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New Strategic Challenges for Europe and China



Lutz Feldt, Claas Knoop,
Peter Roell, Ralph Thiele

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Room 1806, Overseas Chinese Mansion
No.129, Yan'an Xi Road, Shanghai 200040

Tel.: 0086 21 6249 1722

Fax: 0086 21 6249 4549

E-mail: shanghai@kas.de

Webpage: www.kas.de/china

Person responsible: Dr. Peter Hefele, Director KAS Shanghai

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地址: 上海市延安西路 129 号华侨大厦 1806 室

邮编: 200040

电话: 0086 21 6249 1722

传真: 0086 21 6249 4549

E-Mail: shanghai@kas.de

主页: www.kas.de/china

主编: 何彼得博士, 德国阿登纳基金会上海办公室主任

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Foreword

Globalisation is connecting countries, economies and people around the globe. We all cherish and benefit from cheap goods, global tourism, cultural exchange – all linked and depending on physical and virtual strings and knots around the globe. But vulnerability of these global networks has also increased, by traditional as well as by non-traditional threats: maritime terrorism, cyber attacks, climate change to name some.

In recent years developing and emerging countries have published new strategies to cope with these challenges – challenges that long for comprehensive approaches, including state actors, private enterprises and society, military and civil instruments.

The following papers analyse the aforementioned topics in the framework of evolving EU-China Relations. The studies clearly show that new efforts for cooperation between Europe and China have to be made. Afghanistan and Africa are the most challenging 'stages, on which China has remarkable increased its economic and political influence during the last decade.

Some of the ideas and recommendations had been discussed in two international conferences in Beijing and Hong Kong, organized by KAS Beijing and KAS Shanghai in 2011.

As diplomats and high ranking military staff members the authors provide detailed insights in newly emerging threats and national, regional and global policy regimes, and give useful recommendation for policy makers.

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Dr. Peter Hefe

Director KAS Shanghai



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EU-NATO-China: Perspectives of a Developing Partnership

Colonel Ralph D. Thiele

1. Redirection

The cold war is long gone. Powerful nations like the USA, Russia and China are at peace. Today's challenges are different from the past. And they carry different names, i.e. al-Qaeda and piracy, financial crisis and climate change, nuclear proliferation and migration etc. The geometry of global power is becoming more distributed and diffuses while the challenges to security have become more complex and crosscutting. Political and technological changes are allowing huge numbers of people around the world to influence events as never before. New actors are reshaping the international security environment.

The coming decades are likely to see a decline in state sovereignty, a power shift from states to international or non-state networks, and an increase in the lethal power of these non-state actors. Cyber attacks, which have already become a new form of permanent warfare, will further increase in frequency and sophistication. We can expect their effects moving from the disruption of services to the physical destruction of hardware. Crises and conflicts can occur at any time, at short notice and without prior warning and may require a rapid response over large distances. con-

sequently, maintaining and building alliances, partnerships and coalitions for common action will become both - more complicated and more important.

Against this background, Asia and the Pacific have gained considerable attention, not only from the USA, but also from NATO and the EU. The USA has started reinforcing security partnerships across the Pacific as it has been strengthening its ties with island nations as well as intensifying cooperation with China while Beijing has been expanding its own influence in the region. A constructive U.S.-China relationship has become crucial to stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. To this end the U.S. has redirected its strategic approach and decided to build its security on smaller, leaner military forces with particular focus on Asia. The new strategic defence guidance from the Obama administration has refocused the U.S. defence posture on the increasingly competitive security environment emerging in the Pacific.

Global security and prosperity are dependent on the free flow of goods and information. To enable economic growth and commerce, America will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons, working in close cooperation with capable, interoperable allies and partners around the world. The global commons – maritime, air, outer space, and cyber space – constitute a universal public good that serves as a crucial



enabler of international security and trade. Access to and transit of the four domains may be threatened or disrupted by nations and non-state actors, who seek to break the supply chain of critical resources and thus damage the global economy.

The maritime domain is the oldest and best understood of the four domains of the *global commons*. Humans have used it as a highway for trade and conquest ever since the first Phoenicians began to explore the Mediterranean Sea. Today, many consider the maritime domain, the international waters of the world's oceans, to be globalization's circulatory system. Multi-national manufacturing has evolved over the last half century to make more goods available at lower cost, while simultaneously creating new markets worldwide. This trend has transformed the system from a global supply network into an integrated supply chain. Many products, engineered, designed, and patented in the United States, are made of parts manufactured in a number of different countries and shipped to a factory in China for assembly; the finished products are then exported worldwide for sale. Also the military supply chain relies on this integrated model. Thus, threats to and vulnerabilities within both the civil and military supply networks are of concern to military defence planners.

An important aspect of the contemporary maritime domain is that its use depends on reliable access

to air, space and cyberspace. The utility of the maritime domain depends on much more than just ships and harbours. The transmission of information such as orders, inventories, and the tracking of assets utilize a vast network of both intercontinental undersea cables and space-based satellite links, and is a critical enabler of *just in time* business models.

The naval equivalent of supply chain efficiency has been smaller crew sizes, reduced armour and survivability, and greater dependence on commercial *off-the-shelf* equipment. Even more than commercial operators, navies are dependent on digital communications and satellite reconnaissance and navigation for deployed operations, maritime related flight data, and missile guidance. For example, NATO's Operation Active Endeavour which aims to deter, disrupt, and prevent efforts by terrorists to use the Mediterranean Sea for smuggling of personnel and weapons into Europe builds on strong maritime situational awareness, using an array of surveillance and intercept assets on land and sea, and in air, space and cyberspace.

China's increasingly capable regional fleet will soon begin outfitting its first aircraft carrier. In the highly sensitive Persian Gulf region, Iran has repeatedly experimented with anti-access tactics to interfere with the movement of both naval and commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. As trade between the East and West expands,



the Indian Ocean will play an ever-increasing role in global maritime operations. In light of this trend, India has determined that increasing its procurement and development of naval weapon systems will best protect its national interests, including a world-class submarine fleet to support an anti-access defence strategy.

Half the world's merchant tonnage flows through the South China Sea. It connects many of the nations of the Asia-Pacific region, some of which have competing claims on its waters and islands. So the stakes for maritime security and freedom of navigation are high. Against this background, recent renewed tensions in the South China Sea give reason for concern. The islands in the South China Sea are among the disputed territories. There is considerable concern about increased tensions in the region including *„an uptick in confrontational rhetoric, disagreements over resource exploitation, coercive economic actions, and the incidents around the Scarborough Reef, including the use of barriers to deny access“*¹. Tensions also heated up between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, between Korea and Japan over Dokdo/Takeshima, and even between Russia and Japan over the southern Kuriles/Northern Territories.

¹ U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, South China Sea, Office of Press Relations
Washington, DC, August 3, 2012.

Recently Robert D. Kaplan has postulated *„a NATO of the seas for the Indian Ocean comprising South Africa, Oman, India, Pakistan, Singapore and Australia“*² that could enhance regional security and cooperation. Unfortunately an increasing demand for resources reduces the incentive to cooperate, while it is simultaneously intensifying both competition and the impulse to deny access to competitors. Support from the international community for regional partnerships could help to stabilize what threatens to become an increasingly volatile maritime region. If, by contrast, seafaring nations choose to use their naval power to deny free transit of their Exclusive Economic Zone as a means to curtail competition or assert new territorial rights, this would have a serious impact on global trade and the future of access to the maritime domain. It is impossible to predict with certainty whether it will be a nation-state, a non-state actor, or even a hybrid of the two that will choose to instigate anti-access activities. What is clear is that the destruction of, or long-term denial of access to, any portion of this dense web of trade and information would have deep and long-lasting effects.

² Robert D. Kaplan, *„Monsoon – The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power“*, Random House, 2010.



2. Climate change

The issue of climate change is closely linked to the maritime domain. Its impacts have the potential to exacerbate national security issues and increase the number of international conflicts.³ Until fairly recent times, no one thought of climate change as a security issue. By the 19th century, scientists were theorizing that temperatures were affected by what we call today greenhouse gasses. Over the course of the 20th century, the scientific community began to regard climate change as more than a distant possibility. Interest in climate change as a national and international security issue has developed only recently. Even today there are numerous dissenting voices.

The discrepancy in perceptions can be explained to an extent, because climate change is going to affect different nations and regions to different degrees and in different ways. Obviously, there will be *winner*s as well as *loser*s. The Russians, for example, are likely to benefit from the melting of Polar ice and the opening of new maritime routes. By contrast, according to the Climate Change Index, people living in such places as Djibouti, Egypt, Pakistan, and Cuba are likely to suffer from serious physical problems leading in turn to political destabilization.

³ National Research Council. *„Advancing the Science of Climate Change“*, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, USA. NRC (2010).

Climate-induced change is introducing instability in the maritime domain that will require political and also legal foresight as well as cooperation to resolve. The melting of the Arctic ice pack is opening stretches of formerly inaccessible sea lanes and ocean floor to transit and deep-sea mining. This topographical change, combined with advances in deep-seabed exploration and mining and the rising value of scarce mineral resources, is making the northern continental shelves of Asia, Europe, and North America more accessible and therefore more desirable. Arctic border nations are already staking competing claims. In sum, increasing access to the Arctic Ocean means that issues of sovereignty (priority in control over an area), security (responsibility for policing the passageways), environmental protection (control of ship-based air and water pollution, noise, or ship strikes of whales), and safety (responsibility for rescue and response) will become more important.⁴

Other climate change related concerns revolve around the use of natural resources, such as water. Among the nations at greatest risk to climate change and natural disasters are those in Asia and the Pacific. The region is also home to the

⁴ Arctic Council, *„Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report“*, April 2009, second printing, http://www.pame.is/images/stories/AMSA_2009_Report/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf (accessed 26 September 2012).



internationally shared water sheds of the Himalayas that are crucial to the wellbeing of 1.3 billion people downstream. In many parts of the world, water issues cross national borders. Access to consistent and reliable sources of water in these regions is greatly valued. Changes in the timing and intensity of rainfall would threaten already limited water sources and potentially cause future conflicts. Threatened food security in parts of Asia could also lead to conflict. Rapid population growth and changes in precipitation and temperature, among other factors, are already affecting crop yields. Resulting food shortages could increase the risk of humanitarian crises and trigger population migration across national borders, ultimately sparking political instability.⁵ International cooperation or competition for the management of such natural and other resources will be important from a security perspective, in the region and beyond.

