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**German and American Foreign and
Security Policies: Strategic
Convergence or Divergence**

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INHALT

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Zusammenfassung

Mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges sehen sich die transatlantischen Beziehungen einer neuen Herausforderung ausgesetzt. Auch die rituelle Beschwörung des engen Verhältnisses zwischen Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten kann nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß die früher geradezu automatisch gegebene Interessenidentität auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks, hervorgerufen durch den föderativen Effekt einer gemeinsamen externen Bedrohung, in der Form nicht mehr gegeben ist. Auch die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen als ein Eckstein des

transatlantischen Verhältnisses stehen damit vor dem Problem möglicher Interessengegensätze in zentralen außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Fragen, die eine frühzeitige gemeinsame Bewältigung erfordern.

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht mögliche deutsch-amerikanische Interessendivergenzen anhand der drei großen Problemfelder "Rußland und Ukraine", "Iran" sowie "Türkei und Zentralasien". Für jede dieser Regionen werden unterschiedliche Szenarien analysiert und die jeweils wahrscheinlichen deutschen und amerikanischen Reaktionen betrachtet. Hieraus lassen sich dann Aussagen über künftige Interessenkollisionen ableiten und Empfehlungen für die Bewältigung derartiger Divergenzen entwickeln.

Hinsichtlich der Entwicklungen in Rußland und in der Ukraine läßt sich auf deutscher und amerikanischer Seite ein recht hohes Maß an Übereinstimmung in der Bewertung der möglichen Szenarien prognostizieren. Gravierende Divergenzen sind allerdings bei einer deutlich negativen Entwicklung in Rußland hin zu konfrontativen und aggressiven Verhaltensweisen zu erwarten - eine Entwicklung, die nicht mehr ausgeschlossen werden kann. Hier fiel es vermutlich den USA wesentlich leichter, die bislang verfolgte Politik des Wohlwollens und der Unterstützung gegenüber Rußland zu ändern.

Gegenüber dem Iran sind bereits jetzt grundlegende Bewertungsunterschiede auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks zu beobachten. Die USA betrachten den Iran als internationalen "Outlaw" und als eine fundamentale Bedrohung für amerikanische und westliche Interessen. Sie empfinden es als einzig verbliebene Supermacht daher als ihre Pflicht, dieser Gefahr mit Entschiedenheit entgegenzutreten. Demgegenüber ist die deutsche Politik gegenüber dem Iran stärker von dem Ansatz gekennzeichnet, durch die Kommunikation auch in Krisenzeiten eine völlige Isolierung dieses Landes zu vermeiden. Auch überwiegt das Interesse an fruchtbaren ökonomischen

Beziehungen die Furcht vor dem Iran als elementare Bedrohung. Bezeichnenderweise zeigen sich in der Iranfrage zur Zeit größere Konvergenzen zwischen Washington und Moskau als zwischen Washington und Bonn. Die Gefahr deutsch-amerikanischer Auseinandersetzungen um den Iran würde zwangsläufig schwinden, wenn das Regime in Teheran seinen fundamentalistischen, anti-westlichen Kurs änderte. Damit ist aber momentan nicht zu rechnen.

Die Rolle der Türkei in Zentralasien wird aller Voraussicht nach nicht zu gravierenden Gegensätzen zwischen Deutschland und den USA führen, nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil die Möglichkeiten der Türkei, eine hegemoniale Rolle in der Region einzunehmen, weithin überschätzt wurden. Ein (derzeit unwahrscheinliches) Abgleiten der Türkei in ein islamisch-fundamentalistisch dominiertes Regime und ein entsprechendes Agieren dieses Landes in Zentralasien würde zwar zu unterschiedlichen deutsch-amerikanischen Bewertungen führen, allerdings wäre diese Frage weder für Deutschland noch für die Vereinigten Staaten von solcher Wichtigkeit, daß man eine einschneidende Krise in den Beziehungen beider Länder riskieren würde.

Aus der Betrachtung möglicher Entwicklungen in den genannten Regionen ergeben sich folgende Schlußfolgerungen und Empfehlungen:

Eine der wesentlichen Herausforderungen für das deutsch-amerikanische Verhältnis ergibt sich im Falle fundamentaler Veränderung in der russischen Politik hin zu autokratischen Strukturen und konfrontativen Verhaltensweisen. Dies wird zunehmend zu einer realen Gefahr, da es den regierenden Reformkräften offenbar immer schwerer fällt, ihren Kurs fortzusetzen.

Trotz möglicher Bewertungsunterschiede im Einzelfall besitzt Deutschland die besseren Voraussetzungen für eine dauerhafte strategische Partnerschaft mit den USA als Großbritannien

oder Frankreich. Dabei muß eine deutsch-amerikanische strategische Partnerschaft nicht notwendigerweise symmetrisch ausgerichtet sein.

Auseinandersetzungen über die Architektur des transatlantischen Verhältnisses sind eher kontraproduktiv und lenken von den dringlicheren Problemen ab. Statt Debatten über die künftige Rolle von Institutionen und Organisationen bedarf es des intensiven gemeinsamen "Contingency Planning" für mögliche Szenarien gerade in Osteuropa und den Nachfolgerepubliken der Sowjetunion. Nur so können gravierende Divergenzen in den nationalen Bewertungen und unrealistische Erwartungen an die Reaktionen des jeweiligen Partners vermieden werden.

1. Introduction

Between 1989 and 1991 a tectonic shift in world politics led to the abandonment of long standing judgments and assumptions about security relationships. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the demise of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the dismantling of the military confrontation in Europe occurred with a rapidity and decisiveness that was wholly unexpected. Not surprisingly, therefore, the emphasis has been on the geopolitical *changes* that took place. Significant as these changes were, however, the forces of *continuity* should not be overlooked. Many of the institutions and relationships and even some of the policies that prevailed during the Cold War have been perpetuated into the post-Cold War world, albeit with efforts to modify them to suit the new environment. The most striking of these is, of course, the Atlantic Alliance, at the core of which is the relationship between the United States and Germany. The future of United States-German relations, however, is uncertain.

The loss of the common enemy and the transformation of Europe from structures of confrontation to patterns of cooperation between East and West - as well as the moves towards greater integration in Western Europe itself - present new opportunities for trans-Atlantic drift. The extent of this drift remains uncertain, partly because both the United States and Western Europe are in the process of redefining not only their interests but also their sense of strategic identity. The end of the Cold War has deprived the United States of its bearings in the world and has raised anew some traditional questions about the appropriate balance between domestic and foreign policies, about the obligations of the United States government to its own citizens on the one hand and to the maintenance of global order on the other. For their part, the states of the European Community are trying to forge a common identity that accommodates divergent national perspectives and priorities and does not close off the possibility of eastward enlargement. As for Bonn, recognition of the need to take on greater responsibility has to be balanced against a desire to avoid over-assertiveness.

In these circumstances, challenges that emanate from *outside* NATO's traditional and formal area of responsibility are likely to have a dual impact on the relationship between Washington and Bonn. These challenges may put strains on a bilateral relationship that was traditionally held together not only by congruent interests but also by a clearly defined relationship in which the United States underwrote European security and the Federal Republic was the main consumer and beneficiary of this guarantee. At the same time, external challenges could prove to be a galvanizing force. To the extent that they are handled effectively, they could contribute to the revitalization and revalidation of the linkage between the United States and Germany, either within the NATO framework or at the bilateral level.

The purpose of this analysis is to explore some of the more salient of these challenges, to assess their possible impact on U.S.-German relations and to consider ways in which possible negative consequences might be mitigated and the Bonn-Washington relationship strengthened rather than weakened. In order to provide a balanced assessment, however, it is necessary to place post-Cold War contingencies in historical perspective. Accordingly, the first part of the study looks at previous examples of strain and tensions in U.S.-German relations. This is important because the historical experiences have left, if not a residue of resentment, a lingering sense of disappointment that could color perceptions of current and prospective issues. Past experiences are likely to have an impact on the way in which future problems are handled. Yet the study of the past is revealing for more than one reason. It makes very clear that there was never a golden age of tranquillity in which there was an automatic harmony of interest and congruence of outlook between Bonn and Washington. It also makes it easier to discern what is new and different about current or future challenges and it provides insight into what has to be done to manage them more effectively.

The second part of the paper identifies crucial elements in the current German and United States approaches to foreign and security policies and suggests that divergent political cultures are likely to have a significant - although not necessarily a decisive - impact on the prospects for cooperation in dealing with new security challenges.

The third part of the paper looks at the changes that have taken place in Russia and suggests that an increasingly assertive Russia will do much to shape the environment in which regional contingencies arise. This is followed by chapters looking respectively at the kind of contingencies that might arise in Ukraine, Iran, and Turkey and how the United States and Germany would respond. Attention is given

to both the extent of United States and German interests and the degree of convergence or divergence between them. Taking this as a point of departure, it is possible to identify situations in which divergences of interest and policy are relatively harmless as well as those in which they have the potential to erode or disrupt United States-German relations. It also means that having identified potential problems, the conclusion is able to offer a series of recommendations for avoiding or reducing stresses and strains in the German-United States relationship.

2. Historical Differences

2.1 Differences within NATO

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Germany enjoyed a close relationship within NATO. The multilateral alliance provided a framework within which the bilateral relationship was deepened and consolidated. Yet the relationship was never one of complete harmony: it was maintained intact in spite of divergences over how to respond to the Soviet threat, differences over the appropriate balance between military confrontation and diplomatic and economic overtures, and competing preferences over strategy and force posture. The strains and pressures were offset by a fundamental common interest in containing Soviet power in Europe. This was particularly true in relation to controversies over NATO policy, strategy, and force structure. In regard to out of area threats, however, there was more scope for divergence as Soviet power had less of a moderating influence on deliberations between Bonn and Washington.

The strains in the Bonn-Washington axis can be traced back to geopolitics, asymmetrical vulnerabilities and different

national roles and priorities. The United States was both the main provider of European security and the most removed from the conventional threat. The Federal Republic of Germany, as the front line state, was the major consumer of security but was also the most at risk from any war, conventional or nuclear. Washington's foremost concern was to protect Western Europe while avoiding a strategic nuclear war that would damage the Continental United States. From this perspective, war in Europe had to be contained rather than allowed to escalate. For Bonn, in contrast, West Germany would be the immediate battleground for hostilities, whether conventional or tactical nuclear. Not surprisingly, therefore, Germany (along with the other European allies) placed more emphasis on deterrence than defense. The resulting disputes over strategy within the Alliance were finessed when NATO adopted a strategy of flexible response that was capable of flexible interpretation. The United States saw the new doctrine as emphasizing sustained conventional resistance to conventional attack; the Europeans saw it as a strategy of escalation that would start with controlled measures but carried the risk of a loss of control.

Although the Federal Republic had a preference for deterrence over defense, this was accompanied by acute sensitivity to nuclear issues. Bonn typically oscillated between fears of abandonment by the United States and fears that it would be entrapped in a superpower confrontation. Deployment of nuclear weapons on German soil was one of the antidotes to fears over abandonment, but provoked anxieties about the dangers of confrontation. The Federal Republic was also preoccupied with the possibility of singularization, of incurring greater risks, costs and vulnerabilities than its allies. During the 1980s, such concerns intensified as strategy moved from the realm of the specialist to that of the populace. Opposition to the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Germany transformed NATO's nuclear modernization program into a test of German loyalty to the

Alliance as well as NATO's capacity to implement hard decisions. Ironically, with the deployment in place, there were some in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, who saw the INF Agreement with its removal of cruise and Pershing missiles as a weakening of extended deterrence.

In some respects nuclear issues went to the core of the Alliance. Although they had a somewhat abstract theological quality, like most theology they also involved trust and faith. When confidence in United States leadership was high, strategic controversies were relatively muted; when confidence was low, this was manifested either in doubts over the validity of extended deterrence or concerns that the United States was too cavalier about nuclear weapons. The symbolism of the nuclear debate both reflected and refracted underlying political realities. Nuclear strategy, although a serious issue in its own right, also became the means whereby underlying political differences between the United States and Germany could be ventilated, without doing irreparable harm to the Alliance.

Integral to the arguments over strategy were differences over the Soviet threat. The United States had a more serious assessment of the Soviet Union than did West Germany and the other Europeans. This stemmed partly from greater preoccupation with ideology but also from a somewhat mechanistic approach in which the state of the strategic nuclear balance was regarded by Washington as determining the likelihood of conventional aggression. The major assumption was that stability or parity at the strategic level would neutralize United States deterrence and thereby tempt Moscow to exploit its conventional superiority. This logic, which initially underlay NSC-68, was revived during the Kennedy Administration and came to the fore once again in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to nuclear parity. In Germany, the threat was assessed rather more in political terms, particularly after Bonn adopted its *Ostpolitik* in the

late 1960s. Initially this coincided with the United States' détente policy, and did not lead to acrimony. As the United States in the early 1980s rejected détente, however, this placed enormous strain on German-American relations.

Part of the difference reflected Washington's emphasis on the global reach of the Soviet Union and the German focus on the European continent. Part of it, however, stemmed from the fact that Bonn was rather more consistent in its approach and did not suffer the swings of mood and policy that seemed to characterize the United States as it abandoned its unrealistic expectations and unwarranted euphoria about détente and concluded that it had been betrayed by Soviet duplicity. Bonn, in contrast, had more realistic expectations, but continued to believe that encouraging moderate Soviet behavior remained crucial. This was to be achieved through the maintenance of economic links. Indeed, in the early 1980s German Foreign Minister Genscher articulated a case for continued economic exchanges with Moscow that was very reminiscent of the arguments enunciated by the Nixon Administration a decade earlier. They were rejected by the Reagan Administration, however, on the grounds that the best way to deal with the Soviet Union was through a mixture of punishment and denial. Consequently, the early 1980s was a period of considerable acrimony in Atlantic relations. The Reagan Administration felt that it had been let down by allies who had not provided Washington with an appropriate level of support in response to events in Afghanistan, Iran and Poland. For their part, the Germans were skeptical about United States policies that appeared to be based on a revival of anti-communist ideology rather than a sober appraisal of Soviet behavior. The arguments revolved around the wisdom of going ahead with the Siberian gas pipeline. The United States claimed that this would lead to energy dependence on the Soviet Union and open Western Europe up to energy blackmail. Germany and the other West European nations rejected these claims.

United States dissatisfaction with allied policies towards Moscow reinforced some of the older concerns over burden-sharing. From the 1960s onwards many members of Congress in particular believed that the European allies were not bearing a fair share of the common burden of defense. As such concerns intensified, the resentment was directed mainly at the Federal Republic which was the wealthiest of the allies yet was not spending money on defense commensurate with its economic prosperity. At times, the Alliance appeared to be suffering from a fundamental crisis of confidence on both sides of the Atlantic. In the early 1980s issues were transformed into tests of loyalty for the Europeans and tests of wisdom and statesmanship for the United States. Yet NATO - and within it the bilateral United States-West German relationship - was able to survive these tensions, as it had been able to survive earlier periods of strain. The main reason was the recognition in both Western Europe and the United States that the Alliance had to be maintained. Even if the Soviet Union did not pose the kind of threat that the Reagan Administration believed, Europeans recognized that the countervailing power of the United States military presence remained essential. Nowhere was this more true than in Bonn. And from Washington's perspective, the containment policy had to be maintained in spite of dissatisfaction with the allies. This fundamental common interest had somewhat paradoxical consequences for the trans-Atlantic relationship.

In the first place, because the framework was so important and the common interest in containing power was so fundamental it permitted differences to be aired without eroding the foundations of the Alliance. The very solidity of NATO made it possible to have intense arguments over policy, strategy, burden-sharing and responsibility sharing. There was a resilience and robustness to the Alliance that transcended both public squabbling and private disagreement over particular issues. Yet there was also a sense of the

limits of conflict - not least because if disputes reached the point of public and elite disaffection then rational calculation might be outweighed by political or emotional considerations. The possibility that the United States would be less willing to maintain its commitment to European security was constantly in the background. Congressional pressure to reduce American forces deployed in Western Europe was seen as a serious problem in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the possibility of a resurgence acted as sobering factor thereafter. This gave the United States a major advantage in the trans-Atlantic bargaining that was a constant feature of the Alliance. It meant that, in the final analysis, Washington would always get much of what it wanted, if not all. There were established patterns of leadership and "followership" in the Alliance. Even when the allies did not follow as fast or as far as the United States wanted, they ultimately recognized the need to respond to United States desires and preferences. Strategic dependence had its costs, but these were outweighed by the benefits of American protection.

This was particularly obvious on issues that were of direct import to the Alliance and connected directly to European security. Questions of strategy and force posture occasionally proved divisive but were ultimately resolved in a way that was acceptable on both sides of the Atlantic. There were other issues, however, that were outside the formal responsibility of the Atlantic Alliance in which the United States wanted more support than it obtained. There were inescapable differences of perspective between the United States as a global superpower and a German ally with a much narrower set of responsibilities and a more constricted range of vision. This was evident in a series of episodes in which the common interest of countering the direct Soviet threat was not at the forefront. These episodes are important both because they helped to shape attitudes and expectations that are still evident, and because the low salience of the

overriding threat provided a foretaste of the situation that confronts Bonn and Washington as they respond to current challenges outside NATO's formal area of responsibility.

2.2 Differences on Out-of-Area Issues

2.2.1 The German-Brazil Nuclear Deal

One of the issues that caused tension between Washington and Bonn in the 1970s concerned the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation regime had three major components: denial of sensitive materials and technologies through export restrictions; control of nuclear facilities via their systematic monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency; and reassurance to non-nuclear states through bilateral and multilateral guarantees. The United States led the collective effort to maintain this regime. Washington identified the problem, set the contours of an international strategy, pressed for compliance with the regime's codes of conduct, and drew attention to prospective proliferators and lapses in enforcement of export rules. A noteworthy example was the response to the proliferation risk represented by the commercial use of plutonium, a risk highlighted by the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. With critical reprocessing technologies beginning to enter the commercial market place, the Carter Administration in 1977 launched an energetic campaign to tighten controls on weapons relevant technologies and to restrict the use of plutonium in civilian reactors. The Administration embarked on an exercise in political education with itself as the tutor. Sharp differences with allies soon emerged, however, over what appeared to others as an effort to restrict legitimate nuclear commerce.

One of the transactions at the heart of the growing controversy was Germany's wide-ranging deal to supply

enrichment and other technologies to Brazil, a deal that underlined the loss of the United States' ability to control the scope and terms of nuclear exchanges. The Bonn government was divided over the response to the American campaign. On the one hand, the Foreign Ministry leaned towards cooperation with the United States. On the other, the Science and Technology Ministry was allied with the Finance Ministry in support of an aggressive nuclear sales program. The frantic bilateral diplomacy that ensued produced more dissonance than dialogue and created resentment in both capitals. Despite intensified American pressure, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was unwilling to accommodate the United States. The decision to go ahead with the exports to Brazil was officially announced the same day that Carter made his much-publicized statement on the mounting dangers of proliferation. Soon thereafter, Bonn also initiated a four-year energy research program focusing on plutonium recycling and development of the uranium-fueled breeder reactor, underscoring the differences between Germany and the U.S.

If the Carter Administration was maladroit in its campaign to force cancellation of the German-Brazil nuclear deal, Bonn's apparent insensitivity to the dangers of proliferation inherent in the transfer of technologies for producing fissile materials, also contributed to a dialogue of the deaf. The two governments had divergent attitudes and very different ways of defining the problem - rooted in their different locations with reference to the proliferation issue. The United States saw itself as the custodian of the world's non-proliferation regime - and acted accordingly. Washington's tutelary position as global superpower meant that it, more than any other state, would have to deal with the consequences of proliferation. From this perspective, German behavior appeared to put parochial commercial considerations ahead of security concerns, and convenience before responsibility. It was seen as symptomatic of a more generalized attitude among the United States' European

allies, a tendency to take for granted American policing of global trouble-spots while undervaluing the costs and difficulty of doing so.

Bonn, in contrast, saw the Carter Administration arrogating to itself unjustified prerogatives in determining the West's interests. Washington's failure to consult fully before declaring a public position that reversed existing understandings was deemed an abuse of American leadership prerogatives. Disregard for German commercial credibility, and its investment in a massive domestic program, reflected Washington's penchant for crusades that cast allies in the role of obedient followers. Neither American judgment nor diplomatic skill was judged worthy of such deference. This pattern would re-emerge on other issues.

2.2.2 The 1987 Naval Task Force in the Persian Gulf

American-German frictions that developed over the Western response to the Kuwaiti request for "reflagging" of its oil tankers during the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War reflected disparities in regional security roles outside Europe; and divergent perspectives on the mix of coercive and diplomatic measures to be taken in response.

The Reagan Administration, after intense debate, responded positively to the Kuwaiti request to protect its oil tanker fleet against attack by Iran. In late spring and early summer 1987, Washington sought to elicit the participation of its NATO allies - and was unsuccessful. The Europeans were cool toward the escort operation and at pains to follow an independent course.

The European allies did not wish to see their interests become hostage to the emotionalism that too often, they thought, colored official Washington actions with regard to Iran, an emotionalism fed by deep public passions. The

Irangate affair strengthened the impression of an administration given to impetuous acts and unable to maintain a sense of balance in dealings with the Ayatollah's regime. Such concerns were reinforced by other developments. The attack on Libya in 1986 was seen as reflecting a foreign policy style that was instinctively unilateralist, and given to hasty judgments and unconsidered actions. All this contributed to a distinct lack of confidence in U.S. leadership and evoked serious doubts that Washington possessed the constancy and restraint necessary for the sensitive task of protecting Western interests in the Gulf while facilitating the quest for an end to the Iraq-Iran War.

This was the backdrop against which West European governments at first declined Washington's request to participate in the reflagging enterprise. Nonetheless, a drastic turnaround in allied attitudes occurred in mid-August as the situation in the region deteriorated and Saudi Arabia appeared to be a target of Iran's revolutionary leadership. Fresh appeals were made by Washington for allied help, minesweepers in particular. By mid-August, five European governments agreed to participate in a loosely organized escort operation. In addition to the British and French naval forces already in the area, minesweepers and support vessels were dispatched by Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. West Germany assisted in the effort by redeploying some of its naval assets to compensate for the transfer of allied ships from the North Atlantic and Mediterranean.

