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A Representative Survey on Attitudes, Faith and Value Orientations of People With and Without a Migrant Background

Sabine Pokorny, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff

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

Edited translation of the publication “Was eint die Einwanderungsgesellschaft? Eine repräsentative Umfrage zu Einstellungen, Glaube und Wertorientierungen von Bürgerinnen und Bürgern mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund.“

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At a Glance

- On average, Germans without a migrant background are less religious than ethnic German "resettlers" and people with Russian, Polish or Turkish migrant backgrounds. They also pray less often. Religiosity is most pronounced among immigrants of Turkish descent, 82 percent of whom describe themselves as somewhat or very religious and one in two say that they pray daily.

- People with migrant backgrounds tend to exhibit more traditional social attitudes. All the immigrant groups studied have greater reservations about assisted suicide and are more likely to agree that children under three years old should be cared for at home.

- In certain groups, a relationship between religiosity and more traditional attitudes is evident in the case of some attitudes to state and society (e.g., home care for children, lower levels of agreement with assisted suicide, prohibition of abortions). However, the different degrees of religious attachment often cannot explain the differences in attitude between the groups. There are also considerable differences in some attitudes between very religious Germans and very religious migrants, especially from Turkey. Much the same applies for people who are not religious. Religiosity thus has an influence on attitudes, but it is not determinant for the group differences.

- On questions of democracy and the welfare state, essential basic values are less important to some migrant groups than to Germans without a migrant background: Freedom of expression and of the press are less important to people of Polish descent or of Russian descent than to Germans; among people of Russian descent, this also applies for freedom of religion and freedom of assembly. Freedom of assembly is also less important to late resettlers and people of Turkish descent than to Germans without a migrant background.

- At 90 percent, people of Turkish descent answer most often that freedom of expression is very important to them. This has to be interpreted with a certain degree of caution, however, since respondents were not asked what exactly they mean by freedom of expression. At the same time, 80 percent of people of Turkish descent would like better protection of their faith from insults. It is clear that freedom of expression runs up against limits in this group, when one's own faith is affected.

- Security is important to all the groups examined. This especially applies for people of Russian descent and people of Turkish descent. In all groups, moreover, dependability, the protection of the environment and nature, and politeness figure among the especially important values. The "classical virtues" of politeness, punctuality, modesty and respecting rules are more important to late resettlers and migrants of Polish, Russian or Turkish descent than to Germans without a migrant background.

- Religiosity tends to reinforce more conservative and social values, especially among Germans without a migrant background, whereas hedonistic and materialist values either are not influenced or are diminished in some groups.

- There is basic tolerance vis-à-vis the different religions, and contact with people of other faiths or attending a celebration in a church or mosque is not rejected. Tolerance is more limited, however, when it is a matter of one's own family. Above all, people of Polish descent and those of Turkish descent disapprove of the daughter marrying a Jew. In addition, the majority of people of Polish descent disapprove of a Muslim son-in-law and a majority of those of Turkish descent disapprove of a Christian son-in-law. There is a similar response if a family member were to convert. People of Polish descent and late resettlers are sceptical about Islam, above all, but also about Judaism. People of Russian descent are more likely to disapprove of a family member converting to Islam and to Christianity, whereas the majority of people of Turkish descent view conversion to Judaism and to Christianity negatively.

- A clear dividing line between Germans with and without a migrant background is constituted by the attitude to same-sex marriages, which only a small minority of Germans without a migrant background disapprove of. Already among people of Russian descent and late resettlers, nearly one in two disapprove of same-sex marriages. Among people of Turkish descent, there is even a majority of 60 percent that disapprove of same-sex marriages.

The Study

The results are based on a representative telephone survey using a random selection. A total of 3,003 people were surveyed between October 2018 and February 2019, of whom 1,001 were Germans without a migrant background, 1,001 Germans with a migrant background and 1,001 foreigners living in Germany.[1] The present analysis compares Germans without a migrant background to the four largest immigrant groups: ethnic German "resettlers" and immigrants with a Turkish, Russian or Polish migrant background.

1 The underlying definitions of people with a migrant background and resettlers are explained in Section 2.

Contents

1 Introduction and Research Questions

Public debate in the first half of 2020 was heavily focused on the repercussions of the Corona pandemic; other problems were largely pushed out of the public eye. One could almost forget that between 2015 and the end of 2019, the refugee issue dominated the public debate, with the well-known and sometimes severe repercussions on the political party landscape in Germany.

At the latest, the fire in the Moria refugee camp on the island of Lesbos put the issue back on the agenda. The situation in the Middle East continues to create strong migratory pressures. As a result of the Corona pandemic, the economic situation in many African countries will further deteriorate, and migratory pressures will thus tend to increase from this direction as well. In the medium term, we can thus expect this issue to become a higher priority on the political agenda again.

Social cohesion and the integration of immigrants also play a role in the wake of immigration by refugees. The fleeing of refugees from war or persecution can be regarded as a form of migration, but it assumes a special role. At the same time, there is a shortage of skilled workers in Germany, which can only be partially offset by immigration. Germany is a society of immigration and hence it is worth taking another look back, also for the sake of current and future migration: What is the situation in terms of the integration of the four largest immigrant groups in Germany?

Since the Second World War, Germany has experienced several major waves of immigration. If the immigrants were first refugees from war and expellees (*Vertriebene*), numerous labour migrants arrived in the course of the tumultuous economic development of former West Germany: first from southern Europe and then increasingly from Turkey. As labour migration declined, the significance of immigration in the context of family reunification increased. Starting in the 1990s, many resettlers (*Aussiedler*) of German descent returned to the country of their ancestors from the successor states of the former Soviet Union. The eastward enlargement of the European Union resulted in a considerable increase in immigration from Poland. All these developments led to Germany's population developing more and more into a society of immigration. Germany was long in denial about this fact; other than in the extreme right of the political spectrum, it is, however, largely accepted today.

In what follows, we want to examine how persons with immigrant biographies and their descendants from the four largest immigrant groups in Germany have integrated. The focus will be placed here on cultural integration and social cohesion. In addition, the attitudes toward state and society and the value orientations of Germans and immigrants are compared, in order to bring out differences and similarities.

Values are of paramount importance for social cohesion. Democratic societies are characterised by a pluralism of values, but they require a certain fundamental consensus.

Religion and faith also play a role here. On the one hand, they transmit value orientations; on the other, they facilitate contacts and can be the basis for social identity and the perception of in-groups and out-groups that is associated with the latter (Tajfel/Turner 1986). Even if religion and faith are playing less and less of a role in German society, one's religious affiliation is at least significant for the derivation of social and cultural identity and group assignment. By virtue of the immigration of refugees, some of whom come from countries that are not predominantly Christian or secular, religion and religious affiliation again took on a stronger role in the public debate. At the same time, "debates about religion" became "key debates about *social integration*" (Pickel 2017: 37; emphasis in the original).

The analysis comprises two levels. On the first level, the German population without a migrant background is compared to people who either themselves have immigrant biographies or whose ancestors do. Due to space limitations, the analysis is limited to the four largest immigrant groups. These are resettlers and people with Polish, Russian and Turkish migrant backgrounds.

The second level analyses the influence of religiosity. Does the religious attachment of respondents have an impact on their attitudes and value orientations and does this impact differ among the groups examined? The influence of the particular religious denomination was not considered separately. For analyses by denomination, see Hirndorf (2020).

This gives rise to a number of further questions in turn. What effect does it have when former, but also practicing, Christians distance themselves from the foundations of their religion, as is the case in Germany, while large parts of the immigrant population continue to be bound to a religion? And how do things look between the immigrant groups? A large part of the resettlers from the territory of the former Soviet Union are members of an Orthodox church. People of Turkish migrant background are largely Muslim. Do people with such a different sort of background differ from the mainstream society with its strong tendency to secularisation? And what are the consequences for the cohesion of German society?

A survey conducted by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung among 3,003 adults over the age of 18 living in Germany forms the basis of the analysis. 1,001 Germans without a migrant background, 1,001 Germans with a migrant background and 1,001 foreigners living in Germany were surveyed. Unweighted, the numbers in this form are thus not representative of the population in Germany. But this type of sample ensures that the sub-group of migrants is also large enough for robust analyses. In order to obtain representative results, the individual population groups are weighted according to their share in the total population on the basis of the micro-census. The survey was conducted by telephone from 15 October 2018 to 28 February 2019, using a dual-frame approach based on a random sample,[2] by USUMA GmbH, a public opinion research institute. In order also to allow people with poor knowledge of German to take part in the survey, the questionnaire was also translated into Turkish, Russian, English, Arabic, Polish and French and interviewers with the corresponding foreign-language skills were employed.[3] After being weighted, the data is representative for the population resident in Germany over 18 years of age.

2 Some surveys of immigrants are not based on random samples, but rather on samples using an onomastic, i.e., name-based, selection of respondents (cf., e.g., Brettfeld/Wetzels 2007; Haug et al. 2009; Frindte et al. 2011; Halm/Sauer 2015).

3 The total number of foreign-language interviews is 593, which are distributed as follows among the individual languages: 170 Turkish, 152 Russian, 125 English, 88 Arabic, 46 Polish, and 12 French.

2 Migration to Germany

People with a migrant background are defined as "all those who immigrated to the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949, as well as all foreigners born in Germany and all those born in Germany as Germans with at least one parent who immigrated or was born as a foreigner in Germany" (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2013: 6). According to this definition, resettlers or "late resettlers" and their children are also included among people with a migrant background. These people do not have to have their own experience of migration. In Germany, the migrant experience of *one* parent is sufficient to be classified as a person with a migrant background. The term is thus not a legal category, but rather a sociological one, which includes highly different groups in terms of their residency status.

