The European Union and Africa: emerging priorities, opportunities and challenges

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SAIIA is a non-governmental research institute focused on South Africa’s and Africa’s international relations. We provide analysis, promote dialogue and contribute to African policy making in a dynamic global context.

SAIIA’s research agenda is informed by South Africa and Africa’s international engagement on key issues related to addressing the continent's political and economic marginalisation; furthering good governance and political stability in the region, and ensuring that Africa is placed on a more sustainable growth path. SAIIA achieves these objectives by doing solid, forward-looking research on issues of concern to the continent, by building research capacity in South Africa and the region, by providing a platform for informed debate and by making input into policymaking on issues of concern to Africa. Our research agenda is thus strongly policy focused and is clustered according to both thematic and country/region-specific themes.

The thematic clusters are: Governance and Democracy (both at a national and a continental level); Trade and Investment (at a country, continental and multilateral level); Emerging Powers and Global Challenges; and Security and Conflict Resolution (mostly directed at South Africa and Africa’s role in addressing conflict and insecurity in the region with partners from the north). Our country/region specific programmes are divided into two clusters: South African foreign policy engagement and our African Drivers Programme. The last research cluster on SAIIA’s research agenda straddles both region/country-specific research and global themes such as climate change, gender, global governance and migration. However, all our research themes are of a cross-cutting nature.
## Contents

Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. Page 9  
Contributors ............................................................................................................. Page 10

### Introduction  
Frank Spengler ........................................................................................................ Page 15

### Introductory comments  
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos ................................................................................................ Page 18

### The EU-Africa joint strategy: an overview  
Mahmat Saleh Annadif ................................................................................................ Page 20

### The European perspective on the joint EU-Africa strategy and accompanying action plan  
Klaus Rudischhauser ................................................................................................ Page 23

### The joint EU-Africa strategy and accompanying action plan  
Comments and discussion ..................................................................................... Page 26

### Session one: democratic governance and human rights ................................ Page 32

### The democratic governance and human rights partnership  
Geert Laporte .......................................................................................................... Page 33

### Challenges to governance in Africa  
Gideon Ogola Ochanda ........................................................................................... Page 35

### Africa and the international human rights framework  
Judith Cohen ............................................................................................................. Page 38
The European Union’s role in promoting democratic governance and human rights
Aristotelis Bouratsis ................................................................................................Page 42

Democratic governance and human rights: the case of Malawi
Mavuto Bamusi........................................................................................................Page 45

Democratic governance and human rights: comments
Abbia Udofia............................................................................................................Page 48

Democratic governance and human rights
Discussion ................................................................................................................Page 50

Session two: EU-Africa cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction and development of the private sector.................................................................Page 57

Post-conflict reconstruction and development of the private sector:
opening comments
Professor Peter Molt...............................................................................................Page 58

Connecting development with other issues in the EU-Africa strategy
Philippe Darmuzey .................................................................................................Page 59

Addressing post-conflict reconstruction
Klaus-Jürgen Hedrich ................................................................................................Page 63

Post-conflict reconstruction: what and how?
Dr Stefan Mair .........................................................................................................Page 66

The EU-Africa partnership in post-conflict situations
Yacouba Berthé .......................................................................................................Page 69

EU-Africa cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction and development of the private sector
Discussion ................................................................................................................Page 71

Session three: the energy security-climate change interface ..........Page 77

The energy security-climate change interface
Anders Wijkman MEP .............................................................................................Page 78
Energy security and climate change: key development issues
Tim Hughes..............................................................................................................Page 80

The magnitude of the climate/energy challenge
Nick Mabey ..............................................................................................................Page 83

Mitigation, adaption and the Global Climate Change Alliance
Walter Kennes..........................................................................................................Page 87

The energy security-climate change interface
Discussion ................................................................................................................Page 90

Concluding remarks
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos ...........................................................................................Page 95
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific countries</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>ETS</td>
<td>Emissions Trading System</td>
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<td>EUR</td>
<td>Euro (currency)</td>
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<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade</td>
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<td>GCCA</td>
<td>Global Climate Change Alliance</td>
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<td>GEEREF</td>
<td>Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<td>KAS</td>
<td>Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung</td>
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<tr>
<td>KZN</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDRI</td>
<td>Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States dollars</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Introduction

Frank Spengler

A renewed EU-Africa strategy

The European Union and African countries represented by the African Union signed a renewed EU/Africa Strategy in Lisbon, Portugal in December 2007. The aim is to strengthen and develop the EU/AU relationship. The intention of both the EU and the AU was, and is, to develop cooperation on the basis of partnership and mutual accountability, thus moving beyond the recipient-donor relationship that has very often characterised the situation of the past. This new partnership is to be built on shared values such as democracy and respect for human rights, peace and security, trade and mutual integration and sustainable economic development.

However, there are numerous challenges ahead. The most important probably is the implementation of the action plan that is part of the strategy. Both sides must do this. It is the responsibility of all state- and non-state actors to ensure assessment and monitoring of this process.

The action plan is very ambitious with eight priorities:

- Peace and security;
- Democratic governance and human rights;
- Trade, regional integration and infrastructure;
- The Millennium Development Goals;
- Energy;
- Climate change;
- Migration, mobility and employment; and
- Science, information society and space.

The EU/AU Lisbon strategy has been jointly developed. However, some African countries were not really in a position to give significant input into the paper during
the course of the negotiations. This is certainly due to capacity constraints. Nevertheless, the strategy and action plan reflect the will of the African countries, although there is arguably a missing element: what can African countries contribute to Europe?

Nevertheless the joint strategy is an important and successful step towards better cooperation and understanding between Europe and Africa. It is a historic milestone for a new partnership that we are building for the future.

**Priority areas**
This workshop will concentrate on three priority areas: first, democratic governance and human rights; second, post-conflict stabilisation and the role of the private sector; and third, the interface between energy security and climate change.

The first priority area, on democratic governance and human rights is about accountability to citizens. This is a crucial aspect of development. Africa and Europe have different interpretations of what this means and about how non-accountability and human right abuses should be dealt with. These questions can be explored on two levels: first, on the global level in forums such as the United Nations Human Rights Council; and second at the continental level by supporting the African Peer-Review Mechanism and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, as set out in the EU/AU partnership agreement.

As well as EU/Africa collaboration on this, the relationship between African countries and newly emerging actors such as China must be considered. Economic relations between Africa and China have developed impressively, thanks to Africa's abundance of natural resources and growing markets for Chinese goods. China is also active in development assistance, and Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao has committed his country to help African states to improve democracy, the rule of law and social justice. But China also cooperates with authoritarian African regimes, for example Sudan and Zimbabwe. African governments resisting internal and external calls for democratisation seem to benefit from diplomatic and material support from Beijing. Promoting democracy and rule of law seems to be a rather low priority among the objectives of Chinese foreign policy.

Western donors, meanwhile, increasingly provide development support aimed at democratic reforms, participation and accountability. In the view of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, there is no sustainable development without democracy, and democracy always means party democracy. The Chinese democratic concept, such as it is, is not based on good governance. This makes China an interesting partner
especially for those governments that insist on asserting their power against the interests of their own populations. But there are also human right issues that Europe must address, relating to migration and racism.

The second priority for this workshop is post-conflict reconstruction and the role of the private sector. Attempts to create sustainable peace and security in Africa follow conflict resolution and peace-keeping work. Successful post-conflict reconstruction and development depend on governance and aid agencies, and to a great extent on active and integrated private sector activities. This workshop will thus examine how mechanisms such as the EU-Africa Business Forum, the EU Chamber of Commerce and the EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure can be used as vehicles for sustainable post-conflict reconstruction and development.

The third priority is the interface between energy security and climate change. Energy security is one of the world's key challenges for the next decades. Concern over this has accelerated engagement in Africa by external actors, while at the same time compounding worries about environmental degradation and climate change.

The joint EU-Africa strategy is a solid basis from which EU-Africa cooperation can be developed. But it is necessary to define clear proposals on how to do this, and on how we can intensify the links between Africa and Europe in the priority areas. A strengthened partnership will contribute to peace, stability and development, not only in Africa but also globally.
EU-Africa: a long engagement

The EU-Africa partnership as signed in Lisbon in December 2007 is the latest in a series of joint strategies, and the latest face of the engagement between the two continents, which has been a long and often difficult one. The partnership is meant to herald a very different form of cooperation dialogue, which will be based on genuine partnership and shared values. It is thus very different from the first tentative engagement between Africa and the European Economic Community soon after decolonisation, and the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. This change reflects the maturing of the post-colonial period relationship, which began with the Yaoundé Convention.

The changed strategy also reflects the very different world we now live in. The world is in transition and the dominance of the industrialised west over the next century is not assured. Equally, it is uncertain how the global system will evolve. Will we see a more effective rules-based global system or a weaker and diluted one. This global transitional period therefore necessitates re-appraisal and redefinition of relationships. The joint strategy is the first sign of such a process in the context of the EU and Africa. Its substance also illustrates the deepening interdependence of various actors globally and the fact that, although Africa’s economic footprint is relatively small, its significance derives from its natural resources and strategic location. Africa is beginning to develop its relationships with emerging actors. Dealing with many of the new global challenges, some of which are indeed encapsulated in the joint strategy’s priority areas, such as climate change, does indeed require cooperation rather than competition. The new EU-Africa partnership is like a marriage – an appropriate analogy when discussing the relationships between the European Union, China and Africa. There are bound to be disagreements, there are bound to be different interpretations and perspectives. But there are also areas of
mutual benefit and common purpose, and areas in which both sides can learn from each other. The intention of this workshop was not to try to unpack all eight priority areas of the Lisbon strategy in a day. The focus is to look at three key areas that address some of the core values of the partnership, such as human rights, democracy and good governance, and that also encompass some of the major challenges facing Africa: peace and security, and post-conflict reconstruction.
The EU-Africa joint strategy: an overview

H.E. Mahmat Saleh Annadif

Opening comments

On December 8-9, Africa and Europe adopted a joint strategy and an action plan. The strategy offers a certain number of opportunities, but it also contains a lot of challenges that must be tackled if the expectations raised by the Lisbon Summit are to be met. It is true that Africa and Europe are part of a globalised world, which imposes on them a certain number of rules and ways to behave. But nevertheless the two continents are historically and geographically bound together, as they are by the common languages that we speak today. One can travel throughout the African continent: the official languages are either English or French, Portuguese or Spanish. But, even accepting the different languages and the history, Africa remains African.

The EU-Africa bloc consists of more than 80 countries. Europe has experience and technology, while Africa offers a big market with immense stocks of raw material and energy. The EU and Africa can play – as it is laid out in the strategy – an important role on the international scene by pooling together all these resources. Africa in any case thinks that this opportunity can help her attain sustainable development, in order to better integrate into the world economy.

But there are a number of challenges to be tackled. On the European side, there is a major challenge. We want to reinforce the coherence and the efficiency of our partnership. Europe must adapt its financial and legal cooperation and partnership instruments in order to respond to new needs and new expectations. Will this happen over the short or long term?

Because until now Europe cooperates with Africa in a fragmented way. If we look at what is left of the Cotonou Agreement, we have North Africa which is ruled by the military, and sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa which have different
agreements. The challenge is to re-adapt all the texts so that Europe can speak to Africa. This is a head-on challenge.

For Africa the challenges are also numerous. Promoting peace, stability and security are major challenges. Many efforts are being made, such as coordination with the United Nations Security Council, and, of course, with the EU. Peace processes have been initiated in Africa by the EU, offering what is becoming a model for helping Africa to tackle its challenges related to peace, security and stability.

**Realising African potential**

Africa has great potential, but for the moment it needs to reinforce its logistical and technical capacities, and for that it needs support. In terms of peace and security, at the pan-African level, we do not think that the end of a war is an end in itself. Establishing peace is one thing, but rebuilding all that has been destroyed and kickstarting development are others. This is why at an African level there is a declaration on post-conflict reconstruction that sets out what needs to be done to help countries emerging from conflict. But more needs to be done.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a voluntary audit that African countries can choose. It can produce conclusions that are often too expensive to put into practice. This is a concrete example of one area where partnership should assist Africa in implementation. The case of Kenya is revealing. Kenya carried out the audit and an action plan resulted. But the actions were not applied. If they had been, perhaps the post-election violence at the end of 2007 could have been avoided. However, Africa does have the Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the important Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government. That Africa has these marks important progress. Today is not like the 1970s when coups were made easy. Today, a country or the leaders of a country who stage a coup d'état know the sanctions at African Union level and the chain reaction at international level. Africa is making an effort, but it needs to be supported.

The three-year action plan accompanying the joint strategy has a number of priorities and concrete actions to be realised. The African and European populations wait with hope for the outcome of the implementation of this plan by the next EU-Africa summit in 2010. The joint strategy can bring together many actors from civil society, NGOs, parliaments and the private sector. The main challenge is therefore clear. How can work from now to 2010 respond to the expectations and hopes for the joint strategy? The private sector naturally needs a healthy and stable environment to grow. At African level today many things are being done in order to facilitate investment and to create an environment that stimulates wealth, as the only
possibility towards growth and development.

Concerning the securing of energy supplies and tackling climate change, the first preference should be securing the food supply. For Africa, food security is really the first priority. Africa is vulnerable to climate change and the effects are already being noticed in a vicious circle of floods and droughts. This makes the African food supply insecure, and the vicious circle needs to be broken. Africa is not responsible for climate change, but it is part of the global society and therefore concerned. In any case Africa is readying itself. A partnership with Europe will help tackle this global challenge that affects us all.
The European perspective on the joint EU-Africa strategy and accompanying action plan

Klaus Rudischhauser

EU-African relations in context
The new EU-Africa agreement needs to be put into the context of EU-African relations as a whole. The first and, until recently, only EU-Africa summit was held in Cairo in 2000. It was not really followed-up with good implementation of the rather ambitious action plan that was adopted there. Therefore the main challenge for the 2007 summit was to do things better by setting out the path to more regular summits, and to better and more timely implementation. This meant the 2007 summit had a number of obstacles to overcome. The efforts and determination of the Portuguese presidency of the EU in making the summit happen have to be appreciated.

On the substance of the summit, it is necessary to go two steps back: to the adoption in 2005 by the EU of its strategy for Africa. That was the first time the EU defined its strategy for Africa. Up to that point there were a number of strategies but no joint strategy agreed between the European Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and member states. Agreement on a joint approach to Africa and the related policy areas was a major step that should not be underestimated.

However, the EU’s African partners wanted to extend the joint strategy, so that Africa’s strategic role would also be defined. Consequently in early 2007 work began on such a joint strategy. This was developed in less than a year, but is nevertheless a substantial document. Agreeing on this – between the EU institutions and member states, and 53 African states – meant an enormous amount of downstream coordination and work behind the scenes. It would probably have been impossible
for the EU to reach internal agreement in such a short time had a working group not been created within the Council. This group broke new ground by working cross-pillar and across themes. Otherwise, negotiations would have had to have taken place across as many as 20 Council groups.

**Controversial issues**

In the run-up to the summit, there was a large amount of public discussion on whether or not it would take place and whether or not it would be overshadowed by two key issues. The first was the participation of all African leaders, including Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and the related issues of democracy and human rights. As a result of Mugabe’s attendance, some EU member states did not participate at the highest level in the summit. The second and more substantial issue was the discussion about Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that were being negotiated between the EU and African regional organisations and the Caribbean and Pacific countries. The public debate about EPAs turned more and more negative towards the end of 2007, leading to a real risk that the summit could be confrontational and difficult.

