02/2015

PANORAMA

INSIGHTS INTO ASIAN
AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS



NATIONALISM IN ASIA AND EUROPE

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Konrad
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Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs is a series of occasional papers published by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's "Regional Programme Political Dialogue Asia/Singapore".

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Publisher:
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Ltd
34/36 Bukit Pasoh Road
Singapore 089848
Registration Number: 201228783N
Tel: (65) 6227-2001
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Email: politics.singapore@kas.de
Website: http//:www.kas.de/singapore

Manuscript offers, review copies, exchange journals, and requests for subscription are to be sent to the editors. The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Cover photograph by ©iStock.com/Retrovizor

Design, Layout and Typeset:
Select Books Pte Ltd
65A, Jalan Tenteram
#02-06, St Michael's Industrial Estate
Singapore 328958
Website: www.selectbooks.com.sg

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CONTENTS

Preface

Nationalism is a powerful human force that is on the resurgence in Asia and Europe. The effects of globalisation have inflamed nationalistic sentiments in people all over the two continents. Although intense exchanges in business, technology and finance should have resulted in deeper international cooperation and integration and a broad consensus about the necessity of open borders and tolerance with regard to different lifestyles and forms, it has, instead, inflamed nationalistic sentiments, at least in parts of societies in the East and West. Foremost are some of those who feel that they are or will become the "losers" of open borders and increased international competition, and flee to nationalistic sentiments as a measure of defence and protection. Some political movements and even governments, however, also try to mobilise nationalistic sentiments in pursuit of support for their national and/or international agendas. This could be observed, for instance, during recent elections in some European countries and in last year's elections for the European parliament, when some nationalistic parties increased their share of votes and seats in parliaments. Among the most prominent cases are the Front National (FN) in France and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain. In Asia, on the other hand, tensions arising from nationalistic sentiments between China and Japan and between Japan and South Korea are fuelled by simmering territorial disputes and historical issues.

Although we expected that new tools of communications and ever-closer exchanges in an age of globalisation would make the world closer, nationalistic sentiments have create tensions and divisions between a common humanity. The social media and the internet, which are the icons for open societies and dialogues across borders, have also been used for expressions of hatred and disrespect against other nations.

The reappearance of nationalism in Asia and Europe motivated an international conference about this phenomenon, which the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung organised in partnership with the East Asia Institute (EAI) of the National University of Singapore (NUS) in May 2015. We would like to thank Professor Zheng Yongnian, Director of EAI, and members of his institute for the fruitful collaboration in this project. The papers for this issue of our journal had first been presented during that conference. They offer insights into the evolving nature of nationalism, including its relationship to regional integration efforts and globalisation, as well as its impact on the domestic and foreign policies of countries in Europe and Asia.

Dr. Wilhelm Hofmeister

Rethinking the Nation: Inviting the "Essential Outsider" Back In

Claire Sutherland

Images of desperate migrants bobbing on rickety vessels in the Mediterranean and Andaman Seas bring the question of nationality and its discontents into sharp relief. The category of migrant is created by the system of nation-state sovereignty that divides up the political world, just as ethnic categorization divides states internally into majorities and minorities. Migrants and minorities are thus the "Essential Outsiders" (Reid and Chirot 1997) against which sovereign nation-states define their society and citizenry. This is encapsulated in the concept of nationality, which in its strict sense means membership of a nation, but has become synonymous with citizenship as a legal construct. According to this principle, marginality is the status in store for people seeking to improve their lives and livelihoods. In order to overcome this marginal status, they must achieve the standards of citizenship set by the state (assuming they are admitted to it in the first place). Furthermore, in order fully to "belong" in terms of nationality, properly understood, migrants and minorities at the margins of the state must assimilate the ethnic and cultural characteristics associated with the nation. In some cases, like Myanmar, these standards simply cannot be met because citizenship is closed to Rohingya, and because Myanmar's national identity – such as it is – is closely associated with the Buddhist, Bamar dominant ethnic group.

The humanitarian needs of desperate migrants pose such a conundrum to nation-states because their own sovereignty and national sense of self are also at stake. Australia, for instance, a nation of immigrants if ever there was one, pushes back migrants because they embody the "Essential Outsider" it now defines itself against, in opposition to the "imagined community" (Anderson 1991) with which it identifies. Therefore, any study of contemporary nations and nationalism must take into account the migrants and minorities whose status defines the boundaries of belonging to a nation. This article sets out to trace the evolution of the nationalist idea and examine its future potential to include, exclude, legitimate and create a sense of community in myriad ways, with special reference to the Vietnamese case.

The practice of legitimating the state through the nation only became widespread in nineteenth-century Europe. Even then, countries like France and the United Kingdom aspired to be at once nation-states and imperial powers (Wilder 2005), and the Ottoman

and Austro-Hungarian empires continued to control great swathes of European territory until the end of World War I. In January 1918, months before the armistice, then US president Woodrow Wilson's famous "fourteen points" address to Congress called for countries like Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the peoples of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires, to be granted independence along "clearly recognisable" or "historically established lines of allegiance and nationality" (Wilson 1984 [1918], 537, 538). In effect, Wilson was calling for a post-war settlement constructed around nations, rather than states. This served to entrench the nation as a global organizing principle, but one that remains notoriously difficult to realize in practice. Of course, the ideal of "friendly counsel" that Wilson (1984 [1918], 538) hoped would determine borders was soon trampled underfoot by the jackboots of World War II.

Today, the concept of the nation is contested in a different way to other political concepts such as liberty, equality and justice. It is indelibly tainted with the legacy of Nazism and the fear of Fascism, thereby forever associating nationalism with its most extreme manifestations. Whereas chauvinism and fascism imbue national difference with notions of superiority and inferiority, patriotism is simply an attempt to "detoxify" nationalism and rescue it from all these connotations (Sutherland 2012, 65). In the contemporary "age of migration" (Castles and Miller 2003), migrant flows connect and concern all regions of the world. Shared human characteristics and values have become even harder to define, and (national) community solidarity becomes ever more elusive. In this context, the migrant "Other" often defines and delimits national exclusivity and in an important sense, regional identities too. Immigration is one issue, for instance, on which the increasingly embattled European Union can mobilise its leaders in order to take emergency measures as one. When it comes to dealing with the daily unfolding tragedies on Europe's Mediterranean border, the frequent nationalist trope of "we-ness" as shorthand for national belonging is replicated, for once, on a European scale. This is ironic for an organization that has struggled to create a sense of European identity throughout its existence, but indicative of how the "Outsider" can draw a community together, for better or for worse.

It is always easier to define a community in terms of what it is not than what it actually is. Conceptually, this "Othering" is part of the nationalist ideology that underpins our world order and legitimates every nation-state. Nation-building – understood here to mean state-led nationalism – is inherently exclusive and thus exclusionary, in that it defines an "In-group" and an "Out-group" through the legal construct of citizenship. That is why the "Essential Outsider" is key to any discussion of nationalism, especially contemporary nationalism. Indeed, it is one of the few common strands, beyond prioritising the national construct, uniting the myriad political movements that share the label "nationalist". For example, the first week of May 2015 saw the Scottish National Party (SNP) play a hitherto unprecedented role in the United Kingdom's general election campaign and its eventual outcome, in which the Labour party's traditional Scottish

stronghold was reduced from around forty Scottish Members of Parliament to a single one, and the SNP took all but three of Scotland's fifty-nine seats at Westminster. Though the SNP's key aim is to win independence for Scotland, a proposal that was defeated in a 2014 referendum, it has also governed Scotland since 2007 and portrays itself as being to the left of the Labour party. The French Front National (FN), on the other hand, is a far right-wing party whose leader, Marine Le Pen, suspended its founder (her father) in that same week of May 2015 for repeating his view that the Holocaust was a "detail" of history. What links these avowedly nationalist parties? They each claim to speak for the French and Scottish nations respectively – or to "put Scotland first" in the SNP's words – but do so from very different points on the political spectrum. Importantly, in claiming to represent the people, defined as a given nation, they are no different from mainstream parties like the Conservatives and Labour in Britain or the *Partie Socialiste* and Nicolas Sarkozy's newly rebranded *Républicains* in France.

Both the SNP and the FN have the word national in their names because appeals to the nation frame and define their wider political agenda. The FN, however, adopts a strongly anti-immigrant and anti-European stance, whereas the SNP espouses a more pro-European and open definition of the nation, hence its positive rhetoric around immigration (SNP 2014). This is also in marked contrast to the UK Independence Party, for example, which has quickly gained a platform in mainstream party politics and engineered a strong shift in the UK debate on immigration and EU membership despite limited electoral success. These are all examples of how attitudes towards the "Essential Outsider" mirror understandings of the nation in party politics. Similarly, states divide the "national insider" from the "Essential Outsider" through citizenship regimes, which are more or less open to naturalising foreigners. These regimes are often the enduring product of historical circumstance, making party political orientation less clear but nonetheless traceable, particularly in democratic systems. For example, successive Labour and Conservative governments have recently made changes to the UK's citizenship test to reflect their understanding of what immigrants need to "assimilate" in order to be integrated into the UK citizenry. Indeed, the overlap between nationality proper and legal citizenship is clearest in the widespread use of citizenship tests and oaths of allegiance, where a bundle of legal rights and duties is imbued with cultural significance and the requirement to express loyalty to the nation-state. In sum, attitudes towards immigrants reflect understandings of the nation. Nation and migration are thus mutually constitutive, and this is embodied in the idea of the "Essential Outsider". Evolving attitudes can be traced empirically through the political discourses and legislation surrounding migration and citizenship that create the contours of the nation-state.

Benedict Anderson's book entitled *The Spectre of Comparisons*, which is less celebrated than his earlier work *Imagined Communities*, used his expertise on Southeast Asia as an "inverted telescope" through which to shed fresh light on his European

heritage and cultural referents. An admiring commentary by his erstwhile student Pheng Cheah (Cheah and Culler 2003) describes this as a methodological focus on how nations are imagined. In practice, this would mean investigating the *contours* of the FN and SNP's imagined nations as expressed in their policies and pronouncements around immigration in particular. Anderson rejected Eurocentric bias in favour of adopting Southeast Asia as a "ground of comparison" to illustrate how the colonial period and his own European background both coloured his perception of Southeast Asia and its "imagined", constructed contours. Such an approach does not entail a simple one-to-one comparison between Europe and Southeast Asian cases. Rather, it presupposes that Southeast Asia today is haunted or shaped by its European colonial legacy, in the same way as the ghosts of ancestors and spirit worship can haunt and ultimately subvert the nation-state construct. The spectrality of the European legacy, its haunting of Southeast Asian understandings of sovereignty and nation-building, is also taken up in Partha Chatterjee's critiques of Anderson's work. In Chatterjee's (2005) view, so-called "third world nationalism" is not subject to the same logic of seriality and classification that Anderson posits as nationalism's universal grammar. More precisely, Partha Chatterjee felt that Anderson's understanding of "imagined communities" (1991) in terms of bounded serialities and homogenous empty time could not account for the continued influence of the spiritual world on Asian nationalisms. Taking an Asian perspective thus suggests that studies of nationality should consider enduring spiritual and cultural dimensions alongside its political and ideological facets, thereby reintroducing parallel and often conflicting notions of space and time that Anderson argued were superseded by the sovereign nation-state.

Partha Chatterjee's empirical focus was on India, but the work of the anthropologist Heonik Kwon (2006, 2008b, 2010) in the Southeast Asian setting has shown how a parallel world of spirit worship "haunts" official commemoration of the Vietnam War, which in turn underpins Vietnam's nation-building. Here, the victorious North erases the memory of the South and its fallen. But Kwon describes how the Vietnamese spirit world has a different, competing cosmology, which worships ancestors and placates wandering souls. This takes us back to the contours of the imagined nation and the possibility of rethinking these contours in a way more hospitable to immigrants, those "wandering souls" lapping European shores and floating on the Andaman Sea. Kwon (2008a, no page) evokes "a society in which natives and strangers have the right to dwell". Ancestors belong by rights, but "those who are not entitled to join this ritual unity can still benefit from the sites of consolation prepared in the exterior of the communal unity." This can be taken as a starting point for trying to transpose this idea from the spiritual to the political realm, taking wandering souls to be migrants or "Essential Outsiders" (Sutherland 2014b). It is one possible way in which to rethink the contours of the nation and how it is imagined, a question uppermost in my mind while preparing

a recent exhibition entitled "Vietnam: A Nation, not a War", timed to coincide with the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Vietnam-American War.

The exhibition's guiding theme was formulated as a question: If Vietnam is a nation, not a war, then how do we define a nation? In this way, it encouraged visitors to draw parallels between a country they were unlikely to know well and their own sense of national identity. The country we now call Vietnam has expanded, divided and reunified over the centuries, making it difficult to link it to a specific territory. Vietnamese today are proud of a long history tracing back as far as the Bronze Age, but how can we make a direct link between an ancient civilization and today's nation-state? The same questions can be asked of any country and its national heritage. For example, why are Stonehenge and Magna Carta part of English history, and worth preserving and commemorating today? Why does the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314 continue to have resonance for Scottish people? How do history, culture and tradition help us identify with our "home" country, and even feel patriotic about it?

The exhibition presented a timeline and a chronological survey of Vietnamese history, but it also questioned assumptions about the continuity of national history "through the ages" that still underpin the legitimacy of nation-states today. For example, impressive archaeological finds, including burial goods, pediform axe heads and large, richly decorated drums offer ample evidence of a sophisticated Bronze Age culture based in the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam from around 1000-700 BCE. Although such drums have been found all over Southeast Asia, the so-called *Dong Son* drums are often used to represent the origins of Vietnamese culture and the starting point of Vietnam's national history. For example, one forms the centrepiece of the Museum of Vietnamese History in Hanoi. The Vietnamese Institute of History first made the link between the *Dong Son* civilisation and modern-day Vietnam after the country became independent from France in the 1950s. Vietnamese historians wanted to show that its culture was not simply derived from nearby China, as some French colonial scholars had suggested. Today, this narrative of 3000 years of history is followed in Vietnamese history books and school textbooks, and so is widely accepted. The question is, why associate this ancient civilisation with a country that is now much larger, more diverse and so very different from 3000 years ago? In the same way, why does Ancient Greece still spring to mind when we think about Greece today?

Following a timeline is an easy way of "explaining the nation", but it is not the only way. Presenting national history as a smooth succession of events misses out lots of alternative interpretations and approaches, but it helps justify why a country has a right to exist in the eyes of its people and the wider world. At the same time, it can create conflict if some people's story is privileged over others. For example, the exhibition showed how this approach to national belonging can exclude those who do not fit the national narrative, such as migrants or ethnic minorities. The Vietnamese case was used as an example to explore how people identify with cultural heritage to feel a sense of

belonging to a particular country or community. It also highlighted how governments can shape people's interpretation of history and national community. For instance, how important is the sea to an "island nation" like Britain, or a country like Vietnam whose maritime claims conflict with those of China? Playful works of contemporary art by Anthony Key encouraged visitors to think about whether they could really draw an unbroken line between their sense of national identity and that of their ancestors.

Anthony Key is a British citizen of Chinese heritage, who grew up in South Africa, and has spent his life as an artist exploring hybrid identities through the playful appropriation of the stereotypes surrounding Chinese food. For example, noodles knotted into barbed wire shapes are central to a piece entitled "Trespassing". Key's latest piece, featured prominently at the end of the exhibition and representing the culmination of a long personal journey for him, is called "Returning Home". It is a chest-high, cylindrical trunk made entirely from layer upon layer of chopsticks. It is a satisfying whole made of many parts and it represents home in a solid and enduring, but "rootless" way. This exemplifies the edict "Man is not a tree. He has feet and moves" (as featured in a video at the Museum of the History of Catalan Immigration, see Sutherland 2014a). Anthony Key's piece encapsulates this migrant journey and its goal, a new home. The question remains, can nationalism be a force for inclusive forms of twenty-first-century nations that are home not only to natives?

Scholarship on Southeast Asia is also helpful in thinking through new, normative approaches to nationalism. Loran Marsan, in a critique of the Vietnamese director Trinh Minh-Ha's film *A Tale of Love*, offers an alternative to "hierarchal and linear histories of nationalism" (Marsan 2006, no page). She contrasts these narratives to a different kind of story, one that better captures people's diverse experience and understanding of the nation, whether they be natives, migrants or members of the diaspora. Marsan (2006, no page) relays Trinh's metaphor of a heterogeneous nation as a "tightly-knit tissue" of people that respects their difference. Importantly, Trinh's model for imagining the nation is voluntaristic rather than ascriptive. The main character in Trinh's film is named Kieu after the heroine in *The Tale of Kieu*, Nguyen Du's nineteenth-century retelling of an older, Chinese story. *The Tale of Kieu* is often described as Vietnam's great national literary masterpiece and is still much loved by Vietnamese. As Trinh shows in her film and Marsan analyses in her text, this work is significant for theories of nationalism in that all those Vietnamese who identify with the central character do so in different ways, but all make a place for her in their lives. That is, they identify with her in the way nationalist ideologues would have us all identify (and be identified) with a particular nation.

As a member of the Vietnamese diaspora in the US, the character of Kieu in Trinh's film recognises that "the Vietnamese diaspora needs English to survive and that they must love (as opposed to need) their 'mother tongue' in order to continue that cultural linguistic identification" (Marsan 2006). In other words, identification with the

Vietnamese nation is a choice that can be expressed in different ways, all of them valid and all of them open to ethnic Vietnamese at "home" and abroad, as well as to migrants and ethnic minorities who wish to adopt this identity. Although the latter groups are not specifically discussed in Marsan's text, they should in principle be able to join this "cyclical, weaving" (Marsan 2006, no page) national story, in contrast to linear narratives of national unity where they cannot demonstrate the correct ancestry to "belong".

It could be argued that Marsan (2006, no page) sets up something of a straw man in her account of "Western" nationalism as "dependent on finite borders and a homogeneous population." As we have seen, however, ongoing debates in the UK and elsewhere around controlling immigration and integrating migrants rest on just such assumptions. Those who are not deemed to have a stake in the national story by virtue of descent, those who are not resident natives or members of the diaspora, must prove their assimilation by passing the likes of a citizenship test or swearing an oath of allegiance. Trinh's model is different. It explicitly integrates multiple and shifting identities. It moves away from an ideology of nationalism predicated on linear progression through time and the ideal of a unified population bounded in space. Instead, the nation is a nodal point of discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) that anyone can choose to identify with in their own, unique way.

To return to the metaphor of Kieu: "The beauty of Kieu is exactly this idea that she is multiple and multiply embraced in such a way that all of these different interpretations are tied together through a heterogeneous love of Kieu" (Marsan 2006, no page). Marsan argues that the depth and richness of *The Tale of Kieu* is particularly suited to encouraging multiple interpretations and "endless connections", including the spirit of resistance to oppression that is dominant in official narratives of Vietnamese nationalism (Marsan 2006, no page). Yet Trinh's model of the "tightly knit" nation is still strongly evocative of national community and thus has wider potential for reimagining the nation. In practice, the shared national nodal point (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) in common could be as simple as choosing to identify with being British, Brazilian or Ghanaian, or any aspect thereof. After all, few people will evoke the same symbols when asked what they associate with the nation. This is not an overly abstract, idealistic or unrealistic starting point for debating the nation. On the contrary, by focusing on emotions, relationships and experience in the here and now rather than historical ancestry and "true" belonging, Trinh's model corresponds better to people's lived reality than vain attempts to define "British values," or the stultifying questions prescribed in the UK citizenship test. It can work within the boundaries of existing nation-states to embrace difference, whilst recognising that people increasingly identify across borders. Crucially, its starting point is not exclusion and control, but the nature of relationships between people. What it does is draw attention to "where the borderlines are drawn, as well as how arbitrary they are" (Marsan 2006, no page) and disrupt the notion of a single, unitary national story.

In producing a "multiplicity of interrelated national identities" (Marsan 2006, no page), Trinh's "tightly knit" model of the nation corresponds to the way in which we all interpret national belonging differently. This is illustrated in her cinematography, which does not follow a linear structure and uses lighting techniques to discourage the viewer from focusing on any single point within a shot. The onus is clearly on the viewer to develop their own interpretation of the film. In the same way, Trinh's cyclical model of the nation, as relayed by Marsan (2006), encourages individuals to identify with the nation according to their own understanding of what it means to them and to do so when they are ready, rather than be expected to join the linear flow of an increasingly venerable nation progressing through "homogeneous, empty time" (Anderson 1991).

Conclusion

The arrival and refoulement of migrants says much about the reconfiguration of state-society relations across both Europe and Asia, and the often conflicting demands on states to fulfil humanitarian and moral duties under international law, whilst maintaining a nation-state construct that is premised on clearly defined and protected borders that keep citizens safe and unwanted "Others" out. This premise extends to nationality properly understood, namely the sense of national belonging that underpins citizenship as a legal framework. Evolving citizenship regimes, such as Vietnam opening up to its diaspora as a desirable Other, or India's courting of its diaspora through quasi-citizenship for Persons of Indian Origin, or the *de facto* availability of citizenship for sale in Cambodia and elsewhere, reflect the evolution of states' sovereignty over a citizenry in a way that may be increasingly difficult to square with nationality. In Myanmar, the failure of the state to build a multi-ethnic national identity is being laid bare by the move to a democratic system dominated by ethnic parties, the persecution of Rohingya on the ground that they have never "belonged" as state citizens, and continuous conflict over several decades. In Malaysia, the long-standing ethnic segmentation of politics is coming under increasing strain. In Vietnam, the state reaching out to its diaspora is based on the shared appeal of ancestor worship, alongside a post-*doi moi* reconfiguration of state-society relations that includes increasingly vocal opposition to China from citizens and "netizens" online.

This article has used the metaphor of the "Essential Outsider" to show how the interplay of nation and migration is crucial to twenty-first-century nationalism. Vietnamese nation-building is a particularly interesting case through which to explore Partha Chatterjee's critique of Benedict Anderson, in that it exemplifies the conventional nationalist narrative of a long-standing "imagined community," but also holds within it the seeds of a more inclusive form of national identification. Heonik Kwon's work on Vietnamese spirit worship was used to lay the groundwork for evoking another form of national community, as proposed by Trinh Minh-Ha and discussed by Loran Marsan. Anderson's "imagined community" (1991) deftly sums up an enduring and

frequently exclusionary phenomenon, but that does not mean that nations and nationalism are inherently pernicious. Nationalism cannot be easily jettisoned in practice, since it is the legitimating ideology underpinning the world of nation-states as we know it. Similarly, the nation still holds analytical potential for "more open ways of imagining" (Closs Stephens 2010, 40) that could be more inclusive towards all those "Essential Outsiders" that are not trees, but people who have feet and move.

Claire Sutherland is a senior lecturer in politics at Durham University, UK. Publications include *Soldered States: Nation-building in Germany and Vietnam* (Manchester University Press, 2010) and *Twenty-first Century Nationalism: Challenges and Responses* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

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Is there Euro-Nationalism on the Rise?

Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski

This article focuses on the social and political "technologies" that the European Union (EU) aimed at the constructing of a collective identity in a way that emulates the integrative logic of national identity. It can be argued that the EU has been attempting to generate a national sense of belonging in a non-nation-state environment for some time, albeit with modest success. It is a particular case of identity generation, since most EU scholars and practitioners negate the nation-state character of the EU, either by using neologisms such as *mixed polity*, *consortio*, *condominio*, and *proto-federation* (Schmitter 1992; Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998) or by employing the imprecise term of the *sui generis* system.

The "production" or strengthening of national identity can be defined as nationalism, as it fulfils integrating functions regarding individuals in a society and is believed to be a necessary underpinning for representative and majoritarian democracy (Grimm 1995). This theory of "benign nationalism" highlights the integrative and virtuous working of nationalism, rather than its destructive and vicious effects. In this vein, David Miller argues that even in (or perhaps precisely because of) contemporary democratic societies the bonds of nationalism are necessary (Miller 1995; Greenfeld 1999). These bonds can be generated if there is social trust and obligations stemming from the feelings of relatedness. This argument has been frequently applied to the conditions of the modern economy, which are regarded as requiring high levels of moral commitment in the form of mutual solidarity. Only against the background of a high level of social trust can democracy function in a sustainable manner since redistributive measures cannot be otherwise justified. Furthermore, national identity is expected to deliver trust and motivation for citizens to participate and deliberate on public matters. Therefore, the theory of "benign nationalism" presumes that the nation is not only the empirically most common form of a modern political community, but also implies a normative value of nations. Various versions of the arguments supporting nation-oriented EU-identity and nation-like EU-community can be found in the debate on European identity, in particular in the context of the democratic deficit of the European Union. The democratic deficit of the EU is believed to occur because a collective feeling of belonging to the same political community does not underpin majority decisions. For instance, Anthony D. Smith (1993) argues that the desire for European identity arises from flawed assumptions about the end of nation-states, which are as naïve as

they are unsubstantiated, since they ignore both the perseverance of nation-states and the rootedness of national identities. Moreover, Europe lacks a common ethnic base with a reliable and visible set of common historical memories, myths, symbols and values, since abstract allegiances lead to strong and stable identities. Another sceptic, David Miller (1995: 36), rejects the idea of European nationalism on the grounds of a lack of trust between European citizens. According to Miller, the EU must justify material redistribution beyond self-interest, which leads to obligations between compatriots. These obligations are justifiable only against the background of reciprocity and trust, which can be provided only by a national community since it embodies continuity between generations and holds up the virtues of the ancestors by encouraging citizens to live up to them.

This poses a certain dilemma for the application of nationalism by the EU. On the one hand, the EU might be in need of generating a nation-like collective identity to establish acceptance for its decisions under the conditions of diversity and heterogeneity. On the other hand, the EU seems to lack the structural requirements (as a non-nation-state political system) for developing a collective identity. The EU cannot suppress existing collective identities in the radical manner that the belligerent nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did, since the major source of EU legitimacy still resides with the member states. In addition, the nation-states of the EU not only possess significantly more bureaucratic and ideological resources than the EU to forge collective identities, but they can also draw on existing strong national attachments, which counteract European nationalism. Nevertheless, the EU applies identity technologies towards its citizens in an attempt to solve this dilemma. In this sense, the political elites of the EU appear to be aware of the stabilizing effects of a collective identity and attempt to generate it, albeit in a subtler manner than EU member states can do by reverting to nationalism. Therefore, the "nationalism lite" of the EU either uses selected identity technologies of nationalism or uses them at a more subtle level, as the EU cannot exactly emulate nationalism regarding its strength, sacrificial appeal and aggressiveness.

Collective Totems, Rituals and Symbols in the EU

The EU has consistently generated and promoted collective totems, rituals and symbols similar to those of many nationalisms (Marvin and Ingle 1999). The totems are tangible manifestations of the EU, including a flag, the anthem, the motto ("united in diversity") and the passport (Manners 2011). As François Foret (2009: 315) argues, the blue of the European flag can be viewed as an evocation of "the blue of the Western sky" and "stars figuring peoples of Europe form the circle as a sign of union. They are invariably twelve, symbol of perfection and completeness". The flag seem to be the most recognizable totem of the EU, both for citizens and non-citizens. The expectation of the totems is that they transcend linguistic boundaries, mainly due to their non-oral content. Other

totems such as the EU passport and driver's license fulfil mainly symbolic functions vis-à-vis EU citizens, as they enhance the perceived tangibility of the EU. As opposed to the flag and the passport, the anthem and the motto of the EU have not achieved any wide resonance and remain unrecognizable for most EU citizens. However, even the European flag did not achieve the status of the US flag, whose stars and stripes are honoured every day with a dedication rare in other countries (Teachout 2006).

Probably the most effective collective symbol of the EU is the common currency (Hymans 2004). The establishment of the tangible symbol of the euro and its iconography certainly raises the salience of the EU and might have significance for the development of the we-feeling in the European Union (Risse et al. 1999: 147-187). The power of the euro lies in its everyday presence and its iconographic diversity allowing for representation of national motives on the European notes and coins. Thus, the euro is expected to enhance the "realness" of Europe by providing a tangible link from the European level to the daily lives of the citizens (Risse 2003; Cerulo 1995).

In addition to a number of totems, the EU supports ritualistic practices typical of nation-states. According to Ian Manners (2011), one such ritual relates to the Franco-German reconciliation, which is portrayed as closely connected to the "birth" of the European Community/Union. Regardless of the political differences between Germany and France, the rituals surrounding the celebration of the Elysée Treaty include highly visual practices of joint acts of remembrance and hand-holding at war memorials. Furthermore, the EU has been quite active in ritual remembrance practices, as it has attempted to establish several remembrance days: the European Holocaust Memorial Day (marking the liberation of Auschwitz on January 27, 1945), the European Day for the Victims of Terrorism (marking the Madrid train bombings on March 11, 2004) and the Europe Day (marking Robert Schuman's declaration on the European Coal and Steel Community on May 9, 1950) (Manners 2011). However, all these ritualistic practices have limited dramatizing effects for the wider public and Europe and thus are quite ineffective. They remain communicative events, rather than political celebrations, which would be more typical for nationalisms (Foret 2010).

Further cases of cultural symbols can be found in the EU's cultural policies. This includes for instance symbolic initiatives such as the "European Cities of Culture", with the goal of raising the visibility and identifiability of the EU but with respect for national cultures. This point appears essential, as the EU cannot use the nation-like symbolism of the EU with the same strength as nation-states did in the 19th and 20th centuries. Thus, the EU promotes commonality symbols via symbolic diffusion into the everyday life of citizens, but without relinquishing the symbolic ambiguity of these "identity techniques" (Sassatelli 2002: 435-451). As in the case of the euro, this symbolic ambiguity is a response to the European cultural diversity, which in turn reflects the EU's motto "united in diversity" (Sassatelli 2002: 446). This certainly differentiates

this type of practices from the more common nationalism that has a much stronger homogenizing appeal.

Nevertheless, one should point to a tension between the creation of totems, rituals and symbols by the EU elites and the EU legitimacy. On the one hand, these practices (resembling the nationalism of the nation-states) aim at enhancing the EU's legitimacy by producing or strengthening the we-feeling of Europeans. On the other hand, the EU attempts to establish an order-creating cultural system that is not derived from popular sovereignty. This is related to the *no-demos* problem of the EU, since the EU is not a democratic polity and there is no European demos in sight. It poses a certain problem for the legitimacy of practices of nationalism, as they might be difficult to discern from collective indoctrination or brainwashing by the EU elites, contradicting the democratic aspirations of the EU. A collectivistic stimulation of citizens' identity via production and manipulation of totems, rituals and symbols might even exhibit a predilection for authoritarian politics, since it enhances the inequality between the rulers and the ruled, and thus increases the democratic deficit of the EU (cf. Kaina 2006).

Foundational Myth-Making in the EU

In addition to the practices related to totems, rituals and symbols, the EU has been developing its own foundational mythology for some time. The constitutive myths or "mythomoteurs" have been explored mainly in nationalism research (Smith 1987: 24), where one of the most relevant aspects of nationalism is a generation or strengthening of national identity via foundational myth-making. Such foundational myth-making, that is, narratives creating normative and cognitive foundations for a community, can be regarded as an aspect of nationalism. In the context of the EU, the main "mythomoteur" is the narrative of how the integration process has been responsible for peace, prosperity and democracy in Europe. According to Vincent della Sala (2010), the narrative of peace, prosperity and democracy went through all the stages of successful national mythologizing: diffusion, ritual and sacralization. This foundational myth has become deeply entrenched in the political discourse of European integration, and is mainly activated before important decisions with the involvement of citizens, such as the national referenda on EU issues (for instance in France, Netherlands and Ireland) or the EU's struggle to establish new institutions to deal with the recent debt crisis (Della Sala 2010: 11). However, the foundational myth of the European Union as a vehicle for peace, stability and economic growth has been losing its appeal in recent years, in particular with the younger generations of Europeans. As a consequence, the EU has been at pains to establish new "mythomoteurs" which would, for instance, motivate the participants of referenda to accept major European projects such as the Constitutional Treaty. One such myth relates to fundamental rights as inherent to the European project and based on a common European heritage, even though fundamental rights were not part of the initial project of European integration. However, the narrative of the EU as

a guardian of fundamental rights from its very inception results from the EU's appropriation of the fundamental rights credentials of its member states and the Council of Europe. Although fundamental rights were not in the Rome Treaty, the EU has gradually generated this fundamental rights myth, which is believed and acted upon by both institutional myth-makers and civil society actors. It was facing its particular activation during the debates on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and is about to reach the sacralization phase soon.

The foundational myths are different from other political myths, which have much more in common with self-images of superiority. The foundational myths construct a "glorious past" (or in same cases a past based on suffering – leading to a messianic self-image) and appeal to new generations that cannot remember the origins of the polity. In other words, foundational myths attempt to forge a collective identity among citizens through creating a feeling of continuity between older and newer generations. In the case of the EU, the problem of generational continuity occurred in the 1990s, when a new generation of political decision makers and citizens without any WWII experience came to impact decisions on the European level. One might even argue that the appeals to foundational myths aim at a temporary re-establishment of a "permissive consensus" in the EU in times when it is needed, for instance before referenda. The so-called "permissive consensus" (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) allowed the national and European elites to push forward with European unification without much resistance from the citizens until the beginning of the 1990s. However, as the European Community/Union has enlarged and the integration process has reached a deeper level, progress in European unification became increasingly susceptible to mood swings in the public opinion that stopped or delayed some of the EU projects in the last twenty years, notably the European constitution. Against this background, one might argue that the foundation myths of the EU have lost their appeal when confronted with referenda on European issues and that the reconstruction of convincing myths might become even more difficult if the involvement of EU citizens were to increase.

Images of Superiority in the EU

In addition to foundational myth-making, the European Union engages in the promotion of positive self-images or even images of superiority. This points to an aspect of the EU's civil religion that is based on an universalist interpretation of the community values of the EU and its institutional or ethical supremacy vis-à-vis countries outside of the EU. Three main types of self-images promoted by the EU can be discerned: the images of a cosmopolitan Europe, civilian power and normative power. All these self-images espouse an element of superiority highlighting the EU's civilizational progress and thus supremacy in relation to other polities.

The first type of positive self-image refers to the EU as an embodiment of cosmopolitan values. This self-image depicts the European Union as based on a set of abstract

universalistic principles, such as human rights, that thicken into a sort of European constitutional patriotism (Habermas 2001; Stevenson 2006). The self-image is cosmopolitan, as the EU represents a "post-national constellation" in which European citizens are likely to develop a sense of loyalty and solidarity "among strangers" by abstracting from their particular national identities. This cosmopolitan Europe is anchored in a shared culture of universal and liberal values (Shabani 2006: 699-718; Lacroix 2002: 944-958; Cronin 2003: 1-28) and relates to the transformed concept of power politics, according to which the EU exports the rule of law, democracy and human rights worldwide. In this view, the EU subordinates its external policies to the constraints of a higher-ranking universal law (Eriksen 2006: 252-269). Thus, the EU is superior to other polities in international politics, as it acts out of a sense of justice or duty pertaining mainly to human rights, rather than material interest. The EU sanctions infringements of human rights and increasingly fulfils the role of the forerunner of a new and more civilized international order. At the same time, the EU, as a next step of civilization advancement, challenges the normative claims of other polities, for many years mainly those of the USA and, since the Ukraine crisis of 2014, also those of the Russian Federation.

A further positive self-image of the EU pertains to the notion of the EU as a civilian power. The notion of civilian power refers to the methods of international politics rather than the substance (Orbie 2006: 123-128). The EU is believed to use methods of normative change rather than the use of force. According to this image, the civilian power Europe acts principally in accordance with ideas and values, and not military or economic strength. As a result, the EU's actions are believed to be more civilizing, which reinforces the vision of the EU as a post-national superior polity or a post-Westphalian more advanced political system (Sjursen 2006: 169-181). One of the main tenets of civilian power Europe is multiculturalism, which is a form of self-binding by law. As the EU's objective is believed to be the promotion of the advancement of a rule-based international order, the EU fosters the power of international institutions and regional organizations, which allow for extensive coordination and cooperation of actors in international politics (Youngs 2004: 415-435). At the same time, the EU reverts to deliberative and institutionalized cooperation mechanisms of conflict resolution, rather than the military power preferred by many other international actors, including the US, China and Russia (Mitzen 2006: 270-285).

The third self-image of European identity is the EU as a normative power, which is directly linked to the cosmopolitan and civilian image. In this case, the EU stresses its progressive stance, for instance in rejecting death sentences or in promoting and implementing environmental policies. By so doing the EU does not only show its moral superiority but it also asserts its leading role and depicts, for instance, the US as a laggard. Thus, the EU promotes its positive image as the forerunner in the fight against climate change and refers to environmental diplomacy and bio-safety regulations as a

reflection of the distinctive societal values of European societies. Therefore, the "green" normative power defines itself through the difference to other less environment-friendly countries, such as the US (Falkner 2007: 507-526; also Lenschow and Sprungk 2010).

However, the positive self-images generated by the EU exhibit serious cracks in consistency. For instance, the image of green normative power can be quite easily challenged at the empirical level. In this vein, Robert Falkner (2007: 521) argues that the EU's distinctive stance in environmental politics is not simply the product of a deep-rooted normative orientation but frequently the result of domestic conflicts over biotechnology, in which some enterprises are able to lobby successfully in favour of their technological solutions, presented later as the EU common good and best practices at the international level. Also, the positive view of the EU as a foreign policy actor guided by the common good does not accurately depict the foreign policy behaviour of the EU. This is well documented in the case of the EU arms trade policy, as countries with poor human rights records are still frequent receivers of European weapons and military technology (Erickson 2011). A particularly instructive case is the China weapons embargo debate, where pressures on lifting of the embargo have risen considerably, since China has become a willing supporter in the European sovereign debt crises under the condition of ending the embargo (Erickson 2011: 12).

Conclusions

The EU is still far from espousing a coherent euro-nationalistic ideology. Even though certain aspects of nationalism — including symbolic, ritual and myth-orientated practices — are recognizable in the EU, they seem to be rather weak or unstable. The current financial and debt crisis shows how frail the European construction is and how easily it can provoke nationalist reactions of a different kind (including the exit from the EU by the UK, removal of Greece from the EU and reintroduction of the national currency in Germany). In particular, the expected integrative function of the common currency has proven to be exaggerated, as the euro has become the target of attacks by a growing number of political groups in the EU. Moreover, the foundational myth-making remains volatile, whereas the self-images of superiority show cracks in their consistency. Even though the EU mimics some technologies of nationalism, it fosters its euro-nationalism in a subtler manner than nation-states. The EU promotes a "nationalism lite", as it has considerably fewer institutional resources at its disposal than nation-states that are able to revert to traditional forms of nationalism. For instance, the EU lacks an integrated and sufficiently homogenizing educational system as well as an integrated public space that would allow for an efficient transmission of nationalism from the elites to the citizens. In addition, the EU has to compete with the nationalisms of the nation-states and is careful not to provoke conflicts between the European nationalism and the member states' nationalisms. Finally, the main challenge to the EU's nationalism remains the profound indifference of ordinary citizens in the EU societies,

and their political disaffection and ambivalence towards the EU. While nationalism is primarily aimed at citizens, the more critical literature on the EU (White 2010a, 2010b) shows how little Europeanization takes place in the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. In this context, a euro-nationalism is likely to remain a matter of the European elites, if at all.