According to data of the Federal Statistical Office of 28 July 2020, 26 percent of the population in Germany had a migrant background in 2019. This is equivalent to 21.2 million people. 48 percent (10.1 million) of the people with a migrant background have a foreign citizenship, corresponding to 12.4 percent of the population. 52 percent (11.1 million) of immigrants and hence 13.6 percent of the population are German citizens with a migrant background (Statistisches Bundesamt 2020a).

The term "migrant background" thus comprises very heterogeneous individual groups and certainly people who do not consider themselves as migrants: like, for example, many resettlers, who, from a legal point of view, are German citizens. Since it is, however, an official term of the Federal Statistical Office, we will also use it in what follows.

In general linguistic usage, no distinction is usually made nowadays between "resettlers" (*Aussiedler*) and "late resettlers" (*Spätaussiedler*). Both the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees define late resettlers as follows:

"According to §4 of the Federal Expellees Act (BVFG), late resettlers are ethnic Germans who have suffered as a consequence of war and have left the resettlement areas named in the Federal Expellees Act after 31 December 1992 by way of an admission procedure and established permanent residence in the territory of the Federal Republic within six months. Anyone born after 31 December 1992 is no longer a late resettler (§4 para. 1 no. 3 BVFG)" (BMI/BAMF 2013: 46). On the other hand, "people who immigrated on the basis of the BVFG up to the end of 1992 … are referred to as resettlers [*Aussiedler*]" (Worbs et al. 2013: 21).

The resettlement areas include the "former German eastern territories under foreign administration … or [the] areas … outside the borders of the German Reich circa 31 December 1937" (Federal Expellees Act art. 1, para. 1), as well as "the former German eastern territories under foreign administration, Danzig [Gdansk], Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania or China" (Federal Expellees Act art.1, para. 2, no. 3).

The provision that their descendants and spouses of other (i.e. non-German) ethnicity (*Volkszugehörigkeit*) may also enter Germany as late resettlers is important for the following analysis. The group of eligible persons was thus extended to people who are not of German descent, which raises problems of delimitation in the context of a survey. For the sake of improved readability, the term "resettlers" will be used in what follows, even when we are actually referring to both "late" resettlers and resettlers.

2.1 Countries of Origin

As the data of the Federal Statistical Office shows, in terms of countries, the largest number of people with a migrant background come from Turkey or are the descendants of people who do. Poland and Russia follow.

Figure 1: People with Migrant Background by Country of Origin 2019, in thousands



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2020b.

Resettlers and late resettlers, who are not shown in the graph, occupy a special position. According to the micro-census, they have a migrant background, although they are legally Germans. Resettlers are not listed separately in the statistics. They come from several different countries: above all, Russia, Poland, Romania and Kazakhstan, but also from other former Soviet republics, as well as other countries (Worbs et al. 2013: 33). De facto, people with a Russian or Polish migrant background also migrated to Germany and then obtained German citizenship as resettlers: above all, in the context of family reunification. In the survey, the group of resettlers includes 73 people with a Russian migrant background and 49 people with a Polish migrant background. In keeping with their legal status, they are assigned to the resettlers in the analysis and are not included in the groups of immigrants of Russian and of Polish descent.[4] In what follows, no distinction is made as to whether immigrants possess German citizenship: i.e., the group of people with a Turkish migrant background contains both Germans with a Turkish migrant background and foreigners of Turkish descent living in Germany. The same applies for immigrants with a Russian or Polish migrant background.

The following absolute, unweighted numbers for the individual immigrant groups emerge from the survey:

Figure 2: Absolute Number of Cases of the Immigrant Groups Examined (unweighted)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.

The unweighted data reflects the disproportionate approach of the survey and is not as such representative of the population in Germany, but is weighted for all further analyses. In combination with random sampling, the weighted data can be regarded as representative for the population aged 18 and over living in Germany.

When the data is weighted, we obtain the following percentages for the individual groups:

Figure 3: Proportions of the Immigrant Groups Examined (in percent, weighted)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background.

Since the micro-census data on the share of immigrants in a given year are always first published in the summer of the following year and the 2018 micro-census was thus first available in August 2019, the survey data used here was thus weighted on the basis of the 2017 micro-census. The proportions thus differ slightly from the numbers reported for 2019.

2.2 Integration[5]

There is much talk of integration both in everyday discourse and in the media. But what does integration really mean? One theoretical approach in the sociology of migration distinguishes between system integration and social integration (Esser 2001). System integration refers here to the integration of a society as a whole, whereas social integration relates to the integration of individuals into the society (Esser 2001: 3). The form of integration of interest for the present study is social integration.

But immigrants can not only be integrated into the destination society – in this case, German society – but also into the society of origin or their ethnic community in Germany. Depending on the societies into which a person is integrated (or not integrated), we can distinguish between marginality, segmentation, multiple integration and assimilation (Esser 2001: 19). There is marginality when an individual is integrated neither into the society of origin nor into the destination society. In the case of one-sided integration into the society of origin, we can speak of segmentation. There is multiple integration, on the other hand, when an individual is integrated into both the society of origin and the destination society. According to Hartmut Esser (2001: 20), this case is particularly difficult to achieve and hence the exception. On the other hand, in his view, assimilation as one-sided integration into the destination society without integration into the society

of origin is the only way to achieve social integration into the destination society at all (Esser 2001: 21). From this point of view, integration is necessarily also assimilation.

Silke Hans (2010) explicitly starts from the assumption that assimilation does not have to be a one-sided process. Assimilation does not then mean the one-sided adaptation of migrants to the destination society, but rather the adaptation of both groups to one other (Hans 2010: 58 ff.). Thanks to this adaptation, systematic group differences based solely on origin disappear. Drawing on the dimensions of social integration, both Esser (2001: 22) and Hans (2010: 64 ff.) distinguish between four dimensions of assimilation: structural, social, identificational and cultural (cf. also Koopmans 2016).

Structural assimilation is achieved, for example, via the labour market, the education system or citizenship. It is not decisive here whether immigrants obtain a particularly good position on the labour market or have a particularly good degree. On the group level, immigrants are regarded as assimilated if they obtain, on average, the same levels of education and labour market positions as Germans of the same age and gender. Both a convergence of Germans toward immigrants and a convergence of immigrants toward Germans are possible here (Hans 2010: 69).

Social assimilation can take place via contact with neighbours, via clubs, friendships and marriages. It is essential for this form of assimilation that both groups reach out to one another. Immigrants can only have German friends if Germans are also willing to have friendships with migrants.

Identificational assimilation, on the other hand, means an emotional attachment and sense of belonging to a society or even to a local place of residence. Here it is a matter of a one-sided assimilation of immigrants to the destination society.

Cultural assimilation can take place, for example, via a convergence of social norms, language, eating habits or religion (Hans 2010: 71). In the case of language skills, this is necessarily a matter of a one-sided adaptation of immigrants to German society. In the case of norms or eating habits, on the other hand, the destination society can also adapt to immigrants, "such as, in the meantime, is unproblematically the case in the 'pluralistic assimilation' in many ethnic eating habits [sic!]" (Esser 2004: 47).

Even if integration and assimilation do not necessarily have to be identical, the media and politicians mostly speak of integration, regardless of whether integration or assimilation is meant. The term "integration" is far more widespread in colloquial speech and has a considerably stronger presence in everyday life. The term "assimilation", on the other hand, often has a negative connotation. Hence, due to the wider dissemination of the term "integration", we will also speak of "integration" in what follows.

In the sense of Hans (2010), however, integration will be understood as a convergence of immigrants and Germans toward one another. Thus, integration does not mean a one-sided adaptation of immigrants to the destination society, but rather it also takes into account the social framework conditions and hence represents a reciprocal adaptation to each other.

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung already examined the different aspects of integration in an earlier study (Pokorny 2016). The present publication puts the focus on cultural integration, which is treated as a "reciprocal process of cultural rapprochement" (Heckmann 2015: 159) between Germans with and without a migrant background. The religiosity, attitudes toward religion, state and society, and values of Germans without a migrant background, late resettlers, and immigrants with a Russian, Polish and Turkish migrant background[6] are compared with each other. Both the extent to which a convergence between Germans and migrants is necessary and possible in a pluralistic society and how similar these groups should be, in fact, from a normative point of view is certainly open to discussion. But the present study neither can nor is intended to address these issues. It merely represents an analysis of the status quo. For it is only once the current extent of similarities or dissimilarities is known that there can be any discussion of possible consequences. Moreover, the comparison made between Germans and immigrants does not mean that there are not other group differences within German society that are also of great significance for social cohesion. But these differences have to be examined in other studies.

4 In the present survey, the status as resettler or late resettler is established by the following question: "Are you a German citizen by birth, as (late) resettler without naturalisation, as (late) resettler with naturalisation, by naturalisation?" No additional filtering by country of origin was undertaken, since resettlers can also have come to Germany "by way of other foreign countries" (Worbs et al. 2013: 33). Unfortunately, it is not possible to check whether an interviewee really should be regarded as a resettler. It has to be assumed that there is a certain fuzziness, which is presumably also contained in the micro-census (Worbs et al. 2013). This is why individual resettlers from countries other than those defined in the previous section are also included: among others, 17 with a Turkish migrant background. Analogously to the migrants of Russian and of Polish descent, they were excluded from the group of migrants of Turkish descent and are only included in the group of resettlers.

