Political Parties and Party Types - Conceptual Approaches to the Institutionalization of Political Parties in Transitional States: The Case of the Philippines

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FOREWORD

The recently concluded national and local elections last May 2010 undeniably showcased the ill-developed political party system in the Philippines. Instead of serving as an instrument for true representation and a venue for citizens to participate in the political life of the country, political parties in the Philippines remain shackled by the dictates of a few powerful individuals and subject to political exigencies. It is no wonder why after the dust settled after the elections, a mass exodus by elected officials to the winning political party occurred.

In order to stabilize democracy and improve the quality of democratic processes, it is imperative to institutionalize measures that would develop strong and functioning political parties. Based on a clear framework anchored on values and principles, a true political party would serve as a mechanism for the citizenry to consolidate their positions and effectively articulate it to the government and the general public.

This study was undertaken to further our understanding of the critical role of political parties in a democratic system. It analyzes the different criteria for establishing truly functioning political parties and contains key recommendations on how to develop such parties in the Philippines. This study was done on behalf of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and in cooperation with the Centrist Democratic Movement (CDM) of the Philippines.

We hope that this study would contribute to the growing discourse on strengthening the role of political parties in institutionalizing democracy in the Philippines.

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“Political parties and party types – Conceptual approaches to the institutionalization of political parties in transitional states: The case of the Philippines.

1 Introduction: Political parties in the transitional process

For the democratic consolidation of transitional states, political parties are of crucial importance. In the scientific disciplines of party- and transitional- research the importance of parties within these processes has widely been recognized\(^1\) – regardless whether applied to cases of transitional states from the African, Asian or Latin American continent\(^2\).

The study “Political parties and party types - Conceptual approaches to the institutionalization of political parties in transitional states: the case of the Philippines”, is based on the hypothesis that the establishment of intermediary organization (such as political parties), as well as their roles, their duties and their responsibilities within not yet consolidated democracies, are most likely to be based upon the approaches of traditional party research in liberal western democracies; however, those western experiences cannot be easily adapted. This is due to structural, functional and country-specific challenges that parties experience within the transitional process\(^3\).

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\(^1\) Burnell (2004).
\(^2\) Sandbrook (1996); Diamond ( 1999); Randall/Svåsand (2002).
\(^3\) Merkel (1997)
Political parties in transitional states hence adopt other consolidating functions in addition to the well known functional catalogues and functional typologies as presented by western-party-research\(^4\). This study assumes that the more the parties are institutionalized, the better they can fulfill these consolidating functions. The degree of party institutionalization depends significantly on how the party was founded, but also on its “genetic model” (Panebianco 1988:50) and on the ‘party-building’ pattern during the institutionalization process. Therefore, the focus of this study is the question, to what extent and in which form parties (in the Philippines) need to be institutionalized in order to achieve an optimum effect on the consolidation process, thereby affecting other levels of the political system and societal actors (for example, institutions, organizations and associations, political elites and civil society).

1.1 Analytic approach

Beginning with a brief classification from a perspective based in democracy-theory and a theoretic construction of a transitory framework, this study sets out to describe (1) the functional catalogue and typologies of political parties, as be found in classic party-research on liberal, democratic political systems. Although basically all party forms are included in the classic catalogues of party-functions, party research commonly distinguishes between various party types following a variety of features (e.g. ideological alignment, the stance towards the political system, the organizational structure of the party or its constituency/catchment area). As an example, one could mention classic European party models such as Duverger’s ‘mass-based par-

ty’ (1954), featuring strong ties to a socioeconomic class, or Kirchheimer’s so termed “catch-all-party” (1996).  

At the center of this analysis the focus will shift to the development of conceptual approaches for the establishment and institutionalization of political parties in the Philippines. This analysis is set up around seven different dimensions of party institutionalization, whereupon country specific indicators are developed for the individual case of the Philippines:

- Level of organization
- Internal-party democracy
- Programme
- Autonomy
- Roots in society
- Coherence
- Regional and international integration.

Generally it will be taken into account that these dimensions are (a) derived in their theory from existing research and (b) are further developed by applying practical examples.

Finally a ‘continuum of party institutionalization’ will provide an outline of sequences of the party-building process. Therefore the analysis is conducted at the juncture between the scientific fields of party- and party institution-
nalization research on the one hand and transition- and consolidation research on the other.

1.2 Notion of democracy

The range of democratic concepts stretches from minimalist approaches merely focusing on procedural aspects and contractual rights of the individual, up to more complex definitions that extensively assign substantial social and cultural participatory rights to the individual. For the most part, the disciplines of transitional – and democratic-research focus on a minimalist-procedural democratic notion as presented by Robert A. Dahis (1971) concept of ‘polyarchy’ when assessing democratic progress (vgl. Diamon 1998:8; Schubert/Tetzlaff 1998:13ff.; Lauth 2000:49ff.; Freedom House 2001){6}, thereby avoiding a discussion of different normative models of democracy (liberal, republican, deliberate democracy). Wolfgang Merkel (1993:30ff.) remarks on the apparent neglect of a discussion of normative democratic models in transitional research: “It is symptomatic for the field of transitional research that an intensive debate based on democracy theory has never been established. The highly normative question about whether representative, elite or participative, procedural or substantial, ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ models of democracy are to be favoured, whether the thought of Rousseau or Schumpeter, Dahl or Habermas should provide theoretical guidance was decided instantly, without any discourse. However, Robert Dahls (1971) procedural and institutional minima, derived from Schumpeters ‘realistic’ theory of democracy, has advanced to be a common basis for transitional research”

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6 For Dahl polyarchy constitutes the highest form of democracy. The term democracy is reserved for an ideal, in reality non-existent system.
As a basic requirement for democracy, Dahls liberal model of democracy presupposes three conditions that need to be unconditionally available to all state citizens:

(1) The freedom of expression,
(2) The freedom of association and
(3) The freedom of information (Dahl 1971:2-8).

To ensure these conditions, a minimum of eight political arrangements, practices, or institutions have to be given: elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; inclusive citizenship; political competition; and institutions that ensure a horizontal division of powers to hold government accountable (Dahl 1971:3).

Those eight conditions reflect the basic dimensions of political democracy: political competition and political participation (the right to contend in political competition). Linz, one of the major scholars in transition research, takes recourse in his definition of democracy to these eight minimum conditions propounded by Dahl. A political system can be considered democratic, “when it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competitions between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means their claim to rule, (...) without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preferences” (Linz 1975:182f). Di Palma (1990) also presents a sur-
prisingly scant definition of democracy, emphasizing that “Political democracy, as the issue in the transition, is understood in the conventional Schumpeterian or representative sense” (Di Palma 1990:16). Przeworski presents an even shorter definition of democracy as “a system of (...) organized uncertainty” (Przeworski 1991:131). Normative elements of democracy are not discussed any further.

