

# Voters' Voices - Vol. II

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# Appreciation

This study follows up on the first volume of “Voters’ Voices,” which covered research conducted in the years 1995 through 2007. This second volume adds research results from nearly 20,000 interviews conducted in the years 2008 to 2016 from the Sant Maral Foundation database. In total, 67,000 people from across Mongolia have cooperated with the Sant Maral Foundation team over two decades to express their opinions on social, economic, and political issues. They have contributed to a major database that will be of value beyond this present publication. We, the authors, would like to thank all the contributors for the information they have provided. We also thank those members of the team who conducted the interviews and collected the data that has formed the basis of our work.

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# Voters' Voices Volume II

Based on Peoples' Perception of Mon-  
golia's Political, Economic, and Social  
Developments as Reflected in Opinion  
Polls in 2008-2016

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Abbreviations	
Short	Name
AMLP	All Mongolia Labour Party
CMP	Civic Movement Party
CW-GP	Civil Will- Green Party
DP	Democratic Party
DPP	Development Program Party
GEC	General Election Committee (Commission)
IUP	Independence and Unity Party
LIP	Liberty Implementing Party
LPP	Love the People party
MCP	Mongolian Conservative party
MDC	Motherland-Democracy Coalition
MDMP	Mongolian Democratic Movement Party
MGP	Mongolian Green Party
MLDP	Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party
MLP	Mongolian Liberal Party
MNDP	Mongolian National Democratic Party
MNT	Official currency in Mongolia, tugrug, ₮
MP	Member of Parliament
MP	Motherland Party
MPP	Mongolian People's Party
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MSDP	Mongolian Social Democratic Party
MUTP	Mongolian United Traditional Party
MWUNP	Mongolian Women United National Party
NLP	National Labour Party
NSO	National Statistics Office
PM	Prime Minister
PP	Peoples Party
RP	Republican Party
SI	Socialist International
SMF	Sant Maral Foundation
UPP	United Party of Patriots

# 1

## POLITICAL SYSTEM

### 1.1. General Information

Mongolia has a semi-presidential<sup>1</sup> political system. Its subtype is a premier-presidential system, with a president directly elected by the popular vote. The prime minister is elected by the parliament and is held accountable to it. However, the Mongolian semi-presidential system has certain specific aspects. The power of the president is strongly limited by the parliament. After being elected, the candidate is examined by the parliament because “the parliament considers the candidate who has obtained a majority of all votes cast in the first instance of voting as elected president and passes a law recognising his or her mandate” (Article 31 [4] of the Constitution of Mongolia).

Moreover, under article 35 [1] of the Constitution, the president is held to the parliament rather than directly by his electorate. The choice of president is also limited to those who are the representatives of the parties in parliament. The prime minister limits the president’s decree power, and his or her veto power is limited by the parliament.

The semi-presidential system creates much overlap between the president, parliament and prime minister’s office. However, the latest constitutional amendments made in 2000 shifted the power struggle between the president’s office and the parliament to the latter and to the government.

There was a long constitutional controversy over whether a member of parliament could serve a post in government or in the governing administration. The possibility of serving as both a legislator and as a member of the executive branch was tempting for some. The strong role of the Mongolian state—not only as a coordinator but also as the direct distributor of public goods—was inherited from its socialist past and was essential in these discussions. There were conflicting interpretations from the Constitutional Court because the Constitution did not provide a clear statement on whether elected officials may hold government office. Yet, the final interpretation in 1999 allowed MPs to combine legislative and executive duties. Nevertheless, this situation may be reversed as the parties’ corporate interests slowly

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1 There are two separate subtypes of semi-presidential system: premier-presidential and president-parliamentary. Under the premier-presidential system, the prime minister and cabinet are exclusively accountable to parliament, while under the president-parliamentary system, the prime minister and cabinet are dually accountable to the president and the assembly majority.

supersede the individual interests of its members. The number of MPs who also serve as cabinet ministers is declining.

## 1.2. Constitution

For a nomadic population, one of the most important values, if not the most important, was personal freedom. It was (and is) closely linked to the nomadic way of life. As Mongolia preserves one of the last nomadic cultures on the globe, the value of personal freedom is encoded in Mongolians' social behaviour. It creates characterisations such as the "ravine Mongolian", which means a self-sufficient independent household that lives at a "non-disturbing distance" from its close neighbours. Such behaviour was dictated by the nomadic economy, which required a vast area of pastureland.

The role of the state was more regulatory, and it provided significant personal freedoms. The scarce population density meant there was weak regulatory interference by the central or local governments in household affairs. It made for the principal differences in Mongolian citizens' behavioural standards from the East Asians who created sophisticated social hierarchies.

This situation changed dramatically in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The price for Mongolian independence from Chinese control over its territory was the adherence to ideological directives of the Soviet Union. State interference in personal life grew incessantly, reaching its apogee in 1961. The final blow was the loss of household economic independence with the collectivisation of herder's livestock and the call for industrialisation. The model for financing the industrialisation was borrowed from Russia: to build industry at the expense of the rural population. The sole populated town, the capital Ulaanbaatar, had barely 160,000 people in 1960. It reached more than 750,000 in the mid-seventies because of the large number of rural migrants. To control its new assets, the socialist state built extensive and expensive infrastructure all over the country. The government also had to introduce measures to stop the influx of migrant nomads who were settling in the capital after being deprived of their property.

The stages of the enforcement of the collectivist communist ideology in Mongolia are made apparent in the three versions of the constitution ratified in 1924, 1940 and 1960. Although basic rights were fixed, those constitutions were ideologically indoctrinated by using Marxist Leninist class theory. As the backbone of the socialist industrial development the members of the working class were privileged in so much as they at least had some basic rights granted to them.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of the collectivist ideology in Mongolian society demanded new approaches to the drafting of the Constitution. In January 1992, Mongolia adopted a new Constitution with new concepts of personal and political rights—as well as social, economic, and cultural rights.

This Constitution guaranteed personal rights and liberties such as the right to life; the right to personal liberty and safety; the freedom of conscience and religion; the freedom of movement; the freedom of thought, opinion, expression, speech, press, and peaceful assembly; the freedom of association in political parties or other voluntary organisations on the basis of social and personal interests and opinion; the right to seek and receive information; the right to submit a petition or a complaint to state authorities and officials; the right to take part in the government of the country directly or through representative bodies; equality before the law and the courts; and many other social, economic and cultural rights and liberties. Others include gender equality; the rights to a healthy and safe environment; the right of employment, education; the right of fair acquisition, possession, and inheritance of movable and immovable property; and the right to material and financial assistance.

## 1.3. Division of Power

Article 38 of the Constitution states the government is the highest executive body of the state. Mongolia is a unitary state. The territory of Mongolia is divided into 22 administrative units.

### 1.3.1. National Assembly

The Mongolian legislative branch consists of a one-chamber parliament comprised of 76 members. Members of parliament, known as the State Ikh Khural, are elected to four-year-terms (for details concerning the electoral system and election results see Chapter 3). According to the Constitution, the parliament is the supreme legislative power. The primary tasks of the assembly are:

- to enact laws and make amendments to them;
- to determine the basis of domestic and foreign policies;
- to determine and change the structure and composition of the standing committees of the parliament, the government, and other bodies directly accountable to it according to law;
- to pass a law recognising the full powers of the president after his or her election and to relieve or remove the president from office;
- to appoint, replace, or remove the prime minister, members of the government, and other bodies responsible and held accountable to the national parliament as provided for by law;
- to define the state's financial, credit, tax, and monetary policies, to lay down the guidelines for the country's economic and social development; to approve the gov-

ernment's program of action, the state budget, and the report on its execution;

- to supervise the implementation of laws and other decisions made by the parliament;
- to ratify and denounce international agreements and to establish or to sever diplomatic relations with foreign states at the suggestion of the government;
- under some extraordinary circumstances, the parliament may also declare a state of emergency to eliminate the consequences thereof and to restore people's lives and society to the norm.

The parliament has six standing committees:

1. Social Policy Standing Committee
2. State Structure Standing Committee
3. Budget, Finance, Monetary and Loan Policy Standing Committee
4. Legal Affairs Standing Committee
5. Rural Policy and Environment Standing Committee
6. Economic Policy Standing Committee

### **1.3.2. Judicial System**

The judicial system consists of a Supreme Court, provincial and capital city courts, regional, inter-regional, and district courts. Specialised courts, such as criminal, civil, and administrative courts, may be formed and are supervised by a Supreme Court. The courts are financed through the state budget. A general counsel of courts has the function of ensuring the independence of the judiciary. The constitutional court consists of nine members who serve for six years. Their nomination is evenly shared between the State Ikh Khural, the president and the Supreme Court. As the president also has the power to nominate the head of the Supreme Court, he carries a greater weight than the parliament. The president of the Constitutional Court is elected for a term of three years by a majority vote from the court's members. He can be re-elected once.

According to the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the organ exercising the highest authority in the enforcement of the Constitution, making judgements on the violation of its provisions, and resolving constitutional disputes. It is the guarantee for the strict observance of the Constitution.

One of the most frequent events of Mongolian political life arises from article 66 [1] of the Constitution. It states that the Constitutional Court examines and settles constitutional disputes at the request of the parliament, the president, the prime minister, the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor general; or on its own initiative based on petitions and information received from citizens. For example, the power overlap confrontation between the president's office and the parliament has frequently been resolved at the Constitutional Court. That in-

cludes issues such as constitutional amendments limiting presidential prerogatives. As a rule, they have been initiated by petitions and based on information received from citizens.

### **1.3.3. Executive**

Since the introduction of the new constitution in 1992, Mongolian history has unfolded as a never-ending power struggle between the office of the president on one side and the parliament and the executive cabinet on the other. One example of this struggle was Constitutional amendments passed in 2000, when the parliament removed the restrictions on MPs barring occupation of cabinet positions. It also limited the veto power of the president in reaction to diminish the powers of the presidential office from one opposing side of the political establishment.

Mongolia has been a rare success story for the balance of a multi-chamber democracy compared to post-communist Central Asia, a group which Mongolia has historically, geographically and culturally been included. Most of the political establishment in Central Asia has preferred a Russian-style presidential system, which appeared more suitable for building a system, that is no longer centred on the party, and instead reshaped communist parties into parties of the president.

Mongolia's choice of political system was the result of a non-confrontational policy of the "old" Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The leadership of the party had resigned after negotiating with the opposition, and thus it opened the way for a multiparty political system. The flexibility on both sides for a changing political environment provided Mongolia with the choice of a system in which political parties became the leading players in political decision making rather than the president's office. Also, the latest political development in Kyrgyzstan, which switched from presidential form of governance to a premier-presidential system like Mongolia's, shows the growing interest in the Mongolian political system of other Central Asian countries.

However, as the head of state, the president has significant tools at his disposal to influence national policy. Article 26 [1] of the constitution states, that the president, members of the national parliament and the government have the right to initiate legislation. What is more, the president has the right to veto, partially or wholly, laws and other decisions adopted by the parliament. The laws or decisions remain in force if two-thirds of the members of the parliament do not accept the president's veto. Such a limitation of presidential veto power was introduced as an amendment in 2000 as a result of the consensus between democrats, who dominated the parliament during that period, and the opposition represented by the MPRP. That consensus was reached despite strong opposition from the president of the time, N. Bagabandi.

According to the Mongolian constitution, the president has the right to propose to the parliament a candidate for the post of the prime minister in consultation with parliament's

majority party (or parties, if no party holds a majority of seats). The president also can propose to the national parliament a motion to dismiss the government. Moreover, the president has the right “to instruct the government on issues within his competence” (Article 33 [3] of the constitution).

On the other hand, any decree issued by the president only becomes effective when signed by the prime minister. The president has the power to nominate judges to the Supreme Court, and with the parliament’s approval he can nominate the prosecutor general. These powers of appointment to key positions make him significantly influential in the judiciary. The president has also a significant role in nomination of the head of powerful Independent Agency Against Corruption.

Articles 33 [4] and 33 [5] of the Constitution give the president powers in foreign policy. He or she has the power to represent the Mongolian state in foreign relations. He can “conclude international treaties on behalf of Mongolia” but only “in consultation with the parliament”. The president also has the power to appoint and recall heads of plenipotentiary missions to foreign countries with the parliament’s approval. Finally, the president, who acts also as the commander-in-chief of Mongolia’s armed forces, has typical presidential authorities. That includes the right to lead the National Security Council, to declare a state of emergency or a state of war overall or a part of the Mongolian national territory and to order the deployment of the armed forces.

## 1.4. State of Democracy

As Mongolia closely followed the Soviet model of political development for about seven decades, the democratic orientation in Mongolian society is still very weak. The “old” Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP)—which after 2010 would be known as the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP)—was the first political party that ruled Mongolia as a one-party state for most of the 20th century. On the other hand, was the Democratic Party (DP), which has little attachment to liberal policies, despite public declarations.

By 2016, minor parties had ceased to exist as opposing factions in the legislature. The liberal Civil Will Green Party (which will from here out be known as the CWP, despite numerous name changes) was too weak to grow its influence. A breakaway faction of the MPP that took the name MPRP is ideologically opposed to liberalism. The “neo” MPRP was the only minority party to win even a single seat in 2016—and, indeed, it took just one. Despite the population’s growing critical attitude towards political parties, the Mongolian political system gives little room for independent candidates. In most cases, independents are breakaways from political parties that are already known to the public. There are some exceptions to this rule. For example, the celebrity singer S. Javkhlan was the only independent candidate with a strong anti-establishment and nationalistic agenda who was able to win in 2016 Elections.




There is also little support for liberal ideas from civil society. The civil society that once flourished with the support of international donors seems to be slowly drying out. Mongolian society is not developed enough to keep civil initiatives afloat because the middle class is too weak to sustain voluntary activity.

However, the overwhelming majority of Mongolians have accepted the democratic system. The restoration of the old system was never a popular idea despite frequent and continuous economic hardships during the transformation. Between 1995 and 2007, approximately 91 per cent of the Mongolian population approved the introduction of a Democratic system.

Research done in November 2007 by the Sant Maral Foundation (SMF) revealed the strong weight Mongolians assigned to personal freedom in their democracy (see: Figure 1-1).

Figure 1-1: Personal expectations from Democracy (multiple choices)



Source: SMF Report on Voter Education, November 2008

As a result, systemic stability in Mongolia can be linked to the level of public expectations about the Mongolian Constitution and, more importantly, how effectively it is enforced.

With all the ups and downs of the new systemic build, it can be stated that the transition initiated in the early 1990s ended in 2007. The president Nambaryn Enkhbayar in a public speech that he delivered to the Japanese parliament in March 2007 officially announced this end. In November 2007, he repeated his conclusion at a public lecture at Columbia University in the USA.

# 2

## PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM

### 2.1. Legal Regulation of Political Parties

The first Law on Mongolian Political Parties was approved in May 1990. It served until January 2005 when an “updated version” was adopted by the parliament. In that same year, the law was amended twice, in February and then December. There were no amendments to the law in following years, but in December 2015 some changes were introduced (source: Government site “United system of legal information”).

Most of modifications introduced later were an open or hidden attempt to hinder the registration process of minor political parties and their ability to function. In 1990, the registration requirement was simple enough, requiring:

- The party’s name and headquarters’ location;
- Information about the structure and organization of the party;
- An approved charter and action agenda;
- A registration list of not less than 801 members with given names, surnames and ages;
- A property statements.

In 2005 and then, again, later in 2015, the list of required items for the registration underwent significant changes. More requirements and complexities were introduced to the registration process in a new version of the law. In the first edition of the “updated law”, Article 9.3.6 required that the applicants for a new party had to open branches in “at least one third of administrative territorial units” (which included all sub-district divisions in cities) with formally registered locations. The absurdity of this article forced parliament to remove it just one month later in February that same year. Another requirement added was the appointment of a finance director prior to party registration. In the 2015 version of the law, a deadline of 10 days was set for the time between when the party’s founding assembly was held and the submission of the application to the Supreme Court. Applications had to be filed with a certified form and any bureaucratic delay could make the registration process invalid.

The changes to the legislation were partly caused by fears of irreparable splits from within the two major parties. Initially, the MPRP existed as a united, solid power against the new parties being created out of the democratic movement. Excluding the 1996-2000 period, the MPRP was always the ruling party and rightfully calculated that the emergence of new parties would fragment the political opposition, which was sustained mainly by protest votes.

This fragmentation in a majority system would give better chances for a consolidated MPRP.

The situation altered when the MPRP changed its name to MPP during a time of internal frictions. The new breakaway MPRP was registered in June 2011 and was led by prominent party leader and former president, the aforementioned N. Enkhbayar. The new party did not only use the old brand of ideology but had clear ideological differences from the MPP by shifting to leftist radicalism and nationalism. As a result, the MPP electorate was split in the 2012 parliamentary elections, and the MPP joined the DP legal efforts in eliminating potential rivals.

The main problem facing political parties was the fact that the party leadership was uninterested in fine-tuning party institutions through the legal framework. The institutionalisation of parties usually failed because of attempts by the leadership to avoid any responsibility for mismanagement on both party's internal and electorate levels. The first thing that suffers in this process is the poor feedback of communication between the leadership and the party's grassroots. As a result, grassroots members are eliminated from the decision-making process or when appointments are made to the party administration. Moreover, the management structure becomes more vertical through a top-down format.

Based on a similar flawed principle is the idea of introducing new party provisions without any membership or allowing only affiliated membership without any commitments. This idea frequently appears in the media and is supported by prominent politicians.

Another practise for neutralising the influence of the parties' grassroots membership occurs during their Grand Assemblies. According to the political parties' law, the Grand Assembly is the party's highest decision-making body. However, no version of the law has ever said anything about how frequently the Grand Assembly is held. The frequency is usually fixed in party by-laws but is not strictly followed as a rule.

Looking at the history of the Mongolian state, the pioneer of the practise of interfering in the Grand Assembly procedures began with Chinggis Khan's grandson, Khublai Khan. The accomplished general called for an illegitimate Grand Assembly by inviting mostly only his own supporters and then nominating himself as the Great Khan. According to the state law of the era introduced by Chinggis Khan (the Great "Yasa"), the punishment for such an act was death sentence. However, the temptation to ascend as the next Great Khan was too great.

This incident could be considered as the first instance of what would become an exhausting conflict between the strict followers of Mongolian law and Confucian Khublai. Only the economic might of China helped Khublai to take power, together with the dzud—an extreme natural disaster that occurs in Mongolia—that devastated a rebellious army.

This historical event demonstrates a pattern fit for some modern political behaviour in Mongolia. Today's party leaders are frequently setting staged assemblies dominated by their followers to kidnap party leadership positions. Mongolia's courts have frequently examined such cases. The most recent cases of party takeovers occurred within the National Labour Party and Independence and Unity Party (IUP) just before the 2016 Elections. There was also

trouble brewing from the long-awaited DP Grand Assembly held in February 2017, which was also at the centre of many complaints and legal troubles.

## 2.2. Challenges in Creating a Multi-Party System

During the 1996-2000 legislative session, when the DP had an absolute majority in parliament, lawmakers introduced several important reforms that significantly reduced the overwhelming state control over the private sector and civil society. The DP would later significantly damage the position of the private sector during its 2012-2016 term. By summer 2016, the business registry had shown that half (49.2 per cent) of the 134,813 companies listed were no longer operational. State control increased, and state-owned entities competed more with the private sector. Law enforcement was used for political purposes and civil liberties were undermined. This may be another sign that the opposition leaderships' priority was to squeeze more room within the ranks of the elite, while social and market reforms were a second priority.

In July 2008, the centre of Ulaanbaatar was rocked by public demonstrations, which quickly turned into violent clashes with the police. The result was the deaths of several people, the MPRP headquarters was burned, and police officers were put under investigation for abuses of power. This event was the first instance of violent political turmoil since the peaceful transition of 1991. Mongolia was the focus of the world, leaving many to ask whether this was the end of stability in Mongolia, or if it was an isolated incident.

The leadership in the opposition DP explained that the events were the consequences of public discontent over alleged election manipulation, done to seize victory away from it. But was the victory really taken from Democrats? Analysis of the political situation revealed a somewhat different picture. The unpopular coalition government of Prime Minister M. Enkhbold dragged the MPRP's rating down throughout 2007. In October 2007, SMF Political Barometer No. 32 showed that the DP was leading over the MPRP by 4 per cent in national polls, which in a simple majority system could have resulted in a sufficient number of seats in parliament to form a government. For example, in the 1996 elections the Democratic Union Coalition (DU) received 47.7 per cent of votes compared with the MPRP's 40.6 per cent share. However, the 7.1 per cent difference provided the Democrats with 50 out of 76 seats in Parliament.

Realising the problem, the MPRP replaced its leadership. The party nominated the popular politician S. Bayar as the new party chairman and formed a new coalition government, changing the tides of the election. In May 2008, a nationwide SMF survey showed the MPRP leading over the DP by 10 per cent in rural areas and by 5 per cent in Ulan Bator. The 76 seats were split in the following way at that time: 20 seats were elected in Ulaanbaatar's districts, while the rural provinces and cities elected the remaining 56 seats. A lead in the rural prov-

inces gave the MPRP a chance to collect more seats in the parliament than the DP. SMF and other pollsters' observations indicate that the DP did not manage to swing support in their favour from the countryside during the election campaign.

Nonetheless, the results of the parliamentary election in July 2008 were distorted by multiple irregularities on both sides. Although international observers reported a relatively small number of violations on Election Day, there were violations during the counting process. The complicated electoral system, which gave multiple voting choices, created a bitter rivalry between parties and even same-party candidates within a district. The media reported that fraud was equal between both major parties, which were later affirmed in court cases. In reality, the discontent within the election process was present on all sides, including minor parties.

Despite these political conflicts, the events of July 2008 had economic causes as well. Unemployment and a decline in living standards had topped the country's major problems for years. As a result, there were a growing proportion of poor people in Ulaanbaatar because of the increasing migration from rural areas. Corruption, which was widespread and was hindering effective governance, had added to the discontent.

The critical situation forced the MPRP leadership to invite the DP and minority parties into a joint coalition. This step was taken even though the MPRP had won a majority of seats in parliament and the strong internal motivation for the MPRP to create a single-party government. The complexity of national tasks and challenges, such as the needs to bring in foreign investors, raise living standards and reducing unemployment, compelled the MPRP to form a grand coalition with the DP.

The elections in 2012 once again changed the political landscape. This time the DP won on both the national and local levels. That signalled a disaster among the MPP's grassroots membership, which had maintained control over the majority of local administrations since 1991. The reason that the MPP (no longer under the name of the MPRP) had been able to control local administrations was the passiveness of DP voters who did not take part in local elections. This situation changed with the new election law that combined parliamentary and local elections.

However, once again the organisational weakness of the DP played against it, just like in 1996. After the 2012 elections, the DP started removing large swaths of the state administration. To fill the vacancies, they had to recruit new people with very little affiliation with the DP and low commitments to party interests. This situation created a critical group driven more by mercantile interests than by any collective interests within the DP. Therefore, factional interests increasingly drove the DP's operations, with no concern for political goals and party by-laws. The only cementing force in the party was the attachment to power, which proved to be an insignificant factor for unity in the coming election campaign of 2016.

The MPP's 2016 election victory was a strong challenge for the Mongolian elite. Part of it has affiliations with both the DP and the MPP and had found itself outside of political life.

Those affiliated with minor parties had become irrelevant. That may have been serious to many as Mongolia's big business is strongly attached to politics. Only if the MPP's governance led to economic disaster would it consider re-inviting others to share power and responsibility, and, thus, eliminate political opposition.

Smashing the opposition by force is rather difficult on the Mongolian political stage. Buying the opposition out, however, works better. This includes, for example, the decision to invite the breakaway MPRP instead of the MPP into a coalition government in 2012. This arrangement allowed the DP to surrender fewer cabinet positions over, but the resulting political costs are also important.

## 2.3. List of Registered Parties

Table 2-1: Political parties' registry by March 2017

	<b>Registered</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Short</b>	<b>Members number</b>	<b>Chairperson</b>	<b>Transcription</b>
1	1921 Mar	Mongolian People's Party	MPP	161300	M. Enkhbold	7 ардын нам
2	2000 Dec	Democratic Party	DP	150000	S. Erdene	Ардчилсан нам
3	1990 May	Mongolian Green Party	MGP	2100	O. Bum-Yalagch	Монголын ногоон нам
4	2000 Mar	Civil Will-Green Party	CW-GP	35000	S. Oyun Ts. Gankhuyag	Иргэний зориг ногоон нам
5	1993 Dec	Mongolian United Traditional Party	MUTP	1503	B. Batbold	Монголын уламжлалын нэгдсэн нам
6	1998 Mar	Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party	MLDP	863	T. Turmunkh	Монгол либерал ардчилсан нам
7	1998 Dec	Motherland Party	MP	160000	B. Erdenebat	Эх орон нам
8	1999 Dec	Mongolian Liberal Party	MLP	1300	B. Amgalanbaatar	Монголын либерал нам
9	2004 Mar	Republican Party	RP	50000	B. Jargalsaikhan	Бүгд найрамдах нам
10	2003 Dec	Mongolian Women United National Party	MWUNP	1069	G. Tungalaggerel	Монголын эмэгтэйчүүдийн үндэсний нам

*Table to be continued on next page*

Table 2-1 (continued)

11	2004 Dec	Mongolian Social Democratic Party	MSDP	3000	A. Ganbaatar	Монголын социал демократ нам
12	2005 Dec	Peoples Party	PP	11859	N. Narantsogt	Ард түмний нам
13	2006 May	Mongolian National Democratic Party	MNDP	26000	M. Enkhsaikhan	Монголын үндэсний ардчилсан нам
14	2006 Oct	Liberty Implementing Party	LIP	1600	Sh. Tumursukh	Эрх чөлөөг хэрэгжүүлэгч нам
15	2007 Aug	Civic Movement Party	CMP	815	B. Batsaikhan	Иргэний хөдөлгөөний нам
16	2007 Oct	Development Program Party	DPP	933	O. Zayaa	Хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрийн нам
17	2008 Feb	Mongolian Democratic Movement Party	MDMP	850	T. Oyuna	Монголын Ардчилсан хөдөлгөөний нам
18	2011 Jan	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party	MPPRP	35000	N. Enkhbayar	Монгол ардын хувьсгалт нам
19	2011 Sep	All Mongolia Labour Party	AMLPL	2000	Ts. Shinebayar	Хамуг монголын хөдөлмөрийн нам
20	2011 Dec	National Labour Party	NLP	1024	S. Borgil	Хөдөлмөрийн үндэсний нам
21	2012 Jan	United Party of Patriots	UPP	2150	G. Ganbat	Эх орончдын нэгдсэн нам
22	2012 Jun	Mongolian Conservative party	MCP	959	N. Dashdavaa	Монгол консерватив нам
23	2015 Apr	Independence and Unity Party	IUP	3131	G. Uyanga	Тусгаар тогтнол, Эв нэгдлийн нам
24	2015 Apr	Love the People party	LPP	1388	L. Gundalai	Ард түмнээ хайрлая нам

Source: Supreme Court of Mongolia

## 2.4. Relevance of Specific Political Parties

After 25 years of a multi-party system, only a few political parties in Mongolia can be called relevant. Mongolians have founded more than 50 political parties, and most never gained a parliamentary seat while they dwindled into irrelevance.

Self-financing creates severe problems in sustainability, especially for minor parties. The complicated and expensive electoral system that was in place is another reason why the list of relevant parties is very short compared to the list of registered parties. Only four parties can be considered relevant if including only the parties that have won seats in parliament for two consecutive legislative periods, or those that forced other parties to react as they campaigned for the same group of voters.

- **Mongolian People's Party (MPP)**, previously known under its old name, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) until Nov 2010;
- **Democratic Party (DP)**, founded in December 2000 through the merger of different parties;
- **Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)**, which is the new party in 2011 that split off from the MPP after its name change;
- And the **Civil Will Green Party (CWP)**, at times also known as **Civic Courage Party**.

The democratic movement that consisted of newly founded opposition parties to the MPRP has been fragmented since the very beginning. This fragmentation reflects a variety of ideas and trends held up in Mongolian society. While MPRP inherited a strong corporate structure from its communist predecessor, the survival of opposition democratic parties was even in question. Many merged into alliances to stand against the much stronger MPRP.

The two coalitions built by the Democrats in 1996 and in 2004 were very fragile and were driven apart by coalition partners. For example, after the elections in 2004, the Motherland Democracy Coalition (MDC) survived for just a few months. Some coalition leaders decided to dissolve the MDC because they thought the MPRP hampered their ability to effectively share power. As a result, the parliamentary coalition formed by the MPRP and the MDC broke apart into seven parties. MDC members formed two breakaway parties from the DP, while other candidates became independents.

In addition to financing, the legal environment is also not supportive to the survival of smaller parties. To avoid unstable coalitions, the leaders of the major political parties have reinforced a model that allows for only two major players. The maintenance of an unfriendly legal environment—combined with the existing problems that are detrimental to the self-sustainability of minor parties—have resulted in a critical situation for small parties. The number of minor political parties that could be described as relevant continues to decrease, pushing them towards the edge of survival. To formally establish a faction in parliament, it requires a minimum number of eight MPs, which is hard for minor parties to achieve under the current circumstances.



Recently, the dramatic results of the 2016 elections brought the DP to the verge of political insignificance after winning only nine seats in the parliament. Any desertions or split—an event quite frequent in Mongolian politics—will remove them from playing a significant role in legislating and decision-making.

The representation of relevant political parties in parliament is shown in Table 2-2.<sup>2</sup>

Table 2-2: Representation of relevant political parties in parliament

<i>Legislative session</i>	<i>Number of seats in parliament (at election time):</i>					
	<i>MPP</i>	<i>DP</i>	<i>MPRP</i>	<i>CW-GP</i>	<i>Other parties and independents</i>	<i>Total</i>
1992-1996	70	5	-	-	1	76
1996-2000	25	50	-	-	1	76
2000-2004	72	1	-	1	2	76
2004-2008	36	36	-	-	4 <sup>3</sup>	76
2008-2012	45	28	-	2	1	76
2012-2016	26	34	11	2	3	76
2016-2020	65	9	1	-	1	76

Source: SMF Database

## 2.5. Political Spectrum

Mongolian political parties are difficult to classify on ideological grounds because they lack consistent and cohesive political agendas. The origin of the strongest political party (currently), the MPP (formerly the MPRP), can be traced back to the year 1921. It was modelled on Bolshevik ideas and was governed by the “principles of democratic centralism”, as developed by the Soviet revolutionary leader V. Lenin. These principles kept the party disciplined and structured but distant from democratic governance. The party of Marxism-Leninism lasted until the social transformation in 1990, which forced the MPRP to change. During the transition, the party tried several options, including nationalist and religious components. The principal restructuring of the party can be traced to its leader, N. Enkhbayar, who as party chair initiated major changes in 1997. In general, the ideological background of the MPRP has

2 This study will focus on only four parties when analysing survey data: MPRP, DP, MPP, and CWP/CW-GP. Although the partnership of the CWP and the Green Party has broken apart and neither party plays a relevant role any longer, the party is included because of its relevance in previous legislative sessions covered by the study.

3 Three “independents” were members of the DP while competing with formal DP candidates. The formal candidates were frequently members of parties other than the DP but caucused together with the DP as members of the “Motherland-Democracy” coalition.

become democratic socialism.

In November 2010, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) changed its name to the Mongolians Peoples Party (MPP). There had been nothing revolutionary about this party for decades, and the up rise for independence was over almost a hundred years ago. The MPRP was a party of the ruling elite, which followed an ideological course set by the Comintern (Communist International) and then firmly restrained the country from any revolutionary upheavals.

Then, in the 1990s, Mongolia departed from the pursuit of advanced socialist society and transitioned from Marxist theory to backwards "wild capitalism". This transformation was already approaching fruition, and the MPRP leadership had already accumulated a sizeable number of emerging capitalists. This fact made the word "revolutionary" a "sword of Damocles"; or a constant reminder that not long ago their "revolutionary" grandfathers were executing "social parasites" or "enemy classes". That includes "black and yellow feudal lords"<sup>4</sup> and "riches".

Changing the MPRP name was necessary for the superstitious elite, and so it happened after heated and prolonged debates. This change was another sign that it was the end of the transition. If the heavy price for being capitalist was "democratic socialism", the MPP leadership was ready to pay for it.

However, tens of thousands of ordinary MPP members did not successfully transit into capitalism. On the contrary, after the electoral victory in 1996, the Democratic winners applied a course of economic shock therapy that left much of the population without the state safety nets they were used to.

In the meantime, the old MPRP members were rather amazed by the speed and scale with which some of their colleagues were turning into "exploiters of the working class". That feeling was accelerated by the rapidly growing social inequalities within the society. To silence their political opponents, the MPRP formally adopted social democratic ideas and joined the Socialist International (SI) in 1999. The irony of this action was that, in reality, the better match for the new MPP was the more conservative International Democrat Union (IDU), which was already affiliated with the DP. In reality, the MPP should have traded its memberships with the SI for the IDU, and vice versa.

In March 2017 Su. Batbold—one of the richest people in Mongolia and a former MPP chair, an MP, and a former premier—was again re-elected as a deputy chair of the Socintern for another four years term. What is interesting about former PM Su. Batbold is that his 2009-2012 governing policy was not ideologically indoctrinated but was indeed reasonably pragmatic. The Mongolian business community evaluated his governance as much more private-sector friendly than that of his DP successors (see: STOPP 2016 survey). In comparison, the DP government that followed was more inclined to prioritise the public sector over the private.

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4 Definitions of the secular aristocracy and the clergy used at that time.

According to the National Statistics Office (NSO), from 2012 to 2015 the number of government employees increased by 13 per cent from 162,769 to 186,458. At the same time, Foreign Direct Investment fell from US\$ 4407.8 million in 2012 to US\$ 276 million in 2014 due to the deteriorating economy, according to statistics presented by former Minister of Finance B. Choijilsuren (2016-2017). Foreign investment fell further to US\$ 35.2 million in 2016—or a total of 99.2 per cent.

Membership in the SI did not reconcile conflicts of interest within the MPP, and in 2011 former president N. Enkhbayar led a significant portion of the MPP's membership to break away from the party. With elections not far away, the new MPRP accused former colleagues of being members of a party of oligarchs and traitors.

The platform of this new party was anti-capitalist with a strong nationalist agenda. The anti-capitalist stance of the MPRP targeted mostly large business and international corporations. Mongolian nationalism is built upon a nomadic cultural heritage. The household economy is a central focus of small and medium-sized business owners. This position had to be reflected in the MPRP ideology.

The word “revolutionary” obtained a new meaning to the MPRP in their constant “anti-oligarchic struggle”. The Governance and Problem Analysis Centre in Russia published a paper in 2013, which claimed that that year's elections for the Russian Duma were stained by fraud and that the real winner was the ideological counterpart of the MPRP, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The Communists were well ahead of the named winner, United Russia<sup>5</sup>. The Russian Communists at that time introduced an election campaign that included the nationalisation of large businesses and support for small and medium enterprises.

Regardless of the disputes, this example demonstrates widespread popular support for such platforms post-communism. In this context, the biggest problem facing the MPP's leadership was the significant number of MPP members who shared the same attitudes as their MPRP colleagues. It appears that there was a great support among its members for MPRP leader N. Enkhbayar (see: Table 2-3, below). This clash of ideas erupted into a feud between factions within the MPP after their electoral defeat in 2012. One faction aligned with the 2012-2017 MPP leader M. Enkhbold, who accused S. Batbold's faction of being a club of oligarchs and replaced its members who held key party positions. This story reflects two threats facing the party leadership: potential desertions to the MPRP and the possible return of N. Enkhbayar as a party leader if they merged.

In an interview with the local newspaper *Mongolyn Medee* that was published on 20 March 2017, the sole MPRP member in parliament, O. Baasankhuu, stated that six MPP legislators in private talks expressed interest in defecting to his party.

Nevertheless, the closest analogous description of the MPRP ideology is national Bolshevism, a movement that emerged in Germany after the First World War. It was an attempt to combine communism and nationalism together. Today, a related example of national Bol-

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5 <http://expert.ru/2013/03/13/yakunin-popal-vprosak/>

shevism can be found in Russia and is represented by E. Limonov, the founder of the banned National Bolshevik party, and philosopher and writer A. Dugin.

Table 2-3: Respondents’ opinion regarding the most suitable person to be president (poll conducted prior to presidential election 2013)

<i>The most suitable person to be a president for supporters of</i>		
<i>MPP</i>	<i>DP</i>	<i>MPRP</i>
Bagabandi 14%	Elbegdorj 79.2%	Enkhbayar 50.4%
Bat-Erdene 14%	Bat Uul 2.3%	Terbishdavga 14.3%
Enkhtuvshin 12%	Ganbaatar 2.3%	Ganbaatar 8.4%
Enkhbayar 11%	Enkhbayar 2.1%	Ulaan 5%
Lundejantsan 9%	Altankhuyag 1.8%	Bat-Erdene 3.4%

*Source: SMF poll, April 2013*

The traditional political rival for both the old MPRP and the new MPP has been the DP. The DP was formally established in 2000, after a merger of smaller democratic parties that were founded since the beginning of democratic transition. The DP absorbed several parties with various ideological backgrounds. During the first period of mergers, one of the major parties, the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP), claimed to represent both conservative and liberal views on issues. Another party, the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP), was a full member of Socintern since 1996. Mergers with radicals—religious and otherwise—made it difficult to classify the DP. At present, the DP combines liberal, social liberal, nationalistic, and social democratic ideologies. Therefore, the main driving force for this party during elections has been its role as a protest vote. Together with a lack of internal coherence, it makes the party’s chances for sustainable governance very poor.

The DP held a majority in parliament twice, in 1996-2000 and 2012-2016; and twice it ended with a complete defeat in the following elections. In 2012, the DP invited the MPRP to a ruling coalition, and in 2014 the DP chair, N. Altankhuyag, signed a treaty for strategic cooperation with the MPRP. These actions demonstrate how the DP can utilise any of its ideological components depending on what was necessary for any given moment.

B. Battuvshin, a veteran of the democratic movement and a well-known DP activist, expressed his discontent with the situation in his party in 2013. In a private interview he expressed his wishes to be a member of “a real social democratic party” and to be away from the DP oligarchs that held too strong a grip on party policy. The possibility of joining the MPP was completely out of the question. He recalled that in the early 1990s that he and his fellow leader of the Democratic Union, then incumbent president Ts. Elbegdorj (2009-2016), both had to run away from a heavy hail of stones at Sukhbaatar Square after a failed attempt to deliver a speech to an annoyed MPRP crowd. Many in his party undoubtedly share similar attitude.

Another party that has been at least relevant to some degree at points is the Civil Will Party (CWP). It has frequently changed its name after mergers and breakaways. The party name directly translates from Mongolian language as the “Civic Courage Party”. The party named itself in 2000 in honour of the popular politician S. Zorig (“zorig” in Mongolian means courage), whose murder received wide local and international coverage.

The CWP became the CW-RP in 2002 after the merger with the Republican Party (RP), but it reverted to its old name after a split from the Republican Party just two years later. When the CWP merged with the Green Party (GP), it changed its name to the Civil Will-Green Party. However, unlike past broken alliances, the party retained the name CW-GP after the partnership broke up in August 2011. The CW-GP/CWP would probably describe itself as a liberal force, sometimes with an environmental agenda as a reflection of its merger with the Green Party. In the 2016 elections, the CW-GP failed to win any seats in parliament and entered into a process of transformation.

As stated earlier, it is not easy to pinpoint political parties on a political spectrum and describing them through ideological classifications by their platforms because parties in Mongolia do not fit clear ideologies. As a result, efforts to consistently link parties to a standard of left-or right-leaning ideologies usually fail.

Among the various attempts to classify political movements in post-communist countries, one description looks reasonably attractive. It initially appeared in the 2005 publication of “Turning to the Left” by a well-known Russian dissident, intellectual, and political activist Alexander Skobov<sup>6</sup>. For his analysis of Russian political parties, Skobov used a clear framework to interpret the political divisions of “left” and “right”, which traces back to the Assemblée Constituante that followed the French Revolution.

At the Constitutional Assembly, supporters of “the old order” sat on the right side while supporters of “the new order”, or “movement”, sat on the left. Skobov uses this basic criterion of being on the left or right of the political spectrum as a representation of a relationship towards existing social hierarchy and extrapolates it to modern times. Rightists represent the interests of the ruling elite, cementing and strengthening its position. By nature, they are conservative and elitist.

Leftists, on the other hand, challenge the existing order. They want a higher level of public participation in political decision-making. They are reformers and pluralists.

For leftists, pluralism is a useful tool to achieve political goals. Consequently, the level of determination held by a party to transform the current societal power arrangements defines its position on a political spectrum. In this way socialists are more to the left than liberals.

This classification can be used to track changes in the Mongolian political landscape, putting the MPP (the “old” MPRP) to the right wing of the political spectrum while the new elites and their parties constitute the left wing. The Democratic Party (DP) is composed of many

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6 [http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2005/2005\\_08/050814\\_scobov.html](http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2005/2005_08/050814_scobov.html)

fragmented interests. Some of them frequently ally with the MPP while others are openly hostile to the old elite. It reflects a serious discrepancy between social and political interests within the DP. In contrast, while the old conservative elites also had their own setbacks from breakaways and fragmentations within their ranks, they are overall more cohesive.

## 2.6. Parties' Electoral Base

This examination of Mongolian politics will now turn to the opinions and political orientations of the voters who favour each party. The continued measurement of public opinion, parties' bases and their shifts in attitudes will be described using the responses from questions asked from voters put into the context of the parties they support.


Comparing the two major parties by the distribution of supporters' political orientations in 2007, it is clear that the old MPRP attracts a proportionally higher number of sympathisers for the social market economy and democratic socialism. Nearly a third, or 33 per cent, of Mongolians who lean towards democratic socialism were found to be supporters of the DP—or about 22 per cent of all DP supporters (see: Table 2-4). On the other side, 35 per cent of this group supports the MPRP, or only 23 per cent of its overall supporter base. This is despite the fact that the old MPRP claims to be the party of democratic socialism.

Among all who support the idea of a social market economy, which was nearly half of respondents (51 per cent), a majority support the MPRP. This group included 31 per cent of the MPRP's total supporters. The remaining 27 per cent supported the DP, which is 17 per cent of its total supporter base.

Among the sympathisers of a liberal market economy, 27 per cent supported the DP, or 11 per cent of its total supporters. Another 44 per cent of liberal-market supporters favoured the MPRP, or 18 per cent of its supporters.

As a result, in 2007 there was no clear socio-political division between the supporters of the two major parties.

Figure 2-2: Distribution of Groups with Different Political Orientation in October 2007



Source: "Voters' Voices", 2007

Table 2-4: The old MPRP and the DP supporters' political orientation in October 2007

	<b>Supporters of MPRP</b>	<b>Supporters of DP</b>
Supporters of a liberal market economy	18%	11%
Supporters of a social market economy	31%	17%
Supporters of democratic socialism	23%	22%
Passive system supporters	14%	23%
Pessimistic group	15%	26%
Total	100%	100%

Source: "Voters' Voices", 2007

The data in Table 2-4 suggests another possibility: The large number of passive system supporters and the pessimistic cohort among those who favour the DP can drive the party towards populism, which may overcome the liberal ideologies it represents.

A more up-to-date classification of people's political orientation, as of this study's publication, is presented in Chapter 6<sup>7</sup>. Poll results from 2008 through 2015 provide the basis to identify six different groups, with the party preferences for each group political shown in Table 2-5.

<sup>7</sup> Chapter 6 gives a detailed description of each group of political orientation and the specific criteria used to identify them. In particular, Section 6.5.1 deals with the party preferences of people with different political orientation. Therefore, this topic is not discussed in detail in this chapter.

Table 2-5: Political orientation of supporters of relevant parties (2008-2015)

	<i>Respondents who favour these parties:</i>				<i>All respondents (including those who favour other parties or no party)</i>
	<i>MPP (before 2012: MPRP)</i>	<i>DP</i>	<i>MPRP</i>	<i>Civil Will - Green Party (or: old CWP)</i>	
Idealistic Democrats	13.6%	18.6%	14.7%	16.0%	14.9%
Progressive Liberals	14.6%	16.6%	13.7%	21.1%	17.4%
Passive Liberals	16.8%	18.8%	16.1%	14.8%	17.3%
Conservatives	18.2%	17.1%	15.3%	19.1%	17.0%
Traditionalists	22.1%	17.1%	24.9%	16.0%	19.0%
Sovereign Democrats	14.7%	11.9%	15.1%	12.9%	14.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Based on SMF poll results 2008-2015*

The differentiations shown in Table 2-4 and Table 2-5 are, however, not sufficient to form a clear distinction between the two major parties. Nor party can mobilise a homogeneous group of liberals, nor the exclusive support of any other political orientation. This process requires long-term policy. For the time being, this study analyses several criteria to characterise the supporters of the parties observed. Demographic criteria such as age, occupation, and sector of employment are shown in the following tables.

The trend seen among the average age of supporters shows a growing problem within the DP. Comparing the MPRP and the MPP reveals a reverse of the trend. Over time, supporters of the DP are becoming older while the supporters of the MPRP and the MPP are becoming younger. Although this trend could be considered as a sign of maturity, in reality it is likely signalling the declining support for the DP among the young population in favour of its political rivals.

Table 2-6: Average age of party supporters in years

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
MPP supporters in survey samples (before 2012: MPRP)	44.9	45.0	45.7	46.4	47.3	46.2	48.6	46.9	45.1
MPRP supporters in survey samples					44.2	48.1	47.3	45.2	43.2
DP supporters in survey samples	38.7	38.7	37.0	38.3	40.1	41.0	41.9	39.8	41.7
CWP supporters in survey samples	36.5	42.0	35.9	42.0	40.5	38.7	42.1	43.4	36.3
Average age of all respondents (incl. supporters of other parties)	40.0	40.2	39.5	41.2	41.0	41.5	42.5	41.3	39.5

*Source: SMF data base 2008-2016*



Figure 2-2: Average age of party supporters in years




Table 2-7: Occupation of party supporters

	<i>MPP (before 2012: MPRP)</i>		<i>DP</i>		<i>MPRP</i>		<i>Civil Will - Green Party (or: old CWP)</i>	
	<i>2000-2008</i>	<i>2008-2016</i>	<i>2000-2008</i>	<i>2008-2016</i>	<i>2000-2008</i>	<i>2008-2016</i>	<i>2000-2008</i>	<i>2008-2016</i>
Workers	29.3%	33.9%	26.2%	36.1%		34.7%	27.1%	41.0%
Clerical staff	20.6%	17.3%	16.4%	13.0%		10.9%	20.4%	15.2%
Self-employed	18.5%	22.0%	26.6%	27.1%		33.0%	21.5%	21.7%
Nomads/farmers	9.2%	16.5%	9.1%	16.2%		14.1%	6.4%	11.1%
Intelligentsia	22.4%	10.3%	21.6%	7.7%		7.2%	24.5%	11.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF data base 2000-2016

Table 2-8: Party supporters by sector of employment

	<i>MPP (before 2012: MPRP)</i>		<i>DP</i>		<i>MPRP</i>		<i>Civil Will - Green Party (or: old CWP)</i>	
	<i>2000-2008</i>	<i>2008-2016</i>	<i>2000-2008</i>	<i>2008-2016</i>	<i>2000-2008</i>	<i>2008-2016</i>	<i>2000-2008</i>	<i>2008-2016</i>
State officers	15.4%	8.3%	10.1%	5.7%		6.4%	11.9%	7.5%
State service	29.7%	24.4%	24.4%	18.3%		11.4%	23.7%	19.6%
Private sector		62.2%		69.7%		73.5%		62.3%
Mixed private/state	40.2%	5.1%	49.8%	6.2%		8.5%	46.4%	10.1%
NGO	14.7%	0.1%	15.7%	0.2%		0.3%	18.1%	0.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF data base 2000-2016

The next section continues the classification of party supporters with an analysis of their opinions regarding some democratic values and principles.

### 2.6.1. Opinions Related to Democratic Values that Distinguish Political Views of Party Supporters

The five democratic principles that were the most important according to respondents in 2008-2016:

- All people are equally treated by the law
- The state provides for social justice in a market economy
- Men and women have equal rights
- Income differences are kept as small as possible
- Social differences are kept as small as possible

Table 2-9: Opinions regarding some democratic values by supporters of different parties

	<i>Respondents who favour these parties:</i>				<i>All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)</i>
	<i>MPP (before 2012: MPRP)</i>	<i>DP</i>	<i>MPRP</i>	<i>Civil Will - Green Party (or: old CWP)</i>	
<b>All people are equally treated by the law</b>					
Very important	53.4%	58.8%	56.7%	60.5%	57.2%
Rather important	38.8%	34.9%	36.6%	30.4%	35.7%
<b>The state provides for social justice in a market economy</b>					
Very important	41.2%	45.3%	46.0%	47.2%	43.0%
Rather important	46.9%	44.4%	45.4%	40.6%	46.1%
<b>Men and women have equal rights</b>					
Very important	39.4%	45.9%	41.3%	42.7%	43.1%
Rather important	45.6%	42.1%	47.1%	42.3%	43.8%
<b>Income differences are kept as small as possible</b>					
Very important	38.7%	40.9%	42.7%	40.9%	39.8%
Rather important	45.7%	44.7%	45.3%	42.7%	44.9%
<b>Social differences are kept as small as possible</b>					
Very important	38.7%	41.2%	43.3%	42.0%	40.0%
Rather important	48.4%	47.3%	47.9%	46.2%	48.2%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

All five issues have been included in the SMF questionnaires since 2008. Table 2-9 is a list of responses from people who favour one of the four relevant parties. This table only lists responses as “very important” or “rather important”.

Although the differences in opinions between each group are minimal, MPP supporters attach slightly less than average importance to every single one of the democratic values listed above, in Table 2-9.

Table 2-9 shows that the MPRP is clearly leading in positions requiring state regulations. “The state provides for social justice in a market economy” is considered “very important” by 46 per cent of the MPRP supporters, in comparison with 41.2 per cent of the MPP supporters. Limiting income differences is “very important” for 42.7 per cent of the MPRP supporters versus 38.7 per cent of MPP supporters. Moreover, keeping social differences as small as possible is “very important” to 43.4 per cent of MPRP supporters in comparison with 38.7 per

cent of the MPP supporters.

Table 2-10 and Table 2-11, shown below, display other instances where supporters of each party have opinions that may or may not align with the image the parties intend for themselves, or the political philosophy they claim to follow.

Interestingly, Table 2-11 shows that 71 per cent of MPRP supporters agreed with the statement: “Economic growth alone is not enough, the government has to take action to reduce unemployment”. It’s noteworthy because about 63 per cent MPP and DP supporters were also in agreement.

The data also shows that the attitude of DP supporters toward these issues were closer to the supporters of MPRP than the MPP. This likeness in positions may explain how the two parties could sign an agreement on strategic cooperation and coexist peacefully for 2012-2016 coalition government.

Table 2-10: Opinions on selected issues by supporters of different parties

	<b>Respondents who favour these parties:</b>				<b>All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)</b>
	<b>MPP (before 2012: MPRP)</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>MPRP</b>	<b>Civil Will - Green Party (or: old CWP)</b>	
<b>Respondents who agree to the statement:</b>					
The state should guarantee the right to a job for everybody	74.4%	74.7%	77.7%	73.4%	75.8%
The key sectors of economy should be state owned	67.3%	65.0%	69.9%	60.5%	65.5%
The rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created	63.0%	63.7%	69.3%	63.5%	65.2%
The state should guarantee a minimal standard of living for everybody, if one wants more, he should provide for himself	64.5%	63.0%	65.0%	60.1%	63.4%
In democracy, not all things go the way one would like, but there is no better state model	44.8%	52.2%	44.3%	52.8%	45.5%
Contemporary society no longer has strong ideals that guide the people	48.8%	45.5%	56.4%	46.5%	48.6%
I am against dictatorship but support a government with a strong hand	40.7%	33.8%	48.9%	32.8%	35.7%
Only through socialism can all problems be solved	30.9%	24.6%	37.2%	24.7%	27.5%
Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men	18.9%	18.5%	22.0%	15.5%	17.5%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 2-11: Opinions regarding action required to reduce unemployment by supporters of different parties

Question: "What should be done to reduce unemployment?"	<i>Respondents who favour these parties:</i>				<i>All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)</i>
	<i>MPP (before 2012: MPRP)</i>	<i>DP</i>	<i>MPRP</i>	<i>Civil Will - Green Party (or: old CWP)</i>	
Economic growth will provide sufficient employment in the future	27.5%	27.9%	23.8%	24.1%	27.3%
Economic growth alone is not enough, the government has to take action to reduce unemployment.	63.8%	63.3%	70.9%	69.2%	63.9%
(Don't know/No response)	8.6%	8.7%	5.4%	6.6%	8.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Nevertheless, Table 2-10 and Table 2-11 further demonstrate the divergence between the MPP and the MPRP supporters. MPRP supporters embrace positions, which emphasize the role of the state. There is also some discrepancy in supporters' opinions about a statement that the rich and powerful prevent others from equally benefiting from the country's wealth. Another visible difference is apparent in the lack of ideals guiding people.

## 2.6.2. Observation of MPRP / MPP and Demographic Effects from the Party Split

The breakaway from the MPP to form a new party with the old "MPRP" name has altered the structure of groups who had favoured the party before the split. The following tables shows how the three criteria of occupation, sector of employment, and social status matched with people's support before and after the split.

The number of workers who supported the old MPRP, before 2008, was slightly higher than average, according to Table 2-12. However, it fell to slightly lower than the average thereafter. When the party changed its name to "MPP" and a new MPRP was founded, both parties in 2012-2016 had a rather similar number of supporters who were workers. However, this was not the case for clerical staff and the self-employed.

The poll results from 2012-2016 show that 15.1 per cent of clerical staff favoured the MPP, while only 10.9 per cent favoured the new MPRP. A different picture is drawn when looking at the self-employed: this group of self-employed accounts for 24.7 per cent of MPP supporters versus 33 per cent for the new MPRP.

Table 2-12: Occupation of the MPP supporters before and after the split into the MPP and the MPRP

	<b>1995-2007</b>		<b>2008-2011 (before split)</b>		<b>2012-2016 (after split)</b>		
	Respondents considering MPRP best party	All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)	Respondents favouring MPRP	All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)	Respondents favouring MPP	Respondents favouring MPRP	All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)
workers	29.4%	27.7%	32.5%	34.0%	35.5%	34.7%	36.3%
clerical staff	24.1%	23.0%	19.3%	16.2%	15.1%	10.9%	13.1%
self-employed	19.0%	21.6%	19.5%	22.9%	24.7%	33.0%	27.5%
nomads/farmers	8.4%	7.9%	16.3%	16.4%	16.7%	14.1%	15.3%
intelligentsia	19.1%	19.7%	12.4%	10.5%	8.1%	7.2%	7.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

Government civil-servant employees are apparently less attracted to the new MPRP as a radical opposition than the MPP. In contrast, private-sector employees have always been under-represented in the MPP and are over-represented in the new MPRP (see: Table 2-13).

Table 2-13: Sector of employment of the MPP supporters before and after the split into MPP and the MPRP

	<b>1995-2007</b>		<b>2008-2011 (before split)</b>		<b>2012-2016 (after split)</b>		
	Respondents considering MPRP best party	All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)	Respondents favouring MPRP	All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)	Respondents favouring MPP	Respondents favouring MPRP	All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)
State officers	14.9%	12.7%	9.1%	7.1%	7.5%	6.4%	6.8%
State service	30.1%	27.7%	26.1%	22.2%	22.6%	11.4%	18.8%
Private/mixed sector and NGO	55.1%	59.7%	64.8%	70.7%	69.9%	82.2%	74.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

Representations by the relatively small group of people who consider themselves above the middle class between the old MPRP and the new MPP are very close in comparison with the overall average before 2012. When the new MPRP was founded, the number of above middle class MPP supporters decreased and the number of MPRP supporters from this group increased (see: Table 2-14).

Table 2-14: Social status of the MPP supporters before and after the split into the MPP and the MPRP

	<b>1995-2007</b>		<b>2008-2011 (before split)</b>		<b>2012-2016 (after split)</b>		
	Respondents considering MPRP best party	All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)	Respondents favouring MPRP	All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)	Respondents favouring MPP	Respondents favouring MPRP	All respondents (including those favouring other parties or no party)
Above middle class	12.7%	12.3%	11.5%	11.3%	9.3%	12.4%	10.4%
Middle class	57.7%	54.9%	57.6%	55.9%	63.3%	63.0%	64.7%
Below middle class	18.3%	19.9%	22.1%	22.8%	22.1%	19.9%	19.3%
Disadvantaged group	11.3%	12.9%	8.9%	10.0%	5.4%	4.7%	5.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

## 2.7. Internal Organization of Parties

In general, a lot of the data from the Mongolian national statistics regarding political and administrative units has either been unavailable or unreliable, and party membership records are no exception. The problem in tracking the current registration of members makes statistics about them quite unreliable. The idea of a “party without membership” is quite popular among some parts of the political establishment. In the 2000 elections, the total number of members claimed by parties was higher than the adult population of Mongolia. It was not just inflated numbers for campaigning purposes, but also because how often duplicate memberships are found in the registration of several parties.

Although party membership is a necessity by the Law of Mongolia on Political Parties, the negligent attitude towards membership was visible in some leadership policies. For many years, all political parties ignored the number of members in parties, the registration process,

and communications. Only the registration requirement that obligates parties to collect 800 signatures imposes some disciplinary consequence and review. This state of affairs would create little or no responsibility toward the party's grassroots base in the leadership and administration.

In 2017, the Supreme Court started posting on its Website information gathered on political parties (see: Table 2-1). The first thing that becomes obvious from analysis of that data is that there are too many round figures for membership (e.g. 35,000, 150,000 or 160,000). This raises suspicion that no valid information exists about the real situation, and the Mongolian legal system does not care about the validity of the information it receives. The completely obscure Motherland Party has 160,000 members in its account, while Mongolia's second largest party, the DP, reported 150,000. At first glance, the MPP's reported figure of 161,300 members looks fine. However, earlier in 2007, the most organised political force, the old MPRP, recorded in its membership registry having 166,388 members. Then, despite the split away by the MPRP, there was a decrease of only 3 per cent after a 10-year break in recordings.

The DP's losses of membership at that time are even more impressive and visible, declining 25 per cent from 200,000 to 150,000.

Based on these figures we can only conclude that regardless of the actual situation, the DP leadership assessed that they lost approximately a quarter of its supporters in 10 years. In comparison, the MPRP considers its membership as stable and totalling at about 20 per cent of the size of the MPP.

If the memberships provided by each party are added all together, the total number of Mongolians registered with a party is 653,844, or approximately one out of every three Mongolians. The likelihood that this is accurate is extremely doubtful, based on general public attitudes toward party membership,

Ignorance toward party formalities once resulted in an interesting incident within the DP. At the last General Assembly, many of its veteran members who came to participate in events were informed that there was no record of their membership, and they were not permitted to participate at the event. That gave General Assembly organisers free rein to prop up a Khublai-style of assembly where only loyalists could participate so that the outcome was certain. This turn of events may serve as a positive learning experience for political parties, but in the past such events rarely produced the drawings of any such conclusions. The well-known saying that "a clever person learns from someone else's mistakes and a fool from his own" does not apply to Mongolian politics.

Every party during initial registration is required by law to provide information about its structure and organisation, as well as an approved charter and action plan. Yet, as a rule, minor parties are not very interested in developing sophisticated internal regulations because they rely more on the personality of their leaders.

Nevertheless, the complexity of problems facing the mainstream parties forces them to



pay more attention to internal regulations. When the MPRP entered politics in a new political age, it was equipped with all the procedural and organisational resources inherited from the party it broke away from. This was a clear advantage over other would-be opposition parties.

In contrast, the DP, whose official emergence dates to 2000, had to create everything from scratch. The party evolved through a difficult learning process. For example, party members realised too late that their party statutes had granted the party chairman too much power. Adopted without any serious discussion, the statutes passed power for all major decisions to the chairperson. The chairman at the time, M. Enkhsaikhan, could do whatever he wanted without consulting the party's National Council, which found itself somewhat redundant. No regular meetings with the National Council were held, and the chairman only called them if and when deemed necessary.

On the eve of the 2004 elections, the DP realised that its electoral strategy, tactics, and negotiations with possible coalition partners were solely in the hands of the party chairman. The chair's subsequent actions, especially the creation of the Motherland Democracy Coalition, had led to confrontations with the rest of the DP. A final standoff occurred in 2006, when the chairman and some of his loyal followers left the DP and formed the New National Party (NNP). The positive outcome was the DP started to give proper attention to democratic components within its statutes and internal regulations.

In 2017, after the DP's presence in parliament fell to a mere 9 MPs, they adopted a new leader-centric attitude, which is more suitable to minor parties. The neglect of formal by-law procedures did further harm to the new DP leadership in March 2017. Their defeat at the 2016 elections was the reason that the DP announced sweeping party reforms during its Grand Assembly. Yet, when following formal registration procedures, the Supreme Court accepted the nomination of S. Erdene as the new DP chair but rejected new party by-laws because they were "written out of accordance with the Law on Political Parties."

The CWP was built by a group of more highly educated Mongolians and it was a model for party development after breaking away from the MNDP. The CWP made significant efforts to maintain democratic procedures within the party. From the very beginning, the party combined all the necessary attributes of a political party with clear internal regulations. Despite financial constraints, it regularly organised meetings and made contacts with grassroots organisations. What the CWP was missing, however, was an appealing action plan with a follow-up plan for implementation. Similar to other minor parties, it was run with a disproportionate amount of power wielded by its leader. S. Oyun (MP, 1998-2016) has occupied this position since the creation of the party and only recently resigned.

The lack of action and long-term strategy has driven the CWP towards policy focused on short-term benefits. The benefits mainly arose from the continuous presence of the CWP in parliament, represented mostly by S. Oyun. This ended in 2016, throwing the party into deep internal crisis. Until then, the CWP was a convenient coalition government partner with few demands. However, the party's value was that it offered the coalition a wider status of

representation that helped in next presidential elections, which could be decided by a small margin of votes. This “coalition of convenience” was maintained by party leader S. Oyun and its apparatus and often opposed formally declared democratic principles.

The CWP has had two unsuccessful political marriages:

- After merging in 2005 with the Republican Party, the CWRP lasted less than a year. The name was changed back to the CWP in January 2006.
- In 2008, the Green Party merged with the Green Party to establish the CW-GP. However, members of defunct Green Party (GP) rebelled and left CW-GP to lodge an appeal with the Supreme Court for the restoration of the Green Party.
- In 2004, the CWP leadership attempted to merge with the Motherland Party but failed due to opposition from party members. On the eve of 2016 Elections, party leader S. Oyun urged members to merge with the DP. This move upset most of the CW-GP membership and created a split within the party. The act was an attempt to improve the party leaders’ chances to win in the upcoming elections. Due to a strong resistance led by the party chair Ts. Gankhuyag, the merger attempt failed. Yet one of the three CW-GP chairs, S. Demberel, traded his membership for that of the DP in an exchange for a district to run. The sceptical voters gave him 24.5 per cent of the ballots compared with the 41.3 percent received by the MPP candidate who won. By 2016 the CW-GP has two formal leaders: S. Oyun and Ts. Gankhuyag. Despite the more prominent public position of S. Oyun, Ts. Gankhuyag has been a very essential figure to the balance in leadership and integrity throughout the party’s entire existence.

Frequent political alliances and conformist leadership policies eroded support for the CWP to the point that the identification with the party was too low to easily quantify. Statistically, these figures are so minimal that the margins of error make any valid analysis impossible.

After the victory of MP in 1996 parliamentary elections, when it operated as the opposition party, the members of the Democratic Alliance (consisting of the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP) and the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP)) was confronted with the need to link party policy with state policy. The MNDP, which was the senior member in the coalition with the largest number of MPs, decided to introduce an amendment that allowed only the party chairman to occupy the post of the prime minister. It perfectly suited the ambitions of party chairman Ts. Elbegdorj to replace Prime Minister M. Enkhsaikhan in 1998. The MNDP controlled the position of prime minister while the MSDP held the post of parliamentary speaker. This arrangement allowed the party leader to be the chief decision maker of internal policies. This principle was later adopted by the MPRP, which traditionally prioritised the position of its party leader.

The DP inherited its main structure and procedures from the MNDP and still maintains those same principles. Meanwhile, the old MPRP in 2007 changed the rule that the chair must take the post of prime minister.

In addition to the chairman, the secretary for all the relevant parties has strong influence over internal affairs. Party conventions are the highest-ranking body for parties' decision making. As the Law on Mongolian Political Parties does not cover conventions, the scope of their authority as well as frequency of meetings varies from party to party. According to regulations, conventions are to be conducted regularly, usually once every two years. Emergency situations such as the collapse of government or a change in leadership, necessitates additional conventions, which are subject to individual party charters. Between conventions, parties' national councils take care of major decisions. However, the division of powers between councils and chairs varies among parties and typically changes over time.

In minor parties, the party leaders are the most influential actors regarding internal decision-making. It is easier if the leader of a small party is a member of the parliament because the presence of its leader gives the minor party better opportunities to present its position in the media and stoke support. There have been only a few cases, however, when small parties have had a chance of winning a seat in the parliament.

When examining the MPP, the MPRP, and the DP, lawmakers have also demonstrated strong influence over internal party decisions. Most of them are members of formal decision-making bodies (such as parties' national councils) and do not act independently from party policies).

## 2.8. Gender quota

In all relevant parties, the nomination of candidates for parliamentary elections starts from each party's grassroots organisation. In a majoritarian system, local support plays a key role in elections and grassroots organisations are expected to provide the base for a candidate's campaign. The decisions made by each party's national council should be approved at the convention level.

The attempt to introduce a gender quota first occurred shortly after the 2004 elections. Under pressure from feminist groups, the parliament adopted an amendment to the Election Law. This amendment outlined that no party could be registered unless at least 30 per cent of the candidates list was women. However, the amendment was never tested because in December 2007 the same parliament introduced a new amendment that removed the gender quota from the Election Law.

The gender quota is the subject of regular debate on the floor of parliament because the Law on Political Parties of Mongolia undergoes changes every election cycle, or every four years. The latest edition of the Law on Political Parties passed in 2016 included a 20 per cent quota for women as candidates, but it may change again. The main barrier against increasing the quota has less to do with gender parity, and more to do with the unwillingness of each party's long-standing elites to give room for any new members. In the same manner, they also block entrance for younger party members.

## 2.9. Party Funding and Campaign Financing

The survey on party financing conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation for the Open Society Forum in 2014 shows that the internal democratic governance and accountability was poor for all the parties discussed. Comparing the self-assessments from members of the MPP, the MPRP and the DP, however, reveals that the situation in the DP was the worst.

The by-laws of the DP, for example, specify that a Grand Assembly should be held once every two years. Yet, there was an eight-year gap between the last two assemblies of Spring 2009 and February 2017. Instead, in parties an elected body such as the National Council or the Central Committee handles the function of the convention. Rotation within such entities is usually rare, which makes their membership quite exclusive.

As a result, members never had the chance to discuss openly the problems piling up within their respective parties. This may have pushed the leadership to avoided confrontation with ordinary members. Furthermore, party leadership positions have frequently been used as a political shield from prosecution and for generating income. Thus, it becomes increasingly painful to lose one's position.

In order to maintain their posts, party leaders resorted to manipulating the timing of when conventions were held and editing the list of participants.

When attention is moved to how parties are financed, it becomes apparent that this is another very essential part of party operations and the key to success in election campaigns. Some changes related to party financing appeared in the 2005 amendment to the Law on Political Parties. However, the changes introduced did very little to improve public confidence in party financing. Ten years after those amendments were made, a survey on party financing shows that 66.5 per cent of respondents said that party financing was "not at all" transparent (see: Table 2-15).

Table 2-15: Opinions regarding transparency of party financing

<b>Question:</b> "How transparent is the process of party financing?"	<b>Respondents in rural areas</b>	<b>Respondents in Ulaanbaatar</b>	<b>Nationwide</b>
Very transparent	2.5%	1.8%	2.2%
To a certain extent	7.2%	6.0%	6.7%
A little	11.5%	15.8%	13.5%
Not at all	65.7%	67.5%	66.5%
(Don't know/No response)	13.1%	8.9%	11.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF survey on party financing conducted for OSI, 2014

People’s scepticism should not be surprising after examining two financial disclosure reports from the 2008 and 2012 election campaigns, which were posted on the General Election Committee’s official website. Not only are the reported tugrik incomes incredibly low, but also highly unrealistic when observing the scope of a national election campaign.

When looking at the figures published for 2008, the expectation should be that two major parties that operate within the same legal and political environment would have the same, or at least similar, financing. In reality, we see that 56 per cent of the (pre-schism) MPRP financing comes from “internal sources”. In contrast, the DP, claimed zero spending came from the party’s own resources. The DP claims that 68 per cent of its total campaign financing was sourced from unspecified “other donations”, compared with only 21 per cent for the MPRP. The total spending of the ruling MPRP was less than 16 per cent of the total spent by the DP. That is extremely doubtful.

In 2012, the legal framework was the same and the political situation was similar when the MPP (which was the ruling party at that time) faced off against the DP in elections. The renegade MPRP had already split away from the MPP, but that should not have caused the dramatic changes observed in how campaigns were financed. This time the DP’s total spending matched the MPP’s, while the MPRP only spent 60 to 70 per cent of what its major rivals did. The DP’s disclosed sum under the label “other donations”, which in 2008 was its largest source of income, was non-existent, while “private citizen donations” and “legal entities donations” had grown. Both the DP and the MPP’s patterns for campaign financing had changed significantly from 2008.

Table 2-16: Election campaign financing 2008 (in thousands)

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Internal sources (MNT)</i>	<i>Legal entities donations (MNT)</i>	<i>Private citizen donations (MNT)</i>	<i>Other donations (MNT)</i>	<i>Total (MNT)</i>
MPRP (old)	526,615	66,500	150,001	200,000	943,116
	56%	7%	16%	21%	100%
DP	0	320,058	1,597,176	4,162,765	6,080,000
	0%	5%	26%	68%	99%

*Source: Publication of the General Election Committee*

Table 2-17: Election campaign financing 2012 (in thousands)

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Internal sources (MNT)</i>	<i>Legal entities donations (MNT)</i>	<i>Private citizen donations (MNT)</i>	<i>Other donations (MNT)</i>	<i>Total (MNT)</i>
MPP	1,648,000	66,500	2,650,208	0	4,364,708
	37%	2%	60%	0%	99%
DP	645,000	63,679	3,654,516	0	4,936,308
	13%	13%	74%	0%	100%
MPRP - MNDP coalition	1,696,230	148,717	1,211,209	0	3,056,157
	55%	5%	40%	0%	100%

Source: Publication of the General Election Committee

Overall, the comparison of campaign finance for 2008 and 2012 displays no regularity or consistency for tabulations of internal campaign spending and between each campaign’s spending.

In 2016, the GEC’s responsibility for publishing the campaign finance reports was transferred to the State Audit Office. It appears that the report was posted on a website managed by the State Audit Office for a short time but was later removed from access by the general public. Whatever was the cause for this removal, it definitely did not improve public confidence in the transparency of party financing.

Parties as institutions in recent years have not evolved towards collective decision-making, transparency, nor accountability. They instead have moved towards more elitism, behind-the-curtains decision-making, and manipulation. As a result, today’s public perception of parties as institutions has significantly degraded compared with the 1990s. In 1998, the *Politbarometer report* published by the Sant Maral Foundation revealed that 93.6 per cent of respondents affiliated themselves with a party they thought was the “best party”. This rate dropped to 67.2 per cent in Dec 2007. Comparatively, in May 2008 49.8 per cent of respondents said that they “favour” one particular party, which then dropped to 36.9 per cent in 2016. Finally, the number of respondents who thought that political parties represent public opinion decreased from 20.3 per cent in May 2007 to 11.3 per cent in March 2017.

## 2.10. Parties’ Relations with Voters and the Public

Both the MPRP and the DP have a core base of voters. Their hard-core supporters range from 20 to 30 per cent. The parties usually get their strongest support from members. This is an especially strong factor in the capital, Ulaanbaatar, where almost half of the population and voters with party affiliation are concentrated.

The radicalism of some DP voters creates certain instability in voting preferences. For

example, in January 2006 L. Gundalai founded the People's Party as its leader after deserting the DP. When the election time came he had consolidated 29.3 per cent of the vote in the area around Ulaanbaatar, while the DP could muster only 8.7 per cent. The DP at that time lost all its usual protest votes because it was a part of the ruling coalition. The protest-driven support for L. Gundalai evaporated in less than two months after he allied with the new MPRP-led coalition as a minister of health. Simultaneously, the DP joined the ranks of the opposition and regained its voters.

The situation is different in the countryside, where party affiliations are more closely related to candidates' places of origin than it does in the capital. At times a candidate's origin outweighs party affiliation as the motivating factor to voters, allowing for a few independent candidates to get elected. This happened in 2004 when three DP members won elections as independents. Most parties take this factor into consideration when they nominate candidates in rural areas. Although most candidates usually live in Ulaanbaatar (first-generation migrants of the post-capitalist society), they normally must show a clear link of origin to the local community of their constituency to gain party approval. This does not work if the candidate from the opposing party is too strong and parties are simply filling positions with any financially able volunteers willing to take the challenge.

Overall, the relationship between voters and parties is becoming more stable. The concentration of economic and political activity in the melting pot Ulaanbaatar strips politics of local and ethnically based politicians. However, this may change with the mining development. The political situation in Ulaanbaatar today is more volatile than in the countryside because of the large number of people living below the poverty line. The UNDP's Human Development Report 2016 says that one out of five Mongolians lives below the poverty line. Without significant improvements made for poor households, no party can count on continuous support.

Because of the low costs of printing and broadcasting, Mongolia has a variety of newspapers, magazines, radio, and television channels. Many business and political groups consider it essential to have their own media outlets. Information has become relatively unreliable because of the rivalry between groups and media sources. The best-known party affiliated newspapers are "Mongolyn Unen", backed by the MPP, "Zuuny Medee" of the MPRP, and the rather factional "Udrin Sonin", that the DP sponsors. While the DP-and MPRP-affiliated newspapers are widely circulated, the MPP's press has failed to attract consistent newspaper readership.

The parties still have to learn how to engage in regular IT communication with the public. Although many politicians are very active on Twitter and are blogging, the parties lag behind. Some tweets and blogs appear later in printed media, showing that the American president Donald Trump is not the only politician who appreciates direct contact with his voters. Although positive, this type of communication has a limited scope. It appears mainly in major populated areas and targets a group of people within a specific age range and extent of education.

There are visible advancements that have been made by parties in modern IT when it comes to membership, but there are still weaknesses. In general, it is very difficult to obtain classified or reliable information about any political party in Mongolia. At the moment, the MPP is the most advanced at utilising new IT. The MPP has its own operational website, although some information on there is out-dated.

The MPP and the DP have their websites and Facebook accounts, while the MPRP operates through Facebook, without a website. The discrepancy between the new and old style is seen on the MPP website. They offer quite progressive online enlisting services, which require basic identity information. If that information checks out, membership is granted. On the other hand, existing MPP by-laws say: “it is suitable that the applicant has a knowledge of the party program and party by-law.” If the applicant by chance knows the MPP by-laws, then he will find that Chapter 2, Article 3.2 only considers handwritten applications as valid. This obsolete requirement is a relic of the communist past, when plentiful applicants were busy handwriting a detailed essay about their unstoppable drive to become a member of the ruling party.

A ruling by the Supreme Court that a new DP by-law did not comply with the Law on Political Parties was a heated topic covered by media in March 2017. At the time, anyone interested in the subject who searched on the DP website for the “by-laws draft” would find no results.

Scarce resources and a lack of qualified staff are the main reasons for the disconnection in communication as parties are unable to compete with businesses and international groups to recruit better staff.

### **2.10.1. Parties Auxiliaries**

At present, there are only three parties with seats in parliament: the MPP, MPRP and DP. The MPRP—although a major political force—won only a single seat in the 2016 parliamentary elections. The relationship between groups of MPs and their parties is quite close, and communication goes both through each group’s leaders and informally through personal contacts. The leaders usually hold a prominent position in the governing bodies of each party. In most cases the group of MPs’ leaders is secretary general or chair. Thus, one of their main tasks is to keep the group’s activity and discipline in line with party policy. Although MPs are responsible for their electorate, all major decisions are under party control.

There is a quite visible sub-ordination of the parliamentary groups to the party decisions. MP L. Gundalai, the former DP member who went on to establish the People’s Party, is at the centre of a failed attempt to circumvent the party. Gundalai wanted the nomination to run for president to come directly from the parliamentary group. However, his intentions were rejected on the grounds that the party convention puts the power of nomination solely in the hands of the national council. Yet, the nomination process is also closely linked to party



loyalty. It forces parliamentarians to be quite careful in manoeuvring between loyalty to their parties and electorates.

There are different ways how parties can develop relationships with civil society organizations. The MPP has several registered NGOs closely associated with it: the Veterans Union, the Mongolian Democratic Socialist Women Union, the Mongolian Democratic Socialist Youth Union, and the Mongolian Democratic Socialist Students Union.

The DP and the CWP follow a different approach. There is only one registered Democratic Union that is directly linked to the DP. Both the DP and CWP have internal committees that deal with issues concerning veterans, gender and youth, but neither has any closely affiliated organisations to deal with them. Also, no NGO has been directly associated with MPRP since it was founded.

# 3

## ELECTIONS

### 3.1. Election Law

It has become almost a routine that the Election law of Mongolia undergoes significant changes before every election cycle. From election to election, lawmakers may decide to change the number of constituencies, their location and size, and whether electoral wins are decided by majoritarian or proportional votes. The time line of different electoral schemes is:

- **1992:** Simple majoritarian electoral system in 26 multiple constituencies for 76 seats
- **1996-2004:** 76 seat majoritarian electoral system elected by 76 constituencies
- **2008:** Simple majoritarian electoral system in 26 multiple constituencies for 76 seats
- **2012:** Simple majoritarian electoral system in 26 multiple constituencies distributing 50 seats; a proportional electoral system in a single national constituency distributing 26 seats (Mixed electoral system)
- **2016:** 76 seat majoritarian electoral system elected by 76 constituencies

The procedures for amending the Constitution are more complicated, but amendments are under constant consideration by various political groups. In 2017, former Ulaanbaatar mayor Erdeniin Bat-Uul made it the basis of his political brand to appeal for a change to the parliament. He wanted to see the legislature morph from a unicameral to a bicameral system. His proposal was to add up to 500 more representatives in a lower chamber of parliament to give the perception of a better representation of public interests.

Such ideas usually originate from a formerly ruling party and elites who feel under-represented in politics after losing elections. The MPRP has also engaged in regular public discussions about Constitutional amendments, although in their case it seems more about election campaigns and visibility. Significant support within political parties has driven for a switch from a premier-presidential system to a parliamentary constitution.

Nevertheless, the complexity of the amendment procedures brings a basic element of stability for the ruling parties that are interested in maintaining a status quo and a fear implementing unwanted changes. Therefore, since 1992 the Mongolian legislative branch has maintained a one-chamber parliament with 76 members (Article 21.1) elected every four years (Article 21.2).

Things work differently with the Election law. The main reasons behind any electoral changes are usually futile attempts by the ruling party or parties to consolidate their position and get some advantages over the opposition. In a majority-rules system this task is technically achievable, although not guaranteed. For example, in 2012 a regular voter had multiple candidates to choose from, depending on the population density in one of the 26 electoral districts. In this case, the majority share of the vote determined the winner. The ballot also included a list of parties to vote for, and seats were divided by the proportional vote.

In 2008, the number of electoral districts fell from 76 to 26, which made the size of electoral districts bigger and added to the costs of campaigning for minor parties. It also created some legal implications because the introduction of a proportional system presented a conflict with constitutional provisions that required that voters have individuals to choose from on an election ballot, not parties:

*21.3. Any citizen of Mongolia, who has attained the age of twenty-five years and is qualified to vote, shall be eligible to be elected to the State Great Khural (Parliament).*

*23.1. The member of the State Great Khural (Parliament) is a representative of the people and shall respect and uphold the interests of all citizens and the State.*

As Constitutional articles say nothing about parties, applying a proportional system for voting for parties without violating the Constitution was a major legal challenge. The fact that the latest version of the Election Law abandoned the proportional vote shows that politicians and their legal advisors failed to meet the task.

The proportional electoral component was favoured by top-level party bureaucracies, which saw it as a pass to parliament without any risk of direct confrontation with voters. For the party leadership, the loss of elections in a majority district was usually followed by internal challenges within party. Elections fraud became quite common as parties tried to avoid such situations. In this context, the proportional vote could be considered as a way to reduce election fraud. The proportional element also prevented parties from violating election rules, since the party leadership could secure their position without resorting to legal violations that, if found out, would risk the loss of voters' support. Nonetheless, the fully majoritarian system worked in favour of big parties and the winner usually got a strong position in the parliament.

By the time of the 2016 elections, the electoral legal environment had become even more vague and volatile. A new Election Law was approved the year prior, on December 25, 2015. The new law covered the parliamentary, presidential, and local elections all at once. The law was poorly drafted, however, with the introduction of a new complication on the ballot that had voters making two choices. One was for the direct majority election of their district representative and a second that appeared the same on ballots nationwide to choose a party for the proportional vote. Lawmakers rushed to pass the bill in December because Mongolian law forbids the passage of a new electoral law within six months of scheduled elections.

The new Election Law considered Mongolia as a single electoral district for both parliamentary and presidential elections. Ballots still resembled those of the previous elections with a choice of individuals as well as parties for majoritarian and proportional votes, respectively.

However, the leadership of the DP that controlled the majority in legislation argued that they could in fact amend the law within the six-months period before elections. Thus, on May 5, 2016, major changes to the law were introduced.

The newest edition of the Election Law was available on the website for General Election Committee in both English and Mongolian languages, and it looks rather slap-dash. By composition, it is still partly the same version introduced in December 2015. However, copy-pastes of other, alternate versions of text appear in a different font. The variable text comes from another law prepared by the DP leadership to replace the previous law, and the appearance of two different fonts makes it easy to detect where changes were made.

The haste and little discussion in parliament about the introduction of the new law led to multiple discrepancies between the two versions. Consequently, it makes the likelihood of yet another Election law—or at least major amendments—imminent. Thus, the Mongolian tradition of meeting every election with a new Election law has been secured.

In the latest edition of the law, the proportional vote for parties was scrapped completely. The single nationwide constituency principle was also abandoned. Instead, the old majority system of 1996–2000 that allowed for a single vote for a single candidate was revived.

Although there were no evident reasons for such dramatic changes, the supposed motivation was the steady decline of popular support for the ruling DP. The declining support was detected in public surveys and media reports on the declining economy and living standards. One can assume that the party leadership decided if the MPP was leading in the ratings nationwide, it was better to shift the struggle to the district level to compensate for the difference in party ratings and candidates' personal ratings. The additional benefit of such a move was the shift of responsibility for the outcome of elections from the party leadership to the candidates. The poor performance in the elections would be explained as not the fault of the party leadership, but a problem with the candidates' appeal. All these moves were accompanied by a smoke screen of rhetoric concerning strong party positions.

On May 5, 2016, another beneficial tool for election campaign manipulation was introduced, known as Article 22.5. The article said:

*The State Great Khural will create constituencies of the State Great Khural elections in consideration of the election system, population size, and administrative and territorial units in aimags (provinces), the capital city, soum (counties) and districts set forth in this Law and set territories of these constituencies, its numbers, centres and the number of mandates in a constituency within at least 45 days prior to the polling day.*

The time of its appearance was narrowly calculated on the elections' day calendar, fixed by the Constitution and the article's required "45 days prior to the polling day".

This new article and an innovative DP election campaign can be credited for introducing the Mongolian population to new techniques for electoral manipulation. The Mongolian media called the tactic “gerrymandering”, borrowed from the US political lexicon. The term means to manipulate the boundaries of an electoral constituency for a more predictable election outcome that favours one party. Mongolia’s ruling DP introduced gerrymandering, for instance, by establishing additional electoral districts at the Khentii and Uvs provinces so they could benefit from the higher support expected for their party.

This leads to a consideration that the DP lacks an institutional memory.

In 2000, the Democratic Union Coalition (DUC) split into several parties competing for a significantly diminished electorate support. During the campaigns, some of these parties started distancing themselves from the DUC policy in an attempt to increase their own popular support. In the end, J. Narantsatsralt was the sole remainder of the DUC power base, winning just one seat out of the 76 available.

In 2016, the situation repeated itself, but the level of fragmentation increased across all 76 districts. The only advantage for major parties currently was the effective elimination of minor parties and independents as competition for voters, which the DP and MPP thought was part of its own electoral base.

During the 2016 elections, the DP successfully deprived minor parties of the ability to pose any serious threat without any outcry from the MPP, which was the opposition at that time. Indeed, minor parties were not even given the chance to participate in the elections. This goal was achieved by a combination of legal and administrative tool sets, while highly negative campaigns played out rife with mudslinging. Some traditional barriers to entry also posed as hurdles, such as the need for each party to attain approval from the Statue Audit Office for their election agendas. Nevertheless, instead of bringing out more voters for the DP, this policy only upset supporters of the minor parties.

In the 2016 elections, Khentii province received three electoral constituencies compared with the two that it had in 2012. The total number of constituencies was limited to 76. The creation of new electoral districts meant cutting some old ones, and neighbouring Sukhbaatar province lost one of its two electoral mandates. However, the results of the 2016 elections shows that “gerrymandering” did not help the DP candidates even at the new constituencies.

The DP’s populist policies resulted in some level of support from state-sector employees, but upset the private sector, which covers a big portion of the population. Moreover, the DP’s party agenda and PR campaign were barely visible, while the MPP launched an effective campaign to boost party ratings. As a result, the population’s protest votes became more party-centric. This worked strongly in favour for the only visible alternative to the DP—to the MPP candidates.

From that point on, it can be said that the DP’s policies were quite effective only in pushing voters towards their rival, the MPP. Consequently, the landslide win by the MPP in

the 2016 elections was a result of actions by the parties and their leaderships, not individual candidates.

Under the existing status quo, one can expect that in 2020 the ruling MPP, which controls the legislation with a more than two-thirds majority, may try to reapply Article 22.5 in its favour. This would once again bring volatility back to the electoral stage. Thus, as long as Article 22.5 exists, Mongolia’s brand of gerrymandering in elections will persist.

## 3.2. Election Results 2008 - 2016

### 3.2.1. Parliamentary Elections 2008

Table 3-18: Results of parliamentary elections 2008

<b>Party</b>	<b>%</b>
MPRP	43.052
DP	39.228
Independents	5.247
Civil Coalition	4.34
Civil Will Party	3.494
New National Party	1.697
Motherland Party	1.219
Republican party	1.152
Mongolian National Traditional Party	0.3339
MONARCH Party	0.175
EChH Party	0.038
Mongolian Liberal Party	0.011
Civil Movement Party	0.007
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: NDI Report on Mongolian Electorate system, 2009*

### 3.2.2. Presidential Elections 2009

Table 3-19: Results of presidential elections 2009

<b>Name</b>	<b>%</b>
Elbegdorj	51.21
Enkhbayar	47.41
Empty ballots	0.09
All rejected ballots	0.07
Invalid	1.23
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: General Election Committee

### 3.2.3. Parliamentary Elections 2012

Table 3-20: Results of parliamentary elections 2012

	<b>Seats won based on majority votes in 48 constituencies</b>	<b>Seats won according to proportional vote (from parties' national lists)</b>		<b>Total</b>
DP	24	35.32%	10	34
MPP	17	31.31%	9	28
MPRP (Justice Coal)	4	22.31%	7	11
CW-GP	0	5.51%	2	2
Independent	3			3
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>94.45%</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>76</b>

Source: Wikipedia

### 3.2.4. Presidential Elections 2013

Table 3-21: Results of presidential elections 2013

<b>Name</b>	<b>Nominating Party</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>%</b>
Ts. Elbegdorj	DP	622,794	50.89
B. Bat-Erdene	MPP	520,380	42.52
N. Udval	MPRP	80,563	6.58
invalid votes		13,688	
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,239,784</b>	
Registered voters		1,864,273	

Source: General Election Committee

### 3.2.5. Parliamentary Elections 2016

Table 3-22: Results of parliamentary elections 2016

<i>Parties</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>+/-</i>
Mongolian People's Party				
636,138	45.12	65	+39	
Democratic Party				
467,191	33.14	9	-25	
Mongolians People's Revolutionary Party				
112,850	8.00	1	-10	
Sovereignty and Unity	35,394	2.51	0	
Republican Party				
23,118	1.64	0		
Civil Movement Party	12,264	0.87	0	
United Party of Patriots	11,826	0.84	0	
Civil Will-Green Party				
6,568	0.47	0	-2	
Mongolian Social Democratic Party				
5,308	0.38	0		
Love the People Party	4,229	0.30	0	
Mongolian Conservative United Party	3,283	0.23	0	
King Choice	2,794	0.20	0	
Mongolian Conservative Party	2,055	0.15	0	
Freedom Implementing Party	1,804	0.13	0	
Democratic Movement	432	0.03	0	
Independents	67,220	4.83	1	-2
Invalid/blank votes	10,108	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,419,971</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>0</b>
Registered voters/turnout	1,911,047	74.30	-	-

Source: Wikipedia



# 4

## Transformation of Society

### 4.1. Effects of Mongolia's Peaceful Revolution on Society

The collapse of the socialist system created opportunities for a variety of social groups. Suddenly it was possible for people of ambition to occupy niches that had up until then been closely guarded by the powerful elites of the communist party. There is no denying that the political and economic transformation has led to more opportunities for everybody and a general improvement in people's economic situations, but it is also evident that the transformation from a socialist system to a democratic market economy has largely benefited a small group of elites. The change from old to new elites did not necessarily lead to greater equality or fairness in the distribution of wealth.

According to the socialist categorisation of the social hierarchy, Mongolia during the Socialist Era had a working class, agricultural workers (mainly nomadic) and a separate stratum of society known as the *intelligentsia*. From the start of the socialist system, the intelligentsia was carefully kept out of reach from power. The process of forming a power elite (the "nomenklatura") in the socialist society had a dual nature, and the recipe for which was passed over from the USSR to all Soviet satellite states.

The "nomenklatura" was both self-producing and recruiting new members from society via a meritocratic basis. The meritocratic criteria used Marxist-Leninist class definitions where blue collar workers were seen as the "future of humankind" and were prioritised over the intelligentsia. That approach successfully created the composition of society for people of blue collar origin to dominate the "nomenklatura". That also stoked the communist elites' disdainful attitudes toward intellectual labour.

When a new era was brought in with the peaceful revolution at the end of 1989, it appeared that the intelligentsia would again be banned from the sharing of powers in this new reality. The old socialist power elite was actively involved in the transformation process and continued to reject the intelligentsia. They saw this group as potential troublemakers and rivals. The new power group was composed of competing factions of the old "nomenklatura" and a new generation of people predominantly young and new in politics.

However, the old elite had no experience with the new political environment and made serious mistakes in governance. There was a lack of knowledge about how a market economy

functioned, or how election mechanisms worked in a multi-party system. Regulatory institutions were still yet to be built. Moreover, the old style of rule was based on an unchallenged position for decision making derived from the Constitution, which gave the communist party a leading role in society.

The transformation of the political and economic system gradually opened new opportunities for other groups to become part of the elite. New groups of entrepreneurs emerged, and several newly established political parties became serious competitors for power. Some members of the old political elite who had become entrepreneurs through the privatization of state enterprises started to influence political decision-making by either articulating their interest within the former communist party or establishing their own political parties.

All this social change contributed to a transformation beyond the political and economic sphere. The social patterns of society changed as well. Mongolia had the big advantage of having a high proportion of young people in society who were receptive to change and able to adapt. At the beginning of the transformation process in 1990, about 53 per cent of the population was under 20 years old (see: Table 4-1). In 2015, the youth population still accounted for around 38 per cent (2015 Population and Housing By-Census of Mongolia: National Report), whereby the decrease in the portion of young people can largely be attributed to the increased life expectancy from around 63 to 70 years of age.

Table 4-1: Population statistics of Mongolia, by age group in 1990

<b>Age group</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Age group</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<1	3.4%	35-39	4.5%
1-4	12.7%	40-44	3.2%
5-9	13.5%	45-49	3.3%
10-14	12.2%	50-54	2.6%
15-19	11.1%	55-59	2.6%
20-24	9.6%	60-64	1.7%
25-29	8.9%	65-69	1.6%
30-34	6.6%	70 or more	2.5%

*Source: "Women and Children of Mongolia", National Statistical office, 1995*

This analysis identifies three different and distinct phases during the transformation process. There are some measurable changes, such as the decline and recovery of the national economy, in addition to changes to household incomes. However, other criteria linked to changes in attitudes or opinions mark these distinct periods.

Below is a description of the three phases observed in the transformation process.

### **4.1.1. Period 1990 – 1996: Political and economic revolution; beginning of the transformation**

Mongolia's first free elections held in June 1990 marked the success of the peaceful revolution that had swept away the communist leadership. These elections were the starting point for Mongolia's transformation from a socialist country to a democratic state with a free-market economy.

Although the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) won an absolute majority in the 1990 election, the MPRP in 1992 invited some new democratic parties to form a joint government during the interim period prior to the drafting of a new constitution. When the MPRP won an absolute majority again in 1992, it formed a government without the participation of the opposition forces representing democratic values.

Far-reaching reforms were initiated during the interim in 1990-1992 and were maintained by the MPRP in the following years. Many of these reforms carried negative consequences for the people, as the transformation was accompanied by an interruption in public services such as health and education. Issues such as food shortages and rationing, widespread unemployment, and general economic hardship plagued large sections of the general public.

The shift to a market economy was implemented through three major programmes:

- a) the privatisation of livestock and farm land;
- b) the privatisation of apartments in urban areas;
- c) the privatisation of state enterprises.

These privatisation programmes formed the basis of a capitalist system that unavoidably included some elements of inequality. In addition to the widening gap between the rich and poor, the unequal development of urban and rural areas created a new phenomenon of inequality between the urban and rural societies.

Over the decades of its rule, the socialist state had built a major network in rural areas composed of nomads, workers, state administrators and civil servants. When the livestock was privatised to different groups in rural areas, the distribution was by no means equal. The main beneficiaries were the nomads who can look after the herds and administrators who were in charge of the distribution of property, securing benefits for themselves in addition to relatives and friends.

The private ownership of livestock was a major change in the lives of rural Mongolia, particularly for the nomadic population. For the first time, some nomads possessed considerable property. A resident of a *soum* (an administrative section of territory within Mongolia's 21 provinces), however, was given a small number of livestock that was insufficient for creating an income base to compensate for the loss of state employment. Workers and state service employees in rural areas, in particular, were losers in the process of distributing state assets. These people had no experience (or will) for nomadic life. They either consumed or

sold their livestock for subsistence.

The annual change of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1991 to 1996 in percent reflects the economic crisis during this period, particularly in the early years of transformation.

1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
-8.7	-9.3	-3.2	2.1	6.4	2.2

*Source: National Statistical Office of Mongolia*

A large number of rural dwellers who had lost their economic income migrated to urban areas—particularly Ulaanbaatar—creating a rural-urban movement that totalled up to 100,000 people in some years

The privatisation of real estate in urban areas led to another kind of inequality that was previously unknown. Only formally

registered residents of that time could own an apartment. Later developments would show that these people were a considerable value to society and cleared a path for new economic activities. They opened shops, restaurants, or other small businesses.

Rural migrants, however, were excluded from this opportunity of urban privatisation.

On the other hand, the privatisation of state enterprises and large-scale farms through voucher programmes or by issuing shares to all citizens created a new class of wealthy elites instead of providing private property to a broad section of society. The way the privatisation of state assets was managed eventually gave way for the enterprises to end up in the hands of a few who has access to financing, permits and licences. Corruption started to blossom towards the end of this initial transformation period, when the MPRP still had an unchallenged grip over the country's politics.

Parliamentary elections in 1996 ended the MPRP's more than seven decades of uninterrupted rule. The first electoral victory of the democratic forces completed the changes occurring within the political system. Opinion polls showed that people—although unreservedly in support of the shift to democracy—were not satisfied with the existing political system until the rule of the MPRP was broken in 1996.

The Sant Maral Foundation conducted its first opinion polls in September 1995. The empirical data it has collected over the course of two decades allows for analysis of the transformation process and its impact on the people in Mongolia.

### 4.1.2. Period 1997 – 2007: Consolidation of multi-party system; economic recovery

Political changes in 1996 raised hopes for immediate improvement of their personal economic situation among a large section of the population. This optimism, however, did not last long and disappointment of the electorate led to the win of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) in presidential elections in 1997. Parliamentary elections in the following years brought alternating majorities for the MPRP and the young democratic parties.

Economic recovery during the period is shown by annual growth of GDP increasing from 3.9 percent in 1997 to 10.3 percent in 2007.

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
3.9	3.3	3.1	1.2	3.0	4.7
2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
7.0	10.6	7.3	8.6	10.3	

*Source: National Statistical*

The political shifts from 1997 to 2007 resulted in some considerable changes within the former communist party, the MPRP. The later change of its name to the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) reflected a break-away from its communist ideology. During the same time, the democratic forces that firstly emerged in 1990 went through a process of consolidation. Parties that were formed in the early days of the transformation merged with others; some groups broke away and formed new parties; and completely new parties entered the political stage.

A new influential group that formed from the early democratic movement created a new political establishment that was no longer driven by the desire for change but by interest in power. The old political elite that had roots in the former MPRP became more and more alike to the eyes of voters with the new political elite with its roots in the democratic movement.

The period from 1997 to 2008 saw increasing economic development. The mining sector contributed strongly to the growth in gross domestic product (GDP) towards the end of the period. Development became mainly visible in the capital city, Ulaanbaatar, leading to large-scale migration from the countryside to the city. This period also represents the development of strong links between political power and economic interest. Under the disguise of a free market economy, the foundations were laid for considerable wealth to fall in the hands of a small group of people who were either politically well-connected or wielded their own political power.

Thus, capitalism manifested itself between 1997 and 2007 without social justice and equal opportunities, as an oligarchic system took hold that was far different from what people had expected. The reaction to the developing inequality was citizens' disillusionment, and there was alienation between political leaders and the general public.

The landslide victory of Natsagiin Bagabandi over incumbent president Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat in the 1997 presidential election opened a new chapter in Mongolian politics. Bagabandi was the candidate who became a key player against the ruling Democratic Union Coalition which had won the previous year’s parliamentary elections. In fact, the president was the major opposition force and his strengthening position disturbed both the ruling Democratic Union and opposing forces within the MPRP so much that in 2000 they revoked some essential powers granted to the president by the Constitution.

The struggle between the parliament and president’s office also created serious problems for Bagabandi’s re-nomination as the MPRP’s presidential candidate in 2001. Strong protests from grassroots MPRP members, including street demonstrations, forced the MPRP leadership to give Bagabandi his second opportunity to run and eventually win the presidency. Ever since this incident, the polarisation between the parliament and president’s office has been a continued struggle for political power.

### 4.1.3. 2008 to present: Changes in the social pattern; widening gap between rich and poor

Gradually, the gap between the rich and poor had widened in Mongolia. Increasing economic growth mainly benefited a relatively small elitist group. There were, however, some visible spill-over effects: economic growth, particularly industrial production as well as the construction and service sectors, created job opportunities for the well-educated, labourers and semi-qualified workers.

Mongolia’s economic recovery continued in 2008, the negative growth in 2009 was due to the world-wide economic crisis and overcome in the following years.

2008	2009	2010	2011
8.9	-1.3	6.4	17.3
2012	2013	2014	2015
12.3	11.6	7.8	2.4

*Source: National Statistical Office of Mongolia*

Small businesses also got a boost. To some extent, this development has extended beyond Ulaanbaatar to the aimags (territorial administrative units, similar to provinces) and soum centres.

This economic spill over has led to the emergence of a moderately prosperous middle class. The existence of this group is evident and can be observed by the number and types of cars owned

by Mongolians, well-frequented restaurants, shops and entertainment centres, and improvements made to housing facilities. The middle class itself generates further economic growth with their purchasing power and consumption.

The emergence of a new elite in Mongolia was followed by increasing interest from foreign investors. At the beginning of the transformation, China and South Korea were most active and participated at all levels, from small businesses to large economic projects sponsored

by their respective states. Japanese activity was mainly present in the form of big projects, as Japan's medium and small businesses were reluctant to face the legal and economic challenges present in Mongolia. The same applied to Western countries—their businesses and state policy were not interested in Mongolia.

As a result, the Mongolian elite's business connections are mainly the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese groups. The Russians joined the club later, at a time when there was rather little room left for competition. However, Russia's strategic location makes it unavoidable as a local player.

Politically, the emerging middle class does not appear to receive the attention it deserves. A broad-based middle class could potentially become the backbone of the economy and a guarantor for social stability. The middle class does not play this role in Mongolia; it is just filling a niche in the present system. The middle class itself, on the other hand, seems to have little or no interest in politics. They feel that they do not owe their economic rise to politicians and are therefore not obliged to any political group. They merely expect non-interference from politicians.

The expectation for assistance from political quarters comes from another fast-growing group in society: the urban poor. For two decades Ulaanbaatar has absorbed almost all the growth in Mongolia's population, and the number of registered residents in the capital has more than doubled during this period. The capital city, with its booming businesses, has become a magnet for rural migrants. But not all of them can find the opportunity to make a decent living, and inequality in society is rising.

Mongolia has managed during the past two decades to overcome her economic problems. The natural wealth of the country is being utilised to create economic growth. Mongolia has also been able to establish a solid democratic system. But these achievements were reached without a system of social justice and without a compassionate political leadership that would use the wealth of the country to eliminate gross injustice. Benefits from mineral resources mined in rural areas flow mostly to the capital, while rural areas are developing too little and too slowly. The influx of migrants from the countryside to the capital is the visible result of this. Most importantly, the beneficiary of the economic boom is a small elite group.

Frequently, each parliamentary election held since 1990 has resulted in a reversal of the previous election's outcome. But, in the opinion of voters, no party in power has halted the increasing inequality, nor have they ever aimed for social justice.

The following parts of this chapter will analyse the shifting social patterns in Mongolia during the two decades when observations were made, particularly the growing role of the middle class. The analysis will look at the vertical mobility in society that has led to the growth of the middle class but has also marginalised the group described as intelligentsia. Meanwhile, a new group of entrepreneurial self-employed people has appeared.

This chapter will conclude with some analysis concerning Mongolia's small group of elites.

## 4.2. Shifting Patterns of Social Status

The Sant Maral Foundation has collected data related to the social groups in society for more than twenty years (relevant questions were included in 37 polls conducted between 1997 and 2016). The questionnaires requested respondents to assess their own social status and place themselves into one of five categories: Upper class; Slightly above middle class; Middle class; Slightly below middle class; and Below middle class.

The middle class is usually considered a social group of people with a stable income sufficient to meet a certain level of their needs. There are three ways to identify this group:

1. Resource-based assumption
2. Self-assessment
3. A mix of resource-based assumption and self-assessment

The resource-based approach is unreliable in developing countries. Scholars and politicians have multiple, conflicting interpretations. An example of this is evident in the results of a Russian conference held to discuss the middle class<sup>8</sup>. It concluded that the middle class comprised only 7 per cent of the total population versus the official figure, 20 per cent. The Sant Maral Foundation has relied on the self-assessment of the population as it shows a certain level of consistency.

As the middle class is considered a cornerstone of social stability, its growth and its consistent ability to generate resources is crucial for society. If we take a country like the USA, small business is considered a main pillar holding up the middle class<sup>9</sup>. Gallup CEO Jim Clifton has pointed out as much when he stated: “When we get small business to boom, we can save America, restore our middle class and once again lead the world”.

What builds the middle class is different in the Mongolian context. Observations since the SMF survey was first administered show that state employment is an essential part of the middle class (see: Table 4-2, Figure 4-1). Its share is not strictly correlated with the situation of the economy. When the economic situation was starting to deteriorate from 2013, the share of employment by the state started to expand.

Budget deficiency has emerged to maintain the state sector, with compensation from various types of loans issued by the Mongolian government. There was political reasoning behind the money poured into the state sector as the government that led the Democratic Party in 2016 was counting on the state sector’s support in upcoming parliamentary elections that year. Their backing was necessary since the Democrats had already lost the private sector’s support. The expected support did not appear, and the Mongolian government’s debt reached an all-time high (see: Figure 4-2).

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8 [http://www.insor-russia.ru/ru/news/about\\_inzor/377](http://www.insor-russia.ru/ru/news/about_inzor/377)

9 [http://www.shtfplan.com/commodities/gallup-25-million-americans-forced-out-of-middle-class-since-recovery-began\\_09222016](http://www.shtfplan.com/commodities/gallup-25-million-americans-forced-out-of-middle-class-since-recovery-began_09222016)



While facing presidential elections in 2017, the new MPP-led government was rather hesitant to drastically reduce the non-productive and inefficient state sector, despite strong demand for far-reaching economic reforms. It looks like China is a role model for the MPP-led government at the time of this analysis, receiving support from its huge labour force employed by large state enterprises and acting as a main lifeline to the Communist Party of China (CPC). The question remains how long this model can be maintained in a poor country like Mongolia.

The 2016 parliamentary elections were a lesson to Mongolian leaders that you cannot artificially maintain one social group without any regard for the state of the economy and at the expense of other groups. You just cannot afford it, and the political cost is huge. Yet, the repeated mistakes made in 2017 demonstrate that the proper conclusions were not made.

Table 4-2: Middle class, by sector

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
State sector	34.3%	35.5%	32.2%	32.9%	28.0%	30.9%	30.3%	31.1%	27.4%	30.8%
Private sector	56.8%	57.3%	62.9%	63.2%	66.4%	64.2%	61.2%	65.3%	60.1%	62.6%
Mixed sector	8.8%	7.3%	4.9%	3.9%	5.7%	4.8%	8.5%	3.6%	9.1%	6.3%
NGO									3.4%	0.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-1: Middle class, by sector





Figure 4-2: Government debt to GDP



Source: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/>

The composition of the middle class by occupation shows a pattern similar to the general population. The intelligentsia is very weakly represented compared to its position during the socialist era. There is also a stronger-than-expected presence of “blue collar” workers in the Mongolian middle class.

Table 4-3: Middle class, by occupation

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
Workers	34.7%	31.4%	35.1%	30.2%	33.0%	33.0%	43.2%	38.3%	43.3%	34.8%
Clerical staff	18.6%	18.4%	18.1%	16.8%	14.2%	15.4%	13.0%	17.1%	15.0%	16.0%
Self-employed	20.6%	24.8%	21.1%	29.2%	29.2%	32.0%	27.1%	32.7%	25.8%	27.0%
No-mads/farmers	12.5%	10.8%	13.8%	9.6%	14.0%	9.6%	8.3%	9.4%	11.4%	12.0%
Intelligentsia	13.5%	14.6%	11.9%	14.2%	9.6%	10.0%	8.3%	2.4%	4.5%	10.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-3: Middle class, by occupation





Figure 4-4: Middle class, by “collars” in 2016



In all responses received, only 1.2 per cent of respondents placed themselves in the upper class, and SMF has noted that this small group shows many similarities with the group slightly above the middle class. For further analysis, these two groups can be combined and referred to as the “Above Middle Class”.

At the other end of the social scale we have a group assessing its own position as below middle class. By correlating these responses with other relevant questions this one group that is the lowest on the social ladder appears socially disadvantaged. Thus, it will be referred to as the “Disadvantaged Group”. Table 4-4 shows the categorisation of social groups determined from the self-assessment of respondents and how these groups are referred to within this study.

Table 4-4: Social groups (summary of self-assessment by respondents in 37 polls conducted between 1997 and 2016)

<b><i>Division of society into social groups as defined in the questionnaires used in polls 1997 – 2016 (self-assessment of respondents)</i></b>		<b><i>Social groups used in the present analysis</i></b>	
Upper class	1.2%	Above middle class	10.9%
Slightly above middle class	9.7%		
Middle class	57.1%	Middle class	57.1%
Slightly below middle class	20.6%	Below middle class	20.6%
Below middle class	11.3%	Disadvantaged group	11.3%
Total	100.0%	Total	100.0%

*Source: SMF database, 1997-2016*

The long-term trend shows that the Above-Middle Class has grown from 9.1 per cent in 1997 to 16.0 per cent in 2007. After 2007, respondents started to see their own positions on the social scale less optimistically, and the Above-Middle Class became smaller again. By 2016, only 7.0 per cent of all respondents considered their own social position as Above Middle Class (see: Table 4 -5).