Ultimately both issues were discussed very openly and frankly at the summit by heads of state. Those that attended the summit certainly felt this, and much consensus was achieved. The strategy and action plan that came out of the summit are ambitious; one can even say that the EU does not have such ambitious partnerships with many of its other global partners. The strategy and action plan are based on an agreement among the participants to try to speak with a common voice on global challenges and global themes. This makes the summit outcome into more than the usual kind of declaration.

The summit produced several significant forward steps:

- The partners took common positions and agreed to try to take common positions in international fora;
- It was agreed that the partnership should not just be a government to government partnership, but should include civil society and non-state actors at all levels; this is something not found in many partnerships that the EU has concluded with other global partners
- An action plan was produced with a selection of eight themes. This marked a departure from the type of plan that was adopted at the Cairo summit. The eight themes embrace concrete actions on which the partners would like to deliver. There was discussion of many more themes, but the decision was made to limit the action plan to eight.
Nevertheless, the eight themes (peace and security; democratic governance and human rights; trade, regional integration and infrastructure; the Millennium Development Goals; energy; climate change; migration, mobility and employment; and science, information society and space) are very ambitious. They set the agenda for the coming three years, in the period up to the next summit in 2010.

The challenge ahead

The challenge facing us is how to implement these partnerships. In this respect there are two difficulties. The first is that these partnerships are not just between the European Commission and the African Union Commission. They are also between the 27 EU member states and the 53 African States. The challenge will be to work in new institutional setups. The European Commission and EU member states know how to implement programmes, but have little experience in implementing ambitious programmes simultaneously and coherently. New mechanisms will have to be created to define roles and coordinate the activities.

The second difficulty will be how to involve civil society, including business, NGOs, other non-state actors and parliaments. This will involve breaking new ground and learning-by-doing. Discussions have already started to try to find ways of involving civil society. By the time of the next ministerial level troika (EU presidency, Council and Commission) meeting between the EU and Africa, it will be possible to report on these mechanisms and to agree with the African side on what will they will be and how they will work.

In summary, on the one hand, in substantive political terms, the renewed EU-Africa partnership breaks new ground. The two sides have agreed to discuss items that they have previously not been able to discuss or have not discussed in such a wide ranging way, across eight partnerships. Institutional challenges will have to be overcome to move the partnerships forward. There will need to be cooperation between EU member states and the European Commission, as well as the involvement of civil society. It will be extremely difficult to live up to the expectations by the time of the next summit in 2010. Nevertheless the eighty heads of state agreed in Lisbon on an extremely ambitious agenda. The EU member states are very committed, as can be seen now in discussions about implementation. At the moment, the partnerships are on a good track, but it will be necessary to assess progress in a year or two.
The joint EU-Africa strategy and accompanying action plan

Comments and discussion

Comments from Dr Bonginkosi Buthelezi
The EU-Africa joint strategy is a step in the right direction. The EU’s 2005 strategy for Africa was criticised for taking a top-down approach and for lacking consultation with Africa. The legitimacy or success of the renewed strategy will be proved if there are comprehensive and effective follow-up plans, ahead of the next summit which is scheduled for 2010. The EU and Africa are bound together by history and geography and working together is a long-term project.

Cooperation between Africa and Europe has developed and diversified since the first EU-Africa summit which was held in 2000 in Cairo. Both sides will need to develop strategies to guide the cooperation going forward. From an African point of view it is possible to agree with the EU perspective that the Lisbon EU-Africa summit was a historic summit. It aimed at developing a partnership in mutual cooperation and accountability between the two continents. It should be highlighted that the strategy could see a move away from EU-Africa donor-recipient relationship, towards a true partnership. African countries can contribute to the strategy: this is one of the most important issues. Having identified eight priority areas of collaboration in the action plan, there are indeed numerous challenges ahead for the partnership, especially with regards to the implementation of the commitments that have been made. There is a legitimacy test that the EU-Africa strategy must pass.

Comments from John Walters
Was the Lisbon EU-Africa summit really an historic event, and will history repeats itself? Does the renewed EU-Africa partnership imply equality? We must ask what each partner will bring to the table. Will the new partnership in fact be an extension
of the status quo: the donor-recipient relationship enclosed in nice words? Will the partnership put bread on the table in a country like Namibia, which is still waiting for promises to be fulfilled years after independence?

It is necessary to be patient. The new ideas envisaged in the new partnership must be given time. The theories must be put into practice. There are many issues affecting African countries to be addressed: extremely high HIV-AIDS rates, other diseases, high unemployment. Jobs and education, in fact, are central. Africa does not ask for allowances, but for the opportunity to earn its living, and for the opportunity to educate its children, who have a right to education. Many promises have been made in the past, about access to health care, improvements in living standards, access to water, and affordable housing. But many in Africa continue to lack medicine, continue to live in poverty, continue to have to walk kilometres to get access to water, and still live in informal settlements where the houses flood when it rains. Africa needs answers to its questions about these issues, and to its accusation that past promises have not been kept.

**Contribution from the floor**
The EU-Africa strategy document is a very brilliant document. There is a vision, principles, strategies, objectives and so forth, as well as an action plan. But there is a problem because of the dishonesty of African leaders. What can be done to ensure that African leaders keep to the agreement? The next EU-Africa summit will be in 2010 and at that meeting, Africa must tell the EU what it has done. We say this is a partnership, so Africa must show that it is serious and ready to be involved.

**Question from the floor**
What has been done to learn from past failures in the EU-Africa relationship? Meanwhile, the African Union is less known and well understood that the EU. What are the shared values that brings the AU together? How are these shared values a component of the partnership between the EU and Africa. There is a problem with openness and willingness to address past failures. If the new partnership tries to put past failures to one side, there will be a problem in understanding them.

**Contribution from the floor**
The partnership should be widened to include people, both in Europe and in Africa. At the moment there is an impression that it is a partnership between the European elite and the African elite. But while the European elite might be large, the African elite is still small. The partnership needs to be more inclusive. This is important for accountability and human rights. Discussions about civil society and non-governmental actors are addressed to the African elite and the African diaspora in
Europe. But people need to be involved in this matter. But there needs to be a wider understanding of the context of what human rights is about and what accountability is about. This should be understood not just in the elite context.

Response from Klaus Rudischhauser
In terms of including people in the partnership, this has been decided and undertaken as a commitment, but we still have to deliver. However, if one looks back at the process of drafting the strategy, the impression is that both sides are serious about this. On the European side a public consultation was launched on the very day the discussions with the African side started. Civil society representatives were then invited for a meeting in April, which was still at a very early stage of the work with the African partners. A large though not necessarily fully representative sample of European and African NGOs and civil society representatives participated. They delivered a rather substantial report with many recommendations and issues to be considered in a future strategy. The Commission then held a number of meetings with European NGO platforms in Brussels, and had very extensive discussions both with the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament, and to some extent with the joint parliamentary assembly under the Cotonou Agreement.

On the African side, two events involving the civil society took place as part of the development of the strategy. Then, under the Portuguese EU presidency, just four weeks before the Lisbon EU-Africa summit, a civil society summit involving both African and European civil society took place in Lisbon, where a document was formulated and agreed. Then, and this is also evidence that this is a commitment, civil society was invited to the Lisbon summit to present this document. At the summit the business community, civil society, trade unions and youth organisations of both continents presented to the heads of state their ideas about a joint strategy and their expectations. So, without exaggerating, up to the adoption of the strategy the involvement of actors outside governments was substantial. In implementing the strategy, we still face challenges and we still have to deliver, but it has been demonstrated in a very credible way up to the level of heads of state, that there is seriousness behind the undertakings.

Contribution from the floor
It has been rightly pointed out that the proof of the strategy will be in its implementation. But perhaps we already have a means for implementing this strategy: Economic Partnership Agreements. But these are controversial with one partner feeling they are being damaged. Are the Economic Partnership Agreements a sign of how the partnership will be implemented?
Contribution from Professor Peter Molt
The idea behind the partnership is certainly convincing, but I wonder how the European Union and the African Union, that are so far away from local people, can really tackle the problem of legitimacy with civil society. Forging a closer partnership between African and European people needs a major effort. Germany has experience of a partnership between the Rhineland-Palatinate and Rwanda, which started in 1982. It is still very active, but has not been copied in Germany, though the state of North Rhine Westphalia has decided to do something similar with Ghana. A question remains therefore of how partnerships between the people of Africa and the people of Europe can really be brought about.

Question from the floor
Where are people best represented? In parliaments. So what possibilities exist to better integrate African parliaments and European parliaments? Would you agree that this is a key factor now that the strategy has been adopted. The implementation needs to be very precise and detailed, and must also be monitored. Do parliaments need to work on capacity building so that they can better monitor the implementation of the strategy?

Contribution from Klaus Rudischhauser
The European Commission is seen as the bad guy in the EPA discussions. It is true that the EU has not been able to convey, in particular to civil society in the ACP countries, what EPAs are about. Governments however have understood the objectives and the process. So the real problem with EPAs is a communication problem. There have been other problems, such as with timing, because negotiations started too late. From the year 2000 it was known that something had to be done about the non-reciprocal trade arrangements, but it took seven years to really get to grips with this. A lot of time was lost. Consequently, there has been regrettable time pressure to at least address the issue of trade in goods. Neither side used time properly, and this led to a situation that was difficult to manage.

From the Commission’s perspective, EPAs are a part of the partnership that we would like to develop. EPAs aim first of all at continuing the non-reciprocal trade partnership. That means no import duties and no import restrictions for goods coming into Europe, and a gradual lowering of import barriers to ACP countries. In this respect, transition periods might last up to 25 years so that sectors can adapt, and market opening will be limited so that sensitive sectors are protected for those that have signed. EPAs will thus continue to offer the advantages that the EU has been granting for many years. This is for trading in goods. The problem in this respect is not European imports to Africa. They take place in any case. The problem
is trade barriers between African countries, which leads to a fragmentation of markets and a real impediment to trade between African countries. This is an impediment to economic development in Africa. It is not because the EU has aggressive trade interests that it wanted to negotiate EPAs, but because they are a tool to promote economic development in Africa.

When Europe negotiates in the WTO it must also accept market opening, which has led to very significant economic changes in Europe. In the end, it leads to economic development, and this will be the case in Africa if the EPAs are finalised and implemented. Additionally, the EPAs were set up in such a way that whatever would be signed up to would then be supported in material terms by the EU. This can involve a lot of money, so negotiating EPAs is also a question of access to funds that would otherwise not be available, to cushion the effects of opening up, to help the adaptation effort and to boost the development of the African economy.

Foreign direct investment in Africa, especially from Europe, is negligible, which is a real impediment to economic development in Africa. Why do foreign companies not invest in Africa? Because the investment climate is too risky. Because there is not always good governance or clear jurisdiction. EPAs would serve to improve the investment climate, thereby creating economic development. What the EU is trying to achieve is the promotion of economic integration between Europe and Africa. There have been some adverse effects, but African countries also say that the Chinese textile industry is destroying the African textile industry. So, with or without EPAs, Africa has to face the fact of global trade. Erecting trade barriers will not protect Africa from this in the long run. EPAs can help Africa’s economic transition.

Concerning the overall implementation of the Lisbon strategy, it will be necessary to try and get as many actors as possible to participate: parliaments, non-state actors, civil society, NGOs – the willingness is there. We now have to set up mechanisms and encourage their development. For example, twinning between cities or local authorities is one approach that could be pursued.

The key objective of some of the partnerships will be to involve parliaments and to try and promote development of parliaments in African countries. This is something that is also being done outside of this partnership. When the EU provides budget support to African countries, it forces African governments to involve their parliaments in the budgetary discussions and in the establishment of the budget.

**Contribution from the floor**

As far as the EU is concerned there is already an economic partnership between the
EU and Africa. But there are eight action plans in the Lisbon strategy. Progress needs to be made in all eight action plans before it is possible to say that the strategy will benefit both Africa and the EU.

**Contribution from John Walters**
The EU-Africa agreement is not a partnership in the true sense of the word. It is a relationship and it needs to be asked if it is just an extension of the status quo. A partnership implies equality between the partners. The EU brings to the table funds for development, but says the funds will only be given if Africa performs in the sense of good governance. Is that a partnership? It is an agreement where one party allows certain things if the other party behaves in a certain way.

It is certainly the case that the EU is working outside this partnership to engage pan-African parliaments, but what can be done to enhance the capacities of members of parliaments is a valid question. Those members are the representatives of the people. They need improved capacity to represent the people as part of developing the EU-Africa partnership.

**Contribution from Elizabeth Sidiropoulos**
It is useful to consider the nature of the EU-Africa partnership, not because there is the lack of an intention to form a true partnership, but because of facts on the ground. The African continent presents many challenges, whereas the EU has vast resources, substantial capacities and very strong institutions. One of the challenges is that the AU Commission is itself a new institution.

Parliaments can play a role in monitoring and evaluating the strategy, but in the African context many parliaments operate in a very different environment and in a very different way to EU member state parliaments. In Malawi the parliament has not sat since last year because of a range of disputes. The ability to hold governments accountable and to exercise proper monitoring control is lacking in many countries. Concerning EPAs, Africa’s own regional integration schemes, which everyone would agree are many and overlapping, can present a barrier. The question is whether the EPA discussion is going to help to rationalise them, or if it will compound some of the problems.
Session one:
democratic governance and human rights
The democratic governance and human rights partnership

Geert Laporte

Democratic governance and human rights is one of the partnerships of the EU-Africa joint strategy. As an eminent South African member of parliament recently said, governance is the starting point for development. But governance cannot be imposed from outside; it has to grow organically and it should be based on existing African governance architectures. These architectures include the Africa Peer Review Mechanism, the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance, and the Organisation of African Unity’s Declaration Against Unconstitutional Changes of Government. But African politicians recognise that this is not enough. Kenya, for example, has gone through the Africa Peer Review Mechanism process and there has even been an action plan for Kenya. But the recommendations arising from this have not been applied. There is an important question of what should best be done to implement this specific partnership on democracy and human rights in the EU-Africa joint strategy.

Key questions include:

• How can the joint strategy best support political transformation and good governance in Africa? We need concrete proposals as to what can be done, because the time to implement the joint strategy has arrived.
• What are the best ways and means for the EU to accompany Africa as it progresses towards political transformation, governance and democratisation? How can we improve on what we have done so far? In the EU there have been different approaches to promoting governance and democratisation. Some of these have been extensively evaluated, but the record has been rather mixed, so it is necessary to take a fresh look at Africa. Then the question arises of how EU
governance approaches and instruments can better align with the existing African governance architecture? What convergence can we find between the governance profiles of the EU, the European Commission and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism?

• How can we ensure reciprocity in the governance debate? That is a request that came up all the time during the joint strategy process, with strong concerns from the African side. There were many remarks on the EU's responsibilities in the partnership over issues such as governance, policy coherence, mutual accountability, the treatment in Europe of African migrants and so on. These questions relating to reciprocity are certainly also crucial for implementing the partnership on governance. Furthermore, governance could also be integrated better in all the different areas of the joint strategy, if we accept that governance is a starting point for any type of development.

