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Brazil as an International Security Actor

Kai Michael Kenkel

Brazil has experienced an unprecedented rise in economic output and political influence over the past decade. Over this period, its rise has spanned nearly all of the facets of state presence in the modern world, and Brazilian representatives have enthusiastically striven to inscribe their country's ascent on the makeup of global decision-making arrangements. Alongside establishing itself as the world's sixth-largest economy, Brazil has hosted a crucial international meeting on developmental issues (Rio+20); become a key player in environmental negotiations; gained the nod to host the world's two largest sporting events (the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup); seen its diplomats elected to head the World Trade Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization; and joined with other emerging and established powers to form the increasingly influential BRICS and IBSA conglomerations.

The iconic symbol of Brazil's rise has been its drive for permanent, veto-endowed membership in an eventual reformed United Nations Security Council. However, it is precisely in bringing this newfound influence to bear in the security arena that Brazil faces one of its greatest present challenges.¹ While it has accumulated extensive soft power² through both

¹ For a brief treatment of the hurdles in the move from economic to strategic power, see Kai Michael Kenkel, "Brasiliens sicherheitspolitische Wachstumsschmerzen: immer noch ein 'vegetarischer Tiger'?" *Tópicos* (Bonn), No. 2012/2, p. 32-33.

² See Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power", *Foreign Policy* 80, 1990, 153-171; *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2004; *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 1990. On the concept's application to Brazil, see inter alia Robin Lustig, "Brazil emerges as a leading exponent of 'soft power'", British Broadcasting Corporation, 23 March

increased international profile and the attractiveness of socioeconomic policies at home that have lifted millions out of misery, several factors continue to inhibit its development of traditional measures of hard power-based strategic influence. These include its own historical normative traditions, grounded in a South American security subculture; both voluntary limits and involuntary constraints on its strategic capabilities; and the coupling of the near absence of external threats with significant internal challenges.

In this sense, to understand Brazil's role as an actor on the international security stage it is paramount that analysis be based on a broadened conception of security.³ Though they continue to drive strategic analysis in much of the developed world, traditional, hard power-only analytical approaches to security often fail to account for the real challenges to both state and human security faced by states outside the North Atlantic core. Consequently, the present analysis addresses both the traditional strategic paradigm and the enlarged vision adopted by Brazil itself.

The text begins with a presentation of the main determinants of the context in which thinking on security issues in Brazil takes place, including the problematic analytical distinction between international and domestic security threats. It then briefly turns to declaratory security policy documents before providing an overview of the country's military capabilities. The subsequent sections address specific elements of Brazil's presence as a international security actor, covering its defence industry; its presence in the South Atlantic and Africa; its stance on military intervention and participation in United Nations peace operations; and its position on issues of nuclear proliferation and disarmament;. A brief conclusion addresses how these factors come to together to determine the country's future potential to exercise responsibility and contribute to global governance in the security arena. In doing so, an effort has been made to base the analysis, to the greatest extent possible, on sources with Brazilian content.

The Brazilian Security Context

Fundamental to understanding Brazil's positioning as a global security actor is an adequate contextualization of how security is defined and practiced in the country today. The Brazilian and South America security scenarios are profoundly different from those that predominate, for example, in the North Atlantic space. Whereas the traditional Realist notions of security favoured in developing countries' strategic analyses focus on assessments of external, mostly physical, threats to states with both substantial capacity to respond and a consolidated internal state presence, more recently developed analytical approaches such as human security more adequately address the (predominantly internal) realities faced by states at the global periphery.⁴

2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8580560.stm>. Accessed 6 June 2013.

³ Michael J. Sheehan. *International security: an analytical survey*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005; pp. 43-63.

⁴ Brian L. Job, ed. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992; Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, "The Postcolonial moment in security studies". *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2006); pp. 329-352; Mark T. Berger and Heloise Weber, "War, Peace and Progress: conflict, development, (in)security and violence in the 21st century". *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2009); pp 1–16.

Brazil has not been involved in a territorial conflict for a century and a half⁵ and does not face any significant threats to even to a broad definition of its national security. Conversely, it lost over a million of its citizens to armed violence between 1980-2010, victims of one of the world's highest homicide rates.⁶ The country struggles instead with problems related to underdevelopment, inequality and incomplete state provision of political goods across its territory and populace. The country is typical of its region, and indeed much of the developing world, in that while its external environment is largely peaceful, its energies are directed towards significant internal challenges that fall outside the realm of international security. In Brazil's case these further include areas of incomplete state presence, such as in favelas held by organized crime and drug dealers; an extensive drug trade; border controls, including smuggling of arms, merchandise and persons; deforestation and other environmental violations; illegal mining; and the protection of indigenous populations.