In a significant diplomatic adjunct to the "flagging" episode, the Iranian government made its first conciliatory gesture toward a U.S.-sponsored United Nations peace initiative via Bonn. Security Council Resolution 598 called for withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognized boundaries and a total cease-fire. In early September, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran passed a message to Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that Iran wanted to avoid

escalation of the war and further conflict with the United States in the Gulf. That was the first step in a long process, spurred along by the shifting fortunes of war to Iran's disadvantage.

The naval engagement in the Gulf represented the most noteworthy projection of military force by the Western allies in an out of area situation since the Korean War. As such, it foreshadowed the incremental globalization of European security policy as companion to greater burden-sharing within the alliance. As it became more apparent that future conflicts touching on Western interests were likely to be outside NATO's traditional area of responsibility, the question of the terms and conditions under which the Western powers might engage themselves demanded closer attention. The Kuwaiti reflagging episode prefigured future challenges while highlighting the obstacles to fashioning and implementing joint strategies.

The episode occurred at a time when attention was beginning to be paid to a shifting distribution of roles between the United States and its European allies. Against a background of a diminishing Soviet threat and the growing economic strength of Western Europe, these events prompted European governments to consider the desirability of a more equal partnership with Washington that allowed them wider prerogatives of initiation and decision. In this respect, the naval task force episode anticipated what alliance policy making would look like in a world where the European allies would no longer defer automatically to American leadership and would seek to etch more independent diplomatic personalities.

These trends, evident in 1987, were accelerated by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe two years later. The crisis initiated by Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait in 1990 highlighted the practical challenge of devising truly

multilateral diplomacy appropriate to a more egalitarian allied partnership.

2.2.3 The Gulf War

The crisis over Kuwait accentuated the issues of alliance division of labor and collective diplomacy that had surfaced in 1987. It occurred at a historical seam between the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, a time when the West was attempting to redefine its security interests as the Soviet threat rapidly receded. Europe, engaged in drafting the compact for political union, was sensitive to its future influence on the international stage and the terms of cooperation with the United States. Although Germany was widely viewed as the potential leader of the European Community (EC), its aptitude for assuming that role was put to a severe test in the Gulf.

Indeed, the Gulf crisis was a stress test for the Western Alliance and its individual members - one that provided a graphic display of strengths, weaknesses and points of strain. The crisis revealed notable elements of concert and equally significant elements of tension. Coming at a time of reform and renovation of security structures, the crisis revealed that a stable new equilibrium point had yet to be reached. Even so, it was a defining event in two senses. It put in relief distinctive features of the internal dynamics of the Atlantic Alliance at a historic juncture in its evolution, above all the continued reliance on directive leadership by the United States. Moreover, the lessons that were being drawn from the experience helped shape, wittingly or unwittingly, the conduct of allied affairs elsewhere: both in the specific case of Yugoslavia and across the range of common security and political concerns. In pressing against the limits of their cooperation, the United States and its partners opened for examination the terms of their collaborative relationship. New light was cast on both

attitudes and capabilities that were at the heart of what the alliance was, what it could become, and how the evolution should be managed.

The United States performance in the Gulf conformed closely to the postwar model of dominating leadership. The allies also reverted to type, exhibiting continued habits of dependence on American direction. If the Bush Administration safeguarded its presumed prerogatives of unilateral decision making, most allied governments deferred to Washington, while France played off the American lead to pursue its own agenda. Only with regard to the unprecedented cost-sharing arrangements with Germany and Japan was there a noteworthy departure from past practices. The controversy over these "mercenary" payments was symptomatic of the growing incongruities in an alliance whose standard operating procedures no longer matched either the relative capabilities of members or their range of interests.

For all practical purposes, Germany, one of Washington's most important allies, was a non-player throughout the Gulf crisis. Bonn provided no military forces and made no significant diplomatic contribution. Even its considerable financial contribution was extracted rather than voluntary. The funds also came with conditions and were later qualified in amount amidst quibbling over exchange rates and the accounting of the costs incurred by the United States.

Even without these additional sources of contention, the arrangement that permitted the Germans to pay for the United States and others to fight on behalf of common interests in the Gulf could not fail to produce mutual recrimination. The arrangement relieved Bonn of the need to think through what its stakes were and what it was prepared to invest in protecting them. It also put the United States in the unedifying position of passing the tin cup while still

playing its accustomed role as protector and leader. In these circumstances, recrimination and resentment were unavoidable.

Germany's participation in the European Community's efforts to forge a common policy toward the Gulf crisis did nothing to resolve Bonn's dilemmas - largely because the EC was unable to reach a distinct position, opting instead to acquiesce in American leadership. This self-marginalization by the Community relieved pressure on Germany to pronounce its own position on the critical choices posed by Iraq's aggression. Moreover, physical disengagement from the military coalition permitted parochial attitudes and concerns to acquire undue prominence. The Kohl government took an instrumental approach, emphasizing both the financial contribution and the substantial logistic support provided for the redeployment of United States army units from Germany to the Gulf. While this support was appropriate to peculiar German circumstances, the paucity of clear declarations of support for partners engaged in a perilous enterprise to protect common interests and principles of international order created a poor impression in Washington. It appeared that a newly reunified Germany was too preoccupied with its own affairs to appreciate the trials of allies or to recognize the obligation to bolster them.

2.3 Implications

This analysis highlights several features of the past German-American strategic relationship that have implications for their post-Cold War collaboration.

- (1) There has been a marked disparity in the scope of perceived security responsibilities and obligations. The United States characteristically acts as implicit custodian of world order and as guardian of Western interests. It consequently has been sensitive to developments that carry even a modest danger to those

interests. This low threshold of threat perception manifests itself both in the geographic range of American anxious concern and an instinctive tendency to view the world through a glass darkly.

Germany has taken a more restricted view of its interests and responsibilities. Bonn has concentrated its attention on security in Europe and on those political developments that could threaten it directly. Conditions elsewhere have either been devalued or left to the responsibility of others. Consequently, Germany typically has exhibited a lower level of anxiety, and a higher threshold of threat perception, than the United States. As a corollary, those matters on the periphery of German interest and attention have less saliency in Bonn than in Washington.

(2) The United States has been inclined to take a more activist approach to issues identified as problems or threats. Washington has followed the axiom that it is wise to take preemptive measures where danger portends, to act decisively, and to apply whatever means - including military force - the threat requires. The German approach, however, has been characterized by caution rather than decisiveness. Premature action is something to be avoided, and accommodation, not confrontation, is judged the most productive way to handle disputes.

(3) The United States has tended to see relations with other states as seamless. It believes that a segmental approach to foreign relations is ultimately unworkable. This logic applies to allies as well as prospective antagonists. From this perspective, commercial dealings should be placed in a wider political context; human

rights issues made part of diplomatic interchange; and a government's internal policies taken into account in fashioning relations. Germany, in contrast, holds to the view that economic relations should not be governed by the terms of political relations. Indeed, the cultivation of commercial and financial ties is often seen as an effective way to induce favorable change in the outlook and behavior of a foreign government. At the same time, the implied tolerance for deviations from the desired norms of democratic governance and peaceable intercourse among states is differentiated by region. German policy is more sensitive to the internal characteristic of governments with whom it treats in Europe than it is elsewhere in the world. This partially bifurcated focus conforms to a foreign policy outlook whose scope has been geographically limited.

Although these differences in outlook and philosophy have provoked diplomatic confrontations between Washington and Bonn, such clashes were more subdued than those that punctuated Franco-American relations. For Germany, maintaining the framework of common security was paramount even if it meant accepting a subordinate status vis-à-vis the United States. Germany's postwar trauma and Cold War exigencies combined with the Alliance's tacit division of labor that assigned the United States the lead role in addressing out-of-area problems. The wide disparity in resources confirmed American primacy and set limits to German opposition to American preferences. Strategic divergence was tolerable only within carefully circumscribed boundaries; strategic divorce was simply unthinkable.

These conditions are already being modified. A unified Germany is gradually asserting the prerogatives of an independent foreign policy across the span of European issues which have emerged in the wake of Communism's collapse. The United States' attentiveness to continental political

developments has lost its concentrated focus. Ambivalent as to the extent of engagement in European affairs, Washington is showing greater readiness to devolve responsibilities onto what it hopes will be a politically competent European Union. A more egalitarian set of trans-Atlantic relationships is evolving as tasks of collective political management supersede military defense at the top of the Western security agenda and U.S. military assets appear less important.

The combined effect of these changes is to give Bonn more room to affirm a distinct diplomacy and to diminish Washington's will or ability to set the terms of the German-American partnership. The new balance of responsibility and initiative that is being struck could have the effect of narrowing the differences in approach and outlook apparent in attitudes toward the type of sub-strategic out of area problems noted above. Whether this will occur, however, depends on the extent to which Bonn and Washington continue to play the distinctive roles each had during the Cold War period. Then, there was mutual acceptance of respective roles as senior and junior partners in their bilateral relationship, with Germany acting as a relatively reticent regional power deferring to American leadership as a global superpower. Now, the Clinton administration is encouraging Germany to accept an expanded conception of its international responsibilities commensurate with its weight, and to loosen the restraints that have shackled German foreign policy.

President Clinton's enthusiastic reaction to the July 1994 ruling of the German constitutional court on the legality of deploying troops on missions beyond the NATO area is indicative of the American conviction that a more activist German role in world affairs serves the two countries' common interests. Indeed, by holding out the prospect of a German-American special relationship - especially in addressing the challenge of stabilizing Eastern Europe - the President

implicitly has offered Chancellor Kohl a revision of their partnership on terms of near equality. At the same time, Chancellor Kohl has shown evident uneasiness at being promoted as the United States' main partner in Europe, much less as a permanent participant in the UN's farflung peacekeeping operations. The two allies' future relationship will not be symmetrical, however much it differs from the past. Each likely will continue to exhibit traits that reflect important differences in both historical experience and their current status in the world. Moreover, the fluidity of present circumstances, and the absence of immediate threats, suggest that national perspectives and style will be influential in shaping foreign policy. Therefore, Germany and the United States often will find themselves on divergent tracks - especially on issues and in areas that are on the margins of each government's central concerns yet are important enough to elicit an identifiable line of policy. These national perspectives and approaches are the subject of chapter three.

3. Current National Perspectives

This chapter explores the different national styles and perspectives of Germany and the United States on out-of-region scenarios. It also looks at how these national styles are likely to impinge on the development of policy towards third regions.

3.1 Germany

Germany's approach to the United States and to third regions cannot be understood without reference to the German situation during the Cold War, and to the changes - and continuities - in this situation since the Cold War ended.

During the post-war period, Germany developed from a defeated country into an export-oriented economic superpower. It had few sharply defined security interests beyond self defense within the alliance. All of Germany's international political initiatives were fully integrated into the Western alliance framework, and later into the emerging CSCE and the United Nations. Initially, security policy integration was not a choice, but a necessity for Germany. The Western allies needed the German military potential to contain the threat from the East; yet, they wanted to ensure that this potential would not once again be used to further nationalist ambitions. Increasingly, however, both the German public and its policymakers came to appreciate this limited approach to international security as beneficial. Slowly, political and economic integration became a goal in itself. Hence, at the end of the Cold War, West Germany's foreign and security policy was marked by a strong preference for political and economic integration, a deference to multilateral consensus building (as opposed to the formulation and implementation of *national* security interests), a disdain for "power politics" and the use of military force for solving international problems, and a self-perception as a mature "civilian power"¹. While its diplomatic and military ambitions were modest, Germany aggressively pursued economic opportunities abroad.

In the climate of the Cold War, this approach to international security served Germany well. It provided considerable leeway for the pursuit of international economic relations. In any case, Germany was rarely called upon to play a bigger military or political role outside of NATO. In those cases where the United States did expect out of area commitments, Germany could often fall back behind the consensus of its European allies that NATO had no business

¹ On the concept of a civilian power see Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79 (5), Winter 1990/91, pp. 91-106.

outside the treaty area. When the United States became exasperated with the reluctance of its NATO allies to support out of area operations, it usually did not single out Germany in its criticism.

Throughout the Cold War, Germany's approach to international economic relations and technology transfer did not link political behavior with granting economic cooperation. It had close economic relations with such "Pariah" states as Libya and Iran. This "segmented" approach led to frequent clashes with the United States. As described above, the United States as the senior partner in this relationship did not always gain the upper hand. The German government could rightly assume that the core security relationship with the United States - defense within the alliance - was too important for both sides to be seriously affected by such disagreements. Thus, Germany could preserve its core security interest - self defense with a U.S. guarantee - while insisting on its "apolitical" approach to economic relations and technology transfer.

German unification changed the parameters of this relationship. Germany shed the remnants of post-World War II restrictions on its foreign policy. It became by far the biggest and economically most powerful country in Western and Central Europe. At the same time, the relaxed security environment seemed to make German reliance on alliance defense less necessary.

Many observers anticipated that Germany would quickly grow into its new great power role. The strong U.S. support of German unification was based on the premise of President Bush's phrase "Partners in Leadership". Indeed, German political leaders themselves expected no less. The very process of unification seemed to be a first example of a changed Germany, taking its international interests into its own hands and pursuing them even against the will of some of

its European allies. However, it became rapidly clear that the changes in Germany's external environment were not matched by its domestic attitudes and foreign policy approaches. Continuity prevailed; U.S. expectations of Germany sharing in the global management of conflict turned out to be premature.

This development first became apparent in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Iraqi aggression and the Western response faced Germany with a dilemma it had successfully avoided for forty years: Facing up to the implications of its limited approach to security policy. The German political leadership hesitated both in its active and declaratory support for the U.S.-led operation to free Kuwait, at great cost for its international credibility. The German public was concerned about the war, but did not conclude that any German participation was called for. It seemed as if forty years of international political abstinence paired with prosperity had changed German attitudes and styles permanently. The lessons from the Gulf War as well as the subsequent Yugoslav crisis point to a number of features that prevail in the new Germany.²

First, Germany is still struggling to define a role in global affairs based on its national interests and on the available means to pursue these interests. Its strong tradition of defining interests in institutional, non-national terms has turned into an aversion to the mere term "national interest".

Second, while the German constitutional court has removed the perceived legal obstacles to using *Bundeswehr* troops under the mandate of international organizations such as the United Nations, Germany still has to demonstrate the political will

² For a comprehensive analysis of German security policy after the Cold War see Wolfgang F. Schlör, "German Security Policy", Adelphi Paper 277, (London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies June 1993).

to participate in other than humanitarian and diplomatic international measures. During the Cold War, Germany was not allowed to play a military role outside NATO, and increasingly it did not want to. It codified this policy choice with an interpretation of its constitution, banning any military role for the German armed forces outside NATO. The July 1994 decision by the *Bundesverfassungsgericht* to void this ban as it relates to UN-sponsored operations ended an extended political squabble over legalistic issues and will help focus the German debate on the more important question of national interests and commitment. However, it remains to be shown that the German public has given up its reluctance to support militarily risky ventures abroad. Dramatic departures from previous German policy are unlikely. Early government statements following the court's decision emphasized political continuity: German officials still rule out military involvement in the former Yugoslavia, and rejected suggestions that *Bundeswehr* units should join French troops in protecting a sanctuary for refugees in Ruanda. Indeed, given Germany's historical legacy in many potential crisis spots in and around Europe, it might well be possible that the legalistic argument against using German troops will now be replaced by a historical argument. In addition, the current crisis of the German armed forces and the lack of transportation and long-distance logistical capability will make it difficult to back up political commitments to international peacekeeping with military means.³

Third, the formulation of a German security identity is hampered by a habitual search for institutional solutions for political problems. European political and economic

³ On the German debate over *Bundeswehr* use outside NATO before the *Bundesverfassungsgericht* decision see Kurt Kissinger, "Bundeswehr out-of-area", Ridgway Viewpoints 10 (Pittsburgh, PA: Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1993). On the court ruling see "Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr verfassungsgemäß" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 13, 1994. On the *Bundeswehr's* capability to participate in UN peacekeeping missions see "Kinkel und Scharping deuten das Bundeswehr-Urteil" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 14, 1994.

integration was the policy of choice and necessity for post-war Germany. While the original impulse of this policy is still valid, this goal is increasingly used as a substitute for clearly formulated national goals, especially in the field of international security.

These three factors point to continuity in the patterns of German policy towards the U.S. and third regions. However, the results of some of the very third-region policies that have characterized Germany's Cold War approach are now agents of change. In particular, a series of embarrassing incidents has uncovered the critical role of German companies in supplying renegade states with equipment for the production of chemical and nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles, and the lackadaisical enforcement of weak export control laws by the German government. Television pictures of Scud missile impacts in Israel during the Persian Gulf War have heightened a sense that Germany can no longer close its eyes to the international security consequences of its foreign economic policy. As a result, export control legislation has been strengthened, along with enforcement agencies.

Independent of this development, the German public and policymakers have become increasingly aware of the risks associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and unchecked arms exports. These threats are no longer overshadowed by the East-West confrontation, and, indeed, have been compounded by the breakup of the Soviet Union. A number of spectacular arrests involving uranium and plutonium smugglers in the summer of 1994 in Germany have dramatically highlighted this concern. In the public consciousness, these threats are now firmly established as directly affecting German security.

It is important, however, to realize the limits of these new influences on German third-region policy. Germany has become

more reluctant to adopt a free-wheeling approach to technology transfer and arms exports and sees the potential threats to its own security that grow out of such an approach. At the same time, Germany is still not willing to make its economic relations subordinate to political assessments of countries as "renegades". Short of an internationally sanctioned economic embargo, or domestic public pressure, Germany will not cut its economic ties to a country due to requests from the United States. Where it is imposing arms or trade embargoes, as in the case of Turkey, it does so for reasons of moral outrage, not in pursuit of well-defined strategic interests. Germany is using positive economic means to further its security interests, as in the case of Russia. However, it is not using its arms export or technology transfer policy as a positive means to further its security interests.

While there is only little convergence between Germany and the United States in their approaches to third regions, the situation is different for the core security relationship. Germany faces an uncertain security environment. While the Soviet threat is gone, and the last Russian troops have left Germany, the West faces increasing difficulties in trying to ensure stability within the former Soviet Union. Germany, at the former fault line between East and West, feels particularly exposed to the potential instability from this area. German policymakers realize that, for the time being, Europe alone cannot manage security implications growing out of an unstable former Soviet Union. Thus, there remains a strong desire to keep the United States involved in European security. At the same time, there is also a fear that the incentives that keep the United States in Europe are rapidly shrinking. Hence, at the least, Germany sees a need to de-emphasize divergent policy issues between the two countries. Moreover, there is broad bipartisan agreement in Germany on this need.

German concern about the implications of a U.S. disengagement from Europe is heightened by the domestic difficulties in agreeing on a coherent security policy. Despite the court ruling on out of area activity in July 1994, these disagreements still extend to the use of military power outside of NATO, and thus directly affect U.S.-German strategy on third regions. Combined, these developments mean that Germany is likely to be accommodating when it comes to avoiding or modifying policies that the U.S. finds offensive, but less flexible when the United States wants Germany to become more active in third-region issues, for example through military support.

3.2 United States

The challenge that President Clinton has faced is to shape a constructive, influential role for the United States in Europe while it gradually relinquishes some powers of its former tutelary leadership. Compared to its predecessor, the Clinton administration has a stronger desire to see the Europeans assume a large share of common responsibilities. Candidate Clinton struck a theme that has become a benchmark for his administration's foreign policy: multilateralism should be the hallmark of allied cooperation in the post-Cold War era. He called for the "reapportioning of the burden of collective security", urging that "we should look to our alliances to take a more active role in the defense of their own regions." As the President envisaged it, the U.S. role should be "to tip the balance, . . . not to bear every burden"⁴.

*But what does it mean 'to tip the balance'? Clearly, President Clinton had in mind something other than the United States playing the role of balancer in a classic *Staatspolitik* game of 'balance-of-power'. Rather, the term*

⁴ Bill Clinton's Address to the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, April 1, 1992.

refers to the place of the United States in the councils of the West, and in whatever collective projects it undertakes. It presumes that the United States' contribution is exceptional. That contribution is seen as valuable in ensuring that the Alliance makes sound, cogent decisions and executes policies effectively, while maintaining Western unity.

On what grounds might it be claimed that the United States is uniquely able to improve the quality of decisions and their implementation? Above all, there is the conviction, widely held in Washington, that the United States' experience in conducting a global strategy, while acting as leader of the West in its confrontation with communism backed by Soviet and Chinese power, endows it with a mastery of world affairs unmatched by its partners. As Senator Lugar is fond of saying, "when it comes to leadership, we're it". That experience, it is believed, translates into superior discernment as to the potential ramifications of a security problem as well as how it intersects with concerns in other regions or related political spheres. Washington therefore is presumed to have acquired greater prescience as to the chain of effects to be expected from diverse courses of action. In sum, the United States' tenure as a global superpower is seen as making Washington more knowledgeable and more perceptive than its allies.

In this formative period of adjustment to post-Cold War circumstances, the notion that the United States alone can chart a course for the West serves as a convenient reference mark for shaping a new American security role. For it seems to open the way for keeping a good measure of American influence even as American military power diminishes in magnitude and - more important - as an asset ensuring Washington a prominent voice in Alliance councils. The argument based on experience and perspective, rather than power alone, justifies the United States exercising influence

while shedding part of the heavy military and diplomatic burden it bore in the past. It holds out the prospect that Washington can cash the peace dividend and scale back its overseas commitments (thereby mollifying public and Congressional opinion) while minimizing the loss of influence in places like Europe that are of capital importance to the United States.

A related advantage of stressing the value of American insight and judgment is that it does not presume that America always will be expected to take the lead in responding to threats or in managing crises. As Yugoslavia has demonstrated, the United States now follows the twin principles of selectivity and political prudence in deciding whether to commit itself militarily or diplomatically. At the same time, it insists on a *droit de regard* on all matters of consequence. That demand is easier to justify where there is acceptance of the idea that American counsel is welcomed by virtue of the breadth of the U.S. outlook and Washington's accumulated wisdom. Such acceptance cannot be taken for granted.

As a practical matter, American administrations still find it instinctively difficult to take a narrow approach to foreign relations, i.e., one that permits the encapsulation of issue areas, the using of short time-frames for the definition of problems, and the implicit segregation of a country or a region from wider global conditions. Correspondingly, Washington looks askance at what it judges as the parochially self-interested behavior of its partners who are prepared to cast a blind eye on the dangerous policies or obnoxious political practices of regimes that offer a tempting opportunity for lucrative economic dealings. Indeed, there is a generalized perception that there has been an inequitable division-of-labor over the years whereby the United States looks after the collective welfare as a matter of duty (entailing risks, costs and the foregoing of possible

commercial benefits) while the allies strike a balance for themselves on more convenient terms. The latter's readiness to do so is taken to be an unwelcome, but unavoidable outgrowth of their long-standing reliance on their American big brother for their security. This attitude survives despite the evident propensity of the Clinton Administration itself to recognize the convenience of narrowly drawn treatment of policy problems.