5 This section is derived from and similar to an earlier publication by Sabine Pokorny (2016).

6 For the sake of better readability, the term "Germans" will be used in what follows for "Germans" without a migrant background, even if some immigrants are, of course, also Germans. The term "migrant background" will be used irrespective of citizenship and thus includes both Germans with a migrant background and foreigners living in Germany.

3 Religious Affiliation and Religiosity

For many years now, studies on religiosity in Germany consistently come to similar conclusions: The number of members of the two Christian churches is decreasing (cf. Forschungsgruppe Weltanschauungen in Deutschland 2021) and articles of faith are becoming less important. The position of the churches as moral authorities is increasingly being called into question.

This process had already begun in former West Germany before reunification. In 1990, when the GDR, i.e., East Germany, joined the Federal Republic, 17 million people were added, among whom the process of secularization was considerably further advanced than among the citizens of former West Germany. This further accelerated the churches' loss of importance.

A survey that was conducted by Kantar Public for *Der Spiegel* in 2019 confirms the tendencies. A *Spiegel Online* article from 19 April 2019 thus notes: "Fewer and fewer Germans believe in God … Only 55 percent of Germans believe in 'one God' nowadays. When the same question was asked in 2005, the share was still 66 percent" (Pieper 2019).

This declining belief in God is not only the result of the increasing proportion of people who are not members of any religious denomination. According to the *Spiegel* study, belief in God is even declining among people who belong to one of the two major Christian churches.

These tendencies can also be seen among young people. According to the findings of the 18th Shell Youth Study, the proportion of young Catholics for whom belief in God was unimportant increased from 30 percent to 41 percent between 2002 and 2019. The proportion rose from 40 to 50 percent among young Protestants. However, according to the Shell Youth Study (Wolfert/Quenzel 2019), young Muslims differ significantly from young Christians in terms of their attitude to God. Belief in God is important for 73 percent of young Muslims; it is unimportant for only 18 percent (Wolfert/Quenzel 2019: 153).

The Shell Youth Study thus points to an important fact. Among young people with a migrant background, at least Muslims clearly differ in terms of their religious attitudes from Christians of the same age and even more so from people of the same age with no religious affiliation, 82 percent of whom affirm that belief in God is unimportant for them (Wolfert/Quenzel 2019: 153).

A generational comparison among immigrants of Turkish descent shows, however, that although the second and third generations of migrants of Turkish descent consider themselves to be more religious than the first generation, their religious practice in the form of attending a mosque and personal prayers is less pronounced (Pollack et al. 2016: 12). Religious self-identification is thus not the same thing as religious practice and both can differ between generations.

Religion could be significant for integration for a variety of reasons (for all the reasons presented, see Leszczensky 2018: 121 f.). Firstly, people tend to enter into social contact with people who are similar to them. Since values and norms can be religiously shaped and can thus differ between religions, religion could be an obstacle to initiating social contact for Muslim migrants in a predominantly Christian and secular destination society, but an advantage for Christian immigrants, on the other hand. Secondly, religious meeting places, like churches or mosques, also themselves offer an opportunity for making social contacts. The probability of running into people without a migrant background and establishing social contacts with the destination society is in turn higher in Christian congregations than in Muslim congregations. Thirdly, it is conceivable that friends and family members favour social contacts to one's own (religious) group and negatively sanction contacts to another (religious) group. The fourth reason is in fact a variant of the first: It is not only immigrants who tend toward social contacts similar to themselves, but rather the destination society has the same tendency. Both different religions and different levels of religiosity could, then, lead to immigrants having difficulty in developing social contacts with the native population, even if they want to do so.

Although a study of recently immigrated Polish Christians and Turkish Muslims does not reveal any differences in the frequency of loose contacts with Germans without a migrant background (e.g., contacts at work or in the neighbourhood), it does indeed reveal differences in close friendships (Leszczensky 2018). The proportion of native Germans among close contacts increases among Polish Christians in the first years after immigrating, whereas it stagnates among Turkish Muslims. The study cannot answer the question of to what extent religion is the cause here. Nonetheless, it comes to the conclusion that the differences cannot be explained by the individual religiosity of immigrants.

The present study does not deal with social integration, but rather cultural integration. It can be assumed, however, that both forms of integration reciprocally influence each another and cannot be strictly separated. Cultural proximity promotes social contacts, which can in turn bring about a reciprocal adaptation of cultural values and norms.

3.1 Religious Affiliation

In the survey, 38 percent of Germans without a migrant background answer that they are not members of any religious community. 25 percent identify themselves as members of the Roman Catholic Church and 29 percent as members of the Protestant Church. 3 percent are members of one of the Orthodox denominations. All other faiths (including the Jewish faith) do not surpass 1 percent, such that they cannot be separately evaluated.

As would be expected, the religious affiliation of people with a migrant background differs considerably from that of Germans without a migrant background. Among resettlers, only 14 percent are not members of any religious community, 22 percent describe themselves as Catholic, 28 percent as Protestant, 15 percent as Orthodox, and 20 percent as Muslim. In terms of religious affiliation, resettlers are thus a relatively heterogeneous group, in which, however, the Christian denominations predominate.

22 percent of respondents with a Polish migrant background say that they do not belong to any denomination, 66 percent are Catholic and 7 percent are Protestant. Other religious communities do not play any role.

25 percent of people with a Russian migrant background say that they do not belong to any religious community, 20 percent identify themselves as members of the Roman Catholic Church, 5 percent as members of the Protestant Church, and 20 percent describe themselves as Orthodox. Another 20 percent are Muslims and 10 percent are Jews. This is thus the most heterogeneous group, in which no faith represents a majority.

As would be expected, Islam dominates among respondents with a Turkish migrant background: 89 percent identify themselves as Muslims. 10 percent say that they do not belong to any religious community; other religions do not play any role.

Figure 4: Religious Affiliation (in percent)*



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: Which religious/faith community are you a member of?

** Due to rounding, the figures in the graphs sometimes add up to more or less than 100 percent. This applies to all the graphs in this publication.*

3.2 Religious Attachments

More than one in every three Germans without a migrant background has turned away from religion. On a scale from "not religious at all", via "hardly" and "somewhat", to "very religious",[7] 38 percent identify themselves as "not religious at all". 13 percent describe themselves as hardly religious and 39 percent as somewhat religious. Only slightly more than one in every ten Germans say that they are very religious.

Resettlers and respondents with a Polish or Russian migrant background exhibit certain similarities in their religiosity. From 16 to 21 percent of them describe themselves as not religious at all; between 17 and 23 percent as hardly religious. Migrants of Polish or Russian descent describe themselves as somewhat religious somewhat more often (47 and 45 percent) than resettlers (38 percent). On the other hand, a somewhat greater proportion of resettlers are very religious. The share of "very religious" comes to 22 percent in their case, whereas it is 14 percent among respondents with a Polish migrant background and 10 percent among those with a Russian migrant background.

A higher level of religiosity of people with a Turkish migrant background is evident in the survey. Only less than a fifth of them have more or less moved away from religion (18 percent hardly religious or not religious at all). Almost half of them say they are somewhat religious and 37 percent describe themselves as very religious.

Figure 5: Religiosity (in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: How religious are you? Response categories: very religious, somewhat, hardly, not at all.

Even if earlier studies among people of Turkish descent found that religiosity and religious practice do not necessarily go together (Pollack et al. 2016), our data shows a clear correlation between religiosity and frequency of prayer. For all the groups examined, the more religious respondents are, the more often they pray. This is also apparent in clear group differences. The groups that are more religious on average also pray more often. The proportion of people who pray daily is lowest among Germans without a migrant background, only 12 percent of whom pray daily. At the same time, almost every other German responds that he or she never prays. It is more often the case that people of Polish descent pray daily (20 percent) and less often that they never pray (18 percent). The proportion of people who pray daily is even somewhat higher among people of Russian descent (27 percent) and among resettlers (28 percent). But almost a third of people of Russian descent and one-fifth of resettlers also say that they never pray. Migrants of Turkish descent respond that they pray daily by far the most often: namely, more than one in two (53 percent). At the same time, the proportion of people who never pray is the lowest among them at 15 percent.

Figure 6: Frequency of Prayers (in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: How often do you pray? Response categories: never, less than once a year, once a year, several times a year, at least once a month, once a week, several times a week, daily.

Overall, the distance to religion and faith is most pronounced among Germans without a migrant background. For the integration of immigrants, this means that the destination society is a more secularised society in which religion no longer plays the decisive role. Although numerous core values exhibit a distinctly Christian character, religion has lost much of its significance as the basis of social cohesion. Norms and values are no longer justified in religious terms, but rather derive their legitimacy from other considerations and convictions.

Resettlers and people with a Polish or Russian migrant background occupy a middle position with respect to issues of religiosity. In their cases too, very religious people and those who pray daily are a minority, but only at most one-fifth of them have nothing to do with religion anymore.

Respondents with a Turkish migrant background, the great majority of whom (89 percent) identify as Muslim, exhibit far stronger religious attachments. No less than 82 percent describe themselves as somewhat or very religious: This is the highest figure in all the groups examined. In addition, a slight majority of migrants of Turkish descent pray daily (53 percent). In this respect, they are clearly different from mainstream German society.

7 Religiosity was measured in the survey by means of two different scales: on the one hand, the 4-point verbal scale used here; on the other, a scale from 0, "not religious at all" to 100, "very religious", which was already used in an earlier survey (Pokorny 2016). Using both scales in the survey made a comparison between them possible for the first time. For Christians, there is a high level of agreement between the two scales, but this is not the case for Muslim respondents. On average, very religious Muslims place themselves lower on the scale than very religious Christians. At the same time, Muslims who are not religious at all choose a higher value on the scale than Christians who are not religious at all (for a detailed analysis, cf. Hirndorf 2020). This is why the verbal 4-point scale is used for the present study rather than the scale from 0 to 100.