A level of uncertainty exists when it comes to the correlations that can be made between climate change and human security. It is well known that warming facilitates the propagation of certain harmful bacteria and the spread of disease. It is also clear that higher temperatures will lead to droughts, which will affect agricultural production,

⁵ Boko, M., I. Nyong, C. Vogel et. alt., Africa, in: *Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*, edited by Martin Parry et al., Cambridge University Press 2007. 433.

and that ice melt will cause flooding especially in coastal areas. But it is much less easy to predict how these changes will affect different societies. For example, are mass migrations a likely outcome of climate change? What precise ways may lead to conflict? Obviously, we can assert with a large degree of confidence that the climate is changing, and that this will likely harm mankind. The challenge is to find a feasible way to address this problem.

As the threat is approaching, the options for dealing with it become increasingly limited. Studies suggest that there is a narrow window of opportunity to make meaningful changes before irreversible damage is done. Yet, up to date

- the uncertainty of science undermines the political will to act;
- the creeping nature of the threat provides no sufficient incentive to act;
- to many actors it appears to be the other man's problem.

The developed countries have confidence that they will be capable of outpacing the problems created by climate change. The less well-developed countries pretend they have to focus on other subjects. Yet, climate change is a global problem and one that can only be solved in cooperation.

This is particularly true in the Asia-Pacific region. All of Southern Asia – from Afghanistan to Myanmar – will be affected by factors such as snowmelt in the Himalayas, the



Karakorum, the Pamir and the Hindu Kush and rising sea levels. The consequences for low-lying countries, such as Bangladesh, could be dramatic. It is imperative that all countries of the region find ways to cooperate in order to tackle climate change-related problems, such as sustainable water management and food security. Related key challenges include sustainable production and consumption, climate change adaptation, disaster preparedness and energy security.

3. EU – China

The European Union is ready to support the region to meet these very challenges. Particularly climate change has become a priority in EU's relations with third countries. It is evident that a global concerted effort is needed in order to respond to the challenges that climate change presents. The Asia-Pacific region is key to future climate challenges but also, critically, to the solutions that need to be deployed jointly.

Beyond the issue of climate change, the dynamics of political dialogue between the EU and its Asia-Pacific partners has been determined by the intensity of their respective trade, development and even security cooperation. China naturally has gained a prominent role. The EU and China are attractive partners for each other. The EU is China's biggest trading partner, while China is the EU's largest

source of imports and second largest two-way trading partner on its way to become the world's largest economy. The trade and investment relationship has become a major source of wealth, jobs, development and innovation for both sides.

The EU's relationship with China was established in 1975. It has been governed by the EU-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1985. In 2003 the EU and China launched a more comprehensive strategic partnership to reflect the growing depth of their relations. This was upgraded in 2010 to include foreign affairs, security matters and global challenges such as climate change, energy security, global economy governance and global financial architectures. The areas of cooperation are further expanding especially those relating to security and defence policies. Globally, Brussels needs Beijing's cooperation more than ever.

Since the EU-China summit in February 2012, when the High Level People-to-People Dialogue was launched, the EU-China institutional architecture has been based on three pillars: politics, economics and trade. There are annual summits along with regular high level dialogues, as well as over 50 sectorial dialogues covering a broad list of topics such as industrial policy, education, customs, social affairs, nuclear energy and consumer protection.



As the world's largest trader the EU has aspired to a corresponding role as a global political player. Beyond its traditional focus on transatlantic ties and its eastern and southern neighbourhood, Brussels sought in particular to expand its engagement with the emerging powers now seen as crucial partners for *Effective multilateralism*. This vision of rule-based global governance mirrors the EU's own internal dynamics. In this quest, effectively engaging China has been considered vital.

Yet, to this point, there have been mixed results. The European Union's relations with China have been hampered by both Brussels' limited foreign policy capabilities and by competition among member states. China has been able to capitalize on European disunity, misperceptions, and lack of resolve. The antagonism between the strategic partners has probably been most obvious in Africa, where many western critics increasingly see China's large and growing footprint as neo-colonialist in nature.

Beijing effectively blocked EU initiatives at the UN to put pressure on Sudan to accept a peacekeeping force in Darfur or to force Robert Mugabe to ease political repression in Zimbabwe in order to safeguard its own economic interests ranging from oil to arms sales. The protracted current standoff at the UN over how to halt Syria's slide into an all-out civil war or impose sanctions against Iran's nuclear program reveals similar fault lines.

Though both sides have emphasized disarmament and non-proliferation among their political priorities for the partnership and Beijing has set aside its principle of non-interference to become part of the 5+1-dialogue with Tehran, it is not willing to support tougher UN sanctions that would jeopardize its oil and gas imports.

Although the EU has significantly scaled back its earlier overly optimistic expectations on convergence of interests and policy goals vis-à-vis Beijing in recent years, it appears that Europe still has not fully grasped the extent to which China has become a global power whose actions directly impact key European interests in almost every area and region. Although European exports are increasingly dependent on the vast markets of China, policy-makers in European capitals and Brussels need to realize that the dependence is mutual. Europe can pursue a more interests-based and assertive engagement with both countries that finds the right mix of realism and self-confidence to make the most of its comparative advantages.

In between for the European Union relations with Beijing have become second only to those with Washington. The rising prominence of China and Asia in general, has become a key component in U.S.-EU relations as an increased U.S. focus on the Asia-Pacific region translates into less US engagement in Europe. Consequently, EU leaders have come to the conclusion that they



needed to rethink their common foreign and security policy objectives in broader terms.

This has been initiated at the Lisbon summit in September 2010. It was agreed that Europe would have to be more decisive in defining and pursuing its own interests. A more pragmatic approach towards China was suggested, standing firmer in the defence of Europe's key economic interests and shedding earlier illusions of nurturing political change in China through closer engagement. To this end the Commission has advanced the principle of reciprocity of commercial access. It has formulated proposals designed to make access to the EU market conditional on other countries' allowing European companies to compete for their public procurement contracts. Reciprocity is now presented as the fulcrum of a more assertive EU trade policy towards China.

4. NATO - China

NATO's interest in engaging China derives from Beijing's rising potential to shape the international security environment. Most emerging security challenges lie well beyond alliance territory. This very fact is making NATO's ability to serve as a global security hub and to contribute to stability in other regions fundamental to its future relevance.

The missions in Afghanistan and Libya represent important steps in this direction. They also reveal the

profound political and operational difficulties confronting the prospect of a *global NATO*. Accordingly the alliance has recognized that a key contribution to security from challenges *out of area* will be facilitating regional integration and building regional capacity. To this end, the anti-terror missions and the engagement in Afghanistan have opened the door of Asia to NATO, just as trade did for the European Union.⁶

On July 4, 2012, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen expressed his hope to expand the alliance's dialogue with China: „NATO needs to better understand China and define areas where [the two] can work together to guarantee peace and stability" as part of the transformation of NATO into „an alliance that is globally aware, globally connected and globally capable".⁷

Fogh Rasmussen has named three main reasons why NATO should engage China:

- China is an emerging power, with a growing economy and increasing

⁶ Dr. Cui Hongjian, Discussion Paper, 5th Berlin Conference on Asian Security, SWP, October 2010.

⁷ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General, China and NATO: Grappling with Beijing's Hopes and Fears in: China Brief Volume: 12 Issue: 13 July 6, 2012.

[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=39593&cHash=d95eeaf36ffb61428966b69fce6d753a](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39593&cHash=d95eeaf36ffb61428966b69fce6d753a) (accessed: 17 September 2012).



global responsibility for security. As such, he would like to see regular political consultations with China;

- China is UNSC member. NATO operates from UN mandates, so it is important to engage China;
- China shares NATO interests in Afghanistan, especially in terrorism and drug trafficking.

NATO officials see opportunities to cooperate with China in promoting security in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, countering maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and curtailing nuclear weapons proliferation in Iran and North Korea. Yet, they have also reason to complain about cyber espionage and cyber attacks on NATO countries coming from China as well as about Beijing's limited support for NATO logistical efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

NATO does not yet have a policy towards China, with engagement at the political level and not at the military level. Until the mid 2000, NATO's interaction with countries outside of Euro-Atlantic region was of low level of importance. NATO had limited and infrequent dialogue with Asian states, such as Japan, with little element of concrete cooperation. But after September 11 attacks in 2001, Afghanistan brought NATO to Asia. The alliance has increased interactions with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Mongolia that have contributed directly and indirectly to NATO ISAF's Afghan campaign. This also brought NATO closer to China, which shares a

border with Afghanistan via the Wakhan Corridor. China is driven to engage NATO due to Afghanistan, and so is NATO. As such, Afghanistan and Central Asia have become a test case for exploring expanded NATO-cooperation with China.

Chinese officials have reciprocated cautiously NATO's interest in dialogue and possible collaboration on international terrorism and maritime security. Their immediate desire is that NATO will help manage a peaceful transition in Afghanistan that ensures the safety of China's investments in that country as well as prevents Afghan territory from again becoming a safe haven for anti-Beijing Islamic militants. China's longer-term aspirations are for NATO's other members to limit the use of U.S. military power in East Asia and elsewhere.

It was not until recently, that the political dialogue has become institutionalized. In 2009, NATO Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero visited Beijing for the highest level talks in Beijing to date. Senior PRC and NATO representatives - including the Chinese ambassador to Belgium, the NATO Secretary General and the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy - now meet regularly twice a year to exchange views and information. Chinese representatives also participate in several NATO seminars and conferences, such as NATO's annual conferences on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation.



Military-to-military interactions are also increasing. In June 2010, a group of senior PLA officers visited NATO headquarters. Since then, Chinese and NATO commanders have conducted reciprocal visits of each other's flagships on anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. In February, a NATO delegation led by the Director of the NATO International Military Staff conducted the first official visit by a NATO military delegation to China. The parties discussed military cooperation, defence reforms, NATO operations in general and the Asia-Pacific security environment. The Chinese and NATO delegations agreed to deepen counter-piracy training and education as well as to hold annual staff talks between NATO and the PLA.

5. Afghanistan

Afghanistan is likely to remain an important security driver for the years to come. Chinese and NATO representatives both see Afghanistan as an obvious area where NATO and China share security interests and can work jointly. Principally this also applies to the European Union. Not only NATO and the EU will stay engaged in Afghanistan, but so will China. Until today China has been the biggest foreign investor in Afghanistan. In December 2011 China National Petroleum Corp won the 25-year valid contract for the development of oil blocks in the Amu Darya basin, a project expected to earn the war-torn state billions of dollars over

two decades. It marks the second major deal for China in Afghanistan after developing the huge Aynak copper mine south of Kabul, which is due to start producing by the end of 2014.

Yet, after 2014 China will no longer be in a position to enjoy economic profit without investing in security in Afghanistan. Terrorism violence, inspired by separatism and religious extremism, is of significant concern to the local government and Beijing. If the Taliban would come into power again, China would face more pressure than ever in order to preventing the international link between the local terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang and its global supporters. It may be high time for China's policy-maker to rethink present diplomatic strategies and policies.

In mid-May 2012, at the NATO summit in Chicago, the Alliance formally agreed to hand over in the summer of 2013 the lead for combat operations across the country to the Afghans themselves.