External Security Parameters

At roughly 8.5 million square kilometres, Brazil's territory is 24 times that of Germany, and takes up half of the South American continent. Half of the continent's population, just over 190 million people, inhabit that territory, sharing land borders of 16,885 kilometres, five times those of Germany, with ten neighbours. Beyond its 7,367-kilometre coastline, it claims a maritime area of control of another 4.5 million km² in the South Atlantic. Brazil enjoys peaceful relations with its neighbours and has no open territorial disputes. Strategic tensions with Southern Cone have been transformed through diplomatic means and confidence-building measures, particularly in the nuclear arena.

However, in geostrategic terms, much of Brazil's land border spans practically indefensible jungle territory, and the bulk of the country's vast resources lie in the sparsely settled and controlled interior while the great majority of the population reside along the coastline. This unique situation of geostrategic exposure forms the foundational dilemma of what has been recognized as a distinct Brazilian tradition in geopolitical thought.⁷ This school has historically attached paramount importance to extending state control—and limiting that of external forces—in the vulnerable Amazon region, which is iconic to visions of Brazilian territoriality.

Brazil's armed forces are the largest in the region, with approximately 318,000 active-duty personnel. As such they are 70% larger than the Bundeswehr and make up 29% of all personnel under arms in South America⁸. Though Brazil's defence spending is relatively small as a percentage of GDP at 1.62%, at BRL63.7bn (US\$32.67bn) it stands

⁵ The last conflict in which the country was involved was the Triple Alliance War, 1860-1864; the country sent an Expeditionary Force of 27,500 to participate in World War Two, which saw heavy fighting against German forces in Italy.

⁶ Julio Jacobo Waiselfisz, *Mapa da Violência 2012: Os novos padrões da violência homicida no Brasil*. São Paulo: Instituto Sangari, 2012; p. 18. <http://mapadaviolencia.org.br/pdf2012/mapa2012web.pdf>. Accessed 6 June 2013.

⁷ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Geopolítica do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1967; Jorge Manuel da Costa Freitas, *A escola geopolítica brasileira : Golbery do Couto e Silva, Carlos de Meira Mattos e Theresinha de Castro*. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 2004.

⁸ Data are from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2012*. London: Brassey's (IISS); various pages.

as the world's tenth-largest.⁹ Though in GDP terms this is average for the region, Brazil accounts for 43% of spending on the continent, which has one of the world's lowest relative rates of military expenditure.¹⁰ Defence spending grew 35% from 2008 until significant (25-30%) across-the board budget cuts took hold in 2011.¹¹ Funding for equipment purchases doubled over this time, though personnel costs, notably pensions, still consume over 70% of Brazil's defence budget.¹²

The country's armed forces have not historically been considered an integral part of the country's foreign policy toolbox,¹³ focussing instead on territorial deterrence and an extensive array of internal tasks ranging from the provision of basic infrastructure in rural areas to delivery of government programmes (such as vaccinations) to the forceful pacification of slums (favelas) in urban areas in preparation for upcoming megaevents. As discussed below in more detail, the country has over the past decade invested significantly in peace operations as a means of cementing its international profile.

Regional Security Culture

The bulk of these patterns are typical of the region and its security subculture.¹⁴ Shaped by the predominance of internal over external challenges, peripheral status in global geopolitics, developmental inequalities and the legacies of interventionism, South American security culture counts as common elements of its "region of peace": the recognition of colonial borders, manifested in the prevalence of the legal precept of *uti possidetis*; peaceful settlement of international disputes; sovereignty interpreted as border inviolability and territorial integrity; strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention; popular self-determination; *convivencia* (peaceful coexistence); *concertación* (decision by consensus); confidence-building measures, especially regarding disarmament and non-proliferation; and democracy and human rights.¹⁵ These values are

⁹ *Ibidem*. On defence spending see also Rafael Duarte Villa and Juliana Viggiano, "Trends in South American weapons purchases at the beginning of the new millennium". *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*. Vol. 55, No. 2 (2012); pp. 28-47. Villa and Viggiano use data from the well-known yearbooks produced by the Stockholm International Peace Institute (SIPRI).

¹⁰ "Unasur defence spending one of the lowest in the world: average 0.91% of GDP". *Mercopress*. 14 May 2012. <http://en.mercopress.com/2012/05/14/unasur-defence-spending-one-of-the-lowest-in-the-world-average-0.91-of-gdp>. Access 9 June 2013.

