

# ANALYSIS

## LEGAL CONDITION AND THE PERFORMANCE OF PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS IN SIXTEEN PROJECT COUNTRIES OF THE KAS

*David Goertz, Karl-Rudolf Korte, Kristina Weissenbach<sup>1</sup>*

There is general agreement in international party research that political parties fulfil significant “consolidating functions” in the process of transition to democracy (Mainwaring 1998: 67), whether in Africa (Sandbrook 1996), Asia, or Latin America (Dix 1992; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Following this interpretation, we will use the country reports of the KAS Democracy Report to analyse the current state of the political parties and party systems in the 16 countries selected, as well as their contribution towards the process of democratisation.

On the basis of a questionnaire, originally developed by the Research Group on Governance, the foundation’s experts abroad generated national reports. Under the dimensions<sup>2</sup> of general information/political system, party systems/party categorisation or party families, party funding and internal policy-making process, 37 questions were asked to examine the legal condition of the political parties in these 16 countries. To analyse these findings, we will subsume the questions asked in the survey under four key dimensions that are particularly important for the development of trend statements:

- I. Institutionalisation of the party system
- II. Structure of the party system
- III. Internal democracy/internal power structure
- IV. Party contributions towards consolidation

Based on the four dimensions mentioned above, this analytical chapter aims to describe the legal condition of the political parties and party systems in the countries under investigation as well as their contribution towards the process of democratisation. To what extent do parties contribute towards civic political participation? Can we distinguish any regional parallels, common developments, or trends? Do the results yield any insights regarding the further development of the promotion of democracy and political party assistance?

### I. INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

When judging the part played by political parties in the process of democratisation and in the promotion of political participation, international party research accords priority to the degree to which parties and party systems are institutionalised (Mainwaring/Scully 1995; Bendel 1996; Sandbrook 1996; von Beyme 1997<sup>3</sup>; Mainwaring 1998; Grotz 2000: 37f.; Kuenzi/Lambright 2001; Randall/Svåsand 2002a, 2002b; Basedau/Stroh/Erdmann 2006; Basedau/Stroh 2008). What legal basis is there for parties and party systems in the countries and regions under investigation? What regulations control party funding? Within the dimension of party system institutionalisation, these questions and indicators, among others, give information about the legal condition of the party systems in the various regions (see the assessment in Table 1).

### **Middle-East Europe and Southeast Europe**

Twenty years after the end of communist rule, the parliamentary (Croatia, Latvia) and semi-presidential systems (Macedonia, Rumania<sup>4</sup>) in the countries of middle-eastern and southeast Europe that were investigated have arrived at the final stage of the process of democratic consolidation (Bertelsmann 2008). By now, the major political players of all four states accept that democracy is "the only game in town" (Przeworski 1991: 26).

The constitutions of Croatia, Latvia, and Rumania mentioned parties as organs of democratic opinion-forming, guaranteeing the right of all citizens to join and form political parties and other organisations. The only exception is Macedonia's constitution, which does not mention political parties explicitly. Nevertheless, laws specifically addressing political parties have been existing in Macedonia and the other three countries of this group since the 1990s. Generally speaking, there are no major obstacles to the foundation of a new party in any of these countries. Barriers are especially low in Latvia, particularly in the field of party funding which is hardly regulated at all there. Latvia is the only EU member country where parties are not financed by the state and obtain most of their funds from private donations. In Croatia, Macedonia, and Rumania, on the other hand, parties may rely on governmental support.

### **Latin America**

Unlike many of the states in the other regions considered here, the political systems of Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay have a long tradition of democracy to look back on (KAS 2007). At the same time, the history of these four Ibero-American countries documents that the universal trend towards more democracy may occasionally suffer setbacks that are brought about by political traditions – presidentialism, personalism, caudillismo, and authoritarian elements in the political culture – and that regression tendencies may develop from these setbacks (Suter 1999). The presidential democracies of these four countries are designed to concentrate political power in the hands of the executive. As intermediaries between the political decision-making centres on one hand and the citizens and civic society on the other, the parties compete with other political players.

As in middle-eastern and southeast Europe, parties are mentioned in the constitutions of the four Latin American states as active elements in the formulation of political objectives. In this regard, the constitution of Colombia is conspicuous because it contains detailed specifications of the functions, funding, and organisation of political parties, adding considerably to their weight. Furthermore, the existence of a legal code that specifically addresses political parties proves the extent to which they are formalised. Another parallel with legal party regulations in middle-eastern and southeast Europe is the fact that governmental party subsidisation is provided for in the laws of all four states. However, there is a gap between legal regulations and their actual implementation. Thus, although the Peruvian party funding act prescribes in detail how government funds should be used (primarily for training party members), these rules are regularly disregarded in practice.

### **Middle East and North Africa (MENA)**

With an unbroken tradition of party pluralism Morocco as well as Lebanon with their denominational cleavages stand out among the Arab countries (Axtmann 2003: 1). The political and party systems of the two states display a few peculiar traits, not least because their environment is marked by a long civil war, denominational fragmentation, and/or authoritarian rule. Lebanon, for example, is a parliamentary democracy, but the proportional importance of its various religions dominates its political system. Morocco, on the other hand, is a constitutional monarchy in which the king dominates the political fabric and parties often play only a supporting role in political decision-making. The weakness of the parties shows in the fact that their legal institutionalisation in the constitutions of the two countries is very limited. In Morocco, for example, the constitution postulates that parties should be involved in the constitutional process, yet they are "banalised" (Santucci 2001: 59) by being placed on an equal footing with trade unions, professional organisations, and local bodies. In Lebanon, the legal institutionalisation of the political parties is even weaker: the constitution does not mention them, and there is no specific party legislation. Moreover, regulation of party funding is similarly limited.

### Asia

In the cluster of Asian states, we will be examining two post-socialist countries, the parliamentary republic of Mongolia and the presidential republic of Kazakhstan. At the same time, we will be looking at Pakistan, a semi-presidential system whose path to democracy was marred by many setbacks. The differences between these Asian states manifest themselves in the degree to which parties are legally institutionalised. They are mentioned only in the constitutions of Mongolia and Kazakhstan. The latter country has a 7 per cent exclusion clause, and any party that wishes to be admitted to an election is required to demonstrate that its membership exceeds 40,000. In Pakistan, party candidates are subject to minimum requirements that are spelled out in detail. If an infringement of the law has been proven against a candidate, he or she is not allowed to stand for election. This regulation was the reason why two of the country's most prominent politicians, Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari, were temporary debarred from elections.

In all three countries, the regulation intensity of the legal provisions on party funding is low. In contrast to middle-eastern and southeast Europe as well as Latin America, parties here are not commonly financed by the state. Especially small parties may find this form of funding hard to cope with in a difficult economic environment, so that dependencies may arise.

