There has been a change in the US strategy from President Bush to President Obama. Unfortunately Pakistan has become the target of all criticism despite its efforts in the war on terror. It is now being called “the greatest threat to the world” and “the centre of terrorism.” The question is: Does the problem actually lie in Pakistan or is it Afghanistan that is the real problem? Is the crisis due to the wrong policy of the Bush administration which did not realize the fallout its Afghanistan attack would have for Pakistan? Why Bush’s efforts in Afghanistan failed? Was it because of underestimating the situation and deploying not enough troops? He invested more troops and assets and money in Iraq than in Afghanistan. Even nation-building was not prioritized. In fact what president Bush ended up with was pushing Al-Qaeda and Taliban into Pakistan. Would Obama’s promise to send additional troops and appointment of Richard Holbrooke as special representative for the region help solve the problem? Pakistan’s security and loyalty has always been a concern for the US. Successive US administrations have been vocal about Pakistan not doing enough and that its ISI is sympathetic towards the Islamists. There is still lack of trust between the two governments since the US administration clearly talked of no blank cheque. President Obama has also shown tilt towards India. He wants greater participation of regional countries but what he has not done is clearly define his policy. It was these aforementioned concerns behind the initiation of such a roundtable to get to an understanding of a more structured policy from a state of ambiguity especially vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Major Themes of the roundtable

1. What is Af-Pak Policy?
2. US Strategic Interests and Regional Interests
3. Should India be Included as a Major Partner in Afghanistan
4. Options for Pakistan in the Context of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and US Policy

First Session — What is ‘Af-Pak Policy’?

During the first session, the focus was on the question of the new ‘Af-Pak policy’ of the US under the Obama administration. It was highlighted that the policy was more of continuity than change and Pakistan’s sensitivities needed to be considered. India was seen as a strategic partner of the US, while Pakistan despite all the contribution it made was left alone. It is therefore very important that Pakistan keeps its national interest before anything else. Obama has a certain perception that Pakistan should shift its attention from the eastern border to the western border. Pakistan’s apprehensions vis-a-vis Indian objectives do not matter to the US administration and probably that is why India was not included in Holbrooke’s agenda. Some of the important points that Pakistan should be focusing on include efforts to dismantle Al-Qaeda through a regional approach. Though Kashmir is not mentioned in Af-Pak policy, Pakistan should welcome India in regional initiatives to combat terrorism. There is need to re-evaluate and reconsider our policy towards India, not as enemy but important neighbour. However, Pakistan’s position on nuclear assets should be very clear. Pakistan-US collaboration in counter-insurgency methods was highlighted. It was agreed that FATA was basically a spillover of what was happening in Afghanistan; Pakistan’s Foreign office should take a strong position on this. It was also mentioned that since the problem was in Afghanistan, the US must first deal with the situation in Afghanistan rather than thinking of intrusion into Pakistani areas.

On the other hand, Pakistan cannot continue to be in denial for long now; it has to deal with the issue of militancy and terrorism inside its own borders. The policy of dialogue with the Taliban has fired back; Pakistan has been criticized for being in touch with the Taliban, while the US is now doing the same with the “good Taliban”. The question is who is going to decide and identify who is “good” Taliban and who is “bad” Taliban. Because when Pakistan did this it was blamed for using them as their “strategic assets”. It was also observed that Af-Pak policy was not a new policy; it reflected more of continuity of former policies. Sixty per cent of Obama’s administration was not changed from the former one. With the US presence in Afghanistan, the legitimacy of the Afghanistan administration was in question. Though Af-Pak policy talked about a lot of issues, a parallel dialogue process with Saudi Arabia playing an important role was in place. That showed that the US was considering an exist strategy. A strong argument was that there would be a policy change and a tremendous military and economic pressure on Pakistan in consequence of Obama’s policy. The US would push the Afghanistan problem into Pakistan and the situation would be worse for Pakistan as it would slide into chaos leading to escalation of terrorism in the country. Until and unless the US changed its approach from military to development, it would continue to face resistance. It was concluded that even if the US was using Pakistan for its own interests, Pakistan was facing the biggest dilemma of its political history, it had to eliminate Taliban militants and survive as a progressive, democratic country. If this task could be taken care of through US help, then nobody should have any objection. However, it was also a fact that Pakistan could not have a policy based on US suppositions alone.

Second Session — US Strategic and Regional Interests

In this session the focus was on US strategic interests as well as the interests of the regional powers in Afghanistan. It was discussed whether Obama’s perception was realistic and whether the threat to US national interests came from Al-Qaeda or from Pakistan. Pakistan had to play a more consistent role. But another perspective was that the Pakistan army was always threatened by India. That Indo-Pakistan relations must be good was in US interest. More attention was being paid to Afghanistan since the US would be withdrawing from Iraq. Iran was helpful to the US to some extent in Iraq and could be helpful in Afghanistan also. But the core issue was Iranian nuclear issue and the fact that Iran wanted Iraq to stand against the US. It was argued that Iranians were also funding arms to Taliban just to keep the US occupied.