¹¹ *Military Balance 2012*, p. 367.

¹² *Ibidem.*, p. 368.

¹³ João Paulo Soares Alsina Júnior, *Política Externa e Poder Militar no Brasil* [Foreign Policy and Military Power in Brazil], Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2009. See also Fernando José Sant'Ana Soares e Silva, "O poder militar brasileiro como instrumento de política externa". In Edison Benedito da Silva Filho and Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes, eds., *Defesa Nacional para o Século XXI: Política Internacional, Estratégia e Tecnologia Militar*. Brasília: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, 2012; pp. 149-183.

¹⁴ For an analysis of Brazilian strategic culture, using that concept as developed in the analytical literature, see Luís Bitencourt Alcides Costa Vaz, "Brazilian Strategic Culture," Miami: Applied Research Center, Florida International University, 2009. <http://strategicculture.fiu.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=MPrnYgaOCXU%3d&tabid=76>. Accessed 6 June 2013.

¹⁵ The characterization is from Arie M. Kacowicz, *The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American Experience, 1881–2001*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. See also the following contributions to Kai Michael Kenkel, ed., *Coming of Age: South America and Peace Operations*: Monica Herz, "Assumptions on intervention and security in South America", pp. 25-44; Kai Michael Kenkel, "Introduction—Diversity within a common culture: South America and peace operations", pp. 1-22; Kenkel, "Conclusions: Securing South America's Peace Operations Acquis Post-MINUSTAH", pp. 188-202; as well as Kai M. Kenkel, "Brazil and R2P: Does Responsibility Mean Using Force?," *Global Responsibility to Protect* Vol. 4, No. 1 (2012); pp. 5–32.

coupled with a predilection for the multilateral form as a means of protection against the inequalities of military power present in the international system. Within a context of global inequalities of military power, security is often seen as more likely to be attained by means of diplomatic negotiation. As a result, there is a propensity for legal-normativist solutions to international security challenges and, overall, both an inward domestic focus and a continental horizon to security thinking in the region.

Links to Foreign Policy Priorities

That continental horizon, however, shifted decisively under President Lula da Silva (2003-2010). Though it has indubitably remained anchored in the region, the country's foreign policy over the past decade has begun to take on classic traits of emerging-power behaviour.¹⁶ In its Brazilian manifestation, this has meant a revisionist stance with regard to polarity in the international system; ambivalence towards major multilateral institutions (both supporting, for example, the UNSC as the only legitimate forum for decisionmaking on intervention and questioning its legitimacy in the absence of increased Southern permanent members from the global South, notably Brazil itself); increasing mistrust of Western intentions, particularly with regard to intervention; and a turn to variable-geometry groupings such as the BRICS and IBSA.¹⁷

The former is hampered in becoming a security actor by a lack of policy overlap between members; the latter is more promising as particularly a forum for naval cooperation. Internally, the government's successful socioeconomic policies have over the past decade lifted tens of millions of Brazilians out of abject poverty, increased school attendance rates, and boosted consumption by means of extensive transfer payments. This, together with a positive international image and an habile diplomatic narrative, has endowed the country with an enviable reserve of soft power in the global South.

Defence Policy Documents

The discussion of Brazil's formal defence policy documents here must, of necessity, be brief; key documents include the second iteration of the National Defence Policy in 2005; the National Strategy of Defence—whose reach is internal to the military establishment—and the landmark 2001 White Paper on National Defence.¹⁸ Broadly put,

¹⁶ See, by Andrew Hurrell, "An Emerging Security Community in South America?," in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 228–264; "Security in Latin America," *International Affairs* 74, 1998, 529–546; "Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?," *International Affairs* 82, 2006, 1–19. See also Kai Michael Kenkel, "South America's emerging power: Brazil as peacekeeper", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17, No. 5 (2010); pp. 644-661; Kenkel, "Out of South America to the globe: Brazil's growing stake in peace operations", in *Coming of Age*, pp. 85-110; Sean W. Burges, "Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War", *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2008); pp. 63-84; Daniel Flemes, "O Brasil na iniciativa BRIC: soft balancing numa ordem global em mudança?" *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2010); pp. 141-156.

¹⁷ For an illustrative example among many, see (former Foreign, now Defence Minister) Celso Amorim, "Defesa Nacional e Pensamento Estratégico Brasileiro". *Política Hoje*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2012); pp. 33-349.

