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Israel's view of Europe-Israeli relations

**How does the Israeli population assess Europe-Israeli relations?
More than 1000 Israelis were asked for their opinion both before and
after the Brexit decision as well as the election of Trump.**

I. Starting point

Israel and the European Union have found themselves in a paradoxical situation for quite some time, and which would drive even the most experienced marriage counsellor to despair. Never before - when it comes to the intensity of collaboration - have both parties had such extremely close ties, yet rarely before had both reached such a high level of political estrangement as is currently the case. For centuries, "both sides", writes Michael Mertes, "burdened one another with strong changes of heart that alternated between admiration and disappointment, attraction and rejection. Both sides are close to one another - geographically, economically and culturally - and at the same time they view one another with unease, and also increasingly with incomprehension and antipathy".* An unease which seems to have been growing on both sides over recent years.

Israel and the EU cannot afford to perpetuate this "drifting apart" over the long-term, however. Both are too closely linked as part of the "West" from a historical, intellectual-historical perspective and due to their common interests. With interests that extend from the mutual economic and scientific importance of the relations, right through to the the common fight against terrorism as a major challenge ahead, this attachment is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. That is why it is very important to view the development of this relationship over the course of time, indeed also to gain clarity on the question about how this central relationship can be improved once again, and which actors are necessary for bringing about positive change. This includes, among other things, confronting mutual misunderstandings and misjudgements. In Israel, you often get the impression that the country only requires good bilateral relations with the leading European states and that makes up the relationship with the EU as a whole. As an institution, it seems that the EU is frequently viewed in this logic as a "necessary evil" or even as irrelevant. This view fails to realise the dynamic and importance of the European institutions. On the European side, however, there is not always sufficient consideration given to just how prevalent and emotionally charged the need for security is on the Israeli side, as well as the extent to which acts of recognising the existence of Israel, as symbolic as they may appear in isolation, are expected from and would be positively received by the Israeli population.†

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There is no doubt that, Israel as a country with a democratic and liberal economic and social order, belongs to the West. This belonging to the West manifests itself in Israel's close relations with the USA and with the countries in the European Union as well as the institutions of the European Union. If you heed the beautiful message formulated by the French-Jewish philosopher, Bernard Henri-Levy, that Europe is not a geographical term, then Israel clearly belongs to Europe.¹ Yet, Israel is undoubtedly more than just an "offshoot" and a mirror image of Europe. Not least also because Israel is undergoing a social transformation. Whereas the founding generation of Israel was predominantly Ashkenazi, and this is why the the Israeli state aligned itself with European models as regards the composition, structure and form of political discourse - in the sense of a largely secular nation state - another dynamic now comes to the fore: The ratio of Mizrahi Jews, in other words Jews originating from the Near and Middle Eastern countries, has markedly increased in Israel. It currently lies at around 50 percent.

There is also another factor affecting the roots of European-Israeli relations, and which promotes a certain degree of estrangement. Israel considers itself a Jewish and democratic state. And the public debate about whether this "being Jewish" is rather to be interpreted in the religious sense or as an ethnic origin has intensified considerably. Many surveys demonstrate that the importance of religion in Israel tends to be on the rise and therefore goes hand in hand with a social divide in the country.² At the same time, surveys and studies show that the decline in religious beliefs in Europe is develop-

ing against the global trend and only around half of Western Europeans believe in god.³ It is uncertain to what extent these differences of attitudes also influence their view of one another. In any case, however, this cultural difference has implications for future relations.

A third dimension is still the litmus test for relations: The dominant impression in Israel is that anti-Semitism in Europe has increased dramatically. In fact, studies indicate - in spite of significant methodical flaws to some extent - a significant amount of anti-Semitic beliefs in Europe and unfortunately, this trend clearly continues to grow.⁴ This real danger, which paradigmatically manifested itself in the devastating attack on the kosher supermarket in Paris, is connected to the often vague concern that Muslim immigration into Europe signifies a further impetus for this anti-Semitism, combined with the fear of Muslim voter groups' virtually unstoppable influence on European policy. What is even more significant is the accusation, which is heard repeatedly in Israel, that the EU not only underestimates the danger posed by Islam, but that its foreign policy approach is too hesitant in the face of challenges in the region. The word "appeasement" as well as "naivety" were mentioned on several occasions in this context.⁵ According to those surveyed, the EU takes the moral high ground, but at the same time is not prepared to establish the necessary "hard power" against the threat of terrorism.

Another evident paradigm shift in the view of Europe was triggered by Europe's relatively euphoric attitude towards the Arab Spring; this was at a time when Israel warned in particular against the dangers associated with the breakup of accustomed orders and state networks. In Israel, the measurable disappointment about European policy in this upheaval is continually confronted with the tendency that can be summarised in the following

* Michael Mertes, „Distanzierte Nachbarn. Die EU und Israel – Eine paradoxe Beziehung“ [Distanced Neighbours. The EU and Israel - A Paradoxical Relationship], KAS Auslandsinformationen 4/2015, p. 42-63, p. 42.

† We are deeply grateful to Professor Sharon Pardo, who is Chairperson of the Department of Politics and Government at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and Senior Researcher at the National Jean Monnet Centre at the Centre for the Study of European Politics and Society (CSEPS) at BGU. Sharon Pardo closely accompanied the creation of the survey and contributed numerous valuable thoughts and remarks in the course of the study. Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation is proud and grateful for maintaining such a close and long standing partnership with CSEPS as the leading academic institution in Israel in the field of European policy.

¹ The exact quote is: "It cannot be stressed enough that Europe is not a place but rather an idea." Europe is not a category of being, but of spirit." Quoted from: Bernhard Vogel, *Meine Kriterien für Europa, Ost-West-Perspektiven* [My Criteria for Europe, East-West Perspectives] 1/2001, <https://www.owep.de/artikel/205/meine-kriterien-fuer-europa>.

² See „Israel's Religiously Divided Society“, PEW Research, 08/03/2016, <http://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/>

³ See the study of the WIN Gallup opinion research institute from 2015: „Losing our religion? Two thirds of people still claim to be religious“, Gallup International, 13/04/2015, http://www.wingia.com/en/news/losing_our_religion_two_thirds_of_people_still_claim_to_be_religious/290/.