4 Attitudes to State and Society

Just the proximity to or distance from a religion does not allow us to draw conclusions about the attitudes and values that guide behaviour. The latter were addressed by several questions in the survey. General attitudes to state and society are examined first.

4.1 Group Differences

Table 1 presents the level of agreement with a series of statements, again broken down into Germans without a migrant background, resettlers and immigrants from Poland, Russia and Turkey.[8] The statements deal with very different topics, such as attitudes to politics and democracy, to religion, and to child-raising, but also topics of public debate like assisted suicide. In this way, we want to examine a spectrum of social attitudes that is as broad as possible, in order to be able broadly to examine similarities and differences between the groups and thus to get an idea of the current state of integration.

Among Germans without a migrant background, the performance principle meets with the highest level of agreement (92 percent), followed by dissatisfaction about the amount of time politicians take to respond to problems (84 percent). The level of agreement with actively assisted suicide in the case of persons who are terminally ill is also very high (82 percent). Three-quarters of the respondents agree with the statement that decisions in democracy take too long.

Not quite half of the respondents want to see their own faith better protected. This result has, however, to be seen on the background of the fact that about half of Germans without a migrant background describe themselves as not religious or hardly religious. Someone who has no religious faith has no need to protect the latter from insults.

Less than half of Germans without a migrant background (45 percent) are of the opinion that children under three should be cared for at home. 41 percent want their children to have a religious upbringing and almost the same amount identify with a laid-back attitude toward life: They prefer to let things take their course.

Nearly one in five (19 percent) feel that their traditional way of life is threatened. There is less agreement with the prohibition, in principle, of abortion (14 percent), striking children as part of child-raising (10 percent), and the use of force to resolve conflicts in democracy (7 percent).

As measured by the ranking of the answers, resettlers and respondents with a Polish or Russian migrant background resemble Germans without a migrant background. There are some differences, however, in the level of agreement with the individual statements.

Actively assisted suicide meets with significantly less agreement from resettlers. On the other hand, they are more sensitive to insults to their religious faith. There is greater agreement with wanting to care for small children at home and wanting their children to have a religious upbringing. This reflects the stronger religious attachment of resettlers that was already noted above. They also feel somewhat more strongly that their traditional way of life is threatened: No less than one-third of resettlers agree with this statement. The prohibiting of abortions meets with a somewhat higher level of agreement from them. One-quarter believe that abortions should be prohibited in principle. At 4 percent, there is very little agreement with the use of force in child-raising. On the other hand, the use of force as a means of conflict resolution meets with far more agreement. One-fifth of all resettlers completely or somewhat agree with the statement "In every democratic society, there are conflicts that have to be settled by force". This is the highest figure among all the groups examined. In an earlier study by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung on Germans with and without a migrant background and foreigners living in Germany (survey period: January to April 2015), there was a similarly high level of agreement at 18 percent.[9]

It must, however, be kept in mind that for some of the statements, there are many respondents among the resettlers who did not respond or explicitly answered that they are not sure. The proportions are particularly high (over 10 percent) for the protection of one's faith from insults, whether decisions in democracy take too long, the prohibition of abortions and assisted suicide. In the latter case, fully 22 percent of resettlers either answered that they are not sure or did not respond.

People with a Polish migrant background are also distinguished by a low level of agreement with assisted suicide. But they are less unsettled by the statement than resettlers, even if 9 percent still did not respond here. In their case too, there is a stronger wish for home care of small children, as well as for a religious upbringing, than among Germans without a migrant background. They are less disturbed by the slow reaction of democratic decisions. On the other hand, agreement with the use of force in child-raising is higher among migrants of Polish descent than in all the other groups examined. Nearly one-fifth (19 percent) of people with a Polish migrant background completely or somewhat agree with the statement "When raising children, it is permissible to strike them sometimes".

There is also great uncertainty among the respondents of Polish descent in the case of certain statements, as is reflected in the high incidence of non-responses or "not sure" answers. The proportions are particularly high (over 10 percent) for the religious upbringing of children, the assessment of whether decisions in democracy take too long and whether politicians respond too slowly to problems, as well as to the prohibition of abortions.

The acceptance of assisted suicide likewise meets with a significantly lower level of agreement among people with a Russian migrant background. Migrants of Russian descent are also less often of the opinion that decisions take too long in democracy. Migrants of Russian descent more often want small children to be cared for at home, but they less often want children to have a religious upbringing. Similarly to resettlers and as was also the case already in an earlier survey[10] (Pokorny 2016: 89), they are more often in favour of using force to resolve conflicts (15 percent) than Germans without a migrant background.

But the shares of "not sure" and "no response" for these questions are also very high among migrants of Russian descent. 15 percent either answer that they are not sure or give no response on assisted suicide and 22 percent on the question of how long decision-making takes in democracy. Like in the case of resettlers and migrants of Polish descent, it is clear that many immigrants from Russia are also not sure about how to respond or do not want to reveal their attitude.[11]

Striking differences appear in the case of respondents with a Turkish migrant background: both in the ranking of the responses and in the absolute levels of agreement. Like in all the other groups examined, in their case as well, the performance principle comes in first, but at 97 percent the level of agreement is by far the highest. The protection of their faith from insults (80 percent) is considerably more important to them than to Germans without a migrant background. This could be explained by the lower proportion of people who do not belong to any religious denomination and the greater religiosity among migrants of Turkish descent. This will be examined more closely in the next section. They also agree with home care of small children (77 percent), the religious upbringing of their children (66 percent) and the prohibition of abortions (37 percent) more frequently than Germans without a migrant background. Actively assisted suicide, on the other hand, meets with far less agreement (34 percent). But the use of force in child-raising also finds very little agreement. Only 1 percent of people with a Turkish migrant background say that it is permissible sometimes to strike children as part of child-raising.

Table 1: Attitudes to State and Society
(response: entirely/somewhat agree; in percent)

Agreement with the statements:	Germans without MB	Reset-tlers	Polish MB	Russian MB	Turkish MB
It should pay off, when someone is industrious and diligent.	92	85	88	90	97
Politicians respond far too slowly to problems.	84	84	67	79	56
People who are terminally ill should be granted assis-tance in ending their lives, if they request it.	82	63	75	65	34
It takes too long to make decisions in democracy.	76	67	69	58	62
The state should protect my faith better against insults.	47	60	56	45	80
Children under three should be cared for at home.	45	61	59	55	77
Regardless of whether you have children: My children should have a religious upbringing.	41	51	66	29	66
I am happy to let things take their course.	40	41	39	19	43
My traditional way of life is threatened.	19	34	14	20	14
Abortion should be prohib-ited in principle.	14	25	14	15	37
When raising children, it is permissible to strike them sometimes.	10	4	19	10	1
In every democratic society, there are conflicts that have to be settled by force.	7	20	5	15	8

Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., MB = migrant background; question: I would now like to present you some statements on politics, state and society that can sometimes be heard in public discussion. For each statement, please tell me how strongly you personally agree with it; response categories: completely agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, do not agree at all.

4.2 The Influence of Religiosity

Among the German population without a migrant background, the religiosity of respondents has a clear impact on their agreement to the religious upbringing of their children. 88 percent of very religious respondents want their children to have a religious upbringing. This is the case for only 14 percent of Germans who regard themselves as not religious at all.

This pattern is also apparent in all the other groups. The religious upbringing of their children is more important to them, the greater their religious attachment. Among both people with a Turkish migrant background and resettlers, however, from one-fifth to a quarter of people with no religious attachment at all also want their children to have a religious upbringing.

Figure 7: Agreement to the Religious Upbringing of Children by Degree of Religiosity (response: completely/somewhat agree; in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: Regardless of whether you have children: My children should have a religious upbringing; response categories: do not agree at all, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, completely agree, not sure.

Religious Germans without a migrant background and religious people with a Turkish migrant background are more likely to be for a prohibition on insulting religions than non-religious people from these groups. No statistically significant relationship between religiosity and attitude toward the prohibition of insults is apparent in the other groups.

It was suspected that the overall high agreement of migrants of Turkish descent with the protection of their faith could be due to the higher degree of religiosity of this group. After undertaking multivariate analyses, however, this thesis cannot be maintained. Even if we control for religiosity, there is still an independent influence of Turkish migrant background: i.e., even when taking into account individual religiosity, people of Turkish descent agree with the protection of faith more frequently than Germans without a migrant background. This does not mean, however, that religiosity has no influence. Agreement with the protection of religious faith from insults is higher, the more religious people are among both Germans without a migrant background and immigrants from Turkey. Again, no statistically significant influence of religiosity is apparent for the other groups examined.

Among Germans without a migrant background, people of Turkish descent and – if albeit to a lesser extent – people of Polish descent, agreement with actively assisted suicide is considerably higher among people who are not or are hardly religious than among people who are very religious. At the same time, the level of agreement of very religious people varies from group to group. Agreement is highest among very religious Germans without a migrant background, two-thirds of whom think that a terminally ill person should be granted assistance in ending his or her life. Among migrants of Polish descent who describe themselves as very religious, the number is 43 percent. The lowest level of agreement is found among very religious people with a Turkish migrant background. Only 12 percent of the latter are in favour of allowing assisted suicide for the terminally ill. Thus, even if the same mechanism is at work in these groups – the more religious people are, the greater the rejection of assisted suicide – the agreement with or rejection of assisted suicide also differs considerably between very religious people from the different groups. On average, very religious Germans are considerably more open to assisted suicide than very religious migrants from Turkey.