In 2014, the Afghan forces will take *full responsibility* for security. NATO nations have pledged \$4 billion per year to support the Afghan forces after the war ends. NATO forces will remain in Afghanistan with support and training capacities focusing on three areas:

- Security (i.e. building up of police and armed forces)
- Civil reconstruction (economical development)
- Political process



Up to now NATO's primary objective in Afghanistan has been to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country in order to ensure Afghanistan can never again be a safe haven for terrorists. To achieve this goal, the nations that make up the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have conducted security operations and trained and developed the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) - initiatives, programmes and agreements not carried out exclusively by NATO member nations but often done in cooperation with a number of Partner countries.

The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan with 38 contributing nations has brought together national training efforts under one single umbrella. It works in close partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, as well as in collaboration with the European Union lead European Police Mission in Afghanistan and the European Gendarmerie Force. Developing capacity in the defence and security sector through education and training has been important to fighting corruption and improving governance. Capacity building has contributed to the sustainability of the ANSF and thereby provided positive conditions for economic and social development and increasing stability.

Within the framework of the Enduring Partnership, NATO has been working with the Afghan authorities

to develop integrity, transparency and accountability and promote good practice in the management of financial (budgets, procurement and auditing) and human resources in the Afghan Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior. Since 2009, NATO's Professional Military Education (PME) programme for Afghanistan has been delivering education to the Afghan National Army (ANA) officer corps, with the main aim of developing the teaching branch of the ANA Training and Education Commands. The PME programme also has supported the faculty of the newly established Afghan National Security University, which eventually will host all ANA education institutions and some of its training organisations. In coordination with the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A), the PME programme facilitates Afghan access to NATO's education institutions and organises seminars and conferences on specific topics of interest for the ANA.

The European Union has been one of the major donors providing development and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. Between 2002 and end 2011 the EU committed some € 2.5 billion assistance. For the period covering 2011-13, € 200 million have been allocated every year by the European Union for development programmes. These focus on three key sectors: governance - including police - agriculture and rural development, and health and social protection. Regional cooperation activities initiated by the EU are mainly covered



under Afghanistan and Central Asian country programmes and have included support to customs facilities and border management, reintegration and refugees and prevention of drug trafficking.

The EU also supported the Border Management in Badakhshan (BOM-BAF) Programme, implemented by UNDP-Tajikistan from 2007-2010. The programme focused mainly on the physical rehabilitation of three major border-crossing points to Tajikistan and the training of border police, especially on narcotics trafficking. The EU continues to support regional cooperation between Afghanistan and its Northern neighbouring countries through a follow-up project (Border Management Northern Afghanistan BOMNAF), which will extend the intervention to the entire Tajik and Uzbek border with Afghanistan. In addition to infrastructure and supplies, the programme will establish a Border Liaison Offices to allow for increased cross-border interagency cooperation at the border. Another component will be to support the construction of a permanent Customs Training Academy to increase the capacity of key officials in the Afghan Customs Department.

6. Cooperation avenues

Ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan is of high relevance to the Central and Southern Asian security situation. With NATO's combat troops withdrawal by the end of 2014, great opportunities and chal-

lenges are coming up for all actors involved. Now is a critical time for the relevant international actors to rethink how to meet the likely challenges ahead in a cooperative fashion.

To this end – and to the surprise of many – it has been an important step that China and Afghanistan have signed in September 2012 several security and economic agreements during a Kabul visit of top Chinese security official Zhou Yongkang. These include China's support in the training of up to 300 Afghan police officers in China throughout the next four years and investing in Afghanistan's resources sector prior to the NATO troop withdrawal in 2014.

EU, NATO and China share security interests that could and should be coordinated vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Most obviously, NATO can significantly contribute to build the security environment needed to attract EU and Chinese investment into Afghanistan, helping to develop the country's natural resources.

A stronger Afghan economy can in turn help generate the revenue the Afghan government needs to support the large security forces that NATO has been training. It also can provide alternative employment for Afghans who might otherwise turn to the drug trade or the insurgency.

Countering Somali-based piracy in the Gulf of Aden has set an example how the EU – NATO – China cooperation could evolve in future.



Chinese and NATO warships have both been operating in the area in independent but proximate operations. NATO's anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa began in December 2008, disrupting pirate attacks through direct actions and building the capacity of local countries to fight piracy independently. The Chinese decision in late 2008 to send a naval task force to join the multinational mission in the Gulf of Aden meant that Chinese naval vessels would be operating regularly in the same area as NATO warships. Chinese and NATO have coordinated their operations in this mission under the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) forum for maritime security. The European Union and China agreed in July this year during the third session of the EU-China Strategic Dialogue in Beijing to hold regular talks on defence and security and boost their cooperation on anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia.

Of course, the scope of cooperation goes far beyond Afghanistan and piracy in the Gulf of Aden. NATO's efforts to expand its global role, combined with China's growing security engagement in regions to its west – Afghanistan, Central Asia, Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean – require further political dialogue. Cooperation steps could include joint anti-piracy exercises between their parallel missions in the Gulf of Aden. NATO's anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and engagements with China as well as other navies the past three years

sharing information through SHADE has become a successful model of cooperation on maritime terrorism. Similarly, China could participate in EU and NATO-led natural emergency relief exercises. A longer-term goal might include institutionalizing the relationship with both organizations.

The pairing of the Chinese frigate Yi Yang with the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Winston S. Churchill on 21 September 2012 near the Horn of Africa, conducting a joint visit, board, search and seizure boarding, is highlighting the positive dynamics of the present development. In a subsequent press conference in Beijing, the U.S. and Chinese defence chiefs expressed both how important and beneficial bilateral cooperation has been considered – in terms of building stronger ties and developing techniques to better counter piracy. Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie stated: *„The two sides should, within the framework of building a China-U.S. cooperative partnership, promote a new type of military relations featuring equality, reciprocity and win-win cooperation in an active and pragmatic way“*.

U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta emphasised the value and significance of such joint training exercises: *„We won't achieve security and prosperity in the 21st Century without a constructive U.S.-China relationship,*



*including a stronger military-to-military relationship.*⁸

Already NATO's Strategic Concept⁹, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, has built on enhanced cooperation underlining that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach. „The comprehensive approach not only makes sense – it is necessary,“¹⁰ said NATO Secretary General Rasmussen. Clearly, the European Union, NATO – including the U.S. –, and China need to be much better connected. China along with other Asian nations are key partners to assure access to and use of the *global commons*. A common shared situational awareness would help enormously to meet respective challenges.

A comprehensive approach has also become indispensable with regard to the climate issue. The EU-China

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has been entering a new important stage of development when it included the EU-China Climate Change Partnership. China needs to play a constructive role alongside Europe and other industrialised countries, to contribute to the collective effort to limit and reduce future emissions of green gases and make sure the world returns to a climate-safe trajectory. Together with other Asian nations it is already a dynamic supplier of low carbon technologies to its vast home market and to the world. On the other hand, Europe has a lot to offer to help accelerate the necessary decoupling of greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth, be it on the policy and technological levels or in the field of cooperation instruments. It is evident that a global concerted effort is needed in order to respond to the challenges that climate change presents.

⁸ SDA, U.S. and China in Joint Defence Operations, 21 Sep 2012
<http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Contentnavigation/Library/Libraryoverview/tabid/1299/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/3246/China-Afghanistan-sign-cooperation-deals.aspx> (Accessed: 25 September 2012).

⁹ Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of NATO adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 19-20 November 2010
http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf (Accessed 9 July 2012).

¹⁰ Fogh Rasmussen, A Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm (Accessed: 9 July 2012).

An ancient Chinese philosopher once has described the perfect society as „*living in harmony treating others as family*“.

Exactly this is what EU and NATO want to achieve when striving for partnership with China. Assuring access to the global commons, dealing with climate change and proliferation, managing the global economic crisis, building common situational awareness, developing international institutions and decision-making processes requires close and effective cooperation in a family of nations. A robust and ambitious international framework is in the interest of all. Deep and con-



structive engagement with each other on climate action, international security, and prosperity is paramount for getting into a future without dangerous global warming, crises and conflicts. To this end EU, NATO and China are challenged to develop their partnership.

About the author



Ralph D. Thiele is Chairman of the Political-Military Society in Berlin. Colonel Thiele has, in 40 years of politico-military service, gained a broad political, technological, academic and military expertise. He has been directly involved in numerous national and NATO strategic issues while serving as executive officer to the Bundeswehr Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in the Planning and Policy Staff of the German Ministry of Defence, as Chief of Staff of the NATO Defence College, as Commander of the Bundeswehr Transformation Centre and as Director of Faculty at the German General Staff and Command College in Hamburg.

He is a member of the German Atlantic Association and member of the Defence Science Board to the Austrian Ministry of Defence.

Anti-Piracy and Anti-Terrorism in the Indian Ocean: Operation Atalanta and Europe's Contribution

Dr. Peter Roell

Abstract

- Although acts of piracy in the waters around the Horn of Africa have fallen sharply in 2012, the threat caused by Somali piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean is and will remain for the foreseeable future of significance for international shipping causing high economic costs.

- With the Operation Atalanta and its comprehensive approach combining military and civilian measures, the European Union plays and will continue to play an important role in combating piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean.

- Regarding maritime terrorism also in the future we have to expect terrorist attacks, not limited to special regions but on a worldwide scale. In this scenario security and intelligence services need to continue to keep up the pressure and further improve international cooperation to counter this global threat.

Preliminary Remarks

On 27 September 2011 the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in cooperation with the Institute for European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, organized an excellent conference titled "International Security Architecture – European and Chinese Perspectives" in Beijing.

In his opening speech General Xiong Guangkai, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), emphasized that the concept of national security in China has been expanded to an extensive concept which includes political security and home defense as well as security in the fields of economy, culture, information, energy resources and climate change; a definition which also corresponds to the Western understanding of security.

On 29 September 2011 Dr. Peter Hefele, the director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Shanghai, organized a conference in Hong Kong with the topic "European and Asian Perspectives on International Security Policies in South and South East Asia", including defense policies and maritime security in Asia.

With my paper I would like to contribute to the German-Chinese strategic dialogue focusing on piracy and armed robbery and maritime terrorism. Operation Atalanta and Europe's contribution in combating piracy and maritime terror-



ism in the Indian Ocean will play an important role in this endeavor.

The Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world's oceanic divisions, covering approximately 20 percent of the water on the earth's surface. It is bounded by Asia – including India, after the ocean is named – on the North, on the West by Africa, on the East by Australia and on the South by the Southern Ocean.¹¹

The Indian Ocean provides major sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas. It carries a particular heavy traffic of petroleum and petroleum products from the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and Indonesia. Large reserves of hydrocarbons are being tapped in the offshore areas of Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, and Western Australia. An estimated 40 percent of the world's offshore oil production comes from the Indian Ocean. Beach sands rich in heavy minerals and offshore placer deposits are actively exploited by bordering countries, particularly India, South Africa, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Due to this relatively high traffic of petroleum tankers, piracy off the Somalia coast and in the Indian Ocean has been rising. This has been a threat to international shipping since the second phase of the

¹¹ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Ocean.

Somali civil war in the early 21st century.¹²

The Threat Situation

Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships

In article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) piracy is defined as follows:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).¹³

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its 26th Assembly session defines Armed Robbery in Resolution A.1025 "Code of Practice

¹² Ibid.

¹³ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 60-1. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.

for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” as follows:

2.2 “Armed robbery against ships” means any of the following acts:

2.2.1 any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against a person or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;

2.2.2 Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.¹⁴

Looking at the threat situation of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean we can observe two different developments. In the last couple of years the good cooperation between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia has successfully combated piracy in the region. Piracy, once rampant, has been largely exterminated because the littoral states have themselves stepped up their anti-piracy efforts. These efforts include the Eye in the Sky and Malacca Strait Patrols involving coordinated and sometimes joint Indonesian, Malaysia, Singaporean as well as Thai air and sea surveillance and considerable information exchange. They have also invited cooperation from out-

¹⁴ International Maritime Organization (IMO), Assembly 26th session, Resolution A.1025, 18 January 2010, 4.

side powers such as India, the United States and Japan.¹⁵

In contrast to that is the situation off the coast of Somalia. According to a report of 19 January 2012 by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Maritime Bureau (IMB), the greatest threat for international shipping still comes from activities of Somali pirates.¹⁶

The total number of incidents has increased from 219 in 2010 to 237 in 2011. In contrast, however, the number of hijackings declined in the same period from 49 to 28.¹⁷ The main reasons for this improvement were naval activities of a number of nations and improved security measures taken by shipping companies. A key factor was the vastly improved coordination of the three multi-national squadrons of over 20 naval ships in the Somali Basin by the NATO Maritime Group in early 2011.

¹⁵ Mark J. Valencia and Nazery Khalid, “The Somalia Multilateral Anti-Piracy Approach: Caveats on Vigilantism”, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark_J_Valencia/3052# (accessed 9 September 2012).

¹⁶ Piracy attacks in East and West Africa dominate world report, ICC Commercial Crime Services, 19 January 2012, <http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/711-piracy-attacks-in-east-and-west-africa-dominate-world-report> (accessed 15 April 2012).

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 1.



There has not been a single case reported of a ship carrying armed contractors being hijacked, this, combined with the naval activities of the multinational task force has made life very difficult for the Somali pirates.

Pirate activities contracted also considerably along the Indian coast because last year the Indian navy increased their patrols, enhanced surveillance and joined NATO forces in joint patrols.

Most of the attacks took place at the crossroads of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden. For the first time, however, Somali pirates attacked an anchored vessel in Omani waters.¹⁸ This shows that the security of ships at harbors in the region needs to be improved.

On 30 August 2012 the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) made an update and reported for worldwide incidents and for Somalia for piracy and armed robbery the following figures:¹⁹

Worldwide incidents:
Total attacks worldwide: 211
Total hijackings worldwide: 23

¹⁸ Ibid, 1, see also STRATFOR, Somali Piracy: 2011 Annual Update, <http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/somali-piracy-2011-annual-update> (accessed 14 January 2012).

¹⁹ <http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsfigures> (accessed 9 September 2012).

Incidents reported for Somalia:

Total incidents: 70
Total hijackings: 13
Total hostages: 212

Current vessels held by Somali pirates:

Vessels: 11
Hostages: 188

The statistics for 2012 are encouraging. The last successful pirate attack in waters off East Africa had occurred on 10 May²⁰ and there has been no successful hijack since 19 June, when a fishing dhow was seized, and no ship has been fired upon or a boarding attempted since 26 June, when a Maltese-flagged cargo ship was attacked, according to data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).²¹

Analysts believe that increased use of private security guards on ships, international naval patrols, bad weather and increased efforts by local authorities in the Puntland region of Northern Somalia to arrest pirates have also helped to disrupt

²⁰ Thom Shanker, "U.S. Reports That Piracy Off Africa Has Plunged", The New York Times, 28 August 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/world/africa/piracy-around-horn-of-africa-has-plunged-us-says.html?_r=1.

²¹ Mike Pflanz, "Piracy attacks drop to zero for first full month in five years", The Telegraph, 8 August 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/piracy/9462185/Piracy-attacks-drop-to-zero-for-first-full-month-in-five-years.html>.

piracy but have pushed criminals onshore.²²

Although acts of piracy in the waters around the Horn of Africa have fallen sharply in 2012, the threat caused by Somali piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean is and will remain for the foreseeable future of significance for international shipping causing also high economic costs.

The U.S. think tank Oceans beyond Piracy has published the report *The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011*²³ in February 2012 in which it comes to the following conclusions:

The economic costs of Somali piracy have resulted in costs of between 6.6 and 6.9 billion U.S. dollars. Expenditures are distributed as follows:

- 2.7 billion dollars for higher oil consumption due to speed increases in high-risk areas
- 1.3 billion dollars for military operations
- 1.1 billion dollars for security equipment and armed security guards
- 635 million dollars for insurance policies

²² Emily Alpert, "Pirate attacks down off Somalia, reducing worldwide numbers", Los Angeles Times, World Now, 16 July 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/07/pirate-attacks-down-off-somalia-driving-down-worldwide-numbers.html.

²³ <http://www.oceansbeyondpiracy.org>.

- 486 to 680 million dollars for course changes along the West coast of India

- 195 million dollars for higher salaries and risk supplements

The average ransom increased from four million U.S. dollars in 2010 to five million dollars in 2011. Although the total ransom paid in 2011 amounted to 160 million dollars, it only represents two percent of the total economic costs caused by Somali piracy.²⁴

Organizations donated around 20 million U.S. dollars in order to improve the situation in Somalia and other regions affected by piracy. This sum represents a fraction of the funds spent on fighting piracy at sea.

Operation Atalanta and Europe's Contribution

If we have a look at the Operation Atalanta, formally European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU – NAVFOR – ATALANTA) and its mandate, we can see political, military, economic, social and humanitarian elements.²⁵

²⁴ Out of sight, Somali piracy fight gets rougher, Reuters, London, 21 February 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/21/us-somalia-pirates-idUSTRE81K0XT20120221> (accessed on 1 March 2012).

²⁵ EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, "The EU fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa", updated: June 2012, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/piracy/index_en.htm.



Operation Atalanta is the first operation to be taken by the European Union Naval Force. The operation was launched on 8 December 2008 in accordance with the EU Council Joint Action 2008/851 and the EU Council Decision 2008/918. The operation was in support of UNSCR Resolutions 1814 (Protecting of WFP Shipping), UNSCR 1816 (Deterrence of Piracy in SOM TTW), UNSCR 1838 (Maritime Operations of EU/Others) and UNSCR 1851 (Additional Measures on Somali Territory) which were adopted by the United Nations Security Council.

The mandate is to contribute to:

- The protection of vessels of the World Food Program (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia.
- The protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.
- In addition, monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.²⁶

Operation Atalanta is linked to the Maritime Security Centre –Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), an initiative established by EU NAVFOR in response to threats to shipping in waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa. MSCHOA monitors all international and domestic shipping in the region.²⁷

²⁶ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Atalanta.

²⁷ Ibid, 2.

In his paper "Maritime Security: Operation Atalanta – Europe's Contribution" Admiral Feldt emphasized the importance of intelligence in the Operation Atalanta: „The sheer vastness of the area of operation has a detrimental effect on operational flexibility, agility and responsiveness of the force available. Maritime surveillance and through this the „Recognized Maritime Picture“ is a precondition for all operations.”²⁸

Somali pirates have also not changed their tactics over the last few years using so-called mother ships stationed far away up to 1,750 nautical miles in the Indian Ocean, waiting for easy, slow or visibly less protected ships and then attacking the target ship with up to eight skiffs, but they have improved their methods using a captured dhow for a limited time or strikes and then capture a new one in exchange, without sailing back to their hide outs at the coast of Somalia.²⁹

On 15 May 2012 the EU's naval force off the Somali coastline carried out its first air strikes against pirate targets on shore. Maritime aircraft and attack helicopters took

²⁸ Lutz Feldt, "Maritime Security: Operation Atalanta – Europe's Contribution", International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Center for Security Studies (CSS), April 2012, ETH Zurich, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=140842>.

²⁹ Dr. Michael Stehr, "Piracy off the Horn of Africa in 2012", The European Security and Defence Union, vol. 13, edition 2/2012, Bonn/Berlin, 57.

part in the attacks in the early morning. No casualties were reported in the raid along Somalia's central coastline in the region of Galmudug. Michael Mann, spokesman for the EU Foreign Policy Chief, Catherine Ashton, said: „This action against piracy is part of a comprehensive EU approach to the crisis in Somalia, where we support a lasting political solution on land“.³⁰

Bile Hussein, a pirate commander, told AP news agency that speed boats, fuel depots and an arms store had been targeted and that they destroyed their equipment to ashes. It has been a key supplies center for the pirates.³¹

It is noticeable that since this point in time there have been no reports in the international media regarding larger attacks by the EU NAVFOR on Somali mainland. This can have two reasons: Firstly, there have been no more attacks or secondly, they haven't taken place under strict secrecy.

Currently the naval unit exists of six war ships with eight helicopters including five Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPAs). Their joint operation area comprises around four million square kilometers of the Indian Ocean. At present the German

Armed Forces take part with the frigate Sachsen in the Operation Atalanta.³²

In his article "Civilian and Private Security Contractors (PSC) – Yes, They're Here to Stay" Maxim Worcester pointed out "... that in July 2012, Germany's cabinet agreed a draft resolution which would allow armed PSCs to protect German flagged ships from pirate attacks. The draft law will be presented to parliament and in spite of deep misgivings across all parties in it is expected that the bill will be passed. This move has little to do with a change in mindset and more with the fact that it is the only available option: deploying Federal Police on board German vessels is unrealistic in terms of cost and resources. Unlike the UK, where the government has so far placed considerable trust in the self-regulation of PSCs, the German government will also regulate private contractors through the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control. Indeed, it can be expected that the UK's approach to regulation will eventually converge with that of Germany due to the growing recognition of problems associated with the deployment of PSCs.

³⁰ EU forces in anti-piracy raid on Somali mainland, The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/15/eu-anti-piracy-raid-somalia>.

³¹ Somali piracy: EU forces in first mainland raid, BBC NEWS AFRICA, 15 May 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18069685>.

³² Kontingentwechsel im „Atalanta“-Einsatz, 28 August 2012, <http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de>.