The middle class, on the other hand, has been steadily growing over these two decades in respondents' self-assessments. The number of respondents judging their own position in society as middle class (the "Middle Class") rose from 43.3 per cent in 1997 to 74.0 per cent in 2016. The group that falls directly below the middle class shrank from 24.6 per cent in 1997 to 16.5 per cent in 2016, with a few ups and downs in between. The Disadvantaged Group that accounted for nearly one-quarter (23.0 per cent) of all respondents in 1997 diminished to only 2.5 per cent in 2016.

This decline in the number of people who view themselves as below the middle class may reflect a general improvement in people's lives after overcoming the initial negative effects from the economic transition.

Table 4-5: Social groups (self-assessment by respondents)

	<i>Year</i>									
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	9.1%	6.6%	8.9%	10.9%	11.4%	12.6%	12.2%	12.5%	11.8%	15.1%
Middle class	43.3%	49.4%	49.7%	55.0%	56.3%	53.9%	58.3%	57.3%	54.0%	53.0%
Below middle class	24.6%	24.0%	24.4%	20.4%	20.1%	20.4%	18.9%	18.7%	20.4%	19.6%
Disadvant. group	23.0%	20.0%	17.0%	13.8%	12.2%	13.0%	10.6%	11.5%	13.8%	12.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	<i>Year</i>									
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	16.0%	10.5%	11.1%	8.6%	7.9%	8.1%	10.0%	10.1%	9.2%	7.0%
Middle class	55.9%	55.1%	58.0%	53.5%	58.3%	63.6%	70.0%	61.5%	58.9%	74.0%
Below middle class	17.5%	22.2%	20.4%	28.0%	25.6%	20.6%	16.1%	23.1%	25.8%	16.5%
Disadvant. group	10.6%	12.2%	10.6%	9.9%	8.2%	7.7%	3.8%	5.3%	6.0%	2.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

The following Figures show the shifting patterns of social groups in Mongolian society. First, compare the composition of social groups in 1997, when the SMF polls first asked respondents to place themselves on a position on the social ladder—the latest available research data is from 2016 (see: Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6). When comparing these Figures, the most noteworthy difference is the growth of the Middle Class and the decline in the number of members of the Disadvantaged Group.

The next Figure then shows the development of this trend on a year-by-year basis (see: Figure 4-7). This Figure shows how the Above Middle Class grew steadily between 1997 and 2007, but then later shrunk.

Figure 4-5: Social groups in 1997




Figure 4-6: Social groups in 2016





Figure 4-7: Social groups' development 1997-2016



Now take a closer look at the education levels of respondents in different social groups. Initially, Table 4-6 and Figure 4-8 show the education levels generally increased among all respondents in polls from 1997 to 2016.


Table 4-6: Development of education levels (combining figures from all respondents participating in polls)

	Year									
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
low educ.	17.3%	19.4%	18.2%	20.8%	26.3%	20.8%	23.5%	25.5%	23.3%	23.5%
secondary education	49.3%	46.1%	46.5%	45.2%	43.9%	45.3%	42.0%	43.2%	42.4%	41.9%
higher education	33.4%	34.5%	35.2%	34.0%	29.8%	33.9%	34.5%	31.3%	34.3%	34.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	Year									
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
low educ.	24.0%	29.1%	29.5%	28.8%	26.9%	30.6%	31.9%	28.9%	25.0%	19.5%
secondary education	40.0%	43.0%	42.2%	46.4%	45.1%	44.6%	40.3%	45.5%	47.9%	51.1%
higher education	36.1%	27.8%	28.3%	24.8%	28.0%	24.8%	27.9%	25.6%	27.1%	29.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 4-8: Development of education levels (combining figures from all respondents participating in polls)



The following tables and Figures show the education level of respondents in different social groups<sup>10</sup>.

Table 4-7: Social status of respondents with higher education

	1997	2006	2016
Above middle class	11.1%	16.4%	14.1%
Middle class	43.3%	58.2%	77.1%
Below middle class	24.9%	16.9%	8.2%
Disadvantaged group	20.8%	8.6%	0.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Figure 4-9: Social status of respondents with higher education (1997)




Figure 4-10: Social status of respondents with higher education (2006)





Figure 4-11: Social status of respondents with higher education (2016)



This data reveals that during the first decade after Mongolia’s peaceful revolution, many respondents with higher education placed themselves into the categories Below Middle Class, or even in the Disadvantaged Group. Only later did respondents with higher education see themselves more and more as part of the middle class or above that.

10 The data collected by the Sant Maral Foundation may not correspond with national education statistics because the selection of respondents in urban and rural areas could have an influence. In the group referred to as “low education” we include respondents with primary education and those without formal education (illiterates); secondary education includes respondents with completed secondary school and “secondary special” or vocational education; higher education covers respondents with college or university education.



The development over a period of two decades is also visible in Figure 4-22 and Figure 4-24. These observations be a sign that the group with higher education—in other words, Mongolia’s intelligentsia—was shaken by the transformation process and needed some time to find its place in society. A closer look at this group will be in section 4.5 of this study, which deals with the changing role of Mongolia’s intelligentsia.

When comparing how respondents with higher education assessed their own social status in 1997, 2006, and 2016 the changes in social pattern becomes clearly visible.

The correlation between social groups and levels of education has become stronger in more recent years among respondents in other groups as well. A low education is an indication that one belongs to a lower-ranking social group, while higher education signals an elevated position on the social ladder. The following comparison shows how levels of education differed among all four social groups in 1997 and later in 2016:

Figure 4-12: Education level of respondents in the Above Middle Class (1997)





Figure 4-13: Education level of respondents in the Above Middle Class (2016)



While a considerable change between education levels can be seen between 1997 and 2016 for the Above Middle Class, the education of people in the Middle Class has hardly changed at all during that same period.

Figure 4-14: Education level of respondents in the Middle Class (1997)





Figure 4-15: Education level of respondents in the Middle Class (2016)



In the Below Middle Class, the high percentage of respondents with college or university education was half the size in 2016 as it was in 1997, which may be considered in line with a “normal” statistical distribution.

Figure 4-16: Education level of respondents in the Below Middle Class (1997)





Figure 4-17: Education level of respondents in the Below Middle Class (2016)



Members of the Disadvantaged Group have moved upwards on the social ladder even more strongly thanks to the so-called “displaced” people with college or university education who considered themselves rather low on the social ladder in 1997. Thus, the percentage share of people with high education has significantly decreased in the Disadvantaged Group over time. In 2016, only 7.9 per cent of respondents in the Disadvantaged Group have higher education compared with 28.4 per cent in 1997.

Figure 4-18: Education level of respondents in the Disadvantaged Group (1997)





Figure 4-19: Education level of respondents in the Disadvantaged Group (2016)



One way to step up to a higher rung on the socio-economic ladder is higher education. This fact is to be considered together with questions of income, profession, and occupation in section 4.3 of this chapter. Before coming to that point, however, consider the data relating to the development of respondents' education level in the different social groups with some more detail.

Table 4-8: Education level of respondents regarding themselves as belonging to the Above Middle-Class group

	Year									
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
low educ.	14.5%	15.8%	19.3%	19.0%	24.2%	18.0%	20.0%	27.4%	19.0%	24.0%
secondary education	47.0%	42.1%	43.2%	38.4%	40.3%	40.3%	36.7%	35.7%	39.1%	37.2%
higher education	38.6%	42.1%	37.5%	42.6%	35.5%	41.7%	43.3%	37.0%	41.8%	38.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	Year									
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
low educ.	21.3%	15.6%	23.9%	25.9%	25.3%	15.8%	18.6%	10.3%	22.0%	6.7%
secondary education	37.9%	33.7%	27.3%	35.7%	28.0%	37.5%	35.1%	50.0%	41.3%	34.3%
higher education	40.8%	50.6%	48.9%	38.4%	46.7%	46.7%	46.4%	39.7%	36.7%	59.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 4-20: Education level of respondents regarding themselves as belonging to the Above Middle Class




Table 4-9: Education level of respondents regarding themselves belonging to the Middle Class

	<i>Year</i>									
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
low educ. level	19.9%	17.5%	19.6%	19.0%	24.5%	18.4%	20.8%	22.5%	20.5%	20.3%
secondary education	48.6%	46.3%	48.4%	43.5%	43.0%	43.9%	41.3%	42.3%	42.1%	40.3%
higher education	31.5%	36.2%	32.0%	37.6%	32.5%	37.7%	37.9%	35.2%	37.3%	39.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	<i>Year</i>									
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
low educ. level	21.7%	23.8%	27.5%	23.0%	22.0%	26.9%	29.5%	26.0%	24.7%	18.0%
secondary education	38.4%	44.4%	40.8%	46.6%	46.4%	46.3%	41.4%	46.8%	47.8%	51.3%
higher education	39.9%	31.8%	31.7%	30.4%	31.6%	26.8%	29.2%	27.2%	27.5%	30.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 4-21: Education level of respondents regarding themselves belonging to the Middle Class




Table 4-10: Education level of respondents regarding themselves as belonging to the Below Middle Class

	<i>Year</i>									
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
low educ. level	16.8%	20.0%	19.0%	20.2%	23.8%	19.6%	24.5%	24.6%	22.6%	25.5%
secondary education	51.3%	44.8%	51.2%	48.6%	48.9%	47.4%	45.3%	48.4%	43.1%	43.7%
higher education	31.9%	35.3%	29.8%	31.3%	27.3%	33.0%	30.3%	27.0%	34.3%	30.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	<i>Year</i>									
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
low educ. level	23.8%	36.4%	32.4%	34.5%	33.9%	39.7%	44.4%	38.3%	25.7%	29.7%
secondary education	44.9%	46.9%	53.3%	50.7%	48.3%	45.1%	38.3%	42.1%	52.3%	55.7%
higher education	31.2%	16.7%	14.3%	14.8%	17.8%	15.3%	17.4%	19.5%	22.0%	14.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 4-22: Education level of respondents regarding themselves as belonging to the Below Middle Class





Table 4-11: Education level of respondents who regard themselves as belonging to the Disadvantaged Group

	<i>Year</i>									
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
low educ. level	20.9%	20.8%	18.9%	24.6%	34.3%	26.0%	28.7%	32.2%	30.5%	28.5%
secondary education	50.7%	48.3%	47.3%	48.8%	43.3%	49.2%	45.9%	42.6%	43.5%	46.5%
higher education	28.4%	30.9%	33.7%	26.6%	22.4%	24.7%	25.4%	25.2%	26.0%	25.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	<i>Year</i>									
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
low educ. level	31.3%	51.4%	43.4%	43.4%	33.3%	53.1%	52.7%	49.2%	29.6%	34.2%
secondary education	43.9%	38.0%	42.2%	44.8%	48.7%	37.1%	36.5%	44.3%	43.7%	57.9%
higher education	24.8%	10.6%	14.3%	11.8%	17.9%	9.8%	10.8%	6.6%	26.8%	7.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 4-23: Education level of respondents who regard themselves as belonging to the Disadvantaged Group



The next three Figures show the detailed development of how people with specific educational backgrounds consider their social status over the course of 1997 to 2016. It supplements the data provided in in Table 4-7, above.

Figure 4-24: Self-assessment of social status by respondents with higher education




Figure 4-25: Self-assessment of social status by respondents with secondary education





Figure 4-26: Self-assessment of social status, by respondents with low education level





### 4.3. Vertical Mobility in Society

The transition to a democratic system and a market economy opened new windows of opportunity for economic and social advancement, but the old political elite during the transformation phase tried to keep its leading position through expansion. It also tried to do so without creating confrontation with other social groups. Thus, the old elite faced challenges from both outside and within the MPRP’s ranks. In the process, a new generation of politicians emerged from mid-ranking party functionary positions who started building their own factions. Old networks were maintained, and new ones established from the very beginning of the transformation phase, which made the political environment extremely volatile and ambiguous.


The restricted nature of vertical mobility within society was carefully observed by the Mongolian population. The weakest aspect of Mongolia democracy was the absence of equal opportunities that provided economic and social advancement for everybody. When asked in various polls between 2008 and 2016, people chose “to be equally treated by law” as the most important democratic value.

Table 4-12: Responses to the question of how important people consider it to be equally treated by law

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
Very important	59.5%	59.7%	59.1%	58.4%	60.1%	64.4%	59.5%	50.0%	61.5%	59.7%
Rather important	37.3%	37.1%	39.0%	39.7%	37.7%	33.5%	37.0%	43.4%	32.6%	37.3%
Rather not important	2.6%	2.4%	1.6%	1.5%	1.8%	1.8%	2.2%	5.1%	4.5%	2.4%
Totally unimportant	0.6%	0.7%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	1.3%	1.5%	1.4%	0.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-27: Respondents who said “to be equally treated by law” as very important or rather important



The expanding economy did provide a limited scope of expansion for many citizens. That, however, did not directly lead to a change in the elite’s own structure and composition. Challenges for the elite, instead, came from the effects of globalisation and the emergence of international players. The role of the old and new elites will be further looked at in section 4.7 of this chapter.

This section of analysis will study some other criteria, such as income, occupation, and employment, in relation to people’s social statuses. Together, with education levels that were already dealt with in the previous section, these indicators can lead to some suppositions regarding vertical mobility in Mongolian society.

### 4.3.1. Income and Social Status

Incomes reported by respondents in SMF polls show considerable increases in 2008-2016.<sup>11</sup> In 2008, less than 10 per cent of respondents reported an estimated annual household income above 4.8 million tugrik. In 2016, more than 75 per cent of respondents fell into this category. Table 4-13, below, shows how incomes changed for all respondents over the whole period, 2008-2016, followed by annual change for each social group.


<sup>11</sup> Income data were not collected in polls before 2008. Figures shown in this study are those reported by respondents without any adjustment for inflation. Adjustment for inflation is not possible because of different forms of data collection during the period under observation (for some years, income data was collected for pre-defined income groups, in other years actual income figures were recorded in the questionnaires).

Table 4-13: Development of income levels (combined figures for all respondents participating in polls)

Estimated annual household income in MNT	Year								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000	11.6%	10.2%	10.7%	3.9%	3.6%	1.2%	1.2%	3.0%	1.1%
600000 -<1200000	24.4%	25.1%	21.2%	14.1%	12.5%	2.7%	2.0%	1.0%	1.0%
1200000-<2400000	32.5%	29.6%	31.8%	33.9%	25.8%	12.0%	5.1%	3.5%	3.5%
2400000-<4800000	22.4%	22.1%	23.7%	29.2%	31.0%	24.8%	24.6%	18.2%	17.7%
4800000-<9600000	7.6%	10.2%	10.7%	15.4%	20.0%	35.0%	40.7%	39.0%	39.8%
9600000 or more	1.5%	2.7%	1.9%	3.4%	7.1%	24.3%	26.3%	35.3%	36.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-28: Development of income levels (combined figures for all respondents participating in polls)



The group at the top of the socio-economic ladder has, as may be expected, the highest-earning households. Up until 2011, income levels were relatively stable. Thereafter, it can be observed that this group of highest-earners saw their income grow much more steeply than compared with the total sample population. This is especially true for 2014-2016, when the highest-earners' incomes increased strongly.

By the year 2016, 86.3 per cent of households in this group had annual incomes above 4.8 million tugrik (see: Table 4-14), while the corresponding figure for the total population shown in Table 4-13 was only 76.6 per cent.

The Figures comparing incomes from 2008 and 2016 illustrate the remarkable development of income for the Above Middle Class (see: Figure 4-30 and Figure 4-31). There is, generally, a very positive development of incomes for the Above Middle Class after 2011. For the other groups, the major improvements start one year later. Next, when comparing income developments of all groups, it becomes clear that the higher-positioned social groups had sharper increases in income than those below them. This is a sign of the inequality, which could lead to future social tensions. Income inequality is, for example, one of the most important issues on the agenda of every CPC Grand Assembly in China.

Table 4-14: Development of incomes of respondents regarding themselves belonging to group Above Middle Class

Estimated annual household income in MNT	Year									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
less than 600000	9,4%	6,7%	6,0%	4,1%	2,8%	1,1%	1,0%	2,9%		
600000-<1200000	16,6%	22,0%	14,7%	18,9%	9,7%	2,7%	2,9%	1,0%		
1200000-<2400000	28,1%	23,2%	29,9%	36,5%	17,9%	7,7%		1,9%	2,0%	
2400000-<4800000	25,1%	26,8%	27,2%	20,3%	27,6%	16,5%	16,3%	11,5%	11,8%	
4800000-<9600000	16,6%	13,0%	16,3%	16,2%	25,2%	31,9%	38,5%	27,9%	19,6%	
9600000 or more	4,3%	8,3%	6,0%	4,1%	16,8%	40,1%	41,3%	54,8%	66,7%	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-29: Development of incomes for respondents who regard themselves as belonging to the Above Middle Class




Figure 4-30: Incomes of respondents in the Above Middle Class (2008)





Figure 4-31: Incomes of respondents in the group Above Middle Class (2016)



Income increases in the Middle Class much closely resemble the overall development of household incomes. In 2016, the two highest-earning income groups accounted for 78.9 per cent of respondents in the Middle Class, that is only slightly more than the corresponding figure of 76.6 per cent for the total sample population.

Table 4-15: Development of incomes of respondents regarding themselves belonging to Middle Class

Estimated annual household income in MNT	Year								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000	11.2%	8.5%	7.7%	2.9%	3.0%	0.9%	0.7%	2.5%	0.9%
600000 - <1200000	22.0%	20.2%	17.7%	11.8%	8.8%	1.8%	1.5%	0.9%	0.8%
1200000 - <2400000	30.3%	31.8%	32.1%	29.3%	23.6%	11.2%	4.6%	2.5%	2.8%
2400000 - <4800000	26.2%	24.4%	27.0%	31.3%	33.1%	24.0%	21.3%	17.8%	16.4%
4800000 - <9600000	8.6%	12.0%	13.2%	20.6%	23.4%	36.3%	42.1%	41.8%	41.6%
9600000 or more	1.7%	3.0%	2.2%	4.0%	8.1%	25.8%	29.7%	34.5%	37.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-32: Development of incomes of respondents regarding themselves belonging to Middle Class




Figure 4-33: Incomes of respondents in Middle Class (2008)





Figure 4-34: Incomes of respondents in Middle Class (2016)



Social groups at levels below the Middle Class have shown a much slower growth in household incomes. This applies to the Below Middle Class as well the Disadvantaged Group.

These figures provide empirical evidence that the incomes of the higher-positioned social groups in society were increasing at a faster pace than those at the bottom of the social ranking—there are obviously better opportunities for the more privileged groups to achieve economic advancement than others.

Table 4-16: Development of incomes of respondents regarding themselves belonging to group Below Middle Class

Estimated annual household income in MNT	Year								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000	10.6%	12.0%	14.2%	4.1%	4.7%	2.0%	2.0%	3.3%	1.7%
600000 - <1200000	28.9%	33.5%	26.3%	17.4%	18.4%	4.4%	2.4%	0.7%	1.7%
1200000-<2400000	38.3%	28.3%	33.4%	40.2%	32.2%	16.0%	6.7%	5.6%	4.7%
2400000-<4800000	18.0%	18.4%	19.5%	28.2%	30.1%	30.4%	33.2%	20.6%	25.6%
4800000-<9600000	4.2%	7.4%	6.3%	7.9%	12.1%	33.8%	40.3%	37.9%	40.6%
9600000 or more		0.4%	0.3%	2.1%	2.6%	13.3%	15.4%	31.9%	25.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-35: Development of incomes of respondents regarding themselves belonging to the Below Middle Class




Figure 4-36: Incomes of respondents in group Below Middle Class (2008)




Figure 4-37: Incomes of respondents in group Below Middle Class (2016)




Table 4-17: Development of incomes of respondents regarding themselves belonging to Disadvantaged Group

Estimated annual household income in MNT	Year									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
less than 600000	18.1%	20.1%	22.3%	7.7%	6.4%	1.4%	3.4%	7.0%	5.4%	
600000 - <1200000	33.7%	38.9%	31.1%	16.7%	30.0%	12.5%	3.4%	4.2%	5.4%	
1200000 - <2400000	34.1%	27.9%	28.2%	44.9%	36.6%	23.6%	13.6%	5.6%	18.9%	
2400000 - <4800000	10.7%	10.2%	14.6%	20.5%	19.6%	30.6%	33.9%	19.7%	24.3%	
4800000- <9600000	3.0%	2.9%	3.9%	6.4%	6.1%	19.4%	35.6%	33.8%	37.8%	
9600000 or more	0.4%			3.8%	1.4%	12.5%	10.2%	29.6%	8.1%	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016



Figure 4-38: Development of incomes of respondents regarding themselves belonging to Disadvantaged Group




Figure 4-39: Incomes of respondents in the Disadvantaged Group (2008)





Figure 4-40: Incomes of respondents in the Disadvantaged Group (2016)



When comparing the distribution of incomes for different social groups from the first year of observation in 2008 with the latest available figures from 2016, it becomes obvious how differently incomes have developed (see: Table 4-18/Figure 4-41 for 2008 and Table 4-19/ Figure 4-42 for 2016).

Table 4-18: Distribution of income groups among respondents at different social levels (2008)

Estimated annual household income in MNT	<i>Above middle class</i>	<i>Middle class</i>	<i>Below middle class</i>	<i>Dis-advan-taged group</i>	<i>Total of all groups</i>
less than 600000	9.4%	11.2%	10.6%	18.1%	11.6%
600000 - 1200000	16.6%	22.0%	28.9%	33.7%	24.4%
1200000 - 2400000	28.1%	30.3%	38.3%	34.1%	32.5%
2400000 - 4800000	25.1%	26.2%	18.0%	10.7%	22.4%
4800000 - 9600000	16.6%	8.6%	4.2%	3.0%	7.6%
9600000 or more	4.3%	1.7%		0.4%	1.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-41: Distribution of income groups among respondents at different social levels (2008)





Table 4-19: Distribution of income groups among respondents at different social levels (2016)

Estimated annual household income in MNT	<i>Above middle class</i>	<i>Middle class</i>	<i>Below middle class</i>	<i>Dis-advan-taged group</i>	<i>Total of all groups</i>
less than 600000		0.9%	1.7%	5.4%	1.1%
600000 - 1200000		0.8%	1.7%	5.4%	1.0%
1200000 - 2400000	2.0%	2.8%	4.7%	18.9%	3.5%
2400000 - 4800000	11.8%	16.4%	25.6%	24.3%	17.7%
4800000 - 9600000	19.6%	41.6%	40.6%	37.8%	39.8%
9600000 or more	66.7%	37.3%	25.6%	8.1%	36.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-42: Distribution of income groups among respondents at different social levels (2016)



Further analysis of household income data is provided in Chapter 7 (Sub-chapter 7.4). This part of the study considers how relative income provides some indications of inequality.

Opportunities for vertical mobility in society are threatened by hindrances to people's advancements. One such factor is the development of incomes, which is made apparent in this chapter. There is a trend of deteriorating income generation for low-income groups, and accelerating growth of income for high-income groups. Additionally, groups with middle income are in decline. When also considering the significant depreciation of the tugrik against foreign currencies since 2008, the conclusion is: the standard of living has significantly dete-

riorated for a majority of people.

The rapidly increasing gap between the rich and poor could lead to growing social discontent. As surveys have shown, political parties, parliament, and government are among the most corrupt institutions in people’s opinion, and there is little confidence in these institutions. Further elaboration on this aspect can be found in Chapter 6, with more data and in greater detail (see: Table 6-46).

As inequality grows, so does evidence that citizens lack overall confidence that government is acting in their interests too. (see: Table 4-20).


Table 4-20: People’s confidence that “that the government is doing the right things for citizens”

<b><i>Do you approve the statement:</i></b> In principal, you can trust that the government is doing the right things for citizens.	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
Fully approve	11.4%	9.6%	6.1%	8.9%	9.0%	9.8%	11.4%	7.5%	3.5%	8.8%
Rather approve	44.8%	46.5%	43.3%	43.2%	45.4%	47.7%	44.0%	36.7%	34.1%	43.9%
Rather disapprove	28.4%	30.4%	31.1%	28.9%	25.3%	28.4%	28.3%	29.8%	37.6%	28.8%
Totally disapprove	15.5%	13.5%	19.4%	19.0%	20.2%	14.1%	16.3%	26.0%	24.8%	18.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Of the 56.2 per cent of respondents who believed (“fully” or “rather”) in 2008 that the government is doing the right things for citizens, only 37.6 per cent continued to hold these beliefs in 2016. This clearly shows a deteriorating confidence that government was doing the “right things”.

Figure 4-43: People’s confidence that “the government is doing the right things for citizens”



The Mongolian political system has exacerbated discontent, as can be interpreted from the see-saw results each election where voters replaced the ruling parties every four years. This trend may also somehow result in a systemic crisis as confidence in state institutions is also in decline. It looks that soon the parliament’s agenda will be very close to China’s, with more corruption and growing income inequality among the top issues each time the CPC holds its Grand Assembly. If the population is unable to resolve its problems through the existing system, street protests and other forms of public unrest will be unavoidable.

In Mongolia, discontent is more and more often being expressed in social media rather than the established channels of democratic institutions. A lot of crucial public activity has already shifted towards social media as its usage rapidly expands. The following tables and Figures originating from the SMF “Corruption Benchmark Survey” shows clearly how important social media has become as a means of dispensing information, especially for the issue of corruption.

Table 4-21: What is your main source of information about corruption?

	<b>Nov. 2012</b>	<b>March 2013</b>	<b>Sept. 2013</b>	<b>March 2014</b>	<b>March 2015</b>	<b>March 2016</b>	<b>March 2017</b>	<b>Total</b>
Word of mouth	11.8%	8.2%	7.6%	9.6%	8.8%	8.4%	7.4%	8.8%
Friends / relatives	5.5%	4.8%	5.1%	4.9%	4.4%	5.9%	2.8%	4.8%
Personal experience	3.0%	3.6%	2.5%	3.5%	2.1%	1.7%	2.3%	2.7%
Radio	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.7%	0.4%	0.2%	0.4%
Internet / social media	3.8%	5.6%	6.2%	9.2%	13.6%	17.4%	17.4%	10.4%
Newspapers, magazines	7.8%	5.0%	6.0%	6.1%	6.8%	4.6%	4.3%	5.8%
TV	67.8%	72.6%	71.5%	64.9%	63.2%	61.4%	64.7%	66.6%

Source: SMF-TAF Corruption benchmark survey

Figure 4-44: What is your main source of information about corruption?





Table 4-22: If Internet or Social Media is the main source (information about corruption), what is the most informative in exposing corruption?

	<b>March 2013</b>	<b>Sept. 2013</b>	<b>March 2014</b>	<b>March 2015</b>	<b>March 2016</b>	<b>March 2017</b>	<b>Total</b>
Facebook	17.3%	31.0%	37.6%	38.9%	44.1%	44.9%	40.5%
Twitter	10.7%	6.0%	7.2%	8.1%	7.2%	5.9%	7.8%
Information sites	72.0%	60.7%	54.4%	51.9%	47.9%	49.2%	51.0%
Other	0.0%	2.4%	0.8%	1.1%	0.8%	0.0%	0.7%

Source: SMF-TAF Corruption benchmark survey

Figure 4-45: If Internet or Social Media is the main source, which is the most informative in exposing corruption?



### 4.3.2. Occupation/Employment and Social Status

This section will analyse how the social statuses of select occupational groups, students, and retired people has changed over a period of two decades (1996–2016). Ten groups that cover a very large portion of Mongolia’s society will be observed. However, not all respondents in the polls gave a self-assessment of their social status. Some did not provide information about their occupation or employment status, and some groups were excluded, such as housewives without employment status.

The ten groups selected for this analysis are<sup>12</sup>:

- Workers in the public sector
- Workers in the private sector
- State officers
- Employees in the state service (including teachers, doctors, low-level bureaucrats, etc., who all receive salaries from state)
- Nomads/Farmers
- Self-employed persons
- Unemployed persons
- Students and professional trainees
- Retired people or recipients of disability allowances

12 For the years 1996 – 2007 we have a coverage of 73.3 per cent of all respondents in the polls; for the years 2008 – 2016, the coverage is 97.2 per cent, which brings the total number of interviews on which this part of our analysis is based to more than 53,000.

- Intelligentsia

Before presenting detailed statistics from each of these groups, compare Table 4 -23 and Figure 4 -46, which contain aggregated data from all respondents. The base data for this analysis is identical with data shown in Table 4 -5 grouped in three-year intervals.

Table 4-23: Self-assessment of social status by respondents (aggregated data for all participants in polls)


	<b>1996-1998</b>	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	7.2%	10.8%	12.4%	14.3%	10.1%	8.5%	8.6%
Middle class	47.9%	54.9%	56.8%	54.3%	55.6%	64.5%	65.6%
Below middle class	24.1%	20.7%	19.2%	19.2%	23.4%	20.1%	21.3%
Disadvantaged group	20.7%	13.6%	11.6%	12.2%	10.9%	6.9%	4.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1996-2016

The figures show a gradual but steady increase in the number respondents judging their own social status in the Middle Class or Above from 1996 to 2007. Groups Below Middle Class reduced in size accordingly.

This trend of economic improvement, however, was interrupted in 2008-2010. Although the size of the Middle Class itself grew slightly, the Above Middle Class became smaller and the Below Middle Class expanded. After this short stumbling period, again positive development returned through to 2016.

Figure 4-46: Self-assessment of social status by respondents (aggregated data for all participants in polls)





The following tables and Figures demonstrate the change in social status for each occupational group.


### Workers in the public sector

Table 4-24: Self-assessment of social status by workers in the public sector

	<b>1996-1998</b>	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	5.3%	8.9%	11.9%	12.9%	7.5%	6.2%	8.6%
Middle class	45.6%	54.2%	56.2%	58.0%	64.7%	70.0%	71.5%
Below middle class	25.7%	21.5%	22.6%	18.1%	21.1%	19.6%	16.9%
Disadvantaged group	23.3%	15.5%	9.4%	11.0%	6.6%	4.2%	3.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1996-2016

Figure 4-47: Self-assessment of social status by workers in the public sector




### Workers in the private sector

Table 4-25: Self-assessment of social status by workers in the private sector

	<b>1996-1998</b>	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	4.4%	8.0%	9.9%	10.1%	9.9%	8.0%	7.8%
Middle class	51.3%	52.4%	52.2%	51.2%	54.9%	66.7%	68.2%
Below middle class	31.0%	26.9%	22.3%	25.9%	24.2%	20.2%	19.9%
Disadvantaged group	13.3%	12.7%	15.6%	12.7%	10.9%	5.1%	4.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1996-2016

Figure 4-48: Self-assessment of social status by workers in the private sector




### State officers

Table 4-26: Self-assessment of social status by state officers

	<b>1996-1998</b>	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	12.3%	11.3%	14.4%	16.4%	19.7%	21.4%	23.2%
Middle class	47.9%	59.1%	60.2%	57.1%	65.7%	69.7%	67.1%
Below middle class	22.5%	20.6%	18.0%	19.2%	10.6%	7.7%	7.7%
Disadvantaged group	17.4%	9.1%	7.4%	7.3%	3.9%	1.2%	1.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1996-2016

Figure 4-49: Self-assessment of social status by state officers




## Employees in the state service

Table 4-27: Self-assessment of social status by respondents in the state service

	<b>1996-1998</b>	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	6.8%	9.7%	12.5%	13.6%	13.7%	12.7%	17.4%
Middle class	50.5%	59.9%	60.4%	59.1%	64.8%	73.2%	66.7%
Below middle class	23.2%	20.3%	17.9%	18.1%	15.2%	11.6%	15.0%
Disadvantaged group	19.5%	10.1%	9.2%	9.2%	6.4%	2.4%	1.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1996-2016

Figure 4-50: Self-assessment of social status by respondents in the state service




## Self-employed persons

Table 4-28: Self-assessment of social status by self-employed respondents

	<b>1996-1998</b>	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	10.0%	11.1%	11.2%	14.5%	10.9%	7.8%	9.7%
Middle class	54.7%	57.0%	59.0%	57.9%	57.0%	67.7%	67.3%
Below middle class	21.0%	20.7%	19.1%	17.5%	23.9%	19.3%	19.4%
Disadvantaged group	14.3%	11.2%	10.7%	10.1%	8.3%	5.2%	3.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1996-2016

Figure 4-51 Self-assessment of social status by self-employed respondents




### Nomadic herders and farmers

Table 4-29: Self-assessment of social status by nomadic herders and farmers

	<b>1996-1998</b>	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class		9.8%	11.6%	16.9%	5.5%	6.7%	4.0%
Middle class		53.8%	59.9%	47.7%	43.6%	56.4%	70.6%
Below middle class		19.0%	16.2%	19.5%	32.0%	24.5%	19.9%
Disadvantaged group		17.4%	12.3%	15.8%	19.0%	12.5%	5.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1999-2016

Figure 4-52. Self-assessment of social status by nomadic herders and farmers




## Unemployed persons

Table 4-30: Self-assessment of social status by unemployed respondents

	<b>1996-1998</b>	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	4.3%	7.8%	9.1%	11.2%	6.4%	4.0%	4.3%
Middle class	44.3%	49.7%	49.4%	44.9%	43.6%	60.2%	59.6%
Below middle class	25.5%	22.9%	20.9%	21.3%	28.6%	24.4%	29.1%
Disadvantaged group	25.9%	19.6%	20.7%	22.6%	21.4%	11.4%	7.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1996-2016

Figure 4-53: Self-assessment of social status by unemployed respondents




## Students and professional trainees

Table 4-31: Self-assessment of social status by students and professional trainees

	<b>1996-1998</b>	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	9.7%	13.5%	15.7%	19.2%	14.9%	14.9%	8.5%
Middle class	58.4%	60.7%	59.2%	56.6%	61.7%	67.8%	75.5%
Below middle class	21.4%	17.1%	17.8%	17.1%	19.7%	13.5%	13.7%
Disadvantaged group	10.4%	8.7%	7.2%	7.1%	3.7%	3.8%	2.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1996-2016

Figure 4-54: Self-assessment of social status by students and professional trainees




### Retired people or recipients of disability allowances

Table 4-32: Self-assessment of social status by retired (or disabled) respondents

	1996-1998	1999-2001	2002-2004	2005-2007	2008-2010	2011-2013	2014-2016
Above middle class	3.3%	8.0%	9.0%	11.8%	5.7%	5.1%	5.9%
Middle class	31.1%	45.1%	54.1%	50.2%	55.5%	60.8%	59.9%
Below middle class	27.1%	23.0%	21.6%	22.0%	27.5%	26.2%	28.3%
Disadvantaged group	38.5%	23.9%	15.4%	16.0%	11.2%	7.9%	5.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1996-2016

Figure 4-55: Self-assessment of social status by retired (or disabled) respondents




## Intelligentsia

Table 4-33: Self-assessment of social status by intelligentsia

	1996-1998	1999-2001	2002-2004	2005-2007	2008-2010	2011-2013	2014-2016
Above middle class		14.8%	15.5%	15.5%	15.8%	18.5%	23.6%
Middle class		58.7%	59.4%	56.2%	67.6%	67.3%	58.3%
Below middle class		17.2%	17.0%	18.1%	11.3%	11.4%	16.7%
Disadvantaged group		9.3%	8.0%	10.2%	5.2%	2.7%	1.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 1999-2016

Figure 4-56: Self-assessment of social status by intelligentsia



When the first full set of available data from 1999-2001<sup>13</sup> is used to determine the social ranking of each of the ten groups, the intelligentsia appears as the leader on the list. However, many respondents with higher education placed themselves at some lower levels, as discussed in section 4.2 of this chapter. Pensioners were at the bottom of the social hierarchy in 1996-1998.

<sup>13</sup> Because there is no data for intelligentsia for the years 1996-1998 and no polls were conducted in rural areas before 1999, we used the poll data 1999-2001 as starting point.


Table 4-34: Social hierarchy scale and comparison of positions of various occupational groups in 1996-98 and 2014-16

	<i>Position on social hierarchy scale</i>		<i>changes over period of two decades</i>
	<i>1999 - 2001</i>	<i>2014 -2016</i>	
Intelligentsia	1	2	- 1
Students and prof. trainees	2	4	- 2
State officers	3	1	+ 2
State service	4	3	+ 1
Self-employed	5	6	- 1
Nomads / Farmers	6	8	- 2
Workers in public sector	7	5	+ 2
Workers in private sector	8	7	- 1
Unemployed	9	10	- 1
Retired / disability allow.	10	9	+ 1

The social hierarchy scale for 1999-2001 is also shown in Figure 4-57. The data for 2014-2016 is shown in Figure 4-58.



Figure 4-57: Social hierarchy of various occupational groups (aggregated data 1999-2001)




Vertical mobility in society is demonstrated by how the social hierarchy has changed. The latest available data for 2014-2016 shows that state employees have improved their social position more than any other group. State officers have climbed to the top of the social ladder while state service sector (i.e. clerical staff) employees have also improved their position.

All public-sector employees are better off than employees in the private sector, including the self-employed. Although the situation for respondents in the private sector generally improved between 1999 and 2016, the progress they've made was slower than people who worked in the public sector. The situation for nomadic herders, who also can be considered as a part of the private sector, has improved more slowly than any other occupational group. Their position on the social scale was dropped by two places.

Pensioners and the unemployed were at the bottom of the social scale for 1999-2001, and they remained at the two last places for 2014-2016 as well. The fact that their positions swapped can hardly be considered an improvement.

Figure 4-58: Social hierarchy of various occupational groups (aggregated data 2014-2016)



## 4.4. Urban-rural Balance

SMF polls were conducted at both urban and rural localities from 1999 onwards. Data from urban and rural areas shows that the changes in respondents' social statuses developed similarly between 1999 and 2007 but slowed in rural areas between 2008 and 2016. Table 4-35 and Table 4-36 shows how respondents reported their self-assessments. A direct comparison of urban and rural poll results is shown in Figure 4-59 and Figure 4-60.

Table 4-35: Self-assessment of social status by respondents (aggregated data for all participants in polls in urban areas)

	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	11.4%	11.8%	13.8%	11.4%	9.8%	10.3%
Middle class	54.5%	56.6%	54.6%	58.2%	66.9%	65.0%
Below middle class	20.7%	20.1%	19.3%	21.8%	17.7%	20.3%
Disadvantaged group	13.3%	11.5%	12.4%	8.6%	5.6%	4.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Source: SMF database, 1999-2016*

Table 4-36: Self-assessment of social status by respondents (aggregated data for all participants in polls in rural areas)

	<b>1999-2001</b>	<b>2002-2004</b>	<b>2005-2007</b>	<b>2008-2010</b>	<b>2011-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
Above middle class	10.0%	13.0%	14.7%	9.2%	7.8%	7.4%
Middle class	55.4%	57.0%	54.1%	53.6%	63.1%	66.0%
Below middle class	20.7%	18.3%	19.1%	24.5%	21.5%	22.1%
Disadvantaged group	14.0%	11.7%	12.1%	12.7%	7.6%	4.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Source: SMF database, 1999-2016*

Figure 4-59: Comparison of social status in urban and rural areas (respondents' self-assessment 1999-2007)





Figure 4-60: Comparison of social status in urban and rural areas (respondents' self-assessment 2008-2016)



The comparison of how incomes developed in urban and rural areas shows considerable differences (see: Table 4-37 and Table 4-38). The household incomes of respondents in urban areas increased much more than those in rural areas. This is particularly visible when comparing the year-by-year developments in Figure 4-61 and Figure 4-62.

The difference in levels of income was apparent in 2008-2011, but not as strongly as in later years. As mentioned earlier, the rise of income levels is partly due to inflation, but this cannot be attributed to how incomes developed differently in urban and rural areas.

Table 4-37: Income of respondents in urban areas

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
less than 600000	13.2%	7.7%	6.4%	5.3%	4.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.8%	5.0%
600000 - <1200000	23.2%	22.3%	18.4%	11.6%	9.2%	1.5%	1.1%	0.4%	0.6%	11.5%
1200000- <2400000	30.4%	29.3%	31.2%	31.4%	19.0%	5.9%	2.9%	2.1%	2.6%	19.3%
2400000 - <4800000	23.8%	22.3%	26.5%	27.1%	28.3%	13.9%	16.4%	8.3%	9.1%	21.6%
4800000 - <9600000	7.0%	13.9%	14.4%	19.2%	27.1%	38.0%	40.1%	37.1%	37.0%	24.1%
9600000 or more	2.4%	4.5%	3.1%	5.3%	12.4%	40.6%	39.3%	52.0%	49.8%	18.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 4-48: Income of respondents in rural areas

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
less than 600000	10.3%	12.0%	13.7%	3.0%	3.5%	1.8%	1.9%	4.9%	1.3%	6.0%
600000 - <1200000	25.3%	27.3%	23.0%	15.8%	14.1%	3.5%	2.5%	1.5%	1.3%	14.6%
1200000- <2400000	34.2%	29.9%	32.2%	35.6%	29.2%	16.1%	6.6%	4.5%	4.1%	24.7%
2400000 - <4800000	21.3%	22.0%	21.8%	30.6%	32.4%	32.1%	30.2%	25.1%	24.2%	27.6%
4800000 - <9600000	8.1%	7.5%	8.2%	12.8%	16.4%	32.9%	41.2%	40.4%	41.9%	19.6%
9600000 or more	0.7%	1.4%	1.1%	2.2%	4.4%	13.5%	17.5%	23.5%	27.2%	7.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 4-61: Income of respondents in urban areas





Figure 4-62: Income of respondents in rural areas



## 4.5. The Changing Role of Intelligentsia

The role of the intelligentsia was extremely integral as the generator and dissemination of social values in Russia-modelled societies. Mongolia as a Soviet satellite state was no exception.

Although a part of the intelligentsia under communist rule worked within the formal state ideology, the majority was adepts of liberal anti-authoritarian ideas<sup>14</sup>. The intelligentsia contributed significantly to the Russian revolution, but shortly afterwards it started to challenge the oppressive authoritarian rule of the Bolsheviks. Two years after the revolution in his letter to Maxim Gorki, Russian communist revolutionary and statesman Vladimir Lenin stated with bitterness that the intelligentsia was “not a brain but a shit” of the nation. During the communist rule, the old intelligentsia was completely wiped out. Many people were either exiled or executed.

Soon Communists realised that they could not rule without educating people. To counter their ideological rivals, they created their own institutions, such as the “Institute of Red Professors”. These groups were called the “Soviet intelligentsia” to differentiate them from the previous group that was purged. Its main task was to serve the communist state.

Once again, like in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Russia had a problem with categorising the intelligentsia. This time it was because of the Marxist-Leninist class theory. “Intelligentsia” did not fit into any of the two existing classes defined by the Soviet Union: workers and peasants. To deal with the problem, a new term was created that defined intelligentsia as “a layer between the working class and peasantry”. This was counter to the planned development, as the ideology required a merger of all social categories to create a classless society, rather than create even more stratification.

Although this layer of class was antithetical to Leninist ideology, it was commonly used

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14 The origin of the intelligentsia is rooted deep in Russian history. When Peter the Great in an attempt to modernise the archaic economy and culture of the 17th Century opened the country to reforms, he created a new ruling elite. Its role was to promote his policy and quell down resistance from the old system. This policy was continued by successors such as Katherine the Great. Part of this new elite became a new aristocracy, while another part formed a new social stratum called the *raznochintsy* (“разночинцы”). This stratum existed judicially outside all formal estates.

In the 19th century, it got the name “Intelligentsia”. It was a main source and propeller of liberal and revolutionary ideas in Russian society. The social significance of the word Intelligentsia has spread since then in relation to this social group of people who think critically, with a high degree of reflection, and hold the ability to systematise all recorded knowledge and experiences.

An encyclopaedia describes the term like this: There are two different approaches to the definition of the intelligentsia. Sociologists explain for intellectuals’ understanding that the social group is made up of people who usually have a higher education and are professionally engaged in mental work or the development and dissemination of culture. But there is another approach: the most popular Russian social philosophy ranks the intelligentsia rank as those who can be considered to hold the moral standard of society. The second interpretation is narrower than the first.

([http://www.krugosvet.ru/enc/gumanitarnye\\_nauki/sociologiya/INTELLIGENTSIYA.html](http://www.krugosvet.ru/enc/gumanitarnye_nauki/sociologiya/INTELLIGENTSIYA.html))

in the Soviet system anyway. It had to confirm a special statute for a portion of society to be known as the Soviet intelligentsia. In Mongolian language, the “intelligentsia” was named the *sekheeten* (сэхээтэн), and it included mostly people who performed the intellectual labour that emerged in the 1970s, such as writers, researchers, teachers, etc. This group (called a “lever”) formed from a split among intellectual workers, forming the “clerical staff” (албан хаарч) for work that required intellectual labour, such as ministerial clerks, etc.

In the 1970s, Mongolia’s urban population increased dramatically because of the migration from the rural provinces. Nomads escaped labour at state or collective farms after being deprived of their property by collectivisation in 1961. The development of complicated urban infrastructure in Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan and Erdenet required a more sophisticated division of labour and categorisation.

The intelligentsia grew rapidly for two reasons. Firstly, the growth of cities required intellectual workers. Secondly, the shifting position of nomads or workers to the intelligentsia was considered a social advancement that occurred despite the Communist Party’s low quota for the intelligentsia in its membership. Being a worker or nomad made it much easier to climb up the rungs of the Communist hierarchy. Yes, the loyalty of intelligentsia was always treated with suspicion by the Communist state.

The abandonment of the Soviet state model wiped out certain privileges such as higher salaries granted to members of the intelligentsia. Many intelligentsia found themselves left in the cold air of the free-market economy as their skills and professions were no longer in demand.

When the Sant Maral Foundation first started to conduct its surveys, and introduced the category of occupation, it attempted to define each occupation for respondents. That was done with the expectation of the coming systemic changes. In the absence of the terms “white collar” or “blue collar”, the following four categories were used to cover occupations:

- Workers
- Clerical staff
- Self-employed
- Nomadic herders and farmers

The category “clerical staff” was supposed to cover all white-collar workers and intellectuals. Respondents who thought of themselves as intelligentsia, however, found this title inappropriate during interviews and demanded their old category back.

After this old term was reintroduced in the December 1999 opinion poll, the group previously under the name clerical staff that accounted for around 40 to 50 per cent of the sample in previous years split into two groups of about equal size (see: Table 4-39). With the social and economic transition that occurred in subsequent years, both groups underwent significant changes. The intelligentsia gradually declined in size from 26.2 per cent in 1999 to 16.3 percent in 2007, the year which is considered the end of the transition period. The number of intelligentsia declined further to its lowest level ever recorded by an SMF poll at




3.2 per cent in 2015. The latest available figure from March 2016 is 5.8 percent. The size of clerical staff also decreased during this period, but less significantly<sup>15</sup>.

Table 4-39: Selected data referring to occupation (from polls 1997-1999, with individual data for each poll; from 2000 onward combined data for all polls in a year)

	<b>Oct. 1997</b>	<b>March 1998</b>	<b>Oct. 1998</b>	<b>Nov. 1998</b>	<b>April 1999</b>	<b>Oct. 1999</b>	<b>Dec. 1999</b>	<b>2000</b>
Clerical staff	45.0%	48.2%	50.7%	41.9%	45.7%	46.4%	21.6%	25.0%
Intelligentsia	-	-	-	-	-	-	26.2%	25.7%
	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
Clerical staff	18.8%	24.0%	16.6%	18.9%	19.5%	17.6%	20.3%	16.5%
Intelligentsia	20.7%	23.5%	25.1%	22.9%	21.0%	19.1%	16.3%	11.0%
	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Clerical staff	16.9%	15.3%	14.6%	13.5%	13.8%	12.0%	16.6%	15.1%
Intelligentsia	13.1%	9.1%	11.0%	9.0%	11.5%	8.6%	3.2%	5.8%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 4-63: Selected data referring to occupation (from polls 2000-2016)



15 Altogether the categorization of occupation with five groups covered about 65 per cent of the sample in 1997-2007 polls and around 70 per cent in 2008-2016. The remaining part were students, pensioners, housewives etc., part of whom in turn could also classify themselves as “intelligentsia”.

The intelligentsia declined for various reasons. Firstly, the socio-economic transformation had the effect that Mongolia's political and economic system no longer required a "layer" of intelligentsia as a value generator in society. Moreover, becoming a member of the intelligentsia was no longer a desirable goal for social advancement.

There is also the rapidly decreasing influence of Russia in Mongolian affairs—both economically and socio-culturally. There are no longer any big joint economic projects, and the Russian language is not appealing to young Mongolians (many now prefer English while the number of pragmatic Mongolians speaking Chinese is rapidly growing). Since Russia was no longer a role model for Mongolia, the intelligentsia faced the loss of its special statute and attached privileges, such as the higher salaries they received during the Soviet era. The same trend can be observed in Russia and other post-Soviet states where authoritarian governments follow anti-liberal policies. The social position of the intelligentsia as a highly educated group has started to be replaced by the "obrazovantsy" or lumpen-intelligentsia. This term was introduced by the writer A. Solzhenitsyn and used for those with higher than average education but less ethical footings than the intelligentsia.

Although consumer values now dominate post-Communist societies, they are not appealing to the intelligentsia. Both in Mongolia and Russia, the intelligentsia have been pushed out of the media space, although they have become active on social media and Internet forums. Though tiny today, the virtual world of the intelligentsia has all the opportunity to still impact political events, which is why there are frequent attempts to block information spread on the Internet.

It does not seem to be the case that the intelligentsia is ageing itself out of existence or that its members are disappearing from the polls. Indeed, the average age of intelligentsia has not changed dramatically (see: Table 4-40).

Table 4-40: Average age of respondents in polls and comparison of overall average with group of intelligentsia

	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	
Average age of all participants in poll	36.5	36.4	36.6	36.5	37.6	37.1	37.9	37.8	
Average age of respondents in poll belonging to intelligentsia	36.8	36.7	36.6	36.6	37.3	36.7	37.8	37.4	
Age of intelligentsia in % of over-all average	101%	101%	100%	100%	99%	99%	100%	99%	
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Average age of all participants in poll	40.0	40.2	39.5	41.2	41.0	41.5	42.5	41.3	39.5
Average age of respondents in poll belonging to intelligentsia	37.0	37.6	35.9	38.8	36.3	37.0	37.2	37.2	38.4
Age of intelligentsia in % of over-all average	93%	94%	91%	94%	89%	89%	87%	90%	97%

Source: SMF database, 2000-2016

The intelligentsia in Mongolian society is not only diminishing in number, it is also undergoing structural and ideological changes. Between 2008 and 2015, the political orientation of the remnants of the intelligentsia shifted more towards anti-capitalist and authoritarian positions.


Chapter 6 of this study is a full analysis of Mongolian society’s changes in political orientation after the transformation process. Data shows that the six political orientations identified by the Sant Maral Foundation were relatively stable over a period of eight years (2008-2015). The intelligentsia, however, has shifted away from an idealistic or liberal democratic position to a line of thinking that has been termed “sovereign democratic” by contemporary Russian politics (see: Table 4-41 and Figure 4-64).

Table 4-41: Political orientation of intelligentsia

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Idealistic Democrats	15.5%	14.5%	19.1%	13.9%	12.5%	19.3%	10.4%	4.2%
Progressive Liberals	19.6%	27.0%	22.7%	25.3%	21.2%	27.3%	17.9%	8.3%
Passive Liberals	9.8%	18.3%	19.9%	13.9%	18.6%	5.3%	17.9%	16.7%
Conservatives	25.3%	20.3%	9.9%	15.2%	16.4%	9.3%	19.4%	12.5%
Traditionalists	17.0%	11.2%	9.2%	10.1%	15.4%	11.3%	13.4%	20.8%
Sovereign Democrats	12.9%	8.7%	19.1%	21.5%	15.8%	27.3%	20.9%	37.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll results, 2008-2015

Figure 4-64: Political orientation of intelligentsia



A detailed description of the six groups and a list of criteria used for how they are identified is provided in Chapter 6.

## 4.6. New Opportunities through Self-employment

While the numbers of intelligentsia and clerical staff dwindled, more respondents declared themselves as self-employed. Self-employed people are by definition not state-employed or corporate-employed. This is a category that became possible only after Mongolia established its free-market economy. This group has made use of the opportunities that opened during and after this transformation process, and they learned to master their new-found entrepreneurial skills.

This group has been of substantial relevance since the category of “self-employed” was introduced in polls in 2008 (see: Table 4-42).

Table 4-42: Percentage of self-employed respondents in total sample

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
Self-employed respondents in % of total sample population	13.8%	16.9%	13.5%	19.7%	18.6%	19.5%	17.3%	18.8%	15.5%	17.1%

*Source: SMF database, 2008-2016*

One can conclude from the data collected in SMF polls that a portion of the intelligentsia has become much better in facing the challenges of the market economy and is much less dependent on state support than before. They now operate as part of the “self-employed” category.


The members of the intelligentsia included in the self-employed group have largely adopted their peers’ political orientation and attitudes. The self-employed are much less autocratic and more liberal than respondents who continue to identify as intelligentsia.

Table 4-43: Political orientation of self-employed respondents

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Idealistic Democrats	14.6%	15.1%	14.1%	16.2%	11.3%	14.5%	16.7%	15.8%
Progressive Liberals	19.2%	18.8%	19.2%	12.4%	17.4%	15.8%	12.2%	17.4%
Passive Liberals	14.9%	17.7%	17.9%	21.4%	15.9%	22.9%	14.0%	22.4%
Conservatives	23.0%	20.5%	13.1%	17.1%	17.2%	11.8%	21.7%	14.1%
Traditionalists	18.6%	18.8%	17.9%	14.8%	23.7%	18.0%	22.2%	20.3%
Sovereign Democrats	9.7%	9.2%	17.9%	18.1%	14.6%	17.0%	13.1%	10.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*based on SMF poll results, 2008-2015*

Figure 4-65: Political orientation of self-employed respondents



## 4.7. Old and New Elites

At the beginning of the socio-economic transition, Mongolia’s political scene was dominated by two major political rivals, the old MPRP, which represented the establishment, and a group of new democratic forces who belonged to a variety of smaller parties with various alliances whose goal was to take power from the old elites. How much of this struggle was motivated by a genuine desire for more democracy or by other factors cannot be determined from the mere analysis of poll data.

It is, however, very clear that most people in Mongolia believe that “the rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created”. This question has been included in polls since 2008, and responses are available over periods of government rule by different parties. There is no indication that there is a more positive attitude towards the question immediately after elections. Instead, survey answers suggest the situation has worsened in people’s opinions (see: Table 4-44, Table 4-45, and Table 4-46, which show data from different periods of government rule).

Table 4-44: Respondents' opinions regarding "The rich and powerful ..." (2008)

<b>Question:</b> Do you agree with the statement " <i>The rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created</i> "?	Responses in May 2008
Agree	65.9%
Disagree	34.1%
Total	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008

Table 4-45: Respondents' opinions regarding "The rich and powerful ..." (2008-2012)

<b>Question:</b> Do you agree with the statement " <i>The rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created</i> "?	Responses in ...							Total
	Oct. 2008	April 2009	Oct. 2009	April 2010	Oct. 2010	April 2011	March 2012	
Agree	69.5%	77.9%	74.9%	75.7%	75.5%	78.4%	81.5%	78.0%
Disagree	30.5%	22.1%	25.1%	24.3%	24.5%	21.6%	18.5%	22.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2012

Table 4-46: Respondents' opinions regarding "The rich and powerful ..." (2013-2016)

<b>Question:</b> Do you agree with the statement " <i>The rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created</i> "?	Responses in ...				Total
	April 2013	March 2014	March 2015	March 2016	
Agree	83.5%	82.4%	76.8%	74.9%	79.7%
Disagree	16.5%	17.6%	23.2%	25.1%	20.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2013-2016

When voters in the 1996 elections provided the Democratic Union Coalition a large majority in parliament, it was a vote against the old elite. The population wanted real change and new faces in politics. This fact continues to elude the old elites.

On the eve of the 1996 parliamentary elections, the old elites were quite confident in their electoral victory. The transition to a market economy in some communist countries (such as Poland, Russia, Mongolia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, etc.) does not at first glance appear as chaotic as it was. Using their controls over the state bureaucracy, the old elites had allowed some of its members to join the emerging private sector. Through their control of the movement of finances and how huge state-owned assets were privatised, those elites ensured that they would take a much bigger share of the national wealth for themselves than the rest of

the population.

Although it's true that all post-communist countries of the former USSR in Central Asia (the CIS region) had selected a presidential form of state, in Mongolia the parliamentary system prevailed. Mongolia gave priority to a system of collectivist decision-making and put political parties at the centre of its development. The newly emerging class of nouveau riches mainly came from the ranks of the old elites. In return, these people were obligated to finance the MPRP in the new political system, so it could maintain its dominance in government. In spring 1996, the old elites were in control of both the legislature and state administration, both nationally and locally. Its firm grip grasped all state financing, the judiciary and law enforcement. What was more important, they were in possession of the strongest, most organised and disciplined political force: the MPRP.

However, most of the population was unhappy with how society was changing to the benefit of the old elites. Many people saw emerging opportunities in politics and business, but the system provided few openings for them. The old elites initially lacked the tools to sense the changes occurring within the new political system, and the election outcome awarding power to the rival Democrats Coalition came as a major surprise to them. Yet, in fact the result was predictable and SMF polls had shown the steady decline of support for the ruling party.

After their 1996 election victory, the new elites controlled how large state assets were privatised and started to build their own powerful business-political clans. It was noted in their favour, that they had used privatization not only for personal benefits but for a large-scale privatization of livestock in rural area and apartments in urban area for general population. This action had created an opportunity for financial start-up of many small businesses benefiting large part of the population, but it was not enough to keep the Democratic Union Coalition in power.

People's disillusionment with the new, young political parties led to a disastrous election for them in 2000, and the old elites returned to power. Since then, power over the parliament has alternated, changing hands between the two parties with each passing election.

Despite the Democrats' crushing defeat in 2000, the time between 1996 and 2000 had a profoundly positive effect on Mongolian society. The changes made on the societal level were irreversible. Ineffective state industry was largely privatised. Civil society started to play an essential role. New alternative political and business groups emerged and occupied important niches in the country's affairs. The old elites had to adapt to new rules of the political game, and they did it very well resulting in a landslide win at the 2000 parliamentary elections.

But by that time the MPRP was no longer the same party—nor the same crowd—as it was in 1996. The MPRP had to introduce a second echelon of younger-generation leaders in politics. Additionally, the MPRP was leading in privatisation process and therefore its membership included much bigger number of new private property owners than all other parties combined. With the return of its political power, the old MPRP ensured its position as the



guardian of the new system.

All these changes, however, cannot obscure the fact the people’s opinions of the major political parties—the MPRP (later re-named to MPP) and the Democratic Party (DP)—were not without their own self-interests. Between 2008 and 2016, 68.5 per cent of all respondents agreed with the statement: “The two large political parties, the MPRP [or MPP] and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest”.

One can easily see that the prevailing opinion that both parties were equally self-interested has strengthened over time. This sentiment reached its apex in March 2012, in the last poll before parliamentary elections in June 2012.

Responses are listed here in accordance with the three periods of government rule by the MPRP/MPP and DP.

Table 4-47: Respondents’ opinions regarding two large parties (2008)

<b>Question:</b> Do you agree with the statement “ <i>The two large political parties, the MPRP and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest</i> ”?	Responses in May 2008
Agree	60.4%
Disagree	39.6%
Total	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008

Table 4-48: Respondents’ opinions regarding two large parties (2008-2012)

<b>Question:</b> Do you agree with the statement “ <i>The two large political parties, the MPRP (or MPP after 2011) and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest</i> ”?	Responses in ...							Total
	Oct. 2008	April 2009	Oct. 2009	April 2010	Oct. 2010	April 2011	March 2012	
Agree	57.1%	61.2%	61.5%	71.9%	68.0%	68.3%	76.1%	69.5%
Disagree	42.9%	38.8%	38.5%	28.1%	32.0%	31.7%	23.9%	30.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2012

Table 4-49: Respondents' opinions regarding two large parties (2013-2016)

Question: Do you agree with the statement "The two large political parties, the MPP and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest"?	Responses in ...				Total
	April 2013	March 2014	March 2015	March 2016	
Agree	67.7%	68.6%	68.5%	67.9%	68.1%
Disagree	32.3%	31.4%	31.5%	32.1%	31.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2013-2016

The apparent disillusionment of voters can also be seen in responses given to the question whether people agreed or disagreed with the statement: "No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same". Once more the polls data gathered between May 2008 and March 2016 are divided into three periods, or each period between elections. Like the issues listed above, rather pessimistic views dominated the surveys during all three periods of government rule by the MPRP/MPP and DP.

Table 4-50: Respondents' opinions regarding "No matter who governs the country ..." (2008)

Question: Do you agree with the statement "No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same"?	Responses in May 2008
Agree	68.6%
Disagree	31.4%
Total	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008

Table 4-51: Respondents' opinions regarding "No matter who governs the country ..." (2008-2012)

Question: Do you agree with the statement "No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same"?	Responses in ...							Total
	Oct. 2008	April 2009	Oct. 2009	April 2010	Oct. 2010	April 2011	March 2012	
Agree	72.3%	75.3%	74.0%	69.9%	65.2%	59.3%	71.8%	70.6%
Disagree	27.7%	24.7%	26.0%	30.1%	34.8%	40.7%	28.2%	29.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2012

Table 4-52: Respondents' opinions regarding "No matter who governs the country ..."  
(2013-2016)

Question: Do you agree with the statement "No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same"?	Responses in ...				Total
	April 2013	March 2014	March 2015	March 2016	
Agree	66.8%	71.6%	70.9%	69.9%	69.4%
Disagree	33.2%	28.4%	29.1%	30.1%	30.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2013-2016

Out of the 16 democratic values asked about in SMF questionnaires, respondents have listed equal opportunity for all parties to come into government as the least important<sup>16</sup>. During the nine years when this issue was asked about in the polls, 26.6 per cent thought that this was not very important or totally unimportant. These judgements can be interpreted as an expression of frustration with how well political parties have performed in their governance.

The three tables below show how this question was answered in each of the polls between 2008 and 2016; again, data is listed in accordance with the periods of different government rule.

Table 4-53: Respondents' opinions regarding "equal chances of political parties ..."  
(2008)

Question: How do you judge the importance of the fact that, in a democracy "all parties have an equal chance to come into government"?	Responses in May 2008
Very important	30.3%
Rather important	46.5%
Rather not important	17.0%
Totally unimportant	6.2%
Total	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008

<sup>16</sup> A detailed analysis of all issues related to democratic values and principles is provided in chapter 5 of this study.

Table 4-54: Respondents' opinions regarding "equal chances of political parties ..." (2008-2012)

<b>Question:</b> <i>How do you judge the importance of the fact that, in a democracy "all parties have an equal chance to come into government"?</i>	Responses in ...							Total
	Oct. 2008	April 2009	Oct. 2009	April 2010	Oct. 2010	April 2011	March 2012	
Very important	28.7%	27.9%	26.5%	22.9%	25.4%	29.8%	23.9%	25.6%
Rather important	44.9%	43.2%	40.7%	50.6%	49.2%	47.1%	51.3%	48.2%
Rather not important	19.7%	19.4%	20.8%	17.8%	18.3%	16.9%	18.1%	18.5%
Totally unimportant	6.7%	9.6%	12.0%	8.7%	7.1%	6.2%	6.8%	7.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2012

Table 4-55: Respondents' opinions regarding "equal chances of political parties ..." (2013-2016)

<b>Question:</b> <i>How do you judge the importance of the fact that, in a democracy "all parties have an equal chance to come into government"?</i>	Responses in ...				Total
	April 2013	March 2014	March 2015	March 2016	
Very important	27.9%	22.6%	20.0%	19.7%	23.1%
Rather important	46.5%	46.6%	52.3%	47.8%	48.1%
Rather not important	18.5%	21.8%	19.3%	24.0%	20.8%
Totally unimportant	7.1%	8.9%	8.4%	8.5%	8.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2013-2016

## 4.8. Gender Issues

In the 2015 Global Gender Gap Report published by the World Economic Forum, Mongolia was ranked 56<sup>th</sup> out of 145 countries with a score of 0.709 (see: Table 4-56). This index determines the gender gaps present on the national level based on economic, political, education, and health criteria. On the indexes for “Health and Survival” and “Economic participation and Opportunity” Mongolia was ranked first and 22<sup>nd</sup>, respectively. The low rank for “Educational Attainment” was a result of disproportions between genders in the enrolment for “secondary education and tertiary education.” In fact, it was the female students who outnumbered the males (see: Table 4-57).

However, the main issue appears in “Political empowerment”, where Mongolia was ranked 117<sup>th</sup>. The low proportion of women in parliament and with posts at government ministries, in addition to the fact that Mongolia has never had a female head of state in the last 50 years, puts Mongolia far behind many countries. In fact, since the first democratic elections were held in 1992, the highest position a woman politician has ever reached was when Nyam-Osoryn Tuya was appointed as acting Prime Minister for just a few days, from July 22 to July 30 in 1999.

The number of women in parliament has always been below the world average of 19.5 per cent. The situation improved with the election law passed in 2012, which put up a quota requiring that women make up a minimum 20 per cent of all candidates nominated and approved by parties.

Although there is no quota for women parliamentarians, this change has increased the number of women elected to parliament. Women took nine of the 76 seats in the legislature after 2012 parliamentary election, and 13 seats after the 2016 election. However, this is still below the world average.

Table 4-56: Country Coverage 2015 (The World Economic Forum)

	<i>Global index</i>		<i>Economic participation and Opportunity</i>		<i>Educational Attainment</i>		<i>Health and Survival</i>		<i>Political Empowerment</i>	
	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
Mongolia	56	0.709	22	0.783	76	0.992	1	0.980	117	0.064

Table 4-57: Country Score Card (The World Economic Forum)

	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female to Male ratio</i>
<b>ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION AND OPPORTUNITY</b>	22	0.783			
Labour force participation	60	0.83	60	72	0.83
Wage equality to similar work (survey)	22	0.75	-	-	0.75
Estimated earned income (PPP US\$)	41	0.71	9998	14169	0.71
Legislators, senior officials, managers	15	0.72	42	58	0.72
Professional and technical workers	1	1.00	62	38	1.64
<b>EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT</b>	73	0.992			
Literacy rate	1	1.00	99	98	1.00
Enrolment in primary education	108	0.98	94	96	0.98
Enrolment in secondary education	1	1.00	86	78	1.11
Enrolment in tertiary education	1	1.00	73	51	1.42
<b>HEALTH SURVIVAL</b>	1	0.980			
Sex ratio at birth	1	0.94	-	-	0.95
Healthy life expectancy	1	1.06	64	57	1.12
<b>POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT</b>	117	0.084			
Women in parliament	102	0.17	14	86	0.17
Women in ministerial positions	105	0.13	11	89	0.13
Years with female head of state (last 50)	60	0.00	0	50	0.00

The attitudes and evaluations of respondents who participated in SMF studies will be disaggregated by gender for the next analysis. The main concern is to determine whether Mongolian women are passive in their lack of participation in politics or actively barred by the current holders of power. This chapter presents gender-specific findings, including the level of interest in politics among female and male respondents; their intentions and preferences when casting votes; their opinions towards the traditional gender role distribution; and their willingness to support woman candidates in elections.

#### 4.8.1. Interest in politics and voting intentions

In all SMF studies since September 1995, around 71 per cent of respondents said they were “very much interested”, “rather interested” or “sometimes interested, other times not” in politics (see: Table 4-58). That presents quite a high level of public attention to the topic. However, looking at each year individually shows a steady decrease in public interest in politics over time (see: Figure 4-66). When the data is disaggregated by gender, 75 per cent of male respondents and 69 per cent of female respondents reported interest in politics. Additionally, when looking at how interested they are in politics, men and women trend similarly. Nonetheless, the gender gap widens when comparing the rates of response for “very much interested” (see: Figure 4-67).

Table 4-58: How interested are you in politics? (Total of measurements since 1995 till 2015)

<i>1995 -2015</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
Very much interested	9%	6%	7%
Rather interested	26%	20%	23%
Sometimes interested, other times not	40%	43%	41%
Rather not interested	16%	20%	18%
Totally not interested	8%	10%	9%
(No answer)	1%	1%	1%
(Don't know)	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Figure 4-66: How interested are you in politics? (Combination of “Very much interested”, “Rather interested” and “Sometimes interested, other times not” responses)





Figure 4-67: How interested are you in politics? (“Very much interested” responses)




It should be mentioned that the frequency, which subjects chose the response “very much interested” peaked in 2008-2009, when protests broke out after 2008 election. Peaceful at the beginning, these protests turned to riots that resulted in five people killed, over 300 injured and over 700 arrests. The president declared a four-day state of emergency—the first in Mongolia’s history.

Nonetheless, slightly lower interest in politics hasn’t affected women’s intentions to cast their ballots at elections. The proportion of women who stated that they planned to participate in elections since 1995 has been nearly the same as the proportion of men. Moreover, the number of women who responded that they had planned to participate in elections since 2008 is slightly higher than males (see: Figure 4-68).



Figure 4-68: If elections were held tomorrow, would you participate?



In the latest SMF survey conducted in March 2016, a few months before that year’s parliamentary elections, the number of male and female respondents who said they would participate in the election was nearly identical—85.7 percent and 85.2 percent, respectively (see: Table 4-59). The difference of preferences appears when it comes to which party respondents of each gender say they will vote for. Female respondents have supported the MPP more than the DP (see: Table 4-60). This may be linked to the party’s capacity for problem solving (see: Table 4-61). The 43.6 per cent of women who named unemployment as the main problem facing Mongolia said that it could be better solved by the MPP versus 26.6 per cent who thought the DP could do the job.

For men, they are evenly split whether the DP or MPP is better equipped at solving unemployment. It should be noted that unemployment has led the list of most-important socio-political or economic problems facing the country since 2000. The second most-important problem has been the standards of living, which includes poverty and issues concerning insufficient income. Male respondents clearly prefer the MPP in solving this problem, with 59.5 per cent of responses answering in the favour.

Economy and manufacturing is another top problem that women say the MPP can better solve. Nearly half of women respondents, or 47.1 per cent, said the MPP could best solve this issue, while only 11.8 per cent thought the DP was more capable. For men, this gap is significantly smaller: 34.5 per cent named the MPP versus 31 per cent who chose the DP.

Overall, the MPP has received better ratings from respondents for its problem-solving capacity for all the important challenges facing the country than the DP. While 38.6 per cent of valid responses goes to the MPP, 29.4 per cent goes to the DP. For women, however, the gap is significantly larger.

Table 4-59: If Parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, would you participate?

<b>March 2016</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
YES	85.7%	85.2%	85.5%
NO	11.1%	10.7%	10.9%
(No answer)	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
(Don't know)	3.1%	3.9%	3.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 4-60: If Parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?

<b>March 2016</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
Mongolian People's Party	19.5%	22.7%	20.9%
Democratic Party	18.4%	16.0%	17.3%
MPRP	11.3%	9.6%	10.5%
Civic Will - Green Party	1.4%	1.3%	1.4%
MNDP	.4%	.4%	.4%
National Labour Party	4.2%	2.4%	3.4%
Other Party	1.0%	.3%	.7%
(No answer)	12.0%	13.1%	12.5%
(Don't know)	31.7%	34.2%	32.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 4-61: Party problem solving capacity by gender in 2016 (Top five problems, valid percentages)

<b>Top five problems</b>	<b>Mongolian People's Party</b>		<b>Democratic Party</b>	
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
1 Unemployment	32.7%	43.6%	31.0%	26.6%
2 Standard of living\ poverty\ income	59.5%	39.6%	19.0%	37.5%
3 Price increase\ Inflation	37.9%	30.0%	37.9%	20.0%
4 Economy\ manufacturing	34.5%	47.1%	31.0%	11.8%
5 Education	38.1%	27.3%	28.6%	18.2%
Total for all named problems	38.7%	38.4%	30.8%	27.4%
Total of valid responses	38.6%		29.4%	

When comparing each gender's support of the MPP and the DP between 2008 and 2016, the proportion of female respondents who said they would vote for the MPP was notably higher than males (see: Figure 4-69). On the contrary, there was no such evident gender difference in voting preferences for the DP (see: Figure 4-70).

Figure 4-69: Which party would you vote for? - vote for the MPP (based on valid percentage)





Figure 4-70: Which party would you vote for? - vote for the DP (based on valid percentage)



## 4.8.2. Equal rights and traditional gender role distribution

Despite some differences in attitudes between male and female respondents towards politics, Mongolian women show high levels of civil engagement than men. Women are not limited or banned by law from elections and are actively participating. The situation changes when it comes to the problem of equal rights between men and women, and gender stereotypes.

In May 2008, the Sant Maral Fund introduced a new section to its surveys that asked which statements best describe respondents’ personal democratic principles and values (a detailed analysis is described in the Chapter 5, “Democratic Values”). One statement was about the equal rights of men and women: “The following statements describe democratic principles and issues. Please rate the importance of each statement listed below: Men and women have equal rights.”

The summary of all responses from 2008 to 2016 shows that this statement about gender equality ranks as third in importance (see: Chapter 5, Table 5-6). When comparing by gender distribution, this issue is second in importance for female respondents, while third for male respondents (see: Table 4-62). Data collected throughout 2008 to 2016 shows that the proportion of female respondents who said that having equal rights was “very important” was always notably higher than males (see: Figure 4-71).

Table 4-62: Importance of democratic values (summary of surveys 2008-2016 and ranking of responses for male and female respondents)

<i>Ranking</i>	<i>Male respondents</i>	<i>Very important</i>	<i>Ranking</i>	<i>Female respondents</i>	<i>Very important</i>
1	All people are equally treated by the law	60.4	1	All people are equally treated by the law	59.0
2	The state provides for social justice in a market economy	46.0	2	Men and women have equal rights	47.5
3	Men and women have equal rights	43.9	3	The state provides for social justice in a market economy	45.6
4	Social differences are kept as small as possible	42.4	4	Income differences are kept as small as possible	43.2
5	Income differences are kept as small as possible	41.8	5	Social differences are kept as small as possible	42.4
6	There is a free, democratic market	41.5	6	There is a free, democratic market	40.6
7	All people have equal educational opportunities	37.8	7	All people have equal educational opportunities	38.7

*Table to be continued on next page*

Table 4-62 (continued)

8	Everybody can express his/her opinion freely	36.9	8	Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession	37.5
9	Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession	36.9	9	Everybody can express his/her opinion freely	37.0
10	Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property	36.7	10	Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property	35.7
11	Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during one's free time	32.2	11	The state provides as many social security services as possible	33.2
12	The state provides as many social security services as possible	30.7	12	Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during one's free time	32.3
13	Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia	30.1	13	Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia	29.3
14	All parties have an equal chance to come into government	25.6	14	Everybody can believe in what he/she wants	25.2
15	Everybody can believe in what he/she wants	24.5	15	All parties have an equal chance to come into government	25.2
16	I can travel wherever I want	21.8	16	I can travel wherever I want	21.6

Figure 4-71: Importance of the statement "Men and women have equal rights". ("Very important" responses)



Another way to measure public attitudes towards gender roles in society their reaction to the statement: "Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men". When first asked about this statement in the 2008 SMF poll, the proportion of female respondents who agreed with this affirmation of traditional gender roles was significantly lower than male responses. The summary of all valid responses from 2008 to 2016 shows a

gender gap of more than 6 per cent (see: Figure 4-72). When comparing the different social groups, the following patterns in attitudes can be observed:

- **Comparison by age groups in urban and rural areas:** Male respondents in the 40-49 age bracket in Ulaanbaatar and male respondents in the 50-59 age bracket in rural areas had the highest support for traditional gender roles, with 26.7 per cent and 25 per cent support, respectively (see: Table 4 -63).
- **Comparison by education in urban and rural areas:** 42.9 per cent of male respondents with no education who live in Ulaanbaatar appeared to be the most conservative group in their support of traditional roles (see: Table 4-64).
- **Comparison by occupation in urban and rural areas:** the highest support for traditional gender roles came from self-employed male respondents in urban areas (26.9 per cent in agreement), and nomadic herders and farmers in both urban and rural areas (28.3 per cent). Interestingly, analysis by occupation shows that self-employed female respondents in urban area had the highest proportion of agreement with the statement affirming traditional gender roles (21.6 per cent) (see: Table 4-65).

Figure 4-72: “Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men” (“Agree” responses)




Table 4-63: “Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men” (“Agree” responses) / Part A: Comparison by age groups

<b>Age groups</b>	<b>Urban</b>		<b>Rural</b>		<b>Nationwide</b>	
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
18 - 24	22.6%	16.1%	22.9%	17.3%	22.7%	16.6%
25 - 29	24.4%	17.6%	19.6%	13.8%	21.6%	15.4%
30 - 39	22.4%	17.0%	23.0%	15.7%	22.7%	16.2%
40 - 49	26.9%	17.6%	23.0%	17.4%	24.3%	17.5%
50 - 59	21.6%	18.8%	25.0%	15.3%	23.8%	16.6%
60 +	21.4%	18.4%	21.9%	19.0%	21.7%	18.7%
Total	23.3%	17.4%	22.8%	16.4%	23.0%	16.8%

Table 4-64: “Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men” (“Agree” responses) / Part B: Comparison by level of education

<b>Education</b>	<b>Urban</b>		<b>Rural</b>		<b>Nationwide</b>	
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
Illiterate	42.9%	23.1%	26.3%	24.0%	27.6%	23.8%
Primary education	24.4%	19.2%	21.3%	19.6%	22.1%	19.5%
Secondary education	25.8%	18.2%	26.1%	18.4%	26.0%	18.3%
Secondary special	23.5%	19.5%	24.3%	13.5%	24.0%	15.8%
College and university	20.0%	15.2%	18.2%	10.7%	19.2%	13.0%
Total	23.3%	17.4%	22.8%	16.3%	23.0%	16.8%

Table 4-65: “Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men” (“Agree” responses) / Part C: Comparison by occupation

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Urban</b>		<b>Rural</b>		<b>Nationwide</b>	
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
Workers	23.7%	17.7%	20.5%	15.0%	21.8%	16.1%
Clerical staff	23.1%	16.2%	20.0%	12.7%	21.4%	14.1%
Self-employed	26.9%	21.6%	23.2%	17.7%	24.8%	19.3%
Nomads / farmers	28.3%	14.0%	28.3%	17.8%	28.3%	17.5%
Intelligentsia	22.2%	13.2%	17.5%	10.2%	19.8%	11.8%
Total	24.6%	17.6%	22.7%	15.3%	23.4%	16.2%

In conclusion, generally there is strong support for equal rights between men and women. For female respondents, this issue is second in importance among democratic principles, which makes it a high priority for them. Male respondents who are less educated, are over 40 years old, or are employed in Mongolia’s traditional occupational sectors (mainly nomadic

herders and farmers), as well as the self-employed, are the social groups that most favour traditional gender roles.

### 4.8.3. Support for women candidates and female leaders

In the March 2012 SMF poll, before the 2012 parliamentary elections, interviewers asked about the likelihood that respondents would vote for a woman candidate:

*“If it happens to you during Elections to choose between two candidates: a man and a woman, and if both have equal qualities, what will be a chance that you will vote for the woman?”*

Half of respondents said they were “more likely” to vote for the woman candidate. Predictably, females gave more support to the woman candidate than men, by a margin of 14.5 per cent. However, there was a significant gap between urban and rural male respondents. Unexpectedly, urban men were 10 per cent less supportive of a woman candidate than rural (see: Table 4-66).

Table 4-66: “If it happens to you during Elections to choose between two candidates: a man and a woman, and if both have equal qualities, what will be a chance that you will vote for the woman?”

	<i>Urban (UB)</i>			<i>Rural (Aimags)</i>			<i>Nationwide</i>		
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Fe-male</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Fe-male</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Fe-male</i>	<i>Total</i>
More likely	37.9%	55.2%	46.8%	47.5%	60.6%	53.9%	43.7%	58.3%	50.9%
No difference	38.8%	27.9%	33.2%	35.2%	24.8%	30.1%	36.7%	26.1%	31.4%
Less likely	15.2%	8.2%	11.6%	8.0%	5.5%	6.8%	10.9%	6.7%	8.8%
(Don’t know)	8.0%	8.6%	8.3%	9.3%	9.1%	9.2%	8.8%	8.9%	8.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When looking more closely at different social groups, the following features can be observed:

- **Comparison by age groups in urban and rural areas:** Young male respondents in the 18-24 age bracket and elderly male respondents in the age bracket above 60 years old in urban areas were least likely to vote for women candidates. Young female respondents were more likely to support a woman candidate, but notably less compared with women of other age groups. The highest support came from female respondents over 50 years old in urban areas and in the 25-29 age bracket in rural areas (see: Table 4-67).
- **Comparison by education in urban and rural areas:** Male respondents with “Secondary special” or “College and University” education levels who lived in Ulaan-



baatar (or, in other words, the most educated group) were least likely to vote for a woman candidate, with 34.8 per cent and 28.4 per cent, respectively, against the woman candidate. This comes in sharp contrast with the group of illiterates (no formal education) male respondents in urban areas (60 per cent) and illiterate female respondents in both urban and rural areas, who were the most likely to vote for a woman, with 71.4 per cent and 70.7 per cent, respectively, in support of the woman candidate. Female respondents with “Secondary special” education in urban and rural areas were the next most-supportive group (see: Table 4-68).

- **Comparison by occupation in urban and rural areas:** Male respondents who classified themselves as “intelligentsia” were less likely to vote for a woman candidate, which was most evident in the urban areas. Male respondents in the nomadic herder and farmers group (a group that supported the traditional gender roles) in both urban and rural areas were more moderate in their support of a woman candidate than the most educated male respondents of the intelligentsia group. It was also found that 83.3 per cent of female respondents of the nomadic herder and farmer group in urban areas and 62.4 per cent in rural areas were likely to vote for a woman. (see: Table 4-69).

Table 4-67: Voting for woman candidate (“More likely” responses) / Part A: Comparison by age groups

<i>Age groups</i>	<i>Urban</i>		<i>Rural</i>		<i>Nationwide</i>	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
18 - 24	33.2%	47.7%	42.4%	58.2%	37.4%	52.0%
25 - 29	36.0%	57.0%	38.0%	63.8%	37.0%	60.7%
30 - 39	33.8%	58.3%	43.3%	60.1%	39.5%	59.4%
40 - 49	44.1%	52.4%	50.5%	61.2%	48.3%	58.2%
50 - 59	55.0%	61.9%	57.5%	59.9%	56.6%	60.5%
60 +	32.8%	60.6%	51.7%	58.7%	43.3%	59.5%
Total	38.1%	55.3%	47.6%	60.4%	43.7%	58.3%

Table 4-68: Voting for woman candidate (“More likely” responses) / Part B: Comparison by level of education

<i>Education</i>	<i>Urban</i>		<i>Rural</i>		<i>Nationwide</i>	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
Illiterate	60.0%	71.4%	42.4%	70.7%	44.6%	71.4%
Primary education	44.5%	51.6%	47.2%	59.8%	46.5%	57.3%
Secondary education	44.4%	55.8%	50.5%	59.7%	48.2%	58.0%
Secondary special	34.8%	65.3%	50.4%	68.6%	42.5%	67.2%
College and university	28.4%	53.8%	41.7%	56.8%	33.8%	55.2%
Total	37.9%	55.3%	47.5%	60.5%	43.7%	58.3%

Table 4-69: Voting for woman candidate (“More likely” responses) / Part C: Comparison by occupation

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Urban</i>		<i>Rural</i>		<i>Nationwide</i>	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
Workers	38.1%	57.4%	49.6%	63.9%	43.9%	60.2%
Clerical staff	40.4%	56.4%	43.2%	55.7%	41.6%	56.3%
Self-employed	42.9%	55.6%	45.2%	55.9%	44.1%	55.6%
Nomads / farmers	41.7%	83.3%	47.6%	62.4%	47.5%	63.3%
Intelligentsia	35.2%	47.6%	41.8%	59.4%	37.5%	52.0%
Total	39.7%	55.8%	47.0%	60.5%	44.2%	58.5%

Contrary to logical reasoning, the above analysis does not confirm the overall expectation that people who believe in maintaining traditional, stereotypical gender roles in society were less likely to vote for a woman candidate.

More evidence that a patriarchal approach in politics is not working can be seen in the outcome of the 2016 parliamentary elections. The 75<sup>th</sup> district of Ulan Bator is one visible example. DP Candidate Sh. Tuvdendorj, who is well known for his patriarchal attitudes, lost badly. Tuvdendorj finished third in his electoral race with 23.86 per cent of popular support. The first two positions were winning candidate Ms. B. Undarmaa from the MPP (36.78 per cent), followed by Ms. O. Tsolmon from the MPRP (27.98 per cent). Apparently, Tuvdendorj’s rhetoric promoting traditional values in his election campaign was not persuasive enough for the electorate, in addition to the economy, corruption and other factors that were more important to voters.

Traditionalist approach was the source of problems for another well-known Mongolian politician in the past. Being a president Mr P. Ochirbat issued a decree abolishing official celebration of the International Women’s Day. That decree created quite a strong feeling of dissatisfaction within a Mongolian society, which was used to celebrate the 8th of March for

decades. This unfortunate decision had undoubtedly added to the crushing defeat of Mr P. Ochirbat in 1997 Presidential Elections.

These observations lead to an assumption that women’s chances to win in elections depend upon far more complicated factors. One such factor is that educated men who classify themselves as intelligentsia and already have a strong presence on the decision-making level at institutions of power are not ready to vote for a woman candidate, even if she has equal qualities to a male counterpart.

In 1995-2007, only two women, S. Oyun and T. Gandi, appeared on the list of the top 20 leaders (see: Table 4-70). When examining 2008-2016, only S. Oyun remained among the top 20 politicians named by Mongolian respondents (see: Table 4-71). As a woman politician, she had the weighty seventh and sixth positions, respectively, on each of the top-20 lists.

Table 4-70: Top 20 Leaders between 1995-2007

<i>Leaders</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male%</i>	<i>Female%</i>
1. N. Bagabandi	5278	5375	10653	50%	50%
2. N. Enkhbayar	4927	5471	10398	47%	53%
3. R. Gonchigdorj	4055	4217	8272	49%	51%
4. B. Jargalsaikhan	2783	3260	6043	46%	54%
5. Ts. Elbegdorj	2881	3008	5889	49%	51%
6. M. Enkhsaikhan	2320	2374	4694	49%	51%
7. S. Oyun	1720	2340	4060	42%	58%
8. P. Jasrai	1831	1970	3801	48%	52%
9. L. Gundalai	1355	1680	3035	45%	55%
10. P. Ochirbat	1440	1562	3002	48%	52%
11. Ts. Nyamdorj	1274	1466	2740	46%	54%
12. B. Erdenebat (EREL)	1229	1256	2485	49%	51%
13. R. Amarjargal	1104	1286	2390	46%	54%
14. Ch. Ulaan	1229	1155	2384	52%	48%
15. B. Batbayar (Baabar)	1043	925	1968	53%	47%
16. J. Narantsatsralt	909	1028	1937	47%	53%
17. Da. Ganbold	828	768	1596	52%	48%
18. E. Bat-Uul	847	695	1542	55%	45%
19. S. Bayartsogt	768	665	1433	54%	46%
20. T. Gandi	359	671	1030	35%	65%

When the data is disaggregated by gender, both female leaders had a higher proportion of women among their supporters: Gandhi had 65 per cent and Oyun had 58 per cent support in 1995-2007. Oyun had 60 per cent support from women in 2008-2016.

Table 4-71: Top 20 Leaders between 2008-2016

<i>Leaders</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male%</i>	<i>Female%</i>
1. Ts. Elbegdorj	1518	1555	3073	49%	51%
2. N. Enkhbayar	1325	1374	2699	49%	51%
3. S. Bayar	1150	1203	2353	49%	51%
4. S. Ganbaatar	1147	1109	2256	51%	49%
5. N. Bagabandi	568	614	1182	48%	52%
6. S. Oyun	390	593	983	40%	60%
7. Ts. Nyamdorj	453	511	964	47%	53%
8. E. Bat-Uul	452	402	854	53%	47%
9. L. Gundalai	340	390	730	47%	53%
10. Z. Altai (25 channel)	351	360	711	49%	51%
11. Kh. Battulga	380	288	668	57%	43%
12. Sb.Batbold	299	299	598	50%	50%
13. Ch. Ulaan	297	252	549	54%	46%
14. B. Jargalsaikhan	304	236	540	56%	44%
15. Z. Enkhbold	265	239	504	53%	47%
16. R. Gonchigdorj	231	226	457	51%	49%
17. Kh. Temuujin	237	218	455	52%	48%
18. D.Enkhbat	228	194	422	54%	46%
19. S. Bayartsogt	209	205	414	50%	50%
20. B. Bat-Erdene	219	194	413	53%	47%

G. Uyanga became a rising star as a new female politician in 2012 and was a member of parliament from 2012 to 2016. Uyanga became the third most-prominent figure on the list of top-10 leaders in 2015 and the fourth on the same list for 2016 (see: Table 4 -72).

Table 4-72: Top 20 Leaders 2016

<i>Leaders</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male%</i>	<i>Female%</i>
1. S. Ganbaatar	163	116	279	58%	42%
2. N. Enkhbayar	126	98	224	56%	44%
3. Kh. Battulga	72	49	121	60%	40%
4. G. Uyanga	47	52	99	47%	53%
5. Ts. Elbegdorj	38	39	77	49%	51%
6. S. Byambatsogt	33	33	66	50%	50%
7. R. Amarjargal	38	24	62	61%	39%
8. J. Batsuur	35	25	60	58%	42%
9. Ch. Ulaan	39	21	60	65%	35%
10. S. Javkhlan	32	27	59	54%	46%
11. Ts. Nyamdorj	38	21	59	64%	36%
12. B. Bat-Erdene	38	21	59	64%	36%
13. Z. Enkhbold	30	18	48	63%	38%
14. N. Bagabandi	28	16	44	64%	36%
15. Byambasuren	28	11	39	72%	28%
16. Ch. Saikhanbileg	18	17	35	51%	49%
17. M. Enhbold	20	14	34	59%	41%
18. Lundejamtsan	16	15	31	52%	48%
19. S. Oyun	16	13	29	55%	45%
20. N. Altankhuyag	18	9	27	67%	33%

#### 4.8.4. Widening Gender Gap

##### Education

Data from the World Economic Forum on education attainment (Table 4-57) depicts a gender imbalance in primary, secondary and tertiary education. In primary education, the proportion of males is slightly higher compared with females (which is within the demographic frame of age and gender distribution). The situation is reversed in secondary, but the difference between the number of male and female students is still modest. On the level of tertiary education, the difference between genders becomes significant, with a female-to-male ratio of 1.42. Table 4-73 shows data from the National Statics Office on graduates from all levels of educational institutions from 2006-2007 through to 2015-2016. On this table the group of graduates from universities, institutes and colleges held steady with a higher proportion of female students over male—on average 64 per cent over the 10-year time.


Table 4-73: Graduates of educational institutions of all levels at the beginning of an academic year

<i>Classification of educational institutions</i>	<i>2006/2007</i>	<i>2007/2008</i>	<i>2008/2009</i>	<i>2009/2010</i>	<i>2010/2011</i>	<i>2011/2012</i>	<i>2012/2013</i>	<i>2013/2014</i>	<i>2014/2015</i>	<i>2015/2016</i>	<i>Sum 2007-2016</i>
Total	132.8	134.5	134	139.5	133.7	167.8	150.6	137.4	127.7	111.8	1,369.8
Of which: female%	55%	55%	55%	55%	55%	54%	54%	53%	53%	53%	54%
General educational schools	99.9	96.2	89.8	90.2	86.7	107	90	85.1	73.5	56.4	874.8
Of which: female%	53%	53%	53%	52%	52%	52%	52%	51%	51%	52%	52%
Technical and vocational schools	7	8.7	11.2	15.1	11.2	23.1	23.4	18.4	19	20	156.6
Of which: female%	49%	46%	47%	48%	47%	49%	44%	43%	43%	41%	45%
Universities, Institutes and colleges	25.9	29.6	33	34.2	35.8	37.7	37.2	33.9	35.2	35.9	338.4
Of which: female%	65%	66%	64%	65%	64%	64%	64%	64%	62%	61%	64%

*Source: Mongolian Statistical Yearbook 2016*

To look closer at the situation there is the SMF cross-tabulation by gender and education for 2008-2016. The data shows that the area with the highest proportional gender gap is in high education: 15.2 per cent of females against 11.3 per cent of males.

Figure 4-73: Gender / education band, average 2008-2016




The question is if the imbalance in education is narrowing or widening? To check, education has been coded and organised in elevating order from 1 (“no formal education”) to 5 (“high education”). The graphic for 1995-2016 (see: Figure 4-74) shows a visible decline in the level of education for the average Mongolian. Another observation is the level of education is declining faster in the male population.

The gender gap has widened since 1995. From 1995 to 2007, the education level was on average 3.60 for males and 3.64 for females; from 2008 to 2016, the average was 3.25 for males and 3.44 for females. A reverse in the trend for education with a growing proportionate of all respondents with higher education started in 2011, but it may have been only temporary.

Without a doubt, this situation will create an impact on the labour market and the rates of employment between genders. Market demand is becoming more selective, while demanding more experience and education.

Figure 4-74: Gender Education Level - Trends of Mongolian education level (average from 1: “no formal education” to 5: “college or university”)



## Religion

The Mongolian population predominantly is split between two big groups (Figure 4 -75). The first group is inherited from the socialist past and does not refer itself to any specific religion or sect. Males are more present in this group. A linear trend lines shows that the male population is fixed at 40 per cent, while the proportion of females without religious association is growing. Starting from 2013, these two trends are narrowing the distance between the proportion of males and females.

Figure 4-75: Religious affiliations, based on aggregated SMF data 2008-2016








Figure 4-76: Groups with no religious-affiliations in Mongolian society



The biggest religious group in Mongolian society are the Buddhists. Together, with non-believers, they comprise over 90 per cent of the population. With some periods of ups and downs in association, the proportion of Buddhists is slightly above half of the population—52.8 per cent. The gender gap in believers to non-believers is thinner. As expected, Mongolia has more Buddhists among women than males. On the other side, the rising proportion of women without religious association (see: Figure 4-76) has resulted in a declining trend in the number of Buddhist women. Males are more constant and have fixed position around 52 per cent.

The main reason for the decline in Buddhist belief in the female population can be connected to the complete male domination in the Buddhist organisational structure. The Buddhist religion in this respect is not much different from others, and by closing the door to women they should be ready for a declining number of followers. In the past, the Communists in Russia, China and Mongolia had a strong advantage against their religious rivals by giving women a better chance to actively participate in social life.

Figure 4-77: Proportion of Buddhists, by gender



### Self-reliance vs. Dependency

In Mongolian society both males and females are similar in their self-reliance. On average, half of the population (both male and female) believes their futures depend on their own achievements (see: Figure 4-78). Around 40 per cent would rather rely on the state (see: Figure 4-79). There is a slightly higher proportion of state-dependent females than males. That could be the result of families’ needs and widespread dependence on social welfare, such as monetary allowances granted for children being raised. As Mongolian household finances are run by females, they are more interested in additional income. Sometimes it’s the only source of income to keep a family afloat.

Similar to dependence on the state, is the dependence on “other forces”. This is third and the smallest group of dependence, and it can be assumed that in most cases “other forces” means respondents’ family connections. The gender gap is widening during critical times for the national economy. Comparing the “self” and “state” dependents reveals a rather stable trend of a higher proportion of females over time (see: Figure 4-81, Figure 4-80).

Figure 4-78: What do you think, does your future depend on your own achievements, the State, or on other forces: average 2008-2016




Figure 4-79: What do you think, does your future depend on your own achievements, the State, or on other forces: your own achievements




Figure 4-80: What do you think, does your future depend on your own achievements, the State, or on other forces: State





Figure 4-81: What do you think, does your future depend on your own achievements, the State, or on other forces: Other forces



## Media usage trends

The April 2017 SMF media survey gives a glimpse at the impact of the existing gender differentiation in media. Interviewers asked: “How much time do you spend daily on the following media:” with six different responses available starting from:

- 1 - “No time”;
- 2 - “Less than 0.5 hour”;
- 3 - “0.5 hour to one hour”;
- 4 - “More than one hour, up to two hours”;

- 5 – More than two hours, up to three hours” and;
- 6 – “More than three hours”.


(Results by media carriers are presented in Figure 4-82)

Television is unquestionably the most popular media outlet. The average response for usage was “from 2 to 3 hours a day”. Television watching is slightly higher among the male population.

The mobile phone is the second most-popular medium, and it is more popular among females: 2.65 for females against 2.35 for males. The gap in education has somehow created an obstacle for men in reading books. Reading appears an attribute of more intellectually advanced groups, such as the intelligentsia, in SMF surveys.

On the other hand, the male population is more inclined to listen to radio.

Figure 4-82: Usage of media carriers by gender (from “no time”- 0 to “more than 3 hours a day” – 6)



More differentiation can be found in the type of media content preferred by each gender. The area of the highest interest is “local affairs,” which characterises the Mongolian population as rather introverted. Sixty-five per cent of males and 69.5 per cent of females were expressing interest in “local affairs”.

Two important subjects followed are politics and economy. These topics are mainly in

the domain of male interests. Politics is of interest to 37 per cent of males against 24.7 per cent of females. The economy is interesting for 33.9 per cent of males and 26.2 per cent females. Perhaps this reflects, in some ways, the incessant drive of the male population towards political power, which creates the gender disproportion at political institutions.


Foreign news is less important but has the same disproportion between genders.

Yet again arises the education problem. The male population is not only less educated on average but is much less inclined to practice self-education. Only 3.1 per cent of males are interested in educational content compared with 10.9 per cent of females.

Sport content is an area where males are unrivalled: 27.9 per cent of males are interested in sports against 5.2 per cent of females. The same domination is apparent in technology.

According to the National Statistics Office’s Statistical Yearbook for 2016, 41 per cent of males are over 60 years old compared with 59 per cent of females. This proportion might be maintained or even widened as “health and healthy life” content is more favoured by 35.9 per cent of females versus 10.9 per cent of males only.

Figure 4-83: Gender interest areas



# 5

## VALUES

### 5.1 Changing Concepts of Value

Mongolia has continuously undergone serious cultural transformations for about a century. This transformation process is still far from over, but it is becoming more sophisticated under the current trends of globalisation. Complex political and economic events have caused certain cultural values to gain and lose importance over time, or sometimes overlap with each other.

The Lamaism Buddhist culture dominated Mongolian society until the beginning of the 20th century. It pushed its rival Shamanism to remote Northern areas, such as Khuvsgul and even further beyond. The dominating values of that time were presumably Buddhist. We refer to the writings of the Buddhist spiritual leader Tenzin Gyatso, more commonly known as Dalai Lama, for a full categorisation of the basic values of Buddhism. In his book *Key to the Middle Way*, Gyatso describes the following “Three Treasures”, or the “Three Refuges”, of Buddhism:

<b>Three Buddhist Treasures</b>
Buddha
Buddhist teaching
Buddhist spiritual community

When communist ideology emerged in the 20th century, Russia used Mongolians’ incessant drive for independence to spread its influence. The communists completely wiped out Buddhist influence from the whole country in a relatively short time through a violent purge. The following is a breakdown of communism when applying to it the prism of the “Three Treasures”:

<b>Three “Communist Treasures”</b>
Marks, Engels, Lenin
Communist ideology
Communist party


To apply the “Three Treasures” lens to contemporary Mongolian society, we start with the 2008-2016 poll data on religious affiliations. Table 5-1 shows there are two major groups in society: Buddhists and those with no religious affiliations. Among the other religions, shamanism has grown considerably but remains around 4 per cent.

Table 5-1: Confession of respondents in polls (2008-2016)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
No confession	35.1%	41.6%	37.3%	36.6%	38.9%	39.2%	36.2%	34.7%	43.1%	38.4%
Buddhism	58.7%	50.8%	54.6%	53.7%	50.5%	53.4%	54.3%	59.2%	51.1%	53.2%
Christianity	2.5%	2.9%	2.6%	3.6%	1.9%	1.8%	1.7%	1.4%	1.1%	2.1%
Islam/Muslim	0.3%	0.9%	0.5%	0.6%	3.9%	1.1%	0.9%		0.3%	1.6%
Shamanism	1.6%	2.5%	4.4%	4.5%	3.8%	3.9%	5.5%	4.4%	4.0%	3.7%
Other	1.8%	1.3%	0.5%	1.0%	0.9%	0.6%	1.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-1: Confession of respondents in polls (2008-2016)



After only 25 years since the democratic transformation, it may be too early to say that this or that value is deeply rooted in Mongolian society. However, there is a definite renaissance of Buddhism, and its values are widely apparent here. The leftist political attitudes held by Mongolians and their anti-oligarch sentiments show that there still is fertile ground for communist ideology. Meanwhile, widespread superstitious beliefs are the base for shaman-



ism.

Consumerism in contemporary Mongolian society, like in other post-communist countries, was a driving factor for the dismantling of the old communist system—if not the strongest one. Somehow this ended in a bizarre amalgamation of communist and consumerist attitudes. Approximately 40 per cent of the population wants to eliminate any differences in income because of a very strong belief that consumption should be equal. The realisation of this radical dream would remove any drive to take risks in business, however. Society would become equally poor rather than equally rich because of the economic stagnation that inevitably would result. The other possible end would be a return to communism.

This clash of consumerism and communism has grown more volatile in recent years, and it could endanger Mongolia’s democratic achievements. The example of Russia’s “sovereign democracy” shows how democracy can be traded in for more consumption.

When the consumerism present in Mongolian society is put through the prism of the Dalai Lama’s teaching, it might look this way:

<b>Three “Consumer Treasures”</b>
Consumer
Consumption culture
Consumer products

But how strongly have basic democratic values taken root in Mongolian society? The latest ranking of democratic values from March 2016 shows that at the very top of the list is “All people are equally treated by the law”. That compares with 89.1 per cent in 2008, when SMF surveys first included the question about democratic values. That observation undoubtedly demonstrates that rule of law precedes all other democratic values.


A comparison of data from 2008 and 2016 is included in Table 5-2, showing all 16 democratic value statements. Figure 5-2 shows the results of the latest survey. A more detailed analysis of the ten democratic value statements that are considered most important is in a later, separate section of this study.

Table 5-2: Importance of democratic values

<b>Question:</b> How important do you consider these democratic values?	<b>Responses „very important“ or „rather important“</b>	
	<b>May 2008</b>	<b>March 2016</b>
All people are equally treated by the law	89.1%	92.7%
Social differences are kept as small as possible	83.3%	88.8%
Everybody can express his/her opinion freely	82.7%	88.5%
Everybody has the right to enter one’s desired profession	82.6%	88.1%
The state provides for social justice in a market economy	85.3%	88.0%
Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property	78.1%	87.3%
All people have equal educational opportunities	79.0%	86.2%
Income differences are kept as small as possible	76.8%	85.7%
Men and women have equal rights	80.6%	85.0%
There is a free, democratic market	80.4%	83.2%
Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during one’s free time	73.7%	82.1%
The state provides as many social security services as possible	76.8%	77.6%
I can travel wherever I want	66.3%	75.0%
Everybody can believe in what he/she wants	68.8%	69.9%
Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia	69.8%	69.1%
All parties have an equal chance to come into government	66.2%	61.8%

Source: SMF database 2008-2016

Figure 5-2: Importance of democratic values




However, the assumption that the rule of law is unchallenged in Mongolian society may lead to the wrong conclusion. A 2005 survey included the regularly appearing question: “What should be the foundation of the social order in Mongolia?” Responses showed that slightly less than two-thirds of respondents selected the rule of law, and nearly one-third showed a preference for the Confucian rules of ethics.

Table 5-3: Opinions regarding the issue: of “Rule of law” vs. “Rule of ethics”

<b>Question:</b> <i>What should be the foundation of the social order in Mongolia?</i>	<b>Responses</b>		
	<b>Countryside</b>	<b>Ulaanbaatar</b>	<b>Nationwide</b>
Every person should have equal rights before the law	63.9%	61.4%	62.8%
Ethical relations that benefit society	28.6%	33.8%	30.8%
“Don’t know” or no response	7.6%	4.8%	6.5%

Source: SMF database, 2015

Figure 5-3: Opinions regarding the issue of “Rule of law” vs. “Rule of ethics”



The struggle for dominance between law and ethics that is taking place in Mongolia is also spreading to the geopolitical level. Two of the main players in Mongolia, the USA and China, are using their influence to promote their visions of social order. With the Confucius Institute, China has created its own counterpart to US volunteer civil service group the Peace Corps. According to unofficial information, the Peace Corps in 2015 had approximately 180 volunteers working in Mongolia during summer (when the number of volunteers is at its annual peak). The Confucius Institute matched its American counterpart with about 200 volunteers. These volunteers are predominantly engaged in teaching language at Mongolian schools.

There is yet another example of potential problems with the Mongolian judicial system. The Sant Maral Foundation monitored the pace of reforms in judicial administration from 2001 to 2007. Despite the slow pace it took to implement the reforms, they made some definite positive advancement to Mongolia’s judicial system. On the other hand, 14 per cent of SMF poll respondents reported that they were involved in disputes outside the court system. What is most spectacular, is the growth in the number of disputes settled by “mutual agreement”, from 20.8 per cent in 2001 to 64.6 per cent in 2007. That development might really


please the legendary philosopher Confucius, who tried his best to keep Chinese subjects outside of the courtroom.

Table 5-4: Settlement of disputes outside court

<b>Question:</b> <i>Have you ever been involved in any process to settle a dispute that did not involve a court proceeding?</i>	<b>Respondents answering „yes“</b>				
	<b>Nov. 2001</b>	<b>May 2003</b>	<b>March 2005</b>	<b>Sept. 2007</b>	<b>Total</b>
Countryside	9.4%	13.6%	12.0%	14.4%	12.2%
Ulaanbaatar	19.7%	18.4%	14.9%	13.6%	16.8%
Total	13.6%	15.5%	13.2%	14.1%	14.1%

Source: SMF database, 2001-2007

Figure 5-4: Settlement of disputes outside court



During the same period in 2001-2008, the number of cases settled through a decision made by a governor dropped from 40.8 to 14.2 per cent.


Table 5-5: Chosen process to settle cases outside the court system

<b>Question:</b> <i>What type of process to settle such dispute outside the court system was this? *)</i>	<b>Nov. 2001</b>	<b>May 2003</b>	<b>March 2005</b>	<b>Sept. 2007</b>
Decision by the governor	40.8%	39.1%	20.2%	14.2%
Decision by another gov. agency	10.0%	4.9%	3.9%	4.6%
Decision by law enforcement	24.1%	25.9%	25.3%	17.4%
Decision by a NGO	10.3%	13.9%	2.4%	3.9%
Decision through mutual agreement	20.8%	26.6%	52.1%	64.6%
Other	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	1.0%

\*) Answers includes some multiple responses

Source: SMF data base 2001-2007

Figure 5-5: Chosen process to settle cases outside the court system



## 5.2 Democratic Values

In May 2008, the Sant Maral Foundation introduced a new section to the questionnaires of its regular opinion polls, concerning specific values (or principles) for a democratic system. Respondents were asked in thirteen polls conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation until March 2016 to judge the importance of these democratic values<sup>17</sup>.

- 1) I can travel wherever I want
- 2) Everybody can believe in what he/she wants
- 3) Everybody can express his/her opinion freely
- 4) Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia
- 5) Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession
- 6) Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during one's free time
- 7) There is a free, democratic market
- 8) Men and women have equal rights
- 9) All parties have an equal chance to come into government
- 10) All people have equal educational opportunities
- 11) Income differences are kept as small as possible
- 12) All people are equally treated by the law
- 13) The state provides as many social security services as possible
- 14) Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property
- 15) Social differences are kept as small as possible
- 16) The state provides for social justice in a market economy

Table 5-6 shows a summary of all responses in 2008-2016, by ranking of importance.

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<sup>17</sup> The list shown here replicates the sequence in which the 16 issues were listed in the questionnaire and does not represent a hierarchy of importance. A ranking based on the latest poll is provided in Table 53 85. Further details are shown in the analysis below. Respondents were given these statements and asked to judge the importance they attach to these values and principles: Very important / rather important / rather not important / totally unimportant.