The extent to which people want children to be cared for at home also rises with increasing religiosity in two of the groups examined: among Germans without a migrant background and people with a Polish migrant background.[12]

Among migrants of Turkish descent, there is not found to be any statistically significant dependence of the desire for home care on religiosity. Only people of Turkish descent who are not religious at all exhibit a somewhat lower level of agreement. All others are clearly in favour of home care. And even among immigrants of Turkish descent who are not religious at all, the level of agreement with home care is about as high as among very and somewhat religious Germans without a migrant background.

The highly pronounced desire to have small children cared for at home is also reflected in practice. 26 percent of women of Turkish descent say they are housewives. This thus applies to one in every four women of Turkish descent. By comparison, just under 1 percent of German women without a migrant background say they are housewives. According to our survey, however, 20 percent of women of Russian descent are also housewives.

Caring for children at home can hinder the acquisition of the German language and integration into German society. One study shows that Muslim children's significantly worse grades in German (even after controlling for socio-economic background) can be explained, above all, by more limited language skills (Ohlendorf et al. 2017: 576 f.).[13] But the study is not able to find a negative influence of pupils' individual religiosity on educational success. For Protestant pupils, it even comes to the conclusion that religious pupils are more successful. For Catholic and Muslim pupils, educational success is connected neither to individual religiosity nor to religious practice (Ohlendorf et al. 2017: 582). However, the study is not able to draw any conclusion about what influence the parents' religiosity exerts.

A similar pattern is apparent in agreement with the prohibition of abortions as in the case of home care. The more religious Germans and people of Polish descent are, the more they are in favour of abortions being prohibited in principle. No influence of religiosity is apparent for the other groups. Especially in the case of migrants of Turkish descent, this is again due to the fact that agreement with a prohibition is very widespread even among people who are not religious at all.

Agreement with the statement that in every democratic society, there are conflicts that have to be settled by force only exhibits a connection to the degree of religiosity among people with a Turkish migrant background. In this group, the more religious the respondents are, the less is the agreement with the use of force as a means of conflict resolution. Thus, a higher degree of religiosity is associated with less affinity for the use of force among people of Turkish descent. This may seem surprising in light of certain events. It should not be forgotten, however, that the population at large was surveyed for the present study. Violence-prone Islamists and extremists were not the subject of the study, but they attract greater attention in the media.

Overall, the desire for one's own children to have a religious upbringing is consistently the clearest result in all the groups. Those who are themselves religious want to pass on this attitude to their children. Other relationships are less pronounced or less systematic.

8 See too Neu (2020). The groups in Neu's analysis are constituted somewhat differently, however: e.g., people of Russian descent also include resettlers. As a result, the figures may differ slightly.

9 The figure for resettlers was not analysed and reported in this earlier survey; the other results can be found in Pokorny (2016).

10 Since the resettlers from Russia were also included in the group of people of Russian descent in the earlier study, it is only comparable to a limited extent.

11 Similarly high numbers were already found in an earlier study (Pokorny 2016: 85).

12 Interestingly, in both groups, as well as among resettlers, men are more likely than women to want home care for children.

13 But it should not go unmentioned that Protestant pupils with a migrant background also have significantly worse grades in German. Here, however, the difference cannot be entirely explained by socio-economic factors and language skills (Ohlendorf et al. 2017: 576 f.).

5 Value Orientations

In keeping with sociological usage, values are regarded in what follows as action-guiding conceptions (Esser 1999: 72). A widely held thesis on this topic comes from Ronald Inglehart (1977), who starts from the assumption of a change in values in which materialist values are replaced by post-materialist values. But there has also been criticism of this thesis (for an overview, see Scherer/Roßteutscher 2020: 213). Helmut Klages (1985), for example, does not speak of materialist and post-materialist values, but of duty and acceptance values, on the one hand, and self-realisation values, on the other. In his view, there is not a change in values, but rather a value synthesis, in which duty and acceptance values have been partly retained, but self-realisation values are integrated into the value system. For Inglehart's thesis of a change in values, recent studies show that "contrary to Inglehart's assumption, younger generations are again more inclined to materialist value orientations" (Scherer/Roßteutscher 2020: 214).

Values are acquired in the course of socialisation (Scherer/Roßteutscher 2020: 210), especially via parents, but also via pre-school, schools, primary groups, churches and other institutions, and are thus in large measure the result of cultural influences. There are not only differences between societies, however, but also within societies. Democratic societies draw sustenance from a pluralism of values. A fundamental consensus on certain value principles and modes of political interaction is important, however, in order to ensure social cohesion (Scherer/Roßteutscher 2020: 211). It is not a matter of a relativism of values either, but rather state and society are based on certain shared fundamental values, even if it is not clearly defined how pronounced this fundamental consensus has to be.

5.1 Democracy and the Welfare State

5.1.1 Group Differences

Germans without a migrant background, above all, want a society in which people are treated equally before the law and in which men and women have the same rights?[14] For, respectively, 82 percent and 79 percent of them, it is very important[15] that these two fundamental rights are realised in society. It is very important for around three-quarters of the respondents that all people have the same educational opportunities and that everyone can freely express their opinion. Approximately two-thirds regard it as very important that freedom of the press and freedom of research prevail in society and that everyone can believe what they want, and 62 percent regard freedom of assembly as very important.

Claims directed at the welfare state have considerably less importance for Germans without a migrant background. It is very important for 45 percent that the state provides social security that is as comprehensive as possible. And keeping income differences as small as possible is a very important feature for only 31 percent.

There are only slight shifts among resettlers as compared to Germans without a migrant background. The equal treatment of all people before the law is likewise especially important to them (87 percent). That everyone has the same educational opportunities is more important to resettlers (85 percent) than to Germans without a migrant background. As comprehensive as possible social security (61 percent) and small income differences (47 percent) are also more important to them. On the other hand, resettlers attach less importance to freedom of assembly (54 percent) than Germans do.

The differences from the German comparison group are already somewhat greater among people with a Polish migrant background. The equal treatment of all people before the law (77 percent), freedom of expression (61 percent) and freedom of the press (51 percent) are less important to them than to Germans without a migrant background. Freedom of religion (71 percent) and smaller income differences (42 percent) are more important to them.

People with a Russian migrant background exhibit even clearer differences from the German comparison group. Freedom of expression (55 percent), of the press (60 percent), of assembly (40 percent) and of religion (50 percent) are less important to them. Comprehensive social security (38 percent) and small income differences (25 percent) also have less significance for them. Equal treatment of all people before the law (90 percent) and equality of educational opportunity (90 percent) are more important to migrants of Russian descent.

It is especially important to people with a Turkish migrant background that all people are treated equally before the law (95 percent) and that everyone has the same educational opportunities (95 percent). But freedom of expression (90 percent), of religion (80 percent) and of the press (80 percent), equal rights for women and men (86 percent), social security (74 percent) and small income differences (41 percent) are also more important to them than to Germans without a migrant background. The high level of agreement with freedom of expression has to be interpreted with a certain degree of caution, however. At 80 percent, the likewise high level of agreement with the statement “The state should protect my faith better against insults” indicates that for the majority of people of Turkish descent, freedom of expression comes up against its limits when their own faith is affected. On the other hand, migrants of Turkish descent attach less importance than Germans to the freedom of assembly (52 percent).

Table 2: Democracy and the Welfare State (response: very important; in percent)

How important is it to you that …	Germans without MB	Reset-tlers	Polish MB	Russian MB	Turkish MB
all people are treated equally before the law?	82	87	77	90	95
men and women have the same rights?	79	79	79	80	86
all people have the same educational opportunities?	76	85	74	90	95
everyone can freely express their opinion?	74	74	61	55	90
there is a free press and freedom of research?	67	63	51	60	80
everyone can believe in what they want?	67	63	71	50	80
one has the right to demonstrate on behalf of one's opinion?	62	54	61	40	52
the state provides social security that is as comprehensive as possible?	45	61	50	38	74
differences in income are kept as small as possible?	31	47	42	25	41

Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., MB = migrant background; question: Please tell me for each of the following points whether they are personally "very important", "somewhat important", "not so important" or "completely unimportant" for you in the society in which you live. How important is it to you that …? Response categories: very important, somewhat important, not so important, completely unimportant.

5.1.2 The Influence of Religiosity

Some systematic relationships between religiosity and attitudes to democracy and the welfare state are found among Germans without a migrant background. Thus, the significance of equal rights for women and men falls with increasing religiosity. Equal rights is around 20 percentage points less important to very religious Germans than to Germans who regard themselves as not religious at all. Freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, keeping income differences as small as possible, and equal educational opportunities are also less important to religious Germans than to less religious ones. On the other hand, the significance of equal treatment of all before the law and the importance of freedom of religion and of the press rise with increasing religiosity.

In the migrant groups examined, on the contrary, religiosity does not play any role in attitudes to democracy and the welfare state. Merely among migrants of Polish descent, the importance of equal educational opportunities grows with increasing religiosity.

5.2 Action-Guiding Values

5.2.1 Group Differences

For Germans without a migrant background, it is most important to live in safe surroundings (very important: 58 percent), that others can depend on them (58 percent) and to take care of the environment and nature (52 percent).

There then follow – all of them named less than 50 percent of the time – wanting always to be polite to other people (46 percent), to help people out (44 percent), to be respected by others (39 percent), and being interested in how other people are doing (39 percent).

It is considerably less important to them consistently to pursue their own goals, not to be late and to have fun (30 percent each). Always abiding by rules is very important to 23 percent and being creative and original to 22 percent. Being modest is very important to 21 percent. Both adhering to customs and traditions and being successful are very important to 13 percent. Having money and owning expensive things is only very important to 3 percent.

