



ISLAMSKA SCENA
U
BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI



ISLAMIC SCENE
IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

**ISLAMSKA SCENA
U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI**



**ISLAMIC SCENE
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

Izdavač / Publisher
UDRUŽENJE ILMIJJE ISLAMSKJE ZAJEDNICE U BIH
FONDACIJA *KONRAD ADENAUER*

Za Izdavača / For Publisher
Sabina Wölkner
Mensur Pašalić

Uvodničari / Authors
Enes Karić, Fikret Karčić, Dževad Hodžić, Mustafa Spahić, Ahmet Alibašić,
Muhamed Jusić, Ekrem Tucaković

Samo za internu upotrebu
For internal use only

Sarajevo, 2011.

ISLAMSKA SCENA
U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

DVODNEVNI NAUČNI KOLOKVIJ

UDRUŽENJE ILMIJJE ISLAMSKE ZAJEDNICE U BIH
I FONDACIJA *KONRAD ADENAUER*

FAKULTET ISLAMSKIH NAUKA
5. I 6. JULI, SARAJEVO



PREDGOVOR

U krugovima međunarodnih zvaničnika kao i stranih diplomata u BiH, među novinarima i drugim medijskim djelatnicima, unutar policijsko-sigurnosnih službi u BiH, konačno u bh javnosti postoji nesporazum kada je riječ o pojavama novoga tumačenja i prakticiranja islama. Kako pojmovi nisu jasno definirani, često se dešava da govorimo o različitim stvarima a imenujemo ih istim terminom. U općem je interesu da se ova konfuzija i nesporazumi uklone.

Vjerujemo da je opće opredjeljenje države BiH, Islamske zajednice u BiH kao i svih građana da se zaštite dvije važne vrijednosti našega društva. Prvo, da se zaštite univerzalna ljudska prava svakog pojedinca, posebno ona koja se odnose na vjersku pripadnost i na vjeroispovijest kao i pravo na ličnu sigurnost svakog građanina. Drugo, da se javnost tačno, pravovremeno i istinito informira o društvenim pojavama i procesima kada su u pitanju pojave radikalizma svake vrste u našem društvu.

Udruženje ilmijje IZ-e u BiH, u suradnji sa Fondacijom Konrad Adenauer iz Sarajeva, je organiziralo dvodnevni znanstveni skup o temi ISLAMSKA SCENA U BiH. Cilj naučnog kolokvija je bio da se objektivno i znanstveno prezentira geneza nastanka islamističkih pokreta u muslimanskom svijetu s posebnim osvrtom na refleksiju pojava ovakvih učenja i praksi u BiH u posljednjih 20 godina. Kolokvij je bio namijenjen predstavnicima diplomatskih službi i drugih međunarodnih organizacija u BiH, predstavnicima medija, policijsko-sigurnosnih agencija kao i sudstva i tužilaštava BiH.

U ovom zborniku objavljujemo integralni tekst svih 7 referata koji su prezentirani na ovom znanstvenom skupu kao i uvodni referat Reisu-l-uleme kojim je kolokvij otvoren.



FONDACIJA KONRAD ADENAUER: DIJALOG SA MUSLIMANIMA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

Djelatnost Fondacije Konrad Adenauer (KAS) tj. međunarodna suradnja KAS-a obuhvata i cijeli niz zemalja u kojima muslimani daju pečat javnom životu i obilježavaju ga. U tim zemljama raste interes i spremnost KAS-a da se bavi pitanjima i tematskim oblastima specifičnim za islam. Diskusiju potiče i globalizacija, koja uzrokuje promjene u politici, privredi i društvu širom svijeta. Tomu još treba dodati povećan značaj religija – posebno islama, koje utječu na karakter politike, na mogućnosti rješavanja konflikata.

Spomenuta diskusija je u proteklim godinama kod široke javnosti probudila svijest o raznolikosti pojava oblika islama.

Prema tome, doveli bismo čitatelja u zabludu, ako bismo međunarodnu suradnju Fondacije reducirali na određene “šablone” o navodno “pravom” islamu koristeći se motom “islam protiv moderne”, “islam protiv demokratije” ili čak “islam protiv prosvjetiteljstva”. Umjesto toga moramo zahvatiti i jačati povezujuće elemente. Mi želimo promicati demokratiju, ljudska prava i slobodnu pravnu državu sa našim partnerima, svuda gdje se i oni zalažu za te ciljeve. Pri tome našu međunarodnu suradnju karakteriziraju teme među kojima je na prvom mjestu liberalna i slobodarska demokratija. Stoga se KAS širom svijeta bavi stručnim političkim temama. To su prije svega pravna pitanja, počevši od osnovnih i ljudskih prava, preko demokratije i ustava, sve do tema iz oblasti privatnog prava, te pitanja socijalnog poretka, svjetske ekonomije i međunarodne zajednice država.

Mi nudimo mogućnost razgovora i diskusije o tim temama. Želimo stupiti u fer dijalog o tim temama, u kojem jasno i otvoreno možemo zastupati vlastite pozicije. A takav dijalog, u zavisnosti od

okolnosti i teme, može se odvijati u različitim formatima i sa izabranim ciljnim grupama. Pri tome dijalog sa muslimanima igra vrlo značajnu ulogu. Naš cilj pri tome nije da islam kao religiju proglasimo uzrokom različitih problema, već upravo obrnuto, da se suprotstavimo navodno zaoštrenom “sukobu kultura”. Također, ono što mi nudimo ne zasniva se na pretpostavci da naši sugovornici generalno ili čak esencijalno zastupaju različite temeljne pozicije. Štaviše, mi smo sigurni da pluralizam mišljenja, kao i političkih i svjetonazornih ubjeđenja među muslimanima nije ništa manji nego kod kršćana, hindusa ili budista. Stoga većina naših projekata nije usmjerena na “islam” kao religiju, već su naši projekti okrenuti ljudima – muslimanima – koji predstavljaju određene sadržaje, ciljeve i interese i sa kojima želimo surađivati. U skladu s tim su i funkcije “mosta”, kakve KAS može i mora vršiti u svome međunarodnom radu u formi konferencija, radionica i publikacija, raznolike. Istovremeno, mi reagiramo i na slične inicijative koje dolaze od muslimana. I ovdje rezultat mogu biti različita polazišta i pristupi, kako s obzirom na izbor partera i oblikovanje tema tako i s obzirom na karakter istih.

U taj kontekst se ubraja i seminar “Islamska scena u Bosni i Hercegovini”, koji je održan 05. i 06. juna 2011. na Fakultetu islamskih nauka, u suradnji sa Udruženjem Ilmijje. U fokusu diskusije stajale su tzv. “alternativna učenja” u islamu. Činilo se da i sam pojam “alternativne” treba pojasniti. Šta taj pojam znači? U kojoj mjeri su stavovi tih grupa kompatibilni sa islamom? Kakva je kompatibilnost sa europskim vrijednostima? I konačno: kako Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini reagira na ove izazove? Sve su to pitanja koja u diskusiji o islamu u Evropu igraju sve značajniju ulogu. To se odnosi i na Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Ova zemlja ima perspektivu pristupa Europskoj uniji i obavezala se da će slijediti europske standarde. Međutim nerijetko se javlja konfuzija oko pitanja u kojoj mjeri je islam kompatibilan sa životnim formama modernih europskih društava. Nedostatak

znanja o tome lako može dovesti do stvaranja predrasuda, koje islamu samom ili pojedinim muslimanskim grupama nepromišljeno pripisuju “nepodobnost za demokratiju” . Doduše, i u islamu, kao i u drugim religijama, treba ozbiljno shvatiti ekstremističke pojave, te djelovati preventivno imajući u vidu rizike za društvo. Ali paušaliziranje i generaliziranje uvijek je pogrešno. Ova publikacija želi dati doprinos borbi protiv neznanja o islamu, te dati doprinos i potaći dijalog sa muslimanima, ali i sa ne-muslimanima. Tekstovi iz ove publikacije nastali su u okviru ranije smoneutog seminara. Njihovi autori su vodeći islamski naučnici iz Bosne i Hercegovine. Autori osvjetljavaju različita učenja islama iz političke, kulturne i historijske perspektive, a čitatelju nude širok spektar tema i pozicija. Želimo Vam ugodno čitanje!

Sabina Wölkner,

direktorica Predstavništva

Fondacije *Konrad Adenauer* u Bosni i Hercegovini



UVODNI GOVOR

Bismillahir-rabmanir-rabim

Svi ljudi imaju neko viđenje, neku viziju, svi žive u nekom svijetu, manje-više uređenom ili zapuštenom, manje više neizvjesnom i proturječnom, ali nikad potpuno amorfnom ili neartikuliranom. Učeni ljudi, ulema, intelektualci su ti od kojih se očekuje, odnosno zahtjeva da taj svijet artikuliraju. Sadašnja ili ovovremena vizija ne smije biti samo naslijeđe. Vizija se mora uvijek iznova artikulirati tako da svakom učeniku/studentu bude prihvatljiva kao njegova/njena vlastita. Naravno, učeni ljudi, ulema, intelektualci imaju pravo, pod uvjetom da su hrabri i uporni, da preuzmu duhovno i intelektualno naslijeđe, ali i obavezu da to duhovno i intelektualno naslijeđe (miraz) dalje razvijaju prema potrebama vremena i mjesta.

Iako nikad nije bilo lahko biti istinski slobodan *ālim* ili intelektualac, ali mi se čini da je to danas najteže. Hoću reći da imam utisak da danas nije na velikoj cijeni promišljeno, pošteno i odgovorno istraživanje ili naukovanje. U neku ruku istraživački um je otuđen od usvojenih navika i uvjerenja. Ozbiljno promišljanje i poštenu pristup stanju u zajednici ili društvu dovodi u pitanje mir i stabilnost određenih centara moći pa je, stoga, sigurnije držati se postojećih pravila igre i ne talasati ništa što remeti taj ugodni mir. Naravno, zapitani um je uvijek bio odbacivan na stranu zato što se on sam izdvajao od običnog i uobičajenog stanja uma i duha. Bratstvo uleme, odnosno umnih i mudrih ljudi se temelji na toj zajedničkoj vrlini slobodoumnosti koju posjeduju hrabri i istinoljubivi ljudi.

U tom procesu zapitanosti učitelja, učenici/studenti mogu biti uznemireni i nezadovoljni, jer ne dobijaju odgovore na pitanja, koja možda ni učitelj ne zna, a ne mogu se naći ni u knjigama. U tom slučaju učenik/student je ostavljen da sam traži odgovore na pitanja, koja ne razumiju ni učitelji zato što su motivi pitanja opskurni i čudni te i

samim učenicima/studentima nejasni. No, ni teška pitanja se ne smiju zanemariti samo zato što su teška i zato što se na njih nema hitan i jasan odgovor. Učeni ljudi, ulema, intelektualci moraju imati ono što drugi nemaju, a to je uvjerljiv stav i mišljenje utemeljeno na apodiktičkim argumentima bez pritiska populističke retorike. To je glavni razlog da učeni ljudi, ulema i intelektualci mogu imati utjecaj na druge ljude, tj., da mogu oblikovati javno mnijenje. Dakle, hrabrost učenjaka je ono što mu donosi priznanje, ali i navlači na njega ljubomoru od manje hrabrih umova. Nema nauke tamo gdje se uči samo po diktatu instrukcije na način da su sva pitanja predvidiva i svi odgovori unaprijed poznati.

U slobodnoj zajednici i u demokratskom društvu potrebno je da se oslobodimo navike koja može reducirati sve ljude na mediokritetski duh. Slobodna zajednica mora se temeljiti na principu međusobnog uvažavanja i poštivanja, a ne na forsiranoj duhovnoj i intelektualnoj uravnilovki. Nema napretka zajednice ako u njoj nema raznolikosti, niti zajednica ima smisla ako raznolikost nije ustanovljena na principu samosvjesnog istraživanja.

U biti slobodna zajednica znači toleranciju različitih uvjerenja, zato što se ljudi doista ozbiljno razlikuju u pogledima i mišljenjima. Unutar samih sebe muslimani imaju različite poglede o važnim teološkim pitanjima, dok se kao cjelina razlikuju od kršćana i Jevreja. U slobodnom društvu vjernici se radikalno razlikuju od komunista, nacionalisti od internacionalista, patriote od pacifista. Oni se ne razlikuju samo oko tehnike ostvarivanja zadanog cilja; oni se razlikuju oko samog cilja, oko ideala kojem teže, oko njihovog pogleda na ljudsko postojanje. U neku ruku to su nepomirljiva gledišta. Pa ipak, i u tim proturiječnostima treba tražiti osnovu za suživot, ne kroz konflikt, već kroz toleranciju. No, tolerancija ima svoj limit. Naime, kad razlika u vjeri i uvjerenju postane program akcije za agresivnu negaciju vjere i uvjerenja drugoga, onda se ne može bit indiferentan prema toj pojavi. U tom slučaju mora se zauzeti jasan i čvrst stav u zaštiti prava drugoga. U stvari, postoji tradicionalni odgovor za one koji svaja uvjerenja

silom nameću, a to je da će istina na kraju pobijediti, kao što nam se u Kur'anu stalno ponavlja: - *Allah će vam na kraju pokazati šta je istina u vezi svih vaših razilaženja*. Ova Božanska uputa znači da je akcija ili agresija irelevantna za istinu. To znači da istina ima svoj put unatoč svim ljudskim programima.

No, zahvaljujući, reklo bi se, nepristrasnom naučnom istraživanju zadnjih tri stoljeća nudi nam se ogromno znanje koji bi već ovdje na ovom svijetu moglo ustanoviti istinu za kojom težimo na temelju činjenica koje nam se pokazuju. Zato su neki nestrpljivi da čekaju onu Božju konačnu istinu. Oni tvrde da imaju nepristrasne činjenice koje dokazuju neupitnu istinu ovdje i sada i nije im potrebna Božija pomoć i Božija arbitraža. Oni, međutim, zaboravljaju najvažniju činjenicu, a to je da znanje o činjenicama nije i znanje o vrijednostima. I kao što Benedeto Kros (Benedetto Croce) s pravom primjećuje: "Da je zlo činjenica (fact), zlo bi bilo poništeno kao što su poništeni kmetstvo i ropstvo". No, zlo nije znanstvena činjenica. Vrijednosti nisu prirodni objekti. Složit ćemo se da edukacija igra ulogu u kreiranju tolerancije, ali to ne radi znanstvena edukacija.

Znanost kao znanje o činjenicama promovira određenu vrstu pacifizma. Više od tri stoljeća intelektualni ideal je inzistirao na eliminaciji ličnog ili osobnog od činjenica. Sugeriralo nam se da umjesto Božije objave prihvatimo objavu ili revelaciju prirode. Rečeno nam je da se dogma pobjeđuje činjenicama, ili protiv dogme treba se boriti činjenicama. To bi bilo moguće kad bi sama dogma bila jedna od činjenica. Znanost jest osposobljena da činjenicama pobjeđuje dogme, ali znanost nije sposobna da se nosi sa dogmama vrijednosti, ili vrijednosnim dogmama. Ustvari, znanost ne može da definira vrijednosti. Zato su u pravu oni koji kažu da umjesto tolerancije znanost ili nepristrasna nauka promovira indiferentnost. Jer problem tolerancije se pojavljuje kad su u pitanju ljudske emocije, želje i sklonosti. To pitanje se ne rješava negiranjem ili poništavanjem ljudskih emocija, želja i sklonosti, već se to rješava tako da se ta ljudska duševna

stanja uravnoteže i pomire putem odgoja i obrazovanja. Naime, odgoj i obrazovanje mogu otkloniti predrasude, ali to mora biti odgoj i obrazovanje o vrijednostima a ne o činjenicama. To mora biti odgoj i obrazovanje volje, a ne intelekta.

Jer, ljudi nisu nikad bili apsolutno jedinstveni u sadržaju njihovih uvjerenja. Niti su u glavi jednog čovjeka sva njegova uvjerenja savršeno konzistentna. No, nužno je da u svim glavama ljudi postoje uvjeti za miroljubiv odnos prema različitim uvjerenjima. To je postulat tolerancije. Nije izvjesno da smo je kao takvu prihvatili. Jer, tolerancija nije indiferentnost, nije ravnodušnost. Toleranciju nisu izumili indiferentni umovi. Tolerancija neće preživjeti na takav način. Tolerancija ima svoju afirmaciju. To je druga strana tolerancije.

Bez tolerancije nema slobode. To je pravilo na kojem počiva slobodna zajednica i demokratsko društvo. A to znači da čovjek neće biti lojalan ni zajednici ni društvu ako njegove lične aspiracije, vjerovanja i uvjerenja nemaju poštovanje i ako on kao član zajednice i društva nema priliku da pokaže svoje sposobnosti. Sve što narušava privatnost, narušava i slobodno prihvatanje autoriteta, odnosno vlasti. U tome je razlika između slobode i opresije. Sloboda nije negacija autoriteta, odnosno vlasti, već je to potvrđivanje takvog zakona koji je nužan za uspostavu i čuvanje privatnosti. To je svojstveni prerogativ slobode da zagovara vladavinu prava ili postojanje zakona koji regulira granice slobode. Slobodan čovjek priziva zakon ili vladavinu prava kao dokaz njegove spremnosti da postavi granice za njegov vlastiti kapric, hir i inat te tako očituje svoju odgovornost, svoj kapacitet za samokritiku. Zakon je dokaz njegove slobode. Prihvatiti da živiš pod striktnim zakonima je ropstvo, ali živjeti bez zakona je kaos i brutalnost. No, prihvatiti zakon ili vladavinu prava je čovjekova sloboda. Nije sloboda da neko ima pravo na neograničene strasti. Čovjek je slobodan kad može vladati svojim strastima, željama i sklonostima kroz samoproklamovani zakon, koji mu osigurava slobodu privatnosti i slobodu savjesti. Zato je važno uvijek naglašavati da je Šerijat znači nomokratiju a ne teokratiju, da

islām znači toleranciju kao najviši stupanj miroljubivosti, da *imān* znači sigurnost kao najviši stupanj ljudske slobode te da *ihsān* znači samožrtvovanje kao najviši stupanju solidarnosti sa svim ljudima dobre volje. To je ono što nam treba u odgoju i obrazovanju da bi se suočili sa pojavama radikalizma, ekstremizma i nasilja, bolesti od kojih danas sami muslimani najviše pate, a zbog kojih ih drugi gledaju kao uzrok nemira i nestabilnosti u svijetu.

Uvjeren sam da će ovaj okrugli stol dati odgovore na neka od ovih vrućih pitanja. U to ime želim vam uspjeh u radu i zahvaljujm se svim sudionicima na trudu i dobroj volji. Selam!

Reisu-l-ulema dr. Mustafa Cerić



Prof. dr. Enes Karić

**REFORMATORSKE GRUPE I
RADIKALNI POKRETI
U MUSLIMANSKOJ POVIJESTI**

Nekoliko općih i preliminarnih napomena

Povijesno gledano, od smrti Božijeg poslanika Muhammeda (a.s.) 632. godine po gregorijanskom kalendaru, postupno dolazi do suočavanja raznolikih mišljenja i sukoba stavova u ranome islamu.

Suočavanja i sukobljavanja su bila različite naravi, ali postoji opći konsenzus islamologa da rana međumuslimanska trvenja nisu nastala toliko iz *teoloških* koliko iz *političkih* razloga (kao što je problem rukovođenja Zajednicom).

Općenito uzev, raskoli u muslimana su bili političke, kulturalne, pa tek potom teološke naravi (tj. razilaženja na ravni različitog interpretiranja jednog te istog kur'anskog teksta). Također, politički razlozi pravdali su se vjerskim i, potom, teološkim argumentima. Stoga je ponekada veoma teško razgraničiti kada koja grupacija nastupa kao politička stran(k)a, a kada kao specifična islamska sekta sa zasebnim i odjelitim teološkim aspiracijama i tumačenjima jednog te istog teksta Kur'ana.

Također, sukobi u prvih nekoliko desetljeća ranoga islama oblikovali su muslimanske sekte/sljedbe, a te sekte/sljedbe u manjoj ili većoj mjeri odredile su veliki dio muslimanske povijesti.

Gotovo da se može reći da glavni tokovi islama koji su potekli iz ranih debata o pitanju vodstva muslimanske zajednice nikada nisu ni prestali postojati.

U ovom eseju polazimo od toga da rani sukobi u islamu tokom povijesti zadobijaju nove oblike, da oni latentno traju gotovo petnaest stoljeća islama, iako u preinačenim formama. Muslimanska povijest (ili "muslimanska prošlost") nije prošla, već se uvijek nalazi "ispod nogu muslimana".

Rani politički raskol oko Poslanikova nasljeđa

Period od 632. do 661. godine naziva se dobom "četverice pravovjernih *halifa*". *Halife* su naslijedili poslanika Muhammeda (a.s.) – nar-

avno, ne u striktno “poslaničkim” stvarima - zato što je objava Kur’ana bila završena, već su ga *halife* zamijenile na planovima i područjima političkog, državnog, ekonomskog i obredno-vjerskog uređenja i organiziranja rane muslimanske zajednice, kao i na planu tumačenja temeljnih tekstova islama, Kur’ana i kasnije *Hadīta*.

U vrijeme prvog *halife* Abū Bakra (Ebu Bekr – umro 634. godine), dolazi do političke (pa i oružane) pobune beduinskih plemena, tzv. *ar-riddah* koja je buknila naročito u pokrajini an-Nağd (Nedžd). Ova beduinska arabljanska plemena prihvatila su islam, ali ne i davanje zakāta (uvjetno “obligatnog vjerskog poreza”). Centralna halifška vlast iz Medine brzo je upokorila ta “vjeroodstupnička” plemena (*ar-riddah*), koja su tako tretirana jer su negirala jedan od stubova islama - davanje poreza ili *zakāta*. Ali, ova plemena će se – kako ćemo vidjeti domalo kasnije – uskoro pregrupirati kad je *halifat* prešao iz Medine u Damask, 661. godine.

Prvobitni *halifat* (ili rana muslimanska država) se nakon halife Abū Bakra stabilizirao, tako da je u vrijeme drugog *halife* ‘Umara (Omer, *ubijen* 644.) došlo do impozantnog širenja ne samo *halifata*, već i islama kao vjere, te postupno i kao kulture i civilizacije.

Halifa ‘Umar je bio realističan i pragmatičan, u cilju očuvanja jedinstva rane muslimanske države i zajednice, zabranio je najistaknutijim drugovima Božijeg poslanika Muhammeda (a.s.) da napuštaju Medinu i da odlaze u pokrajine. Time je preduprijedio mogućnost decentraliziranog i sektaškog djelovanja najuglednijih pripadnika rane muslimanske elite.

U vrijeme trećega halife Utmāna (Osman, *ubijen* 656.) postupno dolazi do rivaliteta između njegovoga kruga iz reda aristokratije plemena Qurayš s jedne, i kruga muslimanskih pijetista koji su bili okupljeni oko četvrtog ahli s-sunnatskog pravovjernog *halife* ‘Alija b. Abī Tāliba (Alija ibn Ebi Talib, *ubijen* 661.), s druge strane.¹

¹ Kako vidimo, od prve četverice pravovjernih halifa (*al-hulafā’u r-rāšidūn*) samo je Abū Bakr umro prirodnom smrću. Drugi, treći i četvrti halifa poginuli su u atentatima organiziranim od rivalskih frakcija.

Ovaj sukob će kasnije kulminirati u neku vrstu *apokaliptičkog trvenja među muslimanima koje traje sve do danas*. Naime, za *halīfu* ‘Alīju b. Abī Ṭālība vezane su dvije činjenice, prva je da je on bio zet Božijeg poslanika Muhammeda (a.s.), bio je oženjen njegovom kćerkom Fatimom. Druga je činjenica ta da je ‘Alīja b. Abī Ṭālīb bio izabran za četvrtog *halīfu*. Njegovi sljedbenici (koji su nazvani *šī‘ije*) u njegovoj su osobi priznale ne samo zvanje/položaj *halīfe* već i zvanje/položaj *imāma*, vrhovnog vjerskog, duhovnog i političkog lidera muslimanske zajednice.

Šī‘ije kao sekta (ta riječ i znači “grupa”, “pristaše”, “zagovornici”, “stranka ‘Alīje b. Abī Ṭālība) nastaju iz ovog sukoba između aristokratskih mekkanskih krugova i rođaka *halīfe* Uṭmāna s jedne, i pristalica ‘Alīja b. Abī Ṭālība, s druge strane. Praktički, vladavina *halīfe* ‘Alīje b. Abī Ṭālība je posvjedočila *šī‘ijsku pojavu* kao insistiranje na tome da vlast pripada isključivo *halīfi* ‘Alīji b. Abī Ṭālību, potom Ḥasanu i Ḥusaynu, njegovim sinovima koje je imao sa Fāṭimom, kćerkom Božijeg poslanika Muhammeda (a.s.), te dalje njihovim nasljednicima po porodičnoj lozi. Za *šī‘ije* su svi oni prije svega *imāmi* ili vrhovne duhovne vođe.

U neku ruku, *šī‘ije* insistiraju na duhovnoj (ali i stvarnoj “*krvnoj*”) primogenituri *imāmske* loze. Upravo je tu – u odnosu prema *halīfi* ‘Alīji b. Abī Ṭālību - došlo do raskola među ranom muslimanskom zajednicom, neki taj raskol nazivaju “velikom kušnjom” (*al-fitnah al-kubrā*).

Naime, mekkanska aristokracija koja je bila okupljena oko trećeg pravovjernog *halīfe* ‘Uṭmāna, sa Mu‘āwījom (sinom Sufyānovim) na čelu, stacionirala se kasnije u Damasku (661.) i tamo osnovala *halīfat* koji je nazvan Emevijskim (po Umayyatu, djedu Sufyanovu, odnosno pradjedu Mu‘āwījinu).

Mu‘āwīja kao prvi *halīfa* dinastije Emevija (Banū Umayyah) pokazao se politički lukavijim i vještijim od rivalskog *halīfe* ‘Alīje b. Abī Ṭālība, u pregovorima ga je bezobzirno i nemoralno iscrpljivao,

a iz pragmatiskih razloga Mu‘āwija je u vojnim operacijama angažirao arabljanska beduinska plemena (ona ista koja su bila pokorena od Medine).

Uopće uzev, u odnosu na svemuslimanski, univerzalistički i inkluzivni *hilāfat* prve četverice *halīfa* u Medini, Emevijski *hilāfat* u Damasku značio je “arabiziranje” i “beduiniziranje” te važne univerzalne institucije islama.²

Sada na scenu stupaju *hāriġije* (haridžije – *al-hawāriġ*), ukratko beskompromisni “ustanici” koji su bili i protiv *halīfe* ‘Alije b. Abī Ṭāliba (koji je u međuvremenu svoj *halīfat* pomjerio u Kufu) i *halīfe* Mu‘āwije u Damasku.

Razlozi zašto su *hariġije* bile protiv *halīfe* ‘Alije b. Abī Ṭāliba sabiru se u tome što su oni odbacivali kompromise koje je ‘Alīja b. Abī Ṭālib pravio u pregovorima sa suparnikom Mu‘āwijom.

Hariġije su bile ratoborne, okrenute populizmu i republikanizmu, smatrale su da *halīfa* može biti bilo ko koga muslimani izaberu, bile su protiv dinastičkog islama koga su zagovarale Emevije u Damasku, ali su bile jednako tako i protiv ši‘ijskog *imāmata* na koga su gledale kao na neku vrstu nasljednog vodstva kroz lanac imāma, itd.

Tri sljedbe ranoga islama

Od 656. godine pa do 700. godine nastale su i posve se jasno isprofilirale, te historijski zakorjenile, sljedeće tri glavne p o l i t i č k e sljedbe ranoga islama:

- *Ahlu s-sunna wa l-ġamā‘ah* (ili muslimanska većina koja je pristala na *halīfat* u Damasku, pristala je da se *halīfe* nasljeđuju primogeniturom, smatraju da spram *halīfa* treba imati lojalan odnos). Praktički ova muslimanska većina su

² ‘Abdu l-Ḥamīd Aḥmad Abū Sulaymān je u svome djelu *Kur’ānska vizija (Ar-Ru’yatu l-qur’āniyyatu l-kawniyyah)* pokazao da je univerzalistički duh ranoga *halīfata* prve četverice *halīfa* iz Medine splasnio pod Emevijama u Damasku (od 661-750.). Usp. naš prijevod ove Abū Sulaymānove knjige, izd. El-Kalem, Sarajevo, 2010. godine.

promotori političkog kvijetizma ili izbjegavanja sukoba sa vlastima. Ahli s-sunnatske dinastije su uglavnom obilježile cjelokupnu povijest islama, ahli s-sunnatske dinastije su bile i ‘abbāsijska u Bagdādu (750-1258.), osmanska u Bursi, Edrenama i Istanbulu (od 1299-1924), emevijska u Španiji, zatim Turci Seldžuci, itd.

- Druga velika sljedba islama su *aš-šī‘ah* (šī‘ije) ili sljedbenici *halīfe* ‘Alije b. Abī Ṭāliba i nekoliko imāma koji su njegovi potomci. *Šī‘ije* smatraju da su imāmi ti koji trebaju predvoditi muslimansku zajednicu. Potom se *ne slažu* koliko je tih imama u nizu lanca koji priznaju da ga treba slijediti. Neki poštuju sedam, drugi dvanaest imama, itd., po tome su nazvani septimalni, odnosno duodecimalni šī‘iti. *Šī‘ije* su imale i svoj *halifat* u Egiptu, tzv. Fāṭimije (u Kairu negdje od 909 – 1171.) Također, Šafawije u Isfahanu dolaze na vlast 1501. kao šī‘ijska dinastija, od tada je cijeli Iran šī‘ijski. Danas je Iran, također, šī‘ijska država. Šī‘ijske grupacije danas postoje u gotovo svim središnjim tradicionalnim arapskim zemljama (Arabija, Jemen, Oman, Egipat, Liban, Sirija, Bahrejn, Kuvajt, itd.) U Siriji su tzv. prošī‘ijski ‘alawiti (*‘alāwīje*) na vlasti, iako su istaknuta manjina). Ukratko, Arapa i Perzijanaca (Iranaca) ima na milione koji su *šī‘ije*. Procjenjuje se da *šī‘ija* danas ima 8-10% od ukupne populacije muslimana u svijetu. Ipak, sa stanovišta dosadašnjeg posjedništva vlasti u muslimanskom svijetu, *šī‘ije* su bile gotovo uvijek opozicija i marginalizirana, te “gubitnička” grupacija islama.

- *Hariğīje* (islamski egalitaristi), kao treća utjecajna grupacija ranoga islama, nisu nikada zadobile široku podršku muslimanskih naroda, živjele su (ili i danas žive) kao izolirane zajednice u tradicionalnim zemljama islama, a njihovo ime služi kad god se želi označiti bilo koja radikalna borba za “islamske” ciljeve. *Hariğīje* su dugo vremena bili nepomirljivi

borci protiv svih nasljednih *halifata*, itd. I to je razlog zašto se danas radikalnu grupu *al-Qā' idu* nerijetko naziva "harižijama modernoga doba". Na primjer, savremeni saudijski profesor šerijatskog prava šayḥ Šālīh Sadlān je *harižijama* nazvao arapske veterane povratnike iz Afganistana, koje je obučavala CIA u borbi protiv sovjeta. Naime, nazvao ih je *harižijama* jer su se bili počeli javljati sa svojim radikalnim zahtjevima prema kraljevskom režimu u Saudijskoj Arabiji.³

Razne druge sljedbe i škole mišljenja u islamu – mističke, ezoteričke, egzoteričke...

Naravno, u islamskoj povijesti nastale su i mnoge druge sljedbe i sekte, posebno na planu tumačenja Kur'āna i drugih izvora islama.

Ali, iako je snažna njihova vjerska, kultur(al)na i civilizacijska uloga, njihov politički utjecaj je zanemariv u odnosu na bazne političke sljedbe islama. Na primjer, u povijesnom islamu ima pet glavnih mezheba (ili škola tumačenja šerijatskog/vjerskog prava). U tom smislu imaju muslimani *hanefije*, *mālikije*, *hanbalije*, *šāfije*, *gā' farije*...

Povijesni islam ima i mnogobrojne *zāhirijske* (egzoteričke) i *bāṭinijske* (ezoteričke) sljedbe, tu su i mnogobrojni *ōūfijiski* redovi i *ṭarīqati*, na stotine njih, itd.

U vezi s ovakvim sljedbama i školama mišljenja treba reći da postoje mnoga preklapanja. Npr. može se istovremeno biti *hanefija* (u primjeni šerijatskog prava) i *mevlevija* po *sufijskom* opredjeljenju. Također, može se biti istovremeno *hanefija* i *mu' tazila* (ili posebna vrsta racionaliste u tumačenju Kur'āna). Na ovom je planu unutar ovakvih sljedbi tokom povijesnog islama uvijek postojala gipka tolerancija.

3 O ovome šire vidi: Šayḥ Šālīh Sadlān, *Potrebno je da se povratnici iz Afganistana duševno priprave*, objav. kao intervju u saudijskom sedmičnom časopisu *al-Mağallah*, broj 868. od 29. septembra 1996., preveo s arapskog Enes Karić, vidi hrestomatiju *Kur'ān u savremenom dobu*, II, izd. Bosanski kulturni centar, Sarajevo, 1997., str. 507 – 523.

Ali, u principu, ne može se istovremeno biti i *bariġija* i *šī'ija*, ili *bariġija* i *abli sunija*, itd. Tu su se javile oštrije razlike i jazovi.

Veliki dio islamskih sljedbi, grupacija i pokreta javio se s ciljem reformiranja ili obnavljanja ranijeg *izvornog nasljeđa* u islamu. Na primjer, sljedbenici Muhammeda bin 'Abd al-Wahhāba (umro 1797.) tvrde da je njihov pokret reformatorski jer navodno oni od islama odstranjuju *tursko-osmanske mističke i druge privrasline*.

Međutim, kod svih reformatora neminovno se postavlja pitanje: Čime se reformirati?

Gotovo sve savremene radikalne sekte koje se pozivaju na islam – u svome programu imaju agendu “povratka na izvorni i nepatvoreni islam”.

Ovakve grupacije žele reformirati današnje stanje muslimana koncepcijama “pravoga islama” iz prošlosti.

Dakako, postoje i reformatori koji muslimane danas žele reformirati i pozitivnim tekovinama evropskog nasljeđa. Egipatski reformator Muḥammed 'Abduhū (umro 1905.) ima mnoga takva mjesta u svojim djelima. I reformatori kao što su Ğamāluddīn al-Afgāni (um. 1897.), zatim indijski i pakistanski reformatori Ahmad Ḥān Bahadūr, Sayyed Amīr 'Alī, Chiragh 'Alī, Mumtāz 'Alī, Fazlur Rahman i drugi bili su otvoreni prema preuzimanju pozitivnih nasljeđa zapadne civilizacije.

Isti Kur'ān – različita viđenja uređenja muslimanske zajednice

Tri najranije islamske sljedbe: a) *ablu s-sunna wa l-ġamā'ah*, b) *aš-šī'ah*, i c) *bariġije* imaju ista doktrinalna vjerovanja. Na primjer, za ši'ijske muslimane Karen Armstrong kaže: “Njihova razlika od *sunnijske* većine je čisto politička.”⁴ koncepta viđenja političkog uređenja muslimanske zajednice - nisu postale puka prošlost, već se žilavo održavaju i traju sve do najnovijih vremena. Među njima postoje veliki

⁴ “Their difference from the Sunni majority is purely political.” Usp. Karen Armstrong, *Islam, A Short History*, izd. Phoenix, London, 2002., p. 174.

rivaliteti različite vrste i intenziteta. Sve tri sljedbe priznaju jedan te isti Kur'ān, ali ga različito tumače. Te razlike imaju veoma važne političke reperkusije. *Abli s-sunnije* smatraju da muslimani trebaju poštovati vlast bila ona dinastijska ili birana na izborima. *Hariġije* su veoma naglašeno za islamski republikanizam i egalitarizam, smatraju da su dinastijski oblici vlasti izdaja islama, itd. Ši'ijске grupacije zahtijevaju da vladar muslimanima bude ujedno i imām koji je iz Poslanikove loze preko njegove kćerke Fāṭime i zeta 'Alije b. Abi Ṭāliba, ili da je izdanak te tradicije, itd.

Ovdje bismo mogli satima nabrajati mnoge *abli s-sunnatske*, *ši'ijске* i *hariġijske* izdanke i "mikro-sekte" tokom gotovo petnaest stoljeća povijesnog islama.

Ako se ograničimo samo na tri ili četiri posljednje decenije XX. stoljeća i prvu deceniju XXI. stoljeća možemo spomenuti sljedeće grupacije ili sljedbe za koje se tvrdi da su radikalne: (*Ġundu 'llāh*) ili "Božija vojska", koja je od zvaničnog Irana – gdje inače djeluje - proglašena kao teroristička organizacija, po načinima svoga djelovanja je tipična *neohariġijska* mikro-sekta, koja nastoji ukloniti većinsku ši'ijsku vlast. Za *al-Qā'idu* smo već kazali da je od samih saudijskih autoriteta označena kao *neohariġijska* grupacija, ali koja se bori protiv svih arapskih *abli s-sunnatskih* režima (bili oni republikansko-partijski, monopartijski ili kraljevski). Također, različite grupacije islamskog džihada (*al-ġihādu l-islāmī*) na Bliskom i Srednjem istoku u svojim radikalnim nastupima imaju mnoge *neohariġijske* metode djelovanja,⁵ jer u svojim djelovanjima i programima ne kriju da žele oružanim akcijama ukloniti postojeće *abli s-sunnatske* ili *ši'ijске* režime, bore se protiv upliva Zapada i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država na Bliskom i Srednjem istoku, itd. S druge strane, *Hižbullāh* ("Božija partija") iz Libana je tipična *ši'ijсka* grupacija, na Zapadu i od strane Izraela označena je

⁵ Usporedi Johannes J. G. Jansen, *Rani islamski pokret haridžija i moderni muslimanski ekstremizam: sličnosti i razlike*, preveo s engleskog Enes Karić, objav. u hrestomatiji *Kur'ān u savremenom dobu*, II, isto, str. 293 – 305.

kao ekstremna i radikalna sljedba. Međutim, libanski *Hižbullāh* je od *š' ijskog* stanovništva južnoga Libana snažno podržavana formacija.

Stoga je na ovoj dionici našega eseja veoma važno spomenuti da se mora praviti razlika između oslobodilačkih i odbrambenih pokreta s jedne, i radikalnih i “terorističkih” grupacija, s druge strane.