Table 5-6: Importance of democratic values (summary and ranking of responses, including all age groups)

<i>Ranking</i>		<i>Very important</i>	<i>Rather important</i>	<i>Rather not important</i>	<i>Totally unimportant</i>	<i>Total</i>
1	All people are equally treated by the law	59.7%	37.3%	2.4%	0.6%	100%
2	The state provides for social justice in a market economy	45.8%	49.0%	4.0%	1.1%	100%
3	Men and women have equal rights	45.8%	46.4%	6.1%	1.7%	100%
4	Social differences are kept as small as possible	42.4%	51.1%	5.4%	1.2%	100%
5	There is a free, democratic market	41.1%	51.2%	6.2%	1.5%	100%
6	Income differences are kept as small as possible	42.5%	47.9%	7.9%	1.7%	100%
7	Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property	36.2%	55.4%	6.7%	1.7%	100%
8	Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession	37.2%	53.7%	7.3%	1.8%	100%
9	Everybody can express his/her opinion freely	37.0%	53.4%	7.5%	2.2%	100%
10	All people have equal educational opportunities	38.3%	50.8%	8.6%	2.4%	100%
11	Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during one's free time	32.3%	52.8%	12.2%	2.8%	100%
12	The state provides as many social security services as possible	32.0%	48.5%	15.4%	4.1%	100%
13	Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia	29.7%	47.9%	16.6%	5.9%	100%
14	Everybody can believe in what he/she wants	24.8%	51.9%	17.7%	5.6%	100%
15	I can travel wherever I want	21.7%	56.1%	17.4%	4.8%	100%
16	All parties have an equal chance to come into government	25.4%	48.0%	19.0%	7.6%	100%

Source: SMF database, database, 2008-2016



To show how the importance of these democratic values and principles has changed over time in a graph, responses are coded on a scale ranging from +2.00 (“very important”) to -2.00 (“totally unimportant”), with the values +1.00 (“rather important”) and -1.00 (rather unimportant”) in between.


The results show that none of the 16 democratic values or principles received negative values on the scale. What can be observed, however, is a rather consistent level of importance people attach to most of these issues over the long term.

Below are graphs measuring the importance respondents attach to all 16 statement from all polls conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation from May 2008 to March 2016.


Graph 5-1: Importance of the issue: “All people are equally treated by the law” (coded responses)




Graph 5-2: Importance of the issue: “The state provides for social justice in a market economy” (coded responses)




Graph 5-3: Importance of the issue: “Men and women have equal rights” (coded responses)



Graph 5-4: Importance of the issue: “Social differences are kept as small as possible” (coded responses)



Graph 5-5: Importance of the issue: “There is a free, democratic market” (coded responses)




Graph 5-6: Importance of the issue: “Income differences are kept as small as possible” (coded responses)



Graph 5-7: Importance of the issue: “Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property” (coded responses)



Graph 5-8: Importance of the issue: “Everybody has the right to enter one’s desired profession” (coded responses)



Graph 5-9: Importance of the issue: “Everybody can express his/her opinion freely” (coded responses)




Graph 5-10: Importance of the issue: “All people have equal educational opportunities” (coded responses)




Graph 5-11: Importance of the issue: “Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during one’s free time” (coded responses)




Graph 5-12: Importance of the issue: “The state provides as many social security services as possible” (coded responses)



Graph 5-13: Importance of the issue: “Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia” (coded responses)



Graph 5-14: Importance of the issue: “Everybody can believe in what he/she wants” (coded responses)



Graph 5-15: Importance of the issue: “I can travel wherever I want” (coded responses)



Graph 5-16: Importance of the issue: “All parties have an equal chance to come into government” (coded responses)



There have been some differences in opinions between young and old respondents. While the top -10 issues were the same among respondents under 30 years old and above 50 (opinions are identical with the general opinion of all respondents), the ranking of their importance varies. Table 5-7 shows the judgement of the younger generation (respondents under 30 years of age), while Table 5-8 shows the views of respondents who are 50 years or older.

After these tables is a comparison of the views of a) the younger generation; b) the older generation; and c) the overall average for each of the top -10 issues. All further analysis will, however, not specifically study how opinions from various generations differ. Instead, all responses will be looked at from the perspective of each social group and their views on the matter.

Table 5-7: Importance of democratic values (only “top-10” answers by respondents under 30 years old)

<i>Ranking</i>		<i>Very important</i>	<i>Rather important</i>	<i>Rather not important</i>	<i>Totally unimportant</i>	<i>Total</i>
1	All people are equally treated by the law	61.2%	35.1%	3.0%	0.7%	100%
2	Men and women have equal rights	49.0%	42.8%	6.4%	1.7%	100%
3	The state provides for social justice in a market economy	46.3%	47.6%	4.9%	1.2%	100%
4	Social differences are kept as small as possible	44.5%	48.6%	5.4%	1.5%	100%
5	There is a free, democratic market	43.1%	48.9%	6.3%	1.7%	100%
6	Everybody has the right to enter one’s desired profession	42.9%	48.0%	7.3%	1.7%	100%
7	Everybody can express his/her opinion freely	42.1%	49.5%	6.5%	1.8%	100%
8	Income differences are kept as small as possible	43.9%	45.8%	8.6%	1.7%	100%
9	All people have equal educational opportunities	41.9%	47.6%	8.1%	2.4%	100%
10	Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property	38.4%	53.8%	6.5%	1.3%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-8: Importance of democratic values (only “top-10” answers by respondents who are 50 years or older)

<i>Ranking</i>		<i>Very important</i>	<i>Rather important</i>	<i>Rather not important</i>	<i>Totally unimportant</i>	<i>Total</i>
1	All people are equally treated by the law	58.9%	38.6%	1.9%	0.6%	100%
2	The state provides for social justice in a market economy	45.8%	50.0%	3.3%	0.9%	100%
3	Men and women have equal rights	44.0%	48.5%	6.0%	1.5%	100%
4	Social differences are kept as small as possible	42.4%	52.0%	4.7%	0.8%	100%
5	Income differences are kept as small as possible	42.2%	49.6%	6.8%	1.4%	100%
6	There is a free, democratic market	39.6%	53.0%	6.2%	1.3%	100%
7	Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property	35.2%	57.1%	6.0%	1.8%	100%
8	All people have equal educational opportunities	36.0%	53.3%	8.7%	2.0%	100%
9	Everybody has the right to enter one’s desired profession	33.0%	58.4%	7.0%	1.6%	100%
10	Everybody can express his/her opinion freely	33.6%	56.7%	7.6%	2.1%	100%

*Source: SMF database, 2008-2016*

The comparison of how value statements are ranked in Table 5-9 shows that the top-three issues are the same in all age groups, whereby respondents under 30 years old attach slightly more importance to gender equality than older people. On the other hand, young people consider issues related to personal property far less important than the rest of the population.

The judgements of most respondents who are over 50 years old on the 10 most-important issues are very close to the average opinion expressed by respondents over the nine-year period.



Table 5-9: Ranking of “top-10” answers by different age groups

	<i>Ranking according to opinion of people under 30 years</i>	<i>Ranking according to opinion of people 50 years or older</i>	<i>Opinion of all respondents</i>
All people are equally treated by the law	<b>1st</b>	<b>1st</b>	<b>1st</b>
The state provides for social justice in a market economy	<b>3rd</b>	<b>2nd</b>	<b>2nd</b>
Men and women have equal rights	<b>2nd</b>	<b>3rd</b>	<b>3rd</b>
Social differences are kept as small as possible	<b>4th</b>	<b>4th</b>	<b>4th</b>
There is a free, democratic market	<b>5th</b>	<b>6th</b>	<b>5th</b>
Income differences are kept as small as possible	<b>8th</b>	<b>5th</b>	<b>6th</b>
Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property	<b>10th</b>	<b>7th</b>	<b>7th</b>
Everybody has the right to enter one’s desired profession	<b>6th</b>	<b>9th</b>	<b>8th</b>
Everybody can express his/her opinion freely	<b>7th</b>	<b>10th</b>	<b>9th</b>
All people have equal educational opportunities	<b>9th</b>	<b>8th</b>	<b>10th</b>

*Source: SMF database, 2008-2016*

The ten issues considered most important over the 2008-2016 period is further analysed hereafter. The observations made over the course of almost a decade show that the opinions on the importance of each democratic principle remained relatively stable. There was no significant change over time, and certainly none of the ten issues prioritised by respondents lost importance altogether.

### **5.2.1 ISSUE 1: “All people are equally treated by the law”**


With 97 per cent of all respondents regarding equal treatment of all people “very important” or “rather important”, this issue received the highest attention from everyone who participated in the polls. However, most people do not believe that this principle is always maintained. As discussed in chapter 4.7 of this study, nearly 80 per cent of respondents agree with the statement: “the rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created”.

Table 5-10: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 1: "All people are equally treated by the law" (all responses 2008-2016)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very important	59.5%	59.7%	59.1%	58.4%	60.1%	64.4%	59.5%	50.0%	61.5%
Rather important	37.3%	37.1%	39.0%	39.7%	37.7%	33.5%	37.0%	43.4%	32.6%
Rather not important	2.6%	2.4%	1.6%	1.5%	1.8%	1.8%	2.2%	5.1%	4.5%
Totally unimportant	0.6%	0.7%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	1.3%	1.5%	1.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-6: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 1: "All people are equally treated by the law" (all responses 2008-2016)



The issue of all people receiving equal treatment under the law tops the list of priorities for every generation. In all age groups, around 60 per cent regard this issue as "very important", and nearly 40 per cent judge it as "rather important". Together, that's 95 per cent who attach importance to the matter (see: Table 5-11).

Table 5 11: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 1: "All people are equally treated by the law" (by age group)

	<b>Age of respondents</b>						<b>Total</b>
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	62.5%	59.8%	59.3%	59.2%	59.1%	58.6%	59.7%
Rather important	33.5%	36.9%	37.7%	38.0%	38.3%	39.1%	37.3%
Rather not important	3.2%	2.7%	2.4%	2.2%	2.1%	1.7%	2.4%
Totally unimportant	0.9%	0.5%	0.6%	0.7%	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

The same applies to all income groups (see: Table 5-12) and all social groups (see: Table 5-13). There is also little variation in the opinions of respondents who favour different political parties (see: Table 5-14).

Table 5-12: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 1: “All people are equally treated by the law” (by household income)

	<b>Estimated annual household income in MNT</b>						<b>Total</b>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	60.1%	58.9%	59.5%	59.4%	60.0%	61.0%	59.7%
Rather important	37.2%	38.3%	37.9%	38.0%	36.9%	34.4%	37.3%
Rather not important	2.0%	2.4%	2.1%	2.0%	2.4%	3.5%	2.3%
Totally unimportant	0.8%	0.4%	0.5%	0.6%	0.7%	1.0%	0.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-13: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 1: “All people are equally treated by the law” (by social status)

	<b>Social Status</b>				<b>Total</b>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	63.8%	58.8%	60.1%	63.0%	59.8%
Rather important	31.8%	38.4%	37.1%	33.9%	37.2%
Rather not important	3.6%	2.3%	2.2%	2.4%	2.4%
Totally unimportant	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	0.8%	0.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-14: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 1: "All people are equally treated by the law" (by favoured political party)

	<i>Favoured party of respondents</i>				<i>Total</i>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	56.3%	61.2%	58.6%	62.9%	58.9%
Rather important	40.9%	36.3%	37.9%	31.6%	38.2%
Rather not important	2.3%	1.8%	2.8%	3.6%	2.2%
Totally unimportant	0.5%	0.7%	0.7%	1.8%	0.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

## 5.2.2 ISSUE 2: "The state provides for social justice in a market economy"

The second-most important issue, again, has more than 90 per cent consensus from all respondents: social justice. The issue was considered slightly more important in 2008-2009 than in 2015-2016 (see: Table 5-15). However, it remains a high priority, particularly among older participants (see: Table 5-16).

Respondents with high incomes are somewhat less concerned with the matter than those with low incomes (see: Table 5-17).

Table 5-15: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 2: "The state provides for social justice in a market economy" (all responses 2008-2016)

	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>
Very important	47.0%	52.5%	44.5%	43.3%	45.0%	49.8%	48.0%	37.2%	40.5%
Rather important	46.9%	42.8%	51.0%	50.9%	51.5%	45.0%	47.7%	52.9%	51.7%
Rather not important	4.6%	3.4%	3.5%	5.0%	2.9%	4.3%	2.6%	8.2%	6.4%
Totally unimportant	1.5%	1.3%	1.0%	0.9%	0.6%	1.0%	1.7%	1.8%	1.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-7: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 2: “The state provides for social justice in a market economy” (all responses 2008-2016)




Table 5-16: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 2: “The state provides for social justice in a market economy” (by age group)

	<i>Age of respondents</i>						<i>Total</i>
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	47.4%	45.0%	44.9%	46.3%	44.9%	46.9%	45.8%
Rather important	46.2%	49.2%	49.4%	49.1%	50.0%	50.1%	49.0%
Rather not important	4.8%	4.9%	4.7%	3.3%	3.9%	2.5%	4.0%
Totally unimportant	1.6%	0.9%	0.9%	1.3%	1.2%	0.5%	1.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-17: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 2: “The state provides for social justice in a market economy” (by household income)

	<i>Estimated annual household income in MNT</i>						<i>Total</i>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	49.8%	46.8%	48.0%	44.3%	44.1%	44.9%	45.8%
Rather important	45.8%	48.9%	47.8%	50.3%	50.5%	48.4%	49.1%
Rather not important	3.5%	3.3%	3.2%	4.3%	4.4%	5.5%	4.0%
Totally unimportant	0.8%	1.0%	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	1.3%	1.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Because of the generally high level of importance put on the issue of social justice, it is only slightly apparent that the Disadvantaged group value it highest in importance (see: Table 5-18).

Table 5-18: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 2: “The state provides for social justice in a market economy” (by social status)

	<b>Social Status</b>				<b>Total</b>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	49.8%	45.3%	44.8%	48.1%	45.8%
Rather important	44.3%	49.8%	50.1%	46.7%	49.1%
Rather not important	4.5%	3.9%	4.1%	3.8%	4.0%
Totally unimportant	1.4%	1.0%	1.0%	1.4%	1.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Respondents who favour the MPRP are most-concerned with social justice, followed by supporters of the Democratic Party. Respondents who favour the CWP were least concerned about social justice—although it remains relatively high as a priority to them.

Table 5-19: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 2: “The state provides for social justice in a market economy” (by favoured political party)

	<b>Favoured party of respondents</b>				<b>Total</b>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	44.3%	48.2%	48.3%	49.3%	46.6%
Rather important	50.5%	47.3%	47.7%	42.3%	48.5%
Rather not important	4.0%	3.5%	2.7%	7.3%	3.8%
Totally unimportant	1.1%	1.0%	1.3%	1.1%	1.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

The same lesser enthusiasm for social justice from supporters of the CWP is apparent when observing responses from another related question. The following is the responses given to the statement “The state should guarantee a minimal standard of living for everybody, if one wants more, he should provide for himself”:

Respondents favouring CWP	70.9 % agreed
Respondents favouring DP	73.7 % agreed
Respondents favouring MPRP	75.0 % agreed
Respondents favouring MPP	76.0 % agreed

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

### 5.2.3 ISSUE 3: Men and women have equal rights

It has been already mentioned that young people generally regard gender equality with greater importance than older respondents. This detailed analysis shows that this applies particularly among the 18-24 age bracket (see: Table 5-21).

The income and social status of respondents makes hardly any difference (see: Table 5-22 and Table 5-23). Supporters of the CWP attached slightly less importance to gender equality than supports of other parties (see: Table 5-24).

Table 5-20: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 3: "Men and women have equal rights" (all responses 2008-2016)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very important	44.9%	46.9%	44.9%	47.9%	46.5%	48.7%	44.7%	40.2%	43.6%
Rather important	46.1%	44.1%	46.7%	43.8%	48.5%	45.2%	47.3%	46.5%	44.6%
Rather not important	6.7%	7.2%	6.2%	7.0%	3.9%	5.0%	5.8%	11.1%	9.6%
Totally unimportant	2.4%	1.7%	2.2%	1.3%	1.1%	1.0%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-8: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 3: "Men and women have equal rights" (all responses 2008-2016)




Table 5-21: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 3: "Men and women have equal rights" (by age group)

	<b>Age of respondents</b>						<b>Total</b>
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	51.1%	46.6%	45.8%	43.8%	44.5%	43.4%	45.8%
Rather important	40.8%	45.1%	46.3%	48.5%	48.1%	49.0%	46.4%
Rather not important	6.3%	6.6%	6.3%	5.8%	5.7%	6.4%	6.1%
Totally unimportant	1.8%	1.7%	1.5%	1.9%	1.7%	1.3%	1.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-22: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 3: "Men and women have equal rights" (by household income)

	<b>Estimated annual household income in MNT</b>						<b>Total</b>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	44.7%	46.8%	44.9%	46.4%	45.5%	46.9%	45.9%
Rather important	45.8%	46.1%	47.8%	46.2%	47.2%	43.3%	46.4%
Rather not important	7.3%	6.0%	5.6%	5.7%	5.5%	7.9%	6.0%
Totally unimportant	2.1%	1.1%	1.8%	1.7%	1.7%	1.8%	1.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-23: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 3: "Men and women have equal rights" (by social status)

	<b>Social Status</b>				<b>Total</b>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	47.6%	45.4%	46.2%	46.5%	45.9%
Rather important	43.9%	47.3%	45.8%	44.0%	46.4%
Rather not important	6.6%	5.7%	6.5%	7.0%	6.1%
Totally unimportant	1.9%	1.6%	1.4%	2.5%	1.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016



Table 5-24: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 3: “Men and women have equal rights” (by favoured political party)

	<i>Favoured party of respondents</i>				<b>Total</b>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	42.5%	48.4%	42.8%	44.7%	45.3%
Rather important	49.3%	44.3%	48.8%	44.3%	46.8%
Rather not important	6.7%	5.7%	7.0%	8.4%	6.3%
Totally unimportant	1.6%	1.5%	1.3%	2.6%	1.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

## 5.2.4 ISSUE 4: Social differences are kept as small as possible

Differences between social groups are closely related to the second issue: “The state provides social justice in a market economy”. Once again, judgements from the groups in society are similar. Also, similarly, supporters of the CWP, most often replied that this issue was “rather not important” or “totally unimportant” (see: Table 5-29).

Table 5-25: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 4: “Social differences are kept as small as possible” (all responses 2008-2016)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very important	42.3%	44.9%	39.9%	40.6%	42.1%	45.3%	46.5%	36.5%	42.6%
Rather important	49.0%	47.2%	51.9%	51.3%	53.8%	49.6%	47.9%	54.2%	49.7%
Rather not important	6.6%	6.2%	7.1%	7.2%	3.4%	4.1%	4.3%	7.8%	6.5%
Totally unimportant	2.0%	1.7%	1.1%	0.9%	0.7%	0.9%	1.3%	1.5%	1.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-9: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 4: "Social differences are kept as small as possible" (all responses 2008-2016)




Table 5-26: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 4: "Social differences are kept as small as possible" (by age group)

	<i>Age of respondents</i>						<i>Total</i>
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	44.8%	44.2%	41.6%	40.8%	40.8%	44.3%	42.4%
Rather important	48.1%	49.1%	51.1%	52.8%	52.6%	51.4%	51.1%
Rather not important	5.4%	5.4%	6.0%	5.3%	5.4%	3.9%	5.4%
Totally unimportant	1.6%	1.4%	1.3%	1.1%	1.2%	0.4%	1.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-27: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 4: "Social differences are kept as small as possible" (by household income)

	<i>Estimated annual household income in MNT</i>						<i>Total</i>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	44.5%	42.0%	42.7%	40.8%	43.0%	43.3%	42.4%
Rather important	49.8%	51.9%	51.6%	52.2%	50.0%	49.7%	51.1%
Rather not important	4.5%	5.0%	4.4%	5.7%	5.9%	5.9%	5.3%
Totally unimportant	1.1%	1.1%	1.2%	1.2%	1.1%	1.2%	1.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-28: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 4: “Social differences are kept as small as possible”, by social status

	<i>Social Status</i>				<i>Total</i>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	45.1%	42.2%	41.8%	44.5%	42.5%
Rather important	45.9%	51.7%	51.8%	48.3%	51.0%
Rather not important	7.2%	5.0%	5.5%	5.4%	5.4%
Totally unimportant	1.8%	1.0%	0.9%	1.8%	1.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-29: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 4: “Social differences are kept as small as possible”, by favoured political party

	<i>Favoured party of respondents</i>				<i>Total</i>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	41.7%	43.6%	45.1%	43.8%	42.9%
Rather important	52.1%	50.1%	49.9%	48.2%	50.9%
Rather not important	5.0%	5.1%	4.3%	5.8%	5.0%
Totally unimportant	1.1%	1.3%	0.7%	2.2%	1.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

## 5.2.5 ISSUE 5: There is a free, democratic market

The free market, which was ranked fifth in the hierarchy of issues of the greatest importance, is still regarded as an important component of Mongolia’s political and economic system. There are, however, no groups in society that express significantly stronger feelings about this issue than others—with one exception. Supporters of the Democratic Party attach somewhat greater importance to the issue, which may be explained by the fact that the forerunners of the Democratic Party had been the political force fighting for democracy and the market economy.

Among respondents who favour the supposedly liberal CWP are the highest percentage share of people who say this issue is “rather not important” or “totally unimportant” (see: Table 5-34).

Table 5-30: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 5: "There is a free, democratic market" (all responses 2008-2016)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very important	41.6%	43.0%	39.6%	40.6%	41.8%	44.0%	42.2%	38.2%	34.1%
Rather important	49.6%	49.7%	53.5%	52.9%	51.7%	49.6%	49.3%	50.5%	53.8%
Rather not important	6.8%	6.2%	5.6%	4.8%	5.5%	4.7%	7.0%	9.2%	8.9%
Totally unimportant	2.0%	1.2%	1.3%	1.7%	1.0%	1.7%	1.5%	2.1%	3.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-10: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 5: "There is a free, democratic market" (all responses 2008-2016)




Table 5-31: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 5: "There is a free, democratic market" (by age group)

	Age of respondents						Total
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	44.3%	41.8%	41.3%	40.0%	39.5%	39.7%	41.1%
Rather important	47.5%	50.5%	50.9%	52.2%	52.9%	53.0%	51.2%
Rather not important	6.4%	6.2%	6.0%	6.3%	6.2%	6.1%	6.2%
Totally unimportant	1.8%	1.5%	1.7%	1.5%	1.4%	1.2%	1.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-32: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 5: "There is a free, democratic market" (by household income)

	<i>Estimated annual household income in MNT</i>						<i>Total</i>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	42.4%	42.0%	41.6%	40.9%	40.1%	41.0%	41.1%
Rather important	47.4%	50.8%	50.8%	52.3%	52.3%	50.1%	51.2%
Rather not important	7.8%	5.7%	6.2%	5.5%	6.0%	7.3%	6.1%
Totally unimportant	2.3%	1.5%	1.4%	1.3%	1.6%	1.6%	1.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-33: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 5: "There is a free, democratic market" (by social status)

	<i>Social Status</i>				<i>Total</i>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	45.4%	40.1%	42.0%	41.8%	41.1%
Rather important	45.0%	52.8%	50.6%	47.2%	51.2%
Rather not important	7.5%	5.7%	6.0%	8.8%	6.1%
Totally unimportant	2.0%	1.4%	1.3%	2.2%	1.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-34: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 5: "There is a free, democratic market" (by favoured political party)

	<i>Favoured party of respondents</i>				<i>Total</i>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	38.3%	45.1%	39.3%	42.5%	41.6%
Rather important	53.0%	48.6%	51.4%	46.9%	50.6%
Rather not important	7.3%	4.9%	7.7%	8.8%	6.3%
Totally unimportant	1.4%	1.4%	1.6%	1.8%	1.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

## 5.2.6 ISSUE 6: Income differences are kept as small as possible

Income differences are only slightly less important to respondents than social differences (see: Table 5-6). However, while social differences are of more concern to older respondents, younger people place more importance on income (see: Table 5-26 and Table 5-35).

Table 5-35: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 6: "Income differences are kept as small as possible" (all responses 2008-2016)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very important	41.1%	42.1%	39.9%	42.3%	45.2%	40.7%	46.3%	38.1%	41.6%
Rather important	45.9%	45.9%	47.4%	47.2%	48.7%	50.8%	44.9%	51.4%	47.3%
Rather not important	10.3%	9.4%	10.6%	8.3%	5.4%	7.4%	7.2%	8.2%	8.7%
Totally unimportant	2.7%	2.6%	2.1%	2.2%	0.8%	1.2%	1.6%	2.3%	2.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-11: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 6: "Income differences are kept as small as possible" (all responses 2008-2016)




Table 5-36: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 6: "Income differences are kept as small as possible" (by age group)

	<b>Age of respondents</b>						<b>Total</b>
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	44.2%	43.5%	42.0%	41.8%	41.7%	42.9%	42.5%
Rather important	44.8%	46.9%	47.6%	48.6%	49.1%	50.2%	47.9%
Rather not important	9.1%	8.0%	8.5%	7.6%	7.7%	5.8%	7.9%
Totally unimportant	1.8%	1.5%	1.9%	2.0%	1.5%	1.2%	1.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-37: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 6: "Income differences are kept as small as possible" (by household income)

	<b>Estimated annual household income in MNT</b>						<b>Total</b>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	44.7%	42.6%	43.6%	42.0%	42.5%	41.2%	42.6%
Rather important	44.1%	48.0%	47.2%	49.5%	47.2%	48.2%	47.8%
Rather not important	8.6%	7.8%	7.6%	6.9%	8.5%	8.5%	7.8%
Totally unimportant	2.6%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%	1.8%	2.1%	1.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-38: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 6: "Income differences are kept as small as possible" (by social status)

	<b>Social Status</b>				<b>Total</b>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	44.0%	41.9%	43.7%	43.7%	42.6%
Rather important	42.8%	48.8%	47.8%	47.0%	47.9%
Rather not important	10.3%	7.8%	7.1%	6.9%	7.8%
Totally unimportant	2.8%	1.6%	1.4%	2.4%	1.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-39: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 6: “Income differences are kept as small as possible” (by favoured political party)

	<i>Favoured party of respondents</i>				<b>Total</b>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	41.8%	43.5%	44.7%	42.9%	42.9%
Rather important	49.4%	47.5%	47.4%	44.7%	48.2%
Rather not important	7.4%	7.1%	7.1%	10.6%	7.4%
Totally unimportant	1.4%	1.8%	0.7%	1.8%	1.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

## 5.2.7 ISSUE 7: Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property

At this point on the hierarchy scale, only about one-third of all respondents are regarding any of the remaining matters as “very important”. Judgements are relatively close to each other, with very little change. This applies also to the issue concerning people’s freedom to decide on how they manage their property.

Table 5-40: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue: “Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property” (all responses 2008-2016)


	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very important	37.9%	38.6%	35.5%	35.2%	35.0%	35.7%	38.9%	34.9%	35.9%
Rather important	51.2%	51.3%	55.7%	55.9%	58.7%	56.4%	53.3%	55.4%	54.5%
Rather not important	8.7%	7.5%	7.1%	6.8%	4.9%	6.6%	5.8%	7.8%	8.8%
Totally unimportant	2.2%	2.6%	1.7%	2.1%	1.4%	1.3%	2.1%	1.9%	0.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016



Figure 5-12 demonstrates how similar opinions are held steady from 2008 to 2016.

Figure 5-12: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 7: “Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property” (all responses 2008-2016)



People’s freedom to manage their property is already mentioned as ranking higher in importance among older respondents and was only No. 10 among people under 30 years old. Table 5-41 shows, however, even young respondents do not disregard the importance of this matter—it is just the case that other issues fall further down on the list of priorities for young people (e.g. the right to enter one’s desired profession, which is not much of a concern for pensioners).

Table 5-41: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 7: “Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property” (by age group)

	<i>Age of respondents</i>						<i>Total</i>
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	40.0%	36.5%	35.8%	35.1%	34.4%	36.2%	36.2%
Rather important	51.9%	56.0%	54.9%	55.8%	57.4%	56.6%	55.4%
Rather not important	6.9%	6.2%	7.3%	7.1%	6.1%	5.8%	6.7%
Totally unimportant	1.2%	1.4%	1.9%	2.0%	2.0%	1.4%	1.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-42 show very uniform opinions expressed by people in different income groups. Only respondents with an annual household income below 600,000 MNT have a somewhat larger number of people regarding this issue “rather not important” or “totally unimportant”. The reason for this could be that this group does not possess much property. This group is, however, not very relevant to the general picture because the group of households with less than 600,000 MNT annual income has shrunk from about 10 per cent in 2008 to 1 per cent in 2016. This development simply reflects inflation (which we have not balanced by weighting data).

Table 5-42: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 7: "Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property" (by household income)

	<b>Estimated annual household income in MNT</b>						<b>Total</b>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	36.2%	37.0%	37.4%	35.3%	35.5%	36.2%	36.2%
Rather important	52.6%	55.0%	54.5%	56.3%	56.6%	54.9%	55.4%
Rather not important	8.7%	6.4%	6.2%	6.7%	6.3%	7.5%	6.7%
Totally unimportant	2.5%	1.6%	1.9%	1.7%	1.6%	1.4%	1.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-43: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 7: "Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property" (by social status)

	<b>Social Status</b>				<b>Total</b>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	39.5%	35.9%	35.8%	36.3%	36.2%
Rather important	51.3%	56.2%	55.2%	54.7%	55.4%
Rather not important	7.8%	6.3%	7.1%	6.6%	6.6%
Totally unimportant	1.4%	1.6%	1.9%	2.4%	1.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Of all the political party affiliations, it is again those who favour the CPW that attaches the least importance to the matter of property (see: Table 5-44).

Table 5-44: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 7: "Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property" (by favoured political party)

	<i>Favoured party of respondents</i>				<i>Total</i>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	35.7%	38.5%	37.9%	36.7%	37.2%
Rather important	55.8%	53.3%	57.8%	52.0%	54.7%
Rather not important	6.7%	6.6%	3.4%	9.5%	6.5%
Totally unimportant	1.8%	1.6%	0.9%	1.8%	1.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

## 5.2.8 ISSUE 8: Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession

While opinions over the years on freedom to choose one's professions have been relatively similar and unchanged (see: Table 5-45), there has been a clear correlation between the age of respondents and the importance attached to the matter (see: Table 5-46). For young people, it is much more important that they can choose their profession than it is to older respondents who have settled into a job, or who have already retired.

Between the different income groups, no significant differences in opinion are apparent (see: Table 5-47). The exception is respondents in the Above Middle Class social group, which has a higher percentage share who said this matter was "very important" (see: Table 5-48).

Table 5-45: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 8: "Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession" (all responses 2008-2016)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very important	41.3%	39.1%	35.6%	37.5%	36.2%	39.3%	37.5%	30.6%	36.2%
Rather important	49.4%	52.2%	55.8%	51.4%	55.0%	53.9%	52.7%	56.9%	54.1%
Rather not important	7.4%	7.0%	7.5%	8.5%	6.9%	5.5%	8.0%	9.5%	7.9%
Totally unimportant	1.8%	1.7%	1.1%	2.7%	1.8%	1.3%	1.8%	3.0%	1.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-13: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 8: "Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession" (all responses 2008-2016)




Table 5-46: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 8: "Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession" (by age group)

	<i>Age of respondents</i>						<i>Total</i>
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	46.1%	39.4%	37.3%	35.1%	33.3%	32.6%	37.2%
Rather important	45.2%	51.1%	53.6%	55.1%	57.8%	59.2%	53.7%
Rather not important	7.2%	7.6%	7.3%	7.7%	7.0%	7.0%	7.3%
Totally unimportant	1.6%	1.9%	1.9%	2.1%	1.9%	1.2%	1.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-47: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 8: "Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession" (by household income)

	<i>Estimated annual household income in MNT</i>						<i>Total</i>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	40.6%	37.5%	38.2%	35.9%	35.9%	38.4%	37.2%
Rather important	50.9%	53.4%	52.5%	54.9%	55.5%	52.7%	53.8%
Rather not important	6.8%	7.7%	7.1%	7.2%	7.3%	7.4%	7.3%
Totally unimportant	1.8%	1.5%	2.2%	2.1%	1.3%	1.5%	1.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-48: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 8: “Everybody has the right to enter one’s desired profession” (by social status)

	<b>Social Status</b>				<b>Total</b>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	43.7%	36.8%	35.2%	37.9%	37.2%
Rather important	47.5%	55.3%	53.9%	48.6%	53.8%
Rather not important	7.5%	6.5%	8.5%	10.7%	7.3%
Totally unimportant	1.3%	1.4%	2.4%	2.8%	1.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

CWP supporters consider this issue as more important than others (Table 5-49).

Table 5-49: Respondents’ opinion regarding Issue 8: “Everybody has the right to enter one’s desired profession” (by favoured political party)

	<b>Favoured party of respondents</b>				<b>Total</b>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	35.5%	39.0%	38.5%	42.0%	37.5%
Rather important	54.6%	52.3%	54.0%	48.2%	53.3%
Rather not important	7.9%	7.2%	6.2%	8.0%	7.4%
Totally unimportant	2.0%	1.6%	1.3%	1.8%	1.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

### 5.2.9 ISSUE 9: Everybody can express his/her opinion freely

Freedom of expression is ranked relatively low on the hierarchical list. However, young respondents who favour the CWP and the “Above Middle Class” rate this issue more important than others.

Table 5-50: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 9: "Everybody can express his/her opinion freely" (all responses 2008-2016)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very important	39.8%	41.9%	37.1%	35.3%	36.4%	37.8%	33.5%	31.2%	33.8%
Rather important	51.0%	50.4%	54.4%	54.5%	53.5%	53.4%	54.4%	54.2%	57.2%
Rather not important	7.6%	6.0%	6.5%	7.1%	7.5%	7.0%	9.2%	11.8%	7.2%
Totally unimportant	1.6%	1.6%	2.0%	3.1%	2.6%	1.8%	3.0%	2.8%	1.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-14: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 9: "Everybody can express his/her opinion freely" (all responses 2008-2016)




Table 5-51: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 9: "Everybody can express his/her opinion freely" (by age group)

	Age of respondents						Total
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	44.3%	39.5%	37.0%	34.7%	33.7%	33.5%	37.0%
Rather important	47.6%	51.7%	53.0%	54.4%	56.2%	57.2%	53.4%
Rather not important	6.3%	6.8%	7.9%	8.1%	7.7%	7.5%	7.5%
Totally unimportant	1.7%	2.0%	2.1%	2.9%	2.4%	1.8%	2.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-52: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 9: "Everybody can express his/her opinion freely" (by household income)

	<i>Estimated annual household income in MNT</i>						<i>Total</i>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	39.0%	38.2%	37.7%	36.2%	34.4%	38.4%	36.8%
Rather important	50.6%	51.8%	52.6%	54.1%	56.0%	52.8%	53.5%
Rather not important	7.6%	7.5%	7.2%	7.6%	7.9%	7.0%	7.5%
Totally unimportant	2.8%	2.6%	2.5%	2.1%	1.7%	1.8%	2.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-53: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 9: "Everybody can express his/her opinion freely" (by social status)

	<i>Social Status</i>				<i>Total</i>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	46.0%	36.8%	34.1%	35.7%	37.0%
Rather important	46.4%	54.3%	54.5%	51.1%	53.4%
Rather not important	6.6%	7.0%	8.6%	9.6%	7.5%
Totally unimportant	0.9%	2.0%	2.8%	3.6%	2.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-54: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 9: "Everybody can express his/her opinion freely" (by favoured political party)

	<i>Favoured party of respondents</i>				<i>Total</i>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	34.8%	39.5%	39.1%	44.9%	37.7%
Rather important	53.9%	51.0%	52.4%	44.9%	52.2%
Rather not important	8.4%	7.2%	7.8%	7.2%	7.8%
Totally unimportant	3.0%	2.2%	0.6%	2.9%	2.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

## 5.2.10 ISSUE 10: All people have equal educational opportunities

Education is very important for young people, and, accordingly, this group is more sensitive to the issue than others (see: Table 5-56).

Table 5-55: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 10: "All people have equal educational opportunities" (all responses 2008-2016)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very important	41.2%	38.0%	36.2%	37.1%	38.8%	40.4%	37.7%	32.5%	38.7%
Rather important	47.6%	52.2%	53.8%	52.0%	50.3%	49.2%	51.4%	51.7%	50.4%
Rather not important	8.9%	8.0%	7.7%	8.2%	8.3%	8.5%	9.1%	12.2%	9.0%
Totally unimportant	2.3%	1.9%	2.3%	2.7%	2.7%	1.9%	1.9%	3.6%	1.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 5-15: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 10: "All people have equal educational opportunities" (all responses 2008-2016)




Table 5-56: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 10: "All people have equal educational opportunities" (by age group)

	Age of respondents						Total
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 or more	
Very important	43.9%	39.6%	38.5%	36.5%	36.0%	35.9%	38.3%
Rather important	45.5%	50.1%	49.9%	52.4%	52.6%	54.2%	50.8%
Rather not important	8.4%	7.7%	9.3%	8.3%	9.2%	8.1%	8.6%
Totally unimportant	2.2%	2.6%	2.3%	2.8%	2.2%	1.8%	2.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016



Table 5-57: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 10: "All people have equal educational opportunities" (by household income)

	<i>Estimated annual household income in MNT</i>						<i>Total</i>
	less than 600000	600000 - <1200000	1200000 - <2400000	2400000 - <4800000	4800000 - <9600000	9600000 or more	
Very important	38.6%	36.7%	38.2%	39.2%	38.4%	37.4%	38.2%
Rather important	48.6%	52.0%	50.9%	50.6%	51.0%	50.6%	50.8%
Rather not important	9.5%	8.9%	8.2%	8.1%	8.1%	9.9%	8.5%
Totally unimportant	3.2%	2.4%	2.7%	2.1%	2.4%	2.1%	2.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-58: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 10: "All people have equal educational opportunities" (by social status)

	<i>Social Status</i>				<i>Total</i>
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group	
Very important	42.5%	38.6%	36.4%	36.4%	38.3%
Rather important	46.0%	51.3%	52.5%	49.6%	50.9%
Rather not important	9.3%	8.2%	8.8%	9.6%	8.5%
Totally unimportant	2.3%	2.0%	2.4%	4.5%	2.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 5-59: Respondents' opinion regarding Issue 10: "All people have equal educational opportunities" (by favoured political party)

	<i>Favoured party of respondents</i>				<i>Total</i>
	MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	Democratic Party	MPRP (new MPRP founded 2012)	Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP before 2011)	
Very important	36.7%	39.6%	39.6%	38.6%	38.3%
Rather important	52.0%	49.7%	49.6%	50.4%	50.7%
Rather not important	8.7%	8.2%	9.0%	7.7%	8.5%
Totally unimportant	2.5%	2.6%	1.9%	3.3%	2.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

## 5.3 Supplementary Data from the Values Survey

This section of analysis will look at a range of topics linked to socio-economic principles and values reported from the Values Survey. The topics are related to the economic responsibility people take on for themselves (or dependency on the state) to take care of their needs, their attitudes towards private or state-owned businesses, and how they feel about competition as a challenge or incentive. For Mongolians, all these subjects receive new meaning; or their importance to them changed with the transformation from a socialist country with far-reaching state controls to a democratic country with a market-oriented economy. More than two decades after the beginning of the transformation, Mongolia's new political and economic system has firmly taken root to make changes in the social system as well. This analysis considers some aspects of the opinions from respondents' and their attitudes toward these changes.

The five questions in this section asked during the 2015-2017 opinion polls focus on government versus individual responsibilities. Each of the five questions contain diametrically opposed opinions, and respondents were asked to mark their opinion on a scale from "1" to "10", whereby 1 means complete agreement with the statement and 10 means complete agreement with the opposing statement on the other end of the scale; and if respondents' views fell somewhere in the middle, they could choose any number in between.

For each of the five issues is a table with a comparison of answers from the polls in each year. The detailed analysis that follows these summary tables will only show data from the first poll in 2015. The poll in 2016 was conducted only a few months before parliamentary elections and election campaigning may have politically biased respondents' answers. This may be particularly true when comparing the opinions of people with different party preferences. For this reason, the Sant Maral Foundation did not repeat the detailed analysis for polls after 2015. The table summaries at the beginning of each section do, however, show the overall changes of opinion regarding the five questions.

The following are the questions put to respondents, relating to the issue of government versus individual responsibility:

**Issue 1:** "Incomes should be made more equal" vs. "We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort"

**Issue 2:** "Private ownership of business and industry should be increased" vs. "Government ownership of business and industry should be increased"

**Issue 3:** "Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is pro-

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18 The five questions were taken from the World Values Survey questionnaire (Nos. V96 to V100); see also: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>

vided for” vs. “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves”

**Issue 4:** “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas” vs. “Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people”

**Issue 5:** “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life” vs. “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections”

The second-issue statements cover the matter of private versus state ownership. This issue was also addressed in some other questions included in the same questionnaire. These additional questions also deal with foreign investment in the mining sector, which is strategically relevant to Mongolia:

“What should be the proportion of Mongolian and foreign ownership in strategic mine deposits; Ownership of Mongolian investment in strategic mine deposits should be ... “

- a) Only state;
- b) Mixed;
- c) Only private business.

The analysis of the Values Survey also includes information gathered from these questions.

The questions of how far the state has a responsibility to guarantee a minimum standard of living for every citizen and how relevant income equality is to Mongolia have been standard questions in several polls conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation since 2008. The statistics from the SMF database regarding these questions supplement the observations in editions of the Values Survey.

Several polls conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation show how relevant income equality is to people in Mongolia. As part of a list of democratic values and principles, the questionnaires since 2008 have asked respondents to give a response to the importance they place on the statement: “Income differences are kept as small as possible”. From 2008 to 2015, more than 80 per cent responded that it was “very important” or “rather important” that differences are kept as small as possible (see: Table 5-60).

Table 5-60: Relevance of income equality

<i><b>Income differences are kept as small as possible</b></i>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>Total</b>
Very important	41%	42%	40%	42%	45%	41%	46%	38%	43%
Rather important	46%	46%	47%	47%	49%	51%	45%	51%	48%
Rather not important	10%	9%	11%	8%	5%	7%	7%	8%	8%
Totally unimportant	3%	3%	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2015

Sections 5.3.1 through 5.3.5 provide details of the Values Survey.

### **5.3.1 ISSUE 1: 'Incomes should be made more equal' vs. 'We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort'**

The Values Survey's first question on income differences gave respondents the option to choose between 1 (Incomes should be made more equal) at the one end of the scale, and 10 (We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts), with the numbers in between expressing less either response. Although a high percentage share of people attaches significant importance to income equality, it does not mean they are all in favour of making incomes more equal.

In 2015, option '1' took 23.2 per cent of responses, which means those respondents were unconditionally in support of the view that incomes should be made more equal; another 21.6 per cent opted for answers 2 or 3 and thus were strongly inclined in the same direction. In total, 61.8 per cent of respondents answered options 1 through 5, which expresses some degree of preference for more equality. Only 5.8 per cent selected 10 on the response scale and, thus, give their full support to the statement that inequality serves as an incentive for individual efforts. Combining the number of respondents who selected answers 6 through 9 brings the total to 38.2 per cent.

The mean on the 1-10 scale in 2015 was 4.64. In the following two years, there was a shift of opinions towards greater demand for measures to be taken that would set incomes as more equal. Means in 2016 and 2017 were 4.08 and 4.24, respectively (see: Table 5-61).


Table 5-61: Equality or difference of income

Question: 'Incomes should be made more equal' vs. 'We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort' How would you place your views on this scale from 1 to 10?		Responses			
		March 2015	March 2016	March 2017	Total
Responses:	1 = Incomes should be made more equal	23.2%	23.2%	30.7%	25.5%
	2	11.3%	16.7%	13.2%	13.9%
	3	10.3%	13.2%	8.9%	11.0%
	4	5.3%	9.1%	8.7%	7.8%
	5	11.7%	10.4%	6.9%	9.7%
	6	5.4%	5.1%	3.3%	4.6%
	7	8.7%	4.7%	4.3%	5.8%
	8	8.5%	5.6%	7.0%	6.9%
	9	9.8%	4.9%	6.0%	6.7%
	10 = We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts	5.8%	7.1%	11.1%	8.0%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Mean:</b>		<b>4.64</b>	<b>4.08</b>	<b>4.24</b>	<b>4.30</b>
<b>Standard error of mean:</b>		<b>0.088</b>	<b>0.074</b>	<b>0.094</b>	<b>0.049</b>

Source: SMF polls March 2015; March 2016; March 2017

Shown as a Figure, these responses give following picture:

Figure 5-16: Equality or difference of income



A closer look at the responses gives indications of the opinions from different groups in society and their attitudes towards the question of equality. For this purpose, the data has been cross-tabulated by demographics with other information collected during the same poll in March 2015.

The first analysis relates to people in different age groups and shows that most respondents of all ages believe incomes should be made more equal.

Table 5-62: Occupation/employment of respondents, by age

<b>Occupation / employment status</b>	<b>Age groups</b>					
	<b>18-24</b>	<b>25-29</b>	<b>30-39</b>	<b>40-49</b>	<b>50-59</b>	<b>60 +</b>
Workers	11%	28%	24%	22%	16%	1%
Clerical staff	4%	23%	18%	19%	14%	1%
Self-employed	9%	22%	25%	28%	19%	1%
Nomads / farmers	3%	6%	8%	9%	3%	
Unemployed	12%	12%	13%	12%	12%	1%
Students or trainees	52%	3%	1%	1%	2%	
Others	9%	7%	11%	10%	33%	96%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF poll March 2015

Table 5-62 shows that more than 50 per cent of respondents in the 18-24 age bracket are students. In the 25-29 age group, only 3 per cent are students, while 73 per cent are working. The difference of opinions between the older and younger groups becomes apparent when comparing the mean values in Table 5-63. The data shows, however, no continuous trend or correlation between the age of respondents and their views regarding income equality. And, as seen in Table 5-66, the opinions of students on this issue in general do not differ much from working people's opinions.

Responses from the group of very young people (18 to 24 years old) show two peculiarities. Firstly, respondents in this group agree much more than the average with the statement that less equality would serve as an incentive for more individual efforts. Data shows that 11 per cent of respondents in this age group chose answer 10, which means they unconditionally agree with the statement. On the other hand, this group had the highest percentage share of people who chose answer 1, which means they feel that incomes should be more equal (see: Table 5-63).


Table 5-63: Cross tabulation on income equality, by age

Age of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
18 – 24 years	26%	8%	11%	4%	11%	5%	6%	8%	9%	11%	100%	4.81	0.259
25 - 29 years	24%	10%	16%	4%	14%	7%	8%	6%	6%	5%	100%	4.23	0.224
30 - 39 years	22%	14%	9%	4%	13%	4%	10%	9%	9%	5%	100%	4.58	0.183
40 - 49 years	23%	9%	9%	6%	12%	7%	9%	11%	11%	3%	100%	4.75	0.191
50 - 59 years	24%	11%	6%	7%	10%	6%	10%	8%	13%	6%	100%	4.84	0.218
60 years or more	20%	13%	15%	8%	10%	3%	8%	8%	10%	6%	100%	4.55	0.240

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

When shown as a Figure, the data from Table 5-63 looks this way:

Figure 5-17: Income equality, by age



There is a relatively small difference in the opinions of male and female respondents. Men lean a bit more toward the view that incomes should be made more equal, while women tend to more favour the opinion that income differences can be an incentive for individual efforts (see: Table 5-64).

Polls over the past two decades have shown that the opinions of male and female respondents differ only marginally in many issues. Wherever this is the case, the similarities in opinions over matters dealt within this chapter are shown only in the tables, without adding any more Figures to illustrate the fact.

The correlation of responses by level of education shows that respondents with lower and higher levels are less inclined to ask for more equality, while those with middle-level education see a greater need for measures that would make incomes more equal.

Table 5-64: Cross tabulation on “income equality, by gender

Gender	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Male	25%	12%	10%	4%	11%	6%	8%	8%	10%	6%	100%	4.54	0.129
Female	21%	10%	11%	6%	12%	5%	10%	9%	10%	6%	100%	4.73	0.120

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-18: Income equality, by gender







Table 5-65: Cross tabulation on income equality, by education

Education of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Primary school	23%	11%	7%	5%	10%	8%	7%	10%	13%	5%	100%	4.87	0.189
Secondary school	24%	9%	12%	6%	12%	5%	9%	9%	8%	4%	100%	4.52	0.138
Secondary special	31%	12%	4%	7%	12%	2%	7%	9%	8%	7%	100%	4.43	0.291
College & university.	20%	13%	13%	4%	13%	5%	10%	6%	8%	8%	100%	4.69	0.168

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-19: Income equality, by education




The opinions of workers, clerical staff, and self-employed people are very similar, both in their preference for more equality and their rejection of the argument that inequality serves as an incentive (see: Table 5-66). Nomads and farmers are of a slightly different opinion; they ask for less intervention to equalise incomes. Nearly 50 per cent of nomads and farmers accept inequality to some degree as an incentive, compared with less than 40 per cent in all the other groups.

Table 5-66: Cross tabulation on income equality, by occupation/employment

Occupation and employment status of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Workers	25%	10%	12%	4%	11%	5%	7%	10%	9%	5%	100%	4.54	0.209
Clerical staff	24%	12%	7%	6%	12%	6%	10%	7%	8%	8%	100%	4.63	0.237
Self-employed	24%	10%	10%	5%	15%	4%	8%	7%	14%	4%	100%	4.64	0.201
Nomads/farmers	20%	11%	8%	6%	9%	9%	14%	8%	9%	5%	100%	4.86	0.370
Unemployed	19%	9%	13%	4%	13%	8%	7%	8%	14%	6%	100%	5.02	0.269
Students	23%	12%	13%	5%	11%	4%	3%	8%	9%	10%	100%	4.60	0.324
Others	23%	13%	10%	6%	10%	5%	11%	10%	7%	6%	100%	4.52	0.173

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-20: Income equality, by occupation/employment



Employed respondents and students see more need for incomes to be made more equal than unemployed people (see: Table 5-66), but the strongest advocates for more equality are workers and the group of “others”—which includes retired people, respondents who are “at home” without being unemployed (e.g. housewives), and people in the military service. The large number of pensioners with relatively low incomes in this last group could have a dominating effect.

Opinions in rural areas are very close to those in Ulaanbaatar (see: Table 5-67).

Table 5-67: Cross tabulation on income equality, by area of residence

Area of residence	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Ulaanbaatar	24%	10%	10%	7%	11%	4%	9%	10%	8%	7%	100%	4.65	0.137
Aimags	23%	12%	10%	4%	12%	7%	8%	7%	11%	5%	100%	4.63	0.114

Source: SMF poll March 2015

Respondents have been placed into income groups for the following analysis. Households with an annual income amounting to 8.8 million MNT in March 2015 were at the mid-point, while the lowest income group received less than 50 per cent of this average. The next highest-earning group received between 50 and 100 per cent of the average income. Above that comes a group that received up to 200 per cent of the average income, while the highest earners had incomes of more than 200 per cent of the average. The outcome is the following:

- Households having less than 4.4 million MNT.....24.3%
- Households with incomes between 4.4 and 8.8 million MNT.....39.1%
- Households with incomes between 8.8 and 15.0 million MNT. ....24.9%
- Households with incomes over 15.0 million MNT..... 11.6%

More than 60 per cent of respondents reported have below-average incomes. These two groups constitute the two lowest-income groups in Table 5-68. These respondents are less in favour of measures to equalise incomes than the group on the next higher rung, with incomes ranging between 100 per cent and approximately 200 per cent of the average incomes. The very highest income group of respondents, who received more than twice the average income, believes very strongly that income differences serve as an incentive for individual efforts.


These differences in opinion of respondents between people of different income levels show no continuous trend. The two highest-income groups represent the two ends of the scale, while the lower income groups fall somewhere in between (Table 5-68).

Table 5-68: Cross tabulation on income equality, by income

<i>Estimated annual income of respondent's household in MNT</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
less than 4.4 M	23%	11%	9%	4%	12%	7%	11%	10%	12%	4%	100%	4.79	0.180
4.4 to < 8.8 M	23%	12%	10%	6%	11%	7%	6%	10%	9%	6%	100%	4.61	0.142
8.8 M to < 15 M	27%	12%	11%	6%	10%	3%	11%	7%	8%	6%	100%	4.32	0.178
15 M or more	18%	7%	10%	7%	18%	3%	11%	7%	15%	5%	100%	5.11	0.252

Source: SMF poll March 2015

Figure 5-21: Income equality, by income



Respondents, who declared themselves as above middle class in SMF surveys (as opposed to the social group established in this analysis), are clearly more in favour of greater income equality. The reason for this should be sought in another aspect, other than income. It may well be that the reason lies in the social conscience of the people in the group above the middle class, which those with merely high incomes do not have. However, it may just as well be the case that these respondents do not think that the sharing of wealth through the management of incomes could affect them personally. As is seen in the following sections, the social conscience of respondents who claim to be in the group above the middle class become apparent in issues of what the state (or government) should do for the people.

Table 5-69: Cross tabulation on income equality, by social status

Self-assessment of respondents' social status	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Above middle class	28%	12%	8%	7%	8%	4%	13%	5%	10%	5%	100%	4.33	0.294
Middle class	24%	10%	9%	5%	12%	5%	9%	10%	10%	6%	100%	4.70	0.117
Below middle class	20%	13%	14%	6%	12%	7%	6%	7%	10%	6%	100%	4.61	0.170
Disadvant. group	18%	17%	11%	3%	14%	7%	9%	7%	9%	6%	100%	4.58	0.350

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-22: Income equality, by social status




Table 5-70 shows a cross tabulation on income and social groups, providing a detailed breakdown of responses from each group. The table shows that the majority of people in the highest-income group (52.2 per cent) belong to the Middle Class societal group. Only 25 per cent belong to the Above Middle Class. Thus, the influence of the high-income group is much stronger on the opinions of the Middle Class than vice versa, although the average income may suggest otherwise (see: the last line in Table 5-70).

Table 5-70: Cross tabulation on income, by social group

<i>Average annual household income in MNT</i>			<i>Social status</i>				<i>Total or Average</i>
			<i>Above middle class</i>	<i>Middle class</i>	<i>Below middle class</i>	<i>Disadvantaged group</i>	
<i>Income groups</i>	less than 4,400,000	% within income groups	5.7%	54.8%	30.5%	9.0%	100,0%
		% within social groups	15.4%	22.7%	28.2%	35.2%	24,2%
	4,400,000 to <8,800,000	% within income groups	6.7%	61.8%	26.2%	5.3%	100,0%
		% within social groups	28.8%	41.2%	39.2%	33.8%	39,1%
	8,800,000 to < 15,000,000	% within income groups	11.1%	60.4%	24.3%	4.2%	100.0%
		% within social groups	30.8%	25.8%	23.3%	16.9%	25.0%
	15,000,000 or more	% within income groups	19.4%	52.2%	20.9%	7.5%	100,0%
		% within social groups	25.0%	10.4%	9.3%	14.1%	11,6%
Total or average		% within income groups	9.0%	58.6%	26.2%	6.2%	100.0%
		% within social groups	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


The question of whether respondents consider themselves as “winners” or “losers” has a noticeable influence on opinion. It is the group of winners who advocates more strongly for greater equality, while those who consider themselves as losers see income differences more as an incentive for individual effort (see: Table 5-71).

Table 5-71: Cross tabulation on income equality, by assessment of winners/ losers

<i>Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
I consider myself rather a loser	26%	11%	7%	3%	10%	7%	9%	10%	10%	6%	100%	4.75	0.147
I consider myself rather a winner	29%	16%	10%	1%	4%	5%	14%	5%	10%	4%	100%	4.24	0.327
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	18%	11%	12%	7%	15%	5%	8%	9%	10%	6%	100%	4.80	0.145

Source: SMF poll March 2015

Figure 5-23: Income equality, by assessment of winners and losers




Among supporters of different political parties, there are some clear differences in opinions. While supporters of the MPP and the DP appear to be less in favour of more income equality, supporters of the MPRP are very much in favour of measures to make incomes more equal. This analysis is based on a relatively small sample because only respondents who mentioned a favourite party could be included. Since the sample is relatively small, the mean values deviate considerably from the overall mean shown in Table 5 -61.

Table 5-72: Cross tabulation on income equality, by preference of political parties

<b>Respondents favouring a particular political party</b>	<b>Responses:</b>										<b>Total</b>	<b>Mean on scale 1 - 10</b>	<b>Std. error of mean</b>
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
favouring MPP	27%	8%	12%	5%	11%	6%	8%	10%	7%	6%	100%	4.49	0.224
favouring DP	24%	13%	10%	7%	7%	7%	7%	9%	13%	4%	100%	4.55	0.238
favouring MPRP	22%	20%	11%	9%	9%	7%	7%	7%	4%	4%	100%	3.99	0.304

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-24: Income equality, by preference of political parties



Whether people prefer a parliamentary, semi-parliamentary or presidential system is of no, or only little, relevance in this analysis.



Table 5-73: Cross tabulation on income equality, by preferred political system

<i>Preferred political system of respondents</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	Incomes should be made more equal					We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
Parliamentarian	25%	13%	11%	3%	8%	5%	13%	8%	10%	5%	100%	4.54	0.211
Semi-parliament.	23%	11%	13%	5%	13%	6%	5%	8%	11%	6%	100%	4.56	0.186
Presidential	22%	10%	9%	7%	13%	6%	10%	9%	10%	6%	100%	4.76	0.122

Source: SMF poll March 2015

### 5.3.2 ISSUE 2: ‘Private ownership of business and industry should be increased’ vs. ‘Government ownership of business and industry should be increased’

The polls show the population overall supports the private sector in Mongolia’s economy. People prefer private business and industry ownership over increased government ownership. In 2015, about 25 per cent of respondents unconditionally supported an increase in private ownership, while a further 35 per cent agreed to some lesser extent with this statement. Only 7 per cent fully support an increase in government ownership. Another 32 per cent want increased government ownership at a more moderate degree, bringing the total ratio 61 to 39 in favour of private ownership. Based on these figures in Table 5-74, it could be concluded that increased private investment is generally favoured; or, in other words, people accept the principles of the market economy and see advantages in the private sector over state-owned enterprises.

When comparing responses in subsequent years with the results from the 2015 poll, there is not much difference in 2016, except for a much stronger support for the private sector in 2017. That year the mean shifted from 4.68 to 3.87 (see: Table 5-74).


Table 5-74: Private vs. state ownership of business

Question: 'Private ownership of business and industry should be increased' vs. 'Government ownership of business and industry should be increased' How would you place your views on this scale from 1 to 10?		Responses			
		March 2015	March 2016	March 2017	Total
Responses:	1 = Private ownership should be increased	25.1%	21.1%	33.6%	26.2%
	2	10.7%	12.0%	14.5%	12.4%
	3	9.7%	10.7%	10.1%	10.2%
	4	4.3%	8.1%	6.3%	6.4%
	5	11.3%	9.4%	7.6%	9.4%
	6	4.9%	5.5%	4.0%	4.9%
	7	7.1%	7.9%	4.4%	6.6%
	8	9.3%	8.4%	5.7%	7.8%
	9	10.2%	8.3%	6.8%	8.4%
	10 = Government ownership should be increased	7.2%	8.6%	6.8%	7.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<b>Mean:</b>	<b>4.68</b>	<b>4.72</b>	<b>3.87</b>	<b>4.45</b>
	<b>Standard error of mean:</b>	<b>0.091</b>	<b>0.080</b>	<b>0.089</b>	<b>0.050</b>

Source: SMF polls; March 2015, March 2016, March 2017

Expressed as a Figure, these responses lead to the following picture:

Figure 5-25: Private vs. state ownership of business



The picture is, however, completely different when it comes to investments in strategically relevant resource mining deposits in Mongolia. Only 5 per cent of respondents want to see this important sector of the economy completely in the hands of private business; 41 per cent vote for only state investments; and 54 per cent for joint ventures (see: Table 5-75).

Table 5-75: Private and state investment in strategic mine deposits

<b><i>Ownership of Mongolian investment in strategic mine deposits should be:</i></b>	<b><i>Ulaanbaatar</i></b>	<b><i>Aimags</i></b>	<b><i>Nation-wide</i></b>
only state .....	41%	43%	42%
mixed .....	54%	52%	53%
only private business .....	5%	5%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%

*Source: SMF poll, March 2015*

Table 5-76 shows in summary how strongly each of the four groups supports either private or state ownership for the mining sector. Even among the strongest supporters of private ownership for business and industry (see: first category in Table 5-76, with respondents choosing options 1 or 2 on a scale from 1 to 10), only 4 per cent want to see only private investment in the mining sector. The largest group of respondents who strongly support private investment prefer a mix of private and state ownership. The share of respondents who chose full state ownership in the strategic mining sector was 39 per cent.

Looking at the other groups in Table 5-76, the support for state ownership in the mining sector increases gradually in line with respondents' general view on government ownership in business and industry.

Opinions on private versus state control of mining assets is directly linked to the question of how much foreign investment should be allowed there. This factor is indirectly correlated to the findings from the Values Survey. Respondents' opinions from the March 2015 poll are found in Table 5-77.

Table 5-76: Cross tabulation on opinions regarding private or state ownership in business in general and in strategic mine deposits

<b>Respondents' opinion regarding ownership in strategic mine deposits</b>	<b>Respondents supporting the view 'Private ownership should be increased' ...</b>		<b>Respondents supporting the view 'Government ownership should be increased' ...</b>		<b>Average</b>
	<b>strongly</b> (answers 1,2)	<b>moderately</b> (answers 3-5)	<b>moderately</b> (answers 6-8)	<b>strongly</b> (answers 9, 10)	
Only state ownership	39%	42%	40%	50%	42%
Mixed state and private ownership	56%	53%	53%	46%	53%
Only private business	4%	6%	7%	4%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

An overwhelming majority (88 per cent) of respondents feels that Mongolia should own 51 per cent or more of strategic mine deposits. How much of this Mongolian investment should be private-or state-controlled is shown in Table 5-76.

Table 5-77: Mongolian and foreign investment in strategic mine deposits

<b>What should be the proportion of Mongolian and foreign ownership in strategic mine deposits?</b>	<b>Ulaanbaatar</b>	<b>Aimags</b>	<b>Nation-wide</b>
100% Mongolian .....	27%	20%	23%
> 51% Mongolian .....	61%	69%	65%
equal .....	11%	11%	11%
> 51% foreign .....	1%	0%	1%
100% foreign .....	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF poll, March 2015


When looking at the opinions each generation has regarding state and private ownership, the picture is rather mixed. The youngest group (all of them born after the introduction of market economy in Mongolia) are the strongest advocates for more government investment (Table 5-78).

Table 5-78: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by age

Age of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
18 – 24 years	23%	11%	8%	7%	11%	7%	8%	8%	8%	11%	100%	4.89	0.252
25 - 29 years	24%	11%	13%	4%	8%	4%	10%	11%	8%	6%	100%	4.55	0.243
30 - 39 years	27%	10%	10%	3%	10%	6%	6%	10%	11%	7%	100%	4.63	0.195
40 - 49 years	25%	12%	8%	5%	13%	5%	7%	10%	10%	5%	100%	4.58	0.197
50 - 59 years	29%	11%	7%	4%	8%	4%	6%	10%	15%	7%	100%	4.73	0.232
60 years or more	21%	9%	14%	2%	19%	4%	7%	8%	8%	8%	100%	4.75	0.243

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-26: Private vs. state ownership of business, by age



Male respondents are slightly more in favour of private business ownership than females, but, again, the difference is not significant (see: Table 5-79).

Table 5-79: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by gender

Gender	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Male	29%	9%	8%	5%	11%	4%	7%	8%	11%	7%	100%	4.55	0.135
Female	21%	12%	11%	4%	12%	5%	7%	11%	9%	8%	100%	4.79	0.124

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Among the groups with different levels of education, people with a middle-level education (secondary school and secondary special) are more inclined to government ownership than other groups.

Table 5-80: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by education

Education of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Primary school	25%	13%	8%	3%	15%	5%	8%	9%	10%	4%	100%	4.46	0.182
Secondary school	21%	11%	10%	5%	11%	7%	8%	9%	10%	7%	100%	4.86	0.145
Secondary special	28%	9%	7%	6%	8%	3%	6%	12%	10%	13%	100%	4.96	0.312
College & univers.	30%	9%	11%	4%	11%	3%	6%	9%	9%	9%	100%	4.47	0.181

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Table 5-81 shows the correlation between education and occupation. Employment also seems to have an influence on people’s opinion on this issue. About 42 per cent of respondents with middle-level education are workers who prefer government ownership in business; 37.5 per cent of respondents with this level of education are self-employed—and their opinion is very much different, strongly preferring private investment.

Figure 5-27: Private vs. state ownership of business, by education




Table 5-81: Cross tabulation on education, by occupation

			<i>Occupation</i>				<i>Total or average</i>
			<i>Workers</i>	<i>Clerical staff</i>	<i>Self-employed</i>	<i>Nomads/farmers</i>	
<i>Education level</i>	Primary school	% within education	45.3%	4.4%	32.1%	18.2%	100.0%
		% within occupation	24.7%	4.7%	21.2%	45.3%	21.3%
	Secondary school & secondary special	% within education	42.2%	10.0%	37.5%	10.3%	100.0%
		% within occupation	49.5%	22.8%	53.1%	54.7%	45.8%
	College & university	% within education	30.6%	44.1%	25.3%	0.0%	100.0%
		% within occupation	25.8%	72.5%	25.7%	0.0%	32.9%
Total or average		% within education	39.1%	20.0%	32.3%	8.6%	100.0%
		% within occupation	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

The strong preference for state-owned businesses among respondents with middle-level education shown in Table 5-80 can also be found among workers in Table 5-82. This trend is not apparent among self-employed respondents who have a similar educational background, however. It shows that education alone is not a deciding factor, and the personal working environment has a strong influence. While a worker may feel more job security in a state-owned enterprise, a self-employed person is a private entrepreneur whose economic existence could be challenged by more government ownership. The entrepreneur, therefore, has a different

preference (see: Table 5-82 and Figure 5-28).

Table 5-82: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by occupation/employment

<b>Occupation and employment status of respondents</b>	<b>Responses:</b>										<b>Total</b>	<b>Mean on scale 1 - 10</b>	<b>Std. error of mean</b>
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
Workers	21%	8%	11%	6%	13%	4%	8%	10%	12%	8%	100%	5.04	0.214
Clerical staff	30%	14%	9%	5%	6%	4%	7%	11%	8%	6%	100%	4.28	0.244
Self-employed	32%	10%	8%	4%	13%	5%	4%	7%	11%	6%	100%	4.29	0.212
Nomads/farmers	25%	14%	13%	6%	8%	3%	3%	14%	8%	5%	100%	4.32	0.389
Unemployed	24%	9%	8%	3%	11%	8%	9%	7%	15%	6%	100%	4.93	0.281
Students	21%	14%	8%	5%	11%	6%	8%	8%	9%	8%	100%	4.74	0.316
Others	22%	10%	12%	2%	13%	5%	8%	10%	8%	9%	100%	4.88	0.181

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

SMF data shows more preference for government ownership in Ulaanbaatar than in the aimags (see: Table 5-83).


Table 5-83: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by area of residence

<b>Area of residence</b>	<b>Responses:</b>										<b>Total</b>	<b>Mean on scale 1 - 10</b>	<b>Std. error of mean</b>
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
Ulaanbaatar	24%	9%	10%	5%	10%	5%	8%	9%	11%	10%	100%	4.94	0.145
Aimags	26%	12%	10%	4%	12%	5%	6%	10%	10%	5%	100%	4.49	0.117

Source: SMF poll, March 2015



Figure 5-28: Private vs. state ownership of business, by occupation/employment



SMF data shows a trend that government ownership of businesses becomes more acceptable when income increases (see: Table 5-84). Yes, as already discussed before, the high-income group’s opinion is not necessarily identical with the group earning the highest average income. Table 5-85 shows the Above Middle Class, which has the highest average income of all social groups, prefers private ownership. The Below Middle Class group is more strongly in favour of government ownership.

These diametrically opposed opinions between the respondents in the highest-tier income group and in the highest social group can be observed in four of the five issues analysed in this chapter. The view that hard work does not generally bring success but that achievements are more a matter of luck and connections is equally supported by the highest income group and the highest social group.

Table 5-84: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by income

<i>Estimated annual income of respondent's household in MNT</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
less than 4.4 M	25%	14%	11%	2%	10%	5%	7%	11%	11%	5%	100%	4.55	0.185
4.4 to < 8.8 M	26%	9%	9%	5%	13%	5%	8%	10%	9%	8%	100%	4.74	0.147
8.8 to < 15 M	23%	11%	11%	5%	11%	6%	7%	8%	11%	8%	100%	4.71	0.184
15 M or more	26%	11%	9%	4%	10%	4%	5%	10%	13%	9%	100%	4.79	0.285

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-29: Private vs. state ownership of business, by income





Table 5-85: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by social status

Self-assessment of respondents' social status	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Above middle class	25%	11%	15%	7%	7%	2%	9%	7%	9%	7%	100%	4.47	0.299
Middle class	29%	10%	8%	4%	11%	6%	6%	9%	11%	6%	100%	4.52	0.121
Below middle class	18%	10%	11%	3%	13%	5%	9%	10%	10%	11%	100%	5.18	0.182
Disadvant. group	14%	19%	11%	9%	13%	4%	4%	14%	4%	7%	100%	4.64	0.348

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-30: Private vs. state ownership of business, by social status




People, who consider themselves as winners, are predominantly in favour of private business ownership. Those, who considering themselves to be losers prefer more government ownership (see: Table 5-86).

Table 5-86: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by assessment as a winner or loser

<i>Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
I consider myself rather a loser	27%	11%	7%	3%	10%	5%	8%	8%	14%	7%	100%	4.80	0.153
I consider myself rather a winner	21%	15%	20%	5%	3%	4%	9%	9%	7%	7%	100%	4.33	0.316
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	23%	10%	12%	5%	14%	4%	5%	12%	9%	7%	100%	4.69	0.152

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-31: Private vs. state ownership of business, by assessment as a winner or loser




Among political party affiliations and preferences, the strongest supporters of private ownership are supporters of the MPRP. DP supporters are the strongest supporters of more government ownership. But in all groups, supporters of private ownership are stronger than supporters of government ownership (see: Table 5-87).

Table 5-87: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by preference of political parties

<i>Respondents favouring a particular political party</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
favouring MPP	22%	13%	12%	2%	16%	5%	9%	8%	7%	6%	100%	4.55	0.219
favouring DP	29%	10%	7%	4%	10%	5%	7%	11%	11%	7%	100%	4.64	0.251
favouring MPRP	26%	18%	5%	3%	18%	4%	8%	8%	9%	4%	100%	4.25	0.334

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-32: Private vs. state ownership of business, by preference of political parties




There is a slight distinction between the opinions of respondents who prefer one of the political systems.

Table 5-88: Cross tabulation on private vs. state ownership of business, by preferred political system

<i>Preferred political system of respondents</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	Private ownership should be increased					Government ownership should be increased							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Parliamentarian	19%	11%	13%	7%	8%	5%	9%	13%	6%	8%	100%	4.80	0.207
Semi-parliament.	24%	12%	10%	4%	13%	7%	7%	7%	10%	7%	100%	4.65	0.191
Presidential	28%	11%	9%	3%	12%	4%	7%	9%	12%	7%	100%	4.62	0.130

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-33: Private vs. state ownership of business, by preferred political system



### 5.3.3 ISSUE 3: ‘Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for’ vs. ‘People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves’

When asked about government reliability versus self-dependency in 2015, about 24 per cent of respondents chose answer 1 (“The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”). Only about 7 per cent chose “10” (“People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves”). The answers between these two ends of the scale also lean heavily towards people believing that it is the government’s responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for (see: Table 5-89). In total, 60 per cent of respondents are of this opinion, and only 40 per cent think that people are fully or partly responsible to provide for themselves. That is a clear indication that self-responsibility for personal provisions, in general, has relatively weak support among survey participants.

The comparison of responses in the years 2015 to 2017 shows some changes of opinion, but no clear trend toward any direction.


Table 5-89: Government responsibility

Question: <i>'Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for' vs. 'People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves' How would you place your views on this scale from 1 to 10?</i>		Responses			
		March 2015	March 2016	March 2017	Total
Responses:	1 = The government should take more responsibility	23.8%	21.1%	22.7%	22.5%
	2	10.9%	14.7%	11.8%	12.7%
	3	8.5%	11.8%	8.0%	9.6%
	4	4.7%	8.1%	5.9%	6.3%
	5	12.2%	11.0%	8.4%	10.6%
	6	5.8%	5.5%	5.2%	5.5%
	7	8.3%	7.9%	7.9%	8.0%
	8	10.8%	7.0%	7.4%	8.3%
	9	7.8%	7.0%	9.4%	8.0%
	10 = People should take more responsibility	7.3%	5.9%	13.2%	8.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Mean:</b>		<b>4.72</b>	<b>4.39</b>	<b>4.99</b>	<b>4.68</b>
<b>Standard error of mean:</b>		<b>0.089</b>	<b>0.075</b>	<b>0.096</b>	<b>0.050</b>

Source: SMF polls March 2015, March 2016, March 2017

Shown as a Figure, these responses result as follows:

Figure 5 34: Government responsibility



This third issue can provide some insights into aspects of people’s economic self-responsibility or dependency on the state to take care of their needs. Additional information from 2008-2015 in the SMF database also sheds light on this issue.

Several SMF polls asked whether respondents agree with the statement: “The state should guarantee a minimal standard of living for everybody; if one wants more, he should provide for himself”. An average of 75 per cent of respondents agreed with this statement, and agreement never fell below 70 per cent in 2008-2015 (see: Table 5-90).

Table 5-90: Guarantee of a minimal standard of living by the state

<i>The state should guarantee a minimal standard of living for everybody; if one wants more, he should provide for himself</i>	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average
Respondents agree	71%	73%	77%	71%	78%	77%	78%	73%	75%
Respondents disagree	29%	27%	23%	29%	22%	23%	23%	27%	25%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database 2008-2015

When people in the March 2015 Values Survey responded that “Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”, it should be viewed in correlation with the above question on economic dependence on the government.

Table 5-91 shows this correlation between dependence on the government and self-responsibility, based on data from March 2015. For this comparison, respondents are clustered into four groups: strong and moderate supporters of either viewpoint. The table shows that those who support guaranteed minimal standards of living are the majority in all groups. Even respondents who were strongly in support of the view that people should take more responsibility in providing for themselves were, at the same time, in support of a guaranteed minimal standard of living.



Table 5-91: Cross tabulation on the state’s responsibility to provide for everybody

<i>The state should guarantee a minimal standard of living for everybody, if one wants more, he should provide for himself</i>	<i>Respondents supporting the view ‘Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for’ ...</i>		<i>Respondents supporting the view ‘People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves’ ...</i>		<i>Average</i>
	<i>strongly</i> (answers 1,2)	<i>moderately</i> (answers 3-5)	<i>moderately</i> (answers 6-8)	<i>strongly</i> (answers 9, 10)	
Respondents agree	75%	71%	67%	80%	73%
Respond. disagree	25%	29%	33%	20%	27%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

The highest percentage share of respondents who see it as their own responsibility to provide for themselves can be found among the young generation (see: Table 5-92). The group expecting the most support from the government are the people between 40 and 49 years old. This is also the group with 25 per cent unemployment—one of the highest unemployment rates in the survey. As seen in Table 5-95, below, there is a correlation between unemployment and dependency on the government to provide for everyone.

Table 5-92: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by age

<i>Age of respondents</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	<i>The government should take more responsibility</i>					<i>People should take more responsibility</i>							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
18 – 24 years	21%	11%	6%	7%	10%	4%	11%	12%	9%	10%	100%	5.09	0.252
25 - 29 years	19%	8%	11%	6%	14%	8%	9%	11%	8%	8%	100%	4.99	0.237
30 - 39 years	25%	13%	10%	3%	10%	6%	7%	11%	8%	8%	100%	4.63	0.193
40 - 49 years	27%	10%	7%	6%	13%	8%	9%	10%	6%	4%	100%	4.44	0.188
50 - 59 years	26%	12%	6%	4%	12%	4%	6%	11%	10%	9%	100%	4.77	0.225
60 years or more	21%	10%	13%	4%	15%	5%	10%	10%	7%	5%	100%	4.62	0.233

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

The question of gender is of no relevance in this issue. The opinions of men and women are almost identical (see: Table 5-93).

Figure 5-35: Government responsibility, by age




Table 5-93: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by gender

Gender	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	The government should take more responsibility					People should take more responsibility							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Male	24%	11%	8%	6%	12%	6%	8%	10%	8%	8%	100%	4.73	0.131
Female	23%	11%	9%	4%	13%	6%	8%	12%	7%	7%	100%	4.72	0.122

Source: SMF poll, March 2015


Education, on the other hand, does have influence. Higher education generally leads to higher levels of economic self-responsibility and less dependency on the government. Respondents with low education are the strongest supporters of government taking more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for minimal standards of living. Respondents with college or university education are more of the opinion that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves (see: Table 5-94).

Table 5-94: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by education

Education of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	The government should take more responsibility					People should take more responsibility							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Primary school	26%	14%	6%	4%	11%	5%	8%	15%	7%	3%	100%	4.47	0.183
Secondary school	21%	11%	11%	5%	10%	6%	10%	11%	8%	7%	100%	4.82	0.143
Secondary special	28%	11%	2%	6%	17%	6%	6%	7%	8%	9%	100%	4.63	0.289
College & univ.ers.	23%	9%	10%	4%	14%	7%	7%	7%	9%	11%	100%	4.90	0.176

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-36: Government responsibility, by education



Nomadic herders and farmers are the group that puts the least responsibility with the government. Workers, clerical staff, and self-employed groups are very similar in their opinion by assigning more responsibility to the government (see: Table 5-95).

Unemployed respondents expect the government to take more responsibility than the employed and other people (e.g. pensioners or housewives). Students demonstrate the highest level of self-responsibility and see only a little responsibility with the government to provide for everyone (see: Table 5-95). Respondents living in the aimags see marginally more responsibility with the government than those living in Ulaanbaatar (see: Table 5-96).

Table 5-95: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by occupation and employment

Occupation and employment status of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 -10	Std. error of mean
	The government should take more responsibility					People should take more responsibility							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Workers	24%	11%	8%	6%	11%	5%	8%	10%	7%	8%	100%	4.71	0.214
Clerical staff	24%	12%	9%	4%	13%	8%	5%	9%	9%	7%	100%	4.64	0.237
Self-employed	26%	11%	8%	5%	12%	7%	8%	7%	8%	8%	100%	4.57	0.209
Nomads/farmers	22%	13%	6%	2%	14%	3%	11%	11%	9%	9%	100%	5.03	0.402
Unemployed	27%	13%	12%	5%	6%	5%	7%	13%	5%	5%	100%	4.27	0.269
Students	18%	9%	5%	6%	12%	5%	12%	12%	12%	7%	100%	5.34	0.310
Others	22%	9%	9%	4%	15%	5%	9%	14%	7%	6%	100%	4.82	0.174

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-37: Government responsibility, by occupation and employment





Table 5-96: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by area of residence

Area of residence	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	The government should take more responsibility					People should take more responsibility							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Ulaanbaatar	22%	10%	9%	6%	16%	5%	7%	10%	7%	8%	100%	4.79	0.136
Aimags	25%	12%	8%	4%	10%	6%	9%	11%	8%	6%	100%	4.68	0.118

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-38: Government responsibility, by area of residence



The comparison of opinions between different income groups (see: Table 5-97) and different social groups (see: Table 5-98) show the same inconsistency as discussed in connection with Table 5-68 and Table 5-69, in addition to Table 5-84 and Table 5-85.

People in the highest income group and people in the highest social group are diametrically opposed to each other's opinions. Respondents in the highest income group think that people should take more responsibility in providing for themselves; while low-income respondents want the government to take more responsibility (see: Table 5-97). Respondents in the highest social group are clearly more in favour of government taking more responsibility than the lower social groups (see: Table 5-98).

Table 5-97: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by income

Estimated annual income of respondent's household	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	The government should take more responsibility					People should take more responsibility							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
less than 4.4 M	25%	10%	9%	4%	9%	6%	9%	15%	8%	5%	100%	4.70	0.183
4.4 to < 8.8 M	25%	12%	7%	5%	14%	5%	10%	11%	6%	6%	100%	4.59	0.142
8.8 M to < 15 M	23%	10%	11%	4%	13%	7%	6%	8%	10%	10%	100%	4.82	0.185
15 M or more	20%	10%	7%	5%	13%	8%	9%	9%	10%	10%	100%	5.14	0.268

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-39: Government responsibility, by income





Table 5-98: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by social status

Self-assessment of respondents' social status	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	The government should take more responsibility					People should take more responsibility							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Above middle class	25%	12%	11%	6%	9%	9%	10%	4%	10%	5%	100%	4.41	0.285
Middle class	25%	11%	7%	5%	11%	5%	8%	12%	8%	8%	100%	4.72	0.120
Below middle class	22%	10%	11%	4%	15%	5%	9%	10%	8%	8%	100%	4.78	0.175
Disadvant. group	17%	9%	6%	7%	17%	10%	10%	11%	7%	7%	100%	5.15	0.341

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-40: Government responsibility, by social status




Between those who perceive themselves as winners or losers there is a noticeable difference in opinion. Losers tend to place responsibility with the government to ensure that everyone is provided for, and winners think that the people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves (see: Table 5-99).

Table 5-99: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by assessment of winners/losers

<b>Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers</b>	<b>Responses:</b>										<b>Total</b>	<b>Mean on scale 1 - 10</b>	<b>Std. error of mean</b>
	The government should take more responsibility					People should take more responsibility							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
I consider myself rather a loser	26%	11%	6%	3%	12%	7%	8%	11%	8%	8%	100%	4.75	0.148
I consider myself rather a winner	15%	14%	10%	9%	7%	5%	9%	10%	13%	9%	100%	5.16	0.327
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	23%	12%	10%	5%	12%	5%	7%	12%	7%	7%	100%	4.64	0.151

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-41: Government responsibility, by assessment of winners/losers



There is also a considerable difference of opinions between supporters of the three major political parties. Respondents who favour the MPP believe very strongly that the people themselves should take more responsibility to provide for themselves; supporters of the DP lean toward the other end of the spectrum and expect the government to take more responsibility. The opinion of supporters of the MPRP is in between these two viewpoints, but they are closer to DP supporters than MPP supporters (see: Table 5-100).




Table 5-100: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by preference of political parties

Respondents favouring a particular political party	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	The government should take more responsibility					People should take more responsibility							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
favouring MPP	20%	9%	10%	4%	14%	4%	12%	9%	10%	8%	100%	5.02	0.225
favouring DP	28%	16%	4%	4%	9%	7%	10%	7%	7%	7%	100%	4.42	0.244
favouring MPRP	22%	11%	4%	7%	17%	11%	10%	10%	4%	4%	100%	4.57	0.306

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-42: Government responsibility by preference of political parties




Respondents' preferences for a type of political system do not seem to have a strong impact on opinions regarding self-responsibility or dependency on government, except for one difference. Respondents who prefer a parliamentary system show a leaning towards more self-responsibility than those preferring a presidential system. This difference is, however, only marginal and may be coincidental.

Table 5-101: Cross tabulation on government responsibility, by preferred political system

Preferred political system of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	The government should take more responsibility					People should take more responsibility							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Parliamentarian	22%	11%	7%	4%	11%	6%	10%	14%	8%	6%	100%	4.96	0.210
Semi-parliament.	24%	10%	9%	5%	14%	3%	10%	8%	7%	8%	100%	4.67	0.190
Presidential	23%	12%	8%	5%	12%	7%	7%	11%	8%	7%	100%	4.74	0.125

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-43: Government responsibility, by preferred political system



### 5.3.4 ISSUE 4: ‘Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas’ vs. ‘Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people’

This question focuses on the positive and negative effects of competition. The result shows that competition generally has a very positive image among respondents. In 2015, more than 75 per cent responded that competition was incentivising; while only 23.6 per cent responded that it was harmful. The mean value of 3.77 (on the scale 1 to 10) is also a clear indicator to which side of the scale opinions lean. In subsequent years (2016 and 2017) this trend continued to strengthen (see: Table 5-102).

Table 5-102: Whether competition is good or harmful

<b>Question:</b> <i>‘Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas’ vs. ‘Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people’ How would you place your views on this scale from 1 to 10?</i>		<b>Responses</b>			
		<b>March 2015</b>	<b>March 2016</b>	<b>March 2017</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Responses:</b>	1 = Competition is good. It stimulates people	31.1%	29.2%	42.7%	33.9%
	2	13.0%	17.3%	14.5%	15.1%
	3	12.7%	14.0%	9.3%	12.2%
	4	5.8%	10.7%	8.3%	8.4%
	5	13.9%	8.7%	7.5%	9.9%
	6	3.8%	5.8%	3.6%	4.5%
	7	4.9%	3.9%	2.5%	3.8%
	8	5.9%	4.5%	3.3%	4.6%
	9	4.7%	3.1%	4.2%	3.9%
	10 = Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people	4.3%	2.7%	4.2%	3.6%
<b>Total</b>		<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>Mean:</b>		<b>3.77</b>	<b>3.46</b>	<b>3.15</b>	<b>3.46</b>
<b>Standard error of mean:</b>		<b>0.081</b>	<b>0.065</b>	<b>0.078</b>	<b>0.043</b>

Source: SMF polls; March 2015, March 2016, March 2017

Expressed as a Figure, these responses lead to the following picture:

Figure 5-44: Whether competition is good or harmful

Competition is good It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people				
<b>March 2015</b>									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
31%	13%	13%	6%	14%	4%	5%	6	5	4
<b>March 2016</b>									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
29%	17%	14%	11%	9%	6%	4%	5	3	3
<b>March 2017</b>									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
43%	15%	9%	8%	8%	4%	3	3	4	4


It is, however, remarkable that respondents are more likely to accept that there are positives in competition as age increases. Among the youngest group (18 to 24 years), competition is seen most negatively. In the oldest group (60 years and above), 84 per cent judge competition most positively. However, this includes about 18 per cent who opted for answer 5, which is rather weak (see: Table 5-103 and Figure 5-45).

Table 5-103: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by age

<i>Age of respondents</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	Competition is good. It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
18-24 years	22%	11%	13%	8%	15%	7%	4%	6%	6%	8%	100%	4.44	0.233
25 - 29 years	26%	13%	18%	5%	14%	4%	4%	6%	7%	4%	100%	3.91	0.219
30 - 39 years	28%	13%	15%	6%	15%	3%	6%	5%	4%	4%	100%	3.81	0.166
40 - 49 years	37%	10%	12%	5%	14%	4%	7%	6%	2%	3%	100%	3.52	0.172
50 - 59 years	38%	17%	8%	5%	8%	3%	4%	6%	6%	6%	100%	3.60	0.209
60 years or more	32%	14%	11%	7%	18%	1%	5%	6%	3%	1%	100%	3.49	0.204

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-45: Whether competition is good or harmful, by age



Like many other criteria observed for this statement, gender is of very little relevance. Male respondents regard competition only slightly more positively than females (see Table 5-104)

Table 5-104: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by gender

Gender	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1-10	Std. error of mean
	Competition is good. It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Male	33%	11%	14%	5%	14%	3%	5%	6%	4%	4%	100%	3.71	0.117
Female	29%	15%	12%	6%	14%	4%	5%	5%	5%	4%	100%	3.83	0.111

Source: SMF poll March 2015


Respondents with secondary school education consider competition less positively than others (see: Table 5-105). This relatively negative outlook from those who left secondary school without graduating corresponds with the negative opinion of workers (see: also Table 5-106). The two groups—workers and secondary school drop outs—are, however, not identical, as already shown in Table 5-81.

Table 5-105: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by education

Education of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Competition is good. It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Primary school	34%	15%	9%	5%	12%	4%	6%	7%	5%	2%	100%	3.61	0.168
Secondary school	26%	12%	13%	7%	16%	3%	6%	7%	6%	4%	100%	4.02	0.130
Secondary special	36%	14%	12%	4%	12%	7%	2%	2%	5%	6%	100%	3.51	0.257
College & univers.	34%	12%	16%	5%	12%	4%	4%	4%	3%	6%	100%	3.58	0.155

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-46: Whether competition is good or harmful, by education




Self-employed people are a group that see competition as a common challenge in their work. They do not, however, regard competition as harmful. Together, with clerical staff, they see the most positive effects in competition. Table 5-103 shows that the younger respondents see competition less positively than the older. This is further confirmed by the findings shown in Table 5-106. Here students show that they believe competition is much less helpful than all other groups.

Table 5-106: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by occupation/employment

Occupation and employment status of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Competition is good. It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Workers	29%	12%	15%	4%	13%	7%	5%	6%	5%	5%	100%	3.92	0.193
Clerical staff	36%	11%	15%	5%	9%	4%	7%	6%	4%	3%	100%	3.51	0.210
Self-employed	34%	15%	12%	6%	15%	2%	4%	6%	3%	4%	100%	3.47	0.177
Nomads/farmers	27%	17%	9%	8%	16%	2%	6%	6%	5%	5%	100%	3.91	0.352
Unemployed	29%	9%	12%	3%	15%	7%	5%	6%	7%	7%	100%	4.28	0.268
Students	22%	11%	13%	10%	16%	5%	3%	4%	7%	7%	100%	4.28	0.290
Others	32%	15%	11%	7%	15%	1%	5%	6%	5%	3%	100%	3.63	0.158

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-47: Whether competition is good or harmful, by occupation/employment




Respondents in rural areas have a more positive opinion about competition than those living in Ulaanbaatar (see: Table 5-107 and Figure 5-48).

Table 5-107: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by area of residence

Area of residence	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Competition is good. It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Ulaanbaatar	27%	10%	13%	8%	18%	3%	5%	5%	4%	5%	100%	3.94	0.122
Aimags	34%	15%	12%	4%	11%	4%	5%	6%	5%	4%	100%	3.65	0.107

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-48: Whether competition is good or harmful, by area of residence



The highest income group regards competition most negatively, while the second-highest income group has the most positive view on this issue. Table 5-108 shows once more that there is no direct correlation between respondents' income and their values.

Once again, as seen in all other issues discussed before, the highest social group (with the highest average income) has completely different opinions than the highest income group. In this instance, the opinions of the highest income group are closest to the lowest social group (see: Table 5-108 and Table 5-109). Members of the Middle Class have the most positive opinion regarding the effects of competition, and the lowest group on the social scale sees the least benefits in competition.



Table 5-108: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by income

Education of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Competition is good. It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
less than 4.4 M	31%	15%	11%	6%	13%	3%	6%	6%	5%	4%	100%	3.76	0.166
4.4 to < 8.8 M	32%	12%	11%	6%	14%	5%	5%	6%	5%	4%	100%	3.84	0.133
8.8 M to < 15 M	32%	14%	15%	6%	14%	4%	2%	6%	3%	4%	100%	3.55	0.157
15 M or more	30%	10%	15%	7%	13%	2%	7%	6%	4%	6%	100%	3.96	0.249

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-49: Whether competition is good or harmful, by income





Table 5-109: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by social status

Self-assessment of respondents' social status	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Competition is good. It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Above middle class	27%	16%	15%	7%	14%	6%	5%	3%	6%	4%	100%	3.73	0.255
Middle class	36%	13%	10%	6%	13%	4%	4%	5%	5%	4%	100%	3.55	0.105
Below middle class	25%	12%	16%	5%	16%	3%	6%	8%	4%	5%	100%	4.09	0.162
Disadvant. group	17%	11%	17%	4%	16%	4%	10%	11%	4%	6%	100%	4.63	0.335

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-50: Whether competition is good or harmful, by social status




Self-assessed winners and losers show only a marginal difference in their regard for positive or negative aspects of competition (see: Table 5-110).

Table 5-110: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by assessment of winners/losers

<b>Respon- dents' self- assessment whether they are winners or losers</b>	<b>Responses:</b>										<b>Total</b>	<b>Mean on scale 1 - 10</b>	<b>Std. error of mean</b>
	Competition is good. It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
I consider myself rather a loser	35%	10%	9%	5%	12%	5%	6%	6%	5%	7%	100%	3.94	0.141
I consider myself rather a winner	33%	12%	5%	9%	11%	3%	7%	10%	7%	4%	100%	4.08	0.315
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	30%	16%	17%	6%	15%	2%	4%	5%	3%	3%	100%	3.45	0.124

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-51: Whether competition is good or harmful, by assessment of winners/losers




Supporters of the different political parties express almost identical opinions regarding the harmful effects of competition. On the judgement of the positive effects, DP supporters see the greatest advantage. Supporters of the MPP and MPRP are a bit less enthusiastic than DP supporters, but they are like each other (see: Table 5-111).

Table 5-111: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by preference of political parties

<i>Respondents favouring a particular political party</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	<i>Competition is good. It stimulates people</i>					<i>Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people</i>							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
favouring MPP	29%	16%	8%	5%	17%	5%	4%	7%	4%	4%	100%	3.89	0.207
favouring DP	36%	12%	7%	8%	13%	4%	4%	5%	5%	7%	100%	3.78	0.232
favouring MPRP	26%	16%	11%	8%	14%	3%	6%	5%	5%	6%	100%	3.98	0.323

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-52: Whether competition is good or harmful, by preference of political parties




Supporters of a presidential system see competition as more helpful than supporters of a parliamentary or semi-parliamentary system (see: Table 5-112).

Table 5-112: Cross tabulation on whether competition is good or harmful, by preferred political system

Preferred political system of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	Competition is good. It stimulates people					Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Parliamentarian	26%	14%	13%	5%	13%	4%	8%	7%	4%	4%	100%	4.00	0.191
Semi-parliament.	28%	12%	13%	5%	14%	4%	5%	6%	5%	7%	100%	4.13	0.183
Presidential	35%	13%	13%	6%	13%	3%	4%	5%	5%	3%	100%	3.51	0.110

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-53: Whether competition is good or harmful, by preferred political system



### 5.3.5 ISSUE 5: “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life” vs. “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections”

Most respondents have the opinion that hard work eventually leads to success. In 2015, 27.8 per cent expressed this opinion very strongly (answer 1), while another 37.1 per cent opted for answers 2 through 5, which express the same view but to a lesser degree (Table 5-113). 7.4 per cent of all respondents answered “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success” (answer 10). Another 27.7 per cent were of the same opinion to a lesser degree (answers 6 through 9).

Table 5-113: “Hard work brings success”

Question: <i>‘In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life’ vs. ‘Hard work doesn’t generally bring success- it’s more a matter of luck and connections’ How would you place your views on this scale from 1 to 10?</i>		Responses			
		March 2015	March 2016	March 2017	Total
Responses:	1 = In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life	27.8%	24.1%	36.9%	29.2%
	2	9.9%	14.5%	16.4%	13.7%
	3	9.5%	14.5%	8.8%	11.2%
	4	5.1%	9.4%	7.4%	7.5%
	5	12.5%	10.1%	6.8%	9.8%
	6	5.5%	4.1%	5.3%	4.9%
	7	5.9%	4.8%	2.9%	4.6%
	8	9.2%	5.5%	5.0%	6.5%
	9	7.0%	6.1%	5.0%	6.0%
	10 = Hard work doesn’t generally bring success	7.4%	6.9%	5.4%	6.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Mean:</b>		<b>4.45</b>	<b>4.11</b>	<b>3.51</b>	<b>3.46</b>
<b>Standard error of mean:</b>		<b>0.090</b>	<b>0.075</b>	<b>0.084</b>	<b>0.048</b>

Source: SMF polls March 2015, March 2016, March 2017

Shown as a Figure, these responses look as follows:

Figure 5-54: “Hard work brings success”

In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn't generally bring success				
<b>March 2015</b>									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
28%	10%	10%	5	13%	6%	6%	9%	7%	7%
<b>March 2016</b>									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
24%	15%	15%	9%	10%	4%	5%	6	6	7%
<b>March 2017</b>									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
37%	16%	9%	7%	7%	5%	3	5	5	5%

The younger generation, less than 30 years old, believes slightly less in the success of hard work, while those above 50 years old have the strongest view that hard work eventually leads to a better life (see: Table 5-114). Gender is of no relevance (see: Table 5-114).

Table 5-114: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by age

Age of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn't generally bring success							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
18-24 years	23%	8%	8%	9%	13%	4%	3%	13%	7%	12%	100%	4.99	0.252
25-29 years	21%	11%	8%	8%	13%	5%	7%	11%	12%	6%	100%	4.89	0.242
30-39 years	26%	9%	11%	5%	15%	4%	5%	9%	9%	9%	100%	4.61	0.192
40-49 years	30%	11%	10%	3%	12%	8%	7%	7%	5%	7%	100%	4.21	0.195
50-59 years	36%	13%	7%	3%	9%	6%	7%	8%	6%	6%	100%	3.99	0.216
60 years or more	30%	7%	13%	5%	14%	6%	8%	8%	5%	4%	100%	4.14	0.231

Source: SMF poll March 2015

Figure 5-55: “Hard work brings success”, by age




Table 5-115: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by gender

<b>Gender</b>	<b>Responses:</b>										<b>Total</b>	<b>Mean on scale 1 - 10</b>	<b>Std. error of mean</b>
	In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn't generally bring success							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
Male	29%	10%	9%	5%	11%	6%	6%	11%	6%	8%	100%	4.45	0.131
Female	27%	10%	10%	5%	14%	5%	6%	8%	8%	7%	100%	4.44	0.122

Source: SMF poll March 2015

Generally, there is a growing belief in the success of hard work as respondents' education levels increase. However, respondents with college or university education represent an exception to this rule, and, instead, are relatively pessimistic about work and success (see: Table 5-116).


Table 5-116: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by education

<b>Education of respondents</b>	<b>Responses:</b>										<b>Total</b>	<b>Mean on scale 1 - 10</b>	<b>Std. error of mean</b>
	In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn't generally bring success							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
Primary school	30%	9%	7%	3%	12%	6%	6%	12%	8%	7%	100%	4.59	0.194
Secondary school	27%	10%	12%	6%	12%	6%	6%	11%	6%	4%	100%	4.29	0.137
Secondary special	35%	13%	7%	4%	12%	6%	7%	4%	5%	8%	100%	3.92	0.280
College & univers.	25%	10%	10%	6%	13%	5%	5%	6%	8%	11%	100%	4.67	0.178

Source: SMF poll, March 2015



Figure 5-56: “Hard work brings success”, by education



Among the working people, self-employed respondents and nomadic herders and farmers are strong believers that hard work leads to success (see: Table 5-117).


The “working class” (meaning here employed people) is the section of society that believes strongest in the success of hard work. Unemployed respondents and students trend to the view that luck and connections are rather more important (see: Table 5-117).

Table 5-117: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by occupation/employment

Occupation and employment status of respondents	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn't generally bring success							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Workers	27%	12%	11%	5%	14%	6%	4%	8%	7%	6%	100%	4.20	0.203
Clerical staff	26%	10%	11%	6%	10%	7%	5%	8%	9%	8%	100%	4.53	0.241
Self-employed	34%	8%	8%	4%	11%	4%	8%	10%	8%	5%	100%	4.31	0.210
Nomads/farmers	30%	13%	9%	3%	8%	8%	9%	9%	3%	8%	100%	4.28	0.389
Unemployed	26%	12%	9%	6%	13%	4%	4%	10%	5%	12%	100%	4.61	0.285
Students	20%	8%	10%	8%	15%	4%	1%	15%	7%	10%	100%	4.97	0.315
Others	28%	9%	9%	4%	14%	6%	8%	7%	7%	7%	100%	4.48	0.177

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-57: “Hard work brings success”, by occupation/employment




There is a visible difference between opinions of respondents in Ulaanbaatar and the aimags (see: Table 5-118).

Table 5-118: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by area of residence

Area of residence	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn't generally bring success							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Ulaanbaatar	24%	8%	8%	8%	16%	4%	7%	9%	8%	10%	100%	4.82	0.140
Aimags	31%	12%	11%	3%	10%	7%	5%	10%	7%	6%	100%	4.17	0.116

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-58: “Hard work brings success”, by area of residence



There is a possibility that the term “connection” in the context of the issue dealt with in this analysis is understood to mean “corruption”. This understanding may have contributed to the negative responses that came from a large portion of the sample while corruption is believed to be growing in Mongolian society. In people’s opinions, the disparity between the capital city and rural areas may be propelled by corruption, not hard work.

This is the only instance in this analysis where there is agreement between the opinions of the highest income group and the highest social group. The consensus is in the view that hard work generally does not bring success—it’s more a matter of luck and connections.

Respondents with low income are more optimistic; believing that hard work usually does bring a better life (see: Table 5-119). This is also the opinion of the Middle Class. Both the Above and Below the Middle Class social groups are noticeably more negative in their judgement of the rewards of hard work (see: Table 5-120).

Table 5-119: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by income

<i>Estimated annual income of respondent's household in MNT</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	<i>In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life</i>					<i>Hard work doesn't generally bring success</i>							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
less than 4.4 M	29%	12%	8%	4%	11%	5%	7%	8%	8%	8%	100%	4.44	0.188
4.4 to < 8.8 M	30%	9%	10%	6%	12%	7%	5%	11%	6%	5%	100%	4.27	0.139
8.8 M to < 15 M	28%	8%	11%	6%	13%	4%	7%	8%	7%	9%	100%	4.44	0.183
15 M or more	21%	11%	8%	6%	13%	4%	6%	9%	10%	13%	100%	5.08	0.279

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-59: “Hard work brings success”, by income





Table 5-120: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by social status

Self-assessment of respondents' social status	Responses:										Total	Mean on scale 1 - 10	Std. error of mean
	In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn't generally bring success							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Above middle class	19%	11%	8%	8%	14%	5%	7%	11%	9%	7%	100%	4.91	0.290
Middle class	33%	10%	9%	5%	12%	6%	6%	8%	5%	8%	100%	4.14	0.118
Below middle class	22%	9%	12%	4%	12%	5%	6%	12%	11%	8%	100%	4.91	0.180
Disadvant. group	14%	13%	11%	6%	14%	9%	10%	9%	9%	7%	100%	5.00	0.343

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-60: “Hard work brings success”, by social status




Respondents who consider themselves losers rather than winners in life are more optimistic about the rewards of hard work than others (see: Table 5-121). This raises the question: Could this be interpreted to mean that the “winners” are the people who have “connections” and that they credit their own success to this fact without hard work; or is it instead a cultural issue where success or failure is a result of a person’s karma, rather than hard work?

Table 5-121: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by assessment of winners/losers

<b>Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers</b>	<b>Responses:</b>										<b>Total</b>	<b>Mean on scale 1 - 10</b>	<b>Std. error of mean</b>
	<b>In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life</b>					<b>Hard work doesn't generally bring success</b>							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
I consider myself rather a loser	32%	11%	7%	4%	9%	5%	6%	9%	7%	9%	100%	4.36	0.151
I consider myself rather a winner	22%	8%	8%	12%	15%	8%	5%	9%	5%	8%	100%	4.67	0.306
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	23%	10%	14%	5%	15%	5%	5%	9%	9%	6%	100%	4.50	0.147

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-61: “Hard work brings success”, by assessment of winners/losers




The difference in opinions of the supporters between the three major political parties is only marginal but still noticeable (see: Table 5-122). Supporters of the MPP believe more than others that in the long run hard work will bring rewards in the form of a better life.

Table 5-122: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by preference of political parties

<i>Respon- dents favouring a particular political party</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	<i>In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life</i>					<i>Hard work doesn't generally bring success</i>							
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>			
favouring MPP	29%	8%	14%	6%	12%	7%	4%	8%	5%	8%	100%	4.21	0.219
favouring DP	27%	12%	6%	4%	15%	7%	4%	11%	6%	8%	100%	4.55	0.244
favouring MPRP	25%	11%	4%	7%	14%	4%	10%	11%	9%	6%	100%	4.75	0.344

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-62: “Hard work brings success”, by preference of political parties




There is also a difference in the opinions between people with preferences for a specific political system (see: Table 5-123).

Table 5-123: Cross tabulation on “Hard work brings success”, by preferred political system

<i>Respondents favouring a particular political system</i>	<i>Responses:</i>										<i>Total</i>	<i>Mean on scale 1 - 10</i>	<i>Std. error of mean</i>
	In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life					Hard work doesn't generally bring success							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Parliamentarian	22%	12%	6%	6%	16%	7%	6%	10%	7%	8%	100%	4.73	0.207
Semi-parliament.	23%	8%	13%	5%	13%	5%	4%	9%	6%	12%	100%	4.76	0.196
Presidential	31%	10%	10%	5%	11%	5%	7%	9%	7%	6%	100%	4.29	0.125

Source: SMF poll, March 2015

Figure 5-63: “Hard work brings success”, by preferred political system



# 6

## SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

### 6.1 Identification of Groups by their Political Orientation

The political orientation of respondents in the 1997-2007 polls was very much influenced by aspects of political and economic transformation and the alienation of parts of the Mongolian population. In a first attempt by the Sant Maral Foundation to identify specific groups by their political orientation, data from surveys in 1997 through 1999 was used along with statistical analysis for this first categorical breakdown<sup>19</sup>:

Active system supporters	These people fully supported the change to democracy and a market economy. They noticed the economic progress made; expressed strong optimism while maintaining faith in the democratic state; and held a keen interest in politics.
Passive system supporters	This group was also in support of the introduction of democracy and market economy. They, too, saw progress; maintained interest in politics and faith in a functioning democracy; however, their support was less than the group of active supporters’.
Pessimistic group	This group distinguished itself from the two previously described groups by having a more reserved opinion regarding the progress made and were considerably less optimistic concerning the future. They had a negative attitude about voters’ influence in politics and did not have much interest in politics in general.
System alienated group	This last group had the most negative attitude towards all aspects included at the time of analysis. They did not ap-

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19 For more details on previous data analysis, see Voters Voices, No. 3.1.1, p. 344-349



prove of the change to democracy and market economy and had no faith in the functioning of the new system. They were truly alienated by the new system.

This first analysis was refined in 2007, when additional data from polls was available. That led to a more refined description of the system supporters and showed that there were fewer people with pessimistic outlooks, or completely alienated.

The second analysis then identified the following groups:

- Supporters of a liberal market economy
- Supporters of a social market economy
- Supporters of democratic socialism
- Passive system supporters
- Pessimistic or alienated citizens


With the completely new design of the Sant Maral Foundation's questionnaire because the transition had already ended, the data gathered from 2008 through 2015 made it possible to carry out a new analysis that considered the development of people's political orientation during those years. It was not an easy task because political attitudes remained volatile. This situation meant party affiliation variables were beyond factors shaping stable groups in society. However, as political parties mature over time, the attitudes towards them will play a role in factor analysis to determine the most-influencing aspects. This new analysis is based on four factors, each containing two variables that proved statistically most relevant.

Table 6-1 shows the details of the factor analysis. The four factors are listed according to their weight, and eight variable responses to questions statements are ranked by their importance within these factors. The groups identified in this analysis are shown in Figure 6-1.

Table 6-1: Factors used for identification of groups (clusters) within the analysis of political orientation

	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Means</i>
	14.9%	17.4%	17.3%	17.0%	19.0%	14.5%	
<b>1<sup>st</sup> factor: State control</b> (Respondents' attitude toward state control over society)							
Under certain circumstances dictatorship is better than democracy	-0.80	-0.47	-0.64	-0.14	0.39	0.43	-0.1984
	--	-	--	+	++	++	
Only through socialism can all problems be solved	-0.80	-0.54	-0.60	-0.15	0.35	0.51	-0.2018
	--	-	-	o	+	++	
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> factor: Voters' influence</b> (impact of participation)							
No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same	-0.83	0.94	0.96	0.18	0.87	-0.42	0.3415
	--	++	++	o	+	-	
It is enough if one participates in election regularly	-0.44	-0.92	0.92	-0.06	0.82	-0.60	-0.0069
	-	--	++	o	++	-	
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> factor: Systemic questions</b> (system of government and state involvement)							
In a democracy, not all things go the way one would like, but there is no better state model	0.40	0.26	0.28	-0.11	0.29	-0.09	0.1758
	++	+	+	--	+	-	
The state should guarantee the right to a job for everybody	0.70	0.89	0.93	-0.62	0.92	0.87	0.6162
	+	+	++	--	++	+	
<b>4<sup>th</sup> factor: Traditionalism</b> (role of women; "strong hand")							
Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men	-0.72	-0.69	-0.83	-0.32	-0.04	-0.73	-0.5392
	-	-	--	+	++	-	
I am against dictatorship but support a government with a strong hand	-0.46	-0.05	-0.46	-0.06	0.55	-0.10	-0.0761
	--	o	--	o	++	-	

Figure 6-1: Groups with different political orientation (analysis based on data from 2008 through 2015)



Below are tables with the detailed responses from the six groups about the eight statistically most-relevant variables. Agreement or disagreement with the variable question-statements was the basis for the identification of respondents' political orientations (see: Table 61). If there was no response or answer (i.e. "don't know") it was regarded as a neutral position toward the issue in question.

In a separate line at the end of each individual table are the symbols from Table 6-1, which give an indication of how strongly respondents agree or disagree with the statement.