In the Cold War past, official Washington reactions to allied parochialism alternated between fatalistic acceptance and sharp annoyance. Long periods of resigned tolerance for the 'free-riding' and self-indulgent behavior of allies was punctuated by bouts of outrage when Washington thought its partners' behavior was so egregious as to be irresponsible. This behavior has been seen by United States officials as companion to policies and actions that left it up to the United States to protect Western interests put at risk in regional conflicts, the recurrent Middle East wars most prominent among them. Memories persist in Washington of the refusal by some Western European allies to allow the United States to use military bases for supplying Israel with aid at a critical moment in the Yom Kippur War. They are etched all the deeper by the beggar-thy-neighbor policies followed during the ensuing oil crisis triggered by the Arab embargo and the surge in petroleum prices on the world markets. Incidents such as the passive acquiescence in the physical takeover of the European Community ministerial meeting in Copenhagen in December 1973 by officials from Arab governments or the willingness to sacrifice the Netherlands (by blocking the trans-shipment of refined oil products), in a vain attempt to placate oil-exporting Arab governments that had targeted the Netherlands for sanctions, stand out. These incidents vividly portrayed for Washington the fecklessness of allies. They left a lingering impression that when it came to less-than-strategic security threats (especially outside

Europe), the United States should expect most of its allies, most of the time, to take the path of least resistance.

Today, the United States government finds itself caught between its globalist approach to international affairs, as well as its instinctive activism, and a waning ability or inclination to assert itself in the accustomed manner. Raising the alarm about a troubling situation carries with it the implicit obligation to initiate preventive or remedial action - action for which the country might no longer be prepared. In the case of Bosnia, those divergent impulses opened an embarrassing gap between a rhetoric that expressed an intellectual judgment about the significance of what was occurring (and the need for more forceful Western action) and a policy position that expressed the new constraints on American actions. By contrast, on nuclear issues in particular, and arms issues generally, there remains a strong tendency for an American administration to impose its traditionally globalist perspective, and to seek to set its allies on a collective course to deal with them aggressively. Its concerns about Iran's supposed nuclear arms ambitions is a case in point.

The continuation of American leadership on nuclear issues does have the inadvertent effect of complicating the process of cultivating a new division-of-labor (or, sharing of responsibilities) with allies. For it means that multiple signals are being sent eastwards across the Atlantic, signals that have not been fully clarified and differentiated. On the one hand, the United States wants Western Europe both to take the lead in knitting bonds of solidarity with the former Communist states of East Central Europe (with Germany playing the key role) and to be in the forefront of preventive diplomacy and crisis-management where nationality conflicts arise. On the other, it presumes the allies are either not yet ready to contribute substantially to graver nuclear matters or are unnecessary for managing such issues.

Understandably, giving practical expression to new terms of U.S. engagement with its European allies has proven to be dauntingly difficult. There are two principal reasons for this. First, old habits of thinking and behavior die hard: Washington fights shy of yielding its prerogatives of precedence and final say over major allied actions even as it calls upon its partners to show more initiative and to assume heavier burdens. Its partners, for their part, talk bravely of affirming their own distinct personality on security matters, yet are unable to unite in the here and now to tackle concrete problems (as witness their faltering performance on Yugoslavia). These basic questions of Western strategy and collaborative allied diplomacy have not been directly and candidly addressed. The failure to do so has left them to an intermittent dialogue conducted more by pantomime and unilateral declaration than by collective deliberation. Second, the modes and methods of a more egalitarian alliance have not been mastered; neither has the politics of a truly multilateral alliance whose governments are weak of will, and their electorates risk-averse.

Whether and with what consequence these shortcomings of multilateralism within the Alliance become a manifest, serious liability will be determined by three things:

(1) whether serious threats to Europe's post-Communist political order stemming from Russian attempts to reimpose their dominion over the ex-Soviet republics, above all Ukraine, will materialize;

(2) the ability of the major Western partners to agree on a strategic consensus addressing political challenges in Central and Eastern Europe; and

(3) whether a sound basis for sharing responsibilities seen as equitable by governments and public alike is established.

Accord between the United States and Germany is the *sine qua non* for avoiding costly trans-Atlantic clashes over Alliance form and policy. That truth is recognized in Washington as well as Bonn. For senior American policy-makers - including the President - it has become axiomatic that developing a trusting German-American entente is the key to making Alliance multilateralism work, and thereby to securing the American interest in and contribution to the construction of post-Cold War Europe.

From the American vantage-point, the key to a politically and diplomatically viable partnership is tangible evidence that its allies, above all Germany, are prepared to take on major responsibilities of the sort the United States has borne for nearly half-a-century. Germany's disproportionate financial contribution to the economic development of the former Communist states is recognized in official Washington; and so too is Bonn's leadership in championing the U.S. cause within the EU. Indeed, it is the Clinton administration's belief that Bonn and Washington must work in tandem to achieve the conditions of continental peace and democracy. As the President pointedly declared during his state visit in July 1994: "The U.S. and Germany have a more immediate and tangible concern with those issues, even than our friends in Europe. Our common partnership is unique because so many of our challenges are just to Germany's East. I think anything that can be done to enable Germany to fulfill the leadership responsibilities that it is plainly capable of fulfilling is a positive thing."⁵

This view is widely shared in Washington policy circles, including in Congress. However, there clearly has been less acknowledgment of Germany's impressive record in aid to the East on Capitol Hill and in political circles generally. There are two reasons for this negligence. One is a

⁵ Press Conference by President Clinton and Chancellor Kohl, Germany, July 11, 1994.

reluctance to focus on facts that point uncomfortably to the embarrassing dearth of equivalent American assistance. The other is the pervasive tendency to give far more weight to military commitments and engagement of forces than to economic contributions. For most Americans, the litmus test of allied dedication to righting the perceived imbalance of leadership, and of potential sacrifice, is whether the allies step forward to take charge of the serious security problems. In this latter respect, the Western European performance on Yugoslavia confirmed American doubts about the aptitude of allies for taking timely action when the tough questions arise.

Germany's image is doubly tarnished by the harsh judgments that Americans pass on their allies' role in the Yugoslav calamity. For one thing, it is included in the undifferentiated condemnation of failed will and ineptitude. For another, it highlights Bonn's abstention from direct involvement in crisis situations that carry the risk of armed combat. The American focus on the expanded role it wants and expects for Germany, rather than on constraining circumstances, testifies to the unqualified judgment that Germany is now beyond its postwar 'probation' period. It henceforth is to be treated as, and judged by the standard applied to, other allies. Indeed, many already are raising expectations on the presumption that Germany now is the West's standard-bearer in Europe. Now that the German constitutional court has cleared away the perceived constitutional barrier to the involvement of the country's armed forces in UN sponsored peacekeeping missions, expectations of a strong German contribution to collective security operations will rise even higher. The concomitant is that U.S. officials will be on the lookout for signs of German readiness to take on duties for maintaining international order generally.

Germany therefore has assumed exceptional importance in the American strategic vision at the same time as Washington has ceased to distinguish it by reference to historical circumstance. The United States is applying a utilitarian standard in considering whether Germany is fulfilling what Washington postulates as reasonable duties and obligations. Bonn's emphasis on concerting its foreign policy with its EU partners will not affect these appraisals in any fundamental way. The Clinton administration expects Germany to lead - be it in the European Union or outside it. While the President, and his senior advisers, are supportive of the commitment to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), they will judge its value in pragmatic terms. They understand the language of practical accomplishment, while remaining generally uncomprehending of what is disparagingly called 'EC metaphysics'. The key to winning the United State's active support, as opposed to its tacit acceptance, of allied moves towards a CFSP, is a demonstrated success in tackling a challenging problem and getting the job done.

By implication, Germany's contribution to European security will be appraised without regard to the institutions and mechanisms through which it chooses to act. Bonn may well find this American attitude disconcerting, if not downright unfair - on a number of counts. Germany's unmatched contribution in helping the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe through financial aid, open markets and positive example are implicitly undervalued; while attention fastens on its lower profile in the security domain. Germany shares in the blame distributed by Washington for the EU's failure in Yugoslavia (indeed the German reluctance to take the lead - with the dubious exception of the ill-considered recognition issue - is held against it); yet, U.S. officials (much less Congress) often seem inattentive to the complex process and intricate politics of EU construction that leave little room for assertive leadership by any one member - even its largest.

However justified these sentiments might be, Americans will continue to hold high expectations for Germany as Western Europe's strongest and potentially most influential power. From this vantage point, the European Union is becoming a hindrance to clarifying future terms of the German-American strategic relationship. EU development in the long run could lead to a more stable, re-equilibrated trans-Atlantic partnership. For the time being, though, the indeterminate status of the union - and the attendant confusion over the distribution of responsibilities (and accountability) between Brussels and member capitals - offers ready excuses for evading the hard decisions.

The controversy over Western security architecture is a related factor that has added to the static in the lines of communication between the United States and its European allies. Disagreement over the allocation of functions between NATO and WEU/EU has been an enervating distraction from the overriding need to enhance the effectiveness of concerted allied efforts to foster a post-Communist security system. Passions have now abated, and a *modus vivendi* has been reached - for the time-being. However, it would be overly optimistic to assume that issues of organizational jurisdiction and precedence have been resolved. The Maastricht Treaty's provisions for a CFSP, reinforced by the formal designation of the WEU as the European Union's defense arm, ensures that a concerted strategy by the West, and the concerted diplomacy required to implement it, will have to overcome the strains of having two decision centers. Overlapping memberships, and convergent purposes notwithstanding, the very existence of the separate bodies increases the risks of Western irresolution and incoherence when faced with a serious, possibly risky security problem. The mishandling of the Yugoslav crisis stands as an object example of how the availability of multiple organizational vehicles can encourage prevarication and hesitation.

Avoiding that trap will be essential to Western cohesion where there is a serious threat to continental security arising from adverse developments in Russia.

4. The New Context

In the four and a half years since the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe began to break apart, Western governments have struggled to fashion a common strategy suited to novel, unsettled conditions. That challenge has been made all the more daunting by the succession of changes in the status and political orientation of the leadership in Moscow. Within this short span of time, it has passed through three distinct phases:

(1) from November 1989 until December 1991, when the beleaguered Mikhail Gorbachev yielded progressively to the freeing of the Soviet satellites while pursuing a course of rapprochement with the West and pragmatic domestic reform;

(2) from December 1991 to December 1993, when the dissolution of the USSR left Boris Yeltsin as the head of a Russian government committed to liberal reforms and an accommodating, self-effacing foreign policy while groping for leverage on the multiple constitutional, economic, and territorial crises it faced; and

(3) the most recent period, ushered in by the revival of conservative and ultra-nationalistic political forces, which is characterized by a more assertive strategy aimed at establishing Russia's sway within the domain of the CIS, a more independent line in dealing with the West, and the retreat of democrats in the battle over who will shape the country's political and economic institutions.

This latest and, for the most part, unexpected transformation in the political climate is forcing a reconsideration of three premises that have underlain Western thinking about what was required to solidify a Europe "whole, free and at peace with itself". The first was that a new chapter had opened in the history of Russia's place in European affairs. The country's affairs presumably were now on a track parallel to, and in important respects convergent with, that of the West. Moscow's commitment to constitutional democracy and a market economy held the promise that a comity of outlook would be the natural expression of basic social realities; therefore, diplomatic cooperation could go beyond expedient calculations of transitory interest. Two, Russia's weakened position, as well as its new orientation, would lead it to prize good relations with the West; for the West alone could provide critically needed assistance while affording Russia the respected place in continental affairs that national self-esteem demanded. Consequently, Russia not only would cease to be a threat to the independence and interests of its neighbors, but would be a sympathetic participant - if not full partner - in the historic project of building a stable European order. Third, the Western nations embarked on that enterprise confident in the belief that their interests were secure as never before in history. Indeed, the values they espoused, and embodied, were being proclaimed across the continent.

By early 1994, each of these suppositions required amendment. Russia's political future looked increasingly ominous. While the eventual form of the country's governmental institutions and leadership is an open question, anti-democratic forces are clearly strengthened. That trend, discernible a scant few years after the collapse of the Soviet regime, is a strong reminder of how inhospitable to democracy Russian soil is. Internal upheavals have produced a noticeable shift in Moscow's approach to its foreign relations. Cordial relations with the West remain important, but that objective no longer

overrides all other national interests. Those interests are increasingly defined in traditional terms:

(1) restoring a Russian sphere of dominant presence in the territories that constitute the CIS - in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the European republics of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova;

(2) establishing a position of protector for Russian communities in the "near abroad" - including those in the Baltic states;

(3) preventing Russia's segregation from the rest of Europe by the incorporation of its former east central European vassals into Western institutions of cooperation; and

(4) securing for itself the recognized status of a continental power whose self-defined national interest must be taken into account on all matters of European security, e.g., the former Yugoslavia.

This shift in Russian foreign policy is forcing the West to modify what had become the accustomed way of dealing with Moscow. Russian deference to Western desires and an accommodating response to Western initiatives no longer can be taken for granted. The idea of "partnership" (with Russia very much cast in the role of junior partner) has lost much of its credibility. Certainly, the West realistically cannot count on cooperation as arising from a comity of underlying interest and outlook. Cooperation, when it proves possible, will depend on calculations of marginal gain or advantage by a Russian leadership that more and more views external affairs through the prism of national interest. How parochial or enlightened that conception of national interest will be turns on domestic political conditions. As elsewhere, in any concrete instance the definition of interest - and the selecting of a course of action - will entail contingent

judgments of costs, risks, and opportunities. Two things can be said with some confidence: one, the disposition toward narrower, more self-centered formulations of Russian national interests is becoming more pronounced; and two, the Yeltsin government's latitude for exercising its independent judgment is being seriously constrained by a hostile legislature, a self-willed military leadership, and a skeptical public opinion.

The broad conclusion to be drawn from these circumstances is that the West must accept that its relationship with Russia is neither of partnership nor hostility. Instead, Russia should be viewed as a large, proud nation that is still a significant presence in European affairs - and, a nation whose recent traumas have left it not quite reconciled with its lost territories and status. Hence, it is acutely sensitive to any perceived further affronts to its dignity, and keen to restore a measure of past influence. To maximize the potential for cooperation that remains, and to avoid rivalries that could lead to alienation and conflict, the Western allies need to maintain a sustained diplomacy at once supportive of democrats and firm in requiring Russian observance of the codes of conduct to which it has subscribed. Creating as favorable a context as circumstances permit will facilitate the handling of individual issues, where classic diplomatic bargaining will be the norm.

Success for the West in both achieving preferred terms of diplomatic transaction with Moscow and keeping the relationship on the track of constructive engagement, will be jeopardized by division among the allies. To leave differences of interpretation and attitude unresolved, to be uninhibited in undertaking solo diplomatic ventures, or to allow parochial outlooks to shape thinking and policy, is to diminish the West's ability to influence the course of Russian behavior. It hampers efforts to resolve touchy problems - such as Russia's relationship with Ukraine and the

Baltics. Disunity in the West not only undercuts the allies' own ability to bring their weight to bear on issues; it also emboldens the Russian leadership to be more adventuresome in trying to restore Moscow's lost prestige and influence. Unity is difficult to achieve and maintain, however, under the diffuse conditions that have emerged with the Cold War's demise. The disarray on display in Yugoslavia is symptomatic of the Western allies' loss of dedication and discipline in contending with the intersecting challenges of establishing a post-Communist continental order and renovating their own institutional relationship.

A half century of unrelieved confrontation with a mortal foe has left the West with a dichotomous conception of international affairs: implacable conflict or concord and collaboration with amicable partners. The reorientation of Russian foreign policy now in evidence is creating conditions that match neither. Rather, they conform to what has been the standard historical pattern of inter-state relations characterized by the complex interplay of elements in a variegated field of action. Learning how to think and act in such a setting will be retarded by debates over whether the West should treat Russian leadership like Brezhnev or Gorbachev/Yeltsin *circa* 1992-93. Those intellectual conveniences, and the confusion they engender, will hobble a Western diplomacy searching for a pace and a gait suited to the terrain being traversed.

4.1 A Russian "Sphere of Influence"

The Yeltsin government's most radical foreign policy initiative has been to claim a right to police the former territory of the USSR. The principle that it fell within the jurisdiction of Russia to intervene when and where it saw fit is based on two premises. One is that Moscow has the implicit authority to protect its national interest in ensuring that its security is not endangered in any way by instability and

violence on its borders - especially since the economic, demographic and political ties that are the legacy of 200 years of union are ready transmitters of disorder into Russia proper. The other, mutually supporting idea is that it serves the broader interest of regional stability for Russia to be the benevolent superintendent of its now independent, former dominions as they go through a turbulent transition period.

These twin justifications for considering the CIS as a "chasse gardée" amount to the proclamation of a modern-day Monroe doctrine transposed to a wide swath of the Eurasian land mass. Like its American historical counterpart, the doctrine combines the *Realpolitik* notion of sphere of influence with a righteous claim of greater political maturity. The latter points to the virtue of Russia exercising a paternalistic guardianship of unruly neighbors who need the benefits of its tutelage and mentorship. The fact that those central Asian, Caucasian and eastern European neighbors have chosen to free themselves from the political union that had been imposed upon them by their now would-be tutor is turned into two arguments for *de facto* Russian suzerainty. First, Moscow affirms a legitimate interest in how former republics that harbor large Russian minorities treat them. Second, their economic assets have been so closely integrated into the Russian economy as to make the latter's well-being hostage to the unpredictable, potentially "irresponsible" behavior of untried, unstable governments.

Moscow has sought to give itself international legitimacy by seeking from the CSCE a formal mandate to act as the custodian of political order within the CIS. In effect, this would amount to a second-order grant of authority from the United Nations which, under Article 52 of its Charter, makes provision for regional collective security organizations serving as agents of the world body when so approved by the latter.

Receipt of the CSCE's imprimatur in effect would put Russia in a roughly analogous position to NATO's in performing as a sub-contractor of the U.N. in Bosnia (or, the United States service in Somalia as authorized by the Security Council and under the nominal supervision of the Secretary-General). In practice, Russia has been less than shy about acting unilaterally, and often clandestinely, to exert its influence on, and to seek advantage from factional fighting in Georgia, Tadjikistan and Moldova (as well as Azerbaijan where Moscow has offered itself as a protector from the Armenian assault on Azerbaijani territory, and mediator of the dispute, while maintaining a residual military presence in Armenia).

There are two noteworthy changes in the form of Russian interference in the political affairs of former Soviet republics since the political winds began to shift in Moscow in December. What had been *de facto* but deniable interference is now proclaimed as a matter of right based on a broad reading of Russia's inalienable national interest. In addition, while a mandate from the international community still is sought publicly, the Yeltsin government has stated - albeit with some equivocation followed by later "clarifications" - that it is prepared to act unilaterally where necessary to protect Russian minorities or to secure its borders. The latter, in fact, is no more than public declaration of what Russia has been doing in practice over the past two years. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, reputed for his liberal pro-Western views, summed up prevailing thinking in Moscow regarding the reintegration of the former Soviet republics under Russian suzerainty, in frankly stating that "Anyhow, everything will get back to its old place."⁶ By April 1994, Kozyrev's prognosis seemed to have proven correct. At a meeting in Moscow, the other 11 members of the

⁶ Quoted in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* December 12, 1993. A more elliptical formulation of this view was expressed by Andrej Kozyrev in "The Lagging Partnership" in *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1994, vol. 73, no. 3.

CIS agreed to two notable accords: one re-established an 'economic union' with Ukraine joining as an associate; the other declared a readiness to have Russian troops jointly police their external borders. The CIS leaders further agreed to the creation of an Interstate Economic Commission to oversee implementation of the accords.⁷ At a subsequent meeting of the Commonwealth's Collective Security Council in July, a draft agreement was prepared that envisaged multifaceted military cooperation ranging from the formation of peacekeeping units to the integration of air defenses.

To date, few concrete steps have been taken to implement these accords. Ukraine's fear of being pulled too deeply, too fast into the Russian orbit - despite the electoral victory of the nominally pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma - is the primary obstacle to reconstituting the CIS as a coherent economic and security asset. However, continuing pressure from Moscow to win acceptance of its enhanced position as monitor of political behavior in CIS is now a staple of this situation.

The West has contributed to this developing pattern of Russian "neo-imperialism" by turning a blind eye to what has been happening in the remoter corners of the CIS. It has been convenient to avoid contesting Russian actions for a number of reasons:

(1) in the Central Asian republics, the West has tended to see the rise of fundamentalist Islamic regimes as more antithetical to its interests than the perpetuation, in new garb, of the old Communist apparatchiks;

(2) there has been no appetite to get involved, even diplomatically, in the bloody Georgian civil war or Armenian-

⁷ Reported in the *Financial Times*, April 19, 1994.

Azeri war at a time when the Western allies had all they could handle in the ex-Yugoslavia; and

(3) there was a desire not to do anything that could embarrass Boris Yeltsin or provide grist for the mill of his more rabid nationalist opponents - especially as the West was unsure to what extent the more blatant acts of intervention had the President's approval rather than being independent initiatives by local commanders with or without the prior knowledge of higher authority.