⁴ See „Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland Ein Studienbericht für den Expertenrat Antisemitismus“ [Jewish Perspectives on anti-Semitism in Germany A Study Report for the Expert Board on anti-Semitism], April 2017, https://www.frankfurt-university.de/fileadmin/de/FRA-UAS/Verwaltung/Abteilungen/KOM/Studie_juedische_Perspektive_n_Bericht_April2017.pdf

⁵ See Herb Keion, „Israel severely rebuked, as PM warns „spirit of appeasement“ blowing through Europe“, The Jerusalem Post online, 17/12/2014, <http://jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Israel-severely-rebuked-internationally-as-PM-warns-spirit-of-appeasement-blowing-through-Europe-385001/>.



sentence: In cases of doubt, we are left to our own devices and must help ourselves.

The domestic conflict situation in Israel also has - at least at present - a far-reaching influence on the Israeli view of the European Union. The extreme right party, HaBayit HaJehudi ("The Jewish Home"), greatly promotes the estrangement from Europe not least in the form of its president, Naftali Bennett. Europe, according to Bennett's interpretation, is an old continent, rooted in the past and neither capable of innovation nor future-oriented thinking. That became evident with Brexit, which supposedly signals the beginning of the end of the European integration process. Accordingly, Israel needs to increasingly align itself with Asian countries. Here, it is important to bear in mind that right-wing politicians not only see Europe as a prominent opponent to the Israeli settlement policy. It is far more the case that the extreme right acknowledges the high level of economic interdependence between Europe and Israel, and aims to counter this with stronger trade ties with Asian countries.

“Europe, according to Bennett’s interpretation, is an old continent, rooted in the past and neither capable of innovation nor future-oriented thinking.”

That is why this stance is gaining influence on governance, since the right-wing party regularly threatens the current head of government with the dissolution of the coalition. Benjamin Netanyahu can have no real interest in this at present owing to the political scandals and corruption allegations confronting him. However, the most recent statements by “Bibi”, which were not intended for the public ear, reveal that he is not only “driven” but is also himself a “driving force” in this matter. In a one-to-one meeting with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, during which the microphone was accidentally left on, Netanyahu emphasised that Europe poses a threat to its own safety, by undermining that of Israel. Europe needs to decide, „whether it wants to live and thrive or dry up and disappear“⁶.

If the intra-party discussion in the Likud was shaped by a narrative of increasingly negative perspectives on European policy over the past few years, then the domestic political situation and the de facto dominance of right-wing politicians in the Likud and in HaBayit-HaJehudi in government policy brought a further impetus to the political strategy involving the relative abandonment of Europe.

Whilst the above-mentioned reasons for estrangement have definitely determined government action, the question arises whether this government narrative also manifests itself among the general public. Do they only see the negative developments or do the obvious advantages and the intensity of relations, also gain recognition? A particularly important question is whether the different groups in what is an increasingly segmented Israeli society have very different views on Israel's relations with the EU. Does religion, especially due to the dramatic increase of the ultra orthodox segment of the population, have an impact on relations? In this context, it is especially important to focus on the the Arabic segment of the population in Israel. Traditionally, Arab Israelis are more open minded towards the European Union. Is that still the case?

Besides the traditionally close relations between Europe and Israel, they continue to be complemented by the transatlantic relations. As a matter of fact, there was and continues to be reciprocal connections in this transatlantic triangle. At least during the second half of Barack Obama's presidency, the European-American relations definitely played an important role, not least with regard to common trade and climate policy. At the same time, the American-Israeli relations were more strained than ever before owing to Obamas' policy towards Iran and his commitment to a nuclear agreement with Iran. All political parties in Israel were and are more or less unanimous about rejecting the nuclear agreement. Even the personal relationship between the Israeli Prime Minister and the American President hit rock bottom during this time. Following Donald Trump's election as President of the United States, large parts of the Israeli elite and the public initially held out hope of a “new start” for relations between Israel and the United States. However, following the first few months of presidency, scepticism and disillusionment about the new President's unclear course are also starting to take hold in Israel again. The consequences that this will have on Israeli-European relations remain unclear. Do Israelis favour the estranged yet dependable relationship with

⁶ „Microphone leak in Budapest: Netanyahu ridicules the EU, DW, 19/07/2017, www.dw.com/de/mikrofon-leck-in-budapest-netanjahu-l%C3%A4stert-%C3%BCber-eu/a-39758896.



Brussels as opposed to the unpredictable friend in Washington?

What is important in this context is the question, which role Germany plays in this relationship nexus. Germany is and remains one of the main drivers of the European integration process. At the same time, Germany also has special relations with both Israel and the United States. Does Germany, in particular towards the European Union, assume the role of a mediator? And if so, are there limits to this role?

The present study aims to examine whether the trend of political estrangement between Europe and Israel continues. Does the general public in Israel effectively give up on the EU following "Brexit", or does that merely reflect the interpretation of the national religious parties in Israel? And what repercussions does the election of Donald Trump have on European-Israeli relations?

This survey project took advantage of a unique opportunity. The two upcoming decisions on the "Brexit" in Great Britain and the election result in the USA, afforded the opportunity to carry out a largely coextensive survey both prior to and immediately after the event in each case. On the basis of these surveys, it is now possible to determine whether both of these events have an impact on the public opinion in Israel.

II. On the methodology of both parts of the survey

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Israel conducted, in collaboration with the polling agency "KEEVON Research, Strategy and Communications Ltd." and led by Mitchell Barak, two surveys in Israel with most parts being identical to one another. The second survey included additional questions on the consequences of BREXIT and the election of Donald Trump in the USA.

The first survey was carried out from 27 December 2015 up to 1 January 2016. This involved a randomised phone call to 1000 Israelis from 18 years of age or older - including landline connections (72 percent) and IP phones (28 percent).

In total, the survey included 57 questions, including an array of "open questions", in other words questions that do not require a set answer. The questions were posed in two languages to the respective population groups: in Hebrew (between 27 December 2015 and 15 January 2016) as well as in Arabic (between 3 and 7 January

2016). The sample is not only representative for the Israeli population but also in relation to the percentage of specified language groups of the country's total population. It includes corresponding quotas on sex, age and place of residence. The Arabic part of the sample has also been separately accounted for by the four representative areas of residence in which Arab Israelis live.