Table 6-2: Responses to the statement: "Under certain circumstances dictatorship is better than democracy"

	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	5.0%	18.9%	9.3%	23.7%	58.5%	57.6%	29.1%
Disagree	85.1%	65.5%	73.4%	37.4%	19.8%	14.3%	48.9%
don't know or no response	9.9%	15.6%	17.3%	38.9%	21.7%	28.1%	22.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Indicator of agreement or disagreement	--	-	--	+	++	++	

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-3: Responses to the statement: “Only through socialism can all problems be solved”

	<i>Ideal-istic Democrats</i>	<i>Progres-sive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conser-vatives</i>	<i>Tradi-tionalists</i>	<i>Sover-eign Democ-rats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	3.8%	11.2%	9.5%	21.5%	55.9%	61.0%	27.2%
Disagree	83.7%	65.3%	69.0%	36.4%	20.8%	10.5%	47.4%
don't know or no response	12.6%	23.6%	21.5%	42.0%	23.3%	28.5%	25.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Indicator of agree-ment or disagree-ment	--	-	-	<b>O</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>++</b>	

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-4: Responses to the statement: “No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same”

	<i>Ideal-istic Democrats</i>	<i>Progres-sive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conser-vatives</i>	<i>Tradi-tionalists</i>	<i>Sover-eign Democ-rats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree		94.4%	96.2%	39.9%	90.8%	17.0%	59.5%
Disagree	83.1%			21.5%	4.0%	58.5%	25.3%
don't know or no response	16.9%	5.6%	3.8%	38.6%	5.1%	24.5%	15.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Indicator of agree-ment or disagree-ment	--	<b>++</b>	<b>++</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>-</b>	

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-5: Responses to the statement: “It is enough if one participates in election regularly”

	<i>Ideal-istic Democrats</i>	<i>Pro-gressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conser-vatives</i>	<i>Tradi-tionalists</i>	<i>Sover-eign Democ-rats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	18.0%		91.8%	25.5%	84.6%	9.0%	40.2%
Disagree	62.3%	91.8%		31.2%	2.1%	68.6%	40.9%
don't know or no response	19.71%	8.3%	8.2%	43.3%	13.3%	22.5%	18.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Indicator of agree-ment or disagree-ment	<b>-</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>++</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>++</b>	<b>-</b>	

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-6: Responses to the statement: “In democracy, not all things go the way one would like, but there is no better state model”

	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	62.5%	52.9%	53.2%	23.5%	52.1%	27.3%	45.5%
Disagree	22.8%	26.8%	25.6%	34.2%	22.9%	36.6%	27.9%
don't know or no response	14.7%	20.4%	21.2%	42.3%	25.0%	36.1%	26.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Indicator of agreement or disagreement	<b>++</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>-</b>	

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-7: Responses to the statement: “The state should guarantee the right to a job for everybody”

	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	80.7%	91.9%	94.4%	0.2%	94.3%	90.0%	75.2%
Disagree	10.9%	2.6%	1.6%	62.0%	1.8%	2.8%	13.6%
don't know or no response	8.4%	5.5%	4.1%	37.8%	3.9%	7.2%	11.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Indicator of agreement or disagreement	<b>+</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>++</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>++</b>	<b>+</b>	

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-8: Responses to the statement: “Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men”

	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	10.4%	12.6%	6.5%	17.3%	42.7%	8.9%	17.2%
Disagree	82.4%	82.1%	89.1%	49.3%	47.0%	82.0%	71.1%
don't know or no response	7.3%	5.3%	4.4%	33.3%	10.2%	9.2%	11.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Indicator of agreement or disagreement	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>+</b>	<b>++</b>	<b>-</b>	

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-9: Responses to the statement: “I am against dictatorship but support a government with a strong hand”

	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	20.4%	39.0%	19.1%	26.8%	70.5%	31.7%	35.6%
Disagree	65.9%	44.0%	64.7%	32.8%	15.3%	42.1%	43.2%
don't know or no response	13.7%	17.0%	16.2%	40.4%	14.2%	26.3%	21.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Indicator of agreement or disagreement	--	<b>O</b>	--	<b>O</b>	<b>++</b>	-	

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

## 6.2 Development of Groups with different Political Orientation from 2008 to 2015


The six groups identified from the 2008-2015 poll analysis are relatively even in size, with all groups developing similarly over the period.

Table 6-10: Groups with different political orientation

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>Average</b>
Idealistic Democrats	15.7%	13.5%	17.5%	19.5%	13.6%	14.2%	12.9%	16.5%	12.2%
Progressive Liberals	17.5%	17.7%	18.4%	15.2%	18.2%	17.9%	13.8%	16.0%	22.5%
Passive Liberals	14.8%	18.0%	17.5%	16.9%	17.5%	16.9%	18.3%	19.0%	42.4%
Conservatives	23.6%	22.0%	10.4%	16.4%	15.3%	14.0%	18.3%	16.9%	22.9%
Traditionalists	17.0%	19.4%	18.6%	14.4%	20.6%	18.1%	21.1%	18.8%	12.2%
Sovereign Democrats	11.4%	9.5%	17.5%	17.6%	14.7%	19.1%	15.7%	12.8%	22.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Figure 6-2: Groups with different political orientation



## 6.3 Description of Groups and their Political Orientation

Analysis of the six groups of political orientation identified in this analysis of data compiled from 2008 through 2015 shows the following results derived from particularly strong views in favour or against the statements presented to respondents in the eight variables included in the questionnaires.

### 6.3.1 Idealistic Democrats

Respondents in this group fully support democracy and feel strongly against dictatorial rule; they do not think that socialism can solve all problems. They believe that they themselves can make a difference by electing (the correct) leader or party. However, participating in election is not enough, and they are strongly against rule by a “strong hand.” They are in general socially progressive and are pro gender equality.

### 6.3.2 Progressive Liberals<sup>20</sup>

Progressive liberals strongly believe that it is not enough to participate in elections. This group feels that more is required from citizens in a democracy. On the other hand, they believe that for ordinary citizens it makes no difference who governs.

Such views could point at some disillusionment. These people realise the present political system is in a crisis but do not see how they can get involved to contribute to a solution. However, these progressive liberals do not seek solutions through violence (see: Table 6 60).

### 6.3.3 Passive Liberals

This group is very much like the one described above, with only one major difference: passive liberals believe participation in elections is sufficient for their role in a democracy. Differences in other aspects are narrow dissimilarities, rather than opposing views, as can be seen from the comparison below:

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<sup>20</sup> “Liberalism” is quite an important factor in Mongolian society, but in the context of this analysis it should be considered a relative term. What is considered liberal in Mongolia may not be the same in an international comparison. However, some opinions in this present analysis may qualify as truly liberal, even in a global comparison. E.g. the strong disapproval of dictatorship and the attitudes towards gender issues.



	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>
Under certain circumstances, dictatorship is better than democracy	-	--
Only through socialism can all problems be solved	-	-
No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same	++	++
It is enough if one participates in election regularly	--	++
In a democracy, not all things go the way one would like, but there is no better state model	+	+
The state should guarantee the right to a job for everybody	+	++
Women should care for the family and household, and leave politics to men	-	--
I am against dictatorship but support a government with a strong hand	o	--

Passive Liberals are in favour of state intervention to the effect of guaranteed employment for everybody but are strongly against a government with a “strong hand”. They strongly believe that there is no alternative to democracy. The group is very progressive regarding equal participation of women in society.

### 6.3.4 Conservatives

Conservatism in the context of Mongolian political orientation comprises a traditional view about the role of women as well as a preference for rule by a “strong hand”. These people do not believe that democracy is the best form of government.

Conservatives disagree so strongly with any state guarantee for jobs for everybody that such measures may be interpreted as intervention in people’s karma (some people are rich, and some are poor). This is the way it is and should be, and nobody should interfere).

On the four other issues identified as statistically significant, this group has no distinct opinion. Among all respondents, persons classified as conservatives more often than others gave the response “don’t know”.

### 6.3.5 Traditionalists

This group has even more traditional views regarding the role of women and has a stronger preference for rule by a “strong hand” than conservatives. In some other issues traditionalists also tend to have opinions similar to conservatives, but their opinions are more distinct – with one exception: traditionalists are in support of the state’s role in providing jobs

for everybody.

At the same time, traditionalists have no problem agreeing that, under certain circumstances, a dictatorship can be better than democracy.

This suggests that traditionalists have a rather passive attitude. They want the state to “take care of things” and restrict their own involvement to only casting their vote at elections. They are not active in any way in changing society.

### 6.3.6 Sovereign Democrats

This group strongly believes that, under certain circumstances, dictatorship is better than democracy. They also agree that only through socialism can all problems be solved. Responses to the last variable on the list show that these respondents are not against dictatorship, while a government with a “strong hand” is not sufficient for them.

The combination of these strong views suggests that for this group, democracy is not a desirable form of government. That is why term “Sovereign Democrats” was selected for this group. The group appears to be in favour of a system that is essentially authoritarian but disguised as democratic.

The term “Sovereign Democrats” in Russia is used as such a disguise for a system not truly democratic (as can be seen in the current political trends in Russia, where authoritarianism is growing alongside the nostalgic feelings for the former Soviet Union).

*“Sovereign democracy” (Russian: “суверенная демократия”, suverennaya demokratiya) is a term describing modern Russian politics first used by Vladislav Surkov in February 2006 in a speech before a gathering of the Russian political party United Russia. According to Surkov, sovereign democracy is “The type of the political life of the society in which the Power, its entities and actions are selected, formed and directed exclusively by Russian nation in all its diversity and integrity in the pursuit of material well-being, freedom and justice of all citizens, social groups and peoples, which it is composed from”.*

*This term was used thereafter by various politicians and is the official ideology of the Russian youth movement NASHI, created in support of Vladimir Putin.*

*Sovereign Democracy in Russia was realised in the form of a dominant-party system which was put into place in 2007 when, because of the Russian legislative election of 2007, the political party United Russia, headed by president Vladimir Putin, formally became the leading and guiding force in Russian society, not unlike the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. With its power in place, the party did not ever form a formal government.*

## 6.4 Demographic Data and Social Indicators

### 6.4.1 Age of Respondents

Respondents below the age of 25 years are overrepresented in three groups: Idealistic Democrats, Progressive Liberals, and Conservatives. Respondents between 30 and 39 years are overrepresented in the groups of Passive Liberals (Table 6-11).

Traditionalists are the group where young people are strongly under-represented, but respondents of 50 years of age or older are particularly strong within this group.

Table 6-11: Age of respondents in groups of different political orientation

<i>Age or respondents</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
18 - 24	15.5%	15.6%	12.8%	16.7%	10.0%	13.8%	14.0%
25 - 29	14.1%	14.0%	13.0%	12.9%	9.3%	11.6%	12.4%
30 - 39	24.9%	25.1%	27.5%	26.5%	22.4%	23.4%	25.0%
40 - 49	21.3%	22.3%	20.7%	20.8%	23.8%	22.7%	22.0%
50 - 59	13.1%	13.8%	13.6%	12.1%	18.1%	15.5%	14.4%
60 or more years	11.1%	9.1%	12.5%	10.9%	16.4%	12.9%	12.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

Men are slightly overrepresented among Traditionalists and women are overrepresented among Passive Liberals and Conservatives.

Table 6-12: Gender of respondents in groups of different political orientation

<i>Gender</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Male	49.1%	48.5%	44.6%	45.7%	49.7%	47.0%	47.4%
Female	50.9%	51.5%	55.4%	54.3%	50.3%	53.0%	52.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

## 6.4.2 Education and Employment

Respondents with relatively low levels of education are strongly represented in the group of Traditionalists. Respondents with college and university education are very strong among Progressive Liberals (see: Table 6-13).

The different occupations and sectors of employment do not show any significant correlation with any political orientation (see: Table 6-14). There is one exception, however: pensioners are very strongly represented among Traditionalists, which corresponds with the previously identified trend that this age group is overrepresented among the people identified as Traditionalists (see: Table 6-11, above).

Table 6-13: Education of respondents in groups of different political orientation

<i>Education</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Illiterate	2.0%	1.4%	1.9%	2.4%	2.6%	2.2%	2.1%
Primary school	26.8%	20.8%	29.2%	30.1%	30.6%	27.7%	27.6%
Secondary school	32.3%	31.2%	33.2%	27.7%	34.0%	30.9%	31.6%
Secondary special	12.3%	12.4%	11.1%	12.7%	12.7%	13.6%	12.4%
College and university	26.6%	34.2%	24.6%	27.1%	20.2%	25.6%	26.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-14: Occupation and employment of respondents in groups of different political orientation

<i>Occupation and employment</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Workers public sec.	5.5%	5.8%	5.2%	4.8%	5.8%	5.2%	5.4%
Workers private sec.	7.8%	8.1%	7.7%	6.9%	6.3%	6.5%	7.2%
State officers	3.5%	5.3%	3.0%	4.2%	3.0%	3.6%	3.8%
State service	6.9%	8.4%	6.2%	6.9%	4.4%	7.5%	6.7%
Employees private sec.	2.5%	3.9%	2.4%	2.8%	1.9%	2.9%	2.7%
Self-employed	15.8%	17.1%	17.4%	16.9%	18.3%	16.2%	17.0%
Nomads/Farmers	10.6%	7.0%	9.3%	9.4%	9.8%	8.2%	9.0%
Unemployed	13.5%	11.5%	14.3%	10.9%	12.1%	12.4%	12.4%

At home (housewife)	4.4%	4.8%	4.9%	5.4%	5.0%	5.6%	5.0%
Retired/disability allow.	15.5%	13.5%	17.5%	15.1%	23.4%	18.6%	17.4%
Army					0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
Student	7.6%	8.5%	6.0%	8.2%	4.1%	7.0%	6.8%
Employed...	1.9%	2.1%	1.9%	2.2%	1.8%	1.9%	2.0%
NGO	3.5%	3.3%	3.1%	5.1%	3.0%	3.0%	3.5%
Professional trainee	0.8%	0.6%	1.1%	1.2%	0.9%	1.2%	1.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

### 6.4.3 Urban / rural Balance

Progressive Liberals are strongly overrepresented in urban areas, Traditionalists are stronger in rural areas (see: Table 6-15).

Table 6-15: Urban / rural residence of respondents in groups of different political orientation

<i>Urban / rural residence</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Urban	37.8%	45.5%	37.1%	39.3%	35.9%	38.6%	39.0%
Rural	62.2%	54.5%	62.9%	60.7%	64.1%	61.4%	61.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

### 6.4.4 Social Status

Respondents who consider them to belong to the Middle Class social group are strongly under-represented among Idealistic Democrats, while the Below Middle Class and Disadvantaged Group are over-represented (see: Table 6-16). The Middle Class is more strongly represented among Passive Liberals.

Table 6-16: Social status of respondents in groups of different political orientation

<i>Social status</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Above middle class	11.5%	9.9%	7.6%	11.4%	6.7%	8.3%	9.1%
Middle class	53.9%	62.8%	65.3%	57.6%	61.8%	56.9%	60.0%
Below middle class	24.5%	20.4%	21.2%	20.8%	23.0%	24.9%	22.4%
Disadvantaged group	10.1%	6.9%	5.9%	10.1%	8.5%	9.8%	8.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

## 6.5 Views and Opinions on Selected Issues

### 6.5.1 Party Preferences

Of some significance is which political party each of the six groups of political orientation favour. Which party does each trust most to solve the problems in the country and whom would they vote for? For this analysis, consider that the old MPRP changed its name to MPP in 2012 and then a group splitting off from the MPP founded a new party with the original MPRP name. Therefore, the timeline will be divided into two phases: 2008-2011 and 2012-2015.

The first question in this context is which party the different groups favour. In addition to the MPP and the MPRP, the Democratic Party is the only other individual party included in this analysis because all other parties have so little support among respondents that any meaningful analysis is impossible. All parties other than the MPP, MPRP and DP are therefore combined as “others”.

The volatility among minor parties is slowly disappearing, while the similarity in the DP and MPP’s styles of governance has been demonstrated by how regularly they can join forces to create grand coalitions. There is also the little political attachment to concrete ideology nor strategic planning, which puts groups attitudes rather hovering around the average total. There is no pattern in which a single group is overwhelmingly present among supporter of a political party.

Table 6-17: Political parties favoured by groups with different political orientation

<b>2008 - 2011</b>	<b><i>Idealistic Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Progressive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Passive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Conservatives</i></b>	<b><i>Traditionalists</i></b>	<b><i>Sovereign Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Total</i></b>
old MPRP	39.0%	41.9%	46.7%	47.6%	54.4%	50.5%	46.7%
DP	51.8%	45.9%	46.7%	43.9%	37.1%	40.2%	44.4%
others	9.3%	12.1%	6.7%	8.5%	8.4%	9.3%	9.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>2012 - 2015</b>	<b><i>Idealistic Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Progressive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Passive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Conservatives</i></b>	<b><i>Traditionalists</i></b>	<b><i>Sovereign Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Total</i></b>
MPP	33.2%	37.1%	35.1%	40.2%	42.2%	44.6%	38.8%
DP	51.6%	48.2%	48.7%	43.0%	39.7%	39.5%	44.9%
new MPRP	12.4%	11.4%	11.7%	12.4%	14.9%	13.4%	12.8%
others	2.8%	3.3%	4.5%	4.4%	3.2%	2.5%	3.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

One obvious observation seen in Table 6-17 is the falling number of respondents who select “other” parties after the new MPRP was founded in 2012. While this breakaway party has weakened the old MPRP (now MPP) considerably, it has also found support among respondents who previously favoured other, smaller parties that are not individually mentioned here. Support for the Democratic Party did not change among the different groups after the changes that took place within the MPRP/MPP.

The group of Idealistic Democrats clearly favours the DP over all other parties. Both liberal groups also favour the DP, but to a slightly lesser degree. These idealistic and liberal groups are less inclined to favour the MPRP or MPP. Conservatives views are rather neutral, with a slight tendency toward favouring the old MPRP/MPP.

Traditionalist and Sovereign Democrats show strong preferences for the MPRP before 2012. This trend continues after the renaming and split of the party. Between 2012 and 2015, Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats favoured both the MPP and new MPRP.

These same patterns can be observed in responses to the question which party respondents would vote for (see: Table 6-18).

Table 6-18: Political party that groups with different orientation would vote for

<b>2008 - 2011</b>	<b><i>Idealistic Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Progressive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Passive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Conservatives</i></b>	<b><i>Traditionalists</i></b>	<b><i>Sovereign Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Total</i></b>
old MPRP	20.3%	20.3%	24.7%	25.3%	31.3%	22.8%	24.2%
DP	30.8%	24.1%	27.4%	26.8%	21.9%	20.3%	25.3%
others	13.9%	14.9%	13.5%	12.9%	10.7%	14.8%	13.4%
don't know or no response	35.0%	40.7%	34.5%	34.9%	36.1%	42.1%	37.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

<b>2012- 2015</b>	<b><i>Idealistic Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Progressive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Passive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Conservatives</i></b>	<b><i>Traditionalists</i></b>	<b><i>Sovereign Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Total</i></b>
MPP	16.4%	15.3%	17.3%	19.2%	20.7%	19.5%	18.1%
DP	28.7%	20.4%	22.1%	22.2%	19.6%	17.4%	21.5%
new MPRP	7.7%	7.1%	7.2%	6.8%	9.4%	6.8%	7.6%
others	12.6%	15.4%	15.8%	12.0%	14.1%	14.6%	14.2%
don't know or no response	34.6%	41.9%	37.6%	39.8%	36.2%	41.7%	38.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

When considering the question which party could best solve the country's problems, Idealistic Democrats put their faith in the DP which they are also favouring in other questions as shown above (see: Table 6-19).

Traditionalists only have slightly more faith in the old MPRP (before 2012), and otherwise show not much confidence in the problem-solving capacity of their favourite party. Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats are more than any other group of the opinion that none of the political parties can solve the problems.



Table 6-19: Political party that groups with different orientation trust most to be able to solve the problems of the country

<b>2008 - 2011</b>	<b><i>Idealistic Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Progressive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Passive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Conservatives</i></b>	<b><i>Traditionalists</i></b>	<b><i>Sovereign Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Total</i></b>
old MPRP	18.3%	19.0%	21.9%	21.7%	23.9%	19.0%	20.8%
DP	26.7%	18.7%	20.9%	20.7%	15.6%	16.4%	19.9%
others	10.2%	9.5%	8.8%	7.3%	7.2%	8.9%	8.6%
none	32.6%	35.9%	31.7%	31.1%	35.7%	39.3%	34.2%
don't know or no response	12.3%	16.9%	16.6%	19.1%	17.6%	16.3%	16.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

<b>2012 - 2015</b>	<b><i>Idealistic Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Progressive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Passive Liberals</i></b>	<b><i>Conservatives</i></b>	<b><i>Traditionalists</i></b>	<b><i>Sovereign Democrats</i></b>	<b><i>Total</i></b>
MPP	14.7%	11.1%	12.0%	14.8%	13.4%	13.7%	13.2%
DP	23.5%	15.6%	14.8%	16.1%	12.0%	12.3%	15.4%
new MPRP	5.1%	3.2%	3.6%	5.6%	4.8%	4.4%	4.4%
others	2.2%	2.6%	1.9%	2.6%	1.8%	2.1%	2.2%
none	30.6%	39.2%	37.5%	34.8%	41.2%	41.1%	37.7%
don't know or no response	23.9%	28.4%	30.2%	26.2%	26.8%	26.5%	27.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

## 6.5.2 Popular Leaders

The five most popular politicians named by respondents from each group of political orientation were identical in all six groups<sup>21</sup>. There were a few differences in the sequence of the “Top 5” leaders selected by each group. It can be observed in the detailed tables below that certain individuals were more popular than others in some groups. Follows the individual tables for each group are additional Figures that show the popularity of the “Top 5” politicians in 2008-2015.

21 The ranking is based on responses to the question “Of the prominent persons in the country, who would you like to name as those who, in your opinion, should play an important role in politics?” Respondents were given the option to name three persons. For the ranking in this chapter we used only the first choices.

Table 6-20: Most popular politicians named by Idealistic Democrats

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>Total</b>
Elbegdorj	13.7%	31.5%	15.7%	14.8%	7.7%	14.3%	22.6%	8.3%	15.1%
Enkhbayar	6.2%	16.8%	8.1%	5.6%	7.9%	9.7%	7.5%	15.3%	9.4%
Ganbaatar	1.9%	0.4%	2.1%	6.8%	11.8%	14.3%	3.8%	17.2%	7.0%
S. Bayar	17.4%	13.6%	6.6%	3.7%	1.6%	1.5%	0.9%	0.6%	6.5%
Bagabandi	3.7%	2.5%	5.4%	3.7%	2.9%	4.1%	6.6%	2.5%	3.7%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

Table 6-21: Most popular politicians named by Progressive Liberals

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>Total</b>
Elbegdorj	11.1%	22.5%	8.4%	22.2%	9.9%	13.8%	20.2%	0.8%	12.9%
Enkhbayar	6.2%	16.3%	7.2%	9.4%	9.6%	11.7%	7.3%	11.3%	9.9%
S. Bayar	25.4%	16.0%	9.2%	6.0%	3.9%	2.0%		0.8%	9.9%
Ganbaatar	1.1%	1.4%	5.5%	6.0%	17.7%	13.3%	14.7%	28.2%	9.7%
Bagabandi	3.0%	6.5%	5.5%	1.7%	4.4%	4.6%	0.9%	2.4%	4.3%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

Table 6-22: Most popular politicians named by Passive Liberals

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>Total</b>
Elbegdorj	7.1%	28.1%	11.2%	17.2%	10.1%	11.5%	18.2%	4.1%	13.5%
Enkhbayar	5.5%	15.2%	7.2%	13.4%	8.8%	11.9%	9.1%	13.0%	10.0%
Ganbaatar		1.1%	2.5%	6.7%	15.4%	17.4%	14.0%	18.5%	8.8%
S. Bayar	25.5%	16.0%	9.0%	3.7%	3.1%		0.7%	1.4%	8.7%
Bagabandi	5.2%	4.2%	7.8%	6.7%	4.3%	3.2%	3.5%	2.7%	4.8%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

Table 6-23: Most popular politicians named by Conservatives

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>Total</b>
Elbegdorj	9.6%	23.3%	16.2%	14.9%	11.0%	16.7%	16.5%	10.5%	14.5%
S. Bayar	29.4%	20.0%	12.1%	5.8%	3.4%	0.6%	1.7%		12.7%
Enkhbayar	4.9%	16.4%	3.5%	15.7%	7.6%	14.4%	9.9%	11.2%	9.9%
Ganbaatar	1.7%		1.7%	2.5%	11.8%	8.9%	7.4%	20.4%	6.0%
Bagabandi	4.5%	4.3%	5.8%	3.3%	4.2%	6.1%	4.1%	2.0%	4.4%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

Table 6-24: Most popular politicians named by Traditionalists

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>Total</b>
Enkhbayar	6.7%	18.9%	8.3%	17.7%	12.8%	11.7%	9.9%	11.1%	12.1%
Elbegdorj	8.2%	18.9%	12.2%	15.9%	8.1%	8.5%	17.6%	4.4%	11.2%
S. Bayar	24.0%	18.4%	9.3%	2.7%	3.8%	1.6%	1.1%		8.9%
Ganbaatar	0.3%	0.5%	3.2%	5.3%	13.4%	13.4%	8.2%	20.0%	7.9%
Bagabandi	7.3%	8.1%	7.4%	6.2%	5.9%	8.5%	6.0%	1.7%	6.6%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

Table 6-25: Most popular politicians named by Sovereign Democrats

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>Total</b>
Elbegdorj	9.9%	20.2%	11.3%	14.8%	7.5%	15.7%	16.7%	4.7%	11.8%
Enkhbayar	8.2%	20.7%	10.7%	15.6%	9.1%	11.7%	11.7%	10.3%	11.5%
S. Bayar	28.9%	21.8%	8.4%	4.4%	3.7%		0.8%		8.8%
Ganbaatar	0.9%	0.5%	3.6%	4.4%	13.5%	13.9%	5.8%	20.6%	8.1%
Bagabandi	4.3%	3.7%	9.7%	4.4%	4.3%	4.5%	2.5%	0.9%	4.9%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*


The data from Table 6-20 through Table 6-25 was used to draw the Figures below, which reflect the individual politician's popularity among respondents belonging to each group.

## Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj

When Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj was elected president in 2009, his popularity was at a peak among Idealistic Democrats and Passive Liberals, who are strong supporters of the Democratic Party. Elbegdorj had already served as chairman of the party (Figure 6-3).

At the time of his election for a second term as president in 2013, Elbegdorj had become most popular among Conservatives. The point when Elbegdorj was least popular with Sovereign Democrats and Traditionalists was throughout the whole period under observation, 2008-2015. One particularity about the Figure showing Elbegdorj's popularity is the unevenness of the curve. There are ups and downs in his popularity at times, regardless of the political orientation of respondents.

Figure 6-3: Popularity of Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj among respondents of groups with different political orientation




However, by the year 2015 Elbegdorj's popularity had dropped among respondents of all political orientations; only with Conservatives did he still find slightly more than ten per cent of respondents naming him as their first choice.

## Nambaryn Enkhbayar

When incumbent president Nambaryn Enkhbayar lost the election in 2009, he was still most popular with Sovereign Democrats and Traditionalists, who were the base of support for the then MPRP (later renamed to MPP). Around 20 per cent of respondents in these groups named him in 2009 as their first choice of politicians (in a questionnaire allowing up to three names). By 2015, after he had founded the new MPRP as a breakaway group from the old MPRP (by this time calling itself the MPP) he had lost almost half of this support (see: Figure 6-4).


Figure 6-4: Popularity of Nambaryn Enkhbayar among respondents of groups with different political orientation



## Sanjaagiin Bayar

Sanjaagiin Bayar's highest point of popularity was when he served as prime minister (Nov. 2007 - Oct. 2009), but had fallen to zero within a few years for most groups. Bayar was most popular with Sovereign Democrats and Conservatives (see: Figure 6-5).

Figure 6-5: Popularity of Sanjaagiin Bayar among respondents of groups with different political orientation




## Sainkhüügiin Ganbaatar

The former Chairman of the Mongolian Trade Union Confederation, Sainkhüügiin Ganbaatar was elected as a member of parliament as an independent candidate in 2012.

While being a non-partisan member of parliament, he joined the National Labour Party (founded in May 2015) and was elected chairman of the party.

Figure 6-6: Popularity of Sainkhüügiin Ganbaatar among respondents of groups with different political orientation




## Natsagiin Bagabandi

Natsagiin Bagabandi was president from 1997 to 2005 and did not hold any political office after that. This would explain the low level of popularity in 2008-2015, which is the focus of this analysis (see: Figure 6-7).

Those respondents who named Bagabandi as a person whom they would like to play a prominent role in politics predominantly belong to the Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats. Nevertheless, by 2015 even these groups had found new heroes, and Bagabandi's popularity fell to below 5 per cent.

Figure 6-7: Popularity of Natsagiin Bagabandi among respondents of groups with different political orientation





### 6.5.3 Interest in Politics, Political Parties, and Participation

Idealistic Democrats demonstrate very keen interest in politics while Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats have a more indifferent attitude (see: Table 6-26).

These different levels of general interest in politics, however, do not influence respondents' intention to participate in elections. To the question-statement "If Parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, would you participate?", Seventy-six per cent answered "yes". The respondents with no intention to cast their votes were not identical with the groups showing less interest in politics (see: Table 6-27).

Respondents' interest in politics does not correlate with views on voters' influence. It is the group with the least interest in politics, namely Sovereign Democrats, who have the strongest belief in voters' influence (see: Table 6-28).

Table 6-26: Interest in politics by groups with different political orientation

	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Very much interested	9.6%	9.4%	7.6%	7.8%	7.9%	7.6%	8.3%
Rather interested	27.7%	29.4%	24.0%	26.6%	25.6%	23.5%	26.1%
Slightly interested	24.5%	25.5%	25.3%	24.3%	24.1%	25.3%	24.8%
Rather not interested	24.2%	21.5%	26.1%	22.9%	24.8%	24.0%	23.9%
Totally not interested	13.1%	13.1%	16.3%	15.7%	16.0%	18.4%	15.4%
Don't know or no response	1.0%	1.2%	0.8%	2.7%	1.6%	1.3%	1.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-27: Intended participation in election by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>If Parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, would you participate?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Yes	76.6%	76.0%	80.6%	72.6%	79.4%	75.8%	76.9%
No	16.4%	18.0%	14.2%	17.1%	14.3%	17.6%	16.2%
Don't know or no response	6.9%	6.0%	5.2%	10.3%	6.3%	6.7%	6.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-28: Opinion about voters' influence by groups with different political orientation

	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Very strong	16.1%	15.4%	18.1%	14.8%	18.4%	23.8%	17.6%
Rather strong	41.1%	35.2%	40.4%	37.0%	37.8%	33.1%	37.5%
Rather little	31.9%	32.8%	30.2%	34.4%	30.1%	29.7%	31.5%
None	10.9%	16.6%	11.3%	13.8%	13.7%	13.3%	13.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Idealistic Democrats have the greatest confidence in the fact that political parties represent public opinion. Sovereign Democrats are least assured that this is the case. However, the total shows a low level of trust in political parties as representative of public opinion (see: Table 6-29).

Only slightly higher is the number of respondents who are at least "rather confident" in political parties, generally. The percentage share of respondents who are "confident" without any conditions is only between 5 and 10 per cent (see: Table 6-30).

Table 6-29: Opinions regarding political parties representing public opinion by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>In your opinion, do political parties represent public opinion?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Yes	31.0%	22.7%	23.4%	21.0%	23.0%	16.1%	22.9%
No	58.9%	66.9%	65.5%	59.3%	65.3%	72.2%	64.6%
Don't know or no response	10.0%	10.4%	11.1%	19.8%	11.7%	11.7%	12.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-30: Confidence in political parties by groups with different political orientation


<b>Question:</b> <i>How confident are you in political parties?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Not confident	25.3%	34.4%	28.1%	28.5%	31.5%	37.9%	30.9%
Rather not confident	33.0%	30.4%	31.8%	33.1%	29.7%	30.4%	31.3%
Rather confident	35.8%	29.2%	32.3%	30.7%	28.8%	25.8%	30.4%
Confident	5.9%	6.0%	7.8%	7.7%	10.0%	5.9%	7.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Over the years, SMF polls has posed to respondents with the statement “The two large political parties, the MPP and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest”, and found clear indications that an increasing number of people agree with this statement. Figure 6-8 shows the general development of opinion in 2008-2015<sup>22</sup>.

Table 6-31 shows the responses of people with different political orientation. Conservatives and Idealistic Democrats have the fewest issues they agree on.

Figure 6-8: Respondents agreeing with the statement ‘The two large political parties, the MPP and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest’



22 This question covers only the MPP (previously MPRP) and the DP because it was introduced before the re-naming and split.

Table 6-31: Opinions about self-interest of large political parties by groups with different political orientation

<b>Do you agree with the statement:</b> <i>The two large political parties, the MPP and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest.</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	48.5%	63.4%	64.0%	36.4%	69.4%	54.8%	56.6%
Disagree	36.5%	26.1%	24.3%	25.9%	18.6%	26.2%	25.9%
Don't know or no response	15.0%	10.5%	11.7%	37.7%	12.0%	19.1%	17.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

## 6.5.4 Opinions about Political System

Responses to the question “How satisfied are you with the Democracy and present political system?” show a considerable difference between opinions of Progressive Liberals and Passive Liberals.

Passive Liberals’ satisfaction with the present system is above average. This opinion was most closely shared with Idealistic Democrats, who had the strongest positive response to this question. Progressive Liberals showed the highest rate of dissatisfaction, even more than Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats (see: Table 6-32).

Idealistic Democrats and Passive Liberals are also close in their opinions regarding their preferred political systems: both groups strongly favouring a semi-parliamentary system. Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats prefer a presidential system (see: Table 6-33). In both questions about the best political system, Conservatives, like in many other aspects, are the group with the highest number of respondents who answers, “don’t know”.

Table 6-32: Satisfaction with democracy and present political system by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>How much are you satisfied with the democracy and present political system?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Satisfied	27.3%	20.8%	24.2%	19.0%	21.2%	21.5%	22.2%
Rather satisfied	42.6%	37.9%	40.2%	40.2%	37.9%	35.4%	39.0%
Rather not satisfied	18.0%	20.5%	18.2%	19.2%	19.7%	20.4%	19.4%
Not satisfied	9.5%	16.6%	13.0%	13.2%	16.0%	15.6%	14.1%
Don't know or no response	2.6%	4.2%	4.4%	8.3%	5.2%	7.1%	5.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-33: Opinions about most suitable form of state by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>Which form of state is more suitable for Mongolia?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Semi-parliamentarian	40.4%	34.8%	39.0%	28.0%	28.7%	25.0%	32.6%
Parliamentarian	16.4%	18.0%	12.9%	15.9%	13.7%	15.0%	15.2%
Presidential	33.6%	36.2%	36.7%	38.6%	46.9%	46.6%	39.9%
Don't know or no response	9.6%	11.0%	11.5%	17.5%	10.8%	13.4%	12.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015


Polls data shows that each group of political orientation has very different opinions about what is a suitable number of political parties. Responses show significant correlations among political orientations between the two opposing views of “many parties” and “no parties” (see: Table 6-34). This becomes particularly apparent when the data is shown as a Figure 6-9.

Table 6-34: Opinions regarding one-party or multi-party systems by groups with different political orientation

<i>Regarding parties...</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
There should be many parties representing a variety of opinions	40.6%	33.3%	29.5%	22.9%	22.3%	20.6%	28.0%
In principal, we don't need any third force – two parties are sufficient	22.6%	25.5%	28.0%	25.0%	25.5%	25.4%	25.4%
In principal, we don't need parties – to have a strong president is the right thing	30.3%	33.8%	35.8%	38.4%	44.9%	44.7%	38.2%
Don't know or no response	6.5%	7.4%	6.7%	13.7%	7.3%	9.3%	8.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Figure 6-9: Opinions regarding one-party or multi-party systems by groups with different political orientation



Another question-statement asks respondents to judge different political systems and their suitability for Mongolia. Responses shown in Table 6-35 reflect the same opinions expressed to related questions examined earlier.

Traditionalist and Sovereign Democrats believe a strong leader is very good. Idealistic Democrats and both liberal groups prefer an elected democratic leadership. Dictatorship is not really any group’s favourite, but there are some people among Traditionalist and Sovereign Democrats who don’t seem to mind this form of system too much. An” Elite management” (which in the questionnaire is described as a team of professionals or experts independent from the government who are tasked with developing state policy) does not receive much support or strong rejection from any group in this analysis.

Table 6-35: Opinions about different models of political system by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>Which political system is more suitable for Mongolia?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Strong leader</b>							
Very bad	16.1%	14.9%	11.9%	9.0%	7.8%	8.5%	11.3%
Rather bad	14.7%	11.6%	9.6%	10.6%	7.9%	8.7%	10.4%
Rather good	24.0%	25.2%	26.2%	24.1%	26.5%	25.0%	25.2%
Very good	22.1%	23.9%	25.3%	20.6%	32.3%	32.7%	26.2%
Don’t know or no response	23.1%	24.4%	27.0%	35.8%	25.5%	25.1%	26.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Elite management</b>							
Very bad	19.1%	14.7%	14.2%	11.8%	12.9%	15.3%	14.5%
Rather bad	16.9%	12.2%	12.6%	15.4%	11.1%	12.0%	13.3%
Rather good	21.7%	28.0%	26.4%	21.4%	26.2%	24.8%	24.9%
Very good	12.5%	14.9%	13.7%	9.0%	14.7%	14.1%	13.2%
Don’t know or no response	34.2%	42.9%	40.2%	30.4%	40.9%	38.9%	38.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Dictatorship</b>							
Very bad	40.3%	43.0%	39.5%	25.0%	35.8%	36.5%	36.6%
Rather bad	18.1%	16.4%	15.1%	15.2%	14.3%	15.1%	15.7%

Table to be continued on next page

Table 6-35 (continued)

Rather good	9.5%	8.6%	10.1%	12.3%	10.8%	10.7%	10.3%
Very good	3.9%	3.8%	4.2%	5.4%	4.3%	5.7%	4.5%
Don't know or no response	13.5%	12.4%	14.3%	17.7%	15.0%	16.3%	14.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Elected democratic leadership</b>							
Very bad	6.9%	5.1%	4.4%	5.4%	6.2%	8.5%	6.0%
Rather bad	9.9%	6.5%	6.1%	9.7%	8.1%	9.6%	8.2%
Rather good	36.1%	35.3%	37.0%	28.3%	34.9%	32.9%	34.1%
Very good	26.7%	32.4%	32.0%	22.5%	27.7%	25.1%	27.9%
Don't know or no response	20.4%	20.7%	20.5%	34.1%	23.1%	23.9%	23.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

## 6.5.5 Opinions about Problems and Solutions

When asked what the most important socio-political or economic problems in the country were, all groups mentioned unemployment first. Other issues followed “unemployment”, which were related to the standard of living or the income (poverty) at the second place. Inflation ranked as the third most important problem (see: Table 6-36).

Traditionalists seem to be most concerned about unemployment, although this group includes a large percentage share of pensioners who are not working any more.

Table 6-36: Opinions about most important socio-political or economical problem by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>In your opinion, what is the most important socio-political or economic problem facing the country today?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Unemployment	30.1%	30.8%	34.5%	27.2%	36.0%	33.3%	32.1%
Standard of living, poverty, or income	19.6%	16.7%	17.0%	17.7%	18.9%	19.7%	18.2%
Price increase, inflation	15.1%	14.5%	15.4%	17.7%	16.2%	14.4%	15.6%

SMF polls, 2008-2015



The following question has appeared in all regular SMF polls since 2008: “How often do you feel that government policies fail to solve the most important problem you mentioned in the previous question?” Responses show that more than 90 per cent of all respondents have felt this way to some extent since 2010 (see Figure 6-10).

Group analysis of opinions on this issue shows some marginal differences between these groups, but generally the picture is the same way that government fails to solve the most important problems (see: Table 6-37). Only the Conservatives appear to have a more positive view — but only at first glance. The smaller portion of people in this group who “always” feel that government policies fail to solve the problem stems from the fact that a large percentage did not answer or responded, “don’t know”.

Figure 6-10: Opinions about government policy failing to solve important problems (all respondents in polls 2008 – 2015)




Table 6-37: Opinions about government policy failing to solve important problems by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>How often do you feel that government policies fail to solve the most important problem?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Always	54.8%	55.2%	58.7%	45.6%	60.4%	59.7%	55.7%
Often	27.0%	25.2%	22.9%	26.4%	23.9%	23.2%	24.7%
Sometimes	11.0%	11.3%	10.2%	12.4%	7.9%	8.6%	10.2%
Seldom	2.2%	2.2%	2.0%	3.3%	2.0%	2.4%	2.3%
Never	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	1.5%	0.7%	0.9%	1.0%
Don't know or no response	4.1%	5.3%	5.4%	10.8%	5.1%	5.2%	6.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

With unemployment playing such a prominent role among the country's problems, the polls included some further question about this issue. Respondents were asked the following:

*"Unemployment has been a major problem for many people in past years. Some people think that this is only a temporary matter and that economic progress in the future will take care of the problem. Other people think that the government needs to intervene and take appropriate measures to reduce unemployment. What do you think?"*

Responses to this question showed a clear division between groups. Idealistic Democrats and Progressive Liberals feel that the government should intervene with the appropriate steps in policy to reduce unemployment. Passive Liberals, Traditionalist, and Sovereign Democrats tend to believe that economic growth will take care of the problem, and no additional measures are needed (see: Table 6-38).

Table 6-38: Opinions about measures to reduce unemployment by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>What should be done about unemployment?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Economic growth will provide sufficient employment in the future.	22.5%	25.8%	31.1%	25.1%	30.3%	31.0%	27.7%
Economic growth alone is not enough - the government has to take action to reduce unemployment.	69.6%	66.9%	62.3%	58.1%	62.0%	60.8%	63.2%
Don't know or no response	7.9%	7.3%	6.6%	16.8%	7.7%	8.3%	9.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

When asked which institution should play the leading role in solving problems, again responses indicate a noticeable division between groups that favour presidential rule over those for a semi-parliamentary rule. Pro-presidential system supporters assign the issue to the president while those favouring a semi-parliamentary system naming the government as appropriate institution to address the problem (see: Table 6-39).

Table 6-9: Opinions about leading role in solving major problems by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>Which institution should play the leading role in solving this problem?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Government	48.8%	44.8%	48.5%	39.3%	45.3%	39.9%	44.5%
The Parliament	17.4%	16.1%	17.1%	16.9%	16.4%	15.8%	16.6%
The president	9.0%	8.1%	8.3%	11.1%	10.4%	11.6%	9.7%
Judiciary	3.9%	5.0%	3.7%	6.0%	4.1%	5.5%	4.7%
Political parties	3.3%	2.7%	2.9%	2.9%	2.3%	2.9%	2.8%
Civil society	9.7%	13.7%	10.6%	8.5%	10.8%	11.9%	10.9%
None	2.4%	2.6%	1.8%	2.9%	1.8%	2.4%	2.3%
Don't know or no response	5.4%	6.9%	7.2%	12.5%	8.9%	10.1%	8.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

## 6.5.6 Confidence in Institutions

When asked whether they approve or disapprove of the statement: "In principle, you can trust that the government is doing the right things for citizens", Idealistic Democrats showed more confidence in the government than other groups (see: Table 6-40).

When the data from Table 6-40) is shown as a Figure along with a logarithmic curve, again some parallels in opinions can be seen within each group of political orientation (see: Figure 6-11).

The question regarding people's general confidence in the governing administration resulted in some groups expressing distinct views of confidence or non-confidence. Others were less focused and chose answers like "rather confident", or "rather not confident". It is principally the groups of Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats who expressed straight positive or negative views, while Idealistic Democrats used the phrases of weaker support (see: Table 6-41).

Table 6-40: Trust in government ‘to do the right things’ by groups with different political orientation

Do you approve the statement: <i>In principle, you can trust that the government is doing the right things for citizens.</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Fully approve	10.1%	7.4%	9.8%	8.4%	9.1%	7.0%	8.6%
Rather approve	46.7%	42.1%	44.5%	38.6%	42.0%	37.3%	41.9%
Rather disapprove	26.2%	28.6%	25.4%	26.6%	26.2%	28.2%	26.8%
Totally disapprove	13.4%	17.8%	15.1%	16.8%	17.6%	22.1%	17.1%
Don't know or no response	39.6%	46.4%	40.5%	43.4%	43.7%	50.3%	43.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Figure 6-11: Trust in government ‘to do the right things’ by groups with different political orientation




Table 6-41: Confidence in government administration by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>How confident are you in government administration?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Not confident	10.2%	13.0%	10.2%	13.1%	12.0%	15.0%	12.2%
Rather not confident	24.4%	22.6%	21.9%	23.2%	21.1%	22.0%	22.5%
Rather confident	47.7%	42.2%	44.0%	41.7%	39.7%	39.6%	42.4%
Confident	17.7%	22.1%	23.9%	22.1%	27.2%	23.4%	22.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

There is a mixed picture in respondents' confidence in the president. There are no indications that groups that prefer presidential rule have more confidence in the president (see: Table 6-42). However, from the responses to this question it cannot be concluded whether respondents have confidence in the office or simply the person holding the office at that time.

Table 6-42: Confidence in the president by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>How confident are you in the president?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Not confident	13.5%	19.6%	15.2%	17.0%	17.1%	21.0%	17.2%
Rather not confident	20.7%	20.0%	20.6%	22.5%	20.5%	21.4%	20.9%
Rather confident	38.6%	33.8%	36.2%	35.4%	33.5%	31.6%	34.9%
Confident	27.3%	26.6%	28.0%	25.1%	28.9%	26.0%	27.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

The level of confidence respondents put in the parliament is a much clearer picture. Groups that prefer a presidential system show less confidence in parliament than those that favour a parliamentary democracy (see: Table 6-43). However, with only 15.3 per cent of all respondents expressing confidence in parliament, this institution ranks third after the president and government administration. Only the judiciary attracts less confidence, with a mere 12.6 per cent (see: Table 6-44).

Table 6-43: Confidence in the parliament by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>How confident are you in the parliament?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Not confident	17.5%	22.2%	19.0%	19.8%	21.2%	25.4%	20.8%
Rather not confident	29.0%	28.5%	28.0%	29.2%	27.2%	29.6%	28.5%
Rather confident	40.3%	35.0%	37.2%	35.1%	33.0%	31.7%	35.3%
Confident	13.2%	14.3%	15.8%	15.8%	18.6%	13.3%	15.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-44: Confidence in the judicial system by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>How confident are you in the judicial system?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Not confident	24.9%	30.2%	25.7%	23.6%	27.6%	31.6%	27.2%
Rather not confident	33.0%	27.8%	31.0%	30.7%	27.2%	27.4%	29.5%
Rather confident	32.7%	30.5%	29.4%	32.2%	30.5%	28.6%	30.6%
Confident	9.3%	11.5%	13.9%	13.4%	14.8%	12.4%	12.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Civil society does not count as an institution such as the office of the president, parliament, etc. However, the polls do include a question about how much confidence respondents have in civil society.

With about 60 per cent of all respondents being rather confident or confident, civil society appears generally trustworthy in respondents' minds. The strongest expression of confidence comes from the Traditionalists; the weakest from Conservatives (see: Table 6-45).

Table 6-45: Confidence in civil society by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>How confident are you in civil society?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Not confident	14.6%	19.0%	16.2%	21.3%	18.4%	21.9%	18.5%
Rather not confident	25.2%	21.2%	22.7%	26.2%	21.5%	20.8%	22.9%
Rather confident	42.3%	39.6%	40.4%	37.5%	37.7%	37.5%	39.2%
Confident	17.9%	20.3%	20.7%	15.1%	22.3%	19.7%	19.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

The Sant Maral Foundation over the past decade has investigated the problem of corruption in Mongolia in a separate series of surveys. Data has been collected regularly in the “Corruption Benchmark Survey” on people’s opinions of which institutions they regard as the most corrupt.

It is not possible to correlate results from the corruption surveys directly with this analysis of each group of political orientation, but what can be examined are the results from the corruption benchmark surveys in Table 6-46 to offer a general picture of opinions regarding public institutions.

In the ranking shown, various departments and institutions belonging to the government administration have remained always in a prominent place. The judiciary (here listed as judges and prosecutors) is also listed in most of the surveys. Political parties entered the Top-five only in 2010 but gradually rose to the rank of first in 2016.

Table 6-46: Results of Corruption benchmark surveys (five most corrupt institutions)

<b>Date</b>	<b>Ranking of five most corrupt institutions by respondents</b>				
	<b>1st Rank</b>	<b>2nd Rank</b>	<b>3rd Rank</b>	<b>4th Rank</b>	<b>5th Rank</b>
March 2006	Land utilization	Customs	Mining	Judges	Police
Sept. 2006	Land utilization	Customs	Mining	Judges	Police
March 2007	Land utilization	Customs	Mining	Judges	Registry and permit service
Sept. 2007	Land utilization	Mining	Customs	Registry and permit service	Judges
March 2008	Land utilization	Mining	Customs	Registry and permit service	Judges
Sept. 2008	Land utilization	Mining	Customs	Judges	Prosecutors
March 2009	Land utilization	Mining	Judges	Customs	Prosecutors
Sept. 2009	Land utilization	Judges	Police	Prosecutors	Mining
March 2010	Land utilization	Mining	Political parties	Customs	Parliament/legislature
Sept. 2010	Land utilization	Mining	Judges	Customs	Political parties
April 2011	Land utilization	Mining	Judges	Customs	Political parties
Nov. 2011	Land utilization	Mining	Local procurement tenders	Professional inspection agency	Political parties
March 2013	Land utilization	State administration of mining	Local procurement tenders	Political parties	Customs
Sept. 2013	Land utilization	State administration of mining	Local procurement tenders	Political parties	Private companies in mining sector
March 2014	Land utilization	State administration of mining	Local procurement tenders	Judges	Customs
April 2015	Land utilization	Political parties	Mining	National government	Parliament/legislature
March 2016	Political parties	Land utilization	Mining	Parliament/legislature	National government

Source: SMF-TAF Corruption benchmark surveys 2006-2016



## 6.5.7 Social Justice

An overwhelming majority of respondents generally finds that there is a lack of justice in society. Only 4.2 per cent think that there is more justice than injustice in Mongolian society.

Table 6-47: Opinions about justice or injustice in society by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>What do you think about our society? In general, is there more justice or more injustice?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
There is more justice	5.3%	3.2%	4.1%	4.2%	5.1%	3.2%	4.2%
There is more injustice	74.4%	74.8%	74.6%	64.6%	71.9%	74.7%	72.4%
Spontaneous: Sometime more justice and other time more injustice	17.2%	19.4%	18.6%	23.5%	20.2%	18.4%	19.6%
Don't know or no response	3.1%	2.7%	2.7%	7.6%	2.8%	3.6%	3.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

About two-thirds of all respondents think that the rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created. This can be considered as more of the social injustice perceived to exist (see: Table 6-48). This feeling is particularly strong among Passive Liberals, Progressive Liberals, and Traditionalists. Only 38.7 per cent of Conservatives agree with this argument, but a similarly large group has no clear opinion about it at all.

Table 6-48: Opinions about aspects of inequality by groups with different political orientation

<b>Do you agree with the statement:</b> <i>The rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	64.0%	71.7%	74.7%	38.7%	73.0%	68.1%	65.2%
Disagree	25.5%	16.7%	15.2%	24.7%	13.4%	15.3%	18.3%
Don't know or no response	10.6%	11.6%	10.1%	36.6%	13.6%	16.5%	16.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

If respondents believe the rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they have created and that it is an injustice that they do so, the next question to follow should be whether respondents are victims or benefactors of this injustice? This question was phrased as follows:

*“Due to both just and unjust circumstances in society, there are both winners and losers among the different social groups. In your opinion, to which group do you belong?”*

Responses point to the larger numbers of losers among the groups of Idealistic Democrats and Sovereign Democrats (see: Table 6-49).

An additional analysis of all responses to this question reveals a connection between the previous question and people’s self-assessments of whether they are winners or losers. Of the people who agree with the idea that the rich and powerful prevent other citizens from equal benefits, 44.9 per cent consider themselves losers and only 4.7 per cent put themselves into the category of winners (see: Table 6-50). Among those who disagree with this statement, only 33.2 per cent regard themselves as losers, but 10.7 per cent see themselves as winners.

Table 6-49: Winners and losers by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>Do you consider yourself a winner or a loser?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
I consider myself rather a loser	45.5%	39.6%	41.2%	32.6%	42.2%	44.0%	40.7%
I consider myself rather a winner	6.1%	5.5%	4.3%	9.8%	5.2%	5.2%	6.0%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	30.9%	37.2%	37.0%	35.1%	36.8%	32.7%	35.1%
Don't know or no response	17.4%	17.8%	17.4%	22.5%	15.8%	18.1%	18.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-50: Cross tabulation of opinions about aspects of inequality and respondents' judgement whether they are winners or losers (including all respondents)

	Respondents who <b>agree</b> with the statement: <i>The rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created</i>	Respondents who <b>disagree</b> with the statement: <i>The rich and powerful prevent other citizens from earning equal benefits from the wealth they created</i>
I consider myself rather a <b>loser</b>	44.9%	33.2%
I consider myself rather a <b>winner</b>	4.7%	10.7%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	34.7%	39.0%
Don't know or no response	15.6%	17.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database 2008-2015

The issue of income differences was addressed with this question:

*“Some people think that government should take actions to reduce income differences between the poor and rich, but others think that the government should not interfere. What is your opinion?”*

Responses to this question show three groups support government intervention with all types of policies that aim to reduce the disparity. Passive Liberals are in support of strong action by the state to reduce income differences, while Idealistic Democrats and Progressive Liberals voted for moderate action. Other groups are relatively close to the total (see: Table 6-51).

Table 6-51: Opinions on policy issues about income differences by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>Should the state take actions to reduce income differences between the poor and rich?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
The government has to take strong action to reduce income differences	37.4%	34.6%	44.2%	33.4%	41.1%	41.5%	38.7%
The government has to take moderate action to reduce income differences	45.6%	48.2%	39.8%	40.7%	40.8%	40.3%	42.5%
The government should not interfere	7.7%	7.1%	5.6%	9.5%	6.8%	7.4%	7.3%
Spontaneously: it may interfere, or may not interfere	5.5%	7.0%	6.1%	9.3%	7.0%	6.3%	6.9%
Don't know or no response	3.8%	3.1%	4.2%	7.1%	4.2%	4.5%	4.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

Mongolia has gained considerable wealth through recent developments made in the mining sector. With these funds, the country could finance programmes reducing income differences and providing direct or indirect relief to the poor. Therefore, the survey polls touched on this topic by asking people to express their views about such programmes for wealth equality.

Idealistic Democrats and Passive Liberals are in favour of programmes to give immediate relief to the poor. Progressive Liberals would rather see the funds invested by the state to improve economic development. Conservatives and Traditionalists prefer an equal direct disbursement to all people (see: Table 6-52).

Table 6-52: Opinions on how to use state income from mining sector by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>Through recent development of the mining sector Mongolia has gained considerable wealth. How should this money be used?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
There should be increased social programs to give immediate relief to the poor	15.4%	11.6%	14.0%	14.3%	13.1%	12.9%	13.5%
There should be long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc.	31.1%	31.9%	31.1%	29.2%	29.5%	29.5%	30.4%
All citizen should equally benefit through direct disbursement	13.9%	12.8%	14.7%	19.8%	18.1%	15.0%	15.8%
Funds should be invested by the state to improve economic development	37.0%	40.4%	36.9%	30.0%	35.9%	38.2%	36.4%
Don't know or no response	2.6%	3.3%	3.3%	6.8%	3.4%	4.5%	4.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Passive Liberals and Traditionalists are strongly in agreement with the statement “The state should guarantee a minimal standard of living for everybody; if one wants more, he should provide for himself.” Idealistic Democrats are least in favour of this view (see: Table 6-53).

Table 6 53: Opinions on policy regarding guaranteed minimal standard of living by groups with different political orientation

<b>Do you agree with the statement:</b> <i>The state should guarantee a minimal standard of living for everybody; if one wants more, he should provide for himself.</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	46.1%	70.5%	78.4%	38.3%	82.0%	57.3%	63.0%
Disagree	37.0%	20.2%	13.9%	23.2%	10.4%	23.2%	20.7%
Don't know or no response	17.0%	9.3%	7.8%	38.5%	7.6%	19.6%	16.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

SMF polls, 2008-2015

## 6.5.8 Dependency on Outside Support

There are some questions in the Sant Maral Foundation’s surveys related to the issue of economic self-reliance versus dependency on the state, and what people would do when the state fails to meet their expectations. On this topic, the respondents were asked the following:

*“What do you think; does your future depend on your own achievements, the State, or on other forces (like churches, trade unions, firms, the press, TV/radio, communities, business relations), that could influence the economy?”*

Responses are shown in Table 6-54. Progressive and Passive Liberals expressed the strongest confidence that their future depends on their own achievements rather than outside influences.

Table 6-54: Dependency on outside influence or own achievements by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>Does your future depend on your own achievements or on outside influences?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Rather on myself	47.6%	51.4%	49.4%	41.1%	45.5%	47.2%	47.0%
Rather on the state	34.9%	31.0%	32.5%	29.8%	33.7%	35.9%	32.9%
Rather on other sources	7.9%	7.3%	7.1%	10.1%	9.0%	6.3%	8.0%
Don’t know or no response	9.6%	10.3%	11.0%	19.0%	11.8%	10.6%	12.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*SMF polls, 2008-2015*

The next question asked:

*“In times of economic difficulties some people depend on the government to come to their assistance; others believe they can solve the problem by themselves. Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?”*

There is no great difference between groups’ opinions, but Progressive Liberals and Sovereign Democrats are clearly the two outstanding groups that do not expect anything from the government. Progressive Liberals are also the group needing the least help (see: Table 6-55).

What respondents would do if the government fails to meet their expectations is shown in Table 6-56.

Table 6-55: Types of assistance required from the state by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
I don't need any help	13.3%	15.2%	13.5%	11.9%	14.1%	11.7%	13.3%
I need help only to find a job	25.8%	25.6%	29.1%	25.2%	27.8%	24.8%	26.5%
I need financial support	32.7%	28.1%	31.4%	29.9%	32.9%	31.1%	31.0%
I don't expect anything from the government	21.2%	25.1%	20.1%	21.5%	19.1%	25.5%	22.0%
Don't know or no response	7.1%	5.9%	5.9%	11.5%	6.2%	6.9%	7.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Table 6-56: Actions if the government fails to meet expectations by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>If the government fails to meet your expectations, what would you do?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
I will go to court	2.5%	1.6%	2.2%	2.3%	1.9%	1.9%	2.1%
I will join street protests	6.8%	6.2%	6.6%	7.4%	7.0%	6.2%	6.7%
I will join/support civil organizations that can protect my	21.1%	20.1%	21.1%	20.5%	18.3%	18.4%	19.9%
I will vote against the government in elections	17.8%	18.6%	15.3%	14.9%	16.2%	16.5%	16.5%
I will join the opposition party	1.8%	1.8%	1.8%	3.1%	2.4%	1.9%	2.2%
Do nothing and wait for matters to improve	23.6%	24.0%	25.6%	22.1%	26.5%	21.9%	24.1%
Don't know or no response	26.4%	27.7%	27.4%	29.6%	27.7%	33.2%	28.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

The last question in this block of analysis asked respondents to compare their own life with the life of their parents. Idealistic Democrats and Progressive Liberals have quite strong beliefs that they will achieve more than their parents did. Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats are somewhat more pessimistic about their own achievements and think that their parents achieved much more than they will be able to (see: Table 6-57).

Table 6-57: Comparison of expected own achievements and parents' generation by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	18.1%	23.7%	23.0%	21.2%	29.2%	26.3%	23.7%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	39.5%	31.3%	37.6%	34.5%	36.9%	33.8%	35.6%
I will achieve much more than my parents	31.4%	33.9%	28.5%	26.9%	22.9%	26.7%	28.3%
Don't know or no response	11.0%	11.1%	10.9%	17.4%	11.0%	13.2%	12.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

## 6.5.9 Values

The role of religion in respondents' lives appears to be an indicator for conservatism and traditionalism. Among these groups, 22.6 per cent of Conservatives and 18.4 per cent of Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats said religion plays a strong or very strong role in their lives (see: Table 6-58).

Table 6-58: Role of religion in respondents' life by groups with different political orientation

<b>Question:</b> <i>What is the role of the religion in your life?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
No role at all	21.2%	25.8%	26.8%	24.7%	26.5%	27.8%	25.5%
Little	27.8%	24.3%	27.6%	20.4%	23.6%	20.2%	24.1%
Moderate	34.0%	33.2%	29.9%	32.3%	31.4%	33.5%	32.3%
Strong	11.6%	11.3%	10.6%	14.7%	13.3%	12.7%	12.4%
Very strong	5.3%	5.3%	5.1%	7.9%	5.1%	5.7%	5.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

More than 50 per cent of Traditionalists and Sovereign Democrats also agree that contemporary society no longer has strong ideals that guide the people. This view is also shared



by Progressive Liberals. Idealistic Democrats are the group that expressed the strongest disagreement with that proposition (see: Table 6-59).

Table 6-59: Opinions about ideals that guide the people by groups with different political orientation

<b>Do you agree with the statement:</b> <i>Contemporary society no longer has strong ideals that guide the people.</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	44.3%	51.0%	48.9%	30.4%	58.4%	52.9%	47.8%
Disagree	39.0%	31.6%	34.1%	29.9%	24.2%	22.0%	30.0%
Don't know or no response	17.4%	17.1%	39.8%	17.4%	25.1%	22.2%	18.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Whether violence can be used to solve conflicts was measured with the statement: "In every democratic society, there are conflicts that can only be solved through violence". The strongest disagreement came from Idealistic Democrats, while Traditionalists had the highest rate of approval (see: Table 6-60).

Table 6-60: Acceptance or rejection of violence as a means to solve conflicts by groups with different political orientation

<b>Do you agree with the statement:</b> <i>In every democratic society, there are conflicts that can only be solved through violence.</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agree	20.1%	33.7%	29.2%	22.0%	46.1%	36.5%	31.6%
Disagree	61.3%	46.3%	49.3%	36.6%	30.6%	34.2%	42.7%
Don't know or no response	18.7%	20.1%	21.5%	41.3%	23.3%	29.3%	25.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

Respondents are generally "very proud to be Mongolians" as data in Table 6-61 shows; only the Conservatives is below average in this aspect.

Table 6-61: National pride

<b>Question:</b> <i>How proud are you to be a Mongolian?</i>	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>Total</i>
Very proud	87.6%	87.4%	90.8%	81.4%	88.2%	88.5%	87.3%
Rather proud	9.1%	9.4%	6.7%	11.9%	9.1%	9.0%	9.2%
Not that proud	1.5%	1.5%	1.0%	2.6%	1.1%	1.3%	1.5%
Not proud at all	0.7%	0.5%	0.3%	1.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%
Don't know or no response	1.1%	1.2%	1.3%	3.0%	1.1%	0.8%	1.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

SMF polls, 2008-2015

# 7

## ECONOMIC ISSUES

### 7.1 Economic Transition and Macro Economy

More than two decades ago, Mongolia changed to a free-market economy after seven decades of rule by a communist regime. Between 1996 and 2007, the Sant Maral Foundation regularly asked whether people thought the change to democracy and a market economy was correct or not. Throughout this period, the responses were overwhelmingly in favour of the changes (see: Table 7-1).

Table 7-1: People's opinions about change to democracy and market economy (1996-2007)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
The change to democracy was correct	94%	93%	92%	86%	90%	90%	91%	92%	93%	90%	90%	91%
The change to market economy was correct	92%	92%	90%	87%	89%	89%	89%	91%	91%	88%	89%	90%

*Source: SMF database, 1996-2007*

The question was removed from opinion polls after 2007 because responses up until then had clearly indicated people's strong approval of the change, and no new insights were expected.


#### 7.1.1 Current Opinions about the Change from State Control to Free Market Economy

In March 2016, the Sant Maral Foundation included a more nuanced question in its opinion poll and asked a representative sample of 1,500 people: "In 1990, Mongolia changed from a state controlled, planned economic system to a free market economy. What is your opinion about its success or failure and the future?"

The response was that 91.5 per cent of the Mongolian population chose one of the following options provided in the questionnaire:

- The system functions in principle but is not liberal enough. The state should provide more freedom for the enterprises. .... 26%
- The free market economy as it is at present functions and serves Mongolia well; it should continue unchanged. .... 26%
- The system functions in principle but is too liberal. The state should protect consumers/citizens and exercise more control that enterprises cannot abuse their economic power. .... 29%
- The free market system has not worked well for Mongolia and the country should reverse to a state-controlled economy. .... 18%

Figure 7 1: Current opinions about the change from state control to free market economy



The group of respondents who preferred that the government revert to a state-controlled economy was the smallest, with 18 per cent approval Table 7-2. Many of these people were between 50 and 59 years old (see: Table 7-2).

Those among the young generation, born after 1990 (18-24 age group), are the smallest number of respondents who want to return to the socialist system. These young people are more concerned that the state should take care of its citizens and protect them from abuses by the economic power of enterprises.

Respondents above 60 years old are very concerned that the state should protect citi-

zens’ interests. This age group felt that further liberalising the economy and more freedoms for enterprises are the least-priority.

The “40-49” age group is well established and usually occupies top managerial positions in private business. This group of people when they were young initiated and actively participated in the transition away from the state dominated system. It should be of no surprise that they want more freedoms for enterprises and to limit state interference.

Table 7-2: Respondents’ opinions regarding the change to a free market economy (March 2016, by age)

<b>Question:</b> <i>In 1990, Mongolia changed from a state controlled, planned economic system to a free market economy. What is your opinion about its success or failure and the future?</i>	<b>Age Groups</b>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>18 - 24</b>	<b>25 - 29</b>	<b>30 - 39</b>	<b>40 - 49</b>	<b>50 - 59</b>	<b>60 +</b>	
The state should provide more freedom for enterprises	24.6%	26.1%	27.0%	29.7%	26.0%	22.8%	26.4%
It should continue unchanged	26.6%	33.9%	24.9%	27.4%	20.8%	24.7%	26.2%
The state should protect consumers/citizens	36.5%	24.4%	31.4%	23.7%	27.1%	33.3%	29.4%
The country should reverse to a state-controlled economy	12.3%	15.6%	16.8%	19.2%	26.0%	19.1%	18.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

Table 7-2 shows clearly that the opinions of every age group varies. Only “30-39” age group appears to have no preference that would deviate substantially from general opinions.

There are some differences of opinions between male and female respondents (see: Table 7-3), but it is only of minor importance whether respondents reside in Ulaanbaatar or in one of the aimags (see: Table 7-4). Gender differences may appear because the competitive nature of private initiatives appeals more to the Mongolian male population than the female, which is more inclined to the stability of state employment and subsidies.

Table 7-3: Respondents’ opinions regarding the change to a free market economy (March 2016, by gender)

<b>Question:</b> <i>In 1990, Mongolia changed from a state controlled, planned economic system to a free market economy. What is your opinion about its success or failure and the future?</i>	<b>Gender</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	
The state should provide more freedom for enterprises	28.8%	23.5%	26.4%
It should continue unchanged	26.9%	25.3%	26.2%
The state should protect consumers/citizens	28.9%	30.0%	29.4%
The country should reverse to a state-controlled economy	15.4%	21.3%	18.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll March 2016

Table 7-4: Respondents’ opinions regarding the change to a free market economy (March 2016, by area of residence)

<b>Question:</b> <i>In 1990, Mongolia changed from a state controlled, planned economic system to a free market economy. What is your opinion about its success or failure and the future?</i>	<b>Area of residence</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	
The state should provide more freedom for enterprises	27.2%	25.9%	26.4%
It should continue unchanged	24.3%	27.7%	26.2%
The state should protect consumers/citizens	29.7%	29.1%	29.4%
The country should reverse to a state-controlled economy	18.8%	17.4%	18.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

A comparison between people of each social status and level of income shows some disparities, but none are as pronounced as that seen between the age groups.

The most distinctive differences of opinion between income groups can be found among respondents with annual household incomes of less than 4.8 million tugrik. These respondents are against more liberalisation of the economy and greater freedoms for enterprises, while supporting more state protections for citizens’ interests. These low-income groups have the largest shares of people who would like to return to the old economic system (see: Table 7-5).

This trend corresponds with the responses of people belonging to the Disadvantaged Group who called for government and society to revert to the socialist system while clearly disapproving of the lack of change to the present free-market economy. They also want more state protections for the citizens (see: Table 7-6). The “Above Middle Class” social group is least interested in returning to the former socialist system but also show high concern for

protections for consumers and citizens.

Data from the National Statistics Office shows that 8.9 per cent of Mongolian households in 2016 were run by single mothers. Undoubtedly, that situation impacts the numbers in some tables shown here, as these families usually have low incomes and are heavily dependent on state support. They see more opportunities in state-controlled entities. Private companies are frequently very reluctant to hire females because of the extra tax burdens.

Table 7-5: Respondents' opinions regarding the change to a free market economy (March 2016, by level of income)

<b>Question:</b> <i>In 1990, Mongolia changed from a state controlled, planned economic system to a free market economy. What is your opinion about its success or failure and the future?</i>	<b>Income Groups</b> <i>(estimated annual household income)</i>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>less than 600000 MNT</b>	<b>600000 - &lt;1.2 m MNT</b>	<b>1.2 m MNT - &lt;2.4 m MNT</b>	<b>2.4 m MNT - &lt;4.8 m MNT</b>	<b>4.8 m MNT - &lt;9.6 m MNT</b>	<b>9.6 m MNT or more</b>	
The state should provide more freedom for enterprises	data is insufficient for breakdown into sub-groups	data is insufficient for breakdown into sub-groups	22,2%	23,9%	27,5%	28,7%	26.7%
It should continue unchanged			22,2%	27,4%	26,9%	25,3%	25.9%
The state should protect consumers/citizens			33,3%	27,4%	26,6%	31,0%	29.4%
The country should reverse to a state-controlled economy			22,2%	21,4%	19,0%	15,1%	17.9%
Total			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll March 2016

Table 7-6: Respondents' opinions regarding the change to a free market economy (March 2016, by social status)

<b>Question:</b> <i>In 1990, Mongolia changed from a state controlled, planned economic system to a free market economy. What is your opinion about its success or failure and the future?</i>	<b>Social status</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Above middle class</b>	<b>Middle class</b>	<b>Below middle class</b>	<b>Disadvantaged group</b>	
The state should provide more freedom for enterprises	25.5%	26.1%	28.9%	21.9%	26.4%
It should continue unchanged	21.4%	27.9%	21.8%	12.5%	26.1%
The state should protect consumers/citizens	36.7%	27.9%	31.1%	43.8%	29.4%
The country should reverse to a state-controlled economy	16.3%	18.0%	18.2%	21.9%	18.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll March 2016

## 7.1.2 Present State of the Economy

Respondents have given the Sant Maral Foundation a wide-range of opinions about the national economy since it started its polls in 1995. During the transformation process in 1995-2007, respondents saw an overall improvement, despite temporary setbacks in 1999 and in 2005-2006. The average response in 2008-2016 was even more positive. Nevertheless, respondents did not seem to feel any real improvement. In fact, judgements in 2016 were much worse than they were at the end of the transition period in 2007. This becomes particularly apparent when viewing data in Figure 7-2.




Table 7-7: Respondents' opinions regarding the economic situation in Mongolia

	<i>In respondents' opinion, the present economic situation in Mongolia is ...</i>					<i>Total</i>
	<i>very good</i>	<i>good</i>	<i>not good, not bad</i>	<i>rather bad</i>	<i>bad</i>	
1995	0.4%	1.7%	30.2%	49.5%	18.2%	100.0%
1996	0.3%	3.9%	33.8%	49.7%	12.3%	100.0%
1997	0.3%	3.8%	30.3%	50.0%	15.5%	100.0%
1998	0.4%	2.7%	27.6%	49.6%	19.7%	100.0%
1999	0.1%	1.7%	24.4%	47.2%	26.6%	100.0%
2000	0.7%	3.7%	29.5%	49.4%	16.6%	100.0%
2001	1.2%	6.2%	34.8%	45.0%	12.9%	100.0%
2002	1.6%	7.1%	36.4%	43.6%	11.4%	100.0%
2003	1.5%	9.4%	45.9%	35.2%	8.0%	100.0%
2004	1.6%	12.2%	44.6%	34.6%	6.9%	100.0%
2005	0.4%	3.8%	36.9%	46.4%	12.5%	100.0%
2006	0.7%	6.7%	35.8%	42.7%	14.0%	100.0%
2007	1.6%	10.6%	43.2%	34.9%	9.7%	100.0%
<b>Average 1995-2007</b>	<b>0.9%</b>	<b>6.2%</b>	<b>35.7%</b>	<b>43.6%</b>	<b>13.5%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
	<i>very good</i>	<i>good</i>	<i>not good, not bad</i>	<i>bad</i>	<i>very bad</i>	<i>Total</i>
2008	0.9%	9.7%	42.8%	36.1%	10.5%	100.0%
2009	0.3%	5.7%	42.7%	42.6%	8.6%	100.0%
2010	0.3%	7.7%	43.7%	37.8%	10.5%	100.0%
2011	0.2%	11.9%	45.5%	36.4%	6.0%	100.0%
2012	0.6%	11.4%	44.1%	35.4%	8.6%	100.0%
2013	0.2%	9.8%	42.3%	38.0%	9.7%	100.0%
2014	0.4%	9.4%	37.8%	36.4%	16.0%	100.0%
2015	0.3%	2.6%	26.6%	47.7%	22.8%	100.0%
2016	0.4%	4.1%	29.6%	48.0%	17.9%	100.0%
<b>Average 2008-2016</b>	<b>0.5%</b>	<b>8.7%</b>	<b>41.0%</b>	<b>38.7%</b>	<b>11.1%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>


Source: SMF database, 1995-2016

Figure 7-2 Respondents' opinions regarding the economic situation in Mongolia



Responses from 2008 through 2016 are shown in a single curve using a scale ranging from +2 ("very good") to -2 ("very bad"). Other points on the scale are +1 ("good"), 0 representing the response "not good, not bad", and -1 ("bad"). The result of this calculation is shown in Figure 7.3.

Figure 7-3: Respondents' opinions regarding the economic situation in Mongolia (coded responses)



Some changes reflected in the poll results are impacts of the economic crisis in Mongolia. In 2012, the positive judgement from previous years turned gradually to a more negative one, and then, in 2015, respondents suddenly felt a further worsening.

These changes of opinion can be similarly observed among both respondents in rural and urban areas. Data compiled for 2008-2016 is shown separately for urban and rural areas (see: Table 7-8, Table 7-9) and again in two separate Figures (see: Figure 7-4, Figure 7-5).

Table 7-8: Respondents' opinions regarding the economic situation in Mongolia (respondents in urban areas)

	<i>In respondents' opinion, the present economic situation in Mongolia is ...</i>					<i>Total</i>
	<i>very good</i>	<i>good</i>	<i>not good, not bad</i>	<i>rather bad</i>	<i>bad</i>	
2008	1.0%	7.8%	36.4%	41.3%	13.5%	100.0%
2009	0.1%	4.5%	40.7%	45.9%	8.8%	100.0%
2010	0.1%	8.6%	37.0%	42.1%	12.1%	100.0%
2011		11.2%	42.0%	39.2%	7.6%	100.0%
2012	0.8%	9.8%	39.7%	37.6%	12.1%	100.0%
2013	0.3%	12.0%	39.5%	38.2%	10.2%	100.0%
2014	0.9%	7.4%	35.3%	41.5%	14.9%	100.0%
2015	0.8%	2.7%	22.9%	48.6%	25.1%	100.0%
2016	0.5%	3.9%	25.1%	51.3%	19.2%	100.0%
Average 2008-2016	0.5%	7.9%	36.6%	42.0%	13.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-9: Respondents' opinions regarding the economic situation in Mongolia (respondents in rural areas)

	<i>In respondents' opinion, the present economic situation in Mongolia is ...</i>					<i>Total</i>
	<i>very good</i>	<i>good</i>	<i>not good, not bad</i>	<i>rather bad</i>	<i>bad</i>	
2008	0.9%	11.2%	48.0%	31.9%	8.1%	100.0%
2009	0.5%	6.7%	44.2%	40.1%	8.5%	100.0%
2010	0.5%	7.2%	48.1%	34.9%	9.3%	100.0%
2011	0.3%	12.4%	47.9%	34.5%	4.9%	100.0%
2012	0.5%	12.2%	46.3%	34.2%	6.9%	100.0%
2013	0.2%	8.3%	44.3%	37.8%	9.4%	100.0%
2014	0.1%	10.8%	39.5%	32.8%	16.8%	100.0%
2015		2.5%	29.3%	47.0%	21.2%	100.0%
2016	0.4%	4.3%	33.1%	45.4%	16.9%	100.0%
Average 2008-2016	0.4%	9.3%	44.0%	36.5%	9.8%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-4: Respondents' opinions regarding the economic situation in Mongolia (respondents in urban areas)






Figure 7-5: Respondents' opinions regarding the economic situation in Mongolia (respondents in rural areas)



The similarity between the assessments of people in urban and rural areas in 2008-2016 is also shown in Figure 7-6, below.

Figure 7-6: Comparison of respondents' assessment of economic situation in urban and rural area



### 7.1.3 Economic Development and Future Expectations

An increasing number of people thought that Mongolia’s economy was in decline in the later years observed. Between 2008 and 2011, general opinions were optimistic. From 2012 onward, however, more and more respondents saw negative development, up until 2016. This was the first time since the Sant Maral Foundation first began polling in 1995 that more than 50 per cent of the sample thought the economy was in decline.

Table 7-10: Opinions regarding trend in national economic development

“The economic situation is ...”	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
improving	23.4%	17.0%	26.6%	33.5%	33.8%	26.8%	25.9%	5.3%	7.0%
stagnating	42.4%	49.4%	49.7%	49.0%	46.7%	49.7%	42.1%	45.9%	42.7%
in decline	34.2%	33.6%	23.8%	17.4%	19.5%	23.5%	32.1%	48.9%	50.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

The number of opinions that the economic situation was “improving” sharply declined in 2009, when the global economic crisis hit Mongolia. A later trend that the economy was improving was partly due to improved economic relations with China.

The second, even stronger, decline in positive assessments was recorded in 2015 and 2016. At that time, on the other hand, the negativity was because of domestic economic issues, while there were no global issues affecting Mongolia.

Figure 7-7: Opinions regarding trend in national economic development






Figure 7-8: Percentage of respondents who believe the national economy is in decline




Expressed on a scale from +1 (“the economy is improving”) to -1 (“the economy is in decline”) with 0 representing the opinion “the economy is stagnating”, the data from Table 7-10 results in Figure 7-9.

Figure 7-9: Opinions regarding trend in national economic development (coded responses)



Opinions of respondents in urban and rural areas do not differ in this aspect. They all saw a steep decline after 2012.

Figure 7-10: Opinions regarding trend in national economic development (urban-rural comparison)



Despite their negativity on how the economy was developing, most respondents still expected some improvement within the next five years. However, the number of respondents who expected the economy to be worse in five years increased after 2012, and the latest data from 2016 was worse than any previous year. Table 7-11 and Figure 7-9 show how opinions developed between 2008 and 2016.

Separate tables show how the opinions of different social groups vary. The data in these tables are derived from the latest poll conducted, in March 2016.


Table 7-11: Opinions regarding national economic situation

"The economic situation in five years will be ..."	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
much better	7.6%	9.0%	8.8%	10.6%	13.1%	11.5%	10.5%	5.4%	5.2%
slightly better	53.7%	59.4%	55.2%	58.5%	59.7%	54.9%	52.4%	50.4%	54.2%
the same	24.1%	21.3%	21.8%	19.5%	17.9%	19.5%	21.2%	24.9%	21.4%
slightly worse	9.5%	7.3%	8.8%	6.8%	6.4%	8.3%	9.8%	13.9%	13.2%
much worse	5.1%	3.0%	5.4%	4.7%	2.9%	5.8%	6.1%	5.4%	6.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016




Figure 7-11: Opinions regarding national economic situation



Expressed on a scale from +2 ("the economy will be much better in 5 years") to -2 ("the economy will be much worse in 5 years"), the data from Table 7-11 results in Figure 7-12.

Figure 7-12: Opinions regarding national economic situation (coded responses)



Women are somewhat more optimistic than men in their outlook as to how the economy will develop (see: Table 7-12).

The youngest groups of respondents (under 30 years old) are more optimistic than the older ones (see: Table 7-13).

Respondents of urban and rural areas are of similar opinions (see: Table 7-14), but peo-

ple with a low level of education are more negative in their judgements (see: Table 7-15). The Mongolian economy and the rapid IT development in the country has brought a stronger demand for a more highly educated labour force with greater experience. People with low educations may feel on the outskirts of this trend.

Table 7-12: Opinions regarding national economic situation, by gender

“The economic situation in five years will be ...”	<b>Gender</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	
much better	4.9%	5.5%	5.2%
slightly better	49.3%	60.4%	54.2%
the same	23.0%	19.5%	21.4%
slightly worse	14.5%	11.6%	13.2%
much worse	8.3%	3.0%	6.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

Table 7-13: Opinions regarding national economic situation, by age of respondents

“The economic situation in five years will be ...”	<b>Age Groups</b>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>18 - 24</b>	<b>25 - 29</b>	<b>30 - 39</b>	<b>40 - 49</b>	<b>50 - 59</b>	<b>60 +</b>	
much better	6.6%	7.1%	3.1%	5.9%	3.0%	6.6%	5.2%
slightly better	51.9%	55.2%	57.0%	55.5%	49.3%	53.3%	54.2%
the same	25.1%	19.5%	19.5%	18.6%	26.1%	23.0%	21.4%
slightly worse	13.1%	11.7%	16.7%	11.4%	13.4%	9.8%	13.2%
much worse	3.3%	6.5%	3.8%	8.6%	8.2%	7.4%	6.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

Table 7-14: Opinions regarding national economic situation, by urban-rural comparison

“The economic situation in five years will be ...”	<b>Area of residence</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	
much better	4.8%	5.5%	5.2%
slightly better	53.5%	54.9%	54.2%
the same	22.0%	21.0%	21.4%
slightly worse	13.2%	13.2%	13.2%
much worse	6.6%	5.5%	6.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll March 2016

Table 7-15: Opinions regarding national economic situation, by level of education of respondents


“The economic situation in five years will be ...”	<i>Education level of respondents</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>low education level</i>	<i>secondary education</i>	<i>higher education</i>	
much better	3.1%	5.8%	5.2%	5.2%
slightly better	49.7%	55.1%	55.4%	54.2%
the same	25.4%	21.8%	18.7%	21.4%
slightly worse	15.0%	11.9%	14.3%	13.2%
much worse	6.7%	5.4%	6.4%	6.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll March 2016

When taking a closer look at respondents’ occupations and employment statuses, it becomes apparent that people in the private sector (private sector employees and self-employed people) are more pessimistic about the future development of the economy. Unemployed people have the most negative opinions (see: Table 7-16).


This comes as no surprise if one looks at the private sector’s assessment of the economy (see: Figure 7-13). This attitude was further cemented by a significant drop in foreign direct investment (see: Figure 7-14) in recent years.

Figure 7-13: Satisfaction with the Mongolian business environment, by business community



Source: Study of Private Perceptions of Corruption (STOPP) by SMF-TAF

Figure 7-14: Foreign Direct Investment in Mongolia from 2011 to the first half of 2016



Source: Presentation of Minister of Finance, B. Chojilsuren (“Unuudur”, August 10, 2016)

Respondents with relatively low incomes also have a more negative outlook than those with a better income situation (see: Table 7-17). The same applies when comparing the opinions of different social groups (see: Table 7-18).

Table 7-16: Opinions regarding national economic situation, by occupation

“The economic situation in five years will be ...”	Occupation/employment of respondents								Total
	Employees in the state sector	Employees in the private sector	self employed	Nomads/ Farmers	unemployed	students and prof. trainees	retired/disability allow.	others	
much better	5.3%	4.5%	3.1%	3.3%	7.0%	6.9%	5.4%	5.8%	5.2%
slightly better	61.2%	50.5%	55.2%	52.5%	49.0%	54.3%	55.4%	53.6%	54.2%
the same	16.0%	23.2%	20.9%	26.2%	20.3%	23.3%	22.6%	24.6%	21.4%
slightly worse	10.6%	15.2%	15.3%	9.8%	18.2%	12.1%	11.3%	8.7%	13.2%
much worse	6.9%	6.6%	5.5%	8.2%	5.6%	3.4%	5.4%	7.2%	6.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF poll March 2016

Table 7-17: Opinions regarding national economic situation, by income

“The economic situation in five years will be ...”	<i>Income Groups (estimated annual household income)</i>						<i>Total</i>
	<i>less than 600000 tugrik</i>	<i>600000 - &lt;1.2 m tugrik</i>	<i>1.2 m tugrik - &lt;2.4 m tugrik</i>	<i>2.4 m tugrik - &lt;4.8 m tugrik</i>	<i>4.8 m tugrik - &lt;9.6 m tugrik</i>	<i>9.6 m tugrik or more</i>	
much better	11.1%		5.3%	4.1%	4.9%	5.8%	5.2%
slightly better	44.4%	55.6%	55.3%	50.3%	52.9%	57.6%	54.4%
the same	11.1%	22.2%	21.1%	21.1%	24.4%	18.9%	21.5%
slightly worse	22.2%	22.2%	13.2%	19.9%	10.8%	12.6%	13.2%
much worse	11.1%		5.3%	4.7%	7.0%	5.1%	5.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll March 2016

Table 7-18: Opinions regarding national economic situation, by social status

“The economic situation in five years will be ...”	<i>Social status</i>				<i>Total</i>
	<i>Above middle class</i>	<i>Middle class</i>	<i>Below middle class</i>	<i>Disadvantaged group</i>	
much better	7.1%	5.1%	4.7%	4.2%	5.2%
slightly better	63.1%	55.9%	42.7%	45.8%	54.2%
the same	14.3%	22.2%	21.1%	25.0%	21.5%
slightly worse	11.9%	12.4%	18.7%	4.2%	13.2%
much worse	3.6%	4.4%	12.9%	20.8%	6.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

There is a similarity of opinions among respondents who support the MPP and MPRP. Supporters of both camps see economic development in the next five years more negatively than the overall average of respondents, while supporters of the DP are more optimistic (see: Table 7-19). The survey data was collected three months before 2016 parliamentary elections, in which the government-ruling DP received a crushing defeat. Undoubtedly, the negative assessments of the economy impacted the voting results in the 2016 election. A close correlation can be observed between the assessment of household living standards and the state of the national economy.

Table 7-19: Opinions regarding national economic situation, by party preference of respondents

“The economic situation in five years will be ...”	<i>Which party do you favour?</i>			<i>Total of all respondents (incl. other parties)</i>
	<i>MPP</i>	<i>Democratic Party</i>	<i>MPRP</i>	
much better	6.7%	9.6%	6.8%	7.3%
slightly better	51.5%	63.7%	48.6%	55.1%
the same	20.0%	17.2%	24.3%	20.2%
slightly worse	14.5%	5.1%	14.9%	11.5%
much worse	7.3%	4.5%	5.4%	5.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

### 7.1.4 Private Sector vs. State Industries

At the beginning of this chapter, it is shown that respondents are overwhelmingly in favour of Mongolia’s shift to a free market economy in 1995-2007 (see: Table 7-1). In the most recent poll, March 2016, only 18 per cent of respondents thought that the free market did not work well, and Mongolia should return to state controls of the economy (see: Figure 7-1).

The issue of state control over the economy is covered by several other questions. Some questions have been asked regularly since 2008, while others were only included in the last few years of the observed period. Responses show that people differentiate between general questions of privatisation or state ownership and more specific opinions when key sectors of the economy are concerned.

Around 75 per cent of all respondents between 2008 and 2016 believe key sectors of the economy should be state-owned (see: Table 7-20). But only 15 per cent think that every Mongolian company should be nationalised (see: March 2016 poll results, below).

Table 7 20: Opinions regarding state ownership of key sectors

<b>Question:</b> <i>Do you agree with the statement “The key sectors of economy should be state owned”?</i>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
Agree	72.2%	76.3%	76.8%	78.5%	75.5%	81.2%	75.3%	64.2%	72.9%	75.2%
Disagree	27.8%	23.7%	23.2%	21.5%	24.5%	18.8%	24.7%	35.8%	27.1%	24.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database 2008-2016

The following question was included in the March 2016 poll: “Some people think that the state should nationalise every Mongolian company. What do you think?”

Answers were:

The government has to nationalize every Mongolian company	15.3%
The government has to take different actions than nationalising	39.1%
The government should not interfere.	30.9%
Spontaneously: it may interfere or may not interfere...	8.4%
(Don't know/No response)	6.3%


Opinions differed depending on the political party respondents supported (see: Table 7-21).

Table 7-21: Opinions regarding the nationalisation of Mongolian companies, by supporters of different political parties

Question: “Some people think that the state should nationalize every Mongolian company. What do you think?”	Which party do you favour?				All respond. (incl. other and no party)
	MPP (MPRP before 2012)	DP	MPRP	Civic Will - Green Party (old CWP)	
The government has to nationalize every Mongolian company	16.3%	15.8%	24.3%	20.0%	17.4%
The government has to take different actions than nationalizing	34.9%	37.8%	32.0%	46.7%	36.2%
The government should not interfere	33.5%	35.2%	27.2%	20.0%	32.7%
Spontaneously: it may interfere, or may not interfere	7.9%	5.1%	10.7%	13.3%	7.5%
“Don't know” or no response	7.4%	6.1%	5.8%		6.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

Figure 7-15: Opinions regarding nationalisation of Mongolian companies, by supporters of different political parties



People seem unconvinced that state ownership of the economy will be the solution to social inequality, as can be concluded from answers to another question asked in March 2016: “Do you think that nationalising every Mongolian company will reduce social inequality?”

Answers were:

To a large extent...	3.3%
To some extent....	16.4%
A little.....	29.0%
Not at all...	33.8%
“Don’t know” or no response....	17.5%

With regard to this question, some opinions varied depending on the political party respondents favoured (see: Table 7-22).




Table 7-22: Opinions regarding reduction of social inequality through nationalisation of Mongolian companies, by supporters of different political parties

Question: “Do you think that nationalizing every Mongolian company will reduce social inequality?”	Which party do you favour?				All respond. (incl. other and no party)
	MPP (MPRP before 2012)	DP	MPRP	Civic Will - Green Party (old CWP)	
To a large extent	4.2%	1.5%	6.8%		3.5%
To some extent	16.7%	12.8%	20.4%	20.0%	15.9%
A little	27.0%	28.6%	28.2%	26.7%	28.7%
Not at all	34.4%	42.9%	21.4%	46.7%	35.1%
“Don’t know” or no response	17.7%	14.3%	23.3%	6.7%	16.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

Figure 7-16: Opinions regarding reduction of social inequality through nationalisation of Mongolian companies, by supporters of different political parties



The most appropriate role for the state seems to be that of an active facilitator supporting the private sector. More than 50 per cent of respondents in 2016 preferred this over strict nationalisation, liberal policies, or a passive role of the state (see: Table 7-23).


Table 7-23: Opinion regarding state involvement in industry and business

	Having a strong state that sets strict rules and nationalises private companies to guarantee economic success and an equal distribution of public wealth.	Having a state that is not engaged into economic affairs and is completely liberal to generate freedom of actions for companies.	Having a liberal state that sets and controls rules which create a good basis for founding new companies and general economic actions of companies.	Having a state that supports economy by investing money in private sector and supports companies with financial assistance.
Very good	5.3%	6.8%	7.9%	12.8%
Good	20.7%	36.5%	38.1%	41.7%
Not good, nor bad	25.3%	27.2%	26.3%	21.5%
Bad	22.7%	12.0%	10.3%	8.7%
Very bad	12.7%	3.1%	2.5%	2.5%
(Don't know/ No response)	13.4%	14.4%	14.9%	12.9%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF poll March 2016


The Mongolian population has developed a strong negative opinion towards the oligarch class and the wild capitalism currently present in the country. That attitude is extrapolated on the private sector as a whole, making state ownership popular as an alternative to oligarchic clans. Somehow, there is something that holds the Mongolian public back from handing over full state control of businesses to the government (see: Figure 7-17, Figure 7-18).

Figure 7-17. "In your opinion, how much corruption is there in the public sector?"



Source: Study of Private Perceptions of Corruption (STOPP) by SMF-TAF

Figure 7-18. In your opinion, how much corruption is there in the private sector?



Source: Study of Private Perceptions of Corruption (STOPP) by SMF-TAF

### 7.1.5 Resource Nationalism

The mining sector has played a special role in Mongolia’s economy since the beginning of Mongolia’s economic transformation. The privatisation of this sector and utilisation of the public revenues from mining and mineral resources have been and still are widely discussed subjects. This section of the study shows some opinions related to this issue.

The following question has been asked in SMF polls since 2008: “Through recent development of the mining sector, Mongolia has gained considerable wealth. How should this money be used?”

Responses show that a growing number of respondents favour the investment of these funds into long-term programs to improve sectors such as education and health, or economic development.


Table 7-24: Opinions regarding utilisation of the national income from mining

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
There should be increased social programs to give immediate relief to the poor	18.7%	16.3%	16.1%	17.2%	11.4%	9.8%	11.6%	12.7%	10.6%	13.5%
There should be long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc.	28.4%	26.4%	29.5%	30.1%	31.7%	36.6%	42.5%	37.1%	38.0%	32.3%
All citizen should equally benefit through direct disbursement	20.9%	23.0%	16.4%	15.9%	17.0%	8.9%	8.9%	11.2%	8.8%	15.8%
Funds should be invested by the state to improve economic development	31.9%	34.4%	38.0%	36.8%	39.8%	44.7%	37.1%	39.1%	42.7%	38.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Source: SMF database, 2008-2016*

Direct disbursement of benefits to all citizens, or more investment towards social programmes to give relief to the poor have never been the most popular options, but these options have become even less attractive in recent times (see: Table 7-24 and Figure 7-19).

Figure 7-19: Opinions regarding the utilisation of the national income from mining



The data analysed in this part of the study covers the years 2008 through 2016, which coincides with two legislative periods: 2008-2012 when government was led by a coalition led by the MPP (at that time going by the name MPRP), and 2012-2016 when the DP had a majority<sup>23</sup>. A change in priorities can be seen when the data found in Table 7-24 is kept in mind.


23 The 2008-2012 legislative period includes the surveys conducted in Oct. 2008, April 2009, Oct. 2009, April 2010, Oct. 2010, April 2011, March 2012 and June 2012; the 2012-2016 legislative period includes the surveys of April 2013, March 2014, March 2015, and March 2016; Also included outside of two legislative periods is the survey data from May 2008, which is included in Table 7 24 but not in Table 7 25.

Table 7-25: Changing priorities for the use of funds from the mining sector, over two legislative periods

	<i>Legislative Period</i>	
	<b>2008-2012</b>	<b>2012-2016</b>
There should be increased social programs to give immediate relief to the poor	14,6%	11,0%
There should be long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc.	29,8%	38,2%
All citizen should equally benefit through direct disbursement	18,5%	9,3%
Funds should be invested by the state to improve economic development	37,1%	41,5%
Total	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-20: Changing priorities for the use of funds from mining the sector, over two legislative periods



Looking at the data, it appears that the two major parties took different approaches in how they governed the country during the two legislative periods that took place throughout 2008-2016. As a result, the people made particular choices when asked about how the public income from the mining sector should be utilised. Under this assumption, one may assume that the highest percentage share of any particular option means that it is in higher public demand. That, in turn, means that the MPP-led government in 2008-2012 was more inclined to support the private sector compared with the DP government in the following years. Social spending for the poor was at a lower level in 2008-2012 than 2012-2016.

The DP's policy was to introduce a much wider social welfare net covering a larger portion of the population. The public sector played a dominant role in the process. However, the country could not afford this level of social spending; thus, the Democrats implemented their policies by spending huge sums of borrowed money (the 2012 Chinggis bonds, the 2013 Samurai bonds, a currency swap agreement with People's Bank of China worth 5 billion Yuan that has been in place since 2011, etc.). In light of the shrinking economy and a fall in foreign direct investment, the DP's policy effectively brought the country's economy to the edge of bankruptcy. The borrowed money only facilitated more imports rather than spur local manufacturing.

As a result, the new MPP government that came to power after the June 2016 parliamentary election engaged the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in prolonged negotiations in an attempt to lift Mongolia's sagging economy. One of the IMF's key criticisms was the large volume of social spending on populist policies.

Figure 7-21 and Figure 7-22 taken from the 2012 and 2013 "Environmental survey in mining affected areas" studies commissioned by the Asia Foundation, showed improving standards of living through the enhanced social network.

Figure 7-21: Have there been times in the past 12 months when you or your family have gone hungry?





Figure 7-22: How would you describe your standard of living?



Some differences arise in the opinion of how funds generated from the mining sector should be utilised, depending on the political orientation of respondents. Table 7-26 shows how the six groups with different political orientation think about this matter. Larger social programs gave immediate relief to the poor, while the long-term social programs that were proposed for funnelling investment in education, health, etc. were the least controversial. In every group is a small percentage share of respondents (each of similar size) who agree with these sentiments. The direct disbursement of funds to all citizens receives particularly strong support among conservatives and traditionalists. In turn, these two groups are less in favour of the state investing these funds to generally improve the economy than any other group.




Table 7-26: Opinions regarding the utilisation of national income from mining, by groups with different political orientation

	<i>Political orientation of respondents</i>						<i>Total</i>
	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	
There should be increased social programs to give immediate relief to the poor	15.8%	12.0%	14.5%	15.3%	13.5%	13.5%	14.1%
There should be long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc.	31.9%	33.0%	32.2%	31.3%	30.6%	30.8%	31.6%
All citizen should equally benefit through direct disbursement	14.3%	13.2%	15.2%	21.2%	18.8%	15.7%	16.5%
Funds should be invested by the state to improve economic development	38.0%	41.8%	38.1%	32.2%	37.1%	40.0%	37.9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: SMF polls 2008-2015

Figure 7-23: Opinions regarding the utilisation of the national income from mining, by groups with different political orientations



The Tables and Figures provided show details regarding every individual option available to respondents on how the revenue from mining should be utilised, and how the opinions of each of the six groups with different political orientation have changed over time.

Table 7-27: How responses developed in 2008-2015 to: “There should be increased social programs to give immediate relief to the poor”, by groups with different political orientations

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	19.2%	12.9%	17.3%	21.8%	13.8%	13.0%	15.1%	17.3%
Progressive Liberals	16.5%	14.6%	12.9%	15.5%	10.0%	8.6%	7.6%	10.6%
Passive Liberals	22.9%	17.1%	18.1%	16.3%	11.1%	11.6%	13.0%	7.4%
Conservatives	19.1%	16.6%	17.2%	15.4%	13.4%	11.7%	10.0%	17.1%
Traditionalists	17.4%	20.0%	14.0%	19.9%	11.4%	7.9%	11.8%	9.5%
Sovereign Democrats	17.4%	14.2%	17.8%	13.6%	12.3%	7.5%	11.9%	16.1%

Source: SMF polls 2008-2015

Figure 7-24: How responses developed in 2008-2015 to: “There should be increased social programs to give immediate relief to the poor”, by groups with different political orientations




Table 7-28: How responses developed in 2008-2015 to: “There should be long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc.”, by groups with different political orientations

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Idealistic Democrats	27.1%	30.9%	30.1%	20.2%	33.4%	38.6%	42.1%	35.1%
Progressive Liberals	28.1%	27.8%	35.9%	36.5%	32.5%	35.2%	42.4%	36.5%
Passive Liberals	22.0%	25.1%	27.0%	33.7%	33.2%	41.3%	44.9%	39.8%
Conservatives	29.4%	26.3%	26.0%	30.1%	30.7%	34.8%	44.0%	39.9%
Traditionalists	31.1%	21.5%	26.1%	31.2%	28.3%	37.6%	42.0%	41.9%
Sovereign Democrats	33.2%	29.7%	30.2%	30.9%	29.0%	32.4%	39.0%	25.5%

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Figure 7-25: How responses developed in 2008-2015 to: “There should be long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc.”, by groups with different political orientations




Table 7-29: How responses developed in 2008-2015 to: “All citizen should equally benefit through direct disbursement”, by groups with different political orientations

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Idealistic Democrats	20.5%	23.3%	11.3%	17.6%	12.7%	9.0%	7.2%	8.4%
Progressive Liberals	14.5%	17.3%	11.9%	8.8%	16.6%	7.2%	5.1%	10.1%
Passive Liberals	24.0%	21.6%	17.1%	16.3%	13.5%	10.7%	6.8%	6.9%
Conservatives	22.4%	25.1%	24.2%	19.9%	23.8%	13.3%	13.5%	15.0%
Traditionalists	24.3%	27.7%	22.1%	15.6%	19.1%	8.5%	9.8%	12.2%
Sovereign Democrats	19.4%	21.5%	15.5%	16.7%	18.9%	5.8%	9.6%	16.1%

Source: SMF polls, 2008-2015

Figure 7-26: How responses developed in 2008-2015 to: “All citizen should equally benefit through direct disbursement”, by groups with different political orientations





Table 7-30: How responses developed in 2008-2015 to: “Funds should be invested by the state to improve economic development”, by groups with different political orientations

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Idealistic Democrats	33.2%	32.8%	41.4%	40.4%	40.1%	39.4%	35.5%	39.3%
Progressive Liberals	40.9%	40.2%	39.4%	39.2%	40.9%	49.0%	44.9%	42.9%
Passive Liberals	31.1%	36.3%	37.8%	33.7%	42.2%	36.4%	35.3%	45.8%
Conservatives	29.2%	32.0%	32.6%	34.6%	32.1%	40.2%	32.5%	28.0%
Traditionalists	27.2%	30.8%	37.8%	33.3%	41.2%	46.0%	36.3%	36.5%
Sovereign Democrats	30.0%	34.7%	36.5%	38.9%	39.8%	54.3%	39.5%	42.3%

Source: SMF poll results, 2008-2015

Figure 7-27: How responses developed in 2008-2015 to: “Funds should be invested by the state to improve economic development”, by groups with different political orientations



There are also some differences of opinion among people who favour different political parties when it comes how the state revenue from the mining sector should be utilised (see: Table 7-31). A particularly large divide is the split between people who favour the MPP versus the CWP on the matter of disbursement to all citizens. While the opinions of MPP supporters are above average in this matter, the number of CWP supporters is rather small.


A similar divide can be found between supporters of the MPP and MPRP on the issue of expanding social programs to give immediate relief to the poor. Supporters of the MPP are stronger proponents of the welfare expansion than the MPRP followers. The exact opposite dynamic between the MPP and MPRP supporters can be seen in the issue of long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc. Here, the MPRP supporters demonstrate a higher-level acceptance. Direct disbursement of funds to all citizens is exceptionally popular among MPP supporters, but least favoured by CWP supporters.

Table 7-31: Opinions regarding the utilisation of the national income from mining, by groups in favour of different political parties

	<i>Which party do you favour?</i>				
	<i>MPP (MPRP before 2012)</i>	<i>DP</i>	<i>MPRP</i>	<i>Civic Will - Green Party (old CWP)</i>	<i>All respond. (incl. other and no party)</i>
There should be increased social programs to give immediate relief to the poor	16.9%	13.9%	12.4%	15.3%	15.1%
There should be long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc.	27.8%	31.9%	32.2%	31.4%	30.1%
All citizen should equally benefit through direct disbursement	19.6%	16.8%	15.3%	12.4%	17.8%
Funds should be invested by the state to improve economic development	35.8%	37.4%	40.1%	40.9%	37.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-28: Opinions regarding the utilisation of the national income from mining, by groups in favour of different political parties



Next is another look at how opinions have developed on each of the four options of how to utilise state funds generated by the mining sector. When looking at the tables below, it should be kept in mind that support for the CWP dwindled in the later years, as was mentioned earlier. As a result, the CWP’s base of supporters grows smaller every year, and some curves found in the Figures look rather inconsistent. These erratic curves do not hint at rapidly changing opinions but are rather due to the small base of support.

Table 7-32: “There should be increased social programs to give immediate relief to the poor”, by groups in favour of different political parties

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (MPRP before 2012)	20.0%	19.6%	15.1%	25.1%	14.5%	13.8%	17.5%	15.5%	12.7%
Democratic Party	18.2%	18.3%	15.5%	20.6%	10.0%	8.1%	16.4%	11.7%	12.4%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	11.5%	12.4%	11.3%	15.2%	13.1%
Civic Will - Green Party	13.7%	33.3%	18.2%	6.7%	9.4%	11.1%	11.1%	28.6%	13.3%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-29: How opinions developed in 2008-2016 to: “There should be increased social programs to give immediate relief to the poor”, by groups in favour of different political parties




Table 7-33: How opinions developed in 2008-2016 to: “There should be long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc.”, by groups in favour of different political parties

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (MPRP before 2012)	28.8%	23.5%	28.1%	25.1%	27.8%	28.4%	29.9%	29.8%	34.6%
Democratic Party	27.3%	25.8%	28.9%	22.9%	31.8%	39.1%	41.8%	39.9%	40.0%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	28.8%	29.2%	41.5%	39.2%	36.4%
Civic Will - Green Party	39.2%	13.9%	27.3%	36.7%	29.7%	44.4%	33.3%	42.9%	33.3%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-30: How opinions developed in 2008-2016 to: “There should be long-term social programs through more investment in education, health, etc.”, by groups in favour of different political parties




Table 7-34: How opinions developed in 2008-2016 to: “All citizen should equally benefit through direct disbursement”, by groups in favour of different political parties

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (MPRP before 2012)	21.4%	26.6%	19.2%	13.3%	21.2%	13.1%	14.3%	13.8%	10.7%
Democratic Party	19.3%	22.8%	19.8%	18.9%	19.8%	8.3%	7.7%	8.6%	7.0%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	19.6%	13.1%	5.7%	10.1%	14.1%
Civic Will - Green Party	15.7%	13.9%	18.2%	6.7%	10.9%	-	11.1%	-	20.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016



Figure 7-31: How opinions developed in 2008-2016 to: “All citizen should equally benefit through direct disbursement”, by groups in favour of different political parties





Table 7-35: How opinions developed in 2008-2016 to: “Funds should be invested by the state to improve economic development”, by groups in favour of different political parties

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (MPRP before 2012)	29.9%	30.2%	37.5%	36.4%	36.5%	44.7%	38.3%	40.9%	42.0%
Democratic Party	35.2%	33.1%	35.8%	37.7%	38.3%	44.5%	34.1%	39.9%	40.5%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	40.1%	45.3%	41.5%	35.4%	36.4%
Civic Will - Green Party	31.4%	38.9%	36.4%	50.0%	50.0%	44.4%	44.4%	28.6%	33.3%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-32: How opinions developed in 2008-2016 to: “Funds should be invested by the state to improve economic development”, by groups in favour of different political parties



Respondents' preferences regarding the proportion of Mongolian-to foreign-investment in strategic mining deposits are quite clear and did not change much in 2015-2016, when a question on this topic was included in the polls.

Table 7-36: Opinions regarding proportion of foreign investment in strategic mine deposits

<b>Question:</b> <i>What should be the proportion of Mongolian and Foreign ownership in strategic mine deposits?</i>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
100% Mongolian	21.7%	20.7%
More than 51% Mongolian	61.8%	63.9%
Equal	10.4%	9.3%
More than 51% foreign	0.5%	1.3%
100% Foreign	0.2%	0.1%
(Don't know/No response)	5.5%	4.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2015-2016

Table 7-37: Opinions regarding proportion of foreign investment in strategic mine deposits, by supporters of different parties (2016)

<b>Question:</b> <i>What should be the proportion of Mongolian and Foreign ownership in strategic mine deposits?</i>	<b>Which party do you favour?</b>				<b>All respond. (incl. other and no party)</b>
	<b>MPP (MPRP before 2012)</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>MPRP</b>	<b>Civic Will - Green Party (old CWP)</b>	
100% Mongolian	22.8%	18.4%	18.4%	26.7%	20.3%
More than 51% Mongolian	59.5%	66.3%	67.0%	66.7%	63.8%
Equal	11.6%	11.2%	5.8%	6.7%	10.1%
More than 51% foreign	0.9%	0.5%	3.9%		1.4%
100% Foreign		0.5%			0.2%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

While it is clear from the previous question that respondents prefer a majority shareholding in strategic mine deposits by Mongolian entities over foreign control, it is interesting to consider the next question as to who should be the owner of these Mongolian assets. Only around 40 per cent voted for full state control, while nearly 50 per cent prefers a mix of state and private control in the mining sector (see: Table 7-38).