We should also be aware that governance should move beyond purely political and technocratic dimensions, and be part of the debates on, for example, EPAs, regional integration, climate change, natural resources, energy and migration policies. All of these areas, which have been clearly defined in the other partnerships of the joint strategy, are also to some extent linked to governance.
Challenges to governance in Africa

Gideon Ogola Ochanda

Africa should not be regarded as a single, uniform bloc with the same things happening in the east as in the west. This leads to the idea that Africa can be approached using a common agenda, yet from an African point of view, the agenda is viewed very differently. This is relevant when addressing the questions of governance, government and human rights.

When looking at the functions of the different actors involved in governance, it is necessary to evaluate if they are providing a level of governance, and if that is good or bad. This brings to the fore the issue of the role of government, the role of citizens and individuals, the role of organised groups, both informally and formally, either for profit or not for profit, and the role of external actors. How do they interact and function and are there processes running that we can really call governance?

In terms of whether governance in Africa is democratic or not depends to a degree on the eye of the beholder. What qualifies governments as being democratic? Do they hold regular elections? Do they elect members of parliament, or hold presidential elections? People in the industrialised countries look at these symbols but they do not look at the details in terms of the interplay of the many actors and their functions. Kenya has elections, for example, and has been having elections regularly every five years. Is it more democratic than other countries in the region?

The role of political parties
There is also an argument that the best answer to whether a country is democratic or not is to look at the existence of political parties. But some countries do not have political parties, but they function and they are accepted as democratic, whereas there are those in which the main political parties have become institutions that have
the effect of blocking the development of democracy. This has been seen in Kenya, where there are 150 or so political parties, 23 of which are in parliament. But they do not agree and their diversity makes it hard to take decisions.

Other ways of measuring democracy are to assess the media and see if it is vibrant, or to analyse civil society and the role it plays. Or one can look at how the justice system works. A number of African countries have general problems that appear to be common to most African countries. In a lot of countries, there are elected public institutions but the executive dominates. Democracy promoters would rather work with parliaments because they are elected; they work on the process of elections and how parliaments work with the executive. But this can leave a lot of gaps – some parliaments simply work at the will of the executive. These are constitutional or legal issues. Unless they are addressed it is not easy to come to a country and work with parliament for purposes of enhancing governance in a country.

One can isolate for example of the judiciary. In Kenya, for example, the judiciary is an extension of the executive. When this is also the case with the parliament, there is no effective check on power. In this case, focusing on the parliament would be a case of investing in the wrong institution for the purposes of enhancing governance.

**Governance and human rights**

Work on governance must be connected with human rights. We need to emphasise the importance of the individual citizen. The state and government exists to serve the interests of citizens. They are not serving citizens if the citizen is not seeing the benefits, and there is always a tendency to abuse human rights. There is a tendency for the state to be far removed from the citizen.

The real problem in many cases is the failure to professionalise the state. Political parties and leaders are constantly coming and going. Their motivation is generally not working for the overall benefit of the general citizenry. It is more that their time has come and their communities or ethnic groups can be part of the government. When they take power they change everything, removing all the permanent secretaries, for instance, and so there is no continuity. Ethics is not a consideration, and the concept of separation of powers disappears. The result is government institutions that factions battle to control for short-term benefit. This is a constant conflict, particularly in Africa, because we have failed to professionalise the state.

The civil service is the tool of political parties in power. If a party gains power it fills the civil service with its sympathisers or relatives of its leaders. This means though elections might look democratic, inside the institutions of state, everything goes
wrong. With a new government, everybody is sacked; those who were on the outside come in. This is a threat to development.

One great barrier to addressing these issues and taking the joint strategy forward is communication. This must be looked at very seriously. Agreements made for Africa – charters, joint strategies and so on – are made by and with the people who can communicate. This is a tiny minority in most of Africa. In Nairobi, for example, with three million people, very few can access the Internet and have easy access to information. In rural areas, even this level of communication is unimaginable. Access to information could influence election processes in a very positive way.

Access to information and level of communication has a parallel in the level of responsibility of the individual to make choices, such as in elections. There is a huge difference between Europe and Africa in this respect. The great majority of Africans do not have access to information. The EU sometimes complains it is little understood by Europeans, but in Africa even fewer people know what the AU is doing. The EU-Africa strategy needs work to identify who the actors taking the strategy forward will be, and this must be connected to individuals, who must have some reasons for trusting the institutions of government.
Africa and the international human rights framework

Judith Cohen

Human rights standard setting
As we celebrate in 2008 the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights we can reflect on how at international and regional level we have done remarkably well in terms of human rights standard setting, with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights possibly being even more progressive than the Universal Declaration. However, we have grappled particularly in Africa with turning the rights contained in these and other important instruments into reality in peoples’ daily lives. Democratic governance and national human rights institutions can play an important role in strengthening constitutional democracy and promoting human rights in Africa.

The global and regional human rights systems are important despite some arguments that they only represent an opportunity for a soft form of accountability through the state reporting mechanisms. However, this form of accountability of reporting to peers in an open and transparent manner, accompanied with a public pronouncement, is important because it holds governments publicly accountable, even though there is an absence of meaningful sanctions for lack of compliance. On the African continent we are increasingly seeing more successful elections, and instruments such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. However, the focus on public ballots and the carrying out of effective elections has not always ensured that all the values of democracy filter through and are embraced by citizens.

The donor community and its partners need to view democracy broadly, and should not just focus on democracy in a narrow process-oriented way: the holding of
successful and fair elections, creating institutions, and the establishment of laws. It is what follows these elections that is of importance and determines if respect for human rights permeates the society.

The meaning of democracy

Democracy for the peoples of Africa represents freedom from colonial oppression – in South Africa, freedom from apartheid as well. Democracy is an attractive mantra that brings with it a broader outcome, evidenced in great expectations of improvements in peoples’ social and economic conditions. Increasingly, we are seeing higher levels of discontent as it is clear that people on the ground have not experienced democracy. For example, South Africa has experienced a large number of protests in the past year because the government appears unable to respond to the crisis of expectations brought about by the rights enshrined in our constitution remaining elusive to so many. Though we have liberated the state from colonialism and apartheid, we have yet to liberate all our people. As Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime minister of Ghana, said, “a people can win freedom without themselves becoming free.”

If human rights are truly universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated then there appears to have been a neglect of economic and social rights on the African continent. It needs to be recognised that the donor community often places a greater focus on civil and political rights, while people struggle on the continent to have access to drinkable water, food, sanitation and education. Amidst these challenges for human rights and democratic governance we have created a number of African regional institutions such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the revamped OAU, the Pan-African Parliament and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). In order for these institutions and processes to be successful, civil society and human rights institutions can play an important role in fostering participatory democracy. National rights institutions in particular have been found to be more respected when they focus on issues that have economic and social importance to people.

Recognising national institutions

This important role of national institutions has been recognised by Kofi Annan, who stated that building strong institutions at the country level is what in the long run will ensure that human rights are protected and advanced in a sustained manner. Despite this, there is scant mention of human rights institutions in the EU-Africa strategic partnership. In the strategic partnership plan they are not mentioned at all. Given that national human rights institutions are currently under-recognised, even at an international level, the state and non-governmental organisations being the
dominant participant, it is not surprising that this is replicated on the regional level and in the Africa-EU partnership.

Many of the international human rights instruments were created prior to national human rights institutions being established and thus no formal role was ascribed to the latter. However this is starting to change swiftly, and national human rights institutions are themselves demanding and are being granted recognition within the UN treaty body system separate from that of state or civil society. Even in the new human rights council such institutions now have status to make statements whilst there are debates.

**Emerging national rights institutions**

National human rights institutions within Africa are also relatively new institutions and can be linked to the re-emergence of democracies across the region. We currently have 29 African national human rights institutions, 18 of which have an accreditation status at the UN, which means that they are recognised. The Paris Principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights, which set benchmarks to measure the independence and effectiveness of national institutions, make it clear that they ought to be involved at a regional level. However for many international institutions, a clear regional role is not set out in their founding legislation. The main thrust of their mandate is firstly to ensure the harmonisation of national legislation with international human rights instruments, to encourage ratification of international instruments, to contribute to the reporting systems and to cooperate with the regional institutions.

So national human rights institutions can play a prominent domestic role in supporting the regional human rights architecture. In terms of state parties’ regional treaty body reporting obligations, national institutions can be involved in monitoring governments’ compliance in drafting reports, engaging in media strategies, providing technical assistance to various parties, facilitating the involvement of civil society and NGOs, and assisting with individual complaints to the various bodies. To give effect to these potential opportunities there is an important need for national human rights institutions to be recognised as important role players in regional processes. For example the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has raised concerns of the quality of the reporting amidst a background of states often lacking the expertise, resources and/or the political will to comply with their reporting obligations. States do not generally comply with their obligations and when they do their reports are usually very late. Recently, though, the African Commission has noticed a slight improvement in the quality of these reports.
Working with the African Commission would, for national human rights institutions, be the coming together of a natural partnership. Another thing that needs to change is the constituting acts of national human rights institutions. Presently, they focus merely on work at the domestic level and promotion and protection – possibly some governments would prefer it this way. This in turn would lead to national institutions ensuring that their internal functioning arrangements actually reflect this work. We also need to be aware that compliance with the Paris Principles is sometimes done through donor conditionality rather than true commitment to having an independent institution in the country responsible for the protection and promotion of human rights. This results in insufficient support being given to the national institution, meaning that it cannot carry out its task effectively. Even the establishment and start-up, for example, of the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions and its permanent secretariat has experienced significant challenges.

The regional architecture for ensuring the promotion and protection of human rights, democracy and good governance is promising. We need to be realistic and recognise that the track record of participation in regional structures has not been good, with a lack of reporting on time and poor quality of reports being provided. Add to this the proliferation of institutions, and possible reporting fatigue may well be a reality. There is a need to support and develop the emerging recognition of the important role that national human rights institutions can play at an international and regional level. Not only will this increase and strengthen international and regional systems, but it will also strengthen the national institutions’ independence, standing and influence at a domestic level.
The European Union’s role in promoting democratic governance and human rights

Aristotelis Bouratsis

Clear objectives
The European Union works according to a simple set of objectives – and not only in Africa. It is theoretical, but it is very pragmatic. The EU first looks for peace, security, respect of human rights, rule of law and good governance and development. But can you imagine development without peace, stability and security? Good governance? So achieving the objectives is not simple.

The EU is not the sole actor in this world. The European Union strongly believes in multilateral engagement. The difference between the EU and the others is that the EU’s cooperation development engagement is not hiding any other agenda, such as engaging for a regime change. The difference between the EU and others is that partners can talk to the EU and with the EU like a soft power. One of the EU's soft power tools is its cooperation instrument, its human rights and democracy instrument, which are made to work through money and coordinated effort.

The EU furthermore believes that coordination between donors is extremely important. This recalls the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. If one reads this well, it will be seen that, following the agreement of the joint strategy in Lisbon, the EU is looking at Africa no more as aid recipients, but as partners. A partner must be able to develop a feeling of ownership and to express this. That is why the EU appreciates the recent steps taken to re-evaluate the African Union. It has been said that many people in Africa do not understand what the African Union, but the EU appreciates greatly the AU’s existence and hopes it will be a partner for the EU.

From mentioning the Paris Declaration, I will outline some simple principles. The
The aim of establishing the rule of law and good governance is to help national reformers build effective, legitimate and resilient state institutions. The EU wants to do that while taking into account the starting point, and this means getting to know the local context. We know very well that East Africa has different characteristics to West Africa. Morocco is not necessarily Malawi. Nevertheless, the EU wants to promote non-discrimination and the participation of local authorities and civil society.

**Making a real impact**
The EU wants its engagement to have a practical impact. The EU member states and the Commission are the major donors in the world, with 55 percent of aid coming the European Community as a whole. The aid effort has tried to involve civil society since 1975, when the first budget line for co-financing with NGOs was created. There is thus a more than 30 year track record now, showing that the EU strongly believes that building resilient states should be founded on good organisation of civil society, so that civil society can monitor and participate. The EU also does dialogue. This is an engagement in the Cotonou Agreement, and now also in the EU-Africa Lisbon agreement.

The EU also offers practical support to human rights and democracy by, for example, observing elections. This was done recently in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya and Pakistan. Forthcoming missions will go to Bhutan and Nepal. Nevertheless, having elections does not mean that there is democracy.

On human rights, the EU now has more flexible means for defending human rights. The EU does not forget and neglect individual cases. The EU also has country-based support schemes, meaning that, under a very specific objective of the human rights instrument, the Union tries to give very specific answers to human rights problems. Democracy and human rights are about more than just money or the appearance of good and fair elections. The best way to help is to the partner responsibility and the feeling of ownership and engagement. This must be backed up by building institutions, by enabling monitoring – not necessarily institutional or state-owned – and by pushing for more development and regional integration.

**The possibility of better lives**
The overall aim is to give people the possibility of better lives. The Millennium Development Goals are a framework for this. They emphasise like education, which is absolutely necessary for changing mentalities and enabling decision-making. The EU does not impose its values. Human rights and democracy are not just European values, though perhaps they came from Europe as a formulation in the beginning.
They are universal values adopted by the UN. The EU promotes them and does not want to establish or impose a particular European model. But the EU wants its partners to be able to really work effectively. EU aid, in common with aid from other international donors, is now delivered in the framework of the Paris declaration. This means, we hope, that the international community of donors with the national partners will be able to act more effectively, so that in a few years time a new situation emerges.
Democratic governance and human rights: the case of Malawi

Mavuto Bamusi

Malawi’s political development
I would like to offer an invitation to Malawi. It is one of the few countries that has a freshwater lake. It is called Lake Malawi and it is also called the Lake of Stars. I will not tell you why; you have to go to Malawi to see for yourself why it is called the Lake of Stars.

Malawi is a country of 13 million people. It is not big in terms of land area. Lake Malawi covers one third of the entire area. Malawi is a former colony of Britain but in 1964 Malawi gained political independence.

Between 1994 and today, Malawi has seen the establishment of 31 political parties. One could say this is an excellent example of freedom of association. A number of institutions have also been put in place, including the human rights commission, the office of the ombudsman, an anti-corruption body, and a legal aid office, providing legal assistance to the people. A law commission has also been established.

Malawi marked ten years on the path to democratisation in 2004. However, Malawi suffered from poor economic governance and performance, which negatively impacted social rights. In 2004, poverty in Malawi affected 65 percent of the population. Furthermore, maternal mortality rates were among the highest in the world, with 1000 in every 100,000 mothers dying in childbirth. This situation has not really improved since. In some schools, one teacher is responsible for 400 pupils, while each doctor has 100,000 patients. Many doctors have left Malawi for the EU – mainly in Manchester, England. The doctors that have remained in Malawi have opted to work in private hospitals; only a few work in public hospitals.
It is insufficient to talk of human rights in Malawi, when economic and social rights are considered a privilege, and when 60 percent of the rural population has no access to clean and safe water. Economic empowerment in Malawi means the empowerment of a very small number of people, who have connections to the political machinery. On average, a poor Malawian lives on 25 cents per day; some must survive on handouts through social safety nets. Woman and children are the majority in this category.