¹⁸ The full texts of the documents are available online (all authored and published by the Brazilian Ministry of Defence in Brasília): *Política de Defesa Nacional [National Defence Policy]* (2005). http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2005/Decreto/D5484.htm; *Estratégia Nacional de Defesa [National Strategy of Defence]* (2008). http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf; *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*

current Brazilian defence planning consciously does not operate on the basis of the generation of traditional threat scenarios. There is a preference instead to base thinking on missions attributed to the armed forces and broader objectives increasingly derived from foreign policy goals.¹⁹

It is important to recall that following the end of twenty years of military rule in 1985, in Brazil the advancement of civilian control at the normative level, though satisfactory, has advanced relatively slowly. Both the Armed Forces and the Foreign Ministry have traditionally enjoyed considerable autonomy, even isolation, in policy formulation, with a civilian Defence Ministry indeed only being created in 1999. The progression through the documents reveals increasing integration of foreign and defence policy, and the requisite subordination of the latter to the former. As a result the documents' usefulness as bases for the operationalization of policy guidelines has steadily increased. The armed forces retain a number of important internal missions, including assistance to the police in combatting drug trafficking, security for upcoming megaevents, the provision of infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications in rural areas, disaster relief and the delivery of some state programmes such as vaccinations and field hospitals.

In defence policy documents, Brazil is invariably described as a nation at peace with its neighbours, guided by pacifist, multilateralist traditions and ensconced in a region whose strategic scenarios are relatively tranquil; one notable exception is the increasing preoccupation with the southern Atlantic Ocean, discussed below. Cooperation and deterrence are given equal weight as means to guarantee the country's security,²⁰ and the tight association of national security with economic development has long standing.²¹

Given this vision of satisfied territorial concerns, the country employs a concept of security that is broadened well beyond traditional realist geostrategic analysis, and is designed not to stir controversy through the identification of neighbours as potential threats. Indeed, the focus is increasingly global: as defence thinking is meant to accompany the country's rise as an economic and diplomatic power and to reflect its specific profile as an international actor, the White Paper's introduction, for example, highlights the country's key role in global food security and energy production and its massive aquifers. Increasing participation in United Nations peace operations is a combination typical of Southern Cones states that combines the search for international presence with the political advantages of a turn towards external rather internal military missions.²²

[White Paper on National Defence] (2011). <https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes07/lbndn.pdf>. For a history of Brazilian security policy and its interplay with the oscillations of international engagement in foreign policy, see Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, "Política de defesa e segurança do Brasil no século XXI: um esboço histórico". In Silva Filho and Moraes (fn 13 above), pp. 49–82.

¹⁹ National Strategy of Defence, p. 47.

²⁰ White Paper, p. 29.

²¹ National Strategy of Defence, p. 8. This link is associated with the controversial National Security Doctrines implanted during the Cold War with assistance from the United States.

²² See Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez, "Democratization and commitment to peace: South America's motivations to contribute to peace operations". In Kai Michael Kenkel, ed., *Coming of Age: South America and peace operations*. London: Routledge, 2013; pp. 45–63.

The 2005 National Defence Policy provides an overview of guidelines and objectives, which is taken up in later documents. These are largely derived from foreign policy objectives and go far beyond the area of responsibility exclusively of the military apparatus. Traditionally, beyond the Amazon region, the predominant preoccupations have included spillover from the Colombian internal conflict and border control against smuggling and drug trafficking.²³ In the run-up to the large international events to be held in the country in 2014 and 2016, terrorism, particularly in the Triple Border area with Paraguay and Argentina, has been given increasing attention.

Despite the significant advances they represent in terms both of consolidating the country's priorities and profile as well as, critically, engaging transparently with civil society, some analysts have branded the documents as decoupled from the country's traditions and financial realities.²⁴ Finally, defence policy documents, particularly the National Strategy of Defence, call for far-reaching restructuring and equipment modernization programmes, including large-tag items such as nuclear-powered submarines, a major surface vessel purchasing programme for the Navy which includes a second aircraft carrier of French design, and a major order of fighter planes for the Air Force.

Defence Industry

The main beneficiary of the Brazilian armed forces' upcoming spending, which is set to surpass US\$240 billion over the period from 2012-2017,²⁵ is the country's burgeoning defence industry. Once the world's eighth-largest during military rule, it hovers around 30th place globally today. Total production stands at about US\$2.7 billion, of which approximately US\$1 billion is for export.²⁶ As in many other developing economies and in China and Russia, policy regarding the arms industry is often tightly interwoven with broader policy aims, and is shrouded in intransparent practices. Military technology is seen as a key driver of technological progress and eventually production with a higher average value-added for a currently commodity-based economy.