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Borders of Normality, Context-Dependency and the Nationalist Populist Parties in Northern Europe

Anders Hellström

Nationalist claims signify totally different things in, let us say, Hungary and Sweden. Larger N-studies, including all cases in, e.g., Europe, risk losing validity.

Provided that populism refers to "appeals to the people" and nationalism specifically refers to "our" people (see, e.g., discussion in Hellström et al. 2012), it is important to recognize the socio-political context of each particular nation.[1] What I refer to as the borders of normality signifies what is normal to say and do in relation to the issues of national identity, diversity and immigration in each national context.

A nationalist party needs to tap into the particular cultural codes of each particular nation in order to attract the moderate voter/s. The policies of, e.g., immigration will not change if the cultural codes remain intact and against the national populist parties, despite electoral support.

This works both ways. In the continuous reproduction of the nation, these parties play an important role. Undoubtedly, these parties raise nationalist claims and in the opposition to these claims the nation as such is being reproduced; nationalism thus stands against nationalism (ibid.).

In this chapter I have decided to focus on a limited region in northern Europe – Scandinavia and Finland. My argument would be that the four nationalist populist parties[2] in this region, apart from increasingly belonging to the same party family (Jungar and Jupskås 2014), communicate a positive self-image of the party, which radicalises popular concerns rather than represent an extremist side position.

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[1] Taggart (2000: 76) has made a similar point, showing that populism means different things in different countries. According to him, populism is chameleonic.

[2] By nationalist populist parties, I refer to parties that, more or less frequently, pursue politics and rhetoric around the populist divide between "the people" and "the elite" centred on the nation – or rather the national state – as an exclusive category of reference (Hellström et al. 2012). Appeals to "the people" are used by the nationalist populist parties to provide their distinct interpretations of what constitutes national identity, and thus "our" people. Numerous other labels have been used in the literature and there is hardly any consensus reached on how to label this party family (Mudde 2007).

In the figure below (Figure 1), I present the electoral strength of the parties in the national elections.

Figure 1. Results for the nationalist populist parties in the Nordic countries from 1989 to 2014.



As the figure above (Figure 1) illustrates, all the four parties have enjoyed considerable good electoral fortunes, especially in recent years. Their impacts on domestic politics differ, though. Evidently, electoral strength is not enough to provide an impact on domestic politics.

First, I present my approach to the reproduction of national identities. Second, I relate my focus on Northern Europe to the wider processes of European integration and globalisation. Third, I analyse, briefly, how these four parties communicate their claims to culture identity, in relation to the national context.[3]

Nationalism as Communication Strategy

Nationalism is commonly associated with secessionist movements; alternatively it connotes violent experiences of the past. What if we look at it the other way around? What if we acknowledge the nationalism of our common sense (Billig 1995: 6)? We reproduce the nation as a distinct entity in ceremonial events (e.g., national holidays and sport events), daily activities and our speech acts. Studying this is to emphasise

[3] For the three Scandinavian parties, I use examples from my forthcoming book (Hellström forthcoming), and for the Finnish case, I rely on secondary literature.

nationalism as a communication strategy; how we present ourselves as individuals or as collectives (e.g., the nation).

Following Craig Calhoun (2009), I see the nation as a *discursive formation*; representing the borders of normality in contemporary national self-understanding. Nationalist claims reify the nation as something natural and common-sensical. The nation is constantly negotiated and in order to establish the proper balance between the nation, the state and the people – what Ole Wæver refers to as the layered discursive approach (2002) – the role and position of the explicit nationalist parties in these countries is essential to recognize. The different positions of the nationalist populist parties in domestic politics and the different mainstream reactions represent different tokens for how the nation is being reproduced.

Nationalist claims are a particular form of political behaviour in the context of the modern state (Breuilly 1993). An obvious difference is between nationalism claims communicated by movements who look for independence and those who act in established national states and conversely endeavour to tighten the glue between the people, the nation and the state. If the nationalist claims are made in well-established national states, these tend to be addressed in conjunction with the state and not against it. The situation is reversed in cases when the nationalist claims are aimed at pursuing new state-building. Studying nationalism claims as communicating strategies imply a focus on how the nation is reproduced as *our* nation.

The Cases

In Denmark, the mainstream parties tend to adjust to the policies suggested by the Danish People's Party (DPP); the Progress Party is currently in the Norwegian government; and in Finland, the True Finns is equally electorally strong and Timo Soini, party leader of the True Finns, is currently Foreign Minister in the Finnish government. In contrast, in Sweden, the mainstream parties and also the mainstream media are united in a show of repugnance towards the Sweden Democrats.

To be a "real" Swede, it is important to know how to sort your garbage and not share affiliation with the SD. On the other side, it is important for the SD to be credible enough to enable co-operation with other parties in the national parliament (Hellström forthcoming).

Recently, the parallel ambition to obtain organizational cohesion in the party and also to attract the moderate voter in the voting arena has caused internal turmoil in the SD. This struggle is fully exposed in the media spotlight; leading board members of the youth organisation were recently expelled from the party. Not everyone in the party is equally enthusiastic about the party's move towards the centre. This tension has been there all the time in the party's history though.

In the eyes of the voter, the nationalist parties in these countries need to be radical enough to mobilise popular dissatisfied voters against the establishment (thus

successfully employing the populist divide between the people and the elite) and simultaneously avoid accusations of extremism. This balancing act manifests differently in Sweden, compared to the other countries.

Towards a Multidimensional Party Political Space

Both Denmark and Norway were occupied by the Nazi regime during the Second World War, whilst Finland fought against the Soviet Union and Sweden remained neutral. In neither of the countries were the Nazi-style parties able to come close to a parliamentary breakthrough (Sejersted 2011: 76). Instead, the ideology of Social Democracy was the most successful ideology of the twentieth century (Berman 2006: 6)

In the period following the Second World War the four countries were characterised by high political stability and the building of universal welfare states, and the political parties were attached to social groups in society (Demker and Svåsand 2005). Essentially, the party system remained "frozen" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) before the breakthrough of the populist parties; in 1959 in Finland, in 1973 in Denmark and Norway and much later in Sweden. The four countries share common socio-political attributes in the process of democratic consolidation and industrial development, and thus a similar plot in which the national identity is being formed.

A starting point for my study is that while the four countries share common socio-economic features, they differ in terms of discourse of (the borders of normality) and in the policies on immigration.

On a "kindness continuum" in Scandinavia, according to Brochmann and Hagelund (2011) (see also Lithman 2013: 255), Sweden is at one extreme liberal pole with an ensuing support for generous integration policies, Denmark is on the opposite pole, and Norway is somewhere in between. All four counties belong to the upper strata; hence, are more liberal than authoritarian in popular attitudes to immigration and immigrants (see, further, Lithman 2013). In Sweden in 2014, 53,503 applied for asylum and 31,220 were accepted. The corresponding figure in Finland was 3,706 with 1,346 accepted[4]; these two countries constitute the two extreme poles in our comparison.

The countries also differ in terms of opportunities for new political parties to challenge the established party hierarchies. If the workers' movement, together with the liberals, in Sweden, the urbanized farmers in Norway and Denmark and the smallholders in Finland dominated the political development in the early phases of national conciliation, this situation look, naturally, very different today; as with the rest of Europe.

[4] The figures have been collected from national statistics, available at the Finnish Immigration service and the Swedish Migration Board.

Migration and National Identity in Europe

In a recent speech in Lund, Sweden, Zygmunt Bauman (2015) explained that the current crisis is not only related to the economy; it is a crisis of *the state*. The question is if the state still satisfies the citizens' essential and legitimate basic concerns of security. Some would welcome open borders and embrace diversity, others would conversely urge a further encapsulation of the nation-state.

Hans-Georg Betz (1994) refers to the voters on the "losing side" as the "losers of globalization". There is a growing desire in the populations to return and restore the glue between the nation and the people. Otherwise, the state will not work properly.

It is thus not only the question of membership in the EU that is at stake here. All across Europe, different parties belonging to the extreme right (or the left) are gaining electoral benefits. "New" political parties are gaining an influence in European politics by means of politicizing so-called socio-cultural issues to challenge traditional party structures, e.g., Bornschier (2012) says.

In the recent elections to the European Parliament (May 2014), Front National and the DPP became the largest parties in France and Denmark respectively. Indeed, these two parties are against further supra-nationalization of the EU and they also openly oppose a generous immigration policy.

Among others, Kitschelt and McGann (1997: 15) argue that the political space of electoral competition is two-dimensional, including both the socio-economic cleavage structure (welfare versus capital) and the socio-cultural cleavage structure (libertarian versus authoritarian values). Their argument is basically that "the new right" has established a niche in post-industrial societies, combining authoritarian views on issues such as gender, the environment and immigration with a market-friendly view on the economy. They refer to this as "the winning formula". On a socio-cultural scale between progressivism and authoritarian, the Green parties and the so-called Radical right wing populist parties occupy two opposite poles (see, e.g., Ignazi 1992). This was perhaps true in the 1990s; however, it is evident that populism today emerges not only from the right, but also from the left and from the centre (Mudde 2007).

Conversi (2014) emphasises that the current unification process of the EU, based on a pluralist, multicultural and multilateral vision of European togetherness, stands against notions of internal uniformity, and rigid border-making processes around the national-state. While financial capital increasingly floats freely across borders, not all people do. The fissures in public opinion emanating from this tension transmutes in changing voting preferences.

Analysis

The tension in public opinion between diversity embracement and national state encapsulation manifests itself differently, depending on national contexts. In the analysis

I illustrate how the four nationalist populist parties and their predecessors, in order to promote a positive self-presentation, radicalise mainstream concerns in their countries about issues pertaining to national identity, diversity and immigration in Northern Europe.

Finland

In Finland the agrarian class constitutes a separate dimension alongside the class-conscious and yet pragmatic Social Democracy; a kind of agrarian petit-bourgeoisie of small landowners. This could possibly explain the comparatively early breakthrough of Veikko Vennamo's Finnish agrarian party (Fryklund and Pettersson 1981). Industrial development was, for instance, much later pursued in Finland and the agrarian, nationalist political movement remained a strong opponent to the Social Democrats (ibid.: 146).

Already in 1959, the Finnish Rural Party (SMP) erupted from the agrarian foundation. The rhetoric was directed against the current political elite and then president Urho Kekkonen in particular. In the beginning it also attracted predominantly small landowners from the countryside. The initial progress of the party is definitely related to the sometimes uneven and unfair development of industrialisation and urbanisation.

The party was a carrier of populist revolt against the elite, reflecting a growing frustration about the established parties' mistreatment of what was referred to as "the Forgotten People". The memories from the Second World War and the socialism represented by the Soviet Union prepared the ground for its initial growth and so did the grievances against the Swedish-speaking upper-classes, accused of profiting on the rural classes. The SMP's popularity reached its height in the polls in the 1970s and 1980s with 10 per cent of the total votes.

The populism associated with the SMP was combined with an intrinsically Finnish nationalism. It is clear that its successor built further on this legacy. The True Finns (PS) was established in 1995, arising from the ashes of the Finnish Rural Party, which ceased to exist the same year. The PS continues with the populist anti-rhetoric, and it is apparently more centrist on the socio-economic scale, at least compared to Denmark and Norway. In the 2011 national elections the party achieved almost 20 per cent of the vote (see Figure 1).

In sum, both the predecessor party and the successor party mobilize voters based on a grievance against the "elite", following on from class cleavages in the Finnish society and historical memories such as the Finnish winter war.

Denmark

In 1973 Denmark became a member of the European Community (EC) and this year the Progress Party, with its leader, Mogens Glistrup, made its debut in the national elections. The elections went well and Progress Party, with 15.9 per cent of the voters behind it, became the second largest party in the parliament.

On the two-dimensional political space discussed above, the party was inherently market-liberal; though its voters appeared to be more traditionally conservative and thus held pro-authoritarian values (Kitschelt and McGann 1997). Gradually, the party became more authoritarian. The ideological thrust was directed against those abusing welfare services, i.e., the party featured a kind of welfare-chauvinism.

In 1995-6, under the chairmanship of Pia Kjaersgaard, the DPP emanated from a splinter group of the Progress Party. In the 1998 national elections, the DPP gained half of their votes from people that had previously cast their votes on the Danish Progress Party. Their presence created, initially, much controversy and antipathies among the mainstream political actors. In 2001, however, the DPP was made the supporting cast to the mainstream right government under Venstre. In the recent national elections, the Social Democrats again seized governmental power and the DPP was made part of the opposition; however the other parliamentary parties in Denmark have used a similar aggressive anti-immigration rhetoric.

Fransson (1998) argues that the Danish sense of national uniqueness derives from a relative de-attachment between society and state. In the 1880s the Danish farmers gained, horizontally, economic revenues based on corporative principles. These narratives were inspired by the economic expansion of Danish agriculture during the 19th century.

The message is that Denmark is a vulnerable and proud nation that should avoid big international conflicts and instead focus on protecting its own borders.

Denmark has generated a culture with certain values (such as gender equality, freedom of speech, tolerance, humour and diligence) that are worth defending. This fight is, of course, prompted by the DPP, but this defence strategy is also based on state-sanctioned narratives of what the nation is, also from mainstream sources. Following this, the DPP aims to protect the Danish welfare state against unwanted newcomers; hence, radical Islamism. I here infer that the DPP radicalises the myths of Denmark as a country of free and equal individuals to authenticate claims for national cohesion.

Norway

In the 1973 national elections the Norwegian Progress Party, under the leadership of its founder, Anders Lange, entered the national parliament with four seats.

Anders Lange, similar to Glistrup in Denmark, was rigidly opposed to traditional party organization-making. Lange passed away in 1974. His successor, Carl I Hagen, was equally telegenic but, unlike his predecessor, believed in traditional party organization so as to secure long-lasting success. Hagen was elected party leader in 1978 and continued in this post until 2006. Under his leadership the party also changed its name.

Initially the party argued for reductions in taxes and public intervention (Fryklund and Peterson 1981: 212). From the 1970s onwards, the party broadened the party's appeal by combining its original anti-statist stance with a pro-authoritarian view on law and order, and later also on immigration.

The PP grew to become one of the largest opposition parties in the Norwegian national parliament, and in the national election in 2009 it was supported by almost one-quarter of the Norwegians voters and is now part of the government, together with the Conservative party.

The PP pursues an explicit anti-statist view and they sharply rebut any claims of multiculturalism, as something that the Norwegian taxpayers should not be economically responsible for. In the 1990s the immigration issue was made into a potent issue for the party. According to Hagelund (2003), in this period, the immigration issue was transformed from a strict economical issue into a cultural one.

According to Lithman (2013: 267), Norway has diversity in itself. The making of the modern independent Norwegian state (it became independent from Sweden in 1905) intersects with processes of democracy, social citizenship and modernization (ibid.). It is the people, rather than the state, that forms the basis of the Norwegian nation. The popular resistance to diversity echoes the continuity from the protest movement in the 1970s against state-capitalism. The party uses trans-national narratives to promote Norway as a country of free individuals. It does not dream about restoring the golden age of Social Democracy to promote the country's uniqueness. Instead, it promotes further decentralisation to celebrate the country's compartmentalization.

Sweden

In the 1988 national elections, the Swedish Green Party broke the five-party consensus in Sweden and crossed the electoral threshold to the national parliament. And in the 1991 national elections, a new political party rose and crossed the parliamentary threshold. New Democracy (*Ny Demokrati* [NyD]) showed many similarities with the two Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway.

Internal factions within the party and the lack of a local party organization soon led to the collapse of the party though. The NyD had a neo-liberal view on economic politics, combining this position with an authoritarian view on socio-cultural affairs; we recognize this from the previous empirical sections. During this period when the NyD was in the parliament, the Sweden Democrats (SD) enjoyed limited electoral fortunes and mobilised its members in the streets, in various extra-parliamentarian activities.

In 1989, Anders Klarström was elected the first party leader of the SD. He was previously a member of the Neo-Nazi party *Nordiska rikspartiet* and had, like many of his party affiliates, a criminal record (Larsson and Ekman 2001: 126). Other members of the party executive had a similar background, with tentacles to movements such as the White Arian Resistance or were involved in the growing industry of White Power music.

Definitely, the SD has, comparatively, an extremist legacy. It is similarly the case that the party has changed drastically since – although to what extent this is the case is much debated.

If before the SD attracted angry young men who were against immigration, it now mobilizes voters from both the right and the left. In its ambition to attract the moderate voter, it attracts sympathisers who are anxious about immigration and multiculturalism. According to its view, Sweden is extreme and the rest of Europe is not.

The People's Home metaphor, also used by the SD, brings emotive appeals to the consolidation of the Swedish welfare state, based on cultural conformism. The SD uses the People's Home metaphor as a powerful rhetorical instrument to attach its nationalist political agenda with a greater Swedish tradition of protecting "our people", and to radicalize popularly held sentiments for national cohesion. The metaphor as such connotes to popular memory today, appealing to people in the electorate who perhaps wish to restore Sweden to what it looked like when they grew up. The metaphor as such is used to describe the post-World War Two period in Sweden and it brings references to the heydays of Social Democracy.

In 2001, the SD was in practice split into two and the more radical activists formed a new party (*Nationaldemokraterna*, "The National Democrats"), a move that facilitated the transformation of the SD into a more moderate party (Rydgren 2006). We do not yet know the outcome of the struggle between the SD and its youth organisation, but based on previous experiences a new split is not necessarily devastating for the party.

The Swedish national identity was formed as an alliance between promises of individual emancipation and the caring state, what Berggren and Trägårdh (2009) labelled *statist-individualism*. In the political building of the modern welfare state, then, interpersonal relations such as the family and the church had a less dominant role in Sweden compared to, e.g., countries in continental Europe. It is this tradition of national identity that the SD builds on.

Conclusions

From this short exposé we can conclude that it is not primarily the economy that move these parties forward (see, e.g., Mudde 2007: chapter 6); an acknowledgement of the common man, historical memories and the use of national or transnational symbols are seemingly more important.

We can conclude that the SD is much more prone to accept the state than the PP. The anti-statist messages of the PP have become less pronounced over time though (Jungar & Jupskås 2014). And it can also be added that the anti-statism of the PP is never directed against the state as such or transformed into a plea for a new state, but rather against a proliferation of the state on the side of the common man against "the other" and too much state intervention in the private sphere.

Initially, the differences between them were huge. Not anymore. In the reproduction of the nation in the Nordic countries, future research is encouraged to consider the socio-cultural dimension of the economic redistribution. It is not a question of welfare or culture, but rather welfare *and* culture (Kitschelt 2013).

In the art of reproducing the nation, the population shows divergent and even polarised opinions towards borders and national identity. This polarization transmutes into changing party political preferences. In order to provide an impact on actual domestic politics, the nationalist populist parties need to tap into the cultural codes of the nation; hence, radicalising mainstream beliefs and not being isolated in an extremist position. The SD has not yet managed to take this step, while the other parties in our comparison have.

The nationalist populist parties in the four Nordic countries constitute particular tokens for the reproduction of national identities in countries that are less affected by the economic crisis. Paying close attention to the parties in Northern Europe, and the horizontal resistance to them in the civil society, bring keys to understanding how national identities are being reproduced, as either for or against these parties. This invites studies on nationalist claims as communication strategies.

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How to Secede in Europe: Nationalism is Not Enough

Aleksandar Pavković

Liberation or Unification or Recognition of Equal Status

Primary targets for secessionist mobilization have been – and still are – national groups, the groups whose members regard themselves as members of a single national group, that is, individuals who share a common national identity.[1] There are very good reasons for targeting national groups. Secessionists' mobilization aims to split a group which is allegedly aspiring to a state of its own from other groups within a state which have no such aspirations or whose state-aspirations have been (allegedly) met. For the purpose of splitting groups, the commonly recognized features which distinguish one national group from another (strictly speaking, their members), their "national markers," are the most suitable instruments. First, these markers distinguish one group from another by their (allegedly) observable, non-artificial ("natural") and historically rooted characteristics, which form a part of the group's self-understanding or self-perception; and, second, these national markers are linked to national narratives which either state or imply that the group deserves, by virtue of its capacities and its history, to have a state of its own.

Although national identities and secessionist mobilization seem to be tailored for each other, one should note that national identities are not – or not primarily – constructed with the purpose of justifying or initiating an attempt at secession or creation of a new state. In fact, the construction of national identities as distinguishing markers of groups goes back to antiquity, at last to Herodotus and his histories – and possibly even earlier to the bureaucracies of ancient Sumeria and Egypt. National identity markers were thus initially "discovered" or "collected" as part of the biopolitical projects of imperial bureaucracies in ancient empires or of early scholarly pursuits of data collection. Initially even the national narratives based on national identity markers were not state-oriented. The narrative, which Herodotus himself narrates, of the victory of the

[1] DAESH or the Islamic State seems to have transcended that by targeting members of one religious community. But their ultimate aim is not secession but unification of various states into a state ruled by a specific religious code.

Hellenes against the multilingual barbarians ruled by the Persian kings is based on a set of firm national markers: Hellenes are defined not only by their language but by their distinctive everyday culture, including religious ceremonies (e.g., Olympic games) and political habitus, which avoided highly centralized state structures (such as the Persian monarchy). And yet this national narrative did not imply that the Hellenes deserve or should gain a state of their own, distinct from that of the Persian state or the state of any other non-Hellenic group.

Although national narratives need not be state-oriented, national narratives following the American and French revolutions, in fact, became increasingly state-oriented: the end-state of such a narrative is a state "owned" or "deserved" by the nation narrated. The state – to which the narrated nation aspires – may be achieved by national liberation of the homeland from foreign occupation or domination, or it may be achieved by the unification of peoples and lands which were, due to the contingencies of histories, divided into different states. These two basic templates of national narratives dominated the national narratives of the emergent nations and their state-building projects in 19th-century Europe: for example, the Greeks, Serbs and Poles on one hand and the Germans and Italians on the other. In the 20th century the National Liberation template came to dominate the national narratives of European populations and then spread around the globe among the groups that were subjected to European colonial rule or European domination.

This template has a rather simple outline: at some point in history our homeland was conquered by a foreign state or subjugated by stealth or vile means. Our nation thus came to be ruled – and deeply humiliated – by foreigners, who, naturally, not only humiliated us but exploited us and our homeland. This is a narrative of subjugation, injustice, the loss of freedom and dignity, humiliation, discrimination and exploitation – all resulting from the loss of sovereignty over a territory claimed, as its homeland, by the subjugated national group. The main purpose of such a morality-laden narrative is to call for liberation, that is, for the recovery of sovereignty and thus of a state of one's own.

Of course, not all national narratives in Europe follow the National Liberation template – for the simple reason that many European states were not created through liberation from foreign occupiers. In order to create "their" states, the English – and later the British – the French, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Swedish, the Norwegian, the Icelandic, the Hungarian, the Austrian and the German nations did not need to liberate it from foreign occupiers. At most they had to fight off various potential/temporary occupiers or, as in the case of the Spanish and Portuguese, to expand their state boundaries by conquest and expulsion/conversion of the local population. Their national narratives are State Narratives – narratives about a national state – but not National Liberation narratives. In contrast, the American, Dutch, Italian, Irish, Romanian, Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Croatian, Latvian, Lithuanian,

Estonian, Polish, and Kosovo Albanian states were, at least within their national narratives, all created by or through armed liberation from foreign occupiers. National Liberation narratives usually celebrate individual and collective sacrifice for the sake of liberation. The sweetness of dying for one's fatherland – in the Horatian *dolce est pro patria mori* – is in these narratives translated into necessity: it is necessary for the sons of fatherland/patria to fight and, at times, to die in order to gain its freedom from foreigners. National Liberation narratives thus offer at times vivid apologies of killing (and dying) for the purpose of recovering sovereignty and gaining statehood.

The national narratives of many stateless nations in Europe at present do not follow the National Liberation template in so far as they do not include or imply an apology for killing and dying in pursuit of the nation's statehood. In some cases, of course, national narratives narrate the stories of glorious feats of arms and of a heroic fight for freedom, without implying that at present the nation needs to repeat these or similar glorious feats of arms. These stories are now simply exercises in self-boosterism, an endeavour to show that in their love of freedom and in their heroism members of the stateless nation equal if not surpass the nation(s) which have achieved statehood. These stories no longer imply or contain a call for action, a call for heroic struggle for freedom which in this kind of narrative is equated with the nation's statehood. These are often not State Narratives either – in so far as they do not call for a restoration or acquisition of a state of one's own. They are narratives of how a group achieved, through a variety of political and cultural actions, the status of a recognized nation, equal to other state-owning nations. In contrast to State Narratives, they are Status Narratives, of how nations achieved the status of recognized and respected nations.

Thus the national narratives of the Catalans and the Montenegrins – the two stateless nations[2] whose attempts to secede will be discussed here – do not follow the national liberation template in this respect, although both contain stories of a struggle or fight against foreign occupation. Similarly the national narratives of the Scots, Welsh, Flemish and Venetians– to mention only a few stateless or state-aspiring nations in Europe – lack that distinctive feature of a National Liberation narrative. In short, these and other stateless national groups are not – through their national narratives – mobilized to use armed force in pursuit of their national liberation. Why their national narratives follow the Status Narrative template and not the National Liberation one is too complex a question for me to attempt to answer. But one aspect of these *non*-liberation Status Narratives stands out: the current state is *not* labelled as oppressive, that is, as a state which denies the stateless nation(s) its basic civil, political or national rights. In all those cases, the state recognizes, to a varied degree, the cultural and political distinctness of the stateless nation and in most cases grants the region populated by the stateless nation a degree of self-government. It is this recognition that makes the

[2] Montenegro gained independence only in 2006.

host state not only non-oppressive but also to some extent inclusive: the states which recognise the status of their stateless nations as nations deserving self-government, in effect *include* the stateless nations as (more or less) equal participants in the life of the state.

The recognition of equal status and of partnership (in some form) of a stateless nation is here crucial: if such a recognition is denied, members of the rejected national group may indeed come to believe that the state they are living in is both foreign and oppressive to them. A state may become foreign to a minority if it denies their identity and it may become oppressive if it denies them the rights which they consider constitutive of their identity (for example, the use of their native language in public institutions). A host state's denial of identity and of associated (and expected) rights may thus lead to the demand to exit the state and establish a state of one's own.

This dynamic of recognition, denial of recognition and demand for exit may be represented as follows:

> Recognition of equality (partnership) → (perceived) Denial of recognition → Call to decide to exit (referendum) → Referendum on exit → Success: secession (or Failure: revert to partnership within a single state)

Source: *"Creeping" Independence to a EU-Supervised Referendum: The Secession of Montenegro* (2006).

Milo Djukanović, the prime minister who in 2006 led the secessionist coalition, the Bloc for Independence, was in 1992 the prime minister who had led the pro-union coalition. In 1992, he won the first referendum with 95 per cent votes cast for the union with Serbia (in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or FRY). At the time he took the traditional pan-Serbian view of Montenegrin identity, asserting that Montenegrins are by origin Serbs and belong to the Serb people.[3] By 1996 he came, gradually, to regard Montenegrins as a nation distinct from the Serbs, with which they shared little but a state in common; in 2000, he and his ruling party denounced this common state as illegitimate, and finally left it in 2006.[4]

The beginning of Djukanović's transformation was a split in his own party, the Democratic Socialists (ex-Communists) of Montenegro. In 1996, Djukanović denounced the elections in Serbia, which the then Serbian president Milosevic won, as fraudulent, thus supporting the Serbian opposition (Morrison 2006). Another faction in his party, led by the then president of Montenegro, Miomir Bulatović, continued to support

[3] In a speech, Djukanović is reported as saying, "Montenegrins are proud of their Serb origin and the statehood of Montenegro, of the history of the Serb people" (TV Politika 1990).

[4] From 1991 until the present, the current prime minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanović, has dominated Montenegro's political life. He was first elected in 1991, as a member of the League of Communists of Montenegro, and has since held the office of prime minister or president of Montenegro until the present (2015) with an interruption of around 3 years. Hence, the continuous reference to him and his party in this paper.

Milošević (Morrison 2006, p. 156). That faction eventually split from the Democratic Socialists to form a new party which, however, in 1998, lost the parliamentary elections in Montenegro. At this point Milošević appointed the leader of the defeated party, Bulatović, as the prime minister of the federal Yugoslavia. The Montenegrin government, led by Djukanović, denounced this appointment "as another attack on the constitutional order and *equitable position* of Montenegro in Yugoslavia" (emphasis added), (Morrison 2006, p.165). The federal government, led by a Serbian president, thus *denied* the equal status of Montenegro by appointing the principal opposition leader instead of an appointee of the majority coalition government in Montenegro.

Djukanović's government responded by disassociating Montenegro from Serbia through the policy of "creeping independence". In 1998, it took over control of the customs and foreign trade; in 1999, it introduced the German mark as a legal tender in Montenegro. It enlarged and militarized its police forces and created an independent foreign service, establishing missions/embassies abroad. By 2000, the Yugoslav Army and air traffic control were the only institutions in Montenegro remaining under the control of the federal Yugoslav government, still led by the Montenegrin Bulatović (Morrison 2006, p. 182).

This policy was publicly and financially supported by the US and the EU, as a strategy of undermining Milosevic's regime in Yugoslavia/Serbia. As a result, this small de facto state, of 650,000 inhabitants, became, after Israel, the second largest per capita recipient of direct US financial assistance (AIM 2001; Morrison 2006, p. 166). While supporting "creeping independence", the EU and the US initially opposed Djukanović's government's plans to declare *de jure* independence. Once, in 2000, the Milosevic regime in Serbia fell, the EU initiated and chaired the negotiations between the new Serbian government and Djukanović's government; the result was an agreement, in 2003, to establish a new confederal union, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The agreement provided for a referendum on independence to be held, at the earliest, in 2006 (Morrison 2006, p. 189). The referendum was duly held in May 2006 and Djukanović's coalition for independence won, with only 2,300 votes over the required threshold of 55 per cent of the votes cast (Oklopcic 2011, p. 141). The opposition called for a recount, alleging organized fraud, but the Referendum Commission, headed by the EU special representative, rejected these allegations out of hand, proclaiming the results valid (BBC 2006).

The above highly selective account of Montenegro's secession highlights the distinctive aspects of the process leading to a successful (albeit contested) referendum on independence and Montenegro's exit from the State Union. First, the triggers that started the process were unrelated to the questions of national identity: these were the disputes in 1996 and 1998 over Montenegrin *political* support for the majority partner in the joint state, that is, the ruling Serbian parties. These were not disputes over the recognition of Montenegrin national identity or national narrative. Second, the host

state, Yugoslavia, proved to be too weak and unwilling to resist an almost complete take-over of the federal institutions by the Montenegrin government which resulted in its de facto independence. Third, the US and EU from 1998 onwards provided financial and logistics support, enabling the government of Montenegro to achieve de facto independence and to hold the referendum leading to de jure independence. As we shall see, the second and third aspects are missing from the Catalan case.

The major obstacle that Djukanović's government faced was the lack of popular support for de jure independence, which was due, at least in part, to the absence of an overall majority of Montenegrins, individuals who identify themselves as Montenegrin only. The problem was not apparent in the referendum of 1992: in the Montenegro census of 1991, 61 per cent of inhabitants were Montenegrins and only 9.34 per cent were Serbs. In the census of 2003, the number of Montenegrins drastically declined: there were only 43 per cent Montenegrins, as against 32 per cent Serbs (in the 2011 census the percentage of Montenegrins increased to 44 and the percentage of Serbs decreased to 28) (Dzankic 2011, p. 2). Explanations for this change in self-identification are highly contested, but one can note that since 1996 the Montenegrin government has supported a re-definition of the Montenegrin identity as distinct and exclusive of the Serb identity via the following measures: the official language was re-standardized as the Montenegrin language, distinct (with the addition of two new letters of the alphabet) from the Serbian language, a separate Montenegrin Orthodox Church was recognized, and the union in Serbia was presented in official histories and textbooks as an imposition of foreign Serbian rule, resisted by true Montenegrin patriots. A new Montenegrin national anthem, introduced in 2004, proclaims, in the verses written by a Montenegrin separatist (who had collaborated with fascist occupiers during World War II), that Montenegro, as a separate state, is eternal. As a result of these redefinitions of national identity, a Montenegrin no longer could easily claim that he or she is also a Serb: the latter category, that of Serbs, was decidedly classified as unMontenegrin (if not anti-Montenegrin).[5] Faced with the either/or choice between the two, a large number of Montenegrins, in particular those living in the northern part of Montenegro, closer to the border with Serbia, chose to declare themselves as Serbs. Their decision reduced the percentage of Montenegrins in Montenegro to less than half of the population.

The referendum campaign in 2006 reflected this fact: the pro-independence campaign avoided any mention of the exclusive Montenegrin national identity (which demands a state of its own) and instead focused on the promise of a prosperous "Euro-Atlantic" future for an independent Montenegro (Mondo 2006). The major obstacle to such a future, the pro-independence campaign insisted, was Montenegro's union with Serbia, burdened as Serbia was with its recent wars with NATO and EU member states

[5] The Montenegro census of 2011 introduced for the first time the category of Montenegrins-Serbs as well as Montenegrins-Muslims and Montenegrins-Bosnians. There were only 0.30 per cent of Montenegrins-Serbs in Montenegro (Monstat 2011, p. 46).

and the unresolved question of Kosovo. Therefore, a prosperous "Euro-Atlantic" future could be assured only without Serbia. Yet the slim and contested margin of victory for the independence parties suggests that the referendum promise of Montenegro's quick, solo, entry into the EU/NATO did not appear to attract a majority of the Serb voters in Montenegro.

From Mass Protests to the Spanish Constitutional Ruling to an "Informal" Referendum: Catalonia

The concept of Catalan national identity, as it was developed during the 19th century, emphasized the Catalan distinctness: the Catalans, it was maintained, have a distinct language, a distinct society with its customary way of life and folk festivals, a history of an independent state and a growing high culture (literature, arts, music). In short, being Catalan meant *not* being Spanish or anything else. This, as we shall see, did not preclude many individuals feeling that they are both Catalan and Spanish – but this kind of dual identity meant sharing distinct cultural traits and being able to use two distinct languages. The national narratives linked to the Catalan identity ranged from those promoting federal or confederal union with the Spanish state to those promoting an independent state. Fernando Solis (2004, p. 4) neatly classifies these narratives into two broad categories: *differential* (two different nations, one state) and *disjunctive* (two different nations, two states). According to Solis, the largest Catalan party, the centre-right *Convergence and Unity*, which alone ruled Catalonia until 2003, has endorsed the former, while the two smaller left parties, the *Republican Left of Catalonia* and the *Party for Independence,* endorsed the latter.

Once *Convergence and Unity* lost power in 2003 to a coalition of left and socialist parties, the new government (*Generalitat*) of the Autonomous Region of Catalonia put forward a new Statute of Autonomy which recognized Catalans as a distinct nation, made Catalan the preferred language in Catalonia, enabled the Catalan government to set and collect some taxes and reduced the overall fiscal contribution of Catalonia to Spain. Although this Statute passed the referendum in Catalonia and the Spanish parliament, the Spanish Constitutional Court, in 2010, struck down as unconstitutional or legally void all of the above (and other) articles of the Statute (Guibernau 2013 p. 383). The Court's decision triggered mass protests in Catalonia, bringing an estimated million people on the streets, organized by the civil society organizations under the slogan "We are a nation. We decide". This led the largest party, *Convergence and Unity*, to opt for a referendum on independence and, later, for independence. Partly as a result of this transformation of the largest party into a secessionist party, the 2012 elections returned a majority in the Catalan parliament favouring independence (Guibernau 2013, p. 388). The elections were followed by an even larger demonstration, this time in support of independence; in 2013, the Catalan parliament set the referendum on independence

for November 2014. However, the Spanish government banned the referendum and the Spanish Constitutional Court proclaimed it unconstitutional.

The unofficial referendum, called a "consultation of the people," was held on 9 November 2014 and was organized by the Catalan political parties and civil society organizations. With a turnout of 36 per cent of registered voters (2.2 million), 80 per cent voted for independence. Since many voters opposed to independence abstained from voting, a larger turnout in an official referendum would, probably, have failed to produce a majority for independence (Smith 2014).

A poll conducted in April 2015 indicated that only 39.1 per cent of the people polled in Catalonia support an independent state of Catalonia (BOP 2015). This is a significant decrease from the 57 per cent support for independence that was registered in the polls in 2012/13. In 2012, the support for independence extended well beyond the group who identified themselves exclusively as Catalan: in 2012, this group comprised only 31 per cent of the population of Catalonia. Most of the population holds some form of dual identity: in 2012, 26 per cent identified themselves as "more Catalan than Spanish", 36 per cent as "as Spanish as Catalan" and 2.6 per cent as "more Spanish than Catalan" (Guibernau 2014, p. 20). 87 per cent of those who identified themselves as exclusively Catalan and over 60 per cent of those who identified themselves as more Catalan than Spanish or as as Spanish as Catalan said they would vote for independence (Serrano 2014, p. 527). These figures suggest that most support for independence would come from people who identify themselves as Catalan either exclusively (only Catalan) or as part of a dual identity (Catalan/Spanish). But since only a minority of the population identify themselves exclusively as Catalan – a smaller percentage than those who identify themselves equally as Spanish and Catalan – the pro-independence campaign in Catalonia could not – and did not – focus on the distinct Catalan national identity nor even on the narrative of the recovery of independent Catalan statehood. The pro-independence campaign instead focused on two related economic issues: first, on the economic advantages of abolishing the transfer of tax receipts to the Spanish state and gaining fiscal independence for Catalonia (Serrano 2014, p. 534); and, second, on the economic (and political) advantages of membership of the EU as an independent state and not as a region of another state (Bourne 2014). In its pro-EU integration aspect, the Catalan campaign resembled the "Euro-Atlantic" integration aspect of the campaign for Montenegrin independence. But in contrast to the case of Montenegro, EU officials explicitly denied the possibility of Catalonia gaining immediate membership of the EU and the Eurozone upon independence (Bourne 2014, pp. 106-7). Nonetheless, the leaders of the pro-independence parties continued to reiterate the need for Catalonia to remain in the Eurozone (El Pais, 2013).