As a consequence, there has been no well-defined Western strategy to impose constraints on Russia as it moves step by step to implement its doctrine of hegemony within the CIS. That doctrine has crystallized into formal policy in a near diplomatic vacuum - at least until late 1993 when increasingly assertive Russian peace-keeping missions in the CIS crossed a threshold of anxious attention in Western capitals. They were addressed primarily in the Rome meeting of the CSCE Council at the end of November. The body shelved a formal Russian request that it be mandated to act under broad authority of the CIS (with the desired designation as a sub-regional security organization, necessary to deal with threats to peace and stability). Instead, the council reaffirmed its own authority over conflict prevention and crisis management. It adopted statements declaring that: "The CSCE could consider, on a case-by-case basis and under specific conditions, the setting-up of CSCE cooperative arrangements in order *inter alia* to ensure the role and functions of a third party military force in a conflict area are consistent with CSCE principles and objectives. Ministers mandated the CSO and the Permanent Committee to elaborate further conditions and necessary provisions for possible CSCE arrangements of this nature. In carrying out this task, they will bear in mind the proposals examined by the CSO and be guided *inter alia* by the following principles and considerations essential to the CSCE arrangements as well as

to the activities of a third party military force: Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; consent of the parties; impartiality; multinational character; clear mandate; transparency; integral link to a political process for conflict resolution; plan for orderly withdrawal."⁸

These expressions of concern over the troubling propensity of Russia to meddle in the unsettled affairs of its CIS neighbors have not produced serious attempts to impose international constraints on Russian actions. The West has not pressed to establish a United Nations or CSCE authority on Georgia or the Central Asian republics. In response to a joint appeal from Georgian and Abkhazian leaders for a deployment of a UN peace keeping force, Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali at first could only take the request under advisement. In the absence of the political will to tackle the issue, the diplomatic and financial resources have been lacking to send a multinational force to operate in parallel with the Russians.⁹

The decision of the United Nations Security Council in July 1994 to authorize a Russian-led peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia amounted to acquiescence in Moscow's long-standing demand that its forces be accorded that status. The United Nations presence is so modest - no other nation has volunteered troops - that it seems little more than a symbolic statement of UN approval. Russia's action in sealing off Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia, following the extraction of agreement from President Shevernadze for the extensive basing rights in the province, is widely seen as foreshadowing Abkhazia's eventual absorption into Russia. The West seems resigned to acquiescing in this *de facto* annexation.

⁸ CSCE. Decisions by the Rome Council Meeting, December 1, 1993.

⁹ Reported in *Financial Times*, April 8, 1993.

The United Nations also has taken formal note of the Azeri-Armenian conflict; but it has done nothing more than establish a nominal presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. Through these acts of omission, the Western powers have sent a signal to Moscow of tacit acquiescence in the carving out of spheres of influence in part of the old Soviet empire. By so doing, they run the risk of encouraging a more nationalist minded leadership in Moscow to bring pressure to bear on more sensitive states that form Russia's border with Europe: above all, Ukraine and the Baltics.

Awakened from their diplomatic slumber by the deteriorating political situation in Moscow, for a time the Western allies began to send a sterner message to the effect that any Russian attempt to trespass on the political integrity of those states would have serious repercussions. But success in dissuading Russia from backing separatist movements in the Crimea or escalating the pressure on the Baltic governments will require a more attentive, and better orchestrated Western policies than has been apparent to date. The task of reining in the manifest Russian impulse to exert its influence as a European great power with special interests and privileges within the CIS, and its borderlands, has been made more difficult by the failure to establish codes of conduct for Russia in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The United States and Germany have followed very similar courses in their approaches to Russia since 1991. Emphasis has been placed on bolstering Boris Yeltsin and the democratic forces he has led. This strategy is grounded on the firm judgment that democracy in Russia is the key to maintaining a constructive cooperative relationship, and thereby ensure the independence of the east central European states within a stable European order. Both Bonn and Washington have taken every opportunity to improve President Yeltsin's standing in the eyes of his own people. Most recently, a symbolic threshold was crossed in making him a de

facto member of the elite, now G-8 group. Chancellor Kohl was most vigorous in pressing for this move. It conforms to a broader strategic assessment that it is in the West's interest to open Western cooperative institutions to all Eastern Europeans, on some basis or other.

Signs that this optimistic vision of Europe's future was being placed in jeopardy by political developments in Moscow have prompted a dual response in both Germany and the U.S. One response has been reinvigorated efforts to embrace Mr. Yeltsin while simultaneously expanding and accelerating the opening to the Eastern Europeans. The other has been to elicit warnings from Bonn and Washington that Russian behavior in the CIS and the Baltics must be above reproach. Their audience has been the Russian leadership, and their own complacent constituents at home. In December 1993, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Secretary of Defense William Perry took the occasion of the annual Munich conference on security to voice their opposition to any Russian attempt to create "spheres of influence or interest" beyond their borders.¹⁰ Kohl underlined his concern at recent Russian statements suggesting a return to a nationalistic foreign policy. "We all know that in Russia there are deeply rooted fears of encirclement and isolation, and not only in military circles," he said. "NATO must take these fears seriously ... if it wants to create a wide-ranging security order for the whole of Europe." NATO's policy was now aimed at "a real and stable partnership". But, Kohl added, "In return, we expect Russia to continue a foreign policy marked by constructive participation in solving international problems." The Helsinki Final Act called for "unqualified respect for the sovereignty and integrity of all nations" which "must be adhered to unequivocally by Russia". "Above all, Russia must foster trust particularly among its neighbors through its own

¹⁰ "Russia Warned to Curb Ambition", in *Financial Times*, February 1, 1994.

action. Thoughts of creating spheres of influence or interest would not be compatible with this."¹¹

Perry acknowledged that it was natural for Russia to have an interest in the well-being of Russian-speaking minorities in the former Soviet Union. But he warned: "If Russian forces operate beyond Russia's borders, they must do so in accord with international law. Russia's legitimate concerns with stability on its borders must not be dealt with by relying on the old Soviet practices of intimidation and domination, or by undermining the sovereignty and independence of Russia's neighbors, whether their independence is old or new."¹² This message was clouded, however, by the more ambiguous statements of President Clinton during his visit to Russia in January 1994. The joint communiqué issued at his summit meeting with President Yeltsin appeared to accept tacitly Moscow's benign view of its self-styled peacekeeping activities in the CIS. Indeed, in his broadcast address to the Russian people, President Clinton seemed to give his benediction to a Russian Monroe Doctrine in declaring that "you will be involved in some of these areas near you, just like the United States has been involved in the last several years in Panama and Grenada near our area."¹³ Against this background, it was not surprising that Russian leadership discounted Western calls for the observation of UN/CSCE rules-of-the-road for their military missions in the near abroad. Their judgment was confirmed when, in September, the Clinton administration publicly gave its blessing to Russia's acting as the arbitrator of conflicts in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics, whether with a formal international mandate or not.¹⁴

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Remarks by President Bill Clinton to the Russian people in Moscow, January 14, 1994.

¹⁴ The policy was announced by U.S. Ambassador to the UN on a visit to the Caucasus and Moldova the first week of September, reported in the *Financial Times*, September 7, 1994.

Uneasiness about Russian intentions in both Bonn and Washington led to the judgment that NATO should act swiftly to implement plans for the Partnership-for-Peace. Prevailing thinking in both capitals is that such moves provide reassurance to the former satellite states while enmeshing Russia in an institutionalized relationship with the West that will modify and constrain its behavior. The latter premise seems questionable. It is not entirely clear that the prospects of "domesticating" Russian nationalism outweigh the risks of jeopardizing not only the cohesion of the Western Alliance but also its capacity for concerted diplomatic action. Prompted by mounting fears in east central Europe, the Partnership-for-Peace addresses the situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus only obliquely. These regions still get little direct attention. Yet they emerge from the same strategic context as east central Europe - even as they differ in saliency of Western interests, political conditions, and level of recognition by the world community. The issues posed are peculiar to each region while sharing features that raise questions as to whether there would be a unified German-American reaction to a crisis between an overly assertive Russia and its uneasy immediate neighbors.

5. Russia and Ukraine

Of all the issues likely to bedevil United States-German relations in the future, the most serious concerns the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. A confrontation between Moscow and Kiev would subject the Bonn-Washington connection to considerable strain and, under certain conditions, could lead to strategic divergence. This is not surprising in view of the stakes involved - the future of Ukraine is one of the main touchstones of European security for the remainder of the 1990s and beyond. The outcome of the current uncertainty in Ukrainian-Russian relations will do

much to determine the contours of the European security system, and whether or not Russia poses a post-Cold War threat to Europe. A more assertive approach by Russia to its neighbor and former vassal will confirm the trend - identified in the previous chapter - towards a more nationalist outlook in Moscow and a foreign policy less accommodating to the West. On the other hand, continued respect for Ukrainian independence would reveal Russia's sensitivity to the need for restraint in its policies towards the "near abroad" if it wants to maintain cooperative relations with the West. As Zbigniew Brzezinski noted: "Ukraine has ... become the litmus test of Russia's future. A strong and stable Ukraine of some 52 million people would mean automatically that Russia had become a post-imperial state. As such, Russia could then promote its economic recovery and develop its political institutions as an increasingly normal national state, eventually ripened for a closer association with Europe. But a Russia that seeks to suborn Ukraine will be a Russia driven by imperial impulses, disqualified from participation in a wider European community." ¹⁵

Western efforts to influence the evolution of the Ukraine-Russia relationship in positive directions are essential but problematic. A fine line has to be walked between excessive intrusiveness and the abdication of influence. Moreover, a coordinated and coherent approach has to overcome competing impulses and divergent perspectives not only among Western governments but also within them. It could hardly be otherwise. The available options have costs and risks as well as benefits; they involve inescapable but complex and uncertain tradeoffs.

¹⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The West Adrift: Vision and Search of a Strategy", *Washington Post*, March 1, 1992, p. C 1.

If relations between Ukraine and Russia pose dilemmas for the West that are not susceptible to easy resolution, so does the fragile nature of the Ukrainian state. Ukraine suffers from profound economic weaknesses and from ethnic discord. It also has a political system that generates political stalemate, produces abrupt policy reversals, and manifests an emotional nationalism directed against Moscow. Continuing disagreement between successive Presidents and the Ukrainian parliament over nuclear weapons reveals the difficulties of obtaining consensus and affirming consistent national policies.

What makes this particularly disturbing is the 11 million Russians living in Ukraine. Ethnic tensions are particularly pronounced in the Crimean peninsula, where there are 1.5 million Russians, only 800,000 Ukrainians, and 150,000 Tatars. Although the Crimea was given by the Soviet Union to Ukraine in 1954, both the dominant culture and political sentiments in the region favor Moscow over Kiev. Pro-Russian political organizations, (Russian Association of Crimea and the Republican Movement of Crimea) advocate the secession of Crimea and merger with Russia. In July 1992, the Crimean and Ukrainian Parliaments agreed that Crimea would remain part of Ukraine but enjoy a large degree of autonomy on political, cultural, and economic matters. This did not solve the problem, however, and in January 1994, Meshkov was elected as President of the Crimean Republic on a platform proposing independence from Ukraine and reintegration with Russia. The Tatars prefer Kiev to Moscow, but see themselves as the real claimants to Crimea.

If this puts in doubt the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state as currently constituted, the dismal economy is accentuating the question marks about the future of an independent Ukraine. The situation is further complicated by tension and mutual suspicion between Moscow and Kiev. The Ukraine-Russia relationship has been shaped not only by the historical experiences of the two countries but also by their highly

divergent interpretations of this experience. Ukrainian perceptions of the security threat from Russia are deep-rooted. "For Ukraine the defining memory is that of the Pereyaslav Agreement of 1654 in which the Cossack Herman Bohdan Khmelnytsky swore allegiance to the Tsar of Muscovy:"¹⁶ The surrender of independence led to the long era of Russian domination, with the Soviet empire simply adding an ideological overlay to an existing imperial relationship. Three centuries of subservience to Russia has had a profound impact on Ukraine's current attitudes and policies: "the perception of Russia as a potential invader and enemy has made any search for common interest with Moscow exceptionally difficult."¹⁷ This situation has not been changed fundamentally by the election of Leonid Kuchma as President in July 1994.

The belief that Ukraine's resources were pillaged and exploited by Moscow has also been dominant. In fact, Russia "far from sucking its southern neighbor dry, was heavily subsidizing it by supplying around 50 million tons of oil and a large amount of gas each year at a fraction of world prices."¹⁸ Not surprisingly, therefore, Ukrainian expectations that political independence would be followed by economic regeneration have been disappointed. Ukraine's economy has proved weaker and less resilient than even that of Russia, and the Ukrainian currency has fallen sharply against the ruble, significantly increasing the price of energy supplies and fueling rapid inflation. The Russian decision to provide energy deliveries at world prices from the beginning of 1994 caused further pain for the Ukrainian economy. Economic collapse will sharpen the ethnic split in Ukraine and

¹⁶ John Morrison, "Pereyaslav and after: the Russian-Ukrainian relationship", *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 4, 1993, pp. 667-703 at p. 679.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 680.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 686.

intensify demands in the East for either regional autonomy or reintegration into Russia.

There are many in Moscow who see a process of reintegration as both natural and inevitable, ending what Russian Foreign Minister, Andrej Kozyrev has called the period of "romantic nationalism". Ukraine is not recognized in Moscow as "a separate entity from Russia."¹⁹ Neither the Russian interpretation of history nor the contemporary outlook on Russia-Ukraine relations could be more different from that in Kiev. "While Ukrainians see Pereyaslav as the start of 350 years of colonial oppression, patriotic Russians see the annexation of Ukraine as the basis of the country's rise from obscurity to become a first rank European power."²⁰ It is not simply that Ukrainian independence is novel and therefore difficult for Moscow to accept; rather, it strikes at the heart of the Russian identity as a major power. "Even Russians who are democratically minded cannot abandon the idea that the Ukrainians are 'little Russians'."²¹ From Moscow's perspective, therefore, an independent Ukraine is an anomaly to be rectified at the first opportunity.

Such an attitude is not confined to conservative nationalists in Moscow; it is shared by democrats and proponents of continued cooperation with the West. The hard-liners, of course, question the 1954 transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine and see possible secession of the Crimea as one means of re-establishing Russian dominance. Some of Yeltsin's advisers have even suggested that Russia stop importing goods from Ukraine, thereby provoking chaos in Ukraine's economy. Whatever course Moscow finally adopts, it is clear that Ukrainian economic weakness and the disaffected ethnic

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 680.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 681.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 681.

Russian minority provide significant opportunities for Russian meddling.

It is uncertain whether the process of Russian self-definition will stimulate efforts to reintegrate Ukraine. If Moscow's policy towards Kiev is a litmus test of both Russia's identity and its intentions, however, this simply underlines the importance of Ukraine in the still rather indistinct security architecture of post-Cold War Europe. The difficulty is that Ukraine plays several distinct and somewhat contradictory roles in the post-Cold War European security system.

Ukraine, because of its size and location, is an important geopolitical bulwark against a possible resurgence of Russian hegemony. A partial counter-weight to Russia, it also acts as a buffer zone for Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania - and, by extension, for Germany. This could become increasingly important if Russia intensifies efforts to restore its traditional sphere of influence and domination. Familiar geopolitical considerations suggest that Ukrainian independence is an important determinant of power relations and security in Eastern and Central Europe: "An independent Ukraine is one of the most important features of Europe's new strategic landscape; it acts as an important strategic buffer between Europe and Russia. In light of the uncertainties surrounding Russian democracy, it represents the best guarantee against Russian imperial restoration from the point of view of Eastern Europe, especially Poland. The re-incorporation of Ukraine into a Russian-led confederation would transform the geostrategic equation in Europe as a whole."²²

²² D. R. Asmus, R. L. Kugler, F. S. Larabee, "Building a New NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 4, pp. 28-40 at p. 38.

Such a development would clearly alter the power equation on the European continent. Yet, it is not simply a matter of what is done but also of how it is done. The circumstances whereby Ukraine, or portions of it, might be reabsorbed into a greater Russia, are crucial. If done peacefully, and in response to the wishes of a populace faced by total economic collapse, then this is far less disconcerting than if such a reabsorption stems from Russian pressure, intimidation or - most disturbing of all - the actual use of force. Russian behavior towards Ukraine is a major touchstone of the ability of the West to implant codes of conduct or rules of behavior in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Should Russia use force against Ukraine, this would destroy any remaining aspirations for a pan-European system based on generally accepted codes of conduct, and exacerbate the sense of threat resulting from both the altered power equation and the reversion to an older geopolitical configuration. In short, Ukraine's importance as a buffer has several reinforcing dimensions - the geopolitical configuration itself and the principle that this should not be altered by the use of force.

A second role played by Ukraine, and one that has largely overshadowed the first for many observers, is that of potential spoiler to plans for nuclear disarmament. This has been a matter of particular concern in Washington but has also been evident in Europe, including Germany. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kiev inherited a nuclear arsenal that included 46 SS-24 ICBMs each of which carries 10 warheads, and 130 SS-19 missiles each with 6 warheads, and made Ukraine the third largest nuclear power in the world after the United States and Russia - even though the arsenal has remained under the control of Russian officers. Questions have also been raised about the ability of Ukraine to obtain command and control over the arsenal and to maintain it effectively. Nevertheless, there are some in Ukraine who see

the weapons as a guarantor of security and independence against Russia.

As a result of continued efforts by the United States - much of which involved mediation between Moscow and Kiev - agreement was finally reached in January 1994 on dismantling Ukraine's nuclear weapons. Ukraine agreed to transfer 200 warheads to Russia within ten months, during which Russia will deliver nuclear fuel to Ukraine. The SS-24 missiles are to be deactivated within the same period. Although Ukraine obtained economic assistance from the United States and security assurances from both the United States and Russia in return for these concessions, the agreement evoked considerable criticism from parliament, including allegations of capitulation. Ukraine subsequently initiated the process of dismantling the weapons and shipping them back to Russia. Yet, the implementation of the agreement of January 1994 is taking place against a background of Ukrainian efforts to break the codes that would enable it to control the weapons. Although President Kravchuk ultimately acknowledged the costs of Ukraine's role as spoiler of nuclear disarmament and the benefits from relinquishing these weapons, this assessment is not universally shared in Ukraine.

Moreover, the negotiations may have created some perverse incentives for the Ukrainian government. One possibility is that Ukraine will go part of the way in meeting its obligations under the January 1994 agreement and then up the ante to obtain even more aid. For Ukraine, the fewer nuclear weapons in its possession, the more valuable they become. Moreover, Ukraine has obtained attention and concessions only because of its nuclear arsenal. Kiev might conclude that turning over all its nuclear weapons to Moscow or allowing them to be dismantled means it will cease to figure in American considerations. At the very least, Ukraine has an incentive to lengthen the process and to engage in efforts to obtain more support and concessions from the United States.

The role as spoiler of nuclear disarmament has been reduced, but not yet eliminated.

These two roles - geopolitical bulwark and nuclear spoiler - involve tensions and tradeoffs for the West. Although the United States supported by its allies has given priority to the nuclear issue, while trying to reconcile this with geopolitical considerations, the difficulties have been compounded by the divergent attitudes of Ukraine and Russia. Actions that appeal to one almost inevitably alienate the other. Nevertheless, it is clear that both the United States and Germany have significant interests at stake in Ukraine. The next section elucidates these interests.

5.1 German and United States Interests

As well as delineating the extent of United States and German interests in Ukraine, it is necessary to assess the degree of convergence. Consequently, consideration is given to likely German and United States reactions to several different but plausible scenarios involving challenges to their interests in Ukraine. Any serious divergences are likely to be scenario driven. However, they will also depend upon the extent to which the United States and Germany focus upon policies of crisis prevention or are content with crisis management, and on whether Bonn and Washington emphasize the consequences of change or the modalities that brought it about.

5.1.1 United States Interests

United States interests in Ukraine have been defined and articulated at two levels. The first level, support for the dual transition to democracy and a market economy, has been manifested in an undifferentiated policy directed at most states of the former Soviet bloc. Ukraine, along with Kazakhstan and others, has been granted Most Favored Nation trading status and provided with modest economic assistance

in return for lowering barriers to United States trade and investment. The framework for this was created in May 1992 during President Kravchuk's visit to Washington.

In dealing more specifically with Ukraine, the United States has defined its interests largely, if not exclusively, in relation to the nuclear issue. Even acknowledging Washington's imperviousness to the geopolitics of Central Europe, however, United States interests have been conceived very narrowly: Ukrainian nuclear weapons have been defined as a problem to be dealt with, as a complication in the United States-Russia bilateral nuclear relationship and as a threat to counter-proliferation policies. Washington has approached the problems of the former Soviet Union through a prism defined in and by Moscow. Moreover, the United States is still concerned with implementing the denuclearization program that it sees as an integral part of the unfinished business of the Cold War.

Significantly, the United States-Ukrainian agenda has been broadened to encompass issues that go beyond the nuclear question only in response to Ukrainian demands. When it became clear that unmitigated United States pressure on Ukraine to relinquish its nuclear weapons was counter-productive, the Administration began to emphasize partnership. Yet it was a partnership for disarmament rather than for protection: economic and political aid are being provided to Ukraine not because it is seen by Washington as a buffer to Russia but simply as an inducement to Ukraine to continue the process of relinquishing its nuclear weapons - something that would placate Moscow.

Much of the debate leading up to the signing of the January 1994 agreement on Ukrainian abandonment of nuclear arsenal is centered around economic assistance and security guarantees. In the event, guarantees were provided by both Russia and the United States - a development that underlines the position of

Ukraine as the central litmus test for Russia. Yet there are question marks about the depth of the United States commitment and about whether the security guarantees really go beyond the generalized assurances associated with the NPT.

5.1.2 German Interests

Germany shares the United States aversion to a nuclear Ukraine and has expressed considerable irritation when Kiev has hedged or backtracked on its commitment to relinquish its nuclear weapons. There is good reason for this: the abandonment of Ukraine's nuclear weapons would allow the denuclearization process to continue in Europe. Ukrainian retention of a nuclear arsenal, in contrast, would not only derail this process but would create a much more overtly nuclear environment in which Bonn may have to respond to challenges to its security. As well as having nuclear allies in France and Britain, it would also have two nuclear states to its East. Being surrounded by nuclear weapons states in this way could provoke a resurgence of old anxieties about German singularization and vulnerability.

In short, Germany shares the nuclear interest with Washington. The other dimension on which there is a complete convergence of both German and United States interests concerns the smuggling of nuclear materials from both Ukraine and Russia. This is disturbing to both Bonn and Washington. Germany is the front line state on this issue, however, and German police in 1993 reported over two hundred and thirty incidents involving some kind of nuclear material. The United States, concerned as it is with both terrorism and proliferation also has a great deal at stake in containing trafficking of this kind.

Germany, however, has greater economic interests in Ukraine than does the United States. In June 1993, during a visit by Chancellor Kohl to Kiev, a joint statement was issued on

relations between Ukraine and Germany. Bonn and Kiev emphasized "the development of mutually advantageous economic cooperation" and the need for an adequate framework "for the development of industry, agriculture, and the services sector in Ukraine according to market economy rules". They also established a cooperation council to promote bilateral economic relations. Several other initiatives are under way to increase trade between the two nations. A ship-building contract has been signed, while Germany is playing a major role in modernizing telecommunications in Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine has requested financial aid and increased assistance through the Hermes loan guarantee program.