A model which reduces democratic legitimization to ‘vertical’ accountability (of rulers to the ruled) merely defines ‘democracy’ as an electoral or formal system (Diamond 1996:21). Yet, especially for the establishment and institutionalization of parties in new democracies, it appears essential not to follow the “fallacy of electoralism” (Schmitter/Karl 1991:78) – or, in other words, the belief that democracy is established solely on the basis of elections.

In order to avoid neglecting the ‘horizontal accountability’ of officeholders to one another, the rule of law, the prevalence of equal human and civil rights and the protection of minorities and to ensure, in the context of this research, that further institutions such as effective oppositional parties and extended possibilities for participation exist outside election periods, this analysis of party development is based on an extended understanding of liberal democracy.

Of course, there are also exceptions in the field of transitional research that do not solely resort to Schumpeter or refer to Dahl’s procedural minimum exclusively. Philippe Schmitter (1985), for example, criticised the sole reliance on a comprehensive account of a procedural minimum, and noted that instead the relationship between governmental legislation, intermediary structures and representation of
interests (parties, unions, and associations, grass-roots organizations and social movements, media) and the modes of political decision making should be focused.

The interface between citizens and office holders should therefore be included within the term ‘democracy’. In political science, especially in research with special regards to the politics in Asia, an ongoing discussion has brought about the question whether the liberal model of democracy can indeed be practically adapted for cases in Asian countries (Manasca/Tan 2005; Hicken 2006).

Following Przeworski (1991:12ff), ‘Democracy’ is regarded as something procedural, as a system in which conflicts are continually conducted through institutions. This results in a system where none of the competing political forces holds the power single-handedly to determine results in advance or to correct them in retrospect – the uncertainty and openness of the process and the outcome is, however, limited by the institutional frame by which means the political contestants can evaluate their own scope of influence.

This study assumes that political parties perform pivotal functions in democracies and hence in the process of democratisation\(^7\). The most central functions of parties illustrate their significant societal position as an intermediary between the rulers and the ruled. The subsequent chapter therefore introduces (1) the classic functions that parties perform and (2) the basic party types. Finally (3) the focus will shift towards the case of the Philippines, where case relevant party functions are identified and the most suitable party types are introduced.

\(^7\) Dalton/Wattenberg 2000:5.
2 Party functions and party types

What are the main contributions of parties for civil society and the system of party democracy? To begin with, it seems reasonable to take a closer look at the functions of parties at three different levels: The parties in the electorate, parties as organization and parties in government. The introduction of these different levels provides an important contribution to the analysis of the significance of parties in the democratic process.

2.1 Parties in the electorate

As plenty of cases on a worldwide scale show – amongst others the West-European examples of Great Britain or Germany – political parties are currently struggling to mobilize people to participate in the electoral process. Therefore party functions within the electorate are of particular importance.

2.1.1 Simplifying choices for voters

Modern electoral research has discovered that the average voter tends to have problems in making a definite choice facing elections. The complexity of issues and the multiplicity of choices can overwhelm voters. Therefore, one of the peculiar functions of parties in party democracies is to make politics more accessible or ‘user-friendly’ for citizens. Voters are provided with valuable information about specific candidates or policy issues. The party labels provide key informational short-cuts for the electorate. And indeed, empirical evidence suggests that party-ties act as a cue in guiding voter opinion and behaviour. Schattenschneiders classic maxim, describing democratic politics as being impossible without parties, accounts for the significance of
parties in structuring electoral choice.

2.1.2 Educating citizens

Moreover, political parties provide people with important political information; they educate, inform and influence the public. Political parties launch certain issues and discourse into civil society, providing the public with the possibility to discuss matters and form opinions. In some European party systems this function – the political education of citizens – is even drafted in basic law. In Germany for instance, basic law mandates that parties must act to inform citizens on political subjects. A generous annual budget from the federal government is distributed among the parties in order for them to be able to pursue their educational tasks.

2.1.3 Generating symbols of identification and loyalty

“In a stable political system, voters need a political anchor, and political parties can serve this function” (Dalton/Wattenberg 2000:6). Providing a political anchor for citizens is not only important in order to prevent demagogic leaders and extremist movements from claiming power, partisan attachment is also a conserving and stabilizing force for the democratic polity. Political anchorage or partisan attachment creates continuity in voter choices and in election outcomes. Political parties also offer a basis of political identification that is separated from the polity itself. Thereby political frustration with governmental performance can easily be redirected to competent institutions rather than the state itself.
2.1.4 Mobilizing people to participate

A fundamental role of political parties – in almost all democratic polities – is to motivate people to go to elections and participate in the electoral process. This is ensured by two different kinds of mobilization – directly and indirectly: The direct process involves the party organization working actively to canvass neighbourhoods to get them to vote. Moreover political parties try to mobilize citizens to become involved in the campaign itself, as well as participate in other aspects of the democratic process. On the other hand, the indirect way, the parties’ efforts to make politics more ‘user-friendly’ reduce the costs of voting, and the partisan result of electoral activity increases the supposed benefits to the own party supporters.

2.2 Parties as Organizations

A second range of functions that political perform concerns their role as political organizations:

2.2.1 Recruiting political leaders and seeking government office

Parties seek to control the governing apparatus by proposing candidates for political offices – this is elemental to all the classic definitions of a political party. Party government literature emphasizes the role of political parties in the recruitment and selection of political elites. Thus many of the parties’ internal structures, as for example youth groups and internal party offices, are created to identify and nurture future candidates. In most parliamentary systems, political parties have developed formal or informal mechanisms to control parliamentary nominations – this can be seen as one of the basic functions of any political party.
2.2.2 Training political elites

Another basic function is the education of political elites about the democratic process, the norms of democracy, and the principles of their party. Within the classic party government model, the training may accompany a long career starting in party activism, followed by party officeholding, and then finally elective holding. It is very unusual in strong party systems for individuals to rise to a top office without prior career at party level. This socialization function is often considered as a vital part for the success of a functioning democratic system.

2.2.3 Articulating political interests

The structural-functionalist approach states that one of the key functions of a party is to articulate the interests of its supporters. Political parties give voice to their supporters’ interests by taking stands on political issues and by expressing the views of their supporters within the governing process. In this sense parties are no different from special interest groups, which also articulate political interests. However, the centrality of political parties in structuring political campaigns, controlling legislative debates, and directing the actions of politicians gives parties various unrivalled venues in which they can represent the interest of their supporters.