US suggestion of involving regional players in Afghanistan was a positive thing. A country’s policy is determined by its national interest. Iran and US had some common interests in Afghanistan. Iran was staunchly against the Taliban because of their exploiting the Sunni-Shia conflict and the fact that they were merciless with the Hazara people. Iran had got sympathies in Afghanistan from the Shia population, Uzbeks and Tajiks and even from people in Kabul, etc. There were linguistic, religious and regional links and Iran also was interested in having a hegemonic role in the region. Therefore Iran and the US might have some convergence of interests. If Iranians were helpful in sharing assistance and information the US would like it. Russia also had security problems from Chechens, etc., even though it was not very outspoken about it but was very much against Taliban. Central Asian states were also against the Taliban. Saudi Arabia had linkages with Taliban as their ranks also included people from Saudi Arabia and now they were fighting in Pakistan’s areas besides Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia wanted to help Pakistan but how this diplomacy would work was yet to be seen.

It was argued that the regional situation had to be examined closely. The fact that Saudi Arabia along with some of the leading Gulf countries was in competition with Iran made things more complicated. The argument that Saudi Arabia was interested in Afghanistan simply to support Pakistan was quite vague. Pakistan facilitated Saudi Arabia a lot as their interests converged during the Zia days. Saudi interests had always been in line with the US, be it Afghan Jihad or War on Terror. Hence, Saudi Arabia was going to support US policies in the future too. Iran had concerns for the Shiite population of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Gulf countries confronted Iran and saw it as a destabilizing factor and according to some analysts did not approve of US actions in Iraq which allowed Iran a bigger role in Iraq. Russian and Chinese interests converged on checking US presence in Central Asia. It appeared that India as an influential party would safeguard US interests in the region. Saudi Arabia and UAE had equally greater role in fighting terrorism in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. With regards to Saudi Arabia and Iran, Pakistan’s position was quite difficult in coming up with a policy that would ensure balancing relations with both the countries.

Unless steps were taken to develop a strong trust-based Iran-Pakistan relationship, nothing would work. India and Iran had already developed strong relations and India was using Iran’s Chahbahar Port. Therefore it was important for Pakistan that their relations should be straightened out in order to avoid getting isolated in the region. There is no denying the fact that Iran would play a major role in the coming years. Oil pipelines and transport routes from Iran were important. It was agreed that Pakistan had to fight for its own interests both diplomatically and politically. Saudi Arabia, Iran and China should be asked for assistance in this fight.

Third Session — Should India be Included as a Major Partner in Afghanistan

The third session focused on whether India be treated as a partner or adversary in Afghanistan. Pakistan was facing the dilemma of security on borders with both India and Afghanistan. In the policy-making circles only suggestions could be made. Focus of the war on terror had now shifted solely on Pakistan. Though Kashmir was not directly included in Obama’s new strategy, the US administration wanted India and Pakistan to improve relations in other areas and then bring Kashmir in. It was argued that the US was keen to drag India in to fight not only Al-Qaeda and terrorism but also to fight what it perceived as China’s expansionism. Indians would not give anything on Kashmir, but if Obama could somehow manage to let India and Pakistan sort out the issues of mistrust, no one should have reservations about it. It was also highlighted during the discussion that Afghanistan-Pakistan-India was the original plan but the Indian lobby fought and protested against it. Pakistan remained concerned with the fact that the Kashmir issue was supposed to be included in Af-Pak policy. Therefore, a large section of society in Pakistan believed that:

1. Discriminatory attitude was adopted towards Pakistan. India and Pakistan were not seen as equal by the US and the world. The question was whether India would be prevented from working against the US interests or would it continue to work on its own agenda?

2. India had played its role in Afghanistan as Pakistan was isolated. It was in US interest to see that Pakistan moved its forces from the eastern border to the western border which could not be done while mutual suspicions and apprehensions remained between India and Pakistan.

A strong perception in Pakistan was that India was seeking to destabilize Pakistan. However, Indian reaction was that India did not want to dismember Pakistan but to manage relations with it, the reason being if Pakistan bled in FATA, it would not mean any advantage to India. It was argued that basically a weak Pakistan was in India’s favour; India’s role was important in Afghanistan and in the region, but the question remained that to ensure that important role, would the world push Pakistan and India into normalizing their relations? Persuasion was coming from the West and this was again on the cards. It was argued that India might not have a clear strategy when it got involved in Balochistan and FATA; but it was a tactical approach to tell Pakistan that it should stop supporting the political movements in Kashmir, Assam, Nepal and Bangladesh against India. Again the question was discussed in detail if India wanted a weak Pakistan? India was a different state, unlike Pakistan; it did not take foreign diktat. Pakistan would have to accept the reality that India had a role to play. Being a nuclear state, it would have to either decide in favour of status quo or take action. Therefore, Indian role must be realized as essential for Pakistan in future.