Bonn's other major interest in Ukraine concerns German minorities. Ukraine once had a population of 435,000 ethnic Germans. As a result of Stalin's policies, however, Ukrainian Germans were resettled in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. With the end of the Cold War only about 50,000 German were left in Ukraine. In January 1992, Germany and Ukraine agreed that 400,000 ethnic Germans would be accepted back into Ukraine so long as Germany provided financial aid. Although the movement of ethnic Germans back to Ukraine has been very slow this again gives Germany an additional stake in Ukraine.

The area where German interests are most obviously more engaged than those of the United States, however, is in upholding Ukraine as a potential buffer against Russia. Germany has a stake in the development of a sound political and economic base in Ukraine itself that transcends the nuclear issue. Hence, Bonn has a large incentive to provide aid and assistance. A second strand of this approach is the desire to ensure that Ukraine does nothing to provoke confrontation with Moscow. The notion of non-provocative defense that became a major part of the German debate in the 1980s is something that could be exported to Ukraine. This is

certainly consistent with Ukraine's desire for increased cooperation with the German military.

5.2 Convergence and Divergence

In sum, although German and United States interests have different geopolitical bases and political wellsprings, there is currently a broad convergence of interests. Nevertheless, there are some latent differences between Bonn and Washington that, under some circumstances, could become pronounced. German interests in Ukraine are greater and more diverse than those of the United States and more subject to cross pressures and tradeoffs. Moreover, there is a great irony in the fact that Washington has provided a security guarantee for Ukraine that implicitly commits it to maintaining Ukraine as a buffer against Russia, even though United States interests in the buffer are less significant than those of Germany. Although the United States maintained the balance of power in Europe throughout the Cold War, its involvement in the geopolitics of Eastern Europe historically has been minimal. The formalities of the agreement with Ukraine and the realities of interest do not coincide.

The divergences are mainly matters of emphasis but, in some circumstances, could lead to divergent policies. The main reason is that Washington and Bonn have different geopolitical perspectives. The United States is far more remote from Ukraine, retains a special relationship with Moscow and is interested predominantly, if not exclusively, in the nuclear issue. Germany is more directly involved - implicitly if not overtly - in the geopolitics of Eastern Europe and has a greater economic stake. Discord could also arise if Bonn and Washington made divergent assessments of the origins of a crisis in the region. Russian assertiveness towards Ukraine could be attributed to either defensive or aggressive motives. If Bonn and Washington were tacitly sympathetic to Moscow and concluded that its efforts to deal

with another case of instability on its periphery did not presage a more assertive policy towards the West, then there would be no strain on their bilateral relationship. Similarly, if they were united in their condemnation of Moscow's actions there would be few problems. A less likely, but not inconceivable possibility, however, is that one of them would be critical of Moscow and the other more sympathetic. Furthermore, even if Bonn and Washington are united in their approach during the crisis, they may disagree on the implication of the outcome for Western security.

These possibilities are delineated more clearly in relation to a range of contingencies for Ukraine. Although highly speculative, the analysis identifies several scenarios for Ukraine-Russia relations and considers how the United States and Germany might react in each of these. It is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, highlighting the kinds of dilemmas that Bonn and Washington might face in responding adequately to developments in the East while avoiding major divergences of policy that could undermine their own relationship.

5.3 The Scenarios for Ukraine

In considering the scenarios and their impact it is important to acknowledge that each scenario is highly dependent on assumptions about the context and the manner in which it occurs. One of the key determinants of the probability of confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, for example, is the domestic politics of the two states. The most dangerous constellation is one in which former Communists and nationalists become more powerful in Moscow while nationalists also become more powerful in Kiev. In these circumstances, the prospects for confrontation of one kind or another would be greatly increased. Under other conditions, a major clash could more easily be avoided.

Keeping these considerations in mind, it is possible to delineate German and United States interests in each kind of contingency and the range of responses that each would favor in the particular circumstances under discussion. In each scenario, the extent to which there is both symmetry of interest and congruity of interest will be assessed. In addition, attention is given to both the desirability and feasibility of the scenario and the outcome.

5.3.1 Scenario 1

Continued independence with Western assistance and support and Russian acquiescence in return for Ukraine's implementation of the agreement on nuclear weapons

This is clearly the best scenario for the United States and Germany and the one that would create the least tension in their bilateral relationship or the least problems for NATO. It allows nuclear disarmament to proceed as planned, and presumes that Russia will accept Ukraine as an independent state. It presumes that Ukraine retains its value as a geopolitical buffer for Germany and Poland and does nothing more to slow the trend towards denuclearization in Europe.

To arrive at this outcome, however, will require a sustained and substantial commitment to Ukrainian economic development that goes beyond an "aid for disarmament" package. Subsidies for Ukraine to ease its energy dependence on Russia would be a considerable help. It has to be recognized in Bonn and Washington that Ukrainian success in moving towards economic modernization may be a prerequisite for continued independence. Without economic progress, significant segments of the population will look to Moscow rather than Kiev for economic salvation - with potentially disastrous consequences for the capacity of Ukraine to survive as an independent state.

The other requirement for an independent Ukraine is convincing Moscow that its continued access to Western support for its own economic programs depends upon it observing particular rules of conduct, including the non-use of military force against Ukraine. Moreover, it has to be made clear that this is an issue of interstate relations and not simply a matter of the internal Russian empire, however conceived.

There is an almost complete convergence in Germany and the United States on the desirability of this outcome. As the United States has gradually come to recognize the particular problems faced by Ukraine, it has moved some way towards accepting that there are inescapable linkages between the nuclear issue and other matters of importance to Ukraine. If this trend continues, then convergence of interests between Germany and the United States would be very high.

At the same time, it is impossible to be sanguine. If the implementation of the January 1994 agreement goes ahead as planned, then there could be a declining interest of the United States in Ukraine while German interests remain significant. This would be consistent with what has for the most part been a narrow conception of American interests and would reinforce the notion that the security guarantees for Ukraine associated with its denuclearization are not meant to be taken too seriously. On the other hand, now that the United States has accepted that maintenance of an independent Ukraine is a desirable long term objective, it may be willing to take actions to achieve this goal. If this is the case, the convergence with Bonn will be much greater, and the only disputes are likely to be over the relative share of the burden of economic assistance in order to maintain Ukraine's independence. In sum, Germany and the United States have significant interests at stake and are likely to have a high degree of convergence.

5.3.2 Scenario 2

Economic collapse of Ukraine as a result of structural problems in the economy, and its peaceful and gradual reabsorption by Russia

Another alternative is that the deteriorating economy of Ukraine will prove to be the decisive issue. It is conceivable that economic distress will reach a point where the political desire for independence will be overcome by a recognition of the economic benefits from closer association or even reintegration with Moscow. If the dominant assessment is that Ukrainian independence is an experiment that has failed, then some kind of reintegration with Russia may appear to be Ukraine's only salvation.

Ukraine, even with Western help, may find it impossible to function as a viable economic unit separate from Russia and may conclude that its economic circumstances offer little alternative than some kind of union with Moscow, whether tacit or formal. There would certainly be economic advantages to this option. Yet it would require a willingness to subordinate nationalist sentiment and pride in an independent Ukraine to the needs of economic recovery. With inflation running at high levels, stagnation in industry and other problems in the Ukrainian economy, the growth of such sentiment among at least some members of the elite and segments of the population is not inconceivable. Given the strength of Ukrainian nationalism in the Western part of the country, however, this sentiment is unlikely to prevail everywhere. To the nationalist such a development would be a repetition of Pereyaslav. Whether it could take place without internal violence and disorder in Ukraine is doubtful. In terms of feasibility, therefore, this eventuality does not rank particularly high.

As regards its desirability, such an outcome is certainly preferable to a military takeover by Russia, although less desirable than the maintenance of an independent Ukraine. As far as the United States is concerned, the outcome would be looked on with some trepidation but would ultimately be accepted, partly because it would not involve an obvious change in Russian behavior or an overt breach in appropriate codes of conduct. Economic necessity and *de facto* economic dependence would simply have resulted in political reintegration. For Germany the calculation would probably be the same. There would be no enthusiasm for such a development, but Bonn would almost certainly be resigned to the new situation. Yet the geopolitical consequences for Germany would not be insignificant. Its "cordon sanitaire" against Russian power would be reduced, with the result that Germany might look more favorably on efforts by Poland and the other states of central Europe to consolidate their relationship with NATO.

Indeed, it is hard to escape the conclusion that in this scenario German interests are likely to be affected to a greater degree than those of the United States. Although there is a broad convergence of interests, the asymmetry in terms of the higher salience of German interests could lead to differences about the appropriate response. One can visualize circumstances where, for Germany, enlargement of NATO in ways that would maintain a continued geopolitical bulwark against Russian power would look more attractive. The United States, however, might be reluctant to take on new commitments. The argument could well be that since Moscow has not breached the rules, NATO should not take any action that Russian leaders would find threatening. It is also conceivable that the positions would be reversed with Washington pressing for pushing NATO's defense line eastward while a Bonn government would give highest priority to avoid opening any unbridgeable rift with Moscow. Preventing a serious clash between Bonn and Washington, in either form,

would depend on the prior achievement of an extraordinary level of mutual trust and strategic planning.

5.3.3 Scenario 3

Russian support for the Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine leading to partition of Ukraine and/or the reacquisition of the Crimea by Russia

A possibility that cannot be entirely ruled out is that of a geopolitical division of Ukraine, with the reabsorption of the Eastern part of the country by Russia. Economic collapse, the preferences of the ethnic Russians in Ukraine, and the desire of many Russians to reverse the treaty of 1954 in which the Crimea was ceded to the Ukraine, could lead to such an outcome.

As far as Western reactions are concerned, much would depend on the extent to which Russia was seen to be initiating the breakup of Ukraine or simply responding to a situation over which it had little control. The extent to which military force was involved would also have an impact.

In geopolitical terms, it would be less serious for Germany than would the reintegration of the whole of Ukraine into Russia - although there would obviously be serious question marks about the future of the Western part of Ukraine. The implication is that this scenario is not likely to create major divergences between the United States and Germany. The salience of the issue for Bonn and Washington is relatively high (but less so for Germany than scenarios involving the whole of Ukraine) and there would probably be a broad convergence of interest. Such a development might even be treated in the same way the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was treated in 1968 - as a temporary inconvenience. Instead of a traffic accident on the road to détente, however, it will be seen simply as a traffic accident on the road to the

re-creation of the old Russian empire, something that the West would prefer not to happen but might come to accept as inevitable.

5.3.4 Scenario 4

Exploitation of indigenous unrest by Moscow and use of economic leverage to put pressure on Ukraine's government to re-establish close links with Russia, leading to *de facto* subservience while retaining the formalities of independence

This scenario has certain parallels with events in Georgia where Russia played a crucial role in undermining Shevardnadze's authority and sent troops to restore order (and re-establish Moscow's influence). The key element is that Moscow embarks on a deliberate but low key program of intimidation through economic pressure and political support for opponents of continued Ukrainian independence.

Much would depend on the extent to which unrest in Ukraine could be attributable directly to Moscow. The more overt the interference and pressure, the more likely it is that Bonn and Washington would be united in their condemnation of Russia. At the same time, apart from the ritual denunciations it is unlikely that the United States would respond strongly. The "special relationship" with Moscow, and the need for continued cooperation in dismantling Cold War strategic nuclear arsenals, could outweigh United States interests in Ukrainian independence. The result would be public condemnation of Moscow and token gestures of chastisement, combined with the avoidance of any direct linkage between the events in Ukraine and the areas of United States-Russian cooperation. Linkage would be absent from United States policy.

If Washington wanted to insulate the situation in Ukraine from its policies towards Moscow, Germany with more immediate

and salient geopolitical interests might be less sanguine. The stakes would be greater for Bonn and the consequences more significant. Consequently, Germany might press for the extension of security guarantees to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics. A United States failure to support such an initiative could lead to a significant degree of strategic divergence. Moreover, to the extent Bonn is disappointed by the United States reaction, and increasingly concerned about the security implications of what has happened, one of two reactions is possible. The first option is to try to persuade the United States to accord with German preferences, to make efforts to revitalize the Bonn-Washington axis, and to exhort the United States to revalidate its security guarantee to Western Europe. The second is to look elsewhere for support. The most extreme outcome would be one in which Germany begins to look to a European security organization as the future framework for managing security relations in Europe. This is particularly likely to the extent that Paris shares Bonn's reaction to events in Ukraine. The former may be more probable, but the latter option cannot be excluded.

5.3.5 Scenario 5

Economic collapse and Russian military intervention not only to restore order and government but also to re-impose Russian control over Ukraine

This is a variant of the second scenario but with political disorder following economic collapse and characterized by conflict between those who want to maintain independence and those who want to merge with Russia. In these circumstances, an appeal to Moscow for help from the Russian minority is not unlikely and could plausibly be followed by the intervention of Russian military forces leading to the reabsorption of Ukraine.

Such a scenario is certainly not inconceivable for a nation torn by the competing impulses of economic recovery and political independence. Nor would Russian intervention need a great deal of encouragement given Moscow's perception of Ukraine as an integral part of Russia. Even a moderate government in Moscow might feel impelled to intervene to stop internal conflict and to protect ethnic Russians.

This kind of contingency poses major dilemmas for the West. On the one hand, there could well be a recognition that Russia has a legitimate peacekeeping and peace enforcement role in a state that has traditionally been subordinate to Moscow. Although both Germany and the United States have supported Kiev in its efforts to emphasize that Ukraine is not subject to the same kind of Russian peacekeeping efforts as other former states in the near abroad, an intervention ostensibly designed to restore order might be less unpalatable if the situation in Ukraine degenerates into anarchy or civil war. If the intervention could be cast in humanitarian terms it might be even more acceptable. The problem would come with the subsequent failure of Russia to withdraw. This would not only create the specter of a greater Russia, but would also rekindle concerns over what could easily appear reminiscent of the Soviet pattern of intervention in its sphere of influence - a kind of Brezhnev Doctrine without Brezhnev.

This scenario also presents some of the most serious opportunities for division between the United States and Germany. There are two issues for possible divergence - assessing the extent to which Russian actions had deviated from acceptable codes of conduct for interstate relations in Europe (as well as from the specific guarantee that it provided in return for Ukraine's decision to get rid of its nuclear weapons) - and assessing the consequences for European security.

In terms of the codes of conduct argument, it is conceivable, if not probable, that the United States might be somewhat more tolerant than Germany of the initial intervention. Geographic remoteness from the immediate issues and the desire for order could outweigh concerns over a breach of the non-intervention norm. Although congressional and public opinion would preclude signs of even tacit approval, ritual denunciation would almost certainly be combined with inaction. Moreover, the United States might also be more willing to acquiesce in continued occupation of Ukraine as a means of maintaining stability in the region. In the event that such a development took place while Ukraine still possessed nuclear weapons, it would ease the problem of Ukraine's nuclear weapons and make it easier to implement START. Although much would obviously depend on the precise evolution of the crisis, if circumstances are sufficiently ambiguous, Russia can appear to be the solution rather than the cause of the problem - at least as perceived in Washington. Moreover, Clinton's preoccupation with domestic problems and his desire to protect domestic programs could encourage continued wishful thinking about Moscow and a reluctance to respond to a more assertive Russian foreign policy. The states of Eastern and Central Europe could not afford this luxury and might feel compelled to respond more energetically. This would be a reversal of the reactions that dominated during the Cold War when the United States was generally more vehement about Moscow's behavior than the other NATO allies and was also more concerned with taking actions in response.

Indeed, for Germany the problem would be twofold - as well as the breach of codes of conduct and principles of peaceful change in Europe, Bonn would also have a Russian military occupation of Ukraine to worry about. Whatever its causes and rationale, such a development could only be extremely uncomfortable for Germany. Although Moscow could try to reassure Bonn on its treatment of the ethnic Germans in

Ukraine, the geopolitical balance would have been shifted adversely. If the United States did not treat this as seriously as did Germany and the other Europeans, then once again the incentive to place more reliance on European security structures than on the Atlantic Alliance and the United States link could come to the fore in German thinking.

Although a divergence of this kind is not inconceivable, it is unlikely. As discussed in earlier chapters, the United States has long regarded itself as having a particular and unique responsibility for maintaining principles of international order. To the extent that this outweighs domestic constraints and preoccupations, Washington is likely to be at the forefront of condemning Russian actions. Indeed, Washington may attach more weight to the form of Russian behavior than to its consequences. To the extent that it also regards the consequences as particularly undesirable, it could also take the lead in galvanizing the Western allies against a new Russian threat and could well prove to be more receptive to proposals for extending security guarantees to the states of Central Europe. In addition it could be expected to advocate severe economic sanctions, involving comprehensive restrictions on trade, commercial credits and various forms of financial aid. Washington would almost certainly discourage the proffering of economic incentives as a reward for a return to Russian good behavior.

There is some danger that there would be a reversion to the patterns of the Cold War in which Washington reacts more strongly than Bonn or the other European allies, with the result that there is another dispute over burden-sharing and the imposition of economic sanctions. In the event that a confrontational United States finds itself lacking support from an accommodationist German government, the result could be a strengthening of pacifist and neutralist tendencies in Germany and neo-isolationist sentiments in the United States.

It seems more likely, however, that there would be a broad convergence on the need to revitalize NATO. With Germany's position as a front line state accentuated once again, and European security arrangements still only half formed at best, Washington and Bonn might jointly conclude that something akin to the Cold War security structure is a necessity.

The key variable in all this is how salient the issue is for the United States. To the extent that the situation is regarded as a major threat in Washington, there is likely to be a high degree of convergence and strong basis for a concerted response. A failure to react strongly by the United States, however, could have serious implications for the Bonn-Washington axis and lead to a greater effort to replace Atlantic security arrangements with a more independent European security identity.

5.3.6 Scenario 6

Continued independence and confrontation between Russia and a Ukraine that still has nuclear weapons on its territory and may even have obtained a degree of control over them

In this scenario Ukraine and Russia find themselves in a major diplomatic and military confrontation either because Ukraine reneges the January 1994 agreement and takes control of the nuclear weapons on its territory or because a more conservative Russia initiates measures intended to repatriate these weapons and Ukraine resists these efforts.

This is the nightmare scenario for the West - and one that so much of its diplomacy has been designed to avoid. Yet with the prevailing perceptions in Russia about Ukraine it is certainly not inconceivable. A more nationalist government in Moscow could readily decide to exert pressure on Ukraine in ways that lead to military confrontation.

Formulating the Western response would be difficult. While much would depend on the exact origin of the crisis and the way in which responsibility for it is assigned to Kiev and Moscow respectively, the West as a whole would have a clear interest in the peaceful resolution of the crisis. This is a situation in which the United States - responding very much to the nuclear dimension - would almost certainly take the lead in providing good offices, mediation and trying to ensure that the prospects for crisis management were optimized. The difficulty that could arise is that Ukraine might be resistant to United States involvement on the grounds that Washington has been working for the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine and is insensitive to its legitimate security needs - which had been underlined by the crisis.

The worst outcome, obviously, would be one in which nuclear weapons were used. The consequences of this would be enormous. The reaction of the West, however, would depend partly on what they were used for, by whom, and against whom. Most of the efforts would be designed to prevent this from happening. In this connection, one possibility is that both the United States and Germany would become so concerned about the peaceful resolution of the crisis that they would be relatively indifferent to the details and might pressure Ukraine to accede to Moscow's demands. If the crisis were provoked by Russian assertiveness or aggression, however, the reaction might be one of support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russia. Should the outcome favor Moscow none the less and lead to the reimposition of Russian control over Ukraine, the reaction would probably be to galvanize the West into rethinking its security needs. The less ambiguous Russian actions are, the more likely it is that there would be broad consensus in the West and that strategic divergence between Washington and Bonn would be avoided.

This is not a foregone conclusion, of course. Divergent assessments of who is primarily responsible for initiating the crisis as well as discrepant views about what should be done could arise. Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the conclusion that in this scenario, the interests of both Bonn and Washington are deeply engaged and there is likely to be a broad convergence of both assessment and policy.

5.3.7 Scenario 7

Confrontation after Ukraine relinquishes its nuclear weapons, as a result of which Russia uses military force against a non-nuclear Ukraine and re-imposes its suzerainty over Kiev

This is one of the easiest scenarios to consider in terms of the immediate reaction by the West. Both United States and German reactions are likely to be unequivocal in their condemnation. Russia would have completely violated the codes of conduct that the West is trying to establish. At the same time, the geopolitical consequences would be stark.

Russian actions of this kind would probably have a galvanizing impact on the Western Alliance and do much to bring it back to its former state - in which the United States revalidates the security guarantee to its allies. Such a crisis would not only unite the Western Alliance but might also generate a consensus on the need for its extension eastward with the incorporation of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO. There might be some reluctance to do this on the grounds that it would be re-establishing an East-West divide on Europe - albeit further to the East than during the Cold War. If it was deemed that Russian action had revealed Moscow's true intentions then this could be acceptable. Concerns over provoking Moscow needlessly, or taking actions that Russia would find unpalatable, would carry less weight in the wake of the outrage over its military actions against Ukraine.

There is, however, another possibility based on an asymmetry of United States and German interests. Ultimately the problem is greater for Germany and the other Europeans than it is for the United States, especially if Russia combines greater assertiveness on its periphery with continued adherence to nuclear disarmament agreements. Even a resurgent Russia that dominates Ukraine and its other neighbors is not the same as the old Soviet Union. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the United States would maintain its defense spending, reassess the requirements of nuclear deterrence against an attack on the United States homeland, and perpetuate the maintenance of a modest commitment of military forces in Western Europe, while looking to the Europeans themselves to provide most of the military counter-weight to Russia. Washington could well argue - especially in view of continued domestic needs - that the problem is primarily a European problem. Accordingly, the European allies should reverse the decline in defense spending and should strengthen the moves towards West European military cooperation as a matter of urgency. Even if Russia has re-emerged as a geopolitical threat, this is less formidable than the old Soviet threat and therefore one that the Europeans themselves - with Germany playing a crucial role - should be able to handle.

Even if Russian aggression against Ukraine is unequivocal, therefore, there would still be opportunities for discord between Bonn and Washington - over the consequences of the action and the appropriate response. The worst case would be one in which the United States expects strong European reactions, whereas the Germans expect a strong United States reaction. The result of this could be mutual acrimony and a belief in both Germany and the United States that it had been let down by its ally.