2.2.4 Aggregating political interests

One of the most obvious differences between an interest group and a party is the fact that a party does not only articulate political interest but also aggregates it. In their platforms and manifestos, parties traditionally pool the interests of various groups and form a comprehensive pro-
gramme for governing. In disciplined party systems, these programmes provide not only a policy-basis but also an important link to the representational process. This linkage mechanism has prompted party research scholars such as Giovanni Sartori of Austin Ranney to advocate responsible party government as the basis of democratic representation. The parties’ electoral needs also encourage the inclusion of a wide variety of interest groups which help to forge a common programme which these interests can support. Similarly, political parties must reconcile the diverging internal interests that they represent into a combined programme for government. Political parties are one of the few political organizations which must combine interest articulation with interest aggregation and can thereby be easily distinguished from individual politicians, interest groups and other public actors.

2.3 Party in Government

The final level of analysis involves the role that parties play in managing and structuring the affairs of government. In this area, too, political parties have been attributed with numerous key aspects of the democratic process:

2.3.1 Creating majorities in government

In the aftermath of an election, the democratic process seeks to form a functioning and stable government. In contemporary democracies, it is the responsibility of a single political party or a coalition of parties to organize enough elected officials to form a government, or at least to organize majorities in each house of the legislature (as in the American case). The literature on government formation uniformly accepts that political parties are the prime actors
in this process, and that the formation of a coalition is a partisan activity. Moreover, models of coalition formation indicate that the representation of party policy positions and the distribution of party resources are the key factors in determining which government will form.

2.3.2 Organizing the government

Some of the earliest political parties developed as an attempt to organize the legislative process. Political parties provide an efficient mechanism for organizing interests and ensure the cooperation among individual legislators. Within legislatures, it is the responsibility of party organization to maintain party discipline, which is ensured by a variety of incentives and control mechanisms. Parties monitor individual legislators and – if need be – enforce party discipline. Thus in most parliamentary systems, parties vote as blocs with few individual abstentions or deviations from the general party line. Political parties also usually control the selection of legislative leadership offices and the distribution of resources to the legislators. Democracy without parties might be impossible, but large modern legislatures without political parties are also inconceivable.

2.3.3 Implementing policy objectives

Once in government, political parties are the central actors in determining governmental policy outputs, which is one of the key principles of the party government models. In disciplined party systems, this function is performed by the transformation of political content from the parties’ manifesto and campaign promises into written law. Even in systems such as the United States with weaker party mandates, parties are still the primary agents in negotiating public
policy in the legislature. Political parties thereby provide a method to solve the collective decision-making problems of legislators by creating an institutional structure by which collective decisions can be reached and enforced.

2.3.4 Organizing dissent and opposition

Not all parties will be in government. It is therefore up to those parties in the minority to offer the public an alternative course to government. The British concept of the Loyal Opposition represents this point rather well: the opposition party presents a political alternative that acts to limit the present government and offers a potential for change at the next election. As Schattenschneider rightly acknowledged, democracy does not exist until people are aware of a choice between different parties. This choice is regularly manifested in party politics, not only on Election Day but whenever any piece of major legislation is discussed.

2.3.5 Ensuring responsibility for government actions

A central feature of the party government model is that it provides a mechanism for ensuring political responsibility. With parties controlling the government (alone or in coalition), it is clear who is responsible for government actions. Responsible party government makes it easier for the public to decide who should get the credit or blame for the governments’ policy choices and outcomes. Political parties thus provide an effective mechanism to ensure the responsible action of individual legislators. If voters are satisfied with government’s action, they can reward the incumbent parties; if they are dissatisfied, they can vote for opposition. This creates strong incentives for party members in government to work efficiently together in order to deliver
the best possible results, as they are aware that their political fortunes will rise and fall as one.

2.3.6 Controlling government administration

Although the political activities of parties are often focused on the legislative and executive branches of government, another important role of parties is to establish and maintain a political presence within the government bureaucracy. At one level, this occurs through the selection of political appointments, for example when ministries take office in executive agencies. In addition, many political systems allow the assignment of a limited number of administrative positions to political appointments by the ruling party.

2.3.7 Fostering stability in government

Finally, parties provide the key element of continuity in democratic governance. Specific issues and leaders may well change from one campaign to the next, but the party label remains. Historic figures like Margaret Thatcher, Charles de Gaulle and Richard Nixon may well dominate the political scene of a country for a long period of time, but the legacy of such leaders is institutionalized primarily by their ability to effect a lasting influence on their political party. In more specific terms, the stability of governments is directly related to the level of party unity. A stable party usually accounts for a stable government.

Bearing all this in mind, the functions that political parties perform contribute to both the democratization process and good governance. When these separate functions are interconnected in the model of responsible party government, a powerful mechanism for representative democracy is provided. From a rational choice perspective, political parties
can also be regarded as a potential solution to problems of agency and collective decision-making that arise in representative democracies. As many distinguished scholars have pointed out, political parties are important vehicles for translating mass preferences into policy choice, and to ensure the efficient functioning of the whole democratic process. A decline in the ability of parties to perform (even some of) these functions should cause serious concern. (Wattenberg/Dalton 2000:6ff.)

2.4 Different types of parties: Mass-based party and catch-all party

Even though the classic functional catalogues can basically be applied to all party forms, scientific party research distinguishes between different party types (cf. table 1) which are formulated on the basis of various characteristics (structure of party members and constituency, social origins of constituency, the party’s organizational structure, the goals of the party, political and ideological alignment, the attitude towards the political system and party’s claim to power).
### Table 1: Party types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classificational feature</th>
<th>Party type</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure of members and</td>
<td><strong>Catch-all-party</strong> (“Volkspartei”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>constituency</td>
<td>Class-based-party</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interest-based-party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social origins of</td>
<td>Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constituency</td>
<td>Farmers party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small business interests party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational structure</td>
<td>Notabilities party</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cadre party</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Mass based party</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cartell party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Membership party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party’s goals</td>
<td>Vote-seeking party</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Office-seeking party</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy-seeking party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and ideological</td>
<td>Extreme right-wing, conservative,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alignment</td>
<td>Christian, liberal, green, social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>democrat, socialist, communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards political system</td>
<td>Systemcompliant vs. systemadversed parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim to power</td>
<td>Democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian (state parties and single party rule)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authors compilation (cf. Winkler 2002:215; Schreyer/Schwarzmeier 2000: 127)

The classical European ‘mass-party’ concept of Duverger (1954), which is bound to a socio-economic class and the ‘catch-all-party’ concept of Kirchheimer (1966)\(^8\) will be introduced as examples:

\(^8\) Korte/Frohlich 2009.
2.4.1  Mass-based party

The archetypical model of a mass-based party fundamentally consists of pre-and well-defined social groups. “Politics is primarily about the competition, conflict, and cooperation of these groups, and political parties are the agencies, through which these groups, and thus their members, participate in politics, make demands on the state and ultimately attempt to capture control of the state by placing their own representatives in key offices. Each of these groups has an interest, which is articulated in the programme of ‘its’ party. (...) Party unity and discipline are not only practically advantageous, but are also normatively legitimate. This legitimacy depends in turn, on direct popular involvement in the formulation of the party programme, and, from an organizational perspective, this implies the need for an extensive membership organization of branches and cells in order to provide avenues for mass input into the party’s policy-making process, as well as for the supremacy of the extra-parliamentary party, particularly as embodied in the party congress” (Mair 1997:94f.).