Additionally, military technology is connected to the country's quest for greater profile both globally and in its region. One of the most important criteria in recent purchases of major systems has been the transfer of key technologies and the relocation of the production and logistics chains to Brazil.²⁷ In this manner, Brazil hopes to gain ground on European and US manufacturers and itself become a key exporter of ever larger

²³ The government in 2012 committed BRL 12 billion (ca. US\$6 billion) to a new Border Monitoring System (SISFRON). See Brazil. Presidency, "Michel Temer aprova Sistema de Monitoramento de Fronteiras". 2 October 2012. <http://www2.planalto.gov.br/vice-presidente/noticias/2012/10/2012-10-02-sisfron> ; and Guilherme Queiroz, "Defesa bilhonária". *Istoé Dinheiro*. 13 January 2012. http://www.istoedinheiro.com.br/noticias/76604_DEFESA+BILIONARIA (both accessed 13 June 2013). This project also provides a major stimulus to the Brazilian defence industry (see below).

²⁴ Paulo Roberto de Almeida, "Estratégia Nacional de Defesa: comentários dissidentes". *Meridiano 47*, No. 104 (2009); pp. 5-9.

²⁵ Defense Update. "Brazil's Defense Industry – Market Report 2012-2017". 7 April 2013. http://defense-update.com/20130407_brazils-defense-industry-market-report-2012-2017.html. Accessed 13 June 2013.

²⁶ Brazil-Arab News Agency. "Arms industry expects to double in size". 4 October 2011. <http://www2.anba.com.br/noticia/12494151/special-reports/arms-industry-expects-to-double-in-size/>. Access 13 June 2013.

²⁷ See, for example, Yana Marull. "Brazil's defense industry booms". *Agence France Presse*. 22 August 2012. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5geR560TRmRWxL2l7q5M5QkD76Hgg?docId=CNG.cfd6db87af5b4a9c-f141593a81c8c958.171.22>. Access 13 June 2013.

weapons systems in its region.²⁸ It is already a supplier of light attack helicopters and light attack and transport aircraft. As a result of its willingness to engage in the transfer of production technology, recently France has emerged as a preferred arms trade partner, as purchases of Scorpène ships and on-going negotiations over a major purchase of fighter planes has shown. Whereas the Air Force indicated its operational preference for the Swedish Gripen fighter, government officials prefer the French Rafale, due to the prospect of important elements of the production chain being moved to Brazil.

Further, the country is one of the world's top ten producers of small arms and munitions, with a concentration on pistols (Taurus) and small arms ammunition (CBC). Nonlethal weapons and non-weapon military equipment further constitute a growing element of Brazilian defence exports. As a result of what is viewed as the strategic importance of the arms industry, the country has on occasion not been receptive to efforts to limit the production and export of certain categories of arms on normative grounds. For example, though it acceded rapidly to the Ottawa Convention on landmines, despite recognition by the current Defence Minister of cluster bombs' inhumane nature, Brazil continues to manufacture and export—though not itself deploy—cluster-based munitions, and did not participate in the elaboration of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.²⁹ Defence sales have recently begun to constitute a more significant factor in Brazil's growing engagement with Africa, as defence accords with Nigeria, Namibia and major purchases by oil-rich Angola—within the framework of a larger defence cooperation agreement—attest.³⁰

South Atlantic

With the discovery of the extensive pré-sal oilfields of the coast of Brazil's south-eastern coast—thought to hold up to 100 billion barrels, catapulting the country to status as one of the world's largest producers—the South Atlantic Ocean has rapidly become a primary focus of Brazil's security policy and strategic planning. The country's area of control, up to the continental shelf, has been designated “Blue Amazonia” (Amazonia Azul) in allusion to the parallels with the all-important and resource-rich centre of the country's interior. As further oil reserves are uncovered in other parts of the region—as in the Falkland Islands—the South Atlantic ambit has rapidly gained in strategic importance and in potential for conflict.³¹ Though first included in considerations of the country's strategic environment in the 2005 National Defence Policy, it has now taken on an entirely different level of geopolitical emphasis.

For Brazil, its interest in the region is threefold. First, the country is actively seeking to increase its maritime patrolling capacity in defence of the very extensive upcoming

²⁸ See, inter alia, Suzeley Kalil Mathias and Eduardo de Lucas Vasconcelos Cruz, “Defence and Regional Integration: The case of the Brazilian Weapons Industry”. *Brazilian Political Science Review*. Vol. 3, No. 1 (2009); pp. 40-57.

