Intelligence & Democracies in Conflict and Peace - Auslandsbüro Israel
Veranstaltungsberichte
The conference aimed to explore the evolving role of intelligence in democracies by bringing leading experts from Germany, Europe, the US and Asia to discuss the core elements of the intelligence and democracy debate across four core elements of contemporary global security:
- Intelligence and democratization
- Its role in regional security
- The interaction between intelligence and the mass media
- Parliamentary oversight and social responsibility
October 18, 2009
Opening Remarks:
Dr. Shlomo Shpiro (BIU and BESA) and Dr. Lars Hänsel (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung) welcomed the guests and participants. Dr. Shpiro discussed the conference's theme of intelligence in democratic and non-democratic regimes. Intelligence is a creature of conflicts and wars and it serves as a "window for peace." Dr. Hänsel spoke about the internal (forces against democratic values) and external challenges (wars, international conflicts) that a democratic state might face. He emphasized the importance of intelligence as a tool for defending democracy and promoting peace and added that it is essential that the secret services are under state control.
Panel 1: Early Developments
Col. Rose Mary Sheldon: Intelligence in a democracy: Ancient Greece
Ancient Greece is the first democracy in history. They already established different institutions that served as intelligence services. Proxenia was the name of upper class citizens who served as agents, collected information and even executed assassinations if that was needed. The Heralds collected public and private information. Both the Proxenia and the Heralds were protected by law but only the latter received rewards in case of bringing back good news. The third institution was called Presbutai and they served as ambassadors for Greece. The last institution is the Athenian Episkopos who as the "eye of the government" controlled the officials and reported back to Athens. Greece's impressive political and military achievements lacked today's sophisticated intelligence systems. It is more precise to use the term "Information gathering" in order to underline the lack of expertise in the Greek system.
Even though they did not have a centralized intelligence service, the intelligence cycle already existed (collect-analyze-disseminate).
Yoaz Hendel: Roman Intelligence during the Herodian period
King Herod is a controversial research subject, in his case we have to look at intelligence from the aspect of a dictatorship. He was perceived as an outsider in Judea, his real enemies were mostly within the Kingdom itself. Herod's enemies were the Hasmonean family, the Jewish spiritual leadership, the Jewish Aristocrats and members of the palace and his family. His intelligence service consisted of Human Sources (HUMINT), namely field agents, traitors and interrogators who used torture when it was required. The people of the Kingdom were constantly tracked down and observed due to Herod's paranoia and "mania of information". The agents rather created biased information and told Herod what he wanted to hear in order to avoid the bad consequences that came with bringing back unwanted news.
Joris Gijsenbergh: Dutch intelligence and the pursuit of a 'Strong Democracy' 1919-1951
There is a democratic dilemma about intelligence services: Are these secret services defenders of democracy or rather threats for democracy?
The Central Intelligence Service (C.I.) functioned between 1919 and 1940. The C. I. did not regard itself as a defender of democracy and did not worry much about the secret character of its actions. Despite its secrecy, the C.I. believed that accountability and legal frameworks were important and therefore sometimes it practiced restraint in its actions.
The Domestic Security Service (C.V.D. /B.V.D.) served from 1946 to 1951. In theory the new system was more democratic than the C.I. The C.V.D. regarded itself as a defender of democracy and wanted to be publicly known. In practice, the C.V.D. did not carry out any actions in order to be more openly known for the public. In reality the C.V.D. felt that autonomy was more important than accountability.
Panel 2: Intelligence and Democratization
Dr. Dustin Dehez: Bringing intelligence into the Security Sector Reform
The two major requirements of intelligence services are democratic control and effectiveness. African countries have difficulties in creating effective intelligence services. The territory of Sub-Saharan Africa is problematic; our information about the intelligence services is restricted. In 1997 they created a Security Sector Reform trying to narrow the challenges of establishing a well organized intelligence service.
The major challenges that African countries are facing are the following: legacy of the African socialism and colonialism; autocratic military and security service and unknown activities of the intelligence services. In Gambia they established the National Intelligence Agency in order to protect the regime.