For some time the mass party was regarded as being the party of the future, but with the introduction of what Kirchheimer refers to as the ‘catch-all-party’, the concept of the party as a representative of pre-defined sectors of society was rigorously challenged.

2.4.2  Catch-all party

First, the increasing erosion of traditional social boundaries in Western Europe in the late 1950s and 1960s implied a weakening of formerly highly distinctive collective identities, making it less easy to identify separate sectors of the electorate and to assume shared long-term interests.
Second, economic growth and the increased importance of the welfare state facilitated the elaboration of programmes which were no longer necessarily divisive or partisan, but which were formulated to serve the “interests of all”, or at least nearly all.

This study assumes that (all types of) parties can perform their ideal typical functions most effectively, the more the party is institutionalized. Young parties should therefore focus on different dimensions of their institutionalization. But what does – at least in this sense – ‘party institutionalization’ mean? And how can institutionalization be measured, especially in the Philippines? How can a certain party type be identified, that incorporates the specific requirements of the political landscape of the Philippines?

The subsequent chapter picks up on those questions. In the following a theoretical classification of the term ‘party institutionalization’ will be presented alongside various indicators for party institutionalization which can be adapted for the case of the Philippines.
The institutionalization of political parties

The scientific development of the term ‘party institutionalization’ will be outlined and evaluated in this part of the study. This is required in order to shape and define the concept ‘party institutionalization’ more closely but also needed in order to identify those dimensions and indicators required for the establishment of parties as well as their institutionalization with special regards to the specific case of ‘new democracies’ and the Philippines.

But exactly which dimensions prove to be crucial in the institutionalization of political parties? And which indicators and specific characteristics of party institutionalization can be identified in the Philippine case?

While some authors do not distinguish between party institutionalization and party system institutionalization or confuse the concepts, this study is focusing on party institutionalization in the sense of the conceptualization developed by Panebianco and applied to the case of ‘new democracies’ by Randall and Svåsand:

“(…) the process through which they [political parties: added by author] become institutionalized is not identical with the party’s development in purely organization terms. Rather we suggest that institutionalization should be understood as the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture. We suggest further that it is helpful to distinguish between internal and externally related aspects of this process. Internal aspects refer to developments within the party itself; external aspects have

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9 See for a differentiation: Kuenzi and Lambright (2001)
to do with the party’s relationship with the society in which it is embedded, including other institutions.” (Randall/Svåsand 2002:12)

Randall and Svåsand 'take the four elements of systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy, and reification as constituting the core of the process of party institutionalization, that is the process through which the party becomes established as an institution. But the authors also mention, that ‘institutionalization in terms of the four variables will increase the party’s prospects for survival, it is certainly no guarantee against regression or de-institutionalization’.

The definition of party institutionalization by Randall and Svåsand is theoretically discussed along the criteria of identification developed by Huntington (1962), Panebianco (1988)\(^{10}\), Levitsky (1998) and Kenneth Janda (1980). Using the common denominators Randall and Svåsand develop their own four-dimensional grid of party-institutionalization (cf table 2).

The centrepiece of the process of party-institutionalization is defined as “the four elements of systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy and reification” (Randall/Svåsand 2002:14, italics added by author).

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\(^{10}\) Along the scale, Autonomy’ and Systemness’ Panebianco (1988) identifies an “institutionalization continuum” (Panebianco 1988:55) and postulates “that it is at least theoretically possible to ‘measure’ the different parties’ levels of institutionalization, and to place them at one point or another along an institutionalization continuum” (Panebianco 1988:5).
“(...) How this process is affected by the circumstances of democratic transition in those regions that have conventionally been grouped together as ‘Third World’” (Randall/Svåsand 2002:16), is the core question that Randall and Svåsand seek to answer. Even though the central characteristics of the transitional states, often subsumed as the ‘third world countries’, vary significantly, many relevant variables such as religion or ethnic cleavages influence the process of party institutionalization in equal measure.

The four dimensions of institutionalization that Randall and Svåsand identified in their studies form the basis for the analysis presented in this paper and will therefore be defined in the context of party institutionalization research:

**Systemness**

Panebianco (1988) emphasizes that the level of institutionalization of a party is significantly dependent on how a party was established, on the factors of the party’s “genetic model” (Panebianco 1988:50), or, in other words, how ‘party-building’ developed. Panebianco argues that the stronger “the extent to which the party has been constructed through a process of ‘penetration’ from the centre to the periphery (understood both in territorial and more organizational terms)” (Randall/Svåsand 2002:17), the better the party will be institutionalized. Even the element of
‘diffusion’, “in which the party emerged more diffusely out of ‘spontaneous germination’ from below” (Randall/Svåsand 2002:17), will, at least in Panebianco’s thought, contribute towards party-building. Randall and Svåsand, on the other hand, criticise that this combination of “penetration” and “diffusion” (Randall/Svåsand 2002:17) has proven to be unrealistic when applied to ‘third-world-regions’ as this combination mainly reflects European experience in party-building. Inconsistency in the process of party creation and institutionalization in developing countries is regarded as one of the main reasons: “In some cases, parties in the present wave of democratization have had a headstart where they can build on institutional foundations laid in an earlier period. (...) But in many of the “new democracies, general party development has been regularly interrupted” (Randall/Svåsand 2002:17f.). Additionally, access to resources and financing possibilities for party creation in transitional states is diametrically opposite to the possibilities offered to parties in developed countries. It is usually impossible for parties in developing countries to attain sufficient funding for party building solely out of membership contributions. In order to sustain a political role in a competitive national party environment, most parties in transitional states are heavily dependent on external funding (Weissenbach 2010a, 2010b).