Table 7-38: Opinions regarding Mongolian ownership of strategic mine deposits

Specify how the ownership of Mongolian investment in strategic mine deposits should be:	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Only state	38.5%	40.7%
Mixed	48.4%	48.1%
Only private business	4.8%	4.5%
(Don't know/No response)	8.3%	6.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2015-2016

Table 7-39: Opinions regarding Mongolian ownership of strategic mine deposits, by supporters of different parties (2016)

Specify how the ownership of Mongolian investment in strategic mine deposits should be:	<b>Which party do you favour?</b>				<b>All re- spond. (incl. other and no party)</b>
	<b>MPP (MPRP before 2012)</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>MPRP</b>	<b>Civic Will - Green Party (old CWP)</b>	
Only state	40.9%	41.3%	40.8%	53.3%	41.4%
Mixed	48.8%	47.4%	49.5%	46.7%	48.1%
Only private business	6.0%	5.6%	3.9%	-	5.4%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016

## 7.2 Economic and Social Problems

### 7.2.1 Major Issues of Concern


The three most important problems mentioned by respondents have been the same throughout the whole 2008-2016 periods: unemployment; standards of living; and inflation. Aside from only slight differences when one or another problem was considered more pressing, these three have been the main concerns for more than 50 per cent of the sample population at any given time. Other problems of secondary importance were education, law enforcement, corruption, and general issues concerning the economy and manufacturing (see: Table 7-40).

Table 7-40: Most important problems facing the country, since 2008

<b>Question:</b> <i>"In your opinion, what is the most important socio-political or economic problem facing the country today?"</i>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Three most important problems:</b>									
Unemployment	23.7%	29.2%	37.8%	40.6%	34.4%	33.6%	31.1%	32.8%	36.3%
Standard of living, poverty, income	19.3%	20.1%	20.1%	17.3%	18.3%	16.2%	17.6%	18.2%	15.1%
Price increase, inflation	27.7%	13.9%	8.8%	6.1%	15.7%	15.3%	20.8%	15.5%	8.0%
<b>Other problems mentioned:</b>									
Education	4.5%	4.4%	4.8%	4.1%	4.1%	4.4%	5.1%	4.7%	5.8%
Law enforcement	5.4%	6.6%	6.5%	7.7%	6.5%	7.4%	5.1%	5.8%	5.7%
Corruption	5.8%	6.4%	4.0%	4.6%	5.3%	5.0%	4.5%	5.5%	4.4%
Economy, manufacturing	4.8%	6.1%	5.8%	6.6%	4.4%	5.0%	5.8%	8.2%	9.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-33: Most important problems facing the country, since 2008



Respondents in polls, which were held in previous years had, already labelled some problems listed after 2008, as “important”. Long-term observation shows how some problems became much less prominent than two decades prior. Other problems increased in magnitude. For comparison, look at the examples in Table 7-41.

People’s general concern with their standards of living is one of the issues that appeared high on the list from 1995. It was the most important problem in 1995-2006, and thereafter fell between the second or third spots—but was still a factor of major concern. Unemployment was not a major problem during the beginning of the transition period, but its importance has steadily increased. Education, on the other hand, was high on people’s priority lists when the polling first began, but the problem seems to have gradually resolved itself to some extent—at least in the minds of respondents.

The same applies to people’s general concern with the economy. The concern from this issue fell from 20 per cent of respondents in 1995 down to around 5 per cent in 2014. In 2015 and 2016, however, the concern about the economy was on the rise again.

Table 7-41: Most important problems facing the country, during the transformation period

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Standard of living	28.0%	20.6%	27.2%	21.8%	21.0%	18.9%	20.2%	21.7%	22.4%	25.9%	25.4%	16.8%
Unemployment	1.1%	9.8%	12.5%	13.6%	10.5%	12.8%	15.2%	15.8%	16.4%	18.9%	18.7%	15.9%
Economy, business	21.3%	20.9%	16.8%	18.4%	26.1%	24.8%	23.4%	20.8%	19.6%	16.4%	14.6%	10.0%
Education	16.8%	16.1%	11.6%	8.0%	5.4%	7.3%	6.9%	7.0%	8.1%	6.8%	5.8%	4.8%
Law and order	7.2%	6.2%	4.2%	5.7%	4.3%	5.5%	6.4%	4.7%	3.5%	2.3%	2.0%	2.5%

Source: SMF database, 1995-2006

Respondents in later years were asked to state how often they feel that government policies fail to solve the most important problems they face, and which party could, in their opinion, best solve those problems. The responses given between 2008 and 2016 show very little confidence in the governments' abilities in solving the problems that concerned people most. Between 75 and 85 per cent of respondents thought that government policies often or always fail to solve problems (see: Table 7-42, Figure 7-34).

When referring to political parties' abilities to solve problems, most respondents have always thought that none of them could solve any problem best (see: Table 7-43, Figure 7-35).

When considering the problems one-by-one, no party was ever considered to have the competency to solve all problems. Yet, there is some indication that people assign certain problem-solving capacities to the MPP. In five of the six issues listed in Table 7-44, people said that the MPP was the most capable party in solving problems. People trust the DP more on corruption alone as a problem it could better solve. However, corruption is the one problem that exactly 50 per cent believe that no party can solve.

Table 7-42: Opinions on government’s ability to solve problems

<b>Question:</b> <i>“How often do you feel that government policies fail to solve the most important problem you mentioned in the previous question?”</i>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Always	44.5%	52.8%	65.7%	65.1%	65.8%	61.4%	55.6%	57.9%	57.9%
Often	32.7%	27.4%	22.6%	21.3%	23.5%	27.5%	29.8%	29.4%	29.1%
Sometimes	16.3%	13.7%	9.3%	11.6%	8.3%	9.1%	10.5%	10.7%	9.9%
Seldom	4.1%	4.3%	1.7%	1.3%	1.9%	1.6%	3.2%	1.6%	2.3%
Never	2.4%	1.9%	0.7%	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%	0.8%	0.5%	0.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-34: Opinions on government’s ability to solve problems




Table 7-43: Opinions on political parties' ability to solve problems

<b>Question:</b> "Which party can best solve this problem?"	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
MPP (MPRP before 2012)	25.6%	24.4%	16.3%	15.7%	14.1%	12.4%	10.7%	13.6%	14.8%
Democratic Party	21.3%	27.4%	14.8%	14.1%	13.4%	21.5%	23.0%	10.5%	11.2%
MPRP					5.0%	5.4%	4.4%	5.2%	6.9%
None	29.3%	26.9%	46.9%	44.6%	37.7%	32.7%	37.0%	43.9%	35.7%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-35: Opinions on political parties' ability to solve problems




Table 7-44: Opinions on political parties' ability to solve problems; related to specific problems (March 2016)

<b>Question:</b> "Which party can best solve this problem?"	<b>Selected problems with high priority</b>					
	<b>Unem- ployment</b>	<b>Standard of living, poverty, income</b>	<b>Price increase, inflation</b>	<b>Educa- tion</b>	<b>Economy, manufac- turing</b>	<b>Corrup- tion</b>
MPP (MPRP before 2012)	14.6%	20.4%	14.5%	12.8%	14.0%	7.8%
Democratic Party	11.3%	12.0%	12.8%	9.3%	8.5%	15.6%
MPRP	7.9%	5.1%	8.5%	8.1%	7.0%	3.1%
None	36.4%	30.6%	31.6%	31.4%	36.4%	50.0%

Source: SMF poll, March 2016



It is noteworthy that even respondents who have a clear preference for a political party have relatively little confidence that their favourite party can solve problems better than others (see: Table 7-45). Among supporters of the MPP, 65.0 per cent believe that their favourite party can solve problems best. Among supporters of the DP, 61.3 per cent have confidence in the party. Among supporters of the MPRP and the CWP, only 55.7 and 48.2 per cent, respectively, believe their party of choice is the best problem solver.

The CWP has the highest percentage of supporters who believe that none of the parties can solve problems better than the others. CWP supporters show the least confidence not only in their favourite party, but also in all political parties in general.

Table 7-45: Opinions on political parties' ability to solve problems, by supporters of different parties

<b>Question:</b> "Which party can best solve this problem?"	<b>Supporters of MPP (or MPRP before 2012)</b>	<b>Supporters of DP</b>	<b>Supporters of MPRP</b>	<b>Supporters of Civil Will - Green Party (or old CWP)</b>
MPP (or MPRP before 2012)	65.0%	2.5%	3.5%	3.2%
DP	2.6%	61.3%	2.3%	4.3%
MPRP	0.4%	0.6%	55.7%	3.6%
Civic Will - Green Party (or old CWP)	0.1%	0.5%	0.7%	48.2%
Other party	2.0%	2.0%	1.1%	4.3%
None	16.9%	20.1%	22.1%	23.2%
„Don't know“ or no response	13.0%	13.1%	14.6%	13.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Another aspect related to the major issues of concern is the question of which institution should have a leading role in problem solving. For all the issues listed in Table 7 -46, around 50 per cent of respondents assign the leading role to the cabinet government led by the prime minister. Next in line is parliament. It may be of some surprise that respondents see a relatively prominent role for the judiciary for education, but not for corruption. As has been shown in the previous chapter, the judiciary itself is listed among the five most-corrupt institutions, by perception, in other surveys conducted during the past decade.

Table 7-46: Opinions regarding leading role of institutions in problem solving

Question: "Which institution should play the leading role in solving this problem?"	Selected problems with high priority					
	Unemployment	Standard of living, poverty, income	Price increase, inflation	Education	Economy, manufacturing	Corruption
Government	48.3%	49.3%	45.6%	45.7%	44.1%	50.0%
Parliament	19.9%	17.2%	18.4%	13.6%	19.7%	16.1%
President	9.9%	11.2%	12.3%	8.6%	15.7%	6.5%
Judiciary	3.0%	3.3%	7.0%	12.3%	1.6%	6.5%
Political parties	4.2%	3.7%	4.4%	3.7%	6.3%	3.2%
Civil society	11.1%	12.1%	10.5%	12.3%	11.0%	11.3%
None	3.6%	3.3%	1.8%	3.7%	1.6%	6.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF poll March 2016

Closely related to the most pressing problems listed by respondents in 2008-2016 are the issues, which they considered the greatest successes or failures of governments during that period. The tables below show the responses to the following questions: "In your opinion, what is the greatest success of the current Government?" and "In your opinion, what is the biggest failure of the current Government?"

It may be a sign of considerable differences of opinion that during one period a decline in unemployment was named the greatest success, while others at the same time said the growing unemployment was the biggest failure.

Table 7-47: Greatest success of government in 2008-2012 (MPP-led coalitions)

Table 7-48: Greatest failure of government in 2008-2012

Question: "In your opinion, what is the greatest success of the current Government?"		Question: "In your opinion, what is the biggest failure of the current Government?"	
Agriculture/rural development	35.1%	Growing of unemployment	20.5%
Economy\ manufacturing\ investment	18.3%	Price increase\ Inflation	19.5%
Education	13.1%	Declining standard of living\ poverty\ income	14.8%
Reduction of unemployment	6.3%	Corruption	11.1%
Corruption (fighting)	5.0%	Law enforcement	9.1%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2012

Table 7-49: Greatest success of government in 2012-2016 (DP governance)

<b>Question:</b> <i>"In your opinion, what is the greatest success of the current Government?"</i>	
Corruption (fighting)	19.3%
Agriculture/ rural development	15.3%
Education	11.8%
Economy/manufacturing/investment	9.9%
Reduction of unemployment	7.0%

Table 7-50: Greatest failure of government during period 2012-2016

<b>Question:</b> <i>"In your opinion, what is the biggest failure of the current Government? "</i>	
Price increase/ Inflation	21.4%
Growing unemployment	16.8%
Declining standard of living/ poverty/ income	14.1%
Economy/manufacturing/investment	9.7%
Law enforcement	8.3%

Source: SMF database, 2012-2016

Respondents were also presented with the following question in 2008-2016:

*"Unemployment has been a major problem for many people in past years. Some people think that this is only a temporary matter and that economic progress in the future will take care of the problem. Other people think that the government needs to intervene and take appropriate measures to reduce unemployment. What do you think?"*

Table7-51 lists the responses during the 2008-2012 and 2012-2016 legislative sessions.

Table 7-51: Opinions on what steps to take to deal with the problem of unemployment

<b>Question:</b> <i>"What should be done to reduce unemployment?"</i>	<b>Legislative session</b>	
	<b>2008-2012</b>	<b>2012-2016</b>
Economic growth will provide sufficient employment in the future	29.2%	32.5%
Economic growth alone is not enough - the government has to take action to reduce unemployment.	70.8%	67.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Related to the issue of people's standard of living is the question of income differences and what should be done about it, if anything. Respondents were asked the following question:

*"Some people think that government should take actions to reduce income differences between the poor and rich, but others think that the government should not interfere. What is your opinion?"*

Here is another table showing the responses given during the two legislative sessions.

Table 7-52: Opinions on what steps to take to deal with income differences

Question: "What should be done to reduce income differences?"	Legislative session	
	2008-2012	2012-2016
The government has to eliminate income differences	41.3%	38.1%
The government has to take moderate action to reduce income differences	44.5%	47.1%
The government should not interfere	7.1%	8.7%
Spontaneously: it may interfere, or may not interfere	7.1%	6.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

The question of whether respondents would be willing to pay higher taxes to fight poverty and support poor people with low income or without any at all was answered in March 2016 as follows:

Yes .....	36.0%
No .....	51.1%
"Don't know" or no response .....	12.9%

## 7.3 Personal Economic Situation

### 7.3.1 Present Living Conditions

Responses regarding personal economic status show a generally positive trend over the 2008-2016 period. In 2008, only 12.9 per cent of responses received were "good" or "very good" to the question: "How is your present personal and family's living standards?" In 2016, the number of positive response rose to 18.1 per cent of all respondents (Table 7-53).


A long-term comparison, however, shows this level of positivity towards the economy had already existed prior to 2008 (see: Figure 7-36).

Table 7-53: Personal and family's living standard

Question: "How is your present personal and family's living standard?"	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very good	0.8%	0.8%	0.6%	0.8%	0.7%	0.5%	1.6%	1.6%	0.9%
Good	12.1%	13.8%	10.4%	12.7%	13.0%	16.1%	14.4%	13.0%	17.2%
Not good, nor bad	57.1%	59.7%	58.3%	62.9%	62.3%	64.9%	57.9%	56.4%	61.6%
Bad	25.1%	22.0%	25.4%	20.7%	20.8%	16.5%	23.2%	24.1%	17.6%
Very bad	4.9%	3.8%	5.3%	2.8%	3.2%	2.0%	2.9%	4.9%	2.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-36: Long-term observation of personal and family's living standards (including only the responses "good" or "very good")



When comparing how people judge their own and their family's living standards with the general economic situation of the country, responses regarding personal situations are much more positive (see: Figure 7-37). The decline of the national economy after 2011 apparently did not affect respondents personally, to the same extent. A similar discrepancy between how respondents judged their personal living standards and the development of the national economy can be observed in previous years.

Figure 7-37: Personal and family’s living standards compared with their judgement of the state of the national economy (only including responses “good” or “very good”)



Young people less than 30 years old judge their standards of living more positively than older respondents (see: Table 7-54). Responses from males and females respondents are no different (see: Table 7-55), but respondents in urban areas consider themselves to have better living standards than people in rural areas (see: Table 7-56).

The strongest point of influence is respondents’ levels of education. People with higher education levels judge their standards of living better than those with lesser education (see: Table 7-57).

Table 7-54: Personal and family’s living standards, by age

Question: “How is your present personal and family’s living standard?”	Age Groups						Total
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 +	
Very good	1.4%	1.2%	0.6%	0.7%	0.5%	0.7%	0.8%
Good	19.1%	16.0%	13.6%	11.4%	11.0%	10.3%	13.4%
Not good, nor bad	61.0%	60.1%	60.7%	59.7%	60.5%	61.4%	60.5%
Bad	15.4%	20.1%	21.3%	23.9%	24.2%	24.2%	21.6%
Very bad	3.1%	2.6%	3.7%	4.4%	3.8%	3.5%	3.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-55: Personal and family's living standards, by gender

<b>Question:</b> "How is your present personal and family's living standard?"	<b>Gender</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	
Very good	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%
Good	13.9%	13.0%	13.4%
Not good, nor bad	60.2%	60.8%	60.5%
Bad	21.5%	21.8%	21.6%
Very bad	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-56: Personal and family's living standards of respondents, by urban or rural residence

<b>Question:</b> "How is your present personal and family's living standard?"	<b>Gender</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	
Very good	0.9%	0.7%	0.8%
Good	15.2%	12.3%	13.4%
Not good, nor bad	60.5%	60.6%	60.5%
Bad	20.5%	22.4%	21.6%
Very bad	2.9%	4.1%	3.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-57: Personal and family's living standards, by education

<b>Question:</b> "How is your present personal and family's living standard?"	<b>Education level of respondents</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>low education level</b>	<b>secondary education</b>	<b>higher education</b>	
Very good	0.6%	0.7%	1.3%	0.8%
Good	8.7%	11.8%	21.3%	13.4%
Not good, nor bad	57.0%	62.0%	61.9%	60.5%
Bad	27.7%	22.5%	13.7%	21.6%
Very bad	6.0%	3.1%	1.8%	3.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

The next two tables show the difference of living standards for various income and social groups. The results confirm the expected, which is people with higher incomes and higher social status have better living standards than poor people at the bottom of the social ladder (see: Table 7-58 and Table 7-59).

Table 7-58: Personal and family's living standards, by income

<b>Question:</b> "How is your present personal and family's life level situation?"	<b>Income Groups</b> (estimated annual household income)						<b>Total</b>
	<b>less than 600000 MNT</b>	<b>600000 - &lt;1.2 m MNT</b>	<b>1.2 m MNT - &lt;2.4 m MNT</b>	<b>2.4 m MNT - &lt;4.8 m MNT</b>	<b>4.8 m MNT - &lt;9.6 m MNT</b>	<b>9.6 m MNT or more</b>	
Very good	1.1%	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%	1.5%	0.8%
Good	8.2%	8.1%	9.2%	12.4%	16.7%	26.1%	13.4%
Not good, nor bad	48.3%	53.0%	60.4%	64.3%	65.0%	60.0%	60.6%
Bad	32.5%	32.0%	25.4%	20.2%	16.0%	10.8%	21.6%
Very bad	9.9%	6.2%	4.3%	2.5%	1.7%	1.7%	3.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-59: Personal and family's living standards, by social status

<b>Question:</b> "How is your present personal and family's living standard?"	<b>Social status</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Above middle class</b>	<b>Middle class</b>	<b>Below middle class</b>	<b>Dis advantages group</b>	
Very good	4.8%	0.5%	0.1%	0.1%	0.8%
Good	40.2%	14.3%	3.5%	1.9%	13.3%
Not good, nor bad	46.9%	70.3%	51.7%	24.2%	60.6%
Bad	6.6%	13.8%	39.6%	52.0%	21.7%
Very bad	1.5%	1.1%	5.1%	21.8%	3.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

The development of living conditions for the different social groups is also shown in Figure 7-29. Social groups tended to be situated at very different levels by the end of the period versus the start, but the general trends of development are the same. This suggests that the gap between the rich and poor did not widen dramatically because the Middle Class and Below Middle-Class groups have both demonstrated moderate improvements.

Yet responses from the top group slightly decline over the period. The issue of relative income distribution is analysed in more detail in section 7.4 of this chapter.



Figure 7-38: Personal and family’s living standards, by social status (only including the responses “good” or “very good”)



There is a relatively small group of between 10 and 25 per cent of respondents who think that their standards of living improved compared with the previous year. On a year-by-year comparison, there was seemingly a period of stagnation between 2011 and 2013, when the general thinking was that the years prior did not bring much negative change to most people’s living standards. After 2013, the situation appears to worsen (see: Table 7-60 and Figure 7-39).

Table 7-60: Comparison of present living standards with the previous year

<b>Question:</b> <i>“How is your living standard compared with last year?”</i>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Better	16.9%	12.6%	14.4%	22.3%	24.4%	25.6%	20.2%	14.6%	11.5%
Same	53.0%	52.4%	54.1%	60.0%	56.0%	57.7%	54.2%	48.4%	47.8%
Worse	30.1%	35.0%	31.5%	17.7%	19.6%	16.7%	25.6%	37.0%	40.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-39: Comparison of present living standards with the previous year




Table 7-61 shows respondents from various social groups who thought that their living standards had improved compared with the year before. In this table, the Above Middle Class social group reported a period of “good” living standards until 2012. Later, however, these two groups reported a decline in their living conditions, but the downward trend is more moderate for the Middle Class. The two lowest-ranking social groups look as though they both experienced a slight improvement by 2016.


This data is shown in Figure 7-40.

Table 7-61: Comparison of present living standards with the previous year, by social group

Question: “How is your living standard compared with the previous year?”	(only including the “better” responses)								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Above middle class	35.6%	28.5%	39.2%	35.1%	51.3%	46.6%	38.6%	31.5%	22.1%
Middle class	21.2%	15.4%	16.9%	27.9%	26.9%	26.8%	23.0%	17.8%	12.0%
Below middle class	4.8%	2.5%	5.7%	12.8%	12.4%	11.4%	9.5%	3.7%	5.7%
Disadvantaged group	3.9%	1.6%	4.3%	6.4%	7.3%	5.6%	1.7%	4.2%	5.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-40: Comparison of present living standards with the previous year, by social group (only including “better” responses)



### 7.3.2 Expectation for the Near Future


Most respondents seem to be rather optimistic about their near futures (see: Table 7-62). It is remarkable that young people under 25 years old, who are generally the most optimistic of all, lost their optimism after 2014 (see: Figure 7-41). The majority were at secondary, high schools or universities, right before joining labour force. Apparently, the opportunities before them did not generate optimism after graduation.

Table 7-62: Outlook to the near future

Question: “How do you evaluate your nearest future?”	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Optimistic	86.2%	91.7%	88.7%	91.6%	92.8%	93.1%	93.6%	90.8%	92.2%
Pessimistic	13.8%	8.3%	11.3%	8.4%	7.2%	6.9%	6.4%	9.2%	7.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-41: Outlook to the near future, by age (only including “optimistic” responses)



Age groups	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Age group 18 - 24	88.7%	93.8%	92.6%	93.4%	96.7%	95.8%	97.7%	95.4%	90.8%
Age group 25 - 29	86.0%	89.3%	89.3%	92.0%	94.8%	93.8%	93.3%	89.3%	95.8%
Age group 30 - 39	88.8%	93.0%	88.4%	95.9%	92.1%	93.6%	93.3%	90.4%	92.9%
Age group 40 - 49	84.6%	89.0%	87.1%	89.8%	90.6%	92.2%	91.3%	89.7%	89.9%
Age group 50 - 59	83.3%	90.0%	86.7%	85.0%	90.3%	92.6%	93.9%	91.4%	90.7%
Age group 60 or above	83.5%	95.2%	88.4%	92.2%	94.6%	91.3%	93.6%	89.1%	93.8%

### 7.3.3 Economic Self-reliance or Dependency

A key question to test whether respondents are economically self-reliant, dependent on the state, or influenced by other outside forces was introduced by the Sant Maral Foundation in 2008. The term “outside forces” includes churches, trade unions, business relations and more. Survey data shows gradual increases in the number of people who believe the future depends on their own achievements and thereby accept one of the basic rules of a market economy.

Table 7-63 shows responses in 2008-2016 to the question:

*“What do you think, does your future depend on your own achievements, the State, or on other forces (like churches, trade unions, firms, the press, TV/radio, communities, business relations) that could influence the economy?”*

The tables following this summary show how different social groups answered the ques-

tion. Among young people, there is a clear majority of respondents who think they themselves are the masters of their destiny. With increasing age, the percentage of respondents who feel that their future depends on the state strongly increases (see: Table 7-64).

Men rely marginally more on their own capabilities than women (see: Table 7-65). People with a higher education are clearly less dependent on the state or other outside forces than those with lower educations (see: Table 7-66). Similar attitudes are shown in the tables comparing groups with different incomes (see: Table 7-67) and different social status (see: Table 7-68).

Table 7-63: Self-reliance on own achievements vs. dependency on outside forces

<b>Question:</b> "Does your future depend on your own achievements or on outside forces?"	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
Rather on myself	49.6%	56.1%	48.4%	48.5%	55.4%	57.5%	55.9%	52.5%	55.7%	53.7%
Rather on the state	38.3%	34.1%	42.9%	42.8%	36.4%	35.3%	33.3%	39.2%	35.7%	37.3%
Rather on other forces	12.1%	9.8%	8.7%	8.8%	8.3%	7.2%	10.8%	8.3%	8.6%	9.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-42: Self-reliance on own achievements vs. dependency on outside forces




Table 7-64: Self-reliance on own achievements vs. dependency on outside forces, by age group

<b>Question:</b> "Does your future depend on your own achievements or on outside forces?"	<b>Age</b>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>18 - 24</b>	<b>25 - 29</b>	<b>30 - 39</b>	<b>40 - 49</b>	<b>50 - 59</b>	<b>60 +</b>	
Rather on myself	66.2%	59.7%	56.9%	51.8%	46.0%	38.8%	53.7%
Rather on the state	24.7%	31.7%	33.4%	38.7%	45.6%	53.1%	37.3%
Rather on other forces	9.1%	8.6%	9.7%	9.5%	8.5%	8.1%	9.1%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-65: Self-reliance on own achievements vs. dependency on outside forces, by gender

<b>Question:</b> "Does your future depend on your own achievements or on outside forces?"	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
Rather on myself	54.7%	52.7%	53.7%
Rather on the state	36.8%	37.7%	37.3%
Rather on other forces	8.5%	9.6%	9.1%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-66: Respondents' self-reliance on own achievements vs. dependency on outside forces, by level of education

<b>Question:</b> "Does your future depend on your own achievements or on outside forces?"	<b>Education level of respondents</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>low education level</b>	<b>secondary education</b>	<b>higher education</b>	
Rather on myself	46.9%	54.6%	59.3%	53.7%
Rather on the state	44.0%	36.5%	31.4%	37.3%
Rather on other forces	9.1%	8.9%	9.3%	9.0%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-67: Self-reliance on own achievements vs. dependency on outside forces (by income)

<b>Question:</b> "Does your future depend on your own achievements or on outside forces?"	<b>Estimated annual household income of respondents:</b>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>less than 600000 MNT</b>	<b>600000 - &lt;1.2 m MNT</b>	<b>1.2 m MNT - &lt;2.4 m MNT</b>	<b>2.4 m MNT - &lt;4.8 m MNT</b>	<b>4.8 m MNT - &lt;9.6 m MNT</b>	<b>9.6 m MNT or more</b>	
Rather on myself	43.4%	45.6%	50.0%	52.9%	60.8%	62.4%	53.7%
Rather on the state	46.8%	44.3%	40.5%	37.4%	31.7%	29.3%	37.2%
Rather on other forces	9.8%	10.1%	9.5%	9.7%	7.6%	8.3%	9.1%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-68: Self-reliance on own achievements vs. dependency on outside forces, by social status

<b>Question:</b> "Does your future depend on your own achievements or on outside forces?"	<b>Social status of respondents:</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Above middle class</b>	<b>Middle class</b>	<b>Below middle class</b>	<b>Dis advantaged group</b>	
Rather on myself	60.4%	58.7%	44.6%	32.0%	53.8%
Rather on the state	28.6%	32.9%	46.3%	56.9%	37.3%
Rather on other forces	11.0%	8.4%	9.1%	11.1%	9.0%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Opinions are diverse among supporters of the different political parties about dependency on one's own achievements or outside influence for shaping their future. DP supporters demonstrate the strongest degree of self-confidence, followed by supporters of the MPP. Many supporters of the MPRP and CWP demonstrate strong dependency on the state or other forces beyond their control (see: Table 7-69).

Table 7-69: Self-reliance on own achievements vs. dependency on outside forces, by party preference)

<b>Question:</b> "Does your future depend on your own achievements or on outside forces?"	<b>Respondents favouring these political parties:</b>				<b>Total (incl. other parties)</b>
	<b>MPP (MPRP before 2012)</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>MPRP</b>	<b>Civic Will - Green Party (old CWP)</b>	
Rather on myself	50.5%	54.5%	45.9%	43.3%	51.6%
Rather on the state	39.9%	36.8%	45.1%	42.9%	39.0%
Rather on other forces	9.6%	8.7%	9.0%	13.8%	9.4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

MPRP supporters are the largest group of respondents who consider themselves losers in society in response to the question: “Due to both just and unjust circumstances in society, there are both winners and losers among the different social groups. In your opinion, to which group do you belong?” More than 50 per cent of MPRP supporters placed themselves into the group of losers while supporters of the other parties were close to the overall average of 47.5 per cent.

Table 7-70: Respondents’ assessment of their own status as winners or losers, by party preference

<b>Question:</b> “Do you consider yourself rather a winner or a loser?”	<b>Respondents favouring these political parties:</b>				<b>Total (incl. supporters of other parties)</b>
	<b>MPP (MPRP before 2012)</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>MPRP</b>	<b>Civic Will - Green Party (old CWP)</b>	
I consider myself rather a loser	46.2%	47.8%	53.5%	47.7%	47.5%
I consider myself rather a winner	10.4%	9.6%	7.8%	10.3%	9.8%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	43.4%	42.7%	38.7%	42.0%	42.7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

The general picture of winners and losers shows some positive development over the past years. In 2008, 51.3 per cent of all respondents considered themselves losers compared with 40.4 per cent in 2016 (see: Table 7-71).


Table 7-71: Self-assessment as a winner or loser

<b>Question:</b> “Do you consider yourself rather a winner or a loser?”	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
I consider myself rather a loser	51.3%	48.7%	49.1%	50.4%	50.2%	47.6%	52.1%	47.8%	40.4%	49.0%
I consider myself rather a winner	10.4%	8.5%	5.2%	7.3%	6.4%	6.4%	7.0%	9.5%	14.5%	7.9%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	38.2%	42.8%	45.7%	42.4%	43.5%	46.0%	41.0%	42.7%	45.2%	43.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016



Figure 7-43: Self-assessment as winner or loser



Comparisons between the age groups and the genders show a picture similar to the previous question on dependencies. Young people see themselves less often as losers as older ones, but there is one remarkable exception: respondents over 60 years old give rather positive opinions of their achievements (see: Table 7-72).

Table 7-72: Self-assessment of status as a winner or loser, by age

Question: "Do you consider yourself rather a winner or a loser?"	Age of respondents:						Total
	18 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 +	
I consider myself rather a loser	39.2%	45.0%	50.2%	53.5%	55.3%	44.7%	49.0%
I consider myself rather a winner	10.8%	7.5%	7.2%	6.5%	6.4%	10.7%	7.9%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	50.1%	47.4%	42.6%	40.0%	38.3%	44.6%	43.2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-73: Self-assessment of status as a winner or loser, by gender

<b>Question:</b> "Do you consider yourself rather a winner or a loser?"	<b>Male respondents</b>	<b>Female respondents</b>	<b>Total</b>
I consider myself rather a loser	50.8%	47.2%	49.0%
I consider myself rather a winner	8.0%	7.8%	7.9%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	41.2%	45.1%	43.2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-74: Self-assessment of status as a winner or loser, by urban or rural residence

<b>Question:</b> "Do you consider yourself rather a winner or a loser?"	<b>Respondents in urban areas</b>	<b>Respondents in rural areas</b>	<b>Total</b>
I consider myself rather a loser	45.5%	51.1%	49.0%
I consider myself rather a winner	8.2%	7.6%	7.9%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	46.2%	41.2%	43.2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Respondents in rural areas have a less positive opinion about their positions than those in urban areas (see: Table 7-74). Criteria such as education, income, and social status show a direct correlation with respondents' opinions regarding themselves as winners or losers (see: Table 7-75, Table 7-76, and Table 7-77).

Table 7-75: Self-assessment as a winner or loser, by education

<b>Question:</b> "Do you consider yourself rather a winner or a loser?"	<b>Education of respondents:</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>low education level</b>	<b>secondary education</b>	<b>higher education</b>	
I consider myself rather a loser	54.9%	49.1%	42.2%	49.0%
I consider myself rather a winner	7.3%	7.5%	9.0%	7.9%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	37.8%	43.4%	48.8%	43.2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-76: Self-assessment as a winner or loser, by income

Question: "Do you consider yourself rather a winner or a loser?"	Estimated annual household income of respondents:						Total
	less than 600000 MNT	600000 - <1.2 m MNT	1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	9.6 m MNT or more	
I consider myself rather a loser	60.2%	57.3%	51.4%	47.6%	44.2%	40.0%	48.9%
I consider myself rather a winner	5.8%	6.5%	8.0%	7.4%	8.0%	11.2%	7.9%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	34.0%	36.2%	40.7%	45.0%	47.8%	48.8%	43.2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-77: Self-assessment as a winner or loser, by social status

Question: "Do you consider yourself rather a winner or a loser?"	Social status of respondents:				Total
	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Dis advantaged group	
I consider myself rather a loser	34.7%	46.4%	56.0%	66.2%	49.1%
I consider myself rather a winner	14.9%	7.8%	5.8%	5.6%	7.8%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	50.4%	45.8%	38.2%	28.2%	43.1%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016


There is growing confidence among people that they will be able to achieve more than their parents' generation did (see: Table 7-78). However, there was a short period between 2012 and 2014 when this positive trend was interrupted. This is clearly seen on Figure 7-44.

Table 7-78: Comparison of own achievements versus parents' achievements

<b>Question:</b> “When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?”	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	28.8%	30.3%	28.0%	27.7%	25.4%	25.8%	29.1%	22.6%	25.1%	26.9%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	43.4%	43.1%	44.5%	38.0%	37.8%	39.1%	41.2%	39.2%	37.2%	40.4%
I will achieve much more than my parents	27.8%	26.7%	27.6%	34.4%	36.8%	35.1%	29.7%	38.1%	37.7%	32.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-44: Comparison of own achievements and achievements of their parents



Again, it is the young generation that is most optimistic about own achievements (see: Table 7-79). Men are marginally more optimistic than women (see: Table 7-80); and urban people a bit more optimistic than respondents in rural areas (see: Table 7-81). The direct correlation between respondents' education, income, and social status can be observed in this question in the same way as in the previous questions (see: Table 7-82, Table 7-83, and Table 7-84).

Table 7-79: Comparison of own achievements versus their parents' achievements, by age group

<b>Question:</b> "When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?"	<b>Age of respondents:</b>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>18 - 24</b>	<b>25 - 29</b>	<b>30 - 39</b>	<b>40 - 49</b>	<b>50 - 59</b>	<b>60 +</b>	
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	17.7%	21.0%	27.4%	31.9%	33.0%	26.2%	26.9%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	29.3%	36.9%	36.4%	40.8%	45.0%	57.9%	40.4%
I will achieve much more than my parents	52.9%	42.1%	36.1%	27.3%	21.9%	15.9%	32.7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-80: Comparison of own achievements versus parents' achievements, by gender

<b>Question:</b> "When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?"	<b>Male respondents</b>	<b>Female respondents</b>	<b>Total</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	26.6%	27.2%	26.9%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	40.0%	40.7%	40.4%
I will achieve much more than my parents	33.4%	32.1%	32.7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-81: Comparison of own achievements versus parents' achievements, by area of residence

<b>Question:</b> "When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?"	<b>Respon-</b> <b>dents in</b> <b>urban areas</b>	<b>Respon-</b> <b>dents in</b> <b>rural areas</b>	<b>Total</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	26.5%	27.2%	26.9%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	37.7%	42.0%	40.4%
I will achieve much more than my parents	35.8%	30.7%	32.7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-82: Comparison of own achievements versus parents' achievements, by level of education

<b>Question:</b> "When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?"	<b>Education of respondents:</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>low educa-</b> <b>tion level</b>	<b>secondary</b> <b>education</b>	<b>higher</b> <b>education</b>	
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	31.4%	26.2%	23.4%	26.9%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	45.0%	41.1%	34.2%	40.4%
I will achieve much more than my parents	23.6%	32.7%	42.4%	32.7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-83: Comparison of own achievements versus parents' achievements, by income

<b>Question:</b> "When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?"	<b>Estimated annual household income of respondents:</b>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>less</b> <b>than</b> <b>600000</b> <b>MNT</b>	<b>600000</b> <b>- &lt;1.2 m</b> <b>MNT</b>	<b>1.2 m</b> <b>MNT</b> <b>- &lt;2.4 m</b> <b>MNT</b>	<b>2.4 m</b> <b>MNT -</b> <b>&lt;4.8 m</b> <b>MNT</b>	<b>4.8 m</b> <b>MNT -</b> <b>&lt;9.6 m</b> <b>MNT</b>	<b>9.6 m</b> <b>MNT or</b> <b>more</b>	
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	39.5%	31.8%	28.5%	24.9%	24.2%	20.5%	26.7%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	39.8%	44.3%	45.1%	42.0%	37.0%	31.9%	40.5%
I will achieve much more than my parents	20.6%	23.9%	26.4%	33.1%	38.8%	47.5%	32.8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-84: Comparison of own achievements versus parents' achievements, by social status

<b>Question:</b> "When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?"	<b>Social status of respondents:</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Above middle class</b>	<b>Middle class</b>	<b>Below middle class</b>	<b>Dis advantaged group</b>	
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	23.1%	24.4%	29.7%	44.4%	26.9%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	30.5%	40.5%	45.4%	38.0%	40.4%
I will achieve much more than my parents	46.4%	35.2%	24.9%	17.6%	32.7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

When comparing the opinions of supporters of different political parties, supporters of the Democratic Party have the "most optimistic approach" to their ability to achieve more than parents' generations. The MPRP and CWP's supporters have the least confidence that they will achieve more (see: Table 7-85).

Table 7-85: Comparison of own achievements versus parents' achievements, by party preference

<b>Question:</b> "When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?"	<b>Respondents favouring these political parties:</b>				<b>Total (incl. other parties)</b>
	<b>MPP (MPRP before 2012)</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>MPRP</b>	<b>Civic Will - Green Party (old CWP)</b>	
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	27.9%	25.3%	28.5%	28.5%	26.8%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	46.8%	39.0%	44.6%	39.1%	42.8%
I will achieve much more than my parents	25.4%	35.8%	26.9%	32.3%	30.4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Closely related to the three questions above is the issue of how much help respondents expect from the state to solve their problems. The trend is less reliance and expectations on government. The number of respondents who said they "don't need any help" fell from 24.3 per cent in 2008 to 17.9 per cent in 2016, while the number of people who responded "I don't expect anything from the government" almost doubled from 15.7 per cent during the same


period (see: Table 7-86).

Table 7-86: Expectation of help from the state to solve individuals' problems

<b>Question:</b> "Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?"	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
I don't need any help	24.3%	10.2%	8.4%	8.2%	14.7%	13.8%	16.4%	16.4%	17.9%	14.6%
I need help only to find a job	32.4%	31.2%	32.7%	30.0%	27.9%	23.9%	25.3%	20.7%	25.8%	28.3%
I need financial support	27.6%	36.7%	35.6%	32.9%	35.6%	32.4%	33.0%	28.9%	28.2%	33.2%
I don't expect anything from the government	15.7%	22.0%	23.3%	29.0%	21.9%	29.8%	25.3%	34.0%	28.1%	23.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 7-45: Expectations from the state to solve individuals' problems





When comparing the opinions of age groups, the trend is respondents need more financial support, as they grow older. However, at the same time, they expect less help from the state (see: Table 7 -87). The need for help to find a job is, naturally, greater among young people than those who are close to or beyond the retirement age.

Table 7-87: Expectations from the state to solve individuals’ problems, by age groups

<b>Question:</b> “Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?”	<b>Age of respondents:</b>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>18 - 24</b>	<b>25 - 29</b>	<b>30 - 39</b>	<b>40 - 49</b>	<b>50 - 59</b>	<b>60 +</b>	
I don’t need any help	13.9%	16.0%	14.4%	13.9%	14.4%	16.4%	14.6%
I need help only to find a job	37.4%	34.0%	31.2%	28.0%	24.4%	11.6%	28.3%
I need financial support	27.1%	26.2%	30.4%	35.8%	36.5%	44.3%	33.2%
I don’t expect anything from the government	21.7%	23.7%	24.1%	22.2%	24.7%	27.8%	23.8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Responses from male and female respondents do not differ much for this issue, as seen in earlier questions (see: Table 7-88). The disillusionment that nothing can be expected from the government is somewhat greater among people in urban areas than rural areas (see: Table 7-89).

Table 7-88: Expectations from the state to solve individuals’ problems, by gender

<b>Question:</b> “Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?”	<b>Male respondents</b>	<b>Female respondents</b>	<b>Total</b>
I don’t need any help	16.1%	13.3%	14.6%
I need help only to find a job	26.9%	29.7%	28.3%
I need financial support	32.3%	34.0%	33.2%
I don’t expect anything from the government	24.7%	23.0%	23.8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-89: Expectations from the state to solve individuals' problems (by area of residence)

<b>Question:</b> "Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?"	<b>Respondents in urban areas</b>	<b>Respondents in rural areas</b>	<b>Total</b>
I don't need any help	14.5%	14.7%	14.6%
I need help only to find a job	25.2%	30.3%	28.3%
I need financial support	32.3%	33.8%	33.2%
I don't expect anything from the government	28.0%	21.2%	23.8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Once more, it can clearly be stated that with greater levels of education, income, or social status, people need less help and also expect less support from the government.

Table 7-90: Expectations from the state to solve individuals' problems, by education

<b>Question:</b> "Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?"	<b>Education of respondents:</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>low education level</b>	<b>secondary education</b>	<b>higher education</b>	
I don't need any help	12.3%	13.9%	18.5%	14.6%
I need help only to find a job	31.2%	30.4%	21.7%	28.3%
I need financial support	37.5%	32.4%	29.9%	33.2%
I don't expect anything from the government	19.0%	23.4%	29.9%	23.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-91: Expectations from the state to solve individuals' problems, by income

<b>Question:</b> "Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?"	<b>Estimated annual household income of respondents:</b>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>less than 600000 MNT</b>	<b>600000 - &lt;1.2 m MNT</b>	<b>1.2 m MNT - &lt;2.4 m MNT</b>	<b>2.4 m MNT - &lt;4.8 m MNT</b>	<b>4.8 m MNT - &lt;9.6 m MNT</b>	<b>9.6 m MNT or more</b>	
I don't need any help	9.0%	9.7%	11.3%	14.9%	17.5%	23.1%	14.6%
I need help only to find a job	43.1%	38.9%	30.2%	27.3%	22.7%	17.6%	28.3%
I need financial support	30.6%	35.2%	37.3%	33.7%	30.9%	27.7%	33.2%
I don't expect anything from the government	17.4%	16.2%	21.2%	24.1%	28.9%	31.6%	23.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-92: Expectations from the state to solve individuals' problems, by social status

<b>Question:</b> "Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?"	<b>Social status of respondents:</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>Above middle class</b>	<b>Middle class</b>	<b>Below middle class</b>	<b>Dis advantaged group</b>	
I don't need any help	25.6%	16.1%	8.6%	7.7%	14.7%
I need help only to find a job	24.6%	26.5%	31.5%	37.8%	28.3%
I need financial support	25.9%	32.0%	38.3%	38.9%	33.3%
I don't expect anything from the government	23.8%	25.5%	21.6%	15.6%	23.7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Correlating respondents' party preferences with their expectations from government draws a mixed picture. Supporters of the MPP are among those who need the least help, even for finding employment. However, they do say that they need financial support. Finding a job seems to be a more pressing problem for DP and CWP supporters (see: Table 7-93).

Table 7-93: Expectations from the state to solve individuals' problems, by party preference

<b>Question:</b> "Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?"	<b>Respondents favouring these political parties:</b>				<b>Total (incl. other parties)</b>
	<b>MPP (MPRP before 2012)</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>MPRP</b>	<b>Civic Will - Green Party (old CWP)</b>	
I don't need any help	15.6%	14.8%	14.6%	11.0%	15.0%
I need help only to find a job	26.4%	31.0%	26.5%	33.5%	28.8%
I need financial support	37.7%	33.8%	34.7%	29.8%	35.4%
I don't expect anything from the government	20.3%	20.4%	24.1%	25.7%	20.9%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

The four questions observed in this sub-section of analysis are closely linked to each other and show how much the respondents rely on themselves or the state. The following tables conclude this analysis with some cross tabulations of the four different issues considered here.

Table 7-94: Cross tabulation: reliance on own achievement / expectation of assistance from the state

		<b><i>What do you think; does your future depend on your own achievements, the State, or on other forces (like churches, trade unions, firms, the press, TV/radio, communities, business relations), that could influence the economy?</i></b>			
		Rather on myself	Rather on the state	Rather on other sources	Total
<b><i>Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?</i></b>	I don't need any help	18.6%	10.9%	11.0%	15.1%
	I need help only to find a job	27.5%	29.0%	30.7%	28.4%
	I need financial support	29.2%	38.2%	33.3%	32.9%
	I don't expect anything from the government	24.7%	21.9%	25.0%	23.7%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-95: Cross tabulation: reliance on own achievement / comparison with achievements of parents' generation

		<b><i>What do you think; does your future depend on your own achievements, the State, or on other forces (like churches, trade unions, firms, the press, TV/radio, communities, business relations), that could influence the economy?</i></b>			
		Rather on myself	Rather on the state	Rather on other sources	Total
<b><i>When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?</i></b>	My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	23.3%	30.5%	25.8%	26.2%
	There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	35.7%	45.9%	45.1%	40.3%
	I will achieve much more than my parents	41.0%	23.6%	29.1%	33.5%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-96: Cross tabulation: self-judgement of winners and losers / comparison with achievements of parents' generation

		<b><i>Due to both just and unjust circumstances in society, there are both winners and losers among the different social groups. In your opinion, to which group do you belong?</i></b>			
		I consider myself rather a loser	I consider myself rather a winner	Spontaneous: sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	Total
<b><i>When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?</i></b>	My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	32.6%	20.3%	23.0%	27.5%
	There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	40.6%	41.2%	41.8%	41.1%
	I will achieve much more than my parents	26.8%	38.5%	35.2%	31.4%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Table 7-97: Cross tabulation: self-judgement of winners and losers / expectation of assistance from the state

		<b><i>Due to both just and unjust circumstances in society, there are both winners and losers among the different social groups. In your opinion, to which group do you belong?</i></b>			
		I consider myself rather a loser	I consider myself rather a winner	Spontaneous: sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	Total
<b><i>Do you expect help from the state in solving your problems?</i></b>	I don't need any help	12.7%	21.8%	14.8%	14.3%
	I need help only to find a job	30.5%	26.1%	27.1%	28.7%
	I need financial support	35.4%	29.7%	32.6%	33.8%
	I don't expect anything from the government	21.4%	22.4%	25.5%	23.2%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

## 7.4 Income Distribution

### 7.4.1 Development of household incomes and relative income distribution, 2013-2016

The average household incomes of respondents reported to SMF polls increased from an estimated 7.1 million tugrik in April 2013 to 9.2 million tugrik in March 2016. Table 7-98 provides a breakdown of incomes, with people who earned less than 60 per cent of the average income considered as relatively poor. An income of more than 150 per cent of the average income is labelled as relatively rich<sup>24</sup>.

Table 7-98: Estimated annual household income

	<i>Estimated annual household income</i>			
	<i>April 2013</i>	<i>April 2014</i>	<i>March 2015</i>	<i>March 2016</i>
People whose income is less than 60 % of average	less than 4.2 million MNT	less than 4.4 million MNT	less than 5.2 million MNT	less than 5.5 million MNT
People whose income is below average, but more than 60 % of average	between 4.2 and 7.1 million MNT	between 4.4 and 7.4 million MNT	between 5.2 and 8.8 million MNT	between 5.5 and 9.2 million MNT
<b>Median household income (within poll samples)</b>	<b>7.1 million MNT</b>	<b>7.4 million MNT</b>	<b>8.8 million MNT</b>	<b>9.2 million MNT</b>
People whose income is above average, but less than 150 % of average	between 7.1 and 10.6 million MNT	between 7.4 and 11.1 million MNT	between 8.8 and 13.2 million MNT	between 9.2 and 13.8 million MNT
People whose income is more than 150 % of average	more than 10.6 million MNT	more than 11.1 million MNT	more than 13.2 million MNT	more than 13.8 million MNT

*Source: SMF database, 2013-2016*

The number of respondents included within the two groups at each end of the income scale decreased in numbers between 2013 and 2016. On the other hand, the middle-income groups that cover the range of incomes between 60 and 150 per cent of average increased (see: Table 7-99 and Figure 7-38).

24 This method of grouping people by income has been borrowed from international studies that commonly define the “at-risk-of-poverty threshold” as 60 per cent of median disposable income. The threshold of “Relative Wealth” is 150 per cent. This sorting of income data can, however, only be applied to surveys in the years 2013 to 2016 because in earlier years no precise income figures were mentioned in questionnaires. Instead respondents only placed themselves into income ranges.

Table 7-99: Relative distribution of income

	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
People whose income is less than 60 % of average	38%	31%	34%	32%
People whose income is below average, but more than 60 % of average	25%	34%	29%	31%
People whose income is above average, but less than 150 % of average	19%	18%	21%	24%
People whose income is more than 150 % of average	18%	17%	16%	13%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF database, 2013-2016

Figure 7-46: Relative distribution of income



This expansion of the middle-income groups can be interpreted as a reduction of inequality for income distribution. Fewer people could be placed in the extremely poor and extremely rich categories in 2016 than in 2013. Meanwhile, middle-income groups grew. At the same time, absolute incomes increased by close to 30 per cent during the observation period, which is an annual increase of approximately 7.5 per cent.

The following Figures show how relative incomes have developed in different areas, or for different groups in society.

Of particular interest is the development in Ulaanbaatar. In 2013, about 20 per cent of the population had incomes of less than 60 per cent of the average; 50 per cent of people were in the middle-income groups, covering the range between 60 and 150 per cent of the

25 Inequality is a broader concept than poverty because it covers the entire population, rather than only the poor. In the following section, 7.4.2, some other indicators on inequality are shown.

average; and 30 per cent of respondents could be considered relatively rich because their incomes were more than 150 per cent of the average. In 2016, the group below 60 per cent of the average remained more or less the same, but the two middle groups increased and fewer people earned more than 150 per cent of the average.

Rural areas also experienced a slight improvement, but there are still large sections of society with incomes of less than 60 per cent of average.

Figure 7-47: Development of incomes, by place of residence




The level of education plays exactly the role one would expect. People with high education are stronger represented in the groups with high income. Meanwhile, the less educated respondents (with only primary school or no formal education) fall mainly into the lowest income group.

Some improvements are observed between 2013 and 2016. The middle-income groups become stronger, and there are fewer people in the lowest-income bracket, which reflects the general development seen since the beginning of this upward trend, in 2013.




Figure 7-48: Development of incomes of groups, by education



After dividing the sample population into different social groups, the Above Middle Class looks to develop quite differently from the rest of the population. The number of respondents at the top income group increases considerably, while the lowest income group mainly reduces in size. The middle-income group does not grow much. For the highest-ranking social group at the top of the social scale, the level of inequality is about the same. Meanwhile, the richest group grows comparatively in the same way (see: Figure 7-49).

Inequality shrank for the Middle Class and the Below Middle Class because both the highest and the lowest income groups contracted while the two middle-income groups expanded between 2013 and 2016. The Disadvantaged Group only slightly changed. It is noteworthy that the reduction in size of the highest-income earners outpaced that of the lowest income group. Although, the middle-income group’s situation perhaps did not improve at all, it grew in size slightly.

Figure 7-49: Development of incomes of groups, by social status




When contemplating the development within the private and public sectors, again there is only one group where the highest income earners outweigh any improvement in lower income ranges. State officers in 2016 were even more privileged than in 2013, and their income trend was far ahead of the common developments in the country (see: Figure 7-50).

For employees in the state service, the growth was mainly in the middle-income range (between the average and 150 per cent of the average), but also there was a slight rise in the percentage of respondents in the lowest-income group. The number of respondents in the income group earning more than 150 per cent of the average shrank considerably.

The comparison of workers in the public and private sector shows that both started more or less at the same level, but the lowest-income group scaled down more dramatically than private-sector workers.

Figure 7-50: Development of incomes and comparison of public versus private sectors




Another interesting issue is the income trends of the intelligentsia (see: Figure 7-51). Their privileged position is surely dwindling. While nearly 50 per cent of people in this category received more than 150 per cent of the average income in 2013, this number fell to less than 30 per cent in 2016. However, the lowest income group did not change at all.

For the self-employed, the development of income was also slightly negative because the highest-income groups shrank in size less than the lowest income group. Although there was some growth of the middle-income groups, there was a slight overall shift to the lower income groups.

For nomads, the situation improved slightly, although the majority of respondents were still in the lowest income group.


Figure 7-51: Development of incomes, by type of employment



For pensioners, the income development was moderate growth in the middle-income group (see: Figure 7-52).

For unemployed people, the situation worsened between 2013 and 2016. There may have been slightly less inequality in 2016, but the general level of incomes was down and the number of respondents in the lowest group was increasing.

Figure 7-52: Development of incomes, by retired and unemployed respondents



## 7.4.2 Income Inequality / Income by deciles

The simplest measurement of inequality sorts the population from poorest to richest and shows the percentage of expenditure (or income) attributable to each fifth (quintile) or tenth (decile) of the population. The poorest quintile typically accounts for 6 to 10 per cent of all expenditure, the top quintile for 35 to 50 per cent<sup>26</sup>.

The income data collected by the Sant Maral Foundation between 2013 and 2016 largely matches the ranges mentioned by the World Bank: The lowest quintile accounted for 4.9 to 5.7 per cent of all incomes; the highest quintile between 43.9 and 46.5 per cent (see: Table 7-100).

At the bottom of Table 7-100 is the “Decile Dispersion Ratio” and “Quintile Dispersion Ratio”, defined as the income of the richest decile (or quintile) divided by that of the poorest decile or quintile.

These are popular but rather crude measures of inequality. However, both show that there was some improvement in 2014 over 2013. There was a reversal of this trend in 2015, followed by returned improvement in 2016. These figures are, however, based on survey data only and may not be representative for Mongolia’s total population.

Table 7-100: Income distribution by deciles and quintiles

	2013		2014		2015		2016	
	deciles	quin-tiles	deciles	quin-tiles	deciles	quin-tiles	deciles	quin-tiles
lowest 10 %	1.8%	4.9%	2.0%	5.7%	1.5%	5.0%	2.0%	5.7%
2nd 10 %	3.2%		3.6%		3.5%		3.6%	
3rd 10 %	4.7%	10.3%	5.0%	11.4%	5.0%	11.1%	5.1%	11.4%
4th 10 %	5.7%		6.4%		6.1%		6.4%	
5th 10 %	7.1%	15.5%	7.4%	16.1%	7.1%	15.7%	7.3%	15.9%
6th 10 %	8.5%		8.7%		8.6%		8.6%	
7th 10 %	10.1%	22.8%	10.3%	23.0%	10.4%	23.1%	10.2%	22.1%
8th 10 %	12.7%		12.7%		12.7%		11.9%	
9th 10 %	15.8%	46.5%	15.6%	43.9%	15.3%	45.1%	14.2%	45.0%
highest 10 %	30.7%		28.3%		29.8%		30.8%	
“Decile Dispersion Ratio”	17.1		14.2		19.9		15.4	
“Decile Dispersion Ratio”		9.5		7.7		9.0		7.9

Source: SMF database, 2013-2016

26 See: World Bank; Handbook on Poverty and Inequality [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IN-TPA/Resources/429966-1259774805724/Poverty\\_Inequality\\_Handbook\\_Ch06.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IN-TPA/Resources/429966-1259774805724/Poverty_Inequality_Handbook_Ch06.pdf)

The income distribution by deciles in 2013-2016 is also shown in Figure 7-53.

Figure 7-53: Income distribution by deciles




Table 7-101 shows the changes of income distribution by deciles in 2013 and 2016, separately, without the data for the years in between. More equality is apparent because all lower-income sectors up to the 7th deciles have improved, and the share of total income


earned by the 8th and 9th decile shrank.

Table 7-101: Change of income distribution, by deciles (2013 and 2016)

	<b>Deciles:</b>									
	<b>low-est 10 %</b>	<b>2nd 10 %</b>	<b>3rd 10 %</b>	<b>4th 10 %</b>	<b>5th 10 %</b>	<b>6th 10 %</b>	<b>7th 10 %</b>	<b>8th 10 %</b>	<b>9th 10 %</b>	<b>high-est 10 %</b>
2013	1.8%	3.2%	4.7%	5.7%	7.1%	8.5%	10.1%	12.7%	15.8%	30.7%
2016	2.0%	3.6%	5.1%	6.4%	7.3%	8.6%	10.2%	11.9%	14.2%	30.8%
Change between 2013 and 2016	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.7%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	-0.8%	-1.6%	0.1%

Source: SMF database, 2013-2016

Figure 7-54: Change of income distribution by deciles (2013 and 2016)



# 8

## TRENDS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OUTSIDE WORLD

### 8.1 Favourite Foreign Partners

The Sant Maral Foundation for the past two decades has included in its opinion polls questions about people’s attitudes toward foreign countries. The question first introduced in 1997 was phrased: “Which country is the best partner for Mongolia?” The results of total 67,000 interviews conducted between 1997 and 2016 are as follows:<sup>27</sup>

Russia .....	65.7%
China .....	18.6%
USA.....	31.6%
Other Western Countries (includes the European Union).....	10.7%
Japan .....	25.1%
South Korea .....	11.8%

This summary of results provides only a general idea of which countries are considered Mongolia’s most suitable partners. Over the years, there have been some considerable changes affecting all of these countries’ popularity. Comparing the data from 1997-2007 (which may be considered part of Mongolia’s political and economic transition period) and 2008-2016 shows that both of Mongolia’s immediate neighbours, Russia and China, gained popularity among respondents in the latter period. Meanwhile, Western countries such as the USA became less attractive. Support for Japan and South Korea trended the same way (see Table 8-1)<sup>28</sup>.

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27 Respondents could name up to two countries. Therefore, the total will add up to more than 100 per cent. The analysis focuses on the six countries (or group of countries) mentioned most often.

28 The distinction between the two different periods of 1997-2007 and 2008-2016 is the fact that the questionnaire was changed in 2008, and some new questions were introduced. With some justification, the year 2007 could be considered the end of the transition period, as was stated earlier parts in this study.

Some standard questions relating to foreign relations have, however, remained the same throughout 1997-2016, as shown from the results present from the entire two-decade period.




Table 8-1: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia during and after the country’s economic and political transition

	<b>1997-2007</b>	<b>2008-2016</b>
Russia	61.5%	73.1%
China	16.5%	22.4%
USA	33.5%	28.2%
other Western Countries	10.5%	11.1%
Japan	27.5%	20.8%
South Korea	12.0%	11.4%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 8-1: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia during and after the country’s economic and political transition



The changing attitudes toward particular countries becomes even more evident when looking at the results on a year-by-year basis (see: Table 8-2).

Table 8-2: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, year-by-year (including most popular countries as responses)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Russia	45.0%	54.1%	63.4%	62.6%	64.8%	63.9%	62.5%	68.0%	62.7%	56.6%
China	6.2%	11.7%	14.2%	13.2%	12.5%	17.2%	18.9%	21.6%	16.3%	16.7%
USA	29.4%	24.0%	30.3%	22.1%	26.5%	36.2%	33.3%	32.2%	40.9%	42.0%
other Western Countries	30.5%	27.5%	32.3%	8.1%	4.7%	8.0%	8.5%	7.4%	8.4%	6.8%
Japan	20.6%	10.5%	28.3%	20.3%	24.0%	33.5%	33.6%	27.3%	28.3%	31.3%
South Korea	5.4%	2.0%	6.7%	3.1%	10.7%	13.4%	15.4%	14.7%	13.2%	15.7%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Russia	57.3%	67.8%	75.0%	75.0%	71.3%	70.3%	71.9%	76.8%	78.1%	81.4%
China	17.7%	20.8%	24.7%	20.8%	20.6%	20.2%	23.8%	23.8%	26.9%	26.6%
USA	40.5%	35.0%	33.1%	28.9%	29.8%	29.4%	26.1%	23.7%	17.6%	17.1%
other Western Countries	7.3%	12.3%	8.4%	12.3%	11.5%	12.5%	11.1%	8.7%	7.6%	10.7%
Japan	29.8%	24.4%	20.0%	16.0%	21.0%	21.3%	22.6%	20.4%	21.3%	19.6%
South Korea	13.3%	13.8%	12.6%	10.1%	12.1%	11.2%	10.1%	12.0%	9.2%	11.2%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016


Figure 8-2 depicts very clearly some trends that were characteristic for the time shortly after Mongolia’s political opening to the Western world and the gradual changes that took place in the following two decades:

- Russia – more than a “partner” for seven decades before Mongolia’s peaceful revolution, Russia was at the lowest point of its popularity among Mongolians at the beginning of Sant Maral Foundation’s surveys in 1997. Thereafter, an increasingly more pragmatic attitude toward Russia seems to take hold. There was a short-lived decline in popularity between 2004 and 2006, but by the year 2016, Russia’s appeal to Mongolians had reached its peak.  
Visits by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2000 and 2014 boosted his popularity in Mongolia, as well as Russia’s. In 2015, Mongolians rated Putin the highest among the world’s foreign leaders in the “Gallup International” worldwide survey.
- Mongolians’ traditionally reserved attitude towards China also hit its lowest point in 1997. Thereafter, however, the feelings Mongolians felt toward China gradually improved, and by 2016 it had moved from one of the lowest-ranked spots to the second best “partner”, according to respondents’ opinion.
- The USA and other Western countries (including the European Union) were very popular in 1997. There appears to be some enthusiasm for closer relations with these countries that used to be “enemies”, when Mongolia was part of the socialist block. However, this enthusiasm gradually wore down over the two decades under

observation. The Western European countries in particular seem to drastically lose their attractiveness among Mongolians after 1999. This timeline falls together with the timing of when the Democratic Union Coalition’s first term ended, and the MPRP returned to power.

- Japan and South Korea appear to have retained some appeal among Mongolians. South Korea may have gained some popularity because of the large number of migrant workers who moved there.

Figure 8-2: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, year-by-year



More details to each country are shown in Section 8.4 of this chapter. In this present section, analysis continues with a look at the attitudes of specific groups toward countries.

The picture of attitudes of young and old respondents shows a direct and very clear correlation: There is increasing popularity for Russia and China as age increases; and the opposite effect applies to all other countries.

Table 8-3: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by age of respondents

	<i>Age of respondents:</i>						<i>All re- spondents</i>
	<i>18 - 24</i>	<i>25 - 29</i>	<i>30 - 39</i>	<i>40 - 49</i>	<i>50 - 59</i>	<i>60 +</i>	
Russia	50.9%	58.3%	64.7%	69.6%	77.4%	83.5%	65.7%
China	12.9%	13.9%	17.0%	19.7%	25.6%	29.2%	18.6%
USA	38.6%	36.4%	32.8%	30.7%	23.9%	20.1%	31.6%
Other Western Countries	15.1%	13.5%	10.7%	8.9%	8.0%	6.0%	10.7%
Japan	29.0%	26.3%	25.7%	25.1%	21.3%	18.9%	25.1%
South Korea	14.9%	13.5%	12.3%	11.4%	8.6%	6.7%	11.8%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 8-3: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by age (1<sup>st</sup> part)





Figure 8-4: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by age, (2<sup>nd</sup> part)




Gender plays some role in this issue. Women are marginally less in support of Russia but noticeably less in support of China as best partners. Their attitudes towards other countries are only slightly different to the opinion of men.

Table 8-4: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by gender

	<i>Male respondents</i>	<i>Female respondents</i>	<i>All respondents</i>
Russia	66.8%	64.6%	65.7%
China	21.6%	15.7%	18.6%
USA	30.3%	32.9%	31.6%
other Western Countries	10.1%	11.3%	10.7%
Japan	25.6%	24.6%	25.1%
South Korea	10.1%	13.4%	11.8%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 8-5: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by gender



Respondents’ areas of residence are account for major differences in opinions. People living outside of Ulaanbaatar are much stronger inclined to name Russia as the best partner for Mongolia, while people in the capital city are more open toward other countries as well. Western countries other than the USA find hardly any support in rural areas, but South Korea is more attractive in rural areas than in Ulaanbaatar. This is probably because labour from rural areas migrates towards that country and makes it better known than other far-away countries (see: Table 8-5).

Table 8-5: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by area of residence

	<i>Respondents in Ulaanbaatar</i>	<i>Respondents in aimags</i>	<i>All respondents</i>
Russia	59.0%	72.3%	65.7%
China	18.9%	18.3%	18.6%
USA	34.3%	29.0%	31.6%
other Western Countries	14.4%	7.1%	10.7%
Japan	26.3%	23.9%	25.1%
South Korea	10.7%	12.8%	11.8%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 8-6: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by area of residence




Table 8-6 is a tabulation of responses from each aimag for the entirety of the 1997-2016 period. It should, however, be noted that not all aimags were included in every survey conducted during this period. The first surveys outside Ulaanbaatar that included questions concerning the best foreign partners were conducted in 2000. From then on, between six and twelve aimags were usually included in the samples.

Table 8-6: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, for each aimag

	<i>Russia</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>USA</i>	<i>Other Western countries</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>South Korea</i>
Arkhangai	74.1%	16.5%	34.1%	9.4%	20.5%	14.0%
Bayan-Ulgii	72.6%	24.9%	19.9%	2.0%	14.4%	3.0%
Bayankhongor	74.1%	13.7%	21.5%	4.5%	21.0%	10.6%
Bulgan	77.1%	24.0%	26.8%	6.3%	23.6%	7.1%
Govi-Altai	65.3%	11.1%	36.1%	13.9%	29.2%	9.7%
Dornogovi	70.6%	14.8%	30.5%	6.2%	26.3%	16.4%
Dornod	73.4%	16.8%	30.9%	7.3%	21.7%	10.9%
Dundgovi	81.6%	19.3%	23.3%	7.6%	15.3%	10.9%
Zavkhan	81.4%	18.5%	31.5%	5.8%	16.5%	10.0%
Uvurkhangai	68.2%	20.2%	27.4%	7.0%	23.7%	14.7%
Umnugovi	59.6%	19.2%	38.3%	10.1%	25.8%	16.0%
Sukhbaatar	74.9%	17.8%	27.1%	6.6%	27.4%	14.7%
Selenge	72.7%	20.9%	29.6%	8.2%	23.5%	13.1%
Tuv	72.5%	15.0%	33.0%	11.2%	25.1%	13.6%
Uvs	75.5%	21.6%	25.6%	5.1%	27.9%	13.8%
Khovd	70.7%	18.4%	28.1%	6.9%	24.9%	13.0%
Khuvsgul	72.4%	17.3%	28.1%	8.2%	20.6%	10.4%
Khentii	69.8%	16.8%	31.5%	4.5%	30.1%	10.5%
Govisumber	65.2%	14.5%	39.1%	10.1%	24.6%	15.9%
Orkhon *)	64.6%	21.9%	28.4%	10.7%	27.5%	18.8%
Darkhan Uul *)	68.4%	22.2%	22.2%	12.7%	20.3%	8.2%
Ulaanbaatar	58.9%	18.8%	34.5%	14.5%	26.3%	10.6%
Total	65.7%	18.6%	31.6%	10.7%	25.1%	11.8%
*) Darkhan Uul was included in Orkhon during 1997-2007						

Source: SMF database, 2000-2016

When analysing the data related to Russia and China separately in Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2, respectively, further consideration is made for how aimags close to the borders of Mongolia think about their neighbouring countries.


The education of respondents can be considered a major factor influencing the choice of foreign countries as best partners for Mongolia. People with higher education are more open to countries like the USA and Japan, but they also accept China much more than respondents with low education (see: Table 8-7)

Table 8-7: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by education

	<i>Respondents with low education level</i>	<i>Respondents with secondary education</i>	<i>Respondents with higher education</i>	<i>All respondents</i>
Russia	69.8%	65.1%	63.3%	65.7%
China	15.2%	16.8%	23.6%	18.6%
USA	27.6%	31.2%	35.3%	31.6%
Other Western Countries	8.8%	11.2%	11.5%	10.7%
Japan	21.9%	25.1%	27.4%	25.1%
South Korea	13.9%	12.6%	9.1%	11.8%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 8-7: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by education



The close correlation between education and occupation shows the preferences of various groups. Respondents belonging to the intelligentsia are more open to a partnership with the USA than, for example, nomads or farmers (the column “All respondents” in Table 8-8 includes also respondents with occupations not mentioned in the selected groups, e.g. pensioners, housewives, etc.).



Table 8-8: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by occupation

	<i>Workers</i>	<i>Clerical staff</i>	<i>Self-employed</i>	<i>Nomads / farmers</i>	<i>Intelligentsia</i>	<i>All respondents</i>
Russia	65.9%	63.1%	63.6%	74.6%	63.0%	65.7%
China	15.8%	20.6%	18.4%	15.5%	23.1%	18.6%
USA	31.1%	32.7%	33.8%	26.0%	37.8%	31.6%
Other Western Countries	10.7%	13.0%	9.8%	7.0%	9.5%	10.7%
Japan	24.9%	26.2%	26.3%	21.3%	30.0%	25.1%
South Korea	14.0%	9.7%	13.2%	14.1%	9.4%	11.8%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 8-8: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by occupation (1<sup>st</sup> part)





Figure 8-9: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by occupation (2<sup>nd</sup> part)



Respondents' social statuses do not seem to play a major role in their choice of the foreign countries that is the best partner for Mongolia. Table 8-9 shows the similarity of opinions in most social groups. Only the "Above Middle Class" is clearly less in favour of Russia and more inclined toward the USA than any other group.

Table 8-9: Countries considered "best partners" for Mongolia, by social status

	<i>Above middle class</i>	<i>Middle class</i>	<i>Below middle class</i>	<i>Dis-advan-taged group</i>	<i>All respondents</i>
Russia	60.6%	66.7%	66.5%	65.9%	65.7%
China	18.0%	19.5%	19.4%	16.4%	18.6%
USA	35.2%	31.3%	30.8%	31.8%	31.6%
other Western Countries	11.3%	10.0%	10.6%	10.2%	10.7%
Japan	26.4%	24.8%	24.7%	24.8%	25.1%
South Korea	13.1%	11.9%	11.6%	10.8%	11.8%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 8-10: Countries considered "best partners" for Mongolia, by social status (1<sup>st</sup> part)





Figure 8-11: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by social status (2<sup>nd</sup> part)



Respondents that belong to non-government organisations (NGOs) show strong preferences for the USA, which may be related to the fact that NGO activities are partly funded by that country. Both Russia and China are least attractive to respondents in the NGO-sector.

Table 8-10: Comparison of responses for countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by public or private employment

	<i>State officers</i>	<i>State service</i>	<i>Private / mixed sector</i>	<i>NGO</i>	<i>All* respondents</i>
Russia	66.2%	66.4%	65.7%	58.6%	65.7%
China	22.9%	18.9%	18.8%	16.2%	18.6%
USA	33.1%	32.3%	32.3%	37.6%	31.6%
other Western Countries	11.2%	10.5%	10.7%	10.6%	10.7%
Japan	24.9%	26.3%	25.1%	29.3%	25.1%
South Korea	8.7%	10.9%	12.7%	12.7%	11.8%

\*All includes respondents not listed by sector

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 8-12: Comparison of responses for countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia (1<sup>st</sup> part)





Figure 8-13: Comparison of responses for countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia (2<sup>nd</sup> part)



Respondents who consider themselves supporters of specific political parties show distinct preferences. MPP supporters, as well as those of the MPRP to an even larger degree, favour Russia as the best partner. These respondents also name China as the best potential partner, slightly more often than is average.

Supporters of the DP and CWP are more open toward the USA and Japan, in addition to South Korea (see: Table 8-11).

Table 8-11: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by favourite party

	<i>Supporters of MPP (before 2012: MPRP)</i>	<i>Supporters of DP</i>	<i>Supporters of (new) MPRP</i>	<i>Supporters of Civic Will - Green P</i>	<i>All respondents (incl. those favouring other or no parties)</i>
Russia	71.8%	58.0%	81.5%	58.1%	65.7%
China	19.0%	16.5%	21.0%	17.0%	18.6%
USA	27.4%	37.5%	20.5%	39.6%	31.6%
other Western Countries	8.9%	11.5%	8.0%	10.6%	10.7%
Japan	23.7%	27.9%	20.3%	33.5%	25.1%
South Korea	11.2%	13.4%	10.0%	14.5%	11.8%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Figure 8-14: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by favourite party (1<sup>st</sup> part)





Figure 8-15: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by favourite party (2<sup>nd</sup> part)



Political orientation is described in Chapter 6 of this study, where “Traditionalists” and “Sovereign Democrats” are identified as leaning strongly toward Russia as the best partner. The preference for Russia is also a major distinguishing factor between “Progressive Liberals” and “Passive Liberals”. The Passive Liberals have strong preferences for Russia while Progressive Liberals instead chose the USA and Japan as partners. The data in Table 8-12 exclusively refers to polls in 2008-2015 because only responses from that period were used for the classification of different political orientations, as explained in Chapter 6.

Table 8-12: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia (by political orientation).

	<i>Idealistic Democrats</i>	<i>Progressive Liberals</i>	<i>Passive Liberals</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Traditionalists</i>	<i>Sovereign Democrats</i>	<i>All Respondents 2008-2015</i>
Russia	68.7%	68.4%	74.3%	70.6%	77.5%	76.2%	72,7%
China	21.7%	23.9%	22.8%	19.7%	22.0%	21.7%	22,1%
USA	31.1%	33.9%	29.4%	28.2%	24.5%	27.1%	29,0%
other Western Countries	12.2%	12.0%	10.3%	11.4%	9.1%	11.6%	11,0%
Japan	22.7%	22.7%	19.4%	22.3%	18.1%	20.6%	20,9%
South Korea	12.8%	10.9%	13.3%	11.3%	11.4%	9.1%	11,5%

*Based on SMF poll results 2008-2015*

Figure 8-16: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by political orientation (1<sup>st</sup> part)





Figure 8-17: Countries considered “best partners” for Mongolia, by political orientation (2<sup>nd</sup> part)



## 8.2 Communication and Co-operation with Foreign Countries

In addition to the question about the most suitable partner country, respondents after 2007 were asked in polls: “With which country’s citizens are Mongolians in better communication and cooperation?” Respondents could name up to two countries; therefore, results shown in Table 8-13 add up to more than 100 per cent.

The country Mongolian citizens think have the best communication and cooperation is still Russia, although there was a gradual decline in this response’s frequency in 2009-2013. From 2014 onwards, Russia as a response appeared more often again, while China lessened after a steady increase in previous years.


Table 8-13: Opinions about countries with citizens of which Mongolians are in better communication and cooperation

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
Russia	58.9%	63.7%	62.5%	54.5%	49.6%	43.1%	46.7%	55.6%	60.2%	54.6%
China	25.3%	25.3%	30.6%	32.9%	37.2%	38.4%	43.2%	38.5%	33.3%	33.8%
USA	19.0%	17.0%	12.3%	10.9%	12.2%	15.7%	9.1%	6.5%	5.5%	12.6%
Other Western Countries	5.6%	4.4%	5.0%	4.9%	4.4%	5.3%	4.6%	2.7%	3.6%	4.5%
Japan	19.9%	14.4%	13.5%	20.5%	16.5%	18.3%	13.8%	14.6%	13.8%	16.0%
South Korea	34.5%	32.4%	25.3%	30.2%	28.6%	27.7%	33.3%	22.8%	36.7%	29.7%

*Source: SMF database, 2008-2016*



Figure 8-18: Opinions about countries with citizens of which Mongolians are in better communication and cooperation



As already shown at the beginning of the chapter, in Section 8.1, Russia is highly favoured as a partner country for Mongolia. When looking at 2008-2016 exclusively, nearly 75 per cent of all respondents named Russia as an ideal partner. When next looking at respondents' opinions of which foreign country's citizens have good communication and cooperation with Mongolians during the same period, only 55 per cent named Russia (see: Table 8-14).

A similar discrepancy is found with Japan, the USA, and other Western countries. Here, also, the partnership with these countries is regarded much more positively than the communication and cooperation with their citizens.


The opposite picture can be seen with countries such as China and South Korea. These countries are seen as less attractive as partners for Mongolia, but communication and cooperation with their citizens appears to be better.

Table 8-14: Comparison of countries chosen as “best partner” versus countries with citizens of which Mongolians are in better communication and cooperation

	<i>Country considered the best partner for Mongolia</i>	<i>Country's citizens with whom Mongolians are in better communication and cooperation</i>
Russia	73.1%	54.6%
China	22.4%	33.8%
USA	28.2%	12.6%
other Western Countries	11.1%	4.5%
Japan	20.8%	16.0%
South Korea	11.4%	29.7%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 8 -19: Comparison of countries chosen as “best partner” versus countries with citizens of which Mongolians are in better communication and cooperation



Further analysis of each country on a year-by-year basis is made in Section 8.4.

### 8.3 Visa-free Travel to Foreign Countries

In a one-time survey conducted in March 2014, respondents were asked the additional question “Do you support visa free exchange of citizens with the following countries ...” Not included in the list of countries, shown below in Table 8 -15, was China because Mongolians could already travel to China without a visa at the time of the survey.


Afterwards, visa-free travel to Russia was also introduced. The data referring to Russia is included in the tables because it is the one country with which Mongolia has, in the opinion of people, the closest links.

Table 8-15: Opinions regarding visa free exchange of citizens with selected countries (all respondents)

<b>Question:</b> <i>Do you support visa free exchange of citizens with the following countries?</i>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Don't know or no response</b>	<b>Total</b>
Visa free with Russia	72.9%	15.5%	11.6%	100.0%
Visa free with USA	66.2%	19.8%	14.0%	100.0%
Visa free with EU	62.6%	21.1%	16.3%	100.0%
Visa free with Japan	63.3%	22.6%	14.2%	100.0%
Visa free with South Korea	60.8%	24.6%	14.7%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, March 2014

Figure 8-20: Opinions regarding visa free exchange of citizens with selected countries (all respondents)



The comparison in Table 8-16 shows that respondents in Ulaanbaatar are more interested in visa-free travel than people living in rural areas.

Table 8-16: Opinions regarding visa free exchange of citizens with selected countries

Question: <i>Do you support visa free exchange of citizens with the following countries?</i>	<i>Respondents in Ulaanbaatar</i>				<i>Respondents in rural areas</i>			
	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Don't know or no answer</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Don't know or no answer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Visa free with Russia	80.4%	12.9%	6.7%	100.0%	67.6%	17.3%	15.1%	100.0%
Visa free with USA	77.8%	14.5%	7.7%	100.0%	58.0%	23.6%	18.5%	100.0%
Visa free with EU	74.0%	16.1%	9.9%	100.0%	54.5%	24.6%	20.9%	100.0%
Visa free with Japan	73.6%	18.3%	8.1%	100.0%	56.0%	25.6%	18.5%	100.0%
Visa free with South Korea	70.4%	21.0%	8.7%	100.0%	54.0%	27.1%	18.9%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, March 2014

Figure 8-21: Opinions regarding visa free exchange of citizens with selected countries, including only respondents from Ulaanbaatar





Figure 8-22: Opinions regarding visa free exchange of citizens with selected countries, only including respondents from rural areas



When analysing the opinions in relation to respondents' ages and their preferences for either Russia, either the USA, or Japan, people of almost every generation are equally interested in visa-free travel to Russia. However, the younger generation has a stronger interest in visa-free travel to the USA and Japan (see: Table 8-17, Table 8-18, Table 8-19).

Table 8-17: Opinions regarding visa free exchange of citizens with Russia, by age

<b>Question:</b> <i>Do you support visa free exchange of citizens with Russia?</i>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Don't know or no response</b>	<b>Total</b>
Age group 18 - 24	74.6%	15.5%	9.9%	100.0%
25 - 29	77.0%	12.9%	10.1%	100.0%
30 - 39	65.7%	21.2%	13.1%	100.0%
40 - 49	74.8%	14.8%	10.4%	100.0%
50 - 59	79.6%	13.0%	7.4%	100.0%
60 or older	68.7%	12.8%	18.4%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, March 2014

Table 8-18: Opinions regarding visa free exchange of citizens with the USA, by age

<b>Question:</b> <i>Do you support visa free exchange of citizens with the USA?</i>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Don't know or no response</b>	<b>Total</b>
Age group 18 - 24	75.4%	15.5%	9.2%	100.0%
25 - 29	76.3%	13.7%	10.1%	100.0%
30 - 39	65.3%	20.4%	14.2%	100.0%
40 - 49	67.2%	19.6%	13.2%	100.0%
50 - 59	69.4%	19.9%	10.6%	100.0%
60 or older	46.9%	27.4%	25.7%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, March 2014

Table 8-19: Opinions regarding visa free exchange of citizens with Japan (by age of respondents)

<b>Question:</b> <i>Do you support visa free exchange of citizens with Japan?</i>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Don't know or no response</b>	<b>Total</b>
Age group 18 - 24	71.1%	22.5%	6.3%	100.0%
25 - 29	67.6%	18.0%	14.4%	100.0%
30 - 39	63.9%	23.0%	13.1%	100.0%
40 - 49	62.4%	23.2%	14.4%	100.0%
50 - 59	67.6%	21.8%	10.6%	100.0%
60 or older	48.6%	25.7%	25.7%	100.0%

Source: SMF database, March 2014

## 8.4 Changing Preferences of Partner Countries over Time and by Specific Groups

This section of the analysis shows data for each country discussed earlier. The data covers both people’s opinions about “best partner” and better communication and cooperation. Also included is the opinions of respondents who live in aimags bordering Russia or China.

### 8.4.1 Russia

Table 8-20: Percentage of respondents who consider Russia as the best partner for Mongolia (all respondents)

<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
45.0%	54.1%	63.4%	62.6%	64.8%	63.9%	62.5%	68.0%	62.7%	56.6%
<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
57.3%	67.8%	75.0%	75.0%	71.3%	70.3%	71.9%	76.8%	78.1%	81.4%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Table 8-21: Percentage of respondents who consider Russia as the best partner for Mongolia (only including respondents in aimags with a border to Russia)

<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
n/a	n/a	n/a	67.7%	71.8%	71.4%	72.0%	74.1%	68.0%	63.4%
<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
66.3%	74.0%	81.6%	85.6%	76.2%	77.3%	79.3%	80.8%	81.5%	87.7%

Source: SMF database, 2000-2016

Table 8-22: Percentage of respondents who consider Russia as the best partner for Mongolia (all respondents)

<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
58.9%	63.7%	62.5%	54.5%	49.6%	43.1%	46.7%	55.6%	60.2%	54.6%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016


Table 8-23: Percentage of respondents who consider Russia as the best partner for Mongolia, only including respondents in aimags bordering Russia

<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
65.6%	67.6%	61.4%	60.5%	52.3%	55.3%	43.2%	60.3%	80.6%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Data from all four tables above is combined into Figure 8-23, showing that respondents living in proximity with Russia have more positive opinions about it as the best partner and as a nation with better communication and cooperation.

Figure 8-23: Percentage of respondents who considering Russia as the best partner for Mongolia



The aimags that border Russia are marked in the map below (see: Figure 8-1) and are highlighted in Table 8-25.

Table 8-24 provides summaries of opinions regarding Russia as the “best partner” for the separate periods of 1997-2007 and 2008-2016. Each period is then split between respondents living in border aimags and others. Table 8-25 then gives a detailed breakdown on a aimag-by-aimag basis of how responses deviate from the over-all picture.

Map 8-1: Aimags of Mongolia bordering Russia



Table 8-24: Respondents who consider Russia as the “best partner” for Mongolia

	<b>1997-2007</b>	<b>2008-2016</b>	<b>Whole period 1997-2016</b>
Respondents living in aimags with border to Russia	70.0%	79.6%	74.1%
Respondents living in aimags without border to Russia	59.2%	70.4%	63.0%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Table 8-25: Respondents who considering Russia as the “best partner” for Mongolia and the deviation of opinions in individual aimags from the total population

	<b>Deviation from percentages of total sample</b>		
	<b>1997-2007</b>	<b>2008-2016</b>	<b>Whole period 1997-2016</b>
Arkhangai	3.6	6.4	8.4
Bayan-Ulgii	9.0	0.6	7.0
Bayankhongor	11.2	4.3	8.4
Bulgan	13.9	4.9	11.4
Govi-Altai	n/a *)	-7.8	-0.4
Dornogovi	5.5	5.7	4.9
Dornod	8.1	10.7	7.7
Dundgovi	n/a *)	8.5	15.9
Zavkhan	8.9	11.5	15.7
Uvurkhangai	0.6	0.9	2.6
Umnugovi	-6.2	2.7	-6.1
Sukhbaatar	9.2	9.8	9.3
Selenge	6.2	4.2	7.0
Tuv	1.6	4.9	6.8
Uvs	8.0	12.3	9.8
Khovd	6.2	6.0	5.0
Khuvsgul	10.9	-0.7	6.8
Khentii	3.3	2.4	4.1
Govisumber	-8.1	11.5	-0.5
Orkhon	-13.7	-2.6	-1.1
Darkhan Uul	n/a *)	-4.7	2.7
Ulaanbaatar	-4.8	-8.8	-6.8

\*) Darkhan Uul was not separately listed in 1997-2007; some other aimags were not included in any surveys during that period.

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016



## 8.4.2 China

Table 8-26: Percentage of respondents who considering China as the best partner for Mongolia (all respondents)

<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
6.2%	11.7%	14.2%	13.2%	12.5%	17.2%	18.9%	21.6%	16.3%	16.7%
<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
17.7%	20.8%	24.7%	20.8%	20.6%	20.2%	23.8%	23.8%	26.9%	26.6%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Table 8-27: Percentage of respondents who considering China as the best partner for Mongolia, only including respondents in aimags with a border to China)

<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
n/a	n/a	n/a	10.7%	9.6%	13.5%	18.9%	20.4%	18.0%	18.2%
<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
20.6%	15.9%	20.1%	22.7%	22.1%	18.6%	n/a	28.3%	n/a	31.0%

Source: SMF database, 2000-2016

Table 8-28: Percentage of respondents who considering China as the best partner for Mongolia (all respondents)

<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Total</b>
25.3%	25.3%	30.6%	32.9%	37.2%	38.4%	43.2%	38.5%	33.3%	33.8%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016


Table 8-29: Percentage of respondents who considering China as the best partner for Mongolia, only including respondents in aimags with a border to China)

<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
24.6%	22.8%	25.2%	24.4%	38.7%	n/a	58.9%	n/a	37.8%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

The data from all four tables above is combined into Figure 8 -24. The comparison shows that respondents living in proximity to China do not necessarily have a more positive opinion about this country as the best partner or having better communication and cooperation, as seen in the case of Russia. Perceived communication with China is, however, considerably better than the best partner question. That was not so in relations with Russia.

Figure 8-24: Percentage of respondents considering China the best partner for Mongolia



The aimags that border China are marked in the map below (see: Figure 8-2, Figure 8-1) and are highlighted in Table 8-31.

Map 8-2: Aimags of Mongolia bordering China



Table 8-30 provide summaries of opinions regarding China as the “best partner” separately for the periods 1997-2007 and 2008-2016, with each period then divided between respondents living in border aimags and others. Table 8-31 then gives a detailed breakdown on a aimag-by-aimag basis of how responses deviate from the over-all picture.

Table 8-30: Respondents considering China “best partner” for Mongolia

	<b>1997-2007</b>	<b>2008-2016</b>	<b>Whole period 1997-2016</b>
Respondents living in aimags with border to China	15.6%	21.2%	17.2%
Respondents living in aimags without border to China	16.7%	22.6%	19.0%

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Table 8-31: Respondents considering China “best partner” for Mongolia / deviation of opinions in individual aimags from total population

	<b>Deviation from percentages of total sample</b>		
	<b>1997-2007</b>	<b>2008-2016</b>	<b>Whole period 1997-2016</b>
Arkhangai	-3.2	-3.9	-2.1
Bayan-Ulgii	12.9	0.2	6.3
Bayankhongor	-5.7	-1.1	-4.9
Bulgan	4.5	3.4	5.4
Govi-Altai	n/a *)	-11.3	-7.5
Dornogovi	-5.3	0.6	-3.8
Dornod	0.8	-6.9	-1.8
Dundgovi	n/a *)	-3.1	0.7
Zavkhan	-4.5	-2.1	-0.1
Uvurkhangai	1.1	0.2	1.6
Umnugovi	2.2	-1.4	0.6
Sukhbaatar	-1.3	0.4	-0.8
Selenge	1.2	1.6	2.4
Tuv	-7.4	-4.0	-3.6
Uvs	3.0	2.6	3.0
Khovd	0.2	1.0	-0.2
Khuvsgul	-2.1	-1.1	-1.3
Khentii	-1.7	-3.2	-1.7
Govisumber	-9.5	4.5	-4.1
Orkhon	-1.3	1.8	3.3
Darkhan Uul	n/a *)	-0.2	3.6
Ulaanbaatar	0.5	1.3	0.3

\*) Darkhan Uul was not separately listed in 1997-2007; some other aimags were not included in any surveys during that period.

Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

### 8.4.3 USA

Table 8-32: Percentage of respondents considering the USA the best partner for Mongolia

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
29.4%	24.0%	30.3%	22.1%	26.5%	36.2%	33.3%	32.2%	40.9%	42.0%
2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
40.5%	35.0%	33.1%	28.9%	29.8%	29.4%	26.1%	23.7%	17.6%	17.1%


Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Table 8-33: Percentage of respondents believing in better communication and cooperation between Mongolians and citizens of the USA

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
19.0%	17.0%	12.3%	10.9%	12.2%	15.7%	9.1%	6.5%	5.5%	12.6%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 8-25:



## 8.4.4 Other Western Countries

Table 8-34: Percentage of respondents considering other Western countries the best partner for Mongolia

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
30.5%	27.5%	32.3%	8.1%	4.7%	8.0%	8.5%	7.4%	8.4%	6.8%
2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
7.3%	12.3%	8.4%	12.3%	11.5%	12.5%	11.1%	8.7%	7.6%	10.7%


Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Table 8-35: Percentage of respondents believing in better communication and cooperation between Mongolians and citizens of other Western countries

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
5.6%	4.4%	5.0%	4.9%	4.4%	5.3%	4.6%	2.7%	3.6%	4.5%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 8 26: Percentage of respondents considering other Western countries the best partner for Mongolia



## 8.4.5 Japan

Table 8-36: Percentage of respondents considering Japan the best partner for Mongolia

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
20.6%	10.5%	28.3%	20.3%	24.0%	33.5%	33.6%	27.3%	28.3%	31.3%
2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
29.8%	24.4%	20.0%	16.0%	21.0%	21.3%	22.6%	20.4%	21.3%	19.6%


Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Table 8-37: Percentage of respondents believing in better communication and cooperation between Mongolians and citizens of Japan

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
19.9%	14.4%	13.5%	20.5%	16.5%	18.3%	13.8%	14.6%	13.8%	16.0%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 8-27: Percentage of respondents considering Japan the best partner for Mongolia



## 8.4.6 South Korea

Table 8-38: Percentage of respondents considering South Korea the best partner for Mongolia

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
5.4%	2.0%	6.7%	3.1%	10.7%	13.4%	15.4%	14.7%	13.2%	15.7%
2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
13.3%	13.8%	12.6%	10.1%	12.1%	11.2%	10.1%	12.0%	9.2%	11.2%


Source: SMF database, 1997-2016

Table 8-39: Percentage of respondents believing in better communication and cooperation between Mongolians and citizens of South Korea

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
34.5%	32.4%	25.3%	30.2%	28.6%	27.7%	33.3%	22.8%	36.7%	29.7%

Source: SMF database, 2008-2016

Figure 8-28: Percentage of respondents considering South Korea the best partner for Mongolia



# 9

## RANKING OF MONGOLIA'S MOST-PROMINENT POLITICIANS 1995-2016

### 9.1 Ranking of Most-Prominent Politicians in Mongolia

Respondents over the course of the entire 22 years that the Sant Maral Foundation has conducted opinion polls have chosen annually a total of 39 people for the lists of Top-10 politicians. Respondents each year were asked to name up to three individuals to the question: "Of the prominent persons in the country whom you would like to name, who, in your opinion, should play an important role in politics?" The responses were aggregated all together, with the order in which names were listed taking no effect on the ranking.

Some of these 39 individuals were included at the Top-10 for only a short period, while others remained for several years. Only a small number remained continuously on the list of Mongolia's most popular politicians.

Different possibilities for how to sort the ranking are available. Here, three different methods have been used to arrive at an overall ranking using summary data from each year:

- The accumulation of percentages over 22 years;
- The number of years during which the person was among the Top-10;
- The average ranking during those years.



Table 9-1: Three different rankings of most prominent politicians 1995-2016

<b>Ranking by accumulated percentage of respondents who named this person</b>		<b>Ranking by number of years of this person was in the Top10</b>		<b>Ranking by average position of this person during the years when he/she was among the Top10</b>	
<i>(details see Table 9 2)</i>		<i>(details see Table 9 3)</i>		<i>(details see Table 9 4)</i>	
1	N. Enkhbayar	1	N. Bagabandi	1	N. Enkhbayar
2	N. Bagabandi	2	N. Enkhbayar	2	S. Ganbaatar
3	Ts. Elbegdorj	3	Ts. Elbegdorj	3	Ts. Elbegdorj
4	R. Gonchigdorj	4	R. Gonchigdorj	4	G. Uyanga
5	B. Jargalsaikhan	5	S. Oyun	5	Sb. Batbold
6	M. Enkhsaikhan	6	B. Jargalsaikhan	6	N. Bagabandi
7	S. Ganbaatar	7	Ts. Nyamdorj	7	S. Bayar
8	S. Oyun	8	M. Enkhsaikhan	8	R. Gonchigdorj
9	Ts. Nyamdorj	9	L. Gundalai	9	Kh. Battulga
10	L. Gundalai	10	Ch. Ulaan	10	B. Jargalsaikhan
11	P. Jasrai	11	S. Ganbaatar	11	P. Jasrai
12	S. Bayar	12	P. Jasrai	12	O. Dashbalbaar
13	P. Ochirbat	13	E. Bat-Uul	13	N. Altankhuyag
14	Ch. Ulaan	14	S. Bayar	14	B. Erdenebat
15	E. Bat-Uul	15	P. Ochirbat	15	L. Gundalai
16	L. Tudev	16	R. Amarjargal	16	S. Byambatsogt
17	R. Amarjargal	17	Z. Altai	17	M. Enkhsaikhan
18	B. Erdenebat	18	Kh. Battulga	18	P. Ochirbat
19	J. Narantsatsralt	19	B. Erdenebat	19	L. Tudev
20	Da. Ganbold	20	L. Tudev	20	B. Bat.Erdene

Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

In Table 9 2, Table 9 3, and Table 9 4, below, the rankings are shown in more detail. The percentages are highlighted whenever a person was included in the TOP-10 in that particular year<sup>29</sup>.

29 In 2016, two politicians were named by 5.7 per cent of all respondents, and three were named by 5.6 per cent of the respondents. Thus, two people were ranked in the eighth spot (“8”), and no one was ranked ninth. Three individuals were ranked 10th. In total, 12 people are marked for that year. All tables in the following parts of this chapter are based on 1995-2016 SMF poll data, unless other periods are stated in the individual tables.

Table 9-2: Percentages of respondents mentioning most prominent politicians  
(Part 1 = 1995 to 2000)

Name	Rank	Total percent	Percent in each year					
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
N. Enkhbayar	1	500.5%		0.4%	4.5%	15.5%	16.1%	22.2%
N. Bagabandi	2	441.0%	21.7%	21.9%	40.2%	47.6%	33.2%	23.4%
Ts. Elbegdorj	3	397.7%	17.9%	27.5%	13.1%	8.7%	2.9%	4.1%
R. Gonchigdorj	4	316.0%	35.9%	42.2%	34.6%	25.5%	15.0%	19.4%
B. Jargalsaikhan	5	235.6%	11.0%	6.1%	13.7%	17.0%	30.8%	26.3%
M. Enkhsaikhan	6	169.6%	1.7%	2.5%	20.9%	15.7%	9.5%	11.9%
S. Ganbaatar	7	163.8%						
S. Oyun	8	161.7%					6.4%	10.6%
Ts. Nyamdorj	9	150.7%	1.6%	1.2%	0.5%	2.8%	5.3%	3.4%
L. Gundalai	10	140.8%						0.5%
P. Jasrai	11	136.5%	28.7%	26.0%	15.1%	11.7%	14.3%	13.8%
S. Bayar	12	134.6%			1.7%	2.6%	1.3%	0.6%
P. Ochirbat	13	120.5%	23.9%	22.2%	12.2%	6.8%	6.0%	6.8%
Ch. Ulaan	14	110.2%				1.0%	1.9%	4.7%
E. Bat-Uul	15	109.0%	4.6%	6.2%	7.5%	6.5%	2.0%	2.6%
L. Tudev	16	97.6%	32.4%	21.6%	9.2%	8.5%	6.4%	4.2%
R. Amarjargal	17	96.1%	2.9%	0.6%	1.4%	3.6%	9.5%	20.9%
B. Erdenebat	18	76.7%					18.2%	22.0%
J. Narantsatsralt	19	62.7%	6.5%	7.7%	0.2%	0.9%	12.7%	7.4%
Da. Ganbold	20	59.1%	15.5%	16.7%	5.1%	7.5%	2.1%	3.0%
Z. Enkhbold	21	55.4%	0.1%	0.5%	1.1%	1.5%	1.6%	2.0%
Kh. Battulga	22	54.3%	1.1%	0.9%	1.6%	0.5%	0.7%	0.2%
M. Zenee	23	47.4%	9.4%	5.5%	7.1%	7.4%	9.5%	5.5%
M. Enkhbold	24	43.1%						0.4%
O. Dashbalbaar	25	42.6%	1.3%	0.6%	10.8%	19.8%	9.3%	
Sb. Batbold	26	39.7%						
Z. Altai	27	37.3%						
B. Bat.Erdene	28	33.9%						
G. Uyanga	29	30.2%						
L. Enebish	30	29.7%				0.2%	1.0%	3.5%
N. Altankhuyag	31	29.6%						
S. Zorig	32	27.4%	8.4%	7.2%	6.1%	5.7%		
Kh. Temuujin	33	25.5%						

D. Enkhbat	<b>34</b>	24.5%						
O. Magnai	<b>35</b>	17.7%						
S. Javkhlan	<b>36</b>	13.0%						
Ts. Davaasuren	<b>37</b>	9.0%						
S. Byambatsogt	<b>38</b>	6.2%						
J. Batsuur	<b>39</b>	5.7%						

Table 9-2: Percentages of respondents mentioning most prominent politicians (Part 2 = 2001 to 2008)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Percent in each year</i>							
	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>
N. Enkhbayar	29.3%	33.7%	39.4%	54.0%	54.3%	34.3%	28.5%	13.2%
N. Bagabandi	41.9%	34.8%	30.8%	31.0%	15.1%	11.3%	17.5%	8.0%
Ts. Elbegdorj	3.6%	4.2%	6.2%	18.1%	31.4%	38.6%	30.1%	20.9%
R. Gonchigdorj	35.3%	22.1%	19.6%	15.7%	11.9%	7.4%	5.6%	3.2%
B. Jargalsaikhan	12.3%	14.8%	9.6%	14.7%	21.2%	15.7%	12.6%	4.4%
M. Enkhsaikhan	26.0%	16.4%	19.9%	11.7%	14.2%	6.3%	5.0%	1.2%
S. Ganbaatar				0.1%	1.8%	5.4%	4.8%	2.0%
S. Oyun	6.5%	15.7%	21.2%	12.0%	11.8%	11.1%	11.3%	8.1%
Ts. Nyamdorj	5.7%	4.5%	8.7%	11.6%	10.1%	19.0%	16.9%	13.6%
L. Gundalai	2.3%	10.4%	15.0%	11.2%	13.4%	25.2%	24.8%	8.7%
P. Jasrai	9.5%	6.4%	5.0%	2.1%	1.1%	1.4%	1.4%	
S. Bayar	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	1.8%	2.1%	3.5%	43.7%
P. Ochirbat	7.6%	8.5%	4.9%	2.5%	3.3%	2.1%	2.8%	1.0%
Ch. Ulaan	6.9%	7.8%	10.8%	14.0%	16.0%	3.5%	7.6%	5.4%
E. Bat-Uul	1.7%	3.0%	3.5%	2.0%	3.4%	8.1%	5.1%	7.6%
L. Tudev	3.6%	3.7%	2.6%	1.4%	1.4%	1.7%	0.7%	
R. Amarjargal	7.5%	8.4%	3.2%	4.9%	3.5%	4.3%	4.0%	1.6%
B. Erdenebat	10.1%	7.6%	7.3%	4.0%	2.9%	1.3%	0.9%	0.9%
J. Narantsatsralt	5.5%	7.2%	5.1%	4.7%	1.3%	1.2%	2.3%	
Da. Ganbold	1.4%	1.6%	1.6%	1.0%	0.6%	0.5%	1.3%	0.1%
Z. Enkhbold	0.9%	1.1%	1.7%	0.4%	3.1%	1.9%	4.0%	3.5%
Kh. Battulga	0.1%	0.1%		0.1%	0.1%	0.7%	0.2%	1.6%
M. Zenee	3.0%							
M. Enkhbold	0.7%	0.2%	0.5%	1.2%	2.2%	8.3%	8.9%	1.3%
O. Dashbalbaar								
Sb. Batbold								0.5%

Z. Altai								5.7%
B. Bat.Erdene								
G. Uyanga								
L. Enebish	7.2%							
N. Altankhuyag								1.4%
S. Zorig								
Kh. Temuujin								1.5%
D. Enkhbat								2.9%
O. Magnai						0.2%	0.2%	1.0%
S. Javkhlan								
Ts. Davaasuren								
S. Byambatsogt								
J. Batsuur								

Table 9-2: Percentages of respondents mentioning most prominent politicians  
(Part 3 = 2009 to 2016)

Name	Percent in each year							
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
N. Enkhbayar	27.8%	13.9%	20.3%	18.2%	18.3%	17.9%	17.6%	21.2%
N. Bagabandi	11.4%	11.8%	7.8%	6.7%	8.9%	8.6%	3.2%	4.2%
Ts. Elbegdorj	39.5%	22.2%	26.2%	15.0%	20.9%	30.7%	8.8%	7.3%
R. Gonchigdorj	6.1%	5.3%	1.3%	2.0%	3.1%	1.4%	1.2%	2.3%
B. Jargalsaikhan	2.5%	5.6%	3.2%	4.4%	3.0%	2.0%	2.3%	2.4%
M. Enkhsaikhan	1.7%	0.9%	0.5%	1.3%	0.5%	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%
S. Ganbaatar	2.4%	6.8%	11.9%	23.2%	25.8%	17.9%	34.3%	26.4%
S. Oyun	8.0%	8.6%	9.2%	7.4%	4.8%	3.7%	2.4%	2.7%
Ts. Nyamdorj	9.0%	8.4%	5.1%	2.8%	5.3%	4.1%	5.5%	5.6%
L. Gundalai	9.9%	8.9%	3.8%	3.3%	0.9%	0.6%	0.2%	1.5%
P. Jasrai								
S. Bayar	37.7%	17.5%	9.1%	6.4%	3.0%	1.4%	0.8%	0.9%
P. Ochirbat	0.9%	1.6%	0.9%	1.0%	1.6%	2.4%	0.7%	0.8%
Ch. Ulaan	1.8%	1.3%	6.6%	3.7%	6.2%	4.9%	0.3%	5.7%
E. Bat-Uul	10.6%	6.2%	5.5%	3.5%	6.3%	7.3%	3.7%	2.3%
L. Tudev								
R. Amarjargal	4.4%	1.1%	1.7%	0.4%	2.0%	1.8%	2.5%	5.9%
B. Erdenebat	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%
J. Narantsatsralt								

Da. Ganbold	0.5%	0.3%		0.1%		0.3%		
Z. Enkhbold	2.3%	2.2%	6.9%	3.0%	4.3%	4.7%	4.0%	4.5%
Kh. Battulga	0.4%	0.8%	1.2%	6.5%	3.6%	13.9%	8.9%	11.4%
M. Zenee								
M. Enkhbold	1.5%	0.7%	0.9%	0.7%	2.8%	4.5%	5.0%	3.2%
O. Dashbalbaar								
Sb. Batbold	0.2%	14.1%	11.8%	12.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%
Z. Altai	5.0%	10.0%	9.5%	5.7%	0.9%	0.4%		0.1%
B. Bat.Erdene				2.7%	8.3%	8.0%	9.2%	5.6%
G. Uyanga				3.3%	3.3%	2.6%	11.6%	9.4%
L. Enebish								
N. Altankhuyag	1.1%	0.9%	2.0%	2.1%	7.5%	9.5%	2.5%	2.6%
S. Zorig								
Kh. Temuujin	1.6%	4.4%	5.1%	4.7%	5.0%	2.6%	0.3%	0.3%
D. Enkhbat	3.9%	5.5%	8.3%	2.7%	0.6%	0.4%		0.2%
O. Magnai	0.3%	0.5%	0.4%	0.7%	6.0%	5.5%	2.1%	0.9%
S. Javkhlan							6.6%	5.6%
Ts. Davaasuren				2.0%	0.3%	0.8%	5.9%	
S. Byambatsogt								6.2%
J. Batsuur								5.7%

Table 9-3: Ranking of most prominent politicians by number of years they were selected among the Top10 (Part 1 = 1995 to 2000)

Name	Rank	Number of years in Top10	Average ranking in those years	Ranking in each year					
				1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
N. Bagabandi	1	20	3.8	5	5	1	1	1	2
N. Enkhbayar	2	19	2.6				6	4	3
Ts. Elbegdorj	3	17	3.0	6	2	6	8		
R. Gonchigdorj	4	13	4.5	1	1	2	2	5	6
S. Oyun	5	12	6.8						9
B. Jargalsaikhan	5	12	4.8	8		5	4	2	1
Ts. Nyamdorj	7	11	7.7						
M. Enkhsaikhan	8	10	6.1			3	5	9	8
L. Gundalai	9	9	6.0						
Ch. Ulaan	9	9	8.0						

S. Ganbaatar	11	7	2.7						
P. Jasrai	11	7	5.3	3	3	4	7	6	7
E. Bat-Uul	11	7	8.1		10	10			
S. Bayar	14	5	4.0						
P. Ochirbat	14	5	6.2	4	4	7			
R. Amarjargal	14	5	7.6					8	5
Z. Altai	14	5	7.8						
Kh. Battulga	18	4	4.8						
B. Erdenebat	18	4	5.8					3	4
L. Tudev	18	4	6.5	2	6	9	9		
B. Bat.Erdene	18	4	6.5						
Sb. Batbold	22	3	3.7						
Da. Ganbold	22	3	8.0	7	7		10		
J. Narantsatsralt	22	3	8.3		8			7	10
M. Enkhbold	22	3	8.7						
S. Zorig	26	2	9.5	10	9				
G. Uyanga	26	2	3.5						
O. Dashbalbaar	26	2	5.5			8	3		
N. Altankhuyag	26	2	5.5						
S. Javkhlan	26	2	8.5						
O. Magnai	26	2	9.0						
M. Zenee	26	2	9.5	9				10	
S. Byambatsogt	33	1	6.0						
D. Enkhbat	33	1	8.0						
Ts. Davaasuren	33	1	8.0						
J. Batsuur	33	1	8.0						
Z. Enkhbold	33	1	10.0						
L. Enebish	33	1	10.0						
Kh. Temuujin	33	1	10.0						

Table 9-3: Ranking of most prominent politicians by number of years they were selected among the Top10 (Part 2 = 2001 to 2008)

<b>Name</b>	<b>Ranking in each year</b>							
	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
N. Bagabandi	1	1	2	2	5	6	4	6
N. Enkhbayar	3	2	1	1	1	2	2	4
Ts. Elbegdorj				3	2	1	1	2
R. Gonchigdorj	2	3	5	4	8		10	
S. Oyun		5	3	7	9	7	7	7
B. Jargalsaikhan	5	6	8	5	3	5	6	
Ts. Nyamdorj			9	9	10	4	5	3
M. Enkhsaikhan	4	4	4	8	6	10		
L. Gundalai		7	6	10	7	3	3	5
Ch. Ulaan		10	7	6	4		9	10
S. Ganbaatar								
P. Jasrai	7							
E. Bat-Uul						9		8
S. Bayar								1
P. Ochirbat	8	8						
R. Amarjargal	9	9						
Z. Altai								9
Kh. Battulga								
B. Erdenebat	6		10					
L. Tudev								
B. Bat.Erdene								
Sb. Batbold								
Da. Ganbold								
J. Narantsatsralt								
M. Enkhbold						8	8	
S. Zorig								
G. Uyanga								
O. Dashbalbaar								
N. Altankhuyag								
S. Javkhlan								
O. Magnai								
M. Zenee								
S. Byambatsogt								

D. Enkhbat								
Ts. Davaasuren								
J. Batsuur								
Z. Enkhbold								
L. Enebish	10							
Kh. Temuujin								

Table 9-3: Ranking of most prominent politicians by number of years they were selected among the Top-10 (Part 3 = 2009 to 2016)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Ranking in each year</i>							
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>
N. Bagabandi	4	5	9	6	4	6		
N. Enkhbayar	3	4	2	2	3	2	2	2
Ts. Elbegdorj	1	1	1	3	2	1	6	5
R. Gonchigdorj	9							
S. Oyun	8	8	6	5				
B. Jargalsaikhan								
Ts. Nyamdorj	7	9			10		9	10
M. Enkhsaikhan								
L. Gundalai	6	7						
Ch. Ulaan					8	10		8
S. Ganbaatar		10	3	1	1	2	1	1
P. Jasrai								
E. Bat-Uul	5				7	8		
S. Bayar	2	2	7	8				
P. Ochirbat								
R. Amarjargal								7
Z. Altai	10	6	5	9				
Kh. Battulga				7		4	5	3
B. Erdenebat								
L. Tudev								
B. Bat.Erdene					5	7	4	10
Sb. Batbold		3	4	4				
Da. Ganbold								
J. Narantsatsralt								
M. Enkhbold							10	
S. Zorig								
G. Uyanga							3	4



O. Dashbalbaar								
N. Altankhuyag				6	5			
S. Javkhlan						7	10	
O. Magnai				9	9			
M. Zenee								
S. Byambatsogt								6
D. Enkhbat			8					
Ts. Davaasuren						8		
J. Batsuur								8
Z. Enkhbold			10					
L. Enebish								
Kh. Temuujin				10				

Table 9-4: Ranking of most prominent politicians by average ranking in years when they were selected among the Top-10 (Part 1 = 1995 to 2000)

Name	Rank	Number of years in Top10	Average ranking in those years	Ranking in each year					
				1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
N. Enkhbayar	1	19	2.6				6	4	3
S. Ganbaatar	2	7	2.7						
Ts. Elbegdorj	3	17	3.0	6	2	6	8		
G. Uyanga	4	2	3.5						
Sb. Batbold	5	3	3.7						
N. Bagabandi	6	20	3.8	5	5	1	1	1	2
S. Bayar	7	5	4.0						
R. Gonchigdorj	8	13	4.5	1	1	2	2	5	6
Kh. Battulga	9	4	4.8						
B. Jargalsaikhan	9	12	4.8	8		5	4	2	1
P. Jasrai	11	7	5.3	3	3	4	7	6	7
O. Dashbalbaar	12	2	5.5			8	3		
N. Altankhuyag	12	2	5.5						
B. Erdenebat	14	4	5.8					3	4
L. Gundalai	15	9	6.0						
S. Byambatsogt	15	1	6.0						
M. Enkhsaikhan	17	10	6.1			3	5	9	8
P. Ochirbat	18	5	6.2	4	4	7			
L. Tudev	19	4	6.5	2	6	9	9		

B. Bat.Erdene	19	4	6.5					
S. Oyun	21	12	6.8					9
R. Amarjargal	22	5	7.6				8	5
Ts. Nyamdorj	23	11	7.7					
Z. Altai	24	5	7.8					
Ch. Ulaan	25	9	8.0					
Da. Ganbold	25	3	8.0	7	7		10	
D. Enkhbat	25	1	8.0					
Ts. Davaasuren	25	1	8.0					
J. Batsuur	25	1	8.0					
E. Bat-Uul	30	7	8.1		10	10		
J. Narantsatsralt	31	3	8.3		8		7	10
S. Javkhlan	32	2	8.5					
M. Enkhbold	33	3	8.7					
O. Magnai	34	2	9.0					
S. Zorig	35	2	9.5	10	9			
M. Zenee	35	2	9.5	9			10	
Z. Enkhbold	37	1	10.0					
L. Enebish	37	1	10.0					
Kh. Temuujin	37	1	10.0					

Table 9-4: Ranking of most prominent politicians by average ranking in years when they were selected among the Top10 (Part 2 = 2001 to 2008)

Name	Ranking in each year							
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
N. Enkhbayar	3	2	1	1	1	2	2	4
S. Ganbaatar								
Ts. Elbegdorj				3	2	1	1	2
G. Uyanga								
Sb. Batbold								
N. Bagabandi	1	1	2	2	5	6	4	6
S. Bayar								1
R. Gonchigdorj	2	3	5	4	8		10	
Kh. Battulga								
B. Jargalsaikhan	5	6	8	5	3	5	6	
P. Jasrai	7							
O. Dashbalbaar								

N. Altankhuyag								
B. Erdenebat	6		10					
L. Gundalai		7	6	10	7	3	3	5
S. Byambatsogt								
M. Enkhsaikhan	4	4	4	8	6	10		
P. Ochirbat	8	8						
L. Tudev								
B. Bat.Erdene								
S. Oyun		5	3	7	9	7	7	7
R. Amarjargal	9	9						
Ts. Nyamdorj			9	9	10	4	5	3
Z. Altai								9
Ch. Ulaan		10	7	6	4		9	10
Da. Ganbold								
D. Enkhbat								
Ts. Davaasuren								
J. Batsuur								
E. Bat-Uul						9		8
J. Narantsatsralt								
S. Javkhlan								
M. Enkhbold						8	8	
O. Magnai								
S. Zorig								
M. Zenee								
Z. Enkhbold								
L. Enebish	10							
Kh. Temuujin								

Table 9-4: Ranking of most prominent politicians by average ranking in years when they were selected among the Top10 (Part 3 = 2009 to 2016)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Ranking in each year</i>							
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>
N. Enkhbayar	3	4	2	2	3	2	2	2
S. Ganbaatar		10	3	1	1	2	1	1
Ts. Elbegdorj	1	1	1	3	2	1	6	5
G. Uyanga							3	4
Sb. Batbold		3	4	4				
N. Bagabandi	4	5	9	6	4	6		
S. Bayar	2	2	7	8				
R. Gonchigdorj	9							
Kh. Battulga				7		4	5	3
B. Jargalsaikhan								
P. Jasrai								
O. Dashbalbaar								
N. Altankhuyag					6	5		
B. Erdenebat								
L. Gundalai	6	7						
S. Byambatsogt								6
M. Enkhsaikhan								
P. Ochirbat								
L. Tudev								
B. Bat.Erdene					5	7	4	10
S. Oyun	8	8	6	5				
R. Amarjargal								7
Ts. Nyamdorj	7	9			10		9	10
Z. Altai	10	6	5	9				
Ch. Ulaan					8	10		8
Da. Ganbold								
D. Enkhbat			8					
Ts. Davaasuren							8	
J. Batsuur								8
E. Bat-Uul	5				7	8		
J. Narantsatsralt								
S. Javkhlan							7	10
M. Enkhbold							10	
O. Magnai					9	9		

S. Zorig								
M. Zenee								
Z. Enkhbold			10					
L. Enebish								
Kh. Temuujin				10				

## 9.2 Preferences of Selected Groups in Society

Some politicians shown in the above tables are appealing to certain groups in society more than others. These groups' preferences have been analysed using aggregated data from surveys conducted in 1995-2016. These groups are as follows:

- groups of different ages and gender;
- groups with different educational background;
- groups with different occupations;
- groups of different social status;
- groups with different incomes;
- groups with different political orientations.