²⁹ Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. “Brazil”. 4 August 2011. http://www.the-monitor.org/custom/index.php/region_profiles/print_theme/841. Access 13 June 2013.

³⁰ Agência Brasil. “Brasil ajudará indústria de defesa de Angola”. 12 April 2013. <http://info.abril.com.br/noticias/mercado/brasil-ajudara-industria-de-defesa-de-angola-12042013-43.shl>. Access 13 June 2013.

³¹ Alcides Costa Vaz, “O Atlântico Sul nas perspectivas estratégicas de Brasil, Argentina e África do Sul”. *Boletim de Economia e Política Internacional*. No. 6 (2011); pp. 63-68.

investments to be made in offshore drilling installations. Second, fully 90 per cent of Brazil's trade enters and leaves the country by way of seaborne transportation.³² Third, the area has gained in importance as an ambit shared with the states of Western Africa, which have under President Lula saw a significant increase in diplomatic attention, technical cooperation and private-sector investment³³. Similarly, cooperation with the states of the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the Community of Portuguese-Speaking States, has risen since 2012, particularly given the challenges posed by piracy and instability in Guinea-Bissau, a Lusophone state subverted by (largely Brazilian) drug traffickers.³⁴

It is interesting to note recent trends in armed forces thinking which give Brazil's global ambitions a maritime component, viewing the entire South Atlantic, from the Equator to Antarctica (where the country maintains a research base), as Brazil's natural sphere of influence as opposed to a focus solely on its territorial waters and economic zone. This has led to calls for the area to be free of extra-regional (read: NATO) powers, a potential source of tensions given the reactivation of the US Navy's Fourth Fleet and the British dependencies in the area. Joint exercises have been held with India and South Africa, and naval cooperation between IBSA members has steadily increased.³⁵ Much of the extensive new purchasing programme for the Brazilian Navy has been justified in terms of the need for patrolling capacity in this vast area.

Brazil in Africa

Brazil's rise as an emerging economic and strategic actors is inextricably tied to the African continent, by both rhetoric and history. President Lula da Silva (2003-2010) invested heavily in Africa, linking Brazil's rise a global player to its status as a voice for the developing world, based on South-South cooperation and revisionism of global institutional structures of power. Lula's affinity for the African continent is perhaps best symbolized by the opening of twenty new embassies there over his tenure; Brazil now possesses more embassies there than Germany or the United Kingdom.³⁶

Beyond normative underscoring foreign policy aspirations, this presence is a reflection of a boom in economic ties with Africa: Brazilian exports to Africa rose almost sixfold,

³² Wanderley Messias da Costa, "Projeção do Brasil no Atlântico Sul: geopolítica e estratégia". *Revista USP*. No. 95 (2012); pp. 9-22. Here, p. 11. Data are taken from online database provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade.

³³ See Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira and Luísa Calvete Portela Barbosa, "The South Atlantic in the Context of the Relations Brazil-Africa [sic]". *Século XXI*. Vol. 3, No. 1 (2012); pp. 59-77; and Kai Michael Kenkel, "Brazil's peacebuilding in Africa and Haiti", forthcoming in *Journal of International Peacekeeping*.

³⁴ Nancy Brune, "The Brazil-Africa Narco Nexus". *Americas Quarterly*. Vol. 5, No. 4 (2011). <http://www.americasquarterly.org/brune>. Access 13 June 2013.

³⁵ Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, "Brazil in the South Atlantic: growing protagonism and unintended consequences". *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Policy Brief*. May 2013. http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/7f8201c01207875357d3052f3dbe3965.pdf. Access 13 June 2013.

³⁶ For the definitive Brazilian analysis of the country's interaction with the African continent, see José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, *África parceira do Brasil atlântico : relações internacionais do Brasil e da África no início do século XXI*. Belo Horizonte: Fino Traço, 2012. In English, see, by the same author, "The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy". *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*. Vol. 53 (special edition) (2010); pp. 169-182. See also Paulo Fagundes Visentini, "Cooperação Sul-Sul, diplomacia de prestígio ou imperialism 'soft'? As relações Brasil-África do governo Lula". *Século XXI*. Vol. 1, No. 1 (2010); pp. 65-84.

and trade as a whole threefold, from 1996 to 2006.³⁷ In 2011 15.43% of Brazilian imports and 12.12% of exports involved African partners; typically, imports consisted largely of oil, and exports of a higher-than-average percentage of manufactured goods.³⁸ Given its own vast access to natural resources, Brazil is not involved to the same extent as established powers and its BRIC counterparts in a competition for natural resources in Africa. It is, however, desirous of expanding the access of its multinational corporations in the energy and constructions sectors to African markets.