Furthermore, the ‘systemness’ of a party is influenced by the relationship between party and party leadership. In his seminal discussion of the characteristics of party creation, Panebianco (1988:53) emphasizes the role of the “charisma” of a single prominent party leader. And indeed, in early phases of ‘party-building’ a charismatic leader might play a useful role. However, in the long run a charismatic leader will have a negative effect on party institutionaliza-
tion. These parties “pass like a meteor over the political firmament, which spring up and die out without ever institutionalizing. Institutionalization entails a ‘routinization of charisma’, a transfer of authority from the leader to the party, and very few charismatic parties survive this transfer” (Panebianco 1988:53). Transferring these findings to states in transition and especially to the cause of the Philippines is of high relevance, as especially in transitional states, parties are regularly criticized as being merely instrumentalized by single leaders in order to attain personal goals (Hicken 2006).

In party institutionalization research, ‘leadership’ is always combined with the criterion of ‘factionalism’ if the degree of party cohesion has to be determined and the level of institutionalization of a party has to be measured. Implicitly it is assumed that a high degree of factionalism has negative effects on a party’s degree of institutionalization. Commonly the understanding of the term factionalism is based on the broad definition of Beller and Belloni as “any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part” (Beller/Belloni 1978:419). Even though some scholars argue that factionalism can provide constructive effects on the development of a party systems in states in transition (Kohno 1979:91; Waller/Gillespie 1995:186), Kenneth Janda’s research on organizational party coherence indicates that a faction is to be regarded as the antithesis of party cohesion (Janda 1980).

**Value infusion**

According to Randall/Svåsand, the internal ‘attitudinal di-
'dimension’ within a party, which they term ‘value infusion’ is strongest when the party emerges along a specific societal cleavage, when it is closely tied to a social movement and when it is deeply rooted within society. They refer to the classic European mass-based parties defined by Duverger (1954), which are closely tied to a single socio-economic class, or the concept of the ‘catch-all-party’ by Kirchheimer (1966).

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain the connection between social cleavages and party formation with their classical cleavage theory: “For Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the contests between political machines in Europe are much more than just a competition for the economic or status entitlements that emanate from political power because they were founded on lasting divisions. The contest between the political was a struggle between different value commitments, of different ‘conceptions of moral right and interpretations of history and human destiny’ (1967:11). The contention among parties about agriculture and industry was not just about who gets what post’, but about, which way of life is best’ (1967:19). Cleavage politics meant that members voted for the parties because they shared their interests and platforms” (Manasca/Tan 2005:750).

Applied to the case of the Philippines, those rather traditional European theoretical models appear to be questionable – especially because the classical cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan, such as capital vs. worker, are often transcended by other conflicts such as ethncal cleavages (Manasca/Tan 2005).

**Autonomy**

Randall and Svåsand’s table (cf. Table 2) portrays the au-
onomy of a party as a third criterion for party institutionalization. With the term “autonomy” the authors mean a party’s autonomy from external actors. Panebianco regards party dependence on external contributors as one of the main sources for weak party institutionalization, as the legitimization of the party’s leadership and party’s organizational loyalties are situated outside the party structures: “[…] (1) the party’s organizational loyalties will be indirect loyalties, loyalties primarily to the external institution, and only secondarily to the party; (2) the external institution is, consequently, the leadership’s source of legitimation, and this can tip the balance from one side to the other in the internal power struggle” (Panebianco 1988:51f.). However, he also states that a certain kind of international support can – de facto – have a positive impact on inner party development: “There exist a number if transnational party organizations, set up along ideological lines, that function as support organizations for new parties in multiparty systems. While this may give international actors influence in the national development of a party system, this type of influence can nevertheless assist individual party institutionalization” (Randall/Svåsand 2002:23).

Party reification

The final dimension of party institutionalization in transition states is ‘Party reification’ according to Randall and Svåsand. This dimension describes the degree to which a party can make itself memorable amongst the electorate of the given state – it also accounts for the resulting behavior of its political actors. This ability is mainly determined by the historic roots of a party in society, but also by the symbolic values a party represents, the strength of party organization and party access to mass media. The extent to which
party leadership is able to institutionalize a certain set of core party values, a political programme and a comprehensive ideological base within the party organization is decisive: “This explains the crucial role that ideology normally plays in shaping the newly-formed organization, in determining its collective identity. (...) Institutionalization is, in fact, the process by which an organization incorporates its founders’ values and aims” (Panebianco 1988:53).

On the basis of Randal and Svåsand’s four dimensions for the definition of party institutionalization, Basedau and Stroh (2008) modified the model and developed an Index of the Institutionalization of Parties (IIP) along the lines of the abovementioned four criteria. Their index was tested on 28 parties from five countries of Anglophone Africa. Based on party institutionalization research, Basedau and Stroh have filtered out four major dimensions for the measurement of the degree of party institutionalization. These are the 'level of organization'\textsuperscript{11}, internal 'coherence'\textsuperscript{12}, 'autonomy'\textsuperscript{13} and 'roots in society'\textsuperscript{14} – which closely resemble the definition provided by Randall and Svåsand.

For this study the author is extending this understanding of party institutionalization by adding the three criteria internal party democracy, programme and regional and international integration, which reflect the current state of established international party research (Weissenbach

\textsuperscript{11} Cf. the “complexity” in Huntington 1968 and Dix 1992; Mainwaring 1998; Bendel/Grotz 2001.
\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Huntington 1968; Dix 1992; Randal/Svåsand 2002; Bendel/Grotz 2001.
2010a, 2010b). Each criterion is linked with different indicators which can be directly used to assess the level of party institutionalization of political parties in ‘new democracies’ (cf. table 3).

As a reminder: this analysis is based on the idea that strongly institutionalized parties can contribute more significantly to democratic consolidation than less institutionalized parties.

It is crucial for the ‘programme’ dimension to what extent party leadership is able to institutionalize a set of core values, to validate a political programme and an ideological base within the party, therefore enabling the party to occupy a unique political position with its own ideological base within the party system: “The organizational goals (the ideological aims) of the party’s founders shape the organization’s physiognomy; with institutionalization these objectives are ‘articulated’ (...) with respect to organizational needs. There are essentially two processes which develop simultaneously to bring about institutionalization: (1) the development of interests related to the organizational preservation (...); and (2) the development of diffuse loyalties.” (Panebianco 1988:53f.).

Questions relating to whether a bottom-up standard has been established as the main decision-making modus, concerning all personnel and content decisions, are summarized in the dimension of ‘internal party democracy’. This dimension also accounts for the transparency mode of party funding and all democratic principles that apply within party structure.

The dimension ‘regional and international integration’ takes into account that young parties often face the challenge
that, in order to promote party institutionalization, they must intensify regional and international networking, but also establish themselves in domestic interface organizations. Therefore this dimension also questions to what extent and on the base of which shared values and norms integration (in international party alliances, youth or women’s organizations) has been implemented so far.