Instead of listing the rankings for each group, the analysis will compare how certain politicians appeal to these groups<sup>30</sup>.

The first comparison on the age of respondents very clearly shows that some politicians appeal more to the younger generation (see: Table 9-5). This is very distinct in the cases of Gonchigdorj and Oyun, who find twice the support among respondents less than 25 years old comparing to 60 years or older. For Jargalsaikhan and Gundalai, the differences are even greater. These politicians find more than three times the support among young people.

Some other politicians are obviously preferred by older respondents, with the most prominent in this category being Enkhbayar, Bagabandi, and Nyamdorj. Yet another category of politicians finds relatively equal support among all age groups, with typical examples such as Elbegdorj, Jasrai, and Enkhsaikhan.

Despite all these differences, the two top-ranking politicians, Enkhbayar and Bagabandi, have nearly identical support from all age groups. But further down the list, the differences of support are significant enough for rankings to change. For example, Nyamdorj, who is at the 10th position for the youngest age group, rises to fourth place within the 60 years or older age group. Jargalsaikhan, on the other hand, who is ranked at the bottom for respondents 60

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30 Only data from 2008 and onwards was available for comparisons. The tables that list the top-10 politicians differ because of the different data used. More detailed year-by-year analysis is provided for select politicians in the following sections of this chapter.

years or older, is even ahead of Elbegdorj for the youngest group.

Table 9-5: Ranking of some most prominent politicians among groups of different ages

	<b>Total sample 1995 to 2016</b>	<b>Percentages in groups based on age of respondents in years</b>					
		<b>18 - 24</b>	<b>25 - 29</b>	<b>30 - 39</b>	<b>40 - 49</b>	<b>50 - 59</b>	<b>60 or more</b>
N. Enkhbayar	25.2%	22.2%	23.1%	23.4%	24.9%	29.6%	35.7%
N. Bagabandi	22.8%	21.8%	20.7%	21.0%	22.6%	26.4%	29.5%
Ts. Elbegdorj	17.3%	15.9%	16.9%	18.6%	18.9%	15.7%	14.6%
R. Gonchigdorj	16.8%	19.6%	19.5%	18.2%	16.2%	12.0%	9.8%
B. Jargalsaikhan	12.7%	18.2%	15.6%	13.5%	10.2%	8.1%	5.6%
M. Enkhsaikhan	9.3%	9.5%	9.8%	10.5%	9.8%	7.3%	5.9%
S. Oyun	8,4%	8,6%	8,2%	9,3%	9,0%	7,3%	5,7%
P. Jasrai	7.3%	7.7%	8.0%	6.8%	7.1%	7.4%	7.6%
L. Gundalai	7.2%	9.4%	8.3%	8.2%	6.7%	4.2%	3.3%
Ts. Nyamdorj	7.1%	5.1%	6.5%	6.7%	8.1%	8.8%	9.1%

Table 9-6: Ranking of some most prominent politicians among gender groups

Between the two genders is much less difference than, for example, age groups.

The only politician who received considerably more votes from females is Oyun, who is also the only female among the TOP-10 people in the list.

	<b>Total sample 1995 to 2016</b>	<b>Percentages in gender groups</b>	
		<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
N. Enkhbayar	25.2%	24.9%	25.5%
N. Bagabandi	22.8%	23.3%	22.3%
Ts. Elbegdorj	17.3%	17.5%	17.0%
R. Gonchigdorj	16.8%	17.1%	16.5%
B. Jargalsaikhan	12.7%	12.3%	13.0%
M. Enkhsaikhan	9.3%	9.6%	9.1%
S. Oyun	8,4%	7,0%	9,7%
P. Jasrai	7.3%	7.3%	7.3%
L. Gundalai	7.2%	6.8%	7.7%
Ts. Nyamdorj	7.1%	6.9%	7.4%

When considering respondents' levels of education, Bagabandi and Elbegdorj have been most successful in gaining equal support from every group, while Enkhbayar has considerable more support from respondents with low education. Enkhsaikhan, on the other hand, finds more support among respondents with higher education (see: Table 9-7).

Table 9-7: Ranking of some most prominent politicians among groups with different education levels

	<b>Total sample 1995 to 2016</b>	<b>Percentages in groups based on education of respondents</b>		
		<b>Respondents with low education level</b>	<b>Respondents with secondary education</b>	<b>Respondents with higher education</b>
N. Enkhbayar	25.2%	28.9%	23.7%	24.7%
N. Bagabandi	22.8%	22.6%	22.0%	24.0%
Ts. Elbegdorj	17.3%	17.4%	17.5%	16.7%
R. Gonchigdorj	16.8%	14.0%	18.0%	17.1%
B. Jargalsaikhan	12.7%	10.6%	12.9%	13.8%
M. Enkhsaikhan	9.3%	7.4%	8.6%	11.6%
S. Oyun	8,4%	8,0%	8,4%	8,7%
P. Jasrai	7.3%	5.3%	8.0%	7.7%
L. Gundalai	7.2%	9.1%	7.3%	5.9%
Ts. Nyamdorj	7.1%	7.5%	6.6%	7.6%

Analysis by occupations held brings a mixed picture. Although there is no general trend, some isolated patterns are apparent. For example, the clerical staffs have some preference for Bagabandi. Nomads have relatively little support for Gonchigdorj or Jargalsaikhan (see: Table 9-8).

Table 9-8: Ranking of some most prominent politicians among selected occupational groups

	<b>Total sample 1995 to 2016</b>	<b>Percentages in selected groups based on respondents' occupation</b>				
		<b>Workers</b>	<b>Clerical staff</b>	<b>Self-employed</b>	<b>Nomads / farmers</b>	<b>Intelligentsia</b>
N. Enkhbayar	29.0%	28.7%	29.4%	26.6%	29.7%	31.8%
N. Bagabandi	22.4%	21.1%	27.3%	19.5%	20.0%	23.5%
Ts. Elbegdorj	17.1%	18.1%	14.3%	18.7%	18.6%	16.1%
R. Gonchigdorj	14.0%	12.9%	15.6%	13.9%	11.5%	15.5%
B. Jargalsaikhan	13.3%	12.1%	14.5%	14.3%	6.7%	15.9%
M. Enkhsaikhan	10.6%	8.6%	12.1%	9.7%	7.5%	15.1%
S. Oyun	10,1%	10,2%	8,5%	10,6%	8,5%	12,2%
L. Gundalai	8.7%	9.2%	6.6%	9.9%	10.7%	7.5%
Ts. Nyamdorj	8.2%	7.8%	7.9%	7.8%	9.6%	8.9%
Ch. Ulaan	6.7%	6.3%	7.2%	4.9%	8.7%	7.9%

The analysis of opinions covering different social groups shows once more that Elbegdorj draws about equal support from each group in society. On the other hand, politicians like Enkhbayar and Bagabandi find particularly strong acceptance among specific groups. Enkhbayar receives strong support from people who consider themselves Above Middle Class, while Bagabandi got his highest support ratings from the Disadvantaged Group at the bottom of the social ladder (see: Table 9-9).

Table 9-9: Ranking of some most prominent politicians among different social groups

	<b>Total sample 1995 to 2016</b>	<b>Percentages in groups based on respondents' social status</b>			
		<b>Above middle class</b>	<b>Middle class</b>	<b>Below middle class</b>	<b>Disadvantaged group</b>
N. Enkhbayar	29.2%	33.0%	30.3%	26.3%	25.4%
N. Bagabandi	22.4%	22.8%	22.0%	21.7%	25.1%
Ts. Elbegdorj	17.2%	17.5%	17.3%	16.6%	17.6%
R. Gonchigdorj	13.3%	12.2%	13.0%	13.5%	15.9%
B. Jargalsaikhan	12.1%	12.4%	11.5%	12.9%	13.0%
M. Enkhsaikhan	9.9%	10.4%	9.4%	10.2%	11.7%
S. Oyun	9,7%	10,3%	9,3%	10,0%	10,7%
L. Gundalai	8.5%	9.8%	7.9%	8.7%	9.3%
Ts. Nyamdorj	8.1%	10.1%	8.2%	7.8%	6.3%
Ch. Ulaan	6.6%	6.9%	7.1%	5.7%	5.8%

Data relating to the income of respondents is only available for 2008-2016, and the change that took place over the course of nearly a decade of observation led to some major changes in the list of the ten most prominent politicians. By the end of the period, two politicians who used to hold prominent positions no longer hung in with the Top-10. They are Sanjaagiin Bayar, who was prime minister in 2007-2009; Sainkhugiin Ganbaatar, who is a former leader of the Trade Union Confederation that became a member of parliament in 2012; and Erdeniin Bat-Uul, who was Mayor and Governor of capital city Ulaanbaatar in 2012-2016.

Bayar and Ganbaatar appear to be two typical cases of politicians who did not draw support from a broad base of society, but instead relied on clientele from clearly defined groups. In the case of Bayar, his support largely stemmed from the two groups with the lowest income, while only very few people in the highest income group wanted him to play an important role in politics. With Ganbaatar, the situation was completely the opposite. His major base of support was the two highest income groups, and only a few people in the lowest income group wanted him to have an important role in politics (see: Table 9-10).

Elbegdorj and Enkhbayar, who hold the most prominent positions in the rankings, are rather similar in their bases of support: both have more acceptances among the lower in-



come groups than among the wealthy.

Table 9-10: Ranking of some most prominent politicians among groups with different levels of income

	<b>Total sample 2008 to 2016</b>	<b>Percentages in groups based on respondents' estimated annual household income</b>					
		<b>less than 600000 MNT</b>	<b>600000 to &lt;1.2 m MNT</b>	<b>1.2 m to &lt;2.4 m MNT</b>	<b>2.4 m to &lt;4.8 m MNT</b>	<b>4.8 m to &lt;9.6 m MNT</b>	<b>more than 9.6 m MNT</b>
Ts. Elbegdorj	21.8%	26.3%	25.2%	22.5%	22.8%	17.6%	19.0%
N. Enkhbayar	19.2%	20.1%	20.5%	21.4%	19.1%	18.0%	14.5%
S. Bayar	16.7%	23.9%	23.9%	22.0%	16.0%	10.1%	6.0%
S. Ganbaatar	16.1%	7.5%	9.3%	11.4%	17.1%	23.4%	23.7%
N. Bagabandi	8.4%	11.2%	8.9%	8.9%	8.3%	7.6%	6.5%
S. Oyun	7.0%	9.0%	7.3%	7.1%	6.9%	6.8%	5.4%
Ts. Nyamdorj	6.9%	6.1%	9.0%	7.6%	7.1%	5.8%	4.9%
E. Bat-Uul	6.1%	4.5%	7.2%	6.5%	5.6%	5.9%	5.9%
L. Gundalai	5.2%	9.2%	7.4%	6.9%	4.8%	2.8%	1.7%
Ch. Ulaan	3.9%	3.9%	4.3%	4.4%	4.1%	3.4%	2.9%

The preferences of respondents with different political orientations are mostly in line with the politicians they want to see in prominent positions and the parties these politicians are associated with (see: Table 9-11).

Bagabandi and Bayar find their support among conservatives and traditionalists, which somehow fits the party now called the MPP (although their associations were when the party was still the MPRP).

Enkhbayar, on the other hand, finds relatively strong support among traditionalists. He is also popular among sovereign democrats, which is a political orientation that can be associated with the new MPRP that he leads as its chairman.

Elbegdorj's base is spanning across the widest spectrum of political orientations of respondents, including the idealistic democrats, the liberals and the conservatives. That somehow represents the initial (idealistic) democratic movement and the Democratic Party.

Oyun, who was chairperson of the CWP until 2017, has the strongest support among liberal-oriented respondents, which is also in line with the ideology of the party she represents.

Table 9-11: Ranking of some most prominent politicians among groups with different political orientation

	<b>Total sample 2008 to 2015</b>	<b>Percentages in groups based on age of respondents in years</b>					
		<b>Idealistic Democrats</b>	<b>Progressive Liberals</b>	<b>Passive Liberals</b>	<b>Conservatives</b>	<b>Traditionalists</b>	<b>Sovereign Democrats</b>
Ts. Elbegdorj	23.0%	25.7%	22.8%	24.1%	24.8%	20.3%	20.7%
N. Enkhbayar	18.6%	16.5%	17.0%	18.6%	17.9%	21.4%	20.1%
S. Bayar	18.5%	15.9%	18.8%	17.9%	23.0%	17.4%	17.9%
S. Ganbaatar	15.1%	14.2%	15.7%	16.3%	12.1%	16.1%	15.7%
N. Bagabandi	8.9%	7.7%	7.9%	9.0%	8.4%	10.9%	9.2%
S. Oyun	7.4%	7.3%	8.6%	8.2%	7.4%	6.5%	6.7%
Ts. Nyamdorj	7.2%	6.0%	7.0%	6.9%	8.2%	7.3%	7.8%
E. Bat-Uul	6.3%	7.7%	7.5%	6.5%	6.1%	5.2%	4.7%
L. Gundalai	5.6%	6.3%	6.5%	6.4%	5.4%	4.9%	4.1%
B. Jargalsaikhan	4.0%	4.1%	5.0%	3.3%	3.2%	3.7%	5.1%

### 9.3 Detailed Statistics for Some Prominent Individuals Whom Respondents want to Play an Important Role in Politics

This section provided more detailed analysis of a select number of prominent individuals who ranked in the TOP-10 at some time over the past two decades. This material is supplementary to the summaries found previously in this chapter.

For each person discussed is analysis of some individual statistics regarding demographics, social characteristics and the economic or political aspects that are relevant to these individuals who respondents believe should hold prominent roles in politics. This data will be compared with the data of the overall sample from a specific year to determine which groups in society are proportionally over- or underrepresented among the followers of a given politician.

The annual statistics for the general sample used for these comparisons are attached as Annex 9.4, at the end of this chapter. The following subsections examine individuals by alphabetical order, without consideration of ranking:

#### 9.3.1: Rinchinnyamyn AMARJARGAL

#### 9.3.2: Tsakhiagiin ELBEGDORJ

9.3.3: Nambaryn ENKHBAYAR

9.3.4: Sainkhuugiin GANBAATAR

9.3.5: Sanjaasurengiin OYUN

9.3.6: Chultemiin ULAAN

This section covers the major representatives of each relevant political party—small and large—as well as independents. The politicians discussed vary in age. It’s also noteworthy that while Oyun was included as one of the very few women who reached a prominent role in Mongolian politics, for a long time she was the only female appearing at the TOP-10.

The people who want these politicians to have important roles in politics also cover a broad spectrum, as is shown in the statistics below. As in all other parts of this study, the analysis is based on findings and conclusions resulting from the polls conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation over the past two decades.

This chapter dealing with prominent personalities in politics also includes the views of the politicians themselves, which gives a window into the thinking of their supporters. What do the people identified in the polls as Mongolia’s most prominent politicians think about the transformations process and the challenges it presented? Where do politicians see their roles leading and what concerns them?

The Sant Maral Foundation has, therefore, asked these most-prominent politicians the following questions:


- What was the most major political event in Mongolia since 1991?
- What is the major challenge facing Mongolia today?
- How do you see your future political activity and how will it contribute in dealing with that major challenge?

The responses received from politicians are presented below in clearly marked inserts at the beginning of each of the following sections in this chapter.

### 9.3.1 Rinchinnyamyn AMARJARGAL

Rinchinnyamyn Amarjargal (Mongolian Ринчиннямын Амаржаргал; born 1961) was Prime Minister of Mongolia from July 30, 1999 to July 26, 2000.			
Total percentage points accumulated during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	96.1 %	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 17 of 39
Number of years between 1995 and 2016 when listed among the TOP-10 . . . . .	5 years	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 14 of 39
Average rank in the TOP-10 when among them during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	7.6	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 22 of 39

Table 9-12: Percentage shares of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person whom they want to play an important role in politics (figures are highlighted the years when Amarjargal was among TOP-10)



Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

## Rinchinyamyn Amarjargal (Ринчиннямьн Амаржаргал)



### 20th Prime Minister of Mongolia

#### In office

30 July 1999 - 26 July 2000

### Member of the State Great Khural

#### In office

1996-2000, 2004-2008, 2008-2012, 2012-2016

#### Education

1982 Diploma in financial economy in Plekhanov Russian University of Economics in Moscow

1995 *Master of Science in Macroeconomic Policy and Planning* University of Bradford, West Yorkshire. During his state visit in England in March 2000, the university granted him an honorary doctorate.

2003 Visiting research fellow at the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in Japan

#### Political party

Democratic Party

#### Political career

Leading member of the Democratic Party

Founding member of the *New Progress-Union and the National Progress-Party*, later he helped to merge those with other parties to form the National Democratic Party (MNDP).

1996-2000 elected member of the State Great Khural

1998 Foreign minister

1999 Chairman of MNDP

30 July 1999 - 26 July 2000 Prime Minister of Mongolia

2004-2008 elected to the parliament as an independent candidate

2008-2012 elected member of the State Great Khural

2012-2016 elected member of the State Great Khural

### Personal details

#### Born

2 February 1961 Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia

#### Spouse/Children

Married, 2 children

#### Languages

Russian, English

**Views of Rinchinyamyn AMARJARGAL**  
**regarding major political events and challenges**

- *There is Vladimir Lenin's saying, "Politics is the concentrated economy". From this point of view, the major political event in Mongolia since 1991 have been three economic crises: from 1990 to 1992, from 2008 to 2009 and the third lasting from 2013 until today. Those three crises became a real challenge for the Mongolian political system, decision-making institutions, the knowledge and skills of politicians, economic resources and budgetary discipline. What was learned from overcoming these crises was a lesson for Mongolian politics and strongly influenced the formation of the foundation of political system.*

- *To restore the confidence in the state. It is quite common today that the people on the state decision-making level with the loudest voices and strongest pushing power can propel personal interests while state interests are put aside. This is a sign of the loss of accountability. Because of that, we are observing a loss of confidence in the state from the population, business community, and local and foreign investors.*

*Also, the civil service is filled with people who not only are without public servant ethics, but education as well. Most of them reached the decision-making or implementation level through the back door or by carrying their bosses' cases. Because of that, we need to build an accountability system; strengthen discipline and order; we should clean up the civil service; and, in connection to that, we need to reform parties. Then the faith in the state will be restored.*

- *All my political words and actions have addressed the aforementioned problems. I raised these issues, focused the public's attention on them and proposed solutions. I will continue to do the same in the future.*

Table 9-13: Ages of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
18 - 24	32.6%	16.7%	45.8%	28.9%	25.4%	19.1%	26.2%	17.2%	21.5%	15.4%	8.5%
25 - 29	13.0%	37.5%	20.8%	22.2%	22.3%	16.0%	21.0%	15.3%	15.7%	15.4%	17.0%
30 - 39	28.3%	29.2%	16.7%	28.9%	26.5%	31.3%	20.5%	35.0%	23.1%	27.1%	28.7%
40 - 49	21.7%	8.3%	12.5%	12.2%	13.3%	20.1%	23.8%	21.2%	27.3%	23.8%	28.7%
50 - 59	0.0%	8.3%	4.2%	4.4%	8.0%	7.6%	4.3%	6.9%	6.6%	8.9%	10.6%
60 or more	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	4.5%	6.0%	4.3%	4.4%	5.8%	9.3%	6.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	8.8%	6.9%	3.0%	12.5%	10.5%	0.0%	5.9%	8.0%	0.0%	13.6%	3.2%
25 - 29	7.1%	16.8%	18.2%	6.8%	21.1%	0.0%	5.9%	4.0%	0.0%	4.5%	11.3%
30 - 39	28.3%	31.7%	27.3%	26.1%	26.3%	23.1%	29.4%	16.0%	35.7%	18.2%	17.7%
40 - 49	28.3%	27.7%	24.2%	27.3%	15.8%	30.8%	17.6%	12.0%	14.3%	22.7%	24.2%
50 - 59	17.7%	12.9%	12.1%	12.5%	10.5%	30.8%	41.2%	24.0%	42.9%	22.7%	25.8%
60 or more	9.7%	4.0%	15.2%	14.8%	15.8%	15.4%	0.0%	36.0%	7.1%	18.2%	17.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-96</i>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
18 - 24	6.7	-4.9	23.7	5.4	0.2	-0.1	5.9	-2.2	2.5	-2.9	-6.8
25 - 29	-6.0	18.8	1.0	3.6	4.8	1.3	5.2	2.4	0.9	2.1	2.1
30 - 39	5.0	0.6	-8.7	3.6	0.4	3.4	-6.2	5.9	-5.1	1.6	0.5
40 - 49	5.4	-8.5	-5.0	-3.5	-2.7	-0.2	3.0	-0.3	5.8	0.8	5.1
50 - 59	-9.6	0.5	-5.3	-6.5	-1.4	-3.5	-5.1	-3.4	-2.8	-1.7	-0.3
60 or more	-1.5	-6.5	-5.6	-2.5	-1.4	-1.0	-2.8	-2.3	-1.3	0.1	-0.6
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	-5.0	-7.1	-10.2	-1.8	-4.9	-12.4	-5.6	-3.4	-10.6	2.8	-9.9
25 - 29	-5.6	1.1	4.4	-3.7	9.8	-10.5	-6.1	-5.9	-9.5	-6.8	-0.3
30 - 39	-2.4	4.6	1.5	0.1	0.2	-0.9	5.7	-6.8	15.0	-1.5	-7.3
40 - 49	4.3	3.6	2.1	4.6	-6.2	6.5	-4.8	-10.3	-6.9	0.2	2.4
50 - 59	6.3	1.6	-1.5	-0.9	-2.8	15.5	25.8	4.5	21.4	2.3	10.5
60 or more	2.4	-3.7	3.6	1.6	4.0	1.8	-15.0	21.8	-9.4	3.0	4.7

The average ages of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person with an important role in politics each year during the last decade was:

<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
39.0	42.5	42.3	39.0	48.1	43.4	51.0	48.4	44.6	46.9

People who named Amarjargal as a person who should have an important role in politics are generally older than average. Figure 9 1 shows the difference between these respondents and the general average of the sample (in comparison with data from Table 9 96).

Figure 9-1: Deviation of the average ages of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics from the averages of the general sample (difference in years)






Table 9-14: Gender division of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Male	47.8%	58.3%	50.0%	44.4%	45.1%	46.7%	47.6%	43.8%	38.8%	48.6%	38.3%
Female	52.2%	41.7%	50.0%	55.6%	54.9%	53.3%	52.4%	56.2%	61.2%	51.4%	61.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Male	52.2%	47.5%	39.4%	36.4%	63.2%	46.2%	35.3%	60.0%	50.0%	50.0%	61.3%
Female	47.8%	52.5%	60.6%	63.6%	36.8%	53.8%	64.7%	40.0%	50.0%	50.0%	38.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-97</i></b>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Male	-2.2	6.8	-1.5	-4.5	-1.8	-3.8	-2.9	-3.5	-7.6	1.1	-3.7
Female	2.2	-6.8	1.5	4.5	1.8	3.8	2.9	3.5	7.6	-1.1	3.7
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Male	5.5	-1.2	-9.1	-11.9	14.5	-3.4	-15.6	12.3	4.5	2.0	4.5
Female	-5.5	1.2	9.1	11.9	-14.5	3.4	15.6	-12.3	-4.5	-2.0	-4.5

There does not appear to be a preference between men and women for this person. The differences in the proportion of males and females wanting Amarjargal to have an important role in politics looks rather coincidental because there are marginal differences that change in both directions (see: Table 9-14).

The data in Table 9-15 does, however, show a stronger base of support for Amarjargal in Ulaanbaatar while his support in rural areas is relatively low.

Table 9-15: Places of residence of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Urban	100%	100%	100%	100%	77.7%	53.2%	60.5%	46.8%	56.2%	57.5%	58.5%
Rural	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	22.3%	46.8%	39.5%	53.2%	43.8%	42.5%	41.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Urban	65.5%	63.4%	54.5%	45.5%	57.9%	23.1%	35.3%	52.0%	50.0%	63.6%	48.4%
Rural	34.5%	36.6%	45.5%	54.5%	42.1%	76.9%	64.7%	48.0%	50.0%	36.4%	51.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-98</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Urban	-	-	-	-	-5.6	-1.5	16.0	2.9	5.6	13.1	13.6
Rural	-	-	-	-	5.6	1.5	-16.0	-2.9	-5.6	-13.1	-13.6
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Urban	22.3	21.5	10.2	3.6	16.7	-16.8	5.0	10.2	6.5	21.0	7.8
Rural	-22.3	-21.5	-10.2	-3.6	-16.7	16.8	-5.0	-10.2	-6.5	-21.0	-7.8

Amarjargal, in 21 of the 22 years that the Sant Maral Foundation has run polls, received an over-representation of respondents with higher education who named him as one who should play an important role in politics (see: Table 9-16). Table 9-17 shows a similar over-representation of intelligentsia among his supporters. In some years, this over-representation is so strong that his support in these groups was twice the average.

Chapter 4 covers the changing role of the intelligentsia in Mongolia, and how this group has been gradually grown smaller in surveys in the last decade. This development would also affect Amarjargal’s base of support. The growth in the number of self-employed people, mentioned in Chapter 4, does not compensate for the dwindling support base from the intelligentsia because Amarjargal does not find much support among the self-employed. In some years, only half the average of votes came from that group.

The relatively low support from workers also shown in Table 9-17 is another expression of Amarjargal’s under-representation of support from less-educated respondents. Likewise, his low support in rural also reflects the small number of nomads who want Amarjargal to play an important role in politics. Only around the time when Amarjargal held the post of prime minister did he also attract substantial support from a broader spectrum of society.

Amarjargal’s strongest support comes from people who work for the state sector, particularly in the state services (see: Table 9-18). Support from the private sector is less than average, which confirms the weak support from the self-employed respondents who played a vital part for the private sector.

Table 9-16: Levels of education of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Low education level	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	18.6%	20.7%	19.0%	11.3%	15.7%	13.6%	9.6%
Secondary education	63.0%	37.5%	58.3%	42.2%	42.8%	45.4%	45.2%	43.3%	39.7%	32.7%	41.5%
Higher education	37.0%	62.5%	41.7%	55.6%	38.6%	34.0%	35.7%	45.3%	44.6%	53.7%	48.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Low education level	15.0%	7.9%	12.1%	23.9%	31.6%	30.8%	17.6%	12.0%	7.1%	13.6%	8.1%
Secondary education	34.5%	39.6%	39.4%	38.6%	21.1%	38.5%	47.1%	36.0%	42.9%	27.3%	40.3%
Higher education	50.4%	52.5%	48.5%	37.5%	47.4%	30.8%	35.3%	52.0%	50.0%	59.1%	51.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-99</i></b>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Low education level	-5.9	-11.6	-17.0	-15.9	0.9	0.4	-6.0	-9.0	-7.2	-10.6	-12.5
Secondary education	4.1	-19.7	9.1	-2.8	-2.8	1.5	2.1	-0.7	-1.7	-9.6	-0.1
Higher education	1.8	31.3	7.9	18.8	1.9	-1.9	3.9	9.8	8.9	20.2	12.6
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Low education level	-7.7	-15.9	-15.5	-5.3	4.3	1.8	-14.0	-23.8	-24.3	-11.9	-10.9
Secondary education	-7.3	0.9	-3.9	-3.7	-25.9	-6.7	3.8	-2.1	-0.1	-21.0	-12.9
Higher education	15.0	14.9	19.4	9.0	21.6	4.9	10.2	25.9	24.4	32.9	23.8

Table 9-17: Occupations of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Workers	22.2%	23.1%	24.7%	25.9%	24.8%	16.3%	19.2%	17.2%	18.2%	25.3%
Clerical staff	55.6%	56.9%	31.6%	24.5%	20.3%	25.3%	23.2%	21.9%	20.8%	14.7%
Self-employed	22.2%	20.0%	26.4%	14.0%	20.9%	18.7%	17.2%	21.4%	24.7%	21.1%
Nomads / farmers	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%	7.8%	4.6%	5.4%	8.1%	5.2%	5.2%	4.2%
Intelligentsia	-	-	13.8%	27.8%	29.4%	34.3%	32.3%	34.4%	31.2%	34.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Workers	24.1%	29.2%	31.9%	31.3%	28.6%	18.8%	41.2%	55.6%	20.0%	31.7%
Clerical staff	27.7%	16.7%	21.7%	6.3%	28.6%	37.5%	5.9%	22.2%	20.0%	24.4%
Self-employed	18.1%	29.2%	23.2%	12.5%	42.9%	25.0%	17.6%	11.1%	46.7%	22.0%
Nomads / farmers	6.0%	0.0%	7.2%	12.5%	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	6.7%	2.4%
Intelligentsia	24.1%	25.0%	15.9%	37.5%	0.0%	6.3%	35.3%	11.1%	6.7%	19.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-100</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Workers	-9.9	-6.3	2.1	1.1	-5.2	-10.0	-4.7	-9.3	-8.1	-3.2
Clerical staff	11.3	8.4	-2.7	-0.4	0.6	1.4	6.2	1.8	0.5	-2.6
Self-employed	3.7	-1.4	-0.1	-1.3	0.8	1.1	-7.1	1.2	0.4	-3.7
Nomads / farmers	-5.0	-0.7	-0.3	-0.6	-3.5	-2.7	-0.5	-4.7	-1.1	-4.3
Intelligentsia	-	-	1.1	1.3	7.3	10.1	6.1	10.9	8.4	13.8
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Workers	-5.8	-6.6	0.4	-5.7	-5.9	-16.5	7.4	11.7	-19.6	-14.4
Clerical staff	7.0	-1.1	3.9	-10.2	14.0	23.6	-6.7	11.4	2.9	11.0
Self-employed	-3.5	9.2	-0.9	-7.5	14.1	-0.1	-16.3	-16.5	14.3	-0.9
Nomads / farmers	-4.7	-15.2	-6.3	-4.6	-13.0	-4.2	-10.3	-7.9	-0.7	-8.0
Intelligentsia	7.1	13.7	2.8	28.1	-9.1	-2.8	26.0	1.4	3.0	12.3

Table 9-18: Sectors of employment of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
State officers	12.5%	12.5%	11.2%	15.6%	14.9%	16.8%	16.4%	9.8%	8.5%	11.3%
State service	37.5%	28.6%	29.6%	33.5%	34.7%	30.1%	22.4%	21.3%	32.2%	18.8%
Private/mixed sector	50.0%	37.5%	40.0%	35.5%	36.4%	38.9%	47.8%	50.0%	49.2%	56.3%
NGO	0.0%	21.4%	19.2%	15.4%	14.0%	14.2%	13.4%	18.9%	10.2%	13.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
State officers	9.3%	9.5%	3.3%	14.3%	0.0%	20.0%	6.7%	0.0%	13.3%	7.3%
State service	37.3%	33.3%	25.0%	21.4%	42.9%	20.0%	20.0%	55.6%	20.0%	34.1%
Private/mixed sector	38.7%	57.1%	61.7%	57.1%	57.1%	60.0%	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%	56.1%
NGO	14.7%	0.0%	10.0%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	6.7%	11.1%	0.0%	2.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-101</i>										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
State officers	-14.2	-3.3	2.7	0.2	-0.6	4.3	3.8	-3.6	-3.4	1.2
State service	9.8	-5.4	-0.2	1.5	4.9	-3.6	-3.4	-5.5	2.7	-1.5
Private/mixed sector	4.3	1.9	-2.8	-3.2	-1.1	1.7	0.9	6.4	2.6	3.0
NGO	0.0	6.8	0.2	1.5	-3.2	-2.4	-1.4	2.8	-1.9	-2.7
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
State officers	-0.5	1.7	-6.6	6.1	-6.4	12.5	-3.1	-5.6	1.5	0.3
State service	10.7	9.1	2.3	0.5	23.1	0.7	1.9	32.1	2.2	12.4
Private/mixed sector	-11.7	-3.4	2.3	-8.6	-12.4	-8.4	-0.3	-31.0	-1.0	-10.8
NGO	1.5	-7.4	2.1	2.0	-4.3	-4.8	1.5	4.5	-2.7	-1.9

Amarjargal's greater-than-average support stems from the Middle Class social group, who are over-represented during most of the period under observation (see: Table 9-19). This applies also to the middle-income group.

Although the incomes in absolute figures in Table 9-21 show some over-representation of the top income group, this may be due to inflation and the general rise in incomes mentioned in Chapter 7. When observing the relative incomes shown in Table 9-20, and in Figure 9-3, it becomes apparent that Amarjargal in 2013 had a large over-representation of support from the top income group. The two middle-income groups are over represented among Amarjargal's supporters in 2014-2016<sup>31</sup>.

31 Income figures are only available for a limited number of years and the diagrams shown in this analysis may be partly affected by the small size of samples in some years; the diagram may be distorted when these small samples are disaggregated.

Table 9-19: Social statuses of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	0.0%	8.1%	7.7%	10.1%	10.8%	8.8%	15.2%	11.8%	9.9%	14.7%
Middle class	60.0%	57.0%	61.5%	54.1%	56.4%	61.1%	50.0%	55.9%	53.8%	41.3%
Below middle class	40.0%	19.8%	30.8%	20.2%	22.1%	20.7%	24.1%	18.6%	16.5%	27.5%
Disadvantaged group	0.0%	15.1%	0.0%	15.6%	10.8%	9.3%	10.7%	13.7%	19.8%	16.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	16.3%	18.2%	10.3%	5.3%	7.7%	11.8%	8.0%	7.7%	13.6%	3.2%
Middle class	58.2%	48.5%	67.8%	63.2%	46.2%	70.6%	84.0%	69.2%	63.6%	80.6%
Below middle class	14.3%	27.3%	14.9%	31.6%	30.8%	17.6%	8.0%	23.1%	22.7%	16.1%
Disadvantaged group	11.2%	6.1%	6.9%	0.0%	15.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-102</i></b>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	-9.1	1.4	-1.5	-0.7	-0.8	-4.1	3.1	-0.9	-2.1	-0.8
Middle class	17.0	7.2	11.9	-0.7	-0.5	6.8	-8.8	-1.8	-0.9	-11.5
Below middle class	14.6	-4.4	6.3	-0.0	1.8	1.0	5.5	0.3	-3.2	8.3
Disadvantaged group	-22.6	-4.2	-16.6	1.5	-0.5	-3.7	0.3	2.4	6.1	4.0
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	-0.0	7.6	-0.8	-3.3	1.1	3.3	-2.5	-2.6	2.0	-3.7
Middle class	1.7	-8.1	9.7	9.6	-11.3	9.7	13.5	9.2	6.7	6.6
Below middle class	-3.0	4.8	-5.4	3.0	3.1	-4.8	-7.0	-1.0	-2.6	-0.2
Disadvantaged group	1.4	-4.3	-3.4	-9.3	7.0	-8.2	-4.1	-5.6	-6.0	-2.7

Figure 9-2: Social statuses of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics




Table 9-20: Relative incomes of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

		People whose income is less than 60 % of average	People whose income is below average, but more than 60 % of average	People whose income is above average, but less than 150 % of average	People whose income is more than 150 % of average
2013	Supporters of Amarjargal	16%	24%	8%	52%
	Average of total sample	38%	25%	19%	18%
2014	Supporters of Amarjargal	21%	43%	29%	7%
	Average of total sample	31%	34%	18%	17%
2015	Supporters of Amarjargal	10%	55%	20%	15%
	Average of total sample	34%	29%	21%	16%
2016	Supporters of Amarjargal	16%	36%	24%	24%
	Average of total sample	32%	31%	24%	13%

Figure 9-3: Relative incomes of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics compared with total samples (2013-2016)




Table 9-21: Estimated annual household incomes of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	6.5%	10.2%	5.3%	0.0%	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	22.6%	26.1%	31.6%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	35.5%	30.7%	31.6%	41.7%	12.5%	4.0%	21.4%	5.0%	0.0%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	35.5%	20.5%	15.8%	33.3%	31.3%	12.0%	0.0%	5.0%	9.7%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	0.0%	10.2%	10.5%	16.7%	43.8%	32.0%	57.1%	55.0%	41.9%
9.6 m MNT or more	0.0%	2.3%	5.3%	0.0%	6.3%	52.0%	21.4%	35.0%	48.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-103</b>									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	-4.7	-0.2	-3.6	-3.0	3.0	-1.6	-1.0	-2.4	-1.3
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	-1.5	1.0	10.2	-4.6	-13.1	-2.2	-1.8	-0.6	-0.8
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	3.1	0.4	-1.6	5.7	-13.8	-7.2	15.5	1.5	-3.0
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	12.1	-1.5	-7.8	2.5	0.1	-13.1	-23.5	-12.7	-8.3
9.6 m MNT or more	-7.6	0.2	-0.7	2.2	24.6	-3.7	15.7	14.6	1.0




The political orientation of Amarjargal’s supporters may not be surprising. They are mainly supporters of the Democratic Party and among them there are idealistic democrats and progressive liberals who are over-represented among supporters of this party (see: Table 9-22, Table 9-23)<sup>32</sup>.

Table 9-22: Political orientations of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	21.2%	13.6%	21.1%	23.1%	7.7%	20.0%	21.4%	18.2%
Progressive Liberals	12.1%	14.8%	26.3%	15.4%	30.8%	28.0%	28.6%	27.3%
Passive Liberals	24.2%	20.5%	10.5%	23.1%	7.7%	20.0%	0.0%	9.1%
Conservatives	30.3%	13.6%	15.8%	15.4%	23.1%	8.0%	0.0%	13.6%
Traditionalists	9.1%	21.6%	5.3%	7.7%	23.1%	16.0%	35.7%	13.6%
Sovereign Democrats	3.0%	15.9%	21.1%	15.4%	7.7%	8.0%	14.3%	18.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-104</i></b>								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	5.4	-0.2	2.6	2.3	-7.6	4.1	7.9	0.2
Progressive Liberals	-6.0	-3.6	6.9	0.4	12.7	12.4	15.1	12.7
Passive Liberals	9.1	2.7	-7.3	5.9	-9.4	2.9	-18.4	-7.5
Conservatives	7.3	-7.2	6.1	-0.1	8.5	-6.3	-15.4	-4.1
Traditionalists	-7.6	1.8	-12.1	-6.5	2.7	-3.6	12.4	-7.5
Sovereign Democrats	-8.3	6.5	3.8	-1.9	-6.9	-9.5	-1.7	6.1

Figure 9-4: Political orientations of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics



32 Amarjargal was Chairman of the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP), one of the predecessors of the Democratic Party at a time when MNDP and MSDP had formed a coalition that later led to the merger of the parties.

Table 9-23: Favoured political party of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	20.5%	8.3%	18.2%	33.8%	40.6%	36.8%	24.6%	16.6%	24.2%	33.3%	28.7%
DP	68.2%	83.3%	54.5%	46.8%	35.4%	38.8%	53.8%	52.1%	48.5%	17.7%	25.3%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	2.7%	1.8%	9.8%	4.0%	6.6%	10.3%
Other or no party	11.4%	8.3%	27.3%	19.5%	24.0%	21.7%	19.9%	21.5%	23.2%	42.4%	35.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	16.1%	9.0%	6.1%	11.4%	26.3%	7.7%	0.0%	4.0%	14.3%	9.1%	19.4%
DP	26.8%	39.0%	27.3%	40.9%	5.3%	23.1%	41.2%	48.0%	21.4%	36.4%	24.2%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.9%	0.0%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%
CWP - Green	13.4%	10.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Other or no party	43.8%	42.0%	66.7%	47.7%	63.2%	69.2%	52.9%	48.0%	57.1%	54.5%	56.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-105</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-19.9	-29.9	-24.3	-13.1	-15.4	-16.9	-28.6	-29.5	-24.0	-22.5	-21.5
DP	14.8	29.1	10.9	11.9	15.6	17.0	27.1	23.6	22.1	4.3	5.7
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	-0.3	-0.9	1.7	-4.4	2.0	4.8
Other or no party	5.2	0.7	13.4	1.3	-0.2	0.3	2.4	4.2	6.2	16.2	10.9
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-16.6	-23.9	-21.1	-17.4	4.3	-14.3	-21.0	-13.3	-3.2	-9.5	-0.5
DP	-0.7	8.2	6.2	11.8	-17.1	2.9	20.4	20.6	-10.2	20.9	8.2
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.4	-8.5	0.9	-8.1	-8.6
CWP - Green	8.2	4.3	-2.6	-1.8	3.0	-3.5	-1.5	-1.5	-0.7	-1.0	-1.1
Other or no party	9.1	11.4	17.6	7.4	9.9	15.0	2.5	2.7	13.1	-2.3	2.0

Amarjargal lacks strong representative support from people with a pronounced sense of national pride who would fit the criteria of the traditionalist political orientation (see: Table 9-24). No preferences are apparent when factoring religious beliefs (see: Table 9-25).

Table 9-24: National pride of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	74.2%	78.2%	84.2%	92.3%	92.3%	95.8%	100%	81.8%	93.5%
Rather proud	9.7%	17.2%	10.5%	7.7%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	18.2%	4.8%
Not that proud	6.5%	4.6%	5.3%	0.0%	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%
Not proud at all	9.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-107</i></b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	-6.7	-8.0	-3.1	2.3	-0.5	2.4	6.3	-10.0	-1.3
Rather proud	-4.7	5.3	0.2	-0.3	1.5	-5.7	-5.6	12.2	0.8
Not that proud	2.9	2.9	3.4	-1.4	-0.6	3.8	-0.5	-1.5	0.8
Not proud at all	8.4	-0.3	-0.5	-0.5	-0.3	-0.5	-0.1	-0.7	-0.3


Table 9-25: Religious belief of respondents who named Amarjargal as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No confession	21.2%	26.1%	31.6%	23.1%	35.3%	36.0%	7.1%	40.9%	37.1%
Buddhism	60.6%	67.0%	63.2%	76.9%	41.2%	48.0%	71.4%	50.0%	56.5%
Christianity	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.0%	0.0%	4.5%	0.0%
Islam / Muslim	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Shamanism	6.1%	3.4%	5.3%	0.0%	17.6%	4.0%	14.3%	4.5%	6.5%
Other	12.1%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.0%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-106</i></b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No confession	-12.8	-13.7	-4.9	-12.5	-0.3	1.3	-26.8	7.8	-1.8
Buddhism	0.7	14.7	8.3	21.0	-12.3	-10.1	14.7	-11.0	1.5
Christianity	-2.5	-1.7	-2.8	-3.0	-1.9	1.8	-1.7	3.1	-0.9
Islam / Muslim	-0.2	0.1	-0.6	-0.5	1.5	3.1	-0.5	0.0	-0.4
Shamanism	4.4	0.5	0.5	-4.3	13.7	0.5	8.4	0.4	2.0
Other	10.3	0.1	-0.6	-0.7	-0.7	3.5	5.9	-0.2	-0.4

### 9.3.2 Tsakhiagiin ELBEGDORJ

Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj (Mongolian: Цахиагийн Элбэгдорж, born 1963) has been President of Mongolia since 2009. He served as Prime Minister in 1998 and again in 2004-2006.			
Total percentage points accumulated during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	397.7 %	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 3 of 39
Number of years between 1995 and 2016 when listed among the TOP-10 . . . . .	17 years	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 3 of 39
Average rank in the TOP-10 when among them during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	3.0	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 3 of 39

Table 9-26: Percentage share of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person whom they want to play an important role in politics (figures are highlighted the years when Elbegdorj was among TOP-10 in that year)



Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

**Tsakhiaigiin Elbegdorj (Цахиагийн Элбэгдорж)**



**4th President of Mongolia**

**In office**

18 June 2009 – 10 July 2017

**18th Prime Minister of Mongolia**

**In office**

20 August 2004 – 13 January 2006

23 April 1998 – 9 December 1998

**Member of the State Great Khural**

**In office**

1990-1992, 1992-1996, 1996-2000, 2008

**Education**

1988 Bachelor's degree in journalism, L'viv Polytechnic National University, Ukraine

2000 – 2001 University of Colorado Boulder's Economic Institute

2002 Master of Public Administration (MPA), Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, USA

**Political party**

Democratic Party

**Political career**

One of the key leaders of the 1990 Mongolian democratic revolution

1988 – 1990 Correspondent at Ulaan Od-newspaper of the Mongolian Armed Forces

1990 - 1992 elected member of the People's Congress

1992 co-drafted and co-adopted Mongolia's new Constitution

1992 - 1996 elected member of the State Great Khural

1996 - 2000 elected member of the State Great Khural

1996 – 2000 Chairman of the Democratic Union Coalition

1996 – 2000 Majority Leader of the State Great Khural

1996 – 1998 Vice Speaker of the Parliament

1998 Prime Minister of Mongolia

2002 – 2003 Consultant at the Millennium Development Goal Project, United Nations Headquarters in New York City

2004 – 2006 Prime Minister of Mongolia

2008 elected member of the State Great Khural

2009 – 2013 elected President of Mongolia  
2013 – 2017 elected President of Mongolia

#### Personal details

<b>Born</b>	30 March 1963 Khovd aimag, Mongolia
<b>Spouse/Children</b>	Married, Khajidsurengiin Bolormaa, 25 children (4 sons of their own and 21 adopted children)
<b>Languages</b>	<u>Russian</u> , English

Table 9-27: Ages of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
18 - 24	29.4%	20.5%	19.3%	24.5%	17.5%	16.3%	19.0%	15.8%	13.8%	15.3%	16.1%
25 - 29	23.1%	19.8%	23.2%	17.7%	18.8%	16.9%	16.0%	13.9%	10.3%	11.8%	12.6%
30 - 39	22.7%	32.1%	24.6%	28.6%	26.3%	31.4%	36.0%	39.6%	36.6%	29.7%	30.0%
40 - 49	14.7%	13.1%	19.3%	13.2%	18.8%	20.9%	16.0%	17.8%	28.4%	27.5%	25.3%
50 - 59	5.9%	7.7%	8.3%	8.6%	12.5%	9.3%	4.0%	6.9%	6.9%	7.9%	9.4%
60 or more	4.2%	6.8%	5.3%	7.3%	6.3%	5.2%	9.0%	5.9%	3.9%	7.8%	6.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	13.0%	15.0%	16.4%	16.6%	16.6%	12.2%	15.8%	15.1%	10.8%	10.5%	10.4%
25 - 29	14.4%	14.9%	14.3%	11.8%	12.3%	9.8%	13.1%	11.3%	8.8%	13.2%	13.0%
30 - 39	31.8%	28.7%	28.3%	26.8%	26.6%	31.7%	23.9%	19.2%	17.9%	22.4%	26.0%
40 - 49	26.5%	26.9%	23.4%	24.3%	23.1%	26.8%	23.7%	23.8%	21.3%	23.7%	20.8%
50 - 59	10.6%	8.7%	11.2%	11.5%	12.3%	12.2%	13.7%	16.6%	26.7%	17.1%	14.3%
60 or more	3.7%	5.8%	6.5%	8.9%	9.0%	7.3%	9.8%	14.0%	14.6%	13.2%	15.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-96</i></b>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
18 - 24	3.5	-1.0	-2.9	1.1	-7.7	-2.9	-1.3	-3.6	-5.2	-3.1	0.8
25 - 29	4.1	1.1	3.5	-0.9	1.2	2.2	0.2	1.0	-4.5	-1.4	-2.4
30 - 39	-0.6	3.5	-0.8	3.3	0.2	3.6	9.4	10.5	8.4	4.2	1.8
40 - 49	-1.7	-3.7	1.8	-2.5	2.8	0.7	-4.8	-3.7	7.0	4.5	1.6
50 - 59	-3.6	-0.1	-1.1	-2.3	3.2	-1.8	-5.4	-3.4	-2.5	-2.7	-1.5
60 or more	-1.7	0.3	-0.4	1.4	0.3	-1.7	1.9	-0.8	-3.2	-1.4	-0.3
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	-0.8	1.0	3.2	2.3	1.1	-0.2	4.3	3.7	0.2	-0.3	-2.8
25 - 29	1.7	-0.8	0.5	1.3	1.0	-0.7	1.1	1.4	-0.8	1.8	1.4
30 - 39	1.0	1.6	2.5	0.8	0.5	7.7	0.2	-3.6	-2.8	2.7	0.9
40 - 49	2.5	2.8	1.3	1.6	1.2	2.6	1.3	1.5	0.1	1.2	-1.0
50 - 59	-0.9	-2.6	-2.4	-1.9	-1.0	-3.0	-1.6	-2.9	5.2	-3.4	-1.0
60 or more	-3.6	-1.9	-5.0	-4.2	-2.8	-6.3	-5.1	-0.2	-1.9	-2.0	2.5

The average ages of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person who should have an important role in politics each year during the last decade was:

<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
37.7	37.8	39.0	39.0	39.2	39.8	41.9	44.3	41.9	41.7

People who named Elbegdorj as a person who should have an important role in politics are generally younger than the average. Figure 9-5 shows the difference between these respondents and the general average of the sample (comparison with data from Table 9-96).

Figure 9-5: Deviation of average ages of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics from average of general sample (difference in years)






Table 9-28: Gender division of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Male	51.4%	52.5%	56.1%	53.2%	65.0%	51.2%	63.0%	52.5%	44.8%	48.3%	39.6%
Female	48.6%	47.5%	43.9%	46.8%	35.0%	48.8%	37.0%	47.5%	55.2%	51.7%	60.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Male	47.7%	48.9%	50.7%	47.6%	50.8%	45.4%	54.1%	47.2%	47.5%	42.1%	49.4%
Female	52.3%	51.1%	49.3%	52.4%	49.2%	54.6%	45.9%	52.8%	52.5%	57.9%	50.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-97</i>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Male	1.4	1.0	4.6	4.2	18.1	0.7	12.5	5.2	-1.6	0.8	-2.4
Female	-1.4	-1.0	-4.6	-4.2	-18.1	-0.7	-12.5	-5.2	1.6	-0.8	2.4
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Male	1.0	0.2	2.2	-0.6	2.1	-4.2	3.1	-0.5	2.0	-5.9	-7.4
Female	-1.0	-0.2	-2.2	0.6	-2.1	4.2	-3.1	0.5	-2.0	5.9	7.4

In most years, more men than women selected Elbegdorj as someone who should have an important role in politics (see: Table 9-28). This may be related to the fact that throughout the whole of the 1995-2016 period, Elbegdorj received an over-representation of support from rural residents (see: Table 9-29).

Table 9-29: Places of residence of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Urban	100%	100%	100%	100%	65.0%	29.1%	36.0%	27.7%	47.8%	45.7%	40.8%
Rural	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	35.0%	70.9%	64.0%	72.3%	52.2%	54.3%	59.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Urban	42.7%	40.1%	57.5%	38.9%	32.9%	34.6%	32.2%	43.8%	42.5%	47.4%	35.1%
Rural	57.3%	59.9%	42.5%	61.1%	67.1%	65.4%	67.8%	56.2%	57.5%	52.6%	64.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-98</i>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Urban	-	-	-	-	-18.2	-25.6	-8.5	-16.2	-2.8	1.4	-4.2
Rural	-	-	-	-	18.2	25.6	8.5	16.2	2.8	-1.4	4.2
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Urban	-0.5	-1.8	13.1	-2.9	-8.2	-5.3	1.9	2.0	-1.0	4.7	-5.5
Rural	0.5	1.8	-13.1	2.9	8.2	5.3	-1.9	-2.0	1.0	-4.7	5.5

In the early years (1995–2001), respondents with a low education were strongly represented among Elbegdorj’s supporters (see: Table 9-30). This trend cannot be simply attributed to the fact that there are many rural people among them because polls were not conducted in rural areas until 1999. Elbegdorj would also find support from ordinary city dweller with only primary education or those who belonged to the small group of illiterates. This trend corresponds with Table 9-31, which shows a strong representation of workers up until the year 2000.

People with college or university education are under-represented, particularly up to the year 2001; thereafter, this group is only marginally under-represented.

Respondents who work in the public sector are under-represented (see: Table 9-32), especially during the first decade of observation. The reason may partly be because Elbegdorj was representative of the young democratic parties and could not attract much support from these people working in the public service system because they were still strongly influenced by socialism and politically dominated by the old MPRP. People in the private sector, on the other hand, have always shown more than average support for Elbegdorj.

Table 9-30: Levels of education of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Low education level	7.7%	13.5%	21.9%	24.1%	26.3%	26.2%	31.0%	19.8%	19.0%	17.8%	24.8%
Secondary education	62.2%	57.4%	48.7%	49.5%	40.0%	50.6%	38.0%	46.5%	43.5%	39.9%	42.2%
Higher education	30.1%	29.1%	29.4%	26.4%	33.8%	23.3%	31.0%	33.7%	37.5%	42.3%	33.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Low education level	20.2%	21.5%	25.0%	32.4%	30.4%	22.1%	29.0%	33.6%	25.0%	25.0%	19.5%
Secondary education	44.3%	38.2%	46.3%	41.6%	48.0%	46.1%	46.4%	35.1%	52.5%	48.7%	49.4%
Higher education	35.5%	40.3%	28.7%	26.1%	21.6%	31.9%	24.6%	31.3%	22.5%	26.3%	31.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-99</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Low education level	1.8	1.9	4.9	5.9	8.6	5.9	6.0	-0.6	-3.9	-6.3	2.7
Secondary education	3.3	0.2	-0.5	4.5	-5.6	6.7	-5.2	2.5	2.1	-2.4	0.6
Higher education	-5.1	-2.1	-4.4	-10.4	-3.0	-12.6	-0.8	-1.9	1.8	8.7	-3.3

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Low education level	-2.5	-2.3	-2.6	3.2	3.1	-6.9	-2.6	-2.2	-6.4	-0.5	0.6
Secondary education	2.5	-0.5	3.0	-0.8	1.1	0.9	3.2	-3.0	9.5	0.4	-3.9
Higher education	0.0	2.8	-0.4	-2.5	-4.2	6.0	-0.5	5.2	-3.1	0.1	3.3

Table 9-31: Occupations of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Workers	35.4%	43.2%	24.1%	29.1%	29.0%	25.0%	23.2%	25.7%	30.1%	35.4%
Clerical staff	44.3%	35.6%	35.2%	16.4%	11.6%	16.3%	11.6%	21.3%	18.4%	44.3%
Self-employed	12.7%	21.2%	20.4%	20.9%	14.5%	17.5%	29.8%	22.1%	25.8%	12.7%
Nomads / farmers	7.6%	0.0%	13.0%	9.7%	15.9%	8.8%	9.1%	6.8%	6.0%	7.6%
Intelligentsia	-	-	7.4%	23.9%	29.0%	32.5%	26.3%	24.1%	19.6%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Workers	25.8%	28.5%	34.0%	34.5%	44.6%	35.3%	35.6%	29.3%	40.7%	47.9%
Clerical staff	16.2%	23.1%	19.8%	12.9%	13.1%	17.9%	14.9%	10.4%	9.3%	14.6%
Self-employed	27.8%	20.9%	24.7%	24.9%	18.3%	23.7%	26.7%	34.1%	31.5%	25.0%
Nomads / farmers	9.7%	8.8%	11.4%	16.8%	18.0%	10.9%	14.9%	11.0%	8.6%	8.3%
Intelligentsia	20.5%	18.9%	10.2%	10.9%	5.9%	12.2%	8.0%	15.2%	9.9%	4.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-100</i>										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Workers	3.3	13.8	1.4	4.3	-1.1	-1.2	-0.7	-0.8	3.8	3.3
Clerical staff	0.0	-12.9	0.9	-8.5	-8.0	-7.7	-5.4	1.2	-1.9	0.0
Self-employed	-5.9	-0.2	-6.2	5.6	-5.6	-0.1	5.5	2.0	1.5	-5.9
Nomads / farmers	2.6	-0.7	9.2	1.3	7.9	0.7	0.5	-3.1	-0.3	2.6
Intelligentsia	-	-	-5.3	-2.7	6.9	8.3	0.1	0.7	-3.2	0.0
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Workers	-2.6	-1.5	-1.8	3.1	7.6	0.8	0.3	-4.5	-3.1	8.4
Clerical staff	-1.1	2.3	2.0	-4.9	-3.3	3.4	1.0	-2.2	-1.6	-2.5
Self-employed	3.0	-0.7	4.7	0.9	-1.6	-5.1	1.5	0.2	3.9	-7.4
Nomads / farmers	1.1	-2.0	-3.8	3.3	0.9	-2.1	-1.8	0.6	0.7	1.0
Intelligentsia	-0.4	1.9	-1.1	-2.2	-3.6	3.0	-1.1	5.9	0.2	0.5

Table 9-32: Sectors of employment of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
State officers	25.9%	10.0%	21.4%	10.2%	14.8%	4.2%	10.2%	14.0%	11.8%	25.9%
State service	20.4%	31.0%	26.2%	26.5%	25.9%	31.3%	18.4%	25.5%	28.3%	20.4%
Private/mixed sector	53.7%	39.0%	40.5%	48.0%	37.0%	47.9%	55.1%	44.7%	49.2%	53.7%
NGO	0.0%	20.0%	11.9%	15.3%	22.2%	16.7%	16.3%	15.8%	10.8%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
State officers	9.4%	9.8%	5.7%	7.4%	4.7%	9.0%	8.2%	13.0%	6.0%	6.4%
State service	19.2%	28.7%	24.8%	20.2%	17.8%	24.1%	19.6%	14.9%	21.3%	21.3%
Private/mixed sector	55.0%	48.7%	62.1%	64.7%	70.9%	61.4%	67.3%	68.2%	69.3%	72.3%
NGO	16.4%	12.8%	7.4%	7.8%	6.5%	5.5%	4.9%	3.9%	3.3%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-101</i></b>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
State officers	-0.7	-5.8	12.9	-5.2	-0.7	-8.4	-2.4	0.6	-0.0	-0.7
State service	-7.3	-3.0	-3.6	-5.5	-3.9	-2.4	-7.4	-1.3	-1.2	-7.3
Private/mixed sector	8.0	3.4	-2.3	9.3	-0.4	10.7	8.3	1.1	2.6	8.0
NGO	0.0	5.4	-7.1	1.4	5.0	0.1	1.5	-0.3	-1.3	0.0
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
State officers	-0.7	0.0	-2.1	-2.6	-3.4	2.6	0.7	3.3	0.4	-5.4
State service	-1.0	2.0	0.6	-2.5	-3.1	4.4	0.3	-3.2	-2.1	3.5
Private/mixed sector	1.7	-1.7	1.5	5.3	5.1	-8.2	-1.2	1.3	5.0	4.7
NGO	-0.0	-0.4	0.0	-0.2	1.4	1.2	0.1	-1.3	-3.3	-2.7


There is no social group with continuous over- or under-representation among Elbegdorj's supporters. It is, however, noteworthy that the Disadvantaged Group was slightly above average in their support for about half of the observation period (2008-2016), while the Middle Class was slight below for a similar number of years (see: Table 9-33). Nevertheless, there is no real trend or preference from any single group that can be identified with the data available. As mentioned before, Elbegdorj was able to attract votes from all section of society throughout the entire period covered by this study.

The increasing number of Middle Class people in recent years is due to a general shift towards a broader middle class in Mongolia. As seen in Chapter 4, the middle class grew from 43 per cent of respondents in 1997 to 74 per cent in 2016.

Table 9-33: Social statuses of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	10.2%	8.1%	20.8%	12.4%	10.4%	12.6%	12.8%	10.0%	11.8%	12.3%
Middle class	39.8%	50.2%	45.8%	50.3%	56.3%	47.4%	48.6%	56.8%	55.2%	54.8%
Below middle class	30.7%	25.8%	12.5%	26.1%	20.8%	25.3%	21.6%	18.2%	19.3%	19.5%
Disadvantaged group	19.3%	15.8%	20.8%	11.1%	12.5%	14.7%	17.0%	15.1%	13.7%	13.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	14.8%	9.8%	11.3%	9.9%	6.6%	8.2%	12.0%	14.0%	17.3%	5.2%
Middle class	55.7%	64.6%	56.1%	49.9%	61.9%	65.0%	72.1%	62.6%	56.0%	79.2%
Below middle class	16.6%	18.5%	19.8%	29.4%	26.4%	20.1%	11.6%	18.7%	20.0%	11.7%
Disadvantaged group	12.9%	7.1%	12.8%	10.9%	5.1%	6.6%	4.3%	4.7%	6.7%	3.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-102</i></b>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	1.1	1.4	11.6	1.6	-1.1	-0.3	0.8	-2.7	-0.2	-3.2
Middle class	-3.2	0.5	-3.8	-4.5	-0.7	-7.0	-10.2	-0.9	0.4	2.0
Below middle class	5.3	1.7	-12.0	5.9	0.6	5.6	2.9	-0.2	-0.3	0.3
Disadvantaged group	-3.2	-3.6	4.2	-3.0	1.2	1.7	6.5	3.7	0.0	0.9
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	-1.6	-0.8	0.1	1.3	0.1	-0.3	1.6	3.8	5.7	-1.7
Middle class	-0.8	8.0	-2.0	-3.7	4.5	4.2	1.6	2.5	-1.0	5.2
Below middle class	-0.7	-4.0	-0.5	0.8	-1.2	-2.3	-3.4	-5.3	-5.4	-4.7
Disadvantaged group	3.1	-3.2	2.5	1.6	-3.3	-1.6	0.2	-0.9	0.6	1.2

Figure 9-6: Social statuses of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics



Looking at the income of respondents confirms once more that Elbegdorj supporters cover a broad spectrum and are very much in line with the general distribution of income groups. There are no large deviations from the overall sample (see: Table 9-34). This can be easily observed in Figure 9-7, where there is a comparison of data over three years.


Table 9-34: Estimated annual household incomes of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	10.0%	11.7%	9.2%	3.0%	2.9%	1.6%	1.8%	4.0%	2.7%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	23.2%	26.7%	22.3%	14.4%	12.1%	1.6%	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	30.7%	30.9%	36.1%	30.3%	21.7%	11.4%	5.3%	0.0%	0.0%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	26.6%	19.6%	22.3%	32.8%	39.0%	28.2%	19.7%	21.3%	17.6%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	8.3%	8.8%	8.7%	15.9%	17.4%	27.1%	41.7%	38.7%	35.1%
9.6 m MNT or more	1.2%	2.3%	1.5%	3.5%	6.9%	30.2%	30.3%	36.0%	44.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-103</i></b>									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	-1.1	1.3	0.3	0.0	-0.3	0.0	0.8	1.6	1.5
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	-0.9	1.6	0.9	1.5	-1.1	-0.6	-0.5	-0.6	-0.8
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	-1.6	0.7	2.9	-5.6	-4.5	0.2	-0.6	-3.5	-3.0
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	3.2	-2.3	-1.4	2.0	7.8	3.1	-3.8	3.7	-0.5
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	0.6	-1.3	-2.5	1.4	-1.7	-8.7	0.2	-1.8	-5.8
9.6 m MNT or more	-0.2	0.0	-0.3	0.6	-0.1	6.0	3.9	0.6	8.7

Table 9-35: Relative incomes of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

		People whose income is less than 60 % of average	People whose income is below average, but more than 60 % of average	People whose income is above average, but less than 150 % of average	People whose income is more than 150 % of average
2013	Supporters of Elbegdorj	39%	18%	21%	22%
	Average of total sample	38%	25%	19%	18%
2014	Supporters of Elbegdorj	27%	34%	19%	20%
	Average of total sample	31%	34%	18%	17%
2015	Supporters of Elbegdorj	33%	28%	17%	21%
	Average of total sample	34%	29%	21%	16%
2016	Supporters of Elbegdorj	28%	27%	32%	12%
	Average of total sample	32%	31%	24%	13%

Figure 9-7: Relative incomes of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics compared with total samples 2013-2016



When discussing the relationship of respondents’ political orientations and support for specific politicians (see: Table 9-11), it was noted that Elbegdorj’s base spanned the widest spectrum. There are groups that somehow represent the initial (idealistic) democratic movement and the DP, the party, in which Elbegdorj has been a leading figure. This observation is confirmed when looking at the detailed statistics of 2008-2015 (see: Table 9-36).

It’s very clear—and maybe expectedly so—that there is a strong correlation between people’s preferences for Elbegdorj as their favourite politician and the DP as their favourite party (see: Table 9-37). Naturally, the votes for Elbegdorj from respondents who favour the MPP or MPRP are far below the average. This was even true in 2004-2012, when the MPRP was in a coalition government with the DP.

Elbegdorj’s appeal seems to cross a broad spectrum of society, as has been shown with several examples. It may be of some surprise that only very briefly in 2002-2004 was he able to draw support from followers of political parties other than the Democratic Party. It was only during that short time that people who favoured other parties (or no party at all) were substantially represented among the respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person they wanted to have an important role in politics.

Table 9-36: Political orientations of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Idealistic Democrats	17.8%	16.8%	21.9%	20.5%	14.7%	18.9%	16.3%	26.3%
Progressive Liberals	19.4%	17.6%	14.1%	19.0%	20.7%	15.5%	14.2%	5.3%
Passive Liberals	12.6%	20.5%	18.1%	16.6%	19.2%	16.6%	17.9%	14.5%
Conservatives	25.0%	21.4%	10.6%	14.1%	14.7%	15.8%	13.3%	27.6%
Traditionalists	14.5%	15.7%	19.3%	14.1%	18.4%	14.0%	22.1%	15.8%
Sovereign Democrats	10.7%	7.9%	16.1%	15.6%	12.4%	19.2%	16.3%	10.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-104</i></b>								
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Idealistic Democrats	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Progressive Liberals	2.0	2.9	3.4	-0.3	-0.6	3.0	2.7	8.4
Passive Liberals	1.3	-0.8	-5.3	4.0	2.6	-0.2	0.7	-9.3
Conservatives	-2.5	2.8	0.2	-0.6	2.1	-0.5	-0.4	-2.1
Traditionalists	2.0	0.6	0.9	-1.4	0.1	1.5	-2.1	9.9
Sovereign Democrats	-2.2	-4.1	2.0	-0.1	-2.0	-5.6	-1.2	-5.3



Figure 9-8: Political orientations of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics




Table 9-37: Favoured political party of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	16.5%	13.0%	18.9%	19.3%	23.1%	19.2%	18.1%	14.1%	13.3%	28.9%	42.5%
DP	76.9%	80.4%	71.8%	70.3%	63.1%	59.6%	66.3%	56.5%	58.2%	28.7%	28.8%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	4.1%	2.4%	5.9%	6.1%	8.6%	5.0%
Other or no party	6.6%	6.5%	9.2%	10.4%	13.8%	17.1%	13.3%	23.5%	22.4%	33.8%	23.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	14.0%	12.3%	8.2%	11.5%	7.8%	11.2%	9.2%	6.8%	11.3%	5.3%	5.2%
DP	46.1%	54.9%	45.1%	52.5%	46.5%	36.6%	38.0%	52.8%	46.7%	47.4%	55.8%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.7%	0.4%	1.7%	6.6%	1.3%
CWP - Green	4.3%	5.1%	2.6%	0.9%	1.3%	1.5%	1.5%	0.8%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%
Other or no party	35.6%	27.7%	44.2%	35.1%	44.5%	50.7%	49.7%	39.2%	40.0%	40.8%	37.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-105</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-23.9	-25.1	-23.5	-27.6	-32.9	-34.5	-35.1	-32.0	-34.9	-26.9	-7.7
DP	23.5	26.2	28.2	35.4	43.3	37.8	39.5	28.0	31.8	15.3	9.2
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	-0.3	-2.3	-2.3	4.1	-0.5
Other or no party	0.4	-1.1	-4.7	-7.8	-10.4	-4.4	-4.2	6.3	5.5	7.6	-1.0
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-18.7	-20.6	-19.0	-17.3	-14.3	-10.8	-11.8	-10.5	-6.2	-13.3	-14.7
DP	18.6	24.0	24.0	23.4	24.1	16.4	17.1	25.4	15.1	31.9	39.8
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-4.5	-8.1	-4.5	-1.5	-7.3
CWP - Green	-0.8	-0.5	-0.1	-1.0	-1.0	-2.1	0.0	-0.7	-0.3	-1.0	-1.1
Other or no party	0.9	-2.9	-4.9	-5.1	-8.8	-3.5	-0.8	-6.1	-4.0	-16.0	-16.8

Religious beliefs and national pride are two more factors where large deviations of Elbegdorj's supporters from the general sample cannot be detected.

Table 9-38: Religious belief of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
No confession	32.5%	37.2%	32.1%	42.0%	34.9%	37.0%	32.8%	29.3%	33.8%
Buddhism	58.3%	54.1%	57.8%	50.0%	51.1%	56.1%	59.7%	65.3%	63.6%
Christianity	4.5%	4.2%	3.3%	4.0%	2.8%	2.3%	1.7%	2.7%	0.0%
Islam / Muslim	0.5%	1.3%	1.5%	0.0%	6.5%	1.9%	0.8%	0.0%	0.0%
Shamanism	1.7%	2.2%	4.8%	4.0%	3.6%	2.3%	4.6%	2.7%	2.6%
Other	2.6%	1.1%	0.5%	0.0%	1.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-106</i>									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
No confession	-1.4	-2.6	-4.4	6.4	-0.7	2.3	-1.2	-3.8	-5.1
Buddhism	-1.6	1.7	3.0	-5.9	-2.3	-2.0	3.0	4.3	8.7
Christianity	2.0	1.3	0.5	1.0	0.8	0.1	-0.1	1.2	-0.9
Islam / Muslim	0.2	0.2	1.0	-0.5	2.2	1.0	0.3	0.0	-0.4
Shamanism	0.0	-0.7	0.1	-0.3	-0.4	-1.3	-1.3	-1.4	-1.9
Other	0.8	0.1	-0.1	-0.7	0.3	-0.1	-0.8	-0.2	-0.4

Table 9-39: National pride of respondents who named Elbegdorj as a person to have an important role in politics


	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	80.1%	86.9%	88.6%	87.2%	88.9%	95.8%	95.4%	92.1%	96.1%
Rather proud	14.9%	11.8%	10.2%	10.8%	9.8%	3.4%	4.6%	6.6%	3.9%
Not that proud	3.6%	1.2%	1.0%	1.5%	1.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Not proud at all	1.4%	0.1%	0.3%	0.5%	0.2%	0.4%	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-107</i></b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	-0.7	0.8	1.3	-2.8	-3.9	2.5	1.7	0.3	1.3
Rather proud	0.5	-0.1	-0.2	2.8	3.6	-2.3	-1.0	0.6	-0.2
Not that proud	0.0	-0.5	-0.9	0.1	0.4	-0.0	-0.5	-1.5	-0.8
Not proud at all	0.2	-0.1	-0.3	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.6	-0.3

### 9.3.3 Nambaryn ENKHBAYAR

Nambaryn Enkhbayar (Mongolian: Намбарын Энхбаяр; born 1958) served as the Prime Minister of Mongolia in 2000-2004, as Speaker of the Parliament in 2004-2005, and as President of Mongolia in 2005-2009. He is the first person to have held all the top three positions in Mongolian government. He was the chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party from 1997 to 2005.			
Total percentage points accumulated during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	500.5 %	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 1 of 39
Number of years between 1995 and 2016 when listed among the TOP-10. . . . .	19 years	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 2 of 39
Average rank in the TOP-10 when among them during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	2.6	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 1 of 39

Table 9-40: Percentage share of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person whom they want to play an important role in politics (figures are highlighted the years when Enkhbayar was among TOP-10)

1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
-	0.4%	4.5%	15.5%	16.1%	22.2%	29.3%	33.7%	39.4%	54.0%	54.3%
2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
34.3%	28.5%	13.2%	27.8%	13.9%	20.3%	18.2%	18.3%	17.9%	17.6%	21.2%



Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

**Nambaryn Enkhbayar (Намбарын Энхбаяр)**



**3rd President of Mongolia**

**In office**

24 June 2005 – 18 June 2009

**Speaker of the State Great Khural**

**In office**

2004 – 2005

**21st Prime Minister of Mongolia**

**In office**

26 July 2000 – 20 August 2004

**Member of the State Great Khural**

**In office**

1992-1996, 1996-2000, 2000-2004, 2004 – 2008

**Chairman of the Mongolian People's Party**

**In office**

6 June 1997 – 22 November 2005

**General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Party**

**In office**

5 October 1996 – 7 February 1997

**Education**

1980 Diploma in literature and language studies from Maxim Gorky Literature Institute in Moscow, Russia  
1985 - 1986 English language and literature course at Leeds University in the United Kingdom

**Political party**

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party

**Political career**

Since 2010 Founder and member of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party  
1985 - 2010 Member of the Mongolian People's Party  
1980 - 1990 The Association of Mongolian Writers  
1990 Chairman of the Association of Mongolian Writers  
1990 - 1992 Deputy Chairman of the Arts and Culture Development

	<p>Committee</p> <p>1992 - 1996 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u></p> <p>1992 - 1996 Minister of Culture</p> <p>1996 - 2000 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u></p> <p>1996 - 1997 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPP</p> <p>1997 - 2005 Chairman of the Mongolian People’s Party</p> <p>1997 - 2000 The leader of the MPP group in the State Great Khural</p> <p>2000 - 2004 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u></p> <p>2000 – 2004 Prime Minister of Mongolia</p> <p>2004 - 2008 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u></p> <p>2004 - 2005 Speaker of the <u>State Great Khural</u></p> <p>2005 - 2009 elected President of Mongolia</p> <p>In 2010 Enkhbayar established a political party and named it <u>Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party</u></p> <p>Since 2011 Chairman of the <u>Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party</u></p>
<b>Personal details</b>	
<b>Born</b>	1 June 1958 Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
<b>Spouse/Children</b>	Married, Onongiin Tsolmon, 4 children
<b>Languages</b>	<u>Russian</u> , English

Table 9-41: Ages of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics


	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
18 - 24	-	25.0%	21.5%	18.9%	20.4%	17.5%	17.5%	16.6%	17.3%	18.7%	15.8%
25 - 29	-	6.3%	16.5%	15.3%	17.8%	13.2%	15.6%	12.9%	15.8%	13.6%	14.3%
30 - 39	-	18.8%	19.0%	20.7%	20.0%	25.6%	24.2%	28.6%	26.3%	23.5%	28.0%
40 - 49	-	25.0%	10.1%	19.1%	18.2%	18.3%	22.3%	19.5%	20.1%	21.5%	21.7%
50 - 59	-	18.8%	21.5%	16.3%	11.7%	14.8%	11.2%	12.1%	10.8%	12.1%	11.8%
60 or more	-	6.3%	11.4%	9.7%	11.9%	10.6%	9.2%	10.3%	9.8%	10.6%	8.6%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	12.5%	14.1%	8.9%	10.6%	17.2%	10.7%	9.1%	9.9%	9.3%	11.1%	17.4%
25 - 29	13.8%	14.2%	11.4%	10.2%	7.2%	12.6%	10.3%	10.3%	11.4%	9.8%	9.8%
30 - 39	27.6%	24.7%	25.5%	22.6%	22.4%	18.9%	20.9%	20.7%	19.3%	20.3%	25.0%
40 - 49	22.3%	19.5%	17.7%	21.7%	19.2%	20.1%	20.2%	24.6%	17.9%	17.6%	19.2%
50 - 59	12.2%	14.5%	17.3%	15.9%	16.8%	18.9%	18.1%	20.7%	19.3%	19.0%	11.2%
60 or more	11.6%	13.1%	19.2%	19.0%	17.2%	18.9%	21.3%	13.8%	22.9%	22.2%	17.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-96</i>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
18 - 24	-	3.4	-0.6	-4.6	-4.7	-1.7	-2.7	-2.8	-1.7	0.3	0.5
25 - 29	-	-12.5	-3.3	-3.3	0.2	-1.5	-0.2	0.0	0.9	0.3	-0.7
30 - 39	-	-9.8	-6.4	-4.7	-6.1	-2.3	-2.5	-0.5	-2.0	-2.0	-0.2
40 - 49	-	8.2	-7.4	3.4	2.3	-2.0	1.5	-2.0	-1.3	-1.5	-2.0
50 - 59	-	10.9	12.0	5.4	2.4	3.7	1.7	1.8	1.4	1.5	0.9
60 or more	-	-0.2	5.8	3.8	5.9	3.7	2.2	3.6	2.7	1.4	1.6
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	-1.3	0.0	-4.3	-3.7	1.7	-1.7	-2.4	-1.5	-1.3	0.3	4.3
25 - 29	1.1	-1.5	-2.3	-0.3	-4.1	2.1	-1.7	0.4	1.9	-1.6	-1.8
30 - 39	-3.2	-2.5	-0.4	-3.5	-3.7	-5.1	-2.8	-2.1	-1.4	0.6	-0.1
40 - 49	-1.7	-4.6	-4.4	-1.0	-2.8	-4.1	-2.2	2.3	-3.3	-4.8	-2.6
50 - 59	0.8	3.2	3.7	2.6	3.4	3.6	2.7	1.2	-2.2	-1.5	-4.1
60 or more	4.3	5.4	7.6	5.9	5.4	5.2	6.4	-0.4	6.4	7.0	4.3

The average ages of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person who should have an important role in politics each year during the last decade was:

<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
40.7	43.9	43.8	42.9	44.3	45.5	43.7	45.8	45.0	41.7

People who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics are generally older than average. Figure 9-9 shows the difference between these respondents and the general average of the sample (comparison with data from Table 9-96).

Figure 9-9: Deviation of average ages of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics from average of general sample (difference in years)



Respondents who named Enkhbayar as their favourite for an important role in politics are not only older than the average of the sample population. In most years, more than the average number of males support him, and there are clearly more people in rural areas than in Ulaanbaatar who name him (see: Table 9-42 and Table 9-43).

From 1997 to 2000 (when the Democratic Union led government), Enkhbayar was a prominent figure in the opposition with a large following of respondents with college or university education. That support from highly educated people ran out when the MPRP returned to power, and Enkhbayar took up the political posts of prime minister, speaker of the parliament and finally president. During those latter years, people with high education were mostly under-represented among his followers (see: Table 9-44).



Table 9-42: Gender division of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	-	43.8%	60.8%	52.0%	49.9%	51.4%	52.3%	47.7%	47.5%	47.9%	40.7%
Female	-	56.3%	39.2%	48.0%	50.1%	48.6%	47.7%	52.3%	52.5%	52.1%	59.3%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Male	45.4%	45.2%	46.1%	44.3%	41.2%	52.2%	54.1%	51.3%	45.7%	47.7%	56.3%
Female	54.6%	54.8%	53.9%	55.7%	58.8%	47.8%	45.9%	48.7%	54.3%	52.3%	43.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-97</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	-	-7.8	9.3	3.1	3.0	0.9	1.8	0.4	1.0	0.4	-1.3
Female	-	7.8	-9.3	-3.1	-3.0	-0.9	-1.8	-0.4	-1.0	-0.4	1.3
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Male	-1.3	-3.6	-2.4	-4.0	-7.4	2.6	3.1	3.6	0.2	-0.3	-0.5
Female	1.3	3.6	2.4	4.0	7.4	-2.6	-3.1	-3.6	-0.2	0.3	0.5

Table 9-43: Places of residence of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Urban	-	100%	100%	100%	82.2%	51.7%	36.6%	40.1%	46.6%	42.6%	42.3%
Rural	-	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	17.8%	48.3%	63.4%	59.9%	53.4%	57.4%	57.7%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Urban	37.3%	34.8%	42.8%	41.4%	38.4%	34.0%	31.2%	33.2%	43.6%	39.9%	39.7%
Rural	62.7%	65.2%	57.2%	58.6%	61.6%	66.0%	68.8%	66.8%	56.4%	60.1%	60.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-98</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Urban	-	-	-	-	-1.0	-3.0	-7.9	-3.8	-4.0	-1.8	-2.7
Rural	-	-	-	-	1.0	3.0	7.9	3.8	4.0	1.8	2.7
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Urban	-5.9	-7.1	-1.6	-0.5	-2.8	-5.9	0.9	-8.6	0.1	-2.8	-0.8
Rural	5.9	7.1	1.6	0.5	2.8	5.9	-0.9	8.6	-0.1	2.8	0.8

Table 9-44: Levels of education of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Low education level	-	6.3%	7.6%	13.8%	16.0%	19.6%	28.6%	21.1%	23.4%	26.1%	25.3%
Secondary education	-	56.3%	49.4%	44.4%	44.3%	43.5%	39.5%	44.3%	39.9%	42.7%	42.2%
Higher education	-	37.5%	43.0%	41.8%	39.8%	37.0%	31.9%	34.6%	36.7%	31.1%	32.5%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Low education level	24.9%	27.2%	23.6%	32.4%	30.8%	33.3%	35.3%	51.7%	39.3%	35.9%	22.3%
Secondary education	42.2%	40.1%	43.2%	41.9%	43.6%	45.3%	44.1%	28.4%	37.1%	47.7%	56.7%
Higher education	32.9%	32.7%	33.2%	25.6%	25.6%	21.4%	20.6%	19.8%	23.6%	16.3%	21.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-99</i></b>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Low education level	-	-5.3	-9.4	-4.4	-1.7	-0.7	3.6	0.7	0.5	2.0	3.3
Secondary education	-	-1.0	0.2	-0.6	-1.4	-0.4	-3.7	0.3	-1.5	0.5	0.6
Higher education	-	6.3	9.2	5.0	3.0	1.1	0.1	-1.0	1.0	-2.4	-3.9
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Low education level	2.2	3.4	-4.0	3.3	3.5	4.4	3.6	16.0	7.9	10.4	3.4
Secondary education	0.4	1.4	-0.1	-0.4	-3.3	0.1	0.8	-9.7	-5.8	-0.6	3.4
Higher education	-2.6	-4.8	4.1	-2.9	-0.2	-4.5	-4.5	-6.3	-2.0	-9.9	-6.8

Enkhbayar had strong support from state officers and from the public sector in general until 2009, when he lost the presidential election to his DP opponent Elbegdorj. Support from the private sector was below average at that time (see Table 9-45 and Table 9-46). When Enkhbayar lost his prominent political position, he also lost support from the public sector.

Enkhbayar was never particularly popular among the intelligentsia, but from 2011 onward—after Enkhbayar initiated the split of the MPP and founded a new party with the old name MPRP—this group became permanently under-represented among his supporters.

Table 9-45: Sectors of employment of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
State officers	29.8%	22.9%	10.4%	18.7%	17.8%	15.0%	14.2%	14.8%	13.6%	10.9%
State service	40.4%	34.6%	34.8%	35.0%	30.6%	37.7%	27.3%	28.1%	32.4%	20.5%
Private/ mixed sector	29.8%	31.3%	33.9%	35.0%	36.6%	33.6%	44.0%	41.8%	41.9%	52.8%
NGO	0.0%	11.2%	20.8%	11.4%	15.0%	13.6%	14.5%	15.3%	12.1%	15.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
State officers	11.1%	12.7%	9.6%	7.0%	10.1%	5.3%	9.0%	4.9%	8.5%	6.8%
State service	27.9%	27.3%	28.9%	25.5%	15.2%	18.7%	10.5%	23.2%	15.9%	15.9%
Private/ mixed sector	48.0%	54.5%	52.7%	60.5%	72.7%	68.6%	72.2%	63.4%	70.7%	72.0%
NGO	12.9%	5.5%	8.7%	7.0%	2.0%	7.4%	8.3%	8.5%	4.9%	5.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-101</i></b>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
State officers	3.1	7.1	1.9	3.3	2.3	2.4	1.6	1.3	1.7	0.8
State service	12.8	0.7	5.1	2.9	0.9	4.0	1.5	1.3	2.9	0.3
Private/ mixed sector	-15.9	-4.3	-8.8	-3.7	-0.9	-3.6	-2.9	-1.9	-4.7	-0.5
NGO	0.0	-3.4	1.8	-2.5	-2.3	-2.9	-0.3	-0.7	0.0	-0.6
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
State officers	1.3	4.9	-0.3	-1.2	3.7	-2.2	-0.7	-0.7	-3.3	-0.2
State service	1.3	3.1	6.2	4.5	-4.6	-0.6	-7.6	-0.3	-1.9	-5.9
Private/ mixed sector	-2.3	-6.0	-6.7	-5.3	3.1	0.1	5.3	-0.9	3.1	5.1
NGO	-0.3	-2.0	0.7	1.9	-2.3	2.7	3.1	1.9	2.1	1.0

Table 9-46: Occupations of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Workers	18.8%	24.2%	23.8%	26.4%	30.3%	26.2%	23.2%	28.9%	29.1%	30.7%
Clerical staff	60.9%	56.1%	39.4%	26.4%	22.6%	25.5%	18.2%	20.4%	20.4%	17.5%
Self-employed	17.2%	19.7%	21.7%	11.0%	21.6%	14.9%	23.8%	18.4%	22.3%	22.9%
Nomads / farmers	3.1%	0.0%	2.2%	9.2%	8.7%	9.8%	8.5%	10.3%	7.2%	9.1%
Intelligentsia	-	-	13.0%	27.0%	16.7%	23.5%	26.2%	22.0%	20.9%	19.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Workers	33.1%	36.0%	33.5%	38.5%	31.3%	34.0%	35.9%	42.7%	42.9%	42.7%
Clerical staff	20.8%	22.8%	18.8%	16.1%	13.4%	16.0%	9.2%	14.6%	10.7%	9.2%
Self-employed	19.6%	18.0%	20.3%	16.8%	35.7%	24.7%	33.8%	27.0%	39.3%	27.5%
Nomads / farmers	11.8%	10.6%	14.2%	15.5%	16.1%	17.5%	14.8%	9.0%	6.0%	14.5%
Intelligentsia	14.7%	12.7%	13.2%	13.0%	3.6%	7.8%	6.3%	6.7%	1.2%	6.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-100</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Workers	-13.4	-5.2	1.2	1.7	0.2	-0.0	-0.7	2.4	2.8	2.3
Clerical staff	16.6	7.5	5.1	1.5	3.0	1.6	1.1	0.4	0.1	0.2
Self-employed	-1.3	-1.7	-4.9	-4.3	1.5	-2.7	-0.5	-1.7	-2.0	-1.9
Nomads / farmers	-1.9	-0.7	-1.6	0.7	0.6	1.8	-0.0	0.4	0.9	0.6
Intelligentsia	-	-	0.3	0.4	-5.3	-0.7	0.0	-1.4	-1.9	-1.1
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Workers	3.2	0.2	2.0	1.5	-3.2	-1.3	2.2	-1.2	3.3	-3.4
Clerical staff	0.0	5.0	1.0	-0.3	-1.2	2.2	-3.4	3.8	-6.4	-4.2
Self-employed	-2.0	-2.0	-3.8	-3.2	6.9	-0.5	-0.2	-0.7	6.9	4.6
Nomads / farmers	1.1	-4.6	0.7	-1.6	3.0	0.8	4.5	1.1	-1.4	4.0
Intelligentsia	-2.3	1.4	0.0	3.6	-5.6	-1.3	-3.0	-3.0	-2.4	-1.1

The middle class has been among the strongest supporters of Enkhbayar. From 2000 until 2011, this group was over-represented among the people wanting Enkhbayar to have a prominent position in politics (see: Table 9-47).


In 1997-1999, when the Democratic Union was still ruling, Enkhbayar also had substantial support from the lowest social group, the Disadvantaged Group. They may have been disappointed with the young DP politicians whom they placed their hopes in. However, when

Enkhbayar held important political positions, the Disadvantaged withdrew their support—probably disappointed, once more, but this time with the MPRP.

Table 9-47: Social statuses of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	9.5%	5.6%	9.3%	10.3%	13.4%	14.0%	12.9%	13.8%	11.9%	17.9%
Middle class	27.0%	49.5%	46.5%	56.9%	59.2%	61.5%	63.2%	60.3%	55.9%	54.8%
Below middle class	32.4%	23.3%	26.7%	19.5%	16.9%	15.8%	16.5%	16.8%	19.6%	17.3%
Disadvantaged group	31.1%	21.7%	17.4%	13.4%	10.5%	8.7%	7.4%	9.0%	12.6%	9.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	18.3%	14.1%	11.8%	9.0%	3.4%	8.8%	9.1%	8.8%	11.1%	7.1%
Middle class	59.9%	58.4%	59.9%	58.8%	57.5%	60.4%	70.9%	59.1%	53.6%	68.3%
Below middle class	14.9%	21.0%	19.1%	24.5%	26.7%	21.3%	15.9%	27.7%	30.7%	20.1%
Disadvantaged group	6.9%	6.5%	9.1%	7.8%	12.3%	9.5%	4.1%	4.4%	4.6%	4.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-102</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	0.3	-1.2	0.1	-0.5	1.9	1.1	0.8	1.2	-0.1	2.4
Middle class	-15.9	-0.3	-3.1	2.1	2.2	7.1	4.4	2.7	1.2	2.1
Below middle class	7.1	-0.9	2.3	-0.8	-3.3	-3.9	-2.2	-1.5	-0.0	-1.9
Disadvantaged group	8.5	2.3	0.8	-0.7	-0.8	-4.2	-3.0	-2.4	-1.1	-2.6
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	2.0	3.5	0.7	0.4	-3.1	0.3	-1.4	-1.5	-0.5	0.2
Middle class	3.4	1.8	1.8	5.2	0.1	-0.4	0.4	-1.0	-3.4	-5.7
Below middle class	-2.4	-1.5	-1.2	-4.1	-0.9	-1.1	0.9	3.7	5.4	3.7
Disadvantaged group	-3.0	-3.8	-1.2	-1.6	3.9	1.2	0.0	-1.2	-1.5	1.8

Figure 9-10: Social statuses of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics



People in the lower income groups have always been over-represented among Enkhbayar’s followers (see: Table 9-48). Even the general increase of income in recent years has had little effect on changing this picture.


Table 9-48: Estimated annual household incomes of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	12.0%	9.5%	8.9%	4.4%	3.5%	4.5%	0.8%	2.7%	2.3%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	24.7%	28.0%	23.9%	11.9%	14.3%	1.8%	1.5%	0.7%	0.9%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	36.3%	31.6%	35.2%	40.9%	31.7%	14.3%	9.8%	6.7%	2.3%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	19.3%	20.9%	22.7%	28.3%	28.4%	33.0%	27.3%	19.3%	25.7%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	5.4%	8.2%	8.9%	11.9%	18.2%	30.4%	40.9%	44.0%	39.4%
9.6 m MNT or more	2.3%	1.8%	0.4%	2.5%	4.0%	16.1%	19.7%	26.7%	29.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-103</i></b>									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	0.8	-1.0	0.0	1.4	0.2	2.9	-0.2	0.3	1.0
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	0.7	2.9	2.6	-1.0	1.1	-0.4	-0.3	0.0	0.1
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	3.9	1.4	2.1	4.9	5.4	3.1	4.0	3.2	-0.7
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	-4.0	-1.0	-1.0	-2.5	-2.8	7.9	3.7	1.7	7.7
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	-2.2	-1.8	-2.3	-2.5	-1.0	-5.4	-0.5	3.6	-1.5
9.6 m MNT or more	0.8	-0.5	-1.4	-0.3	-3.0	-8.2	-6.6	-8.8	-6.6

Table 9-49: Relative incomes of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

		People whose income is less than 60 % of average	People whose income is below average, but more than 60 % of average	People whose income is above average, but less than 150 % of average	People whose income is more than 150 % of average
2013	Supporters of Enkhbayar	50%	21%	18%	11%
	Average of total sample	38%	25%	19%	18%
2014	Supporters of Enkhbayar	37%	36%	14%	13%
	Average of total sample	31%	34%	18%	17%
2015	Supporters of Enkhbayar	40%	30%	17%	13%
	Average of total sample	34%	29%	21%	16%
2016	Supporters of Enkhbayar	40%	30%	20%	9%
	Average of total sample	32%	31%	24%	13%

Figure 9-11: Relative incomes of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics compared with total samples 2013-2016




Traditionalists and sovereign democrats clearly dominate when identifying Enkhbayar’s sympathisers among the groups of political orientation (see: Table 9-50).

Table 9-50: Political orientations of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	14.8%	13.1%	19.2%	12.6%	12.9%	11.6%	12.9%	20.9%
Progressive Liberals	17.7%	16.1%	19.2%	10.7%	16.9%	13.8%	12.9%	13.7%
Passive Liberals	12.9%	18.5%	16.4%	16.4%	17.1%	18.5%	17.1%	18.3%
Conservatives	21.0%	19.0%	8.0%	17.6%	14.1%	16.4%	12.9%	15.7%
Traditionalists	20.3%	22.9%	16.8%	22.0%	23.9%	22.4%	24.3%	18.3%
Sovereign Democrats	13.3%	10.4%	20.4%	20.8%	15.2%	17.2%	20.0%	13.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-104</b>								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	-1.0	-0.7	0.7	-8.2	-2.4	-4.2	-0.7	3.0
Progressive Liberals	-0.4	-2.3	-0.2	-4.3	-1.2	-1.8	-0.6	-0.8
Passive Liberals	-2.2	0.7	-1.5	-0.8	0.0	1.4	-1.2	1.7
Conservatives	-1.9	-1.9	-1.7	2.1	-0.5	2.1	-2.6	-2.0
Traditionalists	3.6	3.1	-0.6	7.8	3.5	2.9	1.0	-2.8
Sovereign Democrats	2.0	1.0	3.1	3.4	0.6	-0.3	4.0	1.0

Figure 9-12: Political orientations of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics



In regard to their favoured party, supporters of Enkhbayar were clearly oriented toward the old MPRP until it changed its name to MPP. When Enkhbayar initiated the split of the par-



ty to establish the new MPRP, his base of support were the people who evidently approved of this move and followed him to the new party (see: Table 9-51).

Table 9-51: Favoured political party of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-	42.9%	88.3%	79.6%	85.0%	83.9%	79.4%	76.5%	73.9%	79.6%	74.6%
DP	-	50.0%	3.9%	9.9%	7.1%	7.3%	8.8%	9.2%	10.1%	5.0%	8.8%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	1.1%	0.9%	3.1%	3.9%	1.4%	1.5%
Other or no party	-	7.1%	7.8%	10.5%	7.9%	7.7%	10.9%	11.2%	12.1%	13.9%	15.1%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	62.4%	61.4%	51.3%	55.4%	49.6%	30.2%	20.2%	15.9%	26.4%	16.3%	21.0%
DP	10.6%	13.2%	10.0%	9.5%	6.4%	7.5%	8.6%	11.6%	10.0%	5.2%	5.8%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	22.3%	25.0%	22.1%	28.8%	28.6%
CWP - Green	1.8%	2.7%	1.1%	0.2%	0.8%	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.7%	0.7%	0.9%
Other or no party	25.2%	22.8%	37.6%	34.9%	43.2%	62.3%	48.5%	47.0%	40.7%	49.0%	43.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-105</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-	4.7	45.8	32.7	29.0	30.2	26.3	30.5	25.7	23.8	24.4
DP	-	-4.2	-39.7	-25.0	-12.7	-14.5	-17.9	-19.4	-16.3	-8.4	-10.7
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	-1.9	-1.8	-5.0	-4.5	-3.1	-4.0
Other or no party	-	-0.5	-6.1	-7.7	-16.3	-13.8	-6.6	-6.1	-4.9	-12.3	-9.7
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	29.7	28.5	24.1	26.6	27.5	8.2	-0.8	-1.4	9.0	-2.3	1.1
DP	-16.9	-17.7	-11.1	-19.6	-16.0	-12.7	-12.3	-15.8	-21.6	-10.2	-10.2
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.1	16.5	15.9	20.6	20.0
CWP - Green	-3.4	-3.0	-1.5	-1.7	-1.5	-3.5	-1.1	-1.0	-0.0	-0.3	-0.2
Other or no party	-9.5	-7.9	-11.5	-5.3	-10.1	8.0	-2.0	1.6	-3.3	-7.8	-10.7

Being “very proud to be a Mongolian” is an attribute of supporters of Enkhbayar, which is in line with their general traditionalist political orientation (see: Table 9-52).

Table 9-52: National pride of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	86.6%	86.8%	91.1%	91.1%	92.8%	94.3%	95.7%	93.5%	94.6%
Rather proud	10.7%	11.9%	6.5%	5.7%	6.0%	3.5%	2.9%	3.9%	4.9%
Not that proud	2.3%	0.9%	2.0%	1.9%	0.7%	0.4%	0.7%	2.0%	0.4%
Not proud at all	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	1.3%	0.5%	1.8%	0.7%	0.7%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-107</i></b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	5.8	0.7	3.8	1.1	-0.0	0.9	2.0	1.7	-0.2
Rather proud	-3.6	-0.1	-3.9	-2.3	-0.2	-2.2	-2.7	-2.1	0.9
Not that proud	-1.3	-0.8	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.5	-0.4
Not proud at all	-0.9	0.1	-0.1	0.7	0.2	1.3	0.6	-0.1	-0.3

Table 9-53: Religious belief of respondents who named Enkhbayar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No confession	29.1%	41.1%	32.4%	38.2%	34.1%	29.6%	42.1%	23.5%	34.8%
Buddhism	65.7%	52.1%	62.0%	53.5%	54.2%	62.2%	49.3%	69.8%	57.1%
Christianity	1.1%	2.2%	2.0%	1.9%	0.6%	1.7%	1.4%	2.0%	0.4%
Islam / Muslim	0.4%	1.1%	0.4%	1.3%	6.5%	1.7%	0.7%	0.0%	0.4%
Shamanism	1.9%	3.1%	3.2%	3.8%	3.9%	4.3%	5.0%	4.7%	6.3%
Other	1.9%	0.5%	0.0%	1.3%	0.7%	0.4%	1.4%	0.0%	0.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-106</i></b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No confession	-4.9	1.3	-4.1	2.7	-1.5	-5.2	8.2	-9.6	-4.1
Buddhism	5.8	-0.3	7.1	-2.4	0.7	4.1	-7.4	8.8	2.2
Christianity	-1.3	-0.7	-0.8	-1.1	-1.4	-0.5	-0.3	0.5	-0.5
Islam / Muslim	0.1	0.0	-0.2	0.8	2.1	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.0
Shamanism	0.2	0.2	-1.5	-0.5	-0.0	0.8	-0.9	0.6	1.8
Other	0.0	-0.5	-0.6	0.6	0.0	-0.1	0.2	-0.2	0.5


### 9.3.4 Sainkhuugiin GANBAATAR

Sainkhuugiin Ganbaatar (Mongolian: Сайнхүүгийн Ганбаатар, born 1970) was the Chairman of the Mongolian Trade Union Confederation and was elected member of parliament as an independent candidate in 2012-2016.

While being a non-partisan member of parliament, he joined the National Labour Party (founded in May 2015) and was elected chairman of the party.

Total percentage points accumulated during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	164.8 %	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 7 of 39
Number of years between 1995 and 2016 when listed among the TOP-10. . . . .	7 years	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 11 of 39
Average rank in the TOP-10 when among them during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	2.7	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 2 of 39

Table 9-54: Percentage share of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person whom they wanted to play an important role in politics (figures are highlighted the years when Ganbaatar was among TOP-10 in that year)



Source: SMF data base 2000-2016

## Sainkhugiin Ganbaatar (Сайнхүүгийн Ганбаатар)



### Member of the State Great Khural

#### In office

July 2012 - July 2016

Education	<p>1991 studied at the School of Geology, the Polytechnic University of Mongolia</p> <p>1994 Master of Geophysical Engineering and Technology University of Mining, Kemerovo, Russia</p> <p>1998 HND business finance management, Hammersmith West London College</p> <p>2010 Labour Institute</p>
<b>Political party</b>	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
<b>Political career</b>	<p><u>Leading member of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party</u></p> <p>1997 - 2000 Training Manager of Khan Bank</p> <p>2001 - 2002 Director of Special Assets Department</p> <p>2002 - 2003 Teacher at the IFE</p> <p>2003 - 2004 Teacher at the Academy of Management</p> <p>2005 - 2006 Social and economic Advisor to Parliament</p> <p>2005 - 2007 Leader of the Radical Reform Movement</p> <p>2006 - 2007 Leader of the National Soyombo Movement</p> <p>Since 2004 Honorary President of Mongolian Lecture Centre</p> <p>Since 2007 President of Federation of Mongolian Education and Science Union and of Confederation of Mongolian Trade Unions</p> <p>2009 Vice President of the Mongolian Athletics Association</p> <p>2012 - 2016 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u></p> <p>2017 elections - the <u>Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party's</u> nominee for <u>President of Mongolia</u></p>

#### Personal details

<b>Born</b>	30 July 1970 Bayankhongor aimag, Mongolia
<b>Spouse/Children</b>	Married, spouse B. Tungalag, 3 children
<b>Languages</b>	Russian, English

**Views of Sainkhuugiin GANBAATAR**  
**regarding major political events and challenges**

- *By the name of the Oyu Tolgoi investment, we lost US\$320 billion worth of resources. Every day foreigners at the Oyu Tolgoi (copper-gold mine) are selling goods worth US\$5 million while Mongolians every day are indebted by US\$2 million. The Mongolian government has become a hostage government.*
  
- *We should get rid of foreign and local phonies (fraudsters). Natural resources should serve not just a few families, but for the good of Mongolians. Without settling this issue, we will not move forward; the 40 per cent unemployment rate will remain unchanged. To make natural resources a national issue, a trilateral agreement or national consensus is most crucial.*
  
- *I will work with anybody who is not a hostage of the MPP-DP group. I will work to introduce honest, patriotic politicians to governance. Brand new politicians will switch the country to the right path. Because of that, I will prepare young educated people with the right way of thinking for politics. I created the Mongolian Political Institute, and I work there.*

Table 9-55: Ages of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
18 - 24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26.0%	19.6%
25 - 29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.0%	12.6%
30 - 39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.0%	34.3%
40 - 49	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.0%	25.9%
50 - 59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0%	4.2%
60 or more	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.0%	3.5%
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	15,6%	31,7%	18,8%	17,1%	11,8%	10,3%	11,3%	12,1%	9,4%	12,5%
25 - 29	22,1%	29,3%	8,3%	15,4%	8,6%	14,3%	14,4%	10,7%	12,5%	10,4%
30 - 39	23,0%	22,0%	29,2%	28,5%	31,2%	24,3%	24,5%	25,7%	18,5%	28,0%
40 - 49	22,1%	12,2%	22,9%	20,3%	22,6%	24,5%	19,0%	23,6%	21,5%	23,7%
50 - 59	10,7%	2,4%	8,3%	11,4%	15,1%	13,9%	18,1%	15,7%	21,9%	14,7%
60 or more	6,6%	2,4%	12,5%	7,3%	10,8%	12,7%	12,6%	12,1%	16,2%	10,8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-96</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
18 - 24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,7	5,7
25 - 29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,0	-0,1
30 - 39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-14,2	3,5
40 - 49	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,3	1,9
50 - 59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-8,9	-7,2
60 or more	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-3,0	-3,8
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	1,5	18,5	4,4	1,6	-0,6	-1,2	-0,1	1,5	-1,4	-0,6
25 - 29	6,4	15,5	-2,2	4,2	-1,9	2,3	4,5	1,2	1,1	-1,2
30 - 39	-4,2	-3,9	3,1	2,4	7,2	0,6	1,7	5,0	-1,1	2,9
40 - 49	-2,0	-9,9	0,3	-1,6	-1,7	2,1	-3,2	2,4	-0,9	1,9
50 - 59	-0,7	-11,2	-5,0	-2,0	-0,2	-1,5	-1,4	-5,8	1,4	-0,6
60 or more	-1,1	-9,1	-0,6	-4,5	-2,9	-2,3	-1,6	-4,4	1,0	-2,3

**Note:**

Ganbaatar was mentioned for the first time in the poll conducted in May 2000 by six respondents. Three more respondents named him in 2004. These numbers are too small for disaggregation in a meaningful analysis; thus, analysis begins in 2005, when nearly 2 per cent of respondents named him as a person who should have an important role in politics.


