




האוניברסיטה העברית ירושלים
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למען קידום השלום
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Palestinian Center for
POLICY and
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PRESS RELEASE

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, December 2008

Following Obama's Election, Palestinians and Israelis Seek a more active role of the US in Moderating the Conflict

Among other findings of the joint Truman-PSR poll: both publics support continuation of the cease-fire agreement with Hamas. Only about a quarter of Israelis support reoccupation of the Gaza Strip if shelling of Israeli communities continues.

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between November 26 and December 7, 2008. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

Following the election of Obama for president, a majority of the Palestinians and half of the Israelis want the US to play a more active role in moderating the conflict. Half of the Israelis and half of the Palestinians think that a more active American involvement will be successful, whereas the other half splits between expecting it to have no impact or to fail. Nevertheless both sides expect no change in the US role in the conflict. While the Israelis expect no change in US military economic and political support of Israel, the Palestinians expect that US support of Israel will strengthen.

Our poll also examined both publics' attitudes toward the Arab League (Saudi) plan, given the recent public diplomacy campaign by the PLO negotiation team which published the full plan in Israeli newspapers in order to increase Israelis' awareness of the plan. Only 25% of the Israelis reported having seen the ad. Following this public diplomacy initiative the level of support for the plan remained stable: 36% of the Israelis support and 61% oppose the plan

now, while in September 38% supported and 59% opposed the plan. Among Palestinians 66% support the Arab League plan and 30% oppose it.

With regard to the cease fire with Hamas, support is slightly down compared to three months ago: 51% of the Israelis support its continuation and 44% oppose it; among Palestinians, 74% support and 23% oppose the continuation of the cease fire agreement.

The joint poll examined Israelis' and Palestinians' expectations and assessments of the US policy toward the conflict, following the election of President Obama. The poll also examined various negotiation tracks including the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Israeli-Syrian track and the Saudi (Arab League) plan currently on the public agenda; threat perceptions, support of violence, and domestic political affairs.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 4 and December 7, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 600 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between November 26 and December 2, 2008. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pepsr@pepsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

(A) Expectations regarding the US policy toward the conflict following the election of Barack Obama for President

- 49% of Israelis and 57% of Palestinians want a more active role for the US in the conflict following the election of Obama for president. 31% of Israelis do not want the US to intervene, and 18% want the US to continue to play its current role in the peace process. 35% of Palestinians do not want the US to intervene, and only 4 % want it to continue to play its current role.
- As to the two publics' expectations, 49% on both sides expect this involvement to be successful, while 22% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians think it will be a failure, and 23% of Israelis and 16% of Palestinians think it will have no impact.
- Despite the two publics' preference for a more active American role, 50% of Israelis and 59% of Palestinians expect that the US role will not change. 19% of Israelis and 7% of Palestinians even think the US will play a weaker role than in the past.
- 59% of Israelis believe that US support of Israel will not change, and the others are split between expecting that this support will weaken (19%) or strengthen (15%). Palestinians on the other hand expect US support of Israel to strengthen (56%), and 29% more expect it not to change. Only 7% expect it to weaken.
- Two thirds of Palestinians think that Israel would benefit more if the US intervened strongly in the peace process. Among Israelis 39% say that both sides would benefit, 25% - that the Palestinians would benefit and only 14% - that Israel would benefit from such intervention.
- Israelis and Palestinians are quite split as to the possibility of American pressure on the two sides to accept and implement the peace plans currently on the agenda. On each side a majority would accept such pressure with regard to the plan on which there is majority support in the society, but reject pressure with regard to the plan on which there is no

majority support. Thus, with regard to the Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative (detailed below in section B), 44% of Israelis think Israel should accept such American pressure and 50% think it should reject such pressure. With regard to a permanent settlement along the Clinton/Geneva parameters (as detailed below) 51% think Israel should accept such pressure and 43% think that it should reject it. Among Palestinians the pattern is the other way around: 56% of them think they should accept American pressure to accept and implement the Saudi Plan, 39% say they should reject such pressure. As to a permanent settlement along the Clinton/Geneva parameters, 46% of Palestinians think they should accept and 48% think they should reject such American pressure.