The combination of the seven mentioned dimensions 'organization', 'inner party democracy/internal party democracy', 'programme', 'autonomy', 'roots in society', 'coherence' and 'regional and international integration'\textsuperscript{15} provides a suitable foundation on which to develop an additional theoretical dimension for the establishment and institutionalization of parties. This dimension will subsequently be applied to the case of the Philippine parties. Each individual dimension and its respective indicators for practical application on the Philippine case will be explained below (cf. table 3).

\textsuperscript{15} And their attributed indicators.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of Party Institutionalization</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Regularly disbursed.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Party finances are transparent and</td>
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<td>- Party bodies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Based on the votes of official</td>
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<td>- The internal decisions are</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Decision-making processes.</td>
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<td>- Bottom-up principle for all internal</td>
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<td>- Regular party and membership</td>
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<td>- Power of formal party offices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Activities beyond election campaigns</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nationwide organizational presence.</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Material and personnel resources.</td>
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<td>- Regular party congresses.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ideal internal decision making</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Party basis to party leadership.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Party decisions concerning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>party interests democratically</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-making processes</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal politics are the exception.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regularly disbursed.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party finances are transparent and</td>
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<td>Party bodies.</td>
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<td>The internal decisions are</td>
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<td>Decision-making processes.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bottom-up principle for all internal</td>
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<td>Material and personnel resources.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Regular party congresses.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>There is an organizational</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Membership strength.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Dimensions, Criteria and Indicators of Party Institutionalization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>The party provides unambiguous policy- and value positions, and avoids extreme ideological positions. The party acts coherently on programmatic and ideological positions.</th>
<th>- A party manifesto and political programmes exist. - Ideological-, value- and policy orientation rather than ethnic, religious or regional orientation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Notwithstanding its societal roots, the party is relatively independent of individuals within and societal groups outside the party.</td>
<td>- Frequency of alternations in party leadership. - Decisional autonomy from particular individuals, groups or ethnicities. - Decisional autonomy from external actors and benefactors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots in Society</td>
<td>The party has stable roots in society and is appreciated within it.</td>
<td>- Party age relative to the creation of a multi-party-system at state level. - Stability of electoral support. - Appreciation by population. - Links to organizations of civil society (youth- and women’s leagues, trade unions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>Problematization of ethnic heritage.</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| In spite of administrative differentiation, the party acts as a unified organization in public. The party tolerates a certain level of intra-party dissidence and encourages freedom of opinion. | **Integration**

Integration of the party in regional and international party groups and organizations.

The party joins regional and international party alliances.

- Membership of the youth league (GC)
- Membership of the women's league

Regional and International Integration

- Party becomes member of international party groups and organizations.
- Integration of the party in regional and international party alliances.

No dysfunctional factionalism.

- Party factions.
- Relationships between powerful intra-party dissidence.
- Inter-party dissidence and party loyalties at a certain level of intra-party unity and external organization in public.
- The party acts as a parliamentary group in spite of administrative differentiation.

Coherence
associations (Democrat Union; International Democrat Women Union; Socialist Youth International; Socialist Women International; International Young).
- Membership in regional sub-organizations of international party associations (e.g. Asian Pacific Democrat Union)
- The party is integrated in and recognized by regional party associations and organizations.

Source: Author’s compilation; cf. Basedau/Stroh (2008)
3.1 Organization

The party disposes over a professionally well differentiated bureaucratic apparatus which operates on all levels, including the local level, in the interests of the party. A certain minimum stock of material resources, a constant financial income, the possibility to organize party presence outside the state capital and the de facto power of formal party offices should also be regarded as highly relevant variables when assessing the organizational level of a party. In the Philippine case, for example, the country’s geographic features pose a serious challenge for the creation and institutionalization of young parties. A further prerequisite is a large number of party members. The interests of party members are – at least if the party organization seeks sustainability – regularly pooled and discussed at party congresses.

3.2 Internal Party Democracy

The formulation of political will within a party ideally moves bottom-up, from the basis to party leadership. Within democratic parties democratic principles are essential, decisions by party leadership affecting personnel and programme must be coordinated with various party bodies such as commissions or the party congress. Both personnel and programme decision-making processes require this bottom-up principle if they are to be considered legitimate by the party base. It is therefore decisive for inner-party democracy that these processes are transparent to the public and to the party members alike. Decisions have to be made within formally legitimate committees and not in informal, secretive party bodies. Equally strict rules apply for the disclosure of party finance – for both public funding as
well as for private donations (foreign and domestic contributors).

3.3 Programme

Even though – and as already described in the theoretic foundation of this paper – the ethnic roots of a party need to be considered per se as negative (they become dangerous if party leadership attempts to exploit them in order to gain political majorities), an institutionalized and sustained party requires a basic set of values. A clear positioning on party goals and party values is decisive for a distinct ideological basis, whilst the constancy of a party is reflected in its political programme.

3.4 Autonomy

The dimension of institutionalization termed ‘autonomy’ describes the independence from single individuals in- or outside the party and the autonomy from individual interest groups in society. Decision-making structures independent from external actors and international benefactors are as central to a party’s autonomy as regular personnel changes in party leadership. Empirical research suggests that even after changes in party leadership the electoral support remains stable – therefore parties are not dependent on a single charismatic leader or a particular ethnic group.

3.5 Roots in society

A party has strong roots in society and can therefore count on a wide basis of appreciation and support from the public. How old is the party (relative to the establishment of the multi-party-system in the specific country)? How stab-
le is electoral support? Is the party appreciated by large
groups of the population? From an institutional perspec-
tive this dimension also takes into account the intermediary
organizations of the party, like youth- or women’s leagues
and trade unions.

3.6 Coherence

An institutionalized party is characterized by its internal co-
herence and unity. In spite of a highly differentiated orga-
nizational structure the party acts as a unified organization
in public. It is however important that a diversity of opini-
ons is ensured and that political discussions are tolerated
within the party. However the relationships between in-
fluential internal groups should not undermine the party’s
unity.

3.7 Regional and international integration

The ideological and political alignment of parties does not
only lead to increased acceptance in their own country but
also paves the way for international and regional party-al-
liances (e.g. International Democratic Union, Liberal Inter-
national, Socialist International). An institutionalized party
with its affiliated leagues (e.g. women’s and youth leagues)
is a member of one of these supranational party-alliances
and is therefore entitled to international integration, reco-
gnition and stabilization.
4  Party institutionalization and party models in ‘new democracies’ and the Philippines

Young parties in transitional countries all over the world face serious challenges, when trying to implement the formerly mentioned dimensions of party institutionalization, due to the nature of the political system and the party system in the consolidation process. What are the major challenges? What conditions must be established in order to promote party institutionalization in the Philippines? And what type of party is best equipped to succeed with institutionalization under given circumstances in the Philippine party system?