The error rate of the survey lies at 2.25 percent.

The second survey was carried out from 22 November up to 6 December 2016. This involved a randomised phone call to 1004 Israelis from 18 years of age or older - including landline connections (80 percent) and IP phones (20 percent). As regards the phone calls in Arabic, 100 percent of respondents were surveyed via IP phones.

In total, the survey included 41 questions, again including an array of "open questions", in other words questions that do not require a set answer. The questions in the second survey were also posed in two languages to the respective population groups: in Hebrew (between 22 November 2016 and 6 December 2016) as well as in Arabic (between 27 November and 2 December 2016). Once again, the sample is not only representative for the Israeli population, but also in relation to the percentage of specified language groups of the country's total population. This time it once again includes corresponding quotas on sex, age and place of residence.

Even the error rate of the second survey lies at 2.25 percent.

III. An end to the downward spiral?

At first, both surveys very clearly show that relations between the EU and Israel are under strain. Indeed, a narrow majority still view the EU in a positive light. However, the decline in the Israeli enthusiasm for the European integration process becomes particularly apparent as time goes by. For approximately ten years, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung has been conducting surveys with the Keevon institute on Israel's relations with the EU. Here it shows that contrary to the public depiction, the past decision for "labelling" settlement products is not the main factor behind the European Union's decrease in popularity. It is rather the case that the popularity of the EU in Israel has been continually and linearly declining for the past ten years. In 2007, 60 percent




Fig. 1: Israeli approval for the EU

of Israelis were still positive about the EU, we can see a drop of over 15 percentage points to date.⁷

However, the second survey during Winter 2016/2017 does now demonstrate that the European Union's continuous and steady slump in popularity in Israel is surprisingly - at least for the time being - coming to an end. At the beginning of 2016, 45 percent of the Israelis had a good to very good opinion of the European Union. At the end of 2016, 46 percent had a positive impression of the EU. For the first time since 2007, an increase in popularity, albeit minimal, can be noted.

As regards the view of the European Union, there is a significant difference between the Jewish and the Arab Israelis. Whereas during the first of the two surveys only 41 percent of the Jewish Israelis have a sympathetic view of the EU, on the Arabic Side it is an impressive 73 percent. The far more positive view by the Arab Israelis runs through the entire study. It is uncertain whether this enthusiasm can only be attributed to the predominant view in Israel of the EU as "pro-Palestinian", or whether this is rather due to the fact that the EU has funded a considerable amount of projects in the Arabic sector of Israel.

The slight reversal in opinion as described can be attributed to one population group above all. Whereas the scepticism among religious Israelis has even marginally intensified, the attitudes of secular Israelis have become far more positive. Even the voters of parties that are ei-

ther leftist such as the Zionist Union and Meretz, or who are in the centre of the political spectrum such as Yesh Atid or Kulanu, are slightly turning towards the EU again. Here the Joint List also records continuously rising approval ratings in favour of the EU. On the other hand, right-wing parties' scepticism towards the EU has further intensified. When assessing the popularity of the European Union, there is no significant difference between the Ashkenazi and the Sephardic Jews.

Another fascinating fact is that when compared to the first survey, the approval among Israeli Jews only marginally increased, but the rejection of the EU dramatically decreased from 58 to 46 percent. This possibly indicates that the factor of "social desirability" has already played a role when answering the question. By this, social empiricists mean the effect that Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann so impressively outlined in the "Spiral of silence". According to this, respondents do not say what they really think and feel when under the impression that they belong to the minority. This is because they do not see it as socially desired and thus they form the "silent majority". Due to this belief that Israel overwhelmingly rejects the EU, could mean that the actual percentage of those who have a better opinion of Europe, is perhaps even higher than the numbers reveal.

Another survey result also speaks in favour of this finding. Even though this step is not currently part of the political debate, and which indeed appears improbable in the long-term for various reasons, the question about whether the Israelis would advocate their country joining the EU, is of great importance nevertheless.⁸ Especially in a country with such a strong focus on its national sovereignty and in which patriotism is so pronounced as is the case in Israel, the question as to whether such a step would be deemed attractive, is an even clearer indication for an approval or rejection of the EU. The fall in the last ten years was also dramatic here, too. In 2009, 76 percent were still of the opinion that Israel should join the EU, and in 2014 with 66 percent, it was a dramatic ten percentage points lower. From the year 2014 up to the end of 2015, the approval then decreased again by 11 percentage points to 55 percent. The steep

⁷ All previous surveys that have been carried out about the role of Germany in Europe 2007 and 2009 as well as the image of Germany in Israel and in the Palestinian Territories 2014, can be requested free of charge via the website of the Israel office www.kas.de/israel

⁸ That is particularly due to the fact that Europe, in spite of all trends towards renationalisation in individual countries, is a post-national territory, whereas the fundamental idea behind Zionism is - after suffering exile and persecution in their own state - to be able to retake control of the fate of their own state irrespective of the goodwill of other governments and institutions. That already contradicts Israel's accession to the EU from a cultural perspective.



downward curve has also come to a halt here. By now, 56 percent would advocate such a step.

This percentage in itself does not change significantly when respondents are told that the former legal status of the "law of return" in Israel would change by virtue of the applicable EU law. The regulation intends to regulate immigration to Israel. In this case, too, there is still a majority of 56 percent who advocate Israel's accession to the EU.

What is the reason for the end of this downward spiral? In light of Brexit, we would have expected the trust in the EU's efficiency to have decreased rather than increased - particularly as the Israelis are very torn in their general assessment of Brexit: there are almost as many supporters (38 percent) of Brexit as opponents (39 percent), whereas it is hardly surprising that the Russian Israelis welcome Brexit with 50 percent.

In another area of the survey, a possible explanatory model becomes apparent for this new trend of mitigating the EU's unpopularity: The answer to the question whether the Brexit or the election of Trump compromise the role of the EU in a possible peace process between Israel and Palestinians, has a surprise in store. The results varied greatly here. Whereas only a minority of 24 percent believe that the EU can play a more active role in a peace process because of the Brexit and 37 percent believe that the role of the EU will become less active, the decision is portrayed in a completely different light when taking the election of Trump into account. Here a majority of 39 percent say that the EU will play a more important role in the future due to the election of Donald Trump. Even though the findings seem contradictory at first glance, it nevertheless becomes clear that higher hopes are placed in the EU's ability to act in matters relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, than in the Trump administration. That may also explain the end to the general downward spiral. What is obvious - especially as far as the conflict is concerned - is that the majority of Israelis prefer a European neighbour that is more difficult yet more dependable, than an American friend, whose political contours in matters of Middle East policy are (still) very difficult to identify.