Johannes Reissner je u svome tekstu “Militantne islamske grupe”⁶ (koji je pisan osamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća) kazao sljedeće:

[U ovoj raspravi] neće biti obrađene islamske grupe otpora, kao one u Afganistanu od 1979. ili Moro-pobunjenici na Filipinima, čija militantnost ne počiva ponajprije na totalnom ideološkom zahtjevu; granice su, naravno, pomjerljive, ponekada su ovakve grupe otpora potpomognute, ili su pod utjecajem, militantnih islamskih organizacija.⁷

Drugim riječima, prema Johannesu Reissneru, da bi se neka islamska grupacija proglasila “militantnom” potrebno je da islam, temeljen na Kur’ānu, sunni i uzoru pobožnih sljedbenika, smatra totalnom ideologijom koja i danas važi za sve oblasti života. Totalitarnost i radikalnost njihovih zahtjeva daju im militantni karakter, bez obzira koriste li one za ostvarivanje svojih ciljeva silu ili mirne metode.⁸

Po upravo navedenom kriteriju, u navedene radikalne grupacije koje su označene kao *neoharižijske* zapadni proučavatelji islama nabrojaju još i ove: *Ġamā‘atu t-takfīr wa l-hiğrah* osnovana u Egiptu, *Hižbu t-tahrīri l-islāmī* koji ima ogranke i na Zapadu i na Bliskom istoku, *Tanzīmu l-ğihād* u Gornjem Egiptu, i mnoge druge.⁹

S druge strane, postoje grupacije koje je teško svrstati po starim klišejima. Afganistanski i pakistanski *talibāni* su jedna radikalna for-

6 Usp. Johannes Reissner, *Militantne islamske grupe*, s njemačkog preveo Sidik Spahić, objav. u hrestomatiji *Kur’ān u savremenom dobu*, II, isto, str. 81-98.

7 Usp. Johannes Reissner, *Militantne islamske grupe*, isto, str. 81.

8 Johannes Reissner, isto, str. 81.

9 O ovim i drugim grupacijama koje se obično označavaju radikalnim vidi: Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, The Trail of Political Islam*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002.

macija, ali koja je čvrsto privržena *ahli s-sunnijiskom* islamu, iako ima *neobarižijske* elemente i metode djelovanja, itd.

Također, u klasifikacijama koje imaju u vidu radikalnost i militantnost, često se nađu i Muslimanska braća (*al-ihwānu l-muslimūn*), koji djeluju po cijelom Bliskom i Srednjem istoku, i u zapadnoj Evropi. Međutim, glavni tokovi ovog pokreta nikada nisu bili radikalni, pogotovo ne militantni, *već su militantnost i radikalizam prihvatili otpadnici od Muslimanske braće.*

Danas su Muslimanska braća na Bliskom i Srednjem istoku prepoznati kao konstruktivan partner u društvu, negdje kao članovi parlamenata, a negdje, opet, kao veoma radina nevladina organizacija.¹⁰

Doista je danas veliki broj muslimanskih i islamskih grupacija označen u literaturi kao radikalni ili militantni, na primjer: *fidā'iyyān-i islām* (Iran), *ḡamā'ati islām* (Pakistan), *ḡamā'atu l-ḡihād* (Egipat), *tanẓīmu l-ḡihād* (Egipat), itd. itd.

Razlozi zašto se ove i prethodne spomenute grupacije javljaju tokom XX. i XXI. stoljeća, i pritom najčešće *pozivaju na islam*, nahode se u sljedećem:

- Velikim dijelovima siromašnog ljudstva arapskog i islamskog svijeta već od doba kolonijalizma vlada duh poraza i političkog beznađa. Porazi u ratu sa Izraelom doveli su do reaktivnih pojava – nicanja raznolikih ideologija koje su označene kao “islamske” i kao “radikalne”. “Islamski radikalizam” je umnogome reaktivna pojava.
- Neuspjeh arapskih elita, režima i država da riješe političke i ekonomske probleme svojih zemalja jeste veliki izvor radikalizacije stanovništva. (Ondje gdje je država uspješna i gdje postoji demokratsko uređenje, tu ne “cvjetaju” radikalne grupe. Npr. javnost Republike Turske, ili Malezije ili Indonezije nije

¹⁰ Usporedi Ahmet Alibašić, *Islamska opozicija u savremenim političkim sistemima i njena uloga u političkom razvoju arapskih država* (doktorska disertacija), neobjavljeno, Sarajevo, 2010.

obilježena nikakvim radikalnim grupacijama, ili su one svedene na minimum i na marginu.)

- Sukob mnogih segmenata tradicionalnih muslimanskih društava sa agresivnom sekulariziranom sredinom također je po sebi snažno žarište radikalnih ideja. Naime, agresivna sekularizirana sredina podsjeća tradicionalne muslimane na period kolonijalizma i zapadne dominacije.
- Želja da se prakticirani islam svoga vremena reformira po uzoru na idealizirane obrasce “prvotnoga islama” neke grupacije navodi na totalitarne ideologije i djelovanja.
- Nepostojanja efikasne i demokratske države u arapskim zemljama, koja bi štitila svoje građane (pa time i muslimane), izvor je velikih frustracija, te frustracije dovode do radikalnih ideja, a radikalne ideje do nasilnog ponašanja.
- Nasilno vršenje vlasti od strane korumpiranih pozapadnjačenih elita u arapskim i nekih drugim islamskih zemljama veliki je izvor radikalnih ideja. Islam se tu od opozicionih i “radikalnih” grupacija uzima kao ideologija “revolucije” i kao teologija “oslobođenja”.
- Nekoje muslimanske grupacije i pokreti nastoje da novo i strano (zapadno) prihvate kao *islamsko* dok druge grupacije nastoje da ga odbace kao *neislamsko*.¹¹ I tu je veliki izvor radikalnih ideja i tumačenja islamskog nasljeđa.
- Također, veliki broj muslimanskih sljedbi danas nastoje da u islamskim vrelima, pogotovo u Kur’ānu, pronađu savremeni smisao. Pri tome dolazi do varničenja između tradicije prošlosti i zahtjeva savremenosti.

¹¹ Usp. Johannes Reisner, isto, str. 82.

Muhamed Jusić

**ISLAMISTIČKI POKRETI U XX
STOLJEĆU I NJIHOVO PRISUSTVO
U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI**

U svjetskim naučnim i analitičkim krugovima postoji više teorija o razlozima pojavljivanja i uspona onoga što se naziva “islamističkim pokretima” u muslimanskom svijetu u dvadesetom stoljeću. Tako imamo značajan broj onih koji u islamističkim pokretima vide samo pokušaj stvaranja jednog ideološkog pandana tada dominantnim sukobljenim ideologijama kapitalizma i komunizma i njihovih inačica koje su se otimale oko kontrole nad tim bogatim dijelom svijeta. Drugi korijene čitavog fenomena vide daleko prije toga, u frustracijama muslimanskog svijeta zbog zaostajanja za tehnički i naučno sve superiornijim Zapadom i posljedicama brutalne kolonizacije koja je tom dijelu svijeta pokušala nametnuti sistem misli i vrijednosti koji oni smatraju stranim i zbog čega su se odlučili vratiti vlastitim tradicionalnim vrijednostima utemeljenim najvećim dijelom u islamu kako bi razvili vlastitu viziju preporoda i uređenja društva koje bi garantovalo prosperitet i blagostanje.¹

Oni koji zagovaraju sintezu ova dva razloga smatraju kako je islam, naročito nakon političkog sloma ideala arapskog nacionalizma, poslužio kao osnova na koju su nakalemljeni ideološki obrasci XX vijeka. Tu novu ideologiju oni najčešće nazivaju “islamizam”, otud i već ustaljeni pojam islamistički a ne islamski pokreti. Svi koji danas koriste, a najčešće je to na Zapadu, termin islamizam pokušavaju naglasiti razliku između njega i tradicionalnog islama, kao samo još jednog religijskog sistema². I pored toga, još uvijek postoji dosta nejasnoća oko toga šta tačno islamizam podrazumijeva. Tako, npr., nalazimo da se u debati koju je 1990. godine organizovao *The Middle East Forum* moglo čuti više različitih definicija islamizma.

1 Više o razlozima stasavanja islamističkih pokreta u: “Islamska prijetnja, mit ili stvarnost”, John L. Esposito, Živinice, 2001., “What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response”, Bernard Lewis, London, 2004., “The Political Language of Islam”, Bernard Lewis, Čikago i London, 1991., “Islamski ekstremizam”, Dejan Lukić, Sarajevo 1985.

2 Za više detalja o genezi pojma islamizam vidi rad autora Islam i islamizam objavljen u Takvimu Rjaseta IZ u BiH za 2007. str. 133.

Tako npr., prema Johnu Espositu, islamizam je zapravo “islam interpretiran kao ideologija kako bi se podržao politički i društveni aktivizam”.

Profesor istraživač na Univerzitetu Tel Aviv Martin Kramer pak tvrdi da je to “islam koji je preformulisan kao moderna ideologija. Dok je islam tradicionalno nastao u klasi judaizma i kršćanstva, islamizam je odgovor na ideologije koje su nastale na modernom zapadu – kao što su komunizam, socijalizam ili kapitalizam”.

Gruham Fuller, savjetnik u *RAND Corporation* smatra kako je “islamizam najvećim dijelom sinonim za politički islam – pokušaj da se iz islama izvedu rješenja za savremene državne, društvene i političke probleme”.³

Postoje i oni, naročito među samim islamistima, koji smatraju da se ne radi ni o kakvoj novoj ideologiji nego pukom pokušaju reforme islama koji prema njima nikada nije bio samo religija, nego cjelokupan sistem života, što podrazumijeva i državno i društveno uređenje zasnovano na njegovim principima. To je neminovno izrodilo ono što se naziva “politički islam” sa svim njegovim modelima od onoga koji zagovara “reformu iznutra” (kroz postojeće političke sisteme) do onoga koji je više revolucionaran i spreman posegnuti za nasiljem kako bi postigao svoj cilj .

Posebno je zanimljivo razmišljanje jedne druge skupine stručnjaka koji, poput Olivera Roya, pojavu islamističkih pokreta pa i onih najradikalnijih među njima, gdje oni svrstavaju neke selefističke pokrete, objašnjavaju “vesternizacijom i globalizacijom islama”.

Tako on smatra kako je “pogrešno pretpostaviti da su pojave religioznog radikalizma (pod kojim on prvenstveno misli na selefizam) i političkog radikalizma (“Al Qaeda”) tek uvoz iz kultura i konflikata Bliskog Istoka. Ove pojave su prvenstveno posljedica globalizacije i pozapadnjačenja islama. Današnje oživljavanje religioznosti prije svega

3 Is Islamism a Threat? (debata) *The Middle East Quarterly* decembar 1999. tom VI, broj 4

je obilježeno razdvajanjem kulture i religije, o kojoj god religiji da se radi. Ovo objašnjava uzajamni afinitet američkog protestantskog fundamentalizma i islamskog selefizma: i jedan i drugi odbacuju kulturu, filozofiju, čak i teologiju, u korist skripturalnog iščitavanja vjerskih tekstova i neposrednog razumijevanja istine kroz vjeru pojedinca, a nauštrb obrazovnih i religioznih institucija.⁴

Kada je riječ o razlozima širenja utjecaja “islamističkih pokreta” brojni su analitičari koji glavne razloge vide u siromaštvu, beznađu, nedemokratskim tiranskim režimima kojima su dugo, sve do nedavnih dešavanja u tzv. “arapskom proljeću”, jedina stvarna alternativa i opozicija bili brojni islamistički pokreti, koji su svojim humanitarnim, obrazovnim i opozicionim djelovanjem nerijetko dobijali značajnu podršku muslimanskih masa koje su još uvijek tradicionalistički odgojene i željne društvene promjene koja će im donijeti boljitak bez propitivanja temeljnih društvenih vrijednosti.

Muslimani u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji su se nalazili pod nekom vrstom ideološkog staklenog zvona koje ih je u velikoj mjeri držalo izolovanim od ideoloških i inih previranja u ostatku muslimanskog svijeta. To stakleno zvono je razbijeno u plamenu rata koji je zadesio bivšu Jugoslaviju nakon propasti komunističkog režima. Muslimani ovih prostora, prije svega Bošnjaci koji su činili značajan dio tadašnje IZ, i njihova vjerska zajednica nisu imali dovoljno vremena da steknu neophodna iskustva i znanja kako da se nose sa najezdom ideja, ideologija, sekti i drugih društvenih fenomena inspirisanih islamom koji su zapljusnuli ratom razoreno bosanskohercegovačko društvo. Zbog izolacije pod kojom su se pola stoljeća nalazili, bosanski muslimani kao zajednica u prvim godinama rata i poraća nisu uspjeli razviti neku vrstu

4 Roy, Oliver “Islam u Evropi- Sudar religija ili konvergencija religioznosti, prvi put objavljeno u in Krzysztof Michalski (ed.), Conditions of European Solidarity, vol. II: Religion in the New Europe, Central European University Press 2006 / Sarajevo Notebook 27-28 (2010)

“imuniteta” na ideološku interpretaciju islama, ali ni formirati jasan stav prema pluralizmu unutar islamske misli. Taj proces je sada uveliko u toku i na IZ je da, kako u domovini tako i u dijaspori, gdje su evidentirani skoro identični procesi, iznađe modele kojima će u duhu principa islamskog pluralizma ipak sačuvati vlastiti identitet i sačuvati muslimane od vjerskog i ideološkog egzibicionizma. Vrijeme će pokazati da li će i na koji način u tome uspjeti.

Nema sumnje da je od svih pokreta i sekti iz islamskog svijeta čije učenje je zapljusnulo obale tradicionalnog bosanskog islama najveću pažnju na sebe skrenuo pokret selefija (u narodu poznatih kao vehabije). Zbog broja svojih pristalica, ali i incidentnih situacija u kojima su oni u posljednjih desetak godina učestvovali, pokret je skrenuo značajnu medijsku pažnju na svoje aktivnosti.

Selefije (ar. selef, prethodnici, prve generacije muslimana) ili islamski tradicionalisti su pokret nastao oko učenja i djelovanja reformatora sa Arabijskog poluotoka Muhammeda bin Vehhaba (1703. - 1787.). Iako su kod nas, ali i u svijetu poznati kao vehabije (po osnivaču pokreta Abdul-Vehhabu), sljedbenici ovog pokreta ne prihvataju taj naziv. Štaviše, jedno od njihovih ključnih učenja je suprotstavljanje kultu ličnosti.

Ovo je pokret koji insistira na očuvanju islamskog učenja o monoteizmu suprotstavljajući se svim inovacijama u muslimanskoj praksi i učenju, što je vidljivo i iz letimičnog pregleda samo naslova knjiga koje štampaju i distribuiraju. Za sebe kažu da teže povratku Kur`anu – svetoj knjizi muslimana, sunnetu (tradiciji Božijeg poslanika Muhameda a.s.) i praksi prve generacije muslimana⁵.

Selefijski pokret u BiH od rata, kada je dolaskom dobrovoljaca iz arapskog svijeta počeo puštati svoje korijene među bošnjačkim mladićima i djevojkama, doživio je postepenu ideološku preobrazbu koje čak i sami pripadnici pokreta nekada nisu bili svjesni. Iako

⁵ Više o selefijском pokretu kao i o drugim islamističkim pokretima u autorovoj knjizi *Islamistički pokreti – reprezentativan pregled*, Emanet, Zenica

je ta ideološka transformacija bila uslovljena bosanskohercegovačkim društvenim okolnostima, daleko veći utjecaj imali su globalni trendovi, naročito dešavanja unutar matičnog pokreta u Saudijskoj Arabiji.

Iako se selefije doživljavaju kao jedinstvena i monolitna zajednica, danas su oni jedan od islamističkih pokreta sa najvećim brojem sukobljenih frakcija od kojih većina ima vlastitu viziju islamizacije svijeta i društava u kojima djeluju. Jedno je zajedničko za sve njih, a to je da samo sebe smatraju jedinim dosljednim sljedbenicima sunneta (prakse poslanika Muhameda a.s.), a svoju interpretaciju islamske tradicije jedinom valjanom.

Detaljnom analizom možemo raspoznati četiri osnovne frakcije koje se u muslimanskim zemljama (a to se reflektuje i na ogranke pokreta u BiH) bore za prevlast unutar pokreta nastalog oko učenja i djelovanja reformatora sa Arabijskog poluotoka, Šejha Muhammeda bin Abdul-Vehhaba.

Zvaničnu i oficijelnu struju koja uživa podršku vladajuće porodice u Saudijskoj Arabiji čine *es-selefijjetu et-taklidijjun* – trdadicionalni konzervativci koji su izrazito apolitični i koji za militantne selefije poput Usame bin Ladina tvrde da “samo čine nered na zemlji”.

Selefijjetu-s-sahva (sahva – buđenje) ili reformističke selefije su pravac koji uživa najveću podršku među selefijama kako u Kraljevini, tako i van nje. Oni se zalažu za islamizaciju društva putem postepenih reformi, odgoja, obrazovanja i ideološkog sučeljavanja sa sekularistima i liberalima zapadnog kova. Protiv su nasilnih metoda i konstantno evoluiraju u svojim stavovima usvajajući sve više otvorene i liberalne vrijednosti netipične za tradicionalne selefije.

Selefijjet-l-džihadi-š- šer`i ili džihadisti “legalnog džihada” su militantno krilo sefizma koji zagovaraju borbu kao strogu vjersku dužnost svakog muslimana, ali samo tamo gdje su muslimani napadnuti i gdje je neprijatelj jasno definisan (kakva su krizna žarišta širom svijeta i u koja su ubrajali i BiH tokom proteklog rata).

Najekstremniji oblik selefijske ideologije razvio se pod utjecajem militantnih islamističkih pokreta iz Egipta koji su na afganistanskim ratištima i u kampovima za obuku kombinirali selefijski vjerski konzervativizam sa idejama *tekfira* (proglašenja muslimanskih zajednica i pojedinaca koji u njima žive nevjerničkim, odnosno nevjernicima) a svrstavamo ih u grupu *selefijetu el-džihad et-tekfiri* ili internacionalni džihadisti skloni tekfuru.

Nakon 11. septembra ovi militantni su uz nesvesnu podršku globalnih medija postali jedini eksponenti islamističkog militantizma i skoro u potpuno potisnuli ideju mudžahida “legitimnog džihada” nesklonog terorizmu koji su se do tada smatrali samo “borcima za slobodu”. Sinonim za njih je postala famozna organizacija El-Kaida.

Sva ova previranja u matičnom pokretu su se odrazila i na selefije u BiH i bošnjačkoj dijaspori, tako da danas imamo među njima u manjem ili većem broju predstavnike svake od gore spomenutih frakcija.

U zadnje vrijeme zbog sve većeg pritiska sigurnosnih agencija *selefijetu el-džihad et-tekfiri* se sve više fokusiraju samo na polemičke rasprave sa drugim selefijskim ograncima, ali i sa drugim muslimanskim autoritetima oko pitanja *tekfira* i prihvatanja ili neprihvatanja zakona koji nisu Božanski odnosno koji su doneseni u demokratskoj zakonodavnoj proceduri, a samim time i čitavog odnosa muslimana prema demokratskom društvu i njegovim institucijama.

Zagovornici *tekfira* ovaj koncept nazivaju *tevhidul-hakimije* ili vjerovanje u Božiji monoteizam u vlasti, tj. vjerovanje da muslimani ne smiju prihvatati ničiji sud osim Božijeg, pa samim time ni poštivati bilo koje zakone koji nisu od Njega.

Učenje o *tevhidul-hakimije* počiva na vrlo jednostavnoj i teološki simplistički postavljenoj argumentaciji prema kojoj islam naučava da je Bog jedan, apsolutni Vladar i Gospodar, koji jedini propisuje šta je

dobro, a šta zlo. Biti musliman znači biti predan Božijoj volji i uskladiti svoj život sa normama dobra i zla koje Bog propisuje. Ovo usklađivanje nije samo na nivou etičkog i moralnog, ličnog i privatnog nego i kolektivnog života, što podrazumijeva isključivi ustroj društva tj. države u skladu sa normama Šerijata, a za njih je Šerijat samo skup fiksnih tradicionalnih kazni (ar. Hududa) a ne sistem vrijednosti iz kojeg se različitim pravnim metodama izvode propisi pa i zakoni. Iz ovog proizlazi da svaki musliman koji je zadovoljan da živi u društvu uređenom na normama drugačijim od onih koji oni vide kao islamske, prestaje biti musliman, jer je odabrao sistem vrijednosti koji nije islamski. Takav je prihvatio da mu neko drugi pored Boga propisuje norme dobra i zla, što je ravno herezi i obožavanju nekog drugog osim Jednog Boga. Istovremeno, svako učestvovanje u demokratskim i političkim procesima bilo kroz nominovanje u političkim partijama ili puko podržavanje sistema kroz glasanje ili prihvatanje suda države koja ne počiva na Šerijatu predstavlja uzurpiranje Božijeg prava da propisuje šta je dobro, a šta zlo odnosno da donosi zakone (što se čini u parlamentarnoj proceduri kroz donošenje zakona o tome šta se smije a šta ne smije raditi).

Neki autori koji su pisali o ovom učenju korijene ovakve interpretacije vjere vide još u prvim godinama nakon Poslanikove smrti u prvoj sekti koja se pojavila unutar islama, a nakon Poslanikove smrti. Bili su to *haridžije* koji su prema vlastitoj teološkoj doktrini većinu muslimana proglasili nevjernicima zbog činjenja velikih grijeha. Savremeni zagovornici *tekfira* ne smatraju nevjernicima počiniocima velikih grijeha nego, kao što smo to objasnili one muslimane koji ne vjeruju u *tevhidul-hakimije* kako ga oni tumače. Zato nalazimo da se unutar selefijskih ali i unutar naučnih krugova oni nazivaju haridžijama ili neoharidžijama, najčešće s ciljem njihove diskvalifikacije.⁶

Drugi se prisjećaju da je sredinom sedamdesetih godina prošlog

⁶ Više o problemu imenovanja fenomena tekfira i pokretu nastalom oko ovog učenja vidi: "Militantni ekstremisti: HARIDŽIJE NAŠEG DOBA", Ahmet Alibašić, Preporod, god. XL, br. 14/928, 15. juli 2010, str. 12-14.

vijeka, egipatska i svjetska javnost bila šokirana brutalnošću dotada najradikalnijeg militantnog pokreta *Džem'at et-tekfir ve-l-hidžra*, u kojem drugi vide korijene savremenog pokreta tekfira. Pripadnici ove organizacije su svoje muslimanske sunarodnjake i donedavne vjerske istomišljenike proglasili nevjernicima i krenuli u otvorenu borbu u kojoj nisu prezali od korištenja najsurovijih metoda terorisanja civila. Bili su to odmetnuti pripadnici političkog i ideološkog pokreta Muslimanske braće, koji su iz pokušaja egipatskog režima da uguši njihovu opoziciju izašli, nerijetko nakon dugih godina provedenih u stravičnim kazamatima, uvjereni kako se društvo u kojem žive toliko udaljilo od islamskih principa da se više nije moglo smatrati muslimanskim, kao ni oni koji su životom u tako uređenoj državi bili zadovoljni. Nakon krvavog pira ubistava neistomišljenika i odlučne akcije egipatske države i šire društvene javnosti pokret je dijaboliziran i potisnut iz društvene zbilje. Kao organizovana struktura je prestao da postoji. Većina sljedbenika je ubijena ili se javno ogradila od stavova osnivača pokreta, mladog inženjera agronomije Šukri Mustafe, ali je ideja tekfira tj. smatranja drugih muslimana nevjernicima zbog prihvatanja da žive u državama koje po njima nisu islamske, preživjela.

Tekfir je preživio u ideološkom prtljagu arapskih mudžahedina koji su učestvovali u afganistanskoj borbi protiv sovjetskog okupatora. Upravo u borbenim rovovima brdovitih afganistanskih vrleti ta ideja je našla plodno tlo među pripadnicima jednog drugog pokreta koji je sa Muslimanskom braćom imao jako malo zajedničkog, tj. među pripadnicima selefijskog pokreta iz Saudijske Arabije koji su kao dobrovoljci došli da se pridruže afganistanskoj braći u "džihadu protiv Sovjeta". Tekfir se reinkarnira ovaj put u odmetnicima od oficijelnog selefijskog učenja ili se na neki način na njega kalemi, a njegovi sljedbenici za sebe počinju tvrditi da su jedini i istinski zagovornici beskompromisnog selefizma i sljedbenici Muhameda ibn Abdul-Vehhaba i prvih njegovih sljedbenika poznatih kao "ihvani" za koje vjeruju da ih je saudijska vladajuća porodica iskoristila kako bi došla na vlast a zatim potisnula.

Zbog činjenice da je selefijski pokret u Bosnu i Hercegovinu došao preko arapskih dobrovoljaca, nerijetko upravo onih koji su u Afganistanu bili u kontaktu sa nosiocima ideje tekfira, koja je tada još uvijek bila u začetku, tradicionalno bosansko muslimansko društvo našlo se na udaru još jedne islamističke ideologije.

Treba napomenuti da je među arapskim dobrovoljcima iz odreda (kasnije jedinice) *El-Mudžahidin* koji su se borili na strani Armije BiH u proteklom ratu, a za koje se smatra da su rasadnik selefijskog učenja, oficijelna ideologija bila bliža pobunjenim selefijama iz reda oponenata oficijelnoj saudijskoj ulemi od one sljedbenika tekfira. Oni koji su bili skloni idejama tekfira svoje su stavove držali za sebe ili se nisu uključivali u ovu formaciju. Nikada pojedinci koji su nosili ideje tekfira na kojima će kasnije počivati teroristička organizacija Al-Kaida, nisu uspjeli nametnuti svoje stavove širem krugu saboraca. Neki u tome vide razlog zašto El-Kaida i njeno ideološko vodstvo nikada nisu, barem kroz saopštenja, značajnije dali podršku takvoj vrsti angažmana islamističkih dobrovoljaca. Za njih je, naime, bilo neprihvatljivo da se oni bore u redovima, bez obzira na svu autonomiju koju su imali, jedne vojske koja se zvanično borila za sekularnu i demokratsku državu.

Raspuštanjem odreda El-Mudžahedin i odlaskom iz BiH njegovih ključnih ideologa te otvaranjem starih ali i novih selefija u BiH prema drugim pravcima unutar selefizma, prvenstveno putem interneta ali i kontakata sa muslimanskim svijetom i bh. dijasporom, došlo je do značajnijeg širenja ideja tekfira među bh. selefijama. Osim toga, realnost postojanja selefijskog pokreta u BiH podrazumijeva preslikavanje gibanja unutar matičnog pokreta u svijetu na bosansku scenu. Tako je i organizacijsko-ideološko jačanje odmetnutih selefija koji zagovaraju nespojivost islama i demokratskog uređenja društva, našlo svoje simpatizere i među novom generacijom mladih selefija bosanskog porijekla.

Danas, na stranicama koje sa nepoznatih lokacija uređuju oni koji za sebe tvrde da su jedine ispravne selefije možemo pročitati saopštenja u kojima se Islamska zajednica u BiH proglašava nevjerničkom, a

namaz koji predvodi imam koji zagovara ili poziva na učešće vjernika u demokratskim izborima ili civilnom društvu neispravnim. Po prvi put se sreću mladići koji ne priznaju zakone BiH, sud ili koji ne žele da posjeduju lične dokumente BiH ili bilo koje druge države. To je pokrenulo i unutarselefijske rasprave koje se vode na brojnim internet stranicama i forumima.⁷

I dok različiti pravci selefijskog pokreta na sebe skreću najviše medijske pažnje, među bosanskim muslimanima u BiH i dijaspori djeluju i brojne druge sljedbe i islamistički pokreti koji se pozivaju na islam. Već neko vrijeme se u BiH kao vjerska zajednica pokušava registrovati Ahmediyya Muslim Jamaat, a već imaju prijavljen vlastiti mesdžid u jednoj od sarajevskih zgrada.

U dijaspori su još aktivniji s obzirom da ahmedije u EU imaju jaku i razvijenu mrežu svojih džemata. Samo u Njemačkoj danas imaju 25 sagrađenih džamija, a u dogledno vrijeme imaju planove sagrađiti 100 džamija i mesdžida samo u ovoj evropskoj državi u kojima bi širili svoje učenje. U drugim dijelovima svijeta, gdje su ahmedije djelovali, često su evidentirane konfliktne situacije između njih i sljedbenika tradicionalnog islamskog učenja, s obzirom da se ahmedije pozivaju na islam, a imaju nauk koji većina tradicionalnih muslimanskih autoriteta smatra suprotnim temeljnim principima islama.

Ahmedije je u Indiji 1889., osnovao Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835 – 1908.) iz Kadijana – zbog čega se sljedbenici ove sljedbe još nazivaju i kadijanije.

Ono što najčešće muslimanskih autoriteti zamjere ahmedijama jeste njihovo učenje o tome kako je Mirza Ghulam u stvari poslanik i da Muhamed a.s. nije posljednji poslanik što je jedno od temeljnih

⁷ Argumenti zagovornika tekfira i kritike na račun tradicionalnih selefija se najbolje mogu vidjeti u knjizi Ebu Muhammeda (Nedžad Balkan) "Trijumf vjerovjesničkog monoteizma nad da'vom širka i nacionalizma"

učenja islama. Isto je i sa korigovanim učenjem o tome kako je Mirza Ghulam islamskim učenjem nagoviješteni mehdija i da su se “duše Isaa i Muhammeda a.s. pojavile u liku čovjeka i da je taj čovjek Mirza Ahmed” što često stvara tenzije unutar muslimanskih zajednica širom svijeta od Indonezije do Zapadne Evrope.

Osim Ahmedija u BiH je evidentirano i djelovanje Behaija koji nisu djelovali pod imenom svoje sljedbe nego kroz projekte koji su imali za cilj izgradnju mira kroz postojeći obrazovni sistem BiH. Treba naglasiti da i Ahmedije i Behaije zagovaraju mirovnu dimenziju islama.

Što se tiče šiitskog utjecaja koji je također još jedan izazov za bh. muslimane, kako u smislu sprječavanja eventualnih prodora kontraproduktivnih ideologija (sektaških, revizionističkih i onih koje promovišu politizaciju religije i ideološku interpretaciju islama) tako i u smislu otkrivanja jedne, za muslimanske vjerske krugove dugo vremena nepoznate kulture i civilizacije, tu bi iskustva zemalja muslimanskog svijeta u kojima je interakcija šiita i sunita historijska realnost, mogle biti od koristi. Pored brojnih državnih institucija i projekata iza kojih stoji iranska država postoji i veći broj nevladinih prošiitskih organizacija koje među bosanskim muslimanima pokušavaju proširiti šiitsko učenje i vlastitu viziju muslimanske historije, naročito perioda podjela unutar prve muslimanske zajednice koje su i dovele do nastanka sunizma i šiizma.

Bosanski muslimani, možda i s razlogom pokazuju zabrinutost i zbog ovakvog prozelitističkog djelovanja nekih šiitskih organizacija naročito zbog traumatičnog iskustva krvavih sunitsko-šiitskih sukoba kroz historiju.

U ovom kontekstu ne treba zapostaviti ni sve prisutnije aktivnosti različitih islamističkih pokreta i obrazovnih institucija koje sjedište imaju u Turskoj koje već neko vrijeme igraju jako značajnu ulogu u organizaciji vjerskog života među nekim islamskim zajednicama u Jugoistočnoj Evropi, a čije prisustvo u BiH je sve izraženije, kao što su brojni neonakšibendijski tarikati, nurdžije, sulejmandžije ili sljed-

Muhamed JUSIĆ

Islamistički pokreti u XX stoljeću i njihovo prisustvo u Bosni i Hercegovini

benici Fethullaha Gulena⁸. Tu su još i Muslimanska braća, tahrirci, tabligovci, neomutezile, redefinisani sufijski tarikati koji svoje šejhove imaju od Malezije do Kipra, ali i modernisti različitih kovova i učenja o kojima se rijetko piše i čiji se stavovi rijetko analiziraju zato što se fokus šire javnosti zadržava samo na onim pokretima koji predstavljaju sigurnosni izazov ili koji svojim učenjem i djelovanjem u pitanje dovode pravni poredak i ustroj države.

⁸ Više o ulozi turskih islamističkih pokreta na Zapadnom Balkanu vidjeti u "Balkan Muslims and Islam in Europe, The Role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans" Anne Ross Solberg, Sudosteuroopa, 2007.



Mustafa Spahić

**SOCIOLOŠKO-POLITIČKA
ANALIZA POJAVE RADIKALIZMA**

Božijom voljom, odredbom, moćim, mjerom i znanjem sloboda prethodi Objavi (Revelaciji), Objava vjeri i vjerovanju, vjera religiji, religija etici i obredima, a etika politici i esteticima. “Mi smo nebesima, Zemlji i planinama Emanet (Objavu) ponudili pa su se oni sustegli da ga ponesu, jer su ga se pobjavili, a čovjek ga uprta i prihvati – zaista je čovjek okrutan i nezalica veliki” (Kur’an, 33:72). Zato je sloboda prva supstanca, prva odlika, karakteristika i odrednica čovjeka i ljudi: “Da tvoj Gospodar hoće, uzvjerovala bi sva stvorenja na Zemlji! Zar ćeš onda ti (Muhammede) siliti ljude da se obrate u pravovjernike?! Jer nijedna duša ne vjeruje bez Allahove dozvole, a On učini nečistima one što neće da promislu” (Kur’an, 10: 99 i 100). “Kaži od Gospodara vašega je Istina, pa ko hoće neka vjeruje u slobodi, a ko hoće neka ne vjeruje. Mi smo pripremili oganj za nasilnike.” (Kur’an, 18:29). “U vjeri i vjerovanju nema nikakve prisile, zaista se jasno razlikuje put razbora od zablude, i zato onaj ko đavola zaniječe, a u Allaha vjeruje - taj se uhvatio za užu i vezu najčvršću - prekinuti se nikada neće, a Allah sve čuje i sve zna.” (Kur’an, 2: 256). “Zbilja ovo je Opomena i Objava, pa ko htjedne u slobodi izabrat će put do Gospodara svoga. A vi ćete htjeti samo ono što bude Allahova volja, Allah sve zna i zaista je Premudri.” (Kur’an, 76:293). “Gradom ovim zaklinjem se Muhammede, ti ćeš u njemu biti slobodan.” (Kur’an, 90:1). Prvi i arhetipski izvor radikalizma jeste suprotstavljati Objavu slobodi, vjeru Objavi, religiju vjeri, etiku i obrede religiji i estetiku i politiku etici. Prvo što Bog dariva slobodi, da je ukrasi i upotpuni, jeste Objava. Dakle, kao što je sadržaj svake Objave Istina, tako je sloboda forma, oblik, okvir i način na koji se istina od Allaha u Objavi nudi. Prva supstanca, prvi sadržaj, prvo popunjenje, prva bit, srce i duša slobode jesu Objava i vjera utemeljena na njoj. Isključivi sadržaj Objave i vjere koji se nude u formi i šifri slobode jesu: istina, pravda, pravičnost, red, sistem, poredak, zakon, vrijednosti, principi, načela, kriteriji, kategorije, sudovi, dobro, uputa, opomena, savjet, lijek, putokaz, podstrek, motiv, cilj, svrha, i rješenje za čovjeka i ljude. Sloboda u svom čistom praiskonskom i primodijalnom

određenju jeste Božija forma, okvir, oblik i prostor kojoj se nadaje i spušta Objava, a Objava sa svojom istinom i uputom ispunjava i oplemenjuje prostor slobode. Sloboda je, ustvari, forma, oblik, okvir, prostor ili zrak života, a vjera je sadržaj, smisao i određenje života. Ono što je ljuska za jaje orah i lješnjik, koža za tijelo, tijelo za dušu, zrak, kiša, svjetlost, vrijeme i prostor za sva živa bića i stvorenja, to je sloboda za Objavu, vjeru, religiju, etiku, kulturu, pravo, politiku i estetiku. Bez slobode i Objava i vjera i religija i etika i kultura i pravo i politika i ustav i zakoni i estetika su mrtvi kapitali, duboko zakopani u zemlju, koje ljudi ne mogu pronaći ili ako ih i pronađu, ne mogu ih na pravi i od Boga određeni način promicati i svjedočiti. Zašto? Zato što bez slobode ni Objava, ni vjera, ni religija, ni obredi, ni etika, ni vjerozakon nemaju zraka za disanje i prostora za kretanje. Naglašavamo, istina je sadržaj i unutrašnja dimenzija Objave a sloboda je forma, okvir, prostor, ili vanjska dimenzija te iste Objave. Bez Objave i vjere koja slijedi iz nje, sloboda nikada nema istine i sadržaja ZA život nego sadržaj OD života, a bez slobode Objava i vjera nemaju forme, oblika, zraka, prostora i vanjske dimenzije. Zato je sloboda uvjet Objave, a Objava je sadržaj slobode, Objava je izvor istine i uvjet vjere, vjera je uvjet religije, religija je uvjet obreda, etike i kulture, a etika je uvjet politike i estetike. Istina utemeljena na religiji daje život svakoj kulturi, a laž izaziva smrt svake kulture. Svi međuljudski odnosi, veze i komunikacije počivaju na istini, a laž truje, razara i prekida odnose, veze i komunikacije među ljudima. U pravu je istina osnovna i najviša norma iznad koje više norme nema. Na istini počiva pravda kao temelj prava, pravičnosti, pravne zajednice i zdravog društva. Kako je govorio imam Ebu Hamid el-Gazali samo je istina lijepa, zato što je neprolazna, neizbrisiva, i neuništiva, a stvarnost ma koliko velika i raznolika, korisna je samo zato što je prolazna. Kako je primijetio Ibn Hazm ljudi mogu spaliti papire, knjige i dokumente, ali nikada ne mogu uništiti ideje na kojima život počiva. Objektivna historija čovječanstva prema Ogistu Kontu jeste historija ideja. Povijest svijeta i ljudstva za Hegela nije ništa drugo

nego kretanje svjetskog duha ka slobodi, u kome taj duh prolazi kroz tri doba: dječjačko, u kome je slobodan samo pojedinac, mladičko doba duha, u kome su slobodne grupe povlaštenih i odabranih ljudi i zrelo doba duha u kome su slobodni građani. Kao što je u fizici suština materije težina i zapremina, tako je za Hegela supstanca duha sloboda. Prema učenju religije vjera je sadržaj, cilj, smisao i vrijednost života a sloboda je prostor, okvir, forma, oblik i zrak života. Zato je prvi, osnovni, najteži i najopasniji izvor pojedinačnog, dualnog, posebnog (grupnog) i općeg (društvenog) radikalizma rastavljati i suprostavljati slobodu kao prostor, okvir, oblik i zrak života Objavi, koja preko istine, upute i vjere daje sadržaj, vrijednosti, cilj i smisao života. Bez slobode vjera nikada nema prostora i zraka, a bez vjere sloboda nikada nema sadržaja, cilja, smisla i vrijednosti. Oswald Spengler u "Propasti Zapada" primjećuje da se arhetip svake kulture nalazi u religiji i da je religija duša svake kulture. Bez obzira što je istina i vjera unutrašnja, a sloboda vanjska dimenzija Objave, ljudstvo današnjice kao pretežna većina živi dedždžalsko /jednodimenzionalno ili jednooko doba. Zapad od humanizma, nepobitno je i očigledno jer se to se odnosi na značajan broj ljudi, živi odsustvo objave, vjere, religije, vjerozakona, obreda, etike utemeljene na vjeri, a koja se neminovno pretače samo u bonton. Zapad živi odsustvo transcencije, metafizike i eshatologije. To neminovno vodi ka zaboravu Boga, zaboravu bitka, zaboravu sudbine, zaboravu beskonačnosti, zaboravu jedinstva svijeta i života, jer se zbiljom smatra samo ono što se izražava matematičkim formulama i provjerava eksperimentima u laboratorijama, zaboravu sadržaja, smisla, svrhe i cilja, svijeta i života koji prema Maksu Weberu daje samo religija, zaboravu onog višeg drugog svijeta i života, zaboravu bilo kakve nadnaravnosti i metafizičkog iskona i smisla života. To je sloboda od slobode sa stajališta sveukupne dimenzije unutrašnjeg života. Ona kao takva ima za posljedicu sve unutrašnje radikalizme: apoteozu (obogotvorenje), individualizma i egoizma, pozitivizma i scijentizma, pohlepe, gramzivosti, sebičnosti, požude i nagona. Mabli tvrdi da su ljudi postali slijepi