- Among Israelis, 48% believe that the Palestinians would accept American pressure on the two sides on both plans, and 39% believe that the Palestinians would reject it. Similarly, more Palestinians believe that most Israelis would accept than reject American pressure on both plans: on the Arab/Saudi plan, 49% believe most Israelis would accept American pressure, and 43% think that most Israelis would reject such pressure. On the Clinton/Geneva parameters, 55% think most Israelis would accept American intervention, and 36% think Israelis would reject it.

B) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda

The Saudi Plan

- (61% of the Israelis oppose and 36% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In our September poll 59% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 38% supported it. Among Palestinians, 66% support the plan and 30% oppose it, just like in September.
- Following the extraordinary step of public diplomacy initiated by the PLO negotiation department which published the full plan in the Israeli papers on November 20, 2008, 11% of the Israelis report they saw the ads but did not read it, and 14% claim they saw it and also read it. 75% did not see the ad. About half of those who report that they saw the ad and those who saw it and also read it expressed support for the plan while only a third of those who did not see the ad at all supported it. The fact that there is no difference in support between those who only noticed the ad and those who also read it indicates a self selection process where respondents who are more interested in peace also exposed themselves more to the Palestinian campaign, and the difference in support between those who did not see the ad at all and those who saw it does not necessarily indicate a success of the Palestinian campaign.

Clinton/Geneva Parameters

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials eight years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues several times in the past since December 2003, and in

the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the Annapolis conference and the resumption of the peace talks between the parties. The findings indicate stability in support of the overall package among Israelis compared to 2006 and 2007, with a slight majority supporting the package (52%). This is a significant decline from close to two thirds support in December 2004 and December 2005. Among Palestinians, a minority of 41% supports the overall package, down from 47% a year ago. Since we have been tracking these issues in 2003, there was only once majority support for this package on both sides, in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat which was followed by a surge of optimism and considerable moderation in both publics. Among Israelis there is consistent majority support for the Clinton package since 2004, but this majority has shrunk. Palestinian support for this permanent status framework package seems to have been affected in the past more by the disengagement and the disappointment from it, than by Hamas' rise to power. Israeli support only fell following the Palestinian political turnabout, and does not seem to have been affected by the disengagement. Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 54% support or strongly support and 44% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2007, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 56% and opposition at 42%.

Among Israelis 46% support and 48% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2007, similarly 46% of the Israelis supported this component while 50% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians, 40% support and 58% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of property. In December 2007, 39% agreed with an identical compromise while 57% opposed it.

Among Israelis 40% support such an arrangement and 54% oppose it. In December 2007 44% supported it and 52% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 36% support and 64% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2007, an identical compromise obtained 36% support and 63% opposition.

Among Israelis, 40% agree and 57% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2007, 36% supported this arrangement and 63% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 27% support and 72% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2007 23% support, and opposition reached 76%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

Among Israelis 64% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 61% support and 38% opposition obtained in December 2007.

(5) Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 35% support and 64% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2007, 51% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 47% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 56% support and 40% oppose this arrangement compared to 53% who supported it and 44% who opposed it in December 2006.

(6) End of Conflict

In the Palestinian public 56% support and 44% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2007 the support of 66% and the opposition of 32%.

In the Israeli public 67% support and 29% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2007, similarly, 66% of the Israelis supported it while 30% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 41% support and 57% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. This level of support is lower by 6 percentage points than that obtained in December 2007, when 47% supported and 49% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 52% support and 43% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2007, similarly, 53% supported and 43% opposed such a package.

It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people's calculus is compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the undesirable parts.

31% of the Israelis estimate that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package. 55% believe that the majority opposes it. These perceptions tap the normative facet of public opinion and indicate that despite the consistent support in the package over time, it has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 45% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 46% believe that the majority opposes it. In addition 48% among Palestinians incorrectly assume that the majority of Israelis opposes the package, and 40% think there is an Israeli majority for the package. The assessment of Israelis of the Palestinian majority is quite split: 43% of Israelis think that a majority of Palestinians supports the parameters, and 40% think that a majority opposes them.

- In addition to our systematic assessment of the two sides' support of the Clinton parameters we also examine periodically Israelis and Palestinians readiness for a mutual recognition of identity. Our current poll shows that 69% of the Israelis support and 28% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Among Palestinians, 55% support and 44% oppose this step after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established.