The issue becomes apparent in the question about whether the EU is seen as a rather weak or strong advocate of the Israeli right to exist. Even if, institutionally speaking, that is more difficult in the case of the EU, many Israeli citizens wished for a similarly explicit commitment to the existence of Israel as a Jewish and dem-

ocratic state, as rendered by the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel in her speech before the Knesset in 2008. In the first of the two surveys at the end of 2015, the disappointment about the EU in this area was abundantly clear. At that time, only 33 percent viewed the EU as a strong advocate of Israel's right to exist. There was a notable rise in the second survey with 44 percent. Both values are still remarkably low and it is highly questionable whether a comprehensive survey within the EU, would really show such a result. Rather, individual national surveys demonstrate that a clear majority in many countries advocate Israel's right to exist.

Conversely, the question was asked about whether the EU would be a weak or strong advocate of an independent Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution. In the first survey, 73 percent were of the opinion that the EU is a strong advocate of this approach. In the second survey, 69 percent now see this as positive. In principle, however, this finding should not be considered as negative at least from a European perspective, since as a whole the consistently high agreement on this question means that the EU is seen as connected to the solution, which they have consistently advocated for centuries.

IV. The crisis of confidence continues

The fact that they want the EU to play a more active role and that many Israelis view the EU in a more positive light after the election of Trump, does not change anything about one fact: The trust in the EU - in this case as a honest broker in the conflict - has not risen significantly. If, during the first survey prior to Brexit and Trump, only 26 percent were of the opinion that the EU is an "honest broker", and 69 percent had the opposite view, then the esteem for the EU as a broker, has further eroded here. In the second survey after the Trump election, only 23 percent regarded the EU as a moderator in the peace process. 73 percent of the respondents took the opposite view.

That becomes even clearer as regards the explicit "vote of confidence" albeit - at least - the negative finding did not decrease further here. The question about whether they can generally trust the EU, a modest 69 responded negatively whereas 28 percent believed that they could rely on the EU (during the first survey it was 67 and 29 percent).

As regards both questions, there is a consistently high deviation as far as one population group is concerned: the Arab Israelis. Whereas only 18 percent of the Jewish



Israelis and 17 percent of the Israelis of Russian heritage view the EU as an honest broker, 63 percent of the Arab Israelis conceded this role of a reliable intermediary to the EU. When it comes to the question about general trust, the ratio is nearly the same down to the very digit. Hence, the Arab Israelis really stand out. Here, too, they are once more the group in Israel, with by far the best opinion of the EU. As already mentioned, the high number of projects in the Arabic sector and the advocacy for a Palestinian state seem to pay off in favour of the EU.

However, what are the causes as whole as to why the trust in the EU is still comparatively very low? When searching for the causes and as regards the first of the two surveys dealt with here, the main question was whether it is merely relations between Israel and the EU that are under strain, or whether the decline in popularity of the EU in Israel is rather a further symptom of a general abandonment of international organisations.

“68 percent of Arab Israelis concede the role of a reliable intermediary to the EU [...]. This is why they really stand out from the crowd.“

That is why we posed the question about whether the citizens of Israel would welcome their country joining NATO, even if it would entail Israel being committed to delivering military assistance in the event of an attack on the NATO states, just as these states would have to come to the aid of Israel in case of an attack. This pressing as well as rather theoretical question has already been asked once before in 2009 in connection with another survey. At that time, 54 percent advocated joining NATO and 33 percent were against such a step. At the end of 2015, however, only 45 percent were in favour of such an accession and 41 percent were against. In the case of the United Nations and the EU (e.g. labelling), there were in fact controversies which put strain on relations and which could have repercussions on the reputation of these institutions. Such controversies never existed with respect to NATO, however. On the contrary: Even since the early 2000s, and in particular since the events of 11 September, NATO demonstratively endeavoured repeatedly to strengthen their alliance with Israel. Following long diplomatic negotiations and after Turkey had given up its veto against this decision during Spring 2016, it was possible to establish an official Israeli Mission in the NATO during May 2016. A few weeks ago, the

Israeli defence minister, Avigdor Lieberman, even went as far as to recommend the NATO as a possible successful example for a similar defence alliance with the Gulf States.⁹ Against this unique background, the question concerning NATO was a suitable indicator as to whether there is a rather vague and unspecific dissatisfaction with international organisations. The results here speak in favour of this assessment. The second survey also shows that the trend reversal of eroding relations between Israel and the EU also needs to be seen in the wider context of attitudes towards international organisations. Since attitudes have transformed again even when it came to the question about NATO. The approval for Israel joining NATO has increased from 45 to 48 percent. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that Israel actually joining NATO, is not currently on the agenda even in Israel itself.

The reality that it is not only specific dissatisfaction with the EU that can be seen as a decisive factor, but also the critical view of international organisations, is also evidenced by the United Nations being assessed more negatively than the EU (and the NATO). The disappointment about actual or supposed resolutions that are critical of Israel but also debates about UNESCO resolutions which were held over the past few years, plays a role here. Another insightful aspect here are the differences between the Jewish and the Arab Israelis. As regards the Jewish Israelis, in the first survey, 41 percent have a positive view and 58 percent have a negative view of the EU. As regards the Arab Israelis, 73 percent have a positive view of the EU and 20 percent have a negative perspective. There is a similar distribution for the view of the United Nations, yet the figures are even more dramatic. In the first survey, 31 percent of the Jewish Israelis were positively disposed towards the UN - therefore once again ten percentage points below the values towards the EU - and 61 percent were negative. As regards Arab Israelis, 64 percent viewed the United Nations as positive and only 24 percent as negative. This question was not even asked in the second survey, so there is no up-to-date knowledge available about this. However, it is probable in light of the UNESCO resolutions on Tempelberg and Hebron 2016 and 2017 and the fierce public discussion about these resolutions, that the

⁹ See: „Vorbild NATO Israel schlägt Golfstaaten Allianz gegen Iran vor“ [Model NATO Israel Proposes a Gulf State Alliance Against Iran], DER SPIEGEL online, 28/2/2017, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/israel-schlaegt-golfstaaten-allianz-gegen-iran-vor-a-1136595.html>.