In these circumstances, Germany, fearing that it no longer had a viable security guarantee from the United States would

focus even more on European institutions for maintaining security. This second variant is unlikely given the high degree of convergence between German and United States interests and the fact that for both of them this scenario is likely to impinge on vital interests.

5.4 Implications and Assessment

In considering these scenarios, one issue that was not discussed but that would help to shape the Western response, is the extent of warning time prior to a Russia-Ukraine crisis or a Russian military intervention. This would do much to determine the opportunities for both crisis prevention and crisis management. It could also exacerbate strains in the relationship between the United States and Germany, if they responded differently to the opportunities to do something to head off or alleviate the crisis. Such a divergence could be perpetuated into the aftermath of the crisis as the respective responses of Germany and the United States are shaped by the ways in which the two governments allocate responsibility for the crisis. It could, for example, be dismissed as a result of provocation by Ukraine or held up as an example of a new Russian imperialism. Broad judgments of this kind and the specific circumstances surrounding the detailed evolution of what are drawn here as very broad scenarios would obviously have a major impact.

In fact, the analysis of these scenarios suggests that there is a broad basis of agreement between Germany and the United States on the problems of Ukraine. But they also reveal certain circumstances under which a common approach could be prevented by divergences of both assessment and of policy preference. Room for disagreement will be all the greater where the Russian threat and Russian actions are ambiguous. The more ambiguous the situation, the more there is reason to expect a dissonant Western reaction. Divisions could emerge in interpreting the meaning of individual Russian actions, in

appraising the risks they pose, and in determining an appropriate and concerted response. Germany and the United States would not be the only players in that game - it would involve all the allies - but they would be the most influential. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a coherent Western policy unless there is broad agreement between Washington and Bonn on how to proceed.

In this connection, German and American policies toward Russia exhibit a high degree of congruence that is all the more impressive for the uncertainties associated with every aspect of the country's political evolution, and Russia's crucial importance to Europe's future peace and stability. Bonn and Washington share a conception of the "Russian question" and a conviction as to what Western strategy should be for addressing it. Indeed, they have worked in tandem to give practical expression to those assessments. Official thinking in both capitals has concluded that making Russia a partner in constructing a stable continental system is best served by policies that:

(1) actively seek to involve Russia in all cooperative institutions, *inter alia* the G-7, NATO via Partnership-for-Peace, and the European Union via the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation;

(2) demonstrate sensitivity to President Yeltsin's vulnerable political position by avoiding friction on issues (such as punishing the Bosnian Serbs) that could be used to the advantage of ultra-nationalist forces; and

(3) are restrained in their criticism of Russia's growing assertiveness in imposing its dominance over other CIS states. Simultaneous efforts to bolster Ukrainian independence are seen as complementary to, rather than divergent from, this strategy. As the foregoing assessment shows, though, it might prove difficult to reconcile the

priority placed on conciliation with Russia and the commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty.

Were this strategy to fail, i.e. Russia were to turn away from reform internally and toward neo-imperialism, German-American solidarity could prove a liability as much as an asset. The closeness of the German-American partnership in formulating and directing the West's strategy toward Russia obscures differences of potential significance. The German position expresses the strongly held conviction of the country at large, not just the Kohl government. There is a national consensus on the proposition that reaching out to Moscow, welcoming Yeltsin into the charmed circles of the industrial democracies, and accepting Russian protestation of good intentions towards its CIS neighbors, is the only sensible course. In the United States, by contrast, a similar line of thinking represents the pragmatic judgment of Clinton's foreign policy team that, on balance, there is no alternative to a strategy of active engagement. But this is not the unanimous view within foreign affairs circles, much less among Americans generally. Indicative of this lack of consensus on policy towards Russia was Henry Kissinger's scathing denunciation of Partnership for Peace and the Administration's approach to the "Russian question" more generally.²³ This evoked considerable resonance in some quarters and helped to crystallize the existing skepticism about the long-term success of United States policy. Not surprisingly, support of the Clinton administration's prevailing line of policy, from Congress especially, is qualified and contingent. Overall, Russian policy is far less salient an issue in the United States than in Germany. That in itself suggests the possibility of future divergence.

In the event of an adverse change in Moscow's political climate and /or a turn toward a markedly less cooperative

²³ Henry Kissinger, "It's an Alliance not a Relic", *Washington Post*, August 16, 1994.

foreign policy, Washington would find it considerably easier to shift its Russian policy than would Bonn. This holds for whoever would be in power in the two capitals at the time. The ensuing disagreements might take on a sharper edge than necessary due to the misperception in Bonn that the United States shared fully its conception of how to deal with Russia - and therefore surprise at what would seem a precipitous change in thinking. Attentiveness to the domestic sources of foreign policy, (or, at least, the domestic context of each other's foreign policy) is required in order to minimize frictions whenever policy differences might arise on important sensitive matters.

There is a related danger. The fact that the West's two most influential governments have actively promoted the prevailing approach to Russia has muted voices in other capitals, e.g. Paris, that express greater skepticism about the optimistic premises on which Western policy is grounded. Thus an orthodoxy in Western thinking is appearing that could militate against a timely reappraisal in response to signs of faulty diagnosis and imperfect prescription. That possibility could hamper the fashioning of an appropriate Western response to a new challenge. Moreover, it could have two further deleterious effects: producing strains with other Western governments who might hold Bonn and Washington accountable for the consequences of miscalculated policies; and opening the way to recriminations between Bonn and Washington as to who is most responsible for past errors and slowness in correcting them.

To minimize these risks, it is essential that German-American concord not be celebrated at the expense of rigorous, probing appraisal and reappraisal of the course they are following and the reasoning that underlies it.

6. Iran

The United States has not disengaged from the confrontation, tacit or overt, with the revolutionary regime in Tehran that began with the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Throughout the ensuing fifteen years, Washington constantly has seen Iran as a threat to major American and Western interests. In official American eyes, Tehran has endangered friendly governments in the Gulf (including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) through intimidation and subversion; it has been hostile to American efforts to broker an Arab-Israel settlement on Palestine; and, for much of that period, Washington feared that Iranian policies that contributed to instability in the region would open the way to expanded Soviet influence. That latter fear has faded with the collapse of the Soviet Union. But for American policy-makers, Iran is still a renegade country. As National Security Advisor Anthony Lake has written, "Iran has been classified by the Clinton administration as a recalcitrant, outlaw state, along with North Korea, Iraq and Libya. In this view, it is a country that not only choose[s] to remain outside the family of nations but also assault[s] its basic values."²⁴ It is seen as committed to undercutting American and Western influence throughout the Middle East, whether by aiding and abetting terrorists, promoting a rabid brand of Islamic fundamentalism, or threatening moderate Arab governments. The Tehran government's ambitious program to expand and modernize its armed forces is interpreted as supporting all of those purposes.

The most controversial issue, and the one with the greatest potential for bringing Iran back into the international limelight, is the country's nuclear program. Still in an

²⁴ Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States" in *Foreign Affairs*, 1994, vol. 73, no. 2, p. 45. This view was reiterated by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in the wake of the bombings in Buenos Aires and London that the U.S. ascribed to Iran-sponsored terrorists. Mr. Christopher told the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on July 28, 1994 that Iran was an "international outlaw" and should be ostracized by the world community.

early stage of development, it none the less carries the risk of becoming yet another point of confrontation in the world's most volatile region. The possibility that Iran has embarked on a clandestine plan to develop a nuclear weapons capability has produced consternation in Washington - and American anxieties have added an important dimension to the allied debate over how best to deal with the Tehran regime.

Apprehensions in the Clinton administration about Iran's nuclear intentions are heightened by the conviction that Iran harbors ambitions to dominate the Gulf which are antithetical to Western interests. Washington ascribes a meaning to Iran's nuclear program that derives from its dire reading of the country's motivations and external ambitions. Signs of a growing Iranian interest in expanding its nuclear programs, in turn, lend a further element of gravity to the "Iranian problem". Those perceptions lead the United States to monitor closely Iran's efforts to acquire technology and equipment for a declared civilian nuclear program viewed as masking an illicit weapons program. Skepticism as to Tehran's avowedly peaceful intentions strengthens the disposition to restrict all commerce with Iran in sensitive and/or dual use items.

The Clinton administration's anxiety about Iran's alleged nuclear activities should be understood in the context of its mounting concern over growing proliferation risks elsewhere. Its consternation over breaches in internationally sanctioned arms control barriers stems from a concatenation of recent developments, *inter alia*, the breakup of the Soviet Union creating the dual problems of "inheritor" states and seepage of technology and critical skills from countries unable or unwilling to enforce strict export controls; the blatant challenge to the International Energy Agency by North Korea (which is suspected of having obtained a rudimentary nuclear capability already); the revelations of the progress Iraq had made on its dedicated nuclear program; and the widespread move towards the loosening of controls on a wide range of

dual-use technologies with potential weapons applications as the NATO allies dismantle the COCOM arrangements for monitoring of sensitive commerce with the now defunct Soviet bloc.

Hence, the Clinton administration's attempt to impose strictures on what is acceptable intercourse with Iran should be understood against the backdrop of growing dismay in official Washington that slackening vigilance on the part of the West, and by international agencies with stipulated oversight responsibilities, is pointing to a dangerous weakening of constraints on weapons proliferation. Iran is viewed as a link in an informal network of states engaged in the circumvention of international treaties and conventions aimed at curbing the commerce in nuclear weapons-relevant materials. China, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran have been identified with exchanges of components, technology, critical fuels, and engineering know-how in the areas of nuclear energy and rocketry.

This generalized anxiety acquires concrete focus when attention comes to rest on a country previously identified as violator of acceptable norms of international behavior. In American eyes, Iran so qualifies on multiple counts. Suspicions as to Tehran's intentions, coupled with long-standing judgments as to the strategic value of the Persian Gulf region, mean that Washington scrutinizes with an exceptionally skeptical eye all manner of transactions with the fundamentalist Iranian leadership. In addition to concerns that Iran might be receiving inadvertent assistance from Western nations that could contribute to a worrisome weapons program, there is an attendant worry that signs from Western governments of eagerness to "normalize" relations with Tehran could send the misleading signal, that the West sees no major interest as being endangered by Iran's ambitions. Following this line of thinking, it is deemed a serious mistake to do things that imply a laissez-faire

Western attitude towards an Iran still set on an adventurous course. Secretary Christopher has been particularly blunt in his complaints that "some nations still conduct preferential commercial relations with Iran and some take steps to appease that outlaw nation". He declared himself as "absolutely mystified why these countries are unwilling to put their commercial interests aside and recognize that this kind of terrorism must be dealt with and dealt with very harshly."²⁵ Other administration officials speaking anonymously made clear that the Secretary had Germany foremost in mind. The Clinton administration's conviction that Tehran be treated as a threat to regional stability, and as a sponsor of international terrorism, is what underlines the insistence that allies observe strict self-restraint in all their dealings with what the United States continues to think of as an international outlaw.

American policy on Iran, so understood, reflects three aspects of the current foreign policy outlook in Washington: a worried attitude about regional trouble spots; a belief that there is a weakening of the international consensus on the seriousness of local conflict situations and what the world community is prepared to invest in dealing with them; and growing irritation at the lack of Western unity in responding to latent security problems under more relaxed conditions of the post-Cold War era. The last is taken to be at once cause and effect of the preoccupation with parochial domestic matters that has pushed foreign affairs to the margins of public awareness, diverting the attention of leaders who are themselves disinclined to take a broad view of their nation's security interests or to make substantial engagements of political capital to protect them. That parochial state of affairs is seen as contributing to the halting and wholly inadequate attempts to manage the crisis in the former Yugoslavia as well as a diffident reaction to

²⁵ Warren Christopher, *Ibid.*

proliferation trouble-spots. Of course, there is an element of irony in Washington's claims of Western European parochialism coming from an American administration that has proclaimed boldly its commitment to putting the country's domestic problems first, a priority scrupulously observed by a President whose attention to foreign affairs is fleeting and episodic. Washington's recent reticence about assuming its accustomed place in the forefront of collective diplomatic efforts, however, does not extend to two categories of international problems:

(1) strategic issues, especially those that involve nuclear weapons, whether it be the status of those that are the bequest of the Soviet Union or those sought by would-be members of the nuclear club; and

(2) potential conflict situations in regions where there are important American *cum* Western interests, e.g. the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

The record supports the contention that there has been no diminution of Washington's "nuclear" diplomacy. The United States has been relentless in pressing for implementation of the START II accords. That activism extends to the delicate question of the nuclear arsenal inherited by the Ukraine. Equally, the Clinton administration has grappled virtually single-handedly with the harsh challenge presented by Pyongyang in flouting international safeguards and engaging in ill-distinguished blackmail by exploiting deep suspicions that it had already crossed the nuclear threshold.

In all those instances, most strikingly the last, Washington has acted on the implicit assumption that the United States had the singular duty to ensure that the threat of nuclear weapons spreading into politically irresponsible hands was dealt with firmly; and that the United States had the will and authority to lead an international campaign toward that

end. Again, in the words of Anthony Lake, "As the sole superpower, the United States had a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community. We seek to contain the influence of these states, sometimes by isolation, sometimes through pressure, sometimes by diplomatic and economic measures. We encourage the rest of the international community to join us in a concerted effort."²⁶ An American sense of custodial responsibility for "regime maintenance" is counterpart of its superpower role as overseer of global order and protector of Western interests. An assertive American campaign to restrict sensitive commerce with Iran is part of that strategy and draws from those impulses.

Overall, Germany has provided strong backing for the key elements of the Clinton administration's post-Cold War non-proliferation strategy. Bonn has been a full partner in developing initiatives to deal with the multiple dangers arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union; Bonn has pushed for the strict application of all IAEA rules on safeguards and inspections, and full compliance with NPT commitments by signatory states, and has participated actively in on-going review of the means and methods for dealing with the prospective threat that might be presented by new weapons states hostile to the West. Specifically, Germany has reaffirmed its unqualified support in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group for the position that the embargo on nuclear exports to India, Pakistan and Israel should remain in place so long as these states do not accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities.²⁷ Bonn has also taken much of the

²⁶ Lake, *Ibid.*

²⁷ See Klaus Kinkel, Policy Statement on "German 10-Point Initiative on Non-Proliferation Policy", December 15, 1993.

initiative - and has worked closely with Washington - in responding to trafficking in nuclear materials.

German-American disagreements on high-technology exports to Iran are a partial exception to this record of cooperation. To keep this matter in perspective, we should bear in mind that nuclear-specific transfers are not at issue. Indeed, Germany has declined proposals from Tehran to complete the two nuclear power plants of German design at Bushehr on which construction ceased in 1979. But it sees no persuasive reason to deny itself access to a potentially significant market - especially when it contests the diplomatic analysis that seeks to justify such an exclusion.

6.1 Germany

Germany looks at Iran through a different set of lenses that is primarily commercial rather than geostrategic. To put it somewhat differently, Bonn's selection of what it judges to be the appropriate lenses is different from the selection implicitly made in Washington. The Kohl government does not visualize Iran today as a clear danger to the stability of the Gulf or an incorrigibly revolutionary regime dedicated to implacable ideological war against the West. To Bonn's way of thinking, that conception of Iran is dated: it fails to recognize both the degree to which Iran's ambitions were blunted by its costly defeat in the war with Iraq, and how spent is the crusading religious passion which energized the Mullah-led government in the immediate post-revolutionary years.

The German government acknowledges that President Hashemi Rafsanjani has not yet abandoned its desire to expand Iranian influence nor has it found satisfactory terms of accommodation with the West. But it is seen as reasonably pragmatic, circumspect in its behavior, and susceptible to outside influence. A less dire appraisal of the Iranian

"threat" leads logically to a policy judgment that stresses engagement rather than exclusion. To "demonize" Iran, and then to isolate it on the grounds that it does not qualify for inclusion in the community of nations, is to risk making Western policy hostage to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Treating Tehran as an outcast, it is argued, will intensify the Iranian sense of persecution, thereby strengthening the forces of zealotry. To open lines of communication and avenues of intercourse, by contrast, is to ventilate Iranian society. That approach is seen as leading the country's leaders to a less stark view of their place in the world, while providing tangible evidence of the political and economic benefits that would flow from "normalization" of their external relations.

Accordingly, the German government has urged the re-establishment of normal commercial dealings with Iran. That includes easing restrictions on most high-technology items, the granting of credits, and the provision of debt relief by international lending agencies and Western banks. Washington rejects this line of reasoning. In Lake's words, "Some of our allies believe . . . that the regional policy should rely largely on positive incentives for Iran. The record clearly shows, however, that positive inducements such as trade and aid concessions or rescheduling of loans do not lead to real changes in Iran's unacceptable behavior."²⁸

Recent trends admittedly have seen a resurgence of the hard-line faction in Tehran. It has put Rafsanjani on the defensive and curtailed his influence. The President's direction of Iranian foreign policy has also been weakened. The challenge to his leadership is forcing him to back away from policies that had been designed to achieve a gradual reconciliation with the West as part of a general strategy to bring Iran back into the mainstream of international life.

²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 54.

The power struggle between Rafsanjani and the radical clerics, led by Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, places the Islamic Revolution at a crossroads. It has come to embrace every aspect of the regime installed by the successful revolution of 1979; state ownership of industry and control over the economy; the rejection of foreign investment and disdain for the norms of international economic intercourse; social organization and cultural Islamicization of life; a repressive police apparatus; and a xenophobic view of Iran's external relations. Rafsanjani's quiet reforms have eroded each of these pillars of the Mullah's brutally austere rule. Now they are being successfully counter-attacked. At stake is Iran's political personality, including the terms of its relationship with the outside world.

Washington, like Bonn, foresees possibly far-reaching implications from how the contest for power is resolved. The two governments differ though in their interpretation as to how much the West can influence that outcome. The Clinton administration's view is that the situation is too murky for the Western powers to determine how action of theirs would register within Iran and with what impact on the rivals for leadership. Under these circumstances, U.S. officials argue that proposed measures to ease restrictions on commerce with Iran must continue to pay due regard to the risks attached. They inveigh against what they see as impulse actions promoted by an earnest, but imprudent desire to do something to influence intentional Iranian developments - even though we remain in the dark as to what will influence whom, and how.

The German attitude, shared to some degree by most other Western Europeans, is that some risks are worth taking, given the West's interests in seeing the Rafsanjani-led pragmatists prevail. The dominant thinking in Bonn is more confident that dealings designed to overcome Iran's insularity will

make it difficult for the proponents of revolutionary orthodoxy who exploit the fear and ignorance of an isolated populace. Not to take advantage of those opportunities that have been opened during the years of reform is to play into the hands of the radical mullahs. On the specific question of whether to ease existing export curbs on "sensitive items," German officials make the points that

(1) no exemption will be made on the terms and conditions that apply to other countries;

(2) it is to the West's advantage to bring Iran into trading arrangements that balance opportunity with enforced obligation; and

(3) opening a dialogue with Iran on nuclear and chemical weapons is critical to shifting Iranian thinking in the desired direction - whatever the complexion of the country's leadership.

Specifically on the nuclear question, the German government favors a strategy that combines strict adherence to restricting rules on international transfers with commercial inducements to accept those strictures. It is believed that the Iranians will find it in their interest to exonerate themselves of suspicion about their nuclear intentions by accepting an exemplary inspections program that confirms their faithfulness to obligations assumed under the NPT. In this way, access to high technology products becomes a lure enticing Tehran to forego any nuclear aspirations that it may harbor.

The German formulation of the Iranian question is reinforced by the policy toward Iran that is crystallizing in Moscow. Russia's increasingly assertive foreign policy, which claims the privilege of policing the territories of the former Soviet Union, has led to a deepening involvement in the

turbulent politics of the Central Asian and Caucasian republics. There, it has backed the old-line, former Communist leadership often against Islamicist movements. Muslim fundamentalism thus has been identified as a threat to the Russian national interest in ensuring that its smaller partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States are politically congenial, i.e. disposed to accept a paternalistic Russian hegemony and the exceptional status of its Russian minority population. Iran, the source of inspiration as well as practical support for radical Islamic movements, is viewed in Moscow as a dangerous neighbor. While cautious not to draw a line of confrontation with Tehran, Russian officials have given unmistakable signs that they are leery of Iran's ambitions and seek to contain its influence. Consequently, there has been a convergence of thinking between Moscow and Washington, both of whom now look upon the Tehran regime as a dangerous maverick.

From Bonn's vantage point, the stigmatizing of Iran by both the U.S. and Russia feeds Iranian paranoia. That makes it all the more important that other governments act to break the pattern of alienation and hostility. As a country that enjoys cordial relations with Tehran, and is Iran's major European trading partner, Germany feels obligation as well as interest in developing those ties. Indeed, the idea has taken hold that there exists a German-Iranian special relationship.

6.2 The Central-Asian Connection

Iran's political complexion, and its external behavior, are magnified in Washington's eyes by the country's potentially significant role in the evolution of post-Communist Central Asia. Iran is a presence throughout Central Asia, and in Azerbaijan too, by virtue of culture, religion, and history. The Tehran government already exercises influence on local Islamic movements that look to it for example, inspiration and as the possible provider of more tangible forms of aid -

money or arms. Although Iran has been restrained in the Azeri-Armenian conflict, and has left the job of supplying the anti-government forces in Tadjikistan to the Afghans, it is still in a position to affect the calculations of all parties, including the Russians, with a stake in those republics. In the future, Iranian policy also will be a factor in the political evolution of other successor states to the Soviet Union who now seem to be under the firm control of old-line Communist leaders: namely, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

From the United States' perspective, Iran is seen as playing two roles, whose lack of congruence complicates the task of fashioning a clear Western strategy:

(1) as the instigator of fundamentalist Islamic movements whose success could have the unwelcome consequences of bringing to power governments hostile to the West (including hostility toward Western concerns engaged in the development of significant natural resources, e.g. Azerbaijan's and Kazakhstan's oil reserves) and of lending further weight to Islamic movements in other Central Asian republics and beyond, e.g. Turkey and Pakistan; and

(2) as a counterforce to the consolidation of power by retrograde former Communists. The latter role is looked upon with mild favor in most Western capitals - but its very success could lead to realization of the less palatable goal of consolidating the hold of anti-Western Islamic forces throughout the region. The dilemma would be eased, if not erased, were the antagonism between the West and Iran significantly attenuated. Hence, the current debate as to which strategy is most likely to produce an amelioration of relations with Iran takes on added meaning when the linkage to Russian conduct in the southern tier of the CIS is factored into the policy equation. Raising the stakes on reconciling divergent thinking between Bonn and Washington

could, and should generate more strenuous efforts to compose differences. However, it may have the opposite effect by underscoring for each government the importance of the West "getting it right" by following its preferred prescription.