As noted elsewhere in this volume, Brazil seeks to differentiate its approach to technical cooperation from that of OECD donors, highlighting its “horizontal nature, viewed as less paternalistic than previous patterns of interaction; its demand-driven nature, allowing Africans to determine the most pressing problems rather than have them externally dictated; the fact that it is not conceived of as unidirectional but as an exchange of expertise; further it is viewed as not based on national or commercial interests, does not impose conditionalities, and is based on the identification of common interests.”³⁹ As a result, Brazilian interaction with Africa typically does not involve a substantial military presence within the framework of peace operations, other interventions, or cooperation and training programmes.

Given the rising strategic importance of the South Atlantic, it is likely that military cooperation will be predominantly maritime in nature. Recently, the Brazilian Navy has ramped up its cooperation with both South Africa, as a BRICS partner, and a number of both Lusophone (a traditional preferred partner) and non-Lusophone littoral states. One example of particular impact is the role of the Brazilian Marine Corps in the founding and training of its counterpart in Namibia.

Intervention and Peace Operations⁴⁰

Participation in peace operations has emerged as a key element in Brazil’s drive for increased global influence; peacebuilding in particular is viewed as a key way to bring successful policies for socioeconomic development to bear in the security arena. However, the regional security culture mentioned above, with its emphasis on state sovereignty and rejection of the use of force, is increasingly at odds with a peacekeeping practice which it turning increasingly to robust peace enforcement and missions mandated under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

³⁷ C. O. Ribeiro, ‘Brazil’s New African Policy: The Experience of the Lula Government (2003-6), *World Affairs*. Vol. 13, No. 1 (2009); pp. 84-93. Here, p. 88.

³⁸ Christina Stolte, ‘Brazil in Africa: Just Another BRICS Country Seeking Resources?’, Briefing Paper, Chatham House Americas Programme/Africas Programme, 2012/1, p. 4.

³⁹ See Kenkel, ‘Brazil’s peacebuilding’. For a detailed analysis see Robert Muggah and Ilona Szábo de Carvalho, ‘O Efeito Sul: reflexões críticas sobre o engajamento do Brasil com Estados frágeis’. *Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública*, Vol. 5, No. 9 (2011); pp. 166-176.

⁴⁰ For detailed analysis of the Brazilian position on intervention and peace operations, see the work of the present author (fn 15, 16 above) and ‘Brazil’. In Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, ‘Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions’. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; pp. 335-354. For a policy-centred resumé, see the brief prepared for the Providing for Peacekeeping project at the International Peace Institute at http://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/brazil_kenkel-130315.pdf.

Brazil was an early participant in international interventions, frequently contributing individual or small teams of unarmed officers to a number of missions during the Cold War period. Prior to significant shifts in peacekeeping participation in 2004, the country participated in four missions with larger contingents: a 600-man battalion to UNEF I in the Suez (1956-1967); 800 troops in non-combat roles to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III from 1995 to 1997; and a substantial police contribution to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET—1999-2002).

The advent of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004 would bring a significant shift in Brazil's engagement in peace operations, both quantitatively and normatively. Seeing an opportunity to cement its role as a security player at the global level, Brazil has since the inception provided its largest contingent and a string of generals to serve as its military Force Commander. Originally set at 1,300 troops, the joint Army-Marine Corps-Army Engineering Corps contingent was increased to 2,200 after the devastating January 2010 earthquake. Brazilian troops' area of responsibility in the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince encompasses 1.5 million people, many of them still living in tent cities more than three years after the catastrophe.

Over half of MINUSTAH's troops come from South and Central America, and coordinating these efforts has become a major source of military-military cooperation in the region, as well as of incipient steps in defence policy cooperation of a multilateral nature. Brazil has sought to develop in Haiti its own paradigm for peacebuilding that might eventually serve, in keeping with broader foreign policy orientations, as a counterweight to the liberal paradigm favoured by industrialized states and reflected in UN practice.

In recent years Brazil has further extended its participation in United Nations peace operations to include a 230-man contribution, aboard a Navy frigate, to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The country has further provided the maritime force's first non-NATO Force Commander. Further, a former MINUSTAH Force Commander in June 2012 assumed command of MONUSCO, the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is the UN's most robust. His assumption of this command highlights on-going tensions in Brazil's position with respect to intervention, sovereignty and the use of force.