At the same time, macroeconomic factors have been a barrier to human rights. Although interest rates reached an all time high of 48 percent, the EU and other partners stopped budgetary support to Malawi, between 2001 and 2004. The IMF poverty reduction and growth facility in Malawi was suspended twice between 2000 and 2004, because of rampant budget over-runs, which also led to a huge domestic debt burden.

**A background of weak governance**

Public management in Malawi was characterised by weak institutional governance. Corruption in public office was widespread. Malawi went through years of serious food shortages, especially in 2002 and 2004. In May 2004 the third multi-party elections in Malawi took place. The former secretary general of the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Bingu wa Mutharika, who is also a former World Bank official, became the president.

In addition, the former IMF director for Africa, Goodall Gondwe, became the minister of finance. This brought a new era to Malawi – of economic prudence and better control of public expenditures, and intensified action against corruption. Interest rates have fallen from 48 percent to 18 percent. Inflation is now in single digits, and the domestic debt burden has steadily reduced. From food insecurity, Malawi has moved into a situation of food surplus in two consecutive years, though this is because of government agricultural subsidies. This is controversial because many donors in Malawi do not agree with such subsidies.

However, for these gains to translate into meaningful improvements in people's rights, there is a need for strategic partnerships for Malawi. Such partnerships should be people-driven and people-centred. It is also crucial for Malawi to start passing on the benefits of debt relief to the people. In 2006, Malawi qualified for debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). However, to date, one cannot say there are meaningful benefits in the health sector, the education sector, or other sectors. Such benefits are yet to be seen.
Current challenges to human rights and democratisation

Parliament in Malawi is almost non-functional, with no sitting of the institution since mid-2007. The current president took office in 2004 at the head of a political party he formed himself. However, this party is not represented in parliament, so he persuaded 45 members from the main opposition parties to join him. The opposition parties countered by drawing on section 65 of the Malawi constitution, which says that all parliamentarians who have crossed the floor must have their seats declared vacant. But the government is resisting this, and is using the same section 65 constitutional provision, which states that parliamentarians seats should be declared vacant if they join organisations and associations that are political in nature. The government has said the seat of the speaker of the parliament should be declared vacant because the speaker is a member of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. This has resulted in a political stand-off.

In mid-2007 parliament did not convene even though the budget session was due. Almost four months went by without a budget. Organisations such as the Human Rights Consultative Committee advocated and lobbied strongly for parliament to meet, and this succeeded, but parliament only discussed one agenda item: the budget. The budget was passed, but the president then closed parliament again. There are crucial bills awaiting parliamentary enactment. There is a water facility bill which will facilitate the provision of water in urban areas, for which there is a European Investment Bank grant. But this cannot proceed at present.

Furthermore, Malawi has not had an auditor general since 2005. The opposition has refused to approve the auditor general in retaliation for the government move of parliamentarians across the house to the government side. This raises a number of question marks about accountability in Malawi. The country also does not have a chief justice, and has not had an anti-corruption bureau chief. Local assemblies have also not convened since 2005, and there have not been local government elections.

The Africa-EU partnership must be a partnership of the people. It must operate on the principles of equality among the players, and Africa must not be viewed as an object of charity. Africa must not be regarded as a destination for containers of second-hand shoes and clothes. Africa needs more than pity and sympathy. Africa needs support in governance, such support as can transform the people from being passive observers to being active participants in development. The former president of Tanzania said, “as our colleagues in the developed world are striving to get to the moon in spaceships, we in the developing world must strive to get to the village.” This is what this partnership must do.
Democratic governance and human rights: comments

Abbia Udofia

Aiming at delivery
The African Union/EU partnership document no doubt has many strengths: the vision, the strategy, the principles, the action plan, and the approaches. From those points of view it is a brilliant document. But will it produce anything? From an African perspective, the hope is that Africa's leaders will be honest enough to ensure that they display integrity in this partnership. Many African nations do not have structures of democracy, only pretensions.

The EU should not just see Africa as a single bloc; it should look at the regional blocs, and intervene through these blocs. African leaders also need to show discipline in signing and ratifying United Nations conventions on human rights and the African Union Convention Against Corruption. Most leaders have not ratified these documents. How can African leaders show discipline and commitment to the EU/Africa partnership without ratifying such very crucial documents that will move African nations forward?

Some voices say that Africa should not have democracy imposed upon it, and must find its own democratic model. But democracy is the same across the world. If a nation is allowed to find its own way of interpreting democracy, this too often leads to problems. There must be mutual accountability for democracy, or criminal leaders will make a nonsense of the EU/Africa partnership. This is why African leaders must display honesty, accountability, and transparency in this EU/Africa 'marriage'.

However, the EU is the big brother in the agreement. Is it really a partnership, or is it an initiative on the part of the EU. The EU must insist that African leaders play
their part. This can be done even if countries are showing commitment – they can be encouraged through aid or other assistance. Countries that do not comply should be condemned. Africa is not a uniform whole and many African leaders may not be willing to comply.

Europe must look for and insist on the seriousness of African leaders to explore better options for building African progress through this partnership. This means ensuring an improved capacity in terms of infrastructure. It is hard to have an equal partnership when one partner is like a giant and the other is like a dwarf. Infrastructure needs to be built and improved to a standard that will push Africa in the right direction. This means improving the life of the average citizen, reducing conflict and civil unrest, sustaining democratic development, fighting corruption, protecting minorities, and showing commitment to the environment. Without all of these things, and without basic benchmarks, the partnership will remain a relationship between a donor and a recipient.

**Implementation**

Parties to the partnership must demonstrate willingness to abide by the principles of democracy. How can Malawi, for example, with its great inconsistencies, be part of this partnership, if the abuses in Malawi are not stopped or solved. The EU must insist that such countries at least have basic structures of democracy, before allowing them to participate. This can be done through a 'carrot and stick' approach. The EU must also carry out assessments – go to the countries concerned for monitoring and reporting back to Brussels.
Democratic governance and human rights

Discussion

Question from Susann Mende, GTZ Brussels office
What is the status of budget aid/budget support in the partnership? Africans often do not trust their institutions – what role can budget aid then play?

Contribution from Stephen Katenta-Apuli, Ambassador of Uganda to Belgium
The question has been raised of what the EU can do as a partner to accompany Africa along the road of good governance and protection of human rights. The starting point needs to be abolishing poverty in Africa. There is no context in which human rights and democracy can exist in Africa when Africa is still so poor. For the majority of Africans, poverty is the sole preoccupation. They live from day to day. Poverty needs to be ended, first and foremost.

If democracy and human rights are to be observed, the indigenous people must themselves be the source of pressure, not the EU. The pressure should come from the inside. This is what has happened in the rich world: people's rights cannot be abused because the people know what their rights are. But when people do not even know what their rights are, there is the opportunity for those rights to be abused. Education is key, especially for women and children. Educated people stand up themselves for their rights.

In terms of migration, more needs to be done so that Africans have a reason to stay in Africa. Jobs need to be created on the African continent. If the African continent can work, it will make the EU/Africa partnership work. Local governments must be strengthened. They may not perform perfectly, but at least they are close to the people. People more readily identify themselves with local government, because often they know the people involved. Central government is more remote. Africa
needs an indigenous middle class that will stand up for itself. Collecting tax revenues is much easier in a situation of compliance, rather than when force needs to be used.

**Contribution from the floor**

Comments have been made about the EU assessing African countries and reporting back, but in this case, where is the partnership? It should be the partners who deal with members that do not comply; the partnership should send assessment teams. This means the AU and the EU together.

**Contribution from the floor**

Poverty and backwardness are the sources of all evils. Impoverished and illiterate people do not know what human rights are, or how to fight for them. Covenants on economic, social and cultural rights deal with the right to food, health and education. Poor and backward societies cannot even fulfil these rights. Is it enough to exercise periodic elections while people are starving and suffering from poverty-related problems? The best way to ensure human rights is to fight poverty.

This fight requires political commitment. Cooperation between the west and Africa has existed for decades. During this time, Africa has been told by the west to undergo different changes – structural adjustments, reforms, policy changes and so on. But Africa is still in poverty. Is Africa the source of this failure? Perhaps the west's approaches have caused problems – as is said in Africa, 'the one who sleeps in the bed knows better how comfortable the bed is than the one who makes it.' Africans know the solutions to their problems, but they lack the means. First, there must be ownership of policies and strategies. African governments should introduce good policies and good governance to their societies. The donor community should support the priorities they set out. A number of conditions can be imagined in this respect: carrots and sticks. The EU/Africa relationship needs to be based on mutual understanding and respect. Pressure to tackle authoritarian leaders and governments should come from the people themselves. For the people to rise up, they have to be educated. Both donors and recipients need to rethink.

**Contribution from the floor**

There should not be an underlying assumption that the African heads of state merely took a trip to Lisbon and are not really committed to what was agreed there. This assumption leads to the idea that the African leaders have to be whipped into line or pushed to take action. In fact, African heads of state went to Lisbon on their own volition and knew why they were going there. Let us give them the benefit of the doubt that they would want to move forward in accordance with what they agreed. Aspersions should not be cast on their seriousness.
Meanwhile, the civil society movements should not become complacent or arrogant and believe they have all the answers, while the African governments are troublemakers. Such assumptions are counter-productive. African leaders should be treated with due respect, just as European governments would. We should understand that everybody is important to the cause.

**Contribution from Uwe Wissenbach, European Commission**

We have been told we should move away from the donor-recipient relationship, but there are still many calls for development funds and for poverty to be abolished before democratic governance can be established – as if poverty could be abolished with a decree. China, meanwhile, has argued that western-style democracy does not work in Africa, using the experience of the Kenyan 2007 elections as an example. It has become fashionable to blame the west for all kinds of evils and look for a Chinese alternative. There is a dilemma between developing economically but also according to governance principles, and developing without democracy while only planning for democracy once poverty is abolished. Some believe democracy could then develop 'African style'. What is the role of the EU in this debate?

**Contribution from the floor**

The basic challenge is that governments become accountable to people, and that people can request that governments are accountable. But what can the EU-Africa partnership do in this respect? Previously there was a view that Africa and African people were docile, but this has changed. It has changed mainly because of the many contacts between civil society, not between governments. European Commission financing of NGOs has led to closer contact between people in Europe and people in Africa. This is a great benefit of these programmes.

However, whereas once these programmes were somewhat chaotic, now they are very bureaucratic, with too much emphasis given by EuropeAid on direct support for civil society in Africa. This tends to undermine contacts between civil society in Europe and in Africa. How can dialogue be strengthened, not between governments, but between groups of people in Europe who are interested in Africa, and groups in Africa who can profit from that dialogue?

**Contribution from Elisa Rafamatanantsoa, ACP Local Government Platform**

It is good that the joint strategy has taken into account the local dimension of governance, and local government. Concerning Malawi, why have there been no local elections since 2005, and when can the next local elections be expected to take place?
Response from Mavuto Bamusi

On local government elections in Malawi, the central government executive says they do not have the money for local elections. But GTZ has offered the funds. GTZ has been instrumental in supporting local governance in Malawi. But the government has not taken the money. So there are reasons in addition to money. The current government is a minority government; any elections in 2005 or 2006 would have provided a resounding win to the opposition. So the real reasons for delay are political. However, presidential and parliamentary elections are due in 2009, though there is no mention at this stage of local elections, though civil society wants them to also take place.

On China, Malawi worked with Taiwan for 42 years, but terminated the relationship in December 2007. Instead the foreign minister signed an agreement with China. Within two or three weeks, Taiwanese representatives were told to leave. Now China is taking over every project that was being financed by Taiwan, including the construction of a new parliament building. In addition, of great concern, the Chinese have also sent away all the local Malawian contractors from the parliament construction project. Chinese contractors are taking over. Why should this external expertise be brought in when local people can do the work?

Civil society meanwhile is crucial to providing accountability alongside government and the private sector. Civil society can act as an advocate, and can also work practically on delivery, for example NGOs that drill boreholes and provide other essential services. In Malawi, civil society was crucial in dealing with the dictatorial regime.

Response from Judith Cohen

Amartya Sen said poverty is a question of disempowerment. He was referring to access to resources, to knowledge, and to the ability for a person to claim their rights. To give an example, the South African Human Rights Commission looked at older persons legislation recently, and realised that this area is very weak. Therefore, the Commission went throughout the country holding meetings, explaining the legislation and getting input, and transforming that into legal language, which was then taken to parliament. At the same time, the Commission empowered older persons to be able to participate in the process themselves.

On the day of the public hearings, two grandmothers came to the hearings from local townships and spoke in their own languages. They told the parliament of the difficulties of being a grandmother in South Africa, where the next generation has died of AIDS and grandparents must bring up their grandchildren. Had those
grandmothers not done that, the parliament would not have sent the legislation back to the drafting department with an instruction to rewrite it and ensure that specific provisions are included in the legislation to address the needs of grandmothers who are bringing up their grandchildren. This demonstrates the amount of energy, time and resources that needs to go into participation. From the EU-Africa strategy, support is needed to assist Africa to encourage a thriving civil society that will not be disempowered by poverty.

Response from Abbia Udofia
A comment was made that we should not be too harsh on African leaders. But we should stand passionately against corruption. A country like Nigeria has so much money and so many resources, but those in power abuse this. It is not possible to overlook this fact. Leaders must be criticised if they do not use a country's funds well.

One can also compare the progress of the EU since 1957 with the OAU/AU since 1963. What progress has the OAU/AU made? It is necessary to address the inconsistencies in the EU-Africa partnership, so that it achieves more than just rhetoric. From the African side, there should be pressure for progress from within. But how many African countries have a cogent political opposition? Many opposition movements have been eradicated and their leaders even killed. People live in fear and under threat. There is thus hardly any serious political opposition. It is necessary for outsiders to put pressure on African governments to be accountable.

On poverty eradication, capacity and infrastructure need to be built, thus increasing the capacity of people to help themselves. Failing to do this can mean radicalisation of those who are excluded from the process, as can be seen in the Niger delta. The EU and AU should monitor the partnership and ensure compliance. The EU should help the AU to play its role in this respect.

Response from Aristotelis Bouratsis
There can be no development and poverty reduction without rule of law and good governance. Combating poverty means trying to put the elements of good governance and rule of law in place in African civil society. Civil society must be built and strengthened – the EU can now work on this through the EDF. This can be done on a local level and does not necessarily involve European civil society. African civil society must become 'adult' by itself.

The European Commission strongly believes that building good institutions is absolutely necessary. This is a condition for direct budgetary support, though this is
not necessarily the majority part of EU aid. This aid is dependent on real scrutiny of the institutions that are financed. It is true that sometimes EU procedures in this respect are heavy. But this is a result of the need to ensure funds are well and honestly spent, as required by the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors and other institutions. But there is no need for undue pessimism. Nothing is perfect, but there is improvement.

Response from Gideon Ogola Ochanda
Several observations can be made. International instruments and summits are useful and necessary, and bring seriousness into the process. But the agreements that come out of summits such as Lisbon can lack a national thrust. The international agreements need to be accompanied with local and national legislation and action to implement what has been agreed, or they will not work.

Budget aid, it should be remembered, comes in two parts: budget support and sector or grant support. But we believe budget support has less impact. It adds to national and local funds, but without any serious indication of how the extra money should be used. In general the extra funds are used to finance recurring costs rather than on new programmes for poverty reduction, for example. In most African countries, recurring costs make up 65-70 percent of the total national budget. If money is added to the pot, 65-70 percent of it goes, for example, on salaries, allowances and so on. It has been shown that grant or sector support is more useful. It is better to spend EU money, for example, on an EU-labelled road in Africa.