Fourth Session — Options for Pakistan

The fourth session discussed options available to Pakistan in shaping its response to Obama’s Af-Pak policy. Pakistan’s survival depended on determining its interests. Pakistan had to fight a war against terrorism and unless it acted pragmatically and joined the world it would not be able to ensure its territorial integrity. As for the issue of whether people approved it or not, if the state was economically stable and the basic needs of the people were provided, they would support the government in the actions it took to ensure the best interest of its people. An important point raised by one of the participants was that if we did not win this war against extremism and terrorism, Iran would assert itself in Herat, Uzbekistan, Russia and China would rescue Mazar-e-Sharif and in this hypothetical scenario, the Pukhtoonistan issue would be embraced by Al-Qaeda. Hence the need of the hour was to give economic and political stability the top priority to safeguard national interests. An important argument was that though the US presence in the region was not accepted by the regional countries, yet if the US withdrew what would happen? Would it give way to another round of civil war in the region? It was emphasized that since all the regional countries had common interest in eliminating terrorism in Afghanistan, all countries should focus on the mechanism for joint efforts.

The US decision about India being its strategic ally was important yet alarming for the regional countries. What should Pakistan do in such circumstances? Why not look at India as a potential opportunity instead of an enemy. Indian production and economy/capital could benefit Pakistan. Due to hostile relations between the two countries, Pakistan had lost a lot of opportunities. Yet Pakistan was obsessed with the Indian threat while India, on the other hand, felt insecure by Taliban and militancy.

It was emphasized that Pakistan needed to do two things:

1. Try to convince the international community that at times terrorist groups could not be prevented from attacking Indians despite Pakistan’s full efforts as Pakistan itself was a victim of terrorism.

2. If Pakistan had credible information about terrorists then it must proceed to take action against them without the world forcing it to.

An interesting point was raised that no doubt the US wanted to back India to contain China’s role, but would it be able to contain Russia through India? If the US was thinking of an exit strategy then forces from the Muslim countries would be a better option than Indians as the Afghans would not allow Indian military presence on their soil. Interestingly, the Afghans had allowed the Indians to maintain consulates in Afghanistan more than actually needed; this would allow Indians to have an influence in Afghanistan once the US withdrew. As a result, this would have implications for Pakistan. Pakistan could make sure that Indian influence in Afghanistan did not grow beyond a certain level. It was argued that the US presence in Afghanistan would keep India out of Afghanistan; therefore, Pakistan should not be too worried about Indian role in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan must keep a watch on Indian involvement and ensure that it did not interfere in Balochistan and FATA through Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The Chair of the session concluded with following points: The participants agreed that Af-Pak policy was not really detrimental to Pakistan though there were some reservations about it. For instance:

1. In the military action in Waziristan or FATA Pakistan’s topmost security and political concerns should be kept in view.

2. India and Pakistan dialogues if carried out would be helpful in the war on terror. But Kashmir could not be avoided in any bilateral interaction. Hostility should be minimized and prospects of peace improved for the regional interest.

3. Indian presence in Afghanistan had serious implications for Balochistan and FATA the US should check Indian activities and prevent it from interfering in Pakistan.

4. No doubt all the regional actors had common interest in eliminating extremism and terrorism from these areas, it was argued that if Pakistan did not want US assistance, drone attacks, etc. then it should first become strong and stop asking for assistance.

In the final analysis, it was pointed out that Pakistan should do an objective analysis of what was in its own interest. Af-Pak policy was vague and there were few elements in it different from Bush’s policy. The Obama administration was dealing with “good Taliban” through Saudi help, but it was not easy to identify “good” and “bad” Taliban in Afghanistan. It was emphasized that though the real problem lay in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s tribal areas were also an issue, ignoring them would be disastrous and suicidal for the country. It was concluded that the objectives of Af-Pak policy and possibility of its success was more important than who was included and who was not. Mistrust between Pakistan and India should be dealt with effectively as it was in Pakistan’s interest. On the Kashmir issue, unlike Pakistan, India was not dependent on US assistance; Pakistan was more dependent because of its weak economy and unstable domestic situation. It was concluded that Indian presence in Afghanistan was not only because of the US presence and encouragement but also because Indian influence was already there in Afghanistan. It was unfortunate that somewhere in Pakistan’s policy-making process, something really went wrong that it could not influence a neighbouring Muslim country with so much cultural and religious affinities.