United Nations would currently achieve worse values in the Israeli popularity rating.

With this visible classification of the European Union in the “group” of international organisations, the natural question is also how serious the European Union is seen as a political actor. The introduction to this study mentioned the misunderstanding whereby many Israelis believe the bilateral relationships with the EU to represent the relationship with the EU in itself. This is a misconception, which denies that the EU institutions such as the EU Commission and here we mainly refer to the External Action Service, as well as the Parliament, have their own dynamic and own value as a representative of all EU states. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding is hardly any less if not just as prevalent as before. Already at the end of 2015, it was clear how dramatically inaccurate the facts are assessed here. In reply to the question: „When thinking about the European Union, do you think of it as a single entity having relations with Israel or do you think that each individual country has its own relations with Israel?“, 69 percent of respondents at the end of 2015 said that relations with the EU are carried out bilaterally via the respective member states and only 18 percent emphasised that the EU is its own entity, which nurtures relationships with Israel. At the end of 2016 (or rather) at start of 2017, the second survey revealed that the situation was the same with 67 and 19 percent.

That generally gives rise to the question: what level of knowledge do Israeli’s have about the EU when they are interviewed in such surveys? Hence, empirical surveys attempt repeatedly to validate the respondents’ assessments, by posing knowledge-based questions about the object of inquiry itself. If the knowledge is comparatively strong, this enhances the credibility of the statements. This is why we already posed knowledge-based questions in the first of the two surveys. First, we asked in which city the European Parliament is located. Approx. 28 percent could correctly identify Brussels. The correct answer was also Strasbourg, which only 6 percent of respondents knew. Around 35 percent stated that they did not know the answer. In the same vein, a question was asked about the number of member states. Here a total of 32 percent gave an answer that came close to the actual result. It was also asked which continent has more inhabitants, the North American subcontinent or Europe. Here, approximately 50 percent of respondents knew the correct answer. At first glance, this data may paint a rather bad picture about the level of knowledge, yet, if you assess it in relation to comparative surveys within the

EU member states, it becomes clear that knowledge there is not much more developed. Rather, it is even the case that studies conducted by Israeli researchers when comparing Euro barometer data, have proven that the average Israeli can boast an overall higher level of knowledge than the average European.¹⁰

Ties with EU countries also manifest themselves in the question about whether Israeli’s visit countries in the EU. Over 52 percent stated that they were in the EU at least once during the last three years. Here, the so-

“63 percent of the Israelis highly value that the European Union is built on democracy, rule of law [...] and the protection of minorities.”

called Open Skies Agreement between the EU and Israel that was signed in 2013 and which liberalised air traffic between the two territories, may have played a role. Flight prices reduced dramatically due to this agreement. As a result, several direct connections have been developed from and to Israel.

The question about the extent of knowledge about and interest in Europe in Israel is also traditionally influenced by the question whether respondents have relatives in the EU states. Here, more than one third of respondents (35 percent) stated that they have family ties in the EU. That is certainly a large proportion. That gives rise to the question about whether this de facto and family-related attachment might also include enormous potential for conveying positive messages about the EU.

V. Ambivalence - positive messages - negative messages

The introduction to this study addressed the ambivalence of these relations between Israel and the EU and the fact that the actual cooperation - irrespective of differences - is close and trusting. For this reason, this investigation should also be consciously devoted to the question about which facts the Israeli population sees as positive and which messages on the part of the EU,

¹⁰ See Sharon Pardo in the interview with Michael Mertes, “Wie nehmen Israelis Europa wahr?“, [How do Israelis perceive Europe?] online publication KAS Israel, 18/7/2011, <http://www.kas.de/israel/de/publications/23431/>.



could perhaps be emphasised in a more consistent manner in order to achieve a change of thinking among the Israeli population.

In Israel, it is particularly evident how close the economic ties are between the EU and Israel. The fact that more than 30 percent of Israeli exports go to the EU and around 30 percent of the imports to Israel come from the EU, is assessed as positive by 71 percent of Israelis. However, the most striking feature here is the difference between the Arab Israelis and the Jews in Israel: Whereas 75 percent of the Jewish Israelis see this fact as positive, this is only the case for 48 percent of the Arab Israelis.

In addition, it is still and traditionally the close and excellent scientific relations between the two territories that leave behind the most lasting impression among the population. The reality is that after the "Israel Science Foundation", the European Union, which is the most important partner as regards funding research and innovation in Israeli universities and scientific institutions, and that in the past few years billions of Shekels flowed into more than 1000 scientific projects, is seen as positive by 67 percent of Israelis. Here, too, there is a significant difference between the Israeli Jews and the Arab Israelis. The former welcome this with 70 percent and the latter with merely 51 percent. This information is therefore particularly important because this is how the view which many Israeli Jews hear in the media time and again, that the EU behaves incorrectly as regards Israel since it is mainly Palestinians and less so the Jews who benefit from their programmes across the "Holy Land", is refuted.

Another finding to the same effect, confirms an unprecedented success story. The fact that since the 1990s - not least due to the intervention of the then Federal Minister of Research Jürgen Rüttgers - Israel became the only country outside the EU member states that can participate in the EU Research Framework Programmes, has substantially contributed to the excellence of Israeli research institutes. It is also the case that in the current ongoing 8th Research Framework Programme "Horizon 2020", Israeli researchers can apply for funding from the more than 80 billion Euro "pot" - in cooperation with regional or European partners. This fact is also seen very positively in Israel: 65 percent of Israelis welcome that.

One finding is particularly remarkable in connection with the "good news", which concerns the foundations upon which the European Union is based. In spite of all criti-

cism to the EU and despite the accusations sometimes heard in Israel that the EU takes the moral high ground towards Israel, Israelis have a great deal of admiration for the democratic constitution and the respect of human rights in the European Union. An astonishing 63 percent of the Israelis highly value that the European Union is built on democracy, rule of law and the respect of human rights as well as the respect and protection of minorities. That is why the impact of this fact should not be overestimated, because it is equally contradicted by those voices in the Israeli public who occasionally say: As a result of democratic deficits, the EU does not have the legitimacy to make statements about the weaknesses of Israel in this area.