What is most important to Germans without a migrant background is thus, above all, the security of their surroundings, on the one hand, and values that govern social interaction, like dependability and empathy, on the other. These have been joined by wanting to take care of the environment and nature.

Traditional values such as respecting rules, modesty and being oriented to customs and traditions are of secondary importance. Hedonistic or material values are likewise less important: like being creative and original, being successful and – a distant last – money and possessions.

Safe surroundings is in first place for resettlers, as it is for Germans without a migrant background; at 77 percent, it is, however, almost 20 percentage points more important to them than to Germans without a migrant background. The traditional values of politeness, punctuality, modesty and following rules have a greater significance for them. Customs and traditions are also more important to them, but so too are the environment and nature, the well-being of other people and the respect of others.

People with a Polish migrant background have similar priorities. In their case, however, helping other people out is in first place (65 percent). Environment and nature, security and politeness follow. Customs and traditions, respect, punctuality and modesty are also more important to them than to Germans without a migrant background. But hedonistic values like having fun (56 percent) and being creative and original (42 percent) are also considerably more important to migrants of Polish descent than to all other groups examined.

For migrants of Russian descent, the security of their surroundings is again the top priority (84 percent), followed by politeness and caring for the environment and nature. Punctuality, modesty, customs and traditions, and pursuing one's own goals are more important to them than to Germans without a migrant background. Helping other people out, on the other hand, is less important to people with a Russian migrant background.

To live in safe surroundings is also very important to people with a Turkish migrant background. At 89 percent, security is more important to this group than to all the other groups examined. That one can depend on them (78 percent), caring for the environment and nature (73 percent), being respected (58 percent), being successful (58 percent) and always following rules (51 percent) are also considerably more important to migrants of Turkish descent than to Germans and the other migrant groups. Like in the case of the other migrant groups, politeness, punctuality, pursuing one's own goals and modesty are also more important to them than to Germans without a migrant background.

Regardless of the ranking of the individual statements, it is striking that the category "very important" is almost always chosen by people with a migrant background considerably more often than by Germans without a migrant background. The present study is not able to draw any conclusions about the reasons for this.

Security is important to all the respondents regardless of migrant background. Dependability, caring for nature and politeness occupy places in the top third of the standings for all the groups. At the same time, it is apparent that the "classical virtues" of politeness, punctuality, modesty and respecting rules are considerably more important to resettlers and migrants of Polish, Russian and Turkish descent than to Germans without a migrant background.

Table 3: Action-Guiding Value Orientations (response: very important; in percent)

How important is it to you...	Germans without MB	Reset-tlers	Polish MB	Russian MB	Turkish MB
... to live in safe surroundings?	58	77	61	84	89
... that people can depend on you?	58	57	52	55	78
... to take care of the environment and nature?	52	65	63	65	73
... that you are always polite to other people?	46	73	57	68	58
... to help people out?	44	44	65	35	51
... that other people respect you?	39	51	51	40	58
... how other people are doing?	39	51	33	40	32
... to pursue your goals consistently?	30	37	39	45	46
... not to be late?	30	60	50	47	64
... to have fun?	30	39	56	32	25
... to always abide by rules?	23	37	39	25	51
... to be creative and original?	22	30	42	25	35
... to be modest?	21	37	40	35	41
... to adhere to customs and traditions?	13	29	43	25	19
... to be successful?	13	33	30	16	58
... to have money and to own expensive things?	3	5	7	5	0

Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., MB = migrant background; question: Now I would like to read you some statements on the subject of values. For each statement, please tell me how important the following points are for you personally. How important is it to you ...? Response categories: very important, somewhat important, not so important, completely unimportant.

5.2.2 The Influence of Religiosity

Regardless of origin, almost all respondents, whether with or without a migrant background, exhibit certain commonalities in terms of the influence of religiosity on action-guiding values. In all the groups examined, helping other people out and customs and traditions are more important to religious people than to the respondents who are not religious. In all the groups apart from resettlers, the significance of punctuality also increases among religious people.

Among Germans without a migrant background, security, respecting rules, modesty, helping other people out, and protecting nature and the environment are more important to religious people than to the respondents who are not religious. In addition, politeness, dependability, how other people are doing, pursuing one's own goals, and being respected by others become more important with increasing religiosity. On the other hand, being creative and original, as well as being successful and having fun or money, becomes less important the more religious Germans are.

The significance of respecting rules and modesty rises with increasing religiosity also among resettlers.

For religious people with a Turkish migrant background, it is more important to follow rules, to live in safe surroundings, to be modest, to be respected by those around them (very religious: 81 percent, not religious at all: 18 percent), to protect nature and the environment, that people can depend on them, and to be successful.

Like in the case of Germans without a migrant background, the significance of money and consumer goods also falls with increasing religiosity among migrants of Polish descent. On the other hand, living in safe surroundings, being modest, protecting nature and the environment, and having fun are more important to religious people with a Polish migrant background.

Following rules becomes more important to migrants of Russian descent with increasing religiosity. The more religious they are, the less important it becomes to them to be successful.

Religiosity has an especially large impact on values among Germans without a migrant background. This may seem surprising in light of the lesser religiosity of Germans, but it simply means that religious people in this group differ more from non-religious people than in other groups.

Religiosity tends to reinforce more conservative values (preserving creation, politeness, dependability, punctuality, modesty, upholding rules and traditions) and social values (helping other people out), and it does so especially among Germans without a migrant background. It has less of an impact on more hedonistic and material values (being creative and original, wanting money and possessions) or it reduces their importance in some groups.

5.3 Tolerance as Core Value for Coexistence

Tolerance is one of the core values of our society: especially religious tolerance. There is a reason why freedom of faith and religion is guaranteed in the German constitution or "Basic Law". The Basic Law states: "Freedom of faith and of conscience and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed shall be inviolable. The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed" (Article 4). There is currently discussion about also including a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual identity into the Basic Law. Doubts have been raised, however, as to whether this is necessary, since the general principle of equality in the Basic Law ("All persons shall be equal before the law", Article 3) already entails a prohibition of discrimination, according to some (Suliak 2019).

The tolerance of respondents vis-à-vis other religions and sexual orientations was addressed by several questions in the survey. The underlying questions are the following:

- Are there reservations about certain religions or sexual orientations?
- Do such reservations differ between Germans without a migrant background and people with a Polish, Russian or Turkish migrant background, as well as resettlers?
- What impact does religiosity have on tolerance?

The same procedure is maintained here as hitherto. The differences between the groups with different migrant backgrounds are first compared and then the influence of religiosity within the groups is determined.

5.3.1 Group Differences

5.3.1.1 Religious Symbols

The acceptance of religious symbols in the public space offers a possibility for measuring religious tolerance. There are different ways of addressing this aspect. Other studies asked whether wearing religious symbols (in this case, a headscarf) should be allowed (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen 2018: 24 f.) The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung chose a somewhat different approach and wanted to know whether people approve or disapprove of judges wearing religious symbols. We did not want to establish here whether religious symbols are permitted and tolerated, but rather whether they are rejected or favoured. To this extent, the results are not comparable.

Germans' opinions are divided as concerns a Christian judge wearing a cross. Almost half (47 percent) of Germans without a migrant background approve, but almost as many (44 percent) disapprove if a Christian judge visibly wears a cross.

The decision is similarly narrow among people with a Turkish migrant background. 49 percent approve, but 44 percent disapprove.

Among resettlers, the lead of those in favour is somewhat larger. Half approve of a judge wearing a cross, 41 percent of the resettlers disapprove.

Among migrants of Polish descent as well, there are somewhat more for the wearing of a cross (47 percent) than against it (36 percent). Another 16 percent of people with a Polish migrant background are not sure how to respond, however.

Only migrants of Russian descent exhibit considerably more disapproval than approval. Somewhat more than half (53 percent) are against the wearing of a cross; only one quarter are in favour. However, one-fifth of people with a Russian migrant background also say that they are not sure.

Figure 8: Religious Symbols: Cross on a Christian Judge (in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: A lot of people are talking about whether religious symbols may be worn in Germany in public institutions like schools or courts. Do you approve or disapprove of a Christian judge visibly wearing a cross? Response categories: approve, disapprove, not sure.

The scepticism is somewhat greater on the question of whether a female Muslim judge may wear a headscarf. Almost half of Germans do not approve of a female Muslim judge wearing a headscarf. 41 percent approve.

The disapproval is clearer among resettlers and people with a Polish or Russian migrant background. 55 percent of resettlers and of migrants of Russian descent and 61 percent of immigrants of Polish descent disapprove of a female judge wearing a headscarf. Only from 30 to 38 percent, on the other hand, are in favour of the wearing of a headscarf.

On the other hand, migrants of Turkish descent – like Germans on the question of wearing a cross – are divided on the question of a headscarf on a female Muslim judge. 46 percent approve, 47 percent disapprove of a female Muslim judge wearing a headscarf.

Figure 9: Religious Symbols: Headscarf on a Female Muslim Judge (in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: A lot of people are talking about whether religious symbols may be worn in Germany in public institutions like schools or courts. Do you approve or disapprove of a female Muslim judge wearing a headscarf? Response categories: approve, disapprove, not sure.

A very similar picture emerges on the question of a Jewish judge wearing a kippah. There is no uniform opinion among Germans without a migrant background and people with a Turkish migrant background. Nearly half of Germans and nearly half of people of Turkish descent approve and, in both cases, nearly half disapprove of a Jewish judge wearing a kippah.