Accordingly, once legislative frameworks that regulate the activities of PSCs are in place, it can be assumed that private and civilian contractors are here to stay.³³

How does the commander of the Operation Atalanta, British Rear Admiral Duncan Potts, assess the current successes? In an interview with the French news agency AFP he informed about significant successes of the operation. The pressure on the pirates is higher, but should not be diminished now. He gave the following reasons for his opinion: Last year the pirates captured 31 ships in the mission's operation area at the Horn of Africa, this year only five. Nevertheless, currently seven ships with around 200 seamen are in the power of pirates – compared to 20 ships with more than 500 crew members in 2011.³⁴

Besides the EU headed Operation Atalanta, the U.S. headed Combined Maritime Forces³⁵ and the NATO headed Operation OCEAN

SHIELD³⁶, also the naval forces of further countries are engaged in fighting piracy at the Horn of Africa. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is a frequent contributor. In this context I also would like to refer to the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism. SHADE is a platform for close cooperation where countries and coalitions involved in military counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean can exchange their views. The meetings are mostly held on a regular basis in Bahrain and co-chaired on a rotational basis by the Coalition Maritime Forces (CMF), NATO and EUNAVFOR³⁷.

What makes Operation Atalanta and the contribution of the European Union so very special regarding anti-piracy and anti-terrorism measures off the Somali coast, in the Indian Ocean and beyond, is the comprehensive approach, which combines military and civil measures. This includes:

- EUCAP NESTOR: A regional strengthening mission enhancing the maritime capabilities of initially five countries in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean.³⁸

³³ Maxim Worcester, "Civilian and Private Security Contractors – Yes, They're Here to Stay", Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) Berlin, ISPSW Strategic Series, Issue No. 198, August 2012, 3-4, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=152266>

³⁴ „Operation Atalanta: Druck auf Piraten erhöht, 20 June 2012, AFP, <http://www.bundeswehr.de>.

³⁵ Combined Maritime Forces, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmfc/cmfc_command.html.

³⁶ Operation Ocean Shield Current News, http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_ocean_shield.aspx.

³⁷ <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org>.

³⁸ Common Security and Defence Policy, EUCAP NESTOR, European Union External Action, http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1617222/factsheet__eucap_nestor_en_.pdf.

- EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia: Training of Somali Security forces in Uganda.
- Up to now, around 1,800 soldiers of the Somali interim government have been trained. Until December 2012 it should be around 3,000.³⁹
- Support of humanitarian measures by the German government. In 2011, the German government helped with an aid of more than 29 million Euros, in 2008 to 2012 with 242 million Euros via the EU Commission.
- Supply of emergency and temporary financial assistance to the amount of 55 million Euros between 2008 and 2011 by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).
- Drought crisis 2011: Supply of 25 million Euros as special funds for refugees.
- Support of the project "Mine and Weapons Clearance" in the Somali region since 2009: 1.35 million Euros.
- Financial assistance of 2.5 million Euros for the "Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM" since 2009.
- 2009/2010: Financial assistance of 400,000 Euros for the training of Sierra Leonean policemen within the mission of the African Union for Somalia as well as around 670,000 Euros for a UNDP project for the support of the rule of law in Somalia.
- Financial assistance of 110.000 Euros in 2012 for the project „Global Programme against Money

³⁹ http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/EU_TM_Somalia.

Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism".⁴⁰

These measures which are coordinated by the „European Union Special Representative to the Horn of Africa, "Mr. Alexander Rondos,⁴¹ explain very clearly the „comprehensive approach" of the EU.

Maritime Terrorism

There is no universally accepted definition of maritime terrorism but the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group has offered an extensive definition for maritime terrorism:

„...the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities."⁴²

Maritime terrorism, like all forms of terrorism, has mostly a political, ideological or religious background.

⁴⁰ Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/9339, 18 April 2012.

⁴¹ Who is Alexander Rondos?, The current Analyst, 6 February 2012, <http://www.currentanalyst.com/index.php/opeds/167-who-is-alexander-rondos>.

⁴² <http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/definitions/>.



Terrorists will therefore ask themselves where they can hit the infrastructure of the industrialized world most effectively. They may focus their attention on so called choke points and mega-harbors, with 75 percent of all international sea transport activities carried out by around 50,000 ships using 2,800 ports. The strategically important Strait of Malacca is one of the critical choke points. It connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific. It is the most significant trade route between the Far East, the Gulf States and Europe. 90,000 ships use the Strait every year and one third of the world trade, 80 percent of oil exports to East Asia and two thirds of LNG exports pass through the Strait of Malacca.

Should a super tanker be sunk in the Strait of Malacca it would block all traffic, and ships would have to use the Indonesian Sunda and Flores passage. This would result in a detour of at least 1,000 km and two extra days at sea. The resulting costs would increase to approximately 8 billion U.S. dollars per year.

As the largest ports of the world are in South and East Asia, terrorists will focus their planning on ports such as Kobe, Tokyo, Yokohama, Pusan, Shanghai, Kaohsiung, Hong Kong and Singapore. But also mega ports in the U.S.A. and Europe, such as Los Angeles and

Rotterdam, could be in the focus of terrorists.⁴³

A number of successful maritime attacks demonstrate the intentions of terrorists:

- October 2000: A successful attack was carried out against the U.S. destroyer USS Cole in Yemen. 17 U.S. Sailors were killed, 39 wounded.⁴⁴

- October 2002: The French oil tanker Limburg was attacked off Ash Shahir by a terrorist group with connections to Al Qaida. One member of the crew was killed and 90,000 tons of oil spilled into the Gulf of Aden. The monthly container traffic in Yemen shrank from 43,000 to 3,000. The economy of the country declined by one percent of its GDP and 3,000 dockworkers lost their job.⁴⁵

- February 2004: The Abu Sayyaf Group attacked a ferry in the Philippines, 116 people lost their lives.⁴⁶

⁴³ Dr. Peter Roell, "Seepiraterie in Südostasien", Federal College for Security Studies, Berlin, May 2004, 27-44.

⁴⁴ Attack on the USS Cole, <http://www.al-bab.com> (accessed 15 April 2012).

⁴⁵ Yemen says tanker blast was terrorism, BBC News World Edition, 16 October 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm (accessed 15 April 2012).

⁴⁶ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia: 2004 SuperFerry 14 bombing, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_SuperFerry_14_bombing (accessed 15 April 2012).

- July 2010: A suicide attack was carried out by the Abdullah Azzam Brigade against the Japanese oil tanker M. Star in the Strait of Hormuz, a militant group with connections to Al Qaeda. One member of the crew was injured and the hull severely damaged.⁴⁷

Blown up container ships could block harbors for weeks – quite apart from an attack in one of the mega harbors with a so-called dirty bomb. A closure of the Singapore harbor for example would cost more than 200 billion U.S. dollars per year.

Also the terrorist attack of a fully loaded gas tanker in one of the mega harbors would have a devastating effect on the world trade and provide terrorists with an event comparable to 9/11 – one of their stated goals.⁴⁸

Addressing the threat of maritime terrorism excellent intelligence is a necessity. The groups of greatest concern in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, off the coast of Somalia are the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQ-AP), the Abdullah

Azzam Brigades and to a reduced extent Al-Shabaab.⁴⁹

To combat maritime terrorism the Container Security Initiative (CSI), initiated by the United States in 2002, is very helpful. The aim of this program is to identify – out of the 230 million containers transported by sea every year – those containers with weapons of mass destruction or dangerous nuclear substances, which could be used by terrorists for their attacks.⁵⁰

Also, in cooperation with state organizations and industry, technical means are used for the protection against potential terror attacks. Scanning systems for large-size containers, the use of Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD), special anti-boarding systems, such as 9,000-Volt-protective-fences for merchant ships making the boarding for pirates or terrorists more difficult, are just a few examples. Unmanned 'inventus systems' with cameras are capable of searching large ocean areas and transmit data to a ship or a ground station.⁵¹

⁴⁷ UAE confirms oil tanker attack, Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/09/20108683953783853.html> (accessed 15 April 2012).

⁴⁸ Dr. Peter Roell, "Maritime Security: New Challenges for Asia and Europe", Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) Berlin, ISPSW Strategic Series, Issue No. 167, November 2011, 7, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=134578>.

⁴⁹ Rupert Herbert-Burns, "Countering Piracy, Trafficking, and Terrorism: Ensuring Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean", in Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges, ed. David Michel and Russell Sticklor, (Washington: STIMSON, July 2012), 23-39.

⁵⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Container_Security_Initiative.

⁵¹ Dr. Peter Roell, "Maritime Security: New Challenges for Asia and Europe", Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) Berlin, ISPSW Strategic Series, Issue No.



In conclusion we can say that world trade is potentially threatened by maritime terrorism and piracy. This includes Asia and Europe. Any kind of cooperation in this field would be well founded and could be the basis for anti-terrorism measures but also for joint anti-piracy missions.

There are many reasons to believe that also in the future we will have to expect maritime attacks of the kind, not limited to special regions but on a worldwide scale. There is no reliable information that Islamist terror groups, structured and institutionalized, cooperate with pirates in Somalia, although occasionally a few indications for such cooperation seem to pop up.

What are the challenges for decision makers in fighting both maritime terrorism and piracy? Decision makers need to understand that fighting piracy and maritime terrorism at sea will not remove the threat. Suitable measures need to be taken onshore in order to achieve success.⁵²

167, November 2011, 7,
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=134578>.

⁵² Regarding the engagement of the European Union to combat piracy and indirectly maritime terrorism see also Lutz Feldt, "Operation Atalanta – Europe's Contribution", Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) Berlin, ISPSW Strategic Series, Issue No. 185, April 2012, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=140842>.

Recommendations

In our ISPSW publication "Time to rethink the fight against maritime piracy in the Indian Ocean" by my colleague Maxim Worcester, we made the following recommendations:⁵³

- The first step should be a new look at the Maritime Laws governing the use of force on the high seas and within the territorial coastal areas. These laws need to be taken into the 21st century and adopted to the threats of today.

- The Rules of Engagement of the naval units charged with protecting the trade routes need to be coordinated and agreed on. Furthermore, a close look needs to be taken at the kind of naval vessels, which might be required to combat piracy more cost effectively.

- The use of Private Security Companies (PSCs) should be regulated and agreed.

- Shipping companies need to conform to the basic security requirements when operating in danger areas and should at all times comply with due care for their crew and cargo. They will need to invest in superior passive defense measures and adopt active measures, if required.

- Police and the security services should actively combat those inter-

⁵³ <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=127107> (accessed 17 April 2012).



national crime groups involved in piracy at the earliest possible point in time in order to reduce the attractiveness of piracy. They should also prevent piracy from being used by terrorist organizations to advance their aims.