otkako su svojina i interesi spojeni sa zabludama. Izvor je raznih radikalizama, apsolutizacija privatnog vlasništva u ranom i čistom kapitalizmu i apsolutna negacija privatnog vlasništva putem eksproprijacije i nacionalizacije u takozvano društveno ili kolektivno vlasništvo bez titulara u čistom komunizmu. Za imovinu bez titulara Aristotel je ukratko odgovorio učitelju Platonu - "Što je svačije, to nije ničije". U društvima kolektivne ili zajedničke imovine glavni izazov ili problem nije krađa nego uništavanje imovine, zato što se ne smije po zakonu posjedovati. Glavni izazov, radikalizam i ekstremizam u kojima je privatno vlasništvo i imovina neupitnost, svetost i dio osnovnih prava jeste gramzivost, pohlepa i sebičnost. U abecedu sociološke teorije spada tvrdnja da se u razvijenim društvima i civilizacijama siromaštvo javlja i rađa iz izobilja i koncentracije kapitala kod pojedinaca i siromaštva kod većine. Objava islama – Kur'an naređuje: "U imovini imućnih svoje pravo (hakk) ima sirotinja, prosjaci i obespravljeni" (Kur'an, 70:24, 25). Sa stajališta islama nikada bogati ne daju, niti sirotinja, siromašni, siročad, obespravljeni i nesposobni primaju, nego imućni koji su svoju imovinu na halal (dozvoljen način stekli) u okviru imperativne i institucionalne saradnje, solidarnosti i potpomaganja, čiste i svoje vjerezakonske i društvene obaveze izvršavaju a sirotinja, siročad, obespravljeni, prosjaci i nemoćni svoja prava od Boga zagarrantovana ostvaruju. U svakom vremenu i bilo kojem narodu socijalna ili klasna polarizacija na većinu siromašnih i manjinu ekstra bogatih je plodno tlo za razne vrste radikalizama, pobuna i klasnih revolucija koje su trajale u devetnaestom i dvadesetom stoljeću. Suočen sa potocima krvi i hiljadama mrtvih glava, koje su bile rezultat i posljedica Francuske buržoaske političke revolucije 1789. godine Sen Simon će ustvrditi da je zakon vlasništva temeljni zakon socijalne zgrade. Zakon koji učvršćuje cjelinu ili privatnu imovinu jeste najvažniji od svih, ustvari je svojinski ustav i on je u stvarnosti baza društvene zgrade. Najveći izazov i najbitnije pitanje na koje mora odgovoriti svojinski ustav, u okviru socijalne pravde, saradnje i solidarnosti i potpomaganja, jeste – kako da prirodni resursi i blagodati postanu do-

bro i korist čitavog naroda. Dva su odgovora i izlaza. Prvi, ukidanje privatnog vlasništva putem ekproprijacije i nacionalizacije. To vodi u komunizam, a radikalizmi komunizma su parazitizam, uništavanje imovine i ubijanje ekonomskih motiva za rad i privređivanje. Drugi odgovor i izlaz koji nudi imovinski ustav i put kojim je krenuo kapitalizam sa ljudskim likom jeste zadržavanje i neprikosnovenost privatnog vlasništva uz strogu, sistemsku i sveobuhvatnu poresku politiku, tako da se preko ukupljenih poreza pomažu i izdržavaju nesposobne i neproizvodne kategorije stanovništva. Vratimo se islamu i muslimanima. Bez obzira što je islam sinteza i ravnoteža vjere i zakona u slobodi i bez obzira što je sloboda okvir i vanjska dimenzija objave, muslimani manje-više u čitavom svijetu žive u vanjskoj neslobodi. To je za muslimane sloboda od slobode sa stajališta sveukupne dimenzije vanjskog života. Pošto je bez slobode nemoguća politika, institucije, ustanove, red, poredak, sistem, znanost, civilizacija, to muslimani u odnosu na ostale narode svijeta žive nepolitički, nesistemski, neorganizirani, neznanstveni i negrađanski politički život. Na razini svjetskog duha, hegelijanski kazano – muslimanski politički duh, u okviru djelatnog bitka, jeste na razini dječijeg doba, to jest u političkom smislu u muslimanskom svijetu samo su pojedinci slobodni i politički djelatni. To znači da kod muslimana u punom kapacitetu ne funkcioniraju ni institucije, ni ustanove, ni organi, ni forum, ni sistemi, ni red, ni poredak. Gotovo sva vlast, norme, zakoni (iako muslimani vjeruju da je izvor, normi, zakona principa Bog) idu preko pojedinaca, i te nespojivosti do 2011. godine i događaja u Tunisu, Egiptu, Libiji, Jemenu, Bahreinu i Siriji nisu smetale muslimanima. Ni kada je u pitanju socijalna pravda muslimani ne obraćaju punu pažnju na Poslanikove riječi da je siromaštvo pola nevjerstva. Iako veliki broj ljudi na Zapadu vjeruju da su oni sami izvor normi bez Boga, u njih sve norme žive i održavaju se kroz institucije i ustanove. I to u zapadnom čovjeku razvija ogromnu normativnu svijest i kulturu. Bez obzira što muslimani vjeruju da je izvor normi Bog, zato što su im sve ustanove, organi, tijela, sistemi i

institucije u nedostatku javne građanske i političke slobode umrtvljene, nigdje u muslimanima u dovoljnoj mjeri nije razvijena normativna svijest i izvanjska kultura. Da bi se u ljudima kao ljudima razvijala normativna kultura, prvo se mora razvijati normativna svijest i odgovornost kod onih koji upravljaju, a da bi postojala normativna svijest kod onih koji upravljaju moraju u potpunim političkim kapacitetima funkcionirati ustanove, organi, tijela i institucije. U nedostatku političkih sloboda, nefunkcioniranju ustanova, institucija, tijela i organa, u nepostanju normativne svijesti kod funkcionera i normativne kulture kod naroda, neki muslimani posežu za dva radikalizma. Prvi postaju servilni i odani upravljačima kao pravi podanici, a nisu lojalni institucijama niti gledaju na duh i slovo zakona, nego na volju moćnika i upravljača. Drugi idu u vrstu ekstremnog radikalizma do nasilja i terora, gdje preko zacrtanog cilja ili ideala opravdavaju upotrebu svih, pa i nasilnih sredstava. Oni zaboravljaju da islam nije jezuitizam Ignacija Lojole, prema kojem cilj opravdava upotrebu svakog sredstva. Prema islamu istvoremeno mora biti na isti način valjan i cilj i sredstvo kojim se dolazi do cilja. Nema tog cilja i ideala do kojeg se može doći zabranjenim sredstvima. U tome se krije izazov i opasnost zaborava Boga. Zaborav Boga neminovno vodi čovjeka i ljude u prelaženje granica i ulaženje u polje zabrana. Prema Šerijatu ili osnovnom vjerezakonu islama, sve stvari su dozvoljene koje nisu zabranjene – haram ili suprotne sunnetu – mekruh. Sama riječ haram ima osnovna značenja: onoga što je Bog izričito zabranio, zatim svetost, neupitnost, nedodirljivost. Sa stajališta islama neupitni su: životi ljudi, vjera ljudi, um, razum i svijest ljudi. Zato islam zabranjuje alkohol, drogu i poroke. Zatim, neupitni su čast i dostojanstvo ljudi, imetak, potomstvo, pravo na rad i privređivanje, na kretanje, obrazovanje, nauku i spoznaju. Osnovna težnja i intencija zabrane u odnosima među ljudima, sa stajališta islama jeste da se nečinjenjem zabranjenog izbjegnu i spriječe loše i opasne posljedice po čovjeka i društvo u ovosvjetskoj i onosvjetskoj perspektivi, da se nečinjenjem zabranjenog zaštite prava, dobra i vrijednosti, ljudi jednih

od drugih. Neulaženjem u polje zabranjenog, čovjek čuva sebe od samog sebe, čuva druge od sebe i čuva sebe od drugih. Primjera radi, čovjek za koga je prostitucija zabrana – haram, nikada ni sebe ni druge ljude ni žene neće zaraziti ni triperom ni sifilisom, ni gonorejom, ni sidom. S druge strane, prostitucija, *ez-zina* dva insana u ontičkom smislu svodi samo na dva spolna organa kojima nije na umu ni potomstvo ni nastavak ljudske vrste. S treće strane gledano – sve kulture svijeta počivaju na robovanju Bogu, obredima i zabranama. Od deset Božijih zapovjedi u Starom zavjetu, sedam su zabrane: ne kuni se lažno, ne ubij, ne čini preljube, ne kradi, ne svjedoči lažno na bližnjega svoga, ne poželi žene bližnjega svoga i ne poželi imetka bližnjega svoga. Prema islamu ne smije se svjedočiti lažno na bilo koga, ne smije se željeti ničija žena osim svoje i ne smije se željeti ničiji imetak osim svoga. Postavlja se pitanje da li su svijet i život ljudi mogući bez ovih zabrana u Starom zavjetu i svim objavljenim knjigama? Da dodamo, životinjama zato što su životinje ništa se ne zabranjuje, ali one za razliku od ljudi nemaju kulturu. Današnji Zapad, u velikom broju živi život bez sadržaja, srčike i jezgre slobode, to jest bez vjere i etike a muslimani bez forme, okvira, prostora i zraka vjere, to jest bez slobode. Kao što muslimani ne znaju šta će sa slobodom ako im se dopusti, sa politikom, naukom, civilizacijom, ustanovama, sistemom, pravnim redom i poretkom, tako Zapad ne zna šta će sa vjerom, etikom i vrijednostima, iako imaju institucije, jer sve se relativizira. Dok Zapad živi život u slobodi bez Božijih normi sa zemaljskim institucijama i politikom, muslimani žive život bez slobode, politike, reda, sistema, poretka i zemaljskih formi. Život bez formi i oblika ili utvrđene procedure je neizvjestan, težak i nepredvidiv. Dakle, Zapad ne živi vjeru i etiku utemeljenu na njoj, a muslimani ne žive slobodu i politiku utemeljenu na njoj. Zato pokvarenjacima i demagozima nije teško plašiti muslimane zapadnim slobodama, politikom, demokratijom, ustanovama i institucijama, a zapadnjake islamskom vjerom i etikom. A radi se, ustvari, samo o unutrašnjoj i vanjskoj dimenziji Objave – vjeri i slobodi. To i jeste posao i vrijeme za Dedždžala

– jednodimenzionalnog čovjeka, da plaši ljude jedne drugima sa unutrašnjom i vanjskom dimenzijom Objave. Radikalizacija čovjeka je nemoguća dok se on ne svede samo na jednu dimenziju pa se onda kaže: čovjek je samo biće vjere, religije, konfesije, roda, bratstva, plemena, naroda, nacije, rase, zemlje, kontinenta, jezika, kulture, emocija, osjećanja, sjećanja, pamćenja, razuma, uma, pameti, svijesti, savjesti, morala, etike, politike, rada, prakse, društvene prozivodnje, osjetila, percepcije, apercpcije, imaginacije, mašte, vizije, artikuliranog govora, biće upravljanja, rukovođenja, vladanja, samosvijesti, instikata, strasti, požuda, poroka, invencije, inovacije, kreacije, intuicije, i biće zajednice i društva. To su samo odlike, karakteristike i pojavne manifestacije kod čovjeka i ljudi koje kod raznih naroda, u različitim vremenima i na raznim mjestima, manje ili više dolaze do izražaja, a nisu osnovne i bitne odrednice i suština čovjeka. Čovjek je u biti Božije stvorenje. Stvoren je da živi u zajednici i društvu sa tim darovanim odlikama. Tvrđnje unazad tri stoljeća da je čovjek ponajprije ili čak samo biće osjetila, uma, razuma, volje i društvene prakse kroz rad i biće instikata, poroka i strasti nije označilo nikakav iskorak i uzdignuće čovjeka, nego apoteozu osjetila, razuma, uma, volje, poroka i strasti. Kad se čovjek svede samo na bilo koji pojedinačni dar i odliku: vjeru, religiju, etiku, um, razum, i osjetila on se ne razvija i ne oplemenjuje nego pitbulizira. U okviru sociološko-političke analize pojave radikalizma, posebno među muslimanima, nužno se osvrnuti na fenomen vlasti, moći i upravljanja s jedne i politike s druge strane. Prvo, vlast moć i upravljanje su mnogo stariji, dublji i trajniji od politike. Vlast je bila, sada jeste i uvijek će biti vladanje, upravljanje i rukovođenje, ponajprije nad ljudima ali i nad drugim stvorenjima. Draž i slast vlasti iskazuje se samo nad ljudima. Od najgoreg oblika vlasti jedino je gori oblik potpunog bezvlašća ili anarhije. Imami Šafija je kazao da je godina bezvlašća po posljedicama teža i gora od 67 godina diktature. S druge strane, vlast je moć nad ljudima i ona brzo postaje kvarna i kvari ljude. Zato vlast koja valja mora biti ograničena i kontrolisana. Vlast se prvo ograničava usta-

vom i zakonom. Što ustav, zakon kao i nauka imaju manje etničkih, nacionalnih, rasnih, ideoloških i partijskih očiju oni bolje vide. Drugo, vlast se ograničava i kontrolira podjelom vlasti na zakonodavnu, sudsku i izvršnu. Tako zakonodavna vlast donosi zakone, predstavlja sve građane u vlasti i kontroliše izvršnu vlast. U većini muslimanskih zemalja ta se podjela ne uočava. Treće, vlast se ograničava i kontrolira balansom, to jest neprikosnovenom autonomijom i ravnotežom između zakonodavne, sudske i izvršne vlasti. Ni jedan od ogranaka vlasti nisu jedan drugom ni nadređeni ni podređeni nego sve njih kroz ustav i zakon objedinjava isti ustavnopravni poredak. Nažalost, malo je muslimana kod kojih postoji i funkcionira balans vlasti. To ima za rezultat i posljedicu razne izme i radikalizme. Četvrto, provjera vlasti se najtemeljitije vrši na javnim, slobodnim i demokratskim izborima. U kojim muslimanskim zemljama, postoje javni, slobodni i demokratski izbori, i u kojima to žene uopće imaju pravo političkog glasa? Umjesto toga u nekima od tih zemalja, desetljećima vlada vanredno stanje. Zar ta elementarna politička činjenica, koja puno ne smeta Zapadu, nije podloga za politički radikalizam i ekstremizam? Peto, neprestanu političku kvalifikovanu kontrolu vlasti vrši politička opozicija koja je neprestani politički korektiv vlasti i kritičko-političko oko građanske javnosti. Šesto, odmah iza opozicije slijedi, ne bilo koja nego politička i kritička javnost. Javnosti u jednoj zemlji nema bez povjerenja vlasti u građane i bez zakonitosti, proceduralnosti, objektivnosti i transparentnosti rada od strane vlasti. Za kritičku, političku javnost, pojedinačno najbitniji su intelektualci koji su advokati istine i promicatelji općeg dobra. Pored intelektualaca u kontroli i provjeri vlasti ulogu imaju i sve vrste medija: printani, elektronski i tv, ali i sektor civilnog društva i sve nevladine organizacije. Nažalost, u muslimanskim zemljama politička opozicija se smatra neprijateljem, otvoreni, slobodni i kritični mediji nemaju mogućnosti i prostora za rad, a intelektualci, koji kritički promatraju društvo, smatraju se ili budalama ili izdajnicima ili stranim plaćenicima. Dakle, kod muslimanskih naroda radi se ponajprije i ponajviše o

političkim krizama. Prema Aminu Malufu u knjizi “Poremećenost svijeta” radi se o strukturalnoj krizi čovječanstva. “Svijetom je zavladao velika poremećenost i to u više područja istovremeno: intelektualna poremećenost, finansijska poremećenost, klimatska poremećenost, etička poremećenost.” Ako nastavimo pratiti Malufa – poremećeno je i pet osnovnih odnosa na kojima insistra Konfučije: poremećeni su odnosi između vladara i naoroda, oca i sina, muža i žene, između starijeg i mlađeg i odnosi između prijatelja. Poremećeni su odnosi između slobode i odgovornosti. Ljudi hoće slobodu a neće odgovornost. Za Hegela je sloboda spoznata nužnost, to jest istovremeno i odgovornost. Naučnici hoće slobodu istraživanja bez granica a neće nikakvu odgovornost za posljedice svojih rezultata. Ipak, granice slobode su granice odgovornosti. Dokle su ljudi slobodni, dotle su odgovorni. Poremećeni su odnosi između mogućnosti i dužnosti. Ljudi žele neograničene mogućnosti, a sve manje žele konkretne dužnosti. Granice mogućnosti su granice dužnosti. Poremećeni su i odnosi između znanja i neznanja. Ljudi današnjice imaju umišljaj da sve znaju. Sokrat je tvrdio da je kvalitet njegovog znanja da je spoznao da zna da ne zna. Dakle, granice znanja su granice neznanja. Evo kako tu poremećenost iskazuje pjesnik Vilijam Karlos Vilijams: “Čovjek je dosada preživio zato što je bio previelika neznalica. Sada kada može da ih ostvari, on mora da ih promijeni ili da pogine.” Sa stajališta vjere, nauka opisuje svijet i život a religija propisuje život, dariva vrijednosti i određuje teleolos, svrhu, cilj i smisao života. Poremećenost svijeta nastaje kada religija pođe opisivati život i davati sredstva života a kada nauka pođe propisivati život, određivati vrijednosti, svrhu i smisao života. Poremećeni su odnosi između prava i obaveza. Većina traži svoja zamišljena prava bez ikakvog razmišljanja o obavezama. Granice prava su granice obaveza. U protivnom radi se o milostinjii, krađi ili nasilju. Prava ljudi su u granicama njihovih obaveza. Poremećeni su odnosi između etike i estetike. Po svaku cijenu hoće se biti lijep, zgodan i privlačan. Granica etike mora biti granica estetike. U protivnom estetika će završiti u pornografiji, snobizmu, šundu i

kiču. Poremećeni su u najvećoj mogućoj mjeri i odnosi između etike i politike. Evo šta Kant primjećuje na relaciji etika - politika, citiram: “Istinska politika, dakle, ne može da učini ni jedan korak, a da se prije toga ne pokori moralu. I mada je politika sama za sebe teška vještina, njeno sjedinjenje sa moralom je nikakva vještina. Jer moral presijeca čvor koji politika ne može da riješi čim nije s njim u saglasnosti”. Koliko je Kant u pravu (mada je Napoleon tvrdio Hegelu da je politika zamijenila sudbinu), najbolje se vidi na primjeru ovovremene Grčke. Grčku od bankrota nije spasila ni ekonomija ni privreda, ni politika, nego solidarnost, odnosno etika unutar Evropske unije. Poremećeni su odnosi između znanja, tehnike i informacije s jedne i spoznaje s druge strane više nego ikada. Hegel naglašava kako ono što nam je poznato *bekannt* (na arapskom *ilm*) nije i ne mora biti spoznato – *erkannt* (na arapskom *mearifa*). Nikada kao danas ljudi nisu više znali, a manje spoznavali stvarnost. To je izazov radikalizma kod ljudi pa i kod muslimana. Šta znači poznavanje stvarnosti preko tv ekrana i nerazumijevanje naroda, kultura i identiteta primjećuje Amin Malauf u “Poremećenosti svijeta” na stranici 27: “Svako kruži svojom orbitom pred svojom publikom, koja ga razumije u pola riječi i koja ne čuje protivnički govor. Ja bih ipak morao zbog svog porijekla, zbog svog životnog puta, da se pozivam na obje ove orbite (zapadnu i muslimansku) u isti mah, ali svakim danom se osjećam pomalo dalje i od jedne i od druge.” Ustvari, tehnika i tehnologija današnjice, omogućava svim ljudima da gledaju iste slike u isto vrijeme, ali oni gledaju – a ne vide, ili vide različite i nepomirljive slike. Poslije kraha komunizma, raspada Sovjetskog saveza i nestanka Varšavskog pakta, Evropa je duboko zaglibila u krizu. Došlo je do gubljenja repera ili prepoznatljivih konekcija te su Evropa, Afrika i Azija u krizi identiteta, a SAD i muslimanske zemlje iz različitih razloga i na različite načine nalaze se u krizi legitimeteta.

Suma summarum, svijet preživljava i živi krizu svih poznatih i priznatih formi, likova i oblika života. Iz života se u očaju srlja u

uživanje, a iz uživanja se nepovratno srlja u izivljavanje ili perverziju (pedofilija, homoseksualizam, droga). Ljudi se uopšte više ne svađaju i ne tuku nego se samo bez riječi i razloga ubijaju. U ekonomiji i privredi istovremeno nastupa: recesija, restrikcija, inflacija, deflacija, stagflacija, propadanje firmi, gubljenje radnih mjesta, nezaposlenost i opća nesigurnost. Kriza prema priznanju jednog od prvaka EU izaziva strah u ljudima. Oduvijek se zna da strah, strast, porok, nagon, požuda i interes izvana itekako moćno utječu i određuju ponašanje ljudi. Neutemeljen strah, ukoliko je čovjek usamljen a narod izoliran, lahko prelazi u autarhiju i zatvaranje do autizma. Iz takvog straha, potpomognutog finansijskom krizom, stopom nezaposlenih i brojem svakim danom otpuštenih sa posla, krizom zaštite čovjekove okoline, globalizacijom, sve slabijim obrazovanjem, sveukupna u svim likovima kriza civilizacije u kojoj se muslimani najsporije i najslabije snalaze, brzo i lahko se razvija u misao i ideju: pakao – to su drugi, zlo – to su drugi i opasnost – to su drugi. U strahu sličnosti prelaze u razlike, razlike u suprotnosti, suprotnosti u isključivosti, isključivosti, ukoliko se na temelju ustava i zakona institucionalno ne rješavaju, prerastaju u sukobe. To su sve podloge za razne izme, radikalizme i ekstremizme. Kada se estetika potpuno otkaçi od etike ona se, usljed konkurencije, sa estetike spušta na reklamu, sa reklame na pornografiju, a pornografija, htjeli – ne htjeli, željeli – ne željeli, na prostituciju. Jedan od oblika poremećenosti među ljudima jeste svoditi osnovne odnose među ljudima i narodima na dominaciju, asimilaciju, segregaciju, diskriminaciju i aparthejd. Nemali broj muslimana imaju mišljenje ili umišljaj da su podvrgnuti dominaciji, asimilaciji, diskriminaciji, segregaciji, a u pojedinim dijelovima svijeta, kao npr. u Gazi, i aparthejdu. Tih pet krivih i neispravnih odnosa među ljudima izazivaju kao reakciju radikalizam i pobunu. Umjesto takvih odnosa mora se zagovarati priznanje među ljudima i narodima, koegzistencija, integracija, akulturacija i tolerancija. Jedan od oblika poremećenosti svijeta i odnosa među ljudima jeste teorija faktora: te priroda, te geografija, te demografija, te biologija, te

psiha presudno formiraju i determiniraju društvene odnose, procese i pojave ili klasni princip i odnos dominira svijetom, rasni princip i odnos dominira svijetom, kapitalistička okupacija, dominacija i eksploatacija je kriva za sve probleme svijeta, masonsko-židovska zavjera generira većinu problema u svijetu, na sceni je poslije sukoba blokova, sukob civilizacija i kultura utemeljenih na različitim religijama i od 11. septembra 2001. godine kao glavni problem svijeta nastupa islamski fundamentalizam, ekstremizam, revivalizam i terorizam. Pri tome se malo ko ozbiljno osvrće na stvarno stanje u islamskim zemljama i među muslimanskim narodima. Od ideološko-političkih istina, konstrukcije i projekcije stanja u tim zemljama malo ko može dokučiti da se u tim zemljama nalazi najveći broj i procenat izbjeglica u svijetu, da te zemlje i narodi spadaju u najsiromašnije zemlje svijeta, da su u tim zemljama najveće stope nezaposlenih, nepismenih i neškolovanih ljudi. Da u malom broju od tih zemalja postoji podjela vlasti na ustavnu, zakonodavnu i izvršnu, da je vlast ograničena ustavom i zakonom da postoji balans vlasti, da postoji provjera i kontrola vlasti preko redovnih izbora, preko opozicije, preko javnosti, preko medija i intelektualaca. Sve ove okolnosti su plodno tlo za razne izme i radikalizme koji se ne mogu ničim opravdati. Mali broj dobronamjernih ljudi u svijetu postavlja pitanje kako su to muslimanske zemlje sa bogatim prirodnim resursima i siromašnim stanovništvom u većini. Sve su to pitanja koja traže odgovore, a ne ideološke pamflete i etikete. Muslimanski narodi neupitno i neopozivo jesu krivi za stanje u kome se nalaze, ali ne samo oni, nego i drugi koji su na bilo koji način doveli do tog stanja. Ali kriza ili poremećenost svijeta je strukturalna i sveobuhvatna. To je kriza počupanih repera ili izgubljenih identiteta i upropaštenih legitimiteta. Evo kako tu krizu 1934. godine naslućuje Tomas Eliot u pjesmi Stijena: "Gdje je život koji smo izgubili u življenju? Gdje je mudrost koju smo izgubili u znanju? I gdje je znanje koje smo izgubili u informaciji? Ciklusi neba u dvadeset vjekova udaljuju nas od Boga i približavaju prašini."

Fikret Karčić

**ALTERNATIVNE MUSLIMANSKE
GRUPE IZMEĐU ŠERIJATA I
SEKULARNOG PRAVA**

U ovom tekstu razmatramo odnos muslimanskih alternativnih grupa u BiH prema Šerijatu i sekularnom pravu. Pod "alternativnim grupama" se podrazumijevaju različite grupe koje se zasnivaju na određenom tumačenju islama a djeluju izvan institucionalnog okvira Islamske zajednice. Ove grupe su raznolike, kako po ideološkoj orijentaciji, tako i prema načinu djelovanja. Tema kao što je ova zahtijeva detaljno istraživanje na terenu. Bez toga ćemo na ovom mjestu dati samo neke opšte naznake i ilustracije.

Šerijat predstavlja islamski normativni sistem i funkcionalni izraz islama. U tom smislu može se reći da nema aktuelizacije islama bez Šerijata. Jedino je pitanje kakvo tumačenje dati Šerijatu i na koji način ga primjenjivati. Šerijat obuhvata propise religijskog, moralnog i pravnog karaktera. Prevođenje ovog termina sintagmom "islamsko pravo" obuhvata samo pravni aspekt Šerijata. Izvori šerijatskih normi su *Kur'an*, prema muslimanskom vjerovanju objavljena Božija riječ, *Sunnet*, normativna praksa Muhammeda a.s., *idžma* ili konsenzus muslimanskih učenjaka o određenom šerijatskom pitanju, *kijas* ili zaključivanje po analogiji, *adet* ili običaj itd. Nauka koje se bavi šerijatskim propisima naziva se *Fikh*. Koristeći se terminologijom komparativnog religijskog prava možemo reći da u cjelini normi Šerijata postoje norme Božanskog prava (*ius divinum*), sadržane i izvedene iz Objave, i ljudskog prava (*ius humanum*), izvedene iz korištenja razuma i društvenih konvencija (kao što je *kijas*, *idžma*, *adet*). Šerijatske norme upućene su pojedincima, grupama muslimana (*džema'at*) i državi. Na primjer, na pojedince i grupe odnose se propisi obredoslovlja (*ibadat*), dok je država adresat normi koje se odnose na javno pravo (krivično pravo i sl.). Šerijat i fikh u islamu uporedivi su sa konceptom religijskog prava *Halakha* u jevrejstvu i, u određenom smislu, sa kanonskim pravom u kršćanstvu.

Pored Šerijata u muslimanskoj historiji se vrlo rano javila jedna nova vrsta propisa koja se naziva *kanun*. Ovaj termin, grčkog porijekla, ušao je u terminologiju prava Bliskog Istoka s prodorom helenskih tradicija, a u arapski jezik i državno-pravnu praksu u vrijeme prvih

muslimanskih osvajanja u Egiptu i Siriji. U prvo vrijeme kanuni su označavali propise koji su se odnosili na finansijsko-pravno područje, uporedo sa perzijskim nazivima *destur* i *avaradž*. Od vremena kasnijih Abasija (od polovine 4/10 vijeka) termin *kanun* koristi se u značenju pravnih propisa koje izdaje nosilac svjetovne moći. To su propisi koje su izdavali muslimanski vladari na osnovu svog političkog autoriteta, a odnosili su se na pitanja koja nisu precizno regulisana izvorima Šerijata, kao što su organizacija države, vojske, poreza, vlasništva nad zemljištom i sl. Teoretičar šerijatskog prava El-Maverdi (u. 449./1057.) priznao je legitimnost sekularne moći sultana radi primjene Šerijata i očuvanja muslimanske zajednice. Kanuni su posebno izdvani u Osmanskoj državi, gdje su kodifikovani u obliku zbornika koji se nazivaju *kanunname*. Kanuni su načelno bili usaglašeni sa Šerijatom ali se u praksi dešavala da kanuni idu i mimo Šerijata. Može se reći da je Šerijat bio usko vezan za Hilafet, kao ustanovu vjersko-političkog vođstva muslimana, a kanun za sultanat, kao ustanovu političke moći koja se javila sa slabljenjem hilafeta.

Prema tome, historija poznaje dvije komponente pravnih sistema muslimanskih zemalja – pravo izvedeno iz Šerijata i sekularne propise muslimanskih vladara. Ovo je veoma važno naglasiti, jer se uobičajeno predstavlja da je pravni sistem muslimanskih zemalja u prošlosti bio isključivo izveden iz Šerijata.

U toku kolonizacije muslimanskog svijeta, od 16. do 19. vijeka, u oblastima života gdje su važili sekularni propisi muslimanskih vladara uvedeni su sekularni propisi evropskih država. Umjesto *kanuna* muslimanskih vladara uvedeni su *kanuni* evropskih država. Na taj način, u većini muslimanskih zemalja primjena šerijatskih propisa je svedena na oblast ličnog statusa (pravna sposobnost, brak, porodica, nasljeđivanje, muslimanske fondacije) dok su ostale oblasti regulisane recipiranim evropskim pravom.

Ovakav razvoj historije nisu priznali pripadnici različitih puritanskih pokreta koji se javljaju u muslimanskoj historiji. Jedan od takvih

pokreta su oni koji se identifikuju kao *selefi* a koji ne priznaju nikakav normativni značaj historiji nakon prve tri generacije muslimana (*es-selef es-salih*). Za njih je cjelokupna muslimanska historija nakon perioda tri prve generacije muslimana udaljavanje od islamskih uzora, uvođenje “novotarija” (*bid’at*) i opšta degradacija. Ove grupe su negirale a njihovi izdanci danas negiraju legitimitet *kanuna* muslimanskih vladara, kasnije recepiranog evropskog prava i sekularnog prava savremenih država gdje žive muslimani. Prema tome, grupe u BiH koje se na ekstremnan način naslanjaju na ovu ideologiju mogu zauzeti negativan stav prema sekularnom pravu i državi, kako će se to kasnije vidjeti iz nekih primjera.

S druge strane, Islamska zajednica u BiH je nakon prestanka osmanske vlasti priznala legitimitet državno-pravnog sistema Austro-Ugarske. Glavni argument za to bilo je garantovanje temeljnih ljudskih prava muslimana i važenje šerijatskog prava u domenu ličnog statusa muslimana u vrijeme Austro-Ugarske. Na osnovu toga je argumentovano u religijsko-pravnim traktatima kao što je *Rasprava o hidžri* M. T. Azapagića (1884) i fetvama (pravim mišljenjima) uleme tog doba da je BiH u vrijeme Austro-Ugarske vlasti *dar el-islam* (“kuća islama”), da su njeni zakoni legitimni, da je dužnost muslimana da im se pokoravaju i da muslimani ne treba da se sele iz takve zemlje. Pošto se pravno ista situacija nastavila i u vrijeme Kraljevine Jugoslavije ostala je ista šerijatsko-pravna kvalifikacija. U socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji ukinuta je primjena šerijatskog prava putem šerijatskih sudova, ali je Islamska zajednica prihvatila legitimnost države, državnih propisa i legitimnost života u novoj situaciji. Međutim, problem je bio u tome što ova situacija nije bila šerijatsko-pravno obrazložena. Jedan od rijetkih izuzetaka u teorijskom bavljenju ovim pitanjem je članak ovog autora pod naslovom “Značenje i iskazivanje islama u svjetovnoj državi” (*Takvim*, 1989, str.71-80), te nastavak bavljenja ovom temom u radu “Islam u sekularnoj državi: primjer BiH” (*Zbornik radova naučnog skupa “Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka: izvori, razvoj, institucije i perspektive”*, Sarajevo,

2008, str. 423-436). Druga pitanja kao što su legitimitet sekularnih zakona i demokratskih procedura u modernoj državi, nisu bila predmet detaljnog teorijskog bavljenja i islamske legitimizacije. Nove institucije i praksa su prihvaćeni faktičkim putem, normativnim aktima Zajednice i što je, najvažnije, u praksi bosanskih muslimana kao nešto što je neupitno. Na to prihvatanje ukazuju i odgovori na pitanja čitalaca koji su objavljivani u publikacijama Islamske zajednice ali ti kratki i, nekada, usputni odgovori ipak nisu bili teorijska šerijatsko-pravna elaboracija tako važnih pitanja.

Tako je bilo sve dok se u posljednjih dvadeset godina nisu pojavile nove ideološke tendencije na islamskoj sceni u BiH. Pojedinci i grupe, obrazovani u islamskim naukama uglavnom na Bliskom istoku, bez poznavanja humanističkih i društvenih nauka, historije BiH i kretanja u savremenom svijetu počeli su nekritički da prenose mišljenja i tumačenja sa Bliskog istoka, među njima i ekstremističke poglede koji negiraju legitimitet sekularnih država i sekularnog prava. Glavni referentni okvir takvih krugova su jednostrana i ahistorijska, nekada tradicionalistička ili predmoderna tumačenja Šerijata. Na taj način počela je da se unosi zabuna među muslimane u BiH, koji su istraumatizirani agresijom na njihovu domovinu i genocidom koji je protiv njih počinjen. Ovakva tendencija, ma koliko bila malobrojna za sada, ne treba se prenaabregavati zbog potencijalno devastirajućih posljedica po bosanske muslimane, kako u domovini tako i u dijaspori, te perspektivu njihove domovine. Ova tendencija je tim prije opasna što se krije pod krinkom “pravog islama” i uleme školovane na “izvoru”. Na kraju, po samoj definiciji ekstremna shvatanja su manjinska shvatanja i njihova malobrojnost ne bi trebalo da bude razlog njihovog zanemariivanja. Širenje ovakvih ideja vrši se većinom preko interneta i predavanja “daija” (misionara).

Za ilustraciju ove tendencije uzećemo nekoliko pitanja i odgovora koja se mogu naći na određenim internet stranicama. Te stranice su na bosanskom jeziku, nisu nužno administrirane iz BiH, a među po-

sjetiocima imaju lica i iz BiH ili bošnjačke dijaspore. Za stanje duha nekih bosanskih muslimana, većinom “ponovo rođenih” nakon 1992., karakteristična su pitanja koja pitaju. Za stanje duha “nove uleme” karakteristični su odgovori koje daju.

Na web stranici <http://www.essunne.com/Fetve-uleme> (pristupljeno 07. 06. 2011.) nalazi se pitanje “Da li je dozvoljeno stajanje ispred bilo koje državne zastave ili grba, veličajući ih na taj način”?

Pitanje je popraćeno ilustracijom zastave BiH i fotografijom pripadnika Oružanih snaga BiH koji stoje u stroju ispred državne zastave. Odgovor koji je dat glasi:

“Muslimanu nije dozvoljeno da stoji ispred bilo koje državne zastave ni grba veličajući ih, jer je to pokuđena i nova stvar u vjeri koja nije bila za vrijeme Poslanika, sallallahu alejhi ve sellem, niti je bila za vrijeme četvorice pravednih halifa (vladara) – neka je Allah, dželle šanuhu, zadovoljan njima...”

Na kraju slijedi bilješka da je to fetva Stalne komisije za fetve i naučne studije. Ako je ova bilješka tačna, onda se radi o tijelu za tumačenje islama u Saudijskoj Arabiji. Ne znamo da li je ovo tumačenje prihvaćeno od strane državnih organa zemlje u kojoj je izdato ali znamo i opšte poznata je stvar da sve države imaju svoje državne simbole a njihovo poštovanje je stvar međunarodnih uzusa i civilizovanih odnosa u svijetu.

Na istoj web stranici nalazimo i sljedeće pitanje: “Da li po Šerijatu dozvoljeno da radim kod advokata kao sekretar?” U odgovoru se, između ostalog kaže: “... A što se tiče posla advokata u laičkim državama njegov propis je sljedeći: Nije dozvoljeno ukoliko se (advokat) veže za određene zakone i sisteme koji su oprečni Šerijatu.”

Zakoni sekularnih država se označavaju kao “laički, džahilski (oni koji pripadaju dobu prije islama – op. FK) zakoni”.

Na istoj web stranici nalazi se i sljedeće pitanje: “Može li pojedinac ili grupa uzeti u svoje ruke da sprovodi Šerijat u svome mjestu, gradu ili

državi kao što je BiH”? Autor potpisan kao “Ebu Amina” odgovara da uspostava Šerijata nije kratak proces, da je sada vrijeme da’ve (misije – op. FK), da treba izbjegavati krive poteze, te zaključuje:

“Ne može se i nemoguće je doći do Allahovog zakona ljudskim zakonima, jer se time Allahova knjiga baca u stranu i kao da se želi reći (Allahov zakon nije trenutno za primjenu zbog ovog ili onog razloga. On je krnjav nego sad je vrijeme da mi izmislimo zakone jer smatramo da je to bolji i lakši put da dođemo do Šerijata). Ovo je šejtanova obmana.”

Na web stranici <http://www.el-asr.com/pitanje> (pristupljeno 07. 06. 2011.) odgovara se na pitanje da li je dozvoljeno izaći na izbore i glasati (npr. kod nas u Bosni). U odgovoru se nadugo raspravlja o ovom pitanju i na osnovu “mišljenja većine selefijskih učenjaka današnjice” daje odgovor koji se može svesti na to da je glasanje dozvoljeno, stvar idžtihada (slobodnog mišljenja – op. FK) svakog muslimana i “nužno zlo”.