Resettlers and people with a Russian or Polish migrant background, on the other hand, exhibit greater disapproval of the wearing of a kippah. In all three groups, around half respond that they disapprove of a Jewish judge wearing a kippah. Only 32 to 38 percent approve, on the other hand. However, 14 percent of people of Polish descent and 21 percent of people of Russian descent are also not sure of their answer.

Figure 10: Religious Symbols: Kippah on a Jewish Judge (in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: A lot of people are talking about whether religious symbols may be worn in Germany in public institutions like schools or courts. Do you approve or disapprove of a Jewish judge wearing a kippah? Response categories: approve, disapprove, not sure.

On the question whether they approve of a Christian judge wearing a cross, there are only minor differences between Germans, resettlers, and people with a Polish or Turkish migrant background. There is only considerably more disapproval than approval of a Christian cross on judges among migrants of Russian descent, which is also due to the high number of evasive answers ("not sure"). The approval of the headscarf is higher among persons with a Turkish migrant background than in the other groups: especially the other migrant groups, in which majorities disapprove of the headscarf on a female Muslim judge. At the same time, however, there is no majority for the one view or the other. Even among migrants of Turkish descent, there is a certain scepticism about whether a female Muslim judge may wear a headscarf. On a Jewish judge wearing a kip-

pah, Germans and people of Turkish descent are the most tolerant, inasmuch as both groups are divided in their stance on the matter. Disapproval of the kippah outweighs approval in the other migrant groups.

5.3.1.2 Religious Rules

In all the groups examined, only a minority of 15 to 20 percent are in favour of living according to strict religious rules. Germans, resettlers and people with a Russian or Polish migrant background are mostly indifferent. From 53 to 62 percent do not care if people live according to strict religious rules; between 15 and 29 percent (tend to) disapprove.

On the other hand, respondents with a migrant background from Turkey exhibit by far the greatest reservations: 45 percent of them (tend to) disapprove of living strictly according to religious rules; 38 percent do not care.

The high level of disapproval of strict religious rules among migrants of Turkish descent is supposedly in contradiction with the high level of religiosity of this group. However, an earlier study shows that precisely for the second and third generation of migrants of Turkish descent, although 72 percent describe themselves as religious, only 35 percent pray several times a day and only 23 percent go to the mosque every week or more often. In the first generation of migrants of Turkish descent, although there is less difference between religious self-assessment and religious practice, it is still considerable (Pollack et al. 2016: 12). And in our survey as well, 82 percent of the people of Turkish descent describe themselves as somewhat or very religious, but only 53 percent pray daily. People with a Turkish migrant background evidently distinguish between self-description as religious and the actual following of religious rules.

Figure 11: View of Strict Religious Rules (in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: There are many people who live according to strict religious rules. What is your view of this way of life in general? Response categories: (tend to) approve, do not care, (tend to) disapprove.

If the question is made more specific and the three major religions are named, then the greatest reservations are displayed against strict Muslim rules in almost all groups; there is less disapproval of strict Jewish or Christian rules. 22 percent of Germans without a migrant background are suspicious of people who live according to strict Christian rules. The reservations climb to 27 percent vis-à-vis people who live according to Muslim rules: nearly the same figure as vis-à-vis people who strictly live according to Jewish rules (26 percent).

Reservations about people who live according to religious rules are at similar levels among resettlers as among Germans without a migrant background: at 34 percent, however, disapproval of Muslim rules clearly stands out. Respondents with a Polish or Russian migrant background display less reservations. 9 percent of migrants of Polish

descent and 15 percent of migrants of Russian descent disapprove of living according to strict Christian or Jewish rules. Muslims living according to religious rules encounter greater mistrust at 19 percent (people of Polish descent) and 25 percent (people of Russian descent).

Once again, the greatest reservations vis-à-vis all three religions are found among people with a migrant background from Turkey. They too display the greatest reservations about people who strictly adhere to the rules of Islam (41 percent). But they also display greater reservations than the other groups about people who live according to strict Christian or Jewish rules (37 percent each). A breakdown by religion rather than by origin shows that the Muslims living in Germany as a whole (who do not only come from Turkey) also disapprove of living according to strict Muslim rules more than members of other denominations (Hirndorf 2020: 9).

Figure 12: Disapproval of Strict Christian, Jewish and Muslim Rules (response: (tend to) disapprove; in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: What is your view of people living according to strict Christian/Muslim/Jewish rules? Response categories: (tend to) approve, do not care, (tend to) disapprove.

5.3.1.3 Contact to Religions

A further aspect of tolerance consists of whether one is willing to have regular contact with people of other religions. Contact leads to a dismantling of preconceptions and negative attitudes. "The more contact, the less the attitude of rejection toward the members of a religion" applies here (Pickel 2017: 61).

Hence, people without religious denomination and members of non-Christian religions were asked whether they would go to a Christian church if a celebration were being held there. The majority in all the groups examined is willing. The willingness is most pronounced among resettlers (86 percent) and people with a Turkish (76 percent) or Russian (75 percent) migrant background. (Non-Christian) Germans without a migrant background (68 percent) and migrants of Polish descent (60 percent) display the least willingness to go to a church.

Figure 13: Going to a Church if a Celebration is Being Held There (only people without religious denomination and non-Christian religions; in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: Would you go to a Christian church if a celebration were being held there? Response categories: yes, no.

Germans (69 percent), migrants of Turkish descent (75 percent) and migrants of Polish descent (60 percent) display a similarly high level of willingness to attend a celebration in a mosque as in a Christian church. Resettlers and migrants of Russian descent are considerably more sceptical, on the other hand. In each group, about half would go to a celebration in a mosque, whereas almost half would refuse.

Figure 14: Going to a Mosque if a Celebration is Being Held There (only non-Muslims; in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: Would you go to a mosque if a celebration were being held there? Response categories: yes, no.

Almost no one is disturbed if close family members have contact with people of other faiths. The most frequent disapproval is exhibited by people with a Polish migrant background (14 percent), followed by resettlers (9 percent) and migrants of Turkish descent (8 percent). Among Germans and people of Russian descent, the proportion of those who disapprove of contact with people of other faiths is 2 and 0 percent respectively.

In most groups, indifference predominates: i.e., the proportion of people who do not care one way or another if family members have contact with people of other faiths. There are only two groups that are exceptions: Among migrants of Russian descent, indifference and approval are equal at 47 percent each, whereas approval even predominates among migrants of Turkish descent. 62 percent of people with a Turkish migrant background welcome contact with people of other faiths.

Figure 15: Contact of Family Members with People of Other Faiths (in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMH = Germans without a migrant background; question: What is your view of someone from your immediate family having contact with people of other faiths? Response categories: approve, do not care, disapprove.

On a superficial level, religious tolerance appears to be very widespread. For many people, going to a celebration in a Christian church is not a problem, and a majority would also visit a mosque. Greater reluctance about visiting a mosque is apparent, however, among resettlers and people of Russian descent. Religious confession appears to play hardly any role in the family's circle of acquaintances. A rejection of people of other faiths is rare, regardless of from which of the countries examined here the migration occurred. Instead, positive or indifferent attitudes toward such contacts predominate, which could certainly be interpreted as affirmation of a tolerant and diverse society. Migrants of Turkish descent especially stand out here for their great openness to contact with people of other faiths.

Additionally, three questions were asked that represent a kind of tolerance durability test. The respondents were supposed to answer how they would view their daughter marrying a Christian, Muslim or Jew.

Among Germans without a migrant background, as would be expected, there were hardly any reservations about a Christian son-in-law (2 percent). If the latter were Jewish, 11 percent would have reservations. 23 percent would disapprove of a Muslim son-in-law.

The reservations about a Jewish or Muslim son-in-law are greater among resettlers and people with a migrant background from Poland or Russia than among Germans without a migrant background. The reservations are greatest about a Muslim son-in-law. This emerges most clearly among respondents with a Polish migrant background: More than half (61 percent) would disapprove of their daughter marrying a Muslim. But, at 39 percent, disapproval of a Jewish son-in-law is also greater among migrants of Polish descent than among Germans, resettlers or people of Russian descent.

If there is a Turkish migrant background, then the disapproval is directed at Christians and Jews. Nearly one out of every two people of Turkish descent (47 percent) would disapprove of their daughter marrying a Christian. The disapproval of a Jewish son-in-law is even greater: More than half (54 percent) would not like their daughter to marry a Jew. This is the highest figure in all the groups examined.

Figure 16: Disapproval of the Daughter's Marriage with a Christian, Jew or Muslim (answer: disapprove; in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: Imagine you have a daughter: How would you react if your daughter wanted to marry a Christian/Muslim/Jew? Response categories: would approve, would not care, would disapprove.

There are also clear group differences on the question of how one would react if a family member wanted to convert to the Christian, Muslim or Jewish faith. Among Germans without a migrant background, the disapproval of conversion to Christianity is, as one would expect, low (9 percent). 16 percent of Germans express disapproval of converting to Judaism; 24 percent would disapprove of a family member converting to Islam.

A similar ranking is found among resettlers and migrants of Polish descent. Both groups, however, disapprove of conversion to Islam and Judaism considerably more than Germans without a migrant background. 30 percent of resettlers and 33 percent of people of Polish descent with a migrant background would disapprove of a family member converting to Judaism. 52 percent of resettlers and 44 percent of migrants from Poland disapprove of conversion to Islam.

Although the disapproval of conversion to Islam also predominates among immigrants of Russian descent (50 percent), there are similarly high levels of disapproval of conversion to Christianity (46 percent). There is somewhat less scepticism about conversion to Judaism (24 percent).