Other Tracks

- 63% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria, and 25%, like three months ago, support it. If in the peace agreement, Syria will commit to disconnect itself from Iran and stop its support of Hizbulla and Hamas, support increases somewhat to 29%.
- 55% of the Israelis support and 43% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In September 57% supported and 42% opposed such talks. A sizeable Israeli majority (67%) support and only 31% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. In September these figures were 65% and 32% respectively.

(C) Conflict management, threat perceptions and support of violence

- 51% of the Israelis support the continuation of the cease fire agreement with Hamas and 44% oppose it. Three months ago in our September poll, 55% supported and 39% opposed it. Among Palestinians 74% support the continuation of the cease fire agreement and 23% oppose it. Also among Palestinians, this level of support is somewhat lower than it was in September, when 81% supported and 15% opposed it.
- A majority of Israelis (59%) support the deployment of a Palestinian Authority military force in Hebron. Palestinians are quite split as to what this force will accomplish: 45% think it will bring about law order and safety to the residents, while 48% think it will not do that.

- Among Israelis, 62% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. Among Palestinians 47% fear that their security and safety and that of their family are not assured.
- Among Israelis, 27% suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues; 40% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out; 28% believe that Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps.
- A majority of Israelis (59%) think that Israel should bomb the Iranian nuclear facilities in case all the international measures taken to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon will fail; 34% oppose it.

D) Domestic political affairs

- If personal elections for prime minister were held today in Israel, 37% would vote for Bibi Netanyahu, Tzipi Livni would receive 30% of the vote, and 11% would vote for Ehud Barak. Netanyahu is also considered by Israelis as the best candidate to lead the country toward peace with the Palestinians and/or Syria: 33% of the Israelis think he is the most able to do so; 26% choose Tzipi Livni; Barak comes out third with 10%. When security challenges are concerned, 38% of the Israelis trust Bibi Netanyahu most, 20% trust Barak, and 20% believe in Livni. As to the economic challenges Israel is currently facing, 49% trust Netanyahu, 26% believe in Livni, and 7% in Barak.
- In the Palestinian Authority, if presidential elections were to take place today, Mahmud Abbas, the Fatah nominee, would receive 34% of the vote, while Ismail Haniyeh as the Hamas nominee would receive 27% of the vote.

Israeli Poll#(26) 26 November - 4 December 2008; N=600*
(Palestinian Poll#(30) November - 7 December , 2008; N=1270)

*Listed below are the questions asked in the Israeli survey, and the comparable Palestinian questions. When Israeli and Palestinian questions differ, the Palestinian version is italicized.

1-3 (administrative use)

V1) How would you describe Israel's condition in general these days?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Very good	2.8%	3.6%	
2) Good	14.7%	15.2%	
3) So-so	44.9%	43.0%	
4) Bad	20.0%	19.6%	
5) Very Bad	17.4%	18.4%	
6) DK/NA	0.1%	0.1%	

Q1) In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian areas in Gaza Strip these days?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) <i>Very good</i>			1.1%
2) <i>Good</i>			4.6%
3) <i>So-so</i>			5.8%
4) <i>Bad</i>			32.5%
5) <i>Very Bad</i>			55.1%
6) <i>DK/NA</i>			0.9%

Q2) In general, how would you describe conditions of the Palestinians in the Palestinian areas in the West Bank these days?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) <i>Very good</i>			5.2%
2) <i>Good</i>			21.2%
3) <i>So-so</i>			31.1%
4) <i>Bad</i>			26.8%
5) <i>Very Bad</i>			13.5%
6) <i>DK/NA</i>			2.2%

V2) (Q28) Now, after several months have passed since the ceasefire went into effect in the Gaza Strip, do you support or oppose its continuation?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely support	17.5%	20.7%	14.0%
2) Support	29.1%	30.7%	60.3%
3) Oppose	14.6%	14.4%	19.8%
4) Definitely oppose	34.3%	30.0%	3.4%
5) DK/NA	4.5%	4.2%	2.5%

V3) (Q54) What do you expect to happen between Palestinians and Israelis, now that Barak Obama has been elected as president of the US ?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop	2.8%	8.3%	15.3%
2) Negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue	59.1%	52.9%	45.2%
3) Armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations	34.0%	34.9%	30.5%
4) DK/NA	4.2%	3.9%	8.9%