In terms of poverty reduction, it needs to be understood that poverty influences the political decisions that people in poverty make. Voting decisions are made on the basis of short term promises made by politicians, or even small monetary offers. But poverty is also an indicator of a problem; it influences and determines the direction of so many things and shows that something is wrong. Looking for what is really wrong is the best way to deal with poverty, rather than treating it in isolation.

Questions have been raised about colonialism, which is a fact of history. But it is also an ongoing discussion. Colonialism was interference in the natural growth and development of African societies. This causes a problem today. Current development efforts attempt to fast-track growth in Africa, but many small intermediate steps have to be taken. Colonialism interrupted natural processes.

Concerning local government, the normal focus is on local government as part of the national centralised structures. In Kenya, for example, there is an extension of national authority down to the local authority level. This causes problems. There
must be an element of semi-autonomy, or the ability for local authorities to do things the way they want to, for local governance to emerge.

**Contribution from Geert Laporte**

On the question of democratic governance and human rights, a number of points should be highlighted. The EU-Africa joint strategy is a good document – even a brilliant document. The question now is how to make it work and how to operationalise it. A number of dos and don'ts pertain to this.

- **Do not look to much at the external and formal features of democracy, such as parliaments and electoral processes.** It is also important to look at what precedes and follows electoral processes. This implies supporting economic and social rights as well as individual human rights. Economic and social rights are sometimes the real concerns of people in different African countries. Concerns in this respect relate to security, drinking water, food – the basic elements of the day to day life of people affected by poverty.
- **African states should be professionalised in many respects.** There should be avoidance of excessive politicisation of the civil service, learning to share power, addressing issues of ethnicity, and ensuring continuity beyond electoral processes. These are interesting lessons learned, which should now be applied.
- **There are some very interesting African home-grown initiatives, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism and charters on democracy and elections.** These are important elements of the African governance architecture. But many of these instruments are not widely known and do not reach out to the large majority of people. Much work needs to be done to sensitise African countries and their populations to the potential of these African home-grown initiatives.
- **National human rights institutions can play a key role and are already doing so in a number of African countries.** They have been neglected somewhat in the joint strategy, but there is potential, especially if these organisations can operate at a pan-African or regional level.
- **Recommendations have been made relating to strengthening civil society and local governance, and bringing policy-making and democratisation much closer to the real actors.**
- **Support from EU donors should complement national priorities and national reforms in African countries.** It should not impose own-models or conditionalities. Pressure from the EU, however, is sometimes healthy in some countries and some situations.
Session two: EU-Africa cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction and development of the private sector
Post-conflict reconstruction and development of the private sector: opening comments

Professor Peter Molt

Reconstruction and development of the private sector is one of the priorities of the EU-Africa joint strategy. It is one of the topics where perhaps in the next few years, some progress can be made. The topic is of course not new. It is already part of the European security strategy from 2003, which spelled out the importance of reconstruction of development, alongside more military aspects such as security and peace conflict mediation. The link between conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction was emphasised very clearly at that time.

This led to some unhappiness among development-oriented bureaucrats who were concerned that development aid would become a function of security policy. Now, in the new partnership agreement, it is emphasised that the private sector should participate in the reconstruction work.
Connecting development with other issues in the EU-Africa strategy

Philippe Darmuzey

The difficult challenge of connecting development with other issues is symptomatic of the evolution of our world, and of the European Commission's role. The EU-Africa partnership agreed in Lisbon is not just about development. It is a partnership that goes behind development, which goes beyond Africa, and which goes beyond institutions. In dealing with crisis, conflicts and peace-building, there is no single traditional approach based on development cooperation. Development is a continuum involving different multidisciplinary approaches, and participation and involvement of all actors from the society in question, and of the international community, when it is involved in one particular region.

The new joint strategy goes beyond development and Africa because crises everywhere in the world have lessons for the partnership. The political dialogue on post-conflict reconstruction and on issues related to conflict and crisis is a very important aspect of the partnership.

The capacity to respond

The first issue to raise is the EU's capacity to respond to, and instruments it has to address, post-conflict situations. The EU has been working on interacting policies that will address phases of the conflict cycle. Particular attention has been paid to conflict exit strategies and to stabilisation and transition in fragile situations. Previously we talked about fragile states, but the concept has evolved into an idea of fragile situations, which better captures the reality and the political sensitivity of the issue. The EU is also looking at the causes of lawlessness.

In post-conflict environments, the EU has a series of instruments and policies. The
priorities are of course peace-building and actions to address the political process by building capacity and inclusiveness, and managing reconciliation and justice. These are the elements of state building. One very important area is the peace-time dividend, and the opportunity to support populations and work on the protection and return of populations affected by crises and conflict.

There is then the question of reconstruction and post-crisis development. Here, the roles of non-state civil society actors and the private sector are very important. No single public institution intervention will be effective if it is done in a vacuum, and does not involve the strong participation of the population, its civil society representatives and the private sector. The EU also emphasises international consensus in post-conflict situations, built wherever possible through UN in the context of a coordinated positive contribution to the process.

New initiatives
The second issue to discuss is the series of new EU initiatives in this area. These are very important, and demonstrate the better understanding there is now about the link between security and development. Unlike previously, we now understand that development in a vacuum cannot work. In situations of post-conflict fragility, forging a strong link between governance, security and development, and the instruments that can help, is essential. We now know that we cannot looks at development without the foundation of a secure environment. This might involve security sector reforms or security system reforms.

There is also now a better understanding of situations of fragility. In some countries, there might be pockets of instability or fragile situations which, if not addressed, could see the cycle of crisis and conflict restarted. Conflict should therefore not necessarily be looked at at country or state level. In addition, global approaches to governance must be considered.

The European Community has started to work on a governance initiative, though there is still much to do and lessons to learn. Work has started to reserve resources to create incentives for countries, and possibly regions, and to undertake reforms related to governance, in particular in the immediate aftermath of conflicts. A non-traditional approach is needed for this. There are plenty of lessons to learned from the EU experience. Work in this area is a work-in-progress. The Commission is consulting its partners, and working with the EU member states, to see how the approach can be made more pragmatic, efficient and effective. The aim is to end the split approach of EU instruments on one hand, and member states' bilateral policies and instruments on the other. Good progress is being made.
African developments
The European Commission of course has a view on the work done on the African side. First, it is necessary to mention that there is now a continental institutional architecture in Africa. This is at the beginning of its development but it exists, both in the area of governance at large and also in the area of peace and security. The African Union has established a Peace and Security Council. There is also a Peace and Security Council protocol, and the non-aggression and common defence pact, as well as a human security doctrine in Africa. Gradually and increasingly, the pan-African institutions and architecture are building a serious capacity and a strategy to address the issues of post-conflict development and reconstruction, as well as conflict resolution.

Lisbon in review
On the Lisbon EU-Africa joint strategy, one should point out that did not come from nowhere. Before the eighty heads of state signed the Lisbon Declaration, and put in place the long term approach to partnership and the action plan, there were of course dialogues and discussions. In 2005 there was already from the EU side a strategy for Africa. This has now developed into a strategic partnership with shared values, common objectives and equality between the partners. In practice this means the two sides can now openly address what needs to be done without reverting to traditional stereotypes, fears or caution. The two partners need to be able to debate realities, difficulties, challenges and common interests.

A definitive agreement has been made to address peace and security. This will happen through a policy and political dialogue at continental, regional and national levels. But there is also a more concrete partnership in the action plan on the pan-Africa peace and security architecture. The instruments that the European Community is already operating with in Africa will be integrated into this in a manner agreed by the two sides. For example, the African Peace Facility, which existed previously and for which the European Community has provided more than EUR 400 million to address conflicts and crises, will be renewed. But many aspects of it are being rethought in the context of the new strategy, in particular its scope and its management. This rethinking is being done jointly with the African side.

Perhaps more importantly in Lisbon, from a political point of view, there was a discussion of five themes that each side introduced into the debate. For example, there were two heads of state discussing peace and security issues, with the same done for governance, regional integration and trade, climate change, and other topics. On peace and security it was interesting to see that one EU head of state and African head of state referred to the need to move towards a more coherent and effective
approach to address jointly crisis situations, conflict and post-conflict environments as part of a continuum. There was also discussion of specific cases. The media reflected the view that the Lisbon Summit was only about Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations and Zimbabwe, but this was not the case. There were serious discussions on the five themes, in particular peace and security.

The EU-Africa partnership on security is one of the eight partnerships the EU and Africa must put in place over the next three years. To do this, really pragmatic approaches will have to be developed. This will be done, but it will also be important to work on the African peace and security and governance architectures, so that the instruments put in place can have a real impact.
Addressing post-conflict reconstruction

Klaus-Jürgen Hedrich

The first question to ask about post-conflict reconstruction is why it is necessary to discuss this issue. It has been discussed continuously since African states gained independence. Again and again, we have been confronted with this issue. It is not always easy to explain to taxpayers why this discussion continues. A lot of money has been spent supporting different African countries and societies, but with limited success. This was the case with Rwanda, where the German taxpayer, combining the efforts of government, churches, political foundations and NGOs, spent some EUR 1.2 billion before the genocide – with no apparent beneficial result. One can only hope for improvements in the future.

So the question is: why is the EU permanently confronted in its bilateral cooperation with Africa with the issue of post-conflict reconstruction?

It is necessary to take a much closer and deeper look at the connection between security and development. This would be helpful in Africa, but also in other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Neither security nor development are possible without one another. It is also a mistake to think that one should be prioritised before the other. In Germany, for example, there is a permanent debate about if we are doing enough for development and if we are over-stressing the necessity of implementing security measures. In fact, both are needed in order to improve the situation in a developing country.

It is interesting to look at the experience of different countries. If one starts from the early 1960s and chooses four countries: Congo, Sudan, Taiwan and Korea. In each, the per capita income in 1960 was a little less than USD 200. Today, depending slightly on currency ratios, it is around USD 22,000 – 23,000 in Korea, and USD 25,000 in Taiwan. But both Sudan and Congo have lower per capita income than 50
years ago. According to statistics, purchasing power per capita in Congo is USD 74. The reason why this has happened is simple: good governance. Where governments and political elites are committed, one finds development. If governments and elites are not committed, the development process is very much limited.

Education
A first issue in relation to this is education. In a press conference more than twenty years ago I was asked by the German press what I believe is important for development. I said: education, education and education. In this context the role of women is very important because, to put it in a very simplified manner, educated women have educated children. Where women are given the chance to participate in the development process, and especially where women are given the chance of adequate education, development processes speed up.

Concerning EU development cooperation, one of its biggest mistakes is budget aid that is a draw to corruption. The Court of Auditors in Germany told the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development that they were making a big mistake by increasing their support as far as budget aid is concerned. There may be special cases, for example in post-reconstruction, where cash is needed to finance the re-emergence of a country. But for development, budget aid is more or less wasted money.

A second point is that it is certainly good to deepen the cooperation between Europe and Africa. But there is one danger. We should not create the impression in Europe that the African Union and the European Union are on an equal footing. Europeans should be very much aware that it would be a mistake to believe that they have a partner who can really be a partner in the full sense of the word. That does not mean that the efforts of Africans to try to improve their cooperation mechanisms such as the Pan-African Parliament should not be supported. Such cooperation mechanisms are the right approach. But there should be no illusions.

In this connection, comparing situations that at first sight have nothing to do with Africa can be bad for development cooperation. In June 2006, there was an interesting article in the IMF magazine *Finance and Development*, with a simple question for a headline: what happened? The article concerned the different development paths in Latin America and East Asia between 1950 and 2005. This comparison showed once again that good governance is the key to development, with East Asia making more progress than Latin America. There are sometimes exceptions, such as Chile. But it is little known that Chile is among those countries, together with, for example, South Africa, which have the biggest divergence as far as income
distribution is concerned. Chile is one of the most successful countries in fighting poverty but nevertheless, it is a country with one of the broadest wealth distribution splits.

**The role of the EU**

But we are here to discuss EU-Africa cooperation. In this respect, one point stands out. Bilateral cooperation is always better than multilateral cooperation. Bilateral development agencies always rate better than multilateral institutions. The EU's rating is not among the best. So when considering the EU-Africa joint strategy, it is indeed correct to try to improve multilateral cooperation, and to try and support improvements in African institutions. But when implementing programmes and projects, bilateral cooperation is best.

Of course there are areas for the EU to play a very substantial role, for example regarding the private sector, because the EU deals with trade issues. It would be unrealistic if every European state tried to reach trade agreements with each African state. This is a particular area where the EU has a very substantial role to play. The figures are well known. Africa is by far the least attractive continent in the world for investment. The reason, once again, is governance – or lack of it – though there are exceptions. The German business community invests a lot of money in Africa, but the investment is directed at fewer than ten countries. Nigeria, which is on a relatively good track, is one example. But to be clear: Africa does not have the best investment climate. Capital is a very shy enemy. Investors, whether domestic or foreign, have too many places to go to. Rule of law plays a very substantial role in ensuring a context that is favourable for investment. The role of the EU is to encourage moderate and reasonable forces in Africa that are genuinely committed to improving the lives of African people.
Post-conflict reconstruction: what and how?

Dr Stefan Mair

What to reconstruct?
The starting point for any discussion of post-conflict reconstruction and development is to ask what are the needs of post-conflict societies? First and foremost, there is a need for security. The second priority is the creation of a reliable legal and political order. Then there are also provision of basic physical and social infrastructure in terms of health and education. The problem is that usually, the state that existed before the conflict hardly fulfilled those functions. So in most cases in African conflicts it is not really correct to talk about reconstruction. It is more a case of construction of a state or state building.

When looking at state functions, in most cases in Africa, at least in conflict states, security was the security of those in power. State security agencies were perceived more as threat to the integrity of the individual than protectors and guarantors. The political and legal order in many cases, if it was reliable, it was more or less an authoritarian legal and political order. However, in providing physical and social infrastructure, some African countries have made genuine progress. But this has been heavily dependent on the assistance of the donor community. The failure of the state to meet the expectations of the people, and the failure of the state to transform itself into a democracy has been one of the major causes of conflict in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In cases such as these, it is less a question of reconstruction but of state building.

How to reconstruct?
This is a question of the depth and intensity of external intervention in the post-conflict society. Post-conflict reconstruction and state building is likely to involve very complex and long term tasks, challenges and dilemmas. There is first the question of ownership and partnership. We always emphasise that a post-conflict
reconstruction process should be owned by the people. But who represents the people? The ex-combatants or the traditional or the new elite, who may be discredited? Who else will represent the people and own such a process? These questions link to the question of who the external actors' partners are in reconstructing a state. These are a very difficult dilemmas to deal with.

A second dilemma concerns effectiveness and legitimacy. How deeply and intensively will the involvement of external actors be? In some places such as the Balkans, external actors have effectively taken over states. An alternative is the light footprint approach, which again raises questions of ownership and partnership. What might be effective at first glance, might lack legitimacy at second glance, with the lack of legitimacy in the long run undermining effectiveness.

A third problem is that we still pursue a national approach in dealing with post-conflict situations. Many conflicts in Africa have a very strong regional context, such as in the Great Lakes or the Horn of Africa. But post-conflict reconstruction efforts still follow a national approach.