There is no evidence at the moment which would help us to establish how the EU's official denials of an independent Catalonia's automatic membership in the EU impacted on popular support for independence. No evidence is available to enable us

to assess as to how the Spanish government's and the Spanish Constitutional Court's rejection in 2014 of the referendum on independence impacted on popular support for independence. According to opinion polls, popular support for independence had already started to decrease in 2014.

The "Europeanization" aspect of the pro-independence campaign in Catalonia, like the similar "Euro-Atlantic" aspect of the pro-independence campaign in Montenegro, did not appear to attract significant numbers of non-Catalan voters to the independence cause. In contrast, the first economic advantage listed above, the demand for fiscal autonomy/independence from Spain, according to Serrano (2014, p. 540), correlates with individual support for independence, regardless of the individual's national identity. Serrano (2014, pp. 540-1) also identifies several other factors not directly linked to national identification that also impact on support for independence.

Why Go Beyond Nationalism? To Mobilize Those Who Do Not Belong to Dominant National Groups?

Prior to embarking on the political mobilization which led to the independence referendum, political parties in Montenegro and Catalonia faced a similar set of issues: first, the group which is most likely to support secession, those who identify themselves as Montenegrins or Catalans, were in the minority in each region (42 and 31 per cent respectively); second, there was no evidence at that time that a significant portion of voters supported secession (in 2009, only around 20 per cent of Catalans supported independence); the largest or ruling parties in Montenegro and in Catalonia had until then been staunchly pro-union, that is, anti-secessionist parties. As a result of secessionist mobilization, the ruling parties were transformed into secessionist parties and the majority of voters in both countries, at some point in the process of mobilization, expressed support for independence. This was achieved in spite of the fact that the self-identified Montenegrins and Catalans remained in the minority, as they were prior to the secessionist mobilization.

How did the secessionist parties – and the coalitions they formed – attract support beyond the core of true believers, that is, those who identify themselves with the dominant national group? This essay does not, unfortunately, offer an answer to this question. But it does identify a significant aspect of the pro-independence campaigns in both Montenegro and Catalonia which made no reference to the national identity of the dominant national groups, the aspect that could be called the "Europeanization" of the secessionist platform or "the EU promise". The leaders of the secessionist campaigns in both regions insisted that the independence of their new state would bring to their citizens a more advantageous integration into the European Union than could be achieved or had been achieved in the current joint state. The advantages accruing from EU membership are, by definition, not limited to the members of specific national groups within the state but to all of its citizens, regardless of their national identification. The appeal

to the advantages of EU membership thus goes beyond any national narratives based on the national identity which characterizes modern nationalism in Europe, including the Catalan and Montenegrin nationalism.

As we noted, the triggers for secessionist mobilization were in both cases the actions of the central government, which were interpreted as a denial of recognition of equal status or partnership: in the case of Montenegro, the appointment of a Montenegrin opposition leader, in 1996, as the prime minister of the shared state, Yugoslavia; and in the case of Catalonia, the Spanish Constitutional Court's decision, in 2010, to invalidate the articles of the Catalan Statute which asserted or promulgated the equality of Catalonia with the host state. Yet the constitutions of the joint state (the FRY in 1998 and the Kingdom of Spain in 2010,) did not envisage or allow for a procedure of secession or detachment of any part of the joint state.

But the capacity of the two states, Yugoslavia and Spain, to counter secessionist mobilization and the resulting take-over of state institutions greatly differed. In 1998 the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was a new state, formed only in 1992, and significantly weakened by the wars fought in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the resulting international sanctions. It was also a highly polarized state, with an opposition which denied the legitimacy of the regime under Milošević and a large Albanian minority controlling a parallel state-structure in Kosovo. Under these circumstances, the Yugoslav government showed neither willingness nor capacity to prevent the take-over of almost all state institutions by the Montenegrin government (including a separate currency and a foreign service). The Spanish state, in spite of the continuing recession and financial instability, was able to maintain its state institutions and to enforce its laws in Catalonia and to prevent a state-approved referendum on independence. In short, in spite of a large surge of popular support for independence and the resulting pro-independence legislation in the Catalan parliament, there was no "creeping independence" in Catalonia as was the case in Montenegro.

But perhaps most importantly, in spite of the systematic efforts of the Catalan government to find support for its independence in Europe and the US, neither the US, nor the EU nor its member states offered any support (Bourne 2014, pp. 101-4). On the contrary, top EU officials publicly denied the Catalan leaders' claims that Catalonia would, upon independence, gain EU membership and thus undercut an important plank of the secessionist platform (Bourne 2014, p. 106). Thus, in the case of Catalonia, the EU took, as Bourke argues, not a neutral but an obviously anti-secessionist stance. This is in sharp contrast to the EU's policy towards Montenegro: the EU from the start supported the secessionist leaders and their policy of "creeping independence" by providing financial and logistics support. Further, the EU was involved in the negotiation of a new union treaty and a constitution which provided for an independence referendum in Montenegro. The EU appointed a special representative, who became the chair of the Referendum Commission; the EU in effect set the 55 per cent of those voting

threshold as the success criteria for the referendum and, following the referendum, rejected all the opposition's complaints regarding the irregularity of the voting. In effect, the EU, through its representative, set the terms of the referendum and legitimated its results, resulting in the independence of Montenegro (Oklopcic 2011, pp. 140-1).

The EU had, of course, neither legal grounds nor effective means to do anything similar in Spain, that is, Catalonia. But had the EU supported the secessionist leaders in the same way as it did in Montenegro and had it ensured that the referendum was held in Catalonia at the peak of popular support for independence, Catalonia would have probably become an independent state, just as Montenegro is at the moment. But, contrary to the secessionists' promise, Montenegro, almost ten years since its independence, has not yet gained entry into the EU or NATO – and will not gain entry into the EU any time soon. Although not independent, Catalonia is still part of the EU as an autonomous region of Spain.

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Nationalism: A Lifebuoy in a Turbulent Ocean?

Dileep Padgaonkar

The subject of nationalism is so vast, so complex and so contested in academic and political circles that it would require huge reserves of patience and humility just to skim its surface. There is no consensus even on its origins. Should the origins be traced to the Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, interminable rivalries between monarchies, fiefdoms and principalities, or the rise of new elites eager to settle scores with established authorities at home and with foreign powers that subjected them to a host of demeaning humiliations? Or should one go along with much more mainstream thinking, at least in the West, that the most coherent ideas about the nation and nationalism were first articulated by the German poet and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder in the latter half of the 18th century?

The evolution of nationalism, too, is still a matter of considerable debate. Did nations exist prior to the ascent of nationalism? Or did nationalism lead to the creation of nations? Has nationalism linked to the state been a benign force or a malign one? Did it emerge in the wake of industrialisation, the spread of secular education, the emphasis on "high culture" and the yearning for modernity – whether or not you equate modernity, to some degree or other, with Western ideologies, values and institutions of governance? Some useful insights – often challenged but never debunked for their lack of originality – are to be found in the writings of Ernst Gellner, the British sociologist of German origin.

To answer the many questions raised above we need to find out if various expressions of nationalism share certain characteristics in common. These have been admirably evoked by the British historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin, in several of his works. I was privileged to interview him at Wolfson College in Oxford a few years ago. He directed me to read in particular his essays on nationalism – one published in the book *Against the Current* and another in *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*. They list a number of beliefs that gave rise to the idea, or feeling, or consciousness of nationalism.

One belief is that every individual feels an overriding need to belong to a community. The other is that this sense of belonging must be organic in nature, i.e., rooted in a shared language, culture, ethnicity, religion and territory. The third is that the elements of such a sense of togetherness must be dictated by the values of the community only because they are the values it cherishes. (This also includes nationalism that is a civic construct unrelated to genealogy or soil.) And the fourth is that faced

by rival contenders for authority and loyalty, the supremacy of its own claims must be upheld. Taken together, these beliefs would ensure that individuals developed a sense of nationhood and that they would place their loyalty to the nation, and to the state that represented it, above their other loyalties.

How did this process gain momentum in the course of the last hundred years or so? One can start with the collapse of empires – first the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian and later the British, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese and French. The exacerbation of national sentiment that followed the end of the first set of empires led to the re-drawing of the map of Europe and to the horrors of the two world wars. Along the way one witnessed the emergence of Nazism and Fascism and the consolidation of totalitarian Communist regimes. The latter were ostensibly against nationalism per se though they resorted to it to mobilise people to fight the forces of fascism. It also served the countries in Eastern Europe to challenge the hegemony of the Soviet Union after the Berlin Wall was brought down.

The roots of the collapse of the second set of empires must be traced to Japan's victory over Russian naval forces in a war that began in February 1904 and ended in May 1905. News that a non-European country had made a European country bite the dust reverberated, as Lord Curzon feared, "like a thunderclap through the whispering galleries of the East." It enthused a host of individuals – some well known, some others who would be well known in later years: Mustafa Kemal, Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Rabindranath Tagore, Sun Yat-sen and numerous other Arab, Persian, Turkish, Persian, Burmese and Vietnamese nationalists.

In one fell swoop Japan had driven home the point to all people subjugated by Western powers that the latter could be vanquished and their claims of racial and cultural superiority could be rubbished. Industrial and military strength, a robust state structure, progressive social reforms, emphasis on modern education and the revival of pride in their own culture had achieved this feat. As Pankaj Mishra notes in his most stimulating book *From the Ruins of Empire*, thousands of students from across Asia flocked to Japan to learn about its spectacular success. Those who could not join the fray learnt about them from books and newspapers.

The patriotic sentiments that Japan stirred all over the Asian continent served to de-legitimise Western domination and at the same time to raise a question mark over attempts by Asian liberal nationalists to negotiate a measure of self-rule with the colonial masters. The radicalisation of struggles against alien rule spread the cult of violence and, more ominously, rooted those struggles in religious faith. Equally noxious was the xenophobic assault not just on Western powers but also on the culture and civilisation of the West.

The trajectory of Rabindranath Tagore is revealing in this regard. He had hailed Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, which he believed would be a precursor to pan-Asian cooperation. It is on this topic that he lectured to admiring audiences during his

first visit to the country in 1916. He seemed to echo the views of the nationalist intellectual Kakuzo Okakura – whom he knew and respected – contained in the 1903 book *The Ideals of the East*: "Asia is one. The Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty civilisations, the Chinese with its communism of Confucius, and the Indian, with its individualism of the Vedas." At another point he wrote: "Arab chivalry, Persian poetry, Chinese ethics and Indian thought, all speak of a single Asiatic peace, in which there grew up a common life, bearing in different regions different characteristic blossoms, but nowhere capable of a hard and fast dividing line."

Yet Tagore was also wary of the ultra-nationalism of the Japanese pan-Asian advocates. As it is, he was sceptical of nationalism per se, of patriotism gone haywire. He wouldn't reconcile to Japan declaring Korea to be its protectorate in 1905 and a decade later to its annexation of Chinese territories in Shandong. He feared that Japan would sooner or later grab India too. Moreover, he was deeply worried about the frenetic Westernisation of Japan for the obvious reason that he had developed a disdain for the "machine civilisation" of the West that was driven by commercial greed and quest for unrestrained power. Tagore was prescient on these scores. Japan's cruel record in Korea and China and much further afield in later years confirmed his worst apprehensions. It continues to cast a dark shadow on Japan-Korea and Japan-China relations to this day.

Ironically, unlike in Japan, there were no takers for his advocacy of Asian spirituality and traditions in China during his visit to that country in 1924. Intellectuals who belonged to the May Fourth Movement were in thrall of the egalitarian ideals, scientific spirit, industrial achievements and cultural dynamism of the West. By that token, they despised their own culture that, they were convinced, had kept their country weak, backward and prey to sundry war lords and predatory foreign powers. They had no time for Tagore who, in speech after speech, evoked the perennial merits of Buddhism and Confucianism. No matter how much he endorsed the nationalist urges of the Chinese or denounced the destruction of the Summer Palace or spoke disparagingly about the British deploying Indian soldiers against the Chinese people he failed to gain their respect, let alone their trust.

It would be easy to argue that Tagore was a bundle of contradictions or that he didn't have his pulse on what his interlocutors in Europe, Japan, China and even in India thought and felt deeply on issues of the day in their specific context. But his warnings against extreme forms of nationalism and xenophobia, against the unbridled exaltation of the nation and state to the detriment of the individual's rights, against religious bigotry and against the neglect of the spiritual side of man in his frenetic search for material progress continue to resonate in today's world.

Post-colonial regimes, whether democratic or dictatorial or authoritarian, ignored these warnings at their own peril. They did succeed, to a lesser or greater extent, in building state structures, consolidating nationalism, initiating social reform, laying the foundations of a modern economy and re-ordering their relations with the outside world.

But they continue to face acute problems. Social, economic and regional disparities still threaten stability and progress. So does the denial of basic human rights, especially of minorities', women's and children's. Add to this the threats to the environment, the havoc wrecked by climate change and the upsurge of violent, so-called non-state actors. The means of communication have increased manifold. Yet there is little to suggest that such massive information flows result in better understanding between nations and societies.

To complicate matters further, the definition of nationalism has become fuzzier due to several developments of a more recent vintage: the increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature of European societies and the ever-assertive presence of separatist or secessionist outfits – clamouring for self-determination – in several nations across the world (Catalonia in Spain, the Basques also in Spain, Scotland in the UK, the Kurds spread in three countries, Balochistan in Pakistan, Kashmir and parts of the northeast in India, the Chakmas in Bangladesh, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Xinjiang and Tibet in China etc.). Add to this the technology-driven globalisation of economy and mass culture, the proliferation of newer and faster modes of communication and the precipitous growth of trans-national groups wielding the lethal weapons of religious extremism and terrorism.

The responses of states – and of their citizens – to such developments have more often than not been vague, opaque, confused, pusillanimous or, on the contrary, full of passionate, self-serving intensity. That explains, for example, why ethnic and religious minorities in Europe and in Asia are, to put it mildly, a dispirited lot. Their inability or unwillingness to "integrate" leads more and more of their youth to embrace religious extremism and to join the ranks of terror outfits. That, in turn, creates profound unease in the majority – an unease that right-wing forces, riding on a wave of racism, chauvinism, religious bigotry and xenophobia, seek to exploit for political ends.

Xenophobia also accounts in a large measure for the growing antipathy towards multi-national regional forums. This is especially true of the European Union. Political parties that rail against the EU, its bureaucratic conduct of affairs, its maze of regulations and, not least, its disregard for local concerns and interests have been on the upswing. Indonesia's robust assertiveness in ASEAN in the recent past is also a case in point. Add to this a generalised indifference to the United Nations. It is of course unrelated to xenophobia but to a widespread feeling that it lacks gravitas except in the Security Council. The latter, too, has come under a cloud of scepticism partly because consensus often eludes it and partly because it does not reflect the power equations in the world today.

The multi-national forums that still carry a cachet of authority are the ones where economic and security issues are addressed. But even on this count there are murmurs of dissent to the effect that such bodies – like, say, the World Bank and the IMF – are heavily tilted in favour of one or the other power or a group of powers. Much the same

murmurs are heard about international gatherings convened to deliberate on, say, trade or climate change or the environment. In one way or the other they reflect on the way nationalism is perceived. Has it lived its day? Or has it acquired a new, hitherto unclear, lease of life?

Realities on the ground don't inspire much optimism. More and more parties, both in office and in the opposition, embrace a narrowly defined nationalism that is bolstered by majoritarian religious or cultural conceits. Sectarian conflicts are ripping the Middle East apart. Islamism of various hues permeates the fabric of governance and society at large in large swathes of the Muslim world. The Hindu right-wing is on a rampage in India. Extremist and terror outfits, often backed by the armed forces, are on the prowl in Pakistan.

Many democratic governments in the West give the impression that, faced with their sullen and disgruntled non-European minorities and with the economic competition they face from the rising nations of Asia, their reflexes have numbed. Significant in this regard is the mushroom growth of extreme right-wing parties throughout Europe though none have so far managed to come to power so far.

Proponents of a rigid form of nationalism – from one end of the Eurasian landmass to the other – contend that it is the only lifebuoy that nations and peoples possess to remain afloat in the turbulent ocean of world politics. (Let us not miss a delicious irony here: the Chinese Communist Party, that always abhorred all religious manifestations, is now well disposed towards Confucius and Buddhism!) My fear is that it is no such thing. Nationalism of this sort is rather like an albatross around the neck of humankind – much like movements that claim to transcend nationalism such as the Communist International in the past and Al Qaeda and ISIS at present.

We need to imagine a nationalism that serves its true purposes – which is to give a sense of belonging to individuals, to instil in them a civic conscience, to protect their basic rights and to enable them to take legitimate pride in their culture or civilisation even as they draw on the most uplifting values and traditions of other nations. But this needs to be balanced with a clear-eyed assessment of the strategic concerns and interests of rich and militarily powerful nations. How they project their hard and soft power on land, sea, air and cyber-space would indicate the nature of their nationalist urges.

The one nation that now figures on the top of the list of powerful nations is of course China. A comparison with India would be in order here. China's economy is five times that of India. Its foreign exchange reserves are ten times that of India. Its defence budget is way above that of India. Indeed it is three-and-a-half times that of Japan. Should the outside world seek to contain the hegemonic ambitions of China? Or should it seek to cooperate with it in the hope of tempering those ambitions? These are the overwhelming questions of our times.

The past has shown that it is dangerous to leave the definition of nationalism to politicians and generals, to clerics and big business. They are in cahoots in many countries

even today. The ones who articulate an uplifting idea of nationalism are writers and poets, painters, dramatists, filmmakers and public intellectuals. They are the ones who tell you that the basis of a vibrant nationalism is a multi-layered culture – with its own corpus of myths and legends, epics and fables, arts and letters and life-styles – that is open to other cultures and is rooted in the values of freedom, justice and fraternity.

The consequences of a narrow and mean-spirited view of nationalism, they contend, correctly, is a protracted and debilitating strife within nations and between them that could portend untold misery for humankind living under the menacing shadow of weapons of mass destruction. But are those who are at the helm of affairs in a mood to listen to them? The answer isn't blowing in the wind. It can come – as it has from time to time in the past – only with the onset of a massive, non-violent upsurge of public opinion against regimes that wield political, economic and military power for self-aggrandizement alone.

Caution is in order even on this score. Public opinion, as it is reflected in various forms of communication today, often tends to plumb the depths of chauvinism and bigotry too. Eternal vigilance is therefore the price to be paid to ensure that nationalism avoids the twin pitfalls of intolerance and starry-eyed romanticism. Blaise Pascal was bang on the dot when he spoke about two extravagances: to exclude Reason, to admit only Reason.

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Does Nationalism Really Matter to East Asian Regionalism?

Jaewoo Choo

1. Introduction

Scepticism still prevails widely on the prospect of East Asian regionalism.[1] It is very much fuelled by the revival of territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, as well as the dispute in East Sea/Sea of Japan between Korea and Japan.[2] These territorial disputes are all historical problems that Japan refuses to admit, i.e., its unconditional surrender at the end of World War II and thereby the return of all lands and islands to the occupied. Japan accepted the terms of surrender on an unconditional basis and is therefore subject to a total relinquishment of all its rights to the territories it once occupied by force. There can be no exception, especially when the term is unconditional. As long as Japan denies its full and unconditional surrender, territorial disputes with Japan will perpetuate and so will the conclusion by the sceptics on East Asian regionalism.

According to the sceptics, East Asian regionalism cannot overcome the prevailing and repetitive challenges of nationalism exhibited by the regional states against Japan. Historical problems with Japan, including territorial issues, seem unsolvable by any diplomatic means other than nationalistic approaches. The solution of the historical

[1] T. J Pempel, "Soft Balancing, Hedging, and Institutional Darwinism: The Economic-Security-Security Nexus and East Asian Regionalism," *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, pp. 209–238; Richard E. Baldwin, "Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism," Singapore Economic Review, Volume 53, Issue 03, December 2008, pp. pp. 449-478; David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 148-184; Edward J. Lincoln, *East Asian Economic Regionalism* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004); Markus Hund, "ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptic's Appraisal," *Pacific Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2003, pp. 383–417; Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp 575-607; and C. Fred Bergsten, *The New Asian Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2000).

[2] David Martin Jones, and Michael L.R. Smith, "Constructing communities: the curious case of East Asian regionalism," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2007, pp. 165-186.

problems is premised on the compromise that Japan has to make, not with the states it formerly occupied, but with the terms of its unconditional surrender. Otherwise the contenders of Japan's historical problems will have no other choice but to resort to nationalistic approaches in dealing with the issue. Should they adhere to nationalistic approaches, opportunities for trust-building will be a foregone conclusion, as will be the prospect of East Asian regionalism.[3]

Scepticism claims that the trust factor is the critical foundation for the integration of states. Regional integration without trust is too fragile to be lasting. Cost-effect strategic calculations cannot last effectively because cost can shift against profit and benefit as a result of any change in distribution of power. Nationalistic arguments further endorse the aforementioned scepticism because the nationalist states give priority to the interests and values associated with the nationalistic cause over all other interests and values, as would be the case for the former Japan-occupied nations.[4]

However, regional integration in East Asia is processed in an unconventional and often unorthodox way. It is more often than not crisis-driven and not goal-driven like European regionalism. In the advent of a regional crisis, East Asian regional states would exhibit unity, cohesiveness, and togetherness. In times of peace, they have demonstrated a long-held propensity to regard regionalism or regional integration as uncalled for. Regionalism has never had a foothold in East Asia's history. It was a region that was built on the traditional order of a tributary system that was hardly disrupted by a great power's expansionist aspiration. Seldom did the Chinese imperial court attempt to conquer neighbouring states by force with an expansionist ambition, unlike the Greeks, Turks, Romans, French and Germans. Against this background, the colonization of East Asian states by Japanese imperialist forces aroused their nationalist struggles for the values and interests they put above others, i.e., territorial sovereignty, self-determination and independence. Anti-colonial nationalism justified their virulent nationalist struggles and sacrifice of lives against Japanese imperialism.

Anti-colonial nationalism has transformed into the so-called "new nationalism" in East Asia against Japan. New nationalism was embraced by less-developed countries and became "socialistic" in character; "the popular governments recognized the state's obligation to promote the welfare of the masses and to combat the age-old poverty and illiteracy."[5] Hence, new nationalism's external reaction tends to arise only against external provocations. Japan's continuous distortion of history, for instance, has been

[3] Gilbert Rozman, *Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 127-174; and Alon Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 102, No. 5. December, 1997, pp. 1386-1403.

[4] John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd edition, (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 2.

[5] Hans Khon, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, (Malabar, FL: Krieger publishing company, 1965), p. 90.

the cause of argument for the past seventy years. Had there been no provocations and therefore no memories of tremendous sacrifices by the forefathers of these nations against Japan's inhumane colonial rule evoked, relations with Japan would be based on stability, friendship, and development. During the high tide of goodwill, East Asia also took a big stride towards regionalism. However it would be a regionalism that is fundamentally different from that of Europe's.

It is perhaps for this reason that "little was done to challenge nationalist assumption in the name of regionalism." Contrary to Rozman's argument, nationalism is not a "sensitive matter best left to a later stage of regionalism."[6] Nationalist outlooks hardly have influence on the outcomes of East Asian regionalism for a couple of reasons. One is simply related to the character of regionalism that East Asia is in pursuit of – the so-called "open regionalism". The basic attributes of open regionalism are: not-legally-binding, no institutionalization and inclusiveness with membership. Structurally, it is loosely organized and the composite level of institutionalization is therefore perhaps the lowest possible among available degrees. The other reason is largely the open regionalism's inherent ability to override the requirement of fulfilling some orthodox prerequisites of regionalism such as trust and confidence. Open regionalism is not an end but rather a means to an end. It is an ongoing process aimed at facilitating the perfection of regionalism. The progress is gradual and incremental in that it sympathizes with setbacks and processes. Thus, any setbacks inflicted by nationalist outlooks do not necessarily hinder the development of such a regionalism. While they may be the critical factor in the absence of a summit meeting among Korea, China, and Japan at both bilateral and trilateral levels as of late, they are, however, ineffective in halting the process-building efforts of the three countries as they continue to hold both ministerial and working level meetings as of late.

On the premise of East Asian regionalism defined as open regionalism, this paper challenges the conventional theory's argument of the negative consequences of historical feuds on the development of regionalism by demonstrating the continuity in process-building efforts at a high level despite constraining relationships at the leadership level. In the following section, to substantiate the effectiveness of open regionalism as a viable framework for the integration of states with low levels of trust and confidence, it will seek justifications by drawing inferences from the interdependence school of thought. Economic interdependence is not a consequence with the intent to artificially offset the zero-sum nature of trade. Rather it is a consequence driven by mutual interest for mutual gain. Along the process, trust can be built through transaction. In the following section, the paper will still share some aspects of Korea's nationalist outlooks against Japan to defend the paper's earlier argument of how Japan's provocative efforts of distorting history unnecessarily sustain Korea's nationalism.

[6] Gilbert Rozman, "Restarting Regionalism in Northeast Asia," *North Pacific Policy Papers*, No. 1, p. 18.

2. Does History Matter to the Drive towards East Asian Regionalism?

The geographical concept of East Asian regionalism is a combination of two regions: one is Southeast Asia and the other is Northeast Asia. The two regions merged as one for various reasons. Economically, they complement each other with their respective merits while covering shortfalls. Politically, it gives them a much greater market territory as well as creates a much bigger political ground and foundation that would otherwise be fragmented and fragile if the regional states were to be on their own. Socially, all these developments, coupled with globalization, have naturally led the states to appreciate the value of cooperation to meet their individual and collective challenges. Despite the region's early intuitive recognition of the values and imperatives for regionalism, the two regions would not merge in any form of institution until the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997. In addition, political rivalry among the three Northeast Asian states made them prefer an individual approach over a collective approach to the integration of the two regions.

However, the Northeast Asian states' preference was reversed at the advent of the AFC. First, a sense of collective identity between the two regions was strengthened, enabling them to connect their regional concerns and interests in a broader framework (i.e., East Asian regionalism). In particular, Northeast Asia was compelled to realize that the void of regionalism in its own region could be filled by incorporating itself into East Asian regionalism. The political implication was that Northeast Asian states' desire to build confidence and trust could be sought beyond their region. It was then that they began to proactively lead efforts to create institutions. Their behaviour was comparatively in stark contrast to their mere participation attitude with earlier institutions led by their Southeast Asian counterparts in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The efforts were manifested by their collective economic integration initiatives such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT, an economic integration formula for 10 ASEAN states and the three Northeast Asian states, namely China, Japan, and Korea) and Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), and their individual efforts with ASEAN+1 ("1" denotes the individual state from Northeast Asia, namely China, Japan, and Korea). ASEAN+1 has been the foundation of the economic integration framework, although its expected spill-over effect on facilitating integration at the APT level is yet to be seen. While some are still optimistic about the prospect of APT and its contributions to the realization of East Asian regionalism,[7] others are not, simply because the gap in individual interests are too wide to be integrated on a consensual basis. Those sceptics' views are based on the argument that regional states are not sympathetic to others' social (institutional),

[7] Barry Desker, "In defence of FTAs: From purity to pragmatism in East Asia," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 3-26.

economic, and political (domestic and foreign) interests.[8] The former view is reinforced by the recent initiatives by the Northeast Asian states to pursue free trade agreements with the ASEAN states on an individual basis. ASEAN+1 consequently engendered three sets of such arrangements. The resultant "spaghetti bowl" of agreements on the other hand, according to the scepticism, further complicates, and to a certain degree procrastinates, the integration process for East Asian regionalism.[9]

Thus, the view that APT or ASEAN+1 will contribute positively to the cause of broader regionalism may not be sanguine at all. Individual integration with already existing regionalism (i.e., ASEAN) does not necessarily mean these individual states will integrate with others because each standard of integration will differ from the other(s).[10] Without any prior common ground connecting these individual states (i.e., Northeast Asian states), their individual pacts with ASEAN will not necessarily be applicable to all three, for the same obvious reasons: differences in the level of development, economic interests with different standards, and more importantly, confidence in each other, not to mention with their Southeast Asian counterparts. To realize East Asian regionalism, the Northeast Asian states must reach a deal among themselves before they can realize their desire to integrate with ASEAN. Hence, they began to engage in a trilateral discussion in 1999.

The Korea-China-Japan summit meeting began at an unofficial breakfast meeting at the ASEAN + 3 in 1999, and in 2000, the second meeting established the meeting as an official and regular summit meeting among the three members. This meeting set the cornerstone for trilateral economic cooperation through the "Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation (2003)," "The Progress Report of the Trilateral Cooperation" and "The Action Strategy on Trilateral Cooperation" (2004). In the 8th trilateral summit meeting held in Singapore, November 2007, agreements were made to have future summit meetings at one of the three member countries, and the Korea-China-Japan Summit took place in Japan in 2008.

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[8] Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 589-627.

[9] The ever-increasing shared perception of regionalism or any multilateral form of economic and trade cooperation arrangement as a tool for enhancing bargaining power continues to exist among the regional states to hamper regionalism in the region. John Ravenhill, "A three bloc world? The New East Asian regionalism," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 2, 2002, pp. 167-195. For APT to come to fruition, it is argued that it would be rather dependent on external forces and trends (stagnation of world trade liberalization, closer European and American integration). Douglas Webber, "Two funerals and a wedding? The ups and downs of regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific after the Asian crisis," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2001, pp. 339-372.

[10] Matsuo Watanabe, "Issues in Regional Integration of East Asia: Conflicting Priorities and Perceptions," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2004, pp. 1-17. Christopher M. Dent, "Networking the region? The emergence and impact of Asia-Pacific bilateral free trade agreement projects," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1-28. Markus Hund, "ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a new age of pan-East Asian regionalism? A skeptic's appraisal," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 383-417.

The discussions on the trilateral FTA began at the ASEAN+3 Summit on November 4 2002, with a suggestion by Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基), the former Premier of the People's Republic of China. On October 6 the following year, at the fifth *Korea-China-Japan trilateral summit meeting on the occasion of ASEAN+3 Summit* (hereafter "trilateral summit meeting"), Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Korean President Roh Moo-hyun signed the "Joint Declaration on Tripartite Cooperation" and successfully escalated the trilateral FTA into a government policy agenda.

Starting from the point when the Korea-China-Japan Trilateral Summit was held independently from the ASEAN+3 Summit in 2008, the three countries began to actively discuss the issue. There were two crucial factors which saved this issue of Korea-China-Japan economic cooperation from a stalemate, and led it to an interesting phase of development. One was the decline of the world economy due to the global financial crisis, and the other was the fall of the long-term incumbent Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and the transition to the Democratic Party. This transition in particular brought about a positive change to Japanese foreign policy, especially its East Asian policies, including Northeast Asia.[11]

In December 2008, the Korea-China-Japan Summit took place in Fukuoka, Japan, being the first time the Summit took place in a place outside ASEAN. The first trilateral summit outside the ASEAN+3 frameworks happened. At the meeting the three heads of state agreed on the principles and future directions for cooperation as well as detailed measures for cooperation, including that on the joint response measures concerning the global financial crisis. Also it provided a turning point for the three countries, by allowing improvements in public understanding of the issue of Northeast Asian cooperation, and by providing an arena for the trilateral cooperation to go a step further.[12]

What is ironic is that all the developments associated with Northeast Asia's pursuit of regionalism seemed to happen in the span of time in which nationalism in all three countries seemed at their peaks. As shown in Table 1, the three nations launched a trilateral summit meeting as part of the ASEAN+3 scheme and decided to make it an official and regular one in 2000. Since then, the trilateral summit meetings were held during ASEAN+3 meetings until 2008, when they decided to make it an independent meeting.

[11] Wu Qing, "East Asian cooperation gradually will enter a bright stage (*Dongya hezuo jiang shuru jiajing*)," *China Economic Daily* (*Zhongguo jingji shibao*), October 11, 2009.

[12] Yang Hyun Cho, "Assessments and prospects of the Korea-China-Japan Fukuoka Summit," *Major International Affairs Analysis*, (Seoul: Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, January 22, 2009).

Table 1: Comparative chronology of nationalistic moves and tripartite meetings, 2001-2015.

Year	Nationalistic Incidents	Regionalism Progress	Impact on Relationships
2001	Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visit (Aug 31)	Trilateral meeting	Prime Minister Koizumi visited China (Oct APEC) Prime Minister Koizumi visited Korea (Oct)
2002	Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visit (Apr 21)	Trilateral FTA first discussed Initiated the public-private joint study on the economic effects of trilateral economic cooperation	Prime Minister Koizumi visited China Prime Minister Koizumi visited Korea (Mar) Korean President Kim visited Japan (Jun)
2003	Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visit (Jan 14)	"Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation" The Trilateral Joint Research on Possibilities and Prospects for the China-Japan-Korea FTA was launched	Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the National People's Congress Prime Minister Koizumi visited Korea (Feb) Korean President Roh visited Japan (Dec)
2004	Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visit (Jan 1)	The "Progress Report of the Trilateral Cooperation" and "The Action Strategy on Trilateral Cooperation" adopted	No mutual visits between China and Japan Prime Minister Koizumi visited Korea (Jul)
2005	Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visit (Oct 17) Yasukuni Shrine is target of cyber attack, allegedly from China (Jan 5)		No mutual visits between China and Japan Prime Minister Koizumi visited Korea (Jun)
2006	Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visit (Aug 15) Japan announces plans to conduct a maritime survey (Apr 24) Korea dispatches 20 gunboats President Roh demands apologies for past wrongdoings (Apr 25) A group of activists approached Diaoyu Dao		Prime Minister Abe visited China Prime Minister Abe visited Korea (Oct)
2007	(Retired) Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visit		No mutual visits between China and Japan

Year	Nationalistic Incidents	Regionalism Progress	Impact on Relationships
2008	Yasukuni Shrine's official website hacked and Chinese national flag posted Korean Prime Minister's visit to Dokdo (Jul 29) Taiwanese activists accompanied by Chinese Coast Guard vessel approached Diaoyu Dao (Jun) Chinese vessels enters Diaoyu Dao (Dec 8)	First Trilateral Summit held in Fukuoka, Japan (Dec)	Korea rejected a bilateral meeting with Japan at ARF Prime Minister Wen Jiaobao visited Japan (May 7) Prime Minister Fukuda visited Korea (Feb) President Lee visited Japan (Apr, Jul G20, Dec)
2009		Second Trilateral Summit held in Beijing, China (Oct)	No mutual visits between China and Japan Prime Minister Aso visited Korea (Jan) Prime Minister Hatoyama visited Korea (Oct) President Lee visited Japan (Jun)
2010	A Chinese fishing trawler collided with Japanese Coast Guard vessel (Sep 7) Japanese fished in Senkaku area (Aug)	Third Trilateral Summit held in Jeju, Korea (May)	No mutual visits between China and Japan Prime Minister Hatoyama visited Korea (May) Prime Minister Kan visited Korea (Nov G20) President Lee visited Japan (Nov APEC)
2011	Yasukuni Shrine's door (Shinmon) set on fire by a Chinese man Ministers visited Yasukuni Shrine (Aug 15) Three Japanese right wing activists tried to visit Ulleung Island (Aug 1)	Fourth Trilateral Summit held in Fukushima and Tokyo (May) Trilateral Secretariat Office set up in Seoul (Sep)	No mutual visits between China and Japan Prime Minister Noda visited Korea (Oct) President Lee visited Japan (May, Dec)

Year	Nationalistic Incidents	Regionalism Progress	Impact on Relationships
2012	Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook claims Dokdo (Apr 16) Japanese Defense Whitepaper claims Dokdo (Jul 13) President Lee visited Dokdo (Aug 10) Japan suggested to bring the Dokdo dispute to IJC (Aug) Chinese patrol boats enter Diaoyu waters (Jul) Japanese activist visits Senkaku (Aug) Chinese jetfighters enter into Japan's ADIZ since 1958 (Dec 18) Japan responded by counter-dispatching its own F-15 fighters	Fifth Trilateral Summit held in Beijing (May)	No mutual visits between China and Japan
2013	Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine (Apr) Ministers' visit in August Year-long military actions by both China and Japan around Diaoyu/ Senkaku areas	Trilateral meeting halted	No mutual visits between China and Japan
2014	Ministers visited Yasukuni Shrine (Aug 15)	No Trilateral meeting	Prime Minister Abe visited China (Nov)
2015		Trilateral Foreign Ministers' meeting in Seoul (Mar 21); first time in three years since April 2012)	

What is surprising is that much progress was witnessed in regards to Northeast Asia regionalism during a period of time when Japanese nationalism was on the surge. Former Prime Minister Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine every year during his tenure (2001-2006). All Japanese prime ministers during 2001-2011 visited Korea on an annual basis. How all these contradicting phenomena can be explained and rationalized deserves scrutiny on a different premise. Contrary to conventional arguments, nationalism might have less to do with the development of regionalism, largely because nationalism is domestic politics-driven and therefore the targeted audience is domestic, such as the constituencies of the political leaders who utilize nationalism as a means to achieve political solidarity and national unity. Hence it might be more suitable and

appropriate to define nationalism stemming from historical conflicts and territorial disputes in domestic political and social terms instead of foreign ones. It may therefore be more proper for analysis on nationalism to be conducted at the domestic level, including leadership/personal level, instead of at the structural, systemic and national levels.

However, this argument seems to lose substantial ground given that the halt of progress on Northeast Asian regionalism has coincided with the rise of nationalism in Japan. Yet, the rise of Japanese nationalism since 2013 can only be considered as a different form of nationalism from the previous one in terms of its nature and characteristics. In short, the Japanese nationalism exhibited by Abe's government may be categorized as more external and foreign in character and more aggressive and assertive in nature. In this vein, Japanese nationalism under Abe's government is targeted at foreign audiences as well as its own nationals. It is no coincidence that the halt of trilateral or bilateral summits among the three Northeast Asian countries correlates with the rise of Japanese military countermeasures against those foreign vessels' intrusion into Senkaku islands waters and areas since the second half of 2012 as shown in Graph 1 below.

Graph 1: The numbers of Chinese government and other vessels that entered Japan's contiguous zone or intruded into the territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands, 2008-2015.



(Source: Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's Response: Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government and Other Vessels into Japan's Territorial Sea http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html.)