Na istoj stranici nalazi se i sljedeće pitanje “Boravim u jednoj evropskoj kjafirskoj državi već duže vremena i sada imam priliku da steknem državljanstvo te države. Time bih dobio mnogo veća prava nego što ih inače imam, a svakako živim ovdje sa porodicom i planiram još ostati. Pa da li mi je dozvoljeno da uzmem to državljanstvo?” Dakle, neko ko očigledno uživa blagostanje i gostoprimstvo “evropske kjafirske države” ima dileme oko toga je li muslimanu dopušteno da bude i državljanin te države.

Slijedi odgovor koji nadugo i naširoko razmatra pitanje šta je državljanstvo, iznose se stavovi različitih arapsko-muslimanskih autora o ovom pitanju (osim autora iz BiH) i na kraju zaključuje:

“Prema tome, radžih (odabrano) mišljenje po ovom pitanju je da je osnova u uzimanju državljanstva od kjafirske države zabrana iz čega se izuzimaju muslimanske manjine i stanja prinude. Na ovo upućuju jasni i nedvosmisleni dokazi gore spomenuti. S druge strane, koristi

koji se ostvaruju uzimanjem državljanstva se ne mogu ni u kojem smislu porediti sa negativnim posljedicama po vjeru i dunjaluk same osobe i njegove porodice. A Allah zna najbolje”.

Na kraju jedan primjer sa web stranice “Muslimanske omladine Norrköping” (grad u Švedskoj – op. FK) adrese <http://www.n-um.com> (pristupljeno 07. 06. 2011.), pitanje broj 176 pod naslovom “Studiranje prava i bavljenje advokaturom”.

Pitanje glasi: “Esselamu alejkum, je li dozvoljeno da se u Danskoj studira pravo/jura (znači sve po njihovim pravilima/zakonima) da se bude advokat ili jurista?”

Odgovor je dao izvjesni mr. Zijad Ljakić a on se može sažeti u sljedećem:

“A što se tiče onih koji studiraju Pravni fakultet, odnosno fakultet na kome se izučavaju ljudski izmišljeni zakoni, kao i onih koji poučavaju druge ovoj nauci, oni se mogu podijeliti u tri skupine.

Prva skupina: onaj koji studira izmišljene ljudske zakone (Pravni fakultet) ili poučava istom kako bi spoznao njihovu suštinu, ili kako bi utvrdio prednost šerijatskih propisa u odnosu na njih, ili kako bi se okoristio od tih zakona u onome što nije oprečno Šerijatu, u tome nema smetnje niti onome ko studira niti onome ko predaje...”

“Druga skupina: onaj ko studira izmišljene zakone (Pravni fakultet) ili poučava istom kako bi se presudjivalo po njima ili kako bi druge pomagao u tome, uz istovremeno čvrsto vjerovanje da je zabranjeno suditi po onome što Allah nije objavio, međutim na ovo ga navela njegova strast ili ljubav prema imetku ili dunjaluku. Šerijatski status ove skupine je da su oni veliki grješnici, u njihovim djelima je kufr (nevjerovanje – op. FK), zulum (nasilje – op. FK) i fisk (griješenje – op. FK)...” Pisac odgovora ipak priznaje da to ne izvodi iz vjere.

“Treća skupina: Onaj ko studira izmišljene ljudske zakone (Pravni fakultet) ili poučava istom ohalaljujući (proglašavajući dozvoljenim – op. FK) suđenje po njima svjedeno bio uvjeren da je Šerijat bolji ili ne

bio uvjeren u to. Propis ove skupine je da su sa ovim izašli iz islama po idžmau učenjaka. Jer obaveza suđenja po onome što je Allah objavio je nužno poznata stvar u islamu, pa onaj ko ohalali da se sudi po nečemu mimo onoga što je Allah objavio potpada pod propis onoga ko ohalali zinaluk, alkohol, kamatu i slično a što je djelo koje izvodi iz islama po idžmau učenjaka”.

Možemo samo zamisliti kakvu viziju života muslimana na Zapadu vide ovakvi “tumači” te kakvo je njihovo znanje o državama i pravima zapadnih zemalja od kojih mogu “ohalaliti” primanje socijalne pomoći i azil ali ne i njihove “izmišljene ljudske zakone”.

Na osnovu ovih primjera može se zaključiti da se i na islamskoj alternativnoj sceni u BiH i dijaspori javljaju esktrernna mišljenja o tome da je islam nespojiv sa sekularnom državom i sekularnim pravom. Pri tome se koristi prepoznatljiviji vokabular ekstremističkih grupa sa Bliskog istoka o *džahilijskim* zakonima, *tagutu* (idolopoklonski, nasilnički autoritet – op. FK) i njegovim sudovima, “izmišljenim ljudskim zakonima” (rogobatni prevod sintagme *el-kanun el-vad'i*, što znači sekularno, pozitivno pravo) itd.

Kako treba reagovati Islamska zajednica na ovaj izazov?

Po našem mišljenju na dva načina:

1. Kontinuirano i sistematski pratiti kretanja na planu tumačenje islama među bosanskim muslimanima u zemlji i dijaspori. Pravovremeno davati naučno utemeljene odgovore na pitanja koja se javljaju i djelovati autoritetom znanja (*ilm*) i graditi takav ugled u očima muslimana. Uzeti ova pitanja kao prioritet i napustiti dosadašnju paradigmu fokusiranja na politiku u BiH i ono za što se nema legitimitet i što nije poslanje Islamske zajednice (kao što je bavljenje nacionalnim pitanjima Bošnjaka i izgradnjom nacionalnih institucija).
2. Teorijskom elaboracijom važnih pitanja kao što je odnos muslimana prema svjetovnom pravu, građanstvu, demokratskom

ISLAMSKA SCENA U BIH

procesu i sl. što treba da bude prioritet islamskih naučno-obrazovnih ustanova.

Na taj način bi se suzio prostor za nekompetentno tumačenje islamskih propisa ili nekritičko prenošenje ekstremnih tumačenja na bosanskohercegovački i evropski prostor, smanjile ili eliminisale potencijalne negativne posljedice takvih tumačenja po interese muslimana u BiH i Evropi i ojačao autoritet Islamske zajednice u BiH.

Dževad Hodžić

**RELIGIJA I POLITIKA U
SEKULARNOM DRUŠTVU**

Uvodne napomene

1. Svaki od četiri pojma sadržana u naslovu naše teme su povijesno relativni, sociološki i teološki višeznačni i kulturno otvoreni. Do nesporazuma, krivih razumijevanja i pogrešnih rezultata često dolazi upravo i samo zbog toga što različiti sudionici, različite strane u dijalogu pod istim pojmovima podrazumijevaju različite sadržaje. Sporazumijevanje biva izgubljeno u prevodenju. Pa, ipak ovdje nećemo ići za tim da se sistematskim i detaljnim izlaganjem svih značenja pojmova religije, politike, sekularnog i društva unaprijed osiguramo od mogućih nesporazuma, teškoća i napora.
2. Zapravo, u razmatranju odnosa religijskog i političkog u sekularnom društvu ovdje ćemo neka vrijednosna polazišta, neka iskustva i neke interpretativne perspektive podrazumijevati i preferirati. Drugim riječima, u ovom razmatranju do odnosa religije i politike u sekularnom društvu koji bi mogao biti prihvatljiv svim sudionicima ne dolazimo, da tako kažemo, na neki neutralan način. Taj odnos ovisi o tome kako razumijevamo i religiju i politiku i sekularno i društvo. Preko odnosa religije i politike u sekularnom društvu ovdje izlažemo i preferiramo određeno razumijevanje religije, politike, sekularnog i društva.
3. Pitanje odnosa religije i politike u sekularnom društvu ovdje razmatramo normativno a ne deskriptivno. A to dalje znači da se ne bavimo u prvom redu opisivanjem različitih, ne samo realnih političkih praksa, nego ni ovih ili onih političkih teorija društvenih odnosa religije i politike. Ovdje nastojimo ukazati na neka važna, kako politološka, prvenstveno liberalno-filozofska, polazišta i demokratske tekovine tako i religijske, prvenstveno islamsko-teloške i pravno-etičke, normativne odrednice unutar kojih je moguće tragati za prihvatljivim modelom odnosa religije i politike u sekularnom društvu. Tragamo dakle za modelom odnosa religije i politike koji bi mogao imati

načelno konceptualno značenje i važenje. Pri tome ipak nastojimo stalno imati u vidu bosanskohercegovačko društvo i njegovu multireligijsku povijest, strukturu i perspektivu.

4. Argumentaciju za prihvatljivi odnos religije i politike u sekularnom društvu ovdje iznosimo, razumije se, prvenstveno i u užem smislu iz islamske religijske/teološke perspektive. A to dalje znači da primarnu perspektivu u kojoj tematiziramo pitanje odnosa religije i politike u sekularnom društvu u ovom razmatranju obrazuju religijski razlozi i zahtjevi, koji su, prema našem razumijevanju, u izvornom i najboljem interesu religije, odnosno islama samog. U ovom razmatranju riječ je, dakle, u prvom redu o tome koji je odnos religije i politike u sekularnom društvu najprihvatljiviji za religiju.

Sekularno društvo

U našim raspravama često se možemo susresti s mišljenje da je za islam i muslimane prihvatljiva sekularna država ali ne i sekularno društvo. Razloge i argumente na kojima se takav stav zasniva ovdje nije neophodno navoditi i obrazlagati. Oni se u osnovi svode na (pre) naglašeno razlikovanje između države koja predstavlja birokratski aparat i okvir i društva kojem je neposredni sadržaj sami život njegovih pripdanika.

Mi ovdje, međutim, ipak držimo da je opravdano govoriti i o sekularnom društvu a ne samo o sekularnoj državi. Naime, kada se govori o sekularnom društvu, onda se misli na društvo u njegovoj cjelini, a ne na neki njegov dio, na društvo u njegovoj najobuhvatnijoj ravni, a ne u ravni različitih društvenih podgrupa, na društvo koje je jedno i jedinstveno, a ne na neko od mnogih i različitih društava koja djeluju u jednom društvu. Ovdje je, dakle, riječ o društvu čiji je dio i sama država i njene institucije i njeni zakoni i njene politike. Jer, i sama država sa svojim institucijama, zakonima i politikama ne bi bila moguća bez društva koje je zasnovano na nekom najmanjem zajedničkom imenitelju, na

nekom konsenzualnom osjećanju pripadanja, na nekoj bazičnoj jezgri orijentiranja. Takav pristup društvu zastupa se u onim suvremenim političko-filozofijskim razmatranjima u kojima se polazi od Johna Lockeja koji je u *Two Treatises on Government* govorio o tome da se demokracija većine temelji na zajedničkim orijentacijama koje pripadnike jednog društva unutarne obavezuju na prihvatanje procedura i odluka države.¹ Kada govorimo o sekularnom društvu mi zapravo mislimo na ono što to društvo utemeljuje. U tom smislu možemo govoriti o sekularnom društvu svugdje tamo gdje su bazične vrijednosti koje to društvo, taj socijalni poredak omogućuju, sekularne naravi.

A sekularnost u političkom životu sastoji se u pozivanju na 'prirodni um' koji operira s javnim argumentima koji su svima pristupačni. Taj prirodni um koji je zajednički svim ljudima predstavlja epistemički temelj za sekularnu državnu vlast koja se više ne legitimira religijski.²

Islamska sekularnost

Na društvenoj ravni sekularnost se, dakle, u prvom redu sastoji u izvoru političke legitimacije i u demokratskim procedurama. Sekularnost u njenom političkom smislu a ne u ontološkom značenju, držimo, potpuno je prihvatljiva sa stanovišta islama. Štaviše, mogli bismo u jednoj zaoštrenoj formulaciji kazati da je u tom pogledu sekularnost zapravo izvorna poruka islama. Drugim riječima, mogli bismo govoriti o islamskom konceptu sekularnosti. Prvo, Bog nije ničemu i nikome sličan. To znači posvjetovljenje svijeta i povijesti. Drugo, s Muhammedom, alehisselam i Kur'anom završava se, na jednoj strani, ono razdoblje povijesti čovječanstva u kojem Bog svako malo intervenira šaljući ljudima svoje poslanike i objave i otvara, na drugoj strani, ono razdoblje povijesti čovječanstva u kojem takvih intervencija više nema. Na taj nam se način poručuje: od sada morate i možete sami, oslanjajući

1 Usporedi: Helmut Dubiel, *Neizvjesnost i politika*, s njemačkog preveo Sulejman Bosto, Rabic – ecd, Sarajevo, 2006. str. 122

2 Vidjeti: Jürgen Habermas, *Između naturalizma i religije – filozofski članci*, s njemačkog preveo Sulejman Bosto, Tugra, Sarajevo, 2009. Str. 147. i dalje

se na razum. Ostaje vam objava, ali za njeno 'korištenje' više na raspolaganju nemate mogućnosti arbitriranja sa stanovišta nekog religijskog autoriteta i legitimiteta. I treće, niko nema pravo da se postavlja između ljudi i Boga. To u političkom smislu znači da niko nema mandat da ljude zastupa pred Bogom niti Boga pred ljudima. Ako u islamu nema crkve onda to znači da je islam na društvenom planu sekularna religija.

Još jednom, islam ne prihvata sekularnost u ontološkom smislu te riječi. Poslanik Muhammed, alejhisselam, kaže: "Cijela je zemlja mesdžid." Priroda ima sakralnu dimenziju. Ali, iznimno je važno uočiti jednu opću karakteristiku islamske kulture: harem kao sveti, sakralni prostor. Ako se prostor džamija, mesdžida, mezarja, tekija i drugih vjerskih objekata i neposredni prostor oko njih označava kao sveti, sakralni prostor, onda je prostor izvan harema svjetovni prostor. Dakle, u ontološkom smislu nema mjesta za sekularnost, cijela je zemlja mesdžid, u povijesnom smislu, na društvenom planu, izvan granica harema nalazi se prostor za sekularnu svakodnevnicu i životni svijet.

Politički interes

Sa stanovišta političke filozofije za liberalnu državu u pogledu odnosa religije i politike u sekularnom društvu važna su sljedeća pitanja. Koja kognitivna zauzimanja stajališta i normativna očekivanja mora od vjerujućih i nevjerujućih građana u njihovom međusobnom ophođenju zahtijevati liberalna država? I, kako se danas, nakon sloma komunizma, u vrijeme velikih migracijskih pomjeranja i kretanja, u društvenim okolnostima sve većeg pluraliziranja ali i globalizacijskog unificiranja, u vrijeme kada smo suočeni s, manje ili više, neočekivanim 'povratkom religijskog', u društvenu ali i političku sferu, konačno u biotehničkoj eri u kojoj se kroz sve dublje zadiranje u do sada neraspložive, odnosno, 'prirodne' supstrate ljudske osobe instrumentalizira sam čovjek u svojoj ljudskoj prirodi, kako se, dakle, u takvim okolnostima mogu kulturno-hermeneutičke i empirijske perspektive metodički povezati s

normativnim načinima postavljanja pitanja?³ Zapravo, pitanje religije u postsekularnom društvu valja razumijevati kao pitanje sekulariziranja, koje se sastoji u dvostrukom procesu učenja, procesu koji tradiciju prosvjetiteljstva kao i religijska učenja obavezuje na refleksiju njihovih međusobnih granica.⁴

Religija i politika u bosanskohercegovačkom društvu

U našim bosanskohercegovačkim društvenim okolnostima i političkim odnosima, na dostignutoj razini demokratske i političke kulture u našoj zemlji i posebno u procesima koji će se nastaviti i koje treba i dalje osmišljavati, poticati i usmjeravati na evropskom putu naše države i našeg društva, odnos religijskih zajednica i države, prema našem uvjerenju, treba da se temelji, gradi i profilira na sljedećim načelima, standardima, interesima i obzirima.

3 Isto, str. 141. – 179.

4 Tako Habermas, zahtijevajući od religioznih ljudi kompetenciju za prevođenje religijskih potencijala smisla u kategorije i formulacije intersubjektivne racionalnosti u svom djelu *Između naturalizma i religije* u izvjesnoj mjeri, čini se, revidira svoje gledanje na religiju iz njegovog glavnog djela *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* iz 1981. u kojem, naprimjer, ovako piše: “U mjeri u kojoj je sakralno područje bilo konstitutivno za društvo, nasljeđe religije (sada) ne preuzima dakako ni znanost ni umjetnost. Samo do diskursne etike komunikativno rastočen moral može u ovom pogledu supstituirati autoritet svetog.” (J. Habermas: *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* Bd. 2. Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, Frankfurt/Main, 1981. s. 140.) Čini se naime, kako u najnovijim Habermasovim razmatranjima njegova teza o transformaciji religije u diskursnu etiku ostaje, kako to, primjerice, primjećuje Christian Danz, naglašeno u drugom planu. Tako Habermas u svom bečkom predavanju iz 2004. o “Granici između vjerovanja i znanja”, a kojim je otvoren simpozij održan na Austrijskoj akademiji za znanost u Beču od 4. do 6. marta 2004. godine, a u povodu 200. godišnjice smrti Immanuela Kanta, kaže: “Sami praktični um ne može više biti siguran da je kadar samo sa uvidima teorije pravičnosti u njegovim golim rukama djelovati protiv isklizavanja Moderne. Ovoj nedostaje kreativnost govorne otvorenosti svijeta, da bi iz sebe regenerirala svuda okolo krčljajuću normativnu svijest.” (J. Habermas, *Die Grenze zwischen Glauben und Wissen. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte und aktuellen Bedeutung von Kants Religionsphilosophie*, in: H. Nagl-Docekal/R. Langthaler (HRsg.), *Recht – Gedschichte – Redligion, Die Bedeutung Kants für die Gegenwart*, Berlin 2004., s. 141.-160. hier s. 142.)

Na državnoj razini ustavno-pravnih i pravno-političkih odnosa, načelo odvojenosti države i vjerskih zajednica i crkava, odnosno institucionalna odvojenost politike i religije kao značajna tekovina evropskog političkog i državno-pravnog moderniteta treba da predstavlja naše temeljno i čvrsto političko uvjerenje i opredjeljenje.

Država vlast vrši na svjetonazorno neutralan način. To ne znači ništa više ali ni ništa manje od tog da sve odluke koje država sprovodi u vršenju vlasti moraju biti obrazložene u jeziku zajedničkom svim pripadnicima političke zajednice, u argumentacijama i formulacijama prihvatljivim svim građanima koji pripadaju različitim svjetonazorskim i religijskim uvjerenjima. To da država treba i hoće da bude svjetonazorski neutralna, to da država treba da bude odvojena od vjerskih zajednica nije stvar nekog pukog stjecaja slučajnih okolnosti, nečije arbitrarne odluke da tako bude, to je stvar koja se izravno i bitno tiče priznavanja i poštivanja svjetonazorno, politički, kulturno i religijski pluralnog društva. Još konkretnije, da bi građani jedne države, koji pripadaju različitim religijskim i svjetonazorskim tradicijama bili u toj državi ravnopravni, država mora biti svjetonazorno neutralna, ne smije se priklanjati bilo kojem religijskom svjetonazoru. Mogli bismo kazati, što je jedno društvo svjetonazorski i religijski pluralnije to je veća obaveza države da bude svjetonazorno neutralna.

U svjetonazorno neutralnoj poziciji liberalne države sadržano je i temeljno značenje principa sekularnosti države koja (sekularnost) se očituje u svjetovnom, a to znači svim ljudima na temelju 'zdravog razuma' prihvatljivom formuliranju odluka kroz koje se vrši vlast.

Od sekularne države zahtijeva se jasna i stroga nepristranost u odnosu prema crkvama i vjerskim zajednicama. Ako se pođe od danih činjenica, onda je gotovo samorazumljivo da Bosna i Hercegovina mora biti svjetonazorno neutralna i sekularna država prije i više od mnogih drugih.

S druge strane, na najširoj političkoj, odnosno demokratskoj razini sve religijske tradicije pa tako i islam za politički život predstavljaju

velike, neporecive i dragocjene potencijale društvenog i humanističkog smisla. To da BiH treba da se i dalje razvija kao moderna evropska svjetonazorno neutralna država, u kojoj su crkve i vjerske zajednice u svom slobodnom i autonomnom djelovanju odvojene od države, nikako ne znači da religijske moralne, socijalne, kulturne, i sve druge potencijale u demokratskom obrazovanju političke volje treba držati nevažnim, prevaziđenim, antievropskim, antipolitičkim. Opredjeljenost za politički i pravni princip odvojenosti države i vjerskih zajednica ne znači da vjernike kao takve treba isključivati iz političkog života. Njihove stavove, argumente, vrijednosti i opredjeljenja mora se u političkim raspravama uzimati ravnopravno u obzir u društvu u kojem su oni ravnopravni sudionici i u kojem se ustavno garantiraju i religijske slobode.

U takvom društvu, koje se u recentnoj političkoj filozofiji sve češće u normativnom smislu određuje kao postsekularno društvo, ne može se očekivati, ovdje navodim formulaciju Jurgena Habermasa, od svih vjernika da svoja politička stajališta mogu obrazložiti nezavisno od svojih religijskih ili svjetonazornih uvjerenja. Kada je riječ o svjetonazorskoj neutralnosti političkih stavova i njihovog argumentiranja “taj striktni zahtjev može se uputiti samo političarima koji unutar državnih institucija podliježu dužnosti prema svjetonazornoj neutralnosti, dakle, svima koji prihvaćaju javne mandate ili se za njih kandidiraju.”⁵

Drugim riječima, religiozni građani moraju biti ravnopravni u političkim raspravama oko svih pitanja zajedničkog dobra i društvenog života. Taj osnovni smisao i sadržaj postsekularnog društva kao izazov prvenstveno moraju prihvatiti, to je sada ključno, sekularni građani koji su i u svom zapadnom sekularnom mentalitetu i u njegovoj socijalističkoj odnosno komunističkoj ideološkoj podvarijanti skloni da vjernike i religijske tradicije i zajednice, još jednom bih se poslužio kritičkim zapažanjem Habermasa, gledaju kao na arhaične ostatke prošlosti koje u najboljem slučaju treba da budu zaštićeni kao što se

⁵ Isto, str. 157

zaštićuju izumiruće vrste u prirodi. U najkraćem, u postsekularnom društvu vjernicima se ne može oduzeti riječ.

U pogledu na specifični značaj i značenje islamske tradicije i budućnosti muslimana u BiH i Evropi, valja kazati još jednu stvar. Na našoj bosanskohercegovačkoj društvenoj sceni koja se, treba li uopće naglašavati, ne može promatrati izolirano, izvan ne samo regionalnog, nego i šireg evropskog, pa, ako hoćete, i međunarodnog i svjetskog civilizacijskog i geopolitičkog konteksta, pitanje islama sadrži i političke implikacije od najvećeg značaja, pred kojima ne vrijedi zatvarati oči. Kako će muslimani u BiH kao integralnom dijelu Evrope politički promovirati, artikulirati i modelirati svoje vjerske zahtjeve, slobode, prava i identitet – to je politički izazov *par excellence* za sve koji informirano, kompetentno i odgovorno gledaju u sutrašnjicu.

Religijski interes

Islam se u muslimanskom religijskom iskustvu i svjetskim uporedno-religijskim povijesnim razmatranjima određuje kao religija znanja i pravde. Društvena etika u islamu se višestruko naglašava. Na mnogim mjestima u Kur'anu vjera u Boga dovodi se u izravni odnos s dobroćinstvom.

U kur'anskom poglavlju El-Bekare odriče se svaka vrijednost pobožnosti, odnosno vjeri koju bi isključivo sačinjavale molitve lišene dobroćinstva. Posebno se naglašava pravičnost prema siročadi. (En-Nisa, 127) Na drugom mjestu u Kur'anu se kaže: "I imetku siročadi se ne približavate, osim na najljepši način, sve dok punoljetstvo ne steknu, i krivo na litru i kantar ne mjerite, - Mi nikoga preko njegovih mogućnosti ne zadužujemo, krivo ne govorite, pa makar se ticalo i rođaka, i dužnosti prema Allahu ne kršite, - eto, to vam On naređuje da biste to na umu imali." (El-En'am, 152)

Temeljen na toj izvornoj poruci, islam je manje-više uvijek kroz povijest, u tradicionalnim muslimanskim društvima bio prisutan, ne kao 'politički', ne kao 'državni' islam, nego kao socijalni islam, u

tradicionalnim formama i sadržajima civilnog života, u socijalnim institucijama muslimanskih društava.

Prvi stub takvog socijalnog života u muslimanskim zajednicama i društvima, kroz cijelu povijest islama, uvijek je bila institucija vakufā, koji predstavljaju vjerski motivirane socijalne, humanitarne i karitativne zadužbine. Vakufi su bili toliko značajni da se vjerski život često poistovjećivao s vakufima. Vjerski život i vakuf gotovo da su bili sinonimi. Vakuf su sačinjavale džamije, mektebi i medrese, biblioteke, javne kuhinje, prenoćišta, česme, mostovi, bolnice i mnoge druge institucije kulturnog, socijalnog i privrednog života. Pored zadužbina u molitvne, pogrebne, školske, kultrune i slične svrhe, postojali su vakufi za siričad, za putnike, oslobađanje zarobljenih vojnika, za za opskrbu siromašnih djevojaka prilikom udaje, za zbrinjavanje gladnih pasa i mačaka u toku zime i za mnoge druge svrhe.

Umjesto zaključka

Nije sporno da se religija ne može pomiriti s društveno fiksiranim ulogama koje su joj dodijeljene u projektu industrijske moderne. Ali za izlazak iz tog novovjekovnog babilonskog sužanjstva, kako bi rekao Moltmann, religija ne smije pristajanjem na političku moć sama sebi oduzimati pravo na riječ. U Bosni i Hercegovini i na Balkanu u postkomunističkom, tranzicijskom razdoblju to se često događa. Nakon sloma komunizma i raspada bivše Jugoslavije religija se u našem javnom prostoru javlja za riječ manje-više u tri preovlađujuće pretenzije: kao ideologija, kao nacionalizam i kao folklorizam. Najozbiljnija opasnost takvog ideologiziranja religije sadržana je u povezivanju religije i religijskih zajednica s centrima društvene i političke moći. U toj povezanosti događa se zapravo profaniziranje religije. Još preciznije, duhovna dimenzija religije, njena moralna poruka i njena sposobnost da se kritički odnosi prema strukturama društvene moći ozbiljno se dovode u pitanje.

Ahmet Alibašić

**NASILJE U IME ISLAMA:
TERMINOLOŠKO RAZGRANIČENJE**

U diskusijama o savremenim islamskim pravcima mnogo je pojmovnih nejasnoća i lutanja. Primjetno je odsustvo jedinstvene terminologije kako u BiH tako i globalno. Ovaj prilog ima skromnu ambiciju da pokuša razjasniti neke nejasnoće u vezi s imenovanjem problema nasilja i terorizma počinjenih od strane muslimana i pravdanih pozivanjem na islam. Nadamo se da ćemo vremenom napustiti neka lošija rješenja a izbor suziti na manji broj preciznije definiranih pojmova i time omogućiti kvalitetniju komunikaciju i olakšati sporazumijevanje.

Mislim da je za nasilne muslimanske grupe u ideološkom smislu najadekvatniji klasični islamski pojam haridžije (doslovno oni koji su se izdvojili).¹ Ukratko, haridžije su bili prva sekta u islamu koja se pobunila protiv odluke halife Alije (um. 661), r.a., da prihvati arbitražu dvojice ljudi u sukobu između njega i sirijskog namjesnika Muavije (um. 680). Taj svoj postupak su opravdali selektivnim citiranjem Kur'ana i doslovnim tumačenjem dijela kur'anskog teksta "sud pripada samo Bogu" (*ini-l-hukmu illa lillah*). Potom su takva svoja shvatanja pokušali zajednici nametnuti silom i terorom. Između ostaloga, uspjeli su ubiti halifu Aliju. Kod ove grupe jasno razaznajemo sve karakteristike koje ispoljavaju suvremeni nasilni muslimanski ekstremisti koji svoje postupke legitimiraju islamskim pojmovima i argumentima a pri tom ne uočavamo nikakvu bitnu razliku između njih. Dakle, zajednički su im: revnost u izvanjskom prakticiranju vjere, selektivnost i doslovnost u izravnom tumačenju vjerskih tekstova te nepoštivanje bilo kakvog vjerskog ili političkog autoriteta izvan vlastitih krugova. Međutim, ključna sličnost između njih su ekskomuniciranje ili proglašavanje neistomišljenika nevjernicima (*tekfir*) te odobravanje upotrebe nasilja u svrhu ostvarenja vlastitih ciljeva. Olahko ekskomuniciranje protivnika i upotreba nasilja su dvije glavne razlike između haridžija i onih koji se u žargonu nazivaju 'vehabijama'. Te razlike opravdavaju povlačenje jasne terminološke i svake druge distinkcije između ove dvije skupine, čime ćemo se pozabaviti nešto niže.

¹ Vidi: G. Levi Della Vida, "Kharijites", *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2. izd., 4: 1074-1077.

Svakako da nasilje nije jedini problematični oblik ponašanja ali jeste najopasniji. Ono je tzv. "neposredna opasnost". Američko zakonodavstvo jasno naglašava nasilje kao problem kada definira radikalizaciju, pa kaže da je radikalizacija "proces prihvatanja ili promoviranja ekstremističkog sistema uvjerenja *u cilju promoviranja ideološki utemeljenog nasilja* kako bi se postigla politička, vjerska ili društvena promjena".²

Nije Bog zna kakva utjeha, ali valja znati da mi nismo prvi koji se u novije doba suočavaju sa pošasti haridžizma. On je oživljen potkraj 1960-ih i početkom 1970-ih u arapskim društvima da bi na neki način kulminirao 11. septembra 2001. godine. S obzirom da svako doba sa sobom neminovno nosi i neke novine i blagu evoluciju u ideologijama, ovo novo izdanje haridžizma mogli bismo radi jasnoće zvati neoharidžizmom ili novim haridžizmom a njegove nosioce neo-haridžijama ili novim haridžijama (*havaridž džudud*). Tako ih uostalom nazivaju brojne savremene muftije kao što je bivši šejhu-l-azhar Džadulhakk Ali Džadulhakk.³ Kao i rane haridžije i ove moderne ne priznaju nikakve ljudske zakone već samo Božije, naravno onako kako ih oni razumiju. Zato su sami sebe i nazivali *muhakkime*, oni koji prizivaju sud Božiji. Istina, haridžije su u ime Božijeg suvereniteta (*hakimijje*) odbacili Alijinu odluku, dok neoharidžije odbacuju odluke parlamenata, ali suština je ista: ljudski sud je neprihvatljiv. Ovakvo imenovanje ima više prednosti. Naime, ako je ovaj naziv adekvatan, onda u idejnom, političkom i sigurnosnom suočavanju sa ovom pojavom na raspolaganju imamo stoljetno iskustvo muslimanskih društava. U najkraćem, muslimansko iskustvo kaže da je većinu militanata moguće uvjeriti da napuste svoja ekstremistička učenja i vrata se matici muslimanske zajednice. Drugi se reformiraju ali i dalje ostaju zasebna zajednica (*ibadije*), dok je za najupornije rješenje obično bivala državna sila.

2 Ahmet Alibašić, ur., *Savremene muslimanske dileme*, Sarajevo, Centar za napredne studije, 2009, 15.

3 Fikret Karčić, "Heterodoksna učenja i grupe u islamu – komparativna i šerijatsko-pravna perspektiva", *Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu*, 2010, str. 227-41.

Kad su suvremeni termini posrijedi, tamo gdje nije riječ o terorizmu, predlažem upotrebu termina ‘militanti’. Alternativno, može se kazati i ‘nasilni ili militantni ekstremisti’ ili ‘militantni radikali’. Ključna je dakle upotreba odrednice ‘nasilni’ ili ‘militantni’ s obzirom da npr. termin radikalniji može imati pozitivno značenje. Gdje god nema posebnog razloga takve osobe ne treba kvalificirati kao muslimane jer im se time pomaže da ostvare svoju namjeru da ‘govore’ u ime svih muslimana. Kao i kod ratnih zločina odgovornost treba individualizirati gdje god nema osnove za prizivanje kolektivne krivice. Ako, pak, govorimo o referentnom okviru kojim se nasilje pravda, najadekvatnije bi bilo kazati ‘militantni islamizam’ ili ‘islamistički ekstremizam’, da bi se izbjeglo izravno povezivanje sa islamom kao što je slučaj u formuli ‘islamski ekstremizam’. Kad ovo kažemo svakako imamo na umu najnovija istraživanja koja izvan razumne sumnje dokazuju da je “vojna okupacija uzrok skoro sveg samoubilačkog terorizma u svijetu od 1980. godine”, a ne islamistički terorizam.⁴

Držim da ova terminološka rasprava nije akademsko cjepidlačenje. Bitna je za borbu protiv terorizma. Prvo, ona abolira one koji nisu krivi, i to bi nam kao odgovornom društvu i zajednici koja hoće poštovati ljudska prava i onih koji nam se nužno ne sviđaju trebalo biti važno. Drugo, preciznim definiranjem i sužavanjem problema olakšavamo rad sigurnosnim organima, jer sužavajući fokus njihove pažnje mi izoštravamo sliku i štedimo njihove resurse. Istovremeno im tako omogućujemo da ne ostanu slijepi za druge oblike terorizma kao što su napad na ceremoniju postavljanja kamena temeljca za Ferhadiju džamiju, ubistva povratnika kao što je rahmetli Meliha Durić, itd. U BiH nažalost ima mnogo terorizma čija ideološka pozadina nema veze sa vjerom, već sa ekstremističkim etničkim nacionalizmom i to ne treba zaboraviti. Resurse državnih službi moramo racionalno upošljavati i zato što su pored terorizma kao neoprostivog zločina u nas vrlo prisutni i drugi oblici

⁴ Robert A. Pape i James K. Feldman, *Cutting the fuse: the explosion of global suicide terrorism and how to stop it*, Chicago: Chicago University press, 2010.

kriminala kao što su trgovina drogama i ljudima a koji svakodnevno uništavaju mnogo više ljudskih života.

‘Vehabije’ i selefije?

Među najfrekventnijim pojmovima u ovom kontekstu je ‘vehabizam’. Međutim, dosadašnja upotreba ovog pojma ne opravdava njegovo daljnje korištenje. Više je razloga za to. Prvo, taj pojam u nas nikad niko nije precizirao. Definicija ili pobliže određenje su ovdje važni jer potpuno neodređenim terminom ‘vehabija’ ništa ne pojašnjavamo, niti nam ta neodređena kvalifikacija može pomoći u rasvjetljavanju bilo čega, razumijevanju bilo koje pojave ili uzajamnom sporazumijevanju. Jedan lični pokušaj da odredim ovaj pojam doveo me do zaključka da su osnovne karakteristike ‘vehabija’ u kontekstima u kojima se taj pojam u nas koristi sljedeće: 1) vjerska revnost i puritanizam, 2) naglasak na Poslanikovoј tradiciji, literalizam u tumačenju vjerskih tekstova i nepoštivanje autoriteta etabliranih pravnih škola (mezheba), 3) sklonost samoinicijativi, da ne kažemo anarhizmu u organizaciji vjerskih poslova, i 4) isključivost prema drugačijim mišljenjima, koja ponekad graniči sa njihovim anatemisanjem. Neki bi ovdje dodali i nasilje, ali to nije tačno za većinu ‘vehabija’, kao što ćemo vidjeti.

Ništa, međutim, od navedenoga nije ekskluzivna osobina ‘vehabija’. Revnosnih muslimana ima i među sufijama, modernim i tradicionalnim muslimanima. Svako ko smatra da Kur’an muškim nasljednicima određuje duplo više nego ženskim je literalista. Odstupanje od etabliranih mezhepskih rješenja je neminovno. I organi i službenici IZ odstupaju od hanefijskog mezheba u obredima s tim što se u ta odstupanja nastoji uvesti red u smislu da ta odstupanja dobiju sankciju Vijeća za fetve ili nekog drugog foruma u Zajednici. Tako se izbjegavaju brojni problemi što je i bila svrha uspostave mezheba. Dalje, ima i tradicionalnih bosanskih muslimana koji su isključivi u svojim gledištima, pa i nasilni. Primjera je mnogo a žrtve tog nasilja su upravo ‘vehabije’ ali i službenika IZ. Podsjećanja radi, prije nekoliko godina

rukovodioca Vjersko-prosvjetne službe Rijasetu IZ, sarajevskog muftiju i glavnog imama nisu usred dana u Sarajevu pretukle 'vehabije'. Konačno, sklonosti anarhizmu u vjerskim poslovima ima i među 'finim' bosanskim muslimanima, od običnih džematlija, koji npr. ne žele predati kurbanske kožice u Islamsku zajednicu, do intelektualaca. O tome najbolje mogu govoriti Rijaset i muftije koji svakodnevno svoju energiju dobrim dijelom troše na slučajeve nepoštivanja autoriteta IZ od strane njenih članova. Na osnovu svega moglo bi se zaključiti da su svi muslimani pomalo 'vehabije'. Ipak, vjerujem da su nenasilne 'vehabije' bile i ostale sporne za IZ upravo zbog ove drugačije administrativne kulture koja se opire sistemskoj organizaciji vjerskih poslova, o čemu više riječi može biti neki drugi put. No, da se vratimo drugom argumentu o neadekvatnosti pojma 'vehabija' za označavanje nasilnih ekstremista.

Ukoliko prihvatimo ovaj pojam kao legitiman za označavanje saudijske verzije selefizma, što je najčešća implikacija, onda nalazimo još jedan važan razlog za neadekvatnost kvalificiranja nasilja u ime vjere pojmom 'vehabijski'. Naime, velika većina saudijske uleme, kako one provladine (rahmetli Bin Baz, Ibn Usejmin, sadašnji muftija Abdulaziz Alu Šejh, itd.) tako i one koja nije dio vjerskog establišmenta (Avde, Havalu itd.) odlučni su protivnici nasilja. Ovi prvi su uz to i politički kvijetisti, koji zagovaraju totalnu lojalnost vlastima i ne dozvoljavaju ni njihovu javnu kritiku. Naime, dio 'vehabijske' doktrine su i doslovna i selektivna tumačenja ajeta i hadisa o obavezi apsolutne pokornosti vlastima. Neposluh je dozvoljen samo na određen način i pod određenim uvjetima koje je gotovo nemoguće ispuniti. Dakle, ako je neko 'vehabija', onda je to saudijska ulema, a ako su oni davno digli glas protiv ovakvih grupa, osudili ih i upozorili na njihovu opasnost, onda nije opravdano smještati ih u istu kategoriju. S druge strane ni militanti ne priznaju vjerski autoritet ove uleme. Prema tome, distanciranje je obostrano i treba ga uvažiti.

Dakako, ako termin 'vehabija' nije adekvatan onda to nije ni termin selefija i selefizam. Pojam 'selefija' označava onog muslimana koji

svoj uzor vidi u prvim generacijama muslimana, bilo da ih pokušava vjerno oponašati ili samo okvirno slijediti. Historijski, ovaj pojam se koristi i za preteče islamskih modernista iz 19. stoljeća: Džemaluddina el-Afganija, Muhammeda Abduhua i druge, što ponekad unosi dodatnu konfuziju.