Several considerations enter into the policy calculus made in the two capitals, and do it in a way that complicates resolution of this vexing question. One is the disparity in the importance accorded Iran's role as a disruptive force in the Gulf, on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and on political trends in the Islamic world generally. As discussed in an earlier section, the United States attaches much greater importance to these concerns than does the German government. Consequently, the Clinton administration presses for a tougher line in predicating full economic ties with Tehran on clear signs that it will rein in its support for radical groups threatening to subvert friendly governments, and on showing itself prepared to take a more accommodating position on regional issues. Washington's assessment is that the Iranian leadership shows little readiness to respond pragmatically to terms of accommodation offered by the West. To normalize dealings with the fundamentalist regime without a prior understanding of reciprocity, in this view, is tantamount to appeasement. The Iranians will be emboldened by these perceived signs of weakness to continue their confrontational policies. Furthermore, a Western policy of unilateral accommodation would have a demoralizing effect on the Gulf states and leaders of other Islamic states, who would conclude that they would have to cut their own deals with Tehran in the absence of full backing from the West - the United States above all.

The assessments made by the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl part company from those of the Americans in their estimate of what is the most appropriate mix of carrots and sticks. But beyond that, Bonn makes a different estimate of the risks to be run by following a policy of enticement and

normalization with Iran. That is to say, German policy accords less importance to the consequences of a failed policy of normalization than does Washington. American officials ascribe differences in making that last assessment to the fact that it is the Americans who will bear the brunt of the burden for dealing with the potentially dangerous effects of a failed policy that leaves Iran stronger, more confident and with its status as a regional power enhanced - without commensurate offsetting changes in its behavior. In Bonn's eyes, the Americans are engaging in worst case analysis that exaggerates both Tehran's commitment to destabilizing the region for the advancement of its own power political interests, and the opportunity costs of a serious yet sober Western attempt to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Iranian leadership.

These differing attitudes stem in part from the discrepant roles that Germany and the United States have played in the world over the past forty-five years. These roles are less crisply drawn than in the past; but differences remain, accentuated by residual habits of thought and action. They influence policy judgments, and they color mutual perceptions about each other. American officials automatically discount by some immeasurable factor estimates made in Bonn about the magnitude of regional security problems because Germany has not had, and for the foreseeable future will not have, major responsibilities for dealing with them. In this regard, there is clear recollection of what Washington deems faulty German judgments about the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. The obverse is true, too. In Bonn, there is suspicion that the United States' outlook on questions such as relations with Iran are distorted by the conditioning effects of having performed the arduous duty of being the West's policeman for so long - however nobly and successfully that historic task was performed.

The second underlying basis for divergent approaches toward Iran are the very real philosophical differences about conflict resolution and problem-solving in inter-state relations. On the American side, elements of traditional American idealism are mixed with a hard-edged realism that is the outgrowth of its long tenure as a global superpower. Its characteristics are a tendency to dichotomize countries, leaders and policies as hostile or friendly; a belief that the resolve to use force is a necessary and important requirement for safeguarding one's interest in an unruly international environment; and a conviction that diplomacy aimed at peaceful adjustment of disputes and conciliation is enhanced when backed by, rather than kept separate from, demonstrated readiness to resist unjustifiable demands.

On the German side, there is a different orientation, one that places greater stress on active efforts at achieving reconciliation; a belief that antagonism can be muted through assiduous, thoughtful policies designed to establish common ground; and confidence that a proper balance can be found between engagement and appeasement. The German mindset, like the American one, emerges out of historical experience: the traumatizing effect of the Nazi era, and the historic opening to the East that among most Germans is credited with having contributed to gradual undermining of the Communist regime. The "soft" approach to East Germany is seen as having had the double virtue of winning concessions that led to more humane conditions in the East and paving the way for reunification. In addition, that strategy is seen as having had no adverse effects on the West's collective commitment to protecting its basic interests from the challenge coming from Moscow. By contrast, prevailing interpretations in official Washington accord considerably less importance to détente - in all its manifestations, than to Western resolve in standing up to threats wherever they were presented and in resisting the temptation to acquiesce in terms of accommodation advantageous to the Soviet Union.

A pale replay of that debate could occur as Washington and Bonn duel over what strategy to follow vis-à-vis Iran. It is more likely to take on characteristics of the earlier debate to the degree that the issue is cast in broad terms which include the larger question of how to respond to a newly assertive Russian nationalism. How acute the issue becomes, and how much the Cold War past colors it, depends on whether Russian ambitions entail the aspiration to a position of dominance over its former domain in Eastern Europe. Were Ukraine, the Baltics (and perhaps other former dependencies as well) to become the objects of coercive Russian diplomacy, were Russian minorities to be exploited to encroach upon those states' sovereignty, then the West would face a strategic challenge with stakes far higher from those raised by Russian meddling in the Central Asian and Caucasian republics alone. Accordingly, a free-floating intra-Alliance debate between "hawks" and "doves" would take on wider dimension.

6.3 Scenarios

The following scenarios sketch four 'futures' for Iran. Of varying probabilities, and set in different time horizons, a consideration of each highlights the implications for the German-American strategic relationship of a particular evolution in Iran's external relations.

6.3.1 Iran Gets the Bomb

The most dire scenario is one in which Iran appears to have acquired a nuclear bomb. A pattern analogous to that seen in North Korea would pose a stark dilemma for the West. The repercussions for stability in the strategically sensitive Gulf region, and across the Middle East, could endanger vital economic interests and other high political stakes, *inter alia* consolidation of an Arab-Israeli rapprochement, and

containing radical Islamic political forces. Reactions in Washington and Bonn would be closely similar. Both capitals would be alarmed and hasten to forge a common Western response, although differences over burden sharing and the possible use of force could still come to the fore.

Whether recriminations would arise due to past clashes over how to deal with Iran would depend on the path that Iran took to build its bomb. Evidence that an illicit program had benefited from technology provided by Germany, which facilitated Iranian attempts to circumvent international safeguards, would surely be a bone of contention between Washington and Bonn. Washington's readiness to point an accusing finger at Germany would be determined in part by the domestic political repercussions in the United States. A White House inhabited by a successor to Mr. Clinton might find it convenient to tie responsibility for the policy failure around his neck. An incumbent more sympathetic to his predecessor(s) would find reason to shift the focus onto "irresponsible" allies. Congress, for its part, could be expected to cast blame in both directions. The loud baying from Capital Hill would ensure a hunt for the culpable parties. In the event that Iran's weapons acquisition were to lead to a major regional crisis that propensity would be intensified, with rancorous scapegoating of allied governments following in its train.

On the German side, indications that an illicit Iranian nuclear program had made use of materials coming from Germany could be expected to prompt a defensive response from Bonn. There, too, exactly how the issue is treated likely would be influenced by which party is in power, and how the matter gets played out in partisan politics. Under any circumstances, German government leaders would be inclined to justify their overall strategy of expanding ties with Tehran, and to offer as partial explanation for Iranian actions the paranoia that is encouraged by isolation.

6.3.2 *A Second Iran/Iraq War*

The underlying strategic rivalry between these historically antagonistic countries holds the potential for a renewed military confrontation. At any significant level of combat, the array of regional security anxieties evoked by the 1980-88 war likely would re-emerge. Set against the backdrop of the West's troubled relations with both the Baghdad and Tehran regimes, a repeat of the hands-off approach that characterized Western policies between 1980-87 is an unrealistic expectation. Rather, the more appropriate parallel is with the situation in 1987 when Kuwait made its appeal for the reflagging of oil vessels. In this conjectured reprise of that situation, a more forceful and better coordinated Western response aimed at suppressing the conflict while containing adverse effects on friendly governments in the region is a realistic expectation. That still leaves room, however, for allied disagreement on the precise measures to be taken and the risks to be run, in pursuit of these common objectives. In this debate, the recognizable differences between the United States and Germany would likely manifest themselves.

A renewed crisis in the Gulf would pose a major challenge to the Western allies less because of the particularities of that situation than because of the Alliance's general susceptibility to the pressures of dealing with a serious threat to an important interest - whether it occurs in Eastern Europe or the Persian Gulf. The lowered level of political and psychological readiness that accompanied the end of the Gulf War, the incomplete and strained transition from an American-led alliance to a more egalitarian one, and the exceptional demands of truly multilateral diplomatic and/or military strategies combine to make any prospective crisis especially hazardous for Western unity and effectiveness. Viewed from this perspective, the negative

effects of pre-existing frictions on Iran policy would be relatively minor.

6.3.3 A Terrorist 'Smoking Gun'

The surfacing of incontrovertible evidence that Iran had provided tangible assistance to terrorist factions who committed egregious acts of violence would sharpen the question of what the West's relations with the regime in Tehran should be. It also would bring to the boil pre-existing differences between Washington and Bonn as to what measures the newly revealed situation called for. Both governments could be expected to move toward the 'hawkish' end on the continuum of possible responses, but the absolute distance between their views might well remain constant. Moreover, the policy debate even could be aggravated by American recriminations over its partner's failure to respond to earlier warnings of Iran's reckless behavior. The bombings in July 1994 of Jewish targets in Argentina, allegedly with assistance and/or encouragement from Tehran, have brought this scenario to life. U.S. officials have taken the occasion to intensify their attacks on the Iranian leadership, while sharpening their criticism of those allied governments, Bonn among others, who "appease" Iran through preferential trading agreements. Just a few months earlier, Washington's annual review of international terrorism issued in May 1994 placed Iran at the top of the list of states supporting terrorism. Similarly, a month earlier the British government publicly denounced the Tehran regime for ties to IRA terror squads.

Ambiguity as to Iranian complicity in the recent bombings means that German-American differences get a higher profile but still fall below a threshold that would force both governments to make the strenuous efforts needed to bridge those differences. Hence, Iran policy is likely to continue as an aggravating element in relationship between the two

countries, with divergent positions being expressed more sharply in Washington and eliciting more pained responses, at once defensive and righteous, in Bonn. So long as the overall tenor of relations is as favorable as it now is, that condition should not place any serious strains on the close bonds between the two capitals. However, the Buenos Aires and London bombings do give greater saliency to the dispute over Iran with the implication that, in the event of a more dire scenario coming to pass, the level of accumulated grievance will be higher.

6.3.4 Iran as a 'Normal' State

Signs that the Islamic regime in Tehran had abandoned its campaign to subvert neighbors and to back radical factions dedicated to attacks on the West would have the effect of progressively reducing contentious differences between the United States and Germany over Iran policy. Only mild tactical disagreements would remain, i.e. the pace and extent to which the West should reach out to a more conciliatory Iran by encouraging commercial links and offering technical assistance.

Such a clear resolution of the policy debate in Tehran, and of the power struggle on which it depends, is unlikely. Rather, the foreseeable future will be little different from the present. Indications of Iranian desire to move out of its current isolation will be hedged with qualifications and accompanied by signs of internal opposition; Iran's internal politics will be roiled by the cross-currents of revolutionary zeal and practical-minded reform; and, correspondingly, Iran will remain an uneasy presence for neighbors and an unpredictable player in regional power games - in the Gulf, in the wider Middle East, and in Central Asia. The latent danger Iran thereby poses to Western interests, and the value that Iran has in the eyes of Western governments, will reflect, in part, conditions in those

areas. Political stability accompanied by irresolution, if not aggravation of existing tensions, would heighten the importance of what Iran does or does not do. Accordingly, the debate over what Western strategy to pursue vis-à-vis Iran would acquire greater momentum.

By contrast, favorable regional developments would have the effect of encapsulating the Iran issue. A continuation of the Western policy debate at the present level of intensity then becomes probable, punctuated by sharper exchanges when terrorist incidents put the issue back in the limelight.

7. Turkey/Central Asia

This chapter analyzes the implications of the bilateral U.S.-Turkish and German-Turkish relationship on the U.S.-German security relationship. It looks at the role of Turkey in both German and United States security interests, at the differences in both countries' approach towards Turkey, and at a number of scenarios that might affect Turkey's impact on the U.S.-German security relationship. Throughout, the chapter will focus on Turkey's role towards the Central Asian successor states. However, other aspects of Turkey's strategic situation cannot be separated from this role, and will also be discussed.

7.1 The Importance of Turkey

The collapse of the Soviet Union has directed the attention of Western security policymakers onto Turkey. Many Western observers - as well as Turkish policymakers themselves - placed great hopes in Turkey's role as a bridge between the West and the newly independent Soviet successor states in Central Asia. Turkey's status as a secular, yet Muslim country was supposed to serve as a model for these countries' political and economic development. Moreover, it was hoped

that Turkey, the easternmost partner of the Atlantic Alliance, would become a regional power, projecting stabilizing influence towards the former Soviet Central Asian states.

While Turkey's role with respect to Central Asia is the most prominent factor in its new importance for the West, it is not the only aspect which enhances its role within the alliance, and thus for Germany and the United States.

Crises at NATO's southern flank have been elevated from the status of a marginal security concern during the Cold War era to a new prominence. The Gulf War along with other flashpoints in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region have contributed to this change. Since there is no more direct military threat in NATO's Central Region, the formerly less prominent southern periphery has gained importance by default. However, there is genuine concern among the NATO allies about the spillover effects from the South that might affect the Alliance. Along NATO's southern flank, Turkey is the most exposed member. Thus, Turkey is close to crisis spots which concern both Germany and the United States, and it is critical for efforts to deal with security concerns in the region.

Despite the overall importance of Turkey for both German and U.S. security policy, there are unique aspects in each country's relationship with Turkey which lead to diverging, if not conflicting policies.

7.2 German Interests

Despite the geographical distance to Germany, Turkey plays an important role in the German domestic economy. Turkish citizens provide the bulk of "guest workers" in Germany, laborers which were first recruited in the 1960s to fill labor shortages in the then booming German economy. Turkish

guest workers are still important for the German economy, in particular for sectors and jobs that are less attractive to German employees. However, rising unemployment in Germany due to a major recession and to the effects of unification has led German policymakers to reduce the influx of guest workers, and to encourage many of those already in Germany to return to Turkey. At the same time, parts of a disgruntled public have reverted to open xenophobia, including attacks on Turkish residents that have led to several deaths.

This combination of developments in Germany has put strains on the German-Turkish relationship. The Turkish government is interested in continuing the economic relationship with Germany: guest workers are an important source of foreign currency income, as well as a reprieve for the Turkish labor market. In 1994, Turkey is suffering severe economic difficulties, increasing the impact of the change in German policy. Combined with attacks on Turkish citizens, this policy conflict pairs strong emotional issues with hard economic interests.

However, the German-Turkish relationship is further charged by an array of international issues, some of which have been latent for some years, and others which have emerged more recently. They include the Turkish quest for membership in the European Community, German policy towards Turkey during the Gulf War, German policy towards Kurdish groups in Germany, and German policy towards Turkish military operations against Kurds in Eastern Turkey.

Turkey has long been striving to become a member of the EC. It applied for membership officially in 1987, and its application was quietly shelved in 1989. Most current EC members remain reserved about Turkish membership, mainly on grounds of Turkey's economic development, but also for fear of an invasion of Turkish labor. More recently, concerns about Turkish human-rights violation have also become an

issue. While Germany is not the only EC member to decide on this issue, its close economic ties to Turkey make it a natural target for Turkish lobbying efforts. Moreover, Germany's enthusiasm for opening the community towards the East makes it vulnerable to accusations of double-standards. The Turkish request for membership in the EC will thus become even more awkward for Germany once the EC has concluded the current round of expansion and starts to consider membership applications from Central Eastern Europe. Turkey's entry into the European Customs Union is scheduled for 1995, but current economic difficulties might delay this step as well.

The suspicion among Turkish policymakers that Germany treats Turkey as an economic resource, but not as a NATO ally or as an equal partner, became even more salient in the Gulf War. During this conflict, Turkey requested the dispatch of the ACE Mobile Force Air Component as a symbol of reassurance and deterrence against attacks from Iraq. A debate about the merits of this request ensued in Germany, with some senior policymakers arguing that Turkey had provoked the Iraqi threat by allowing allied planes to fly missions from Turkish bases. Thus, any alliance obligations would be void.²⁹ Germany eventually complied with the Turkish request and sent its part of the AMF Air Component. However, the preceding debate not only put into question Germany's reliability as an ally, but also seriously damaged German relations with Turkey. These relations suffered further when press reports surfaced in Germany that the Turkish army had used armored vehicles donated by Germany in operations against Kurdish civilians. The equipment in question had been given by Germany as part of Gulf War assistance, supposedly to enhance Turkey's defenses against an attack from Iraq. Turkey's use of these weapons against its Kurdish minority caused an uproar in

²⁹ On the NATO operation in Turkey and the German political reaction see Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Deutschland und der Irak-Konflikt", *Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik* 68 (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 1992), pp. 30-33.

Germany, contributed to the resignation of the then defense minister, and led to a German arms embargo against Turkey.³⁰ The Turkish government, on the other hand, rejected German accusations, pointing to the internal security threat posed by the Kurdish insurgency. In addition, Turkish officials accused Germany of hypocrisy, referring to the unchecked activities of Kurdish nationalist groups in Germany. Only after a wave of terrorist acts by Kurdish groups against Turkish facilities on German territory in 1993 did the German government crack down on these organizations.

Apart from the problems that have been described above, there is one policy issue where Turkey converges with Germany: The attitude of both countries towards the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Both Germany and Turkey favor stronger intervention by the international community in defense of the Bosnian Muslims, and stronger sanctions against Serbia. However, the sources of this policy convergence are different: Germany was historically allied with Croatia and Slovenia against Serbia, and was one of the main supporters of Slovenian and Croatian independence. It supported Bosnian independence out of principle, and out of aversion to the Serb-dominated rump-Yugoslavia. Turkey's support for the Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, stems from a solidarity with this religious group against the threat from other groups. This solidarity is fed by the perception that the Western world fails to take stronger action in defense of the Bosnian Muslims because of their faith. Nevertheless, despite this perception the Turkish government has been in broad support of UN policies towards this conflict. Unilateral measures have by and large been limited to symbolic steps

³⁰ In April 1994, the Turkish government signed an agreement on military cooperation, apparently to alleviate the effects of the German arms embargo. According to the agreement, Russia will sell armored vehicles and air defense systems to Turkey, paid for by debt reduction. See "Die Türkei will in Rußland Waffen kaufen" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 23, 1994.

(such as the visit by the Turkish prime minister in Sarajevo in early 1994) and declaration.³¹

Turkey has declared its willingness to provide troops for peacekeeping operations. Germany, after a court ruling that lifts the ban on employing *Bundeswehr* troops in operations outside NATO territory, still argues that the German role during World War II would make the presence of its troops politically too sensitive.

In summary, Germany's relationship with Turkey is dominated by economic and domestic political considerations. While Turkey is critical to newly reformulated German security interests, it is at this point unlikely that Germany will conduct an active policy in pursuit of these interests. Thus, the strategic value of Turkey is currently not important enough to elicit economic or political concessions from Germany.

7.3 U.S. Interests

In contrast to Germany, the United States sees Turkey foremost as a crucial strategic ally, bolstering its position both in the Middle East and in Central Asia. Economic considerations clearly rank behind Turkey's strategic importance for the United States.

During the Gulf War, Turkey offered the use of bases on its territory for air strikes against Iraq. Despite its own civil war against Kurdish rebels, Turkey still is a jump-off point for the ongoing UN operation to protect the Kurdish safe haven in Northern Iraq.

³¹ On Turkish policy towards the Yugoslav war see John Murray Brown, "The region's reluctant activist" in *Financial Times*, April 15, 1994.

Turkey's potential as a secular, yet Muslim hegemon, extending a stabilizing influence towards the Muslim successor states of the Soviet Union, is possibly the most important long-term asset of Turkey for the United States. If Turkey were to fulfill this role, it might not only help stabilize the Central Asian region, it might also serve as an instrument of U.S. influence, shaping the political and economic developments in these countries. In turn, Turkish influence in Central Asia would decrease the likelihood that these countries would revert to a close alliance with the Russian center. By the same token, a Turkish role in the region might also help to minimize the attraction of Muslim fundamentalism sponsored by Iran.

However, the fate of Turkey itself has strategic importance for the United States. Turkey is not only coping with Kurdish insurgency, but also with economic decline and increasing Muslim fundamentalism. The stability of the current political system is by no means guaranteed. Local elections in early 1994 resulted in strong showings of the Islamic *Refah* party.³² If the current secular regime were to collapse and be replaced by a fundamentalist government, U.S. strategic interests would be affected in four ways:

(1) The United States would lose an important ally with potential influence on the Arab world as well as on the new states in Central Asia;

(2) The United States would lose important strategic bases, complicating any military operations in the Middle East (in particular in Iraq), and possibly in Central Asia;

(3) Turkey could emerge as a new fundamentalist power, negating U.S. efforts in Central Asia, and trying to

³² See John Murray Brown, "A Shock for the Secularists" in *Financial Times*, April 15, 1994.

influence developments in Europe (particularly former Yugoslavia);

(4) The latent Turkish-Greek conflict within NATO could break out again, leading to an alliance-wide crisis.

Thus, there are important reasons for the United States to support Turkey. However, the flexibility of the U.S. government in delivering this support is limited, due to three principal reasons.

Strong Greek lobby: A politically very effective Greek lobby opposes U.S. policies that give Turkey an advantage over Greece.

No Turkish lobby: The impact of the strong Greek lobby is magnified by the virtual absence of a Turkish lobby. In contrast to the sizable and politically influential U.S.-Greek community, there is no significant Turkish-born population in the United States. Thus, there is little basis for a well-organized pressure group.

Fear of Islam: For some Americans, the image of Moslems has been equated with Arab terrorists. This image has been enhanced most recently by the World Trade Center bombing in New York in February 1993. Despite the small number of individuals involved in such acts, some U.S. citizens have come to see Arabs and Turks as part of a global Muslim threat against Western civilization in general, and the American way of life in particular. Thus, parts of the U.S. population view assistance for any Muslim country with suspicion.

Turkish policymakers realize the limits of U.S. support, and are becoming increasingly disillusioned. They point out that despite their staunch support for the United States in the Gulf War, Turkey is still suffering from the economic embargo

against Iraq, while Jordan, an Iraqi supporter, has been granted special oil deliveries from Iraq.³³

7.4 Scenarios

7.4.1 Incremental failure of Turkey to establish leading role in Central Asia

Scenario Description

Turkey makes no further progress in establishing itself as an influential force in Central Asia. Central Asian Soviet successor states look to other countries for economic and political ties.