Though Brazilian diplomats have taken pains to minimize the appearance of a rupture with previous practice, MINUSTAH is a mission that involves the robust use of force and is authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. MONUSCO's Intervention Brigade, now under the command of a Brazilian officer, is the first to have an explicitly offensive military mandate. Some analysts argue that the prospect of prestige associated with increased contributions to peacekeeping have softened Brazilian rejection of the use of force to resolve conflict and protect civilian populations. Indeed the country has become increasingly involved in normative debates over the subject at the UN, floating in November 2011 the successful "responsibility while protecting" concept, a necessary first step in reconciling Northern impulses to protect individual rights with Southern qualms about perceived violations of state sovereignty. Though Brazilian

diplomacy has not pursued the initiative further, it stands as a hopeful indicator that the country will continue to contribute proactively to intervention debates assuming its natural mediating function.

The Nuclear Issue

Brazil has possessed civilian nuclear technology well before the opening of its first reactor, Angra I, in 1986. During military rule in the 1970s and 1980s, a parallel military nuclear programme was pursued by the Navy, in contravention of the 1968 Tlatelolco Treaty—a Brazilian initiative—which had declared the region a nuclear weapons-free zone. The civilian 1988 Constitution forbids the country from pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons technology; the Navy programme has been abandoned. Similarly, a nuclear development race with Argentina was put to an end in 1994 with the creation of the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), a pioneering regional confidence-building initiative involving mutual inspections and transparency.

Brazil's nuclear energy sector continues to grow, with the country now possessing the ability to refine uranium domestically, and a number of new reactors in construction.⁴¹ The construction of a number of nuclear-powered (though not-armed) submarines is a major component of the Brazilian Navy's plans for increasing its ability to patrol the South Atlantic.⁴² Its major partner in this endeavour is France, which has supplied the wherewithal to produce the vessels' hulls; the nuclear propulsion technology remains Brazilian in origin.

Though not considered to be actively pursuing nuclear weapons technology, Brazil's relationship with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is ambiguous. The country signed the Treaty in 1994, a move a significant number of analysts in Brazil consider a mistake. Whereas Brazil renounced nuclear technology and received little recompense, there is a perception that non-signatory India, for example, has effectively been rewarded with greater influence for its own flaunting of the Treaty's precepts.

Briefly put, Brazilian representatives object to what they see as the unequal treatment accorded different categories of signatory. While nuclear "haves" are free to develop their nuclear programmes largely as they see fit, mostly developing "have-nots" are limited not only with regard to potential weaponized aspects of their programmes, but also in exploiting their potential developmental benefits on the civilian side. The country has advocated more consistent standards in establishing disarmament initiatives involving the "haves" and non-proliferation efforts directed at non-nuclear powers. Indeed, Brazil sees itself as a natural broker between these two groups.⁴³

⁴¹ Joaquim Francisco de Carvalho, "O espaço da energia nuclear do Brasil". *Estudos Avançados*. Vol. 26, No. 74 (2012); pp. 293-307.

⁴² João Roberto Martins Filho, "O Projeto do Submarino Nuclear Brasileiro". *Contexto Internacional*. Vol. 33, No. 2 (2011); pp. 277-314.

⁴³ Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, "Noites tropicais: O Brasil e a nova era da não proliferação e do desarmamento nucleares (2003-2010)". *Revista de Sociologia e Política*. Vol. 20, No. 43 (2012); pp. 43-57.

Conclusion

As the brief analysis above has shown, Brazil is likely to continue to gain status as an international security actor for the foreseeable future. Though its strong economic growth has begun to stumble somewhat, the country has consolidated its presence in an ever-increasing number of global decisionmaking bodies in a wide range of policy areas. However, the hard core of security issues—where the currency is military and geostrategic power—continues to present difficulties to entry for Brazil. This is due to three main factors: the gap between a lack of external threats and demanding internal challenges; a gap in technology and spending capacity; and national and regional traditions that value either other policy areas—such as development—or other, pacific, forms of dispute resolution.

Rather, Brazil's role as a security actor comes to the fore with the adoption of a broadened security lens: it is a major actor in food security, energy security and natural resource supply. Coupled with an increasingly global horizon, the country is here to stay as a player on the global stage; as global power shifts southward, it is sure to play a recurring role at the core of security issues as well. As it does so, Brazil is in the process of developing the means, and will, to exercise the global responsibility inherent in its newfound status in ways that circumvent and augment the traditional recourse to the use of force. The emergence of a new security player, and perhaps a new, broader, way of approaching issues such as intervention is to be welcomed.