### Sub-Saharan Africa

Addressing Namibia, Uganda and South Africa, the 2009 Democracy Report analyses the parties and party systems of two presidential systems (Uganda and Namibia) and one parliamentary system (South Africa<sup>5</sup>). Whereas Uganda became independent in 1962 and has been beginning its last attempt at democratisation in 1989 (parties were only legalised in 2005) (Hartmann 1999: 21f.), Namibia and South Africa attained independence at a relatively late date (1991, 1990). Therefore both countries had an opportunity to learn from the institutional mistakes made by Uganda and other African states. At the same time, both South Africa and Namibia underwent a much shorter post-colonial phase, and they hardly had a chance to build on past democratic traditions (Bratton/van de Walle 1997; Emminghaus 2003).

The constitutions of all three countries analysed in sub-Saharan Africa were formulated against the background of their historic experience with one-party regimes. This experience influenced the content and wording of the constitutional articles and laws relating to political parties: by now, all three states require a multi-party system in their constitution (Schmidt 1997: 253ff.; Emminghaus 2002; Korte/Weissenbach 2007). Adopted in 1991 and 1996, respectively, the constitutions of Namibia and South Africa are among the most modern and liberal codes on the entire continent. The constitution of the Republic of Namibia contains a catalogue of fundamental rights and affirmative-action regulations (Article 23, 2) and specifies a presidential system of government. Notwithstanding their role as models for the entire African continent, however, the constitutions of South Africa and Namibia mention political parties only in the context of elections.

In Uganda, there is no tradition of political parties. After Milton Obote had banned all parties in 1969, Uganda became a "non-party democracy", a republic of councils founded on individuals, not parties. It was only in 1995 that Uganda's fourth constitution provided the foundation for a multi-party system in Article 29 and 72. Article 29 (e) proclaims the right of all citizens to form and join associations and form political parties (Kayunga 2009). In 2005, an amendment to the constitution transformed the former "movement system" into a "multi-party system". Uganda alone excepted, the constitutions of the African states under investigation do not contain a legal definition of the key functions of political parties. Again with the exception of Uganda, there is no specific legislation which regulates the internal organisation, general functions, and funding of political parties.

The following table presents a survey of the institutional framework conditions and the legal institutionalisation of the parties and their funding in all cases under analysis (Table 1):

Table 1 | LEGAL REGULATIONS AND PARTY SYSTEMS

Government System	Number of Political Parties <sup>(1)</sup>	Incorporation of Party Systems and Parties in Constitutional Law	Party Legislation/Party Financing
<b>Argentina   Latin America</b>			
Presidential system	Four relevant parties	Parties are incorporated in the constitution. Constitution guarantees their free establishment and exercise of activities as well as their democratic organisation and performance. The constitution contains articles on party funding.	Party legislation exists. Content: party organisation, foundation, and rules on the participation of political parties in elections. Law on party funding exists; the state collaborates in the financing of political parties.
<b>Kazakhstan   Central Asia</b>			
Presidential system	Ten registered political parties. One political party in parliament.	Parties are mentioned in the constitution.	Party legislation exists. Content: party foundation and rules that regulate the participation of political parties in elections. Deficit: for a political party to be registered it should have not less than 40,000 members. There is a 7 per cent threshold clause. Law on party funding exists; the state does not collaborate in the financing of political parties.
<b>Colombia   Latin America</b>			
Presidential system	Five relevant parties	Parties are incorporated in the constitution as a fundamental institution of the democratic system, and it guarantees their free establishment and exercise of activities. Furthermore the constitution regulates the form of financing.	Party legislation exists. Content: party foundation and organisation. Law on party funding exists; the state collaborates in the financing of political parties.
<b>Croatia   Middle-East and Southeast Europe (MESEE)</b>			
Parliamentary system	Eleven relevant parties	Parties are mentioned in the constitution. The constitution regulates the form of financing.	Party legislation exists. Content: party organisation, foundation, and liquidation. Law on party funding exists; the state collaborates in the financing of political parties.
<b>Latvia   MESEE</b>			
Parliamentary system	Eight relevant parties	Parties are mentioned in the constitution.	Party legislation exists. Content: party organisation, foundation, and liquidation. Law on party funding exists; the state does not collaborate in the financing of political parties. Deficit: only basic rules on party financing.
<b>Lebanon   Middle East and North Africa (MENA)</b>			
Parliamentary system	Nine relevant parties	Parties are not mentioned in the constitution. The constitution guarantees freedom of association and thus indirectly the right to organise political parties.	There is no law specifically regulating political parties. Like all other non-profit associations, political parties are governed by the Ottoman law of association of 1909. Deficit: lack of a truly democratic electoral law.
<b>Macedonia   MESEE</b>			
Semi-presidential system	Six relevant parties	Parties are not mentioned in the constitution. The only constitutional provision related to parties in a broader sense is the freedom of association of individuals. Establishment and functioning of political parties is dealt with by the law on political parties.	Party legislation exists. Content: party organisation and foundation. Law on party funding exists; the state collaborates in the financing of political parties.
<b>Morocco   MENA</b>			
Constitutional monarchy	Four relevant parties	Parties are mentioned in the constitution.	Party legislation exists. Content: party organisation and functions. Deficit: non-feasible conditions and procedural complexities for party organisation. Law on party funding exists; the state collaborates in the financing of political parties.

Continuation of Table 1

<b>Government System</b>	<b>Number of Political Parties<sup>(1)</sup></b>	<b>Incorporation of Party Systems and Parties in Constitutional Law</b>	<b>Party Legislation/Party Financing</b>
<b>Mongolia   Asia</b>			
Parliamentary system	Three relevant parties	Parties are mentioned in the constitution.	Party legislation exists. Content: rules that regulate the participation of political parties in elections. Law on party funding exists; the state does not collaborate in the financing of political parties.
<b>Namibia   Sub-Saharan Africa</b>			
Presidential system	Seven relevant parties	Parties are incorporated in the constitution but only in connection with elections.	No specific legal regulation exists. The state collaborates in the financing of political parties.
<b>Pakistan   Asia</b>			
Semi-presidential system	Seven relevant parties	Parties are not mentioned in the constitution. Establishment and functioning of political parties was previously governed by the Political Parties Rules 2002.	Party legislation exists. Content: party organisation and rules that regulate the participation of political parties in elections. Law on party funding exists.
<b>Peru   Latin America</b>			
Presidential system	10 relevant parties	Parties are mentioned in the constitution.	Party legislation exists. Content: party organisation and foundation. Law on party funding exists; the state collaborates in the financing of political parties.
<b>Romania   MESEE</b>			
Semi-presidential system	Six relevant parties	Parties are incorporated in the constitution as a fundamental institution of the democratic system, and it guarantees their free establishment and exercise of activities.	Party legislation exists. Content: party organisation, reorganisation, association, foundation, and liquidation. Law on party funding exists; the state collaborates in the financing of political parties.
<b>South Africa   Sub-Saharan Africa</b>			
Parliamentary system	13 relevant parties	Parties are incorporated in the constitution but only in connection with elections.	No specific legal regulation exists. The state collaborates in the financing of political parties.
<b>Uganda   Sub-Saharan Africa</b>			
Presidential system	Six relevant parties	Parties are incorporated in the constitution. Art. 29 secures the right of all citizens "to form and join associations and form political parties". Article 72 guarantees the right to form political parties.	Party legislation exists since 2005: the "Political Parties and Organisation Act". Content: rules regarding the formation and registration, internal organisation, and financing of political parties. The state collaborates in the financing of political parties.
<b>Uruguay   Latin America</b>			
Presidential system	Four relevant parties	Parties are mentioned in the constitution. <sup>(2)</sup>	No specific legal regulations exist in Uruguay's current legal system on the internal organisation and daily operation of political parties or on their participation in national elections. A Parties Act is currently in the last stages of its legislative process.