V4) And if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip will continue, how in your opinion should Israel react?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there	30.2%	26.6%	
2) Carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out	44.7%	40.3%	
3) Use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps	19.2%	27.8%	
4) DK/NA	6.0%	5.2%	

V5) And if in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians, Israel will have to negotiate with the Hamas government - in your opinion, should Israel do it or not?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely should negotiate	17.7%	22.7%	
2) Think it should negotiate	33.4%	32.4%	
3) Think it should not negotiate	14.9%	13.6%	
4) Definitely it should not negotiate	32.2%	29.7%	
5) DK/NA	1.9%	1.6%	

V6) And what about the majority of the Israeli public? Do most Israelis support or oppose negotiations with the Hamas?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	25.0%	27.6%	
2) Majority opposes	59.6%	59.2%	
3) DK/NA	15.4%	13.2%	

V7) And if a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fateh will reestablish, should Israel negotiate with it, or should it not, in order to reach a compromise agreement?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely should negotiate	24.1%	29.1%	
2) Think it should negotiate	39.4%	38.0%	
3) Think it should not negotiate	14.2%	12.4%	
4) Definitely it should not negotiate	19.7%	18.2%	
5) DK/NA	2.6%	2.2%	

V8) Last week an ad listing the details of the Arab League peace plan also known as the Saudi plan has been published in Israeli papers. Did you happen to see or read this ad.

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Did not see the ad	74.7%	74.5%	
2) Saw the ad but did not read it	11.0%	11.3%	
3) Saw and read	14.0%	13.6%	
4) DK/NA	0.3%	0.6%	

V9) (Q38) According to the Saudi plan, Israel will retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and a Palestinian state will be established. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194 (which allows return of refugees to Israel and compensation). In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. Do you agree or disagree to this plan?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	7.4%	13.8%	9.2%
2) Agree	19.6%	21.8%	56.7%
3) Disagree	26.2%	23.4%	22.6%
4) Definitely disagree	42.6%	37.2%	7.8%
5) DK/NA	4.1%	3.7%	3.7%

V10) (Q39) If the US under president Obama decides to pressure the Palestinians and the Israeli sides to accept and implement the Arab or Saudi Peace Initiative, do you think the Israeli (Palestinian) side should accept or reject this American intervention

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Accept	37.2%	43.5%	56.0%
2) Reject	55.8%	50.4%	39.0%
3) DK/NA	7.0%	6.1%	5.0%

V11) (Q40) What in your opinion will be the attitude of most Palestinians (Israelis) to such American intervention – would they accept or reject it?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Accept	44.5%	48.3%	49.2%
2) Reject	40.8%	38.7%	43.0%
3) DK/NA	14.8%	13.1%	7.9%

V12) Recently a Palestinian military force trained by the Americans in Jordan, has been deployed in Hebron in order to limit Hamas activities there. Do you support or oppose this step?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely support	30.3%	29.5%	
2) Support	31.5%	29.4%	
3) Oppose	11.8%	11.1%	
4) Definitely oppose	16.9%	21.2%	
5) DK/NA	9.4%	8.8%	

Q25) The Palestinian Authority has deployed a security force in Hebron, do you think the presence of this force will lead to:

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) will lead to enforcement of law and order and will deliver safety to residents			45.2
2) will not lead to enforcement of law and order and will not deliver safety to residents			47.7
3) DK/NA			7.1

If Israel and the Palestinians return to permanent settlement negotiations, various compromise proposals may come up on the table. I will read to you now several items that might be included in the final settlement with the Palestinians. For each of these items tell me the extent to which you agree or disagree to it, taking into account all its elements.

V13) (Q41-5) The proposed permanent settlement will be based on mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. Do you agree or disagree with this item?

(When the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples)

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	21.5%	23.6%	4.8%
2) Agree	42.5%	43.6%	50.1%
3) Disagree	14.7%	13.8%	31.4%
4) Definitely disagree	16.5%	14.7%	12.6%
5) DK/NA	4.8%	4.3%	1.2%

V14) (Q41-2) A demilitarized independent Palestinian state, will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force and a multinational force will be established to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of terrorism and violence directed against each other. Do you agree or disagree with this item?