- The banking community should take a much closer look at money laundering and report all suspicious transactions to the authorities.

- Long term plans to bring the beginning of stability to Somalia, and the establishment of an effective Coast Guard, need to be drawn up and funding made available. This could be a public-private partnership involving suitably qualified private security companies.

Regarding maritime terrorism ISPSW makes the following recommendations:

- Although we could observe in the last 15 years only a few maritime terrorist attacks the potential threat should not be underestimated.

- In spite of recent successes and a decline in successful terrorist attacks by Islamist groups the security services need to continue to keep up the pressure and further improve international cooperation to counter this global threat.

- The security and intelligence services need to concentrate both on infiltrating the non-Islamist terrorist groups in their relevant countries (HUMINT) and also step-up Open Source Information (OSINT)

Research. This precludes the relevant linguistic and intercultural skills.

- Governments should consider establishing a National Security Council in their countries, if they have not done so, in order to further improve inter-ministerial cooperation and provide a comprehensive security approach.

- Governments should also consider the harmonized use of Armed Forces within the European Union in the event of major terrorist attacks.

- Governments should carefully consider their communications policy with the public. Frequent warnings of impending terrorist attacks which do not materialize are not helpful in sensitizing the public.

- Academia can contribute significantly to the activities of the security and intelligence services by helping to analyze the motivation behind fringe terrorist groups and separatist organizations. Such information would be helpful in building up profiles and identifying potential targets of such groups.

- Businesses should realize that certain terrorist groups present a threat to their business continuity. They should also realize that the state cannot provide adequate levels of security at all times. Reliable private security organizations are in a position to provide businesses with risk assessment and business continuity plans as well as armed and unarmed close protection.

About the author



Since January 2006 Dr. Peter Roell is president of the Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) in Berlin.

Before, he served as senior advisor for foreign and security policy at the Permanent Representation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the EU in Brussels. In Germany, Dr. Roell also served as director of the Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Africa (Sub-Saharan) branch and at German embassies in the Near and Middle East and in Asia.

Dr. Roell is an ancien of the NATO Defense College in Rome and the Federal College for Security Policy Studies (BAKS) in Berlin.

Maritime Surveillance as a Pre-condition for Maritime Security - A European Approach

Lutz Feldt

Everything can be found at sea, according to the spirit of your quest.
(Joseph Conrad)

The character of the sea has changed. From an open space where freedom was the rule, it has become a shared, common good for humanity, vast but fragile, needing worldwide management and protection.

The maritime space or better: the maritime domain is covering 70 % of the surface of planet earth. The attention, or awareness, now provided to every activity at sea is a consequence of globalisation. To start with one of the driving factors: global trade has to be at the forefront of all security initiatives. Today almost 95 % of world trade is transported by sea, and from an European perspective round about 25 % of the ships fly European flags.

The world Merchant Fleet comprises round about 47 000 units of 300 GRT and a load-carrying capacity of 1 234 million deadweight tons and is engaged in international traffic under 158 different flags.⁵⁴ To get an impression about the structure of this huge fleet, it seems appro-

priate to specify the ship types: 17.700 general cargo ships, 9.740 crude oil tankers, 7.770 bulk carriers, 4.700 Container ships, 4.200 passenger liners, 1.490 liquid gas tankers and 1.330 chemical tankers are sailing the oceans. We recognize that these different ship types require quite different ways of attention. They represent the grand total of ship, which are registered and therefore could be called the "World's Merchant Fleet". These figures do not include the growing number of small and medium-sized feeders, which are connecting the increasing number of offshore installations with ports. These installations together with the worldwide underwater cables need our attention as well and it is obvious that *maritime surveillance* is one key to achieve a picture of the situation at sea.


Taking into consideration that worldwide there are round about 14.000 naval vessels representing their flag states together with an unknown number of 'state vessels', we can imagine that the character of the sea has really changed. And these numbers do not include the huge number of ships not officially registered and up to now not required by any regulation to be registered: all ships with a 300 deadweight tons and less.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Annual Report 2010 German Fleet Command, Facts and Figures 2010, Executive Summary, page 14 ff.

⁵⁵ <http://www.gjenvick.com/SteamshipArticles/ShipTonnage/1932-06-28-ShipTonnageExplained.html>.



Another view, which explains the dimension of this change, is this one:



These four areas, transport, resource, habitat and power projection are offering one way to deal with the different aspects of maritime security.⁵⁶

They are dependent on each other, and information sharing is a vital demand to increase *global maritime domain awareness*.

Three points, which need to be discussed, point into the direction of achieving more and better maritime security:

⁵⁶ Heiko Borchert, *The Future of Maritime Surveillance in an Era of Contested Maritime Domains* (Lucern: Sandfire AG, 2011).

1. By comparison with land, space or even cyberspace, the sea is still relatively ungoverned, but everything that happens at sea is interconnected in a way and recognises no borders.

2. A more integrated governance regime is needed.

3. At sea, we are enjoying informal 'regimes' or regional and local 'regimes', which have the advantage of being very pragmatic and flexible in their progress.

Other important aspects of maritime surveillance are areas, which, due to their geography and the new threat dimension (the asymmetric threat), require more attention.

They are called 'maritime chokepoints' or 'maritime hotspots'. These chokepoints can be areas with navigational hazards as well as areas with all kinds of resources, newly explored and to be mined, due to new technology. They have their vital importance due to the fact that they are along major trade routes but they can have a political importance as potential conflict areas. But independent from these different aspects, the importance of having a reliable picture of the maritime situation is of vital importance for the littoral states and for the global community. Chokepoints are sometimes local or regional but their importance is global. This has an impact on the question about the responsibility for maritime surveillance and maritime security in these narrow passages.

These three points are touching on these very sensible issues. To understand these sensibilities it is necessary to know these chokepoints. They are:


1. The Strait of Malacca, located between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. It links the Pacific with the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
2. The Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, located between Somalia, Djibouti and Yemen, linking the Indian Ocean with the Red sea and the next chokepoint.
3. The Suez Canal, located in Egypt, linking the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea
4. The Strait of Hormuz, located between the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Iran, linking the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea.
5. The Bosphorus Straits, located in Turkey, linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea, and connecting the Caspian Sea in addition
6. The Panama Canal, located in Panama, linking the Pacific with the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean
7. The Danish Straits, located in Denmark, linking the Baltic Sea with the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean.
8. The English Channel, located between the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, linking the Atlantic Ocean with the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea and the Baltic Sea.
9. The Taiwan Strait, located between China and Taiwan, linking the South China Sea with the East China Sea,
10. The Korea Strait, located between the South Korea and Japan (Islands of Kyushu and Shikoku), linking the East China Sea with the Sea of Japan.
11. Strait of Tiran, located between the Sinai Peninsula

and Saudi Arabia, linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aqaba, and Jordan and Israel.⁵⁷

Today we may expect for political reasons new and more chokepoints, this would be an outcome of the growing maritime awareness. In addition to chokepoints the importance of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEC) is rapidly increasing and needs more attention in relation to maritime surveillance and maritime security.

A general overview about the 'Highways of the Sea' and the chokepoints shows the global aspect of maritime surveillance on one hand and the regional approach to achieving a recognized maritime picture on the other hand. Crude oil is used as an example for all kinds of trade.

What are the main risks and threats to maritime security? They correspond to the four principle areas – resources, habitat, transportation and power -projection.



⁵⁷ <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=330>.

1. Risks and threats affecting territory and citizens from the sea:

- Terrorism from the sea through infiltration of commandos or the use of explosives or weapons of mass destruction
- Human trafficking, which exploits illegal immigration, endangering the stability of nations
- Narcotics and arms trafficking, including small arms
- Navy to Navy engagement at small or medium size

2. Risks and threats affecting the global maritime interest:

- Piracy
- Smuggling of goods of all kind, seize and value
- Disputes over maritime borders, with a special focus on the Exclusive
- Economic Zones, between nations and the international community

3. Risks and treats affecting global resources at sea:

- Environmental degradation, such as dumping of toxic waste at sea
- Risks to biodiversity in sea basins
- Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
- Illegal pumping of oily bilge water into the high seas
- Maritime accidents, collisions, groundings, wrecking which pose a continuous threat to ships, ports, all offshore maritime infrastructure and the global coastlines

To sum up: Major threats to maritime security are:

1. The use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of a state.

2. Terrorist acts against shipping, offshore installations and other maritime infrastructure, unlawful acts, illegal transport and the use of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Piracy and armed robbery at sea.

4. Transnational organized crimes, e.g. smuggling of migrants, narcotic drugs, arms, as a special to all stakeholders, threat small arms.

5. Threats to resources security, e.g. illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing

6. Environmental threats, e.g. major pollution incident, illegal dumping.

The emphasis on the risks and threats laid down here, are based on two experiences. One is the still existing and wide-spread phenomena 'sea blindness', or the lack of 'maritime situational awareness', the other is the strong believe, that one or two maritime services can offer an adequate solution to achieving maritime security.

But we know by own experience and by research of different maritime disasters that this not a successful approach.

Threats, risks and vulnerabilities are covering the whole spectrum of life at sea. They are related to all stakeholders ashore who are carrying different parts of responsibility for the global maritime domain. This is a responsibility for states e.g. governments, and non- states actors e.g. all non- governmental organisations. The importance of the maritime domain awareness is proven by this broad spectrum of threats, risks and vulnerabilities and it is obvious, that this broad



spectrum must be mirrored by a broad spectrum of answers. And maritime surveillance is one key to achieve a common approach to cope with growing insecurity at sea. There are different options of improving maritime surveillance, but some basic principles are valid independent of the perspective. Globally, regionally and even locally, the answers to maritime surveillance are mostly fragmented solutions, following an approach, which is driven by the interests of the representatives of the involved sectors: e.g.:

- Border control at sea
- Fishery control
- Defence
- Maritime safety and security
- Maritime environment
- Customs
- General law enforcement.

In general this means that the number of state actors comprise at least five different ministries not taking into account the number of agencies and non-state actors.

To all these different stakeholders it seems of great importance to follow a similar thinking and to develop a 'mental change' which is not easy to achieve. Some 'key messages' to promote maritime surveillance are of vital importance for this change:

The overarching principle must be a comprehensive or interagency approach to achieve maritime security through maritime surveillance. The perspective on how to act must fol-

low the sequence: 'Think globally, but act regionally and locally.'

It is important to develop all regional maritime surveillance and security initiatives in a global context. Therefore all already existing contributors to maritime surveillance have their own, but often very limited, part of the whole picture. But their part is of importance and this importance will increase when they accept to share their own information with other contributors in an organised way. 'Information sharing' is at the heart of maritime surveillance and maritime security. A change of mindset from 'need to know' to 'need to share' and finally 'responsibility to share' is urgently needed.