<sup>(1)</sup> Relevant parties represented in parliament for two subsequent periods.

<sup>(2)</sup> No section of the current constitution is specifically devoted to political parties; many of its provisions and articles on other topics, especially those dealing with the electoral system, expressly refer to party actions, prerogatives, and functions.

Source: own depiction at the basis of country reports in this volume.

## II. STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

The questions about the structural pattern of a party system and the standing of the parties within the political system (membership figures, party programmes, contacts with related societal groups and organisations, fragmentation) yield highly diverse results when each case is analysed. Generalisations can be made only rarely; the only supra-regional trend that emerges from the party systems of many countries is for increasing pragmatism, accompanied by a blurring of ideological differences.

### **Middle-East Europe and Southeast Europe**

During the nearly two decades that have elapsed since the end of communism, the parties that were newly founded or rebuilt in the early 1990s in the four states under consideration developed along different cleavages. In contrast to the east European states (Poland and the Czech Republic) that were examined in the KAS Democracy Report of 2007, ethnic cleavages are of comparatively great importance in this case. They are particularly prominent in Macedonia, a multi-ethnic state, and in Latvia, where a large ethnic Russian minority lives. Furthermore, all party systems show a medium degree of fragmentation, oscillating between six and eleven relevant parties.

In Latvia and Macedonia, ethnic conflict lines play a prominent role in the structure of the party systems. The most important conflict line in the Baltic state runs between the Latvian majority and the Russian minority. What is more, this cleavage blankets ideological differences between the parties. The societal concept of the national Latvian forces unites conservatism with free-market liberalism, whereas "left" is regarded as synonymous with pro-Russian, which excludes the pro-Russian parties from power. Although it comprises eight relevant parties with programmes that differ in formal terms and is consequentially highly fragmented, the party system is relatively homogenous – nearly all "Latvian" parties follow a course of economic liberality.

Although it includes six relevant parties, Macedonia's party system is comparatively stable. Ever since a multi-party system was established in the early 1990s, the country has been ruled by coalition governments led by one of the two major parties. Next to ideological factors – the VMRO-DPMNE belongs to the Christian democratic conservative camp, while the SDSM is social-democratic – ethnic factors play a significant role in the structure of the Macedonian party system. Both major parties in the Balkan state are primarily ethnic Macedonian. The structures of Croatia's and Rumania's party systems are generally based on the classical left-right pattern. Thus, it was mainly ideological factors that prompted the foundation of the two dominant parties in today's Croatia, the conservative HDZ and the social-democratic SDP. By now, the situation in Rumania is developing along similar lines.

As in the other regions under consideration, precise and reliable membership figures are hard to come by. Credible and up-to-date statistics exist only rarely, and the figures quoted by the parties themselves are either suspect because they might have been dressed up, or the party executives refuse to publish them. Nevertheless, a few characteristics merit description: Latvia's fragmented and fluid party system is remarkable for its party-membership density, which is very low compared to the EU average: depending on which survey is consulted, only 0.9 to 1.4 per cent of the population are organised in political parties.

Firm relations with societal groups and organisations exist in Latvia, Macedonia, and Rumania. In Latvia and Macedonia, both multi-ethnic and multi-denominational countries, links with Christian groups play a particularly important role.

By now, all relevant parties in this group of states have their own party programmes based on certain values and ideologies. In Croatia, Latvia, and Rumania, however, these play only a minor role in political practice. The exemplary conclusion of the authors of the report on Rumania is, "Voters are usually mobilised around the image of party leaders and not so much around party programmes" (Terpe/Papuc/Matei in this volume).

Macedonia is exceptional in that the ruling conservative VMRO-DPMNE not only has a fully developed party programme and election platform but also defines targets and deadlines in its programme, which gives it a competitive edge over the other parties of the country.

### **Latin America**

Unlike the parties of middle-eastern and southeast Europe, which are mostly “young”, many of the parties in Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay were founded in the 19<sup>th</sup> or early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The liberal and conservative parties of Colombia, the Blancos and Colorados of Uruguay, and the Radicals and Peronistas of Argentina go back to the 19<sup>th</sup> or the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Initially, the parties structured themselves along the classical left-right pattern in conformance with their European role models. When the antagonism between East and West subsided, however, the parties of South America, too, dropped some of their ideological overhead and became more pragmatic, a process in which some traditional parties showed a surprising degree of persistence and adaptability. Elsewhere, as in Peru, for example, there were spectacular upheavals in the party system, in the course of which established parties were ousted from the political scene by new political players.

Today, many of the relevant parties in the Ibero-American states under investigation are classical “catch-all parties” (Kirchheimer 1965; Delhees et al. 2008: 145). As in middle-eastern and southeast Europe, the MENA region, and Asia, ideological fuzziness is accompanied by a growing trend for factions and spin-offs to form among these established parties, increasing the degree of fragmentation in the party system. All in all, fragmentation – there are four relevant parties in Argentina and Uruguay and five in Colombia – maybe classed as moderate, compared to the other regions examined. Once again, Peru does not conform to the general pattern, for it has ten relevant parties, and 85 per cent of the parties that stood for election in 2006 were founded shortly before. Ideological fuzziness goes hand in hand with a decline in the significance of party programmes. The following exemplary conclusion is drawn by Dadomo in the chapter on Argentina: “The ideological richness of parties is weak owing to a lack of long-term programme discussion. As traditional parties weaken and split into many factions, people cast their vote according to the personalised leadership of charismatic politicians without taking into account party programmes” (Dadomo in this volume).

On the other hand, programmes that are relatively undifferentiated can be more easily adapted to changes in the ideological environment as well as to new socio-political and socio-economic developments.

The Argentinean party system perfectly mirrors the trend towards increasing pragmatism, de-ideologisation, and fragmentation, but it also documents the adaptability of the traditional South American parties. The country’s two most powerful parties, the Peronistas (PJ) and the Radicals (UCA), the latter somewhat weakened in recent years, were founded on the basis of the societal cleavages between town and country and capital and labour. Both are now catch-all parties in many respects. Of the two, the PJ succeeded in dominating the country’s politics most convincingly in nearly all its democratic phases since the 1940s, thanks to its integrative receptiveness towards a multitude of political currents and its personalist orientation. Developments in Colombia and Uruguay followed similar lines. In both countries, there is no classical two-party system today, nor do the parties have a clear-cut ideological profile. Instead, the formation of factions within the parties and the foundation of new parties play an increasingly important role.