Islamisti?

U ovim raspravama sve češće se spominje i termin 'islamizam', što također smatram nespretnim rješenjem. Iako relativno noviji pojam on se sve češće koristi za aktivno društveno potvrđivanje i afirmaciju vjeronanja, propisa, zakona ili politika za koje se vjeruje da su islamskog karaktera. Preciznije, islamista (*el-islami*, mn. *el-islamijjun*) je svako ko vjeruje da Kur'an i sunnet sadrže važna načela za muslimansko društvo i vlast i ko na neki od načina nastoji implementirati ta načela. Islamizam uključuje i uske literalističke i netolerantne (fundamentalističke) trendove, ali ne samo njih.⁵

Kako aktivnosti na društvenoj afirmaciji islama obično prije ili kasnije poprime politički karakter, Međunarodna krizna grupa definira islamizam kao "islam u političkom prije nego vjerskom izdanju". Islamistički pokreti su oni pokreti sa islamskim ideološkim referencama koji teže primarno političkim ciljevima. Tako su po MKG-u "islamistički" i "islamski politički" suštinski sinonimi.⁶

Slično MKG-u razmišlja i Mir Zohair Husain koji smatra da je islamizam najbolje definirati kao transformaciju islama u ideologiju.

5 Graham Fuller, "Islamists in the Arab World: The Dance around Democracy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, sept. 2004, 3; Abdullahi A. Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan*, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2008, str. 6-7; William E. Shepard, Francois Burgat i James Piscatori, "Islamism" *Oxford Encyclopedia of Islamic World*, New Work, Oxford University Press, 2009, 3: 191-194.

6 International Crisis Group, "Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History" 20. april 2004, str. 1. "Islamski" je, pak, u upotrebi MKG-a jedan općiji izraz, koji se obično odnosi na islam u vjerskom prije nego u političkom smislu ali koji je sposoban, u ovisnosti o situaciji, obuhvatiti oboje (npr. "islamski aktivizam").

Na njega se može gledati kao na oživljavanje islamskog vjerovanja kao političkog idioma u kome praktičari islama kultiviraju islamske simbole, ideje i ideale. Neki od tih praktičara su prosvijetljeni, drugi nisu. Neki su iskreni, drugi neiskreni, jedni nasilni, drugi miroljubivi, neki dobri, drugi loši.⁷

Ostali pojmovi

Povremeno se u nas kao rješenje nudi termin tekfirovci (kao i tekfirlije i tekfirdžije). On ima veze s ovim ali mislim da nije dobro rješenje. Naime, radi se samo o jednom aspektu problema (anatemisanje drugih muslimana), koji kao takav nije relevantan za državu, posebno ne za sudske i policijske organe. On može biti interesantan samo za sigurnosne službe kao indikator ekstremizma, ali anatemisanje kao takvo ne predstavlja nikakvo krivično djelo u sekularnoj državi i ne može biti predmet njenog interesovanja. On je svakako relevantan za vjersku zajednicu i vjerske rasprave, u kojima se mogu snaći samo najbolji poznavaoци islamske doktrine i prava. Uz to, *tekfir* ne prakticiraju samo militanti, ali mi to njihovo anatemisanje neistomišljenika ne opažamo jer ga ne prati nasilje. Zato smatram da je haridžizam adekvatniji termin jer uz anatemu (*tekfir*), konotira i upotrebu sile. Iz istog razloga, nije najveći problem ni to što neke zajednice žele u samoizolaciju. Ako Amerika može živjeti s Amišima, možemo i mi s njima. Demokratska društva su uvijek nalazila načina da akomodiraju građanski neposluh, mirni separatizam i druge vrste nelojalnosti i osporavanja suvereniteta dokle god se ne poseže za nasiljem.

Također, treba izbjegavati izvedenice iz pojma *džihad* (mudžahidi, mudžahedini, džihadlije, džihadisti) jer nepravedno, makar podsvjesno, uspostavljaju vezu između svete islamske dužnosti džihada i jednog od najodratnijih zločina savremenog doba ili jednostavno olahko prepuštaju monopol ekstremistima nad inače prihvatljivim pojmovima. Džihad nije samo oružana borba a onim dijelom kojim jeste (*kital*)

⁷ Mir Zohair Husain, *Global Islamic Politics*, New York, Longman, 2003, str. 338.

mnogo je bliži pravednom ratu nego arbitrarnoj upotrebi sile ili sveto-me ratu. Podjednako je pogrešno navoditi Šerijat kao inkriminirajući element u postupcima ili planovima pojedinaca i grupa, uzimajući u obzir da “islamsko pravo (Šerijat) predstavlja normativni aspekt islama”; da je “život svake muslimanske skupine neodvojivo povezan sa pridržavanjem Šerijata”; te da “iznevjeravanje šerijata dovodi u pitanje islamski identitet pojedinca i grupe”.⁸

Upotrebom pojmova “panislamista” i “panislamizam” jasno se želi inkriminirati međumuslimanska solidarnost te ona nailazi na osudu i odbojnost kod apsolutne većine muslimana. Konačno, potpuno je neprihvatljiva i skandalozna upotreba pojma ‘islamofašizam’ kojim se uspostavlja bliska veza vjere islama i jedne od najtotalitarnijih ideologija novoga doba.

Na kraju, ovo su možda elementarne napomene, ali s obzirom na značaj terminologije u borbi za umove i srca muslimana u sukobu sa militantima smatram da je važno da ne pravimo dosadašnje greške u ovom smislu. Deset godina od 11. septembra 2011. trebalo bi da smo ostavili iza sebe histeriju i da smo spremni racionalno razmišljati o jednom zaista velikom problemu. Jednostavno kazano, “alžirska grupa” nam se ne bi smjela ponoviti.

8 Fikret Karčić, *Studije o šerijatskom pravu i institucijama*, sarajevo, El-Kalem i CNS, 2011, str. 7.



Ekrem Tucaković

**ULOGA ISLAMSKE ZAJEDNICE,
MEDIJA I DRŽAVNIH INSTITUCIJA
U PRONALAZENJU RJEŠENJA**

I Islamska zajednica -karakter

Prema Ustavu Islamske zajednice, iz kojeg su izvedeni ostali normativni akti, Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini je jedna i jedinstvena zajednica muslimana (član 1); ustrojstvo i njene djelatnosti temelje se na Kur'anu, životnoj praksi Muhammeda alejhi-s-selam, islamskoj tradiciji Bošnjaka i zahtjevima vremena (član 4); Islamska zajednica čuva vjerodostojnost islamskih normi i osigurava njihovo tumačenje, a u tumačenju i izvršavanju obrednih dužnosti primjenjuje se hanefijski mezheb (član 8).

Islamska zajednica je tradicionalna vjerska zajednica, u administriranju svojih poslova i organizaciji rada je samostalna i autonomna, kako u odnosu prema državi tako i prema bilo kojem drugom vjerskom središtu izvan Bosne i Hercegovine. Pored, za sve muslimane, zajedničkih konstitutivnih izvora islama, Kur'ana i vjerovjesničke tradicije, islamska tradicija Bošnjaka je jedan od izvora u tumačenju i primjeni islamskih normi. Islamska zajednica baštini vlastitu respektabilnu tradiciju islamskog odgoja, obrazovanja i praktične primjene vjerskih propisa, zatim susreta sa različitim društvenim sistemima i ideologijama, iskustvo školovanja kadra u autoritativnim domaćim i stranim naučnim centrima, također ima pristup i uvid u svu temeljnu klasičnu i savremenu islamsku literaturu i povijesne tokove islamskog mišljenja, a od posebne važnosti je njeno iskustvo institucionalne organizacije. Ove odlike Islamsku zajednicu čine kompetentnom institucijom u čuvanju vjerodostojnosti učenja, tumačenja i primjene islama, sposobnom da bude odgovorna prema vjernicima, njihovim potrebama i društvenom kontekstu.

S druge strane, Islamska zajednica nije klerikalna organizacija, svećenička institucija. U rad svih njenih izvršnih i zakonodavnih organa uključene su osobe koje nemaju status vjerskih službenika, u Saboru Islamske zajednice, kao najvišem zakonodavnom organu, samo jedna trećina predstavnika mogu biti uposlenici Islamske zajednice. Rukovodne pozicije podliježu načelu smjenjivosti, izbornosti i ograničenog

mandata. Islamska zajednica ima svoj izborni sistem, sprovodi izbore za sve nivoe, muslimani učestvuju u izbornom procesu i kao birači i oni koji se biraju, tako da u značajnoj mjeri mogu kreirati rad i profil Islamske zajednice. Na taj način Islamska zajednica dobija, putem izbora i učešća u njenom radu muslimana, još jedan specifičan vjernički legitimitet koji joj daju muslimani, kao nosioci dijela specifične moći i suvereniteta. To je jedna od bitnih specifičnosti i vrijedno dostignuće muslimana i Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini.

II Islamska zajednica i alernativni islamski pokreti

Susret ovdašnjih muslimana i Islamske zajednice sa islamskim pokretima raznovrsnih orijentacija bio je različitog intenziteta i odvijao se na različitim nivoima. Pozitivno je da ti susreti budu unutar obrazovnog sistema Islamske zajednice na razini naučnih rasprava i proučavanja pluralnosti islamskog mišljenja i pokreta i tu je pokazana konstruktivnost i poželjna fleksibilnost.

Međutim, varničenje, katkad sa mogućim negativnim posljedicama, dešava se na razini obrednog, što je u prethodnom periodu prinudilo Islamsku zajednicu da institucionalno reagira u cilju očuvanja hanefijske tradicije i jedinstva obredne prakse. Prvi put je to bilo 1993. godine u vidu fetve reisululeme dr. Mustafe Cerića o obaveznosti pridržavanja propisa hanefijskog mezheba (pravne škole) u načinu vršenja vjerskih obreda, drugi put 2006. godine kada je Rijaset Islamske zajednice donio Rezoluciju o tumačenju islama u kojoj je potencirana odlučnost zaštite originalnosti “vjekovne tradicije IZ-e”, i tom prilikom je potvrđeno jedinstvo Islamske zajednice u doktrinarnom i institucionalnom učenju islama. Treći put se desilo 2007. godine kroz dopunu Rezolucije o tumačenju islama iz 2006., kojom prilikom je Rijaset IZ potvrdio ranije stavove, osudio izjave u kojima se omalovažava IZ-a i vrijeđa bosanska ulema, što je okarakterizirano protivno duhu islamskog morala i protiv mira i sigurnosti bosanskih muslimana. Tada je posebno istaknuto “da oni koji na bilo koji način unose nemir u

džamije pod izgovorom provođenja ‘prave vjere’ nisu dobronamjerni ljudi.”

Islamska zajednica ima obavezu da čuva jedinstvo obredne prakse i tradicije, vodi računa o općim prilikama i interesima vjernika, da osigurava ravnotežu između različitih stavova i neutralizira potencijalni destruktivni vjerski radikalizam. Ovi principi i vrijednosti se odnose i na izazove susreta s alternativnim pokretima. Islamska zajednica, kao odgovorna institucija, preuzima odgovornost za posljedice tumačenja islama njenih autoriteta. Odgovornost je važna razlika između institucionalnog učenja i tumačenja islama u okviru Islamske zajednice i vjerske samovoljnosti i avanturizma pojedinaca i grupa. Zahvaljujući odgovornosti i umjerenosti Islamska zajednica je izbjegla oštre sukobe, nije pala u zamku “progona vještica”, odnosno progona ljudi zbog njihovog drugačijeg mišljenja i nije pristala na ulogu davanja licenci za kvalitet lične vjere pojedinca. To je izrazito pozitivno i višestruko korisno iskustvo.

Od posebne je važnosti da, pod izgovorom borbe protiv netradicionalnih, ponekad i devijantnih ideja i stavova koji se zaogrću plaštom islama, Islamska zajednica ne posegne za znanstvenom rigidnošću i krutošću, “diktaturom” jednog mišljenja i stava nametnutog s pozicije moći ili guši pluralnost teorijskog propitivanja interpretativnih vjerskih tokova. Dakako, neophodno je unutar islamskih institucija omogućiti i njegovati širok konstruktivno usmjeren kritički pristup. Protiv ideja se ne može boriti silom i aparatom prinude. Potrebno je ponuditi kvalitetnije ideje, kvalitetnije argumente, bolju i ljudima ovog vremena i njihovim potrebama primjereniju interpretaciju islamskog učenja. Unutar tako postavljenog okvira Islamska zajednica nema razloga da se boji za svoju poziciju u zajednici muslimana, niti njene vrijednosti mogu biti ozbiljnije dovedene u pitanje. Islamska zajednica treba zadržati svoju otvorenost, ulaziti u produktivne debate o pitanjima koja su od interesa za muslimane, biti faktor koji uključuje a ne isključuje, jačati vlastitu

moć apsorpcije i modelativne sposobnosti. S druge strane, bila bi fatalna greška da Islamska zajednica prihvati ili uzme poziciju neosnovane i proizvoljne diskreditacije i etiketiranja ljudi ili krši njihova prava samo zato što drugačije misle vjeru ili nose drugačije životne navike i sklonosti proizašle iz njihove vjerske revnosti.

III Uloga državnih institucija

Status vjere i odnos države i vjerskih zajednica reguliran je Zakonom o slobodi vjere i pravnom položaju crkava i vjerskih zajednica na principu odvojenosti, ravnopravnosti i saradnje. Član 8 ovog Zakona potvrdio je kontinuitet historijski zasnovanim crkvama i vjerskim zajednicama u skladu s njihovim vjerskim propisima i unutrašnjom organizacijom.

Prema tome, državne institucije imaju zakonsku obavezu osigurati jednak tretman vjerskim zajednicama, podsticati u društvu ambijent saradnje, razumijevanja i tolerancije. Pored pozicije neutralnosti, posebno je značajno da državni organi izbjegnju odnos koji se temelji na predrasudama ili stereotipizaciji određenih vjerskih grupa ili pojedinaca. Državni zakoni bi se trebali primjenjivati jednako na sve građane, a primjena zakona mora biti lišena bilo kakvih stereotipa ili stava da su određene grupe i pojedinci, isključivo zbog svojih vjerskih ubjeđenja ili nekih drugih formalnih odlika, predisponirani za kršenje zakona i zbog toga izvrgnuti sumnjičenju. Kršitelji zakona imaju imena i prezimena i konkretna djela koja im se stavljaju na teret. Zakonski se tretira pojedinac na osnovu počinjenog djela, a ne njegovog mišljenja ili svjetonazora. Zbog slabosti i neprofesionalnosti državnih institucija u prošlosti je bilo više slučajeva u kojima su neki muslimani, bilo pojedinačno ili kao članovi određene grupe, stavljeni u neprimjeren kontekst i bili žrtve sumnjičenja i nepravde. Naime, ti primjeri svjedoče o kršenju prava i sloboda, širenju i podsticanju negativnih stereotipa i predrasuda, što vodi ka marginalizaciji i isključivanju grupa i pojedinaca iz društvenog i javnog života.

Kao primjer kreiranje ozračja netolerancije u društvu prema pojedincima ili grupama, kao rezultat aktivnosti državnih institucija, može se navesti izvođenje združene akcije policijsko-sigurnosnih snaga u selu Gornja Maoča kod Brčkog, početkom februara 2010. godine. U Tužilaštvu BiH korišten je termin članovi “vehabijske zajednice”, te obrazloženo da je operacija izvedena radi hapšenja tih osoba osumnjičenih za namjeru promjene ustavnog poretka Bosne i Hercegovine i ugrožavanje teritorijalne cjeline države. Spektakularnost akcije, težina optužbi, te potom nemogućnost dokazivanja istih i puštanje na slobodu uhapšenih, doveli su u ozbiljnu sumnju namjere i sposobnost državnih struktura. Također, ozbiljne sumnje u propuste državnih institucija, što se održava na širenje neistina i straha od muslimana, pokazale su se i prilikom prijavljivanja otkrića 54 kg eksploziva, 17. 02. 2010. g., kada je Elviz Aličić iz Mostara optužio dvije osobe da su umiješane u transport eksploziva, od kojih je jedan bio predsjednik Medžlisa Islamske zajednice Jablanica. Imenovani je kasnije priznao da je dao lažan iskaz, ali je ostala sumnja da se radilo o obavještajno-policijskoj spletki s namjerom optuživanja Islamske zajednice i kompromitacije muslimana. Kontinuirano plasiranje medijskih priča o vehabijama ili okupljanju naoružanih vehabija u različitim dijelovima Bosne i Hercegovine, priče o vehabijama su posebno plasirane iz entiteta Republika Srpska, u javnosti podstiče strah od muslimana.

Policija Republike Srpske, u augusta 2010. godine, tokom ramazana, izvela je akciju hapšenja pet bošnjačkih povratnika u Bosanskom Novom i Bosanskoj Dubici. U prvim informacijama iz policije navedeno je da se uhapšeni sumnjiče za terorističke aktivnosti i da se radi o “vehabijama”. Uhapšeni su vrlo brzo pušteni na slobodu, ali je ova akcija ponudila još jedan dokaz o provođenju policijskih akcija i hapšenju muslimana bez valjanog povoda i opravdanja. “Taj dan ćemo još dugo pamtit, odnosno nikada ga nećemo zaboraviti kao što će sjećanje na '92. godinu ostati u nama do kraja života. Sve je podsjećalo na tu 1992. godinu kada su nas srpski policajci i vojnici hapsili i odvodili u logore.

Srpska policija nas je ovom akcijom još jednom podsjetila koliko je sigurnost nas povratnika upitna i kako je malo potrebno da se počini zločin nad nama”, bio je stav bošnjačkih povratnika u Bosanskom Novom i Bosanskoj Dubici u povodu ove akcije.

Kreiranju negativnog ozračja i predrasuda prema muslimanima pridonose tvrdnje bez jasnih dokaza i izjave, možda i nesmotreno date, visokorangiranih državnih dužnosnika. Direktor Obavještajno-sigurnosne agencije (OSA), 12. 07. 2010. g., je izjavio da u Bosni i Hercegovini vidi “potencijalnu opasnost od 3.000 osoba koje u svakom momentu mogu prevrnuti, da li zbog psihičkog ili nekog drugog stanja” i napraviti teroristički akt sa velikim posljedicama, te zatražio da se radikalno izdvoji iz vjere i adekvatne zakone, obećavši da u tom slučaju za tri mjeseca tih ljudi više neće biti na slobodi. Ova izjava, bez navođenja dokaza, dovodi u pitanje odgovornost i profesionalnost. Ona se, s druge strane, koristi kao zvanična potvrda da u BiH ima na hiljade muslimana potencijalnih terorista.

Postupci pojedinih zvaničnika međunarodne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini nisu doprinosili razvoju demokratskog društva i vladavini prava. Nakon sjednice Zajedničke komisije za odbranu i sigurnost Parlamenta BiH, održane 12. jula 2010. g., direktor Federalne uprave policije izjavio je: “Nama nije cilj da razvijamo islamofobiju, a iz međunarodne zajednice ima ljudi koji upravo to hoće”. Ovdje treba podsjetiti da je Dru Engl, međunarodni tužilac u Tužilaštvu BiH, u optužnici protiv grupe Rijada Rustempašića kao inkriminirajući element naveo – Šerijat.

IV Uloga medija

Javni prostor ideološki nije ekskluzivno područje određene grupe ili jednog svjetonazora, nego ga u demokratskom društvu ravnopravno dijele sve zainteresirane društvene grupe i pojedinci u skladu sa zakonom. Medijski prostor u Bosni i Hercegovini je često poprište ideoloških i političkih sukoba pri čemu se mediji instrumentaliziraju

i zauzimaju jednu stranu. Na taj način se žrtvuju profesionalni novinarski standardi i kodeksi, općeprihvaćena kultura dijaloga i upotrebe primjerenog jezika u javnom prostoru. Usljed toga dolazi do kršenja za-garantiranih prava i sloboda, uključujući i slobodu savjesti i uvjerenja, jer se vrijeđaju osjećanja vjernika, a javni prostor je nerijetko poprište iskazivanja prikrivene ili neprikrivene mržnje prema učenju ili osobi zbog njenih vjerskih uvjerenja i aktivnosti. Na taj način mediji pridono-se ozračju koje podstiče kompromitaciju, izolaciju i marginalizaciju ideja i pojedinaca na temelju vjerskog opredjeljenja. Navest ćemo prim- jer kada je novinar jednog od javnih servisa u povodu policijske akcije u Gornjoj Maoči, februara 2010. godine, izjavio da su u ovom selu zaplijenjeni “dokumenti koji ukazuju na planove o proizvodnji oružja za masovno uništenje.” Tako teška konstatacija ni tada ni poslije nije dobila ozbiljnu potkrepu. Otvaranje BBI centra u Sarajevu, zbog toga što se u njemu ne prodaje alkohol i svinjetina, za neke medije bio je ar- gument za lansiranje teze o navodnom islamiziranju Sarajeva. Također je primjetna praksa medijskog izdvajanja autoriteta jedne vjerske za- jednice u odnosu na druge i neprimjereno etiketiranje, kao i praksa negativnog pristupa ili grubog izvitoperivanja stavova i postupaka ili ponižavajućeg portretiranja određenog vjerskog simbola.

Drugi problem koji je prisutan u medijskom prostoru jeste da se, i pored stručnih osoba i postojanja odgojno-obrazovnih ustanova Is- lamske zajednice koje nude stručnu naobrazbu za tumačenje islama, primijeti tendencija površnog, reduciranog, nestručnog, ponekad tendencioznog i zlonamjernog tumačenja islama, islamske tradicije i vrijednosti od strane osoba koje ne posjeduju potreban nivo kompe- tencije.

Ostrašćeni ideološki medijski sukobi otežavaju trezven i raciona- lan razgovor o svim bitnim pitanjima koja se tiču prisustva vjere ili vjerskih praksi i mišljenja u javnosti i iznalaženju modaliteta kojima će se zadovoljiti zakonsko pravo i standardi ljudskih prava i sloboda u demokratskom društvu. Bez sumnje, mediji imaju važnu ulogu u

kreiranju zdravog i humanog društvenog ambijenta, ali isto tako i atmosfere linča, progona ljudi zbog njihovih uvjerenja i marginalizacije društvenih grupa. Primjeri koji su ovdje spomenuti dolaze iz negativne prakse i imaju destruktivne posljedice po društvo. Nijedan medij ili novinar ne može biti ponosan da mu se rad kvalificira destruktivnim.

V Zaključak

Pluralitet vjerskog mišljenja je neminovnost demokratskog i slobodnog društva. Sloboda i puna vladavina pravednih zakona koji se neće primjenjivati selektivno i potirati vjerske specifičnosti i razlike osiguravaju uravnotežen i zdrav razvoj društva. Unutar takvog okvira većinski legitimitet mogu zadobiti autentične vrijednosti i interpretacije islama koje će odražavati vremenske i prostorne zahtjeve, potrebe i specifičnosti muslimana. Država i njene institucije imaju obavezu da izgrade i održavaju prostor slobode i vladavine pravednih zakona.

Islamska zajednica po svom karakteru i tradiciji čuva institucionalno jedinstvo učenja i tumačenja islama, kao i jedinstvo obredne prakse. Premda nijedan ekstremistički pokret s islamskim predznakom nije nastao na tlu Bosne i Hercegovine niti je proizvod muslimana Bošnjaka, u vremenu globalizacije ideja i utjecaja razumljivo je da muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini nisu i ne mogu ostati izvan domašaja, makar perifernih, utjecaja idejnih i vjerskih procesa u različitim muslimanskim zemljama. Međutim, stabilna i dobro organizirana Islamska zajednica, koja prepoznaje zahtjeve vremena i mjesta i potrebe vjernika, je najbolja i najsigurnija prepreka svakom ekstremnom islamskom pokretu i ideji u Bosni i Hercegovini. Islamska zajednica nema potrebu da preslikava ili nekritički prihvata bilo čije iskustvo ili praksu tumačenja i primjene islamskih normi, jer posjeduje vlastite resurse, autoritativnost i potrebnu kompetenciju da naučava i primjenjuje izvorni duh i intencije islama i usmjerava poslove muslimana. Istodobno, ona je nužni katalizator različitih utjecaja i osigurava ravnotežu, trasira srednji put i razvija svijest o odgovornosti unutar učenja i interpretacije

izvora islama. U društvenom kontekstu ona podstiče demokratske procese, vladavinu prava, poštivanje vjerskih vrijednosti i potreba, brine se za zaštitu prava muslimana, zalaže se za eliminiranje predrasuda i diskriminacije po osnovu vjere i uvjerenja. Stoga je u interesu države i društva da se omogući nesmetan rad Islamske zajednice kako bi ona bila u mogućnosti vršiti svoju vjersku misiju i podsticala društvenu koheziju. Nije dobro da država vrši bilo kakav pritisak ili se upliće u vjerske rasprave, niti je opravdano očekivati da Islamska zajednica u vjerskim debatama učestvuje po diktatu ili s onih pozicija koje dolaze izvan vjerničkog okvira, odnosno da dobija zadatak i ulogu koju ona treba obaviti od bilo koga izvan Islamske zajednice ili vjernika. Pristajanje na izvanjski diktat ili uslovljavanje je štetno po Islamsku zajednicu, muslimane i društvo u cjelini.

S druge strane, neophodno je da država Bosna i Hercegovina poštuje ljudska prava svih svojih državljana bez obzira na vjeru, naciju i porijeklo, da se drži pozicije neutralnosti i nemiješanja u autonomne poslove vjerskih zajednica. Posebno je važna primjena standarda o ljudskim pravima, prije svega Evropske konvencije o zaštiti ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda, kao i prakse i presuda Evropskog suda za ljudska prava iz Strazbura. Primjera radi, vrlo je korisna presuda Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u slučaju Bugarske, gdje je miješanje države u vjerske rasprave i zauzimanje strane u tim raspravama ocijenjeno neprihvatljivim i suprotno Evropskoj konvenciji o zaštiti ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda. (Vrhovno vjersko vijeće Muslimanske zajednice protiv Bugarske, aplikacija br. 39023/97) Za državne institucije su svi građani jednaki u svom ljudskom dostojanstvu i pravima, a to posebno znači da državni organi moraju imati visok stepen senzibiliteta u pojedinim specifičnim aspektima vjerskog života, te izbjeći neosnovano sumnjičenje grupa i pojedinaca, etiketiranje i netrpeljivost. Potrebna je individualizacija i konkretizacija krivice zakonskih prestupnika, a ne djela pojedinca pripisivati svim članovima grupe ili sljedbenicima određenog mišljenja, kao što se to nerijetko čini. Generalizacija

i postupanje na temelju predrasuda kod oštećenih rađa otpor, osjećaj povrijeđenosti i negativnu reakciju koja može poprimiti različite oblike, posebno ako takva praksa traje duže vrijeme.

Važna uloga medija bit će kvalitetno i produktivno ispunjena ukoliko mediji u svom radu dosljedno primjene odredbe zakona, profesionalne standarde i novinarske kodekse. Zanimarivanje profesionalne novinarske etike i nepristrasnosti u medijskom predstavljanju prijepornih tema i pojava vodi manipulaciji javnosti i stvaranju nezdravog društvenog ambijenta u kojem lakše dolazi do diskriminacije, klevete i kršenja drugih prava. Odražavanje interesa cijele javnosti i predstavljanje ideološki neutralno događaja i pojava je obaveza prvog reda, prije svega, javnih servisa, jer se finansiraju od novca koji plaćaju svi građani.

Zajednička uloga Islamske zajednice, državnih institucija i medija jeste razvijanje duha dijaloga, razumijevanja, poštivanja zakona i temeljnih vrijednosti i standarda ljudskih prava i sloboda. Važno je promoviranje međusobnog povjerenja, dobronamjernost i, ali i uvažanja ingerencija, prava i obaveza. Neprihvatljivo je postavljanje bilo koga na stub srama u cilju njegove diskreditacije, moralne i ljudske kompromitacije. Svi društveno relevantni faktori trebali bi saradivati u područjima zajedničkog interesa, jačanja društvene kohezije i općeg prosperiteta. Zauzimanje suprotstavljenih pozicija i insistiranje na njima, kršenje ličnih sloboda i prava, neprofesionalan i neodgovoran odnos ne vodi rješenju i društvenoj harmoniji. Alternativna vjerska scena ambiciju za društvenim priznanjem treba temeljiti na kvalitetu i vjerodostojnosti sadržaja koje nudi, društvenoj odgovornosti i korisnosti, poštivanju zakona i transparentnosti u radu.



ISLAMIC SCENE
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

TWO DAY COLLOQUIUM ORGANISED BY
ASSOCIATION OF ILMIJJA OF ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IN BIH
AND KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG

FACULTY OF ISLAMIC STUDIES
5TH & 6TH JULY 2011



FOREWORD

In the circles of international officials as well as foreign diplomats in BiH and other public figures within police and security bodies in BiH, and eventually in BiH public there is a misunderstanding when we talk about appearance of new interpretation and practising of Islam. As the terms are not clearly defined, it often happens that we talk about different things but name them using the same term. It is of a common interest to eliminate this confusion and misunderstandings.

We believe that it is the general orientation of the state of BiH, Islamic Community of BiH as well as all citizens of BiH, to have two significant values of our society protected. Firstly, to protect universal human rights of each individual, especially the ones related to religion and religious affiliation and right to personal security of each citizen. And, secondly, to timely and truly inform the public on social appearances and processes of different radicalisms in the current society.

Ilmijja Association of Islamic Community in BiH, in cooperation with Konrad Adenauer Foundation from Sarajevo, has organised two day scientific gathering with topic: ISLAMIC SCENE IN BiH. The aim of a scientific colloquium was to objectively and scientifically present the genesis of appearance of islamist movements in Muslim world with special accent on reflection of these appearances and such teachings and practices in BiH in the past 20 years. Colloquium/gathering was intended for the representatives of the diplomatic services and other international organisations in BiH, media representatives, police and security agencies as well as judiciary and prosecution of BiH.

In this collection ahead of you, we are publishing integral text of all 7 reports that were presented on this scientific gathering as well as the introductory report given by Reisu-l-ulema which officially welcomed this gathering.



DIALOGUE BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND THE KONRAD-ADENAUER FOUNDATION

The Konrad-Adenauer Foundation's (KAS) international work covers a wide range of countries where Muslims are the primary actors in public life. In these countries, the KAS has increasingly focused its attention on the examination of Islam-specific questions and activities. This examination is driven by processes of globalization, which bring about major changes in the political, economic and social spheres. Also relevant is the growing importance of religion in general, and Islam in particular, because it exerts important influences on a given country's political character and affects opportunities for conflict settlement.

Recently, this debate has garnered broad public attention and brought the variety and breadth of forms of Islam into the public consciousness. It would be misleading to suggest that the international work of the foundation has been reduced to a view of Islam as the "other." For example, to adopt the view of Islam vs. modernity, democracy or the Enlightenment would be false. Instead, concepts must be revisited in order to strengthen common ties. We want to internationally promote the goals of democracy, human rights and the rule of law with like-minded partners. Globally, the KAS is primarily focused on political topics. These are principally legal issues that arise from the examination of basic human rights and can range in nature from questions of democracy and constitutions to private legal themes and questions of social order, the global economy or the international community.

We offer opportunities for discussion about the aforementioned topics. Through these conversations, we seek to engage in a fair dialogue in which we clearly and openly represent our positions. Dialogue can occur using various formats and with divergent target groups. Much

depends on primary assumptions and theme. Dialogue with Muslims plays a considerable role. The point is not to label Islam as a capricious religion and the cause of numerous problems. Rather, we position ourselves firmly against the so-called “clash of civilizations.” Our conversations do not begin with the assumption that our dialogue partners hold considerably or completely opposing views. We are convinced that the diversity of opinions and plurality of political and ideological beliefs among Muslims are as numerous as those of Christians, Hindus or Buddhists. As a result, the majority of our projects are not primarily devoted to “*the* Islam,” but rather its representatives: Muslim individuals. The people we work with adhere to specific goals and interests, and it is for these reasons that we have chosen to work with them. The KAS is consistently addressing various “bridging” methods in our international work. These methods are subsequently addressed through fora such as conferences, workshops and publications. Simultaneously, we respond to similar initiatives organized by Muslims. We recognize that there may be different starting points affecting the choice of partners and organization or character of the topics we seek to discuss with one another.

It was within this context that that the KAS and the scholars’ association “Ilimyya” organized a conference called “The Islamic Scene in Bosnia and Herzegovina” at the Faculty of Islamic Studies on June 5th and 6th. Discussions focused on so-called “alternative” aspects of Islam. Even the term “alternative” requires explanation. What does it mean? To what extent are the views of these groups combatible with Islam? Are they compatible with European values? And finally, how is the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina responding to this challenge? These are issues that play an increasing role in the debate about Islam in Europe, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The prospect of European Union membership in Bosnia and Herzegovina is real, and the country has agreed to comply with European standards. Despite

this, there is frequent confusion regarding the extent to which Islam is compatible with the lifestyles of modern European societies. Lack of knowledge leads to stereotypes and cause Islam or certain Muslim groups to be labelled as unfit for democracy. Radical factions or groups exist within Islam, as they do in every religion, and must be taken seriously in order to decrease risks faced by society. However, it is wrong to make sweeping generalizations.

The goal of this publication is to reduce ignorance regarding Islam and inspire a dialogue among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The articles in this publication were developed during the conference and their authors are the leading Islamic scholars in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Contributions examine different forms of Islam from political, cultural and historical perspectives. They provide the reader with a broad spectrum of issues and positions. We wish you enjoyable and thought-provoking reading!

Sabina Wölkner,

Director of the Office of the
Konrad-Adenauer Foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina



INTRODUCTION

Bismillahir-rabmanir-rahim

All people have some views, some visions, they all live in some kind of a world, more or less organised or neglected or uncertain and contradictory but they never live in a totally structureless or non-articulated world. The educated in religion/scholars, *ulemas*, intellectuals are the people that are expected or requested to articulate that world. Current vision of this time should not only be in heritage. The vision needs to be always repeatedly articulated so that every pupil/student takes it as his/her own. Naturally, the scholars, ulemas, intellectuals have a right and obligation, providing that they are brave and persistent, to take over spiritual and intellectual heritage; but they are also obliged to further develop the spiritual and intellectual heritage according to the needs of time and place.

Although it had never been easy to be truly free, *ālim or an intellectual* but it seems to me that this is the most difficult nowadays. I am trying to say that my impression is that a thoughtful, fair and responsible research or studying is not valued. Somehow, the research minds have been alienated from the adopted habits and beliefs. Serious thinking and honest approach to the situation in the community or society challenges issues of peace and stability of certain centres of powers and therefore is safer to keep playing by the rules and go with the flow not to disturb this pleasant peace. Naturally, the questioning minds have always been rejected as they were themselves very much separated from the common and simple state of mind and spirit. Brotherhood of *ulema* that is to say bright and wise people is based on this common virtue of free mind that is possessed by brave and truthful people.

In this process of questioning of the teachers, pupils/students may be unsettled and dissatisfied as they get no answers to questions that

teacher cannot give answer to and they cannot be found in the books. In such a case pupil/student is left to look for replies as the teachers cannot understand them and their motives are obscure and weird to pupils/students and are unclear to them. However those difficult questions cannot be ignored only because they are difficult and for we have no quick and clear answers to them. Scholars, *ulema*, intellectuals must have what others do not have, and that is a persuasive approach and views based on apodictic arguments with no pressure of populist rhetoric. This is the main reason that scholars, *ulema* and intellectuals could have influence on other people, e.g. that they can shape up public opinion. However, bravery of scholars is what brings them recognition but also causes jealousy of less brave minds. There is no science where one learns only as dictated/instructed where all questions are predictable and all answers are already known in advance.

In a free community and democratic society we need to free ourselves from habit that may reduce all people down to spirit of mediocrity. A free community has to be based on the principle of mutual respect and acceptance. A free community must be based on the principle of mutual respect and acceptance and not on the forced spiritual and intellectual levelling. There will be no progress in the community unless it has no diversity. And community has sense if it is created on the principle of confidently research.

In principle, a free community means tolerance of different beliefs since the people are indeed different in their views and opinion. Inside themselves Muslims have different views on significant theological issues whereas they differ from Christians and Jews. In a free society believers are radically different from communists, nationalists differ from internationalists, patriots differ from pacifists. They do not only differ from techniques of the set up goal; they do differ from the goal itself and from ideal they are striving for, and their view of the human being. To some extent these are irreconcilable views. However, even in those discrepancies, basis for living together should be looked for via

tolerance and not via conflicts. But the tolerance has its limits. Namely, once the difference in religion and beliefs becomes a program of action for aggressive negation of a religion and beliefs of other, then one cannot be indifferent to such occurrence. In such a case one needs to take the clear and firm stance in order to protect the right of other. In fact, there is a traditional response for all those who are forcibly imposing their beliefs and that is that the truth will win in the end as written in Qur'an: - *Allah shall in the end show you what the truth is in your diverges*. This divine instruction means that the action or aggression is irrelevant for the truth. This means that the truth finds its own way in spite of all human programs.

But, owing to, I would say an impartial scientific research done in the past 3 centuries, we are offered enormous knowledge that could in this world determine the truth that we strive for in accordance with the facts that we are being presented. That is why some of people are impatient to see the God's final truth. They claim that they have impartial facts that prove unquestionable truth here and now and no God's Help or God's Arbitration is needed for them. They, however, do forget the most important fact and that is that knowing facts is not the same as knowing values. And as Benedetto Croce (Benedetto Croce) rightfully observed: "If the evil was a fact, the evil would have been abolished as serfdom and slavery was abolished". But, the evil is not a scientific fact. The values are not natural objects. We can agree that the education plays a great role in creation of tolerance, but that is not done by scientific education.

Science as the knowledge of the facts promotes a certain kind of pacifism. For more than 3 centuries intellectual ideals have insisted to eliminate the personal from the fact. We were suggested to accept revelation of nature instead of God's Revelation. We were told that doctrines/dogma are beaten by facts or that we should fight dogmas using facts. That would be possible only when a dogma could be one of the facts. Science is armed to fight dogmas using facts, but the science

is not able to deal with dogmas of values or valuable dogmas. In fact, the science cannot define values. That is why those who say science/or impartial science promotes indifference instead of tolerance are right. As the problem of tolerance appears when we talk about human emotions, wishes or preferences. This issue is not being resolved by negation or abolishment of human emotions, desires and affiliations, but in the way that this human and spiritual state gets in balance and reconcile via upbringing and education. Namely, upbringing and education may eliminate prejudices, but that has to be education on values and not the facts. This needs to be upbringing and education of will and not intellect.

For, the people have never been completely united in the contents of their beliefs. And in no man's head/mind all his beliefs are perfectly consistent. However, it is essential that people in their heads/minds have conditions for peaceful relations to different beliefs. That is a postulate of tolerance. It is not certain that we have accepted it as such. As the tolerance is not an indifference. Tolerance was not invented by the indifferent minds. Tolerance shall not survive in such a way. Tolerance has its affirmation. That is another side of tolerance.