The 'need to know' principle is restrictive as well as linked to a culture of secrecy. But living in the information age and knowing that only a clearly defined and very limited amount of information needs to be protected the principle must be replaced by the 'need to share' mentality. It is obvious that a remarkable number of stakeholders still do not know what they do not know. Therefore they are not able to act in accordance with their responsibilities.

Information sharing is the key for a better maritime situational awareness.

Another 'key message' deriving from the risk and threat assessment is the recognition, that neither military nor a combination of civilian and military capabilities can alone deliver effective maritime surveillance and security.

Two additional aspects should be taken into consideration.

The 'step by step' approach is based on the idea of reaching a better and more reliable maritime surveillance by accepting the different actors' capabilities and abilities.⁵⁸

All national solutions are a fact, a given, which will remain as their contribution to better coordination, and cooperation must be the next step.

Secondly there is an urgent need to coordinate all capabilities in a region. This can be done by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as a global actor, but regional agreements like the RECAAP⁵⁹ in South Asia, SUCBAS in the Baltic Sea⁶⁰, V-RMTC^{61, 62} in the Mediterranean and Black Sea and MSSIS aim at global coverage and dealing with 66 nations, willing to share basic information, are encouraging examples for the step by step approach.

The regional approach is inherent in the "step by step" approach. From a European point of view regional approaches are the only acceptable ways to achieve progress in maritime surveillance. The al-

ready existing examples, SUCBAS and V-RMTC, are supplemented by another one, MARSUNO⁶³, covering the Northern Sea Basins are pilot projects initiated by the European Commission and have been completed in May 2012, awaiting implementation. Another project in the Mediterranean Sea, BlueMass-Med⁶⁴, a different approach due to individual requirements and attitudes to maritime surveillance and security has been accomplished in July, providing a set of experiences which should be integrated into the following work to achieve a cooperative system for maritime surveillance for Europe. One way to facilitate the different regional approaches is to identify and announce single focal points, which must act as interfaces and gateways for internal and external data, information and knowledge sharing. Coherence and coordination of all activities, hitherto fragmented, are essential to achieving greater efficiency. The regional approaches with different solutions and different ways to proceed need both: same standards and procedures but different ways to achieve them. Coherence could be reached through a template, which should be developed in consensus. This is one way to start with regional solutions, exercise them as pilot projects, and implement them as re-

⁵⁸ http://www.eda.europa.eu/libraries/documents/marsur_wise_pen_team_report_-_26_april_2010.sflb.ashx.

⁵⁹ <http://www.recaap.org/>.

⁶⁰ <http://www.sucbas.org/>.

⁶¹ http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_Regional_Maritime_Traffic_Centre.

⁶² http://www.dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/security_technology/2011/01/01/feature-01.

⁶³ http://www.marsuno.eu/PageFiles/598/Final%20Report%20111222_tryck.pdf

⁶⁴ http://www.bluemassmed.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=6&Itemid=56.



gional systems with a global reach, if required.

Safety has been the prime driver behind the efficient situational awareness that civil aviation has achieved today. And safety was the primary driver for the IMO, the United Nations Guardian for all aspects related to safety at sea. But the increasing importance of maritime security has for a long time being underestimated. It was a crucial decision by the IMO, to accept the responsibility for maritime security in addition to maritime safety.

The 'key messages' are reflecting the progress, already achieved, to identify and define both areas of responsibility: safety and security. Both are dependent on maritime situational awareness and a common approach to achieve or improve this awareness is maritime surveillance. Maritime situational awareness is the 'sine qua non' of maritime security and depends on surveillance and information sharing by the international community. Current capabilities to achieve that awareness are developing but remain still inadequate and poorly coordinated. On the other hand we can identify some encouraging examples on regional and local levels. The requirement for effective maritime surveillance goes well beyond simple positional data: the nature of cargo, ports of departure and the final destination, previous and next ports of call, track log and the identity of crew members must be recorded and transparent to safety and security regimes.

Moreover the autonomy, mobility and range of ships mean that maritime situational awareness for security reasons cannot be guaranteed simply by surveillance of a particular region or choke point. A ship bound for Europe may well have sailed from a remote port on the other side of the world, if the integrity of cargo is to be assured, the entire passage must be monitored. The IMO and other international and national authorities with maritime responsibilities have been alive to these considerations and in recent years have implemented measures such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, ISPS, to increase security in the maritime domain and in ports. The global actors who are involved in maritime security are well known, but focussing on the major actors gives an impression, which the actual and incoming authorities at the seas are.

- Firstly, the United Nations through the IMO is a global actor, with great experience, great patience in negotiations, but limited power to implement necessary regulations.

- Secondly, the United States through its Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps and their common 'maritime strategy'⁶⁵. While not having ratified UNCLOS⁶⁶ the United States Government is a supporter of the IMO and a facilitator.

⁶⁵ <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf>.

⁶⁶ http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

tor of a lot of international processes.

- Thirdly, NATO, with its Maritime Strategy⁶⁷ and its Maritime Operations Concept, representing many navies of the world, is a provider of maritime security and is offering a huge number of maritime issues for further discussion and development. It is not longer a purely military focused organisation but considering all maritime aspects in its principle concepts.

In the wake of UN, the US and NATO, the European Union through its Commission and to a limited degree through its military staff as well has developed a 'European Security Strategy',⁶⁸ named 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' and an 'Integrated Maritime Policy'.⁶⁹ The European Union Military Staff has promulgated a 'Maritime Security Operations'⁷⁰ concept, which is following an interagency approach.

The African Union has taken encouraging steps towards a better understanding of its security interests at sea, with a strong emphasis on their territorial waters and the

EEZ, by drafting an indigenous 'African Maritime Security Strategy'⁷¹

In addition to these different organisations with individual responsibilities, capabilities and political ambitions, unaligned nations like Brazil, China, India, Pakistan, Russia and to a certain degree Turkey have maritime ambitions and strategies which will have a serious impact on maritime security and the further development of international laws, standards, procedures and regulations.

In essence all stakeholders have responsibilities on three levels: strategic, operational and tactical.

The European Union has chosen 'maritime surveillance' for a lot of reasons, but the most important is, that maritime surveillance is a contributor to all stakeholders at sea: governmental, commercial and non-governmental. 'Maritime surveillance is the effective real time understanding of all man-made and natural occurrences at sea including their past background.' The purpose of maritime surveillance is to create the necessary knowledge to allow effective supervision as regards such occurrences at sea. The scope of maritime surveillance covers the EU maritime domain consisting not only of member states' territorial waters and exclusives zones but also in all international sea areas triggering European interests.

⁶⁷ http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110318_alliance_maritime-strategy_CM_2011_23.pdf.

⁶⁸ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

⁶⁹ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁷⁰ <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2087>.


⁷¹ http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2010/october/situationroom/Brief%20of%20the%20CPS%20_2_.pdf.



The actors of maritime surveillance are of great numbers, they carry out seven functions: border control, customs, defence, fisheries control, general law enforcement, marine environment and maritime safety and security. These seven functions perform many different initiatives at national, regional and EU level.

international sea areas of European interests.

The overarching objective of CISE is to improve the efficiency and cost effectiveness of maritime surveillance in the European Union maritime domain by enabling appropriate, lawful, secure and



A chart on the users' community:

The European Union decided, taking into consideration the present situation, the principles, key messages, threats and risks as well as international experiences like ReCAAP to overcome obstacles by creating a 'Common Information Security Environment'⁷² for the European Maritime Domain and in-

effective data and information sharing across sectors and borders throughout the European Union.


The chart below shows the four areas concerned with information gathering: sensors, platforms, intelligence, reporting and, as a fa-

⁷² <http://ec.europa.eu/maritime>

[affairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/maritime/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/index_en.htm).

cilitator, communication: Information sharing as the core of “The big picture”:

Step 1 Identifying all user communities
 Step 2 Mapping of data sets and



The way to achieve this Common Information Sharing Environment is following a six steps roadmap, which is on one hand a fundamental preliminary work to be carried out before establishing the CISE and on the other hand it is a process which has a value of its own: dealing with the six steps is creating maritime domain awareness in the European Union, its member states and different agencies.

The steps are:

gap analysis

Step 3 Identifying common data classification levels

Step 4 developing the technical supporting framework for CISE

Step 5 Establishing appropriate access rights

Step 6 Ensuring respect of legal provisions

These steps are essential to identify and establish the legal, technical and operational understanding of CISE.



In addition to this process both pilot projects, MARSUNO in Northern Europe and BluemassMed in Southern Europe had been initiated to accompany and prove the fundamental ideas of CISE and this way to improve maritime surveillance in

Europe in order to improve maritime security and at the end better governance at sea.

This example can be used as a facilitator or blueprint for other parts of the global maritime domain as well.

About the author



Admiral Feldt has been engaged in sea duty assignments for 13 years included leadership functions on all command levels and duty assignments in different naval staffs.

Since retiring Admiral Feldt has taken over several posts of honour. He has been president of the German Maritime Institute until June 2012 and is now a member of its board. He had been contracted by the European Commission from 2008 till 2009 as an advisor for the "Instrument for Stability". From July 2009 to December 2010 he had been contracted by the European Defence Agency to be a member of the Wise Pen Team and working on the topics of maritime surveillance and maritime security. Since August 2011 as the director of the Wise Pens International Admiral Feldt is working on a study dealing with future maritime capabilities of the European navies together with his team.



Strategic Cooperation with Africa: The Examples of China and Europe

Dr. Claas D. Knoop

Since the AU came into operation in the year 2002 as the successor organisation of the Organisation for African Unity/OAU a range of strategic partnerships with Africa have evolved, e.g. with China, the European Union, India and Latin America.⁷³

The following deliberations shall deal with China's and the EU's partnerships with Africa.

The formal framework for cooperation between China and Africa was laid down already before the African Union came into being:

During a ministerial conference in Beijing in the year 2000 the "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation" (FOCAC) was agreed, followed by three conferences in which the framework for future cooperation was concluded.

According to the Action Plan adopted in the 2006-Beijing-conference, cooperation between China and Africa was to focus on four areas:

- Political relations
- Economic cooperation
- International Affairs and
- Social Development.⁷⁴

During the 4th Ministerial Conference in the FOCAC- framework, which took place in Egypt in November 2009 the Chinese Prime minister, made pledges for eight new measures, amongst them:

- a China-Africa Partnership on Climate Change and utilisation of New Energy Sources
- concessional loans of 10 billion US \$ to African countries and
- zero-tariff treatment for 96 % of products from least developed African countries.⁷⁵

At the 5th Ministerial conference which took place in July this year in Beijing Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed a series of additional measures in 5 priority areas in the next three years to boost China-Africa ties.