Determining the nature of party membership is difficult in South America. Generalising somewhat, we may say that the parties in the region are voter parties rather than member parties, that membership is often comparatively informal, and dues are collected only rarely. In all four Latin American states, a member of a party is a person who thinks of himself as such, publicly supports the party, and shows commitment to it either financially or organisationally.

### **The MENA region**

The two MENA states, Lebanon and Morocco, are singularities in the Arab world because of their unbroken tradition of party pluralism (Axtmann 2003: 1). In both states, the party spectrum covers a wide range of political currents, from national conservatism or leftist socialism to Islamism. However, the fact that the parties in the two states belong to programmatic currents should not deceive us as to their programmatic weaknesses. In point of fact, they represent organised clientelist groups and platforms for distributing lucrative jobs. Many are personalist in their orientation, and their success in articulating the interests of the population and communicating them to the political system is often limited. In such a context, parties are "(...) little more than large-scale interlinking patron-client networks" (Willis 2002: 14).

Another common feature resulting from programmatic weakness is the general lack of fully-developed party programmes. The reasons for this weakness differ from country to country. In Morocco, it is largely due to the dominant structural characteristics of the political system. On the one hand, the Moroccan King accords little weight to parties within the political system of the country. On the other hand, the parties are bound up in a neo-patrimonial network of mutual loyalties and services which clashes with the Western concept of free articulation of interests. In Lebanon, the factors that are responsible for the peculiar structure of the country's party system are rooted in the logic of its electoral system, which is largely controlled by religious proportionalism. The country's 128 seats in parliament are shared out half and half between Muslims and Christians. Because of this denominational parity, any programmatic differences between the parties are of minor importance, so that power shifts can take place only within one of the two blocks. Added to this denominational parity, there is the great influence exerted by political dynasties on individual parties, which are therefore led by clans rather than programmes.

Despite these deficits, both states feature a vibrant scene of civil-society engagement as well as a large number of NGOs. In both countries, relevant parties maintain close relations with civil-society organisations. Lebanese parties especially are generally well organised in their strongholds and operate an extensive network of local offices. The large number of expatriate Lebanese makes it indispensable for the country's parties to be highly organised.

### **Asia**

The difference between the political systems and the levels of economic development of the three Asian states are greater than in any other of the regions under scrutiny. This impression is confirmed if we look at the structural characteristics of the party systems in Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Pakistan.

Kazakhstan's party system is structured on the basis of ideological values and characterised by administrative pressure to vote for a specific party, a preference for stability over change, and regional differences. Although the party landscape is highly volatile, and although ten parties representing various ideological and political creeds are registered, the political scene of the country is dominated by the NUR OTAN. Since the parliamentary elections of 2007, it has been the only party represented in parliament, for none of the other parties succeeded in jumping the 7 per cent hurdle. In point of fact, therefore, Kazakhstan has a one-party parliament and a governing party that belongs to the conservative spectrum. The two central Asian states differ considerably in the level of their democratic consolidation. Mongolia has progressed noticeably further on its way towards a consolidated democracy, and the country's party system shows a trend towards concentrating on a few relevant parties and marginalising the opposition. Thus, the multi-party system which Mongolia had in the 1990s has changed into a two-party system by now, in which the two dominant parties have formed a coalition. These two parties are increasingly difficult to distinguish in terms of their ideological or programmatic values, while the opposition is marginalised at the moment. Instead, the parties' public image is now dominated by an intransparent blend of political and business interest and the clientelism that is universally practiced by all parties.



While Kazakhstan and Mongolia do have certain features in common, no such features could be found in Muslim-influenced Pakistan. Surprisingly enough, it does share certain traits with the states of the MENA region. Although Pakistan's parties formally represent different ideological creeds, their programmatic differences are obscured by personalist and clientelist factors. As in Lebanon, parties controlled by political dynasties play an eminent role. In such a system, the attractiveness of a party leader and his organisation in terms of recruiting members and voters depends on his ability to dispense direct or indirect benefits among his followers. Comprising 110 registered parties, moreover, the party system is highly fragmented, besides being highly polarised between the government and the opposition. Further factors include religious and dogmatic conflicts and the generally defective integration of the ethnic groups that make up Pakistan's population.

As in the countries of the MENA region, a large number of civil-society groups exist in the three Asian states, which shows that society has a deeply-rooted need for democratic representation despite its dwindling confidence in the power of the parties to take action.

### **Sub-Saharan Africa**

Although a background that is either ethnic or religious is characteristic of the parties in all three states investigated in the region of sub-Saharan Africa, its significance is subject to variation. To all intents and purposes, philosophical, ideological or socio-political differences are of no importance to either the population or the political parties of Uganda, but they are important in Namibia and South Africa. The erstwhile prohibition of political parties left the population as well as the parties themselves in great uncertainty and doubt about this form of participation (Bratton/Gina/Sentamu 2000). As internal events such as party conventions were forbidden until the constitution was revised in 2005, the parties had no chance to develop either internal democracy or programme policies. In Uganda, the parties of today "have more flexible goals and no fixed positions. In addition, parties usually shift their positions of different issues in several cases for the purpose of achieving electoral success" (Kayunga in this volume).

South Africa's party system is still dominated by a single party, the ANC. The results of the various parliamentary elections reflect this dominance: although ethnic cleavages feature less prominently in the structure of South Africa's party system than in Uganda, and although most parties like to define themselves as catch-all parties, they all address specific groups within the electorate. The ANC still draws on its roots in the struggle for freedom against Apartheid, keeps calling itself a movement instead of a party, and maintains that it bridges the differences between ethnic and population groups. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) has most of his followers among native Zulus, especially in the region of KwaZulu-Natal. The Democratic Alliance (DA) is still regarded as representing the whites in South Africa's party system, although it did speak out against Apartheid in the past. The Independent Democrats (ID) are mostly associated with the coloured electorate.

As the constitution has little to offer in the way of regulations concerning the foundation and organisation of political parties, South Africa's party spectrum comprises as many as 150 registered parties at present, although many of them are seen as mere "briefcase parties". The most eminent event that occurred within South Africa's party system in the last five years certainly was the separation of the Congress of the People (COPE) from the ANC late in 2008. In the parliamentary elections of 2009, the COPE came in third at 7.42 per cent of the vote (IEC 2009)<sup>6</sup>.

The structural patterns of Namibia's party system resemble those of South Africa: it is dominated by a single strong party, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), the opposition is in disarray, and party alliances cannot be formed because of personal conflicts and vanities (Brenke 1995; van de Walle 2003). Moreover, the conflict lines in Namibia's society are beginning to run parallel with those in South Africa: the SWAPO still draws its strength from the struggle for independence in what used to be the German colony of South West Africa, and programmatic or ideological differences between Namibia's parties are of no significance, the party landscape still being dominated by personalism and clientelism (Matlosa 2007).