**Supply side challenges**

As well as ‘demand side’ challenges for post-conflict reconstruction, there are ‘supply side’ challenges. The question of coordination and coherence always comes up. In post-conflict situations there are a multitude of state agencies, NGOs on the development side, and different military forces. Coordinating them and making their efforts coherent is a very demanding task. The EU has the problem of coordination among the three pillars, and between the EU and its member states.

The second supply side challenge is that of resources. Post-conflict reconstruction demands vast material and personnel resources. Only a few players can provide these resources, and even fewer are willing to deploy them towards Africa. There is strong pressure, for example, to do more in Afghanistan and Iraq. The EU also has a commitment to the Balkans. Not much remains for Africa. This raises the question of regional and functional. Nobody doubts there is a development and security nexus, but the constant problem is what objectives should be defined in this area? It is not realistic to enter a post-conflict situation with the aim of achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It is necessary to be more modest about what can be achieved in the field of security and development.

**Africa’s role**

What can Africa do to help cope with these challenges? On the question of what to reconstruct, the prospects are mixed. In the past, some African leaders and some
African institutions have played a constructive role in managing conflicts and finding creative and innovative solutions for resolving them. But there is still a strong tendency in the African Union (not the institutions and African leaders) to reinforce the old, well-known state and regime structures in post-conflict situations. The commitment of most AU states to good governance and democracy is very limited.

On how to reconstruct, African institutions and leaders can play a major role in providing additional legitimacy to external intervention in post-conflict societies. It is still the case that external intervention by African countries is still more acceptable in many situations than intervention by former colonial and imperial powers. An exception to this is if it is a neighbouring country that intervenes. African institutions can also make an important contribution to promoting regional contexts for post-conflict reconstruction. ECOWAS is certainly an example of that.

On the supply side it is harder to come up with examples of valuable contributions by African institutions. Efforts to integrate the African Union and African leaders in post-conflict reconstruction will make the task of coordination and coherence more complicated rather than less. Concerning resources, while developed countries have problems mobilising the necessary resources for post-conflict reconstruction, Africans have even greater problems. The only exception to this is providing military personnel for peacekeeping efforts. Relative restrictions on African capacities are likely to remain even if the EU sticks to its commitment outlined in the EU-Africa Action Plan to investing in the peace and security capacity of the African Union and African institutions.

**Final remarks**

Certainly it is necessary to foster cooperation between Africa and the EU. But this should not ignore the major differences between the AU and the EU and their members. Africa's main contributions to coping with post-conflict reconstruction are providing additional legitimacy, providing regional contexts and providing military personnel for peacekeeping efforts. But if the EU wants to be more efficient in post-conflict reconstruction in Africa, it should not rely to heavily on its African partners. If bilateral aid and bilateral cooperation is more efficient and effective than multilateral aid, then the solution is not to concentrate more on bilateral aid, but is to reform the multilateral aid system and make it more effective. The task of post-conflict reconstruction, is too big to be shouldered by one member state. The need for coherence and coordination requires one player who will take it in hand. More must be done on the EU side to define its military and civilian headline goals and to make European security and defence policy more coherent, alongside development policy.
The EU-Africa partnership in post-conflict situations

Yacouba Berthé

Countries in post-conflict situations face a particular set of problems. This is especially relevant for Africa, where problems often arise in post-conflict situations. In these situations, the speed of intervention is important.

In Mali for example, there was a rebellion in the north involving the Touareg people. The government and the rebels signed a peace accord, but this did not solve the underlying problems. The rebellion took place in an under-developed region where there is an imbalance in the distribution of wealth. The population has an urgent need for basic infrastructure. The government took some steps to deal with this, but they did not have the means to create long-lasting change. This is one example of why post-conflict periods are the greatest challenges some states face.

The root causes of conflict can be the lack of infrastructure such as roads or bridges or other basic socio-economic infrastructure. But conflict can also be about control of power, which is ultimately about control of wealth and its distribution. The drive for personal enrichment can also play a part. The partnerships outlined in the EU-Africa joint strategy should concentrate on infrastructure development, but for this to happen, security is needed. Security of persons and of their possessions would also concretely help the cause of socio-economic development. Investors rarely come to countries in conflict.

How can cooperation between the EU and Africa deal with the challenges to peace and security? Everything depends on peace and security, and answering this question will facilitate the development of the private sector in Africa. Peace and security protect and reassure investors and their communities.
Another question that must be asked is how we can remove the barriers to peace. One of these is social cohesion, which can be ruined by a conflict or the taking up of arms. In post-conflict situations, everybody will have lost a relative or a close person. It is absolutely necessary in a post-conflict situation that ways and means are found of consolidating the social cohesion in the affected area. Without this there is the threat that the conflict will be revived or will move to a neighbouring country or region.

These questions can be addressed through civic education programmes involving civil society, through the training of opinion-formers in peaceful handling of post-conflict situations, and through political awareness-raising against violence.

To ensure security there is a broader question of restructuring the military in Africa. Conflicts often arise because the army is dominated by one ethnic group, by a clan, by an individual or by a group of people. It is necessary in the post-conflict period after the peace accords are signed to think about the restructuring of the armed forces. This includes reinforcing the capacities of the armed forces and the security forces. In a recent KAS meeting in Togo with the Togolese military there was one military representative who had obtained his rank and commanded a battalion because he belonged to a certain ethnic group, not because he had been trained and educated.

In some conflicts the army is in a weak position because it lacks equipment. And sometimes the army is not representative of the population. We are in the midst of developing a concept in the West African sub-region, called ‘the citizen in uniform’. This is to allow the armed forces and all military personnel to feel also like citizens. This involves knowing the laws of the country and being able to act accordingly.

A further phenomenon is the circulation of arms in Africa. Factions in a conflict or rebellion can very easily obtain any kind of weapon. Ways must be found to control the circulation of arms.

In conclusion, the focus in Africa must be to use the EU-Africa partnership to promote direct investments in infrastructure – the roads, bridges and schools – as a way of resuscitating the partnership between the public and private sectors. The private sector is really the motor of development, but in Africa is does not benefit from government attention or incentives. Building ways for civil society to take part in the process of peace consolidation must also be addressed.
EU-Africa cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction and development of the private sector

Discussion

Contribution from the floor
The view is often put forward from the EU side that civil society should be the only partners in development. Unfortunately, civil society might not have the strength to implement some of the measures that should be implemented in Africa. This can only be done by the politicians, whether that is seen as a good or bad thing. Conversation on this should not become one-sided and based on blaming the other. If this happens, every prime minister or president can be criticised.

Contribution from the floor
Meeting the challenges of what to reconstruct and how is the key to success. Civil society and NGOs can contribute greatly to this because they work with the public at large at grassroots level. But whatever civil society does, it is in the framework of policies, strategies and a working environment set by the government, whether civil society is working at the highest political level or the lowest level with the public. All stakeholders – civil society, NGOs, partners and government – have a role in the normal situation of development and ensuring democratic governance, and in post-conflict reconstruction. The roles of each stakeholder must be coordinated in a balanced way, especially in post-conflict situations, or there is a risk of being dragged back into conflict.

Contribution from the floor
Concerning comments made about bilateral cooperation being more effective than multilateral, what is the EU-Africa joint strategy? Is it a bilateral partnership or a multilateral one? How should it be classified?
In practice, peacemaking and peace-building is not always done in a consultative way. In Kenya for example, declarations and resolutions were issued in a non-consultative way. The work done at regional level in such situations, in particular by Africans, has not always been recognised. This is a shame. Efforts made at AU level should also be acknowledged.

**Contribution from the floor**
The question was raised if we are talking about reconstruction or construction. Issues of peace, and post-conflict work need to be treated as part of the process of construction of the state, not reconstruction. We must consider if the work of construction is best done bilaterally or multilaterally, and to isolate the obstacles or challenges to construction. These obstacles or challenges are part of the cause of conflict, and need to be removed so the process of construction proceeds.

There are positive aspects to, for example, the post-election conflict in Kenya. It brought into the foreground some of the issues that were ignored for a long period of time. There are really no obstacles to the process of state-building in that country. Issues need to be addressed rather than papered over. Conflict is often a result of complacency in this respect.

In Kenya, power was used to the advantage of certain ethnic groups. The process of construction needs to target or isolate where exactly the problem lies, such as ethnic communities using power to get access to wealth. This was the cause of conflict in Kenya.

Some conflicts are very necessary. If they had not happened, certain issues would not have been addressed. In a way they help the process of state construction. The EU and other bilateral relationships Africa has should be directed at state construction: constantly isolating obstacles and challenges and seeing how to address them, rather than waiting for them to burst into conflict.

**Contribution from the floor**
The issue of sequencing is an interesting one. The point was made that Taiwan and Korea have achieved much greater things economically than the DRC or Sudan because of good governance. If we follow this sort of simplistic reasoning, we might conclude that democracy does not matter in the process. Other Asian countries are examples of the sequence in which there is economic take-off in an authoritarian situation, though later work can be done to create a democratic environment.

Countries like Angola and DRC – with Chinese assistance – have clearly said that
their priority is not to build a sophisticated democratic system and fight corruption, but is to house the refugees and put in place infrastructure. The IMF reacted against this. How is the question of sequencing addressed in the EU-Africa joint strategy? It is necessary to look at the diversity of the situations in African countries. There is no one-size-fits-all solution.

On the question of bilateral and multilateral development, ratings for bilateral donors are good or better than those of multilateral donors. Nevertheless, once bilateral donors are together in one country they create a big mess, which can be worse than working with one multilateral donor. In healthcare in Tanzania, there are 800 relatively small-scale projects. The Tanzanian health ministry spends a great deal of time just dealing with all the bilateral donors. In the EU, the member states impose very stringent financial constraints on the EU budget. These create more bureaucracy and less efficiency. In Germany, for example, with fewer constraints and financial rules, the agencies much more efficient and flexible. But improving the multilateral system is probably the better solution, rather than continuing with projects set up by numerous agencies.

Response from Klaus-Jürgen Hedrich
Good governance is crucial. But what is good governance about? It is if a government is committed to the wealth of the nation and its people. One point that is very important is corruption. Take the 53 African countries and one will have problems to find five governments that are not corrupt, or that at least are less corrupt. That has a lot to do with good governance.

As far as multilateral and bilateral assistance are concerned, multilateral organisations such as the EU of course have to play a role. But there is a coordination problem. Of course coordination is necessary, but it is very easy for it to break down. It is constantly discussed, and the problems with ensuring coordination are continuous.

China, meanwhile, is most welcome in Africa. China is one of the most important global players. But African leaders, African societies and the African business community are increasingly realising what the Chinese are really interested in. One example to illustrate this is jobs: how many non-Chinese jobs has China created in Africa? In the long run, Africans are aware of who is really a partner offering support, and who is a partner whose interests are promoting its own policies. Nevertheless, China is a global power, and global powers will be present globally.

Response from Stefan Mair
Africa has a particular place in the EU’s current security discourse. There is a view
that the EU has a responsibility to protect Africa against the emergence of powers like China. Also, though perhaps it is cynical to suggest it, Africa is the perfect place for the EU to develop and test certain instruments of security and defence policy. This is a motive that links to the question of China.

On the question of sequencing, one clear pattern shows in analyses of the issue. This is that respect for democracy is de-linked from a democracy dividend. There is no direct linkage between how successful democracy is in providing certain economic rules and basic infrastructure. Democracy is regarded by most Africans as something with its own value, but not necessarily as tool to achieve economic growth.

Concerning the idea of partnership, not only the EU but also most other countries overstretch the term ‘partnership’. Partnership requires certain shared values. Is China is a partner to the EU? I would say no. But it is certainly a country the EU needs a relationship with, perhaps developing into a partnership. The same is true from the EU’s view for several African countries. They are not partners. Nevertheless it is important to have discussions with these countries, and to have summits to exchange views and ideas. Partnership requires openness and frankness and also name-calling sometimes.

**Response from Yacouba Berthé**

Settling conflict is a question of resources and Africa needs support in this. The current pan-African power structure, for example the institutions of the African Union, may not really be sufficient to bring about solutions. Work needs to be done to strengthen the capacity for inter-African mediation. The OAU, the predecessor of the AU, never managed to settle its internal conflicts.

**Response and summary from Philippe Darmuzey**

A number of questions have been raised in this session. A first and very crucial one is that, if one looks at what happens in conflicts and post-conflict situations as detailed in the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management’s Peace and Conflict Report of 2008, it is clear that unusual number of new conflicts, which began in 2005, were borne from the failure of past peace processes. Very often in a post-conflict situation, there is a tendency to try and reconstruct something that existed before – this is ultimately perhaps the recycling of the root cause of the conflict. Different instruments, strategies, bilateral or multilateral approaches will not resolve this easily. The ownership of the construction/reconstruction process should be much more developed.
An interesting statement was made in relation to Kenya, that sometimes conflicts are conducive to real reconstruction. Unfortunately, of course, it is a very big price to pay. If conflicts are caused by, for example, land disputes or ethnic divisions, how can we ensure these issues do not rise again, causing further conflict? But there are positive examples, such as in post-apartheid South Africa. This shows that a genuine approach to post-conflict reconciliation within the afflicted society might be a better approach than an externally-determined strategy with an international conceptual dimension.

The EU has some essential instruments, but they are only limited means for dealing with something which is a national concern and which belongs to civil society and other actors. On the joint strategy, do we have on the African side and on the EU side the capacity to succeed? Was Lisbon another big conference with a result that looks good on paper? There is cause for optimism because there is capacity being built on both sides.

The African Union represents a continental approach that is really more than window dressing. An African peace and security architecture, is in the making, with a continental early warning system and regional approaches – the work of SADC and ECOWAS has been very important, for example.

Activities at national level are also clearly very important. Here, there have been mixed experiences, with some successes and some failures. But still there are many reasons to believe that progress can be made. The EU-Africa relationship is no longer about the traditional relationships between one EU member state and one country in Africa. Something more ambitious is developing, going beyond wishful thinking because it is a question of the destiny of the two continents. The European side cannot afford crisis and instability in Africa, and Africa also needs Europe for its economic, political and cultural values.

There are still political deficits but as we move from crisis to crisis, we learn and build on what happens. The EU now has a new Treaty meaning in its external relations it will gradually move towards something more integrated. The EU does not have the capacity of NATO as a military power, but it does have plenty of other options to offer, which are more interesting than what NATO can provide to the African continent.

Recently, in Addis Ababa, the EU established a delegation to the African Union. This is a comprehensive representation of the EU to the AU, meaning the possibility to create synergies and to go beyond the EU’s institutional blockages. In the medium
term, the EU will be able to establish an external service that will deliver better for the relationships between the external partners and the EU.

Naturally there is much to do, with major challenges to be faced. Involving civil society, the private sector, youth and other players is essential. In Lisbon, correctly, there were side events involving these players, but these were not just side events. The declarations from youth, civil society and the private sector were aired in the plenary session of the Lisbon Summit, meaning that the fourth level of the partnership, the so-called people-centred partnership, has now a meaning. It is too early to say if the joint strategy will deliver but we will try our best.
Session three: the energy security-climate change interface
The energy security-climate change interface

Anders Wijkman MEP

In Africa, development, poverty reduction and the role of energy take priority over tackling climate change, but the issues must be looked at in a more systematic way. Around two billion people in today's world lack access to modern energy carriers, which means that they have to depend, more or less entirely, on animal dung and wood fuel for their energy needs. As long this is the case there is not going to be any development. Poverty reduction is very, very difficult to achieve. A range of development and social issues are very closely linked to the role of modern energy carriers.