3. How Much does Trust Matter? Will Interdependence Override Lack of Trust Factor?

The discussion on Northeast Asian regionalism has been taking place since the end of the Cold War. Although there have been significant achievements in reaching the logical validity and practical probability of regional cooperation, this has yet been insufficient to persuade the various parties to achieve a consensus. The parties, however, do seem to agree that Northeast Asian regional or economic cooperation will work towards regional development, prosperity, peace and stability. At least on a theoretical level the necessity, justification and expected results of Northeast Asian regional cooperation seem positive. There also exist various academic and practical suggestions on how to materialize this cooperation, but many experts are still sceptical about the prospect of Northeast Asian regionalism. The reason for this scepticism lies in the belief that there is no solution when it comes to the various socio-political and economic differences, and the differing beliefs, ideologies, historic perceptions and languages.[13] There is no medium that will surmount these differences to lead to regional integration. In this context, the claim that there is no "progress" but only "process" in Northeast Asian regional integration seems valid.[14]

Today, many analysts and policy decision makers share the understanding that the only incentive in eliciting the integration of Northeast Asian countries is an economic one. Their logic has its roots in the neoliberal belief of a "spill-over effect," that economic cooperation will eventually exert positive influence on non-economic sectors as well. In other words, it is the belief that increased economic ties will help overcome various differences and difficulties that lie among parties. The school of neoliberal thought and its theories have proven themselves well in the course of economic development. It was through this process that many organizations, regimes and institutions were created, their influences proven through establishing international order and stability. However it is only in Northeast Asia where such regionalism or regional integration has failed to bear fruit.

Despite the numerous suggestions for regional cooperation, the various systemic and anthropological differences have deterred the effort towards a Korean-Sino-Japanese FTA, set aside Northeast Asian regionalism. However this is a problem deeply related to the trust issues of Korea, China and Japan, and is a problem that is therefore solvable with the joint effort of the three actors. The largest hindrance to the

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[13] Zbigniew Brzezinski, and John Mearsheimer, "Clash of the Titans," *Foreign Policy*, No. 146, 2005, pp. 46-50; Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1993/94, pp. 5-33; and Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1993/94, pp. 34-77.

[14] David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 148-184.

Korean-Sino-Japanese FTA is the absence of leadership. It is difficult to solve the problem of Northeast Asian leadership through internal efforts. This problem can be solved with the active participation of the US, it being a regional power in practical terms although not geopolitically so. However the stance shown by the Obama administration is no different from that of past administrations. The administration adheres to the traditional stance of maintaining or even strengthening bilateral alliance systems, keeping China in check, while on the surface stressing multilateralism merely for its strategic interests. In such a status quo it is difficult to expect American leadership, which in fact remains more as a problem that will require the attention of the three countries for the materialization of a Korean-Sino-Japanese FTA.

One lesson certainly prevails to date: Bilateral agreements by states absent of trust and confidence in each other hardly work. Applying this experience to the second case of the crisis, concerned nations naturally may have realized that there must be a strong witness stance for any type of solution reached by the distrusted parties to be effective. Furthermore, if the nations all assume an objective and unbiased role of self-witnesses for the efficacy of the agreed solution, benefits for self-interests will naturally be generated by taking such a stance, thereby realizing the advancement of a solution by facilitating cooperation and consequently laying a foundation for institutionalization.[15]

The reasons for the absence of regionalism in Northeast Asia are very well known. They are animosity arising from the past relations among the regional states, differences in political and social systems, discrepancies in economic development levels, and a long tradition of ethnic homogeneity that does not often allow nations to be susceptible to the concept of integrating with others.[16] The immediate effect of these factors has been the absence of confidence-building opportunities, to say nothing of the chances to build a collective identity, regionalism and multilateralism.[17] As the international relations history of the region would suggest, the accumulated effect of imperialism in the region fundamentally shaped the regional states' perception on each other. In other words, brutal and crucifying ways of ruling by the regional imperialist power(s) has left permanent psychological damage on the conquered states (victimized states of imperialism) to the extent that it has now been enrooted deeply in their socio-cultural values as a foundation of their perception of the strong(er) states. In a similar vein, the regional states do not, or rather cannot, view comparatively strong states with any amicability,

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[15] Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security*, Vol.20, No.1, Summer 1995, p. 42.

[16] For a detailed analysis on the impact of the "comparatively high degree of ethnic homogeneity" on the shaping of the regional international relations, see Christopher M. Dent, "Introduction: Northeast Asia – A Region in Search of Regionalism?" in Christopher M. Dent and David W. F. Huang (eds.) *Northeast Asian Regionalism: Learning from the European Experience* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 4-8.

[17] Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp. 575-607.

but rather with great scepticism and doubt about their intentions whenever they come up with policy initiatives at the regional level. In the end, all these have contributed significantly to the "non-existing chance" for confidence-building opportunities within the region.

With the tidal waves of economic interdependence, globalization, and regionalization shoring up in Northeast Asia as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, the regional states highly valued the opportunity for regionalism. Because of these external factors, the regional states, especially Japan and South Korea, have proactively undertaken policy initiatives in search of an answer to the foundation of regionalism in Northeast Asia.[18]

As the AFC exposed the structural and institutional vulnerabilities of the regional states, the regional states attached greater value to the importance of regionalism as a means to avoid future recurrences of similar crises and to sustain their economic as well as political development. Yet, Tokyo's suggestion to build an Asian version of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, would meet some reservation from Beijing.[19] This reservation was only to be offset by Beijing's decision to offer sumptuous financial assistance to the crisis-hit Southeast Asian states and Korea. Beijing's individual offer of help could not escape Tokyo's scepticism as their regional rivalry began to concurrently bud.[20]

4. Concluding Remarks

Nationalism in Northeast Asia did not seem to impede the progress of regionalism even during China and Korea's dissatisfaction with Japanese leaders' consistent visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and their distortion of history. On the contrary, Japanese leaders have visited Korea on a regular basis, and China more than Chinese leaders have visited Japan. The only way to understand this phenomenon is to assume that nationalism during this period was confined to domestic purposes and audiences. It did not cross the line. Hence, studies on nationalism during this period should be done at the domestic

[18] In particular, the question of Japanese leadership was viewed by the Chinese with much discomfort when the issue was described as a "flying geese" model with Japan at the head leading the rest of the Northeast Asian and/or East Asian states. According to analysts, it does not "set a good example of multilateral cooperation" to China. Wang Hongying, "Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization," in Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan, and Daojiong Zha (eds.) *China's International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000), p. 82.

[19] Sandra R. Leavitt, "The Lack of Security Cooperation Between Southeast Asia and Japan: Yen Yes, Pax Nippon No," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, Issue 2, p. 226.

[20] For a comprehensive assessment on the economic rivalry between China and Japan in terms of FTA pursuits with and economic aid provided during the 1997 AFC to the Southeast Asian states, see Elizabeth Economy, "China's Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 44, 2005, pp. 409-425.

level. However, nationalism would expand beyond the confines of its domestic nature beginning in 2013, when Japan would shift its nationalism's orientation and purposes to become foreign in nature. The domain of Japanese nationalism was changed to facilitate its normal state aspirations and its efforts to amend its alliance treaty with the United States. Hence it was inevitable for Japan to externalize the character and nature as well as the purpose of its nationalism to better serve its foreign relations aspiration, i.e., to become a normal state.

In this vein, the world is now challenged with a question as to how to understand the relationship between nationalism and regionalism. As long as nationalism was confined to domestic usage, it did not seem to affect the progress and development of regionalism. However, as the parameters of Japanese foreign policy began to take a sharp turn, it seems the rise of nationalism is definitely taking a toll on the development of regionalism.

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Paradox of Northeast Asia as a Community of Shared Memories and Histories

Jungmin Seo

Introduction

Though popular discourses on Northeast Asia in the mass media treat Northeast Asia as a coherent and distinct geographic and politico-economic region separated from the rest of Asia, the development of the concept since WWII shows that it is extremely difficult to conceptualize Northeast Asia through a single framework. Arjun Appadurai suggests that "[r]egions are best viewed as initial contexts for themes that generate variable geographies, rather than as fixed geographies marked by pre-given themes. These themes are equally 'real,' equally coherent, but are results of our interests and not their causes."[1] Katzenstein and Sil also concur with Appadurai by stating: "Regions do not exist only as material objects. Although they have a behavioral dimension indicated, for example, by the flow of goods and the travel of people across physical space, they cannot be represented simply and succinctly by accurate cartographic depictions. They are also constructs that are imagined and thus can bend to the efforts of political entrepreneurs."[2] I agree with Appadurai, Katzenstein and Sil that Northeast Asia as an area should not be perceived as a group of nation-states with fixed memberships. Our general perceptions of Northeast Asia is the product of, not the cause of, specific historical and politico-economic contexts in which Northeast Asia as an area disguises itself with fatefulness and naturalness.

Without doubt, the existence of the hegemonic power of the United State in this region greatly influenced the concepts of Northeast Asia as an area[3]. Nevertheless, the American hegemony itself has been operated by a few heterogeneous disciplines and

[1] Arjun Appadurai, "Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination," *Public Culture*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2000), p. 7; also see Amitav Acharya, "Global international Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds," *International Studies Quarterly*, volume 58, issue 4 (2014), p. 650.

[2] Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, "Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism," in J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson eds. *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 23-24.

[3] Shogo Suzuki, "Imagining 'Asia': Japan and 'Asian' international society in modern history," in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang eds. *Contesting International Society in East Asia* (New York: Stanford University Press, 2014), p. 72.

forms, and consequently, facilitated the emergence of multiple realms – either supplementary or contradictory among themselves – of Northeast Asia. In this sense, the multiplicity of Northeast Asia can be understood as the result of interactions between American hegemony and the reactions from regional actors in Northeast Asia.

This chapter tries to explain the paradox of Northeast Asia as a community of shared memories and histories. For this purpose, I will briefly review two sets of popular discourses on Northeast Asia as an area: Northeast Asia as a "Security Complex," and as an "Economic Region." Many studies have been done for these two concepts and I would not do more than provide a brief introduction for the purpose of comparison with two key concepts of this chapter: "Northeast Asia as the community of history and memories," and as "the (potential) field of knowledge production." Of those two relatively novel concepts that this chapter boldly proposes, the former, I argue, presents the underlying paradox of formation of a genuine community in Northeast Asia whereas the latter proposes, however slight it might be, the possibility of an escape from that paradox.

Northeast Asia as a Security Complex and as an Economic Unit

By "security complex", I mean "a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another."[4] In terms of the interlocking nature of a security complex, we can easily agree that the Northeast Asian security complex is comprised of five regional polities and one outside force: China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States. A significant change of security policies of any of these polities may significantly change the overall security arrangement of this region and the politics of the rest of the polities.

The majority of the discussions on the security problems in this region revolved around two sets of problems: the Taiwan and the North Korean issues. In the contexts of the US policy toward global terrorism, the international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation, and the historical legacies of the Cold War, it is undeniable that those two sets of problems define the nature of the Northeast Asian security complex. Nevertheless, Avery Goldstein and many other IR theorists concur that the true nature of the Northeast Asian security issue is not about the North Korean nuclear programme

[4] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: *A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998), pp. 11-12; cited from Jong-Yun Bae and Chung-in Moon, "Unraveling the Northeast Asian Regional Security Complex: Old Patterns and New Insights," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. XVII, no. 2 (Fall 2005).

or the Taiwanese sovereignty issue, but the rise of China as a potential hegemon,[5] which makes China the hub of Asian security[6].

The lack of a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is a defining factor of the security environment in this region[7]. Though compensated by an interlocking "spider web" form of bilateralism between the US and Northeast Asian states[8], from the end of WWII to the Korean/Vietnam War and to the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asia failed to establish an equivalent to NATO[9]. The US's unwillingness to form a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia suggests that we should rethink the role of America in long-term regional stability in this region. Though the US has helped to defuse regional crises and discouraged conflicts, it has not made it a priority to promote significant improvements and enduring solutions to regional security problems in Northeast Asia, while sustaining the status quo of tensions and conflicts[10]. In that sense, Asian states' uncritical reliance on the US's security initiatives will help them attain immediate solutions to many problems, including the Taiwan and North Korean issues, but will not make an ultimate change in the current tensions and conflicts.

Northeast Asia in terms of international political economy means a continuing battlefield[11]. Soon after WWII, the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait not only marked the ideological fault line but also symbolized the competition between two different economic systems: free market capitalism and soviet-style collectivism. The end of the Cold War reformatted the shape of economic competitions: between Asian models of Japan and rising NIEs and the liberalism led by the United States. The 1997 financial crisis in Northeast Asia and the long-lasting Japanese stagnation have been

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[5] Avery Goldstein, "Balance-of-Power Politics: Consequences for Asian Security Order," in Alagappa, *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* (Stanford: Stanford university press, 2003), p. 189.

[6] Muthiah Alagappa, "Introduction," in *Asian Security Order*, p. 25.

[7] Uwe Wissenbach, "Barriers to East Asian Integration: North East Asia – A Non-Region?" *Journal of Global Policy and Governance*, vol. 2, issue 2 (November 2013).

[8] Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan and Asian-Pacific Security," in J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson eds. *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

[9] Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is there no NATO in Asia?: Collective identity, Regionalism and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, vol. 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 575-607; Kai He and Huiyun Feng, "'Why is there no Nato in Asia?' revisited: Prospect theory, balance of threat, and US alliance strategies," *European Journal of International Relations*, XX (X) (June 2012), 1-24; Arthur A. Stein, "Recalcitrance and initiative: US hegemony and regional powers in Asia and Europe after World War II," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, vol. 14 (2014), pp. 147-177.

[10] Michael Mastanduno, "Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia," in *Asian Security Order*, p. 143.

[11] Richard Higgott, "The Political Economy of Globalisation in East Asia: The salience of 'region building,'" in Kris Olds, Peter Dicken, Philip F. Kelly, Lyly Kong and Henry Wai-chung Yeung eds., *Globalization and the Asia-Pacific* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 102.

understood as evidences of the final victory of the Western economic model. Yet, the rise of China as an economic superpower re-vitalized a new competitive economic model: China model of economic development[12].

In spite of numerous efforts from inside and outside, the economic sectors of Northeast Asia have endured the lack of multilateral formal institutions as much as the security sectors have[13]. Without a well-defined concept of the East Asian economic region, the area has grown through dense webs of informal/private relations promoted by the *huaqiao* (overseas Chinese) capital and Japanese FDI. Though there was a warning, especially by then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, on the emergence of economic blocs in Europe (EU) and North America (NAFTA), the most concrete Asian form of economic regionalism until the 1997 financial crisis, besides a narrowly defined ASEAN, was the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which relies on a vague/open/expanding concept of the "Pacific Rim."[14]

The financial crisis that deeply destabilized the economies of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong and Vietnam created a wide-spread perception in this region, regardless of the varied opinions on the real source of the trouble, that "the IMF was acting to protect the interests of Western lending institutions and to open Asian markets for Western firms at the expense of Asian workers and the sovereignty of Asian countries."[15] The asserted supremacy of the Japanese economy over the United States's, the rise of NIEs, and the successful reform in China gave rise to the notion of the Pacific Rim and Asian Pacific, and predicted that the gravity of the world political economy would shift from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific. Nevertheless, the financial crisis and the subsequent readjustment, the abandonment of the Asian model of capitalism and the adoption of neo-liberal tenets, reaffirmed the illusionary nature of APEC.

In spite of the initial failure of the Asian Monetary Fund proposal by Japan that would replace the influence of the IMF in East Asia[16], financial regionalism in East Asia made significant progresses through innovative financial arrangements based on

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[12] Shaun Breslin, "The 'China model' and the global crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of governance?" *International Affairs*, vol. 87, no. 6 (November 2011), pp. 1323-1343.

[13] Shaun Breslin and Jeffrey D. Wilson, "Towards Asian regional functional futures: Bringing Mitrany back in?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 2 (2015), pp. 126-143.

[14] Paul Bowles, "Asia's post-crisis regionalism: Bringing the state back in, keeping the (United) states out," *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 2002), p. 247.

[15] Ibid., p. 252.

[16] This proposal was vehemently refused by China and the United States for different reasons. From the perspective of China, the formation of the Japan-led AMF means the establishment of financial hegemony by Japan. American policy makers, on the other hand, saw the emergence of the "Yen-bloc" as the persistence of a heterogeneous economic system, an "Asian model," and as a hindrance to the complete financial globalization strongly promoted under the Clinton administration.

multiple currency swap bilateral agreements. Based on the New Miyazawa Initiative in 1998 and the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000, East Asian states were connected by 16 bilateral currency swap arrangements by 2012, amounting to 240 billion dollars. Nevertheless, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 proved that, due to "national policies of self-help in the form of accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and conservative financial regulation," the Chiang Mai Initiative played little or no role in mitigating the impact of the global financial crisis[17].

The two financial crises of 1997 and 2008 and the shifting nature of East Asian economies – the rise of China as an economic superpower at the global level, the end of high-speed growth in many NIEs and even China, and the efforts to overcome the long-lasting economic stagnation in Japan – made the regional players think of the successful formation of multilateral regional institutions as the cure-all solution. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that East Asia as a region is not like its American or European counterparts. None of the East Asian states is as dominant as the United States in the American continents, which has thus enabled it to exercise hegemonic forces to accomplish the NAFTA. Unlike states in the EU, most of the Asian states do not enjoy the political stability and firm domestic political legitimacy through which the state can persuade societal forces to accommodate and adjust themselves to embrace the collective economic re-arrangement in the region[18]. The most fundamental problem of the imagination of East Asian regionalism is its inherent nature of developmentalism. The idea of economic regionalism in East Asia has taken the distorted or changed form of state developmentalism that sees Northeast Asia as a new centre of global capitalistic production. Hence, it created a protectionist dream: replacing the pre-War autarchy that deletes borders within but, as a regional entity, creates borders without[19].

The uneven development of capitalism and market economy in the region forces each state to be extremely wary of the possibility of regional domination by one actor. It should be noted that the only experience of solid and formal politico-economic regionalism in Northeast Asia was the nightmare of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere before WWII. It would be reasonable to think that any design of a sustainable economic regionalism system should be highly realistic in terms of calculating the particularistic interests of each player. With the existences of deep dilemmas and conundrums, a naïve utopian design would bring about another disaster similar to the one that the world witnessed in the 1930s.

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[17] William W. Grimes, "East Asian financial regionalism: Why economic enhancements undermine political sustainability," *Contemporary Politics*, vol. 21, no. 2 (2015), pp. 146.

[18] Shaun Narine, "State Sovereignty, Political Legitimacy and Regional Institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific," *The Pacific Review*, vol. 17, no. 3 (2004).

[19] Karatini Kojin, *"Senzen" no shinko* (Considering "Prewar") (Tokyo: Bungei shunshu, 1994), p. 14; cited from Leo Ching, "Globalizing the Regional, Regionalizing the Global: Mass Culture and Asianism in the Age of Late Capital," *Public Culture*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2000), pp. 237-240.

Northeast Asia as a Community of Shared Memories and History[20]

Northeast Asia is an area of collective memory and history, not necessarily because each nation shares them but because one's memory is interlocked with imaginations about the others. The Japanese national identity emerged through the century-long efforts to differentiate itself from both the West and Asia at the same time. When Japan was otherized by the West with essentializing Orientalist discourses, it had to impose vigorous Orientalist schemes upon its neighbours, Korea and China. Japan has been an Asian nation defending against the totalizing universalist claims of the West and a modernist/Western power manufacturing a deep sense of cultural and racial hierarchies among Asian nations[21]. Similarly, the Korean national identity was the product of long-lasting struggles to differentiate itself from two empires, Japan and China[22]. The deployment of "nomadic people" or "horse riding people" to separate the Korean identity from China made the borderline with Japan blurred. Using the authentic Confucian civilization or literati tradition to differentiate Korea from the Japanese "militaristic" history damages the borderline with China. China itself has long been swayed between China as a civilization and as a nation. The un-Sinicized territory and people inside of the border disallows the straightforward pursuit of the nationalistic identity, whereas the Westphalian world system in the 19th and 20th centuries has forced China to forget the imperial tribute system. Overall, all nation states in Northeast Asia heavily rely on each other to sustain a concrete national identity; even with countless loopholes in those efforts.

Though the problems of history and identity started from the invasion of Western modernity in the 19th century, Northeast Asia as a community of shared memories and history becomes particularly significant with the continuing problematization of the memories of the colonial and war-time periods, as the political legitimacy of each nation state largely starts with the national memories of these periods especially after the end of the Cold War that largely prevented recalling pre-War imperial memories[23]. For China and Korea, anti-Japanese imperialism has been the foundational discourses of the post-war nation state building processes. For Japan, the denial of its militaristic history has been the source of the post-war Japanese identity as a "peace-loving" and "civilized" nation. At the same time, WWII has been regarded as the moment that

[20] A *very* early version of this section was previously published as a segment of the following article: Jungmin Seo, "Historical Memories as Social-Political Processes: East Asian Examples," *GEMC Journal*, vol. 2 (2010): pp. 36-46.

[21] Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[22] Andre Schmid, *Korea between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

[23] Sebastian Conrad, "The Dialectics of Remembrance: Memories of Empire in Cold War Japan," *Comparative Studies in Society and history*, vol. 56, no. 1 (2014): pp. 4-33.

Japan fell into an "abnormal status." The sense of abnormality could be solved only through Japanese imagination of militarily equipping herself to defend against the rise of China and the irrational North Korea[24].

The fact that the memories of the colonial and war-time periods are the sources of the national identities for all three Northeast Asian states does not mean that those nations share the same forms and contents of the memory. Ironically, since each nation has too much stake in the historical interpretation of the same periods, the politics of memory has become one of the most difficult problems among those nations by creating the problem of "ontological security,"[25] or formulation of security rationality from victimized national memories. A series of recent events show that each nation state invests equal amount of passion and energy to producing an ethno-centric historiography of WWII: Japanese political celebrities', sometimes including the prime minister's, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine; the tension aroused by the emergence of a revisionist textbook sponsored by right-wing businesses and political circles in Japan and the subsequent hysterical reactions in China and Korea; and incessant mobilization of anti-foreigners (*sangokujin*: meaning Koreans and Chinese in Japan), anti-Japanese sentiments by nationalist politicians in each country. At the centre of all these political tensions and popular distrusts against each other lie each nation's competing claims for the authentic/universal historical knowledge that presumably makes the distinction between victims and victimizers indisputable. In this sense, Northeast Asia is a community of shared memories and history in a strange way; a sustainable national identity of each nation state is possible only through denying the others' history. The morality, legitimacy, and glory of each national history are possible only at the expense of the others' claim of historical subjectivity.

As to the intensifying politics of memory in Northeast Asia, I argue that the controversies and debates regarding the colonial and war histories in Northeast Asia were intensified because of a false belief and/or hope that historical accuracy could solve the political conundrums in the region. In other words, it is not "politicized history" but the "myth of non-politicized history" that reproduced political tensions and, more fundamentally, the instability of the Northeast Asian historiography. An increasing number of historians agree with the post-structuralist idea that the past cannot speak for itself but should be narrated through negotiations, struggles and accommodations in the contemporary political – broadly defined – field[26]. The (re)emergence of the memories of the February 28 massacre in Taiwan, the Nanjing massacre in China, and the comfort

[24] Linus Hagström, "The 'abnormal' state: Identity, norm/exception and Japan," *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 21, no. 1 (2015), pp. 122-145.

[25] Karl Gustafsson, "Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese Relations," *Asian Studies Review*, vol. 38, no. 1 (2014): pp. 71-86.

[26] Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

women throughout East Asian societies in the international scene is, therefore, more a function of contemporary political struggles toward the independence of Taiwan, Chinese nationalism, and East Asian feminism than the natural outcome of unearthed historical truths.

As I argued on other occasions[27], the comfort women issue and the Nanjing massacre could be narrated as a collective memory through the formation of new historical subjects. The new historical consciousness produced by the democratization movement and the rise of feminism in Korea enabled the collective memory of the comfort women and, eventually, produced the history of victimization as the core of the identity formation by adding women as the co-subject of national suffering, while making a sharp contrast with the developmental nationalism symbolized by the Park Chung-hee era (1961-1979). The new national identity reinforces its own narration of victimization by excluding those outside of the story: collaborators. The ever-changing discourses of the Nanjing massacre also reflect the shifting position of the CCP and the new subjectivity emerging in the Chinese society in the process of reform. Taiwanese moves toward independence by distancing themselves from the Chinese nation by constructing a hybrid identity of a Chinese/Japanese/Indigenous nation also forces Chinese popular nationalism to admit the unending national humiliation. Occasional voices of "denial" from Japan is actively vitiating the CCP's identification with the "victorious" Chinese nation. The memories of the comfort women and the Nanjing massacre have never been stabilized and will not in the near future.

Let me put a short final note on the presence of the United States in the memory and history of Northeast Asia. The United States is involved in Northeast Asian monumental memories through three main events: WWII, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. These three wars are remembered in America in radically different ways: theatrical victory (WWII), forgotten war (the Korean War) and a bitter defeat that changed the American psyche (the Vietnam War). In Northeast Asia, however, the memories of American presence fundamentally differ depending on one's position during the Cold War, which is yet to be a distant history in this region. Nevertheless, except for the two twin-states in the Korean peninsula, the memory of American post-war presence in Northeast Asia is malleable, since the Chinese and Vietnamese official historiography regarded the Korean War as a victorious one and Japan has been the staunchest ally of the United States. Compared to the varied memories regarding the Japanese militarism before the end of WWII, the history and memory of the American presence in Northeast Asia will not be a main factor in the making of a common historiography in this region.

[27] Jungmin Seo, "Politics of Memory in Korea and China: Remembering the Comfort Women and the Nanjing Massacre," *New Political Science*, vol. 30, no. 3 (2008): pp. 369-392.

Northeast Asia as the Field of Knowledge Production

Sun Ge, a Chinese literary critic, once confessed the extreme difficulties of having meaningful and constructive discussions among Northeast Asian scholars while introducing her experiences in four inter-regional conferences on "Intellectual Community in Northeast Asia" to promote communication among Northeast Asian intellectual communities[28]. Though she introduced the term "trans-cultural knowledge" to solve the deep epistemological problems in Northeast Asia, the most important point she made in her article is the reality that the majority of intellectuals in China, Japan and Korea heavily rely on the frame of references to the West to create their own discourses. In other words, the local structure of concepts and discourses are framed to dialogue with the West, not among Asians[29]. In fact, inter-regional academic interactions are thin and significant dialogues more often occur in western metropolitan centres, where political scientists, sociologists, historians, and economists identify themselves as "Asian study scholars" who presumably dialogue with "universal disciplines."

Let us first think about the emergence of the Western, especially American, area studies that have determined the modern form of academic knowledge about Northeast Asia by training thousands of "native" Asian scholars in American academic institutions. In America, the majority of area scholars are not specialized in regions but in a single state, country, nation, and society. And the regions and nations are presumably separated, as the cultural essentialism of American area studies has long dictated[30]. The study of non-Western societies in Western societies emphasizes culture. As Rey Chow, a Chinese American literary critic, argues: "In the name of studying the West's 'others' then, the critique of cultural politics that is an inherent part of both post-structural theory and cultural studies is pushed aside, and 'culture' returns to a coherent, idealist essence that is outside language and outside mediation. Pursued in a morally complacent, anti-theoretical mode, 'culture' now functions as a shield that hides the positivism, essentialism, and nativism – and with them the continual acts of hiearchization, subordination, and marginalization – that have persistently accompanied the pedagogical practices of area studies, 'cultural studies' now becomes a means of legitimizing continual conceptual and methodological irresponsibility in the name of cultural otherness."[31] In that sense, the arguments of the clash of civilizations are

[28] Sun Ge, "Globalization and Cultural Difference: Thoughts on the Situation of Trans-cultural Knowledge," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2001).

[29] For a detailed discussion regarding the problem of inter-Asian communication and referencing, see Koichi Iwabuchi, "De-westernisation, inter-Asian referencing and beyond," *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1 (2014), pp. 44-57.

[30] Arif Dirlik, "Asia Pacific studies in an age of global modernity," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2005), p. 160.

[31] Rey Chow, "Theory, Area Studies, Cultural Studies," in *Learning Places*, p. 111.

not produced by a single author, Samuel Huntington, but by the structure of American academia itself.

The cultural essentialism based on a single state in American area studies is not only the result of the orientalistic epistemology of the West but also the product of the Asian nation states' incessant nationalistic efforts. The essentialism that was originally imposed by the West to make a certain society particularistic so that the West can claim the universality of its civilization is ironically re-deployed by the otherized nations themselves. The government academic funding structure in Northeast Asian states shows it vividly. The Korea foundation, the Chiang Ching-kuo foundation and the Japan foundation all discourage studies that blur the national or ethnic borderlines in this region. The only area other than "national studies" encouraged by these foundations is the research on the relationships between each country and the United States. Compared to the active encouragement of US-Northeast Asian relations, the efforts of these foundations to promote relations among the regional players are disappointing and minimal. In this sense, the orientalistic essentialism has become the very tool of Asian nation states to solve the identity problems and, as a result, the cultural and social sciences in this region structurally cannot achieve universality. In other words, the study of Korea, Japan and China in Northeast Asia takes the form of "area studies" that objectify their own subjectivities.

One of the most ambitious discourses that possibly resisted the Western totalizing discourses of modernity was "Confucian civilization" or "Asian values", which was actively promoted by various Northeast Asian leaders. To some degree, nationalists and right-wing thinkers in Northeast Asia made awkward and invisible alliances in promoting the sense of Asian uniqueness. The potential power of the discourses of Asian values and Confucian civilization was bankrupted by two notable events. On the one hand, the 1997 Asian economic crisis destroyed the material basis of those discourses as well as the long-envied economic model of the developmental state. Though China and Japan evaded the direct impact of the financial storms in Northeast Asia, the utopian hope of building up an ideal economic system based on the "essential virtue" of the Asian civilization could not be viable anymore as the victims of the financial crisis quickly embraced the universal path of the globalizing neo-liberal economic model that denies the active roles of the state or, in some sense, culture. On the other hand, the recent Chinese push for nationalizing Confucian legacies made Confucianism as a

regional ideology less attractive[32]. The Chinese efforts to reify Qufu as the sacred place for "the Chinese nation" naturally made other communities feel that Confucianism was a somewhat alien cultural element.

The economic crisis in 1997 replaced the "Confucian civilization" discourse, if not the tendency of essentialization itself, with "Northeast Asian Popular Culture."[33] The popularization of Hong Kong martial arts film, Japanese manga, and the Korean soap opera syndrome created a sense of a homogeneous metropolitan: Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, Taipei, Shanghai and Singapore. As cultural agencies in Asian cities began to consider cultural markets outside of their national borders, it might be possible to predict the emergence of regionally defined collective cultural sensitivity.

Nevertheless, the syndrome of Northeast Asian popular culture is circumscribed by an inherent obstacle. Communication via popular culture in Northeast Asia has hardly been interactive. The fevers of the Hong Kong films, Japanese manga, and Korean soap opera emerged and overwhelmed the regional cultural market separately. Further, none of the pop-culture fever shows any sign of de-nationalization of the discourses. The Koreanness of Pae Yong-jun in 2005 is graver and deeper than the Chineseness of Chow Yun-fat (Zhou Ren-fa) in the 1990s. The success of the Korea wave is dominantly, if not entirely, understood as the cultural victory of Korea over other nations in Korean society; whereas it is often perceived as a form of cultural invasion by many Chinese and Japanese commentaries. None of the cultural fever in Northeast Asia is de-nationalized in its form and its economic and political objectives. To my knowledge, none of the soap operas and films co-produced by two or more societies was successful in the market. It might be the structural and semiotic fate of cultural industries other than Hollywood that "in postindustrial capitalism, profit is gained through the commodification of difference itself and the conscious production of that difference."[34] In other words, the postindustrial cultural production system successfully manufactures the Korean wave as a market phenomenon by essentializing, commodifying and reifying the Koreanness in the Japanese and Chinese markets. The emergence of research institutes for the cultural market in the Chinese government and universities also indicates a wide-spread understanding in China that the realm of popular culture is the

[32] A few recent academic works presented a grave warning that the Chinese endeavour to promote Confucianism as the essence of Chineseness in the globalized cultural field would achieve nothing but diminish the universalist nature of Confucianism and the nationalizing civilizational frameworks of Confucianism. See Kiri Paramore, "'Civil Religion' and Confucianism: Japan's Past, China's Present, and the Current Boom in Scholarship on Confucianism," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 74, issue 2 (May 2015), pp. 269-282; Shufang Wu, "'Modernizing' Confucianism in China: A Repackaging of Institutionalization to Consolidate Party Leadership," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 39 (2015), pp. 301-324.

[33] Chua Beng Huat, "Conceptualizing an East Asian popular culture," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2004).

[34] Iwai Katsuhiko, *Shihonshugi wo kataru* (Talking about capitalism) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994), p. 20; cited from Leo Ching, p. 240.

place where "national essences" compete with each other in commodity forms. Hence, it is a much too optimistic perspective if one expects that the Northeast Asian popular culture would produce the regionally integrated cultural sensitivity.

Let us go back to the issue of the problem of the intellectual community in Northeast Asia. As Edward Said and Spivak suggest, the post-colonial societies as synthesis cannot imagine themselves without the process of self-otherizing[35]. Hence, any attempt to create the sense of Asianness should face and negotiate the hegemonic/totalizing Western modernity from the very beginning. The notion of a direct return to the pure "indigenous" culture and civilization is not a viable option because of the history of imperialism[36]. The Asian attempt to find its own modernity is inherently the product of the region's history of facing the Western modernity. The problem of finding Asianness is even complicated via the history of internal imperialism of the region. The Western technology of knowledge production on the colonial others was precisely duplicated by the Japanese colonialists in the Korean peninsula and in northeastern China, notably by the South Manchurian Railway Research Institute. Hence, for the Korean society and, to a lesser degree, the Chinese society, the burden of knowledge and identity produced by the colonialism of a neighbour makes the production of Asianness against the Western modernity even more complicated and difficult. This double layer of colonial history in Northeast Asia, in that sense, makes the newly emerging post-colonial scholarship, which is based on the dichotomy of imperialism and colonies, inapplicable to this region.

I do not intend to suggest a fine solution to these complexities of epistemologies and knowledge production. Nevertheless, as in the case of the politics of history and memory I discussed earlier, I believe that the new space for area-based knowledge production is possible only through the process of de-nationalization. If Northeast Asian feminists can write a common history textbook for Asian women, they are able to produce knowledge that crosses borders. If Northeast Asian peasants can protest against the APEC meeting together, they can agree on their common history and produce their own knowledge. The scheme of a common space for knowledge promoted by Sun Ge is, therefore, perfectly plausible in this context. In sum, the space for regional knowledge production is possible not though negations among national intellectuals but though the formation of a new identity that crosses border. The vulgar but simplest suggestion is, therefore, the creation of regional civil societies based not on nationality and citizenship but on the location in the web of global production – both material and symbolic.

I have not tried to suggest a new model of Northeast Asian community in this chapter. Rather, my aim is limited to pointing out the conundrums, dilemmas and problems

[35] Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin, 1978); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

[36] Rey Chow, p. 111.

of the making of a Northeast Asian community by delineating the multiple layers of the concepts of Northeast Asia as an area. Those layers, as anyone can easily agree, are not separated or isolated from each other but deeply entangled and, in most cases, working simultaneously. Nevertheless, by analyzing the multilayer nature of the concept of area, we can see that community building is not possible without a broad perspective for comprehensive solutions of the problems embedded in those layers. The problems of history and memory will negatively impact the rising sense of economic integration and unnecessarily provoke the sense of insecurity. The failure of the space for regional knowledge production will produce policy makers who are insensitive to their neighbour's worldview and uncritically subscribe to the American perspective of regional prosperity and security.

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Sino-Japanese Relations: The Long Thaw Ahead

Lim Tai Wei

Introduction[1]

Like any other major power relationships, the Sino-Japanese relationship is characterized by its alternating periods of friendship and icy periods of bilateral disagreements over historical memories. Such fluctuations arise because of many factors, including constantly re-calibrating power relationships between the two influential Northeast Asian states. There are different schools of thought on Sino-Japanese relations centred around balancing and hedging. In recent memory, the balancing view has a strong realist flavour that dates back to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's 2006 administration when he wrote and spoke about an "arc of democracy" in his publication *Utsukushi kuni e* or *Towards a Beautiful Country*. It started a debate related to Japanese intentions in its relationship with China. In the first section of this writing, a discussion of terms and terminologies (hedging, balancing, etc) used to characterize the Sino-Japanese relationship by political observers, Sinologists, Japanologists, journalists and international relations experts are discussed. The first section is concerned with the ways in which Sino-Japanese relations are framed and discussed. The strengths as well as the weaknesses and problematized areas of each of these paradigms are discussed.

The second section of the writing focuses on a recent empirical event that occurred on 10 November 2014. For more than two years, the leaders of East Asia's two largest economies (China and Japan) did not meet, despite cajoling from all stakeholders in the East Asian region. Then a golden opportunity arose in the form of an APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) meeting in November 2014 when the leaders of all Asia Pacific countries (including Japan) met in Beijing to discuss economic exchanges. Seizing on this opportunity, for six continuous months, Sino-Japanese senior officials at all levels worked hard to make the Sino-Japanese meeting materialize at the APEC meeting. In this empirical section of this paper, the latest Sino-Japanese rapprochement event is analyzed in detail. The three research questions in this section of the writing are: (1) Did the November 2014 meeting represent continuity in the Sino-Japanese

[1] Part of this paper is derived from my limited-circulation background brief in the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore: Lim, Tai Wei, "Xi Jinping-Abe Shinzo APEC Meeting: An Ice-Breaking Diplomacy?", in the EAI Background Brief No. 971 (Singapore: East Asian Institute National University of Singapore), 2014.

practice of patching up problems through carefully crafted encounters between top leaders? (2) What were the internal and external forces that motivated Tokyo and Beijing to compromise and meet up? (3) What do the protocols, rituals, and nuances in the 2014 meeting tell us about Sino-Japanese relations? The methodology used for this writing relies on interpretive work on an eclectic set of secondary media materials. The interpretive work is combined with textually based comparative work, examining diplomatic protocols (or the lack of them) and informal meetings. Both empirically rich secondary sources as well as theoretically oriented academic references were utilized in this writing. In the theoretical field, some notable works were utilized to study their conceptual theories and arguments.

Section One

Balancing. The case made for the need to balance the emerging power of China is based on the fact that, after China successfully carried out economic reforms from 1979 onwards, the country has been increasing its military budget. Additional cited reasons for balancing against China is that its intentions are not well-known, unpredictable or transparent. In working with the unknowns, the pro-balancers' priority is therefore to check any form of Chinese expansionism. In soft balancing against China, the idea is to provide it with constructive space to engage with the community, accommodate its rise, and to reassure China that the regional and international communities are not out to contain it but to ensure its rise is peaceful. In doing so, the other large powers must resist from testing China's intentions and tolerance in every single security and military matter. In doing so, the long-term outcome is a constructive China that is strong and self-restrained in exercising its power arbitrarily and willing to use its economic power for the good of the region and the world.