Prof. David Snead: US efforts to overthrow Fidel Castro, 1959–1963
The unsuccessful attempts by Eisenhower and Kennedy to remove Castro from power are considered intelligence failures. In Eisenhower's and Kennedy's views, the biggest threat for democracy was communism. In Cuba, the USA supported the Batista led, anti-communist government. When Castro came to power he quickly eliminated his enemies, started to nationalize the economy and created ties with the USSR. His actions made it clear by 1960 that he was following the path of communism for Cuba. Eisenhower attempted to remove Castro by training anti-Castro forces and sneaking them into Cuba. They began to bomb Cuban sugar-fields and the CIA developed an assassination program to eliminate Castro, which failed time and again. Kennedy tried to invade Cuba but the Bay of Pigs operation was a big failure.
Dr. Itai Sneh: Intelligence, the lack of democracy and the consequences of torture: The Shah's Iran as a case study
The Shah had a weak legitimacy, and a lot of enemies, therefore in 1957 he formed the SAVAK, the National Intelligence and Security Organization. The SAVAK served as a tool to torture and eliminated anybody who could mean threat for the Shah.
There was not allowed any open opposition against the institution in Iran, but with time the resistance of the people became more and more violent.
Khomeini got exiled to Iraq, then to France due to his increasing popularity. In 1977 censorship laws were introduced in order to maintain the Shah's power as much as possible but he became more and more detached from the people and his health deteriorated too. Finally the people dismissed the Shah and Khomeini came to power in 1979 out of popular will. The SAVAK was closed down shortly after the overthrow of the Shah.
Dr. Michael Petersen: US Military Intelligence and the defense of El Salvador, 1983–1992
In the 1980's, under Reagan's presidency, the US intelligence community realized that a more intense intervention is needed in Central America in order to stop Communist expansion. El Salvador's military government was viewed as a potential barrier against Communism in Central America. The DIA tried to help the government of El Salvador to fight the leftist group, called FMLN. The DIA operated with direct intelligence sharing and between 1987 and 1989 it carried out several operations in El Salvador. In 1989, a guerilla attack by FMLN surprised the El Salvadorian and the American armies. It demonstrates how little US aid really helped. Overall, the defense of El Salvador was a failure in the history of the US Intelligence.
October 19, 2009
Panel 1: Intelligence, Regional and Global Security
Dr. Gustavo Diaz Matey: Intelligence as a Democratic Indicator
Intelligence is a sociological phenomenon that serves for information gathering and preventing of hostility. It is important to distinguish between intelligence that has always been existed and intelligence services that were established as a result of the state concept. Intelligence cycle, covert action and counter-intelligence are all tools for decision making. Intelligence focuses on hostility both in democracies and non-democracies. Intelligence in a democratic system should have relation with the citizens and should create a legal framework for its actions and secrets. The functions and limitations of intelligence services must be clarified and their methods and sources have to be protected. Intelligence in a non-democratic system focuses more on internal opposition and less on external threats. The intelligence is outside of the legal system in non-democratic countries. Intelligence in democracies should be used to measure the level of democracy.
Dr. Yigal Sheffy: The 'Rotem' Affair of 1960 and the surprise of the 1973 war
In 1960 the Egyptian forces entered Sinai causing big surprise to Israel. The IDF could not respond in time and this event led to the conclusion that intelligence needs to operate with an earlier warning on a possible Egyptian attack
The tools for an earlier warning are the HUMINT (Bedouins in Sinai), the SIGINT (Interception and D/F station) and the VISINT ("Vautour" reconnaissance aircraft).
The 1960 Rotem affair and the 1973 Yom Kippur War showed an over-reliance on the intentions rather than on the capabilities of the enemy. From this miscalculation, intelligence failures arose.
Col. James Dillard: The OSS, Ho Chi Minh and Vietnam's Fight for Freedom
After Japan invaded China and created a puppet state called Manchuko, a Japanese-French alliance was born. The Franco-Japanese collaboration made Roosevelt take actions in Southeast Asia. In March 1945, the Japanese forces performed a coup in Vietnam. The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and Ho Chi Minh decided to fight the Japanese coup with unified forces. The OSS was operating with urgent reports and warnings and collaborated with the Viet Minh. In May 1945, an underground resistance force got created in Indochina and Ho became and agent of the OSS.