Certainly no less remarkable and surprising is that the "offer" of a "special privileged partnership" to Israel and to Palestinians in the event that they reach a permanent peace settlement, is in fact much more attractive for the majority of the Israeli population than was originally expected due to the dominating debates in the media. This offer was submitted in 2013 in the course of the initiative by the United States Secretary of State, John Kerry.¹¹ Time and again, many Israeli politicians on the right as the left of the political spectrum, expressed criticism about the "conditionality" associated with this offer of European engagement in Israel; since in their opinion, it may actually restrict or even impede the EU support for humanitarian advances and for the dialogue between the two groups. At the same time, they also expressed doubts about the appeal of this offer - in the sense of: What do we get that we don't already have? In this case, the population obviously deem the even better access to the European markets and the closer cooperation in any area, more much more attractive than the political elite do: 60 percent would see such a privileged partnership as positive.

Nonetheless, 52 percent of Israelis find it remarkable that the European Union accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees as a reaction to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. That "only" 52 percent welcome it and yet 36 percent reject this step by the EU, can be explained by the fact that many Israelis fear that it could lead to an increase in the threat of terrorism and anti-Semitism within the EU. The fact that this fear is very dominant becomes clear with the question about whether it is

¹¹ See EU, Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, 16/12/2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140097.pdf.



dangerous for Jews or for Muslims to live in the EU. Only a very narrow majority of 49 percent believe that Jews can live safely in Europe. A dramatic 47 percent believe that life in the EU is dangerous for Jews. On the other hand, 75 percent believe that Muslims can live safely in Europe, whereas only 20 percent do not share this view. In Israel, there is quite a serious concern that the EU underestimates the "danger posed by Islam". On the one hand, this concern is directed against - as perceived in Israel - the growing influence of Muslim voter groups on European policy and the fear of increasing anti-Semitic attacks, on the other. As early as 2015, Prime Minister Netanyahu implied an "Islamisation of Europe" in light of this.¹²

VI. EU - Palestinians – settlements

As expected, the fact that the European Union is the largest donor for development projects in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, is viewed negatively in Israel. 47 percent perceive this as negative and only 40 percent as positive. However, an interesting "foot note", provides an insight into the difference between the Jewish and the Arab Israelis. That the EU is a donor for development projects in the Gaza and the West Bank, is seen as positive by 41 percent of the Jewish Israelis and 46 percent see it as negative. The Arab Israelis see that in a much more critical light, however. Here, only 35 percent perceive it to be positive and 51 percent as negative. Throughout the years, this phenomenon has appeared in the surveys repeatedly: The difference in voting behaviour between the Arab Israelis and the Palestinians in the West Bank is usually significant. On the other hand, the Arab Israelis are often much more similar to the Jewish Israelis with respect to their views. In this context, sociologists refer to the phenomenon of the "over-identification" of the minority society with the majority society.

The Israeli population has a very negative view of the European Union's refusal to recognise Israel's sovereignty rights beyond the border of 1967, and therefore also the occupation of the Golan Heights, of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Only 26 percent can sympathise with this. Yet, almost 60 percent reject this.

It is apparent from the survey that the highest level of criticism towards the EU is the EU's decision to label products from the occupied territories as settlement products. 76 percent of Israelis are against and only 18 percent are for this "labelling". It was to be expected that the vast majority would reject it. The high level of rejection is nevertheless surprising and makes it clear that the argument propounded by European politicians that this labelling is in accordance with general European law and is not a "boycott", and hence clearly distinguishable from the measures of the BDS movement, is obviously hardly convincing in Israel. Here again, we encounter the fascinating fact that the Arab Israelis also view this decision critically. 52 percent see it as negative and that is striking mainly due to the Arab Israeli's otherwise exceptionally good assessment of the EU.

The following question makes it clear just how much the negative attitude towards "labelling" is influenced by media reporting; who is more economically disadvantaged by this decision, the Israelis or the Palestinians? 42 percent believe that the Palestinians suffer because of this decision and only 23 percent believe that the Israelis have to endure economic loss. Only 24 percent of respondents believe that both sides are economically affected to the same extent. In the first instance, this demonstrates that the argument voiced by the right-wing political spectrum in Israel about how this decision causes harm because they are only hurting those who they actually want to protect - namely the Palestinians - fell on fertile ground. In fact, some industrial settlements, above all the company Sodastream, which created many jobs, were moved away from the West Bank.¹³ Even though the labelling decision has indeed a counterproductive effect, in a situation whereby the Israeli politics and the Israeli public tend to increasingly turn their backs on Europe and the West - quite irrespective of the historically problematic implications - these results should also be seen in the context of the fact that the economic damage caused by this decision, is limited. As regards the entire Israeli export amounting to around 15 billion dollars each year, the settler products at around 150 million dollars, therefore around one percent, are of minor importance when seen as whole.¹⁴

¹² See Reuters, „Netanyahu says Europe's 'Islamization' pushing Israel to expand Asia trade", Haaretz online, 19/01/2015, <http://haaretz.com/business/1.637751>; also: Herb Keinon, „Netanyahu: Israel must open Asian markets due to anti-Semitism in Europe", The Jerusalem Post online, 18/01/2015, <http://jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Netanyahu-Israel-must-open-Asian-markets-due-to-Islamization-anti-Semitism-in-Europe-388164>.

¹³ Mareike Enghusen, „Sodastream – Schlag ins Wasser" [Sodastream - A Washout], Capital online, 02/03/2017, <http://www.capital.de/dasmagazin/unternehmen-sodastream-wassersprudler-israel-nahostkonflikt-palaestiner-8575.html>.

¹⁴ See „Israel muss Siedlerprodukte markieren" [Israel has to label settler products], taz online, 11/11/2015, <http://www.taz.de/!5250869/>.



It is indeed the case that Germany supported the EU's decision, yet at the same time, hardly any country voiced their criticism and scepticism about the effect of the decision with the same intensity as witnessed in Germany. Generally, the question arises as to which role Germany can play in the Israel - European Union - Germany triangle.