### III. INTERNAL DEMOCRACY

Ideally, objectives should develop within a party from bottom to top, from the rank-and-file to the executive. This implies that democratic principles must be implemented within the parties, meaning that decisions about content and personnel, for example, are taken by general assemblies, committees, and party conventions in consultation with the party leadership, and the latter is not left to act on its own. An analysis of internal decision-making processes reveals three groups of parties within the various party systems. Once again, the results show that the answers to the question of democracy in the internal decision-making-process cannot be pooled into geographical or regional trends.

#### 1. Deficits in internal democracy

In the first group, which includes Rumania, Mongolia, and Uruguay, internal decision-making and the distribution of power are based on a model which permitted the establishment of internal democratic structures in spite of certain flaws. Thus, most parties in these three countries believe it to be their duty to ensure that their members are involved in the development of objectives and decisions. Operating from the rank-and-file to the leadership, the decision-making process follows the bottom-to-top principle, and the parties' functional structure is such that elected bodies are responsible to the general assembly. The structure of most parties in this group of countries is federal, and their functional structure is such that the lower tiers of the hierarchy have their own competences. These states do not exclude any segment of the population from political participation through and within parties, the freedom of the media is assured, and there are normally minimum quotas for women.

The demand for internal democracy is very important for the key functions of the parties, i.e. electing candidates and solving programmatical questions. In Rumania and Mongolia, candidates are elected in a democratic process by which local party organisations appoint a candidate for their constituency. In Uruguay, party conventions are responsible for appointing candidates for parliament. Informal deals circumventing formal decision-making processes were observed in the party systems of all countries. In Rumania, for instance, party leaders follow the example of established Western party systems in attempting to influence decisions about the nomination of candidates. In contrast to the two other groups, party leaders in this case need to rely on compromises and negotiations with local party organisations or party convention delegates. The same holds true for programmatical questions.

Imperative mandates exist in none of the three states. Parliamentarians are free to exercise their mandates as a matter of principle. As party leaders normally hold prominent positions in parliamentary parties, there is close harmonisation between the headquarters of a party and its members in parliament. Parliamentary parties normally follow the lead of their executive, which dictates important decisions. If they occur at all, deviations from the party line often entail informal sanctions, under which the culprit may be refused another candidacy in parliamentary elections or appointment to a function within the party.

Pluralist and open mass-media coverage is guaranteed in all three states. In Rumania and Uruguay, party-internal activities focus on elections and campaigns. As in the other states analysed, parties display a tendency towards professionalisation by increasingly consulting external agencies. To address the voters, a wide range of modern media like the internet and mobile telephony are used together with traditional mass media, such as radio and television. Next to these, direct contacts between citizens and politicians play a major role. Mongolia, on the other hand, lags behind in this regard. The parties in this central Asian state practise active, professional communication only tentatively. Modern media like the internet or interactive communication platforms are used with reserve although, in the long run, this would be an ideal option for addressing the electorate, especially in a large, sparsely-populated state such as this. It is true that only a scant 11 per cent of Mongolians had access to the internet in 2008 (as against 1.5 per cent in 2001), but even in this central Asian state the number of internet users has been growing substantially in recent years (Internet World Stats 2009).

## 2. Internal democracy as window-dressing

In the second group, the picture presented by internal decision-making and the power distribution within the parties is inconclusive. The group includes Latvia, the Balkan states of Croatia and Macedonia, the South American republics of Argentina, Colombia and Peru, the African states of Namibia and South Africa, and Kazakhstan. Most of the states that belong to this group do not exclude any segment of the population from participation in political parties. In some countries (e.g. Argentina, Colombia, Peru), the parties voluntarily agreed to apply quotas in the nomination of candidates. Kazakhstan alone excepted, the freedom of the media is assured. On the other hand, we find that the internal development of objectives from bottom to top, i.e. from the rank-and-file to the top echelons of the party, is often hardly more than mere window-dressing and bypassed on a regular basis, as in Namibia or Uganda. In point of fact, internal decision-making processes are often hierarchic and characterised by client-patron relationships and a fixation on a few leading figures. Because of the specific conditions prevailing in each context, generalisations can be made only rarely, which is why we will consider each case on its own in regional sequence.

In the Croatian party system, the party chairman has the greatest influence on decision-making. The case of the ruling HDZ shows how important it is to have a charismatic leader dominating the party in all major questions at the regional and national level (at the moment, there is no knowing whether the position of the party chief will be as powerful after Ivo Sanader has been replaced by Jadranka Kosor). A similar situation can be observed in Latvia. Parties have comparatively few members, and important issues relating to candidates and programmes are made by the party leadership without any debate with the rank-and-file that goes beyond mere acclamation. Only opposition parties appear to be less dominated by their leaders. Macedonia displays similar characteristics in as much as parties are dominated by their leaders, especially where programmatical issues are concerned. Despite the centralist structure of the country, local party organisations play a relatively big role in the appointment of candidates for parliamentary elections. At the same time, cases in which individual MPs deviate from the party line are rare, and there is hardly any evidence of controversial issues being debated within parliamentary parties. Latvian and, to a lesser extent, Macedonian MPs follow another strategy if they find themselves unable to assert their minority opinion within their parliamentary party, or if they think that their re-election is threatened: they either found another party, or they cross the floor<sup>7</sup> to a party where their chances of re-election appear better.

Latvia, an EU member, displays noticeable deficits in the field of political participation. The problem lies in the large number of ethnic Russians without citizenship or voting rights. Almost 400,000 Latvian inhabitants, more than 16 per cent of the population, are classed as "non-citizens" without the right to vote or stand for election. Political participation by naturalised ethnic Russians used to be further restricted by a clause, meanwhile rescinded, which required members of parliament to speak the Latvian language to perfection.

Most of the parties' internal activities focus on campaigning. Accordingly, the parties of Macedonia and Croatia's spend the lion's share of their budget on election campaigns. Latvia is an extreme case; having relatively few members, the parties of this Baltic state rely almost exclusively on professional media campaigns on television. In an election year they will spend considerably more than half their budget on election advertisements and campaigning. Despite regulations to the contrary, the precise purposes for which party funds are used are often not transparent in all three states. As parties declare only part of their campaign-related income, it is impossible to specify precisely how they use their budget.

In the South American states of Argentina, Colombia, and Peru as well as in Croatia, Latvia, and Macedonia, deficits in intra-party democracy form part of the heritage of a centralist and occasionally authoritarian past which still influences the political culture of these countries. The internal decision-making structures of the parties follow the top-down principle, meaning that decisions are made by small caucuses. Formal regulations providing that issues related to programmes and candidates should be decided by party conventions are regularly circumvented in practice. In the presidential

systems, the institution of primaries for the offices of president and vice-president, which follows the model of the USA, served to enhance the degree of mobilisation in the run-up to elections, but it also reinforced trends towards personalisation. The gap between formal regulations on the one hand and the actual situation on the other is characteristic of Argentina's party system. In their statutes, parties undertake to hold internal primaries to nominate candidates for parliament and the office of president. In fact, however, party members are presented by their leaders with a cut-and-dried list of candidates which duly receives the formal blessing of the rank-and-file. Consequently, intra-party democracy is nothing but window-dressing, and party leaders impose their decisions through their hierarchical power. However, federal structures ensure that local party organisations can at least assert their influence when they nominate candidates for provincial elections.