Ganbaatar’s popularity rose substantially in 2010 and 2011, even before he became a Member of Parliament in 2012.

The average ages of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person who should have an important role in politics each year during the last decade was:

<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
37.3	30.8	38.7	37.9	41.2	41.3	41.2	41.4	44.3	40.7

People who named Ganbaatar as a person who should have an important role in politics are generally younger than average. Figure 9-13 shows the difference between these respondents and the general average of the sample (in comparison with data from Table 9-96).

Figure 9-13: Deviation of the average ages of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics from the averages of the general sample (difference in years)



There are no noteworthy gender criteria to discuss (see: Table 9 -56), but Ganbaatar’s supporters are clearly predominantly people in Ulaanbaatar and less so in rural areas (see: Table 9-57).

Although Ganbaatar came into politics from the Trade Unions, there is no obvious over-representation of workers among his followers after he became an MP in 2012 (see: Table

9-59). Before becoming a Member of Parliament in 2012, respondents with higher education were over-represented among his supporters. Thereafter, his base of support moved towards people with secondary education (see: Table 9-58).

Table 9-56: Gender division of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Male	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40.0%	44.1%
Female	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60.0%	55.9%
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Male	46.7%	56.1%	47.9%	51.2%	51.6%	51.2%	49.4%	43.6%	47.1%	58.4%
Female	53.3%	43.9%	52.1%	48.8%	48.4%	48.8%	50.6%	56.4%	52.9%	41.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-97</i>										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Male	-	-	-	-4.4	-	-	-	-	-2.0	-2.7
Female	-	-	-	4.4	-	-	-	-	2.0	2.7
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Male	-2.0	7.6	-0.3	2.6	2.0	0.2	1.7	-1.9	-0.9	1.7
Female	2.0	-7.6	0.3	-2.6	-2.0	-0.2	-1.7	1.9	0.9	-1.7

Table 9-57: Places of residence of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Urban	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62.0%	67.1%
Rural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38.0%	32.9%
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Urban	63.9%	82.9%	43.8%	53.7%	48.4%	38.6%	42.0%	47.1%	45.5%	44.4%
Rural	36.1%	17.1%	56.3%	46.3%	51.6%	61.4%	58.0%	52.9%	54.5%	55.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-98</i>										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Urban	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.1	23.9
Rural	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-17.1	-23.9
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Urban	22.0	38.5	1.9	12.5	8.5	8.3	0.2	3.7	2.8	3.9
Rural	-22.0	-38.5	-1.9	-12.5	-8.5	-8.3	-0.2	-3.7	-2.8	-3.9



Table 9-58: Levels of education of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Low education level	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22.0%	21.0%
Secondary education	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.0%	46.2%
Higher education	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48.0%	32.9%
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Low education level	15.6%	19.5%	18.8%	29.3%	22.6%	29.2%	33.7%	31.4%	23.9%	17.6%
Secondary education	43.4%	46.3%	41.7%	43.1%	45.2%	46.3%	39.3%	44.3%	50.8%	59.5%
Higher education	41.0%	34.1%	39.6%	27.6%	32.3%	24.5%	27.0%	24.3%	25.3%	22.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-99</i>										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Low education level	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.1	-1.7
Secondary education	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-11.6	4.4
Higher education	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.6	-2.6
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Low education level	-8.2	-8.1	-10.4	2.0	-6.4	-2.5	-2.0	-0.0	-1.6	-1.4
Secondary education	4.8	3.0	-0.7	-3.8	-0.0	3.0	1.2	1.3	2.6	6.2
Higher education	3.4	5.1	11.1	1.9	6.4	-0.6	0.9	-1.3	-1.0	-4.9

Table 9-59: Occupations of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Workers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.1%	33.3%
Clerical staff	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39.4%	15.8%
Self-employed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33.3%	29.8%
Nomads / farmers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0%	4.4%
Intelligentsia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.2%	16.7%
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Workers	31.1%	36.7%	27.0%	38.5%	25.8%	38.3%	29.2%	44.4%	37.1%	51.1%
Clerical staff	17.8%	33.3%	32.4%	22.0%	10.6%	11.8%	13.4%	6.7%	19.7%	7.9%
Self-employed	22.2%	13.3%	18.9%	19.8%	34.8%	25.2%	37.8%	32.2%	31.5%	24.7%
Nomads / farmers	7.8%	13.3%	8.1%	15.4%	12.1%	16.4%	11.5%	6.7%	7.3%	10.5%
Intelligentsia	21.1%	3.3%	13.5%	4.4%	16.7%	8.3%	8.1%	10.0%	4.5%	5.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-100</i>										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Workers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-17.2	4.9
Clerical staff	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.1	-1.5
Self-employed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.0	5.1
Nomads / farmers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-6.3	-4.2
Intelligentsia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-4.6	-4.3
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Workers	1.2	0.9	-4.4	1.5	-8.7	3.1	-4.6	0.6	-2.5	4.9
Clerical staff	-3.0	15.6	14.6	5.5	-4.0	-2.0	0.8	-4.2	2.6	-5.5
Self-employed	0.6	-6.7	-5.1	-0.2	6.1	0.1	3.8	4.6	-0.9	1.9
Nomads / farmers	-3.0	-1.8	-5.4	-1.7	-0.9	-0.3	1.2	-1.3	-0.0	0.0
Intelligentsia	4.2	-8.0	0.4	-5.0	7.5	-0.8	-1.2	0.3	0.9	-1.4

Table 9-60: Sectors of employment of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
State officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.8%	5.4%
State service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28.1%	15.1%
Private/mixed sector	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46.9%	63.4%
NGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.3%	16.1%
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
State officers	9.1%	7.4%	26.7%	9.2%	10.0%	8.1%	9.3%	4.8%	13.9%	5.3%
State service	20.8%	25.9%	26.7%	23.0%	13.3%	20.6%	18.0%	19.3%	19.7%	18.5%
Private/mixed sector	61.0%	59.3%	40.0%	62.1%	76.7%	65.9%	67.3%	66.3%	64.7%	68.3%
NGO	9.1%	7.4%	6.7%	5.7%	0.0%	5.4%	5.4%	9.6%	1.7%	7.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-101</i></b>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
State officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.9	-4.7
State service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.4	-5.2
Private/mixed sector	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	10.2
NGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-5.8	-0.3
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
State officers	-0.7	-0.4	16.7	1.0	3.6	0.6	-0.5	-0.8	2.0	-1.7
State service	-5.9	1.7	4.0	2.0	-6.4	1.3	-0.1	-4.2	1.9	-3.2
Private/mixed sector	10.7	-1.3	-19.4	-3.7	7.1	-2.6	0.4	2.0	-2.9	1.3
NGO	-4.1	-0.0	-1.3	0.6	-4.3	0.6	0.2	3.0	-1.0	3.6

The middle class is evidently over-represented among Ganbaatar’s supporters (see: Table 9-61).

There is a mixed picture with regard to the income of his supporters in 2008-2016. However, data on the relative incomes during that period shows that support from the middle-income group (100% to 150% of average household income) seems to be a bit broader in comparison to the overall sample (see: Table 9-62 and also Table 9-63).

Table 9-61: Social statuses of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.3%	12.8%
Middle class	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57.8%	48.9%
Below middle class	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.0%	28.6%
Disadvantaged group	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.9%	9.8%
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	13.8%	4.9%	19.1%	9.1%	2.3%	7.0%	8.7%	7.4%	11.6%	5.4%
Middle class	56.9%	73.2%	61.7%	49.6%	55.2%	65.3%	76.3%	59.6%	57.8%	77.3%
Below middle class	16.4%	14.6%	8.5%	30.6%	29.9%	20.2%	12.5%	28.7%	26.5%	15.5%
Disadvantaged group	12.9%	7.3%	10.6%	10.7%	12.6%	7.4%	2.6%	4.4%	4.1%	1.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-102</i></b>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-12.7	1.4	-2.7
Middle class	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22.3	3.1	-3.9
Below middle class	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.7	0.3	9.3
Disadvantaged group	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-11.3	-4.8	-2.7
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	-2.6	-5.7	8.0	0.6	-4.2	-1.5	-1.8	-2.9	-0.1	-1.5
Middle class	0.4	16.6	3.6	-4.0	-2.2	4.5	5.8	-0.5	0.8	3.3
Below middle class	-0.9	-7.9	-11.8	2.0	2.2	-2.2	-2.5	4.6	1.2	-0.9
Disadvantaged group	3.1	-3.0	0.3	1.4	4.2	-0.9	-1.5	-1.2	-2.0	-0.9

Figure 9-14: Social statuses of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics




Table 9-62: Estimated annual household incomes of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	21.1%	6.4%	7.4%	1.1%	2.5%	2.3%	0.0%	1.0%	1.8%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	28.9%	25.5%	21.5%	15.1%	11.6%	2.3%	2.2%	0.7%	1.1%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	23.7%	29.8%	29.8%	31.2%	25.4%	11.6%	3.0%	3.1%	3.3%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	18.4%	27.7%	27.3%	36.6%	32.9%	24.2%	22.2%	18.4%	18.4%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	5.3%	6.4%	13.2%	14.0%	20.4%	37.1%	51.1%	41.5%	47.1%
9.6 m MNT or more	2.6%	4.3%	0.8%	2.2%	7.3%	22.6%	21.5%	35.4%	28.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-103</i></b>									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	9.9	-4.0	-1.4	-1.9	-0.8	0.7	-1.0	-1.3	0.6
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	4.9	0.4	0.2	2.1	-1.5	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.3
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	-8.7	-0.5	-3.4	-4.8	-0.9	0.4	-2.9	-0.4	0.3
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	-4.9	5.7	3.6	5.8	1.7	-0.9	-1.3	0.7	0.4
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	-2.4	-3.6	2.0	-0.5	1.2	1.4	9.7	1.1	6.1
9.6 m MNT or more	1.2	2.0	-1.0	-0.7	0.2	-1.7	-4.8	-0.1	-7.6

Table 9-63: Relative incomes of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

		People whose income is less than 60 % of average	People whose income is below average, but more than 60 % of average	People whose income is above average, but less than 150 % of average	People whose income is more than 150 % of average
2013	Supporters of Ganbaatar	36%	27%	22%	16%
	Average of total sample	38%	25%	19%	18%
2014	Supporters of Ganbaatar	25%	44%	16%	14%
	Average of total sample	31%	34%	18%	17%
2015	Supporters of Ganbaatar	37%	28%	20%	16%
	Average of total sample	34%	29%	21%	16%
2016	Supporters of Ganbaatar	34%	38%	18%	11%
	Average of total sample	32%	31%	24%	13%

Figure 9-15: Relative incomes of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics compared with total samples 2013-2016





Table 9-64: Political orientations of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	22.0%	12.5%	16.3%	26.9%	13.3%	15.3%	7.1%	19.2%
Progressive Liberals	12.2%	20.8%	30.1%	16.1%	20.1%	14.1%	17.9%	13.5%
Passive Liberals	12.2%	18.8%	13.8%	19.4%	17.9%	21.8%	22.9%	16.5%
Conservatives	29.3%	22.9%	5.7%	9.7%	13.3%	9.8%	15.0%	16.8%
Traditionalists	14.6%	20.8%	17.1%	8.6%	21.2%	19.9%	24.3%	22.6%
Sovereign Democrats	9.8%	4.2%	17.1%	19.4%	14.1%	19.0%	12.9%	11.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-104</b>								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	6.2	-1.3	-2.2	6.1	-2.0	-0.5	-6.4	1.2
Progressive Liberals	-5.9	2.4	10.7	1.1	2.0	-1.5	4.4	-1.1
Passive Liberals	-2.9	1.0	-4.0	2.2	0.9	4.7	4.5	-0.1
Conservatives	6.3	2.1	-4.0	-5.8	-1.3	-4.5	-0.4	-0.9
Traditionalists	-2.1	1.0	-0.3	-5.6	0.8	0.4	1.0	1.4
Sovereign Democrats	-1.6	-5.2	-0.2	2.0	-0.4	1.5	-3.1	-0.6

Table 9-64 shows that the political orientations of Ganbaatar’s supporters is spread equally across the whole spectrum, without much over-representation from any group.

Figure 9-16: Political orientations of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics



The fact that Ganbaatar became a member of parliament as an independent candidate explains why his followers come mainly from the group that does not prefer any of the large parties (see: Table 9-65).

Table 9-65: Favoured political party of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.4%	14.1%
DP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.2%	25.4%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.2%	6.3%
Other or no party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61.2%	54.2%
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	16.5%	12.2%	14.6%	4.1%	10.8%	14.4%	10.4%	7.9%	11.8%	12.5%
DP	33.1%	31.7%	29.2%	16.3%	11.8%	15.8%	17.5%	28.6%	10.4%	9.7%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	5.1%	8.3%	6.4%	6.4%	7.9%
CWP - Green	8.3%	4.9%	0.0%	4.1%	4.3%	1.0%	0.9%	1.4%	1.0%	1.1%
Other or no party	42.1%	51.2%	56.3%	75.6%	73.1%	63.7%	62.9%	55.7%	70.4%	68.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-105</i>										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-31.8	-18.6
DP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-9.3	-2.1
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.7	1.2
Other or no party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36.5	19.5
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-16.3	-15.0	-14.2	-18.0	-11.2	-6.6	-6.9	-9.6	-6.8	-7.3
DP	2.2	10.6	0.0	-6.1	-8.4	-5.0	-9.9	-3.0	-5.0	-6.3
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-1.2	-0.2	0.2	-1.7	-0.7
CWP - Green	2.6	2.3	-1.8	1.8	0.8	-0.5	-0.5	0.7	0.0	0.0
Other or no party	11.5	2.1	16.0	22.3	18.9	13.2	17.5	11.7	13.6	14.3



Table 9-66: Religious belief of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No confession	45.0%	43.8%	40.7%	31.5%	40.2%	33.9%	40.0%	32.2%	38.7%
Buddhism	45.0%	45.8%	45.5%	57.6%	48.8%	58.4%	51.4%	64.0%	52.3%
Christianity	2.5%	6.3%	3.3%	5.4%	2.1%	3.4%	0.7%	1.4%	2.2%
Islam / Muslim	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	0.0%	3.4%	0.9%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Shamanism	7.5%	4.2%	8.1%	4.3%	4.7%	2.8%	6.4%	2.1%	6.8%
Other	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	1.1%	0.8%	0.6%	0.7%	0.3%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-106</i></b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No confession	11.0	4.0	4.2	-4.0	4.6	-0.9	6.0	-0.9	-0.2
Buddhism	-14.9	-6.6	-9.3	1.7	-4.7	0.3	-5.3	3.0	-2.6
Christianity	0.0	3.4	0.4	2.4	0.2	1.2	-1.0	-0.1	1.2
Islam / Muslim	-0.2	-1.1	0.3	-0.5	-0.9	0.0	0.2	0.0	-0.4
Shamanism	5.9	1.3	3.4	0.0	0.7	-0.8	0.5	-2.1	2.4
Other	-1.8	-1.1	1.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	-0.5	0.1	-0.4


Table 9-67: National pride of respondents who named Ganbaatar as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	63.4%	93.5%	83.1%	90.3%	93.6%	93.8%	96.4%	91.6%	95.3%
Rather proud	17.1%	6.5%	13.6%	7.5%	5.4%	5.3%	3.6%	5.4%	3.6%
Not that proud	14.6%	0.0%	1.7%	2.2%	0.7%	0.6%	0.0%	3.0%	1.1%
Not proud at all	4.9%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	0.2%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-107</i></b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	-17.4	7.3	-4.2	0.3	0.8	0.4	2.7	-0.3	0.5
Rather proud	2.7	-5.4	3.2	-0.5	-0.8	-0.4	-2.0	-0.6	-0.5
Not that proud	11.1	-1.7	-0.2	0.7	0.1	0.2	-0.5	1.6	0.3
Not proud at all	3.6	-0.3	1.2	-0.5	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	-0.7	-0.3

### 9.3.5 Sanjaasurengiin OYUN

Sanjaasurengiin Oyun (Mongolian: Санжаасүрэнгийн Оюун, born 1964) is the leader of the Civic Will Party. She is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a former Minister of Environment and Green Development and was a Member of Parliament of Mongolia (State Great Khural) from 1998 until 2016.			
Total percentage points accumulated during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	161.7 %	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 8 of 39
Number of years between 1995 and 2016 when listed among the TOP-10. . . . .	12 years	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 5 of 39
Average rank in the TOP-10 when among them during period 1995 – 2016 . . . . .	6.8	Ranking based on this aspect . . . . .	No. 21 of 39

Table 9-68: Percentage share of respondents who named Oyun as a person whom they want to play an important role in politics (figures are highlighted the years when Oyun was among TOP-10 in that year)



Source: SMF data base 1999-2016

**PhD. Sanjaasurengiin Oyun (Санжаасүрэнгийн Оюун)**



**Vice-Speaker of the State Great Khural**

**In office**

2004 - 2005

**Member of the State Great Khural**

**In office**

1998-2000, 2000-2004, 2004-2008, 2008-2012, 2012-2016

**Education**

1987 Diploma in Geochemistry in Charles University of Prague.  
1996 PhD in Geology from the Department of Earth Sciences at University of Cambridge.

**Political party**

Civil Will Party

**Political career**

Leader of the Civil Will Party

1988 -1999 Geologist, joint venture manufacturing Mongolian-Czechoslovakmetal

1990 - 1991 Project Specialist at the UNDP

1996 - 1998 Geologist at the Rio Tinto in England

1998–present Head of the Zorig Foundation

1998 - 2000 elected member of the State Great Khural

1999-present President of the Mongolian Geological Association

2000 - 2004 elected member of State Great Khural

March 2000-present Leader of the Civil Will Party

2004 - 2008 elected member of the State Great Khural

2004 - 2005 Vice-Speaker of the State Great Khural, Head of “Motherland-Democracy” coalition group in the State Great Khural

2006 - 2007 Chairman of the Subcommittee for Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Matters by the State Great Khural

2007 - 2008 Minister of Foreign Affairs

2008 - 2012 elected member of the State Great Khural

2012 - 2016 elected member of the State Great Khural

2012 - 2014 Minister of Environment and Green Development

24 June 2014–present Ph.D. Sanjaasurengiin Oyun is working as the first president of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA)

### Personal details

<b>Born</b>	18 January 1962 Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
<b>Spouse/Children</b>	Married, spouse Ts. Enkhbayar, 3 children
<b>Languages</b>	<u>Russian</u> , English, Czech

### Views of **Sanjaasurengiin OYUN**

#### regarding major political events and challenges

- *I think that the adoption of the new Constitution without any external pressure that described the basic principles of social structure and political system was the major achievement to the natural start of the development of legal governance. In this way, we Mongolians managed to come to a common agreement at the national level and set the direction for the country's future development.*
- *What is most missing in Mongolian society is Good Governance. In all areas of Mongolian society, Good Governance and Ethics should become the norm. Without ethics, we cannot talk about any social progress. I wish to make the rule of law and rule of ethics real in our society. First of all, our legal system should stop practising differentiated approaches and work without outside interference.*
- *I think of participation in politics as an active, responsible citizen. There are several areas, like green development or handicapped children, in which I have been involved. I will continue like this. I will try to create an impact that will be clearly tangible to society.*

Table 9-69: Ages of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
18 - 24	-	-	-	-	36.2%	18.8%	19.8%	22.4%	19.5%	17.7%	13.4%
25 - 29	-	-	-	-	14.1%	15.6%	19.2%	14.7%	15.6%	14.0%	15.6%
30 - 39	-	-	-	-	24.9%	31.5%	29.7%	28.9%	32.7%	29.2%	28.4%
40 - 49	-	-	-	-	11.3%	20.5%	18.7%	22.4%	18.8%	25.2%	26.6%
50 - 59	-	-	-	-	11.3%	8.7%	8.2%	6.6%	7.9%	8.1%	9.4%
60 or more	-	-	-	-	2.3%	4.9%	4.4%	5.0%	5.4%	5.8%	6.6%
Total	-	-	-	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
18 - 24	14.0%	15.1%	18.1%	21.1%	17.4%	16.7%	12.1%	16.4%	17.2%	23.8%	10.3%
25 - 29	10.2%	15.8%	15.1%	5.6%	14.2%	15.3%	15.2%	6.6%	6.9%	0.0%	20.7%
30 - 39	29.4%	24.6%	27.7%	33.5%	32.9%	30.6%	25.6%	23.0%	20.7%	23.8%	17.2%
40 - 49	29.0%	27.0%	19.3%	19.9%	21.9%	18.1%	22.8%	31.1%	17.2%	33.3%	34.5%
50 - 59	13.0%	10.2%	14.5%	11.2%	9.0%	11.1%	15.9%	11.5%	31.0%	14.3%	6.9%
60 or more	4.4%	7.4%	5.4%	8.7%	4.5%	8.3%	8.3%	11.5%	6.9%	4.8%	10.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-96</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
18 - 24	-	-	-	-	11.0	-0.4	-0.5	2.9	0.5	-0.7	-1.9
25 - 29	-	-	-	-	-3.4	0.9	3.4	1.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
30 - 39	-	-	-	-	-1.2	3.6	3.0	-0.1	4.4	3.7	0.3
40 - 49	-	-	-	-	-4.6	0.3	-2.1	0.9	-2.6	2.2	2.9
50 - 59	-	-	-	-	2.0	-2.4	-1.2	-3.7	-1.5	-2.5	-1.5
60 or more	-	-	-	-	-3.7	-2.0	-2.7	-1.8	-1.6	-3.4	-0.4
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
18 - 24	0.2	1.0	4.9	6.8	1.9	4.3	0.6	5.0	6.6	13.0	-2.8
25 - 29	-2.5	0.1	1.3	-4.9	2.9	4.8	3.2	-3.3	-2.6	-11.4	9.1
30 - 39	-1.4	-2.6	1.9	7.5	6.8	6.6	1.9	0.1	-0.0	4.2	-7.8
40 - 49	5.0	2.9	-2.8	-2.8	-0.0	-6.2	0.4	8.9	-4.0	10.8	12.7
50 - 59	1.5	-1.1	0.9	-2.2	-4.3	-4.1	0.5	-8.0	9.6	-6.2	-8.4
60 or more	-2.9	-0.3	-6.1	-4.4	-7.3	-5.3	-6.7	-2.7	-9.6	-10.4	-2.7

The average ages of respondents who named Oyun as a person who should have an important role in politics each year during the last decade was:

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
38.3	37.4	38.1	36.4	37.2	39.9	40.7	41.6	38.5	39.4

People who named Oyun as a person who should have an important role in politics are younger than average. The following Figure 9-17 shows the difference between these respondents and the general average of the sample (comparison with data from Table 9-96).

Figure 9-17: Deviation of average ages of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics from average of general sample (difference in years)



The strong over-representation of women among Oyun’s supporters was already mentioned and should not cause surprise since she is the only female politician popular enough to enter the TOP-10 list of Sant Maral Foundation’s opinion polls (see: Table 9-70).

Oyun entered politics when her brother Sanjaasurengiin Zorig, a prominent pioneer of the democratic movement, was killed in 1998. She was mentioned for the first time in the April 1999 poll, a year after she took her assassinated brother’s seat in parliament. In 2000, Oyun entered the TOP-10 for the first time when she founded the Civic Will Party and became its chairperson.

Oyun retained a position at the TOP-10 until 2012, finding her support base mainly among the urban population (Table 9-71). The general education level among her base is above average (see: Table 9-72) because it includes fewer rural residents and less than the average number of nomads (Table 9-73).

Oyun’s base of support is mainly in the private sector. She gets less than average support from state officers and employees in the state service (Table 9-74). Until 2012, she also

received relatively good support from the NGO sector, which was withdrawn in the later years observed.

Table 9-70: Gender division of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	-	-	-	-	37.9%	48.9%	43.4%	38.7%	39.6%	41.2%	31.6%
Female	-	-	-	-	62.1%	51.1%	56.6%	61.3%	60.4%	58.8%	68.4%
Total	-	-	-	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Male	38.9%	42.5%	41.0%	39.1%	45.2%	41.7%	37.7%	27.9%	41.4%	23.8%	55.2%
Female	61.1%	57.5%	59.0%	60.9%	54.8%	58.3%	62.3%	72.1%	58.6%	76.2%	44.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-97</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Male	-	-	-	-	-9.0	-1.6	-7.1	-8.6	-6.8	-6.3	-10.4
Female	-	-	-	-	9.0	1.6	7.1	8.6	6.8	6.3	10.4
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Male	-7.8	-6.3	-7.6	-9.1	-3.5	-7.9	-13.2	-19.8	-4.1	-24.2	-1.6
Female	7.8	6.3	7.6	9.1	3.5	7.9	13.2	19.8	4.1	24.2	1.6

Table 9-71: Places of residence of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Urban	-	-	-	-	88.1%	67.9%	55.5%	58.2%	61.9%	56.5%	50.3%
Rural	-	-	-	-	11.9%	32.1%	44.5%	41.8%	38.1%	43.5%	49.7%
Total	-	-	-	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Urban	44.7%	56.8%	62.0%	50.9%	54.8%	51.4%	45.7%	70.5%	48.3%	57.1%	51.7%
Rural	55.3%	43.2%	38.0%	49.1%	45.2%	48.6%	54.3%	29.5%	51.7%	42.9%	48.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-98</i>											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Urban	-	-	-	-	4.9	13.2	11.0	14.2	11.3	12.2	5.4
Rural	-	-	-	-	-4.9	-13.2	-11.0	-14.2	-11.3	-12.2	-5.4
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Urban	1.5	14.9	17.7	9.1	13.7	11.5	15.4	28.7	4.8	14.5	11.2
Rural	-1.5	-14.9	-17.7	-9.1	-13.7	-11.5	-15.4	-28.7	-4.8	-14.5	-11.2

Table 9-72: Levels of education of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Low education level	-	-	-	-	23.7%	18.3%	19.8%	21.1%	24.0%	20.4%	20.3%
Secondary education	-	-	-	-	49.2%	49.3%	48.9%	48.2%	42.4%	43.7%	41.6%
Higher education	-	-	-	-	27.1%	32.4%	31.3%	30.8%	33.7%	36.0%	38.1%
Total	-	-	-	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Low education level	19.5%	18.2%	24.7%	18.0%	17.4%	36.1%	26.6%	18.0%	31.0%	23.8%	13.8%
Secondary education	39.2%	39.6%	41.0%	58.4%	51.6%	38.9%	43.9%	50.8%	51.7%	57.1%	41.4%
Higher education	41.3%	42.1%	34.3%	23.6%	31.0%	25.0%	29.4%	31.1%	17.2%	19.0%	44.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-99</i></b>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Low education level	-	-	-	-	6.1	-2.0	-5.2	0.7	1.1	-3.8	-1.7
Secondary education	-	-	-	-	3.5	5.4	5.7	4.1	1.0	1.4	-0.0
Higher education	-	-	-	-	-9.6	-3.5	-0.5	-4.8	-2.0	2.4	1.8
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Low education level	-3.3	-5.5	-2.9	-11.1	-9.9	7.1	-5.0	-17.7	-0.4	-1.7	-5.1
Secondary education	-2.6	1.0	-2.3	16.1	4.7	-6.3	0.7	12.7	8.8	8.9	-11.9
Higher education	5.8	4.6	5.2	-4.9	5.2	-0.9	4.3	5.0	-8.4	-7.2	17.0



Table 9-73: Occupations of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Workers	-	-	30.4%	26.9%	31.7%	32.2%	26.2%	24.9%	30.9%	25.6%
Clerical staff	-	-	32.4%	22.3%	15.1%	18.1%	14.5%	20.0%	13.2%	17.2%
Self-employed	-	-	27.5%	20.0%	17.3%	19.1%	26.4%	24.9%	25.3%	23.9%
Nomads / farmers	-	-	4.9%	6.3%	10.1%	8.7%	8.1%	7.5%	3.8%	8.0%
Intelligentsia	-	-	4.9%	24.6%	25.9%	21.8%	24.8%	22.6%	26.8%	25.2%
Total	-	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Workers	25.5%	40.3%	29.8%	33.9%	50.0%	39.5%	45.9%	33.3%	27.3%	40.0%
Clerical staff	19.8%	22.6%	23.1%	20.0%	10.7%	14.9%	5.4%	0.0%	9.1%	25.0%
Self-employed	25.0%	22.6%	19.8%	20.9%	23.2%	21.9%	37.8%	38.1%	45.5%	25.0%
Nomads / farmers	7.5%	5.6%	11.6%	10.4%	8.9%	14.4%	5.4%	9.5%	9.1%	5.0%
Intelligentsia	22.2%	8.9%	15.7%	14.8%	7.1%	9.3%	5.4%	19.0%	9.1%	5.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-100</i></b>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Workers	-	-	7.7	2.1	1.6	6.0	2.3	-1.5	4.7	-2.8
Clerical staff	-	-	-1.9	-2.7	-4.5	-5.8	-2.6	-0.0	-7.1	-0.1
Self-employed	-	-	0.9	4.7	-2.9	1.6	2.1	4.8	1.0	-0.8
Nomads / farmers	-	-	1.1	-2.2	2.0	0.6	-0.4	-2.4	-2.6	-0.6
Intelligentsia	-	-	-7.8	-2.0	3.8	-2.4	-1.3	-0.9	4.0	4.3
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Workers	-4.5	4.6	-1.7	-3.1	15.5	4.3	12.2	-10.6	-12.3	-6.1
Clerical staff	-0.9	4.8	5.3	3.5	-3.9	1.0	-7.2	-10.8	-8.0	11.6
Self-employed	3.4	2.6	-4.2	0.9	-5.6	-3.3	3.9	10.5	13.0	2.1
Nomads / farmers	-3.2	-9.5	-1.9	-6.7	-4.1	-2.3	-4.9	1.6	1.8	-5.5
Intelligentsia	5.2	-2.5	2.5	5.3	-2.0	0.2	-3.9	9.3	5.5	-2.2

Table 9-74: Sectors of employment of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
State officers	-	-	6.3%	15.7%	10.4%	6.9%	10.6%	7.7%	6.8%	10.5%
State service	-	-	23.8%	28.1%	27.1%	31.5%	21.4%	23.0%	25.3%	16.2%
Private/mixed sector	-	-	50.0%	41.8%	41.7%	42.4%	52.7%	51.0%	56.3%	54.8%
NGO	-	-	20.0%	14.5%	20.8%	19.2%	15.3%	18.4%	11.6%	18.6%
Total	-	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
State officers	10.4%	9.8%	8.6%	8.3%	2.1%	7.0%	7.7%	0.0%	10.0%	5.0%
State service	25.0%	20.5%	22.9%	23.9%	23.4%	18.0%	33.3%	16.7%	10.0%	35.0%
Private/mixed sector	51.6%	55.4%	61.9%	60.6%	68.1%	69.0%	53.8%	77.8%	80.0%	60.0%
NGO	13.0%	14.3%	6.7%	7.3%	6.4%	6.0%	5.1%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-101</i>										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
State officers	-	-	-2.2	0.3	-5.1	-5.7	-2.0	-5.8	-5.0	0.4
State service	-	-	-6.0	-3.9	-2.7	-2.2	-4.3	-3.9	-4.3	-4.1
Private/mixed sector	-	-	7.2	3.1	4.2	5.1	5.8	7.3	9.7	1.5
NGO	-	-	1.0	0.6	3.6	2.7	0.5	2.3	-0.5	2.1
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
State officers	0.6	2.0	-1.4	0.1	-4.3	-0.5	-2.0	-5.6	-1.8	-2.0
State service	-1.7	-3.7	0.1	2.9	3.7	-1.3	15.2	-6.8	-7.8	13.2
Private/mixed sector	1.2	-5.2	2.5	-5.2	-1.5	0.6	-13.1	13.5	12.4	-6.9
NGO	-0.2	6.8	-1.3	2.2	2.1	1.2	-0.1	-1.1	-2.7	-4.3

Oyun's base had an over-representation of respondents in the Below Middle Class and Disadvantaged Group for a considerable period (2002-2009). Thereafter, the over-representation shifted to the middle class, which is in line with the general improvement of people's social status (see: Table 9-75).

This shift of support to the more affluent segment of society is also confirmed by the rising level of income (see: Table 9-76).

Table 9-75: Social statuses of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	-	-	8.7%	15.3%	11.2%	11.9%	11.0%	11.0%	11.4%	14.7%
Middle class	-	-	53.6%	49.4%	55.6%	46.9%	55.1%	55.3%	47.9%	51.3%
Below middle class	-	-	24.6%	21.5%	18.3%	24.3%	21.1%	19.5%	23.1%	22.9%
Disadvantaged group	-	-	13.0%	13.8%	14.8%	16.9%	12.7%	14.1%	17.6%	11.1%
Total	-	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	17.5%	10.0%	8.9%	10.4%	10.4%	6.3%	8.6%	3.6%	14.3%	17.2%
Middle class	53.5%	60.0%	51.3%	59.1%	70.1%	64.7%	69.0%	67.9%	57.1%	65.5%
Below middle class	19.0%	18.8%	27.2%	21.4%	16.4%	22.4%	13.8%	17.9%	28.6%	6.9%
Disadvantaged group	10.0%	11.3%	12.7%	9.1%	3.0%	6.6%	8.6%	10.7%	0.0%	10.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-102</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	-	-	-0.5	4.5	-0.3	-1.1	-1.1	-1.6	-0.6	-0.8
Middle class	-	-	4.0	-5.4	-1.3	-7.5	-3.7	-2.4	-6.8	-1.5
Below middle class	-	-	0.2	1.3	-1.9	4.6	2.5	1.2	3.4	3.7
Disadvantaged group	-	-	-3.6	-0.3	3.5	3.9	2.3	2.8	3.9	-1.4
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	1.1	-0.6	-2.3	1.8	3.9	-2.2	-1.8	-6.7	2.7	10.3
Middle class	-3.0	3.4	-6.9	5.5	12.7	3.8	-1.5	7.8	0.2	-8.5
Below middle class	1.7	-3.8	6.9	-7.1	-11.2	-0.0	-1.2	-6.2	3.2	-9.4
Disadvantaged group	0.2	0.9	2.3	-0.2	-5.4	-1.6	4.5	5.1	-6.0	7.6

Figure 9-18: Social statuses of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics





Table 9-76: Estimated annual household incomes of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	15.1%	10.8%	5.4%	4.2%	5.3%	3.4%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	19.5%	24.2%	18.2%	13.9%	11.7%	1.7%	7.1%	0.0%	3.4%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	22.6%	28.0%	36.5%	33.3%	25.2%	3.4%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	26.4%	22.3%	25.0%	31.9%	27.7%	20.3%	3.6%	19.0%	24.1%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	14.5%	12.1%	12.2%	16.7%	22.7%	42.4%	46.4%	38.1%	27.6%
9.6 m MNT or more	1.9%	2.5%	2.7%	0.0%	7.4%	28.8%	35.7%	38.1%	44.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-103</i></b>									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	4.0	0.4	-3.5	1.2	2.1	1.8	-1.0	2.4	-1.3
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	-4.6	-0.9	-3.1	1.0	-1.4	-0.5	5.3	-0.6	2.6
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	-9.7	-2.2	3.3	-2.6	-1.1	-7.8	1.3	-3.5	-3.0
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	3.1	0.4	1.4	1.2	-3.5	-4.8	-20.0	1.4	6.1
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	6.8	2.1	1.0	2.2	3.5	6.7	5.0	-2.3	-13.4
9.6 m MNT or more	0.4	0.3	0.9	-2.8	0.4	4.6	9.4	2.6	8.9

Table 9-77: Relative incomes of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

		People whose income is less than 60% of average	People whose income is below average, but more than 60% of average	People whose income is above average, but less than 150% of average	People whose income is more than 150% of average
2013	Supporters of Oyun	29%	29%	22%	20%
	Average of total sample	38%	25%	19%	18%
2014	Supporters of Oyun	18%	36%	29%	18%
	Average of total sample	31%	34%	18%	17%
2015	Supporters of Oyun	33%	29%	10%	29%
	Average of total sample	34%	29%	21%	16%
2016	Supporters of Oyun	31%	24%	21%	24%
	Average of total sample	32%	31%	24%	13%

Figure 9-19: Relative incomes of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics compared with total samples 2013-2016



The supporters of the CWP’s chairperson are a mirror-image reflection of the party’s claim as a force for liberalism. There is a clear over-representation of progressive liberals and passive liberals (see: Table 9-78) among Oyun’s supporters. Of course, the strongest support for Oyun comes from people who favour the CWP (see: Table 9-79). There is, however, also a strong backing from respondents who do not favour any particular political party.

Table 9-78: Political orientations of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	15.1%	18.0%	16.1%	15.3%	15.2%	14.8%	10.3%	14.3%
Progressive Liberals	18.1%	21.7%	23.2%	18.1%	20.4%	21.3%	17.2%	4.8%
Passive Liberals	19.9%	16.1%	17.4%	23.6%	20.1%	16.4%	20.7%	9.5%
Conservatives	19.9%	21.7%	8.4%	13.9%	15.2%	18.0%	13.8%	28.6%
Traditionalists	18.7%	13.7%	14.2%	12.5%	17.8%	21.3%	13.8%	28.6%
Sovereign Democrats	8.4%	8.7%	20.6%	16.7%	11.2%	8.2%	24.1%	14.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-104</i></b>								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	-0.7	4.2	-2.4	-5.5	-0.0	-1.1	-3.2	-3.7
Progressive Liberals	-0.0	3.3	3.9	3.1	2.3	5.7	3.8	-9.8
Passive Liberals	4.7	-1.6	-0.4	6.4	3.0	-0.7	2.3	-7.1
Conservatives	-3.1	0.9	-1.3	-1.6	0.7	3.7	-1.6	10.9
Traditionalists	2.0	-6.1	-3.2	-1.7	-2.6	1.8	-9.5	7.4
Sovereign Democrats	-2.9	-0.7	3.4	-0.6	-3.4	-9.3	8.2	2.2

Figure 9-20: Political orientations of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics




Table 9-79: Favoured political party of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-	-	-	-	45.0%	42.7%	35.2%	24.9%	24.6%	26.5%	20.9%
DP	-	-	-	-	22.9%	16.6%	25.4%	34.2%	32.9%	21.9%	19.5%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	15.0%	16.9%	26.5%	24.0%	12.8%	29.3%
Other or no party	-	-	-	-	32.1%	25.8%	22.5%	14.4%	18.6%	38.9%	30.3%
Total	-	-	-	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	11.1%	13.2%	9.0%	6.2%	7.1%	1.4%	11.8%	14.8%	10.3%	14.3%	3.4%
DP	32.3%	32.1%	22.9%	23.6%	14.2%	13.9%	19.0%	16.4%	27.6%	0.0%	10.3%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7%	1.6%	0.0%	9.5%	10.3%
CWP - Green	17.0%	22.9%	17.5%	14.9%	14.8%	18.1%	9.7%	18.0%	6.9%	9.5%	20.7%
Other or no party	39.6%	31.8%	50.6%	55.3%	63.9%	66.7%	58.8%	49.2%	55.2%	66.7%	55.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-105</i>											
	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-	-	-	-	-11.0	-11.0	-17.9	-21.2	-23.6	-29.4	-29.3
DP	-	-	-	-	3.0	-5.2	-1.4	5.7	6.5	8.5	-0.0
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	11.9	14.2	18.4	15.6	8.3	23.8
Other or no party	-0.8	-1.6	8.2	3.6	7.9	4.3	5.1	-2.9	1.6	12.6	5.6
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-21.5	-19.6	-18.1	-22.5	-15.0	-20.6	-9.2	-2.6	-7.1	-4.3	-16.4
DP	4.8	1.3	1.8	-5.5	-8.2	-6.3	-1.8	-11.0	-4.0	-15.5	-5.6
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-5.6	-6.8	-6.2	1.4	1.7
CWP - Green	11.8	17.2	14.8	13.1	12.6	14.5	8.2	16.6	6.2	8.5	19.6
Other or no party	4.9	1.1	1.5	15.0	10.6	12.4	8.4	3.8	11.2	9.9	0.7

Table 9-80: Religious belief of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
No confession	29.9%	40.4%	34.8%	41.4%	36.7%	36.1%	37.9%	28.6%	55.2%
Buddhism	59.8%	50.9%	53.5%	44.3%	55.0%	50.8%	51.7%	57.1%	41.4%
Christianity	6.7%	3.1%	5.2%	5.7%	2.4%	3.3%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%
Islam / Muslim	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Shamanism	1.2%	5.0%	5.2%	8.6%	4.2%	8.2%	10.3%	9.5%	0.0%
Other	2.4%	0.6%	0.6%	0.0%	0.3%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-106</i></b>									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
No confession	-4.1	0.6	-1.7	5.9	1.1	1.3	4.0	-4.6	16.3
Buddhism	-0.1	-1.5	-1.3	-11.7	1.6	-7.3	-5.0	-3.9	-13.5
Christianity	4.2	0.2	2.4	2.7	0.5	1.1	-1.7	3.3	-0.9
Islam / Muslim	-0.2	-1.1	0.1	-0.5	-3.0	-0.9	-0.5	0.0	-0.4
Shamanism	-0.4	2.1	0.4	4.3	0.2	4.6	4.5	5.4	-4.5
Other	0.6	-0.4	0.1	-0.7	-0.3	1.1	-1.2	-0.2	3.0

Table 9 81: National pride of respondents who named Oyun as a person to have an important role in politics


	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very proud	76.1%	80.0%	87.1%	90.1%	94.8%	89.8%	96.6%	85.7%	93.1%
Rather proud	16.0%	18.1%	11.6%	8.5%	4.5%	10.2%	3.4%	14.3%	6.9%
Not that proud	5.5%	1.9%	1.3%	1.4%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Not proud at all	2.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-107</i></b>									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very proud	-4.8	-6.1	-0.2	0.1	1.9	-3.6	2.8	-6.1	-1.7
Rather proud	1.6	6.2	1.3	0.4	-1.7	4.5	-2.2	8.3	2.8
Not that proud	2.0	0.2	-0.6	-0.0	0.1	-0.4	-0.5	-1.5	-0.8
Not proud at all	1.2	-0.3	-0.5	-0.5	-0.3	-0.5	-0.1	-0.7	-0.3



### 9.3.6 Chultemiin ULAAN

Chultemiin Ulaan (Mongolian: Чүлтэмийн Улаан, born 1954) was the minister of economic affairs and finance in 2000-2004. He was a member of parliament without interruption from 1996 to 2008.			
Total percentage points accumulated during 1995-2006	110.2 %	Ranking based on combined percentages	No. 14 of 39
Number of years between, when listed among the TOP-10. . . . .	9 years (1995-2006)	Ranking based on number of years included on Top-10	No. 9 of 39
Average rank when included in the TOP-10	8.0	Ranking based on average ranking	No. 25 of 39

Table 9-82: Percentage share of respondents who named Ulaan as a person whom they want to play an important role in politics (figures are highlighted the years when Ulaan was among TOP-10 in that year)



Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

**Chultemiin Ulaan (Чүлтэмийн Улаан)**



**Vice-Speaker of the State Great Khural**

**In office**

2012

**Deputy Prime Minister of Mongolia**

**In office**

2004- 2006

**Member of the State Great Khural**

**In office**

1996-2000, 2000-2004, 2004-2008, 2008-2012, 2012-2016, July 2016-present

<b>Education</b>	1977 Engineer-economist, State university of Economic in Irkutsk 1992 Academy of Management, Moscow
<b>Political party</b>	Mongolian People's Party
<b>Political career</b>	<u>Member of the Mongolian People's Party</u> 1977 - 1985 Specialist, Head of department at the State Planning Commission 1985 - 1990 Instructor, Head of department at the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party's 1992 - 1996 Head of department, Minister of the National Development Agency 1996 - 2000 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u> 2000 - 2004 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u> 2000 - 2004 Minister of Finance 2004 - 2008 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u> 2004 - 2006 Deputy Prime Minister 2006 - 2007 Chairman of the Budget Standing Committee 2004 - 2009 Director of the National Development Institute 2007 - 2008 Minister of Finance 2008 - 2012 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u> 2012 - 2016 elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u> 2012 Vice Speaker of the <u>State Great Khural</u> 2012 - 2014 Minister of Finance

	2015 - 2016 Chairman of the Budget Standing Committee 2016 – present elected member of the <u>State Great Khural</u>
<b>Personal details</b>	
<b>Born</b>	22 April 1954 Sukhbaatar aimag, Mongolia
<b>Spouse/Children</b>	Married, 3 children
<b>Languages</b>	<u>Russian</u> , English

### Views of **Chultemiin ULAAN**

#### regarding major political events and challenges

- *The adoption of the IV Mongolian Constitution and definition of methods of transition to the market economy, and the implementation that followed is an important political event. I am proud that as a Minister of the Government, (the government) formed as the result of first Elections under the new democratic law. I took part in defining the transition to the market economy mechanisms and its further implementation. This activity was very important as it set the basis for Mongolia's development, according to the general world practices.*
- *The most important goal today is to overcome the existing economic crisis, financial deficiencies, to eliminate the debt burden and to set the solid basis for further development. First of all, we should concentrate our resources and efforts to eliminating opportunistic behaviour and separate ourselves from the influence of rich people and foreigners. We should avoid political divisions, stop the profiteering through corrupt practices and end the fighting over political nominations and power.*
- *I am optimistic about my political future. I worry about the future progress of the country. I think this is the time we should join our efforts to eliminate what has been done wrong in the past. I will keep sharp eyes on the wrongdoings, I will be soft and supportive on the right doings and I will actively promote things that are just.*

Table 9-83: Ages of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics


	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
18 - 24	-	29.2%	13.2%	14.6%	14.5%	13.8%	15.1%	13.2%	8.7%	13.0%
25 - 29	-	12.5%	9.4%	8.0%	12.4%	12.8%	11.9%	13.4%	12.0%	15.2%
30 - 39	-	4.2%	13.2%	28.1%	22.8%	20.7%	19.8%	18.5%	28.3%	31.5%
40 - 49	-	12.5%	22.6%	17.6%	21.2%	25.0%	25.9%	20.0%	21.6%	17.4%
50 - 59	-	20.8%	28.3%	19.6%	20.7%	15.4%	13.1%	18.0%	16.3%	12.0%
60 or more	-	20.8%	13.2%	12.1%	8.3%	12.2%	14.3%	16.7%	13.1%	10.9%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	14.7%	11.7%	5.6%	12.5%	9.6%	5.5%	6.3%	5.3%	-	6.7%
25 - 29	15.2%	21.6%	2.8%	8.3%	9.6%	10.3%	5.1%	7.9%	-	10.0%
30 - 39	29.8%	26.1%	36.1%	29.2%	19.2%	20.5%	7.6%	10.5%	-	30.0%
40 - 49	24.6%	14.4%	19.4%	4.2%	19.2%	29.5%	16.5%	21.1%	-	23.3%
50 - 59	7.9%	15.3%	16.7%	25.0%	19.2%	14.4%	34.2%	15.8%	-	20.0%
60 or more	7.9%	10.8%	19.4%	20.8%	23.1%	19.9%	30.4%	39.5%	-	10.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-96</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
18 - 24	-	5.7	-12.0	-4.6	-5.7	-5.6	-4.0	-5.1	-6.6	-0.8
25 - 29	-	-6.1	-8.1	-6.7	-3.4	-0.1	-3.0	0.1	-3.0	2.5
30 - 39	-	-21.2	-12.9	0.3	-3.8	-8.3	-8.5	-7.0	0.1	0.8
40 - 49	-	-3.2	6.7	-2.7	0.4	3.5	4.5	-3.0	-2.1	-6.6
50 - 59	-	9.9	19.0	8.5	11.3	5.1	3.7	7.4	5.4	0.5
60 or more	-	15.0	7.2	5.1	1.2	5.5	7.3	7.5	6.1	3.6
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	0.6	-1.5	-8.8	-3.0	-2.8	-6.0	-5.1	-5.4	-	-6.5
25 - 29	-0.5	7.9	-7.7	-3.0	-0.9	-1.7	-4.8	-1.6	-	-1.6
30 - 39	2.7	0.3	10.1	3.1	-4.8	-3.2	-15.2	-10.2	-	4.9
40 - 49	0.5	-7.7	-3.2	-17.8	-5.0	7.0	-5.8	-0.1	-	1.5
50 - 59	-3.5	1.7	3.3	11.6	4.0	-1.0	14.7	-5.7	-	4.7
60 or more	0.2	-0.7	6.3	9.0	9.4	4.9	16.2	23.0	-	-3.1

The average ages of respondents who named Ulaan as a person who should have an important role in politics each year during the last decade was:

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
37.8	38.7	45.8	44.5	46.3	45.3	52.2	51.6	62.0	42.6

People who named Ulaan as a person who should have an important role in politics are generally older than average. Figure 9-21 shows the difference between these respondents and the general average of the sample (comparison with data from Table 9-96).

Figure 9-21: Deviation of the average ages of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics from averages of the general sample (difference in years)



Respondents who named Ulaan as a person who should have an important role in politics are predominantly male and there is an over-representation of rural people (see: Table 9-84 and Table 9-85). There has been some over-representation of people with college or university education, but less so in the latest years observed (see: Table 9-86).

In the years with a strong over-representation of rural people, there is also a coinciding trend of an above-average number of nomads (see: Table 9-87). Generally, however, Ulaan has had strong support from the public service (see: Table 9-88). Self-employed people and the private sector are grossly under-represented among Ulaan’s supporters.

Table 9-84: Gender division of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Male	-	45.8%	58.5%	59.3%	52.8%	52.1%	49.4%	52.5%	47.6%	51.1%
Female	-	54.2%	41.5%	40.7%	47.2%	47.9%	50.6%	47.5%	52.4%	48.9%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Male	51.3%	54.1%	38.9%	58.3%	50.0%	56.2%	49.4%	55.3%	-	65.0%
Female	48.7%	45.9%	61.1%	41.7%	50.0%	43.8%	50.6%	44.7%	-	35.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-97</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Male	-	-3.1	11.6	8.8	2.3	4.8	3.0	5.0	5.6	4.4
Female	-	3.1	-11.6	-8.8	-2.3	-4.8	-3.0	-5.0	-5.6	-4.4
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Male	2.5	5.5	-9.4	9.7	0.4	5.2	1.7	9.8	-	8.2
Female	-2.5	-5.5	9.4	-9.7	-0.4	-5.2	-1.7	-9.8	-	-8.2

Table 9-85: Places of residence of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Urban	-	100%	60.4%	29.6%	14.0%	27.1%	22.7%	28.1%	25.7%	29.3%
Rural	-	0.0%	39.6%	70.4%	86.0%	72.9%	77.3%	71.9%	74.3%	70.7%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Urban	18.3%	18.0%	36.1%	62.5%	9.6%	20.5%	41.8%	13.2%	-	11.7%
Rural	81.7%	82.0%	63.9%	37.5%	90.4%	79.5%	58.2%	86.8%	-	88.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-98</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Urban	-	-	-22.8	-25.0	-30.5	-16.8	-27.9	-16.2	-19.2	-13.8
Rural	-	-	22.8	25.0	30.5	16.8	27.9	16.2	19.2	13.8
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Urban	-23.6	-26.4	-5.8	21.3	-30.3	-9.8	-0.0	-30.3	-	-28.9
Rural	23.6	26.4	5.8	-21.3	30.3	9.8	0.0	30.3	-	28.9

Table 9-86: Levels of education of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Low education level	-	16.7%	13.2%	21.6%	27.5%	26.1%	26.7%	25.2%	18.9%	19.6%
Secondary education	-	29.2%	35.8%	38.2%	38.9%	41.0%	38.0%	39.6%	39.5%	40.2%
Higher education	-	54.2%	50.9%	40.2%	33.7%	33.0%	35.3%	35.3%	41.6%	40.2%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Low education level	35.1%	20.7%	27.8%	20.8%	38.5%	27.4%	36.7%	52.6%	-	25.0%
Secondary education	36.1%	42.3%	41.7%	45.8%	48.1%	52.1%	48.1%	31.6%	-	61.7%
Higher education	28.8%	36.9%	30.6%	33.3%	13.5%	20.5%	15.2%	15.8%	-	13.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-99</i></b>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Low education level	-	-1.5	-4.4	1.3	2.4	5.7	3.8	1.0	-3.2	-3.1
Secondary education	-	-15.9	-9.8	-5.7	-4.3	-3.1	-3.4	-2.7	-2.0	-1.6
Higher education	-	17.4	14.2	4.4	1.9	-2.6	-0.4	1.7	5.2	4.7
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Low education level	11.3	-6.9	-1.4	-6.5	9.5	-4.2	0.9	21.2	-	6.1
Secondary education	-2.6	-1.0	-0.7	-1.1	2.9	8.8	10.0	-11.4	-	8.4
Higher education	-8.8	7.8	2.0	7.5	-12.4	-4.6	-10.9	-9.8	-	-14.5

Table 9-87: Occupations of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Workers	-	27.3%	10.5%	22.2%	31.4%	24.8%	22.0%	26.3%	20.7%	22.4%
Clerical staff	-	45.5%	42.1%	28.1%	25.0%	30.1%	21.0%	20.8%	27.9%	28.4%
Self-employed	-	18.2%	10.5%	11.4%	14.3%	9.0%	21.7%	15.8%	19.3%	20.9%
Nomads / farmers	-	9.1%	5.3%	9.6%	10.7%	14.3%	12.2%	12.6%	6.1%	4.5%
Intelligentsia	-	-	31.6%	28.7%	18.6%	21.8%	23.1%	24.6%	26.0%	23.9%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Workers	34.0%	44.2%	33.3%	50.0%	48.6%	42.0%	30.3%	50.0%	-	55.8%
Clerical staff	18.2%	15.8%	37.0%	0.0%	17.1%	15.2%	18.2%	4.5%	-	7.0%
Self-employed	15.7%	12.6%	14.8%	12.5%	0.0%	12.5%	45.5%	31.8%	-	14.0%
Nomads / farmers	23.3%	11.6%	14.8%	6.3%	28.6%	23.2%	6.1%	9.1%	-	23.3%
Intelligentsia	8.8%	15.8%	0.0%	31.3%	5.7%	7.1%	0.0%	4.5%	-	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-100</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Workers	-	-2.1	-12.1	-2.6	1.4	-1.4	-1.9	-0.1	-5.6	-6.0
Clerical staff	-	-3.1	7.8	3.2	5.4	6.2	4.0	0.7	7.6	11.0
Self-employed	-	-3.2	-16.0	-3.9	-5.9	-8.6	-2.6	-4.4	-5.0	-3.9
Nomads / farmers	-	8.4	1.5	1.1	2.6	6.2	3.6	2.7	-0.2	-4.1
Intelligentsia	-	-	18.8	2.2	-3.5	-2.4	-3.1	1.1	3.2	2.9
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Workers	4.0	8.5	1.9	13.0	14.1	6.7	-3.5	6.1	-	9.7
Clerical staff	-2.5	-2.0	19.2	-16.5	2.6	1.3	5.6	-6.3	-	-6.4
Self-employed	-5.9	-7.4	-9.2	-7.5	-28.8	-12.6	11.5	4.2	-	-8.9
Nomads / farmers	12.5	-3.6	1.3	-10.9	15.5	6.5	-4.3	1.2	-	12.8
Intelligentsia	-8.1	4.5	-13.2	21.8	-3.4	-1.9	-9.3	-5.2	-	-7.2



Table 9-88: Sectors of employment of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
State officers	-	33.3%	16.7%	21.7%	23.5%	25.3%	14.4%	15.8%	15.1%	17.5%
State service	-	11.1%	36.7%	35.5%	44.9%	35.8%	28.2%	29.9%	39.7%	21.1%
Private/mixed sector	-	55.6%	23.3%	34.8%	20.4%	22.1%	46.0%	39.3%	37.3%	43.9%
NGO	-	0.0%	23.3%	8.0%	11.2%	16.8%	11.4%	15.1%	7.9%	17.5%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
State officers	8.1%	11.9%	18.2%	6.3%	6.1%	2.8%	6.3%	5.6%	-	0.0%
State service	22.1%	26.2%	31.8%	25.0%	15.2%	19.6%	18.8%	16.7%	-	18.6%
Private/mixed sector	58.4%	57.1%	40.9%	50.0%	75.8%	74.8%	68.8%	77.8%	-	81.4%
NGO	11.4%	4.8%	9.1%	18.8%	3.0%	2.8%	6.3%	0.0%	-	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-101</i>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
State officers	-	17.5	8.2	6.3	8.0	12.7	1.8	2.3	3.2	7.5
State service	-	-22.9	6.9	3.5	15.1	2.1	2.4	3.0	10.2	0.8
Private/mixed sector	-	20.0	-19.5	-3.9	-17.1	-15.1	-0.8	-4.4	-9.3	-9.4
NGO	-	-14.6	4.4	-5.9	-6.0	0.3	-3.4	-1.0	-4.1	1.1
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
State officers	-1.7	4.1	8.2	-1.9	-0.3	-4.7	-3.5	-0.1	-	-7.0
State service	-4.5	2.0	9.1	4.0	-4.6	0.3	0.6	-6.8	-	-3.2
Private/mixed sector	8.0	-3.4	-18.5	-15.8	6.2	6.3	1.8	13.5	-	14.5
NGO	-1.8	-2.7	1.2	13.6	-1.3	-2.0	1.0	-6.6	-	-4.3

In 1998-2001, respondents from the lowest social status were over-represented. In 2002-2007, this shifted to the Middle Class. Yet the picture lacks any uniformity in the latest years observed (see: Table 9-89). Rather seldom has the Above Middle Class ever been over-represented among Ulaan’s supporters.

There is a similar pattern regarding respondents’ income. There is more often an over-representation of people with low incomes (see: Table 9-90). When looking at the relative incomes from 2012-2016, households with incomes below 60 per cent of the average are very strongly represented (see: Table 9-91).

Table 9-89: Social statuses of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	-	8.3%	0.0%	5.5%	9.3%	18.3%	9.3%	14.2%	8.1%	16.9%
Middle class	-	33.3%	12.5%	55.7%	54.9%	58.9%	69.5%	61.8%	58.9%	55.1%
Below middle class	-	33.3%	50.0%	19.7%	20.3%	13.1%	14.2%	15.3%	21.0%	20.2%
Disadvantaged group	-	25.0%	37.5%	19.1%	15.4%	9.7%	7.0%	8.6%	12.0%	7.9%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	18.1%	25.0%	14.3%	4.2%	5.8%	7.1%	7.7%	10.8%	-	0.0%
Middle class	60.2%	48.1%	57.1%	83.3%	50.0%	69.3%	66.7%	59.5%	-	78.3%
Below middle class	14.0%	19.4%	14.3%	4.2%	34.6%	17.1%	23.1%	24.3%	-	16.7%
Disadvantaged group	7.6%	7.4%	14.3%	8.3%	9.6%	6.4%	2.6%	5.4%	-	5.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-102</i></b>										
	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	-	1.6	-9.2	-5.3	-2.2	5.3	-2.8	1.6	-3.9	1.4
Middle class	-	-16.4	-37.2	0.9	-2.0	4.5	10.7	4.1	4.2	2.3
Below middle class	-	9.2	25.5	-0.6	0.1	-6.5	-4.4	-3.0	1.4	1.0
Disadvantaged group	-	5.7	20.9	5.0	4.1	-3.3	-3.5	-2.7	-1.7	-4.6
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	1.8	14.4	3.1	-4.4	-0.8	-1.4	-2.8	0.6	-	-6.9
Middle class	3.7	-8.5	-1.0	29.8	-7.4	8.4	-3.8	-0.6	-	4.3
Below middle class	-3.3	-3.1	-6.1	-24.4	7.0	-5.3	8.1	0.3	-	0.3
Disadvantaged group	-2.3	-2.9	4.0	-1.0	1.2	-1.8	-1.5	-0.2	-	2.3

Figure 9-22: Social statuses of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics





Table 9-90: Estimated annual household incomes of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	13.1%	13.9%	13.0%	1.9%	2.7%	2.8%	0.0%	-	1.7%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	35.5%	11.1%	13.0%	15.4%	19.9%	1.4%	2.7%	-	0.0%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	35.5%	22.2%	26.1%	46.2%	37.0%	15.3%	5.4%	-	3.4%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	12.1%	36.1%	26.1%	28.8%	28.1%	31.9%	24.3%	-	30.5%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	2.8%	8.3%	21.7%	5.8%	8.9%	29.2%	54.1%	-	42.4%
9.6 m MNT or more	0.9%	8.3%	0.0%	1.9%	3.4%	19.4%	13.5%	-	22.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-103</i></b>									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
less than 600000 MNT	1.9	3.5	4.2	-1.1	-0.5	1.2	-1.0	-	0.4
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	11.5	-14.0	-8.3	2.4	6.7	-0.8	0.9	-	-0.8
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	3.2	-8.0	-7.1	10.2	10.7	4.1	-0.5	-	0.4
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	-11.2	14.2	2.5	-1.9	-3.1	6.8	0.8	-	12.5
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	-4.8	-1.7	10.6	-8.7	-10.3	-6.6	12.6	-	1.4
9.6 m MNT or more	-0.5	6.0	-1.8	-0.9	-3.6	-4.8	-12.8	-	-13.9

Table 9-91: Relative incomes of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

		People whose income is less than 60 % of average	People whose income is below average, but more than 60 % of average	People whose income is above average, but less than 150 % of average	People whose income is more than 150 % of average
2013	Supporters of Ulaan	44%	24%	18%	14%
	Average of total sample	38%	25%	19%	18%
2014	Supporters of Ulaan	32%	49%	14%	5%
	Average of total sample	31%	34%	18%	17%
2015	Supporters of Ulaan	67%	0%	0%	33%
	Average of total sample	34%	29%	21%	16%
2016	Supporters of Ulaan	49%	29%	17%	5%
	Average of total sample	32%	31%	24%	13%

Figure 9-23: Relative incomes of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics compared with total samples 2013-2016



In 2011-2012, Ulaan received exceptionally strong support from idealistic democrats (see: Table 9-92). It's clear that Ulaan's supporters are mostly supporters of the MPP and

MPRP (see: Table 9-93).

Table 9-92: Political orientations of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	15.3%	16.7%	8.3%	46.2%	36.7%	16.5%	21.1%	-
Progressive Liberals	20.7%	22.2%	16.7%	15.4%	8.9%	8.9%	10.5%	-
Passive Liberals	18.0%	16.7%	20.8%	25.0%	13.3%	15.2%	15.8%	-
Conservatives	17.1%	22.2%	12.5%	5.8%	13.3%	16.5%	5.3%	-
Traditionalists	18.9%	13.9%	25.0%	5.8%	11.1%	25.3%	21.1%	-
Sovereign Democrats	9.9%	8.3%	16.7%	1.9%	16.7%	17.7%	26.3%	-
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-104</i></b>								
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Idealistic Democrats	-0.5	2.9	-10.1	25.4	21.4	0.6	7.5	-
Progressive Liberals	2.6	3.8	-2.7	0.4	-9.2	-6.8	-2.9	-
Passive Liberals	2.9	-1.1	3.0	7.8	-3.7	-1.9	-2.6	-
Conservatives	-5.8	1.4	2.8	-9.7	-1.2	2.1	-10.2	-
Traditionalists	2.2	-5.9	7.6	-8.5	-9.3	5.8	-2.2	-
Sovereign Democrats	-1.4	-1.0	-0.6	-15.4	2.1	0.2	10.4	-

Figure 9-24: Political orientations of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics




Table 9-93: Favoured political party of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-	95.0%	81.4%	86.5%	82.2%	77.7%	79.1%	85.9%	81.8%	64.8%
DP	-	5.0%	4.7%	5.3%	9.6%	9.0%	8.9%	2.6%	5.7%	12.1%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	1.2%	0.6%	3.0%	3.4%	0.7%	2.0%	2.2%
Other or no party	-	0.0%	14.0%	7.1%	7.6%	10.2%	8.7%	10.8%	10.4%	20.9%
Total	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	61.3%	54.1%	61.1%	58.3%	63.5%	32.2%	15.2%	36.8%	-	40.0%
DP	12.9%	14.4%	13.9%	8.3%	7.7%	11.6%	8.9%	7.9%	-	8.3%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	17.1%	30.4%	21.1%	-	16.7%
CWP - Green	3.2%	0.9%	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	-	0.0%
Other or no party	22.6%	30.6%	25.0%	29.2%	28.8%	38.4%	45.6%	34.2%	-	35.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-105</i>										
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	-	48.1	25.4	32.8	29.0	31.6	30.9	30.0	31.6	32.2
DP	-	-29.9	-15.2	-16.5	-17.2	-19.5	-17.5	-10.8	-13.8	-15.4
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-1.8	-2.0	-5.1	-5.1	-3.8	-3.5	-3.0
Other or no party	-	-18.2	-10.2	-14.4	-9.8	-7.0	-8.3	-15.4	-14.3	-13.8
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	28.4	26.9	32.4	36.3	41.5	11.2	-2.1	19.4	-	20.2
DP	-17.9	-6.7	-15.3	-14.1	-12.5	-9.2	-18.5	-23.7	-	-7.7
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	10.9	21.9	14.8	-	8.1
CWP - Green	-2.5	-1.7	-1.8	1.9	-3.5	-0.8	-1.5	-0.7	-	-1.1
Other or no party	-8.1	-18.5	-15.3	-24.1	-25.4	-12.1	0.2	-9.8	-	-19.5

Table 9-94: Religious belief of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No confession	35.1%	30.6%	54.2%	19.2%	25.7%	21.5%	31.6%	-	35.0%
Buddhism	56.8%	66.7%	37.5%	78.8%	70.1%	72.2%	63.2%	-	61.7%
Christianity	1.8%	2.8%	4.2%	0.0%	0.7%	1.3%	0.0%	-	0.0%
Islam / Muslim	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-	0.0%
Shamanism	1.8%	0.0%	4.2%	1.9%	2.8%	5.1%	2.6%	-	3.3%
Other	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	2.6%	-	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-106</i></b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No confession	1.2	-9.2	17.7	-16.3	-9.9	-13.2	-2.4	-	-3.9
Buddhism	-3.1	14.3	-17.4	22.9	16.7	14.1	6.5	-	6.8
Christianity	-0.7	-0.1	1.4	-3.0	-1.2	-1.0	-1.7	-	-0.9
Islam / Muslim	-0.2	-1.1	-0.6	-0.5	-4.3	-0.9	-0.5	-	-0.4
Shamanism	0.2	-2.9	-0.5	-2.4	-1.2	1.5	-3.3	-	-1.1
Other	2.7	-1.1	-0.6	-0.7	0.0	-0.5	1.4	-	-0.4

Strong national pride is an attribute for most of Ulaan’s supporters (see: Table 9-95).

Table 9-95: National pride of respondents who named Ulaan as a person to have an important role in politics

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	93.5%	97.1%	91.7%	98.1%	95.5%	91.1%	94.7%	-	95.0%
Rather proud	5.6%	2.9%	4.2%	1.9%	4.5%	8.9%	5.3%	-	5.0%
Not that proud	0.9%	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-	0.0%
Not proud at all	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%
<b><i>Difference to general sample as shown in Table 9-107</i></b>									
	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	12.7	11.0	4.4	8.0	2.7	-2.3	1.0	-	0.2
Rather proud	-8.8	-9.1	-6.2	-6.1	-1.7	3.2	-0.4	-	0.9
Not that proud	-2.6	-1.7	2.3	-1.4	-0.6	-0.4	-0.5	-	-0.8
Not proud at all	-1.3	-0.3	-0.5	-0.5	-0.3	-0.5	-0.1	-	-0.3

## 9.4 Annex: Reference Tables for Comparison of Supporters of Selected Politicians with the General Sample

The following reference tables contain annual statistics and overall samples used to compare data concerning the individual politicians spotlighted in Section 9.3. All data originates from SMF polls from the annotated years. Some data in these tables may differ from the data quoted in previous chapters because this present chapter presents data solely from respondents who answered the questions related to the specific politicians.

Table 9-96: Annual percentage shares of age groups from the general sample

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
18 - 24	25.9%	21.6%	22.2%	23.5%	25.2%	19.1%	20.3%	19.5%	19.0%	18.4%	15.3%
25 - 29	19.0%	18.7%	19.8%	18.6%	17.5%	14.7%	15.8%	12.9%	14.8%	13.3%	15.0%
30 - 39	23.3%	28.6%	25.4%	25.3%	26.1%	27.8%	26.6%	29.1%	28.2%	25.5%	28.2%
40 - 49	16.4%	16.8%	17.5%	15.7%	15.9%	20.3%	20.8%	21.5%	21.4%	23.0%	23.7%
50 - 59	9.6%	7.9%	9.5%	11.0%	9.3%	11.1%	9.4%	10.3%	9.4%	10.6%	10.9%
60 or more	5.9%	6.5%	5.6%	5.9%	6.0%	6.9%	7.1%	6.8%	7.1%	9.2%	7.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
18 - 24	13.8%	14.1%	13.2%	14.3%	15.5%	12.4%	11.5%	11.4%	10.6%	10.8%	13.2%
25 - 29	12.7%	15.7%	13.8%	10.5%	11.3%	10.5%	12.0%	9.9%	9.5%	11.4%	11.6%
30 - 39	30.7%	27.1%	25.8%	26.0%	26.1%	24.0%	23.7%	22.8%	20.7%	19.7%	25.1%
40 - 49	24.0%	24.1%	22.1%	22.7%	22.0%	24.3%	22.5%	22.3%	21.2%	22.5%	21.8%
50 - 59	11.4%	11.3%	13.6%	13.4%	13.4%	15.2%	15.4%	19.5%	21.5%	20.5%	15.3%
60 or more	7.3%	7.7%	11.5%	13.1%	11.8%	13.6%	15.0%	14.2%	16.5%	15.2%	13.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Average age of respondents in the last decade (in years):</b>											
<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>		
38.4	40.4	40.8	40.0	42.0	42.1	42.7	43.8	43.0	41.3		



Table 9-97: Annual percentage shares of genders from the general sample

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Male	50.0%	51.6%	51.5%	49.0%	46.9%	50.5%	50.5%	47.3%	46.4%	47.5%	42.0%
Female	50.0%	48.4%	48.5%	51.0%	53.1%	49.5%	49.5%	52.7%	53.6%	52.5%	58.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Male	46.7%	48.8%	48.5%	48.3%	48.6%	49.6%	50.9%	47.7%	45.5%	48.0%	56.8%
Female	53.3%	51.2%	51.5%	51.7%	51.4%	50.4%	49.1%	52.3%	54.5%	52.0%	43.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-98: Annual percentage shares of the urban-rural proportion from the general sample

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Urban	100%	100%	100%	100%	83.2%	54.7%	44.5%	43.9%	50.6%	44.4%	44.9%
Rural	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.8%	45.3%	55.5%	56.1%	49.4%	55.6%	55.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Urban	43.2%	41.9%	44.4%	41.9%	41.2%	39.9%	30.3%	41.8%	43.5%	42.7%	40.5%
Rural	56.8%	58.1%	55.6%	58.1%	58.8%	60.1%	69.7%	58.2%	56.5%	57.3%	59.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-99: Annual percentage shares of respondents' levels of education from the general sample

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Low education level	5.9%	11.6%	17.0%	18.2%	17.6%	20.3%	25.0%	20.4%	22.9%	24.1%	22.1%
Secondary education	58.9%	57.2%	49.2%	45.0%	45.6%	43.9%	43.2%	44.1%	41.4%	42.3%	41.6%
Higher education	35.2%	31.2%	33.8%	36.8%	36.7%	35.8%	31.8%	35.6%	35.7%	33.6%	36.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Low education level	22.7%	23.8%	27.6%	29.1%	27.3%	29.0%	31.6%	35.8%	31.4%	25.5%	18.9%
Secondary education	41.8%	38.7%	43.3%	42.3%	46.9%	45.2%	43.3%	38.1%	43.0%	48.3%	53.3%
Higher education	35.5%	37.5%	29.1%	28.5%	25.8%	25.9%	25.1%	26.1%	25.6%	26.2%	27.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-100: Annual percentage shares of select occupational groups from the general sample

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Workers	32.1%	29.4%	22.7%	24.8%	30.1%	26.2%	23.9%	26.5%	26.3%	28.4%
Clerical staff	44.3%	48.5%	34.3%	24.9%	19.6%	23.9%	17.1%	20.0%	20.3%	17.3%
Self-employed	18.5%	21.4%	26.6%	15.3%	20.1%	17.6%	24.3%	20.1%	24.3%	24.8%
Nomads / farmers	5.0%	0.7%	3.8%	8.4%	8.1%	8.1%	8.6%	9.9%	6.3%	8.5%
Intelligentsia	-	-	12.7%	26.5%	22.1%	24.2%	26.2%	23.5%	22.8%	21.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Workers	29.9%	35.8%	31.5%	37.0%	34.5%	35.3%	33.8%	43.9%	39.6%	46.1%
Clerical staff	20.7%	17.7%	17.8%	16.5%	14.6%	13.9%	12.6%	10.8%	17.1%	13.4%
Self-employed	21.6%	20.0%	24.1%	20.0%	28.8%	25.1%	34.0%	27.6%	32.4%	22.9%
Nomads / farmers	10.8%	15.2%	13.5%	17.1%	13.0%	16.7%	10.3%	7.9%	7.3%	10.5%
Intelligentsia	16.9%	11.3%	13.2%	9.4%	9.1%	9.1%	9.3%	9.7%	3.6%	7.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-101: Annual percentage shares of select sectors of employment from the general sample

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
State officers	26.7%	15.8%	8.5%	15.4%	15.5%	12.6%	12.6%	13.4%	11.9%	26.7%
State service	27.7%	34.0%	29.8%	32.0%	29.8%	33.7%	25.8%	26.9%	29.5%	27.7%
Private/mixed sector	45.7%	35.6%	42.8%	38.7%	37.5%	37.2%	46.8%	43.6%	46.6%	45.7%
NGO	0.0%	14.6%	19.0%	13.9%	17.3%	16.5%	14.8%	16.1%	12.1%	0.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
State officers	9.8%	7.8%	10.0%	8.2%	6.4%	7.5%	9.7%	5.6%	11.8%	7.0%
State service	26.7%	24.2%	22.7%	21.0%	19.7%	19.3%	18.1%	23.5%	17.8%	21.8%
Private/mixed sector	50.3%	60.5%	59.4%	65.8%	69.6%	68.4%	66.9%	64.3%	67.6%	66.9%
NGO	13.2%	7.4%	7.9%	5.1%	4.3%	4.8%	5.2%	6.6%	2.7%	4.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-102: Annual percentage shares of select sectors of employment from the general sample

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	9.1%	6.8%	9.2%	10.8%	11.5%	12.9%	12.1%	12.7%	12.0%	15.5%
Middle class	43.0%	49.8%	49.7%	54.8%	57.0%	54.4%	58.8%	57.7%	54.7%	52.8%
Below middle class	25.4%	24.1%	24.5%	20.3%	20.2%	19.7%	18.7%	18.3%	19.7%	19.2%
Disadvantaged group	22.6%	19.3%	16.6%	14.1%	11.3%	13.0%	10.4%	11.3%	13.7%	12.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	16.3%	10.6%	11.2%	8.5%	6.5%	8.5%	10.5%	10.3%	11.6%	6.9%
Middle class	56.5%	56.6%	58.1%	53.6%	57.4%	60.8%	70.5%	60.1%	57.0%	74.0%
Below middle class	17.3%	22.5%	20.3%	28.6%	27.6%	22.4%	15.0%	24.1%	25.4%	16.3%
Disadvantaged group	9.9%	10.3%	10.3%	9.3%	8.4%	8.2%	4.1%	5.6%	6.0%	2.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-103: Annual percentage shares of income groups from the general sample

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
less than 600000 MNT	11.1%	10.4%	8.9%	3.0%	3.2%	1.6%	1.0%	2.4%	1.3%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	24.1%	25.1%	21.3%	12.9%	13.1%	2.2%	1.8%	0.6%	0.8%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	32.4%	30.2%	33.1%	36.0%	26.3%	11.2%	5.9%	3.5%	3.0%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	23.3%	21.9%	23.6%	30.8%	31.2%	25.1%	23.5%	17.7%	18.0%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	7.6%	10.0%	11.2%	14.5%	19.2%	35.7%	41.5%	40.4%	40.9%
9.6 m MNT or more	1.5%	2.3%	1.8%	2.8%	7.0%	24.2%	26.3%	35.4%	35.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-104: Annual percentage shares of respondents' political orientation from the general sample

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Idealistic Democrats	15.8%	13.8%	18.5%	20.8%	15.3%	15.9%	13.6%	17.9%
Progressive Liberals	18.1%	18.4%	19.4%	15.0%	18.1%	15.6%	13.4%	14.5%
Passive Liberals	15.1%	17.8%	17.9%	17.2%	17.1%	17.1%	18.4%	16.6%
Conservatives	23.0%	20.8%	9.7%	15.5%	14.6%	14.3%	15.4%	17.7%
Traditionalists	16.7%	19.8%	17.4%	14.2%	20.4%	19.6%	23.3%	21.1%
Sovereign Democrats	11.3%	9.4%	17.3%	17.3%	14.6%	17.5%	16.0%	12.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-105: Annual percentage shares of respondents' favourite political party from the general sample

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	40.4%	38.2%	42.5%	46.9%	56.0%	53.7%	53.1%	46.1%	48.2%	55.9%	50.2%
DP	53.4%	54.2%	43.6%	34.9%	19.8%	21.8%	26.8%	28.5%	26.4%	13.4%	19.5%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CWP - Green	-	-	-	-	-	3.0%	2.7%	8.2%	8.4%	4.5%	5.5%
Other or no party	6.2%	7.6%	13.9%	18.2%	24.2%	21.5%	17.5%	17.3%	17.0%	26.2%	24.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
MPP (<2012 = MPRP)	32.6%	32.9%	27.2%	28.7%	22.1%	22.0%	21.0%	17.3%	17.4%	18.6%	19.8%
DP	27.5%	30.8%	21.1%	29.1%	22.4%	20.2%	20.8%	27.4%	31.6%	15.5%	16.0%
MPRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.2%	8.5%	6.2%	8.1%	8.6%
CWP - Green	5.2%	5.7%	2.6%	1.8%	2.3%	3.5%	1.5%	1.5%	0.7%	1.0%	1.1%
Other or no party	34.7%	30.6%	49.1%	40.3%	53.3%	54.2%	50.5%	45.3%	44.0%	56.8%	54.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-106: Annual percentage shares of religious affiliations from the general sample

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
No confession	34.0%	39.8%	36.5%	35.6%	35.6%	34.7%	34.0%	33.1%	38.9%
Buddhism	59.9%	52.4%	54.9%	55.9%	53.5%	58.1%	56.7%	61.0%	54.9%
Christianity	2.5%	2.9%	2.8%	3.0%	1.9%	2.2%	1.7%	1.5%	0.9%
Islam / Muslim	0.2%	1.1%	0.6%	0.5%	4.3%	0.9%	0.5%	0.0%	0.4%
Shamanism	1.6%	2.9%	4.7%	4.3%	4.0%	3.5%	5.9%	4.1%	4.5%
Other	1.8%	1.1%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	0.5%	1.2%	0.2%	0.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 9-107: Annual percentage shares of respondents' levels of national pride from the general sample

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very proud	80.8%	86.1%	87.3%	90.0%	92.8%	93.4%	93.7%	91.8%	94.8%
Rather proud	14.3%	11.9%	10.3%	8.0%	6.2%	5.7%	5.6%	6.0%	4.1%
Not that proud	3.6%	1.7%	1.9%	1.4%	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%	1.5%	0.8%
Not proud at all	1.3%	0.3%	0.5%	0.5%	0.3%	0.5%	0.1%	0.7%	0.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

# 10

## EFFECTS OF TRANSFORMATION ON DIFFERENT GENERATIONS

### 10.1 Definition of Age Groups in this Chapter and their Characteristics

Previously in this study, the analysis was covering people's opinions on selected issues and their attitudes toward aspects of economic, social and political life. Respondents are grouped by age for a comparison of their opinions and attitudes. These age groups used in previous chapters are always based on the age of respondents at the time of the survey. Another comparison observed the opinions of young people, or pensioners and the years in between. This time the comparison will compare the opinions and attitudes of people in different age groups during particular points in time. An earlier comparison, for example, observed the opinions of young people, pensioners, and the years in between.

For this method, respondents are grouped according to the year they were born. For example, someone born in 1970 would appear in the first survey of the Sant Maral Foundation in 1995 in the "25-29" age group. Respondents, who were born in 1970, for the 2000-2009 surveys would then fall into the groups for "30-39" years old. For all surveys since 2010, those same people born in 1970 would be in the "40-49" age group.

This last chapter of the study will use a different system to establish age groups that is independent from the time of the survey. Using the year of birth instead of the respondents' ages at the time of survey will demonstrate how each generation's opinions changed over the course of more than 20 years of polling. This will allow for a comparison of how people born in 1970 answered certain questions in 1995 versus 2000, 2010, etc.

Speaking very broadly, the surveys conducted between 1995 and 2016 cover three generations of respondents, which allows for some long-term observation of how opinions changed. It also provides a look at how the political, social, and economic transformation that took place has affected these generations. This analysis divides respondents between six age groups:

## **GROUP 1: People born after 1986**

These are the people who were under 30 years old at the start of this study. They were not yet born or were so young that they did not yet attend school when Mongolia's peaceful revolution took place. They appear for the first time in Sant Maral Foundation's polls in 2005, when they were 18 years old.

This comprehensive analysis includes this group only from 2006, when there was sufficient database for a detailed disaggregation.

For obvious reasons, this age group has shown the highest concern for education (see: Figure 10-22). However, unemployment is rising in importance for this group and ranks highest among all the problems mentioned by this group since 2009 (see: Table 10-59 and Figure 10-24). This group had the highest unemployment rate by 2016 (see: Figure 10-6), but they still may be considered the least affected by the transition. They also show very positive attitudes in many aspects surrounding their lives.

## **GROUP 2: People born in the years 1973 – 1986**

This second group was below the age of 18 in 1990, when the political change took place. Most of this group would have been attending school at the time, and the higher education they have received may have been a result of the political and economic changes in two ways: a) the economic difficulties in the country may have negatively impacted their education; or b) the new opportunities offered after Mongolia's political transformation gave this generation the opportunity to study and work abroad.

About a third of the people in this group were already among the respondents of the first polls conducted, in 1995. At that time, this was the youngest group in the polls, and the declining standards of living and education were the biggest problems they reported. A few years after 1995, the problems related to education were replaced by unemployment. Meanwhile, the worries about the standards of living remained high on the list of problems. This group has placed unemployment as the biggest problem since 2009 (see: Figure 10-25). This judgement corresponds with the fact that this group has some of the highest unemployment rates in the last decade, as shown in Table 10-30 and Figure 10-6.

Despite these negative facts, people in this age group demonstrate rather positive attitudes on many other issues. They are optimistic because they believe that they can achieve more than their parents did; they are convinced that their future depends on their own actions ahead of external factors; and they see their social position mostly in the Middle Class and above.

These people are strongly oriented toward the USA, other Western countries, Japan and South Korea. Yet they have little regard for Mongolia's immediate neighbours, Russia and China (see: Subsection 10.3.6).

This group was not actively involved in the process of toppling the communist rule and was probably not affected by the affiliated hardships of transition as much as older people because they were too young at that time. They lived all their adult life in a free democratic environment that offered numerous opportunities. The general optimism of people in this age group could be the result of this personal experience. Their set of values would not be considered traditional, and they do not believe that there are circumstances under which a dictatorship would be better than democracy.

People in this group are today between their early thirties up to mid-forties, and they have been the largest group in the annual survey data since 2002.

### **GROUP 3: People born in the years 1961 – 1972**

These people were between 18 and 29 years old in 1990. This group would probably include most of the young activists who were instrumental in the democratic movement and would later become the new political elites. These people are today between 44 and 55 years old. This group was given new opportunities, but they also had to suffer through the economic hardships that occurred at a time when they were starting their adult lives.

This analysis shows that this group was particularly hard hit by unemployment in the early years of transition. They remained as the group with the highest percentage share of unemployed until 2011, mainly due to the loss of jobs in the public sector (see: Subsection 10.3.1).

Meanwhile, other members of this generation took up opportunities for entrepreneurialism. At times, more than a quarter of this age group was self-employed. However, Subsection 10.3.1 shows that incomes from self-employment fell short of salaries in the public sector, which still left this group at a disadvantage. As a result, the concerns about the standard of living and income in this group were above the average in the later years of this study, after 2006 (see: Figure 10-20).

When naming the ten most important problems of 1995-2016, this age group was closest to the average for all criteria. The exception is income, which indicates that their judgment is representative of a large section of the middle of society (see: Subsection 10.3.3).

### **GROUP 4: People born in the years 1951 – 1960**

These people were between 30 and 39 years old in 1990. They probably were already settled down into jobs and started families when their lives were interrupted by the political upheaval that led to a period of economic hardship.

A small percentage share of these people may have been able to make good use of the new opportunities, particularly in the business world. A larger number of members of this age



group, however, were not able to advance their social positions as much as those in younger groups. In 2007, which this study considers as the end of the transition period, age Group 4 had the lowest percentage share of people who considered themselves the “Above Middle Class”. These people also came out of the transition at the bottom of the social ladder. When comparing this group with the three younger groups, the situation remains unchanged in 2016.

This age group’s experience with changes may be the reason why they strongly believe that their future depends on the state or other external forces more than their own actions and initiatives (see: Figure 10-17). They are also rather pessimistic when it comes to the question of whether they will be able to achieve more than their parents (see: Figure 10-15). Not surprisingly, more than 50 per cent of people in this age group consider themselves losers rather than winners.

People in this group were brought up with—and probably still adhere to—the more traditional value system. Meanwhile consumerism has replaced these values for later generations. For example, a large percentage of people in this age group believe that “Women should take care of the family and household and leave politics to men”. Also, more than the average number these people agree with the statement “Under certain circumstances dictatorship is better than democracy”.

People in this group are today between 56 and 65 years old, which means they are close to or just above retirement age<sup>33</sup>.

## **GROUP 5: People born in the years 1941 – 1950**

These people were between 40 and 49 years of age in 1990 and are today above the age of 65. They were brought up and educated in a system completely different to what the country changed to in 1990 and, at the time of Mongolia’s peaceful revolution, were well established within the existing social structures.

The lives of this generation as they knew it were seriously interrupted by the events in 1989-1990. Their children’s educations may have been badly affected by collapse of the education system, but, generally, there was less than average concern about education from this age group (see: Figure 10-22).

Unemployment was not a major problem for most in this group in 1996-2016. They were more concerned about the economy in general and their standards of living (see: Figure 10-28). New opportunities for economic advancement, like self-employment, had no attraction for them because it was probably not necessary to look for such opportunities when unemployment was not their major concern.

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33 The usual retirement age is 55 years old for women and 60 years for men. Military personnel can retire at an age below 50 (Women can retire after 20 years of military service; men after 25 years).


Comparing their lives with that of their parents, these people were rather pessimistic and only around 20 per cent of them believed they would do better (see: Table 10-54). This is because most of these people reached retirement age during the past decade and now live on their pensions. It should be of little surprise that they largely believe their future depends on the state or other external forces more than their own initiatives.

**GROUP 6: People born before 1941**

These people were already above the age of 50 in 1990, and they were probably the least able (and/or willing) to adjust to all the changes. Today these people are above the age of 75. In the Sant Maral Foundation’s polls, this group becomes too small after 2010 for any meaningful analysis.

The World Health Organisation reports life expectancy is 65 for males and 73 for females.

Figure 10-1: Age of respondents at time of survey



Continue of Figure 10-1: Data of Proportion of different age groups in surveys 1995-2016

Year of birth of respondents	Age of respondents in year of survey																												
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016		
<b>GROUP 6:</b> Respondents born before 1941	<1936																												
	1936	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	
	1937	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
	1938	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79
	1939	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78
	1940	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77
<b>GROUP 5:</b> Respondents born in the years 1941-1950	1941	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	
	1942	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	
	1943	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	
	1944	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	
	1945	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	
	1946	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	
	1947	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	
	1948	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	
	1949	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	
	1950	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	
	<b>GROUP 4:</b> Respondents born in the years 1951-1960	1951	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65
1952		38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	
1953		37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	
1954		36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	
1955		35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	
1956		34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	
1957		33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	
1958		32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	
1959		31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	
1960		30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	
<b>GROUP 3:</b> Respondents born in the years 1961-1972		1961	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55
	1962	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	
	1963	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	
	1964	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	
	1965	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	
	1966	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	
	1967	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	
	1968	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	
	1969	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	
	1970	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	
	1971	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	
1972	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44		
<b>GROUP 2:</b> Respondents born in the years 1973-1986	1973	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	
	1974	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	
	1975	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	
	1976	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	
	1977	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	
	1978	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	
	1979	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	
	1980	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	
	1981	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	
	1982	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	
	1983	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	
1984	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32		
1985	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31		
1986	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30		
<b>GROUP 1:</b> Respondents born after 1986	1987	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	
	1988	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	
	1989	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	
	1990		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	
	1991			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	
	1992				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21				

Figure 10-1 and the two tables below reflect the size of each age group in proportion to one another, as reported in 1995-2016 surveys by Sant Maral Foundation<sup>34</sup>.

Table 10-1: Proportion of different age groups in polls 1995-2005

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<b>GROUP 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0%
<b>GROUP 2</b> born 1973 - 1986	18.6%	18.5%	22.5%	26.9%	32.4%	29.3%	32.8%	34.3%	38.6%	38.2%	39.7%
<b>GROUP 3</b> born 1961 - 1972	38.6%	40.1%	36.7%	36.2%	34.7%	33.9%	33.3%	33.6%	32.4%	30.8%	31.2%
<b>GROUP 4</b> born 1951 - 1960	20.7%	22.0%	21.4%	17.7%	16.8%	19.6%	18.9%	18.0%	16.0%	16.8%	16.9%
<b>GROUP 5</b> born 1941 - 1950	11.8%	10.7%	10.5%	11.0%	9.2%	10.8%	8.9%	9.4%	8.1%	9.0%	6.9%
<b>GROUP 6</b> born be- fore 1941	10.2%	8.6%	8.7%	8.3%	6.8%	6.4%	6.1%	4.8%	4.8%	5.2%	3.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

34 The percentage shares shown in Table 10-1 and Table 10-2 demonstrate how in some years Age Groups 1 and 6 are represented by a relatively small number of people. In these cases, those groups will be excluded from analysis because a disaggregation of such small numbers of responses would create a distorted picture.

Table 10-2: Proportion of different age groups in polls 2006-2016

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>GROUP 1</b> born after 1986	3.5%	5.4%	8.2%	9.9%	14.9%	13.1%	16.5%	17.1%	18.8%	24.0%	29.0%
<b>GROUP 2</b> born 1973 - 1986	37.3%	39.4%	35.3%	34.9%	35.4%	34.7%	34.1%	34.4%	31.3%	31.5%	35.9%
<b>GROUP 3</b> born 1961 - 1972	33.0%	31.7%	28.4%	28.3%	25.8%	26.0%	25.6%	25.4%	24.7%	24.3%	19.1%
<b>GROUP 4</b> born 1951 - 1960	16.0%	14.3%	14.2%	13.9%	12.6%	14.1%	13.0%	13.1%	14.9%	12.6%	10.0%
<b>GROUP 5</b> born 1941 - 1950	6.7%	5.9%	9.6%	8.2%	7.2%	7.7%	7.6%	7.5%	8.2%	5.4%	4.3%
<b>GROUP 6</b> born be- fore 1941	3.5%	3.3%	4.3%	4.8%	4.1%	4.4%	3.2%	2.7%	2.2%	2.2%	1.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Source: SMF data base 2006-2016*

## 10.2 Impact of the Economic Transformation on Society

The data from each group shown in Table 10-3 provides some initial insights regarding how the transformation affected society. While one can assume that some in the first age group (below 30 years old in 2016) did not complete their education and therefore have low representation from people with college or university education, it is noteworthy that there is a decline in the number of college or university graduates among Groups 2, 3, and 4. This could indicate two things: a) the interruption of the education system during the transition phase may have negatively affected people’s education opportunities; b) the new market economy may have offered opportunities for income-generating activities without requiring formal education. Some young people were perhaps attracted to the chance for quick gains, and thus did not complete the education they may have otherwise pursued.

Table 10-3: Some basic statistics for different age groups and data related to their education

	<b>Group 1</b>	<b>Group 2</b>	<b>Group 3</b>	<b>Group 4</b>	<b>Group 5</b>	<b>Group 6</b>
<b>Year of birth</b>	after 1986	1973 through 1986	1961 through 1972	1951 through 1960	1941 through 1950	before 1941
<b>Age at beginning of transition</b> (in the year 1990)	not born or younger than 4 yrs.	4 to 18 years	18 to 29 years	30 to 39 years	40 to 49 years	50 years or older
<b>Present age</b> (in the year 2016)	18 to 29 years	30 to 43 years	44 to 55 years	56 to 65 years	66 to 75 years	older than 75 years
<b>Education</b> (completed level in 2016):						
Primary school or less	27%	23%	21%	23%	24%	31%
Secondary school or second. special	52%	47%	47%	43%	38%	36%
College or university	22%	30%	31%	34%	38%	32%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

The change from a state-controlled to a market-oriented economy had an immediate effect on the working environment. Not only did the state sector lose its monopoly on employment, the new economic freedom also offered opportunities for small enterprises run by self-employed entrepreneurs. Survey data shows that the private sector and self-employment gained relevance over the years, both in Ulaanbaatar and in the aimags.

Survey data from Ulaanbaatar residents in 1997 shows that 65 per cent of employed respondents worked in the state sector at that time compared with 35 per cent in the private

sector<sup>35</sup>. That pattern reversed by 2016. The state employed only 22 per cent in Ulaanbaatar while the private sector employed 78 per cent (see: Table 10-4 and Table 10-5).

Table 10-4: State and private sector employment; urban or rural residence, (1997-2006)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Ulaanbaatar</b>										
Employment in state sector	65%	49%	32%	38%	35%	34%	32%	28%	31%	26%
Employment in private sector (incl. NGO)	35%	51%	68%	62%	65%	66%	68%	72%	69%	74%
<b>Aimags</b>										
Employment in state sector	n/a	n/a	56%	45%	49%	46%	37%	43%	42%	36%
Employment in private sector (incl. NGO)	n/a	n/a	44%	55%	51%	54%	63%	57%	58%	64%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2006

Table 10-5: State and private sector employment; urban/rural; 2007-2016

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Ulaanbaatar</b>										
Employment in state sector	30%	30%	26%	30%	25%	24%	27%	22%	27%	22%
Employment in private sector (incl. NGO)	70%	70%	74%	70%	75%	76%	73%	78%	73%	78%
<b>Aimags</b>										
Employment in state sector	43%	42%	43%	40%	37%	35%	36%	38%	39%	41%
Employment in private sector (incl. NGO)	57%	58%	57%	60%	63%	65%	64%	62%	61%	59%

Source: SMF data base 2007-2016

The percentage share of people working in the state sector in 1997 and 1998 (see: Table 10-4) may be, to some extent, influenced by the quality of the sample. Although employment in the public sector was heavily reduced because of the transition from a state controlled economy to a market economy with a strong private sector, poll results from the early years


35 The “employed” includes all respondents who reported to have full-time employment on contract or took part in professional training. The state sector includes all state officers, workers and other state service employees; the “private sector” includes NGO employees and the self-employed, unless otherwise specified in some tables. Nomads/farmers are not included in this statistic.

may have been affected by an over-representation of some groups in the sample. For this reason, the conclusions on sectorial employment statistics are made with some reservations.

Development in the aimags headed in the same direction but less pronounced. Employment in the private sector increased in aimags from 44 per cent in 1999 to 59 per cent in 2012.

The Figure below is based on data from Table 10-4 and Table 10-5. It shows the upward trend for employment in rural areas followed the development in Ulaanbaatar, with a delay of about two years. The downward trend after 2012 started earlier in rural areas, however. After 2012, the private sector failed to generate any additional growth in employment at rural areas, while private sector employment in Ulaanbaatar still increased.

Figure 10-2: State and private sector employment, by Urban or rural residence; 1997-2016



Unemployment was very high when economic development was interrupted during the initial years of transformation. The loss of jobs in the public sector particularly led to high unemployment. This analysis exclusively uses data from the polls conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation, not official government statistics. Data from polls is available for the years 1997 through 2016 and shown in the tables below.



Table 10-6: Development of unemployment rate<sup>36</sup>

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Unemployment in Ulaanbaatar	22.2%	15.3%	12.7%	12.5%	13.3%	12.4%	11.3%	11.9%	10.9%	11.2%
Unemployment in aimags	n/a	n/a	11.8%	14.8%	14.9%	13.9%	14.8%	18.0%	13.8%	10.1%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Unemployment in Ulaanbaatar	9.5%	10.7%	7.5%	13.3%	10.5%	9.7%	11.2%	13.9%	8.2%	12.2%
Unemployment in aimags	9.8%	11.2%	14.8%	15.6%	13.3%	12.7%	14.2%	14.8%	12.4%	14.6%

*Source: SMF data base 1997-2016*

The data in Table 10-6 shows that the unemployment rate that was initially high came down after 1997. However, unemployment went on the rise again after 2009, when the economic crisis in Asia reached Mongolia and began to disrupt the local economy. Very recently, in 2016 the unemployment grew again, particularly in rural areas without any outside influences that could be assigned blame. That unemployment affected different generations in different ways will be shown in the next section of this chapter.

While unemployment was a major drawback during the transformation process, the newly created opportunities that helped establish small businesses in the private sector and self-employment offered the chance for compensation for any loss of employment in other sectors. Self-employment, virtually unknown before the opening of the economy, developed into an important sector providing jobs for a relatively stable share of the workforce (see: Table 10-7).

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36 Unemployment figures are expressed as a percentage share of the total population aged 18 years or older. Figures in this chapter are taken from data collected during SMF polls in the respective years. These percentages shares may not correspond with official statistics published by the National Statistical Office of Mongolia.

Table 10-7: Development of self-employment

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Percentage of self-employed respondents in Ulaanbaatar	5.9%	10.0%	14.0%	9.4%	12.2%	13.4%	12.5%	12.7%	12.7%	14.3%
Percentage of self-employed respondents in aimags	n/a	n/a	12.3%	12.1%	11.3%	13.3%	19.9%	12.8%	17.4%	18.1%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Percentage of self-employed respondents in Ulaanbaatar	14.0%	14.6%	18.8%	14.1%	21.5%	19.2%	19.3%	18.5%	18.6%	16.8%
Percentage of self-employed respondents in aimags	15.0%	13.2%	15.5%	13.2%	18.5%	18.3%	19.7%	16.3%	19.0%	14.5%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Income development is another important criterion to measure the effects of the transformation. Regrettably, insufficient data was collected from the years under observation. When incomes were recorded in surveys, it was in the form of income ranges, which draws a somewhat distorted picture because of inflation. However, we can show a comparison of incomes for employees in the private and state sector and self-employed people that gives some indication of who gained and who lost over the years.

Firstly, this analysis shows in the three tables below the over-all development of household incomes in Ulaanbaatar and in rural areas against the national average when this data was collected in 2008-2016. Readers should, however, keep in mind that inflation is partly responsible for income growth. The official rate of inflation as published by the National Statistical Office of Mongolia was as follows:

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Rate of inflation:	22.1	4.2	13.0	8.9	14.0	12.5	11.0	1.9	1.1

Table 10-8: Development of estimated annual household incomes in Ulaanbaatar; 2008-2016

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
less than 600000 MNT	13.2%	7.7%	6.4%	5.3%	4.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.8%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	23.2%	22.3%	18.4%	11.6%	9.2%	1.5%	1.1%	0.4%	0.6%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	30.4%	29.3%	31.2%	31.4%	19.0%	5.9%	2.9%	2.1%	2.6%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	23.8%	22.3%	26.5%	27.1%	28.3%	13.9%	16.4%	8.3%	9.1%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	7.0%	13.9%	14.4%	19.2%	27.1%	38.0%	40.1%	37.1%	37.0%
9.6 m MNT or more	2.4%	4.5%	3.1%	5.3%	12.4%	40.6%	39.3%	52.0%	49.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-9: Development of estimated annual household incomes in aimags; 2008-2016

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
less than 600000 MNT	10.3%	12.0%	13.7%	3.0%	3.5%	1.8%	1.9%	4.9%	1.3%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	25.3%	27.3%	23.0%	15.8%	14.1%	3.5%	2.5%	1.5%	1.3%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	34.2%	29.9%	32.2%	35.6%	29.2%	16.1%	6.6%	4.5%	4.1%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	21.3%	22.0%	21.8%	30.6%	32.4%	32.1%	30.2%	25.1%	24.2%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	8.1%	7.5%	8.2%	12.8%	16.4%	32.9%	41.2%	40.4%	41.9%
9.6 m MNT or more	0.7%	1.4%	1.1%	2.2%	4.4%	13.5%	17.5%	23.5%	27.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-10: Development of estimated annual household incomes (nationwide); 2008-2016

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
less than 600000 MNT	11.6%	10.2%	10.7%	3.9%	3.6%	1.2%	1.2%	3.0%	1.1%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	24.4%	25.1%	21.2%	14.1%	12.5%	2.7%	2.0%	1.0%	1.0%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	32.5%	29.6%	31.8%	33.9%	25.8%	12.0%	5.1%	3.5%	3.5%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	22.4%	22.1%	23.7%	29.2%	31.0%	24.8%	24.6%	18.2%	17.7%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	7.6%	10.2%	10.7%	15.4%	20.0%	35.0%	40.7%	39.0%	39.8%
9.6 m MNT or more	1.5%	2.7%	1.9%	3.4%	7.1%	24.3%	26.3%	35.3%	36.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

The difference between how incomes developed in Ulaanbaatar and in the aimags is clear: In 2016, the percentage share of households in the highest income bracket was nearly twice as high in Ulaanbaatar than in rural areas.

Below are tables that demonstrate how the household incomes of select groups of employment (e.g. state sector employees, private sector employees, the self-employed, unemployed and retired) developed. The comparison shows that employees in the state sector had by far the highest increases in income in 2008-2016. Employees in the private sector were better off than the self-employed, while the unemployed and retired saw the least progress in their incomes.

Table 10-11: Development of estimated annual household incomes of employees in the state sector; 2008-2016

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
less than 600000 MNT	4.5%	2.4%	3.0%	5.0%	1.8%		0.6%	0.5%	
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	15.1%	11.8%	7.5%	10.7%	5.6%	1.0%	1.7%	0.5%	
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	35.5%	26.8%	32.7%	23.9%	14.2%	1.6%	2.2%	1.5%	0.8%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	30.0%	35.1%	32.7%	27.0%	34.9%	13.7%	15.0%	10.3%	6.9%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	12.8%	18.0%	21.0%	28.3%	31.6%	40.7%	41.1%	34.4%	32.9%
9.6 m MNT or more	2.0%	5.9%	3.0%	5.0%	11.9%	43.0%	39.4%	52.8%	59.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-12: Development of estimated annual household incomes of employees in the private sector (excluding self-employed respondents), 2008-2016

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
less than 600000 MNT	10.1%	9.6%	4.5%	2.1%	2.2%				0.4%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	19.7%	21.6%	17.2%	9.2%	5.7%	1.1%		0.6%	0.7%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	32.4%	28.3%	29.3%	29.8%	20.1%	7.1%	3.1%	1.8%	1.1%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	24.2%	23.9%	27.1%	36.2%	33.1%	16.2%	13.0%	13.2%	9.7%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	11.0%	11.7%	18.2%	19.1%	28.6%	39.5%	42.2%	38.9%	39.3%
9.6 m MNT or more	2.5%	4.9%	3.8%	3.5%	10.3%	36.1%	41.7%	45.5%	48.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-13: Development of estimated annual household incomes of self-employed respondents; 2008-2016

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
less than 600000 MNT	12.3%	5.5%	11.2%	5.1%	3.0%	0.8%	0.5%	0.5%	0.4%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	21.1%	19.4%	15.4%	11.3%	8.8%	0.5%	2.6%	0.5%	
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	30.3%	32.8%	25.9%	26.2%	23.6%	9.3%	1.1%	1.4%	2.7%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	22.4%	23.3%	32.9%	32.8%	33.9%	24.5%	20.0%	14.9%	18.8%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	11.0%	15.9%	12.2%	21.0%	22.1%	41.3%	45.8%	42.8%	40.8%
9.6 m MNT or more	2.8%	3.2%	2.4%	3.6%	8.6%	23.5%	30.0%	40.1%	37.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-14: Development of estimated annual household incomes of unemployed respondents; 2008-2016

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
less than 600000 MNT	15.7%	24.9%	20.8%	6.7%	9.3%	6.0%	5.1%	10.4%	5.2%
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	38.3%	35.7%	32.1%	21.8%	25.3%	8.2%	3.2%	1.6%	4.1%
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	27.0%	27.1%	25.6%	45.4%	29.2%	16.7%	12.8%	11.2%	9.3%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	14.9%	9.7%	16.7%	19.3%	24.4%	28.3%	28.8%	23.2%	26.8%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	4.0%	2.5%	4.2%	4.2%	9.8%	25.8%	35.9%	32.8%	40.2%
9.6 m MNT or more			0.6%	2.5%	1.9%	15.0%	14.1%	20.8%	14.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-15: Development of estimated annual household incomes of retired respondents; 2008-2016

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
less than 600000 MNT	9.9%	10.2%	5.7%	3.0%	2.9%	0.3%	0.4%	3.6%	
600000 - <1.2 m MNT	26.1%	33.6%	28.7%	11.5%	16.3%	0.9%	2.4%	0.4%	
1.2 m MNT - <2.4 m MNT	39.0%	30.3%	41.0%	44.8%	36.8%	24.6%	6.9%	4.0%	2.5%
2.4 m MNT - <4.8 m MNT	21.0%	20.4%	19.5%	29.1%	28.8%	33.2%	38.5%	25.1%	28.3%
4.8 m MNT - <9.6 m MNT	3.0%	5.0%	4.5%	9.7%	12.8%	29.5%	40.9%	44.8%	48.5%
9.6 m MNT or more	1.0%	0.5%	0.6%	1.8%	2.3%	11.5%	10.9%	22.0%	20.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

## 10.3 Impact of Transformation on Different Generations

Using the age grouping explained in Section 10.1 of this chapter, the analysis now examines different aspects of each group. For some issues, data is available from more than two decades of polling since 1995, while other questions have fewer years of data because they were only introduced later.

First the analysis examines how the social and economic situations of different generations have developed over the years (see: Sections 10.3.1 and 10.3.2). Thereafter, the analysis will use data from the database to find out whether these developments could have led to changes in people's political motivations and faith in democratic institutions (see: Section 10.3.5). Finally, it will look at each generation's attachment to values (see: Section 10.3.7).

### 10.3.1 Development of Social Status, Employment and Unemployment for Different Generations

#### Social Status

Chapter 4 reveals the shifting patterns of social status based on people's self-assessment. There has been a steady increase in the number of people who place themselves in the middle class, coinciding with a clear reduction in the number of people belonging to the Disadvantaged Group. Both developments suggest a positive general trend. However, it's also been shown that the "Above Middle Class" shrank over time, after an initial increase observed in 1997-2007. This point of the study now analyses how the situation has changed for people of different ages.

The tables below show how people in different age groups regard the development of their own social status over a period of 20 years (excluding for the youngest group that entered the database only in 2006).

The data shows clear indications that the very pessimistic attitudes recorded when data collection first began in 1997 strongly improved by 2007—the year considered by this analysis as the end of the transition period. The following period of social stratification did not lead to any further improvements in the top strata of the social hierarchy. This is probably because of economic drawbacks experienced while Mongolia was feeling the impact of global economic crisis.