Whether we talk about poverty alleviation in general, or about employment, enterprise, communication, education, health, urbanisation, and even demographics, the role of energy is absolutely critical. In the past official development assistance (ODA) has paid far too little attention to the critical role of energy in development. In the European Union, for instance, between four and five percent of the ODA budget in the past has been allocated in support of energy infrastructure, investments and capacity building in the field of energy. That clearly has not been sufficient. This is one major problem for developing countries today and in particular for countries in Africa.

A second problem is that most low-income countries face a real struggle because of very high energy prices. In the North, we have managed quite well, without any notable inflation so far, to absorb the higher prices of oil and of energy in general. But many developing countries face an uphill battle.

There is a close link between energy security and climate security. While Africa only contributes a few percentage points to the world's overall greenhouse gas emissions, sooner or later the African economies will grow. The real challenge now is to provide
access to modern energy carriers, but to do it in a way so that local and regional environments suffer minimal damage from air pollution, acidification, and so on, and also in a way that addresses the critical issue of greenhouse gases.

If we look carefully at Africa, we see there are opportunities in this regard. Solar power in the deserts of Africa represents a fantastic opportunity. I have been part of a fascinating project in the last couple of years, called TREC (http://www.trecers.net/), which originates from Jordan. Prince Hassan bin Talal and researchers there are trying to foster cooperation between Europe and Northern Africa in solar energy, establishing mirrors in the deserts that reflect solar energy to solar power towers, and than transmit it with very little loss to the European continent. That is one opportunity.

Another is biomass. Africa today is very dependent on biomass, but normally in a very inefficient way. But modern biomass offers an opportunity. There are huge tracts of land in parts of Africa where there is also sufficient water to grow biofuels, provided the sustainability criteria are set right. Already at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg there was a energy initiative involving renewable energy. Over the last couple of years we have seen a lot of activity. Energy cooperation is also a component of the EU-Africa joint strategy. There is also the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) that was launched at the United Nations climate change conference in Bali, which is a new mechanism to try to attract finance from the private sector to renewable energy and energy efficiency. Furthermore, there is the Global Climate Change Alliance that was launched in Lisbon in November and in Bali in December. This aims to deal not only with climate change mitigation but also with adaptation and deforestation. However, the Alliance has very limited funding. EUR 60 million is a drop in the ocean relative to the overall needs. This is the backdrop to the discussion on the energy security-climate change interface as it relates to Africa.
The EU-Africa joint strategy should be viewed positively, though there are asymmetries and weaknesses within Africa. One cannot have a strategic partnership with failing or failed or disfunctional states, or states that are run by kleptocrats. But sometimes content follows form. People have argued that the Pan-African Parliament is ahead of itself, because its constituent elements are so weak. But there is a counter-argument. If structures are created, there is an incentive to fill them with capacity and provide a strategic framework.

Energy security and climate change rank as key development issues in the EU-Africa joint strategy document. The first question it provokes is if there are common or shared interests in energy security and climate change between Europe and Africa. At first sight, it may not be particularly clear that there are common strategic interests or partnerships, though there are commercial interests. But if Europe wants to extract petroleum it does so perfectly successfully right now. If it wants to exploit uranium or coal, it does so perfectly successfully. A strategic partnership is not needed for that. But it is necessary to look at what Europe's evolving interests are, particularly with respect to the EU's insecurity of access to energy, and, perhaps more importantly, questions of climate change.

With these in mind, Africa begins to play a much more central role strategically. For example, the Congo basin is the second largest rainforest in the world. Its preservation and sustainable use is a vitally important global issue and a vitally important EU issue. But how much is the EU prepared to pay to protect the Congo Basin, for example to find alternatives for people logging for fuel, or so that local landowners do not sell their titles to loggers?
What is the challenge?
Africa has about 509 million people without electricity, and something like 575 million people who are dependent on biomass – wood and dung – for their energy needs. By contrast, in 20 years, the number of people without electricity in China has dropped from upwards of 800 million people, to 100 million people. Conversely the number of people that do not have access to electricity in Africa is increasing, not decreasing. As an illustration, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a mere 5.8 percent of people have access to electricity.

There is nothing particularly controversial about the EU-Africa partnership on energy security. It seems to be based on common sense, and a mutually reinforcing relationship. However, in the partnership documents the linkage between energy security and climate change is stated but not particularly well developed. There is a degree of idealism about the strategy. But it is underpinned by what are perceived to be shared interests, objectives and action plans.

The strategic plan also mentions regional economic communities (RECs). As energy security and climate change are more than regional issues – they are continental issues – the plan is well developed on the point that the RECs in Africa have to play a central role. Policy design will have to take place at regional level. Like all plans, it requires funding. Where the funding is coming from is identified. There are existing EU-Africa programmes that have dedicated EUR 220 million. But details need to be fleshed out on a programme by programme basis, and identification of the sources of funds is in the documents but is not well developed. However, with agreement on funding, there could well be progress.

The partnership on climate change is a priority action. It is highly welcome and non-controversial, although the underlying issues may be extremely controversial. Africa produces around three percent of global greenhouse gases, an amount similar to Germany. There is an asymmetry here, but it does not undermine the need for partnership.

The implications of global warming for Africa are immense. Africa is particularly vulnerable to climate change. It is not just a threat to coastal areas, but to agricultural production. Thus dialogue between the EU and Africa must be welcomed if it takes place in a structured manner. If nothing else, the strategic plan creates the basis for this form of dialogue over the three year period of the action plan. The integration of climate change issues into regional and Africa-EU policies is key. Africa must also start to integrate climate change into its own regional, developmental and national policies. There is an obvious need for partnership in this respect.
needless to say, climate change mitigation requires more money.

So far there has not been a sufficiently integrated and detailed dialogue about what the EU and Africa's shared interests are in this area. Africa is not clear about its own interests, and does not fully understand the EU’s interest. Africa has to develop a coherent position. For it to be a partnership we need to be clear on these points. Structural asymmetries will be a challenge to the partnership. In other words, we produce different things; we produce different emissions; we have different needs. That does not mean a partnership is not possible but the symbiosis must be understood a lot more clearly.

The EU and Africa are also at profoundly different stages of development. The EU is moving towards knowledge economies, whereas Africa has not entered the industrial revolution in many respects. Even manufacturing capacity in Africa is very low. South Africa is only now signing agreements to build coal-fired power stations, and it is one of the more progressive countries in Africa with regard to green policies and environmental sensitivity. South Africa has a EUR 100 billion energy security plan for the next twenty years, and this is based on South Africa remaining largely a coal driven economy.

The EU-Africa plan pre-supposes Africa capacity, and this is not a given. The AU and NEPAD secretariats are populated by extremely professional, well qualified people but are threadbare. The capacity question must be taken seriously. Perhaps a question might be raised about the AU seconding personnel, from universities for example.

For there is a wonderful opportunity and unique potential for Africa to leap stages of energy development. Africa is uniquely placed with regard to the potential for solar energy, for hydro power, and biomass, as long as it is sustainable. It is entirely conceivable that with the correct focus, the investment and the correct planning and funding, Africa could make technological leaps, bypassing dinosaur technology, bypassing energy inefficiency and carbon polluting technology. This is the key challenge for Africa's security right now and it is where there is the greatest need for partnership.

In summary, to move the partnership forward, we need to look at sequencing, we need to publicise the plan, we need to tighten institutional relationships and adopt a third approach to Africa. It is not a one size fits all situation, but should involve trilateral cooperation. The EU-Africa joint strategy should not be expected to find all the answers. There are other big players we need to cooperate with as well within this relationship.
The magnitude of the climate/energy challenge

Nick Mabey

There are real interests and opportunities for the EU and Africa when it comes to energy security and climate change. It is necessary to identify where there might be enough common interest and political will to actually drive forward the agenda in areas where the real benefits are.

Development and a changing climate

If nothing is done to combat climate change, the global temperature could rise by as much as six or seven degrees Celsius in this century. A 6.5 degree rise would be double the temperature change the planet experienced in the last Ice Age. So the numbers are big.

Climate change in fact involves a lot of changes. The first thing being noticed is increasing volatility, for example in rainfall, with more extreme weather events. Africa will experience both floods and droughts. Climate vulnerability is determined by geography, but the impact of climate change also depends on social systems and the ability to adapt. In this sense, climate change presents the same challenges as a conflict.

How to manage the risks is a question for societies and politicians. At a certain point, global warming will become unmanageable – 6.5 degrees Celsius will be unmanageable for the EU and the US. A lesser temperature rise of 1.5 degrees Celsius might be unmanageable for Africa or Central Asia, because of their geographic, social and economic vulnerability. Assessing climate change is a question of assessing the impact of global warming on one hand, and the capability to manage risks on the other. What does the science and economics tell us? The UK government's Stern Review says the cost of climate change may be between five and twenty percent of global GDP. Of course this connects to energy. Oil prices are
now about USD 100 per barrel. At the moment there is a huge outflow of cash to OPEC countries, who then pump a very small amount back in development aid. Huge amounts of money are lost on weather-related disasters, and where does this money come from? From long term development budgets, in most countries. Serious problems will occur even if the world sticks to the EU's stated target of limiting global warming to two degrees above pre-industrial levels.

So the EU's warming reduction target is not uncontroversial. What does it mean in managing risk? It does not matter what we do. Millions of people will have to deal with climate change. Previously plotted business as usual scenarios have in fact been exceeded already in terms of emissions being pumped out. Even with a massive reduction in emissions from this point on, the temperature will rise until the end of the century. Divergence between high emission (business as usual) scenarios, and scenarios in which serious mitigation takes place only becomes evident after 2050. We have to prepare for adaptation.

The politics of cutting carbon are becoming hard to manage. Developed countries must pay the bill for mitigation, adaptation and for international cooperation at the same time. The politics of this is not straightforward. And the costs could be higher than we think. Neither the Stern analysis or the IPCC analysis include all of the extreme scenarios such as monsoon variation and increased storm activity, increased glacial melting, ocean acidification and of course potential social tension and breakdown. Even Stern has now acknowledged that he probably under-estimated the cost of climate change by three to four times.

The real issue really is not about choosing between different scenarios, but about how do we avoid going beyond tipping points where control is lost. Once we have lost control, climate change becomes a security issue rather than an economic problem. Climate change will become a core issue for the business of development. More money will be dedicated to adaptation, and it will come from development budgets.

Energy, meanwhile, is at the heart of most serious foreign policy disputes. Energy influences China-US relations, EU-China relations and thinking about situations such as Iran and Sudan. We have a very competitive geopolitics of energy, but at the same time, efforts are being made to build a cooperative, universal approach to climate change.

**Africa’s role in international climate negotiations**
The climate debate, as negotiations to find a successor to the Kyoto Protocol
proceed, needs to be reframed around the interests of the global poor. We are seeing a rise of power-based private negotiations, where the major economies or the G8+5 meet. African countries need to make sure they are much more proactive in delivering a pro-poor climate deal. This need makes countries like Nigeria and South Africa into critical players, because they are half at the global negotiating table and half off. Without this effort, there will not be a two-degree agreement that suits Africa, because it will be dealt with by the wrong people. The EU and Africa do have a common interest here. This is where the EU needs Africa to play a role, but so far it is not: Africa does not have a common voice in this area.

Climate change will of course affect growing seasons. Between 2020 and 2050, growing season failure can be expected to increase dramatically. Where will the people from blighted areas go? Lack of water will limit growth. Kenya and Tanzania both suffered recently in this respect. Some of the economically successful parts of Africa, where growing of commodity crops takes place, may be affected both by growing season failures and migration crises.

**Adaptation**

There is a perception that adaptation to climate change is a technical issue, which can be dealt with if there is enough money, and that governments will act to do this. But in Africa there are predatory elites, along with communal differences, and it cannot be assumed this will happen. The development and climate community do not like to talk about the social stresses caused by climate change, and how it has to be managed. Where will migrants go, what will happen when they get there, and what land disputes will there be? The approach to crises will have to be humanitarian, but also a conflict prevention approach with a strong political element.

What might happen can be seen when we consider trans-boundary water management. Africa's water basins are shared between many countries. They may experience more rainfall or less – there is a lot of uncertainty. Upstream countries might forecast rainfall to go down and think about building dams to secure access to the water. Downstream countries might have a contrary view. This type of uncertainty will put stress on existing agreements. Perceptions of future climate change are likely to drive the first wave of inter-state tensions over water – as they are in the Arctic about the availability of sea lanes between the US and Canada. Canada is already spending on new bases in the north because of climate change – or because of the perception of future change. In this context, how can the stability of international water agreements be increased?

Another question is: do we connect UN adaptation funding to reforms and better
governance? There is a really tricky conditionality issue here that needs to be thought through. Should money be spent, for example, on new water infrastructure that might not be stable? New water systems are likely to be a conflict driver. We must be careful to ensure that the billions that will be spent on adaptation do not actually provoke conflict.

However, potentially climate change will force the major energy powers to cooperate more. There is already work between the EU and China on energy, as well as US-China work. A climate changed world will see a shift to paying attention to relationships with energy consumers rather than with energy producers. Africa could benefit from this to reduce international interference on the continent. Relationships with energy producers will be much more structured.

In summary:

- EU-Africa cooperation needs to focus on efficiency. Whether the energy source is oil, biomass or coal it must be used properly. Efficiency is cheap, it generates local jobs and is easy to do – not enough of it is done.
- The EU-Africa partnership also needs to be underpinned by real capacity-building for African political voices. Money will not flow to Africa unless Africa comes up with things to spend it on – it is a capacity issue, but a focused capacity issue.
- Adaptation should be reframed in terms of societal resilience. We need to move away from a paradigm of concrete programmes to a more complicated approach of building societal structures that can manage resilience.
- The concessional finance flows to Africa should be reformed to support low-carbon development pathways, such as renewable energy. Who will build African innovation in this area? Will it be Africa? It might be more likely that countries like Brazil and India provide the innovation, and Africa imports it. This could apply to decentralised power, for example. There is a job with such approaches to make them happen.
- Africa should be working to help the nascent cooperation on stability around energy and climate cooperation. Africa has the most to gain from the major energy consumers getting their acts together, and being less in thrall to fossil fuel producers.
Mitigation, adaption and the Global Climate Change Alliance

Walter Kennes

Climate uncertainty
There is a lot of uncertainty about what will happen with the climate in Africa. There are gaps in the meteorological information. There are three major African climate phenomena to be considered: the Intertropical Convergence Zone, which brings the rain to the central areas; the West African monsoon, which is a rather little-understood phenomenon; and the El Niño effect. There is uncertainty about all of these interactions. With climate change, some regions will get more rainfall, others will get less. There may even be varying effects in one place. But it is certain the weather will be more extreme. There is a need to work on this.

The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Nairobi (COP12) took place in November 2006. It was the first time it took place in Africa. This drew attention to Africa's vulnerability and the need to do more about it. From this, the Commission drew specific conclusions about how to bring climate change into development policy. Developing countries, including the most vulnerable, are not aligned to the EU's stated target of keeping global warming at less than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, even though it is the African continent that will suffer most from temperature rises. African countries should be allies to the EU target.