In Colombia, the establishment of democratic internal structures presents a more differentiated picture. On the one hand, both the liberal and the conservative party have meanwhile granted effective participation rights to their rank-and-file. On the other, it is the leadership which holds all decision-making power in the party that governs the country at the moment, the Partido de la U, which revolves around the personage that dominates the country's political system, president Álvaro Uribe. Various other recently-founded parties display similar characteristics, as does Peru's fluid party system in which parties are clusters that form around charismatic individuals.

At the same time, the obligation to toe the party line so as to increase its influence in parliament is an alien concept to Latin American MPs. Instead of attempting to solicit support for their views within their own party, disappointed parliamentarians often turn to founding new parties or cross the floor, a fact which shows that politicians think relatively little of party loyalty. This emerges particularly clearly in the case of Peru. On the one hand, 35 per cent of the country's members of parliament are unaffiliated, an extraordinarily high proportion. On the other, party discipline is very lax within the parliamentary parties. Thus, it is not uncommon for the members of a parliamentary party to cast different votes on core concerns, a practice which greatly obstructs the effectiveness of parliamentary work.

In the South American states under consideration, the parties' internal activities focus on elections and campaigns. However, there are several characteristic features that stand out in this context: direct contacts between politicians and voters – at rallies, for example – still play an important role despite the mass media. In the presidential systems of Latin America, on the other hand, media campaigns are being professionalised mainly by consultants from abroad. When PR campaigns are mounted to market a candidate according to the US model, parties and their members play only a supporting role in the struggle for political power. In this context, Juan Fernando Jaramillo, the author of the chapter on Colombia, says that campaigns are being "Americanised", while others mention a transition from traditional campaign practices to "videopolitica" (Fischer-Bollin 2003: 81). However, the limitations of "videopolitica" appear starkly in the more backward rural areas. In many regions of the country, this campaign approach is not very useful because there is no power supply, and access to mass and telecommunication media is limited.

In South Africa and Namibia, political participation through political parties is not subject to legal restrictions applying to specific groups of the population. Moreover, parties generally maintain youth and women's organisations. Decision-making in the parties of both South Africa and Namibia follows the bottom-up principle. To the outside world, the parties of the two countries play a pioneering role with regard to their internal democracy; especially the ANC and the SWAPO describe themselves as transparent mass organisations and maintain elaborate structures that range from the local to the national level. Although the regional structures of most parties reach down to the lowest level, however, decisions about key issues and nominations are often made at the national level: "in the case of SWAPO Party of Namibia, the two most important structures are the Political Bureau and the Central Committee (CM)" (du Pisani and Lindeke in this volume). In Namibia, moreover, especially minor parties that were recently established show deficiencies in their structure at the lowest regional or local levels, and most of them remain inactive outside campaign periods. The ANC as well as South Africa's minor parties have been professionalising their member

communications: they use not only mass media like television or the radio, which is of particular relevance in South Africa, but also, and to an increasing extent, interactive online communication platforms. Particularly in the election year of 2009, Twitter and Facebook were seen to play the part of multipliers in addressing the electorate.

Kazakhstan occupies a special position in our analysis of party-internal structures. As described above, only a single party is now represented in the parliament of the country. The president's style of government shows certain traits that are at least semi-authoritarian (Gallina 2006). At the same time, the internal decision-making process of the dominant NUR OTAN party displays certain characteristics which result in an overall picture as blurred as that presented by the other states of the second group. Policy decisions of fundamental importance relating, for example, to nominations or the focal points of political and programmatical work are made by party conventions. Quotas for women and ethnic minorities are in force. The day-to-day activities as well as the strategic orientation of the party are managed by the party leadership, the "first deputy", and a 15-member body. In point of fact, the informal influence of this caucus extends much further to programmatical and candidacy issues. The core problem of all Kazakh parties is lack of equitable access to the mass media. Opposition parties are systematically excluded from the radio. Their only chance is to use webpages that are critical of the government or the opposition print media, which are few in number. By contrast, the space devoted by the mass media to reports about the governing party, NUR OTAN, is all the greater. Accordingly, Kazakhstan ranks 125<sup>th</sup> among a total of 169 countries on the global press freedom ranking list of Reporters without Frontiers (RWB 2008: 127 f.).

### **3. Lack of internal democracy**

With regard to party-internal decision-making and the implementation of democratic principles, the third group displays certain phenomena that fly in the face of the maxim that objectives should be developed from the bottom to the top. This group includes the party systems of Morocco and Lebanon, two MENA states, as well as Pakistan and the African state of Uganda. In these states, the influence of personality worship, patronage, dynasties, and clientelism on the internal development of objectives is so unmistakable that they cannot be said to conform to democratic principles. It is this lack of democracy in internal policy-making which makes the parties appear unsuitable as instruments in the democratisation of the state and society.

Moreover, two of the four states hamper political participation by certain groups of the population. In multi-denominational Lebanon, certain religious groups are inadequately represented because of the antiquated party code of 1909 and the laws that prescribe proportionality between the religions. Then again, although women are legally entitled to vote in Pakistan they are regularly deprived of that right, particularly in rural areas. In all four countries, issues relating to nominations and programmes are settled by a small circle of leaders. Any party-internal discussion about programme issues is nipped in the bud by the parties' fixation on a few top players, the appropriation of parties by dynasties of politicians in Lebanon and Pakistan, and the dominance of patron-client relationships. Many party chairmen, having led their parties as patriarchs for a number of years, bequeath their power to their relations. Because of this lack of internal democracy, the parties are structurally incapable of reform and, consequently, find it difficult to address new societal issues.

In general, the parties of all four states concentrate on campaigns in their internal activities. Differences appear in Morocco and Lebanon, where parties like Hezbollah (Lebanon) and Istiqlal (Morocco) maintain their own social organisations. Assisted by Syria and Iran, Hezbollah has established its own infrastructure in the Shiite parts of the country, operating schools, hospitals, and orphanages. Not least because of its extensive social commitment, the party enjoys great support in the country's Shiite population centres.

Noticeable differences emerge when we look at the way in which the media are used in campaigns. In Pakistan, communication between the parties and their voters is very limited. In Morocco, trends towards improvement and professionalisation have emerged in the field of political communication in recent years, although the success of these attempts is limited by the low alphabetisation rate

and the lack of interest in politics among the population. Thanks to its highly developed PR industry, Lebanon plays a pioneering role in the professionalisation of campaigns in the Arab world. Accordingly, many Lebanese parties pour their entire budget into campaigns.