Nevertheless, there was a noticeable strengthening of the Middle Class social group, and by 2016 around 75 per cent of all respondents saw their social position within that group. This applies to all age groups for which there is data. For the two oldest groups, however, data

is insufficient for reliable analysis because these groups were too small in the survey samples, as well as society in general.

Table 10-16: Development of social status of people in Age Group 1 (born after 1986)

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	18.9%	17.6%	16.6%	11.3%	12.2%	11.4%	13.6%	13.5%	10.9%	12.4%	8.3%
Middle class	54.7%	63.5%	59.4%	64.8%	54.0%	59.3%	64.1%	72.4%	64.9%	62.4%	76.0%
Below middle class	18.9%	11.9%	19.3%	17.0%	26.4%	24.4%	15.7%	11.7%	21.3%	20.2%	14.3%
Disadvantaged group	7.5%	6.9%	4.8%	7.0%	7.4%	4.9%	6.7%	2.5%	2.8%	5.0%	1.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Table 10-17: Development of social status of people in Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	9.8%	9.6%	9.7%	14.0%	13.2%	14.1%	14.0%	13.0%	12.5%	15.2%
Middle class	52.4%	58.2%	56.4%	59.3%	59.0%	58.0%	61.6%	60.2%	57.0%	56.1%
Below middle class	20.7%	22.2%	23.4%	16.9%	18.6%	18.6%	16.1%	18.2%	20.2%	18.3%
Disadvant. group	17.1%	10.0%	10.6%	9.8%	9.2%	9.3%	8.3%	8.7%	10.3%	10.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	18.0%	11.4%	12.4%	9.6%	6.7%	8.4%	10.5%	9.0%	9.0%	6.5%
Middle class	56.7%	55.4%	60.6%	55.0%	61.5%	65.2%	72.9%	64.6%	62.0%	76.2%
Below middle class	16.5%	21.5%	18.9%	24.8%	24.5%	19.3%	13.3%	20.5%	23.4%	14.5%
Disadvant. group	8.9%	11.7%	8.1%	10.6%	7.3%	7.1%	3.3%	5.9%	5.7%	2.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Table 10-18: Development of social status of people in Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	9.1%	6.8%	9.9%	10.5%	10.2%	11.7%	12.5%	12.2%	11.0%	14.9%
Middle class	44.7%	52.0%	52.5%	55.1%	58.1%	52.4%	56.6%	56.0%	56.0%	53.3%
Below middle class	26.9%	25.1%	24.5%	21.8%	21.2%	22.0%	20.2%	18.1%	19.0%	20.1%
Disadvant. group	19.3%	16.1%	13.1%	12.7%	10.5%	13.9%	10.7%	13.7%	14.0%	11.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	15.3%	11.3%	11.9%	8.1%	10.3%	7.2%	9.5%	10.3%	8.7%	8.7%
Middle class	55.0%	51.4%	53.8%	53.0%	54.4%	63.6%	66.9%	59.6%	54.0%	69.0%
Below middle class	18.2%	22.8%	21.0%	28.5%	24.2%	21.0%	18.5%	24.3%	30.7%	18.8%
Disadvant. group	11.5%	14.5%	13.4%	10.4%	11.1%	8.3%	5.1%	5.8%	6.6%	3.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Table 10-19: Development of social status of people in Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	8.8%	4.9%	10.3%	8.7%	12.9%	13.5%	9.6%	11.9%	11.5%	14.0%
Middle class	43.8%	45.4%	41.2%	52.3%	50.8%	49.8%	55.0%	55.5%	48.1%	48.5%
Below middle class	24.4%	23.1%	24.8%	22.5%	20.3%	20.2%	21.3%	20.0%	21.4%	19.6%
Disadvant. group	23.1%	26.6%	23.6%	16.6%	16.0%	16.5%	14.2%	12.6%	18.9%	17.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	12.7%	7.6%	9.6%	5.5%	6.1%	5.8%	8.2%	11.0%	8.6%	5.4%
Middle class	55.2%	57.6%	55.8%	56.0%	50.8%	62.2%	70.3%	58.4%	56.3%	71.1%
Below middle class	19.0%	24.2%	22.1%	28.6%	34.1%	23.6%	16.8%	25.4%	28.5%	19.5%
Disadvant. group	13.1%	10.6%	12.5%	9.9%	9.1%	8.4%	4.7%	5.2%	6.6%	4.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016



Table 10-20: Development of social status of people in Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	6.5%	4.7%	6.0%	9.2%	9.2%	9.4%	7.1%	13.1%	7.9%	17.4%
Middle class	24.7%	37.3%	41.0%	52.6%	52.1%	54.7%	61.9%	57.4%	48.4%	45.0%
Below middle class	29.0%	23.8%	27.0%	19.8%	22.6%	21.6%	17.8%	17.9%	26.0%	22.5%
Disadvant. group	39.8%	34.2%	26.0%	18.4%	16.1%	14.3%	13.2%	11.6%	17.7%	15.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	13.3%	7.0%	6.6%	7.0%	1.4%	3.8%	5.5%	-	-	-
Middle class	52.8%	57.0%	61.7%	46.2%	72.6%	60.5%	67.1%	-	-	-
Below middle class	21.0%	21.1%	21.4%	37.3%	19.2%	28.0%	25.3%	-	-	-
Disadvant. group	12.8%	14.9%	10.2%	9.5%	6.8%	7.7%	2.1%	-	-	-
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	-	-

Source: SMF data base 1997-2013

Table 10-21: Development of social status of people in Age Group 6 (born before 1941)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Above middle class	10.3%	2.9%	1.4%	8.5%	7.7%	11.8%	12.1%	9.4%	9.5%	13.6%
Middle class	31.0%	34.7%	38.9%	47.8%	55.6%	50.7%	50.5%	51.2%	44.8%	50.9%
Below middle class	23.0%	26.8%	23.6%	22.4%	17.9%	20.6%	25.7%	23.6%	22.9%	23.6%
Disadvant. group	35.6%	35.6%	36.1%	21.4%	18.8%	16.9%	11.7%	15.7%	22.9%	11.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Above middle class	17.8%	3.0%	8.7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Middle class	53.5%	56.0%	50.4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Below middle class	16.8%	26.0%	27.0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Disadvant. group	11.9%	15.0%	13.9%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	100%	100%	100%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: SMF data base 1997-2009

Data from three separate years will be used to illustrate the general developments for each age group. Those years are: a) 1997, when the first surveys were conducted; b) 2007, which marks the end of the transition period; and c) 2016, which is the latest available year for data.


Figure 10-3 shows the over-all development when comparing data from 1997, 2007, and 2016. The pictures show a steady increase in the number of people in the Middle Class and declining numbers for the two lower social groups. The Above Middle Class almost doubled

between 1997 and 2007, but by 2016 had shrunk to a level in that was below that of 1997.

One very positive effect observed from the data is the smaller number of people who saw themselves in the lowest category, the Disadvantaged Group. This group declined from 23 per cent in 1997 to only 2.5 per cent in 2016.

The widening of the Middle Class can be an indicator of reduced inequality in Mongolian society. Figure 10-4 and Figure 10-5 show this development is similar in all age groups.

Figure 10-3: Social status of people (all age groups combined) in selected years



The comparison of age groups, however, shows some considerable differences between other criteria.

Firstly, in 1997 the number of people who placed themselves at the bottom of the social ladder correlated with their increasing age. Less than a quarter of people younger than 40 years old when Mongolia’s peaceful revolution took place associated themselves with the Disadvantaged Group in 1997. Among the older respondents, this social group accounts for 35 to 40 per cent. In 1997-2007, the social statuses of the older respondents developed more rapidly. By the end of this 10-year-period, the Middle Class was almost equal in size between in all age groups.

The youngest group (born after 1986) was not included in 1997. When these people appear in the analysis in 2007, the data shows that they had the highest representation within the Middle Class, while being the smallest in the Below Middle Class and Disadvantaged Group. These respondents, who are too young to have experienced the economic hardships of the transition, generally have greater optimism, as is seen in the other criteria later observed in this study.

Figure 10-4: Social status of different groups in selected years (part 1)





Figure 10-5: Social status of different groups in selected years (part 2)



Summing up this section, Table 10-22, below, shows how the different age groups are represented in each of the social groups:

Table 10-22: Proportion of age groups in social groups (total sample 1997-2016)

	Above middle class	Middle class	Below middle class	Disadvantaged group
<b>Gr. 1</b> (born after 1986)	7.7%	7.2%	5.3%	3.0%
<b>Gr. 2</b> (born 1973-1986)	38.0%	36.1%	31.2%	26.4%
<b>Gr. 3</b> (born 1961-1972)	30.2%	29.8%	31.6%	31.8%
<b>Gr. 4</b> (born 1951-1960)	14.3%	15.1%	17.0%	20.4%
<b>Gr. 5</b> (born 1941-1950)	6.4%	7.9%	9.4%	11.1%
<b>Gr. 6</b> (born before 1941)	3.4%	4.0%	5.4%	7.4%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

## Employment

Table 10-4 and Table 10-5 have already shown the changing pattern between public and private sector employment in Ulaanbaatar and in rural areas. When these figures are combined, it appears that the relation between public and private sector nationwide has changed very little over the period of study: In 1999, the public sector accounted for 31.5 per cent of all employment while the private sector had a share of 68.5 per cent<sup>37</sup>; in 2016, the respective figures were 33.6 and 66.4 per cent (see: Table 10-23); data for 1997 and 1998 is only available for Ulaanbaatar, and therefore, is not including in this comparison.

The relatively small downward trend in employment by the public sector after 1999 suggests that the conversion from a state controlled economy to a market economy, with all its negative effects, was already mostly complete by the end of that first decade during the transition period. This assumption is also supported by the very high unemployment rates before 1999, which would be an effect of the shrinking public sector (see: unemployment data in Table 10-29).

Table 10-23: Public and private sector employment (total population)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Public sector	n/a	n/a	31.5%	40.7%	34.4%	45.8%	29.7%	29.0%	32.3%	29.7%
Private sector	n/a	n/a	68.5%	59.3%	65.6%	54.2%	70.3%	71.0%	67.7%	70.3%
Total	n/a	n/a	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Public sector	34.9%	35.5%	34.2%	35.5%	32.9%	29.9%	31.4%	31.1%	33.3%	33.6%
Private sector	65.1%	64.5%	65.8%	64.5%	67.1%	70.1%	68.6%	68.9%	66.7%	66.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

37 These figures are based on employed people only. Students, pensioners, or people staying “at home” are not included. The private sector includes employment in NGO and self-employed people.

Section 10.2 has also shown a difference in the development of incomes between households relying on income from the public and private sectors. A comparison of data in Table 10-11 and Table 10-12 shows that incomes in the public sector grew considerably more than the private sector incomes after 2010.

Below is a comparison of public and private sector employment for each age group, which could be relevant to the household incomes of each group. Data for Age Group 6, however, is insufficient because most people in this group were already retired when the first SMF polls were conducted. Age Group 5 is only included until 2004 and Age Group 4 is only documented until 2012 for the same reason. The comparison for Age Group 1 starts only in 2012 because most people included in that age group were still listed as students before then.

Table 10-24: Public and private sector employment, only Age Group 1 (born after 1986)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Public sector	not sufficient data available						20.1%	24.1%	28.4%	23.9%	33.3%
Private sector	not sufficient data available						79.9%	75.9%	71.6%	76.1%	66.7%
Total							100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2012-2016

Table 10-25: Public and private sector employment, only Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Public sector	46.3%	33.4%	24.2%	31.0%	29.1%	32.7%	25.6%	23.4%	25.9%	26.7%
Private sector	53.7%	66.6%	75.8%	69.0%	70.9%	67.3%	74.4%	76.6%	74.1%	73.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Public sector	31.0%	32.5%	33.5%	34.0%	31.3%	28.5%	32.1%	33.5%	35.2%	30.0%
Private sector	69.0%	67.5%	66.5%	66.0%	68.7%	71.5%	67.9%	66.5%	64.8%	70.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Table 10-26: Public and private sector employment, only Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Public sector	68.2%	41.5%	31.7%	39.1%	32.6%	46.3%	29.9%	30.8%	33.2%	29.5%
Private sector	31.8%	58.5%	68.3%	60.9%	67.4%	53.7%	70.1%	69.2%	66.8%	70.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Public sector	37.4%	38.2%	33.6%	37.4%	37.7%	34.3%	32.4%	29.3%	38.7%	40.0%
Private sector	62.6%	61.8%	66.4%	62.6%	62.3%	65.7%	67.6%	70.7%	61.3%	60.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Table 10-26 shows that Age Group 3 (people who were between 18 and 29 years old when Mongolia's peaceful revolution occurred) had the highest share of employment in the public sector for 1997. The loss of jobs in the public sector affected these people most and it happened at a time when they were still rather young. It will later become apparent that these people were the ones who made the most use of the new opportunities that were offered in the private sector through self-employment (see: Table 10-31).

Table 10-27: Public and private sector employment, only Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Public sector	65.1%	49.4%	35.5%	49.0%	40.7%	56.1%	36.3%	33.2%	42.2%	35.3%
Private sector	34.9%	50.6%	64.5%	51.0%	59.3%	43.9%	63.7%	66.8%	57.8%	64.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Public sector	40.6%	37.5%	41.8%	46.9%	31.7%	31.3%	not sufficient data after 2012			
Private sector	59.4%	62.5%	58.2%	53.1%	68.3%	68.7%				
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				

Source: SMF data base 1997-2012

Table 10-28: Public and private sector employment, only Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Public sector	75.0%	52.0%	37.5%	46.2%	44.1%	61.9%	34.7%	36.4%	not sufficient data after 2004	
Private sector	25.0%	48.0%	62.5%	53.8%	55.9%	38.1%	65.3%	63.6%		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

Source: SMF data base 1997-2004

The loss of employment in the public sector resulted in increased unemployment until the private sector was developed enough to absorb the people who lost their government jobs. The tables and Figure below show how different generations had different experiences, particularly in the early years of the transition.

Age Group 6 (above 50 years in 1990) was least affected by unemployment. The unemployment rate measured by the Sant Maral Foundation’s polls was very rarely above the 5 per cent mark until these people left the employment statistics and became pensioners.

People in Age Groups 4 and 5 (who were between 30 and 49 years old in 1990) did experience relatively high unemployment in the early years of the transition, but their situation improved steadily until they reached pension age.

As mentioned before, people in Age Group 3 were most-affected by unemployment, and not only in the early years of economic transition. Figure 10-6 shows clearly that the peak of unemployment for Age Group 3 was in 1997. Unemployment fell in subsequent years largely because of the new self-employment of these people, which is discussed later.

Unemployment for people in Age Group 2 remained relatively high throughout the 20-years period. Some in this group were just starting their working life when questions regarding employment were first included in polls in 1997. It appears to have been a very bad starting point for most of these people, and their employment situation remained rather gloomy in the two decades that followed.

In the most recent years, unemployment has become the most pressing problem for the youth in Age Group 1.



Table 10-29: Unemployment rates (based on SMF polls 1997-2006)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.1%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	17.2%	12.1%	9.1%	10.0%	13.2%	13.4%	11.7%	14.9%	12.5%	10.9%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	36.7%	20.2%	17.5%	19.0%	17.4%	15.8%	16.5%	19.5%	13.7%	13.4%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	21.5%	18.8%	13.9%	15.6%	15.9%	13.0%	15.7%	14.7%	14.8%	9.5%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	11.8%	9.6%	11.5%	8.3%	10.4%	12.2%	6.4%	7.6%	7.7%	4.3%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	-	4.0%	2.1%	3.7%	1.9%	1.3%	1.7%	6.7%	4.3%	4.1%
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	22.2%	15.3%	12.5%	13.5%	14.1%	13.4%	12.9%	15.1%	12.5%	10.6%


Source: SMF data base 1997-2006

Table 10-30: Unemployment rates (based on SMF polls 2007-2016)

	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	3.8%	7.2%	7.4%	13.5%	8.4%	13.9%	16.4%	15.6%	12.2%	17.7%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	10.7%	14.0%	14.6%	17.7%	16.1%	13.8%	14.4%	17.6%	11.9%	14.7%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	11.4%	14.2%	14.8%	16.2%	16.9%	13.8%	16.2%	16.9%	12.3%	14.3%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	9.3%	9.7%	10.4%	15.8%	7.8%	8.0%	8.8%	11.7%	7.9%	4.0%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	5.5%	0.9%	2.0%	3.2%	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	9.7%	11.0%	11.6%	14.7%	12.2%	11.7%	13.0%	14.4%	10.7%	13.5%

Source: SMF data base 2007-2016

Figure 10-6: Unemployment rates (based on SMF polls)



Self-employment was a new opportunity for overcoming unemployment and achieving economic progress in the market-oriented economy that began after 1990. Surveys from the past two decades teach that Age Groups 2 and 3 (below 30 years in 1990) made the most use of these new opportunities. For most of these people, it may not have been their first choice to look for self-employment opportunities, but it was necessary when there were no jobs offered in the public sector and large private companies had not yet developed sufficiently to offer employment.

The survey data cannot tell about the survival of the small businesses that were started by the people who took up self-employment after the economy started to recover.

Self-employment was rather popular among young people who entered the labour market after 2006 for about nine years. 2015 was when growth suddenly stopped simultaneously alongside a rise in unemployment. This indicates that these young people did not give up self-employment for better-paid professions in the public or private sector but failed in their entrepreneurial pursuits and abandoned them.

Table 10-31: Self-employment (1997-2006)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.3%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	3.8%	6.6%	11.0%	9.7%	10.4%	12.9%	15.1%	11.9%	15.6%	16.1%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	7.7%	13.9%	19.1%	14.5%	16.8%	18.9%	21.6%	16.6%	20.3%	21.9%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	9.4%	12.1%	15.6%	9.5%	10.4%	12.5%	16.8%	16.1%	14.1%	17.6%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	5.4%	8.7%	8.6%	8.0%	6.1%	5.3%	5.3%	4.8%	4.3%	2.6%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	1.1%	1.2%	2.1%	1.5%	4.2%	1.9%	2.2%	1.5%	-	1.6%
<b>Total</b> (all six groups com- bined)	5.9%	10.0%	13.7%	10.5%	11.8%	13.6%	16.0%	12.8%	15.3%	16.4%


Source: SMF data base 1997-2006

Table 10-32: Self-employment (2007-2016)

	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	3.8%	2.6%	6.6%	6.1%	9.9%	12.3%	12.9%	12.9%	15.3%	6.9%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	15.6%	16.0%	19.2%	17.9%	24.2%	25.1%	26.3%	22.6%	24.6%	25.4%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	18.7%	21.1%	25.0%	19.2%	28.1%	24.2%	24.3%	25.3%	25.7%	20.6%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	15.1%	13.0%	15.7%	9.4%	18.4%	13.1%	15.3%	9.5%	9.3%	4.0%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	2.5%	1.7%	2.5%	2.5%	-	1.8%	1.3%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	-	-	1.7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups com- bined)	14.6%	13.8%	16.9%	13.5%	19.7%	18.6%	19.5%	17.3%	18.8%	15.5%

Source: SMF data base 2007-2016

Figure 10-7: Self-employment



### 10.3.2 Personal Economic Situation of Different Generations

Economic difficulties shortly after the peaceful revolution and the gradual improvement that followed after 1999 are also reflected in people’s judgement of their personal economic situations. In 1995-1996, more than 55 per cent of respondents described their personal situation as bad, and the situation got worse until 1998. In 1999-2007 the picture improved slightly. By 2016, there was a significant change for the better, with indications that the economic recovery had also reached the people. Only 20 per cent of people in 2016 said that their situation was “rather bad” or “bad” (see: Table 10-33) in response to the question “How is your present personal and family’s standards of living?”

Table 10-33: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living (total population)


	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Very good/good	9.2%	11.0%	8.8%	6.5%	10.0%	11.7%	13.4%	15.0%	16.6%	17.3%	10.2%
Not good/not bad	33.8%	33.5%	28.8%	30.5%	33.2%	37.3%	36.7%	37.2%	43.3%	40.8%	39.5%
Rather bad/bad	57.1%	55.6%	62.3%	63.0%	56.7%	51.0%	49.9%	47.9%	40.1%	41.9%	50.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very good/good	13.1%	18.0%	12.9%	14.6%	11.0%	13.5%	13.7%	16.6%	16.0%	14.6%	18.1%
Not good/not bad	39.0%	45.3%	57.1%	59.7%	58.3%	62.9%	62.3%	64.9%	57.9%	56.4%	61.6%
Rather bad/bad	47.8%	36.8%	30.0%	25.8%	30.7%	23.5%	24.0%	18.5%	26.1%	29.0%	20.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

Figure 10-8: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living (total population)



The data shows a clear indication that the younger generation considers their standards of living much better than the older.

The following tables and Figures show the responses from each age group. Young people demonstrated a more positive evaluation of their living standards, even in the early years of transition when the older generation felt standards had worsened. It is, however, clear that the opinions of all groups reflect a definite improvement and a predominantly positive outlook for 2016.

Table 10-34: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living, only Age Group 1 (born after 1986)

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very good/ good	17.9%	21.5%	18.7%	21.0%	15.2%	18.6%	22.0%	22.3%	20.7%	18.1%	25.5%
Not good/ not bad	45.5%	52.5%	61.7%	60.7%	62.9%	57.4%	60.5%	66.2%	60.8%	57.5%	57.8%
Rather bad/bad	36.5%	25.9%	19.7%	18.4%	21.8%	24.1%	17.4%	11.6%	18.5%	24.4%	16.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Table 10-35: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living, only Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)

	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Very good/ good	13.3%	13.6%	10.4%	9.3%	13.5%	14.2%	14.0%	17.9%	17.7%	17.6%	11.2%
Not good/ not bad	39.8%	36.3%	40.7%	39.7%	41.5%	46.1%	43.5%	42.1%	47.6%	45.0%	45.2%
Rather bad/bad	46.9%	50.0%	48.9%	51.0%	45.0%	39.8%	42.5%	39.9%	34.7%	37.3%	43.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Very good/ good	13.1%	18.4%	13.3%	14.1%	11.4%	14.0%	15.2%	18.5%	15.7%	17.9%	14.9%
Not good/ not bad	41.7%	48.8%	57.6%	62.5%	58.0%	64.1%	62.3%	64.9%	60.8%	53.3%	63.3%
Rather bad/bad	45.1%	32.7%	29.1%	23.5%	30.6%	21.9%	22.4%	16.6%	23.5%	28.8%	21.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

Table 10-36: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living, only Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Very good/ good	9.5%	11.1%	10.1%	6.7%	10.0%	12.5%	12.9%	14.0%	15.8%	14.6%	9.0%
Not good/ not bad	38.0%	35.6%	31.1%	31.4%	33.7%	35.8%	35.7%	35.6%	42.3%	39.7%	37.0%
Rather bad/bad	52.5%	53.3%	58.7%	61.9%	56.3%	51.7%	51.4%	50.4%	41.9%	45.8%	54.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very good/ good	14.0%	16.8%	12.1%	13.8%	11.0%	14.3%	11.1%	12.1%	14.4%	8.9%	13.9%
Not good/ not bad	36.1%	40.8%	56.6%	55.9%	53.9%	61.4%	62.5%	66.2%	51.9%	60.0%	62.4%
Rather bad/bad	50.0%	42.4%	31.3%	30.3%	35.1%	24.3%	26.4%	21.8%	33.8%	31.0%	23.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

Table 10-37: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living, only Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Very good/ good	5.9%	10.0%	7.2%	6.4%	7.2%	8.2%	14.0%	11.8%	13.3%	17.0%	10.1%
Not good/ not bad	29.6%	30.7%	25.2%	22.7%	25.5%	33.3%	29.2%	32.1%	40.7%	39.1%	34.0%
Rather bad/bad	64.5%	59.3%	67.5%	70.9%	67.3%	58.6%	56.8%	56.0%	46.0%	43.8%	55.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very good/ good	10.1%	16.5%	11.0%	14.8%	9.4%	10.0%	8.6%	15.1%	14.9%	12.6%	16.7%
Not good/ not bad	37.2%	40.7%	57.4%	58.5%	61.0%	64.0%	61.8%	62.8%	58.3%	53.6%	62.4%
Rather bad/bad	52.8%	42.8%	31.6%	26.8%	29.6%	25.9%	29.6%	22.1%	26.9%	33.8%	20.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2016

Table 10-38: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living, only Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Very good/good	8.8%	8.9%	7.6%	2.7%	5.4%	8.8%	12.0%	13.2%	17.3%	22.9%	10.5%
Not good/not bad	25.9%	30.1%	15.1%	22.6%	31.1%	31.2%	34.1%	34.5%	37.3%	33.1%	31.6%
Rather bad/bad	65.4%	61.1%	77.4%	74.7%	63.5%	60.0%	53.9%	52.3%	45.4%	44.0%	57.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very good/good	11.5%	17.4%	13.2%	11.1%	7.0%	10.5%	9.3%	13.5%	not sufficient data after 2013		
Not good/not bad	39.3%	48.3%	54.2%	63.6%	63.3%	69.7%	64.0%	62.2%			
Rather bad/bad	49.2%	34.4%	32.6%	25.2%	29.8%	19.7%	26.8%	24.4%			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			

Source: SMF data base 1995-2013

Table 10-39: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living, only Age Group 6 (born before 1941)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Very good/good	7.3%	9.4%	4.5%	2.0%	6.9%	11.4%	12.9%	15.5%	21.3%	22.5%	6.3%
Not good/not bad	24.2%	29.3%	14.2%	23.5%	13.0%	27.6%	32.1%	36.4%	35.2%	35.1%	30.4%
Rather bad/bad	68.5%	61.3%	81.2%	74.5%	80.0%	61.0%	55.1%	48.1%	43.5%	42.4%	63.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Very good/good	18.3%	24.5%	11.0%	14.6%	not sufficient data after 2009						
Not good/not bad	39.2%	48.2%	52.0%	56.0%							
Rather bad/bad	42.5%	27.3%	37.0%	29.4%							
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%							

Source: SMF data base 1995-2009



Figure 10-9: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living (part 1)



Figure 10-10: Respondents' assessment of their personal and their family's present standard of living (part 2)



Respondents expressed optimism when asked how they evaluate their nearest future during the time of economic hardship. During the first poll in 1995, already more than 60 per cent of respondents gave positive feedback on what they thought about their near futures.

This optimism rose sharply to a new peak in 1996, the year when the young democratic parties won parliamentary elections for the first time. The electoral victory of the democratic forces over the old MPRP was, however, reason for the older generation to become more pessimistic again. Survey data shows clearly that Age Groups 4, 5, and 6 grew more pessimistic after 1996. The trend only reversed itself with the data showing stronger optimism after the MPRP regained power in the 2000 elections.

Since then, the gap between young people's optimism and older people's pessimism has bridged. Actually, the opinions of all generations had grown very close by 2016.

Figure 10-11 shows this narrowing in the differences of opinions very clearly. In 1995, optimism lowers as ages increase for respondents. After some rather erratic curves in subsequent years, the opinions of all groups came closer together and were almost identical in 2016.

Table 10-40: Respondents with a positive outlook toward their personal future, part 1

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Gr. 1 born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	72.7%	82.6%	83.1%
Gr. 2 born 1973-1986	76.7%	88.1%	82.6%	79.1%	80.5%	87.3%	86.6%	84.8%	86.3%	88.4%	82.2%
Gr. 3 born 1961-1972	67.5%	83.7%	74.0%	74.5%	71.3%	80.6%	82.7%	79.8%	82.6%	83.2%	79.3%
Gr. 4 born 1951-1960	60.3%	80.6%	71.1%	63.3%	61.2%	80.4%	78.5%	73.1%	80.6%	85.0%	76.1%
Gr. 5 born 1941-1950	50.7%	77.1%	57.9%	59.8%	56.9%	76.6%	79.7%	83.7%	81.6%	85.3%	78.4%
Gr. 6 born before 1941	50.9%	80.8%	55.0%	55.7%	56.2%	84.7%	87.8%	77.3%	90.7%	85.2%	72.6%
Total (all six groups combined)	64.0%	82.9%	72.0%	70.6%	70.3%	82.4%	83.2%	80.6%	84.0%	85.8%	79.8%


Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

Table 10-41: Respondents with a positive outlook toward their personal future, part 2

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	86.2%	84.3%	90.6%	94.1%	92.4%	93.4%	96.6%	95.9%	96.1%	92.3%	93.1%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	82.8%	86.9%	86.9%	91.7%	89.4%	94.2%	92.7%	93.7%	93.0%	90.8%	91.6%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	78.8%	82.0%	86.8%	89.8%	86.9%	90.5%	90.4%	91.9%	92.6%	89.7%	91.2%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	76.3%	83.7%	84.6%	90.1%	86.7%	85.6%	91.3%	90.9%	93.9%	89.4%	93.1%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	78.3%	87.1%	80.7%	96.7%	86.6%	91.4%	94.4%	94.1%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	84.7%	90.4%	86.3%	93.6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	80.3%	84.9%	86.2%	91.7%	88.7%	91.6%	92.8%	93.1%	93.6%	90.8%	92.2%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Figure 10-11: Respondents with a positive outlook toward their personal future



In 2008, the Sant Maral Foundation introduced the question: “Due to both just and unjust circumstances in a society, there are both winners and losers among the different social groups. In your opinion, to which group do you belong?” and has continued to ask this in every survey since.


There is only a relatively small group who consider themselves “winners” in Mongolian society. Slightly more than half of all respondents see themselves as losers, instead. The general trend, however, is positive, and this trend applies in principle to all age groups.

Table 10-42: Respondents’ self-assessment whether they are winners or losers (total population)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
I consider myself rather a loser	51.3%	48.7%	49.1%	50.4%	50.2%	47.6%	52.1%	47.8%	40.4%
I consider myself rather a winner	10.4%	8.5%	5.2%	7.3%	6.4%	6.4%	7.0%	9.5%	14.5%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	38.2%	42.8%	45.7%	42.4%	43.5%	46.0%	41.0%	42.7%	45.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Figure 10-12: Respondents’ self-assessment whether they are winners or losers (total population)



The responses of individual age groups presented in the tables below confirm one aspect discussed before: members of Age Group 3 (whom were concluded as the worst-affected by the economic transition) see themselves as losers more than any other group in Mongolian society. Their own judgement confirms what the analysis concludes already with the survey data.

Table 10-43: Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers, only Age Group 1 (born after 1986)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
I consider myself rather a loser	39.9%	39.6%	40.5%	35.6%	39.0%	40.5%	44.2%	40.1%	28.1%
I consider myself rather a winner	8.7%	12.6%	7.3%	9.6%	8.1%	7.3%	14.0%	11.5%	21.3%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	51.4%	47.8%	52.3%	54.8%	52.8%	52.1%	41.9%	48.5%	50.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-44: Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers, only Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
I consider myself rather a loser	53.9%	48.3%	49.6%	46.9%	49.8%	48.0%	51.4%	48.5%	41.6%
I consider myself rather a winner	11.0%	7.0%	4.5%	5.9%	5.6%	5.9%	5.8%	8.1%	11.9%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	35.1%	44.7%	45.9%	47.2%	44.7%	46.1%	42.8%	43.4%	46.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-45: Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers, only Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
I consider myself rather a loser	52.8%	50.7%	52.6%	57.0%	57.1%	50.0%	58.5%	54.1%	51.2%
I consider myself rather a winner	9.5%	8.6%	5.1%	5.0%	4.9%	4.7%	4.7%	9.5%	11.5%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	37.6%	40.7%	42.3%	38.0%	38.0%	45.3%	36.9%	36.4%	37.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-46: Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers, only Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
I consider myself rather a loser	55.4%	53.0%	56.0%	55.6%	54.8%	48.4%	50.7%	55.6%	45.2%
I consider myself rather a winner	8.0%	7.7%	4.8%	7.1%	5.2%	7.7%	4.3%	8.7%	15.3%
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	36.6%	39.4%	39.1%	37.3%	40.0%	43.9%	45.0%	35.7%	39.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-47: Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers, only Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
I consider myself rather a loser	43.6%	50.9%	46.4%	54.5%	42.6%	48.8%	not sufficient data after 2013		
I consider myself rather a winner	12.8%	8.6%	5.1%	12.1%	12.5%	7.9%			
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	43.6%	40.6%	48.6%	33.3%	44.9%	43.3%			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			

Source: SMF data base 2008-2013

Reliable data that Age Group 6 has an above-average number of respondents who consider themselves winners appears only in 2008-2009. By that time, they are only pensioners and seem to be content with the way things went for them.

Table 10-48: Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers, only Age Group 6 (born before 1941)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
I consider myself rather a loser	43.5%	40.8%	not sufficient data after 2009						
I consider myself rather a winner	17.6%	12.6%							
Spontaneous: Sometimes I am winner, sometimes a loser	38.8%	46.6%							
Total	100%	100%							

Source: SMF data base 2008-2009

Figure 10-13: Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers (part 1)






Figure 10-14: Respondents' self-assessment whether they are winners or losers (part 2)



Another indicator of optimism versus pessimism is the responses to the question: “When comparing your life with the life of your parents, what would you say?” Table 10-49 shows that optimism grew between 2008 and 2016. While the responses “My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do” and “I will achieve much more than my parents” were more or less equal in 2008, afterwards there was a steady increase in the number of people who expressed optimism that they would be able to achieve more than the previous generation.

Table 10-49: Respondents’ opinions when comparing their life with the life of their parents (total population)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	28.8%	30.3%	28.0%	27.7%	25.4%	25.8%	29.1%	22.6%	25.1%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	43.4%	43.1%	44.5%	38.0%	37.8%	39.1%	41.2%	39.2%	37.2%
I will achieve much more than my parents	27.8%	26.7%	27.6%	34.4%	36.8%	35.1%	29.7%	38.1%	37.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

The individual tables for each age group and the Figure thereafter show that optimism follows the age line exactly, and that young people are more optimistic than the older ones.

Table 10-50: Respondents’ opinions when comparing their life with the life of their parents, only Age Group 1 (born after 1986)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	24.2%	17.4%	13.3%	16.2%	14.8%	19.3%	24.1%	12.0%	19.8%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	35.9%	34.8%	33.5%	27.9%	25.2%	27.0%	24.1%	32.2%	27.3%
I will achieve much more than my parents	39.9%	47.8%	53.2%	55.9%	60.0%	53.7%	51.8%	55.8%	52.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-51: Respondents' opinions when comparing their life with the life of their parents, only Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	26.5%	29.9%	25.5%	25.8%	23.3%	25.1%	29.9%	21.5%	23.8%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	39.9%	42.6%	44.3%	35.5%	32.9%	34.6%	36.0%	32.3%	33.3%
I will achieve much more than my parents	33.6%	27.6%	30.3%	38.7%	43.8%	40.3%	34.1%	46.2%	42.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-52: Respondents' opinions when comparing their life with the life of their parents, only Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	31.5%	31.8%	33.5%	32.0%	31.0%	33.8%	37.5%	27.8%	33.8%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	41.9%	41.6%	44.7%	38.1%	39.9%	38.6%	43.8%	41.1%	42.0%
I will achieve much more than my parents	26.7%	26.6%	21.9%	29.9%	29.1%	27.6%	18.7%	31.2%	24.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-53: Respondents' opinions when comparing their life with the life of their parents, only Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	35.7%	37.7%	36.9%	31.3%	33.3%	25.9%	26.8%	33.3%	27.7%
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	46.8%	42.0%	46.5%	44.5%	41.7%	51.5%	51.6%	49.3%	53.9%
I will achieve much more than my parents	17.5%	20.3%	16.5%	24.2%	25.0%	22.6%	21.7%	17.4%	18.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Table 10-54: Respondents' opinions when comparing their life with the life of their parents, only Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	22.9%	31.4%	33.3%	32.9%	26.2%	20.3%	not sufficient data after 2013		
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	57.5%	50.0%	52.8%	42.5%	61.1%	59.4%			
I will achieve much more than my parents	19.6%	18.6%	13.9%	24.7%	12.8%	20.3%			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			


Source: SMF data base 2008-2013

Table 10-55: Respondents' opinions when comparing their life with the life of their parents, only Age Group 6 (born before 1941)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
My parents achieved much more than I will be able to do	28.2%	26.0%	not sufficient data after 2009						
There is no significant difference, we are almost equal	56.4%	62.5%							
I will achieve much more than my parents	15.4%	11.5%							
Total	100%	100%							

Source: SMF data base 2008-2009

Figure 10-15: Respondents' opinions when comparing their life with the life of their parents; here only responses "I will achieve much more than my parents" (total population)



How much people think that they are the masters of their own destiny can be seen with the question: "What do you think, does your future depend on your own achievements, the State, or on other forces (like churches, trade unions, firms, the press, TV/radio, communities, business relations), that could influence the economy?" (included in questionnaires since 2008). Analysis of responses from the whole 2008-2016 period shows moderate growth in the number of people who believe that they themselves are responsible for shaping their futures.

There are fewer people in 2016 than in 2008 that think that their future depends on the state or other outside forces. However, the changes are not as strong as they appear in responses to the previous question regarding people's ability to achieve more than their parents. Nevertheless, the pattern of responses in different age groups is very similar to that in the previous question. The younger generation clearly sees itself as less dependent on the state or other forces and more self-reliant than older people<sup>38</sup>.

38 Figure 10-17 shows only a comparison of the number of responses received for "My future depends rather on myself", rather than individual tables for each age group.

Table 10-56: Opinions regarding outside influences on own future (total population)

	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
My future depends rather on myself	49,6%	56,1%	48,4%	48,5%	55,4%	57,5%	55,9%	52,5%	55,7%
My future depends rather on the state	38,3%	34,1%	42,9%	42,8%	36,4%	35,3%	33,3%	39,2%	35,7%
My future depends rather on other sources	12,1%	9,8%	8,7%	8,8%	8,3%	7,2%	10,8%	8,3%	8,6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Figure 10-16: Opinions regarding outside influences on own future (total population)





Figure 10-17: Opinions of different age groups regarding outside influences on their own future; here only responses “My future depends rather on myself” (total population)



### 10.3.3 Major Problems and Issues of Concern

The Sant Maral Foundation has asked regularly about opinion regarding problems that face the country since 1995: "In your opinion what is the most important socio-political or economical problem facing the country today?" This section of the analysis will look at the changing concerns and differences in opinion between young and old people<sup>39</sup>.

Table 10-57 and Table 10-58 list the ten most important issues that were mentioned by respondents. Out of these ten, the three most-mentioned problems are marked in colour:

most important     
  2nd place     
  3rd place

Table 10-57: Major problems and issues of concern (all responses, 1995-2005)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Unemployment	1.1%	9.8%	12.5%	13.6%	10.5%	12.8%	15.2%	15.8%	16.4%	18.9%	18.7%
Standard of living / poverty / income	22.5%	17.0%	22.6%	20.5%	20.1%	18.0%	19.6%	21.1%	22.0%	24.3%	23.7%
Price increase / inflation	5.4%	3.6%	4.6%	1.3%	0.9%	0.9%	0.7%	0.6%	0.4%	1.6%	1.7%
Education	19.9%	19.0%	13.2%	9.4%	6.4%	8.6%	8.2%	8.4%	9.5%	8.2%	6.6%
Law enforcement	4.3%	5.4%	3.3%	5.1%	4.1%	5.2%	5.9%	4.4%	3.0%	2.1%	1.8%
Corruption	1.0%	1.1%	.7%	2.0%	5.1%	3.5%	2.6%	3.2%	4.5%	4.2%	10.6%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	21.3%	20.9%	16.8%	18.4%	26.1%	24.8%	23.4%	20.8%	19.6%	16.4%	14.6%
State admin. / political system	8.8%	9.3%	12.3%	17.5%	16.6%	11.8%	11.5%	11.7%	11.5%	11.8%	11.9%
Ecology / environment	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.6%	0.4%	0.8%	1.2%	1.3%	1.2%
Social justice	7.9%	8.1%	8.8%	8.1%	6.8%	7.3%	6.2%	6.6%	5.7%	5.1%	3.8%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

39 The analysis is based on multiple response questions; each respondent could name up to three problems or issues of concern. All percentages in tables and diagrams in this Subsection 10.3.3 are based on responses.



Table 10-58: Major problems and issues of concern (all responses, 2006-2016)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Unemployment	17.6%	16.7%	23.7%	29.2%	37.8%	40.6%	34.4%	33.6%	31.1%	32.8%	36.3%
Standard of living / poverty / income	16.4%	15.8%	19.3%	20.1%	20.1%	17.3%	18.3%	16.2%	17.6%	18.2%	15.1%
Price increase / inflation	1.0%	4.8%	27.7%	13.9%	8.8%	6.1%	15.7%	15.3%	20.8%	15.5%	8.0%
Education	5.8%	5.9%	4.5%	4.4%	4.8%	4.1%	4.1%	4.4%	5.1%	4.7%	5.8%
Law enforcement	2.8%	2.5%	5.4%	6.6%	6.5%	7.7%	6.5%	7.4%	5.1%	5.8%	5.7%
Corruption	8.8%	8.5%	5.8%	6.4%	4.0%	4.6%	5.3%	5.0%	4.5%	5.5%	4.4%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	15.4%	14.2%	4.8%	7.9%	5.8%	6.6%	4.4%	5.2%	5.8%	8.2%	11.9%
State admin. / political system	19.0%	15.7%	2.1%	2.7%	3.1%	2.8%	2.8%	2.6%	2.1%	3.0%	3.0%
Ecology / environment	1.6%	3.5%	2.9%	2.8%	3.4%	4.8%	3.2%	3.4%	2.4%	1.4%	1.6%
Social justice	6.6%	5.8%	3.3%	4.9%	4.6%	4.0%	3.6%	5.7%	4.0%	3.7%	4.4%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

The data shows that unemployment was not a major concern in the initial years of the transformation, in 1995-1999. Joblessness only became an important issue in 2000, when it was listed among the overall top-three problems for the first time. In 2004, unemployment advanced to the number-two problem. Not only was unemployment the biggest problem from 2007 onwards (excluding 2008), it continued to rise in magnitude.

People's standard of living (including the issue of poverty and low income) was of great concern until 2005, when it began to gradually lessen in importance. However, it was still a major issue and remained among the three most-mentioned problems every year throughout the period of analysis.


General questions of the country's economy (including manufacturing and mining) were highly ranked on people's list of problems in the initial years of transition but have been of less concern since 2005. Only very recently in 2016 did this issue again appear among the biggest issues, at third place. The education system was cited as a problem mainly in 1995-1997.

Thereafter it was only of relatively low importance in the over-all statistics, but some groups in society continued to rank it as an important problem. More details of the weight given to education are shown below.

Mongolia’s political system and state administration is another problem that occasionally reached a high priority.

Figure 10-18 includes the issues that appeared the highest on the list of priorities throughout the years. The Figure covers: a) how the importance has changed according to people’s opinion; and b) how different age groups regard these problems.

Figure 10-18: Major problems and issues of concern (selected issues)




## Unemployment

The Figure shows a clear growth of importance given to unemployment. The closeness of the coloured lines representing each age group to the dotted line representing the average indicates that all age groups shared this concern for the greatest length of time. Only when one group reached the pension age did the concern lessen.

There seems to be some easing of the problem's weight for some groups after 2011. However, the groups of young people still mention unemployment as a high-priority problem.


Figure 10-19: Respondents in different age groups naming unemployment as a major problem



### Standard of living / poverty / income

A relatively stable percentage share of people names their standards of living among the top-three problems that concern them most. Despite all the economic progress that has taken place since 1995, people are still greatly concerned about this issue. However, it appears that the nearly uniform lines that follow opinions in the early years have become far more varied. This indicates that young people are less concerned about their standard of living than older ones, for example.


Figure 10-20: Respondents in different age groups naming standard of living / poverty / income as a major problem



## Inflation

A different picture is drawn from inflation. Here the opinions of all age groups are nearly identical, and the different lines in Figure 10-21 are hardly distinguishable. It is also noteworthy that the very erratic changes in how often inflation is cited as a problem is very uniform across all age groups. All seem to have made the same observation that inflation became a major issue in 2007-2008. That fact that the issue was mentioned less in subsequent years is an indicator that other problems became more pressing (see: Table 10-58 and Figure 10-18). This shows that unemployment took over the leading position from inflation in 2009).


Figure 10-21: Respondents in different age groups naming price increase or inflation as a major problem



## Education

After Mongolia avoided a near collapse of the education system in the early years of the transition, education fell to a minor problem for the general public but remained as some considerable importance for the young generation.

Figure 10-22: Respondents in different age groups naming education as a major problem




## Economy / mining / manufacturing

The country's general economic situation was of great concern to people up until 1999, before it then gradually dropped on the priority list when other issues became more important to people. By 2008, the economy was mentioned by only around 5 per cent of respondents.

The recent increasing of awareness of this problem might be directed at the mining sector more than the economy.

Figure 10-23: Respondents in different age groups naming economy / mining / manufacturing as a major problem



### 10.3.4 Different Perceptions of Various Generations Regarding Major Issues of Concern

The tables and Figures found in this subsection shows each age group’s opinions on the issues have changed over time. The sequence of issues in the tables of this subsection does not necessarily indicate a ranking. The same sequence is repeated in all tables, although their ranking may differ. The ranking of the most important issues for each group is shown in the Figures.

Some individual views from each age group were commented on earlier. The following are tables and Figures only, without further commentary.

#### Age Group 1 (born after 1986): Ten major issues of concern


Table 10-59: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 1 (born after 1986)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Unemployment	12.3%	19.0%	20.0%	30.1%	39.1%	41.4%	35.8%	33.0%	39.0%	30.9%	41.4%
Standard of living / poverty / income	13.7%	16.1%	14.1%	17.4%	14.7%	10.9%	16.9%	13.5%	12.4%	13.5%	9.7%
Price increase / inflation	1.4%	6.3%	33.5%	12.3%	8.1%	7.0%	15.5%	15.9%	20.2%	15.2%	9.3%
Education	7.5%	9.8%	9.7%	10.6%	8.8%	5.5%	5.9%	8.7%	7.8%	7.1%	9.0%
Law enforcement	4.1%	2.9%	6.5%	5.1%	8.1%	6.3%	6.2%	8.1%	5.5%	10.6%	5.6%
Corruption	7.5%	9.3%	4.9%	6.4%	4.4%	6.3%	4.4%	5.1%	3.2%	4.6%	3.2%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	15.8%	11.2%	5.4%	8.9%	5.3%	9.4%	4.1%	4.5%	3.2%	5.3%	12.0%
State admin. / political system	19.2%	8.8%	1.1%	2.1%	3.4%	.8%	3.0%	1.8%	2.3%	4.6%	1.9%
Ecology / environment	4.8%	6.3%	2.7%	3.0%	4.4%	7.0%	4.2%	4.8%	2.3%	2.1%	1.4%
Social justice	9.6%	2.9%	1.6%	3.8%	3.8%	4.7%	3.0%	3.0%	2.8%	3.9%	4.2%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016



Figure 10-24: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 1 (born after 1986)



**Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986): Ten major issues of concern**

Table 10-60: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Unemployment	1.4%	10.2%	13.6%	13.1%	11.5%	13.3%	16.9%	18.0%	17.7%	20.3%	17.8%
Standard of living / poverty / income	25.3%	16.5%	22.1%	20.9%	21.9%	20.4%	20.5%	21.1%	22.8%	23.7%	23.8%
Price increase / inflation	6.3%	4.0%	5.2%	1.5%	.9%	1.2%	.5%	.6%	.4%	1.2%	1.8%
Education	25.3%	21.9%	16.8%	12.6%	10.1%	11.0%	10.1%	11.4%	10.6%	9.6%	7.3%
Law enforcement	4.5%	4.6%	2.0%	3.7%	3.3%	3.6%	4.5%	3.3%	2.4%	1.5%	1.4%
Corruption	.5%	.6%	.8%	1.6%	5.0%	3.6%	2.6%	2.6%	5.0%	4.5%	11.9%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	14.0%	19.9%	14.0%	17.1%	22.6%	21.4%	20.2%	18.2%	17.7%	15.4%	15.2%

State admin. / political system	8.0%	7.4%	10.2%	15.2%	14.0%	10.3%	11.0%	9.6%	9.8%	10.9%	10.0%
Ecology / environment	.0%	.1%	.0%	.3%	.5%	.6%	.5%	1.1%	1.4%	1.6%	1.3%
Social justice	7.7%	8.6%	10.2%	10.5%	7.3%	8.0%	6.7%	7.0%	5.8%	5.2%	4.4%


Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

Table 10-61: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Unemployment	18.7%	18.8%	25.8%	31.3%	41.3%	42.2%	36.5%	33.8%	32.4%	37.5%	39.3%
Standard of living / poverty / income	16.5%	17.8%	18.3%	18.8%	18.6%	18.0%	16.2%	14.5%	17.0%	15.8%	14.9%
Price increase / inflation	1.1%	5.3%	27.0%	14.8%	8.8%	6.6%	15.1%	14.5%	19.8%	14.2%	6.6%
Education	7.1%	6.6%	4.3%	3.6%	4.3%	4.2%	4.8%	4.2%	4.4%	5.4%	4.9%
Law enforcement	2.9%	1.6%	5.4%	6.1%	6.0%	7.5%	6.3%	6.9%	4.9%	3.5%	4.7%
Corruption	9.6%	8.8%	7.0%	7.0%	4.1%	5.1%	5.8%	7.2%	5.2%	6.7%	4.2%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	13.9%	12.3%	3.5%	8.8%	5.8%	4.5%	4.6%	5.8%	5.8%	8.8%	11.2%
State admin. / political system	16.3%	13.1%	2.0%	2.2%	3.7%	1.5%	2.3%	2.4%	2.5%	1.9%	3.8%
Ecology / environment	1.8%	3.3%	2.8%	2.4%	2.9%	4.2%	3.6%	4.2%	2.7%	1.1%	2.3%
Social justice	6.4%	5.5%	3.5%	3.9%	4.1%	5.7%	3.6%	5.5%	3.8%	4.0%	3.6%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Figure 10 25: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)



**Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972): Ten major issues of concern**

Table 10-62: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Unemployment	1.1%	9.9%	13.4%	13.8%	11.0%	13.8%	14.7%	15.2%	15.7%	18.9%	17.7%
Standard of living / poverty / income	22.9%	16.5%	22.0%	20.0%	19.3%	16.9%	19.2%	21.2%	21.2%	24.6%	22.9%
Price increase / inflation	5.6%	4.0%	5.3%	1.5%	1.4%	1.0%	.8%	.7%	.4%	1.7%	1.9%
Education	21.0%	20.7%	13.8%	9.3%	5.4%	8.4%	8.9%	6.8%	9.8%	7.9%	7.4%
Law enforcement	4.1%	4.7%	3.5%	5.0%	4.1%	4.7%	5.2%	5.2%	2.7%	2.1%	1.7%
Corruption	.7%	.9%	.7%	2.7%	6.4%	3.4%	3.5%	4.1%	5.4%	4.7%	11.4%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	20.2%	19.9%	17.6%	17.6%	25.7%	25.4%	22.9%	21.8%	20.3%	16.6%	14.1%

State admin. / political system	8.4%	9.0%	11.0%	18.0%	17.8%	11.6%	11.3%	12.5%	12.0%	11.7%	13.6%
Ecology / environment	.0%	.1%	.2%	.3%	.3%	.9%	.4%	.8%	1.1%	1.2%	1.0%
Social justice	9.0%	8.5%	7.7%	7.7%	5.5%	7.3%	6.6%	6.6%	5.3%	5.3%	3.5%


Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

Table 10-63: Major problems mentioned by people in age group 3 (born 1961-1972)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Unemployment	18.0%	15.5%	24.1%	28.9%	35.6%	39.8%	35.0%	35.3%	29.7%	31.7%	30.5%
Standard of living / poverty / income	17.3%	13.8%	20.6%	21.5%	22.2%	18.1%	19.7%	17.0%	18.6%	24.4%	19.3%
Price increase / inflation	1.1%	4.4%	26.2%	13.4%	9.3%	4.7%	15.1%	15.4%	20.7%	17.1%	7.7%
Education	4.8%	5.2%	4.4%	4.4%	3.9%	4.3%	3.7%	3.6%	4.1%	2.1%	3.9%
Law enforcement	2.3%	3.1%	5.8%	6.8%	6.6%	9.4%	7.1%	7.6%	4.1%	3.1%	7.7%
Corruption	9.7%	9.9%	5.2%	6.6%	4.8%	3.9%	6.0%	3.4%	5.5%	4.5%	5.6%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	15.7%	15.1%	5.0%	7.1%	6.6%	5.1%	3.2%	4.4%	6.9%	8.4%	13.0%
State admin. / political system	19.1%	17.3%	2.0%	2.9%	1.6%	4.7%	2.7%	2.8%	2.1%	3.1%	3.5%
Ecology / environment	1.3%	3.3%	2.7%	2.5%	4.3%	5.5%	2.9%	2.8%	2.8%	1.0%	1.1%
Social justice	6.3%	7.0%	3.5%	5.0%	4.6%	2.4%	3.4%	6.4%	4.5%	3.5%	4.9%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Figure 10-26: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972)



### Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960): Ten major issues of concern

Table 10-64: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Unemployment	.9%	9.8%	11.2%	14.5%	9.8%	12.1%	15.6%	14.8%	16.9%	17.7%	22.9%
Standard of living / poverty / income	21.4%	17.3%	24.6%	20.3%	19.6%	15.5%	19.1%	21.6%	21.9%	25.1%	23.4%
Price increase / inflation	5.2%	2.8%	4.5%	1.1%	.9%	.7%	.6%	.3%	.1%	2.4%	1.3%
Education	18.7%	19.1%	12.2%	8.2%	4.2%	7.4%	6.2%	8.0%	8.6%	7.5%	4.8%
Law enforcement	3.6%	4.8%	3.3%	5.9%	4.4%	5.0%	6.9%	4.5%	3.4%	1.9%	1.8%
Corruption	1.6%	1.5%	.6%	1.8%	3.9%	3.4%	2.1%	3.0%	3.6%	3.4%	8.4%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	24.9%	22.9%	18.9%	19.8%	28.7%	26.8%	26.5%	21.9%	21.3%	17.6%	15.3%
State admin. / political system	9.1%	9.3%	10.9%	18.2%	18.5%	14.8%	11.2%	12.3%	11.8%	13.1%	11.8%
Ecology / environment	.0%	.1%	.1%	.0%	.2%	.5%	.1%	.8%	1.1%	.9%	.7%
Social justice	6.3%	7.2%	8.6%	6.3%	7.2%	6.9%	6.0%	6.5%	6.1%	5.4%	2.8%


Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

Table 10-65: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Unemployment	16.7%	15.2%	23.2%	32.1%	36.7%	42.9%	32.6%	31.2%	26.3%	29.1%	30.7%
Standard of living / poverty / income	17.1%	15.3%	22.3%	17.7%	23.3%	15.7%	19.9%	20.0%	21.1%	21.6%	18.7%
Price increase / inflation	.5%	4.2%	26.5%	14.1%	6.9%	5.0%	17.2%	15.0%	20.6%	16.2%	8.0%
Education	5.0%	5.2%	3.3%	3.6%	5.8%	2.9%	2.4%	3.1%	5.7%	3.4%	5.3%
Law enforcement	2.2%	3.4%	5.7%	7.2%	5.8%	7.9%	6.3%	8.5%	6.3%	5.4%	6.0%
Corruption	7.7%	6.5%	5.7%	6.6%	2.9%	5.0%	4.6%	3.5%	3.4%	5.4%	7.3%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	15.7%	16.1%	5.1%	5.7%	6.2%	6.4%	4.9%	5.4%	6.3%	12.2%	10.0%
State admin. / political system	21.3%	19.7%	3.6%	.9%	3.3%	3.6%	2.6%	2.3%	1.7%	2.7%	2.7%
Ecology / environment	1.4%	2.9%	2.4%	3.0%	3.6%	5.0%	2.2%	2.3%	1.1%	2.0%	1.3%
Social justice	6.5%	5.5%	1.8%	7.5%	3.3%	4.3%	4.7%	7.3%	5.7%	2.0%	6.7%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Figure 10-27: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)



**Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950): Ten major issues of concern**

Table 10-66: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Unemployment	1.0%	8.7%	12.3%	13.5%	7.9%	11.5%	11.4%	13.2%	13.3%	17.5%	18.0%
Standard of living / poverty / income	19.5%	16.9%	22.2%	21.4%	17.3%	16.9%	16.0%	19.5%	20.8%	24.2%	24.6%
Price increase / inflation	6.3%	2.7%	3.0%	.6%	.3%	.5%	.6%	.9%	.9%	1.1%	2.0%
Education	16.2%	12.5%	9.3%	6.0%	4.1%	5.2%	6.0%	6.7%	7.1%	5.8%	3.8%
Law enforcement	4.6%	7.2%	4.8%	6.9%	4.4%	8.6%	9.3%	5.6%	5.3%	4.5%	2.9%
Corruption	2.0%	1.7%	.6%	1.2%	3.8%	3.4%	1.7%	2.9%	2.8%	3.4%	8.1%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	27.2%	23.6%	16.5%	20.8%	32.3%	30.5%	29.7%	24.0%	24.3%	17.7%	13.3%



State admin. / political system	9.4%	13.2%	16.8%	17.9%	17.0%	12.0%	12.7%	13.9%	13.1%	12.5%	13.6%
Ecology / environment	.0%	.4%	.0%	.0%	.5%	.2%	.4%	.4%	.9%	.8%	1.7%
Social justice	6.3%	6.8%	9.6%	7.9%	7.7%	6.3%	6.2%	5.6%	5.5%	4.9%	5.8%


Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

Table 10-67: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Unemployment	11.3%	12.9%	21.5%	21.0%	33.5%	36.8%	29.1%	36.7%	-	-	-
Standard of living / poverty / income	14.0%	14.3%	19.2%	27.2%	21.9%	22.4%	20.1%	16.3%	-	-	-
Price increase / inflation	.7%	3.9%	32.9%	13.8%	9.0%	5.3%	16.9%	17.0%	-	-	-
Education	6.0%	6.4%	3.2%	2.6%	2.6%	2.6%	2.0%	2.0%	-	-	-
Law enforcement	4.7%	2.9%	3.7%	7.7%	5.8%	6.6%	6.3%	5.4%	-	-	-
Corruption	5.7%	5.0%	3.7%	3.1%	2.6%	2.6%	4.7%	4.1%	-	-	-
Economy / mining / manufacturing	20.3%	19.6%	6.4%	8.2%	5.8%	11.8%	6.5%	5.4%	-	-	-
State admin. / political system	23.3%	15.7%	1.8%	4.6%	3.2%	3.9%	5.6%	4.1%	-	-	-
Ecology / environment	1.0%	3.9%	2.7%	4.6%	2.6%	2.6%	2.7%	1.4%	-	-	-
Social justice	8.7%	6.4%	4.6%	6.2%	9.0%	1.3%	3.6%	6.1%	-	-	-

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Figure 10-28: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)



### Age Group 6 (born before 1941): Ten major issues of concern

Table 10-68: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 6 (born before 1941)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Unemployment	1.5%	9.4%	8.7%	12.2%	8.9%	10.0%	12.9%	13.7%	14.0%	15.8%	20.1%
Standard of living / poverty / income	22.1%	19.9%	22.7%	20.3%	20.4%	21.5%	23.2%	21.8%	22.9%	24.6%	23.7%
Price increase / inflation	2.9%	3.7%	1.8%	1.0%	.0%	.0%	1.2%	.9%	1.1%	1.9%	.6%
Education	13.3%	12.3%	7.9%	6.3%	2.6%	6.5%	4.1%	3.4%	7.7%	6.1%	5.9%
Law enforcement	5.3%	9.8%	4.7%	6.0%	5.9%	10.8%	9.1%	4.3%	5.2%	2.9%	4.1%
Corruption	.6%	.8%	.4%	1.0%	3.3%	4.2%	1.5%	3.0%	2.0%	3.2%	5.9%
Economy / mining / manufacturing	23.3%	19.0%	16.2%	20.3%	29.6%	23.5%	22.9%	22.2%	15.5%	16.6%	13.6%
State admin. / political system	10.3%	9.7%	22.0%	20.6%	17.1%	10.4%	13.5%	13.7%	16.3%	14.7%	15.4%
Ecology / environment	.0%	.0%	.0%	.5%	.0%	.0%	.6%	.0%	.9%	1.1%	1.2%
Social justice	9.1%	8.6%	9.4%	6.3%	8.9%	6.2%	2.6%	5.6%	7.4%	3.7%	1.2%


Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

Table 10-69: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 6 (born before 1941)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Unemployment	22.3%	14.6%	17.9%	19.5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Standard of living / poverty / income	10.2%	17.7%	18.9%	21.2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Price increase / inflation	1.9%	6.3%	25.3%	12.4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Education	4.5%	1.9%	4.2%	3.5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Law enforcement	4.5%	1.3%	4.2%	8.8%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Corruption	5.1%	6.3%	6.3%	6.2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Economy / mining / manufacturing	15.3%	13.3%	8.4%	10.6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
State admin. / political system	24.8%	23.4%	2.1%	8.8%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ecology / environment	1.9%	4.4%	6.3%	3.5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Social justice	3.8%	3.2%	6.3%	3.5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Figure 10-29: Major problems mentioned by people in Age Group 6 (born before 1941)



### **10.3.5 Effects on Political Motivation and Faith in Democratic Institutions**

People's general interest in politics, their confidence in democratic institutions, and opinions regarding how well democracy functions in Mongolia are issues that have been considered since the beginning of Sant Maral Foundation's research. This section will analyse whether there is a noticeable difference between the opinions of people with personal experience of the socialist system before 1989, the transformation that followed, or the later period when a political system other than democracy is only history. Do generations that were instrumental in shaping the new political system have a different appreciation of democracy from those who take democratic values for granted?

#### **Interest in Politics**

Data from the Sant Maral Foundation demonstrates a steady increase of interest in politics among respondents in the polls from 1995 until about 2009. There were some upward and downward trends during those years, but 2008-2009 was the first strong rise followed by a sharp drop in people's interest in politics (see: Table 10-70, Table 10-71 and Figure 10-30)<sup>40</sup>.

These deviations from the general trend in 2008-2009 are without a doubt due to the unprecedented incidents of violence during the 2008 parliamentary elections. No other election ever raised that much interest, and after 2009 the general level of interest dropped again to the levels observed before (years with parliamentary elections are marked in the tables below; presidential elections were always held one year after parliamentary elections).

The older generations do generally show a stronger interest in politics than the younger groups in society. Interest in politics among the younger groups does, however, increase, as they grow older. Interest in politics appears to be strongest between the two groups of respondents who were 40 years or older when Mongolia's peaceful revolution took place in 1989-1990.

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<sup>40</sup> Tables are sometimes divided where data is available from more than two decades. This is done only to fit the data into the format of this publication and is without reference to specific events or periods, unless otherwise specified in the tables.

Table 10-70: People expressing the opinion to be “very much interested” or “rather interested” in politics (1995-2005)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	19.4%	22.0%	31.5%	29.1%	28.2%	27.5%	25.3%	25.9%	26.3%	25.6%	25.6%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	20.7%	25.0%	26.3%	26.3%	29.2%	25.6%	25.5%	27.5%	28.8%	24.7%	25.6%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	21.9%	29.8%	29.0%	31.6%	34.8%	33.3%	30.3%	29.9%	31.2%	33.1%	33.5%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	32.2%	34.4%	32.7%	33.7%	36.2%	33.8%	31.6%	34.9%	40.8%	38.3%	37.1%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	32.0%	29.4%	31.4%	33.1%	36.6%	33.3%	42.0%	44.7%	45.4%	38.8%	48.2%


Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

Table 10-71: People expressing the opinion to be “very much interested” or “rather interested” in politics (2006-2016)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	36.9%	21.4%	37.3%	40.5%	37.8%	28.0%	26.8%	30.7%	32.2%	28.1%	23.6%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	28.2%	22.8%	40.0%	42.4%	38.7%	29.4%	24.8%	25.6%	31.4%	25.8%	32.2%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	27.7%	29.7%	40.7%	47.8%	35.5%	34.4%	28.2%	32.3%	29.5%	29.8%	33.6%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	37.5%	34.6%	51.6%	49.2%	38.8%	41.0%	30.3%	34.8%	39.3%	36.4%	41.0%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	40.9%	39.0%	48.3%	50.0%	43.3%	41.6%	33.4%	39.2%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	41.9%	43.1%	42.6%	47.0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Figure 10-30: People expressing the opinion to be “very much interested” or “rather interested” in politics



### Voters’ Influence

Approximately 50 per cent of all people believe that voters have a “very strong” or “rather strong” influence. Long-term observations show that these percentage shares are normally somewhat higher in years when parliamentary elections are held than in others (see: Table 10-72, Table 10-73). There is, however, a strong downward trend after 2013, leading to the lowest ever percentage share in 2016.

The Figures that follow compare the overall average opinion on voters’ influence with the opinions from each age group. There are only slight differences, and none of the groups has an exceptionally higher or lower opinion regarding voters’ influence. However, Age Groups 2 and 6 tend to have more positive outlooks, while Age Group 4 is slightly more negative than the average.

Table 10-72: People expressing the opinion that voters have a “very strong” or “rather strong” influence (1995-2005)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	47.0%	53.9%	49.0%	40.7%	42.0%	50.1%	54.2%	50.7%	50.4%	57.4%	46.2%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	36.4%	47.9%	50.3%	36.5%	34.6%	44.7%	48.7%	48.0%	45.8%	53.2%	39.0%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	32.1%	45.1%	46.9%	35.5%	30.9%	45.6%	49.8%	45.8%	47.4%	55.0%	43.9%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	37.5%	45.9%	41.8%	38.7%	32.3%	47.9%	52.8%	52.7%	55.8%	56.2%	41.1%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	41.8%	55.3%	52.0%	35.8%	43.7%	53.6%	59.7%	55.1%	56.0%	58.8%	51.4%
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	38.1%	48.8%	48.6%	37.6%	36.8%	47.4%	51.7%	49.3%	49.2%	55.6%	43.3%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

Table 10-73: People expressing the opinion that voters have a “very strong” or “rather strong” influence (2006-2016)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	45.9%	42.4%	47.9%	52.6%	52.2%	59.0%	59.3%	56.6%	54.9%	45.5%	39.7%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	44.2%	45.8%	54.2%	49.2%	48.3%	52.1%	59.2%	59.2%	55.6%	45.1%	34.6%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	41.0%	43.8%	54.0%	51.6%	45.7%	56.8%	63.2%	65.2%	56.8%	46.9%	30.6%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	42.1%	45.8%	51.4%	54.5%	56.3%	46.4%	59.9%	62.8%	52.5%	40.9%	36.7%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	44.7%	50.5%	56.7%	57.5%	43.2%	55.4%	67.4%	69.0%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	49.5%	57.7%	60.7%	52.1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	43.1%	45.7%	53.7%	51.9%	49.3%	54.0%	61.0%	61.6%	55.8%	45.9%	35.6%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016



Figure 10-31: Opinions of different groups regarding voters' influence, average shown by dot line (part 1)





Figure 10-32: Opinions of different groups regarding voters' influence, average shown by dot line (part 2)



## Satisfaction with Democracy in general and Present Political System

People's satisfaction with democracy in general and Mongolia's political system in particular has varied widely during the period under observation<sup>41</sup>. Generally, the trend is positive from 1995 until 2008-2009, with only a few years in between where results were negative. However, after 2009 there is a definite change in this trend, and respondents grew increasingly dissatisfied with the political system (see: Table 10-74 and Table 10-75).

Table 10-74: People expressing satisfaction with democracy and Mongolia's political system (1995-2005)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	42,7%	56,1%	56,4%	36,0%	26,7%	41,3%	52,7%	46,2%	48,8%	53,6%	37,9%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	37,3%	56,3%	59,5%	36,1%	26,4%	40,9%	54,2%	50,1%	49,0%	54,6%	37,9%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	35,8%	57,0%	59,6%	35,3%	25,5%	45,5%	56,1%	53,3%	60,6%	63,8%	47,3%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	35,9%	59,5%	48,7%	33,6%	31,6%	45,7%	60,1%	61,4%	62,0%	69,5%	51,2%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	34,2%	60,7%	50,3%	33,8%	23,8%	45,8%	63,0%	64,0%	74,5%	66,2%	55,0%
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	37,4%	57,2%	56,8%	35,4%	26,6%	42,8%	55,1%	51,1%	53,0%	57,7%	41,0%

Source: SMF data base 1995-2005

41 The question: "How much are you satisfied with the Democracy and present political system?" was included in polls since 1995 but different wordings were used for the answer options in the questionnaires:

Response options in questionnaires 1995-2007

- very satisfied
- satisfied
- not satisfied
- totally unsatisfied

Response options in questionnaires 2008-2016

- satisfied
- rather satisfied
- rather not satisfied
- not satisfied

For this comparison, only the term "satisfied" is used, but it includes responses "very satisfied" and "satisfied" from 1995-2007 polls, as well as "satisfied" and "rather satisfied" from 2008-2016 polls.

Table 10-75: People expressing satisfaction with democracy and Mongolia’s political system (2006-2016)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	33,1%	31,1%	71,0%	71,3%	64,0%	61,8%	62,3%	74,1%	62,2%	56,9%	52,7%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	34,3%	36,1%	70,6%	69,4%	61,6%	61,3%	59,5%	65,0%	60,2%	52,2%	50,9%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	33,8%	39,7%	71,5%	73,4%	60,8%	62,8%	58,8%	66,1%	62,3%	55,8%	43,2%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	40,4%	42,1%	71,0%	76,5%	62,6%	61,6%	58,7%	69,8%	65,7%	46,0%	47,4%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	39,3%	52,2%	79,6%	70,8%	69,1%	66,2%	64,3%	63,9%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	60,7%	53,7%	70,5%	75,0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	36,4%	39,4%	71,8%	72,1%	62,9%	62,4%	60,5%	67,6%	62,5%	53,3%	49,3%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

When comparing the opinions of each age group with the average, only slight variations appear. Even when major changes occurred in the general trend, all age groups followed in a very similar manner.

Age Groups 5 and 6 (all people born 1950 or earlier) were slightly more satisfied with the political system than other groups. These people belong to the generation with living experience of the previous political system, and they showed a preference for democracy based on their experiences.

Figure 10-33: Satisfaction of different age groups with Mongolia’s political system, average shown by dot line (part 1)





Figure 10-34: Satisfaction of different age groups with Mongolia’s political system, average shown by dot line (part 2)



## Spectrum of Democracy and Dictatorship

Since 2008, the polls have included a question on people’s opinions of whether Mongolia had already developed a democratic system, was still in the process of development or was developing in the opposite direction, towards a dictatorship. The question was phrased: “Some people think that there is too much democracy in Mongolia and that a dictatorship would make things better. Others think that we have a kind of dictatorship with no real democratic values. In your opinion, where does Mongolia belong on the spectrum?” The responses are shown in Table 10-76.


Table 10-76: Opinions regarding the level of democracy in Mongolia (responses of all age groups)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
We have a developed democracy	14.5%	13.7%	13.2%	9.8%	13.7%	4.9%	11.2%	5.4%	8.4%
We are still developing democracy	30.3%	27.8%	27.6%	27.6%	25.2%	31.8%	30.8%	26.0%	31.5%
We are at crossroads	32.9%	34.2%	35.3%	39.9%	33.0%	36.4%	31.6%	41.9%	33.8%
We are changing to a dictatorship	18.0%	18.8%	18.0%	16.8%	20.7%	22.0%	21.1%	22.1%	22.4%
We are too dictatorial	4.3%	5.5%	6.0%	5.8%	7.4%	4.8%	5.3%	4.6%	3.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Two aspects from these responses are significant over the 2008-2016 period—the number of people who believe that Mongolia has a developed democratic system diminishes while the number of people who think that the system is changing to a dictatorship grows. In fact, more than 20 years after Mongolia’s peaceful revolution there are considerably more people who believe that the country is developing into a dictatorship than there are those who think that a democratic system has been established (see: Figure 10-35).

Figure 10-35: Opinions regarding the level of democracy in Mongolia (selected aspects of all age groups)



When comparing the opinions of people who belong to different generations, each age group has very different perception. Many more people from the older generation regard Mongolia's political system as a developed democracy than the younger generation. The younger age groups see much more danger of the country developing into a dictatorship.

The combined responses of polls conducted in 2008-2016 show the following results:

Table 10-77: Opinions of different age groups regarding the level of democracy in Mongolia (summary of responses 2008-2016)

	Group 1 (born after 1986)	Group 2 (born 1973-1986)	Group 3 (born 1961-1972)	Group 4 (born 1951-1960)	Group 5 (born 1941-1950)	Group 6 (born before 1941)	Total
We have a developed democracy	11.0%	10.8%	11.6%	12.0%	14.1%	15.6%	11.6%
We are still developing democracy	32.1%	28.0%	27.4%	25.4%	26.0%	30.7%	28.0%
We are at crossroads	34.3%	35.0%	33.9%	33.6%	36.6%	36.8%	34.6%
We are changing to a dictatorship	18.1%	20.4%	21.0%	22.4%	18.1%	12.4%	20.0%
We are too dictatorial	4.6%	5.8%	6.1%	6.7%	5.3%	4.6%	5.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016



The more positive perspective of older people is also shown in the year-by-year analysis (see: Figures, below). The differences of opinions are especially distinct in the 2008-2010, when the full data from the oldest age group (born before 1941) is available. In 2011-2016, this age group is not represented enough for a sufficient sample for analysis.

It can be concluded from the available data that people who were 40 years or older at the beginning of Mongolia’s transition to democracy see its development since then much more positively than the younger age groups.

Figure 10-36: Opinions of Age Group 1 (born after 1986) regarding the level of democracy in Mongolia (selected aspects)




Figure 10-37: Opinions of Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986) regarding the level of democracy in Mongolia (selected aspects)




Figure 10-38: Opinions of Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972) regarding the level of democracy in Mongolia (selected aspects)




Figure 10-39: Opinions of Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960) regarding the level of democracy in Mongolia (selected aspects)




Figure 10-40: Opinions of Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950) regarding the level of democracy in Mongolia (selected aspects)





Figure 10-41: Opinions of Age Group 6 (born before 1941) regarding the level of democracy in Mongolia (selected aspects)



### Confidence in Political Institutions

Using survey data from 1997 onwards, this subsection of the analysis will study people’s confidence in the parliament, judiciary, government, and political parties. The analysis is restricted to a few select indicators for each of these political institutions in order to show only a limited number of examples.

#### A) Confidence in Parliament

Confidence in parliament was at its lowest point in 1999, towards the end of the Democratic Union Coalition’s term of office. It is remarkable that when the people’s confidence collapsed in 1997-1999, it happened simultaneously in all age groups. Confidence levels grew in all age groups after the 2000 elections, which brought the old MPRP back to power.

These observations can be interpreted in two ways: a) the obvious interpretation would be that people were not satisfied with events after the Democratic Union Coalition obtained a majority in parliament. This is also obvious from the fact that the MPRP returned to power in the next election; b) another interpretation is that people’s confidence in the parliamentary system grew considerably after they experienced how their votes led to their intended change of power. Simply put: they experienced the power of the ballot.

It may speak for the second interpretation that confidence in the parliamentary system became much stronger among the older generation (people born before 1950) after 2000. This level of confidence has remained very high among these people ever since. It is this gen-

eration who experienced the old socialist system for many decades that seems to appreciate the new democratic parliamentary system most and has maintained faith in it.

All other age groups follow a similar pattern of ups and downs that may be caused by political events, but these swings are unlikely to be a question of difference between generations.

Table 10-78: People’s confidence in parliament; only responses “very confident” or “rather confident” (1997-2006)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39.0%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	55.4%	42.0%	23.4%	43.3%	58.8%	52.4%	52.3%	57.9%	47.1%	40.5%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	57.3%	36.0%	21.7%	38.0%	59.3%	49.7%	49.8%	53.8%	47.1%	41.3%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	50.0%	37.3%	18.6%	44.2%	64.7%	57.0%	58.9%	64.0%	52.2%	49.0%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	55.1%	37.2%	23.8%	45.1%	66.1%	73.1%	68.0%	74.1%	58.1%	53.4%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	55.6%	36.0%	17.9%	52.7%	76.5%	73.9%	80.2%	75.1%	70.8%	68.6%
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	55.1%	38.0%	21.7%	42.5%	61.8%	55.3%	55.1%	60.0%	49.5%	43.9%


Source: SMF data base 1997-2006

Table 10-79: People’s confidence in parliament; only responses “very confident” or “rather confident” (2007-2016)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	31.9%	61.8%	65.1%	51.6%	47.1%	48.8%	48.4%	47.6%	35.5%	45.4%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	36.3%	60.3%	58.6%	47.9%	43.0%	45.6%	41.1%	44.3%	38.3%	38.0%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	35.4%	61.5%	62.9%	48.9%	50.8%	44.1%	47.9%	45.9%	31.2%	44.2%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	39.0%	61.6%	60.7%	48.0%	49.6%	45.3%	50.0%	48.0%	32.2%	45.5%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	47.2%	69.4%	71.6%	51.7%	54.7%	54.2%	54.0%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	50.0%	83.4%	72.4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	37.3%	62.8%	62.5%	49.8%	48.6%	46.5%	47.0%	46.9%	34.3%	43.2%

Source: SMF data base 2007-2016

Figure 10-42: People’s confidence in parliament; only responses “very confident” or “rather confident”



**B) Confidence in Judiciary**

In 1997-2007, no more than 30 per cent of people ever said that they were “very confident” or “rather confident” in the judicial system. In 2008 and the following decade, confidence was much higher (see: Table 10-80 and Table 10-81).

The lack of confidence in the judicial system in 1997-2007 becomes very apparent when comparing these with confidence in parliament (see: Subsection A, above) and government (see: Subsection C, below). Only political parties were perceived less confidently than the judiciary (see: Subsection D, below).

The comparison in Figure 10-43 shows that only the people in Age Group 6 have a slightly more positive view. All other generations are similar in their lack of confidence in the judiciary.

Table 10-80: People’s confidence in judiciary; only responses “very confident” or “rather confident” (1997-2006)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28.9%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	34.9%	33.5%	29.9%	33.8%	28.0%	31.2%	30.2%	32.7%	26.0%	25.0%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	28.5%	27.8%	25.4%	26.6%	25.1%	26.2%	25.9%	25.4%	20.8%	22.5%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	30.4%	25.8%	24.4%	25.1%	26.4%	27.9%	30.5%	29.7%	20.5%	18.5%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	20.7%	25.5%	19.5%	24.5%	24.9%	31.1%	30.5%	27.5%	17.3%	27.7%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	20.5%	30.4%	25.7%	31.8%	41.5%	29.8%	40.9%	42.2%	24.2%	33.7%
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	29.3%	29.0%	26.2%	28.7%	27.4%	28.9%	29.4%	30.1%	23.0%	23.9%


Source: SMF data base 1997-2006

Table 10-81: People’s confidence in judiciary; only responses “very confident” or “rather confident” (2007-2016)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	28.5%	49.4%	53.7%	42.1%	40.3%	47.8%	42.9%	49.3%	49.6%	60.2%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	23.0%	46.6%	41.9%	39.8%	37.0%	42.0%	40.8%	43.0%	49.7%	54.3%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	23.6%	45.7%	42.3%	43.5%	43.8%	39.6%	38.9%	40.4%	42.8%	49.3%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	24.0%	45.3%	40.2%	38.4%	44.0%	38.8%	36.5%	39.4%	44.1%	59.5%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	24.4%	51.3%	51.6%	35.3%	35.2%	43.8%	45.5%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	32.6%	66.3%	53.3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	24.0%	47.7%	44.3%	41.5%	40.7%	42.2%	40.5%	43.6%	46.7%	56.1%

Source: SMF data base 2007-2016

Figure 10-43: People’s confidence in judiciary; only responses “very confident” or “rather confident”



**C) Confidence in Government**

People’s confidence in government was measured by responses to the statement: “In principle, you can trust that the government is doing the right things for citizens”. In the first decade of observations, about two-thirds of all people had “fully approved” or “rather approved” of this statement. This picture changed in later recent years. By 2016, only about a third of all respondents shared this opinion.

Like in many other aspects, the older people (born before 1950) have a more positive opinion than the younger. The question of confidence in government once more shows a very strong correlation to age—the younger the people, the less confidence they have in government.



Table 10-82: Respondents who “fully approve” or “rather approve” the statement: “In principal you can trust that the government is doing the right things for citizens” (1997-2006)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51.6%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	66.3%	56.6%	41.9%	59.8%	68.9%	65.6%	68.5%	69.9%	57.8%	54.2%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	68.3%	55.9%	44.0%	58.8%	66.8%	64.5%	67.0%	68.0%	62.2%	55.0%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	70.5%	54.7%	44.1%	65.0%	70.7%	68.7%	73.7%	73.4%	67.8%	66.7%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	59.2%	51.4%	46.7%	66.6%	74.4%	80.2%	79.8%	83.2%	73.8%	65.8%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	60.6%	56.9%	47.8%	69.3%	80.8%	76.3%	82.8%	83.1%	80.9%	76.5%
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	66.4%	55.4%	43.8%	61.8%	69.7%	67.7%	70.4%	71.7%	62.8%	57.9%


Source: SMF data base 1997-2006

Table 10-83: Respondents who “fully approve” or “rather approve” the statement: “In principal you can trust that the government is doing the right things for citizens” (2007-2016)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	41.0%	49.4%	50.9%	45.7%	50.0%	54.2%	54.0%	52.9%	42.3%	35.5%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	57.1%	54.5%	52.4%	47.3%	50.9%	51.9%	56.1%	49.4%	42.5%	38.0%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	61.3%	54.6%	56.9%	48.2%	54.7%	51.9%	58.8%	56.8%	43.6%	34.5%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	68.4%	56.6%	58.7%	53.1%	48.1%	57.9%	62.0%	63.4%	48.5%	47.2%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	77.6%	66.8%	65.9%	54.2%	55.9%	64.7%	57.1%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	80.4%	67.7%	64.8%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	61.1%	56.2%	56.1%	49.4%	52.1%	54.4%	57.5%	55.4%	44.2%	37.6%

Source: SMF data base 2007-2016

Figure 10-44: Respondents who “fully approve” or “rather approve” the statement: “In principal you can trust that the government is doing the right things for citizens”




People’s confidence in state organisations generally relates to confidence in government, as seen in responses in 1997-2007 (see: Table 10-84). It is once more confirmed that older people have greater confidence in the state.

Table 10-84: People’s confidence in state organisations; only responses “confident” or “rather confident”

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33.4%	38.2%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	42.7%	37.8%	35.2%	38.5%	39.9%	42.7%	39.9%	42.1%	30.3%	33.0%	34.9%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	38.7%	30.9%	30.0%	34.8%	38.1%	36.8%	39.9%	36.6%	28.9%	29.0%	37.2%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	40.9%	36.3%	25.5%	38.4%	45.0%	37.0%	44.6%	43.2%	29.8%	32.0%	35.9%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	36.0%	31.1%	26.5%	34.6%	42.7%	42.7%	44.6%	43.3%	28.9%	33.2%	39.3%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	47.2%	31.9%	25.5%	41.3%	50.3%	47.5%	57.9%	51.4%	43.5%	43.1%	44.5%
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	40.8%	33.9%	30.5%	37.0%	41.0%	39.9%	41.8%	41.2%	30.3%	31.9%	36.5%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2007

Figure 10-45: People’s confidence in state organisations; only responses “confident” or “rather confident”




SMF polls recorded opinions on governing administrations from 2008 with the question: “How confident are you in government administration?” People’s responses to this question are shown in Table 10-85.

Table 10-85: People’s confidence in government administration; only responses “very confident” or “rather confident”

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	65.9%	71.1%	60.9%	60.9%	67.8%	61.1%	69.7%	61.0%	73.3%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	61.1%	66.8%	62.1%	61.5%	64.7%	64.9%	62.9%	66.8%	72.8%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	61.7%	64.8%	62.5%	61.9%	64.3%	65.2%	66.7%	66.6%	71.7%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	66.0%	61.3%	56.2%	62.2%	65.2%	63.8%	72.6%	64.2%	79.0%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	72.5%	80.2%	64.4%	68.9%	75.0%	74.3%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	77.0%	75.6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	64.2%	67.4%	62.2%	62.8%	66.4%	65.3%	68.1%	65.5%	74.2%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Figure 10-46: People’s confidence in government administration; only responses “very confident” or “rather confident”



Comparing the three indicators shown above demonstrates that people’s trust in the government “doing the right things for citizens” is higher than the confidence in state organisations in general. And when asked directly whether people have confidence in the government administration, their positive responses were very stable in the later years of the 2008-2016 period (see Table 10-86 and Figure 10-47).


Table 10-86: Comparison of three indicators related to people’s confidence in government and state organisations

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
In principal you can trust that the government is doing the right things for citizens	66.4%	55.4%	43.8%	61.8%	69.7%	67.7%	70.4%	71.7%	62.8%	57.9%
People’s confidence in state organisations	40.8%	33.9%	30.5%	37.0%	41.0%	39.9%	41.8%	41.2%	30.3%	31.9%
People’s confidence in government administration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
In principal you can trust that the government is doing the right things for citizens	61.1%	56.2%	56.1%	49.4%	52.1%	54.4%	57.5%	55.4%	44.2%	37.6%
People's confidence in state organisations	36.5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
People's confidence in government administration	-	64.2%	67.4%	62.2%	62.8%	66.4%	65.3%	68.1%	65.5%	74.2%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Figure 10-47: Comparison of three indicators related to people's confidence in government and state organisations



#### D) Confidence in Political Parties

Of all political institutions, parties have the worst image. Only a relatively small group of people believe that political parties represent public opinion (between 10 and 25 per cent; see Table 10-87 and Table 10-88). And once more the data shows a direct correlation between age and confidence. Older people are more convinced that political parties represent public opinion than young people.

Table 10-87: Respondents who think that political parties represent public opinion (1997-2006)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.1%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	19.5%	14.9%	11.7%	16.2%	20.5%	21.0%	20.2%	22.2%	15.6%	16.8%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	22.7%	15.5%	9.1%	17.3%	22.1%	21.5%	25.3%	24.3%	17.0%	20.0%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	24.7%	15.1%	10.3%	18.7%	25.0%	26.8%	27.3%	31.7%	21.9%	28.0%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	22.2%	18.8%	17.6%	23.6%	34.3%	32.0%	34.5%	42.1%	21.0%	29.4%
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	28.3%	21.3%	17.9%	25.0%	41.2%	37.8%	39.9%	42.5%	29.6%	39.8%
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	22.6%	16.1%	11.7%	18.4%	24.3%	24.0%	25.0%	27.2%	17.8%	21.0%


Source: SMF data base 1997-2006

Table 10-88: Respondents who think that political parties represent public opinion (2007-2016)

	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Gr. 1</b> born after 1986	8.5%	18.4%	28.1%	22.6%	19.1%	23.2%	20.8%	19.6%	16.7%	17.0%
<b>Gr. 2</b> born 1973-1986	16.8%	23.6%	22.2%	21.5%	19.3%	21.0%	19.6%	19.7%	21.7%	14.1%
<b>Gr. 3</b> born 1961-1972	21.4%	25.1%	26.9%	21.8%	20.8%	21.4%	25.0%	22.3%	22.6%	12.2%
<b>Gr. 4</b> born 1951-1960	26.1%	26.1%	25.0%	21.2%	22.7%	20.9%	20.6%	27.4%	20.5%	17.3%
<b>Gr. 5</b> born 1941-1950	30.3%	30.3%	31.2%	25.3%	26.0%	29.2%	28.9%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6</b> born before 1941	29.9%	31.1%	33.3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b> (all six groups combined)	20.4%	24.9%	25.8%	22.6%	20.8%	22.4%	22.5%	22.4%	20.5%	15.0%

Source: SMF data base 2007-2016

Figure 10-48: Respondents who think that political parties represent public opinion




An additional question testing people’s confidence in political parties was introduced in 2008. People were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement: “The two large political parties, the MPP and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest”. The results are shown in the tables below:

Table 10-89: Respondents who agree with the statement: “The two large political parties, the MPP and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest”

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1, born after 1986</b>	48.0%	47.9%	57.2%	54.2%	59.5%	47.5%	52.9%	56.6%	51.7%
<b>Gr. 2, born 1973-1986</b>	45.6%	51.1%	63.9%	59.7%	63.0%	57.6%	55.9%	56.6%	58.8%
<b>Gr. 3, born 1961-1972</b>	45.9%	47.3%	59.7%	53.1%	65.0%	62.3%	56.4%	62.7%	63.8%
<b>Gr. 4, born 1951-1960</b>	42.8%	48.8%	63.7%	56.7%	67.7%	65.6%	55.9%	62.3%	62.0%
<b>Gr. 5, born 1941-1950</b>	44.6%	47.7%	67.7%	51.9%	61.7%	51.7%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6, born before 1941</b>	36.9%	54.7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total (all six groups combined)</b>	45.0%	49.3%	61.5%	55.9%	63.1%	57.3%	55.4%	58.5%	57.9%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Figure 10-49: Respondents who agree with the statement: “The two large political parties, the MPP and DP, are the same when it comes to self-interest”



A similar response to the previous question was received from the statement: “No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same”.


Table 10-90: Respondents who agree with the statement: “No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same”

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1, born after 1986</b>	50.0%	56.6%	53.8%	46.6%	56.2%	50.7%	55.6%	62.5%	59.3%
<b>Gr. 2, born 1973-1986</b>	56.6%	60.2%	57.6%	51.6%	62.1%	60.6%	56.9%	58.7%	64.7%
<b>Gr. 3, born 1961-1972</b>	58.5%	60.8%	61.8%	48.1%	63.7%	56.0%	62.8%	60.3%	69.3%
<b>Gr. 4, born 1951-1960</b>	55.1%	66.8%	62.6%	52.5%	67.0%	64.9%	61.5%	70.2%	68.0%
<b>Gr. 5, born 1941-1950</b>	61.0%	69.8%	63.3%	40.3%	60.9%	57.0%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6, born before 1941</b>	47.6%	68.4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total (all six groups combined)</b>	56.4%	62.1%	59.7%	49.4%	62.1%	57.8%	58.8%	60.6%	63.9%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016



Figure 10-50: Respondents who agree with the statement: “No matter who governs the country, circumstances for the common citizen will remain the same”




### 10.3.6 Changing Preferences Regarding Foreign Relations

Responses to the question “Which country is the best partner for Mongolia?” show some very clear preferences for Mongolia’s Northern neighbour. Over whole period 1997 through 2016 the most popular countries were<sup>42</sup>:

Russia.....	42.6%
USA .....	16.4%
China.....	13.0%
Japan.....	12.1%
South Korea.....	6.7%
Western countries (other than USA).....	6.5%
Other countries.....	2.7%

42 The analysis is based on multiple response questions; each respondent could name up to two countries. All percentages in tables and figures in this sub-section 10.3.6 are based on responses.

Figure 10-2: Preferred foreign partner countries named by respondents (all responses, 1997-2016)



When the poll results are observed in some more detail over time, we find very different trends with respect to the various countries:

- Russia has gained strongly over the past two decades and is with a great distance to other countries considered the most suitable partner for Mongolia (popularity rose from 32 per cent in 1997 to 48 per cent in 2016);
- China was regarded best partner by less than 5 per cent in 1997, but this figure more than tripled to nearly 16 per cent in 2016. This now makes China second on the list of most suitable partners;
- The popularity of the USA dropped to half from 21 per cent in 1997 to 10 per cent in 2016;
- Western countries (other than USA) lost support very quickly in the initial years of the transition; they fell from 22 per cent in 1997 to 3 per cent in 2001 and then remained around 5 per cent;
- Japan was considered a better partner than China for a long time, but lost this position in 2009; it was, however, the increasing support for China and not so much the loss of support for Japan that led to this change; in 1997, Japan's naming a best partner was around 15 per cent, in 2016 close to 12 per cent;
- South Korea was not considered a suitable partner by many people in 1997 but gradually was viewed more positively.

The following tables and Figure below show these trends in more detail.

Table 10-91: Preferred foreign partner countries named by respondents (all age groups, 1997-2006)

	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Russia	32.2%	40.0%	35.7%	45.7%	42.9%	36.3%	35.8%	38.9%	36.3%	32.7%
China	4.4%	8.6%	8.0%	9.6%	8.2%	9.8%	10.8%	12.4%	9.5%	9.6%
USA	21.1%	17.7%	17.1%	16.2%	17.5%	20.6%	19.0%	18.4%	23.7%	24.2%
Western countries	21.9%	20.4%	18.1%	5.9%	3.1%	4.6%	4.9%	4.2%	4.9%	4.0%
Japan	14.8%	7.8%	15.9%	14.8%	15.8%	19.1%	19.2%	15.6%	16.4%	18.1%
South Korea	3.9%	1.5%	3.7%	2.3%	7.1%	7.6%	8.8%	8.4%	7.6%	9.1%


Source: SMF data base 1997-2006

Table 10-92: Preferred foreign partner countries named by respondents (all age groups, 2007-2016)

	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Russia	33.6%	38.2%	42.2%	44.8%	41.1%	40.9%	42.1%	45.7%	48.0%	48.3%
China	10.4%	11.7%	13.9%	12.4%	11.9%	11.7%	13.9%	14.2%	16.5%	15.8%
USA	23.7%	19.7%	18.6%	17.3%	17.2%	17.1%	15.3%	14.1%	10.8%	10.2%
Western countries	4.3%	6.9%	4.7%	7.4%	6.6%	7.3%	6.5%	5.2%	4.6%	6.4%
Japan	17.4%	13.8%	11.2%	9.6%	12.1%	12.4%	13.2%	12.1%	13.1%	11.7%
South Korea	7.8%	7.8%	7.1%	6.0%	7.0%	6.5%	5.9%	7.1%	5.6%	6.7%

Source: SMF data base 2007-2016

Figure 10-51: Preferred foreign partner countries named by respondents of all age groups




There are considerable differences in opinions between young and old people when it comes to what countries they judge as suitable partner countries. Below are Figures demonstrating how well each age group regards relations between Mongolia and each country.

## Russia

Russia is clearly the favourite of the older generations. The younger respondents have lower regard for Russia as the best partner. Nevertheless, percentages increase for each age group.


Figure 10-52: Respondents in different age groups naming Russia as one of their favourite foreign partner countries



## China

Like Russia, China is more popular among old people than the younger generation. The views of the different generations are, however, much closer in this case. Each generation seems to soften its stance on China over time as it gains in popularity.

Figure 10-53: Respondents in different age groups naming China as one of their favourite foreign partner countries



## USA and (other) Western countries

The views of the old and young generations divert toward opposite directions when the USA and other Western countries are considered. Young people clearly see the USA as a more suitable partner for Mongolia than older respondents.

Despite this trend, the USA and other Western nations are failing to win over younger groups in Mongolian society. The number of people who see the USA as the most suitable partner declines for every group.

Figure 10-54: Respondents in different age groups naming the USA as one of their favourite foreign partner countries





Figure 10-55: Respondents in different age groups naming Western countries (other than USA) as their favourite foreign partner countries





## Japan and South Korea

Japan and South Korea are also more popular among the young than the old. The general trend, however, is rather similar in all age groups.

Figure 10-56: Respondents in different age groups naming Japan as one of their favourite foreign partner countries





Figure 10-57: Respondents in different age groups naming South Korea as one of their favourite foreign partner countries



In addition to the analysis above are tables and Figures, below, with data from each age group, separately without any further comments.


## Age Group 1 (born after 1986): Preferred Foreign Partner Country

Table 10-93: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 1 (born after 1986)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Russia	22.8%	28.2%	27.0%	32.6%	37.7%	32.8%	32.0%	34.0%	38.5%	37.5%	40.2%
China	4.3%	4.5%	11.9%	10.8%	7.4%	9.5%	7.4%	7.1%	8.7%	11.8%	9.5%
USA	31.5%	27.7%	25.2%	22.9%	22.0%	21.2%	23.5%	22.1%	19.2%	16.4%	15.0%
Western countries	6.8%	9.1%	6.5%	7.4%	10.9%	9.5%	9.5%	10.5%	6.4%	7.9%	9.2%
Japan	19.1%	17.3%	16.9%	12.2%	13.4%	11.6%	13.7%	14.0%	15.1%	17.5%	16.7%
South Korea	11.7%	10.5%	10.1%	9.6%	7.6%	6.3%	8.4%	6.9%	9.4%	7.9%	8.3%

Source: SMF data base 2006-2016

Figure 10-58: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 1 (born after 1986)




## Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986): Preferred Foreign Partner Countries

Table 10-94: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Russia	22.8%	28.7%	28.8%	40.4%	35.5%	30.7%	31.0%	33.4%	31.1%	26.5%
China	4.3%	5.1%	4.8%	7.2%	5.9%	7.3%	8.0%	10.8%	7.9%	7.2%
USA	26.0%	21.5%	21.8%	19.5%	19.9%	23.2%	22.1%	20.9%	25.6%	27.5%
Western countries	23.1%	30.8%	21.8%	8.0%	4.3%	6.1%	5.4%	5.1%	6.2%	5.0%
Japan	16.5%	7.7%	17.0%	15.8%	19.5%	21.4%	21.3%	16.7%	17.1%	20.1%
South Korea	4.6%	2.1%	4.6%	3.5%	9.0%	8.8%	10.8%	10.7%	9.7%	11.2%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Russia	29.4%	34.0%	39.6%	42.1%	39.1%	37.2%	37.9%	42.0%	45.4%	47.3%
China	8.5%	9.4%	10.3%	11.5%	7.6%	9.4%	10.5%	11.9%	14.1%	14.7%
USA	26.1%	22.4%	20.5%	18.9%	21.1%	19.5%	17.5%	16.9%	12.8%	10.6%
Western countries	5.6%	8.0%	6.1%	7.6%	8.0%	8.2%	8.0%	5.9%	5.3%	7.1%
Japan	18.6%	15.6%	12.4%	10.3%	13.5%	13.2%	16.0%	13.2%	14.1%	11.5%
South Korea	9.1%	8.3%	8.1%	6.4%	7.1%	7.4%	6.7%	8.4%	6.1%	7.9%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Figure 10-59: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 2 (born 1973-1986)




## Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972): Preferred Foreign Partner Countries

Table 10-95: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Russia	31.1%	40.1%	36.0%	45.2%	45.7%	36.9%	36.8%	41.3%	38.3%	34.2%
China	3.5%	7.9%	8.1%	9.2%	8.6%	9.7%	11.1%	11.0%	9.5%	9.9%
USA	21.2%	19.4%	16.3%	17.4%	16.4%	20.9%	18.8%	18.1%	24.5%	23.2%
Western countries	24.7%	20.5%	18.8%	6.3%	3.4%	4.0%	5.1%	4.2%	3.9%	3.6%
Japan	14.0%	7.6%	15.3%	14.5%	13.2%	18.9%	18.3%	15.8%	15.9%	17.2%
South Korea	3.9%	.9%	3.8%	1.8%	7.6%	7.8%	8.4%	7.8%	6.5%	9.6%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Russia	35.2%	39.3%	42.6%	44.0%	39.9%	42.9%	44.3%	47.3%	50.1%	52.8%
China	9.8%	11.5%	14.5%	12.4%	15.1%	11.7%	15.3%	13.4%	19.5%	18.4%
USA	23.4%	19.6%	18.3%	18.4%	14.8%	16.9%	12.6%	13.4%	7.9%	8.6%
Western countries	3.0%	6.1%	4.4%	7.1%	5.9%	6.6%	6.0%	4.8%	2.9%	3.9%
Japan	17.8%	13.5%	11.4%	9.1%	13.7%	11.6%	13.5%	13.2%	13.7%	8.8%
South Korea	7.8%	7.9%	7.4%	6.6%	8.1%	7.2%	5.5%	6.2%	4.4%	5.9%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Figure 10-60: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 3 (born 1961-1972)




## Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960): Preferred Foreign Partner Countries

Table 10-96: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Russia	36.3%	40.8%	43.1%	47.2%	46.6%	38.1%	37.9%	42.0%	40.1%	39.0%
China	5.6%	9.4%	11.2%	11.3%	9.0%	10.0%	12.3%	14.4%	11.3%	12.8%
USA	19.2%	17.3%	10.8%	13.6%	18.7%	19.2%	18.4%	17.4%	21.5%	22.3%
Western countries	19.7%	19.6%	16.5%	4.0%	1.9%	3.9%	4.3%	3.8%	3.9%	2.5%
Japan	12.4%	6.9%	13.5%	14.4%	14.7%	19.3%	18.5%	14.3%	16.6%	15.8%
South Korea	5.1%	1.8%	3.5%	2.0%	4.1%	7.3%	7.4%	6.6%	5.9%	6.5%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Russia	38.0%	41.4%	45.7%	50.8%	46.2%	46.9%	50.0%	50.8%	59.1%	58.1%
China	14.2%	14.0%	18.4%	15.3%	14.8%	15.6%	20.5%	21.0%	19.2%	27.0%
USA	20.7%	14.4%	16.4%	12.4%	11.4%	10.8%	10.2%	8.8%	6.9%	2.8%
Western countries	2.8%	8.8%	2.6%	4.7%	4.3%	6.2%	2.8%	5.0%	2.5%	3.3%
Japan	15.5%	13.0%	10.3%	7.3%	9.5%	13.2%	9.4%	7.6%	6.9%	6.5%
South Korea	5.9%	7.0%	5.9%	5.2%	9.0%	4.5%	5.4%	5.9%	5.4%	1.9%

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Figure 10-61: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 4 (born 1951-1960)



## Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950): Preferred Foreign Partner Countries

Table 10-97: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)


	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Russia	40.9%	50.6%	39.3%	52.8%	48.5%	45.7%	44.7%	45.7%	43.5%	43.8%
China	3.6%	11.3%	12.1%	14.8%	12.3%	15.4%	15.0%	17.8%	10.7%	14.3%
USA	14.6%	12.3%	15.0%	10.0%	12.8%	14.5%	11.8%	15.0%	19.4%	15.2%
Western countries	18.2%	11.9%	12.1%	2.8%	1.5%	3.2%	4.0%	2.2%	4.3%	2.4%
Japan	19.0%	8.1%	17.3%	14.0%	15.3%	14.5%	17.4%	12.6%	13.9%	17.9%
South Korea	1.5%	1.0%	2.3%	1.6%	4.0%	5.1%	5.9%	4.8%	6.1%	3.0%

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Russia	41.1%	49.2%	50.2%	54.0%	53.3%	53.6%	49.8%	-	-	-
China	15.1%	14.9%	19.7%	17.9%	16.8%	21.7%	20.7%	-	-	-
USA	19.4%	14.9%	14.3%	10.3%	13.1%	9.0%	12.8%	-	-	-
Western countries	3.0%	4.6%	1.9%	6.3%	3.7%	4.5%	2.5%	-	-	-
Japan	13.8%	9.0%	7.9%	7.1%	9.3%	7.7%	8.4%	-	-	-
South Korea	4.9%	6.5%	4.4%	2.7%	2.8%	2.5%	4.4%	-	-	-

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Figure 10-62: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 5 (born 1941-1950)




## Age Group 6 (born before 1941): Preferred Foreign Partner Countries

Table 10-98: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 6 (born before 1941)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Russia	44.7%	53.7%	41.6%	55.5%	46.9%	44.5%	44.1%	44.9%	45.8%	41.8%
China	6.8%	15.7%	9.1%	8.8%	10.4%	15.5%	18.3%	16.8%	15.7%	14.1%
USA	17.4%	9.5%	16.2%	13.9%	14.2%	17.2%	10.9%	12.4%	15.1%	19.8%
Western countries	15.9%	5.4%	12.3%	5.1%	1.4%	2.9%	2.9%	2.7%	4.2%	2.8%
Japan	12.9%	10.3%	16.9%	14.6%	14.2%	12.6%	15.2%	14.6%	15.7%	15.8%
South Korea	2.3%	2.5%	2.6%	.7%	8.7%	4.6%	6.0%	6.8%	3.0%	2.8%
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Russia	40.7%	52.6%	52.1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
China	19.3%	16.8%	17.4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
USA	14.7%	15.3%	13.2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Western countries	4.0%	2.9%	3.7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	16.7%	7.3%	8.9%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Korea	2.0%	3.6%	2.1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: SMF data base 1997-2016

Figure 10-63: Foreign countries mentioned as best partner by people in Age Group 6 (born before 1941)



### 10.3.7 Values

The Sant Maral Foundation in 2008-2016 included some questions in its surveys that were directed at identifying certain values. For example, respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement “Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men”. It is assumed that a person who agrees with that statement could be considered as having “traditional” values.

Other questions during this period were directed toward democratic values and how deeply people adopted the basic principles of democracy after the transition period was over. Two of these questions were: “In democracy, not all things go the way one would like, but there is no better state model”; and “Under certain circumstances dictatorship is better than democracy”.

With these three questions the analysis looks to determine if there are differences of opinions between young and old people.

#### ★ “Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men”

There is no clear division between young and old people’s views on this issue. There are differences over time, but not so much between the different age groups.


Table 10-99: Respondents who agree with the statement: “Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men”

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1, born after 1986</b>	25.0%	28.4%	19.1%	12.7%	14.9%	13.3%	12.5%	29.7%	20.1%
<b>Gr. 2, born 1973-1986</b>	26.1%	18.2%	18.8%	12.3%	16.8%	16.7%	12.9%	22.3%	23.9%
<b>Gr. 3, born 1961-1972</b>	25.8%	20.6%	22.5%	15.6%	18.4%	17.9%	16.2%	25.5%	24.5%
<b>Gr. 4, born 1951-1960</b>	27.3%	22.1%	20.8%	15.7%	17.2%	17.6%	24.6%	18.7%	27.0%
<b>Gr. 5, born 1941-1950</b>	21.2%	29.5%	25.5%	11.3%	14.7%	11.2%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6, born before 1941</b>	30.7%	35.6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	25.8%	22.2%	20.8%	13.8%	16.9%	16.1%	16.4%	23.8%	22.8%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016



Figure 10-64: Respondents who agree with the statement: “Women should care for the family and household and leave politics to men”



**★ “In democracy, not all things go the way one would like, but there is no better state model”**


There is strong agreement among all respondents with this statement. It appears that the majority of people in all age groups consider democracy as the best state model. Data for Age Group 6 follows the same trend but may be viewed with some caution because there was only a small number of people from this age group who responded to the polls in the later years of the period under observation.

Table 10-100: Respondents who agree with the statement: “In democracy, not all things go the way one would like, but there is no better state model”

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1, born after 1986</b>	60.2%	60.8%	60.2%	63.3%	62.1%	63.7%	59.4%	59.2%	54.8%
<b>Gr. 2, born 1973-1986</b>	62.0%	60.5%	56.5%	61.5%	64.3%	61.1%	63.1%	56.2%	54.0%
<b>Gr. 3, born 1961-1972</b>	59.1%	61.2%	60.4%	60.9%	69.0%	60.4%	62.3%	55.9%	54.3%
<b>Gr. 4, born 1951-1960</b>	59.2%	57.3%	58.9%	57.9%	67.8%	62.3%	64.2%	60.6%	63.1%
<b>Gr. 5, born 1941-1950</b>	60.1%	57.5%	58.1%	58.5%	68.9%	63.8%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6, born before 1941</b>	48.4%	67.1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	60.0%	60.3%	58.7%	60.8%	66.2%	62.0%	63.1%	57.7%	55.4%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Figure 10-65: Respondents who agree with the statement: “In democracy, not all things go the way one would like, but there is no better state model”



★ “Under certain circumstances dictatorship is better than democracy”

There is a noticeable increase in the number of people who agree with this statement and could imagine a situation where dictatorship is preferable to democracy. This view is, however, not shared by all generations in the same way. Young people are much less in agreement with the statement.

Table 10-101: Respondents who agree with the statement: “Under certain circumstances dictatorship is better than democracy”

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Gr. 1, born after 1986</b>	37.1%	32.4%	31.5%	26.0%	36.0%	37.0%	34.6%	40.7%	36.5%
<b>Gr. 2, born 1973-1986</b>	26.4%	32.5%	35.3%	33.7%	39.0%	41.3%	41.2%	36.0%	36.7%
<b>Gr. 3, born 1961-1972</b>	30.3%	34.1%	39.7%	41.0%	42.4%	45.8%	40.0%	33.9%	43.5%
<b>Gr. 4, born 1951-1960</b>	38.2%	32.2%	36.2%	39.0%	41.2%	43.2%	43.8%	35.2%	45.1%
<b>Gr. 5, born 1941-1950</b>	39.2%	33.1%	36.8%	30.8%	47.2%	38.5%	-	-	-
<b>Gr. 6, born before 1941</b>	32.4%	40.0%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	31.5%	33.3%	36.2%	35.5%	40.6%	41.6%	40.9%	36.0%	38.9%

Source: SMF data base 2008-2016

Figure 10-66: Respondents who agree with the statement: “Under certain circumstances dictatorship is better than democracy”