In the end, the Japanese forces surrendered due to a clash with the OSS. On September 2, 1945 Ho took charge and Vietnam became independent. Truman abandoned Roosevelt's policies about Vietnamese nationalism and brought the focus to the USSR.
Panel 2: Intelligence Services and the Media
Adm. Sigurd Hess: German Intelligence and the media
After World War II, freedom of the press got re-established in Germany. Agencies were established to maintain relationships with the press. Materials of the intelligence services went through the governmental press.
There were three different institutions of the intelligence service in Germany: the BFV served as external intelligence service, the BND was used for internal intelligence service and the MAD was the military counter-intelligence service.
The BND struggled with weak leadership and nepotism but this situation changed by the end of the 1960's. In 1969 the BND was directed to reorganize communication with the press and in consequence, it started to organize public lectures, briefings and background talks for the press.
Communication between the press and the intelligence services is an essential element of democracy. The press is the fourth power.
Col. (res.) Miri Eisen: Intelligence and the media in Israel
The relationship between the media and intelligence changed after the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Israeli media was no longer “fed” by the army and the government; it became more critical of government decision-making processes
There are three intelligence services in Israel: Shabak, Mossad, and Aman.
Starting in 2000, with the Intifada and terrorism, Shabak and Aman opened up to the media. They started to give out hard material about their activities.
Today, they work with the press on a daily basis; however, the Ministry of Defense still censors information that could jeopardize the state.
The Mossad is the only intelligence agency that does not have any connection with the media.
It is hard to find the balance between keeping the secrecy of intelligence but still letting out information to the public
Hilmar-Detlef Bruckner: How the French media established the public image of secret intelligence
In the 1870's, under the pressure of Germany, the people in France started to question the decisions of the army and the government. Journalists even began to accuse the French Prime Minister of being a secret agent for the Germans.
In the 1880's as an effect of the economic crisis, the public became concerned about military activities in France.
In 1886 they introduced a new law on espionage.
In 1894, as a consequence of the Dreyfus affair, the center of attention moved from Germany to Britain.
There was a change in the terms they used to describe intelligence activities: espionage became intelligence and spies became agents.
In France they restarted the publicity of espionage, it became more known for the public.
Intelligence is war in peace.
Amir Rappaport: Media coverage of intelligence operations in Israel
In the 1950's and 1960's almost nothing was known by the public in Israel about the activities of intelligence services. This situation has changed dramatically by now. The intelligence services now have websites, and they do give out material to the media. Even though there has been a change, what is known to the public is only 10% of what is happening in reality.
As a consequence of the Second Lebanon War, the intelligence services started to provide the media with less information about their operati ons. In the early years of the decade, since the outbreak of the ‘Second Intifada’ in October 2000, more information was available than nowadays. Intelligence services also use the media for propaganda and for recruitment of new personnel.
Panel 3: Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability
Dr. David Robarge: The CIA and public accountability
In the US, President Polk told Congress to “mind (their) own business” regarding intelligence and this policy remained until the intelligence failure of Pearl Harbor. Over the years, accountability has increased, and by now, the CIA is one of the most open secret services in the world.
The CIA is accountable in two different ways. Officially it is accountable to the Congress (intelligence sub-committees, special commissions, investigators etc.). Unofficially it is accountable to the media and to several watchdog groups, etc. The tools of accountability are the oversight committees, the special commissions and the media. Much of the effects are felt inside the services: people know what they can do and what they cannot. Parliamentary and public (media) accountability expanded even more after 9/11.
Prof. Wolfgang Krieger: German intelligence and Parliamentary oversight
Parliamentary oversight in Germany was established in 1956, with weak control over the BND. The oversight system changed after the events of 9/11 and the Bundestag now plays a bigger role in controlling the BND.