Hedging. There are several ways through which observers argue that Japan is hedging against China. Proponents of this view argue that Japan is normalizing as a defence establishment and adopting guidelines that could witness some weapons exports (Australia, India, Vietnam and the Philippines are all potential clients), more island-hopping exercises with the US, co-training with the militaries of other liberal democracies in the region, upgrading defensive capabilities, and mustering political will for such changes. In accordance with this view, all these actions are perhaps carried out in response to Chinese determination to build a blue water naval fleet, and expansion of maritime patrol activity in the first and second island chains. The obvious candidates for regional military partnerships with the Japanese are first and foremost the US, Australia, and India and Japan may also keep an eye out for partnering with South Korea. In end March 2015, the international media announced that Japan signed a non-binding defence pact with Indonesia for cooperation in training, technology, intensifying maritime collaboration, and the possibility of receiving Japanese help

in constructing port infrastructure and coastal defence in Indonesia.[2] The collective strength of these states can hedge against the heft of China. But most importantly, hedging also means leaving lots of room for constructive friendship-building, economic outreach and confidence building measures to avoid conflict and co-exist.

Sustainable equilibrium. Besides old-school balancing and hedging, some new keywords have emerged to replace more classical concepts related to the international power structure. This includes sustainable equilibrium – that as China becomes more assertive, and Japan becomes more confident about its military potential, the US would restrain Chinese ambitions and expansionism while checking Japanese nationalism.[3] It is a status quo option that quite a few middle and small powers are in favour of because it presents them with the prospect of geopolitical stability, which is necessary for economic development. A pre-condition for this to succeed is for US power to remain pre-eminent if not dominant in the world. In many ways, this seems to be the case in many indicators. The region's small and middle powers also seem to subscribe to this worldview, given the unknowns with China and the known knowns with the US. It is also testimony to the limitations of China's charm diplomacy, despite diplomatic reassurances through geopolitical stance like the "peaceful rise", soft power institutions like the Confucius Institutes and economic diplomacy through loans with little or less preconditions to the developing world.

Cautious optimism. It appears national interest trumps any economic, diplomatic or soft power instruments from an external power. Consequently, some practitioners and observers of diplomacy have argued that relations with China, including Sino-Japanese

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[2] Agencies, "Japan expands security ties in region with Indonesia pact", dated 20 March 2015, in *Today* (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings), 2015, p. 36.

[3] When I circulated this paper to my colleagues for reviewing and feedback, some raised an important question. The concept and idea of nationalism is as complex as bilateral relations between two states. Assuming Sino-Japanese relations is bedevilled by the issue of nationalism, then it may be a pertinent question to understand what does "nationalism" itself entails. It can be conceptualized in terms of ethnicity and race, historical memories, ideas of sovereignty and other ways. When conceived in terms of ethnic and racial categories, how is nationalism in China and Japan which tends to focus on the idea of ethnicity, *minzu* in the Chinese language and *minzoku* in the Japanese language, understood as a terminology in understanding history, including the much-contested WWII historical period. How is ethnicity-based nationalism different from a multicultural or multi-ethnic state when the latter practises nationalism? The idea of nationalism in Japan, which often defines itself as a homogenous population, appears to be different from China's context, which is self-defined as a multiethnic state with over 50 groups of minorities officially recognized. The largest cleavage between China and Japan brought about by nationalism is not through the category of ethnicity but from historical memories. China remembers the war as a victim of what it perceives as Japanese aggression and imperialism while nationalists in Japan see itself as a wrongdoer but also a victim of ABCD (America, Britain, China, Dutch) containment, atomic bombing and reprisals. Out of the unresolved historical memories arise contemporary issues of island disputes, comfort women compensation, and Yasukuni shrine visits. In Sino-Japanese ties, therefore, nationalism is rooted in historical memories, from which springs forth other nationalistic sentiments. There are also no hegemonic definitions of nationalism nor understandings of historical memories within both countries, complicating matters further.

relations, should be more businesslike instead of relying on vague concepts of soft power, or "friendship" (*youhao* in Chinese or *yuukou* in Japanese) exchanges. At the point of this writing, some official voices within China have raised the prospect of allocating the AIIB loans according to professional business standards. In other words, infrastructure and capacity-building loans are only dispensed if they meet the broad concept of sustainable profitability. The details are yet to be worked out at the point of this writing but this represents a possible view of Chinese power in line with those advocating more professional business-like relations with China. This is also in line with the character of Chinese diplomacy, given that China officially declares it would not join or form any alliances with other countries. Essentially, this may imply that its loans are provided in mutualistic economic interests and not to promote a geopolitical agenda or to maintain alliances against third powers.

The optimists. There is also a group of Japanese who are optimistic about Sino-Japanese ties. They tend to come from the elderly generation, business sector executives and/or people who have lived in Japan for a period of time. They are the old-school traditionalists when it comes to private sector advocates of good Sino-Japanese relations for constructivist goodwill in bilateral relationship. An example is Shigeru Endo, who was a senior executive with the Mitsui group for over 40 years. He highlighted four points of significance in the Sino-Japanese relationship: (1) Japan needs to maintain a technological edge so that China plays a complementary catch-up role; (2) Japan needs to welcome the rise of China and see it as a development that is of mutual benefit; (3) China is dependent on trade and will desist from upsetting its neighbours by being belligerent; (4) Japan needs to be tough on its position especially in the face of Chinese people who are tough negotiators.[4] Individuals who subscribe to these views will dwindle unless both countries are willing to cultivate more young leaders that can work together, holding such optimistic worldviews.

Section Two[5]

In the second section of the paper, I have picked an empirical event to contextualize the terminological and theoretical concepts discussed above. From an interpretive reading of the event, I was interested in the following three analytical objectives. Can any Sino-Japanese diplomatic exchange be classified under a single paradigm (band-wagoning, hedging, thawing, sustainable equilibrium, balancing) or is an eclectic approach such

[4] Endo, Shigeru and Colin Cheong, *Succeed in Business with China* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Business), 2012, p. 203.

[5] Part of Section II comes from a limited-circulation background brief: Lim, Tai Wei, "Xi Jinping-Abe Shinzo APEC Meeting: An Ice-Breaking Diplomacy? EAI Background Brief No. 971", in the National University of Singapore (NUS) East Asian Institute (EAI) [downloaded on 8 April 2015], available at http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB971.pdf.

as using pragmatism to understand the interactions behind Sino-Japanese interactions more appropriate How do the other Sino-Japanese relations scholars define the term and concept of "pragmatism"? There are no universal doctrines, ideological tenets or theories on pragmatism. It is a loosely-constituted set of decisions and outlook based on the principle of maximization of national interests. The very essence of non-doctrinal approaches to conducting relations may be the cornerstone of pragmatic diplomatic policies.

For more than two years, the leaders of East Asia's two largest economies (China and Japan) did not meet, despite cajoling from all stakeholders in the East Asian region. Then a golden opportunity arose in the form of an APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) meeting in November 2014 where the leaders of all Asia Pacific countries (including Japan) met in Beijing for economic exchanges. Seizing on this opportunity, for six continuous months, Sino-Japanese senior officials at all levels furiously worked hard to make the Sino-Japanese meeting materialize at the APEC meeting. Quite expectedly, the Sino-Japanese meeting of leaders attracted significant international attention due to the ongoing territorial disputes, historical memories disagreements between the two countries and the fact that the leaders of East Asia's two largest economies had not met personally since September 2012 (this was an informal meeting; the last formal meeting goes back even further to December 2011). It was an abnormal situation for the two leaders not to meet, given the influence and reach of these two big powers, economies and states.

When an extraordinary meeting takes place at the highest level after two years of absence, such as the Xi-Abe mini-summit, the event lends itself to intense political analysis, commentator speculation, media glare and construction of public perceptions/opinions. The study of rituals, symbolisms and signifiers does not yield the same analyses as high-level political interactions, especially those in the international relations (IR) realm, which reveal much more about state-to-state relations through an analysis of state actors' actions such as band-wagoning, alliances, swaggering, hedging, appeasement, balancing or offensive realism. The study of diplomatic protocols and rituals fall within the softer aspects of state relations where analysts look for clues related to hierarchy of states in official ceremonies. The level of respect provided by the host to invited guests reveal much about how state leaders will react emotively and cognitively in bilateral talks. In the case of Japan and China, the eagerness of Japan to arrange the 10 November 2014 talk and the Japanese agenda of setting up crisis mechanisms and hotlines indicated Tokyo's concerns about the lack of operational procedures to prevent conflict and that it was ready to compromise on certain issues to realize the establishment of conflict-avoiding mechanisms in East China Sea (to prevent a 擦枪走火 *[caqiang zouhuo]* or misfiring situation in the East China Sea).

Some Chinese sources had earlier indicated a slightly different concept known as "擦枪而不走火*(chaqiang erbuzouhuo)*", a murky and ambiguous term that presupposes the inevitability of Sino-Japanese clashes and militarily brushing against

each other in the East China Sea while maintaining a strict retaliatory posture without effecting the first strike, as reported in a Chinese-language *Xinhua* media report.[6] There are no clear satisfactory explanations for this term in Chinese military or diplomatic strategies with regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. The Chinese Defence Ministry spokesperson mentioned this phrase on 24 April 2014; it was reported in the Chinese-language *Xinhua* report and it was not translated with exact precision in the English-language version of the same *Xinhua* report. In the English-language version of the report, Yang Yujun, a Defense Ministry spokesperson, confirmed what Chinese Navy Commander Wu Shengli had said to the reporters on the sidelines of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium on Wednesday 23 April 2014, about a "worst-case scenario", referring to the fact that the possibility of a military conflict between China and Japan remained, and that the priority was to "prevent the outbreak of a conflict".[7] This was the closest depiction of the "擦枪而不走火 *(chaqiang erbuzouhuo)*" situation in the English-language report. It was this kind of ambiguous talk and unclear translation that made Tokyo nervous and it was a scenario that Japan was keen to prevent.

Mechanism of meeting arrangement. The desire to engineer a meeting between Xi and Abe involved a long list of former leaders, including the delegation of the Asia-Africa Study Group, led by former prime minister Noda Yoshihiko, who joined LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) vice president Komura to visit Beijing and met Yu Zhengsheng, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s fourth ranking member. Noda, if one recalls, was the prime minister under whose watch the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were nationalized, causing the Chinese to react angrily to what they perceived as the disruption to the status quo. Besides former leaders, Japanese opposition party leaders also joined in the long line of politicians and officials visiting Beijing to bring a thaw to the bilateral relations. In end June 2014, a team headed by Socialist Democratic Party Chairman Yoshida Tadamoto went to Beijing and met with Yu Zhengsheng as well as Wang Jiarui (head of the CCP's International Department) in separate meetings.[8] One may recall that at the earliest stages of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), when it was facing an embargo from the West and engaged in the Sino-Soviet split, the earliest Japanese politicians who established unofficial ties with China were

[6] Xinhuanet新华网, "国防部发言人：西太海军论坛提东海'擦枪而不走火' (Guofangbu fayanren: Xitaihai nianluntan ti donghai 'caqiang erbu zouhuo')", dated 24 April 2014, in the Xinhuawang新华网 (Xinhuanet) website [downloaded on 12 November 2014], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2014-04/24/c_1110399498.htm.

[7] Zhang, Yunbi, "Diaoyu Islands vow 'may backfire'", dated 25 April 2014, in the China Daily/Xinhuanet.com [downloaded on 12 November 2014], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-04/25/c_133288992.htm.

[8] Przystup, James J., "Japan-China Relations: Searching for a Summit", dated September 2014, in *Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* [downloaded on 10 November 2014], available at http://csis.org/files/publication/1402qjapan_china.pdf, unpaginated.

the Japanese socialist parties. In other words, there are historical precedents for contact between non-ruling or non-mainstream party politicians at low points in Sino-Japanese relations (i.e., times when it was politically inconvenient for mainstream leaders to make their appearances). Sometimes, in such cases, party leaders rather than ruling government officials made more suitable candidates for visiting Beijing, especially since China also had a party-centred political structure and political decision-making process.

External and Domestic Pressures in Japan for the Xi-Abe Meeting. The press conference statements released by Abe himself on 10 November 2014, revealed much about the pressures emanating from domestic, regional and international stakeholders on Prime Minister Abe to meet President Xi at APEC. He said: "This represented a first step toward improving (bilateral) relations, by having Japan and China return to a starting point of a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests," and added, "Not only Asian nations, but also many others have placed expectations on dialogue between the leaders of Japan and China."[9]

One of the more urgent motivating factors for the Japanese side in calling for the meeting was the potential for clashes between patrol boats and jet fighters in the East China Sea. The latter item is more crucial than the former due to the high speeds (breaking the sound barriers at Mach speeds) at which jet fighters travel. The spectre of jet fighters approaching near each other happened on 24 May 2014, in the East China Sea, alarming many stakeholders in regional peace and security in East Asia. The Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore held on 30 May 2014, was probably one of the first occasions in which Abe mentioned about the need to set up a maritime and air communications system.[10]

Other than the prime minister himself, other major powerful interest groups in Japan also sent their representatives to Beijing. One example of a powerful source of influence in Japan was the *zaikai* (or big businesses) in Japan. Keidanren (Japan's most powerful business association) Chairperson Yonekura Hiromasa met with former state councillor Tang Jiaxuan to talk about economic matters on 27 May 2014. The powerful business federation in Japan is a strong lobby group for restoration of positive (especially economic) ties between Japan and China. Hiromasa also met with Vice President Li Yuanchao; it is unknown if any arrangements were made on these trips for the Abe-Xi meeting. With the business federation leader, opposition party leaders, a non-LDP former prime minister, as well as the vice president of Abe's own party having already

[9] Matsui, Nozomi, Takashi Funakoshi and Nanae Kurashige, "UPDATE: Abe, Xi hold landmark meeting in Beijing with eye toward starting over", dated 10 November 2014, in *The Asahi Shimbun* website [downloaded on 12 November 2014], available at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201411100043.

[10] Przystup, James J., "Japan-China Relations: Searching for a Summit", dated September 2014, in *Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* [downloaded on 10 November 2014], available at http://csis.org/files/publication/1402qjapan_china.pdf, unpaginated.

visited Beijing, the time seemed to be right to deploy the trump card, former prime minister Yasuo Fukuda, an elder politician (*genro* or elder statesman) in the LDP party structure, respected by Washington and an old friend of Beijing's. Fukuda's father (also a Japanese prime minister) was the architect of the Fukuda Doctrine, to soften Japan's image in East Asian countries after anti-Japanese riots broke out in several major Asian cities. Yasuo Fukuda was the right man for the job at the right time. Between 27 July to 29 July 2014, former prime minister Fukuda embarked on a secret visit to Beijing, met President Xi and then conveyed Prime Minister Abe's message of having an Abe-Xi meeting during APEC in November 2014. This was probably the first turning point in Sino-Japanese negotiations for an APEC meeting (the second turning point would be the four points of consensus that came later, discussed below).

Last-minute attempts to close the Sino-Japanese gap. As the global media speculated on whether the Sino-Japanese meeting would happen, last-minute manoeuvrings between the two states became a subject of intense speculation in the international media. The international media was taken on a dynamically changing ride through Sino-Japanese relations. First, the possibility of holding the talks started with a wide gap in perceptions on both sides, with the Chinese insisting on having communications exchanged over the Diaoyu/Senkakus and the historical memories issue but the Japanese preferring no conditionalities for holding the talks. There was optimism of a meeting when former prime minister Fukuda visited Beijing in late July 2014 (Fukuda was later followed by National Security Advisor Shotaro Yachi and the then foreign minister Fumio Kishida). Up till this point, the efforts were expended on arranging the 10 November 2014 bilateral meeting. The deployment of experienced politicians, changing goalposts for negotiations, and ambiguous updates on developments all fitted snugly with Ming Wan's observations of Beijing's diplomatic strategy of being "firm in principles but flexible on tactics" and seeking diplomatic advantage through "old friends."[11] The series of officials who travelled to Beijing in the six months before the APEC meeting consisted of almost all *qinghuapai* or pro-Beijing factional leaders ("old friends" of Beijing's or pro-China hands) in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) such as Yamazaki Taku, Masahiko Komura (the former foreign minister who was in charge of arranging Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan) and Yasuo Fukuda. But, on Thursday 6 November 2014, Sino-Japanese experts appeared on mainstream Japanese news and media channel to express the unlikelihood of a Xi-Abe meeting taking place due to remaining differences in opinions regarding maritime disputes and Yasukuni visits. However, media reports revealed that the Japanese prime minister would deliver a souvenir item to President Xi in the hope that both men can unofficially meet up.[12] Besides

11 Wan, Ming, *Sino-Japanese Relations Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Washington and Chicago: Stanford University Press), 2006, p. 127.

12 Beijingdian, "Zhongrihuo feizhengshi juxing shounao huitan", dated 7 November 2014, in *Xinming Ribao* (Singapore: *Xinming Ribao*), 2014, p. 25.

the "souvenir" diplomacy, there were other versions of media reports which mentioned that the non-official "ice-breaking" meeting might be in the form of a corridor meeting or a short table-top meeting as opposed to a formal closed door meeting. The Chinese state media appeared to agree with this narrative. At the barest minimum, in the worst case scenario, commentators and media sources expected Chinese President Xi to have a handshake (so-called "handshake" diplomacy) at the APEC meeting. Then *Xinhua* (China's official news agency) dampened the optimistic mood when it mentioned that chances for the meeting were marginal, following which, a flurry of top Japanese officials, including the foreign minister of Japan, visited Beijing ahead of the APEC meeting, again creating optimism that the meeting would take place.

The positive atmosphere reached new heights on Friday 7 November 2014, when the Chinese and Japanese media outfits announced that they had reached four points of mutual consensus. These four points of mutual consensus are appended below:

> Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China Relations
>
> November 7, 2014
>
> Japanese
>
> Toward the improvement of the Japan-China relations, quiet discussions have been held between the Governments of Japan and China. Both sides have come to share views on the following points:
>
> 1. Both sides confirmed that they would observe the principles and spirit of the four basic documents between Japan and China and that they would continue to develop a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.
>
> 2. Both sides shared some recognition that, following the spirit of squarely facing history and advancing toward the future, they would overcome political difficulties that affect their bilateral relations.
>
> 3. Both sides recognized that they had different views as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku Islands, and shared the view that, through dialogue and consultation, they would prevent the deterioration of the situation, establish a crisis management mechanism and avert the rise of unforeseen circumstances.
>
> 4. Both sides shared the view that, by utilizing various multilateral and bilateral channels, they would gradually resume dialogue in political, diplomatic and security fields and make an effort to build a political relationship of mutual trust.

(Source: Ministry Of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], "Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China Relations", dated 10 November 2014, in the MOFA website [downloaded on 11 November 2014], available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4e_000150.html.)

For Beijing, Point No. 3 above was the most important because, according to the Chinese government's perception, it was the first admission in black and white that there was a difference in opinion between the two countries over the issue. Abe himself mentioned that China and Japan had different ideas about Diaoyu/Senkaku on 7 November 2014, Friday, evening. With these compromises made, in the afternoon of Sunday, 9 November 2014, the Japanese foreign minister held talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to lay the last foundations for the Xi-Abe talks (either official or unofficial). At the same time, Prime Minister Abe assured the party leader of his domestic coalition partner, the pacifist and moderate Komeito Party, that he would endeavour to hold talks with President Xi. Previously, Abe had come under criticisms and scrutiny for not visiting Beijing after assuming political office. But, on 9 November 2014, Prime Minister Abe himself wished to turn the table on criticisms of his China policy, that he had deliberately delayed his visit to Beijing after visiting a record 49 countries.

Abe's delayed visit to Beijing was a sharp contrast from his visit to Beijing during his first administration in 2006-2007. At that time, Prime Minister Abe was invited to make an official visit to the People's Republic of China from 8 to 9 October 2006, by Premier Wen Jiabao, and held talks with a wide spectrum of leaders, including President of the People's Republic of China Hu Jintao, Chairman of Standing Committee of National People's Congress Wu Bangguo, and Premier of State Council Wen Jiabao. For the record, the 2006 Beijing trip was Abe's first trip overseas as prime minister when he assumed power in his first term and this was a fact given much attention by the international media. This time round in 2014, he expended great resources and connections in all sectors to make the Beijing meeting possible. Consequently, it led some seasoned analysts in Japan like Koichi Nakano, a professor of Political Science at Sophia University, to say that the meeting as a "minor victory" for Japan's leader but that Abe "is still on probation as far as the Chinese government is concerned"[13] due to the cold handshake reception. Abe counter-argued against the view that his Beijing visit was long overdue: "It's very significant that the milestone 50th nation I will visit is China. I want to improve our bilateral relations," before departing Tokyo for Beijing.[14]

But, even as China and Japan reached consensus on four points of common outlook, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was busy fending off questions and denying criticisms that he had promised the Chinese side not to visit Yasukuni Shrine. The Chinese insisted that the Japanese side should re-examine history and break ties with a militaristic past.

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[13] Adelstein, Jake, "Beijing's 'Star Trek' APEC Summit", dated 11 November 2014, in *The Daily Beast* [downloaded on 12 November 2014], available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/11/beijing-s-star-trek-apec-summit.html#.

[14] Matsui, Nozomi, Takashi Funakoshi and Nanae Kurashige, "UPDATE: Abe, Xi hold landmark meeting in Beijing with eye toward starting over", dated 10 November 2014, in *The Asahi Shimbun* website [downloaded on 12 November 2014], available at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201411100043.

Some interpretations of Point No. 2 also argued that it was something of a compromise by Beijing because the wordings of the second point were vague and did not specify specifically that Abe should not visit Yasukuni Shrine. Therefore, following this interpretation, while Point No. 3 was a Japanese compromise, Point No. 2 was a Chinese compromise. This compromise was probably the main and final obstacle to be cleared before the meeting of the two leaders. This reading probably conformed to the model of "pragmatic, compromising approaches" that Ming Wan said characterized the Sino-Japanese relationship, a model of negotiations with compromises based on not betraying core principles and the use of "less precise language" when there is a need for ambiguity.[15]

The carefully crafted and scripted meeting finally took place on 10 November 2014. Indeed, on 10 November 2014, at 11.50 am, President Xi and PM Abe met for slightly less than 30 minutes, generating another round of international media frenzy. Much of this highly anticipated meeting ran as expected according to script while a few other points were not entirely within the expectations of commentators and the international media. For example, one unexpected feature was that Prime Minister Abe was made to stand at the Great Hall of the People to wait for the arrival of President Xi, a departure from the usual protocol of the host waiting for the guest. This ritualistic play catered to the sensitivities of the domestic audience. Then, the meeting was witnessed by the international media with features of an uncomfortable handshake, stiff experience and silence in greetings from the Chinese side. Again, these political rituals played to the outstanding issues of conflicts between the two states. Another departure from convention at the meeting was that the national flags in the background were missing. Every single bit of symbolism was dissected carefully by the media and commentators. Even Xi's facial expression was carefully analyzed, with the media narrative that any hint of a smile would be conceived as an affront to the Chinese nationalistic faction but, at the same time, if he glared, he might be branded by international opinions[16] as being petty or a non-gracious host. Extrapolating from this interpretation, Xi therefore chose the stiff and poker-face look.

The symbolic chill in the handshake protocol reflected the pressing needs for both leaders to play to domestic audiences. For President Xi, he needed to appear less friendly in order to keep up with his strong-leader image (*Time* magazine had just featured his photo on its cover story at the time of the meeting and before that, he had been on the cover of other magazines adorning an emperor image) and also not to diminish his strongman credentials in talking tough to Japan over historical memories and territorial disputes. The latter was a tradition kept up amongst Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials because the party itself was built on the legitimacy of liberation of the Chinese

[15] Wan, Ming, *Sino-Japanese Relations Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Washington and Chicago: Stanford University Press), 2006, p. 95.

[16] Agencies, "Abe, Xi hold terse meeting" dated 11 November 2014, in *Today* (Singapore: Mediacorp), 2014, p. 2.

rural areas from the Japanese imperialists during World War II and the capitalists during the Nationalist period. Any overt friendliness towards the Japanese would diminish Xi's anti-Japanese militarism credentials, as perceived by the people of China. One media narrative quoting Kyoto Sangyo University's Institute for World Affairs director Kazuhiko Togo even claims that the nationalistic audience in China "had been led to believe Mr Abe was not worth meeting"[17] and so any overt friendliness was a political risk for Xi.

On the Japanese side, the leaders' domestic considerations differed. In meeting President Xi, a symbolic handshake would enable Prime Minister Abe to report back to his domestic audiences and lobby groups of fulfilling promises made to the business lobby and his coalition partner, the pacifist Komeito Party, that he has done his job to secure their continued support. Prime Minister Abe also used the event to shore up his political legitimacy by declaring that he has followed a consistent policy of having good relations with China since his first term in 2006-2007, when he symbolically visited China shortly after taking office then. More importantly, on immediate practical terms, Abe secured the window of opportunity for the militaries on both sides to start discussing about operational procedures and mechanisms to prevent clashes at sea and in the air in the East China Sea. To understand how potentially dangerous the situation was, Przystup came up with a list of misses and clashes that took place in the lead-up to the Abe-Xi meeting.

> List of near misses and potential clashes in East China Sea between China and Japan.
>
> May 1-6, 2014: Chinese Coast Guard ships Haijian 2102, 2166 and 2401 are found operating in Japan's contiguous zone.
>
> May 7-9, 2014: Chinese Coast Guard ships Haijian 2101 and 2113 are found operating in Japan's contiguous zone in the Senkakus.
>
> May 24, 2014: PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) aircraft approach each other over the East China Sea.
>
> May 26-31: Chinese Coast Guard ships Haijian 2146 and 2151 enter Japanese territorial waters in the Senkakus.
>
> May 31, 2014: Chinese Coast Guard ships enter Japanese territorial waters in the Senkakus.
>
> June 11, 2014: PLAAF and JASDF aircraft have a close encounter over the East China Sea.
>
> June 13, 2014: Six members of the Chinese Coast Guard ship Haijian 2101 board a Chinese fishing boat, operating within Japan's EEZ.

[17] Agencies, "Abe, Xi hold terse meeting" dated 11 November 2014, in *Today* (Singapore: Mediacorp), 2014, p. 2.

June 16-22, 2014: Chinese Coast Guard ships Haijian 2102 and 2146 are found operating in Japan's contiguous zone in the Senkakus area.

June 29-July 1, 2014: Chinese Coast Guard ships Haijian 2102 and 2146 are found operating in Japan's contiguous zone

July 5, 2014: Chinese Coast Guard ships Haijian 2101 and 2151 enter Japan's territorial waters near the Senkakus.

July 10-21, 2014: Chinese Coast Guard ships Haijian 2012, 2113, and 2146 are found operating in Japan's contiguous zone near the Senkakus.

July 12, 2014: Chinese Coast Guard ships Haijian 2101 and 2151 enter Japanese territorial waters near the Senkakus.

Aug. 9-13, 2014: Chinese Coast Guard ships enter Japan's contiguous zone near the Senkakus.

Aug. 24, 2014: Haijian 2101, 2113, 2146, and 2305 enter Japan's territorial waters.

(Extracted from the source: Przystup, James J., "Japan-China Relations: Searching for a Summit", in *Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* [downloaded on 10 November 2014], available at http://csis.org/files/publication/1402qjapan_china.pdf.)

From the above table, it was clear that tensions were rising in the East China Sea and had became a legitimate cause of concern for both parties. From the trends observable in the table, the Coast Guard ships were approaching closer to the contiguous zone (defined by territorial waters around Senkaku based on Japanese control of the islands) before entering it. Japan had an urgent need to ensure the safety of her servicemen patrolling these islands under their effective control while China needed to assert their claims over the disputed ownership of the islands to refute the concept of effective control. This formed the context of the uneasy relationship between the leaderships of both countries which, when played out in the media, affected the national sentiments of China and Japan.

The maritime dispute between Japan and China over Senkaku-Diaoyu since 2012, when the Noda administration nationalized the islands, is a potentially game-changing issue that altered the past conventions of the unofficial practice of *seikei bunri* (separation of economics and politics) which had kept Sino-Japanese relations going even when the bilateral political relationship was rocky. For example, even at the lowest points of Sino-Japanese relations during the Koizumi administration due to his Yasukuni Shrine visits, bilateral trade and economic exchanges continued to expand and flourish. The current Abe administration's relaxation of visa rules, the Keidanren chief's visit to Beijing and domestic priorities of pushing through Abenomics appear as attempts to maintain economic priorities in the bilateral relations but, at the same time, the priority of seeking the establishment of a hotline and crisis management system indicated that

strategic-security-military components of the relationship is now equalizing in importance and reaching parity with economic exchanges.

In other words, expectations needed to be re-adjusted on both sides with regard to any unmitigated return to separation of economics and politics. Economic priorities are now conflated with strategic-military concerns and nationalistic sentiments that have flared up in both countries due to maritime disputes. Both leaders needed to play fiddle to their domestic audiences. The need to do so is visible from the domestic challenges that both leaders faced. President Xi needed to shore up public and official support for his wide-ranging and thorough anti-corruption campaign that has cleaned out some corrupt senior officials at all levels of government in an unprecedented (and also politicized) manner. Prime Minister Abe faced challenges to his administration after the resignation of three ministerial cabinet members, one of whom was touted to be Japan's first female prime minister (Yuko Obuchi). The resignation of Obuchi also dealt a blow to his attempt to introduce more women into prominent positions within the political circle. Promoting female leadership in politics and big businesses was one of the cornerstones of Abenomics. Prime Minister Abe also needed to fend off parliamentary challenges in pending tax hikes. In both cases, managing nationalistic sentiments and sometimes stoking them proved to be a useful mobilizational tool in carrying out painful reforms and unpopular political initiatives.

A nuanced brief reading of the very complex Abenomics may be useful here. Abe is facing challenging economic performance issues despite a few rounds of money printing, which is carried out through government bond purchases. The *Wall Street Journal* described this succinctly in its media report. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has pumped money into Japan's economy by purchasing Japanese government bonds from private holders; this has been criticized as "effectively underwriting government borrowing, by ensuring demand for whatever debt the government tries to sell".[18] Moreover, there is a longer-term challenge of demographic changes. Inducing an artificial inflation in order to stimulate domestic consumption may run into obstacles when applied on an ageing Japanese population. For young people, with inflation coming, they may consume more, an economics textbook scenario. But for senior citizens, any imminent price rise will only deter them from consuming, in order to cut down consumption to preserve long-term consumption power.

The Economist ran an article in April 2014 that detailed this phenomenon in the world (particularly in developed economies), not just in Japan. The article indicated that, globally, the conventional view is that a bigger proportion of seniors translated to slower growth and, because the elderly need to extract their wealth for daily livelihood, it implied smaller savings, which can mean higher interest rates and falling asset

[18] Schlesinger, Jacob M., "Keynes Mutiny: What Abe's Tax Delay Would Mean for Japan", dated 12 November 2014, in *The Wall Street Journal* website [downloaded on 13 November 2014], available at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/11/12/keynes-mutiny-what-abes-tax-delay-would-mean-for-japan/.

prices.[19] Hence, such a phenomenon elicits a different behaviour response to price rise and may mean prolonged deflation for Japan. The Bank of International Settlement, the world's oldest global financial organization, in Switzerland, published a report written by authors with the Bank of Japan detailing this situation. The yen depreciation may stimulate Japan's exports, which benefit the multinational companies (MNCs), but many SMEs depend on greater domestic consumption, which is plagued by some of the problems mentioned above. With the yen coming down in value, Japan has to pay more for imported goods (particularly energy) at higher prices and this affects demand. On top of these challenges, public and corporate perceptions and level of confidence are also important psychologically and they are carefully watching Abenomics' developments politically and economically.

Despite the frosty handshake meeting, the atmosphere behind closed doors was described as much better than the handshake. *The Straits Times,* in Singapore, quoted unnamed Japanese officials as saying that it was a "gentlemanlike" exchange.[20] Abe spoke to the press immediately after the meeting and saw it as the ice-breaking opportunity to move forward with ties in the form of a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests"[21]. Most analysts agree on looking beyond the body language to find positivity in the symbol of the meeting itself. Also, within expectations, President Xi told Abe about the importance of historical memories for the Chinese people and to have a "prudent" military policy.[22] Also as expected, Yasukuni shrine visits and Diaoyu/Senkaku island disputes were left off the table.

Implications. What are the short, intermediate and long-term implications of the meeting? First, in the short term, ties are unlikely to suddenly warm up as most media reports on the day after described the meeting as a "frosty", "cool" or "stiff" handshake encounter. This by itself may not be insignificant since the bilateral meeting is considered as a "thawing" encounter, which implies there is much work to be done. To look at the intermediate and long-term potentialities, one has to go beyond the body language analysis at the handshake stage. If the Xi-Abe meeting is able to create the necessary conditions for lower officials to discuss the practical issue of setting up a hotline for

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[19] *The Economist*, "Age invaders", dated 26 April 2014, in *The Economist* [downloaded on 13 November 2014], available at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21601248-generation-old-people-about-change-global-economy-they-will-not-all-do-so.

[20] Kor, Kian Beng, "Xi, Abe meet but China-Japan ties set to remain cool", dated 11 November 2014, in *The Straits Times* (Singapore: Singapore Press Holding SPH), 2014, p. A1.

[21] Kihara, Leika, "China's Xi, Japan's Abe hold landmark meeting after awkward handshake", dated 10 November 2014, in the *Yahoo* news/*Reuters* website [downloaded on 10 November 2014], available at http://news.yahoo.com/chinas-xi-meets-japans-abe-bid-thaw-frigid-041248986--business.html.

[22] Kihara, Leika, "China's Xi, Japan's Abe hold landmark meeting after awkward handshake", dated 10 November 2014, in the *Yahoo* news/*Reuters* website [downloaded on 10 November 2014], available at -http://news.yahoo.com/chinas-xi-meets-japans-abe-bid-thaw-frigid-041248986--business.html.

crisis management, that would be an intermediate-term achievement of the November 2014 meeting. If the hotline and crisis management mechanism is established, it would represent the first time that Sino-Japanese relations have shifted momentum towards security issues as a primary focus in terms of extraordinary meetings. A long-term implication would be the creation of positive conditions for further augmentation of Track II exchanges (student exchanges, cultural immersion, intellectual discussions, etc.), some of which had been hindered by public sentiments.

The Xi-Abe meeting is also significant from a long-term perspective in that it signifies a post-"asymmetrical, compatible objectives"[23] historical phase that Ming Wan formerly used to characterize Sino-Japanese relations. Previously, Wan argued that Sino-Japanese relations were conducted according to the mutually compatible objectives of forging good relations even though their reasons for doing so were different.[24] The Chinese wanted a partner to hedge against the Soviets and the Japanese wanted to enhance Japan's security and economic development by facilitating Chinese economic development and both had a common target of working against Moscow's influence.[25] But in the 21st century and after the fall of communism in 1989, such rationale for cooperation no longer existed. Thus, Japan and China continued to have different asymmetrical national interests and identities but without compatible political objectives (even as economic mutualism remained intact although somewhat diminished by the political turbulence).

Overall, at a macro level, it is unclear if body language diplomacy will remain as a symbolic reflection of Zhongnanhai's views of other countries. In the same APEC meeting, the body language of the Chinese leader in interacting with other world leaders was carefully scrutinized. The Chinese leader gave two leaders exceptional treatment in handshakes and attitudes. One was a smiling President Xi greeting the bubble-gum-chewing US president when the latter arrived at the welcome red carpet. And the other was an overtly friendly Xi greeting Russian President Putin. It is unclear how body language diplomacy is determined exactly but from observation studies of the handshakes and taps on the shoulder, it appears that realist indicators of the power of a state, such as size, and its friendliness towards China are major determinants of how guests would be treated at the major international or bilateral events in Beijing.

Concluding remarks about the APEC event. It is conceivable that the thawing effect of the Xi-Abe talk can be conceptualized in terms of the balancing concept. The Japanese gesture of holding the Sino-Japanese leadership summit during the Beijing

[23] Wan, Ming, *Sino-Japanese Relations Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Washington and Chicago: Stanford University Press), 2006, p. 86.

[24] Wan, Ming, *Sino-Japanese Relations Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Washington and Chicago: Stanford University Press), 2006, p. 86.

[25] Wan, Ming, *Sino-Japanese Relations Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Washington and Chicago: Stanford University Press), 2006, p. 86.

APEC November 2015 meeting is a form of soft balancing. This is because there were indications that Prime Minister Abe's participation at the summit would not get a warm reception. But his government persisted, with a pragmatic eye on Japan's long-term interests in setting up a maritime crisis hotline and to answer his critics. It is also an example of accommodating China so as to establish the norms and institutions for crisis management in the hope that it will desist from unilateral actions in territorial disputes. Regardless of the spectrum of interpretive readings about the intentions behind the Abe-Xi summit during the Beijing APEC November 2015 meeting, the *pragmatic* net result of the meeting alone was the symbolic encounter between the two leaders after two years' of absence, signalling early interest for talks on a maritime crisis hotline and a face-saving gesture by both sides for attending China's most important party of the year. There were no underlying doctrines for the compromises made nor were the negotiators on both sides guided by ideology. The Sino-Japanese meeting to discuss the agenda items was the outcome of a path of least resistance taken by all stakeholders to avoid further deterioration of the bilateral relationship. Pragmatism is a useful paradigm to understand the activities of different levels of officials working towards having a leaders' summit in the APEC Beijing meeting. It can also be argued that this is the difference between realpolitik and an analytical paradigm. The dilemma faced in meeting President Xi against negative public moods both within China and Japan reflects realpolitik mitigation of any intentions of balancing China on paper. Reflecting its views on overall Japanese attempts to balance against China, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report 7-5700 states:

> Abe released an article outlining his foreign and security policy strategy titled "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond," which described how the democracies of Japan, Australia, India, and the United States could cooperate to deter Chinese aggression on its maritime periphery....This energetic diplomacy indicates a desire to balance China's growing influence with a loose coalition of Asia-Pacific powers, but this strategy of realpolitik is couched in the rhetoric of international laws and democratic values.[26]

Theoretically and conceptually, the report appears to hint that Japan's intention may be to navigate China along a regionally accepted normative and constructivist path (at least when conceptualized in terms of laws and worldviews) but, in the process, a mixture of pragmatic accommodations, self-restraint, standing the ground, band-wagoning and even cooperation are effected. But many features that appear as acts of balancing against China at the doctrinal level become ambiguously implemented when manifested as diplomatic initiatives. The APEC Beijing meeting between Prime Minister Abe

[26] Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Mark E. Manyin, Ian E. Rinehart, Rebecca M. Nelson and Brock R. Williams, "Japan-US Relations: Issues for Congress", dated 13 Jan 2015, in Congressional Research Service CRS Report 7-5700 R:334336 (Washington DC: CRS), 2015, pp. 10-11.

and President Xi reflects this complex, ambiguous and sometimes even contradictory bilateral relationship.