As far as the dimension of internal democracy is concerned, the African state of Uganda also belongs to the lowest-ranking group. It was only a short while ago that political parties were allowed to implement processes of internal policy- and decision-making. Before the country's fourth constitution was revised in 2005, Article 269 prohibited Uganda's parties from setting up branch offices, holding party conventions and delegates' conferences, and organising campaign rallies or public events of any kind. Although the political parties have adopted formal regulations governing their internal democratic structures and decision-making mechanisms since that time, they actually operate on a hierarchical basis. "The party leaders, particularly of FDC, CP and NRM, play a dominant role, partly because of their charisma. In addition it is characterised by patronage style of leadership. The chairperson and secretary-general of the parties usually wield most of the powers" (Kayunga in this volume). In the years to come, the parties of Uganda – and by the same token, the promotion of democracy and party assistance – will be confronted by the challenge of having to establish a foothold among the population, develop political alternatives, and democratise their internal decision-making mechanisms and organisational structures.

#### **IV. THE PARTIES' CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS CONSOLIDATION**

What kind of contribution do political parties in the states under investigation make to democratisation? How important are they for the political participation of the people and the democratisation of the country? These questions will be summarily addressed in the last chapter of this article. It is obvious that merely subdividing the countries into geographical regions is not adequate to identify common patterns in the institutionalisation of parties and party systems as well as in their contribution towards consolidation. Instead, there are three categories that emerge when we analyse the parties' contribution towards consolidation:

a) The countries where parties *significantly contribute towards democratic consolidation* in the estimation of the Foundation's experts include Rumania, Croatia, Macedonia, Uruguay, and Mongolia. A comparison of the three states located in sub-Saharan Africa shows that the parties in South Africa and Namibia may be regarded as supporting consolidation (Booyesen 2009). Because they select, pool, and articulate the interests of the various segments that make up the population, it is impossible to imagine the political process in any of the four aforementioned states operating without political parties.

In Croatia, Macedonia, and Rumania, a relatively stable party system has been developing in recent years. Motivated by the prospect of membership in the EU and NATO as well as by pressure from the tribunal of The Hague, Croatia's parties are trying to adjust their leaderships and party structures so as to meet new requirements. In Macedonia, the role of some party leaders who oppose effective intra-party democratisation remains problematic, while in Rumania, the fact that parties and other political institutions enjoy relatively little trust is seen as an obstacle to the further consolidation of the party system. Croatia's accession to NATO and its membership in the EU, which will probably be perfected soon, are a tribute to this success in transformation. Even the young republic of Macedonia may hope to be received into the north Atlantic pact despite the blockade which Greece has been mounting so far.

Uruguay and Mongolia are the only two countries in their respective groups where the political parties' contribution to the democratisation of the country and the political participation of the citizens is seen as positive. Uruguay was the only Latin American country rated as a "full democracy" by the British journal *The Economist* in its 2008 Index of Democracy<sup>8</sup>. In Uruguay's presidential system, the parties succeeded, by dint of self-regulation mechanisms, in establishing themselves as leading actors in the political life of the population.

Mongolia is proof positive that a democratic polity can hold its own in a regional environment of semi-authoritarian or dictatorial regimes (the country's neighbouring states include China, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan). Under difficult conditions, Mongolia's parties succeeded in establishing themselves as a bridge between politics and society and making a substantial contribution towards the country's democratisation, although the fact that the opposition is being marginalised at the moment is not without its problems. Unlike the transforming countries of central and eastern Europe that are motivated by the prospect of accession to the EU, the two countries are hampered by a lack of the inducement offered by a similar perspective to support and direct their development.

The situation in the Republic of South Africa and in Namibia may be summarised in a similar way. The picture presented by both countries is that of a multi-party system dominated by a single party (the ANC in South Africa and the SWAPO in Namibia). Although dwindling into insignificance, the opposition parties largely fulfil their function in the promotion of democracy: "The micro-parties in parliament, the nine that scored below 1 per cent of the 2009 vote, clearly have limited institutional capacity. Yet, they still fulfil the fundamental party functions such as posing select alternatives to voters, nominating candidates, and participating in elections. They also fully support the operations of the legislatures in which they are represented" (Booyesen in this volume).

This comparatively positive assessment of the contribution made by the political parties towards the democratisation of their respective countries is confirmed by the Status Index of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) as well as by the Freedom in the World Report of Freedom House (FH). The BTI rates Croatia, Rumania, Macedonia, and Uruguay as well as South Africa and Namibia as "highly advanced" in their transition to a free-market democracy, while Mongolia is at least rated as "advanced". Based on the scope of democratic liberties, FH rates all seven states as "free", the only exception being Macedonia, which is rated as "partly free".

b) In the second group we find Latvia, the South American presidential states of Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, as well as Lebanon and Uganda. On the one hand, there is no doubt that all these countries have developed relatively efficient market economies and are comparatively far advanced on the way towards establishing fundamental democratic structures (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008). On the other hand, the national studies of this year's Democracy Report show that the political parties of these countries have not succeeded either in establishing a foothold in society or in offering programmatic alternatives to the citizens. Parties are not accepted as effective problem-solvers in any of these countries. This discrepancy between the conclusions drawn by the BTI regarding the development of a market economy and those drawn in the reports of this study regarding the capability of the parties to promote consolidation stems from the fact that of the 17 criteria and 52 individual questions covered by the BTI, only one criterion relates to party systems (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008). By contrast, the qualitative data surveys of the KAS Democracy Report focus on the parties and party systems in the countries under investigation, so that the weak points in the parties' consolidation performance can be uncovered.

The parties and the party system of Latvia, an EU member country, illustrate this very well. Parties in this Baltic state are dominated by charismatic leaders who represent economic pressure groups. The party system is highly fluid, and party memberships are very small. In consequence of these flaws political participation is defective, and civic commitment is underdeveloped. In this context, Ivars Ijabs, the author of the article on Latvia, talks of a vicious circle: "Citizens distrust parties, regarding them as elitist, closed and corrupt. Parties, on the other hand, can rely only on their own patronage networks, since the broader public normally does not want to devote its time, energy and reputation to such mistrusted organisations" (Ijabs in this volume).

The South American presidential republics of Argentina, Colombia, and Peru all have their own democratic "inadequacies", and the same holds true for Lebanon. Although democratic standards have been established in all four countries, none of the party systems has managed so far to fulfil adequately the duties which they have in a democratic state. Most of the parties in the four

abovementioned states show deficits in their organisation, their internal democratic structures are flawed, and they only move into the public field of vision during campaigns. The programmatic footing of the parties investigated is insecure. The people in these states cast their votes primarily not for parties but for individuals. At the same time, the almost complete lack of programmatic distinctions prevents the party system from addressing key societal cleavages. Other difficulties include fragmentation tendencies and the frequent foundation of new parties. While these factors tend to undermine the exclusiveness of the two-party systems in Colombia and Argentina after a long period of stability, most of the new parties are nothing but voting clubs for individuals that have no stable backing in society. In Lebanon, on the other hand, parties are kept from establishing themselves as effective organs for managing and pooling interests by the overpowering influence of denominational segmentation.