The operational scope of the BND is narrower than before. It does not operate though covert operations and its ‘post-colonial’ activities have ended. One unique feature of the German system of intelligence is that there is no separate military intelligence service in Germany; the BND operates as a civilian and a military service as well. The weakest part of the oversight system is that the research staff is more competent than the committee staff (but the research staff are not allowed to view secret documents.
Dr. Sebastien Laurent: The French intelligence services and the law under the Fifth Republic
Until the 20th century, the French state's action in the field of intelligence were held in total secrecy. In the end of the 19th century, progression started towards some degree of openness. There are now five French Quangos and Committees concerning intelligence: CNIL, CNIS, CCSDN, CVFS and DPR. However, it should be emphasized that many files remained hidden and many illegal files were created before the 1970's.
In the 1970s attempts were made to politicize intelligence oversight but until today the tradition of secrecy remains strong in France. A more effective legal reform is needed. In 2007 the French government established the Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence Services in order increase the oversight of the Parliament. But there is still a way to go before effective oversight and public transparency are achieved.
Prof. Stuart Farson: The impact of the war on terror on Canadian Muslims
There are many examples of how Canadian law regarding the war on terror affected judges' decisions in cases relating to Canadian Muslims (Project Thread, Toronto 18). In the majority of the cases the decisions ended with the deportation of Muslims from Canada. The Harari case has a longstanding impact and the conclusion that derives from it is that reliability and quality of evidence must be given more value.
Panel 4: Intelligence Structures and Crisis Management
Dr. Philip Davies: Tasking and the Coordination Process in Britain and the United States
R/P is considered one of the great successes of the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) system in the United Kingdom. R/P is similar in the UK and in the USA. NIRP tasking process includes annual review led by the Intelligence Coordinator and working level implementations such as the ‘SIS Red Book’ and operational clearance. In the UK there is no systematic attempt for national overview. R/P is best applied to covert collection and not to all collection sources. National R/P only works if departments accept that national authority trumps departmental lines of demarcation. It is required to incorporate national R/P into practical, working levels.
Col. (ret.) Virendra Verma: The role of intelligence in Indian decision making
In 1947, with the Partition of India, democracy was established in the new modern India. Right after the introducing of democratic values, a free press started to operate. The invasion of India by China in 1962 came as a big shock since India represented the philosophy of non-violence. The Chinese occupation was not considered a failure in intelligence; Indian decision-makers simply ignored the professional advisors' opinion. In recent years, intelligence began to play a more pronounced role in Indian political decision-making.
There is a need for cohesion between professional advisors and statesmanship, which at the moment is sadly lacking in India to the extent that intelligence can make a maximum effective contribution to India’s security and foreign relations.
Dr. Motohiro Tsuchiya: Restructuring Japanese intelligence agencies
The evolution of the Japanese intelligence agencies started many centuries ago by Sun Tzu who employed ninjas as secret agents. After World War II, the public image of intelligence became negative.
The Japanese government established the Japanese Intelligence Committee following the American example of the CIA. After the Cold War ended, there was an incident when one of the missiles fired from North-Korea fell into the sea close to Japanese shores. As a consequence of that, and of the 9/11 attacks, Japan realized the need to modernize and prepare its intelligence apparatus for terrorist attacks. Between 2003 and 2007 a series of policy proposals were introduced in the subject of intelligence. In 2003, Japan’s first intelligence gathering satellites were launched into space. There has also been a change in the public opinion on intelligence. The people of Japan are starting to realize the need for a well functioning intelligence service. Better coordination, democratic oversight and lawmaking are the essential elements of a well-functioning intelligence service in Japan.
Prof. Hillel Frisch: Palestinian Intelligence Services
The Palestinian leadership is not united; therefore their intelligence services work separately as well. The more homogenous a society, the more fragmented the security structure. Alternately, the more heterogeneous a society, the more unified the security system. Yasser Arafat fragmented his security structure in the West Bank but did not distribute special tasks to the different services, resulting in organizational chaos and internal rivalries. Hamas unified its security force in Gaza due to the bigger threat they face. Mahmoud Abbas continues to deal with different intelligence services without any specializations concerning their tasks. He does not feel the need to unify intelligence since he enjoys the support of the USA and suffers no threat from Israel. On the other hand, the Hamas has to stay unified because they fear constant threats from outside.