The Global Climate Change Alliance
Even a two degree Celsius rise will make a massive difference to agriculture. Many changes to growing patterns will have to be made. Challenges such as this for Africa were behind the idea of a Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), in which the EU would collaborate with the most vulnerable countries, in particular least developed countries – mainly in Africa – and the small island states.
The GCCA is based on the idea of having a better dialogue and moving towards a shared vision, because the two degree objective is really a minimum objective, but for the moment it is not a shared vision. It might be surprising that the countries that have the greatest interest in sharing the two degree vision have not got behind it so far. That is part of the GCCA initiative, which incidentally will establish a dialogue in collaboration with the African Union.

At the same time, adaptation efforts are needed. There is an attempt to increase adaptation funding. Adaptation will be cross-sectoral, dealing for example with agricultural production and new varieties – agriculture is a key part. Adaptation also requires long term planning, for example making sure infrastructure is adapted so it is more suitable for resisting extreme weather phenomena. Adaptation is also required in respect of diseases such as malaria, and healthcare.

To a certain extent, development work is adaptation work. But adaptation needs to be mainstreamed and become part of the development strategy. This is also the best way to move forward in line with the principles of efficient development cooperation. Mainstreaming is very important.

Another operational component is working on disaster risk reduction. Forecasting of weather phenomena is not an exact science, and work is in preparation to link meteorological services more closely to policy-making, and to use meteorological information better.

Mozambique, with very severe floods in 2000 and more recently, has illustrated that working on disaster risk reduction can really pay off. But much more needs to be done: insurance mechanisms and better risk-sharing, for example.

Opportunities
There may also be some opportunities from climate change for African countries. One example – not sufficiently exploited at the moment – is better participation of the African countries in the carbon market. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) makes it possible for emissions-reducing investments in developing countries to generate emission rights that can be used to reach targets set under the Kyoto Protocol. However, CDM projects so far have almost entirely gone to other places and not Africa. About half go to China, and a lot go to Latin America. Only three percent of projects have gone to Africa, and they have not gone to the least developed countries. There is thus potential for capacity-building – one of the legs of the GCCA. There are in this respect opportunities we would like to exploit.
Forests are another opportunity for Africa. The Congo Basin forest is the world's second-largest tropical forest. Fortunately it has not been diminished and degraded at the same rate as other forests. The East Asia tropical forest has been the fastest-declining. The Bali UN climate change conference in December 2007 brought in the possibility that mechanisms will somehow be found to pay for the carbon that is held in the forests. This means a future opportunity for the countries that conserve forests and contribute to the global public good of a stable climate. But translating this opportunity into something concrete is quite a challenge. It is not just a technical question but also a matter of governance of natural resources. It cannot be handled just by negotiations with governments; it also needs to be channelled down to the population that is dependent on the forest.

Energy and forests
Deforestation has mainly been caused by rising population pressures and use of biomass for energy – firewood and cooking. There are important possibilities to improve this situation through better stoves, electrification and use of renewable energy.

The EU intends to work on these subjects in the EU-Africa partnership on energy and climate change. We must work country by country to mainstream adaptation into their strategies. The Commission is identifying a number of target countries to do this, and to work on other areas. We must also do things at the right level on the basis of subsidiarity. African regional economic communities have a task to complete.

Some issues are pan-African, such as the dialogue on the common vision. Getting African countries to align themselves with the two degree Celsius target can also be done at the pan-African level.

There is also a reference in the partnership text to the AU's 'Great Green Wall for the Sahara' initiative, which has everything to do with energy and climate. It aims to promote reforestation in the Sahel region. Impressive results have been produced in Niger, which now has areas that are greener than Nigeria to the south, which gets a lot more rainfall. There is potential and it should be exploited in this flagship initiative, which the African heads of state have subscribed to. The development community must translate this into practical results and not a general vision.

To do this many questions must be addressed: who owns the trees, who owns the timber and what is the link between forests, farmers and livestock? This is a very delicate balance and some improvement can be made.
The energy security-climate change interface

Discussion

Contribution from Anders Wijkman, MEP

How do we mobilise EU and AU policymaking to think sufficiently big and quick in the next three to five years? The time period up to the UN climate conference in Copenhagen at the end of 2009 is particularly critical. While we can accept that Africa needs to subscribe to the two degrees Celsius goal, it is not clear that African governments understand that or have expressed it well enough. Capacity-building on all levels is very much linked to that.

Technology leapfrogging meanwhile is much discussed but how can this be done? Why are energy countries not more interested in exploring Africa’s renewable energy potential? Funding for solar power in the Sahara has been almost impossible to arrange. Reliance on coal and nuclear power remains. Spending on conventional energy is a given in the short term, but how can the longer term research agenda be advanced?

On forests, should forest compensation be part of the carbon market? Or should there be a separate funding mechanism as the Brazilians would like? These are not easy questions. The Commission still does not accept the idea of including carbon sinks in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). On the ETS, could auctioning of emission permits be used to help finance mitigation, adaptation and forests in Africa? Otherwise it is not clear where money will come from. The CDM is not going to deliver the big money in the foreseeable future. It may expand by 2020, but expansion of the CDM in the next ten years will not be sufficient, whereas funding is needed now.

Response from Tim Hughes

On African awareness of the two degrees Celsius goal, this relates to the climate
change/energy security nexus. That nexus is not being conceptualised, expressed or considered in Africa, though even in Europe there is public opinion research that reflects 'not my problem' or 'not my fault' attitudes. There are many misperceptions. Statistics show that European consumers on average are either ignorant of the climate change issue, or in denial. In Africa we have not even got to the stage of acknowledgement. Africa may experience the silting up of rivers and power shortages, but so far there is no coherent pan-African, or even regional, dialogue. Outside the ministry in South Africa the two degree debate simply does not exist. Europe is way ahead. Africa needs an intensive campaign to publicise the issue. This is a first step in linking questions of climate change to questions of energy insecurity.

Africa remains fixated with its developmental and political challenges, which are very immediate. Most of Africa is not ready to make sacrifices for what is seen as a future, unknown, misunderstood phenomenon such as climate change. Africa may reach tipping points and not be able to mitigate or adapt, being left instead with crises that reverse the developmental gains of the last 20 to 30 years. It is just not high enough on the agenda. Somebody has to begin explaining the implications of climate change to politicians in Africa, and the issue needs to be mainstreamed into parliaments, while civil society has a crucial role to play in raising awareness. The EU-Africa partnership can help to do this.

Response from Nick Mabey
A sense of urgency is needed. Regarding the two degree target, the only uncertainty is when we will go past the tipping point. The question then is how to manage that uncertainty. We need to look at the problem in a different way, as we do with terrorism, proliferation and other security risks. In these cases we do not flirt with worst case scenarios because they are a bit cheaper.

A second key point is that people have to believe prosperity is possible in a low-carbon world. Rich countries and poor countries have to win this prosperity debate, but so far little progress has been made, especially in Africa. People must also believe the path to the low-carbon world will be equitable. Coal miners in Ohio and people in Africa have to believe that the contribution they are asked to make is fair. A political discussion on this is needed.

We are working on looking at what the worst case scenario could look like from a security point of view: what will happen if the science is the worst it might be, if the energy security questions cannot be answered and if the climate policies fail – which is probably the most likely scenario unfortunately. How would we react in this case, and how do we avoid being there? At present, the climate game is being run by
economists who believe they can control the economy, but attempts to reduce emissions so far have fundamentally failed, for example in the UK. There is a lot of specious optimism about how good we are at controlling the economy, which is an incredibly powerful, dynamic, complex beast. As soon as you put a block in its path, it flows around it and finds another place to produce carbon dioxide. It is important to convey to people the extent of the risk.

One must also consider the reality of a low-carbon world. Africa may not have an targets but it will be part of a low-carbon world, and many companies will not buy products from place that use coal, or support air-freight of commodity goods from Africa that can be obtained closer to home, such as flowers from Kenya. In a globalised world, supply chains will be carbon measured. Wherever you are and whatever you do, you will have to fit in with both a climate changed world and a low-carbon world. This has to be at the heart of development planning.

This brings one onto the issue of capacity-building. Low-carbon initiatives connected to markets will produce real opportunities. There may in the future be low-carbon economic zones in developing countries, and the developing countries will benefit from this because firstly they need to reduce their carbon output, but also because it will be a way of connecting with the global economy. The low-carbon economy will be huge. What is Africa going to sell and how will its firms operate? Africa should start building focused projects offering real value and get carbon finance. The problem is not the money – this can be found – it is having some good ideas that start to do transformational things on the ground. The Kyoto Protocol market mechanism does not succeed in Africa because the market goes to where the risk is low and profit is high – in other words, to Asia, and a bit of Latin America. For Africa, targeted interventions are needed for the public good, using the market but not being led by it, because the market will not lead us to Africa.

Contribution from Anders Wijkman MEP
The low-carbon economy with certain products labelled as low-carbon, could be seen as indirectly introducing protectionist measures, or at least ways of banning certain types of products. But it is a reality and that could perhaps be an argument for African governments.

But how do we think big and how do we mobilise opinion, in particular when it comes to finance and technology? Why is more not happening to tap the renewable energy potential in Africa?
Response from Walter Kennes
On the question of the low-carbon economy, Africa’s share of emissions is very small, leading some to say they should not bother about the low-carbon economy. But they should, because of the risks of high energy prices and insecurity. Development cooperation should also encourage moves towards a low-carbon growth path. For producing a unit of GDP, Africa uses more carbon than other continents – it is the least carbon-efficient continent.

The European Commission publishes Country Strategy Papers, which set out its cooperation with different countries. At present hardly any of these refer to environment in a serious way; and few refer to climate change. This needs to be changed. With the GCCA resources – around EUR 60 million – the Commission will look for some country pilot cases where it can work on the issue of mainstreaming environmental and climate issues. But mainstreaming climate adaptation is not easy and resources must not be wasted. But taking these small steps is important, and will show, by the time of the UN climate meeting in Copenhagen at the end of 2009, to the least developed countries and island states, that some worthwhile things can be achieved.

On technological leapfrogging, it is hard to tell why it is not done more. There are some ongoing initiatives, including some energy projects, such as solar power in the Sahel. We should certainly examine the potential for leapfrogging, but the reasons why it does not happen more are unclear.

Concerning forests, whether or not they are included in the EU ETS is not the main issue. It is a highly complex subject. On the development side, the role of forests as offering a carbon ‘service’ is seen as a new resource for development. But it would be even better to talk about a total ecosystem service – this would include biodiversity as well, not just carbon. The Commission is currently working on governance in this area, with the FLEGT initiative – Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade. This encourages only legal export of wood from developing countries through certification systems. This is a step in the right direction, but it will take time to fully develop these approaches.

Furthermore if funds are to flow to the developing world because of forests, the money should not simply go to the central governments, but must really find its way to the populations that rely on the forests for their livelihoods.

Contribution from the floor
The effect of biofuels on food prices must not be overlooked. Insecurity about this
is a big problem for shifting public opinion.

**Response and summary from Anders Wijkman MEP**

Biofuels can be done the right way, or a very wrong way. US production of ethanol from corn is a very wrong way, but ethanol in Brazil done by the Brazilians, with developing sustainability criteria, is not bad. There are enormous amounts of land in Brazil, in northern Mozambique, in Tanzania, which can be used for biofuels. It is a misconception that biofuels are always bad. Should tobacco growing be stopped because of high food prices? It would not be surprising if the oil companies in part at least are behind this debate.

I applaud the FLEGT initiative but it is not a response to deforestation, not in Brazil and not in the Congo. The forest issue will require careful thinking in the next six to eight months. We need something on the table no later than early 2009.

On technology leapfrogging, efforts must be made to utilise the potential there is in Africa for modern biomass or for solar technologies, for example.

Adaptation must focus more on resilience and on the risks – such as migration and water conflicts – we face if it is not done right.

Importantly, Europe needs a public debate focusing on the finance. Finance ministers hate earmarking. If they receive the revenues from auctioning of carbon permits into their coffers they are not likely to consider spending them in Africa. But pressure has to be brought for this, because it would be the polluter-pays principle in practice, and will help the most vulnerable populations of the world.

There should be coherence between what the European Commission is doing and what EU member states are doing. For too long we have seen actors operating in recipient countries on bilateral bases. It is now important to aim for much better collaboration, coordinated joint working and avoidance of duplication. Action on climate change – adaptation, risk reduction, mitigation, defining the role of forests – offers an opportunity to really work together. The EU has the context for dividing labour. Within the GCCA, one could envisage different countries taking the lead on different aspects. But it is not happening so far. The signal for this to happen must be sent.
Concluding remarks

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

The EU-Africa joint strategy is a broad framework that will allow us to go forward within the context of the action plan that has been drawn up. The opportunity of the strategy and the partnership is to use it as a springboard for creating greater awareness of key global challenges, and to create greater synergies where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. This requires a change of mindset. As well as the EU engaging Africa, African states and the African Union must engage the EU.

The strategy also implies moving away from the traditional donor-recipient relationship. The strategy is not about just aid or volumes of money. It is also about capacity-building, and about looking at what each party can bring to the table in terms of lessons learned and particular experiences. This is key to the issues of peace and security, and climate change and energy security. The partnership can look at innovative technologies and at generating private sector interest in key industries and bringing them to the table, to address African concerns in particular, in a way that can help us break out of the aid dependency that has developed.

Climate change provides some opportunities for Africa and for key developing countries that have some capacity in the area of innovation. In many ways Africa could become a pilot case for application of the technologies that will drive a low carbon economy. This has clear implications for trade, in terms of global supply chains and how Africa will fit in to them by meeting new standards and challenges.

Africa has different capacities and faces different challenges. The way South Africa engages with the EU on climate change and energy security, will be very different from the way Mali does it. This is not just a question of geography, but also of specific challenges faced in each case. This is also true with the issue of the role of the private sector in post-conflict reconstruction and development, and indeed with
the issue of strengthening and building up democratic and accountable institutions, and with civil society involvement.

This raises a key point in the context of climate change and engagement on different issues: Africa is not homogeneous. Neither is Europe, but Europe clearly, because of the depth of its integration, is far more coherent in certain policy areas than is Africa. Although we use the term partnership in connection with the EU-Africa strategy, we are in fact talking about an asymmetric relationship. This is not necessarily a problem. But Africans must consider how to take advantage of the opportunity, and how to create greater awareness within its own societies, with more dialogue and debate being a prerequisite.

The role of new external actors in Africa is relevant on this point: for example the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, or indeed the delegation of 15 African countries to New Delhi at the beginning of April to discuss issues of mutual interest with India. What proactive preparations has Africa made for these engagements, by defining its particular interests, continental interests and shared values? While there are trends indicating greater progress in this regard, African states cannot ignore these questions.

This is just to mention some of the relevant, important issues. Someone made the point, very correctly, that human rights is about ending poverty. But that does not for a moment detract from the discussion about how one creates accountable and effective states, where the citizens of that state are free to engage in external dialogues. This is a strong point on the issue of good governance and human rights. Engagement between African and European representatives is a major part of the EU-Africa strategic partnership, and this means people-to-people exchanges as much as government-to-government ties.