There is no freedom without tolerance. That is the rule that is a foundation of a free community and a democratic society. And this means that a man shall not be loyal to community or society if his personal aspiration and beliefs are not respected and if he as a member of community and society has no chance to show his abilities. Everything that violates privacy, violates free choice of acceptance of authority, in other words, the authority. There lies the difference between freedom and oppression. Freedom is not negation of authority or government, but it is confirmation of such a law that is not vital for setting up and keeping privacy. That is peculiar prerogative of freedom to advocate rule of law or presence of law that regulates boundaries of freedom. A free man evokes the law or rule of law as a proof of his readiness to set up the boundaries for his own caprice, whim and spite and this way

manifests his responsibility, his capacity for self-criticism. The law is a proof of his freedom. Accepting to live by the strict laws means slavery, but living without law is chaos and brutality. However, accepting the law or rule of law is a man's freedom. Freedom is not when one has right to unlimited passions. A man is free when he can control his passion, desires and affiliations via self-proclaimed law that provides him freedom of privacy and freedom of conscience. Therefore, it is important to always emphasize that *Sheriat* Law means nomocracy, not theocracy, that *Islām* means tolerance as the highest degree of non-belligerence, that *imān* means security as the highest degree of human freedom, and that *ihsān* means self immolation as the highest degree of solidarity with all good people. That s what we need in upbringing and education to be able to face radicalism, extremisms and violence, illnesses that Muslims suffer the most and because of which other people see them as a cause of unrest and instability in the world.

I believe that this round table will give some responses to some of the hot issues. In the name of this, I wish you success in your work and I thank all participants for their efforts and good will. Selam!

Raisu-l-ulama dr. Mustafa Cerić



Enes Karić

**REFORM GROUPS
AND RADICAL MOVEMENTS
IN THE MUSLIM HISTORY**

A few general and preliminary remarks

Looking from a historical prospective, since the death of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 632 according to Gregorian calendar, gradually started, a confrontation of different views and conflict of opinions in early Islam.

Confrontations and conflicts were of a different nature, but there is general consensus of islamologists that early internal Muslim conflicts were not due to theological but due to political reasons (such as problem of Community leadership).

Generally speaking, the schism among Muslims were, in first place, of political, then cultural and lastly of theological nature (meaning disagreements related to different interpretations of the same Qur'anic text). Also, political reasons were justified by religious and then by theological arguments. Therefore, sometimes it is difficult to distinguish when certain group acts as a political party or as a specific Islamic sect with a separate and distinct theological aspirations and interpretations of the same text of the Qur'an. Also, in the first few decades of early Islam conflicts had formed Muslim sects, the same sects, more and less, that had determined the major part of Muslim history.

Perhaps, it could be said that main streams of Islam that came from the early debates, related to the issue of Muslim community leadership, had never ceased to exist.

In this essay, we begin from the fact that early conflicts in Islam have got new forms during the course of history and they are latently taking place, in modified forms, for almost fifteen centuries of Islam. Muslim history (or "Muslim past") did not pass, but still exists "under the feet of Muslims."

Early political disagreement about the Prophet's heritage

Period from the 632 to the 661 is known as period of "Four Righteous Caliphs (rulers)." Caliphs have succeeded Prophet Muhammad

(PBUH) - of course, not strictly in “the matters of prophethood”, because the revelation of Qur’an was completed, but Caliphs succeeded him in the terms and areas of political, state, economic, ritual and religious organization and set up of the early Muslim community, as well as in terms of interpreting the basic texts of Islam, the Qur’an and later on the Hadith.

During the reign of first Caliph Abu Bakr (Abu Bakr - died 634), there was a political (even armed) revolt of Bedouin tribes, the so-called ar-reddah – outlaws, that has erupted particularly in the province an-Najd. These Arabian Bedouin tribes have embraced Islam, but refused to give zakaat (conditionally “obligatory religious tax”). Central Caliphs authority of Medina quickly defeated the “infidel” tribes (ar-reddah-outlaws). They were treated as such, outlaws, because they denied one of the pillars of Islam – which is tax or zakaat. However, as it will be seen later, these tribes would be regrouping soon, during the time of shift of power of Caliphate from Medina to Damascus, in the year 661.

Early Caliphate (or early Muslim state) has consolidated after caliph Abu Bakr, so that during the time of second Caliph Umar (Umar, was killed 644) it will experience impressive expansion, of not only Caliphate but it meant a spread of Islam as well, and gradually as a culture and a civilization. Caliph Umar was a realistic and pragmatic. In order to preserve the unity of the early Muslim state and community he has banned most prominent companions of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) to leave Medina and the province. Through this measure he prevented a possibility of a decentralized and sectarian activity of the most prominent early members of the Muslim elite.

During the reign of third Caliph Uthmān (who was killed 656) gradually occurred rivalry between his inner trusties, who represented the aristocracy of Quraysh tribe from one side, and the group of Muslim pietist who were gathered around fourth Sunni righteous Caliph Ali b. Abi Talib (Ali ibn Abi Talib, was assassinated 661), on the other side. ¹

1) As we can see, out of first Four Righteous Caliph's, only Abu Bakr died by natural

This conflict would later culminate in some sort of apocalyptic friction among the Muslims that continues until today.

Namely, there are two facts related to the Caliph Ali b. Abi Tālib. First, he was the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), he was married to his daughter Fatima. Second, Ali b. Abi Tālib was fourth elected Caliph. His followers (who are called the Shia) have recognized in his personality not only the title / position of Caliph but the title / position of Imam as well, the supreme religious, spiritual and political leader of the Muslim community.

Shia as a sect (the word means “group”, “supporters”, “advocates”, Party of Ali b. Abi Tālib) arose from the conflict between the Meccan aristocratic circles and the relatives of Caliph Uthmān, on one side, and supporters of Ali b. Abi Tālib, on the other.

Practically, the rule of Caliph Ali b. Abi Tālib has witnessed the Shia appearance as a consequence of their insistence that power belongs solely to Caliph Ali b. Abi Tālib, and then to Hasan and Husayn, his sons that he had with Fātīma, daughter of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), and to their successors in the family lineage. For the Shia, all of them, Ali and his successors, are Imams, in the first place, or the supreme spiritual leaders.

In some way, Shia insist on the spiritual (but also real “blood”) primogeniture of imam’s lineage. It was the reason - in relation to Caliph Ali b. Abi Tālib – that resulted in schism among the early Muslim community, some people call that schism as “the great temptation” (al-Fitnah al-Kubra).

Furthermore, the Meccan aristocracy that gathered around the third righteous Caliph Uthmān had moved later on to Damascus (661). With Muāwiya (son of Sufyān) at the helm they established caliphate known as the Umayyad Chaliphate (from Umayya, Sufyan’s grandfather or great-grandfather of Muāwija).
death, second, third and fourth Caliph were killed in the assassinations organized by rival factions.

Muāwija, the first Caliph of Umayyad dynasty (Banu Umayyah) proved to be politically more shrewd and more skilful than his rival Caliph Ali b. Abi Tālib: During negotiations he had exhausted him in very immoral way, while on the other hand, due to pragmatic reasons, Muāwiyya engaged in military operations Arabian Bedouin tribes (the same one that were previously conquered by Medina Chaliphate).

Broadly, in comparison to overall Muslim, universalistic and inclusive Caliphate of the first four caliphs of Medina, the Umayyad caliphate in Damascus represents “arabization” and “beduinization” of this universally important institution of Islam.²

Then, along came Kharijites (al-Khawārij). Briefly, uncompromising “insurgents” who were against both, Caliph Ali b. Abi Tālib who, in the meantime, has moved his caliphate in Kufa, and Caliph Muāwiyya in Damascus. Their reason for rejection of Caliph Ali b. Abi Tālib could be summed in that they rejected compromises that Ali b. Abi Tālib made in negotiations with rival Muāwiyya. Kharijites were combative, oriented towards populism and republicanism. They considered that Caliph can be anyone chosen by Muslims. They were against dynastic Islam advocated by Umayyad in Damascus, but were also against Shia’s imamate which they considered as a type of hereditary leadership through the chain of Imams, etc.

Three sects of early Islam

From the 656 until the 700, three main political sects of early Islam, with clear profile and historically deeply rooted, came to existence:

- Ahlu s-Sunnah wa-l-jamaat (or Muslim majority that has accepted caliphate in Damascus, accepted succession of caliphs by primogeniture and consider that Muslims should be loyal to caliphs). Practically, this Muslim majority are promot-

2) Abdul-Hamid Ahmad Abu Suleyman showed in his book *The Qur’anic vision* that universalistic spirit of early caliphate of first four Caliphs from Medina had plumped under Umayyad dynasty in Damascus (from 661-750)

ers of political quietism or of conflicts avoiding policy with the authorities. Ahli-s Sunna dynasties mainly characterized the entire history of Islam, since all of the Abbasid in Baghdad (750-1258) Ottoman in Bursa, Edrenama and Istanbul (1299-1924), the Umayyad in Spain, then the Turks Seljuks, etc, were Ahli-s Sunna dynasties.

- The other major sect of Islam are As-shiah (Shiites), or followers of Caliph Ali b. Abi Tālib and several Imams who are his descendants. Shiites believe that Imams should lead the Muslim community. However they disagree in concern of a number of imams that should be followed. Some accept seven, the others twelve Imams, and because of this they are called septimal or duodecimal Shiites. Shiites had their own caliphate in Egypt, called Fātimiye (in Cairo between 909 to 1171), also Safewije in Isfahan came to power 1501 as a Shia dynasty, since then the entire Iran is Shia. Today, Iran is also Shia state. Shia groups now exist in almost all traditional Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, etc.) In Syria, the so-called *Alevi* are in power, although they are prominent minority in that country. In short, there are millions of Arabs and Persians (Iranians) who are Shiites. It is estimated that the Shiites make 8-10% of the total population of Muslims in the world. However, having in mind previous rulers and governments in the Muslim world, the Shiites were almost always the opposition and marginalized, the “loser” groups of Islam.

- Kharijites (Islamic egalitarians), a third influential group of early Islam. Never gained widespread support from the Muslim people. They lived (or still live) as isolated communities in traditionaly Islamic countries and their name is used whenever someone wants to lebel any radical struggle for “Islamic” goals. Kharijites have long been intransigent fighters against all he-

editary caliphates, etc. That is why nowadays radical group al-Qaeda is often called “Kharijites of modern age.” For example, the modern Saudi professor of Sharia law Sheikh Sālih Sadlān called Kharijites Arab veteran who returned from Afghanistan, who were trained by the CIA against the Soviets. Namely, he called them Kharijites because they begun advocating their radical demands towards the royal regime in Saudi Arabia.³

Various other sects and schools of thought in Islam - mystical, esoteric, exoteric...

Of course, Islamic history has witnessed appearance of many other sects and groups, particularly in terms of interpreting the Qur’an and other Islamic sources. Although they have strong religious, cultural and the civilization role, their political influence is negligible if compared to main political sects of Islam. For example, historical Islam has five main madhhab (schools or interpretations of Shariah / religious law). In this sense, Muslims have Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi’i, Ja’fari ... Historical Islam encompasses many zāhiriyy (exoteric) and bātiniyy (esoteric) sects, there are many Sufis and tariqas, hundreds of them, etc. Regarding these sects and schools of thought, it should be stated that they overlap each other a lot. For example, one can be Hanafi (in the application of Sharia law) and the Mevlevi in the Sufi orientation at the same time. Also, one can be simultaneously Hanafi and mu’tazila (or a special kind of rationalist in the interpretation of the Qur’an).

In this regard, through out history of Islam certain amount of tolerance has been observed. But, in principle, one can not simultaneously be Kharijites and Shiites, or Kharijites and Ahli Sunnis. This is where differences and gaps appeared. A number of Islamic sects, groups and movements appeared with the aim of reforming and returning to the earlier, original heritage of Islam. For example, the followers of

3) See: Interview of Sheikh Sālih Sadlān publicized in Saudi magazine *al-Mağallah*, number 868. from 29 September 1996.

Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1797) claim that their movement is reformist, because, supposedly, they remove from Islam Turkish-Ottoman mystical and other additions.

However, all reformers inevitably face question: How to reform? Almost all contemporary radical sects that refer to Islam - have an agenda in its program “of return to the original and authentic Islam.” These groups want to reform the current state of the Muslims with concepts of “true Islam” of the past. Of course, there are reformers who want to reform the Muslims through positive achievements of European heritage. Egyptian reformer Muhammad Abduhu (d. 1905) has many such places in his works. And reformers such as al-Gamāluddīn Afghāni (d. 1897), then Indian and Pakistani reformers Ahmad Bahadur, Sayyed Amir Ali, Chiragh But, Mumtaz But, Fazlur Rahman and others were opened to take positive legacy of Western civilization.

The same Qur’an - different views on organization of Muslim Community

The three earliest Islamic sects: a) ahlu s-Sunna wa-l-gammaa, b) as-Shiah, and c) Kharijites have the same doctrinal beliefs. For example, for the Shia Muslims Karen Armstrong says: “Their difference from the Sunni majority is purely political.”⁴ Hence, these three sects, as three main perceptions of the concept of Muslim community political organization – didn’t become mere history, but it stubbornly survives and lasts until the present day. Among them there is great rivalry of different types and intensities. All three sects acknowledge one and the same Qur’an, but they interpret it differently. These differences have very important political repercussions. Ahli-s Sunnah believe that Muslims should respect authority whether it is dynastic or elected in the elections. Kharijites consider dynastic forms of government betrayal of Islam, particularly emphasizing on Islamic republicanism and egalitari-

4) “Their difference from the Sunni majority is purely political.” Karen Armstrong, *Islam, A Short History*, Phoenix, London, 2002, p. 174.

anism. Shia groups demand that the ruler of the Muslims is also, at the same time, Imam who is from the Prophet's lineage through his daughter and son-in-law Fātima and Ali b. Abi Tālib or is brought up in that tradition, etc. We could go on for hours stating many Ahli-sunni, Shia and Kharijites factions and "micro-sects" during almost fifteen centuries of history of Islam.

If we concentrate on last three or four decades of the XX century and first decade of XXI century, we can mention the following groups or sects claimed to be radical: (Jundullāh) or "God's Army", declared as a terrorist organization by official Iran, where it operates. Judging by ways of its operations it looks as typical neo-khariji micro-sect that seeks to remove the Shia majority from power. We have already said that the Saudi authorities have declared al-Qaeda as neo-khariji group, but it fights against all the Arab Ahli s-Sunnah regimes (whether republican- multiparty, single-party systems or monarchy regimes). Also, the different groups of Islamic Jihad (al-Jihad l-Islami) in the Middle East, in its radical acts have many neo-khariji methods of action,⁵ for in their policies and programs they do not hide that they intend to remove the existing Ahli Sunnis or Shia's regimes through arms. They fight against the influence of the West and the United States in the Middle East, etc. On the other hand, Hezbollah ("Party of God") from Lebanon is a typical Shia's group, designated as extreme and radical sect by the West and Israel. However, Lebanese Hezbollah is formation strongly supported by Shia population of southern Lebanon.

Therefore, at this stage of our essay, it is very important to mention that one must distinguish between the liberation and defense movements from one side and radical and "terrorist" groups, from the other. Johannes Reisner in his article "The militant Islamic groups" (which is written in the eighties of last century) said the following:⁶

5) Compare with Johannes J. G. Jansen Early Islamic movement of Kharijites and modern Muslim extremism; similarities and differencies; translated from English by Enes Karic.

6) Compare with Johannes Reissner, Militant Islamic groups

*"[This discussion] Islamic resistance groups will not be treated, such as those in Afghanistan since 1979 or Moro rebels in the Philippines, whose militancy is not based primarily on the overall ideological claim; boundaries are, of course, variable, sometimes these resistance groups are supported by, or under the influence of militant Islamic organizations."*⁷

In other words, according to Johannes Reissner, for an Islamic group to be declared as a "militant" it must *consider Islam, based on the Qur'an, Sunnah and the model of devout followers, as a total ideology, which still applies to all spheres of life. Totalitarianism and the radicalism of their demands gives them a militant character, regardless of whether they use the force or peaceful methods to achieve their objectives (goals).*⁸

Western analysts of Islam, using above mentioned criteria include the following groups as neo-khariji: Jamāatu-t- Takfir wa-l-Hygra that was established in Egypt, Hizbu tahríri -l-Islam, which has its branches in the West and the Middle East, Tanĕimu l-Gihad in Upper Egypt, and many others.⁹

On the other hand, there are groups that are difficult to classify according to the old clichés. Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are radical formation which is firmly oriented towards Islam of Ahli-s-Sunnah, although they have neo-khariji elements and methods of operation, etc.

Also, Muslim Brotherhood(al-l-ihwānu muslimiin), which operates throughout the Middle East and Western Europe, is often found in the classifications that have in its perspective radicalism and militancy. However, the main streams of this movement have never been radical, and certainly not militant, but Muslim Brotherhood expellees have accepted militancy and radicalism. Today, Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East is recognized as a constructive partner in the com-

7) Ibid

8) Ibid

9) See about this and other groupies who are labeled as radical: Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, The Trail of Political Islam*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002.

munity, sometimes as members of parliaments, and in others as very hardworking non-governmental organizations. Indeed, in the literature a large number of Muslim and Islamic groups are nowadays labeled as radical or militant, for example: *fidāiyān-i Islam* (Iran), *ḡamāati Islam* (Pakistan), *ḡamāatu l-Gihad* (Egypt), *tanēimu l-Gihad* (Egypt) etc. etc.

The reasons why these and the previously mentioned groupings appeared during the XX and XXI century, most of them alluding on Islam, is in the following:

- Feeling of defeat and political hopelessness prevails, from colonial times onward, over large number of poor people in the Arab and Islamic world. Defeats in war with Israel led to a reactive phenomenon
- The emergence of diverse ideologies which are labeled as “Islamic” and “radical.” “Islamic radicalism” is largely a reactive phenomenon.
- A failure of Arab elite, regimes and states to solve political and economic problems of their countries is a source of radicalization of the population. (Where the state is successful and where there is a democratic government there is no “blossoming” of radical groups. For example, the public of Turkey, Indonesia or Malaysia are not labeled by any radical group, or they are kept to a minimum and marginalized.)
- Many segments of the traditional Muslim societies clash with an aggressively secularized environment which in itself represents a strong source of radical ideas. Namely, aggressively secularized environment reminds traditional Muslims of the period of colonialism and Western domination.
- A desire to reform practical Islam of the time according to a model of ideal forms of an “original Islam” leads some groups towards totalitarian ideology and actions.

ISLAMIC SCENE IN B&H

- Inexistence of an effective and democratic state among the Arab countries, which would protect its citizens (and thus the Muslims), is a source of great frustration. That frustration leads to radical ideas and radical ideas to violent behavior.
- The violent exercise of power by corrupt westernized elites in Arab and some other Islamic countries is a major source of radical ideas. Islam is seen, by opposing and “radical” groups, as an ideology of “revolution”, and as a theology of “liberation”.
- Some Muslim groups and movements are trying to accept “that new and foreign (Western)” as Islamic, while others are rejecting it as non-Islamic. That is a great source of radical ideas and interpretations of Islamic heritage.
- Also, a large number of Muslim sects are trying to find contemporary meaning in the Islamic sources, especially in the Qur’an. It causes a sparks between the traditions of the past and the requirements of modernity.

Muhamed Jusić

**ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY AND
THEIR PRESENCE IN BIH**

There are several theories in the world's scientific and analytical circles, about the appearance and the rise of what is called "Islamist movement" in the Muslim world in the twentieth century. So we have a significant number of those who see in Islamist movements only attempt to create an ideological counterpart to the then dominant conflicting ideologies of capitalism and communism and their versions who have been fighting for control of that rich part of the world. Others see root of the whole phenomenon long before in the frustrations of the Muslim world because of the lag in all after technical and scientific superior West and the consequences of brutal colonization, which is that part of the world tried to impose a system of thought and values that they considered foreign and therefore they decided to return to their own traditional values generally based in Islam in order to develop their own vision of revival and renovation that would guarantee the prosperity and welfare.

Those who advocate a synthesis of these two reasons believe that Islam, especially after the political collapse of the ideals of Arab nationalism, served as the basis for ideological forms of the twentieth century. This new ideology, they often call "Islamism", hence there is already established term "Islamistic", not Islamic movements. Everyone today specially in the West who uses the term Islamism is trying to emphasize the difference between it and traditional Islam as just another more religious system. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of confusion about exactly what Islamism really means. Thus, for example, in a debate organized by the Middle East Forum in 1990 several different definitions of Islamism had been given.

For example, according to John Esposito, Islamism is in fact "Islam interpreted as an ideology to support political and social activism." Professor Martin Kramer researcher at the University of Tel Aviv said in a statement that "it is Islam as it was reformulated as a modern ideology. Whereas Islam in fact traditionally originated in category of Judaism and Christianity, Islamism is a response to the ideology that appeared

in the modern West - such as communism, socialism or capitalism.” Gruh Fuller, advisor to the RAND Corporation believes that “Islamism is largely synonymous of political Islam - the attempt to derive from Islam solutions for the modern state, social and political problems.” There are those, particularly among the Islamists, who believe that it is not a new kind of ideology rather than merely trying to reform Islam, which according to them was never just a religion but a complete system of life, which includes both, state and social system based on its principles. This had certainly come with what is called “political Islam” with all its models from that one which advocates “reform from within” (through the existing political system) to one that is more revolutionary and ready to use violence to achieve its goal.

Understanding of another group of scholars, such as Oliver Roy is very interesting. He states that Islamist movements and the occurrence of those most radical among them, where they consider some *Salafi* movements by “westernization and globalization of Islam”. So he believes it is “wrong to assume that the phenomenon of religious radicalism (under this term he is mostly thinking of *Salafism*), and political radicalism (“Al Qaeda”) only imports from the culture and conflicts of the Middle East. These appearances are primarily consequences of globalization and Westernization of Islam. Today’s religious revival is primarily characterized by the separation of culture and religion, whatever that religion was. This explains the mutual affinity of the American Protestant fundamentalism and Islamic *Salafism*: both reject culture, philosophy even theology, in favor literally reading of religious texts and direct understanding of truth through individual faith, on detriment of educational and religious institutions.

“When it comes to the reason of spread and the influence of “Islamist movement”, many analysts see the poverty, hopelessness, undemocratic, tyrannical regimes ruling for a long time, so that the only real alternative and opposition were Islamist movements, until recent developments in so-called “Arab Spring”, whose humanitarian, educa-

ISLAMIC SCENE IN B&H

tional and opposition activity often received significant support of the Muslim masses who are traditionalist and looking for social changes that will bring them prosperity without questioning the fundamental social values.

In Communist Yugoslavia, Muslims were placed under some sort of ideological glass bell which largely kept them isolated from the ideological and other turmoil in the rest of the Muslim world. That glass bell was broken in the flame of war that occurred in the former Yugoslavia after the collapse of the communist regime. Muslims in this area, primarily Bosniaks who were representing the significant portion of Islamic community in that time, and their religious community did not have enough time to gain the necessary experience and knowledge in order to cope with the invasion of ideas, ideologies, sects and other social phenomena inspired by Islam who splashed Bosnian society destroyed by the war. Due to half a century isolation to which Bosnian Muslims were subjected, they have not been able as a community in the early years of the war and postwar to develop some kind of “immunity” on an ideological interpretation of Islam, nor to form a clear attitude towards pluralism within the Islamic thought. This process is now largely ongoing and it is up to Islamic community at home and in the diaspora, where similar processes have been recorded, to find models which will in the spirit of the principles of Islamic pluralism preserve their identity and to keep Muslims from religious and ideological adventures. Time will show are they and how going to succeed.

There is no doubt that of all the movements and sects in the Islamic world, whose teachings were swept the coast of traditional Bosnian Islam greatest attention was drawn by the *Salafi* movement (popularly known as the *Wahhabis*). Due to the number of its adherents, but also incidents in which they were participated in the last decade, the movement has attracted significant media attention to their activities.

Salafis (ar. *salaf*, predecessors of the first generation of Muslims) or the Islamic traditionalist movement created around the teachings and actions of Muhammad ibn Wahhab (1703-1787) reformer from the Arabian Peninsula. Despite they are well known in our country and in the world as *Wahhabis* (the founder of the movement, Abdul-Wahhab), followers of this movement do not accept that name. Moreover, one of their key teaching is opposition to the cult of personality.

This is a movement that insists on the preservation of the Islamic doctrine of monotheism and opposing to all innovations in the Muslim practice and teaching, what is evident from only a quick review of only the titles of the books that are printed and distributed among them. They see themselves as a movement aspiring to return to the original teaching of the Qur'an - the holy book of Muslims, the *Sunnah* (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) and the practice of the first generation of Muslims.

Salafi movement in BiH since the time of the war, when the volunteers coming from the Arab world started to spread its teachings among Muslim boys and girls, experienced a gradual ideological transformation that even the members of the movement were not aware of. Although this ideological transformation was conditioned by Bosnian social circumstances, a far greater impact had global trends, especially developments in the parent movement in Saudi Arabia. Despite of that *Salafis* have seen as unified and monolithic community, today they are one of the Islamist movement with the highest number of clashed fractions, most of them have its own vision of Islamization of the world and the societies in which they operate. One thing is common for all of them, they think of themselves as the only consistent followers of the *Sunnah* (practice of Prophet Muhammad) and they interpretation of Islamic tradition as only valid. Through detailed analysis we can identify four main fractions in the Muslim countries (and this is reflected in the branches of the movement in BiH) who fight for dominance within the movement generated around the teachings and actions of reformer

from the Arabian Peninsula, Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. Formal and official stream, which enjoy the support of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia are *es-Selefijjetu taklidijjun* – traditional conservatives who were very apolitical, and who claim that the militant *Salafis* like Osama bin Ladin are “only making disorder on earth.”

Selefijjetu-to-sahva (sahva - wake up) or *Salafi* reformists are the direction that enjoy the greatest support among *Salafis* in the UK, and in abroad. They advocate the Islamisation of society through gradual reforms, education and ideological confrontation with secularists and westernized liberals. They are against the violent methods and constantly evolving their attitudes by adopting more open and liberal values atypical for Salafi tradition.

Selefijjet-ul-Jihad-Sher`i, or *jihadists*, “legal *jihad*” represent military wing of *salafism* who consider fighting as a strict religious duty of every Muslim, but only when and where the Muslims are attacked and where the enemy is clearly defined (as the trouble spots around the world in which they counted and Bosnia during the last war). The most extreme form of *Salafi* ideology has evolved under the influence of militant Islamist movements from Egypt who on Afghan battlefields and training camps combined *Salafi* religious conservatism with ideas of *Takfir* (declaration of Muslim communities and individuals who live in them infidel, or non-believers) and we can classify them into a group *Selefijjetu al-Jihad al-Takfir* and international jihadists tend to *Takfir*. After September 11, these militants under unwitting support of global media have become the only exponents of Islamic militarism and almost completely suppressed the idea of the *Mujahideen* “legitimate *jihad*” opponent to terrorism that were until then considered only as the “freedom fighters”. Synonym for this militant group has become the famous Al-Qaeda organization. All this turmoil in the mainstream movements has influenced the *Salafis* in Bosnia and the Bosniak diaspora, so that we have today among them a lesser or greater number of representatives of each of the previously mentioned factions.

Recently, due to increasing pressure from security agencies *Selefi-jetu al-Jihad al-Takfir* is mostly focusing only on the polemical debates with other *Salafi* organizations, but also with other Islamic authorities over the issue of *Takfir* and acceptance or rejection of laws that are not divine or that have been passed in the democratic legislative procedure, and thus the whole relationship of Muslims towards a democratic society and its institutions.

Those who advocate *Takfir* calling this concept *Tevhidul-hakimije* or belief in God's monotheism in the power which is belief that Muslims should not accept any other than God's law, and therefore should not respect any law that is not from Him.

Teaching of *Tevhidul-hakimije* rests on a very simple and theological argumentation, according to it Islam teaches that God is One, absolute Ruler and Lord, who only prescribes what is good and what is evil. Being a Muslim means to submit to the will of God and organise one's life in accordance to the standards of good and evil that God provides. This alignment is not only at the level of ethical and moral, personal and private but also collective life, which involves the organization of society and the state in accordance with the norms of the *Sharia* and for them *Sharia* represents only a fixed set of traditional punishments (ar. *hudud*) and not the system of values from which derived the various legal methods and regulations and laws. From this point, every Muslim who is satisfied to live in a society regulated with standards different from those they see as Islamic ceases to not be a Muslim anymore because he chosen a value system that is not Islamic. That kind of person accepted that someone else besides God prescribes to him standards of good and evil, which is like heresy and worshipping other god but One. At the same time, any participation in democratic and political processes through a nominee in political parties or a mere support system through voting, or accept the state court that is not based on *Sharia* is violating God's right to prescribe what is good and what is

bad or adopting laws (what is been done in parliamentary procedure by passing laws about what is permissible and what is not).

Some authors who have written about this doctrine see the roots of this interpretation of religion in the first sects the first years after the Prophet's death. They were *Harijets* who had according their theological doctrine declared the majority Muslims as non-believers because of committing great sins. Contemporary advocates of *Takfir* do not consider committers of major sins as unbelievers, but, as we explain before only those Muslims who do not believe in *Tevhidul-hakimije* it the way they interpreted it. So we find that within *Selefi* branches but also within academic circles they call them *Harijets* or *neo- Harijets*, aiming their disqualification.

Others can remember the mid-seventies of the last century, when the world public was shocked by the brutality of Egyptian most radical militant movements *Jem'at al-Takfir ve-l-Hijra*, in which others see the roots of the modern movement *Takfir*. Members of these organizations have declared their fellow Muslim, who were recently sharing their opinion as infidels and moved on into an open fight that did not refrain from using the most brutal methods of terrorizing civilians. They were infidel members of the political and ideological movement the Muslim Brotherhood, who came from the Egyptian regime attempted to quell their opposition, often after long years spent in horrible prisons, convinced that a society in which they live is so moved away from the Islamic principles that could not be longer considered as a Muslim, as well as those who were satisfied with life in such environment. After bloody murders of opponents and categorical action of Egyptian government and the wide public diminished and moved away from social reality. As an organized structure has ceased it existence. Most followers were killed or publicly distanced themselves from the attitudes of the founders of the movement, young agronomists Shukry Mustafa, but the idea of *Takfir*, considering the other Muslims unbelievers for accepting to live in according to them non- Islamic states has survived.

Takfir has survived in the ideological baggage of Arab mujahedin who participated in the Afghan struggle against Soviet occupation. It is in the fighting trenches Afghanistan's mountainous cliffs, that this idea has found fertile ground among the members of another movement that had very little in common with the Muslim brothers, among the *Salafi* movement from Saudi Arabia who came as volunteers to join brothers in Afghanistan in "the Jihad against the Soviets. " *Takfir* is re-incarnating this time in the outlaws from the official *Salafi* teachings or in some way it bobbins, and his followers began to claim for himself that they are the only true supporters and followers of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and his first followers were known as the "*Ikhwan*" they believe that the Saudi ruling family used them to come to power and then abandon.

Due to the fact that the *Salafi* movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina came along with the Arab volunteers, very often those who in Afghanistan were in contact with carriers of ideas of *Takfir*, which in that time still was in its beginning, traditional Bosnian Muslim community was again targeted by another Islamist ideology. It should be mentioned here that among the Arab volunteers from Detachment (later unit) *El-Mujahedin* who fought on the side of the BiH Army in the war, were considered to be base of *Salafi* teachings, their official ideology was closer to opponents of official Saudi *Ulama* than those followers of *Takfir*. Those who were prone to ideas of *Takfir* kept their attitudes for themselves, or did not join this formation. Individuals who were carrying the idea of *Takfir* which will later terrorist organization Al-Qaeda rely on never succeeded to impose their views to larger number of fellows. Some see this as a reason why Al-Qaeda and its ideological leadership have never given, at least through press releases, provided significant support to this type of engagement of Islamist volunteers. For them, in fact, it was unacceptable that they were fighting in the ranks, despite of the autonomy they had, along with official military that fought for the secular and democratic state.

By dissolution of the *Al-Mujahideen* and departure from Bosnia of its key ideologues and the opening of old and new *Salafis* in Bosnia towards other directions within *Salafism*, primarily through the Internet and contacts with the Muslim world and the BiH Diaspora, there has been a significant expansion of the idea of *Takfir* among Bosnian *Salafis*. In addition, the reality of *Salafi* movement in BiH includes the imitation of changes within the parent movement in the world and applying that on Bosnian space. Thus, the organizational and ideological strengthening of the rogue *Salafis* who advocate the incompatibility of Islam and democratic order of society, have found their supporters among the new generation of young Bosnian origin *Salafis*. Today, in the web site regulated from the unknown location of those who claim that they are the only correct *Salafis*, we can read the press releases in which the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina is declared as no believing, a prayer led by the imam who advocates or urges the believers to participate in democratic elections and in civil society incorrect. For the first time it could meet boys who do not recognize the laws of BiH, the court or who do not want to possess identity documents of BiH or any other state. It was initiated and inner *Salafi* debates on many Internet sites and forums.

While various aspects of the *Salafi* movement draw most of the media attention, numerous other sects and islamic movements that call themselves islamic movements are at work amongst Bosnian Muslims in BiH, and its diaspora. For some time *Ahmediyya Muslim Jamaat* is trying to register as a religious group in Bosnia, and have already registered their own masjid in Sarajevo. They are in the Diaspora even more active since *the Ahmadiyya* in the EU have a strong and developed network of the *Jamaats*. Only in Germany they now have 25 mosques built with plans in the near future to build 100 mosques only in this European country in order to spread his teachings in it. In other parts

of the world, where the *Ahmadiyya* act, often are recorded conflicts between them and the followers of traditional Islamic teachings, even *Ahmadiyya* are called on Islam, their doctrine most of the traditional Muslim authority consider opposite to fundamental principles of Islam. *Ahmadiyya*, were founded in India 1889th by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) from Kadijana - which is why the followers of this sect is also called *Qadianis*.

What most resent Muslim authorities criticize *the Ahmadiyya* is their teaching that Mirza Ghulam is in fact prophet and that Prophet Muhammad is not the last prophet what is one of the fundamental teachings of Islam. The same case is with modified teaching that Mirza Ghulam is expected *Mahdi* and that "the soul of Jesus and Muhammad are appeared in the form of a man and this man is Ahmed Mirza," what often creates tensions within the Muslim communities around the world from Indonesia to Western Europe.

Besides *the Ahmadiyya*, in BiH, the other organization appeared named *Behaija* who, however did not act under the name of their sect but rather through the projects aimed at bringing peace through the current education system in BiH. It should be noted that *the Ahmadiyya* and *BEHAIJA* advocate for peace dimension of Islam.

As for the *Shia* influence, which is also another challenge for the BH Muslims, in the contest of preventing invasion of counterproductive ideology (sectarian, revisionist, and those that promote the politicization of religion and ideological interpretation of Islam) and in terms of revealing one for the Muslim religious circles long time unknown culture and civilization, there would experience of the Muslim world in which the interaction of Shiites and Sunnis is historical reality be useful. In addition to numerous state institutions and projects supported by the Iranian government there is a large number of non-governmental *pro-Shia* organizations among Bosnian Muslims who are trying to spread *Shiite* teachings and their own vision of Islamic history, especially the first period of division within the Muslim com-

munity which led to the emergence of *Sunnism* and *Shiism*. Bosnian Muslims, perhaps with the reason show they concern and because of these proselytic actions of some *Shiite* organizations especially because of the traumatic experience of bloody *Sunni-Shiite* conflict in history. In this context we should not neglect activities of various Islamist movements, and educational institutions based in Turkey who for period of time play a very important role in the organization of religious life among some Muslim communities in Southeast Europe, and whose presence in BiH is getting stronger, such as numerous *neo-Nakshibendi Tarika*, *Nurji*, *Sulejmanji* or followers of Fethullaha Gulen. There are also *Muslim Brotherhood*, *Tahriries*, *Tabligies*, *neo-Muteziles*, modified *Sufi Tarika* who have their *sheikh* from Malaysia to Cyprus, as well as modernist with various backgrounds and teachings that is rarely written about them, and whose views are rarely analyzed because the focus of the public is kept only on those movements that represent a security challenge, or whom by their teachings and actions are questioning the legal system and constitutional order of the state.

Mustafa Spahić

**SOCIO-POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
RADICALISM APPEARENCE**

By the God's will, the Provisions, Powers and Measure of Knowledge, the Freedom precedes Revelation, Declaration precedes the Faith and believing, Faith precedes Religion, Religion precedes Ethics and worshipping and Ethics to Politics and Aesthetics. "We have offered the Heavens, Earth and mountains, the Emanet (Revelation) and they have refrained from carrying it, as they feared it, but the man took it and accepted it-the man is trully cruel and ignoramus" (Qur'an, 33: 72). That is why the freedom is the first substance, first quality, characteristic and determinant of a human and people: "If your Lord willed so, all creatures on the Earth would have believed! Would you then (Muhammad) force people to become believers? ! Since no soul believes without Allah's permission, and He defiles those who do not want to think"(Qur'an, 10: 99 and 100). "Say, the truth is from the Lord, so whoever wills so, let him believe in liberty, and whoever wills not, let him disbelieve. We have prepared the fire for the tyrants."(Qur'an, 18: 29). "Our faith and belief has no force and there it trully distinguishes the path of understanding from delusion, and the one who denies the Devil, and believes in Allah-that one has grabbed the rope and got the strongest link, it will never break up, and Allah hears and knows everything . '(Qur'an, 2: 256). "Surely this is a Warning and Revelation, and the one who wills in freedom, will choose the path to his Lord. And you'll want only what is the will of Allah, Allah trully knows everything and is trully Wise" (Qur'an, 76: 293). "I swear by this city that you Muhammad will be free in it." (Qur'an , 90: 1). The first and archetypal source of radicalism is to oppose the Revelation to Freedom, Religion to Faith, Ethics and worshipping to Religion and Aesthetics and Politics to Ethic. The first thing that God gives to freedom to decorate it and complete is Revelation. So, as the content of any Revelation is the Truth, it is also that shape, frame and manner in which the truth given by God in the Revelation is Freedom. The first substance, the first content, first fill, the first bit, the heart and soul of freedom are Revelation and faith based on it. An exclusive content of Revelation and faith that are

offered in the form and code of freedom are: truth, justice, fairness, ordinance, system, order, law, values, principles, policies, criteria, categories, courts, well, instructions, warnings, advice, medicine, sign, encouragement, motivation, goal, purpose, and the solution for a human being and the people. Freedom, in its pure and primaevial destiny is God's form, frame, shape and space to which the Revelation is given and brought down; and Revelation with its truth and instruction fills out and ennobles the space of freedom. The Freedom is actually a form, shape, frame, or the air of life whereas the faith is contents, meaning and definition of life. What the shell represents to an egg, nut or hazelnut, skin to a body, body to a soul, air, rain, light, time and space for all living beings and creatures, the same applies to freedom to Revelation, faith, religion, ethics, culture, law, politics and aesthetics. Without freedom and Revelation, faith, religion, ethics, culture, law, politics, the Constitution, laws and aesthetics are dead capitals deeply buried into the ground that people can not find or if they find them they can not promote them and witness them in the right manner.