From Beijing's perspective, the APEC meeting was not decided solely based on factors related to the bilateral relationship. In agreeing to meet Prime Minister Abe, they took into consideration the overall success of APEC in Beijing as well as the desire to avoid accidents in the maritime areas under dispute through the idea of the establishment of a hotline. The overriding factors in the Sino-Japanese relationship, more than any other hedging or balancing concerns, are the maintenance of peace, avoidance of war/conflict/bloodshed and a politically stable environment for economic development. All other priorities are subordinated to these goals based on primary security interests. The November 2014 Abe-Xi meeting reflects these pragmatic principles, not just because there are intertwined and mutualistic economic interests or the need to balance and hedge against each other but because of domestic national interests.

Discussions about the maritime hotline issue is also a reflection of realist concerns about China's rising military powers. The so-called "normalization" concept of Japan, especially when it is interpreted by Chinese realists, is sometimes couched as the Japanese military balancing against China or hedging with other regional militaries to constrain the rise of China. Both interpretations may be acceptable explanations but they can also be eclectically combined as a pragmatic response to the re-alignment of power and order in East Asia. On the one hand, there is a rising China and its intention to reach deeper into the Pacific, construct an overland and maritime regional connectivity, initiate the building of regional banks and a whole slew of other world-changing initiatives. On the other hand, the US remains as the first amongst equals in the Pacific in almost every category of power indicators and it has been keen, during Obama's administration, to re-pivot to East Asia to assert its traditional interests.

Even as China enters into maritime disputes in South and East China Seas, there is tremendous self-restraint exercised by almost all claimant states thus far, including self-restraint by both China and Japan. Pragmatically, states in the region avoid testing China's intentions but at the same time bandwagon with large states like the US and Japan for protection. In the past, the separation of economics and politics was the classic strategy that many smaller states utilized in navigating between China and the US. The success of this arrangement may prompt some to advocate the idea of sustainable equilibrium where the status quo is maintained with the ambitions of China and Japan both checked by the US. Sustainable equilibrium requires US power to remain strong. Most countries in the region do not doubt the continuance of American dominance but pragmatism dictates engagement with other powers for extracting maximum benefits from all large powers amidst their rivalries and cooperation.

The recent consecutive membership admission of Washington allies into the Chinese-led AIIB is sometimes cast as a form of economic band-wagoning by the international media but pragmatism may be a better way to understand the phenomenon

instead. AIIB represents another opportunity for Tokyo to exert its influence in its own way with the proposed contribution of US$2 billion to the project, the offer of its own ADB expertise and the repairing of its relationship with China, and at the same time, to have the opportunity to work with other major economies (including Washington allies) to create trade opportunities and transform the organization from within.

The idea of a more businesslike relationship between China and Japan may also be a euphemism for a pragmatic bilateral relationship as both countries move beyond the pretence of the previous relationship of Japan offering assistance for capacity-building to the then-developing China. The basic question that may govern their relationship now is what both sides can gain from the relationship and how they need to conduct the relationship given the core existence of a US-Japan alliance and China's growing role in the region along with its self-declared non-alliance pledge. Both hawks and pro-China elements in Japan need to take into consideration China's desire for greater space in the Pacific and its obligations to the US under a long-standing alliance that was the cornerstone of peace in the region for most of the post-WWII order. A pragmatic expression of these almost-schizophrenic and mildly contradictory priorities can be found when Prime Minister Abe declared Japan's loyalty to the US in not following the UK and other European allies to join the AIIB as founding members (with some international commentators asking the US to be more flexible with Tokyo on TPP in return) and Deputy Prime Minister Aso's cautious attitude in requesting for more information before joining AIIB (belatedly offering US$2 billion to join as ordinary member). Looking ahead, there are reasons for optimism in Sino-Japanese ties. For the first time since the Koizumi administration, there is now a politically stable and long-lived Japanese administration that China can work with in terms of Sino-Japanese ties as Abe appears to be firmly in power for the next few years until 2018. Perhaps both powers can seize the chance to work pragmatically on their common practical challenges together.

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The Role of Nationalism in the Vietnamese Revolution and Current Nationalist Issues in Vietnam

Pham Hồng Tung

1. The Role of Vietnamese Nationalism in the Vietnamese Revolution

In one of his writings published in 1924, Hồ Chí Minh declared: "Nationalism is a large driving force of the country". He even considered nationalism as "the only huge driving force in the society of the Vietnamese people".[1] These statements of Hồ's have been proven throughout the history of Vietnam, particularly in the history of the struggle of the Vietnamese people for national independence and national re-unification in the 20th century. The Vietnamese revolution, although it was led by the communist party, was in its nature a nationalist revolution. This was acknowledged by the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) itself at the beginning of the revolution: "In this period, the Vietnamese revolution is a nationalist revolution which is aimed at national liberation".[2]

However, as Hồ already noted in the above article, the contents of Vietnamese nationalism changed radically in the early decades of the 20th century, as it was "modernized" and propagated by different elite groups.[3]

The core factor and the origin of Vietnamese nationalism, as assumed by many Vietnamese researchers, is the Vietnamese patriotic tradition or patriotism.[4] Vietnamese historians have proposed different ways to explore the roots of Vietnamese patriotism and its nature. For Phan Huy Lê and many others,[5] Vietnamese patriotism has its roots

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[1] Ho Chi Minh, "Báo cáo về Bắc Kỳ, Trung Kỳ và Nam Kỳ", in *Toàn tập*, Vol. 1, Chính trị Quốc gia, Hanoi, 2002, pp. 466 and 467.

[2] Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*, tập 7, Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, 2000, p. 119.

[3] Ibid, p. 466.

[4] See Trần Văn Giàu, *Giá trị tinh thần truyền thống của dân tộc Việt Nam*, Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, 2011; Phan Huy Lê, "Chủ nghĩa yêu nước: nội lực tinh thần nền tảng của Mặt trận Tổ quốc Việt Nam", in *Xưa & Nay*, No. 67, 1999, pp. 6-7.

[5] See Phan Huy Lê, "Chủ nghĩa yêu nước: nội lực tinh thần nền tảng của Mặt trận Tổ quốc Việt Nam", in *Xưa & Nay*, No. 67, 1999, pp. 6-7; Phạm Hồng Tung, *Die Politisierung der Massen in Vietnam, 1925-1939*, Logos Verlag, Berlin, 2002, pp. 33-72.

deeply in the Vietnamese traditional economic basis, particularly in the land-using system and the organization of wet rice cultivation. It is also rooted in the Vietnamese traditional society, particularly the communal organization of Vietnamese villages, as well as in the spiritual world, especially the tradition of ancestor worshiping.

Other Vietnamese experts, like Hà Văn Tấn[6] and Phạm Hồng Tung,[7] point out that, although the communal sense of Vietnamese villagers played an important role in consolidating the communal coherence, village communitarianism by itself could hardly develop into regionalism or nationalism. In fact, Vietnamese villages did not exist separately from each other and among them there have been many kinds of inter-village and super-village interactions. It was those relationships that built up the basis for regionalism and nationalism in traditional Vietnam.

The tradition of struggling against foreign invasions also played an important role in the development of Vietnamese patriotism and nationalism. In pre-modern periods, the Vietnamese people had to fight more than twenty times against foreign invasions, which came mostly from the north. Generations of Vietnamese have great pride in their glorious tradition of fighting against foreign invaders. The people who had led the Vietnamese in those fights or had died for the fatherland have been considered national heroes and worshiped in the temples and communal houses (*đình*) of the villages.

Nonetheless, in its contents, the Vietnamese traditional patriotism was not only love for the fatherland and for compatriots. As the Vietnamese monarchical states considered Buddhism (from around the 10th to 13th century) and later Confucianism (from late-13th to 19th century) as state ethical philosophies, patriotism was mixed with these religious-political theories. Influenced by Buddhism, love for compatriots meant also love for men and for nature. Under the influence of Confucianism, love for the fatherland was mixed with loyalty towards the king and worshiping of ancestors was understood in the sense of the filial piety of children towards their parents and predecessors.

It was in these ways that Vietnamese patriotism in the form of villages' communitarianism and Buddhist or Confucian teachings could exercise its influences upon the daily orientation and activities of the Vietnamese people.

In the second half of the 19th century, Vietnamese traditional patriotism was challenged seriously, as the country was attacked by French colonialism. From September 1858 to 1896, together with the resistance of the Nguyen dynasty, hundreds of armed uprisings broke out throughout the whole of Vietnam. Like their ancestors from years past, the Vietnamese people took up weapons and fought bravely against the French

[6] Hà Văn Tấn, "Làng, liên làng và siêu làng (mấy suy nghĩ về phương pháp)", in *Tạp chí Khoa học*, Đại học Tổng hợp Hà Nội, No.1, 1987.

[7] Phạm Hồng Tung, *Văn hóa chính trị và lịch sử dưới góc nhìn văn hóa chính trị*, Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, 2009, pp. 218-245.

invaders for nearly four decades. Finally, however, all resistances and uprisings were defeated.

After this failure, since the early 20th century, the leaders of the Vietnamese patriotic movement, like Phan Bội Châu, Phan Châu Trinh and others, began to re-examine the movement and its causes and they realized that the main reason for the defeat was the ideological basis of the movement, namely the traditional patriotism, which heavily relied on the politico-ethical principles of Confucianism. In one of his works, Phan Bội Châu wrote in 1905: "Now I want to tell you about the true reasons for the loss of our country: first, the king did not care about the people. Second, the mandarins did not care about the people. And third, the people did not care about the country".[8] As a result, the whole nation was de-politicized and the people were "in an everlasting sleep like a log".[9]

This analysis led Phan and other Confucian reformers to a conclusion: the country and the nation should no longer be identified with a certain king or dynasty, but with the Vietnamese people.[10] So, in order to mobilize the Vietnamese people and improve their participation capacity in the independence movement, they decided to carry out many propaganda campaigns and tried to "wake the people up", call for their solidarity, and then "open their minds and improve their morals" through reform movements.

The central slogans of the reforms which Phan Bội Châu, Phan Châu Trinh and other radical Confucians proposed were: "learn from the West and follow the Japanese example", in order to "turn the Vietnamese people from 'a herd of slaves' into 'a civilized people'".[11] Their calls were responded to very positively by the Vietnamese people, particularly the youth. From 1904 to 1908, a large reform movement developed in many urban and rural areas in Vietnam. About 200 students even found their way to Japan for further training.

Although the reform movement was quickly suppressed be the French colonial government, its contributions to the nationalist movement in Vietnam were of great significance. In fact, it brought new contents into Vietnamese nationalism and changed its nature. First, for the first time, it freed Vietnamese traditional patriotism from Buddhism and particularly from Confucianism, so that the traditional patriotism could become the core factor of Vietnamese modern nationalism. Second, the contents of Vietnamese nationalism was no longer limited in a patriotic or communal sense and targeted only at national independence, but included an aspiration for the modernization and prosperity of the country, in which the people, not the king, should be the true masters. Third, the movement brought in also a new imagination about their "nation".

[8] Phan Bội Châu, *Toàn tập*, Vol. 2, Thuận Hóa Publishers, Huế, 1999, p. 129.

[9] Phan Bội Châu, *Toàn tập*, Vol. 2, Thuận Hóa Publishers, Huế, 1999. p. 351.

[10] See Phan Bội Châu, *Toàn tập*, Vol. 2, Thuận Hóa Publishers, Huế, 1999, pp. 339-340.

[11] Phan Bội Châu, *Toàn tập*, Vol.2, ibid, p. 334.

The Vietnamese nation must be an inclusive community which unified all people that belonged to "the children of dragon father and fairy mother", without any discriminations based on gender, age, social status and religion. The leaders of the reform movement also provided a new nationalist imagination about the position and the role of their country once it was modernized and independent: the new Vietnam would be a powerful civilized country which has friendly relationships with all civilized states and peoples in the world, particularly the Asian peoples, who belong to the "same culture, same race and same continent".[12]

Like reformers of that time in China and Japan, the Vietnamese Confucian reformers were heavily influenced by Social Darwinism and other political theories from the West.[13] Thanks to this, they were able to bring in new contents and characteristics for Vietnamese traditional patriotism and laid down the basis for Vietnamese modern nationalism.

After the First World War, there appeared a new generation of Vietnamese elite – the "Westernized" indigenous intellectuals – or the native intelligentsia. In contrast to Confucian intellectuals, they were products of the colonial education system. Hundreds of them even had the opportunity to study in universities in France. This also meant that they were influenced by different Western philosophies, political theories and cultures. Unlike the traditional elite, who mostly lived in the villages and had daily interactions with the peasants, most of the new intellectuals were living in urban areas and had nearly no contact with their rural compatriots.

After the First World War the new intelligentsia became the main source that provided the leadership for all anti-colonialist and reform movements in Vietnam. Being influenced by different political theories, they were divided into different sub-groups, created different organizations with different political orientations and approached the masses in different ways.

The first group of Vietnamese intellectuals did not participate directly in the anti-colonialist movement, but were very active in many social and cultural reform movements. This group consisted of many sub-groups, gathering in newspaper offices and associations. Through their intellectual works, they propagated vigorously democratic theories, and called for social emancipation, including emancipation of the youth and women. Some of these intellectuals, like Trương Vĩnh Ký, Nguyễn An Ninh, Nguyễn Văn Vĩnh, Phạm Quỳnh, Nguyễn Văn Huyên, Hoàng Xuân Hãn etc., carried out basic researches, in which they systematically re-examined the cultural and social traditions of the Vietnamese, and pointed out the positive values that the Vietnamese should preserve and bring into play in the future, and the negative values and characteristics of the Vietnamese people and society which they should overcome in order

[12] See Phan Bội Châu, *Toàn tập*, Vol.2, ibid, p. 334.

[13] See Shiraishi Masaya, *Phong trào dân tộc Việt Nam và quan hệ của nó với Nhật Bản và châu Á*, 2 vols, Chính trị Quốc gia, Hanoi, 2000.

to build a modern nation of Vietnam. At the same time, these intellectuals also called upon their people, particularly the young generations, to learn from the West, adapting the good values, in order to improve the capacity of the people and create new good characteristics for the Vietnamese nation. Although these intellectuals did not take part in the independence movements, their influence on the nationalist movement in Vietnam was really great.

The second group of new Vietnamese intellectuals took part directly in different ways in the anti-colonialist movements. This group also consisted of various sub-groups, approaching the nationalist question from different political points of view.

The first sub-group, which was influenced very much by French revolutionary theories and particularly by the Sun Yat-sen theory, founded *Việt Nam quốc dân đảng* (the Vietnam Nationalist Party – VNP) in December 1927. In its programme, the VNP planned to carry out a four-phase revolution[14], in order to overthrow the colonial rule, recover national independence and establish a republic of Vietnam. Instead of patiently mobilizing the masses, the VNP launched assassination attempts against French colonial officials or Vietnamese collaborators, in order to "wake the people up". The party also focused on recruiting their supporters from the native soldiers in the colonial troops. These were quickly uncovered by the colonial government and the French decided to destroy the VNP. Facing up to the suppression of the French, without large support from the people, the VNP started an armed uprising in early 1930, which was defeated very quickly by the colonial government. After this failure, the VNP never re-emerged in the history of the anti-colonialist movement in Vietnam, although some of its fragments continued to exist both inside the country and abroad.

The second sub-group of new Vietnamese intellectuals was influenced by Marxism –Leninism, and founded their first political organization, the *Thanh Niên*, in June 1925, led by Nguyễn Ái Quốc, who later became famous under the name Hồ Chí Minh.

Hồ had left the country in 1911 and travelled to various parts of the world, before he landed in Paris in 1917. In contrast to most of the Vietnamese patriots living in Paris at that time, Hồ participated actively in many social protests in France and this led him to the French Socialist Party (FSP). When the FSP split in December 1920, Hồ voted for the leftist majority and became one of the founding members of the French Communist Party (FCP). In 1923, Hồ was sent by the FCP to Moscow. Although trained by the Comintern, Hồ did not seem to be indoctrinated by Stalinism, like most of the communist leaders of that time. On the one hand, Hồ devoted his time to learning Marxism-Leninism, which he considered as the only theory which could provide him and the Vietnamese people with an ideological basis, revolutionary methods, strategy and tactics for the struggle for national liberation. On the other hand, as noted above,

[14] The foreseen four phases of the revolution were: first, preparation for the revolution; second, leading armed uprisings to overthrow the colonial rule and gain national independence; third, re-building the country as a republican state; and fourth, help other people to carry out revolutions.

Hồ highly valued the role and significance of the patriotism and nationalism of the Vietnamese people. In a number of his writings and speeches, he insisted on possible ways of bringing together and promoting both communist internationalism and nationalism in leading revolutions in Asian countries. However, Hồ's ideas were ignored by the Comintern's leaders, who often looked down on him, as well as other Asian communist leaders, as "a dreaming peasant" (*Bauerträumer*).[15]

In late 1924, Hồ went to South China and founded the *Thanh Niên* in June 1925. Thanh Niên's most important goals were to bring patriotic young Vietnamese intellectuals together in an organization, then provide them with training courses which were taught by Hồ himself. In his lectures, Hồ introduced to the young cadres not only the principles of Marxism-Leninism, but also other revolutionary theories, particularly Sun Yat-sen's theory and French revolutionary theories from the 18th century. Of course, Hồ finally tried to persuade his followers that among these revolutionary theories, Leninism was the one that could lead the Vietnamese revolution to its final victory. And the most important principle that he instructed the young cadres was: "Workers and peasants are the roots of our revolution."[16] Therefore, the young cadres, which mostly originated from urban intellectuals, must find effective ways to mix themselves among the masses, in order to understand them better, so that they can mobilize their support for the revolutionary struggle.

After these short-term training courses in Guangzhou, Hồ selected his best students and sent them to Moscow for further training. The others were sent back to Vietnam, where they should apply the knowledge and skills they had learned in practice, develop the Thanh Niên's organization, and mobilize the support of the peasants, workers and students for the revolution. As a result, the Thanh Niên developed very well in all parts of Vietnam. In mid-1929, the Thanh Niên became radicalized and split into two groups, both of which decided to transform themselves into communist parties. Under its influence, some other organizations of patriotic students decided to follow its strategy and in early 1930 they also transformed their organizations into communist parties.

At this moment, Hồ decided to unify all these organizations and founded the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The profile, strategy and action programme that Hồ Chí Minh prepared for the party was a mixture between the guidelines of the Comintern and the demands of the Vietnamese nationalist movement. The party's mission was defined as leading a revolution in Vietnam, in order to recover national independence and pave the way to a socialist society in the future.

Having been informed about the foundation of the CPV and its pro-nationalist orientation, the Comintern sent a group of Vietnamese cadres back to Vietnam. This group consisted of those whom Hồ had chosen and sent to Moscow for further training.

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[15] Neuberg, A., *Der bewaffnete Aufstand. Versuch einer theoretischen Darstellung eingeleitet von Erich Wollenberg*, Europaische Verlagsanstalt. Frankfurt am Main, 1971, pp. xv-xvi.

[16] Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*, Vol.1, Chính trị Quốc gia, Hà Nội, 2000. p. 22.

Trần Phú was the head of this group. In October 1930, Trần Phú chaired the first plenum and criticized very sharply the pro-nationalist guideline of Hồ Chí Minh and laid down a new strategy based on the class-struggle principles of the Comintern. It also changed the name of the party to Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). Hồ – the founder of the party – was locked out of the party's leadership for the next ten years.

As the plenum was discussing the new strategy, a revolutionary high tide broke out in Vietnam. Local communist cadres led hundreds of demonstrations by peasants and workers in many provinces. In Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh large demonstrations destroyed the administration of 171 villages. Although the local cadres were unprepared, they had to take over power and tried to build a new type of administration that they called *Soviet*, just like the one in the Soviet Union. However, facing the suppression of the colonial government, the Soviet could only hold on for several months because it had already lost the support of the local people after the local communist cadres applied a series of radical policies against the "class enemies". By September 1931, at least 2,000 of ICP's members had been arrested. Many of them were executed, including most of the central and regional leaders. The party was systematically destroyed.[17]

In the next 5 years, the remaining ICP cadres tried in vain to rebuild the party. Despite the heavy losses in 1930–31, the ICP still held fast to the Comintern's Stalinist guideline and condemned nationalism. Consequently, the ICP became an isolated force in the anti-colonialist movement. In its report to the Comintern in June 1936, the party had to confess: "In general, the role of the ICP was really weak. Instead of leading the protest movements of the masses, our party ran after them."[18]

Facing the attacks of Fascist movements, the Comintern changed its strategy in July 1935. It ordered communist parties to put aside the class struggle, and try to collaborate with all democratic and progressive forces in a broad front against Fascism. In France, the Communist Party of France collaborated effectively with some left-wing forces in building the Popular Front in 1935. In May 1936, the Front won the general election and founded its government, which announced a reform plan for French colonies, including Indochina.

In this context the ICP re-examined for the first time its political strategy. The party leadership exercised a serious self-criticism of its "left extremism" and openly declared the ICP's willingness to collaborate with all progressive forces in a common struggle for democratic reforms in Indochina. With this new strategy, the party improved its influence remarkably and led a number of protest movements from September 1936 to May 1939, which involved the massive participation of peasants, workers and urban

[17] Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*, vol. 6, Chính trị Quốc gia, 2000, p. 59. See also Trần Trọng Thơ, *Xây dựng cơ quan lãnh đạo cấp trung ương, xứ ủy của Đảng thời kỳ 1930 – 1945*, Chính trị Quốc gia, Hanoi, 2014, pp. 321-322.

[18] Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*, vol. 6, Chính trị Quốc gia, 2000, p. 60.

people.[19] Although the new strategy brought new successes to the party, it still leaned on class struggle principles and did not accept nationalism as the basic political orientation of the Vietnamese revolution. Evidently, in its propaganda materials the party still intentionally avoided using such words or symbols that could evoke nationalist or patriotic sentiments, like "nation", "fatherland" and the names of national heroes.

The outbreak of the Second World War brought many forced changes in world politics and also changed the destiny of the Vietnamese people radically. After France was defeated by Germany in June 1940, and the Japanese army moved into Indochina in September, the ICP anticipated that the opportunity for the Vietnamese revolution had arrived and launched several abortive insurrections that were quickly suppressed by the French. Thousands of cadres were arrested or killed, including most of the ICP's leaders.

Exactly at this moment Hồ Chí Minh returned and summed up a plenum in May 1941. The ICP's new leadership decided that the Vietnamese revolution must be a nationalist revolution with national independence as its highest goal. In this revolution, the "interest of class or groups must be sacrificed for the survival of the whole nation",[20] and therefore the ICP must put aside all slogans of the class struggle, like "land for the tiller", in order to unify Vietnamese of all social strata, religions and ethnic origins in the common struggle against the Japanese and French for national liberation and independence.

The plenum also decided to found *Việt Minh* (League for Independence of Vietnam) – a new form of national front, through which the party could mobilize the support of all Vietnamese people for the patriotic struggle, without any political or social discrimination. The Việt Minh had various member organizations of workers, peasants, women, youth, students, children etc., all of which possessed the same name: "association for the survival of the fatherland" (*cứu quốc hội*). Propaganda campaigns were also carried out actively in rural and urban areas. Intentionally, in its propaganda materials, the Việt Minh avoid mentioning any words that could remind the people of its communist origins, such as "Marx", "Lenin", "proletariat" or "class struggle" etc. Instead, these materials were full of patriotic sentiment and calls for national liberation. Names of national heroes, like the Trưng Sisters, Triệu Lady, Trần Hưng Đạo or the mythical Hùng kings (who were considered the common ancestors of the Vietnamese), were intensively used as symbols of patriotism and national solidarity. Hồ Chí Minh also composed a version of the national history and many propaganda materials in poetic form and had them delivered among the masses.

The nationalist struggle of the Việt Minh was massively supported the Vietnamese people, particularly after the Japanese overthrew the French colonial government on

[19] See Phạm Hồng Tung, *Die Politisierung der Massen in Vietnam, 1925-1939*, ibid, pp. 325-390.

[20] Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*, vol. 7, Chính trị Quốc gia, 2000, p. 113.

March 9, 1945. The Allies, especially the American in southern China, also offered the Việt Minh significant support. In July 1945, the American OSS (Office of Strategic Service – the forerunner of the CIA) even parachuted into the Việt Minh's headquarters and helped to train its first armed forces.

Thanks to all of these, when Japan was forced to capitulate on August 15, 1945, the Việt Minh was the only organization that was well prepared to take over power. Also, it was the only one that could legitimize its political status as a pro-Allies force. In the second half of August 1945, the Việt Minh organized and led hundreds of demonstrations in the whole country, took over power and established a new government in most of the provinces and cities. On September 2, 1945, a large meeting was held in Hanoi and Hồ Chí Minh read out the Declaration of Independence, and announced the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

With the victory of the August Revolution of 1945, the long struggle of the Vietnamese people for national independence was completed. It is obvious that the main political motivation of this struggle in general and of the Vietnamese revolution was nationalism, and not any other ideological or theoretical orientation. Most evident was the case of the ICP – the leading force of the Vietnamese revolution. There is no doubt that Marxism-Leninism had played an important role in the life of the party. However, whenever the ICP relied absolutely on this ideology and turned its back on nationalism, it became an isolated political force and could not lead any large protest movement. Only when the party, under the leadership of Hồ Chí Minh, relied on Vietnamese nationalism, while applying Marxism-Leninism only as a political approach or method, could it mobilize successfully the support of the Vietnamese people and gain the victory.

After the August Revolution, the Vietnamese people had to experience two long and very fierce wars – the First Indochina War (1946-54) and the Second Indochina War (1954-75) – before they could enjoy peace, national independence and reunification. Leading the Vietnamese people and state during the wars in the context of the Cold War, the Communist Party of Vietnam (the ICP until 1951 and the Labour Party of Vietnam [LPV] from 1951-76) was wrestling between the communist principles of class struggle and nationalism. In order to be supported by the Soviet Union, China and the socialist bloc, the party had to follow a political guideline that was compatible to the ideological uniform of the socialist bloc. That was sometimes extremely difficult, particularly after the conflict between China and the Soviet Union broke out in 1956. On the other hand, the party wanted to unite all the Vietnamese people in patriotic solidarity, so that it could mobilize their support for its war efforts. Retrospectively, the wartime history reveals the fact that each time the party tried to realize the class struggle theory, the Vietnamese revolution experienced a new setback. The land reform that was carried out by the party from 1953-56 was a typical example, in which it repeated the mistakes it had committed during the revolution high tide of 1930-31. A hundred

thousand Vietnamese were jailed or executed unjustly. For this, Hồ Chí Minh himself had to apologize openly. But whenever the party relied on Vietnamese nationalism, it was supported strongly by the people and gained victories.

2. Current Nationalist Issues in Vietnam

Because nationalism played a very significant role in the Vietnamese revolution and wars, it has become one of the most important issues of the social sciences in Vietnam during the last seven decades. Before the country was reunified in 1975, there had been two Vietnams: the socialist one in the north and the capitalist one in the south. Surprisingly, there were very few discussions among social scientists in the south about the definition of nation and nationalism, although the regime in Saigon always identified itself as a nationalist one. The official propaganda of Saigon was also not aimed towards national independence and reunification. Most of the fierce debates on the nation question and nationalism took place in North Vietnam, where national independence, liberation and reunification became one of the central topics of the official propaganda.

How to define the Vietnamese nation was the topic of greatest concern in North Vietnam during the war (1954-75) and discussions on this issue are still going on even today among Vietnamese historians, ethnologists and philosophers. As most of them are Marxist social scientists (or, at least, they identify themselves as Marxists), their debates have been based on the Marxist theory about the nation issue. The definition of Stalin was often quoted as the theoretical principal reference.[21] However, many historians in Hanoi realized very soon that it is impossible to apply the Stalinist way of defining the nation in Vietnam. They even pointed out that the Marxist theory of the mode of production is also not suitable for studying the history of Vietnam. Of course, in the context of North Vietnam before 1986, it was quite impossible for them to exercise open criticism of Stalinism or Marxism. Several of the Vietnamese historians had to search for Marx's interpretation of the "Asian mode of production" and apply it in their studies on Vietnamese history.

In this way, most Vietnamese historians have asserted that the Vietnamese nation had been built and developed for a long time before the conquest by French colonialism in the middle of the 19th century. Their arguments have been based on the unity and coherence of the Vietnamese community throughout its long history. Communal unity and coherence have been the origins of the vitality of the Vietnamese as a distinct people in their struggles against the aggressions of the northern invaders. These have

[21] According to J.V. Stalin, a nation is not a tribal or racial phenomenon but a historical community that can be defined by five characteristics: a stable/continuing community, a common language, a distinct territory, economic cohesion, and a collective character (or common psychological make-up). A nation has to have all five characteristics in order to be a nation. None of the elements taken separately is sufficient to define a nation.

been the base for the development and consolidation of the centralized states of the Vietnamese in history. Given the fact that in history, the Vietnamese people were split several times into antagonistic groups and states and civil wars broke out, it was the communal unity and coherence that built up the motivation for the struggles of the Vietnamese for national reunification.

Going further with their arguments, Vietnamese scholars have pointed out in their researches that the communal unity and coherence of the Vietnamese have their roots deep in the economic, social and cultural background, of which wet rice cultivation with the demands of construction and defending of the irrigation system, the village community and the ancestor worshiping tradition have been emphasized.

There is no doubt that these arguments by Vietnamese historians had served very well the official propaganda during the war and they are still contributing greatly to the consolidation of the imagination of the Vietnamese people about their nation as an unique and coherent community. However, having overemphasized the communal unity and coherence of the Vietnamese nation, it seems that Vietnamese historians have failed to explore and evaluate the significance of the internal diversities of the Vietnamese people and of regionalism in the historical development of Vietnam as a nation and state as well.

For this shortcoming, the Vietnamese scholars have been challenged by a group of foreign experts led by Keith W. Taylor. Having spent decades studying Vietnamese history, in 2013, he published a massive work, *A History of the Vietnamese*.[22] In his study, Taylor focuses on the regional diversities and internal conflicts and concludes that there has been nothing that could be call a Vietnamese nation and that Vietnamese nationalism or patriotism is just a "surface orientation". Taylor's thesis has been supported by researches conducted by Patricia Pelly,[23] Li Tana,[24] Nola Cook,[25] Choi Byung Wook,[26] and James C. Scott[27]. In their works, they also concentrate on exploring regional characteristics or diversities in the history of Vietnam and directly or indirectly reject the significance of Vietnamese nationalism and the unity of Vietnam as a state-nation.

Facing the new challenges from these foreign scholars, there are up till now only a few prompt responses from several Vietnamese scholars living abroad. The Vietnamese

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[22] See Taylor, Keith W., *A History of the Vietnamese*, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

[23] See Pelly, Patricia, *Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of the National Past*, Duke University Press, 2002.

[24] See Li, Tana, "An Alternative Vietnam. The Nguyen Kingdom in the 17th and 18th Centuries", in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, March 1998.

[25] See Cook, Nola, "Southern Regionalism and the Composition of the Nguyen Ruling Elite (1802-03)", in *Asian Studies Review*, 23:2, June 1999, pp. 227-8.

[26] See Choi, Byung Wook, *Southern Vietnam under the Reign of Minh Mang (1820-1841): Central Policies and Local Response*. Ithaca, New York, Cornell Southeast Asian Program, 2002.

[27] See Scott, James C., *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2009.

historians in Hanoi are still hesitant because they know that, in order to respond to these challenges, many well-considered preparations must first be done. But they are also well aware that they cannot avoid these challenges because they are really fundamental to all nationalist issues in Vietnam and closely relevant to some burning issues in Vietnamese politics today.

For some decades now, the national unity of Vietnam has been challenged by ethnic separatism. Vietnam is a multi-ethnic nation-state. Beside the ethnic majority, the *Việt*, there are officially 53 ethnic minorities. Among them, there are several cross-border ethnic minorities (CBEM), like the Thái, Tày, Nùng, Mong, Khmers etc. In the northern mountainous area, while the Thái, Tày, Nùng and other CBEM have been living peacefully, the Mong has become a more and more complicated issue. The Mong people are living in southern China, northern Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and the USA. For a long time they have struggled for their autonomy and to build a separate "kingdom of the Mongs". During the war this tradition was made use of by the French and the Americans in order to gain the support of the Mong people for their war efforts.[28] In early May 2011, based on a secret rumour, thousands of the Mong people gathered in the Mường Nhé district, Điện Biên Phủ province, waiting for the appearance of "the king of the Mongs", who would found a "kingdom of the Mongs". At the same time, some persons tried to introduce new religions and persuade them to change their customs. Among these persons, Dương Văn Mình is the most influential.[29] It is said that Dương has successfully persuaded about over two thousand of the Mong people to convert to his new religion. Recently, under his instruction, his followers become more and more active and participated in many protests in the northern mountainous areas. The Vietnamese government applied various methods to settle the protests and arrested Dương. In November 2011, hundreds of his followers marched to Hanoi, asking for the release of their leader. The situation in the region is still tense.

The other burning issue that is challenging the unity of the Vietnamese nation and the security of the country is the protest of ethnic minorities in the Central Highland. This is the living area of various ethnic groups, like the Bahnar, Rahde, H're, Djarai, Kaho, Vân Kiều, Stieng etc. During the war, these ethnic groups were split into two parts. While most of them supported the revolutionary force, others collaborated with the South Vietnamese government and the Americans. These were helped by

28 During the First Indochina War the French tried to help some local leaders of the Mong people in Hà Giang to build their own armed forces and established an autonomous area in Đồng Văn, fighting against the Việt Minh. During the Second Indochina War, the Americans supported Vang Pao, built a special troop of the Mong and let them take part actively in the fight against "the communists" in Laos and Vietnam.

29 Dương Văn Mình was born in 1961 in Ham Yen district, Tuyên Quang province. Since 1989 he has preached for a new religion under the Mong people in the mountainous areas in northern Vietnam. He even claimed to be a reincarnation of Jesus, whose mission is to save the Mong people before the earth crashes into the sun in the near future.

American advisers in founding the FULRO (*Front Unifié pour la Libération des Races Opprimées)* nand the BAJARAKA – the two anti-communist organizations that led the struggle for the autonomy of the Central Highland.

After the war, the Central Highland has been exploited more and more intensively. Millions of the Viet and other ethnic groups have moved into the region, and acquired land that was considered as belonging to the local ethnic groups. As a result, the ethnic groups found that that they were losing their land, and that their forests and their living enviroment were under serious threat. Since 2001, protests have broken out in the region. Thousands of local people demonstrated against the policies of the government, and demanded autonomy. The protest movement became more and more violent, as it was encouraged openly by the Degar state (*Montagnard Degar Association*), which was founded and based in southern California.

In the south, another challenge to the national unity and security of Vietnam is the claim of some Cambodian groups about Khmer sovereignty over the lower Mekong delta. The long-lasting disputes between Vietnam and Cambodia about this region had resulted in wars and conflicts in the past and the problem is still unresolved. Recently, Sam Rainsy and other Cambodian radical politicians raised the question again and called for protests against Vietnam. Demonstrations broke out in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese flag was burned by some over-provocative Buddhist monks.

However, the most serious challenge to the national interest and sovereignty of Vietnam comes from China. The Sino-Vietnamese dispute over sovereignty of the Paracel islands and Spratly islands has lasted for decades. Both states have claimed that they have historical evidences and legal right over these archipelagos. In 1974, China launched attacks and took the Paracel islands from the hands of the former Republic of Vietnam. In 1998, China violently eliminated some units of the Vietnamese navy and occupied several islands of the Spratly. Noticeably, not only Vietnam and China but also the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei have officially claimed sovereignty of the Spratly islands, but the tense disputes have been mostly between China and other Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. In May 2014, China sent an oil rig, the Haiyang 981, to the sea area near the Paracel where Vietnam claims sovereignty. The relationship between the two countries fell into a terrible crisis, as Chinese Coast Guard vessels crashed into Vietnamese vessels and sank a Vietnamese fish boat. Hundreds of massive anti-Chinese demonstrations broke out in Vietnam and in several provinces they turned into riots. Chinese firms and factories in Vietnam were attacked and some Chinese workers were killed or beaten. Even Japanese, Korean and other foreign companies and firms were victimized. The protests inside Vietnam were supported by hundreds of demonstrations by overseas Vietnamese. The Sino-Vietnamese dispute has been quickly internationalized, as the US, Japan, Germany, India and other countries expressed their serious concerns about the peace and security of the region. In this context, it seems that ASEAN can hardly

find a consensus. While Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia have protested strongly against the Chinese aggressive attitude and activities, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and others reacted somewhat hesitatingly. Until now the disputes are still going on. Leaders of the two communist parties in Vietnam and China try, on the one hand, to settle the conflicts amicably in view of their shared ideology, but on the other hand, they are both not ready for any compromise and sacrifice of their nationalist interests and sovereignty.

3. Conclusions

Vietnamese nationalism has played a very important role in Vietnamese politics, both during the Vietnamese revolution, the wars and the post-war development of the country. On the one hand, it was a continuous development of Vietnamese traditional patriotism; on the other hand, it was a political cultural product resulting from the introduction of Western political theories into Vietnam during the first decades of the 20th century.

In the 20th century, nationalism was the key factor that encouraged and motivated the participation of the Vietnamese people in the struggle for national independence, liberation and reunification. The Communist Party of Vietnam was the only political organization that overcame its own mistakes and difficulties and brought into full play this nationalism. That is why the party was the only political force that gained the victories in the power contests and became the ruling power in Vietnam until today.

Nonetheless, the position of the nationalist orientation in the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has been challenged many times by the ideological background of the party. In its history the party has had to pay high prices for its ideological dependence on the Comintern or other ideological patrons. The history of the Vietnamese revolution and wars reveals the fact that whenever the CPV was successful in modifying or even putting aside the Stalinist (and later the Maoist) principles of class struggle, and relied on Vietnamese nationalism, it could mobilize the massive and strong support of the people for the revolution.

The conflicts among socialist states, including the border war between China and Vietnam in 1979 and the collapse of the socialist bloc from 1989-1991, indicated clearly that the socialist ideological basis of communist parties and socialist states was really weak. Also, it is evident that the common ideological basis of the socialist states, which they used to propagate eagerly as "proletarian internationalism", could not help to prevent socialist states, like Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union etc., from falling into bloody conflicts. The fact is that nationalism was the true motivation of all political developments in Vietnam as well as in other socialist countries in the second half of the 20th century.