(An independent Palestinian state would be established in the areas from which Israel withdraws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian state will have no army, but it will have a strong security force but an international multinational force would be deployed to insure the safety and security of the state. Both sides will be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other)

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	21.0%	22.2%	1.2%
2) Agree	42.7%	41.8%	25.5%
3) Disagree	13.6%	13.4%	53.6%
4) Definitely disagree	18.9%	19.3%	18.8%
5) DK/NA	3.7%	3.3%	1.0%

V15) (Q41-6) Israel will have the right to use the Palestinian air space for training purposes. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space, its land and its water resources. In addition Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state and its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force will be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor the territorial integrity of the Palestinian state and its border crossings given its being demilitarized. Do you agree or disagree with this item?

(The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace. But Israeli will be allowed to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. The multinational force will remain in the Palestinian state for an indefinite period of time and its responsibility will be to insure the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including its international border crossings)

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	13.7%	14.6%	2.4%
2) Agree	43.8%	41.0%	32.5%
3) Disagree	20.8%	20.3%	46.3%
4) Definitely disagree	17.1%	19.7%	17.1%
5) DK/NA	4.7%	4.3%	1.7%

V16) (Q41-1) The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza strip territories, except for several large blocks of settlements which will be annexed to Israel and will not exceed 3% of the size of West Bank. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. The Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza strip. Do you agree or disagree with this item?

(An Israeli withdrawal from all of the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of its settlements. But in the West Bank, Israel withdraws and evacuates settlements from most of it, with the exception of few settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be exchanged with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with the attached map)

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	14.4%	15.3%	4.3%
2) Agree	31.2%	30.7%	50.0%
3) Disagree	21.9%	21.2%	31.5%
4) Definitely disagree	26.2%	27.1%	12.1%
5) DK/NA	6.2%	5.6%	2.1%

V17) (Q41-3) Jerusalem will be the capital of both states. East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. The Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including those in the old city as well as the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. The Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. Do you agree or disagree with this item?

(East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israel sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that will come under Israeli sovereignty)

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	11.7%	16.3%	1.0%
2) Agree	21.3%	23.9%	34.7%
3) Disagree	18.7%	16.6%	45.6%
4) Definitely disagree	44.8%	39.9%	17.7%
5) DK/NA	3.5%	3.3%	1.1%

V18) (Q41-4) The solution to the refugee problem will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency:

- Return to the Palestinian state
- Return to areas currently in Israel which will be transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above
- Residency in their current states
- Immigration to countries such as the US Canada and Australia
- Return to Israel.

Return to Israel will be restricted and at the discretion of Israel.

As a base for its decision, Israel will consider the average number of refugees who will immigrate to states such as Australia Canada and Europe. All refugees irrespective of their choice will be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of properties.

Do you agree or disagree with this item?

(With regard to the refugee question, both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242 and on the Arab peace initiative. The refugees will be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of the states in those areas. The number of refugees returning to Israel will be based on the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and

others. All refugees will be entitled to compensation for their "refugeehood" and loss of properties)

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	7.9%	9.0%	1.9%
2) Agree	30.0%	30.5%	37.7%
3) Disagree	29.7%	28.1%	42.5%
4) Definitely disagree	25.4%	25.4%	15.4%
5) DK/NA	6.9%	6.9%	2.5%

V19) (Q41-7) And now after we went over the main features proposed as part of the Israeli Palestinian permanent settlement please tell me the extent to which you support or oppose such a permanent settlement in general, when you consider all features together as one combined package.

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely support	8.9%	10.9%	1.3%
2) Support	38.2%	41.1%	39.7%
3) Oppose	24.6%	23.2%	42.6%
4) Definitely oppose	22.5%	19.7%	14.7%
5) DK/NA	5.8%	5.1%	1.7%

V20) (Q42) In your opinion, what is the Israeli (Palestinian) majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Israelis (Palestinians) support or oppose this combined final status package?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	29.1%	30.8%	44.9%
2) Majority opposes	55.1%	54.9%	45.9%
3) DK/NA	15.7%	14.3%	9.2%

V21) (Q43) And what is the Palestinian (Israeli) majority opinion on this combined package for a permanent status settlement? Do most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (Israelis) support or oppose this combined final status package?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	39.9%	42.6%	40.0%
2) Majority opposes	40.8%	40.2%	47.9%
3) DK/NA	19.3%	17.2%	12.1%