Why? Because without freedom, nor Revelation, nor faith, nor religion, nor worshipping nor ethics nor laws have air to breathe and space to move. We emphasize that the truth is the contents and the inner dimension of Revelation and the freedom is a form, frame, space, or the external dimension of that same Revelation. Without Revelation and faith that follows from it, the freedom never has the truth and contents FOR life but contents FROM life. And without freedom revelation and faith have no form, shape, air, space and external dimensions. That is why the freedom is condition of Revelation, revelation is content of freedom, Revelation is source of the truth and condition of faith, faith is condition of religion, religion is condition of worshipping, ethics and culture whereas ethics is condition of politics and aesthetics.

The truth based on religion gives life to every culture, and a lie causes the death of every culture. All relationships, connections and communication between people are based on the truth whereas a lie

poisons, destroys and breaks relationships, connections and communication between people. In the law, the truth is fundamental and the highest legal standard, beyond which there is no other higher one, and the truth is foundation for the justice, law, equity, legal community and healthy society. As Imam Abu Hamid al Ghazali said only the truth is beautiful because it is timeless, indelible and indestructible. The reality, no matter how large and diverse it is, it is only beneficial as it is ephemeral. As noted by Ibn Hasm people can burn the papers, books and documents, but they can never destroy the ideas on which the life rests. An objective history of mankind according to Ogist Kontu is history of ideas.

The history of the world and mankind according to Hegel is nothing but a global movement of the global spirit towards freedom in which the spirit passes through three periods: boyhood state, when only an individual is free, youthhood state when you have free groups of privileged and chosen people, and maturity state of the spirit when you have free citizens. As according to physics, the essence of substance is weight and volume, for Hegel, the substance of spirit is freedom. According to the teachings of religion, faith is the content, purpose, meaning and value of life and freedom is space, frame, form, shape, and the air of life. Therefore, the first, the basic, the hardest and most dangerous source of single, dual, separate (group) and general (social) radicalism is disassembling and opposing freedom as space, frame, shape and air of life to Revelation that via the truth, instruction and faith gives content, value, purpose and meaning of life. Without freedom of faith there is never space and air, and without faith, freedom never has content, meaning, purpose, value. Oswald Spengler in his "Decline of the West," notes that the archetype of every culture lies in religion and that religion is the soul of every culture. No matter what's true and that the faith is inner and freedom is an external dimension of Revelation, today's human beings as vast majority live Dejjal time / or one-eyed, one-dimension time. The West from humanism /it refers to

a significant number of people, it is undeniable and obvious/ lives the absence of a revelation, faith, religion, laws, worshiping/rituals, ethics based on religion, which is inevitably becoming only a bonton/ etiquette, it lives the absence of transcendence, metaphysics and eschatology. This inevitably leads to forgetting God, forgetting of existance, infinity, unity of world and life as reality is being considered only what is expressed by mathematical formulas and that is being tested in laboratory experiments, forgetting the content, meaning, purpose and goal of the world and life that according to the Max Weber is only given by religion; also it leads to forgetting the supeme other and life, as well as any metaphysical and supernatural origin and meaning of life. This is the Freedom from Freedom from the standpoint of the overall dimensions of the inner life which itself has the consequence of all the inner radicalisms: apotheosis, individualism and egoism, positivism and scientism, greed, selfishness, lust and instinct. Mabli says that people have become blind since the property and interests got connected with delusions. The source of various radicalisms is absolutization of private property in the early and pure capitalism and the absolute negation of private property through expropriation and nationalization in the so-called social or collective ownership without titulars in the pure communism. For a property without titulars Aristotle has shortly replied to Plato - "What is everybody's, is noone's". In societies of collective or common property, the main challenge or problem is not stealing, but the destruction of property, because it can not be legally possessed. The main challenge, radicalism and extremism where private property and assets are unquestionable, the sanctity and a part of the fundamental rights is moneygrubbing, greed, and selfishness. The ABCs of sociological theory includes the claim that in developed societies and civilizations poverty occurs and breeds in abundance and concentration of capital in individuals and the poverty of the majority. Revelation of Qur'an orders: "The poor, beggars and the oppressed have the right (hakk) in the assests of the rich" (Qur'an, 70:24, 25).

From the standpoint of Islam, it is never that the rich give, nor the poor, beggars, orphaned, oppressed, disabled take, but the wealthy who obtained their property in a halal way (permissible manner earned) within imperative and institutional cooperation, solidarity and facilitation are fulfilling their religious and social duties whereas the poor, orphans, the oppressed, disabled, beggars are exercising their rights guaranteed by the God. At any time and any nation, social or class polarization where you have the majority of poor and minority of extremely rich there is a "fertile" ground for various kinds of radicalisms, rebellions and class revolution were occurring in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Faced with streams of blood and thousands of dead, which were the result and consequence of the French political revolution in 1789, Sen Simon will say that the property law is the fundamental law of the social building. Law that strengthens that unit or private property is the most important of all, in fact, it is the property constitution and it is the basis of social building in reality. The largest challenge and most important question the property constitution needs to answer to is how to make natural resources and benefits become good and benefit of all people/within social justice, solidarity, cooperation and facilitation/. There are two answers and two ways out. First, the abolition of private property through expropriation and nationalization and this leads to communism whereas radicalisms of communism are parasitism, destruction of property and destroying the economic motives for work and contribution. The second response and the way out that property constitution offers, is the path that capitalism with a human face has taken and it is maintaining and inviolability of private property with a rigorous, systematic and comprehensive tax policy so that they can help and serve the disabled and non-productive categories of population with collected taxes. Now going back to Islam and Muslims, regardless of the fact that Islam is a synthesis and balance of faith and law in freedom and that the freedom is a frame and outer/external dimension of revelation, Muslims, more or less all over the world, live in

outer non-freedom. It is for Muslims freedom from freedom from the standpoint of the overall dimension of external life. Since it is impossible to have policies, institutions, organizations, order, system, science, civilization without freedom, the Muslims compared to other nations of the world live non-political, unsystematical, disorganized, unscientific and non-civilised political life. At the level of the world spirit, said in Hegelian way, the Muslim political spirit within the active being, is at the child's age; in a political sense speaking only some individual Muslims in the Muslim world are free and politically active. This means that with Muslims the institution or bodies, systems, forum, order, do not function at full capacity but almost all power, norms, laws (although Muslims believe that the source of norms, laws, principles is God) go through individuals, and this incompatibility all until 2011 and events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, did not bother the Muslims. Even when it comes to social justice, Muslims do not pay full attention to the Prophet's words that poverty is half infidelity. Although a large number of people in the West believe that they themselves are the source of norms without God, and with them all norms live and are maintained through the institutions and bodies. And this is what with Western man develops an enormous normative awareness and culture. Regardless of the fact that Muslims believe that God is the source of norms, as their all institutions, bodies, systems are in the absence of public civil and political liberties dead, Muslims do not have sufficiently developed normative awareness and external cultures. In order to have people develop normative culture, you must first develop a normative awareness and commitment in those who govern. And to have normative awareness with those who govern, there must be a full political capacity of functional authorities, bodies and institutions. In the absence of political freedoms, functioning of institutions, bodies and organs, as well as absence of normative awareness among officials and the normative culture of the people, some Muslims turn to radicalism:

ISLAMIC SCENE IN B&H

- the first become servile and loyal to the managers as real vassals, and are not loyal to the institutions nor they respect the law but the will of those in power;
- the second take direction of sort of extreme radicalism and violence and terror, where over the set target or ideal they justify the use of all, even violent means.

They forget that Islam is not jesuitism of Ignatius of Loyola, according to which the goal justifies the use of each means. According to Islam there must be simultaneously both, a valid goal and means to reach the goal. There is no such a goal and ideal that may be reached using forbidden means. Therein lies the challenge and danger of forgetting God. Forgetfulness of God inevitably leads a man and people to crossing borders and entering the field of restrictions. According to Sheriat Law, or basic law of Islam, all things are allowed unless prohibited /haram, or opposite to Sunnah-makruh. The very word haram has basic meanings: a) the haram is what God has expressly forbidden, *haram* means holiness, unquestionable, untouchable. From the viewpoint of Islam the following are indisputable: the life of the people, the faith of the people, mind, intellect and consciousness of people and that is why Islam forbids alcohol, drugs and vices. Then, honor and dignity of people property, progeny, the right to work and commerce, movement, education, science and knowledge are unquestionable. The basic aspiration and intention of the bans in relationships between people from the viewpoint of Islam is to avoid and prevent bad and dangerous effects on man and society in this or that world's perspective, to protect the rights, property and values and people from one another. Not entering the field of restrictions, the man keeps himself from himself, keeps others away from himself and keeps himself from others. For example, a man for whom prostitution is forbidden/haram will never infect other people with either gonorrhoea or syphilis or AIDS. On the other hand, prostitution *Ez-Zinah*, between two persons/*insan* puts down to only two sexual organs who do not care for descendants or continuation of

humankind. On the third point of view, all the cultures of the world are based on slavery to God, worshipping/rituals and prohibitions. Out of the ten commandments of God in the Old Testament, seven are prohibitions: do not swear falsely, do not kill, do not commit adultery, do not steal, do not falsely witness against your closest, do not wish for the wife of your closes, do not wish for your closest's property. According to Islam one must not testify falsely at anyone, as well as wish for anyone's wife except his own and want anybody's property other than his own.

The question is whether the world and human life is possible without these prohibitions in the Old Testament and all the published books? Also, the animals because they are animals nothing is forbidden, but they unlike the people have no culture. Today's West, a large number of people in the West live a life without content, pith and core of liberty, in other words they live life without faith and ethics whereas Muslims live life without form, frame, air of faith that is to say without freedom. As Muslims would not know what to do with freedom if they are allowed it, as well as with politics, science, civilization, institutions, systems, legal order and the order, also the West does not know what to do with faith, ethics and values, although they have the institutions. This is for all is relative. While the West lives a life of freedom without God's standards with earthly institutions and policies, Muslims live a life without freedom, politics, order, system, order and earthly forms. And a life without shape or form or established procedure, is uncertain, difficult and unpredictable. Thus, the West does not live the faith and ethics based upon it, and Muslims do not live freedom and a policy based on it. Therefore, it is not difficult for the corrupt and demagogues to scare Muslims with western freedoms, politics, democracy, institutions and bodies. Whereas, the Westerners are scared by islamic faith and ethics, and it's really all just about the internal and external dimension of revelation-faith and freedom. That is the job and time for the Dajjal, One-Dimension Man, that scares/intimidates people with

each other and with both internal and external dimension of Revelation. The radicalization of a man is impossible until he is reduced to one dimension, and then it is said: A man is only a creature of faith, religion, confession, gender, clan, tribe, people, nation, race, country, continent, language, culture, emotion, feelings, remembrance, memory, intellect, mind, sanity, consciousness, moral, ethics, politics, labor, practice, social production, feelings, perception, apperception, imagination, vision, articulated speech, managing, governing, behaviour, self-consciousness, instincts, passions, lust, vices, invention, innovation, creation, intuition, community and society. These are just the qualities, characteristics, patterns and manifestations with a man and people of different nations in different times and places, that more or less get expressed but are not basic and essential points and essence of a man. The man is essentially a divine creature that lives in the community and society with these donated characteristics. Claims said over the last three centuries that a man is primarily or even only a being, with senses/feelings, intellect, mind, will and social practice through the work and being of instincts, vices and passions, did not make any step forward and elevation of a man but the apotheosis of the senses, intellect, mind, will, vice and passion. When a man is reduced only to any individual gift and characteristics: faith, religion, ethics, mind, intellect, and senses, he is not developing and refining but pitbulizira. Within the socio-political analysis of the phenomenon of radicalism, particularly among Muslims, it is necessary to address the phenomenon of authority, power and control on one side and politics on the other side. Firstly, authority, power and control are much older, deeper and more lasting than politics. Power was, is still and will always be the governance, management and leadership, especially over the people but other creatures also. Charm and delight of the authority is only shown over people. Of all the worst forms of government, the only worse form is complete anarchy. Imami Safija said that a year of anarchy by the consequences is worse than than 67 years of dictatorship.

On the other hand, authority is power over people and it quickly becomes a malefic and corrupts people. Therefore, an authority should be limited and controlled. The authority is before all restricted by the constitution and the law. As the constitution, law and science have less ethnic, national, racial, ideological and party eyes, they are able to see in a better way. Secondly, the authority is restricted and controlled by the division of powers into legislative, judicial and executive. Thus, the legislative authority passes laws, represents all citizens and controls the executive authority. In most Muslim countries, this division is not present. Thirdly, the authority is restricted and controlled by the balance, i.g. by undisputed autonomy and balance between the legislative, judicial and executive authorities. None of the branches of such authority are superior or subordinate to each other, but all of them are through the constitution and the law incorporated by the same constitutional order. Unfortunately, only few Muslims have balance of power. This results and has as consequence of a variety of radicalisms. Fourthly, the checking of authority is the most thoroughly carried out in public, free and democratic elections. Where in Muslim countries one can have a public, free and democratic elections in which also women have a political right to vote? Instead, in some of these countries, martial law governs for decades. Isn't that basic political fact, the West does not mind much, the basis for political radicalism and extremism? Fifthly, the ongoing political qualified control of the authority/ government performs is executed by political opposition which is a constant political corrective of authority and critical and political around civic public. Sixthly, right after, the opposition follows, not any, but the political and critical public. Public in one country cannot exist without confidence of government with citizens and without legality, procedures, objectivity and transparency in the work of the authorities. For a critical, political public, individually the important are the intellectuals who are advocates of truth and promoters of the common good. In addition to intellectuals, control and checking of authority/ is also done by all

types of media: printed media, electronic media and TV but also the sector of civil society and all non-governmental organizations. Unfortunately, in Muslim countries, political opposition is considered an enemy; open, free and critical media have no opportunities and space to work and intellectuals who look at society in a critical way are considered fools or traitors and foreign mercenaries. Hence, the Muslim nation faces mostly and primarily political crises. According to Amin Maalouf and his book "The distraction of the world" it is a structural crisis of the humanity. "The world is gripped by a major distraction, and in several areas simultaneously: an intellectual, financial, climatic and ethical distraction." If we continue to follow Malaufa disturbed are the five basic relationships on which Confucius insists: relations between the rulers and people, father and son, husband and wife, between older and younger, and relations between friends. Also disturbed are the relations between freedom and responsibility/liability. People want freedom and do not want responsibility. For Hegel, freedom is recognized necessity, also simultaneously it represents a responsibility. Scientists want the freedom to explore without limits and do not assume liability for the consequences of their results. However, the boundaries of freedom are boundaries of responsibility/liability. As long as people are free, they are responsible as well. Disturbed are relations between the abilities and duties. People want unlimited abilities and fewer want concrete duties. Boundaries of abilities are boundaries of the duties. Disturbed are relations between knowledge and ignorance. People of today imagine that they know everything. Socrates argued that the quality of his knowledge sat in the fact that he knew that did not know. Thus, the boundaries of knowledge are the boundaries of ignorance. Here's how the disorder is expressed by the poet William Carlos Williams: "The man has survived so far, because he was too ignorant. Now when he can achieve them, he must change them or perish." From the standpoint of faith, science describes the world and life, whereas religion prescribes life, determines values and sets teleolos,

purpose, goal and meaning of life. Disorder of the world occurs when religion starts to describe the life and gives the means of life and when science starts prescribing life, determines the values, purpose and meaning of life. Disturbed are the relations between rights and obligations. Most of people seek their imaginary rights without thinking about obligations/commitments. The boundaries of rights are the boundaries of obligations. Otherwise, it's about alms, theft or violence. The rights of people are within the boundaries of their obligations. Disturbed are the relations between ethics and aesthetics. At all costs one wants to be beautiful, handsome and attractive. Boundaries of ethics must be the boundaries of aesthetics. Otherwise, the aesthetics will end up in pornography, snobbery, trash and kitsch. Relation between ethics and politics are disturbed to the maximum extent. Here is what Kant notes between ethics-politics, and I quote: "The true politics therefore can not make even one step before it obeys the morale. And although the politics itself is a difficult skill, its union with morality is no skill at all. Because morale cuts the knot which politics can not resolve as soon as it is not in agreement with it." To what extent Kant is right, although Napoleon told Hegel that the politics has replaced the fate, is best shown in the today's Greece. Greece was not saved from bankruptcy by the economy, or the economy or politics, but solidarity and ethics within the European Union. Disturbed are the relations between knowledge, techniques and information and knowledge on one side and comprehension on the other side, more than ever. Hegel emphasizes that what we know *Bekant* /germ., in Arabic language. *Ilm* is not and does not have to be what we comprehend *Erkennt*/germ. comprehend, in Arabic language *me'arif*. Never in the history did people know more and comprehended less. That is the challenge of radicalism in humans and even the Muslims. What does it mean knowing the reality through the tv screen and failure to understand peoples, cultures and identities, notes Maalouf Amin in "World Disorder" on page 27 it reads: "Everyone circulates in its orbit in front of his audience that

understands him in half the word and does not hear the opponent's speech. Considering my origin, I would, however, have to, for my life's journey, call on both of these orbits (Western and Muslim) at the same time, but every day I feel a bit farther from both." In fact, techniques and technologies of today, allows all people to watch the same images at the same time, but they look and do not see or hear different and irreconcilable images. After the collapse of communism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, Europe has deeply got stuck in the crisis. There was a loss of recognizable directions or connections, thus Europe, Africa and Asia are faced with a crisis of identity whereas the United States and Muslim countries for different reasons and in different ways are faced with a crisis of legitimacy.

In short, the world survives and lives a crisis of all known and recognized forms, figures and forms of life. From life, one rushes in a despair into the enjoyment, from the enjoyment irreversibly heads into ranting or perversion (pedophilia, homosexuality, drug use). People generally do not even quarrel, but rather kill each other without reason. In economics and the economy simultaneously comes: recession, restriction, inflation, deflation, stagflation, the decline of firms, losing jobs, unemployment and general insecurity. Crisis, according to one of the leaders of the EU causes fear in people. It has always been known that fear, passion, vice, instincts, passions and interests outside, strongly influence and determine behavior of people. Unfounded fear, when a man is lonely and people isolated, easily turns into autarchy and incarceration and up to autism. From this fear, aided with financial crisis, the unemployment rate and the number of laid-off people every day, the crisis of environmental protection, globalization, poor education, the overall figures in all the crisis of civilization where the Muslims cope with it in the slowest and weakest way, quickly and easily develops into a thought and idea: hell, this is for others, evil also to others and danger to others. In fear, the similarities turn into the differ-

ences, the differences turn into contrasts, contrasts turn into exclusivities, and if not resolved in accordance with the Constitution and Law exclusivities turn into conflicts. These are all foundations for a variety of –isms, radicalisms and extremisms. When aesthetics gets completely off the hook of ethics, due to competition, from the aesthetics goes down to advertising, from advertising to pornography and from pornography to prostitution. One form of the disorder among people is to reduce the basic relationships between people and nations to domination, assimilation, segregation, discrimination and apartheid. A substantial number of Muslims have an opinion or imagine it that they are subject to domination, assimilation, discrimination, segregation, and in some parts of the world as well as in Gaza even to apartheid. The five false and incorrect relations between people cause radicalism and rebellion as a reaction to them. Instead of such relations, there must be advocating the recognition among people and nations, coexistence, integration, acculturation and tolerance. One form of the disorder of the world and human relations is a theory of factors: the nature, geography, demography, biology and psyche, crucially form and determine social relations, processes and phenomena, or class principle and the relation dominates the world, racial principles and the relation dominates the world, capitalist occupation, domination and exploitation is to blame for all problems of the world; Jewish-Masonic conspiracy generates most of the problems in the world, after the post-conflict blocks, a clash of civilizations and cultures based on different religions is at the stage and since 11 September 2001 as a major world problem comes Islamic fundamentalism, extremism, revivalism and terrorism. Only some seriously pay attention to the actual situation in the Islamic countries and among Muslim peoples. From an ideological and political truth, the construction and projection of the situation in these countries, very few people can figure out that in these countries we have the largest number and percentage of refugees in the world, that those countries and peoples are among the world's poorest countries, that in

ISLAMIC SCENE IN B&H

these countries we have highest rates of unemployment, illiterate and uneducated people. In a small number of these countries there is a division of authority on constitutional, legislative and executive legal, the authority is limited by the constitution, and law that there is a balance of power, that there are checks and controls of power/authorities through regular elections, opposition, public, media and intellectuals. All these conditions are good ground for a variety of *-isms* and radicalisms that can not be justified. A small number of people with good intentions in the world are asking how is that possible that Muslim countries with rich resources have majority of poor population. These are all questions that require answers, not ideological pamphlets and labels. The Muslim peoples are unquestionably and irrevocably to blame for the situation in which there are, but also others who in any way contributed to this situation. But the crisis or disorder of the world is structural and overall/comprehensive and it is a crisis of broken directions or lost identities and destroyed legitimacies. Here's how this crisis was anticipated in 1934 by Thomas Eliot in a poem *Rock*: "Where is the life we have lost in living? Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? And where is the knowledge we have lost in information? The cycles of sky in twenty centuries are distancing us from the God and bring us closer to the dust."

Fikret Karčić

**ALTERNATIVE MUSLIM GROUPS
BETWEEN
SHARIAH AND SECULAR LAW**

In this paper we would consider the relationship of alternative Muslim groups in BiH towards Shariah and secular law. The term “alternative groups” covers different groups based on a particular interpretation of Islam and act outside of institutional framework of Islamic community. These groups are diverse, both, in terms of ideological orientation and the way of acting. Topic such as this requires detailed research in the field. Since we don't have it, we will give here some general hints and illustrations only.

Shariah represents Islamic normative system and functional expression of Islam. In this sense, it could be said that there could be no actualization of Islam without Shariah. The only question remains is the one as to what interpretation Shariah should be given and how to apply it. Shariah includes regulations of religious, moral and legal character. By translating this term with phrase “the Islamic law” would cover only legal aspect of Shariah. Sources of Shariah norms are the *Qur'an*, God's revealed word according to the Muslim belief, *Sunnah*, the normative practice of Muhammad, *Ijma* or consensus of Muslim scholars on a particular issue of Shariah, *Qiyas* or reasoning by analogy, *Adet* or custom, etc. Science that deals with Shariah rules is called *Fiqh*. Using the terminology of comparative religious law, we may say that general Shariah norms include Divine law norms (*ius divinum*), contained and derived from revelation, and human rights (*ius humanum*), derived from a reasoning and social conventions (such as *Qiyas*, *Ijma* 'Adet). Shariah norms are addressed to individuals, groups of Muslims (*Jamaat*) and the state. For example, regulations of worshiping (*ibadat*) are addressed to individuals and groups, while standards relating to public law (criminal law, etc.) address the state. Shariah and *Fiqh* in Islam are comparable with the concept of *Halakhah* religious law in Judaism and, in some way, with the Christian canon law.

In addition to Shariah, Muslim history witnessed new type of legislation called *Kanun - Canon*. This term, of Greek origin, entered law

terminology of Middle East with invasion of Hellenic tradition of the Middle East, and it entered Arabic language and state-law practice at the time of the early Muslim conquests in Egypt and Syria. In the beginning Canon, along with Persian names *destur* and *avaradž*, were designated as regulations of financial and legal area. From the time of later Abbasids (second half of 4 / 10 century) the term Canon-*Kanun* is used with the meaning of legal regulations issued by the bearer of the secular power. These were regulations issued by Muslim rulers on the basis of their political authority and were related to issues that were not precisely regulated by Shariah, such as organization of the state, army, taxes, land ownership, etc. In order to secure practical application of the Shariah and preservation of the Muslim community El-Mawardi (449 /1057), a Shariah low theorist, acknowledged the legitimacy of the secular power of Sultan. Canons were especially issued (in multitude) by the Ottoman Empire, where they were codified in the form of collections called *Kanunname*. Essentially, Canons were in agreement with principle of Shariah but some time it went beyond Shariah principles. It could be said that Shariah was closely linked to the Caliphate, an institution of religious and political leadership of Muslims, while Canons were linked to Sultanate, an institution of political power that emerged with the weakening of the Caliphate.

Therefore, history recognizes two components of legal systems in Muslim countries – law derived from Shariah and secular rules of the Muslim rulers. This is very important to emphasize, because it is usually understood that the legal system of Muslim countries, in the past, was exclusively derived from the Shariah.

During the colonization of the Muslim world, from 16th to 19th century, secular rules of Muslim leaders which governed certain areas of life were replaced by secular laws of European countries. Instead of Canons of Muslim rulers, there were introduced Canons of European countries. In this way, in most Muslim countries, the application of

Shariah regulations was reduced to the areas of personal status (legal eligibility, marriage, family, inheritance, Islamic foundation), while other areas had been regulated by European law

Such development of history was not accepted by members of various puritan movements that arose in Muslim history. One of such movements is those who identify themselves as Salafis. They do not give any normative significance to history after the first three generations of Muslims (*al-salaf al-salih*). For them, the entire Muslim history, after a period of first three Muslim generations, represents an alienation from the Islamic ideal, the introduction of “novelty” (*bid'ats*) and general degradation. These groups deny the legitimacy of the Canons of Muslim rulers, European law that was adopted later on and the rights of the modern secular state where Muslims live, just as their followers do nowadays. Therefore, groups in Bosnia that are somehow attached to the extreme way of this ideology may have a negative attitude towards the secular law and state, as some examples will show it later on.

On the other hand, upon the end of Ottoman Empire rule, Islamic Community in BiH recognized the legitimacy of the state and legal system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The main argument for such decision was that Austro-Hungarian Empire guaranteed basic human rights for Muslims and the validity of application of Shariah law concerning personal issues of Muslims. Based on that, religious and legal tracts, such as *Hijra Tract* written by Azapagić AHMET (1884), and *fatwas* (juristic opinion) of *ulema* (scholars) of the time argued that BiH was *dar al-Islam* (“House of Islam”) during the Austro-Hungarian rule. It also said that its laws are legitimate, Muslims are obliged to obey it and they should not migrate from such country. Since, from the legal point of view, the same situation continued during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia rule, the same Shariah law qualifications remained. Though application of Shariah law through Shariah courts was abolished in socialist Yugoslavia, Islamic community has accepted the legitimacy of

the state, government regulations, and the legitimacy of life in a new situation. However, there was a problem since justification of such an act did not have Shari'ah-legal explanation. Theoretical approach to this issue could be found in an article of this author entitled "The meaning of the expression of Islam in a secular state" (1989, p.71-80), and continuation of work on this topic in "Islam in a secular state: an example of BiH" (Collections of works from scientific conference, "The Islamic tradition of Bosniaks: sources, development, institutions and perspectives", Sarajevo, 2008, pg. 423-436), are but a few exceptions. Other issues such as the legitimacy of secular law and democratic procedures in the modern state have not been subject of detailed theoretic research and islamic legitimization as yet. New institutions and practices are accepted as facts, through normative Community acts and, more importantly in practice, by the Bosnian Muslims as something that is unquestionable. This acceptance is indicated in the answers to the readers' questions published in the publications of the Islamic community, but these short and, sometimes, casual responses were not Shari'ah /legal theoretical elaborations of such important issues.

That situation continued until new ideological tendencies have occurred on the islamic scene in BiH, in the last twenty years. Individuals and groups educated in the field of Islamic sciences, mainly in the Middle East, without prior knowledge of humanistic and social sciences, history of Bosnia and trends in the modern world, began uncritically to convey the opinions and interpretations from the Middle East, including the extremist views which deny the legitimacy of the secular state and secular law. The main reference of such circles are one-sided and non-historical, sometimes traditional or a pre-modern interpretations of the Shari'ah. A confusion began to enter, in this way, among Muslims in Bosnia who were traumatized in their homeland by aggression and genocide committed against them. This tendency, no matter how small it is now, should not be neglected because it could have potentially devastating consequences for Bosnian Muslims, both at home and in Dias-

pora, and for the perspective of their homeland. This tendency is even more dangerous because it is hiding under the excuse of “true Islam” and the ‘*ulama*’ (scholars) educated at the “source”. Finally, extreme views are minority views by definition but their paucity should not be a reason for their neglect. The spread of such ideas is done mostly through internet and lectures conducted by “*da’ija*” (missionaries).

To illustrate this tendency we’ll take a few questions and answers that can be found on certain internet sites. These pages are in Bosnian language, and are not necessarily administered from BiH. It has among visitors people from Bosnia and the Bosnian Diaspora. The state of mind of some Bosnian Muslims, mostly “born again” after 1992 is characterized the type of questions they ask. The state of mind of ‘*new ulama*’ is typified through given responses.

On website <http://www.essunne.com/Fetve-uleme> (accessed 07th June 2011) there is a question: “Is it allowed to stand in front of flag of any state or coat of arms, praising them in that way?” The question is accompanied by illustration of BH flag and a photo of members of the Armed Forces who stand in the line in front of the state flag. The answer that is given is as follows: “It is not allowed for Muslim to stand in front of any state flag or coat of arms praising it, because it is disliked and new thing in the faith that was not in the time of the Prophet, *sallallahu alaihi wa sallam*, nor was it during the period of four righteous *caliphs* (rulers) - may Allah be pleased with them ...”

At the end of the following note it says that this fatwa is issued by the Standing Committee for the Scientific Study and fatwa. If this note is correct, then it is the body for interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia. We do not know whether this interpretation is accepted by the state authorities of the country in which it was issued, but we know and is commonly known thing that all countries have their national

symbols and its respecting is a matter of international standard and civilized relations in the world.

On the same page we find the following question: “Does Shariah allow that I work as a secretary for a lawyer?” In response, among other things is said: “... As for the work of lawyers in the secular states, the regulation is as follows: It is not allowed if (a lawyer) binds to specific laws and systems that are contrary to Shariah.

The laws of secular states are marked as “ignorant, *jahily* (those who belong to the period before Islam - note. FK) laws.”

On the same web page is the following question: “Can an individual or group take into their own hands application of Shariah in their hometown, city or country like Bosnia?” Author signed on as “Abu Amina” responds that the establishment of the Shariah is not a short process, and it is now time for Da’va (mission - note. FK), in order to avoid wrong actions, and concludes: “It is impossible to reach the laws of Allah by human laws, because in that way book of Allah is thrown aside, as if one would like to say the law of Allah is not currently in use for one or another reason. It is incomplete and it is time now for us to invent laws because we believe that it is better and easier way to get to the Shariah). This is the deception of Satan.”

The website <http://www.el-asr.com/pitanje> (accessed 07th June 2011) responds to the question of whether it is allowed to participate in election and to vote (for example here in Bosnia). In response there is long discussion on this issue and based of “majority opinion of *salafi* scholars of today” and given answer can be summarized in that voting is allowed, a matter of *ijtihad* (free thought - note. FK) of every Muslim and a “necessary evil”. On the same page there is following question, “I am resident in a European (non-believers) country for a long time and

now I have the opportunity to gain citizenship of that country. In that case I would have much more rights than I usually do, I am living here with family anyway and I am planning to stay for some time. So is it allowed to me to take citizenship?" So, someone who obviously enjoys prosperity and hospitality of "European non believer state" has a dilemma whether Muslim is allowed to be a citizen of that country or not. The following is an answer that discusses at length the question about what citizenship means, quotes the attitudes of various Arab-Muslim authors on this issue (except authors from Bosnia), and finally concludes: "Accordingly, *rajih* (the most accepted) opinion on this issue is that the taking of citizenship of non-believer state is basically forbidden, exemptions are the Muslim minority and situation of compulsion. This point support clear and unambiguous evidence mentioned above. On the other hand, the benefits which are realized by taking the citizenship cannot be in any sense comparable to the negative consequences for the faith and the life of person and his family. And Allah knows best."

At the end here is one example from a web page "Muslim youth of Norrkoping" (a town in Sweden - note. FK) address <http://www.n-um.com> (accessed 07th June 2011), Question number 176, entitled "Studying law and engaging in advocacy."

The question reads: "Assalamu Alaikum, am I allowed to study law in Denmark / Jura (meaning everything by their rules / laws) in order to become a lawyer or jurist?"

The answer is given by Mr. Zijad LJAKIC and it can be summarized as follows: "As for those who study the Law School where humanly invented laws are studied, as well as those who teach law, can be divided into three groups:

First group: those who study the humanly invented laws (Law School) and teaches the same in order to recognize their essence, or

to determine the advantage of Shariah regulations in relation to it, or to gain benefit from these laws in what is not contrary to the Shariah, there is no prohibition for anyone who studies or to those who teaches it...”

“The second group: those who studied invented laws (Law School) and teaches the same in order to be able to give verdicts or to help others to do so, with strong believe that it is forbidden to give verdicts by the laws not revealed by Allah rather his passion, and love for the possessions in this world. The status of this group according to the Shariah is that they are great sinners, there is in their works *kufir* (disbelief - note. FK), opresion (violence) and *Fisk* (sins - note. FK)...” Yet, writer of answers admits that it does not lead out of faith.

“The third group: those who study humanly invented laws (Law School) and teaches the same, declaring verdicts issued allowed by these wheter he was convinced that the Shariah is better or not. According to the *Ijma'* this grup has abandoned islam and are declared non-believers. It is because of the obligation to judge according to what Allah has revealed, is necessarily known thing in Islam, so whoever permits to be judged by something outside of what Allah has revealed falls under the regulation of those who permits impurity, alcohol, interest, etc., which are deeds that lead from Islam by *Ijma'* of scholars.”

We can only imagine what kind of vision of Muslims life in the West see these “interpreters” and what is their level of knowledge about states and laws of Western countries from which they can “consider permitted” receiving social assistance and asylum but not their “made up human laws.”

Based on these examples we can conclude that Islamic alternative scene in BiH and abroad witness rise of extreme opinions that Islam is incompatible with a secular state and secular law, while using

distinctive vocabulary of extremist groups from the Middle East about ignorant laws *Taghut* (idol worshiper, violent authority - note. FK), and its courts, “invented human laws” (clumsy translation of the phrase *al-Kanun al-vad'i*, which means secular, positive law), etc.

How should Islamic community respond to this challenge? In our opinion, in two ways:

1. Through continuous and systematic monitoring of developments in the field of interpretation of Islam among the Bosnian Muslims in the country and abroad. To provide timely scientifically based answers on questions that arise and act by authority of knowledge (*'ilm*) and build such a reputation in the eyes of Muslims. Take these issues as a priority and leave the current paradigm of focusing on politics in Bosnia and that for which it does not have legitimacy and which is not the mission of the Islamic community (such as dealing with national issues of Bosniaks and establishment of national institutions).

2. Through theoretical elaboration of important issues such as attitude of Muslims towards secular law, citizenship, democratic process and so on, which should be a priority of Islamic scientific and educational institutions.

That would narrow the space for the incompetent interpretation of Islamic rules and uncritical transmission of extreme interpretations on the Bosnian and European space, or it would reduce or eliminate potential negative consequences of such interpretation to the interests of Muslims in Bosnia and Europe and strengthen the authority of the Islamic Community in BiH.

Dževad Hodžić

**RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
SECULAR SOCIETY**

Introductory remarks

1. Concepts contained in the title of our topic, each of the four, are historically relative, sociologically and theologically meaningful and culturally open. Often and just because of the fact that the same terms are understood differently by different participants and parties in the dialogue, it leads to misunderstandings, wrong understanding and erroneous results. Mutual understanding is being lost in translation. Here, we won't follow systematic and detailed exposition of all meanings of terms: religion, politics, secular and society, in order to avoid possible misunderstandings, the difficulties and efforts.
2. In fact, while considering the relationship between religious and political in a secular society some values, experiences and interpretive perspectives would be given preferential status and implied as such. In other words, considering the relationship between religion and politics in a secular society that could be acceptable to all participants, we would not come in a neutral way, so to say. This relationship depends on how we understand terms religion, politics, secular and society. Through relationship of religion and politics in a secular society we would exhibit and prefer specific understanding of religion, politics, secular and society.
3. Here, we consider the issue of relationship between religion and politics in a secular society in normative not descriptive way, which means that we are not going to describe different political practices, real or otherwise, or any political theory of social relations between religion and politics. Here we would try to point to some important politico-logical, primarily liberal-philosophical, values and democratic movements as well as religious, especially Islamic theological and legal-ethical, normative determinants within which is possible to search for an acceptable model for the relationship between religion and

politics in a secular society. Therefore, we search for a model of the relationship between religion and politics that could have a conceptual meaning and validity, keeping constantly in mind Bosnian multi-religious society and its multi-religious history, structure and perspective.

4. Here, we would present primarily the arguments from Islamic religious / theological perspective, for acceptable relationship between religion and politics in secular society. That means that religious reasons and requirements are behind primary perspective through which we would analyze the issue of relationship between religion and politics in a secular society. It is, according to our understanding, authentic and in the best interest of religion and Islam itself. Therefore, we would, essentially, discuss question related to type of relationship between religion and politics in a secular society that is most acceptable for religion.

Secular Society

In our discussions we often hear that secular state, but not a secular society, is acceptable to Islam and Muslims. It is not necessary to specify and explain reasons and arguments on which this stance is based. In short, it is reduced to over emphasized distinction between the state, which represents the bureaucratic apparatus and circle and the society whose essence is life of its own members..

However, we believe that it is justified to speak about secular society, not just about secular state. In fact, when we are talking about secular society, we mean society in its entirety and not some parts of it, the society in its most comprehensive level not level of different social subgroups, the society that is one and unique not some of the many different (sub)societies that operate in one society. Here we discuss about society of which the state itself, its institutions, its laws and its policies are part. Because the state itself with its institutions, laws and poli-

cies would not be possible without society that is based on the lowest common denominator, at some consensual sense of belonging, at some basic nucleus of orientation. This approach to society is represented in those contemporary political and philosophical considerations that begin with John Locke who, in his “Two Treatises on Government”, said that democracy of majority is based on common policies which obligates, from within itself, members of one society to accept procedures and decisions of the state.¹ When we talk about secular society, we actually mean that which forms that society. In that sense, we can talk about secular society everywhere where the basic values, which that society and that social order enables, are secular in nature. In the political life, secularism forms a call for the “natural mind” which operates with public arguments that are available to all. The natural mind, which is common to all people, is the epistemic foundation for the secular state power which is no longer legitimized by religion.