That is the key to understanding the challenges that Vietnam has to face today. The unrests in the mountainous regions and the protests of some ethnic minorities reflect

not only the disagreements of local people with certain policies from Hanoi, but also the conflict between ethnic orientations and the nationalist ones. In fact, these ethnic minorities have been demanding not only changes in the government's policies, but also their political, cultural and spiritual autonomy. Therefore, in order to settle the unrests and consolidate the national unity and sovereignty of Vietnam, the Vietnamese ruling elite have to re-approach the nationalist question from different perspectives. In this way they can find resolutions for the burning issues concerning the unrests of the cross-border ethnic minorities.

Much more complicated are the disputes between Vietnam and China over the sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly. For the time being, no solution has been found that could satisfy both parties. But one thing is quite clear: alone, Vietnam cannot match up to the pressure from China and defend effectively its national interests. Relying on support from the international and regional communities may be the best strategic choice for Vietnam, but this may also undermine the ideological basis of the ruling elite, including the political legitimacy of the CPV.

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Time for Myanmar to Grow Beyond Its Nationalisms

Khin Zaw Win

The authoritarian system in transitional Myanmar has formally come to an end, although vestiges of it will remain for some time. So one may tentatively start referring to a post-authoritarian ambience. It is therefore in this milieu that multiple paradoxes have emerged, some of them leading to crises which are continuing. When one speaks of reforms in Myanmar and elsewhere, a common assessment yardstick is whether they have been too fast or too slow. In Myanmar's case at least, the decisive factor has not been the pace of the reforms, but the capacity to implement and equally the capability to cope with the consequences. Much of the country – state as well as society – has been caught unprepared.

Perhaps the central paradox – and accompanying untenability – is that an ethnically, culturally, religiously and linguistically diverse country continues to be dominated by institutions – government, military, civil service and judiciary – that are controlled by the majority ethnic and religious group. This is also the core lesson that that majority group and successive governments have not learned throughout the modern era. It needs to be said that a misplaced and misused nationalism is integral to this state of affairs. Many of the problems lay nearly dormant during the forty-nine years of military and military-backed dictatorship, only to burst out at the first stirrings of freedom – another paradox, which echoes what had happened in the former Yugoslavia.

Overcoming the Corner Cluster

PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE	High	Sangha Christian	Churches
	Low	Civil Political parties Parliament Military Courts Government	Society
		Low	High
	PLURALISM		

In present-day Myanmar, two values which are in short supply are pluralism and public trust in national stakeholders. The correlation between the two is shown in the above chart, and the clustering of political "institutions" in the lower left corner is diagnostic of Myanmar's predicament. The extent to which this is not recognized or ignored adds to the extremity.

To enlarge upon and elaborate further (and add to the sense of acuteness), the present new state and polity have shown neither the strength, commitment nor inclination to address the consequences adequately. The ongoing Rohingya crisis is an enduring case in point. Bamar (Burman) nationalism appears to be a sacrosanct ideology which no one dares to touch. Indeed, some "leaders" would be more likely to exploit it. More than that, no one seems to care much about the consequences of keeping an unmodified ideology beyond its shelf-life. The fact that the country continues to bear the burden of past folly and arrogance in fanning the flames appears to have been missed. We have to think of what more lies in store for Myanmar then.

In *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830*, historian Victor Liebermann describes the historical strands that were woven into nationalism:

> While innocent of the French insistence on popular sovereignty, evolving political identities, especially in Burma and Vietnam, shared undeniable similarities with their increasingly coherent European counterparts both before and after 1789. Bear in mind that most European nations also began as heterogeneous dynastic conglomerates whose provinces served as cultural periphery to the metropole, and whose cultural integration was a contested, imperfect affair starting in some cases as early as the 13th century and lasting well into the 20th century….

> As in early modern Europe, and again contrary to some recent theorizing, universal religions also proved compatible with projects of ethnic differentiation. The fusion of religion with ethnicity became most obvious in those areas where rival communities supported different religious/cultic traditions…In such contexts defence of the faith became synonymous with ethnic self-assertion….
>
> In the 20th century under European intellectual tutelage, concepts of national territory and national culture were secularized, while becoming far more systematic and exclusive. Nonetheless, the 20th-century redefinition of Siamese, Burmese, and Vietnamese loyalties built on pre-1850 foundations in a fashion that depended less on intelligentsia interventions and was incomparably less artificial than the 20th century construction of Malay or Indonesian nationalism.

In her book *Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Borderworlds of Burma*, Mandy Sadan traces the roots of this present manifestation:

> While the Indian and Chinese states acknowledged the importance of developing ideological visions of the nation and how it should relate to its diverse range of communities, in Burma there was little time or scope for developing complex realignments of ideologies of nationhood. The dominating idiom was of an increasingly militarised Burmese nationalism apparently opposed to the political structures that supported the federal Union.…Neither was there any successful ideological modeling of what economic inequalities might mean for the nation as a whole that might be capable of persuading non-Burmese elites that the new nationalism was more than a surreptitious form of Burmese ethnic chauvinism.…In Burma there was no unifying central ideology that could help to define how non-Burmese peoples and regions could be incorporated positively both philosophically and politically.

Myanmar can be described as a land of many nationalisms but with no nation. Sixty-seven years after independence, nation-making has not only stalled, it has even regressed. There is a long list of countries that had been mapped into existence by colonial powers and eventually became independent states. Their postcolonial record in building states and nations has been patchy, and there is a voluminous literature on the whys and wherefores. Myanmar is in the category of states that have fared poorly. The most eloquent testament to this lies in the longest-running civil war in the world – beginning a bare three months after independence in 1948 and stretching up to the present day. In the early decades, this conflict was partly fuelled by ideology and partly ethnic-based. Following the collapse of the Burma Communist Party in 1989, it has become a solely ethnic-oriented war, with religious overtones. No matter what some scholars say, economic motivations are of much lesser import in this conflict.

That nationalisms play an important – even pivotal – part in all this is widely accepted. The question now is how to bring an end to the lethal side-effects of nationalism without taking it out of the equation or pillorying it. Following the revival of a

democratic system in 2010, there has been a resurgence of some forms of Buddhist nationalism. Then there is the imminent introduction of a federal system, with a panoply of ethno-nationalisms feeding into and growing out of it.

Spiralling Inwards

On the matter of what the entity called Burma/Myanmar is striving towards, there is the long and interesting discussion over nation-state and state-nation, and the prospects and potentialities for each. It might be added that this debate is not just taking place within (What is meant is that the debate is not happening) Myanmar. Reduced to its simplest terms, the argument goes like this: if a multi-ethnic country has trouble in the building of a nation-state, why don't we go for a state-nation? Many of Myanmar's problems stem from the fact that the majority (which includes the state) thinks in terms of a Bamar nation-state surrounded by ethnic nationality appendages. Of course the other nationalities desire the establishment of a pan-ethnic nation-state, but the will and impetus are still missing. What about a state-nation then? Opinion across the world leans towards this concept now; India is striving towards this end and a measure of success is being achieved. As with the other postcolonial countries, the state-building and -strengthening project has been going on in Myanmar. But somewhat ironically, the half-century of military rule detracted from this and weakened rather than strengthened the state.

The current Myanmar state (generally classified as fragile) is not reaching out to the other nationalities in any genuine sense. The much-talked-about ceasefire process is only a military technical matter – and no wonder that the ethnic nationalities refuse to call it a peace process. With the recent upsurge in Bamar nationalism, there could even be a turning inwards, with dimmer prospects for a plural society and country.

A Stratified Society



It was an occasion for joy and celebration when multi-party democracy returned to Myanmar. It should not be forgotten that it has come at great cost – the anniversary of the Four Eights that was marked in front of Yangon's City Hall is a poignant reminder of that. There are more parties now and more political stakeholders than in the past. Efforts are required to ensure that this revived multi-party system works well, and fairly and equitably. With Myanmar's diversity, special attention has to be given to having breadth, inclusion and equitable representation in politics. Moreover, preparing for federalism and the long-deferred need for nation-building cannot be left out.

Buddhist Nationalism

Nationalism is a form of both discourse and practice, and it views the world as being naturally divided into "nations", whose basis can be defined in linguistic, ethnic, religious or other cultural terms. Thus, nationalism is a multifaceted phenomenon, one that can be linked to the formation of a given state, but is not necessarily so, and that can be violent, but only under certain conditions. When religion is regarded as a fundamental part of a nation, we speak of "religious nationalism". Sri Lanka is a prime example of religiously based ethno-nationalism.

It has been stated that there are two major forms of religious extremism:

- Fundamentalism – marked by strong religion and weak nationalism
- Ethno-religious nationalism – marked by weak religion and strong nationalism

Here, majoritarian bigotry and electoral politics come in. There is talk about responsible investment; in Myanmar we should start calling for responsible leadership. Shortly after the part-revival of a democratic system began in 2011, civil war returned with a vengeance in Kachin state, and anti-Muslim violence erupted. It is to be noted

that Buddhist communities suffered too. The communal thing had been there, simmering. Then it suddenly burst out, sparked by incidents which were either trivial or trumped-up. The authorities were tardy and half-hearted in both pre-empting and reining in the violence. There is evidence as well as allegations with regard to "hidden hands".

Another resurgent entity in the present eased-up atmosphere is Buddhist extremism. The sizeable movement which is the Ma-Ba-Tha[1] has a nationalist element which is fixated upon "protecting the faith" against incursions by other religions, and is putting a lot of effort into the moral uplift of Buddhist youth. There are varying shades of extremism in it. Farther out, there is the real rabid fringe. Inflammatory rhetoric from this cabal can ignite the larger movement at critical moments. Another sad commentary on democracy in Myanmar is that this large segment of the population is being eyed by political leaders of all stripes as "vote banks", as they are called in India.

A true leader is expected to lead his or her people towards a better society, a better country and a sounder state. This includes moving them away from attitudes like racism. Regretfully we are not seeing this with Myanmar's present leaders. Virtually their entire efforts are channelled towards getting votes and winning elections and the presidency.

So it is quite a canvas and a palette that one has to work on, even on this single issue of a downtrodden minority. It would seem that democracy and human rights in Myanmar are subject to double or triple standards. It was an arduous and bitter struggle to get these installed in Myanmar, but now they are not being applied to all. The arguments that I have made can be summed up thus: let us get our society's house in order and grant citizenship and rights to all our minorities that are on Myanmar soil. Further immigration can be controlled or curtailed. Besides the liberal component of such a course of action, there are other, very practical reasons as well. There are problems and potential crises looming on many sides, so let us clear our decks.

We have to face the fact that there are deep fissures and divisions in Myanmar's ethnic, social and religious fabric that are in need of healing. Does anyone in his right mind think that excluding one particular minority is going to make things easier with the other minorities? Bringing the country together will not be helped by making some people outcasts.

[1] Ma Ba Tha is the Burmese acronym for Organization to Protect Race, Language and Religion.

Buddhist Nationalisms



In today's Buddhist society, the 969 movement and the vigilantes come close to being the Ku Klux Klan of present-day Myanmar. Another common feature is the silence and implicit support of the majority of Bamar Buddhists here. There is no doubt that there is mischief afoot. And the medium upon which these artists ply their skills is a gullible public easily swayed by nationalist emotions. There seems to be quite a bit of nationalisms bubbling in the region as well.

In the wake of the sectarian violence, interfaith groups in Mandalay and in the whole country will have to redouble their efforts. Some political leaders have been clamouring that the present constitution is not democratic and has to be amended. But even if one accepts that, does a more democratic constitution mean that society also takes on stronger democratic values, like tolerance for minorities? Not necessarily. Amending the constitution is only one aspect of building a democratic Myanmar, and the other tasks are sadly being neglected. Too much attention is being paid to the superstructure of a democratic system and not enough to the real substance of such a system.

Working on society is key, and for that one cannot rely on the state alone. Indeed it is doubtful whether the state has the capacity or the willingness to do this. Unknowingly, Bamar Buddhist society is facing an internal crisis and Buddhist leaders – lay and clerical – do not seem to be finding a way out. Extrapolating this paralysis to other ethnic issues and the civil war does not produce a very encouraging picture.

The Rohingya issue presents a test for Myanmar as a democratic society, a Buddhist society and a humane society. Following the isolation of half a century of dictatorship, there is now a resurgence of Buddhist-tinged nationalism and majoritarianism

with intolerance of minorities. "Democratic" politics is engrossed with amending the constitution and winning the next elections. It would be extremely difficult and risky to bring the two communities in Rakhine together for discussions. A "neutral" Bamar element (religious/civil society/ state or any combination) might have to be the buffer or facilitator.

The final word on Buddhism – the Myanmar Theravada school to be precise – is that there will have to be an internal re-think of its rigidity, insularity and intolerance. This is not a new process since Buddhist schools have evolved over the centuries. A serious comparative study of the other schools and traditions within Buddhism should not be unacceptable. Misconceptions like the "siege mentality" have to be abandoned.

Non-Buddhist Nationalisms



Myanmar is now more multi-religious and multi-sectarian than ever before. Practices like aggressive proselytizing and conversion are highly sensitive matters. Buddhism can be said to be the state religion in all but name.

As the country (possibly) edges towards federalism, Mandy Sadan warns in her book that

> [m]anipulating Burma's political structures is only ever going to be partially effective in finding long-term resolutions of the country's ethnic conflicts. Embedded in any political solution must be a far stronger awareness of the social, economic and

> cultural contexts from which these movements of violent resistance emerged, not just the political structures against which they may be focused. Important, too, is that the representatives of "peripheral" communities be respected as equal partners in the development of the country's political future, with greater respect for their distinctive histories, social models and political cultures, which can enrich rather than diminish the national life of modern Burma. Modern Burma is a historical product of their interaction and their effort.

Her book can be regarded as a history of the Kachin people, and delves into the roots of Kachin ethno-nationalism. The author is unsparing in her remarks, and those concerning national political parties are deservedly scathing:

> However, such insights would require far greater sensitivity to non-national political cultures than is currently found within any national party. It seems that the centre still does not know enough about its peripheries, while the peripheries feel they know more than enough about the centre.

She concludes that

> [t]o make the current conflicts the final manifestation of violence will require a mammoth effort of listening and engagement of the kind that the Burmese centre has yet to experience. It will require Burmese national politicians with the intellectual and ideological capacity and willingness to occupy a space in Burmese political life that no Burmese politician has yet occupied.

> The Panglong Spirit posited ahistorical notions of harmonic pasts that never existed and in which no one believed.…It represented all that was failing in the new state and the centre's capacity to engage meaningfully with its multiple peripheries. It gave no sense of whether the Union should be premised upon assimilation, incorporation or progressive convergence. It was void of political direction, detail or accountability other than that everyone should somehow "get on".

The response to this failing is one episode in the continuity of the Kachin ideological discourse.

The Myanmar government is poorly equipped to handle the situation and it is doubtful whether it can find a long-term solution to the problem. In addition to that, the blame cannot be laid entirely at the government's door. There are deep-seated issues within society, and there is hardly any indication that these are being addressed. Many if not all the democratic leaders have distanced themselves, out of concern that anything they might say or do might annoy the Buddhist majority and cost them votes in elections later this year.

If comparisons with nationalism in Europe past and present are to be drawn, one striking factor is that economic chaos, unemployment and austerity are not the driving forces as they are in Europe. A columnist has written of nationalism in Europe:

> This was the terrain out of which fascism grew 80 years ago. The Great Depression had delivered millions into the arms of destitution and unemployment across a European continent that was yet to fully recover from the catastrophe of the First World War. As with the economic shock to engulf the world in 2008, the Great Depression of the 1930s started in the United States with the stock market crash of 1929, arriving on the back of a boom that had been fueled by an unsustainable level of consumer debt, reckless lending in poorly regulated markets, and lack of long-term investment. The result was a global slump which proved a godsend to hitherto marginal political figures such as Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, along with the movements they led.
>
> In their modern incarnation, nationalist movements and parties throughout the continent, with the exception of Scotland, have succeeded in legitimizing racist views and the revulsion of multiculturalism and immigration. In its most extreme form this has manifested in organized violence against people deemed "untermenschen".

In the period leading up to the Second World war, Bamar nationalist movements had emulated their counterparts in Europe (especially Germany and Italy), particularly in their militancy. In those years too, the resentments had not stemmed so much from economic factors, and were instead fuelled by anti-colonial and anti-immigrant sentiments. The common feature that connects with Europe and with colonial Burma/Myanmar is that politicians find nationalist agitation an easy and useful tool to employ.

The Big Picture – And a Way Out

A scholar has described "nation" as a ghost word. Even if we do not go to that extent, the ill-effects of unbridled nationalism need to be made known – particularly in a country like Myanmar. Nationalism need not be abolished altogether (even if that were possible); it can be "de-fanged" in a manner of speaking. Who is to do it? Historians and academics generally, and an enlightened media. Political leaders will no doubt think hard before doing it. Many of them would like to ride the tide, especially during election campaigns. This is precisely what most if not all Myanmar politicians are doing now.

This is an era of electoral politics, with an electorate emerging from decades of dictatorship. Populism holds sway and beyond garnering votes, parties and politicians have little regard for public opinion. There seems to be little thought as to the direction in which the country is going, or needs to go. Civil society is not strong or big enough; it is divided and mostly involved in niche issues. The crony private sector is flourishing and going from strength to strength, keeping to its rentier, extractivist and exclusivist ways. On top of it all, all these stakeholders are discrete and inward-looking. One donor has asked how a democracy can be built if people do not talk to each other. In other

words, Myanmar seems to be losing its way. After expending much time and suffering, a semi-democracy has been gained. But beyond this, there is neither a road nor chart.



In assessing current Myanmar politics, let us lay aside the debate over democracy, human rights, the rule of law and other buzzwords for a moment. In the past, it was a matter of the military dictatorship ruling over the people. The re-introduction of a democratic system has meant that power based on the gun is replaced by power based on numbers. The power establishment has been clever in courting the "big-ticket" organizations mentioned above. This has involved relegating religious and ethnic minorities to a lower status, even that of perceived threats which must be persecuted. Looked at this way, the treatment of the Rohingyas, the other Muslims and ethnic minorities becomes very clear. To put it another way, the building of "democracy" = majority rule requires that the minorities pay the price. And a heavy price at that.

From a deterministic perspective, one could say that this unholy alliance with militant Buddhism has been in the cards all along. In a way, the present establishment is continuing what former prime minister U Nu began in 1960. Allying with extreme Buddhism is more than just a tactical arrangement to contest the elections: it inclines towards a longer-term cohabitation.

This *de-diversifying trend* will impact upon the already sputtering peace process, ethnic relations, and relations with neighbouring countries. Minorities will continue to bear the brunt of all this. Federalism will come to a certain extent, but whether it is just a shell or something with substance will depend on the minorities too.

Conclusion

Coming back to the title of this paper, if Myanmar is to grow out of its nationalisms, they will have to be discussed and an honest appraisal done. This is not happening. There is a state and a society with the mis-attributes mentioned above, engaged in many pursuits and speaking with many voices, yet missing the axial issue at the heart of its troubles. There is a need to "go to scale" despite the leadership that cannot be relied upon.

Laying aside the consultations on the diagnosis, the other, implicit part of the title is to find ways to "grow out". No matter what is said in favour of or against it, globalization is seen as one antidote. The colonial empires were seen as the first wave of globalization and there was a backlash. The second wave started not so long ago, following the end of the Cold War. Myanmar has been slow to ride the wave but it is beginning now. If globalization appears too broad and vague and uncertain, there is an alternative in regionalization, which is already on its way. Myanmar is hesitantly part of ASEAN now and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will step up the momentum. The other regionalizer is a strongly resurgent China. Other powers in East Asia will be joining in as well. One by-product of these processes would be greater cosmopolitanism.

Myanmar is being subjected to forces and influences quite unlike what it has experienced in the past, and change whether willing or unwilling is going to be the order of the day. With an incompetent state and un-visionary leaders pursuing their paltry little ends, Myanmar has little chance of standing up to the winds of change. The out-dated nationalism which is found so useful now may be transformed beyond recognition. Only a diverse and resilient pan-nationalism can hold its ground.

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Selective Avoidance on Social Media and Citizen Participation: Evidence from Singapore and Hong Kong

Marko M. Skoric

INTRODUCTION

Social media platforms are increasingly being used by citizens, activists, journalists and politicians as sources of information, channels for expression and discussion, and tools for political mobilization. Research has shown that certain uses of social media are linked with increased civic and political engagement and that these platforms can be effectively used to cultivate civic skills, engage citizens in political discussions, mobilize the electorate, and help organize real-world civic and political activities (Macafee and De Simone, 2012; Valenzuela, Park, and Kee, 2009; Vitak et al., 2011).

Social media offer citizens access to political information coming from a variety of sources, including friends and friends of friends, casual acquaintances, activists and politicians, political parties, for-profit and non-profit organizations, and news media. The exposure to political information online has been linked to improved political knowledge, increased awareness of political opportunities, and greater interest in civic and political affairs (Rojas and Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Shah et al., 2001). Furthermore, informational uses are predictive of improved cognitive elaboration and greater likelihood of political expression and discussion, which are shown to predict participation in civic and political life (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014). Since a vast majority of ties maintained on social media are of the weak, bringing type (Ellison et al., 2007), they can also promote accidental exposure to cross-cutting views and politically dissonant information (Kim, 2011). However, new technologies also allow citizens to easily filter out such dissenting voices and create homogenous information environments in which such exposure is unlikely to happen (Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2001). In this chapter, I empirically examine the links between citizens' actions aimed at limiting exposure to political disagreement on social media and their likelihood of participation in civic and political actions. More specifically, I analyze how the acts of hiding posts and unfriending people on Facebook are related to civic and political participation in Singapore and Hong Kong.

Social Media Use and Exposure to Political Disagreement

Since the 1990s, the proliferation of the internet has brought both an unprecedented expansion of access to political (and other) information as well as a continuously improving capacity for filtering and personalizing such content (e.g., Negroponte, 1995; Sunstein, 2001). This dramatic increase in information availability has not necessarily translated into greater exposure to political information since citizens' time and cognitive resources are limited, as is their interest in politics. Consequently, there has been a greater demand for tools that aid information search, filtering, curation and personalization, including search engines and software-based personal assistants. The role of the latter was supposed to be played by *intelligent agents* in the 1990s internet terminology (Negroponte, 1995) or by *social algorithms* in the current social media era (Lazer, 2015), with both denoting software designed to automatically curate and filter information according to a user's taste and preferences.

Today's social media environments are characterized by *context collapse* (Marwick and boyd, 2011) in which individuals from different social contexts (i.e., family, work, school) interact freely without the usual boundaries that separate them. Social media also allow for significant expansion of weak social ties on the basis of everyday interactions that happen both online and offline (Ellison et al., 2007), and such expanded networks of friends and acquaintances increase the likelihood of exposure to political difference and disagreement (Kim, 2011). However, social media platforms also afford users opportunities to customize their environments and reduce exposure to dissonant or unwanted content. Limiting such exposure typically happens through a combination of algorithmic filtering performed by software and manual sorting, which includes hiding undesirable messages, blocking users or even removing them from friends lists (Bakshy et al., 2015).

Research has shown that people have a preference for opinion-reinforcing information in both traditional and online media environment (e.g., Garrett, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng, 2009, 2011). This is achieved through either *selective exposure*, a process of preferential selection of opinion-reinforcing information, *or selective avoidance,* through filtering out of unwanted and dissonant content from their media environments. Scholars have expressed concerns that digital environments afford many opportunities for avoiding opinions that we disagree with, which could result in *echo chambers* and more polarized and fragmented citizenry (Sunstein, 2001). However, research shows that while citizens display preference for opinion-reinforcing information they may not necessarily avoid opinion-challenging information online (Garrett, 2009). This chapter examines how exposure to political disagreement on social media may induce selective avoidance through the active shaping of one's social media environment, and how it is connected to the likelihood of participation in civic and political affairs in the context of two developed Asian societies.

Political Expression, Exposure to Disagreement and Political Participation

So what is a possible effect of exposure to political differences on citizen participation? In a normative sense, democratic decision-making and governance rely on exposure to diverse viewpoints and political disagreement. This is of particular importance in societies characterized by high levels of socio-economic, cultural, linguistic and religious heterogeneity. In such societies, social media act as platforms for expression of diverse political viewpoints, which through the virtue of context collapse can be disseminated across the usual social, ideological and economic cleavages. Furthermore, it has been established that such political expression on social media plays an important role in citizen participation (Gil de Zuniga, Molyneux, and Zheng, 2014; Kushin and Yamamoto, 2010; Macafee and De Simone, 2012). While the act of expression has an impact on the expresser by fostering a sense of commitment to the cause (Skoric and Poor, 2013), it also mediates the effect of using social media for social interaction on participation (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2014). People express themselves through interacting with others on different social media platforms. The aspect of the political self is often meant for a specific audience (Papacharissi, 2012), which could yield disagreement if it reaches the unintended ones. Such acts of expression on social media can therefore lead to viewpoint diversity and disagreement in one's online social network. Indeed, Brundidge (2010) points out that political expression is one of the possible means to inadvertent online exposure to political differences. Kim's study (2011) shows that social network sites use has a direct effect on exposure to cross-cutting perspectives and also an indirect one via online political messaging.

But does such exposure to political difference benefit citizen participation? The research on this topic has yielded a mixed pattern of findings. Mutz (2002) suggests that homogeneous environments are ideal for encouraging political mobilization, specifically voting, through reinforcing opinions and promoting recognition of common problems, whereas cross-pressures repress voting because of increased social costs and political ambivalence. Pattie and Johnston (2009) found that exposure to countervailing views has a negative impact on the likelihood of voting but encourages other forms of participation such as voluntary activities and future involvement in either political activism or party politics. These results suggest that exposure to a political difference online may yield different impacts, depending on the forms of participation (i.e., political participation with a focus on partisan-related activities and civic engagement). It is therefore important to shed more light on the role of selective avoidance and opinion shielding in different forms of citizen engagement, taking into account both technological affordances of different platforms and specificities of a socio-political context.

Selective Avoidance and Opinion Shielding on Social Media

Politically motivated filtering on social media platforms like Facebook happens either through algorithmically driven machine processes or via manual selection and

de-selection of content and people (Bakshy et al., 2015). The latter can be done by hiding the disliked posts (unfollowing) or as a more extreme measure, by completely severing an online tie by unfriending the user. Neither of the processes requires permission from the other party and the users who are being unfriended or whose posts are being filtered out are not notified of these actions.

How widespread is unfriending, blocking and hiding of posts, and what are the most common reasons behind these actions? A recent US study shows that 63% of social media users have unfriended at least one person in their online network, with about 18% practising such opinion shielding for political reasons (Rainie and Smith, 2012). Another study examining the most common reasons behind unfriending behaviours, reports that indiscriminate posting about unimportant things, making politically polarizing comments and engaging in undesirable offline behaviours are the prime reasons for being unfriended online (Sibona, 2014). It is therefore clear that politics is one of the main reasons behind severing ties on social media platforms and that this phenomenon may be relatively common, at least in the context of a ideologically polarized society such as the United States.

How about other countries? Research done in Israel shows that more ideologically extreme users who have higher number of Facebook friends are most likely to unfriend others and that weak ties are the most common casualty (John and Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015). This is not surprising, as unfriending close friends or family members is likely to have more serious social and emotional consequences. Furthermore, it was found that users are more likely to be unfriended or unfollowed during times of amplified conflict; a study by John and Dvir-Gvirsman (2015) found that during the Israel-Gaza armed hostilities in 2014, 16% of Jewish Israeli Facebook users unfriended or unfollowed someone.

This study moves research forward by looking into such selective avoidance and opinion shielding behaviours in a comparative context, and analyzing how these acts are related to civic and political participation in Singapore and Hong Kong. First, I examine the phenomena in the context of a highly developed semi-authoritarian state – Singapore, during a period of political calm. Given the vast popularity of social media platforms and their increasing prominence in political life, it is important to evaluate the role of social media in the process of citizen engagement in the countries where political opinion expression and disagreement have traditionally been controlled and restricted. Second, I present findings from a survey conducted in Hong Kong in late 2014, during the times of significant political upheavals and street protests, triggered by citizens' demands for greater political democracy. While being very similar to Singapore in terms of the level of economic and technological development as well as its colonial history, Hong Kong has enjoyed far better protections of the freedoms of speech, press and assembly, while at the same time significantly limiting citizens' political rights, including the right to elect its Chief Executive.

This study aims to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: What is the relationship between selective avoidance on social media and civic participation?

RQ2: What is the relationship between selective avoidance on social media and political participation?

RQ3: How does political conflict influence the likelihood of selective avoidance on social media?

METHOD

Data

The findings reported in this study are based on two survey datasets, one collected in Singapore and the other one in Hong Kong. The Singapore data was collected via a computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) survey conducted in May 2013 in Singapore, utilizing random-digit dialing (RDD) techniques. Surveys were conducted in English and Chinese, the two most commonly used languages in Singapore. In total, 799 valid responses were obtained for a final response rate of 33.14%. Equivalency across languages was obtained using back-translation techniques.

Second, a street intercept survey of Hong Kong students was conducted during the 2014 Hong Kong protests to examine their media-use habits and their protest-related behaviours. A total of 769 students from public tertiary institutions in Hong Kong filled out the questionnaire (in Chinese) which was distributed on all eight university campuses in November 2014 at the height of street protests.

Measures

Civic participation

Civic participation questions were only asked in the Singapore survey, where the respondents were asked to indicate whether they have a) signed petitions, b) engaged in volunteer work, c) boycotted products, and d) donated money to charities.

Political participation

To assess the levels of political participation among Singaporean citizens, two questions were used: one assessing their political rally attendance and the other one asking them whether they donated money to political parties.

In Hong Kong, only the questions on political participation were asked, both specifically related to participation in the 2014 protests. The respondents had to indicate a) how many days they spent at the protests, and b) how many times they stayed overnight at the protests.

Selective Avoidance/Opinion Shielding

In both surveys, two questions assessing participants' selective avoidance actions on social media were asked: Have you ever hidden someone's comments from your Facebook feed because they did not share your views about current events? Have you ever unfriended someone on Facebook because they did not share your views about current events?

RESULTS

To analyze the data, a series of contingency tables were run with Pearson's chi-square tests used to test for possible associations between the variables.

Singapore

First, median splits were performed on the civic and political participation variables, separating participants into low and high groups. Looking at civic participation, the tests show no statistically significant difference between Singaporean citizens scoring high on the measures of participation and those scoring low. In the low engagement group, 9.9% citizens reported hiding comments from their Facebook feed, whereas the percentage was 8.9% for those in the high engagement group. In contrast, a significant difference was observed between those scoring high on the measures of political participation and those belonging to the low engagement group, with 18.7% in the former group reporting hiding comments and only 6.8% reporting doing the same in the latter group (see Table 1).

Table 1. Singapore: Hiding comments from Facebook feed

		Have you ever hidden someone's comments from your Facebook feed because they did not share your views about current events?		
		No	Yes	$\chi 2$
Civic participation	Low	90.1%	9.9%	0.10
	High	91.1%	8.9%	
Political participation	Low	93.2%	6.8%	12.26**
	High	81.3%	18.7%	

A very similar pattern was observed for Facebook unfriending. Looking at civic participation, the tests show no statistically significant difference between Singaporeans scoring high on the measures of participation and those scoring low. In the low engagement group, 6.6% citizens reported unfriending people because of dissonant views, whereas the percentage was 4.8% for those in the high engagement group. In contrast, a marginally significant difference was observed between those scoring high on the measures of political participation and those belonging to the low engagement group, with 8.8% in the former group reporting unfriending people and 4.4% reporting doing the same in the latter group (see Table 2).

Table 2. Singapore: Unfriending people on Facebook

		Have you ever unfriended someone on Facebook because they did not share your views about current events?		
		No	Yes	$\chi 2$
Civic participation	Low	93.4%	6.6%	0.61
	High	95.2%	4.8%	
Political participation	Low	95.6%	4.4%	2.81†
	High	91.2%	8.8%	

Hong Kong

Before conducting the analyses, I transformed the political participation variable assessing protest attendance into a categorical variable with 3 levels: no attendance, low attendance and high attendance (median split for low and high). The results show significant differences between groups in terms of likelihood of hiding comments on Facebook, with 17.7% of the high engagement group reporting doing so, compared to 8.5% and 9.9% for the low protest attendance and no protest attendance, respectively (see Table 3).

In terms of frequency of unfriending on Facebook, a similar pattern emerged. The results show significant differences between groups, with 18.2% of the high engagement student group reporting unfriending for political reasons, compared to 5.1% and 5.6% for the low protest attendance and no protest attendance, respectively (see Table 4).

Table 3. Hong Kong: Hiding comments from Facebook feed

		Have you ever hidden someone's comments from your Facebook feed because they did not share your views about current events?		
		No	Yes	$\chi 2$
Protest attendance	None	90.5%	9.5%	11.58**
	Low	91.5%	8.5%	
	High	82.3%	17.7%	

Table 4. Hong Kong: Unfriending people on Facebook

		Have you ever unfriended someone on Facebook because they did not share your views about current events?		
		No	Yes	$\chi 2$
Protest attendance	None	94.4%	5.6%	31.02**
	Low	94.9%	5.1%	
	High	81.8%	18.2%	

DISCUSSION

This study shows that high levels of civic engagement are not associated with greater attempts to shield oneself from dissenting views on social media. Indeed, highly civically engaged Singaporeans were no more likely to hide comments or unfriend someone on

Facebook because they disagreed with his or her political views. According to Pattie and Johnston (2009), exposure to diverse viewpoints has a positive impact on voluntary activities, and it is therefore not surprising that highly engaged citizens did not attempt to filter them out at a higher rate compared to those less engaged.

Still, the findings also support the notion that political engagement is linked with a greater likelihood of opinion shielding and selective avoidance on social media platforms. This is in line with the literature showing that political mobilization often requires more homogenous information environments which promote opinion reinforcement, rather than ambiguity and political ambivalence (Mutz, 2002). It is worth noting that selective avoidance happens even during calm periods of political life, as evidenced by the findings from Singapore that show a higher rate of selective avoidance of dissonant information among the more politically active citizens. Singaporeans active in politics also unfriended others at a higher rate than did those less politically active, although this difference was only marginally significant in this study.

How does the presence of political conflict influence the levels of opinion shielding and selective avoidance? While the Hong Kong data shows that the frequency of hiding posts and comments with dissenting views and deleting Facebook friends was generally low among students even during the times of heightened political conflict, it was still significantly higher among the more highly engaged than among those less engaged or those who did not join the protests. Moreover, compared to the rate of Facebook unfriending reported by Singaporean participants (8.8%), Hong Kong students unfriended those who disagreed with them at a much higher rate (18.2%). I interpret these findings as evidence that maintaining the protest zeal and high levels of offline participation during the protests is linked with the intensified shielding from dissenting or critical views, both in terms of the frequency and severity of actions. Similar patterns of results were observed in John and Dvir-Gvirsman's study (2015) conducted during the Israel-Gaza conflict, which reported that 16% of Facebook users unfriended someone during the period of hostilities. Such dissolution of social ties may lead to the creation of a more politically homogenous social media environment, similar to an echo chamber, which may reduce ambivalence and dissonance about the causes and consequences of the conflict.

CONCLUSION

Scholars have argued that among other things, the "benefits of Facebook friends" are reflected in a significant expansion of our weak social ties that provide bridges across different types of social and political cleavages (Ellison et al., 2007). Context collapse that characterizes many social media environments has a potential to increase information flows and provide users with access to heterogeneous political views and perspectives that may be less commonly encountered in real life. Such exposure to diverse perspectives is expected to be beneficial for democratic functioning and

community engagement, and this study shows that civic participation is not associated with attempts to shield oneself from dissenting views online. But, some political situations may require more homophilic information environments in which dissenting views are either not present or are temporarily muffled. Social media platforms provide various ways through which ideological homophily can be preserved, including completely automated, algorithmic filtering, as well as manual sorting, hiding and deleting of undesired content and users.

It would be interesting to examine whether the severance of ties among Facebook friends translates into similar relationship termination offline, or if it is primarily a mechanism for online opinion shielding. Given that most Facebook ties originate from different offline contexts it is likely that unfriending has consequences beyond the social media realm, which may have more serious implications for the real-world life. Future research should examine longer-term consequences of opinion shielding and selective avoidance on social media, paying special attention to the possibility that such actions, aided by social algorithms, may lead to the creation of more permanently homogeneous social and information environments and more ideologically divided citizenry.

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Nationalism of Chinese Internet Users: Ideology and Socio-demographics

Shan Wei[1]

The Rise of Chinese Nationalism

The rise of Chinese nationalism has drawn more and more attention from the international community in the past two decades. In 2005, 2010, and 2012, there were massive anti-Japan demonstrations in multiple cities due to territorial disputes and historical grievances.[2] The Chinese government has been getting more assertive in its foreign policy, especially in its relations with neighbouring countries. Many believe this is partially a response to popular sentiments of nationalism.

As China is becoming politically and economically more powerful, and as this country is in rapid social transformation, how nationalistic sentiments among Chinese citizens shape the nation's future is becoming important for China observers all over the world. To answer this question, we first need to have a clear image of Chinese nationalism.

Chinese nationalism has its historical origin and contemporary breeding ground. Isaiah Berlin saw nationalism as an "inflamed condition of national consciousness" usually caused by "some form of collective humiliation."[3] For many Chinese, this inflamed condition and collective humiliation were caused by some Western powers during the imperialist era in the 19th and early 20th century.

In the recent two decades, Chinese leaders have attempted to use national identity and national sovereignty as a new ground for regime legitimacy. Considering these historical and contemporary conditions, nationalism will remain an important force in shaping China's policies on both domestic and international issues for a long time.

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[1] The author would like to thank Professor Zheng Yongnian for his invaluable comments and insights, and Dr. Du Jun for her suggestions on methodological issues.

[2] For more details of these protests, please see http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012%E5%B9%B4%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%8F%8D%E6%97%A5%E7%A4%BA%E5%A8%81%E6%B4%BB%E5%8A%A8; http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010%E5%B9%B4%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%8F%8D%E6%97%A5%E7%A4%BA%E5%A8%81%E6%B4%BB%E5%8A%A8; http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005%E5%B9%B4%E4%B8%AD%E5%8D%8E%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E5%85%B1%E5%92%8C%E5%9B%BD%E5%8F%8D%E6%97%A5%E7%A4%BA%E5%A8%81%E6%B4%BB%E5%8A%A8. Accessed May 2015.

[3] Isaiah Berlin, "The Bent Twig: A note on nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51, no. 1 (1972), pp. 11-30.