As part of these measures China, according to Hu, will launch the "Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, deepen cooperation with the AU and African countries in peace and security in Africa, provide financial support for the AU's Peace Keeping Operations in Africa and the development of the African stand-by-forces and train more officials in peace and security affairs and peace-keepers for the AU."⁷⁶

The strategic cooperation (Europeans prefer the term "Partnership") between the EU and Africa was launched in 2007 in Lisbon during

⁷³ F. Stehnen et al., Afrika und externe Akteure-Partner auf Augenhöhe?, Nomos, 2010.

⁷⁴ Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa cooperation.

⁷⁵ ChinAfrica Economist, December, 2009, 37.

⁷⁶ Government of China, Xinhua, 21st July 2012.



the EU-Presidency of Portugal.⁷⁷ The initial push for this partnership came by the way from the then British Prime minister, Tony Blair, who made the first move during the British G-8 Presidency in 2005.

The partnership is probably the most comprehensive one compared to others, including the cooperation with China.

It covers eight priority areas:

- Peace and Security
- Democratic Governance and Human Rights
- Trade and Regional Integration
- Effective Action to achieve the Millennium Development Goals
- Energy
- Climate Change
- Migration, Mobility and Employment and
- Science, Information Society and Space.

Both sides agreed on Action Plans to ensure that the long term strategic goals of the partnership yield results as quickly as possible.

The day-to-day work on the implementation of this strategic partnership is carried out by "Joint Expert Groups" which are co-chaired by experts of the European and African side in the eight different priority areas. Germany currently holds the co-chair in the areas of Democratic Governance and Energy. On the political level yearly meetings between the EU and the African side on ministerial level and

between the two Commissions of AU and EU take place alternating between Addis Abeba and Brussels.

Let me now take a closer and critical look at the strategic objectives of the two partnerships with a special emphasis on peace and security.

First of all it is fair to say that we have to be very conscious of the fact that Africa is a huge continent comprising 55 countries, of which 54 are members of the AU. It goes without saying that such a diversity of countries, cultures, traditions, religious beliefs etc. makes it extremely difficult for Africans to agree on a common platform for partnerships with external partners and subsequently implement the partnerships with concrete actions.

However, the end of the cold war and the demise of the apartheid regimes in South Africa and Namibia had a major impact on Africa's development. Greater unity among African states about fundamental issues for the future of the continent was forged. The birth of the African Union to replace the OAU constituted a qualitative leap for the peoples and the countries of the continent. The new vision, values, principles and policy framework enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union were a clear departure from earlier ways of doing business.

One significant innovation based on the Constitutive Act is the establishment of a peace and security framework that reflects Africa's desire to act to maintain, restore and enhance stability on the continent.

⁷⁷ The Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Brussels, June 2000.



The establishment of the Peace and Security Council, the planned setting up of regional brigades as part of African Stand By Forces and African Peace Keeping Operations, such as in Sudan or Somalia are certainly elements of a new Peace and Security Architecture that is geared to enable the continent to act more effectively in crisis situations.⁷⁸

In the EU's partnership with Africa peace and security is the No.1 priority. In their strategic cooperation Africa and the EU have agreed basically on three priority actions:

- action No.1: enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security
- action No.2: full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
- action No.3: predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations.

When it comes to the implementation of action No.1 we can indeed see a very positive development over the past years: regular consultations between the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) about matters of mutual concern and interest are taking place in Brussels and Addis Abeba. Furthermore effective and well organized mechanisms for consultations at ambassadorial level in particular in Addis Abeba, Brussels and New York have been set up.

⁷⁸ Olaf Bachmann, *The African Standby Force: External Support to an "African Solution to African Problems"?*, Institute of Development Studies, IDS, April 2011.

Turning to action No.2 the reality on the ground unfortunately does not look so bright. Originally, the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Stand by Force (ASF) in five regions of the African continent were envisaged for 2010. However, in view of the complex challenges in setting up the system and lack of progress in some of the five regions (in particular in the north and the central region) it has been agreed at a summit meeting of African Heads of States and Governments to shift the date for operationalisation of APSA/ASF to the year 2015.

The German Federal Government is very committed to support the AU in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the continent. One visible example for the German support is a new building on the compound of the AU in Addis Abeba, which will become the headquarter for the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission early next year.⁷⁹

Action No.3—predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations—is probably amongst the biggest challenges in the implementation of the strategic partnership between Africa and Europe.

Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) are very costly and Africa is the continent where more than 75% of all Peace Keeping Forces serving under a UN mandate are deployed. The AU budget for PKOs is by far

⁷⁹ *Germany and Africa: A Strategy Paper* by the German Government, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin 2011.



not sufficient to cover the expenses. That is why the AU and its members heavily rely on external financial support. From the AU's point of view a reliable and predictable financial mechanism within the UN structures would be the best solution. However, so far there is no agreement in the UN Security Council about this issue because some of its members think it should be first and foremost the responsibility of the AU and its member states to provide the necessary funding ("African ownership").

Before this background the financial support of the EU for the AU PKOs is of crucial importance. In 2004 the EU established the so called African Peace Facility (APF) on the request of the AU. Since then about 740 million Euros have been allocated. The money is provided from the European Development Fund (EDF) which provides financial support to the so called ACP countries. The use of EDF resources for AU PKOs is very controversial, not least because the non-African ACP countries oppose this and ask for compensation. APF money has been used for a range of PKOs in Africa, such as in Sudan (AMIS) and in Somalia (AMISOM).

There are still considerable deficiencies on the side of the AU and her member states when it comes to reporting about the use of the money and accountability in general. In my opinion it is also fair to say that if it is the objective of the African Union to provide "African solutions for African problems" a stronger commitment also

in financial terms of the member countries to meet this goal is clearly desirable.⁸⁰

After only five years in operation it is probably too early for a balanced judgement of results of the joint strategic partnership between Africa and Europe. Both sides have acknowledged that concrete results in most of the 8 priority areas mentioned earlier on are still missing. A joint evaluation of the different partnerships of the strategy has shown that both sides have to do more to fill the partnership with real substance and this does not only concern governments but also the private sector which has deliberately been included in the strategic partnership. What is particularly missing on the African side is a clear commitment of the African member countries and regional organizations to support the sector goals set out by the partnerships in the different priority areas. On the side of the AU Commission it is often the lack of capacity to deal with the objectives of the partnership. In Brussels it is basically the overboarding bureaucracy between the different actors involved (EU-Commission, Council of Ministers, Member States) which to a certain extent may lead to obstacles for effective implementation.

Whoever wants to see proof for China's strong commitment to Africa needs to pay a visit to Addis Abeba, capital of Ethiopia and the headquarter of the only international organization which covers

⁸⁰ Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013, 17.



the whole continent—the African Union.

The commanding feature of the AU compound in Addis Abeba is the new AU Conference Center, a generous donation of China to the AU. This is clearly a strong symbol of the political and economic importance, which China attaches to the strategic cooperation with Africa, a continent that in a few years time will reach a population of one billion people.

In the past 10 to 15 years we have seen a dramatic increase in Chinese trade figures related to Africa:

In 1998, the overall trade between Africa and China (export and import) according to China Commerce Yearbook amounted to 5,5 billion US\$. In 2006 this figure increased to 55,4 billion US\$ which subsequently was almost doubled in 2008 when this figure went up to 106,8 billion US\$.⁸¹

The strategic importance of Africa for China is also highlighted by the fact that Africa has become a prime source for raw materials and commodities, such as e.g. oil. Currently about 30 % of China's oil imports are coming from African countries.

Seen from the African perspective China's visibly strong role on the continent is clearly perceived as an important factor which has broadened the room for manoeuvres in the political field for African leaders as well as it provides new and addi-

tional economic options for African countries.

The strategic partnership with Europe is seen by most Africans principally in a positive light, but sometimes there is also a certain degree of suspicion that the EU or one or the other of her member countries have a "second agenda" in mind when they deal with their African partners. Before the background of the colonial and imperialistic past of many European countries in Africa this does not come as a surprise!

Both sides also feel clearly that the implementation of the long-term partnership needs more commitment and political determination in order to fill the joint cooperation with real substance. It is also true for both sides that the strategic partnership between Africa and Europe is very much a project of the elites which so far has not really been firmly embedded in the minds of peoples at grass-root level. China's strong engagement in Africa and the well known fact that China does not attach political strings to its support for African countries (other than e.g. the EU and the US) has often lead to outspoken criticism from external actors but also from the African side. For the sake of the argument I only want to point out a few assumptions which have been repeatedly made in this context:

- exclusive use of Chinese labour force instead of Africans in projects and companies
- unsatisfactory labour conditions which often lead to health hazards

⁸¹ China Commerce Yearbook, Africa-Asia-Confidential, January 2009 (for 2008).



- loss of jobs for Africans because of Chinese import competition
- cultural isolation of the Chinese people from their African host countries⁸²

I want to stress that I am not joining those critics who are engaged in non-substantiated "China bashing". However, I do believe that the criticism on China's engagement in Africa deserves a fair and open debate.

I also strongly believe that there is an enormous potential for combining our efforts to help Africa to develop itself - based on the strategic cooperation and partnerships of China and the EU and her member countries with Africa.

Let me just mention two examples: According to the outcome of the last FOCAC meeting in Beijing in July this year China will establish a partnership with Africa on transnational and transregional infrastructure development.

Furthermore China has pledged to enhance its cooperation with the AU in matters of peace and security. These objectives and pledges are matching clearly with the objectives and commitments of the EU-Africa joint strategy. Is this not a convincing argument for joining hands and start talking to each other about coordinated actions in these important areas where Chinese and European know how could complement each other? My an-

swer to this question is simply: yes, let's do it! And my experience in Africa and with Africans tells me that such Sino-European cooperation would fall on fertile ground.

In concluding my deliberations I would like to submit, that the role of external actors in Africa has changed from one of seeking to control or impose to one of a more collaborative and cooperative relationship. Partners on equal level are the key notion for the new strategic relationship with Africa.

Certainly, external actors like the EU, its member countries and China have their own interests in their relations with Africa, but they also share common values, principles and goals relating to the development of the continent. There is a convergence of interests and a growing mutual respect and understanding.

It is in this spirit that I want to conclude my deliberations with a quotation of John F. Kennedy who once said: "If we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity."

⁸² Helmut Asche, *Chinas Funktionen in Afrika*, ed. F. Stehnen et al., 129.

About the author



Dr. jur. Claas Dieter Knoop

German diplomat from 1976 until 2010.

Executive Positions: Head of Division in the European Department of the Foreign Office
Chief Representative of the German Permanent Mission to the EU in Brussels
Ambassador to Ethiopia and Djibouti
Permanent Representative to the African Union with Observer Status in Addis Abeba

Focus of Consulting Expertise: EU, African Union/AU, Relations between the EU and the AU, Horn of Africa, Southern Africa

Memberships: DGAP, Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft/PMG, Board member of the German-Ethiopian Foundation at the University of Hamburg