VII. And what about Germany?

The view of Germany constitutes the particularly positive results of this survey: From 2009 onwards, the popularity of Germany in Israel continued to grow at a consistently stable rate. In 2009, an impressive 65 percent already had a good image of Germany. In 2014, it was almost 70 percent, at the end of 2015, it was 73 percent and in the second Europe survey it was 67 percent: an increase of overall 11 percentage points. Even though




Fig. 2: Does the German federal government defend Israeli interests in the EU?

the Arab Israelis have an even more positive image of Germany, currently at around 91 percent, the other population groups also have a very positive attitude towards Germany. It is merely the Russian Jews in Israel who expressed a comparatively more sceptical view of Germany; however, this still leaves an overwhelmingly positive image behind. During the past few years, all surveys have consistently demonstrated, albeit at a high level, that women view Germany slightly more critically than men do. Equally, the finding that the intensity of religiosity causes positive feelings towards Germany to dramatically decline has been consistent throughout. Therefore, currently only 42 percent of ultra orthodox Jews are convinced about Germany. Very similar, though also at a much higher level, is the view on Germany from a Muslim point of view. 94 percent of secular Muslims in Israel view Germany in a positive light and it is "only" 73 percent for religious Muslims. Quite generally,

that is not only due to the history of Germany or due to a generally negative assessment of Germany, but is also linked to sociological and cultural reasons. Very religious groups traditionally also tend to preserve their way of life by systematically isolating themselves from the outside world. That becomes clear with surveys on other themes whereby - as far as religiosity in Israel is concerned - you can make very similar observations.

A finding that the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung clearly observed in surveys over the past few years, namely that the popularity of Germany grows as the respondents increase in age has levelled out in the meantime. There are hardly any more significant differences between the age groups and it is no longer possible to predict a clear trend.

We can determine a clear and overwhelmingly positive trend from the Germany-EU-Israel triangle. As early as 2014 as part of their survey on the attitudes towards Germany, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung ascertained that 65 percent of Israelis are of the opinion that Germany acts as defender of Israel within the European Union.¹⁵ Prior to the election of Trump, as part of the first of the two surveys presented here, 68 percent stated that Germany defends Israel in the EU. Meanwhile in the second survey, 70 percent express this opinion.

In the same vein, the question has been asked about which role Germany should play within the EU. Here, too, Brexit and the Trump election resulted in Israel's expectations of Germany significantly increasing once again. As regards the first survey, 61 percent of respondents want Germany to play a more active role in the European Union. In the second survey, we can see a significant increase to 70 percent. What is interesting here is that there is no clear difference between population groups. Both Jewish as well as Arab Israelis equally want Germany to participate more actively in the European Union. Here again, it is only the Russian Israelis with currently 65 percent, who are more sceptical than the other groups by approx. 5 percentage points. This continuous pattern can also be attributed to the fact that both the Cold War and a propagandistic devaluation of Germany in the Soviet Union, but equally the rather negative image of Germany in Russia today, also have repercussions on the Russian immigrants as well as their descendants in Israel.

¹⁵ Michael Borchard, Hans Heyn, „Das Heilige Land und die Deutschen [The Holy Land and the Germans], 11/1/2015, <http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.40104/>.



In an open question without a set answer, 57 percent of the Israelis wish for their country to maintain the closest relations with Germany above all others within the EU. France only follows Germany with 14 percent. All other countries are barely within the measurable range. The situation looks similar when asked who should play the leading role within the EU after Great Britain has left the Union. This question was asked in two directions. In one case, respondents should assess in this open question (without a set answer), who in their view will play this role. Here 68 percent state that Germany will play this role. Only 12 percent see France in this position. Again, no other countries play a role. As regards the rather personal question about which country respondents themselves wish to see in this leading role, 57 percent vote for Germany and only 14 percent for France. The fact that France really stands out here has less to do with French politics than the fact that it was mainly French Jews who made up a large proportion of those who migrated to Israel over the past few years.

As a whole, these findings clearly demonstrate that following Brexit, there is once again the prevailing hope but also the expectation, that Germany should play a leading role in international politics. Germany, which for good reasons has always played a rather restrained role in Middle East policy, will have to find an answer to these increased expectations over the long-term.

The reason why Germany enjoyed such a high level of trust, were discussed during previous surveys conducted by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Israel.¹⁶ Already in 2014, the German Federal Chancellor and her ties with Israel were cited as one of the reasons for the positive view of Germany. Her speech before the Knesset in 2008, in which she emphasised that the existence of Israel is part of Germany's reason of state, left a lasting impression among the Israeli public and created the feeling that Germany is a reliable partner of Israel. Also following Brexit and the election of Trump, the recognition granted to the German head of government, has further increased again. In 2014, 70 percent of respondents had a good opinion of Angela Merkel. Merely 11 percent had a negative view of the German leading politician. After Brexit, the respect for Angela Merkel remains consistently high. 71 percent have a positive view of the Federal Chancellor. However, the number of those who express a negative view has risen to 19 percent. Here it may be the refugee policy above all that can be

attributed to her negative image. In connection with this, the predominant fear in Israel is that Muslim immigration could result in an increase in anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany.




Fig. 3: *What is your view of the German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel?*

Highly revealing is also the view of the individual population segments and of the political orientation when it comes to the popularity of Angela Merkel. The younger the respondents are, the more sceptical is their view on the German Chancellor, and the older the respondents are, the more sympathetic is their view on the head of government. Among the 18- to 22-year olds, "only" 58 percent have a good opinion about the Chancellor. However, the 50- to 59-year olds represent the pinnacle here. Here an impressive 80 percent see Merkel in a positive light. As regards political orientations, the affinity for the German Chancellor is particularly pronounced among the left-wing and centrist parties, whereby the leftist Meretz party strongly deviates from this with 94 percent. However, the Chancellor also gets remarkable approval ratings between 60 and 65 percent among supporters of the right-wing parties Likud, HaBayit haYehudi, Israel Beitenu as well as the United Torah Judaism.

It is merely among supporters of the Schas party (the Mizrahi ultra orthodoxes), that the approval rate for Angela Merkel is only 38 percent. The latter may be due to the above-mentioned fact that the ultra orthodox population segments isolate themselves from the "outside". That could also explain why as regards the religious orientation, secular, traditional and orthodox Jews are at approximately the same level with 73, 72 and 71 percent, whereas only 50 percent of the ultra orthodox Jews have a good opinion about the Chancellor.