Among Chinese citizens, who are more likely to be nationalistic than others? Are age, education, and income important in shaping an individual's national identification? What would be a nationalist's views of political, economic, and cultural issues?

Increasingly, Chinese citizens tend to express their political opinions, including nationalism, in the internet world. Since 2009 the internet has covered every city and 99% of rural villages in the country, becoming the largest internet infrastructure in the world. By the end of June 2013, the number of internet users in China had reached 591 million, the largest in the world.[4]

The expansion of the internet into various segments of Chinese society has significant political consequences. More and more ordinary people, especially those disadvantaged in socio-economic terms, now have a major forum to express their political opinions. It has been getting harder to block information. Recently many mass protests were mobilized via social media or online discussion boards.[5] A number of corrupt CCP officials have also been exposed by microblog posts.[6] In this sense, the internet has become an important platform for tracing Chinese political opinions.

Online public opinion surveys provide a systematic overview of the nationalistic attitudes of the general public. In the Chinese Political Compass Survey, a web-based survey to explore Chinese internet users' ideological spectrum, respondents were asked questions about their views of the nation and the national political authorities, as well as their attitudes towards many political, economic, and cultural issues.

The results show that Chinese nationalism is highly correlated with conservative (in the Chinese sense) or authoritarian orientations in politics, the economy and culture. Richer people are generally less nationalistic than those who are less rich. The rich interacts more frequently with the government and other countries, which helps them to develop more open-minded attitudes towards political authorities and the outside world. Education also reduces nationalism. People who received higher education are less likely to be nationalistic than those who did not finish high school.

In terms of age cohorts, the pre-1970s and post-1990s groups have stronger nationalistic sentiments than those who were born in the 1970s and 1980s. This high level of nationalism among the youth may be a "life cycle" phenomenon. People at the schooling age are apt to accept officially indoctrinated views, but they may not retain the strong nationalistic sentiments in the later stages of their lives. Those with better education and higher income tend to become more moderate when they get older.

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[4] China Internet Network Information Center. 2013. "Statistical Report on Internet Development in China." July 2013. (CNNIC Report thereafter); and http://finance.ce.cn/rolling/201308/28/t20130828_1258658.shtml. Accessed February 2014.

[5] http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB534.pdf; http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB750.pdf. Accessed March 2014.

[6] Karita Kan, "Whither Weiwen? Stability maintenance in the 18th Party Congress Era." *China Perspectives*. No. 1, 2013.

Defining and Measuring Nationalism

We know nationalism is a kind of group loyalty – loyalty to one's nation. But there can be different types of loyalty. Students of social psychology find that there are two related but distinctive group identifications, "patriotism" and "nationalism".[7]

Patriotism focuses on affective attachment to one's own country, which is often expressed in statements connoting pride and love for country, such as "I love my country" and "I am proud to be a Chinese". Patriotism may not include views about other countries. And this feeling is not necessarily related to one's attitudes toward national political authorities. A person may or may not withdraw her support for the government or national leaders, but still loves the country.[8]

In comparison, nationalism has two dimensions: on the one hand, a positive feeling about one's nation; on the other, a bias against other nations. Simply speaking, the two sides of nationalism are: "how to see ourselves" and "how to see others". Nationalism is often expressed in such statements as: "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Chinese", and "People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong."

In terms of "how to see ourselves", nationalists tend to give the nation a supreme status and accept political authorities representing the nation without much criticism, while patriots' positive feeling about the nation is independent of their appreciation of the authorities. Nationalists are generally supportive of the government and compliant with national political authorities.

In terms of "how to see others", nationalism involves feelings of national superiority and dominance, with the sentiment that "my" nation is better than others and, in the more aggressive version, should dominate or control others. Studies in Western societies find that nationalists show stronger support for nuclear armament policies and are ready to go to war.[9]

With this definition, an empirical analysis can be conducted to reveal the general picture of Chinese nationalism. This study uses a recently released dataset, the Chinese Political Compass Survey (中国政治坐标系) data. As a web-based survey, the questions are modelled on the UK survey "The Political Compass" and tailored to the Chinese context.

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[7] Kosterman, R. and S. Feshbach. 1989. "Towards a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes." *Political Psychology*. Vol. 10: 257-274.

[8] Blank, Thomas, 2003. "Determinants of National Identity in East and West Germany: An empirical comparison of theories on the significance of authoritarianism, anomie, and general self-esteem." *Political Psychology*, Vol. 24, No. 2: 259-288.

[9] Druckman, D. 1994. "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A social psychological perspective." *Mershon International Studies Review*. Vol. 38: 43-68.

The website was launched in August 2007 and in March 2015, the site was firewalled by the Chinese government. Consequently, people inside mainland China do not have access to this site anymore. The organizers of the survey subsequently decided to release the data for public use. So far they have released the 2014 data. This is what is used in this article.

The survey includes 50 questions about the respondent's political, economic, and social/cultural orientations, as well as several socio-demographic items, such as education, income, and age. In the 2014 data there are 171,830 respondents who completed the survey. A caveat to use this dataset is that it is by no means based on a random sample of the Chinese population. Among the respondents, 64% are male; 84% have a college or higher level of education; 92% belong to the post-1980s or 1990s generations (those who were born in the 1980s or 1990s).[10] Respondents in this survey may not be representative of Chinese citizens.

Yet for two reasons we do not have to worry too much about generalizing findings from this sample to a larger population. First, while the distributions of gender, age, and education are not representative of the Chinese population, they are well consistent with the population of Chinese netzens.[11] That is, sample statistics can be used to describe the population of Chinese internet users.

Second, for a non-random sample, inferring population parameters along a single dimension is misleading, but it is not necessarily wrong to generalize findings about relationships between variables.[12] For instance, we do not want to use the mean value of nationalism measure from the sample to infer the mean for the general Chinese population, but it may be safe to argue for a relationship between nationalism and political conservatism in the population if we find a statistically significant relationship of the two variables in the sample.

[10] What we may want to keep in mind is that this is not a random sample. That is to say, the sample may not represent the entire Chinese population. The sample is highly biased towards males, youth, and the highly educated.

[11] Wu, A. Xiao. 2014. "Ideological Polarization over a China-as-Superpower Mindset: An Exploratory Charting of Belief Systems among Chinese Internet Users, 2008-2011." *International Journal of Communication*. Vol. 8: 2243-2272.

[12] Manion, M. 1994. "Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China: Learning from Local Samples." *China Quarterly*. Vol. 139, September: 741-765.

Four survey questions are selected to measure nationalism.[13] The four questions are:

> *Would you strongly agree (2), agree (1), disagree (-1), or strongly disagree (-2) with the following statement* (numbers in parentheses are scores):
>
> *Q1. Human rights take precedence over sovereignty (*reversely scored*)*
> *Q2. National unity and territorial integrity are the highest interest of society*
> *Q3. Force should be used to reunify Taiwan with China if conditions permit*
> *Q4. The state should take measures to train and support athletes so they can win glory for the country in various international competitions*[14]

The first two questions, concerning sovereignty and national unity, tap the first aspect of nationalism: uncritical loyalty to national authorities. The third and fourth questions deal with the second aspect: seeking superiority of one's own group and dominance over other groups.

Calculating the arithmetic mean of the scores on the 4 items creates an index of nationalism, with higher scores indicating stronger nationalistic views. Table 1 presents the major descriptive statistics of the index. With a range from negative 2 to positive 2, the mean value of the index is 0.18 and the median is 0.25. Both are larger than the midpoint, 0, which indicates that the Chinese citizens in this sample slightly incline towards nationalism.

Table 1: Statistics of Nationalism in the Sample

Statistics	Values
Mean	0.18
Median	0.25
Range	-2, +2
Number of observations	171,830

Ideological Positions and Nationalism

The terms "left" and "right" are increasingly popular in China's public sphere. Public intellectuals are labelled as leftist or rightist when they debate political issues. However, the concepts of left and right or conservative and liberal are different from these concepts in the West.

Broadly speaking, the leftists or conservatives tend to support an authoritarian state, emphasize national unity and security, think highly of the old socialist economic system, and value traditional culture. By contrast, the right-winged or liberals advocate

[13] Factor analysis confirms these 4 items are loaded on one dimension.

[14] The English translation of the questions are from Pan, J. and Xu Y., 2015. "China's Ideological Spectrum." MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2015-2.

a constitutional democracy, emphasize individual liberty, support market-oriented reforms, and are more enthusiastic about modern science and technology.[15]

In the survey there are three groups of questions to measure the respondent's ideological position in political, economic, and social/cultural issues. For political orientations, respondents are asked about their attitudes towards such statements: "Western multiparty systems are unsuitable for China" and "People should not have universal suffrage if they have not been educated about democracy."

Questions used to measure economical orientations include: "Sectors related to national security and important to the national economy and people's livelihoods must be controlled by SOEs" and "Individuals should be able to own, buy and sell land." Questions about social/cultural orientations include: "Traditional Chinese classics should be the basic education material for children" and "I will recognize the relationship between my child and a homosexual partner if it is their choice."

Again, the arithmetic means of scores on each group of items are computed. With the results it is possible to visualize the general ideological spectrum of Chinese respondents. As generational changes of political culture have been salient in China, here the results are presented by age group.

The respondents are divided into 4 age groups, post-1990s, post-1980s, post-1970s, and pre-1970s, indicating those who were born in the 1990s, 1980s, 1970s, and before the 1970s respectively. These categories are popular in China's public discourse. In the following figures, political, economic, and cultural ideologies are presented respectively.

[15] Pan and Xu, 2015. Ibid.

In Figure 1, the Y-axis indicates ideology and the X-axis is age groups. On the Y-axis, higher scores mean a more liberal orientation, and lower scores indicate more conservative inclinations. Figure 1 shows that Chinese citizens in different age groups have quite different ideologies. People who are born after 1980 are much more conservative than the older generations, and the post-1990s group is the most politically conservative.

Figure 1: Political Orientation by Age Cohort



Source: Chinese Political Compass Survey

Economic ideology has a different pattern. According to Figure 2, the pre-1970 generation is the most conservative, which is understandable. They have experienced the socialist economic system during Maoist time and they are accustomed to the bigger role of the state in the economy. The post-1990s group is again, quite surprisingly, much more conservative than the post-1980s and post-1970s groups.

Figure 2: Economic Orientation by Age Cohort



Source: Chinese Political Compass Survey

Figure 3 presents cultural ideology by age group. Except that the pre-1970s group tends to be conservative, all the rest inclines towards being liberal. It looks like China's open-door reform started in 1979 has made younger generations more open-minded in social and cultural values.

Figure 3: Cultural Orientation by Age Cohort



Source: Chinese Political Compass Survey

Then why are the Chinese youth so "leftist" in terms of political and economic views? There may be two related reasons. First, since the early 1990s, Beijing has reinforced its ideological education and propaganda, especially in schools. People who are born after 1980 are the major target of this ideological campaign. Second, most of the post-1990s group in the sample are students. School-age people tend to accept orthodox ideas inculcated by the authorities, whereas older people realize the complexity of reality and may become more open-minded.

As mentioned in the previous section, by definition, nationalism is related to one's political position and nationalists tend to be compliant with the authorities. In this sense a relationship between nationalism and conservative ideology can be expected in the Chinese context.

Figure 4 reports the relationship between ideologies and nationalism. Here the Y-axis is nationalism and the X-axis is ideology. Higher scores on the Y-axis indicate stronger nationalistic sentiments and higher scores on the X-axis means a more liberal orientation. According to the figure the relationship is very straightforward: a clear-cut negative correlation, no matter whether it is political, economic, or cultural ideology.

That is to say, in China, nationalism is systematically associated with conservatism in political, economic, and cultural issues. If one is politically, economically, or culturally liberal, she cannot be a nationalist. If she is nationalistic, then she is more than likely to be conservative, or left-winged in China. This is consistent with findings in Western societies, where authoritarianism is a strong predictor of nationalistic sentiments.[16]

Figure 4: Relationship between Ideology and Nationalism



Source: Chinese Political Compass Survey

[16] Blank, Thomas, 2003. Ibid.

Social-demographics and Nationalism

People's education, income, or age has an impact on their political attitudes.[17] Thus it is expected that these factors also have an influence on nationalism.

Figure 5 presents the relationship between income and nationalism. There is a clear inverted U-shape pattern, with higher levels of income related to weaker sentiments of nationalism, and the lowest income group also related to weaker nationalism. Generally the richer a person is, the less likely she is to become a nationalist. The richest two groups, "150-300k" and "more than 300k", have negative values of nationalism. One possible reason is that the rich interacts more frequently with the government and other countries, which makes them more knowledgeable of the political reality, and hence less influenced by official propaganda and more open-minded to the outside world.

As for the "0-25k" group, their views of the nation are not as positive as those with an income between 25k and 75k Yuan. As the lowest income group in society, it is difficult for them to develop a positive identification with the nation as well as with the national authorities.

Figure 5: Chinese Nationalism by Income Level



Source: Chinese Political Compass Survey

[17] Shan Wei, 2009. "How Much do the Chinese Trust Their Government." EAI Background Brief. No. 472.

Figure 6 reports the relationship between educational levels and nationalism. The relationship is negative. Higher levels of education are related to lower levels of nationalism, especially in the "more than college" group. The "less than high school" group has the strongest positive feelings about the nation. The difference between "high school" and "college" groups are not statistically significant. It implies that if one goes to college, that is not enough to reduce her nationalistic sentiments. She will have to go to graduate school to become immune from this political view.

Figure 6: Chinese Nationalism by Education Level



Source: Chinese Political Compass Survey

Many researchers have noticed significant generational change in China in the past three decades as the Chinese society experienced dramatic socio-economic transformation. The cohort born after 1980 is found to have diverged considerably from those born before 1980 in political attitudes. Age may be one of the most important factors in understanding China's political values changes.

According to Figure 7, there is a U-shape curve relationship between age cohorts and nationalism. Both the youngest and oldest group have stronger nationalistic sentiments than others. The pre-1970s group has the highest level of nationalism. Many of them have memories of the anti-Japan war and the founding period of the People's Republic. They have witnessed how China rose up from the verge of collapse. It is

not surprising that this generation has a stronger national identity than the other generations.

The post-1990s group is more nationalistic than those 10 or 20 years older. Why is that? There can be two lines of explanation. First, this may show the success of Beijing's propaganda and "patriotic education" since the early 1990s. Second, this may be due to the "life cycle effect", that is, people in their teens or early twenties, as they are still in school, tend to accept officially indoctrinated ideas by the educational institutions. In the later stages of life, however, they may develop different views.

Figure 7: Chinese Nationalism by Age Cohort



Source: Chinese Political Compass Survey

To seek an answer, the interactive effects of age and education on nationalism are explored. In Figure 8, respondents at different ages are divided into four groups by their educational levels. For respondents younger than 25 (the post-1990s group), their nationalistic attitudes are not necessarily higher than the older cohorts', but they are highly concentrated around the median of the distribution no matter what their educational levels are.

For those who are older than 25 there are clear differentiations between different levels of education, and the differences are getting larger as age increases. The "more than college" group consistently has a lower level of nationalism than others, and demonstrates a U-curve, with the middle-age people scoring the lowest. The "less than high

school" group occupies the upper part of the plot, but some of them have much lower scores, especially those of older ages.

Figure 8: Chinese Nationalism by Education and Age



Source: Chinese Political Compass Survey

The general pattern is that older people are more dispersed in the plot than younger people. That is to say, the post-1990s group are more homogenous than the older age cohorts in terms of nationalistic attitudes. Considering the majority of this group are still in school, it may imply the "life cycle effect", namely, school-age people are more compliant with official ideologies. When they are out of schools and face the complexity of reality, their views become more diverged. Those with post-graduate education may become less nationalistic when they reach their middle age, while those with high school or lower education may become more nationalistic.

Figure 9 presents the interaction between age and income. Three income groups are selected to represent the lower-, middle-, and upper-income people. Again, the youngest people in the sample are largely concentrated around the median of the distribution, showing that they are more homogenous in nationalistic views.

When people are older than their early 20s, differentiations between different income groups become salient. The upper-income people, those who have an annual income over 300k Yuan, become less likely to be nationalistic as their age increases.

The lower income group, those who reported 25-50k Yuan annual income, are more likely to hold a stronger national identification in the older cohorts.

Figure 9: Chinese Nationalism by Income and Age



Source: Chinese Political Compass Survey

In short, China's youngest generation, the post-1990s group, has showed stronger nationalistic orientations than those who are 10 or 20 years older. This may be because most of them are still in school and under the indoctrination of the official "patriotic education". This does not mean they will hold the same level of nationalism when they are older. Their views will change. Some become more nationalistic while others become less. Other factors such as education and income play a role in the process of change.

Policy Implications

Two aspects of Chinese nationalism have been explored. First, what is the relationship between nationalism and other political and socio-economic orientations? In other words, what would be a nationalist's views on broader political, economic, and cultural issues? Second, in terms of education, age, and income, who are more likely to be nationalists in China?

Overall, Chinese nationalists are conservative in political, economic, and cultural issues. They are supportive of an authoritarian state, think highly of the role of the state in economy, and emphasize the traditional culture.

Rich and well-educated people are less likely to be nationalistic. The younger and older generations are more nationalistic than those in their middle age.

The youngest age cohort, the post-1990s group, has stronger nationalistic sentiments than those who were born in the 1970s and 1980s. This may be because most of them are still in school and immersed in officially indoctrinated views, but they may not retain the strong nationalistic sentiments in the later stages of their lives. Those with better education and higher income tend to become more moderate when they get older.

Nationalism is a double-edged sword for the Chinese government. On the one hand, it legitimatizes the government as the supreme representative of the nation, and renders popular support for the regime's endeavour to become an international power.

On the other hand, nationalists in China are conservative in political, economic and cultural issues. Many of their views go against the Communist Party's goals of modernization. Their hostility towards Western values and knowledge may ultimately undermine Beijing's wish to encourage innovation and thereby maintain its economic growth rate in the long term.

Chinese leaders may want to convey patriotism instead of nationalism to their citizens, as defined in the previous sections of this article. An enduring prosperous nation is composed of citizens with critical thinking and love for the nation, and who are open to various values and beliefs from other nations.

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Hardcore Subcultures for Law-Abiding Citizens and Online Nationalism: Case Study on the Korean Internet Community *ILBE Jeojangso*

Kyujin Shim

Introduction

Nationalism is resurgent in East Asia. As tensions intensify in the region, relations among Korea, China and Japan have chilled to seldom-preceded levels. How ironic, given that Internet technology and the World Wide Web facilitate globalization and intercultural connections and have the potential to make our planet a brightly imagined One World. But in that very potential, of course, lies the hard fact that the Internet is simultaneously a "base camp" for crusades of extreme nationalism.

The phenomenon of extreme nationalism is not atypical in Japanese society, and *Netto-uyo* (net right-wingism) is one of its most representative cases of online grassroots nationalism, increasingly making its presence felt and its voice heard via the Internet, YouTube, Internet bulletin boards, chat rooms, other social media, and increasingly popular forms of comic-art discourse (manga etc.). On such platforms, *Netto-uyo* is a combative voice on many international issues, including the military sexual-slavery (the so-called comfort women) quarrel with Korea, the territorial conflict with Korea over the islands Tsushima and Takeshima (known to Koreans as Daemado and Dokdo respectively), the dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands (known to the Chinese as Diaoyu), and the conflict with Korea regarding the dislike a number of Japanese have for Koreans (including North Koreans) resident in Japan and having special rights (McCormack, 2011). Initially the latter polemic was presented as comic-book agitprop on the Web, then as the hardcover best-selling manga *Kenkanryu – Hating the Korean Wave*, and finally going onto the Web generally in all its forms. *Kenkanryu* has extended into a series with follow-up handbooks, continuing volumes, etc. In its characters' speech bubbles, wording typically includes references to Takeshima, Tsushima, and so on, and angry disclaimers such as (in translation): "There never was any forced removal of Koreans!!!"

Netto-uyo not only remains as a virtual community, i.e., in cyberspace, but has also taken to the streets as a grassroots activist organization, *Zaitokukai* (Citizens' Group against Special Rights for Korean Residents in Japan), initially organized by

100 netizens under the slogan (in translation) "Let's proactively organize by visible and effective actions!" By early 2012, *Zaitokukai* had become the largest conservative right-wing group in Japan, with more than 11,000 activists (Chung, 2013; Sakamoto, 2011).

In Korea, a conservative online community known as *ILBE Jeojangso* (hereinafter ILBE) is in many ways a comparable counterpart to Japan's *Netto-uyo*. ILBE's two fundamentals are ultra-conservatism (i.e., what many regard as extreme right-wingism) and commitment to absolute freedom of speech. This mix manifests itself as vigorous advocacy of its right-wing views. Initially it began as a humour-site, quickly gained wide attention, and in 2014, established a new record by exceeding the 20,000 mark for *simultaneous* log-ins (the number is assumed to be more for mobile users), and a total membership exceeding 100,000 (Kim, 2014). ILBE has become a significant social concern to which most Korean mainstream media devote high interest, and much attention, printed media space, and broadcast media air-time.

In general, the Internet is perceived as a liberal space in terms of major user demographics and political orientation, and Korea's cyberspace leans toward liberals and left-wing groups (Peak, 2013). So, interesting questions arise regarding ILBE and its popularity: In a *liberal*-dominant cyberspace, what drives conservative netizens to the ILBE community, armed with strong racism and nationalism? What are the differences and commonalities between the ILBE community and Japanese *Netto-uyo*? In the chronology of Korean online communities, sporadically, netizens possessing conservative and racist traits have attempted to build conservative online communities but these have been limited, and none has evolved into an influential community on a par with ILBE (Peak, 2013). This leads to our next question**:** What leads to ILBE's great success and the popularity of its site, in contrast to the humble beginnings of its conservative predecessors which ended in failure? In addressing the question, this study explored the characteristics of the ILBE community as neo-right online activists. Also, to examine the difference between ILBE and traditional nationalism in South Korea, the study delved into the historical context of society's political and regional conflicts. Further study looked at the generation gap between Generation X (in the Korean context, the 386 Generation) and millenniums (the young population, now in their 20s and 30s) to understand ILBE as a form of online subculture for the young generation.

Characteristics of ILBE

What is ILBE?

ILBE is an ultra-conservative online humour-site that split from DC Inside (디시인사이드), a major online community (Kim, 2014). ILBE radically increased its user numbers during the 2012 presidential election (Chung, 2012; Peak, 2013). According to the online data archive Rankey, as of October 2013, ILBE's daily visitor average was 103,640 on PCs, and 217,453 on mobiles (Huh, 2013). Due to ILBE's policy of anonymity, which

it stresses more heavily than does any other Korean website, it is extremely difficult to identify the age, education level, gender, or social class of its users. However, an assumption from its contents is that the age spectrum of ILBE's users comprises mainly late teens to early twenties yet includes those in their 40s (Choi, 2013). ILBE reveals strong aversion toward Korean females, foreign immigrant workers, the political and social left, and residents of Jeolla-do (known to be the most liberal region in Korea), and refers to them in extremely violent, sarcastic, outspoken, and insulting ways. For example, they mocked the coffin of the victim of the 5.18 Gwangju Democratization Movement by referring to it as a "skate parcel (홍어)". Also, they derided victims of the 2014 *Sewol* ferry tragedy as *odeng* (오뎅 or 어묵), meaning fish-cake (Cheon, 2014). On the other hand, they extol as national heroes ex-presidents Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, who are commonly evaluated as dictators. ILBE is evoking more and more political and social controversy (Huh, 2013).

ILBE is causing serious political and social controversy in Korean society. Leftist netizens, especially, are reacting almost hysterically or neurotically. For example, celebrities who carelessly or inadvertently used ILBE language were almost ostracized, and virtually witch-hunted, by leftist netizens despite their explanations that it was an inadvertent use of language and that they were not ILBE users. The cycle of (i) accusing celebrities irrelevant to the political arena of having a "ILBE tendency," (ii) teenagers who witness such accusations online joining the ideological disputes, (iii) blindly defining the opponent as a "wingnut" or "moonbat" without clear conceptualization of the conservative or the progressive, and (iv) attacking the opponent via cursing or violence, is being repeated (Yoo, 2013). In brief, ILBE's emergence is a catalyst that sharpens the conflict in Korean society between left and right and between conservative and liberal.

Is ILBE a Nationalist Community?

Nationalism has various meanings depending on time and place. In particular, the terms *ethnicism* and *nationalism* tend to be used without clear distinction in Korea. Before the 1980s, the age of democratization, nationalism was a concept mainly favoured by the left/liberal camp. For example, the Korean student activists camp in the 1980s was largely divided between the Proletarian Democracy (PD) group, emphasizing class equality, and the National Liberation (NL) group, emphasizing liberation and autonomy. The NL group's argument for freedom from imperialist American oppression emphasized "ethnic homogeneity" with North Korea.

Currently, however, in a dramatic change in the understanding of nationalism, the term is used by the right/conservative camp. It is closely connected to the downfall of the pro-North party that had been emphasizing "national independence". Given the worldwide phenomenon of ultra-rightists armed with racism – e.g., Japanese *Netto-uyo*, French Front National, Russian skinheads, German neo-Nazis, etc. – nationalism has become (and has remained) commonly associated with ultra-rightism and ultra-conservativism.

Netto-uyo has typical nationalist sentiments. As a result of the long-term economic depression that traces back to the early 1990s, the economically excluded class vented their complaints on the Korean-Japanese. And among the post-war generation, as they witnessed the economic growth of nations once colonized by Japan, the perception grew and took hold that Japan is no longer the war assailant. This concept of nationalism distinguishes itself from both the former right wing and left wing (Kim, 2012).

Although ILBE is often perceived as the Korean version of *Netto-uyo*, it is hard to affirm that it is a nationalist website. In contrast to *Netto-uyo,* which displays strong ethnic superiority to, and revulsion of, other races, Korean ILBE users' hatred is targeted mainly at the internal Korean society, including females, homosexuals, liberals, Jeolla-do residents and the pro-North (Kim, 2014). And although it has a racist sentiment toward immigrant workers, this particular aspect remains as merely their secondary concern. The inference is thus that ILBE expresses the most negative form of nationalist inclination in attacking the social minority or political correctness. Another perspective is that this simply demonstrates their nationalism to be sufficiently pliable and adhesive enough to be able to attach itself to anything; in this perspective, their nationalism is unpredictable, a so-called *loose cannon*, and thus hard to manage.

Keys to Success

Retroaction. How did ILBE, whose major users are males in their twenties (Kim, 2014), come to have rightist/conservative/nationalist sentiments, and prosper, based on such attitudes? The answer is in the keyword**:** *retroaction*. And it is not merely coincidental that ILBE's values and direction directly oppose the political correctness of the liberal/left/minority who dominate Korean cyberspace.

Internet usage of Korean netizens occurs at portal sites and community sites (see Figure 1), around which netizens sharing common interests, such as sports, games, cooking or childrearing, assemble (Cheon, 2014). Here the activity is not only discourse on specific interests, but also political and social debates, and these sites are strong reference points for netizens. However, such community sites have highly exclusive dispositions. Those with tendencies different from those of the leading group are often excluded and eventually expelled. For example, if one uploads a satire picture describing the rightist president Lee Myung-bak as a mouse, one will be praised. However, if one posts a picture describing the leftist president Roh Moo-hyun as a koala, one will be criticized heavily for insulting the dead (Peak, 2013). Thus, minority users whose ideas differ from those of the dominant group online tend to wander elsewhere, and many gravitate to, and assemble at, ILBE.

Being disaffected by a majority which excludes minority opinions despite their displayed posture of support for freedom of expression, democracy, and affirmative action, ILBE users oppose major online ideologies. They have rightist or conservative sentiments not because they actually agree with such ideologies, but rather because of their "anti against anti" sentiment (Chung, 2012). In the following sections, ILBE users'

distasteful behaviours, even seemingly evil acts, are discussed as being reactions to liberals' hypocrisies. Because of this, a view exists that the emergence of ILBE could be viewed as the problem of the leftists rather than of the rightists. The novelist Lee Seung-jun has commented that "ILBE is the illegitimate child of political leftists who are corrupted, incapable, hypocrite and snobby" (Lee, 2015). The cultural critic Choi Tae-sub explained that it is "a tendency of the 'post-democratization generation' who cannot feel the weight of democracy, as nearing the end of period in which democratization justified everything" (Chung, 2012, Translated).

Slurs against the subjects of ILBE's hatred, such as leftists, feminists, Jeolla-do residents and sexual minorities, mostly occur in this mode. The main reason for the hatred toward these marginalized groups is rooted in the claim that they are not actually discriminated against, but rather, are privileged by the social welfare system and proactive action (Cheon, 2014). To be specific, the existence of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in South Korea is an example often referred to by ILBE users as "a sign of reverse discrimination against males in Korean society." And this is where the nationalist narrative operates as an effective scheme to justify aversion toward "free-riders" who steal taxpayers' monies. ILBE users' criticism against victims of the 2014 *Sewol* ferry tragedy uses the same smear. ILBE users claim to stand on nationalist and patriotic values as they defame the families of *Sewol* ferry victims in two ways: (i) the defamatory slur against those families that they feel unreasonably sought monetary compensation from the government for a personal tragedy; and (ii) the further slur that compensation amounts for the *Sewol* victims were too much compared to what were allotted to the victims of the Korean Navy *Cheonan* sinking in 2010, and of the Yeonpyeong shelling in 2011, which ideologically armed ILBE with conservatism and nationalism (Jay, H., 2012).

Competition of Derision. An example of a posting directly showing ILBE's nationalist or racist sentiment is the posting titled "Baek Chung-kang actually has manners! He doesn't eat all." It includes a picture of a smiling westerner devoid of arms and legs. Baek Chung-kang is a Korean Chinese singer.[1] Among ILBE users, the notion "Korean Chinese immigrants commit vicious crimes and even eat human flesh; thus they should be exiled" is widespread. Through such posts, ILBE impliedly shares and spreads revulsion of, and antagonism against, immigrant workers.

How is this possible? The two most representative factors are derision and competition. Of note is that Internet traffic investigation instances usually classify ILBE as a humour-site (Kim, 2014). And, as mentioned *supra*, the Korean online community is more heavily populated by leftists/liberals, whose dominant weapons are satire and derision. This tendency became most apparent during the Lee Myung-bak administra-

[1] http://www.ilbe.com/5961383410.

tion's conservative years, 2008-2011, as liberal online websites ceaselessly parodied the president and his camp followers in texts, pictures, and videos (Kim, 2014).

ILBE is the first full-scale right/conservative site equipped with the so-called "humour" code that used to be the weapon of the leftists. Although conservative/rightist/racist online sites existed previously, they generally were overly serious and formal, characteristics which were major obstacles to securing popular appeal. Then ILBE attacked the leftist camp in exactly the same way but even more nastily than the method those leftists had used against the rightists (Kim, 2014). Lee (2013) expressed it so: "ILBE's extreme rightism is a toadstool that grew from this reality. The sarcastic satire and humour that once tore down the authoritarianism of the conservatism is now targeting the vested liberals." And "humour" and "prank" are useful excuses when driving an attack on an opponent to its extremes, while such attacks simultaneously generate popular appeal.

Another ILBE characteristic is "competition". Unlike many other community sites that use honorifics, ILBE users talk down to each other and confer grades depending on their activities. One's grade is elevated by recommendations one earns for one's posting, aiming at it being a "popular posting". One's grade declines if one's posting earns non-recommendations (called "democratization" as a derision of democracy). This system is a decisive factor in prompting users' competitive postings of aggressive and arousing contents. The formal statement of a user arrested for insulting the former president declared that his motivation was his wish to create a "popular positing" (Park, 2013). Commentators of course have pointed out that this competitive fashioning inhibits ILBE users from sharing any collective and communal identity and sentiments, thus characterizing the ILBE community as mere fragments, apart from any sort of genuine membership sense and/or privileges.

Self-Criticizing Sentiment. Remarkably, ILBE users' hatred is directed not only externally but also internally, i.e., toward themselves also. In a bizarre variation of the *mea culpa* (I am to blame) principle, users call themselves "idiots" or "defectives" or worse. Such self-criticism or self-degradation is best described as a form of dysphemia, i.e., commenting offensively about oneself *and* about others because one is motivated by self-loathing *and* by loathing those others. Of course, this provides a convenient vehicle for the use of wicked language (Cheon, 2014; Kim, 2014).

On one hand, such self-criticism sarcastically reveals the young generation's sense of deprivation. As in many other nations, in South Korea, the issue of youth unemployment has become a serious social problem. Given the older generation's occupation of fine jobs, the younger generation often faces the situation of having mainly part-time jobs being available to them. A new terminology has even emerged, namely the 880,000-won generation (who earn about US$800 [about 880,000 South Korea won] a month), referring to youths' employment prospects (Woo and Park, 2007). While liberal youths' anger is directed at the upper class or the government, that of ILBE

users' mainly targets the so-called 386 generation (those born in the 1960s who were in university in the 1980s, when democratization reached its apex). Many of the 386 generation are leftists or liberals who still complain about the current system although they could have been employed in sound jobs, and who, with much less effort, could have established themselves as societal pivots. ILBE intensively attacks their hypocrisy. This can be interpreted as the reaction of the younger generation who feel isolated from the 386 group, which privatizes democratization as its exclusive property (Chung, 2012).

Comparison with Japan's *Netto-uyo*

Japan's *Netto-uyo* was started from about the 2002 FIFA Korea-Japan World Cup period. Japanese freelance journalist Yasuda Koichi, author of *The Internet and Patriotism*, which discusses *Netto-uyo Zaitoku-kai,* explains that the economic recession and the social unrest that continued during the late 1990s spawned the anger that was derived from the notion that immigrant workers are a "work-depriving force", targeting Korean-Japanese who account for one-third of immigrants in Japan (McLelland, 2008; C. Kim, 2013; Sakamoto, 2011).

Further radicalization on the Internet occurs when widespread frustrations, despondencies, and even fears, are rife (all these, for example, are the inevitable sensations of many for whom, for prolonged periods, no employment is available). In such a situation, alas, some group or instance is blamed, and catchy hate-slogans emerge without justification but with awful harm. The above-mentioned "work-depriving force" is one such slogan. In the face of such polemic (one might liken it to a wildfire), those of good sense depart the scene, leaving it to the radicals, and real intellect and reason departs. That, essentially, is what happened in the Japanese situation described by Chung (2013) and Yasuda Koichi (2012).

In part, this explains the growth sequence. In January 2007, after growing its online presence, 100 netizens who agreed to "establish an active organization that carries out visible actions, as, with only the internet [*sic*], one cannot change the world," inaugurated the first *Zaitokukai*. Its support base was gathered through collective action and hostile statements towards Korean Japanese, and by February 2012, it had grown into the biggest rightist organization in Japan.

ILBE is similar to *Netto-uyo* in that issues of economic recession, employment shortage, and unsatisfactory reality, are expressed in xenophobic language. However, there is a dissimilarity: unlike *Netto-uyo,* whose foci of attack are mainly international neighbours like Korean Japanese, ILBE's main targets are internal minorities or allegedly free-riders. Also, unlike *Netto-uyo,* which has taken its agenda to the street, ILBE currently (i.e., at the time of this writing – mid-2015) is highly unlikely to organize itself into the *reality* of *now.* Indeed, ILBE users pursue complete decentralization and are highly resistant to "friendship acts" (forming individual rapport). While other national and racist online groups aim at an expanded community with a traditional hierarchical system so as to be an effective and influential organization, ILBE tends

to resist any form of anti-democratic system within an organization. The ideal online community for ILBE users is representation of ideas based on absolute equalitarianism, and achieved (ILBE believes successfully) by absolute anonymity, a fact-based approach, an unmoderated competition system, and the creation of a zero-privilege, zero-hierarchy environment.

In short, despite ILBE being rightist, its conduct does not derive from firm ideological principles, like *Netto-uyo*, but rather from its pursuit and purpose of amusement (Kwak, 2013). Of interest is whether ILBE will grow into a strong rightist/nationalist organization like *Netto-uyo,* which emerged 10 years earlier, or simply remain netizens thriving on racist humour.

Conclusion

Contrary to the widely held belief that the Internet would facilitate the formation of a global village, and engender a marketplace of ideas, thus contributing to widespread liberalism and democracy, nowadays the younger generation in South Korea – suffering as they do from economic depression and unemployment – tend towards cynicism about social progress. Korean nationalism started from the economic recession, the ideological vacuum after the disappearance of industrialization and democratization success stories, and the neo-liberalist generation's sense of helplessness. An online characteristic is that such a sense of helplessness is expressed as provocative fun and entertainment, instead of as serious introspection. In this sense, some aver that Korean and Japanese youths' rightward shift is degradation rather than conservatism. The reduction of conventional language to short- message structuring, as in *Twitter* and other social media, and the growth of reflective and emotional responses, as per the limitless use of "like" buttons, aggravate users' tendencies to create content that are more provocative and sensational than that of others' without proper consideration of the consequences or of the extent of the resultant hurt and shock from thus-unchecked wording and disgusting images (Joo, 2013).

Ironically, although ILBE is becoming a social problem in today's Korean society, it represents Korean males' simple and humble hope and desire for recognition as "good patriarchs" (Kim, 2014). However, its forms of expression are highly antisocial and dismissive of authority. Recent research on online communities points out that ILBE's extreme expression and aggression wholly took over the online leftist subculture it so much loathes. That is, ILBE's destructive expression now targets vested leftists, the original initiator of that sarcastic satire and humour that once dragged down conservatives' authoritarianism (Kim, 2014). Thus, nationalist discourses on ILBE in the current state may not be political but may be simply hostile instead, an expression of animosity towards the older generation and a form of amusement through which Internet *alter egos* relieve their stress. However, as the case of *Zaitokukai* demonstrates, no one can predict how nationalism, initiated in simple anger, might advance.

Accordingly, scholars and opinion leaders have warned that to prevent ILBE from propagating further extreme right-wingism or jingoism, the whole society should reconsider what is necessary in South Korea to build trust and unity politically, economically, pertaining to regional conflicts, and addressing the generation divide. That is, the fundamental question is whether social-, economic-, cultural-, and gender-repression in daily and professional lives still reside over the whole society, rather than the wholly ethical political and institutional democratization of society? If social leaders and the older generation in South Korea simply ignore fundamental social issues that drive seemingly ordinary law-abiding citizens to seek *alter egos* to enjoy hardcore subcultures and to relieve stress and pressures, the so-called ILBE phenomenon will continue even if ILBE itself is closed or blocked[2]. And it will not stay a subculture but will flourish with more mass appeal.

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Figure 1. Major online communities in South Korea



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ISSN 0119-5204
0 119520 400006