The new saliency of Turkey in global security hinges largely, but not exclusively on its potential role as a bridge between the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the West, providing a counterweight to Islamic fundamentalist influence from Iran. The expectation that Turkey will indeed play this role is based on the following factors or assumptions: geographical proximity, cultural affinity, economic potential.

However, contrary to widespread expectations at the time of the Soviet breakup, Turkey has so far not been able to fulfill this role. The relative geographical proximity has not translated into economic benefits, because Turkey does not share direct borders with the Islamic Central Asian countries. Armenia, which does border on Turkey, is involved in a bloody war with Azerbaijan, in which Turkey has, albeit passively, taken the side of the Islamic Azerbaijan.

Turkey's status as a secular Muslim country has not led to a significant attraction for the Central Asian Soviet successor states. Indeed, rather than following either the modern Turkish or the fundamentalist Iranian model, most Central

³³ See *Financial Times*, April 23, 1994.

Asian countries (with a few notable exceptions) have embarked on a course of conservative authoritarianism, keeping in power many of the old Soviet political elite, and failing to make significant political changes. In addition, Russia has made efforts to discourage closer ties between the Central Asian Soviet successor states and Turkey. For example, a planned oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Turkey was canceled, reportedly due to pressure from Moscow. Instead, a pipeline from Kazakhstan to a Russian Black Sea port will be constructed.³⁴

Turkey's own economic problems also restrict its ability to become more active in Central Asia. The leeway for Turkish investment in Central Asia remains limited. Despite the dispatch of Turkish experts and a relatively strong personnel presence in the region, there has been almost no increase in trade between Turkey and Central Asia since the disintegration of the Soviet Union.³⁵

Thus, despite the initial hopes that Turkey might play an important role in shaping the future of the Islamic successor states to the former Soviet Union, this role has so far remained small, and is unlikely to become bigger in the short run. What are the consequences of this development for U.S. and German policy?

U.S. support for Turkey: While Turkey retains strategic value for other aspects of the region (Iraq, Western Mediterranean theater), its value as a mediator between Western values and economic aid and the Islamic successors to the Soviet Union is decreasing. Turkey's importance to U.S. interests will correspondingly diminish, and the United States is less likely to pursue policies dedicated to strengthening its influence in Turkey.

³⁴ See Steve LeVine, "Central Asians Cut Loose from Moscow" in *Financial Times*, January 27, 1994.

³⁵ See John Murray Brown, "Euphoria has Evaporated" in *Financial Times*, May 7, 1993.

U.S. pressure on Germany: Failure of Turkey to serve as a bridge to Central Asia will make it less likely that the U.S. tries to influence German policy towards Turkey, including questions of military aid and EC membership. Thus, under this scenario, divergence between Germany and the United States will be reduced.

Turkish leverage on EC: A diminished role of Turkey in Central Asia will reduce its potential value as an EC member. Consequently, Turkish leverage on the question of EC admittance will diminish even further. In turn, Germany will be under less pressure from other EC members to support Turkish accession demands, thus shielding it from U.S. pressure to support Turkish EC membership.

7.4.2 Active Turkish involvement in Armenian-Azerbaijani war

Scenario Description

The Turkish government bows to domestic pressure and becomes active in the Caucasian war. It sends military experts to Azerbaijan and reinforces its troops at the Armenian border. Turkish irregular troops start skirmishes at the Armenian border.

Despite the geographical proximity to the Caucasian civil war and the cultural affinity to the Azerbaijani side, Turkey has so far taken pains not to become involved in this conflict. While it has announced its support for the Azeri cause, it has refrained from providing overt assistance, and has even facilitated food shipments to Armenia, when UN aid met with difficulties. In addition, developments in early 1994 point to a possible devolution of the conflict. Nevertheless, the specter of Turkish involvement looms large among Western security concerns in the region.

Turkey's strategic role in Central Asia is crucially dependent on whether the Armenian-Azerbaijani civil war

across its border continues or is concluded. If the war continues, the following parameters will prevail:

- **Turkish domestic pressure for intervention:** There is significant domestic pressure in Turkey in favor of more active support of Azerbaijan against Armenia. The Turkish government is spending domestic political energy by resisting this pressure.

- **Spillover:** A hot conflict across the border carries the possibility of spreading onto Turkish territory. Armenian troops might retaliate for what they perceive as Turkish support for the other side, or Azerbaijani irregulars might use Turkish territory to stage operations.

- **Lack of land access to Central Asian countries:** As long as the conflict continues, Turkey's economic ties to Central Asia are bound to remain limited. The lack of a secure land line of communication is one of the major obstacles to a larger role of Turkey in Central Asia.

- **Antagonistic neighbor, draw on security resources:** A continued Caucasian war means that Armenia remains a potentially antagonistic neighbor for Turkey. Thus, Turkish strategic planning must provide for resources to cover this border, competing with resources used in the Kurdish conflict.

With a continued war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey's influence in the Central Asian region will remain limited. At the same time, the risk that Turkey might become involved in the ongoing civil war on Azerbaijan's side is significant. Turkish involvement in this war - proxy, covert assistance, or through open military intervention - would have serious security implications for both the United States and Germany.

First, Turkish involvement would constitute intervention by a NATO country on the territory of the former Soviet Union, in the "near abroad". Depending on the domestic political situation in Russia at the time, such action is likely to cause Russian reprisals. Such reprisals could affect Turkish territory, even if Turkish involvement takes place on an unofficial level. Hence, Turkey could invoke the assistance clause of the NATO treaty, forcing NATO members Germany and the United States to take positions in this conflict. In such a case, it is possible that Germany, along with other European NATO allies would refuse to come to Turkey's aid. The United States might back Turkey, leading to a split in the alliance. However, depending on the overall U.S.-Turkey relationship at the time, the United States itself might maintain a cautious approach, avoiding a direct confrontation with Moscow. Nevertheless, independently from a Turkish request for assistance, the Russian government might hold the U.S. or Germany responsible for Turkish action in the Caucasus.

7.4.3 *Economic decline of Turkey*

Scenario description

Economic austerity measures announced in 1994 fail to turn the economy around. However, they succeed in generating widespread labor unrest and a radicalization of the political spectrum. Muslim fundamentalist groups continue to make inroads. The Kurdish conflict continues unabated and remains costly in financial and human terms. Successive government fail to unite the country behind an economic agenda. However, the military refrains from political involvement.

At the time of this writing, Turkey is undergoing a severe economic crisis, leading to a major devaluation of its currency. The Turkish government has announced radical policy measures to pull the economy out of the slump. However, some of the announced measures have met with strong resistance from labor unions and some political parties. Regardless of the long-term success of the economic package, the current crisis highlights the implications of another scenario on U.S.-German security relations: the prospect of economic collapse in Turkey. Such a development would have direct ramifications for both Germany and the United States, as well as on policy issues between these countries and Turkey.

For both the United States and Germany, the priority goal with respect to Turkey would shift from utilizing Turkey as an economic or strategic asset to containing its economic or strategic liabilities. Economic disaster in Turkey could lead to a new surge of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers in Germany, facilitated by the already substantial Turkish community in Germany. Turkish citizens already in Germany will be less inclined to leave for their home country, even with financial incentives provided by the German government. If Germany wanted to do anything to aid Turkey, it would be difficult to do so through the EC, due to Greek resistance. Hence, Germany would have to resort either to travel

restrictions (negatively affecting relations with Turkey) or to unilateral aid to Turkey.

The United States would be less affected by the immediate economic consequences of a Turkish economic collapse. However, the possible results of economic disaster - the rise of extremist groups - would run counter to U.S. interests, and threaten the fragile post-Cold War balance in the region.

EC membership issue: Economic collapse in Turkey would make accession to the EC even more remote than it already is, because Turkey would be unable to meet convergence criteria. Moreover, Turkey's impending entry into the EC customs union might be endangered as well. In practical terms, this development would remove a point of embarrassment from the U.S.-German agenda, since EC membership of Turkey is no longer practical, regardless of the strategic value. At the same time, U.S. pressure on Germany to help Turkey might increase in other ways. For example, the U.S. might view German restrictions on Turkish guest workers as further destabilizing the Turkish economy.

Influence in Central Asia: Turkey's potential influence in Central Asia would be affected by economic collapse in two ways: First, Turkey would lose the ability to provide any aid or investment in the region. Trade would also decrease. Second, Turkey would lose its attraction as a development model for the newly independent countries in Central Asia. A failure of Turkey's economy might lead these countries to look for other paths towards economic development.

Both of these effects will contribute to minimizing Turkey's influence in Central Asia. Thus, Turkey's strategic importance for both the United States and Germany will correspondingly diminish.

Political stability: Economic collapse and the resulting policy measures by the Turkish government are likely to further strengthen Muslim fundamentalist groups in Turkey, and lead to general civil unrest, including politically motivated violence. Such unrest could divert government and military attention away from the Kurdish uprising in Eastern Turkey, thereby loosening government control over these areas. If the government shows itself to be unable to cope with these problems, it is highly likely that the military might once again assume power. Such a scenario could pose serious dilemmas both for Germany and the United States. On the one hand, human rights abuses, which usually come hand in hand with the imposition of military rule, will generate public and political pressure in Germany for sanctions against Turkey. The United States will also be concerned about human rights abuses, but there is likely to be less direct pressure for action against a military regime. At the same time, the specter of a fundamentalist regime in Turkey is of great strategic concern both for the United States and Germany. The United States, however, will be more able to act on this strategic interest than Germany. Thus, it is likely that increased political instability in Turkey will lead to major policy divergence between the United States and Germany. This divergence, however, will focus on Turkey itself and will be only indirectly related to the issue of the Central Asian successors to the Soviet Union.

7.4.4 Economic collapse, major political instability

Scenario description

Economic disaster, setbacks in the campaign against the Kurdish insurgency, and the Muslim fundamentalist success in elections combine to bring the military back into politics. A coup attempt fails, however. Subsequent elections are marred by violence and result in a victory for fundamentalist groups. The new government suspends its membership in NATO and announces its active support for Azerbaijan against Armenia.

A scenario featuring political instability in Turkey includes a two-stage policy response from the United States and Germany. Policies aimed at reversing a process of destabilization would be at issue in the first stage. In the second stage, instability is perceived as "permanent," and both the U.S. and Germany would have accepted that Turkey has sunk into chaos. The distinction is important because it directly affects many of the strategic and economic benefits Turkey has for either Germany and the United States. For example, Turkey's role as NATO's bulwark at the Southern Flank is no longer credible if the country succumbs to civil war, or if a fundamentalist government comes into power. In such a case, damage limitation strategies will replace strategies that rely on Turkey as a strategic asset. However, in such a case Turkey would once again become an issue with respect to Central Asia: Muslim fundamentalist success in Turkey might serve as a catalyst for such political forces in the Central Asian Soviet successor states. Radical forces in Turkey might not be inhibited by international restraints from interfering in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A Turkey riveted by civil war will not be available as a trading partner or transit route for Central Asia and the Caucasus region. Countries in these regions might then orient themselves towards Iran in order to fulfill their economic needs.

From a European security point of view, such a development would bring the fundamentalist threat closer to Europe's doorstep. Germany, which is already affected by Kurdish terrorism on its territory, will experience additional "spillover" due to the large number of Turkish residents.

Such a development would have wider implications in other respects as well: civil war involving fundamentalist groups in Turkey might draw involvement from Iran and other fundamentalist groups in the Middle East.

While the first stage might feature a relatively high divergence between the United States and Germany, the second stage would lead to more convergent policies. Both countries would perceive the situation as disastrous. Bilateral U.S.-Turkish and German-Turkish relations would play a much smaller role, simply because the ground rules would have changed. It would be easier for both countries to operate without historical "baggage" and hidden agendas.

This does not mean, however, that there would be a similar convergence on how to approach Central Asia. The "loss" of Turkey would make it more difficult for the West to wield influence in that region, and could at the same time increase the risk of adverse developments, such as a turn towards fundamentalism. A more assertive posture by the West would have to include financial and economic aid, an issue where Germany and the United States would likely look at each other for shouldering a bigger burden.

7.5 Overall Assessment

Turkey's role in Central Asia is unlikely to lead to major policy divergence between Germany and the United States. Both Turkey's ability to function as regional hegemon in ex-Soviet Central Asia and the need for such a hegemon has been significantly overestimated. Turkey's domestic problems are increasing, while most Central Asian Soviet successor states are surprisingly resilient to any kind of outside influence, including Iranian fundamentalism. A projection of current developments with only incremental change will lead to modest policy divergence between the United States and Germany. A rapid improvement of Turkey's economy and an accompanying increase of Turkey's influence in Central Asia could lead to heightened tensions between Germany and the United States, as the U.S. tries to get Germany to accept closer EC ties with Turkey. Such a development seems rather unlikely as of 1994,

however. A rapid deterioration of Turkey's economic situation, possibly resulting in major domestic unrest and a further rise of Muslim fundamentalism is likely to have a two-staged effect on U.S.-German relations. During the first stage, the United States might make strong efforts to salvage the situation, and look to Germany to assist in this effort. Germany's own economic woes, however, combined with popular outrage against Turkish human rights abuses, will lead it to assume a more defensive posture. Such a policy would combine further restrictions on the influx of Guest workers with an extension of the already existing arms embargo to other sectors of economic relations. In such a situation, U.S. and German policy would be diametrically opposed. However, neither side would attach vital importance to the issue, thereby avoiding a fundamental clash in U.S.-German security relations. If Turkey were to lapse into political anarchy, and Muslim fundamentalist groups were to gain power, both Germany and the United States would lose most strategic advantages they have held with Turkey. At the same time, they would probably be united in their perception of the risks associated with such a development. Thus, this scenario, while the least desirable from an overall perspective, will create highly convergent policies, with a sense of urgency in both Washington and Bonn.

8. Conclusions and Recommendations

Although this analysis of possible crises and their potential impact on U.S.-German relations is suggestive rather than exhaustive, it does yield a number of important conclusions and recommendations, both at the level of substance and in relation to the way policy is made by the United States and Germany:

- 1. The greatest threat to the German-American strategic partnership lies not in differing strategic visions, but rather in failure to realize the one they now share.**

Both Germany and the United States are dedicated to extending the Western community's zone of peace and democracy eastward to embrace the successor states of the defunct Soviet empire, including Russia itself. Both view maintenance of the trans-Atlantic security link as contributing an essential element of stability to that hoped-for-evolution. Both agree in principle that a thriving European Union serves the same end while providing the basis for constituting a more equitable partnership between the United States and Western Europeans. These strategic objectives focus on Europe, necessarily and properly so. Successes registered elsewhere could not offset failure to accomplish historic undertakings in Europe; clashes over how to deal with other regional trouble spots would pale placed against so signal an achievement.

The outlook for success in that common enterprise now looks to be problematic. The somber political situation in Russia has cast a shadow over what had been the bright prospects for European peace and democracy. A reversion to autocracy is now more than a mere abstract possibility; it is a real, if not yet imminent, danger. The clear signs of recrudescent national and neo-Communist political forces call into question not only the country's democratic future, but its rejection of an imperial mission. Russia's commitment to constructive engagement with the West can no longer be taken for granted.

- 2. The implications for the German-American strategic partnership of this turn in Russian foreign policy are so serious as to challenge the partnership's cohesion and effectiveness.**

- a. Both governments will be pursuing their common strategy in a less accommodating environment than they had expected to be inhabiting. All judgments about the requirements for building a durable European-wide system based on principles of constructive engagement will be contingent, with the role and contribution of Russia uncertain. Accordingly, dealings with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe must be more carefully calibrated as to their individual fears and sensitivities heightened by awareness of sentiment in Moscow.

- b. Premiums will be placed on a coordinated effort by all the Western powers. But unity will prove difficult to achieve and to maintain. A more assertive and less cooperative Russia introduces a disturbing element into Western deliberations over a strategy toward the East while still not posing the magnitude of threat that would force them to forge a common front. There is a serious risk that honest differences among the Western allies will become more, rather than less contentious as the stakes rise on "getting it right".

- c. The old habits of relying on American initiative and, most often, American direction, for dealing with challenges to allied security and vital interests are a potential liability in the emerging strategic environment. It is imperative to establish a new balance of initiative, duty and accountability. More will be required of the European allies, Germany above all.

3. Germany's role in a more balanced trans-Atlantic alliance is critical to achieving its ends and purposes.

Germany is singled out by the objective realities of geography, history and economic strength to make a

critical contribution to consolidating the liberal revolution in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Germany may be better positioned to work out a viable new relationship with the United States than is either of America's other two major allies, Britain or France. The former is too disengaged from the process of constructing the European Union, and too diffident in its attitude toward the political turbulence in post-Communist societies, to act in this capacity. As for France, it has been too single-minded in seeking to define itself, and Europe, in contra-distinction to the United States to hold the full trust and confidence of Washington. By contrast, Washington feels nearly as comfortable in its working relationship with Bonn as it does with London, while judging Germany as having both the weight and conviction for serving as the main European partner in the post-Cold War era.

4. A future German-American strategic partnership need not be symmetrical.

Symmetry is not a condition for stability and effectiveness. The keys are communality of outlook, compatibility of style and behavior, and complementary of function. The body of evidence presented in this paper points to a high degree of convergence in the two countries on the contours of their foreign policies, disagreements on secondary questions such as Iran notwithstanding. A potentially more serious obstacle to operationalizing a conjectured strategic partnership between Washington and Bonn is posed by the two countries' distinctive and characteristic approach to foreign policy; the most important being divergent attitudes toward the use of force.

5. A widening of Germany's security role that foresees the participation of German armed forces beyond the country's borders should be approached with caution.

The experience of having German troops engaged in United Nations peacekeeping operations could either gradually dissolve the aversion to military action, or reinvigorate it. Were those missions to be seen as failing and/or entail casualties (as nearly all recent UN missions have), the immediate and perhaps enduring response would be a reversion from playing any military role abroad whatsoever.

In that eventuality, Bonn's return to a reticent security policy might call into question efforts to reorient NATO in a manner that presumes a more prominent and active role for the United States' European allies, above all Germany. Prospects for a budding German-American strategic partnership would suffer from such a reaction: Germany would be seen as refusing to accept its proper responsibilities and instead wishing to continue as a free-rider, benefiting from the United States' selfless commitment to defending common Western interests.

For a German-American strategic partnership to flourish, it is imperative that false hopes be avoided and the necessary investments be made in raising consciousness all around as to what the two countries are seeking to accomplish, and what each realistically can contribute.

6. Arguments over architecture divert much needed attention away from the real challenges that are increasingly coming to dominate the security agenda in Europe.

If, in the future, the Western partners are confronted by Russian coercive pressure against Ukraine or the Baltics, an effective response will demand timely coordinated

measures. The West cannot afford to be caught between institutional venues, arguing over which should act with what precedence. Indeed, given the novel nature of the situation, and the absence of rehearsed response, it will be all the more important that precious time and energy not be squandered in sorting through the formats for allied collaboration. The gravest danger is that an intra-allied debate would open on the question of whether the European or the Atlantic forum should take the lead. Were that to occur, Germany would be put in the uncomfortable position of being cross-pressured between its European loyalties and its Atlantic attachment. Even under the smoothest of organizational circumstances, Germany's crucial importance in addressing the problem could place considerable strain on a German government still not entirely comfortable with the burdens of leadership. It might well be tempted to seek the protective cover of the European Union's CFSP. An equivocal delayed response from the 12 (or 16) - while NATO action is held in suspension pending an agreed EU position - would cause frustration and irritation in Washington. The European allies would be accused of shirking their responsibilities - with particular disappointment directed at Germany for not showing leadership. Moreover, neo-isolationist opinion chary of full and direct American involvement in Europe's dangerously turbulent affairs could gather strength from signs of allied weakness, coupled with signs the allies expected the U.S. to ride to their rescue. That situation also could have the opposite but not entirely contradictory effect of prompting the U.S. to press its own forceful leadership so as to impose direction and discipline - and thereby to reassure the American public that whatever country ventured in dealing with a renewed threat from the East, control would rest in reliable American hands. As the government that would be most exposed to those cross currents, Bonn has reason to anticipate them by taking preemptive initiatives to define

the mechanisms for concerted Western action and to provide an essential European element of leadership.

7. Joint contingency planning is essential to minimize the prospects that a crisis, especially in Ukraine, will catch the allies unprepared and place unnecessary strain on the Bonn-Washington alliance.

There is an urgent need to engage in much more serious speculation about possible scenarios and options for reacting to them. Contingency planning cannot prevent surprise but it can help both to reduce its likelihood and to minimize its disruptive consequences. Preoccupation with immediate issues should not lead to the exclusion of longer-term possibilities. Moreover, with security issues so much more ambiguous, and relationships more fluid and uncertain than they were during the Cold War, efforts to think through a much broader range of possibilities than in traditional contingency planning are crucial.

This would increase the capacity for damage limitation or harm reduction as Germany and the United States attempt to work out a concerted response to crises in the former Soviet Union, especially the Ukraine and the Baltics. Divergence between Bonn and Washington rooted in different geopolitical considerations might, under some circumstances, be unavoidable. It could be exacerbated by a muddled Western response to a serious Eastern crisis. Nevertheless, damage might be reduced to the extent that Germany and the United States have in place a process of bilateral contingency planning and have developed plans for efforts to coordinate responses to a variety of possible contingencies.

Advanced consultations and joint planning cannot prevent divergent interests but can minimize their consequences, not least by reducing the chances that each government

will have unreasonable or unrealistic expectations of the other. Such exercises could promote a clarification of interests that would otherwise not be evident until the crisis manifests itself. To the extent that strains in the relationship are likely to be generated by unexpected divergence in national assessments of the situation or unrealistic expectations about each other's preferences and likely responses they could be minimized by joint contingency planning of this kind.

This need cannot be met by ritual incarnations of German-American fraternity alone, no matter how genuine the sentiments. Each government must simultaneously

(1) confront its public with the hard questions of national interests in the post-Cold War world and the commensurate actions required to satisfy them, and

(2) engage the other in candid exchanges on how to tackle the formidable challenge of building a braver new world without endangering the one already achieved.

Statesmanship of the highest order is called for, now as ever before.

List of Abbreviations

ACE	Allied Command Europe
AMF	Allied Mobile Force
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IRA	Irish Republican Army
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
WEU	Western European Union