¹⁶ See *ibid.*



The enthusiasm for Angela Merkel also has a clear European dimension and relevance in Israel. In the survey following Brexit and the Trump election, it was asked which European head of government could most likely contribute to a negotiated solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What is special about this question is that it was posed openly in other words without a set answer. Such open questions have the advantage that the opinion of the respondent is not "directed" and can therefore be expressed in a way, which is even more genuine. As regards this question, 40 percent of the respondents named Angela Merkel. In what is a dramatic gap, 7 percent named the French and 5 percent name the British head of government. In the first survey, the ratio was almost just as divergent down to the very digit.

VIII. Outlook and evaluation

There is no doubt that the extent of the Israeli population's estrangement from the European Union remains serious. Over the past ten years, the European Union lost much of its good reputation in Israel. The same applies the other way round. As in any relationship, the responsibility for this development lies with both sides.

The fact that the downward spiral has temporarily come to a halt, is anything other than a reason to sound the all clear, since the causes of this mutual estrangement will not decrease in significance in the near future. The dissent regarding the political solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will increase to the extent whereby the two-state solution, to which the EU rightly adheres, will become a more distant prospect - as is regrettably the case at present. What is more, the change to the social composition of Israel and the increase in religious attitudes, will serve to further intensify the scepticism towards Europe as already measured in these surveys. At the same time, the enormous weakness of the left-wing and mostly more Europe-friendly political spectrum in Israel as is currently apparent, does not seem to be diminishing.

The explosive nature and drama surrounding this trend, is because the extent to which relations between Europe and Israel are deteriorating, is identical to that in which the necessity to expand cooperation and to deepen relations, is increasing. The most recent Euro barometer indicates that the theme of "the fight against terrorism" continues to move upwards on the scale of the most important themes for EU policy and in the meantime, has been placed at the top of the agenda in some member

states such as in Germany.¹⁷ Yet, the synergies and hence the potential for collaboration remain immense with regards to economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation. Especially in matters regarding innovational strength, Europe can expect to reap tremendous benefits from Israel and its "startup wonder".

This argument can also be seen from the opposite perspective, however. The fact that a clear majority approve of the economic interdependence between Israel and the European Union as well as the fact that scientific

"The conclusion that two thirds of Israelis believe it to be dangerous for Jews to live in the EU, should be considered a huge challenge for Europe."

cooperation obtains excellent values when assessing relations and especially when it comes to innovation, also means by reverse implication, that it is increasingly the case that Europe in the eyes of the public is not as "rooted in the past" as those national religious politicians surrounding Naftali Bennet in particular, but also the Prime Minister himself, would have us believe. This also reveals the "communicative challenge" for the EU: In Israel, it needs to be illustrated time and again that the working areas in which conflicts predominate, ultimately only make up a small part of the otherwise very healthy relations, along the lines of: 90 percent agreement, ten percent divergences.

The explanatory model for the mitigation of the downward spiral follows a similar logic. That the surveys reveal a discernible link with the election of Donald Trump, whose Middle East policy is - not only at the time of the last survey but also now - neither predictable nor dependable, and therefore places greater focus on the attractiveness of the indeed difficult yet dependable partner in Europe, is an indication that Europe should not yet be put on the political "scrap heap" by Israel. Israel's hopes for an "easy ride" with Asia and in particular, China, which is increasingly dependent on oil exports from the region, could soon prove illusory in light of the ex-

¹⁷ See also data from the Euro barometer "Two Years until the 2019 European Elections", in: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20170426PVL00115/Two-years-until-the-2019-European-Elections>.



plicity politically motivated interest-driven politics of these actors in the region.¹⁸

Yet, the European Union itself must also ensure to make it clear that Europe and Israel are traditionally bound together by common values: The conclusion from the finding of this survey, that two thirds of Israelis believe it to be dangerous for Jews to live within the EU, should be considered a huge challenge for Europe. Here in the long-term it not only concerns the problem of the "internal security", but ultimately nothing less than the ethical and political credibility of the European integration project. The impression of a community of values - within the EU - but also and particularly towards Israel, depends largely on whether the EU succeeds in relentlessly combating anti-Semitic tendencies. Therefore, in the end, Europe can illustrate that its Union, with its value preferences, is still noticeably closer to Israel than those economies in Asia in which Israel places new hopes.

In doing so, Germany will also and particularly continue, as the surveys show, to be seen as a special hope - not only when it comes to combating anti-Semitism. Even though the German-Israeli relations, in spite of their strong substance, are not completely free from conflict at present, they do, however, remain a source of hope for the overwhelming majority of citizens in Israel regarding relations with Europe. Germany is considered a mediator or even a lawyer for Israeli interests in the European Union. What is particularly remarkable, though, is that this survey also reaffirms that a majority of Israelis place their trust in the German government to play an active role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Also in Israel, the results of our survey seamlessly tie in with those surveys worldwide that expect more foreign and security policy activities by Germany.¹⁹ Even if this vote of confidence in light of the immense complexity of the Middle East conflict situations is probably what the Greeks referred to as a "Greek gift", the results of this study once again highlight that, despite the burden of

history, the wider public increasingly believes that Germany should take responsibility in the region.

Ultimately, the surveys equally make it clear that the European Union should also not confine itself to the role of a spectator, which merely sits at the tribune and offers advice. It needs to prove to both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides, that in case of emergency, it is prepared to share the costs and burden of peace. In the event of a peace agreement, that would not only comprise financial aid for an emerging Palestinian state, but finally also security guarantees, which help to secure the existence of Israel in the long-term. It is only by means of such a commitment - supported by facts - to the safety and the existence of Israel that the attitude in Israel towards the EU will once again change in a clearly positive way.

¹⁸ See: Bernard Zand, „China und der Nahe Osten Die widerstrebende Weltmacht“ [China and the Middle East The Reluctant Word Power], DER SPIEGEL online, 12/10/2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/china-importiert-mehr-oel-aus-opec-als-usa-a-927499.html>.

¹⁹ See: Stefani Weiss, „Germany's Security Policy: From Territorial Defense to Defending the Liberal World Order?“, Bertelsmann Foundation, 10/2016, <http://www.bfna.org/publication/newpolitik/germanys-security-policy-from-territorial-defense-to-defending-the-liberal-world-order>.