Round Table Panel: Learning from History
Questions: Are there any universal principles of intelligence? What are the basic principles for the future?
Dr. David Robarge
It is important to understand why states did not use intelligence in certain cases. Covert operations have to be analyzed and used as examples. The history of US intelligence over the past six decades, since the end of WWII, provides many examples of covert action but its overall results are mixed.
Dr. Philip Davies
It is essential to look at different methods and different operating principles. Democratic states employ their intelligence services for certain purposes, non-democratic states for quite different purposes. Intelligence is thus not universal, it provides a wide range of tools, and the question is what leaders do with them.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Ephraim Lapid
In formulating and presenting intelligence analysis and predictions, it is important to be brave, to speak one's mind, and to be able to correct mistakes. Intelligence is a tool of decision-making. In case of mistake, correction and assessments are as important as feedback to improve future performance. Intelligence chiefs who only toe the line and say what their political masters expect do not provide effective guidance.
Prof. Wolfgang Krieger
In Germany, the BND made no effort to write any internal history; it is hard to reconstruct history only from the outside. German intelligence is often reluctant to learn from history. It is important to accept a potential failure since intelligence is not, and cannot be, infallible.
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Andre Ranson
The entire process of intelligence has to be examined, not just the outcome of it.
It is important to make attempts towards discovering what the enemy would do, even though you may not always gain a full picture. Intelligence is also affected by the history of each specific country: those with more colonialist past have this sometimes reflected in their intelligence tradition but also in modern international commitments.
Jens Wegener
Intelligence has a historiography function next to its public and internal functions. Learning from history is a comparative project; we have to put the events in context. Intelligence is often defined as ‘the missing dimension in international relations’.
October 20, 2009
Special Panel: Israeli Intelligence Learning from History
Brig. General (ret.) Shlomo Gazit
The intelligence surprise of the October 1973 war was a watershed point in the development of Israeli military intelligence. Before 1973, assessments examined the probability and signs of impending war. After 1974, we began to look both ways – at war and at peace. What are windows of opportunity to move forward towards peace? This change was difficult for many people who were used to perceive enemies as a constant threat, but these attitudes were slowly changing. Before the historic visit of Egyptian President Sadat in Israel, in 1977, we had to assess Sadat’s political intentions. It was very difficult because he was a leader who made decisions by himself, either to “declare” war (1973) or peace (1977) and followed them up. Since then, Israeli military intelligence has been looking at both sides of the conflict – possibility of war that is providing early warning, on one hand, but also examining closely for signed of political developments opening more windows for peace.
MK (Former Minister) Avi Dichter
In 1984, the Shabak underwent a deep crisis. The killing of two captured terrorists, who had kidnapped a bus from Tel-Aviv to Ashkelon, shook the organization from within. We as intelligence officers have a first duty to democracy, to the truth. Things had to be changed. The challenge was how to ensure that such a thing never happened again. Those people at the top of the organization who exposed this affair paid a heavy price, but the changes were made. Today the service is operating within very strict and clear rules and regulations. There is the 2002 Shabak Law, and much of the details are regulated by internal government regulations. Preventing terrorism must be done within the structure of the law. New generations of Shabak officers learn this from the beginning of their career in the organization.
Shabtai Shavit
Until the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Mossad was a regional intelligence organization which focused almost exclusively on the states of the Middle East and its immediate neighbors. The global political changes of the early 1990s forced us to change, and do so fast. During the Cold War, the main threat was that of interstate war and much of those were played within the overall global rivalries between the two superpowers. After 1991, the types of threats changes, as well as the possible states and organizations from which those threats could potentially emanate. We had to change quickly from a regional organization to a global player. This brought about also more need to rely on cooperation with other services since resources and capabilities are limited. This was the main challenge for the Mossad under my leadership – how to turn from a small, regionally-oriented organization to one which could operate and obtain information all over the world.
Dr. Shlomo Shpiro