Uganda's parties occupy a similar position in the process of consolidation. Because of the lack of any democratic tradition, and because of the year-long ban on politics and/or a multi-party system, Uganda's parties have not succeeded so far in impressing the people with the importance of participation through political parties (Dreyer 2006). Most citizens either mistrust or know little about political parties (Bratton/Lambright/Sentamu 2000: 13). Moreover, 26 per cent of Uganda's population stated "that they 'don't know' what democracy means, perhaps because the popular political discourse in Uganda has focused mainly on political stability. Indeed, more citizens are unaware of the term 'democracy' in Uganda than in six other African countries where this question was asked in 1999–2000 (and where an average 17 per cent said 'don't know')" (Bratton/Lambright/Sentamu 2000: 6).

c) The party systems of Morocco, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan are diametrically opposed to the concept of free articulation and communication of interests vis-à-vis the political system, which is the part of the political parties in the Western concept of pluralism. Logically enough, both the BTI and FH identify significant deficits in the establishment of democratic standards in Pakistan, Morocco, and Kazakhstan. It is not least due to the salient structural characteristics of Morocco, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan that the contribution made by the political parties towards democratic consolidation is relatively small. Specifically, these characteristics include the low importance accorded to parties by the president of Kazakhstan and the monarch of Morocco, deficits in the freedom of the media in Kazakhstan, and Pakistan's authoritarian past. Because of these factors, the political parties were unable to establish themselves as effective organs for organising and pooling interests in the context of elections. Especially in Morocco, the situation is aggravated by the prevalence of patron-client relationships, although Morocco's parties are those within the group which display the most noticeable upward trend in implementing their consolidating functions.

"Rooting democracy in a soil hardened and dried by decades of dictatorship is going to be no instant or easy task" (Massod Husain in this volume). With this remark, the author of the chapter on Pakistan refers to the difficult contextual conditions under which Pakistan's party system is labouring. In such an environment, parties have been unable so far to perform their tasks adequately. Among the obstacles that are seen as preventing political parties from contributing more towards democratisation we have the authoritarian past of the country, the eminent position of dynastic clans in the party landscape, the lack of party-internal democracy, and the inadequacy of the parties' financial resources. If the state were to furnish part of the funding, the situation might be remedied to a certain extent.

If we compare the analytical results of the countries in the two last-named groups, in which parties do not promote a process of consolidation and even obstruct it in some cases, with the results of the BTI Democracy Index and the Freedom in the World Report (FH), we find that there are certain discrepancies (Cf. Table 2).



Table 2 | BTI AND FH COUNTRY RANKINGS

Country	Region	Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008 <sup>(1)</sup>   <sup>(2)</sup>	Freedom House 2008 – Freedom of the World <sup>(3)</sup>   <sup>(4)</sup>
Argentina	Latin America	Advanced (7.34)	Free (2.0)
Kazakhstan	Asia	Limited (5.53)	Not Free (5.5)
Colombia	Latin America	Advanced (6.21)	Partly Free (3.0)
Croatia	Middle-East and South-east Europe (MESEE)	Highly advanced (8.57)	Free (2.0)
Latvia	MESEE	Highly advanced (8.60)	Free (1.5)
Lebanon	MENA region	Advanced (6.16)	Partly Free (4.5)
Macedonia	MESEE	Highly advanced (7.52)	Partly Free (3.0)
Morocco	MENA region	Very limited (4.65)	Partly Free (4.5)
Mongolia	Asia	Advanced (6.25)	Free (2.0)
Namibia	Africa	Advanced (7.32)	Free (2.0)
Pakistan	Asia	Very limited (4.41)	Not Free (5.5)
Peru	Latin America	Advanced (6.60)	Free (2.5)
Romania	MESEE	Highly advanced (8.31)	Free (2.0)
South Africa	Africa	Highly advanced (7.98)	Free (2.0)
Uganda	Africa	Advanced (6.19)	Partly Free (4.5)
Uruguay	Latin America	Highly advanced (8.90)	Free (1.0)

<sup>(1)</sup> Status of transition to a free-market democracy.

<sup>(2)</sup> Against a normative background that includes the rule of law, democracy, and a market economy supported by social policy, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) comprehensively informs about cases in which political development has been guided successfully. 125 countries are investigated in detail and ranked by their status and management performance in two lists. The status index shows the level of development reached by the states under investigation on the way towards democracy and market economy (Cf. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008).

<sup>(3)</sup> Combined average ratings.

<sup>(4)</sup> Since 1972, Freedom House has been publishing an annual report, *Freedom in the World*, on the degree of democratic freedoms in nations and significant disputed territories around the world, by which it seeks to assess the current state of civil and political rights on a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free) (Cf. Freedom House 2008).

Source: own depiction based on BTI (2008) and Freedom House (2008) data.

With its qualitative orientation, the KAS Democracy Report fills a void that has not so far been investigated in similar detail by any of the established democracy indices. Moreover, it shows up deficits that appear only in the margins of democracy indices with a wider scope. However, the defects in party institutionalisation are owed not only to certain characteristics of the political structure but also to “home-made” factors that operate within the parties themselves. This being

so, political parties need to occupy clearly defined positions with regard to societal conflicts so as to sharpen their profile in public. At the same time, they need to summon enough courage to reform their organisation from the ground up.

So far, the impact of party system and party characteristics on the process of consolidation has not been analysed either adequately or clearly in research, so that further empirical and theoretical studies are needed (Basedau 2002; Burnell 2004): especially those among the countries investigated whose societies are particularly heterogeneous in ethnic terms show a functional dilemma between equitable representation on the one hand and efficient government on the other. Thus, analysing parties and party systems in the 16 countries under investigation provides starting points for an approach to democracy and party promotion which supports the "consolidating effect" of participation within and through political parties.

- 1| *Research Group on Governance: [www.forschungsgruppe-regieren.de](http://www.forschungsgruppe-regieren.de); [www.nrwschool.de](http://www.nrwschool.de) (last accessed on 02/08/09).*
- 2| *Each with several sub-indicators e.g. concerning the legal framework conditions that govern the parties' activities, internal organisation, opinion-forming in the governing bodies or internal decision-making.*
- 3| *To be sure, von Beyme uses the term "consolidation of party systems" which goes beyond the concept of party institutionalisation because it includes polarisation characteristics (minimum extremism; formation of coalitions).*
- 4| *Although Rumania is a parliamentary system in formal terms, it is mostly categorised as semi-presidential because of the relatively powerful position of its directly-elected president (cf. Preda/Soare 2008).*
- 5| *Sometimes the political system of South Africa is also categorised as "presidential system with federal elements".*
- 6| *Cf. <http://www.elections.org.za> (last accessed on 02/08/09).*
- 7| *MPs crossing the floor change to another party without relinquishing their mandate.*
- 8| *Cf. The Economist intelligence unit's Index of Democracy (2008).*

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