Islamic secularity

On the social level, secularity is essentially made of the source of political legitimacy and democratic procedures. We believe that secularism, in its political sense and not in the ontological meaning, is fully acceptable from the view point of Islam. Moreover, in one strong formulation, we could say that in this sense, political one, secularity is actually the original message of Islam. In other words, we could talk about the Islamic concept of secularity. First, God is not like anything or anyone. This means the secularization of the world and history. Secondly, with Muhammad (Pbuh) and the Qur’an ends that period of human history in which God intervenes by sending his messengers to the people and revelation, on one side, and opens that period of human history in which such interventions are no longer present, on the other. This tells us: From now on you must and you can go on alone, relying

1) Compare: Helmut Dubiel, *Incertitude and politic*, translated from German into Bosnian language by Sulejman Bosto, Rabic – eclid, Sarajevo, 2006 page 122

on your intellect. What you're left with is revelation, but for its 'use' you do not have possibility of arbitration by certain religious authority and legitimacy. And third, no one has the right to be placed between people and God. In political terms it means that no one has the mandate to represent people before God, or God before people. If there is no church in Islam, then it means that socially Islam is secular religion. Once again, Islam rejects secularism in the ontological meaning of that word. Prophet Muhammad said: "The whole earth is mosque." Nature has a sacred dimension. But it is extremely important to note one feature of Islamic culture: "harem" as a holy, sacred area. If the area of the mosques, graves and other religious buildings and the nearby areas around them is considered holy, sacred area, then the area outside the harem is the secular area. So, in the ontological sense there is no place for secularism, the whole earth is mosque: In historical sense, on the social level, beyond the borders of harem is a space for secular everyday life and the people.²

Political interest

For a liberal state in terms of relationship between religion and politics in secular society, from the viewpoint of political philosophy, the following questions are important: What kind of cognitive viewpoints and normative expectations a liberal state must require from believing and non-believing citizens in their mutual dealings? How could it be possible, nowadays, after collapse of communism, at the time of large migration and movements, in the social circumstances of increasing pluralization and globalized unification, in the time when we are confronted with more or less unexpected 'return of religious' to the social and political sphere, in the biotechnical era in which human instrumentalise itself through deeper encroachment of previously unavailable 'natural' substrates of his human nature, to connect methodi-

2) See: Jurgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*-philosophic articles translated from German into Bosnian language by Sulejman Bosto, Tugra, Sarajevo, 2009, Page 147

cally cultural-hermeneutic and empirical perspectives with normative ways of asking questions in such circumstances?³ In fact, the issue of religion in post secular society must be understood as a question of secularization, which consists of a double process of learning, a process that obligates tradition of enlightenment and religious learning to reflect on their mutual borders.⁴

Religion and Politics in Bosnian society

Looking at Bosnian social circumstances and political relations, the achieved level of democratic political culture in our country, especially processes that will continue and are in need for further development, promotion and guide on European way of our country and our society, the relationship between religious communities and state, in our opinion, should be based, established and proliferated on the fol-

3) Ibid

4) Thus, Habermas, requiring competence from religious people to translate the potential of religious meaning into categories and formulations of inter-subjective rationality in his work *Between naturalism and religion*, to some extent, seems to revise his view of religion from his main work *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* in 1981 where, for example, writes: "In so far as the sacral region was constitutive of society, the legacy of religion (now) does not take any science course or an art. Only up to discourse ethics the communicative decomposed morality in this regard can substitute the authority of the sacred." (J. Habermas: *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* Bd 2. Funktionalistischen Zur Kritik der Vernunft, Frankfurt / Main, 1981 P. 140) It seems in fact, in the latest Habermas' analysis of his thesis about the transformation of religion in the discourse ethics remains, as, for example, notes of Christian Danz, outlined in the second plan. Thus Habermas in his lecture in Vienna in 2004. about "The line between belief and knowledge," and with that was opened the symposium held at the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna on 4 to 6 March 2004 year, to mark 200th anniversary of the death of Immanuel Kant said: "Only practical mind can no longer be sure that its able only with insights from theories of justice in his bare hands to act against slipping off of modernity. This has a lack of creativity, verbal openness of the world, to regenerate itself from all around normative consciousness." (J. Habermas, *Die Grenze zwischen Glauben und Wissen. Wirkungsgeschichte und Zur aktuellen Bedeutung von Kants Religionsphilosophie*, in: H. Nagl-Docekal / R. Langthaler (ed.), *Recht - Gedchichte - Redligion, Die Bedeutung Kants für die Gegenwart*, Berlin 2004, S. 141st to 160th hier S. 142)

lowing principles, standards, interests and considerations:

- At the national level of constitutional, legal and political relations, the principle of separation of state and religious communities and churches, or institutional separation of politics and religion as a major achievement of European political, legal-state modernity should represent our basic and strong political conviction and dedication. State rule is neutral and free of religious influence. It means that all decisions undertaken by the State, in the ruling process, must be explained in a language common to all members of the political community, using arguments and formulations acceptable to all citizens who follow different ideologies and religious beliefs, nothing more or nothing less than that. For state, to be ideologically neutral, to be separated from the religious communities, is not matter of mere accidental circumstances, someone's arbitrary decision for that to be so, it is a matter which is directly and significantly related to recognition and respect of ideologically, politically, culturally and religiously pluralistic society. More precisely, if citizens of one state follow different religious and ideological traditions, the state must be ideologically neutral in order to provide equal rights to everyone and should not take side of any religious ideology. We could say, if a society is ideologically and religiously pluralistic then state's obligation to be neutral is bigger. Neutral position of liberal state contains fundamental importance of the principle of secularity of the state which is manifested in the mundane, which means formulating ruling decisions on the basis of 'common sense', acceptable for all people. A clear and strict impartiality towards churches and religious communities is required from secular state. If given facts are taken in consideration, than it is almost self-evident that Bosnia and Herzegovina must be ideologically neutral and secular state before and more than many others.

- Furthermore, on the political and democratic level all religious traditions, including Islam, represent large, undeniable and invaluable resources of social and humanistic sense for political life itself. Thus

Bosnia's needs to continue developing as a modern European ideologically neutral state, where churches and religious communities are free and autonomous in their actions, separate from the state, does not mean that religious' moral, social, cultural and other potentials in constituting of democratic political will should be treated as irrelevant, superseded, anti-European, anti-political. Commitment to political and legal principle of separation of state and religious communities does not mean that the believers should be excluded from political life. Their views, arguments, values and commitments must be given equal consideration, in the political debates in the society in which they are equal participants and constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom. In such society, which is in recent political philosophy, in the normative sense, more often defined as post secular society, cannot be expected; we cite here formulation of Jurgen Habermas, from all believers to explain their political position independently of their religious or ideological beliefs. When it comes to ideological neutrality of political attitudes and their arguments, "that strict requirement may be asked of politicians only, those inside state institutions, all those who accept public mandate or are nominated for it, who are obliged to be ideologically neutral."⁵ In other words, religious citizens must be equal in political debates about issues of common good and social life. That basic meaning and contents of post secular society must be primarily accepted as a challenge by secular citizens who, in their secular Western mentality and its socialist and communist ideological sub-versions, tend to look at believers and religious traditions and communities as, once more I'll use the critical observations of Habermas; archaic remnants of the past that should be protected as endangered species in the nature are protected, at best case. In short, believers' rights cannot be taken away by post secular society. Regarding specific significance, meaning of Islamic tradition and the future of Muslims in Bosnia and Europe, we must say one more thing. It would be useless to close our eyes in order to neglect a fact that

5) Ibid, page 157.

issue of Islam, among other things, has political implications of major importance on our Bosnian social scene, which cannot be isolated out of not only regional but also European and even international and global, civilized and geopolitical context. It is a political challenge par excellence for all those who are informed, competent and are looking responsibly towards future to formulate the way through which Bosnian Muslims, as an integral part of Europe, will politically promote, articulate and model their religious requirements, freedoms, rights and identity.

Religious interest

Islam is comprehended as religion of knowledge and justice in the Muslim' world religious experience and historical comparative religions' considerations. Social ethics in Islam are repeatedly emphasized. In many places in the Qur'an, faith in God is directly related with the benevolence. Qur'anic chapter Al-Baqarah abjure value of piety or faith which is exclusively based on prayers devoid of benevolence. Righteousness towards orphans is particularly emphasized. (En-Nisa, 127) In another place the Qur'an says: "And do not approach the orphan's property except in a way that is best until he reaches maturity. And give full measure and weight in justice. We do not charge any soul except [with that within] its capacity. And when you testify, be just, even if [it concerns] a near relative. And the covenant of Allah fulfill. This has He instructed you that you may remember."(El-En'am, 152). Based on the original message, Islam was, more or less, always present in the traditional Muslim societies throughout the history not as a 'political', not 'civil' Islam, but as a social Islam, in traditional forms and contents of civil life, in social institutions of Muslim societies. Throughout the history of Islam the institution of "waqf", which represents religiously motivated social, humanitarian and charitable foundations, constituted the first pillar of social life of Muslim communities and societies. "Waqf" /foundations were so significant that the

religious life was often identified with it. Religious life and “waqf”/ foundations were almost synonyms of each other. “Waqf”/foundation included mosques, schools, libraries, public kitchens, shelters, fountains, bridges, hospitals and many other institutions of cultural, social and economic life. Beside foundations established for sacral purposes, funerals, schools, cultural and similar purposes, there were foundations for orphans, passengers, for release of captured soldiers, support of poor women while getting married, taking care of hungry dogs and cats in the winter and for many other purposes.

Instead of conclusion

There is no dispute that religion cannot be reconciled with fixed social roles that are assigned to it through project of industrial modernization. In order to get out from this Babylonian captivity of the modern age, as Moltmann said, religion cannot write off its own right to speak by accepting political power share. It happens often in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Balkans in the transitional post-communist period. After collapse of communism and the disintegration of former Yugoslavia religion in our public space appears, more or less, in form of one of three dominant tendencies: as an ideology, as nationalism and folk art tendency.

The biggest danger of such ideological misuse of religion lies in connection of religion and religious communities with centers of social and political power. Such connection is actually profanation of religion. To be more specific, spiritual dimension of religion, its moral message and its ability to be critical towards social structures of power is seriously challenged.

Ahmet Alibašić

**VIOLENCE IN THE NAME OF
ISLAM: THE TERMINOLOGICAL
DISTINCTION**

When discussing the contemporary Islamic trends there is much conceptual confusion and wandering. The absence of uniformed terminology in Bosnia but also globally is present. This presentation has a modest ambition to try to clarify some confusion regarding the naming of violence and terrorism committed by Muslims justifying it with reference to Islam. We hope that we would eventually abandon some bad solutions and reduce the selection to a few more precisely defined terms and thus allow for better communication and facilitate common understanding.

In ideological sense, for the violent Muslim groups the most appropriate classical Islamic term would be *Kharijites* or *Khawarij* (literally, those who separated themselves).¹ In short, Kharijites were the first sect in Islam that rebelled against the decision of the Caliph Ali (um. 661), r.a., to accept the arbitration of two men in a conflict between him and the Syrian governor Muawiyah (um. 680). The Kharijites justified their actions by selectively quoting the Qur'an and the literal interpretation of the Qur'anic text, "the judgement belongs to God alone" (*in al-hukm illa lillah*). Subsequently they tried to impose their understanding on other Muslims by force and terror. Among other things, they managed to kill the Caliph Ali.

In this group one clearly recognizes all characteristics that are exhibited by modern violent Muslim extremists who legitimate their actions by Islamic concepts and arguments. At the same time there are no essential differences between these two groups. So, what is the common for them are: diligence in outward practice of religion, selectivity and literalism in the interpretation of religious texts as well as disregard of any religious or political authority outside their own circles. However, the key similarity between them are: excommunication or in other words, declaring their opponents as infidels (*takfir*) and *approving the use of violence to achieve their goals*. An easy excommunication of

¹ See G. Levi Della Vida, "Kharijites", *Encyclopedia of Islam*, second edition 4: 1074-1077.

opponents and the use of violence are two major differences between Kharijites and those known as 'Wahhabis'. These differences justify the drawing of clear terminological and every other distinction between these two groups, which will be dealt with later in this presentation.

Violence is certainly not the only kind of problematic behaviour but is the most dangerous. It is so called "clear and present". American law clearly emphasizes violence as a problem when defining the radicalization and states that the radicalization is "the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system... to advance political, religious, or social change."²

Though it is not a big consolation, but one should know that we are not the first ones who in recent times have been faced with the scourge of Kharijism. It was revived in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in the Arab societies and somehow culminated on 11 September 2001. Given that every age inevitably carries some new features and evolution in ideologies, this new edition of Kharijism we could – for the sake of clarity - call neo-Kharijism or new Kharijism and its followers Neo-Kharijites or New Kharijites (*Khawarij Judud*).

They are anyway called this way by a number of contemporary muftis like the former Shaykh al-Azhar Jadulhaqq Ali Jadulhaqq.³ Like the early Kharijites these new ones do not recognize any human laws, but only God's law, of course, they way they understand it.

That is why they called themselves *muhakkima*, those who invoke the judgement of God. So, Kharijites have in the name of God's sovereignty (*hakimiyya*) rejected the decision of Ali, while neo-Kharijites reject the decisions of parliaments, but the essence is the same: the human judgement is unacceptable. The adoption of this terminology has several advantages. In fact, if this term is adequate one, then in

2 Ahmet Alibašić, ed., *Savremene muslimanske dileme*, Sarajevo, Centar za napredne studije, 2009, 15.

3 Fikret Karčić, "Heterodoksna učenja i grupe u islamu – komparativna i šerijatsko-pravna perspektiva", *Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu*, 2010, p. 227-41.

the ideological, political and security dealing with this phenomenon we have centuries of experience of Muslim societies at our disposal. In short, the Muslim experience says that most of the militants can be convinced to abandon their extremist teachings and return to the mainstream of Muslim community. Others still remain a separate community but reform their teachings (eg., *ibadiyya*), while for the most persistent ones, the solution was usually seen in the use of state power

When using modern terms in cases not involving terrorism we suggest using the term ‘militants’. Alternatively, we may use ‘violent or militant extremists’ or ‘militant radicals’. The point is therefore to use the terms ‘violent’ or ‘militant’, given the fact that term radical used without qualification can have a positive meaning. Wherever there is no particular reason, such people should not be qualified as Muslims because it helps them to realize their intention to ‘speak’ on behalf of all Muslims. As with war crimes, responsibility needs to be individualized wherever there is no basis for invoking the collective guilt. If, however, talking about the frame of reference the violence is being justified with, the most appropriate would be to say ‘militant Islamism’ or ‘Islamist extremism’ to avoid direct connection with Islam as is the case in the formulation of ‘Islamic extremism’. When saying this, we keep in mind the latest research that proves beyond reasonable doubt that the military occupation - not Islamist terrorism - is the cause of nearly all suicidal terrorism in the world since 1980.⁴

I believe that this terminological debate is not an academic hair-splitting. It is essential for the fight against terrorism. First, it fully absolves of responsibility those who are not guilty, and this should be important to any responsible society and community that want to respect human rights of all including those who we do not necessarily like. Secondly, by precise definition and narrowing of the problems, we facilitate the work of the security authorities by reducing the focus

⁴ Robert A. Pape i James K. Feldman, *Cutting the fuse: the explosion of global suicide terrorism and how to stop it*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010.

of their attention we sharpen the image of the target and save their resources. At the same time, we allow them not to remain blind to other forms of terrorism such as was an attack on the ceremony marking the beginning of the rebuilding of the Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka, murder of the returnees such as the late Meliha Duric, etc. In B&H, unfortunately there is a lot of terrorism whose ideological background has nothing to do with religion but with extremist ethnic nationalism and this should not be forgotten. Resources of government departments must be rationally used because apart from terrorism, as a crime beyond forgiveness, other forms of crime are present as well, such as drug and people trafficking which destroy many more lives on a daily basis.

‘Wahhabis’ and the Salafis?

Among the most frequent terms used in this context is ‘Wahhabism’. However, previous use of the term does not justify its further use. There are several reasons for this. First, the term has never been defined. Definition is important here because a totally vague term ‘Wahhabi’ explains nothing, nor do vague qualifications help us clarify anything, understand any phenomenon or improve mutual understanding. A personal attempt to define this term has led me to the conclusion that the basic characteristics of the ‘Wahhabis’ in contexts where the term is most frequently used are as follows: 1) religious zeal and puritanism, 2) emphasis on the tradition of the Prophet, literalism in the interpretation of religious texts and disregard for the authority of established legal schools (*madhabib*), 3) preference for self-initiative, even anarchism in the administration of religious affairs, and 4) the exclusion of different opinions, which sometimes borders on their excommunication. Some would add here violence as another characteristic, but it is not true for most of the ‘Wahhabis’, as we shall see now.

Nothing, however, of what was just said is an exclusive feature of ‘Wahhabis’. Devote Muslims are also found among Sufis, modern and

traditional Muslims. Anyone who thinks that according to the Qur'an male heirs should get twice as much as their female relatives is a literalist. Deviation from established *madh'hab* solutions is inevitable. Both the authorities and officials in the Islamic Community in B&H deviate from the Hanafi *madh'hab* in the religious rituals bearing in mind that they attempt to introduce order into those deviations by making sure that the deviations obtain the sanction of the Council of Fatwas, or any other forum in the Community. This is the way to avoid confusion, which was the original purpose of establishing *madhabib*. Further, there are also traditional Bosnian Muslims who are exclusive in their views, and even violent. There are many examples and the victim of this violence are not just 'Wahhabis' but also officials of the Bosnian Islamic Community. As a reminder, a few years ago, the head of the Religious and Educational Department of the ICBH, the Mufti and the Chief Imam of Sarajevo were attacked in the daylight of the centre of Sarajevo not by Wahhabis but by some other Muslim group. Finally, the tendency to anarchism in religious affairs is present among the 'fine' Bosnian Muslims, from the ordinary congregations who do not want to hand over sacrificed animal skins to the Islamic Community, to the intellectuals. The Muftis and Riyasat are the ones who know that best, because they spend much of their energy on the cases of disrespect for the authority of the Islamic Community by its own members. Based on what has been said so far, one might conclude that all Muslims are a bit of 'Wahhabis'. However, it seems that the non-violent 'Wahhabis' were and remain controversial for the Islamic Community because of different administrative culture that resists the structured administration of religious affairs, of which more can be said some other time. But, let's go back to the second argument for the inadequacy of the term 'Wahhabi' to denote violent extremists.

If we accept this as a legitimate term to denote the Saudi version of salafism, which is usually the implication, then we find another important reason for the inadequacy of the term Wahhabism for denot-

ing violence in the name of Islam. We mean here the fact that the vast majority of the Saudi ulema, both pro-government (the late Bin Baz, Ibn Uthaymin, the present Mufti Abdulaziz Al Shaykh, etc.) and those that are not part of the religious establishment (Salman 'Awda, Safar al-Hawali, etc.) are determined opponents of violence. The first group are, in addition, political quietists, who advocate a total loyalty to the authorities and do not allow their public criticism. That is because a part of the 'Wahhabi' doctrine is also literal and selective interpretation of the verses and *ahadith* on the obligation of absolute obedience to authorities that be. Disobedience is allowed only in a certain way and under certain conditions that are almost impossible to fulfill. So, if someone is a 'Wahhabi', then this is the Saudi ulema, and if they have raised their voice against such groups long ago, have condemned them and warned against their danger, then it is not reasonable to put them in the same category with these same militants. On the other hand, the militants themselves do not recognize the religious authority of those scholars. Therefore, distancing is present on the both sides and should be taken into account.

Of course, if the term 'Wahhabi' is not an adequate term, then the term Salafis and Salafism are also not adequate. The term 'Salafis' means Muslims who see their role models in the early generations of Muslims, whose religious practice is to be followed more or less strictly. In addition, this term is also used for the precursors of Islamic modernists of the 19th century Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and others, which only brings an additional confusion.

Islamists?

In these discussions, the term 'Islamism' is often mentioned, which also appear to be an inadequate solution. Although a relatively recent term, it is increasingly used for active societal assertion and affirmation of beliefs, norms, laws or policies that are believed to be Islamic in character. More precisely, the Islamist (*al-Islami*, *pl. El-Islamijjun*) is

anyone who believes that the Qur'an and Sunnah contain important principles for Muslim society and government, and who in some way is trying to apply these principles. Islamism includes a narrow, intolerant and literalistic (fundamentalist) trend, but not only them.⁵

As activities on the social affirmation of Islam are usually sooner or later gain a political character, the International Crisis Group defines Islamism as Islam in political, rather than religious mode. Islamist movements are the movements with the Islamic ideological frame of reference seeking primarily political objectives. Thus, according to the ICG, the "Islamist" and "Islamic political" are essentially synonyms.⁶

Similarly, Mir Zohair Husain also believes that Islamism is best defined as the transformation of Islam into an ideology. It can be seen as a revival of the Islamic faith in a political idiom in which the practitioners of Islam cultivate Islamic symbols, ideas and ideals. Some of these practitioners are enlightened, others are not. Some are sincere, others dishonest; some are violent, others peaceful; some are good, others bad.⁷

Other terms

Occasionally in this context we are offered the term *tekfiris*. It has something to do with the issue of militant extremism, but is not a good solution because it is only one aspect of the problem (excommunication of other Muslims), which as such is not relevant for the state,

5 Graham Fuller, "Islamists in the Arab World: The Dance around Democracy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sept. 2004, 3; Abdullahi A. Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan*, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2008, p. 6-7; William E. Shepard, Francois Burgat i James Piscatori, "Islamism," *Oxford Encyclopedia of Islamic World*, New Work, Oxford University Press, 2009, 3: 191-194.

6 International Crisis Group (ICG), "Islamism in North Africa I: "The Legacies of History", 20th April 2004, page 1. "Islamic" is however in use of the ICG a general term that is usually refers to Islam in religious rather than political sense but is able, dependant of situation, to cover both (for instance "Islamic activism").

7 Mir Zohair Husain, *Global Islamic Politics*, New York, Longman, 2003, p. 338.

particularly not for judicial and police authorities. It may be of interest only for security services as an indicator of extremism, but excommunicating others as such does not represent a crime in a secular state and can not be the subject of its interest.

It is certainly relevant to the religious community and religious debates, in which only the best doctors of Islamic doctrine and law can find the way. In addition, *takfir* is not practiced only by the militants, but we do not perceive their excommunication of the opponents as a security threat because it is not followed by the violence. So *Kharijism* is more appropriate term because it implies the excommunication (*takfir*) accompanied by use of violence.

For the same reason, the biggest problem is not that some communities want an isolation. If America can live with the Amish community, we can live with similar groups. Democratic societies have always found ways to accommodate civil disobedience, peaceful isolationism and other types of disloyalty, and denial of sovereignty as long as it does not involve violence.

One should also avoid derivatives of the term “jihad” (mujahidin, jihadists, etc.) as they unfairly establish a link between the holy Islamic duty of jihad and one of the most disgusting crimes of modern times and in such a way surrender to extremists the monopoly over otherwise acceptable terms. Jihad is not only the armed struggle, but a part of it is that (*qital*). Jihad as is very close to a just war and very distinct from arbitrary use of force or holy war. It is equally wrong to invoke the Shariah as an incriminating element in the behaviour or plans of individuals and groups, taking into account that “Islamic law (Sharia) is a normative aspect of Islam”, that “the life of every Muslim group is inextricably linked to the adherence to the Sharia”, and “betrayal of the Shariah calls into question the Islamic identity of individuals and groups.”⁸

8 Fikret Karčić, *Studije o šerijatskom pravu i institucijama*, Sarajevo, El-Kalem and Centar za napredne studije, 2011, p. 7.

The using of terms “panislamist” and “panislamism” intends to incriminate inter-Muslims solidarity and as such should be avoided. Finally, it is completely unacceptable and scandalous to use the term “islamofascism” because it establishes close relationship between religion of Islam and one of most totalitarian ideology of the new era.

To conclude, these may look like very basic remarks but given the importance of terminology in the battle for the minds and hearts of Muslims in conflict with the militants it is important not to repeat old mistakes any more. Ten years after 11 September 2001 we should leave hysteria and be willing to think rationally about a really major problem. In other words, we must not allow that the “Algerian group” happens to us again.

Ekrem Tucaković

**THE ROLE OF THE ISLAMIC
COMMUNITY, THE MEDIA
AND STATE INSTITUTIONS
IN FINDING SOLUTIONS**

I The Character of Islamic community

According to the Constitution of the Islamic community, which is derived from other normative acts, the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is one united community of (Article 1), the organization and its activities are based on the Quran, life practices of Muhammad *'alaihi-s-salam*, Islamic tradition of Bosniaks and time requirements (Article 4); Islamic community keeps the authenticity of Islamic norms and ensures their interpretation, and *the Hanafi madhhab* is used in interpretation and performing worshipping (ceremonial) duties (Article 8).

The Islamic community is a traditional religious community, in managing its own affairs and work organization is an independent and autonomous, in relation to the state as well as to any other religious centers outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, for all Muslims, the common constitutional sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the Prophet's tradition, Islamic tradition of Bosniaks is one of the sources in the interpretation and application of Islamic norms. The Islamic community has its own respected tradition of Islamic upbringing, education and practical application of religious regulations, than meetings with different social systems and ideologies, the experience of training (educating) its staff in authoritarian domestic and foreign scientific centers, also has access to all the basic classical and contemporary Islamic literature and historical trends of Islamic thoughts, and its experience of institutional organization has special importance. These features make Islamic community competent institution in safeguarding of authenticity of the learning, interpretation and application of Islam, able to be responsible towards the believers, their needs and social context. On the other hand, the Islamic community is not clerical organization neither the priestly institution. In the work of its all executive and legislative bodies, involved are the people who do not have the status of religious officials (ministers) in the Parliament of the Islamic community, as the highest legislative authority; only one third of representatives

may be employees of the Islamic community. The ruling positions are subject to the principle replacement, electivity and limited mandate. The Islamic community has its own electoral system, which maintains elections for all levels; Muslims participate in the process of election as voters and those who are selected for voting so that they substantially can create work and profile of the Islamic community. In this way, through the election and participation in the work of Muslims, the Islamic community gets specific believer legitimacy given by Muslims as a bearer of specific power and sovereignty. This is one of the key and valuable achievements of Muslims and the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

II Islamic community and alternative Islamic movements

The concat local Muslims and the Islamic community with the Islamic movements of different orientations was of varying intensity and occurred at different levels. It is very positive for these meetings to be within the educational system of the Islamic community at the level of scientific discussion and study of the plurality of Islamic thought and movements, and has been shown constructive and desirable flexibility. However, arcing, sometimes with possible negative consequences, occur at the level of ritual, forcing as in the previous period the Islamic community to respond institutionally in order to preserve *Hanafi* tradition and the unity of the ritual practices. The first time it was in the form of *fatwas Reis-ul-ulema* Dr. Mustafa Cerić in 1993, the mandatory following of the *Hanafi madhhab* (legal school) in the manner of performing religious duties, the second time was the 2006 when the Islamic community passed a Resolution on the interpretation of Islam which stressed its determination of the protection of originality “age-old tradition of the IC”, and the unity of the Islamic community in the institutional and doctrinal teachings of Islam was confirmed. The third time it happened in 2007 through the amendment of the Resolution on the interpretation of Islam in 2006, during which the *Riyasat*

confirmed earlier views, condemning the statements which underrate IC and insult Bosnian scholars, which is characterized, contrary to the spirit of Islamic morals and against the peace and security of the Bosnian Muslims. It was specially emphasized that “those who in any way bring unrest into mosques under the excuse of establishing ‘true faith’ are not people with good-intentions.”

The Islamic community has an obligation to preserve the unity of ritual practice and tradition, takes into account the general situation and the interests of the faithful, to ensure a balance between different points of view and neutralizes the potentially destructive religious radicalism. These principles and values relate to the challenges of encounters with alternative movements. The Islamic community as a responsible institution takes responsibility for the consequences of its authority’s interpretations of Islamic. Responsibility is an important distinction between institutional learning and interpretation of Islam within the Islamic community and religious adventurism and arbitrariness of individuals and groups. Thanks to the responsibility and moderation Islamic community avoided sharp conflicts, did not fall into the trap of “witch hunt” and persecution of people because of their different opinion and did not accept the role of licensing for the quality of personal faith of an individual. This is extremely positive and very useful experience.

It is of crucial importance under the excuse of combating non-traditional, sometimes deviant ideas and attitudes that embraces mantle of Islam that the Islamic community reaches out to the scientific rigidity and stiffness, “dictatorship” by one opinion and attitudes imposed from a position of power or the suffocating plurality of theoretical questioning interpretative religious texts. Of course, it is necessary to enable and foster within the Islamic institutions wide constructive focused critical approach. It cannot fight against the idea with force and machine of power. It is necessary to offer better ideas, better arguments, and for people of this time and their needs, more appropriate interpre-

tation of Islamic teachings. Within this kind of framework, the Islamic community has no reason to fear for its position in the community of Muslims, or its value may be seriously questioned. The Islamic community needs to maintain its openness, to enter into a productive debate on the issues which represent interest to Muslims; to be factor that includes not excludes, to strengthen power of absorption and flexible abilities. On the other hand it would be a fatal mistake that the Islamic community accepts or takes a position unfounded and arbitrary discredits and labels people or violates their rights just because they think religion differently or have different habits and preferences raised from their religious zeal.

III The role of state institutions

Status of faith and the relationship between state and religious communities is regulated by the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and religious communities on the principle of separation, equality and cooperation. Article 8 of this Act has confirmed the continuity of the historically based churches and religious communities in accordance with religious rules and internal organization. Therefore, state institutions have a legal obligation to ensure equal treatment of religious communities, to encourage environment of cooperation, understanding and tolerance in society. In addition to the position of neutrality, it is highly important for government authorities avoid a relationship that is based on prejudices or stereotypes of certain religious groups or individuals. State laws should apply equally to all citizens, and the application of law must be devoid of any type of stereotypes or attitude that certain groups and individuals, solely because of their religious beliefs or other formal qualities, are predisposed for breaking the law and therefore subjected to suspicion. Violators of laws have names and surnames specific offenses that they are accused for; the law treats individuals on the basis of the crime, not his opinions or views. Due to the weakness and lack of professionalism of state institu-

tions in the past there were more cases in which some Muslims, either individually or as members of certain groups, placed in an inappropriate context and were victims of suspicion and injustice. Specifically, these examples testify to the violation of the rights and freedoms, and encouraging the spread of negative stereotypes and prejudices, which leads to marginalization and exclusion of groups and individuals from the social and public life.

It may be given an example of creating a climate of intolerance in society against individuals or groups, as a result of the activities of state institutions, the performance of the joint action of police-security forces in the village of Gornja Maoca near Brcko, in early February 2010. The Prosecutor's Office of BiH used the term, members of the "*Wahhabi community*," and explained that the operation was carried out for the arrest of the suspects intended to change the constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina and as the threat to the territorial unity of the state. Spectacular action, big charges, and then the inability to prove the same and then release of the arrested, brought into serious doubt the intention and competence of state structures. Also, serious doubts about the failures of state institutions, what reflects on spreading lies and fear of Muslims, had shown during the report of discovery of 54 kg explosives, 17 2 2010, when Elviz Aličić accused two persons to be involved in the transport of explosives, one of whom was the president of the *Majlis* of the Islamic Community of Jablanica. The above named later admitted that he gave false testimony, but the suspicion remained that it was intelligence and police intrigue with the intention of accusing the Islamic community and the Muslims. Continuous media stories about the *Wahhabis* or the gathering of armed *Wahhabis* in different parts of the country is encouraging the public fear of Muslims. Stories about the *Wahhabis* are specially coming from the entity of Republic Srpska.

Police of Republic of Srpska in August 2010, performed the action of arresting five Bosniak returnees in Bosanski Novi and Bosan-

ska Dubica during Ramadan. The initial reports from police indicated that the arrested are suspected of terrorist activities and that they are a “*Wahhabi*”. The arrested were quickly released, but this action is another prove against the implementation of police actions and arrests of Muslims without justification and good reason. “This day will long be remembered, as we shall never forget the memory of ‘92. And will remain in us until the end of life. It all remind us of 1992 when we were arrested and taken to concentration camps by Serbian policemen and soldiers. By this action Serbian police once again reminded us that our safety is really questionable and how little it takes for crimes to commit against us, “this was the attitude of Bosniak returnees in Bosanski Novi and Bosanska Dubica on the occasion of this action.

Statements and claims perhaps unwisely given without clear evidence of high-ranking government officials contribute to creating a negative atmosphere and prejudice against Muslims, high-ranking. Mr Almir Dzuvo, director of the Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA), 12 July 2010, said that in Bosnia and Herzegovina he sees “a potential danger from 3,000 people that can in any moment be overturned, whether because of mental or other condition” and do a terrorist act with great consequences, and sought adequate laws and to radically be separated from religion, promising that in this case for three months these people will no longer be outside free. This statement, without giving any evidence, is questioning responsibility and professionalism. On the other hand, it is used as an official confirmation that there are in BiH thousands of potential Muslim terrorists.

Some actions of officials of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina have not contributed to the development of a democratic society and rule of law. After session of the Joint Commission for Defense and Security of the BiH Parliament, held on 12 July 2010, Mr. Zlatko Miletic, Director of the Federal Police, said: “We did not aim to develop Islamophobia, and there are in the international community people who just want so”. It should be noted here that

the international prosecutor at the Prosecutor's Office Drew Engle in indictment against the group in Riyadh Rustempašić set out "*Sharia*" as incriminating element.

IV The Role of Media

Public space is not ideologically exclusive area of certain groups or single viewpoint, but rather in a democratic society it is equally shared by all interested groups and individuals in accordance with the law. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the media space often has the scene of ideological and political conflicts in which the media is used as an instrument and takes up one side. In this way, there is scarifying a professionalism of journalistic standards and ethics, generally accepted culture of dialogue and use of appropriate language in public space. As a result, there is a violation of guaranteed rights and freedoms, including freedom of conscience and conviction, because the feelings of believers have been offended, and often the public space is the place of expression of hidden or unhidden hatred towards learning or a person because of their religious beliefs and activities. In this way the media contributes to an atmosphere that encourages isolation and marginalization of ideas and individuals on the basis of religious belief. We will mention one instance where a journalist from the public service on the occasion of the police operation in Upper Maoca (February 2010) declares that in this village seized "documents that indicating plans to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. That so hard conclusion has not been ever or never seriously supported. Opening BBI Center in Sarajevo, just because of not selling alcohol and pork, was an argument for some media to launch of the thesis about the alleged Islamisation of Sarajevo. Also it is noticeable the practice that some media preferring one religious authority over the other, labeling him, and the practice of negative approach or brutal skewing attitudes and practices or degrading portrayal of a religious symbol. Another problem presented in media is that, despite the exis-

tence of experts and educational institutions of the Islamic community which offers competent education for the interpretation of Islam, is seen the tendency of reduced, incompetent, sometimes tendentious and malicious interpretations of Islam done by people who do not possess the needed level of competence. Flamed ideological conflicts of the media make sober and rational discussion of all relevant issues difficult related to the presence of religion or religious practices and opinions in public and in finding modalities that will satisfy the legal rights and standards of human rights and freedoms in a democratic society. There is no doubt, the media has an important role in creating a healthy and humane social environment, but also the atmosphere of lynching, and the persecuting people because of their beliefs and the marginalization of social groups. Examples that have been mentioned here come from the negative practices and have a destructive impact on society. No media or journalist can be proud of his work if it is qualified as destructive.

V Conclusion

The plurality of religious opinions is an imperative of a democratic and free society. Freedom and full rule of law which will not be applied selectively and annulling religious specific and differences provide a balanced and healthy development of society. Within this frame the major legitimacy can get the authentic values and interpretations of Islam that will preserve the temporal and spatial requirements, needs and specificities of Muslims. The state and its institutions have an obligation to build and maintain a space of freedom and the rule of just laws. The Islamic community by its character and tradition preserves the institutional unity of teachings and interpretations of Islam and the unity of ritual practice. Although none of the extremist Islamic movement was created on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina or was the product of Muslim Bosniaks, in a time of globalization of ideas and influence it is understandable that Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina

are not and cannot remain out of reach, at least of the peripheral impact of ideological and religious processes in various Muslim countries. However, stable and well-organized Islamic community, which recognizes the demands of time and place and the needs of the believers, is the best and safest barriers to any extreme Islamic movements and ideas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Islamic community does not need to uncritically accept anyone's experience or practice of interpretation and application of Islamic norms, because it owns its own resources, authoritativeness and experts needed to teach and apply the original spirit and intentions of Islam and directs the affairs of Muslims. At the same time, it is a necessary catalyst for the different effects and provides a balance, traces the middle path and develops a sense of responsibility within the learning and interpretation of the sources of Islam. In a social context it encourages democratic processes, rule of law, respect for religious values and needs, cares for the protection of the Muslims rights, and calls for the elimination of prejudice and discrimination based on religion or belief. Therefore it is in the interest of the state and society to enable the smooth running of the Islamic community to make it able to carry out their religious mission and encourage social harmony. It is not good for the state to perform any kind of pressure or interfere in religious discussions, neither it is reasonable that the Islamic community participates in religious debates according to the dictates, or from those positions that come out of the believer's frame, or to get the role it should be done from anyone outside the Islamic community or the believers. Agreeing to an external diktat or conditioning is harmful for the Islamic community, Muslims and society at large.

On the other hand, it is essential that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina respects the human rights of all its citizens regardless of creed, nationality or origin, to hold the position of neutrality and not to interfere in the affairs of autonomous religious communities. Especially important is the application of standards on human rights, primarily the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms, and the practices and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. For example, it is very useful European Court of Human Rights judgment in the case of Bulgaria, where the governments interfere in the religious debate and supporting one side in these debates judged as unacceptable and contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. (Supreme Religious Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, Application no. 39023/97) For state institutions, all citizens are equal in their human dignity and rights, and in particular it means that public authorities must have a high degree of sensitivity in certain specific aspects of religious life, and avoid unjustified suspicion of groups and individuals, intolerance and labeling. Individualization and concretization of the guilt of offenders is needed, rather than attribute individual acts to all group members or followers of a particular opinion, as it often does. Generalization and treatment based on prejudice with the damaged births resistance, a feeling of hurt and a negative reaction that can take various forms, especially if such practice is existing for a long time. The important role of the media will be fulfilled and productive if the media in its work consistently applies the decisions of the law, professional standards and journalistic ethics. Neglecting of professional journalistic ethics and fairness in the media presentation of controversial issues and phenomena leads to manipulation of the public and creating an unhealthy social environment which leads easily to discrimination and violation of other rights. A reflecting of the entire interest of the public and promoting events ideologically neutral is in the first place responsibility above all of public services, because they are funded from money paid by all citizens.

Shared role of the Islamic community and government institutions and the media is to develop a spirit of dialogue, understanding, respect for law and fundamental values and standards of human rights and freedoms. It is important to promote mutual trust, goodwill, and respect responsibilities, rights and obligations. It is unacceptable for

ISLAMIC SCENE IN B&H

anyone to be set up on a pillar of shame with the aim to discredit his moral and human rights. All socially relevant factors should cooperate in areas of common interest; strengthen social cohesion and common prosperity. Taking the opposing position and insisting on them, the violation of personal freedoms and rights, unprofessional and irresponsible attitude, does not lead to resolution and social harmony. Alternative religious scenes and ambition for social recognition should be based on the quality and authenticity of the content that offers, social responsibility and benefit, respect of law and transparency in the work.



**ISLAMSKA SCENA
U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI**


**ISLAMIC SCENE
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

Izdavač / Publisher
UDRUŽENJE ILMIJJE ISLAMSKJE ZAJEDNICE U BIH
FONDACIJA *KONRAD ADENAUER*

Za Izdavača / For Publisher
Sabina Wölkner
Mensur Pašalić

Uvodničari / Authors
Enes Karić, Fikret Karčić, Dževad Hodžić, Mustafa Spahić, Ahmet Alibašić,
Muhamed Jusić, Ekrem Tucaković

Prijevod / Translation
F. Serdarević, A. Sokolović, B. Merdan

Lektura i korektura / Proofreading
Amir Zimić

Štampa / Print
DOBRA KNJIGA, Sarajevo

Samo za internu upotrebu
For internal use only

Sarajevo, 2011.