V22) And will you vote for or against such an agreement in a referendum initiated by the government?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) I will definitely vote for	17.2%	22.7%	
2) Think I will vote for	26.6%	26.7%	
3) Think I will vote Against	15.2%	14.3%	
4) Definitely will vote Against	31.7%	28.4%	
5) DK/NA	9.3%	7.9%	

V23) (Q44) If the US under president Obama decides to pressure the Palestinians and the Israeli sides to accept and implement this compromise permanent settlement as outlined above in the six items, do you think the Israeli (Palestinian) side should accept or reject this American intervention?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Accept	44.7%	50.8%	46.4%
2) Reject	47.6%	42.5%	48.3%
3) DK/NA	7.7%	6.7%	5.3%

V24) (Q45) What in your opinion will be the attitude of most Palestinians (Israelis) to such American intervention – would they accept or reject it?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
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1) Accept	42.8%	47.6%	55.3%
2) Reject	41.2%	38.5%	36.3%
3) DK/NA	16.0%	13.9%	8.4%

V25) Some argue that the best solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the establishment of one joint state (for Palestinians and Israelis) in all the territories west to the Jordan river; while others argue that the best solution is in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and another state for the Israelis. Which view do you support?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) The establishment of one state for the Palestinians and the Israelis	8.2%	8.8%	
2) The establishment of two states one for the Israelis and one for the Palestinians	75.4%	76.8%	
3) None of the above	13.9%	12.3%	
4) Other solution	0.6%	0.5%	
5) There is no solution	0.3%	0.3%	
6) DK/NA	1.5%	1.3%	

V26) (Q29) There is a proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. Do you agree or disagree to this proposal?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely agree	20.7%	23.8%	7.4%
2) Agree	49.1%	45.1%	45.1%
3) Disagree	14.3%	13.5%	33.2%
4) Definitely disagree	12.4%	14.5%	12.6%
5) DK/NA	3.4%	3.1%	1.7%

V27) (Q30) And what is the Israeli (Palestinian) majority opinion on this issue? Do most Israelis (Palestinians) support or oppose the mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	56.3%	55.7%	47.9%
2) Majority opposes	27.2%	29.3%	41.8%
3) DK/NA	16.5%	15.0%	10.3%

V28) (Q31) And what is the Palestinian (Israeli) majority opinion on this issue? Do most Palestinians in the territories (Israelis) support or oppose the mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Majority supports	36.5%	39.5%	38.3%
2) Majority opposes	40.2%	40.2%	49.4%
3) DK/NA	23.3%	20.3%	12.3%

V32) Do you support or oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Strongly oppose	54.3%	47.3%	
2) Somewhat oppose	17.3%	15.2%	
3) So so	12.0%	11.0%	
4) Somewhat support	8.6%	9.0%	
5) Strongly support	6.3%	16.0%	
6) DK/NA	1.5%	1.5%	

V33) (asked only if the answer to the previous question is (1) or (2)) And if in the peace agreement, Syria will commit herself to disconnect itself from Iran and stop its support of Hizbulla and Hamas, will you then support or oppose a full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria?

	Israeli Jews		All Israelis		Palestinians
	Valid	Total	Valid	Total	
1) Strongly oppose	63.8%	44.9%	62.3%	38.8%	
2) Somewhat oppose	15.9%	11.2%	15.2%	9.5%	
3) So so	6.5%	4.6%	6.5%	4.1%	
4) Somewhat support	9.2%	6.5%	9.9%	6.2%	
5) Strongly support	4.6%	3.2%	6.0%	3.7%	
6) DK/NA	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	1.4%	
	N=359		N=374		

V34) (Q9) To what extent are you or are you not worried that you or your family members may be harmed by Arabs in your daily life?

(Would you say that these days your security and safety, and that of your family, is assured or not assured?)

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Very worried (<i>Not assured at all</i>)	33.4%	31.7%	6.6%
2) Worried (<i>Not assured</i>)	29.3%	29.9%	39.9%
3) Not worried (<i>Assured</i>)	23.7%	23.0%	46.3%
4) Not at all worried (<i>Completely assured</i>)	12.2%	14.2%	6.8%
5) DK/NA	1.4%	1.2%	0.4%

V35) Of the following personalities who is the most able to lead Israel toward peace with the Palestinians and/or Syria?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Tzipi Livni	25.5%	26.0%	
2) Bibi Netanyahu	35.1%	32.6%	
3) Ehud Barak	7.4%	9.6%	
4) None of the above	23.7%	24.1%	
5) Other	1.1%	0.9%	
6) DK/NA	7.2%	6.7%	