Research into the party constellation of the Philippines promptly suggests that hardly any party manages to meet all seven dimensions of party institutionalization yet (cf. table 2). The most important fields in the context of the institutionalization of new parties in transitional states worldwide (with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa) are outlined below:

4.1 Organization: Stressing the connection between party finance and party organization

Similar to various young democracies and transitional states (e.g. Kenya) the level of organization in Philippine parties is largely underdeveloped. This deficiency is closely connected to the Philippine party finance regime. Philippine parties must rely on membership contributions and private (national and international) donations. Therefore they can only fall back on very limited financial resources to maintain on-going party activities (regular party conferences etc.:
cf. transparency of party finance in part 4.2) between electoral campaigns. Experience from other transitional states, like South Africa for example, suggests that a public party finance system is beneficial to the organizational level of political parties. However, in South Africa the smaller oppositional parties have criticized the hegemonic predominance of the ruling ANC (African National Congress) party and demand comprehensive financial disclosure on all parties’ income and expenditure. Most of the larger South African parties can produce transparent membership registers/records and can – at least partly – rely on finance through membership contributions. However, those achievements are not evident in all African transitional states. In Kenya for example, where party institutionalization remains at low levels, questions about the membership base or about official membership registration in political parties can often not be answered. Party representatives of the ‘Orange Democratic Movement’ (ODM), the ‘Party of National Unity’ (PNU) or the ‘Democratic Party’ (DP) declared that their according parties registered their members exact figures could, however, not be specified. Organizational structures can – if at all – be identified in the state capital. Properly staffed Party offices and secretariats yet prove to be an exception (cf. Interviews conducted by the Author; Weissenbach 2010c).

This complex of problems can also be transferred to the Philippine case: party membership in Philippine parties is very limited in numbers and the organizational level of most parties is far from being a membership-party. Additionally most Philippine parties are ‘capital-parties’, based in Manila, with only little organizational presence in the manifold provinces and regions, which understandably does not improve their nationwide organizational capacity (Arlegue/
4.2 Internal party democracy: Overcoming top-down-processes and patron-client-relationship

In Kenya, political parties hardly hold any account of their members. If membership cards exist, they are usually bought for sympathizing constituents by the members of parliament. Parallel membership in more than just one party is therefore common. This condition is connected to the high expectations of Kenyan voters on their party or party candidate: Only very rarely Kenyan voters select a party based on the ideology or the political programme it represents, but instead lend their vote to a party that promises direct material advantages to them (Weissenbach 2010c).

These findings can also be transferred to many of the new parties in transitional states, such as the Philippines:

Membership-meetings, commissions and party-conferences are not regularly held by most Philippine parties. Therefore, active participation for members is hardly possible and inner-party decisions are usually not transparent and visible to the public. Neither personnel nor content decisions genuinely involve the party basis but are usually made exclusively by party leadership behind closed doors. This strong tendency towards personalized decision-making is not only evident in intra-party matters, but also in the development of the political programme (cf. part 4.3). Beside those top-down hierarchical structures, Philippine parties are also faced with a tendency towards patron-client-relationships. These are not only evident in the relationship between voters and rules but also within party structures. Just as inner party decision making is usually not or only
partly transparent, there is also a lack of an effective legal framework for the regulation of party finance. As a result, there is no requirement for financial disclosure, no regulation of party income and expenditure, no restrictions or caps on contribution towards the party (at least outside campaigns periods) and no public party funding.

Therefore, parties that seek to persist in the political system of the Philippines often resort to sources of income that border on the illegal ("smuggling and gambling operations", Arlegue/Coronel 2003:226). "Corruption also plagues the election process. Vote buying is widespread, and many candidates buy votes directly or pay opposition supporters not to vote" (Arlegue/Coronel: 226).

4.3 Programme: *value-orientation instead of charismatic leaders*

It is characteristic for young parties in transitional states to rely on or at least orientate themselves to (charismatic) leaders in the process of democratization. A strong ideological alignment, a decidedly policy-oriented (e.g. a green(s) party) are an exception. The party system of many ‘new democracies’ can usually not be categorized by the indicators evident in western party systems like ‘left/right alignment’ and ideological or political preferences of the parties. The primary function of the party system in ‘new democracies’ is often to provide an institutional frame for the initiatives and public image of powerful individuals. Concerted political action along common political lines therefore rarely exists. Party alliance are often characterized by internal conflicts between individual political leaders, quickly leading to a separation of the formerly allied parties. So far the shaping power of political programme
often fall in ‘new democracies’. This may be the reason for weak party-ties on the part of both party leadership and common party-members. As a consequence, politicians in the Philippines (and other transitional states) are more likely to swap parties (‘floor-crossing’) – or to be active members of more than one party – than their professional counterparts in established democracies. Voters often tend to support the same individual politicians even when they swap party and programme: “Because political parties lack firm ideological bases and clear party platforms, politicians do not develop strong ties to parties and will change their party affiliation in order to advance their careers. In turn, parties are unable to develop a clear mandate and platform because their membership is frequently changing” (Arlegue/Coronel 2003:218). If young parties seek lasting institutionalization, they are well advised not to focus exclusively on the plans and goals of a single (charismatic) leader but instead to build the party on a value-based ideology. The political programme and the party name should astutely reflect this ideological foundation.

4.4 Autonomy: Personalization and Family networks as challenge

The dependence of parties on individual persons as well as the parties’ internal tendency to succumb to personalization and clientele-effects have already been stressed in this paper. “Family networks often display parties as channels of political recruitment. The major parties are still under control of a few dozen of these dynasties (Aquino, Cojuangco, Osmeña, Romualdez, Marcos, Lopez, Enrile, etc.) (...) (Ufen 2008:339).
If a party leader defects to another party or instead decided to establish a new party, the role of the old party in the party system often diminishes or the party is indeed facing complete extinction. The strong position of the party leader can lead to serious deficits in internal-party democracy. As the African example illustrates, internal party elections for party offices are either not held at all or they are performed under controversial circumstances: Nominations do not result from the choice of party members at local level but instead are chosen by party leadership depending on the loyalty of the candidate.

The financial dependency of Philippine parties on their party leaders should be regarded as a serious argument for the introduction of a sustainable public party funding system. The introduction of such a system could also help to countervail the ongoing trends of patronage and corruption. Presidential control over the allocation of public funding creates party dependence on the president, which offers a fertile breeding ground for corruption. Only through a system based on the right to equal access to public resources can parties gain genuine decisional autonomy, independent from the inconsistency and randomness of individual person, groups or external actors.