V36) And of the following personalities who will lead Israel best through the security challenges it might face in the coming years?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Tzipi Livni	16.9%	19.9%	
2) Bibi Netanyahu	41.6%	38.3%	
3) Ehud Barak	19.1%	20.4%	
4) None of the above	15.1%	15.0%	
5) Other	0.5%	0.4%	
6) DK/NA	6.8%	6.0%	

V37) And of the following personalities who will lead Israel best through the economic challenges it might face in the coming years?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Tzipi Livni	22.4%	25.7%	
2) Bibi Netanyahu	53.3%	48.8%	
3) Ehud Barak	4.7%	7.3%	
4) None of the above	12.7%	11.8%	
5) Other	0.2%	0.1%	
6) DK/NA	6.7%	6.2%	

V38) And if personal elections for a Prime Minister were held today which of the following personalities would you vote for?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Tzipi Livni	28.6%	29.6%	
2) Bibi Netanyahu	41.4%	37.0%	
3) Ehud Barak	8.3%	10.6%	
4) None of the above	13.4%	15.4%	
5) Other	1.2%	1.0%	
6) DK/NA	7.0%	6.3%	

V39) In case all the international measure taken to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon will fail, should Israel or should it not bomb the Iranian nuclear facilities?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Definitely it should bomb	43.0%	37.5%	
2) I think it should bomb	23.5%	21.0%	
3) I think it should not bomb	12.6%	13.2%	
4) Definitely it should not bomb	13.4%	21.1%	
5) DK/NA	7.5%	7.2%	

Now following Obama's election for presidency in the US, I would like to ask you a few questions on the expected US policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict

V40) (Q33) Some people expect a strong American role in trying to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, including pressure on both sides to the conflict to compromise important national interests. What do you expect to happen?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) The US will now lay a stronger role	25.5%	25.7%	29.0%
2) The US will play a weaker role	16.5%	18.7%	7.4%
3) US role will not change	51.7%	49.6%	59.0%
4) DK/NA	6.3%	6.0%	4.6%

V41) (Q34) What do you want president Obama to do? Do you want him to play a stronger role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process or do you want him not to intervene in the peace process?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) I want a stronger role for the US in the peace process	42.2%	48.7%	57.0%
2) I want the US to continue to play its current role in the peace process	21.3%	18.1%	3.8%
3) I want the US not to intervene in the peace process	34.0%	30.9%	34.9%
4) DK/NA	2.4%	2.2%	4.3%

V42) (Q35) If the US under president Obama plays a strong role in the peace process, do you think this would bring about a successful or failed Palestinian-Israeli peace process?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Certainly will lead to successful process	7.3%	12.9%	19.7%

2) Think it will lead to successful process	36.8%	35.8%	29.6%
3) Will not have an impact	24.8%	22.6%	15.6%
4) Think it will lead to failed process	10.4%	9.6%	21.1%
5) Certainly will lead to failed process	12.6%	12.2%	8.6%
6) DK/NA	8.1%	6.9%	5.4%

V43) (Q36) Who in your opinion would benefit more if the US intervened strongly in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, Israel or the Palestinians?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Israel	12.5%	13.6%	65.9%
2) Palestinians	27.3%	24.9%	10.2%
3) Neither side	20.7%	18.4%	3.8%
4) Both sides	34.7%	39.0%	17.8%
5) DK/NA	4.8%	4.1%	2.4%

V44) (Q37) In your opinion will the US military economic and political support of Israel change?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) The US support will weaken	20.5%	19.4%	6.7%
2) The US support will strengthen	12.0%	14.7%	56.4%
3) The US support will not change	59.5%	58.6%	28.9%
4) DK/NA	8.0%	7.3%	7.9%

V45) To what extent do you support or oppose dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
1) Strongly support	19.2%	26.0%	
2) Support	30.3%	29.1%	
3) Oppose	20.5%	18.1%	
4) Strongly oppose	25.2%	22.4%	
5) DK/NA	4.8%	4.4%	

V46-48) What percent of the Israeli public support dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians?

	Israeli Jews	All Israelis	Palestinians
Percent of respondents believing that the majority of the Israeli public support dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians	34.7%	36.0%	