4.5 Roots in Society: Far away from being a Catch-all-party

Because of the concentration on an individual party leader, who belongs to a certain dynasty, family or ethnic, parties in transitional states are kind of rooted in society. Yet this rootedness cannot be considered as being pluralistic, cross-regional, cross-ethnic or based on a stable ideologi-
The ethnic rootedness of a party should not be regarded as something negative per se, in fact the ethnic rootedness of a party can be considered as a typical cleavage in most of the ‘new democracies’ (e.g. Kenya but also the Philippines). However, party leaders tend to instrumentalize the ethnical roots especially during election campaigns in order to secure voters approval. This in turn can often lead to (violent) conflict. The last presidential elections in Kenya, which ended in violent conflicts could be regarded as an example. During the electoral campaign ethnical issues are extensively communicated and symbolized with the goal of attaining more (political) recognition for their own ethnic on a national level.

Between electoral campaigns parties hardly initiate any activities to involve the public or to gain new members. The parties could be described as “campaign-vehicles”, they are often set up to achieve good results at the polls but not to last permanently. This, of course, complicates the possibility of an enduring integration of citizens into the party. Some parties, however, are currently trying to improve their roots in society with the help of special party institutes or Think Tanks (e.g. the Liberal Party with its “Liberal Party Institute” or the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats United Muslim Democratic Party – Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP-KAMPI)). However, Philippine parties are still far from holding the status of Catch-all parties.

4.6 Coherence: *High frequency of party switching and factionalism*

The cross section analysis of new parties in transitional
states (Weissenbach 2010c) reveals that internal-party divergence and debate is often suppressed by party leadership. Therefore the formation of powerful factions within the party is very unlikely. Individuals with diverging opinions are either sanctioned (e.g. no nomination for offices), appeased by party leadership or excluded from the party. Adding to this, an orientation towards short-term material gain or an improvement of the individual prospects within the party is more evident among the party members than to insist on the tradition of democratic discourse or inner-party debates.

Philippine parties are hitherto characterized by a relatively low internal coherence. An internal plurality of opinions or a certain amount of variance in political trends is hardly evident in most parties. It is more likely that members with diverging opinions will swap parties, or that a party will split or merge with other parties: “The largest political parties in the Philippines today are still characterized by a lack of meaningful platforms, by a high frequency of party switching and factionalism, as well as by numerous dissolutions and re-emerges” (Ufen 2008: 339).

4.7 International and regional integration: Party programme as a basic principle for international integration

As the example of the international integration of South-American parties suggests, regional and international integration fosters the image and acceptance of a party significantly – on domestic and on foreign grounds. Research results from the African parties (Weissenbach 2010b) illustrate that the integration of the South African “African National Congress’ (ANC) into the ‘Socialist International’ alliance can boost the recognition of a party, that initially
had to fight for domestic and international acceptance but managed to become a member of an international network based on its political programme.

The African case does, however, provide examples of failed international integration attempts too: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Kenya tried to attach itself to the “Liberal International” alliance, mainly based on the grounds of the party’s name, only to realize that the own values, norms and political views were not represented in the alliance and a deeper institutionalization would be unlikely. And indeed, membership in an international alliance only fosters party institutionalization effectively, if the party itself follows a distinct value based political programme and identifies with the principles of the international alliance. Empty words in the own programme or a party name which closely resembles the name of one of the established parties from abroad often rather leads to confusion than adding to sustainable party institutionalization.

Recapitulatory it should have become evident that the results of transition- and party-research based on countries with a similar level of democratization as the Philippines can provide a good basis for comparison. The classical functional catalogue of western political parties should rather be considered as an analytical starting point, providing orientation for the new parties in transitional democracies. The real challenge in the establishment and institutionalization of parties are, however, heavily dependent on the level of transition of their respective countries.
5 Conclusion: Party-building process and the continuum of party institutionalization

The central functional catalogues and typologies of political parties have been the starting point of this study. Those functions derived from party-research on liberal, democratic political systems can be considered a point of reference for political parties in ‘new democracies’ like the Philippines. In established as well as new democracies, political parties are acting on three different levels: in the electorate, as an organization and in government.

The introduction of these different levels and the different party types (cf. table 1) provided the theoretical basis for the functional approach which is reflected upon in the synopsis on ‘dimensions of party institutionalization’ (cf. table 3). However, the indicators which can measure the level of party institutionalization in the Philippines differ significantly from those indicators that apply for Germany or Great Britain for instance – as for example the indicators ethnicity, stability in electoral support after alternation in party leadership or the autonomy of a party from a single charismatic leader (from a certain ethnic background) is not as relevant in established western democracies as it is compared to transitional states like the Philippines. Likewise, the classic European party models such as Duvergers’ mass-based party or Kirchheimers’ catch-all party (cf. table 2) cannot be transferred to the party system of the Philippines on a one-to-one basis.

A correlation between the level of party institutionalization and their ability to fulfill their functions in the process of democratic consolidation was identified. Within the ‘party-
building-process’ the seven dimensions of party institutionalization are to be ascribed with different levels of importance at different stages. Therefore it can be concluded that a ‘continuum of party institutionalization’ (Weissenbach 2010c) exists, which describes the sequences of the party institutionalization (cf. graph 1):

In the course of this party institutionalization process, political parties in the Philippines have to face special challenges:

- Curbing political corruption;
- Enhancing party transparency;
- Strengthening of parties as independent institutions;
- Establishing a body of Party law that regulate party structures and finances;
- Reducing parties’ financial dependency on individual leaders by providing public funding for parties;
- A destructive combination of embedded patronage and money politics keeps democratic and economic institutions weak;
- Patronage is a central characteristic of corruption in the Philippine political system;
- Tremendous gap between the rich and the poor;
- Strong presidential control over access to governmental resources is seen as a major cause of corruption, facilitating the misuse of state funds;
- Pork barrel politics;
- The president’s control of certain development funds also engenders party switching, weakening the party system;
- The absence of strong ideological agendas, and frequently shifting membership and alliances;
- Expensive elections;
- Citizen’s expectations of patronage and payments in exchange for political support;
- Politicians frequently switch party affiliation;
- Personality-driven politics: voters often continue to
support politicians without regard to party affiliation.

The lack of firm ideological bases and clear party platforms and manifestos seems to be one of the outstanding problems of Philippine political parties: “Politicians do not develop strong ties to parties and will change their party affiliation in order to advance their careers. In turn, parties are unable to develop a clear mandate and platform because their membership is frequently changing”. (Arlegue/Coronel 2003: 218)
References


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