Not surprisingly, only a small minority (11 percent) of migrants from Turkey express opposition to a family member converting to Islam. The majority of immigrants of Turkish descent would disapprove, however, if a family member wanted to convert to the Christian (56 percent) or Jewish (58 percent) faith.

Like the daughter's marriage, Germans without a migrant background are also for the most part relaxed about a potential conversion of a family member. Some migrant groups, however, have greater reservations about certain religions. People of Polish descent and resettlers are sceptical about Islam, above all, but also about Judaism. People of Russian descent are more likely to disapprove of conversion to Islam and to Christianity, whereas people of Turkish descent view conversion to Judaism and to Christianity negatively.

Figure 17: Disapproval of a Family Member Converting to Christianity/Judaism/Islam (answer: disapprove; in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: How would you react to a family member wanting to become a Christian/Muslim/Jew? Response categories: would approve, would not care, would disapprove.

The strong disapproval of certain religions, both for a potential son-in-law and in the case of a family member possibly converting, among the migrant groups reveals the superficiality of the agreement on more general questions about religious tolerance. From a social distance, one is tolerant of people of other faiths. There are few objections to contact. The respondents become considerably more reserved, however, when the contact to certain religions could lead to a marriage with one's own daughter or to the conversion of a family member.

5.3.1.4 Attitude to Same-Sex Marriages

There is a very similar pattern with regard to the attitude to same-sex marriages. In the German population without a migrant background, same-sex marriages overwhelmingly meet either with a positive response (55 percent) or with indifference (28 percent). Only 16 percent express disapproval.

A contrasting picture is apparent among respondents with a migrant background. Disapproval of same-sex marriages is consistently much higher than among Germans without a migrant background. People with a Polish migrant biography are most likely to be characterised by a certain tolerance. 26 percent of them disapprove of same-sex marriages. Among resettlers and respondents with a Russian migrant background, the disapproval rises to 46 and 45 percent respectively. Among people with a Turkish migrant background, the disapproval is even at 60 percent.

Attitude to same-sex marriages thus constitutes a clear dividing line between people without and those with a migrant background.

Figure 18: View of Same-Sex Marriages (in percent)



Source: Survey 2019-00 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Gw/oMB = Germans without a migrant background; question: In Germany, men are allowed to marry men and women to marry women. What is your opinion about this? Response categories: approve, do not care, disapprove.

5.3.2 The Influence of Religiosity on Tolerance or Intolerance

The presence of a migrant background has a strong influence on various aspects of tolerance, which could also be due, however, to the stronger religious attachments of the people in question. It is thus necessary to examine whether and to what extent religious attachments have an impact on the various aspects of tolerance.

Respondents' view on judges wearing religious symbols is hardly influenced by their own religiosity, regardless of whether the judges are Christian, Muslim or Jewish. There is greater openness to the wearing of a cross or a kippah among religious people only

in the case of Germans without a migrant background. The pattern is similar in the case of migrants of Turkish descent, among whom religious people tend to favour a female judge wearing a headscarf.

The view of people who are, in general, guided by strict religious rules is only influenced by the attachment to one's own religion in the case of Germans without a migrant background. The more religious Germans are, the lower is the disapproval of strict religious rules and the higher the approval. In the other groups, the view of people who live according to strict religious rules is not systematically influenced by one's own religiosity.

With respect to strict Christian and Muslim rules, approval rises with increasing religiosity among Germans without a migrant background and people with a Polish or Russian migration background. Among Germans without a migrant background, tolerance toward strict Jewish rules also rises the more religious people are.

At a low level, the avoidance of contact with people of other faiths declines among Germans without a migrant background with rising religiosity. Attending a celebration in a Christian church or a mosque, on the other hand, is not systematically decided by religiosity.

The influence of religiosity on the daughter's desired marriage behaviour is not easy to interpret. In all groups, it is, above all, the proportion of indifference ("would not care") that falls with increasing religiosity, whereas both approval and disapproval increase. Additionally, in many groups, the number of non-responses rises with increasing religiosity. On average, religious people do not respond to the question on a potential son-in-law considerably more often than less religious people.

Nonetheless, the reservations about Jewish sons-in-law rise among religious migrants from Turkey, Poland and Russia. Among resettlers and immigrants of Polish descent, religious attachments reinforce the reservations about potential Muslim sons-in-law. This relationship is also apparent in somewhat weaker form among Germans without a migration background. Above all, religious people with a Turkish migrant background, on the other hand, disapprove more of Christian sons-in-law than people who are not religious.

As regards the conversion to one of the three major world religions, a systematic influence of one's own religiosity is only apparent among Germans without a migrant background and only vis-à-vis Christianity and Islam. The more religious Germans are, the more they are in favour of a family member converting to Christianity and the more they disapprove of conversion to Islam. No systematic relationship is found among any of the other groups examined.

Almost all of the groups examined have in common that disapproval of same-sex marriages increases with religious attachment. There is no systematic influence only in the case of resettlers.

In short, tolerance vis-à-vis the practice of religion in everyday life tends to be positively influenced by one's own attachment to a religion. Especially among religious Germans, there is great willingness to approve of the religious practice of other faiths. Different

standards are sometimes applied in one's own family: Here, some religious people disapprove of certain faiths more strongly than people who are not religious. This tendency is also found among Germans without a migrant background.

Across almost all the regions of origin, there is increasing disapproval of same-sex marriage among people with religious attachments. This applies, however, to a lesser extent for Germans without a migration background: 38 percent of very religious Germans disapprove of this way of life. Same-sex marriages meet with the greatest disapproval among very religious respondents with a Turkish (78 percent) or Russian (100 percent) migrant background.

14 In 2018, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung asked about the same items in another survey. For a detailed analysis of these statements on democracy and the welfare state over time, by east-west differences and by party preferences, see Neu (2019).

15 Since a large part of the values are either very important or important to a large majority, only the "very important" shares are considered, in order to be able to bring out differences.

6 Summary and Analysis

People with a migrant background – despite all the differences in detail – consistently exhibit a greater attachment to their religion than Germans without a migrant background. What this means for the integration of immigrants is that they encounter a largely secularised destination society in which religion only still plays a subordinate role and has lost much of its significance as a basis for social cohesion. Norms and values are no longer justified in religious terms, but rather derive their legitimacy from other considerations and convictions. The latter may well be in contradiction to religion.

In general, the attitudes toward state and society of people with a migrant background do not essentially contradict those of Germans without a migrant background. They are, above all, distinguished by more traditional social attitudes. All the immigrant groups examined have more reservations about assisted suicide: especially migrants of Turkish descent, only one-third of whom would like assistance to be provided to the terminally ill to end their lives.

Moreover, all the immigrant groups agree more often than Germans that children under three should be cared for at home. At fully three quarters, the proportion is particularly high among people of Turkish descent. The considerably greater desire to have small children cared for at home in all the groups with a migrant background can hinder the acquisition of the German language and integration into German society: especially when German is not spoken in the family. It would promote integration to care for as many children as possible from families with a migrant background in extra-familial facilities. This would benefit the children, firstly, since they learn the German language better in such settings and contact with children of other origins lays the foundation for tolerant attitudes. It would also benefit the parents, however, since they would be able to take part in gainful employment. Every effort should be made, therefore, to increase the proportion of children who are cared for in daycare centres. In order to attenuate parents' reservations, expanded religious instruction – including for Muslims – could be introduced.

In certain groups, including Germans without a migrant background, a relationship between religiosity and more traditional attitudes is evident in the case of some attitudes to state and society (e.g., home care for children, lower levels of agreement with assisted suicide, prohibition of abortions). However, the different degrees of religious attachment often cannot explain the differences in attitude between the groups. There are also considerable differences in some attitudes between very religious Germans and very religious migrants: especially from Turkey. Much the same applies for people who are not religious. Even very religious Germans are evidently less traditional, on average, than very religious immigrants: especially from Turkey.

The finding that 20 percent of resettlers and 15 percent of immigrants of Russian descent agree with the statement “In every society, there are conflicts that have to be settled by force” gives cause for reflection. This proportion has been relatively constant since 2015. Agreement is in the single-digit percentage range in all other groups.

Among the questions on democracy and the welfare state, it is striking that people with a Polish migrant background regard freedom of expression and of the press as less important than Germans without a migrant background. Among respondents with a Russian migrant background, freedom of expression, of the press, of religion and of assembly are less highly rated than among Germans. Freedom of assembly is very important to only 40 percent of people of Russian descent: This is the lowest figure in all the groups examined. But freedom of assembly is also less important to resettlers and migrants of Turkish descent than to Germans.

90 percent of people of Turkish descent regard freedom of expression as very important. This is by far the highest figure in all the groups examined. At the same time, however, 80 percent of immigrants from Turkey also express the desire for the state to protect their faith better from insults. From their perspective, freedom of expression evidently runs up against its limits here.

Security is important to all the respondents regardless of migrant background. In all groups, moreover, dependability, the protection of the environment and nature, and politeness figure among the especially important values. The “classical virtues” of politeness, punctuality, modesty and respecting rules are more important to all the migrant groups examined than to Germans without a migrant background.

Religiosity tends to reinforce more conservative and social values, especially among Germans without a migrant background, whereas hedonistic and materialist values either are not influenced or are diminished in some groups.

There is basic tolerance vis-à-vis the different religions, and contact with people of other faiths or attending a celebration in a church or mosque is not rejected. Tolerance is more limited, however, when it is a matter of one’s own family. Above all, people of Polish descent and those of Turkish descent disapprove of the daughter marrying a Jew. In addition, the majority of migrants of Polish descent disapprove of a Muslim son-in-law and a majority of those of Turkish descent disapprove of a Christian son-in-law. There is a similar response if a family member were to convert. People of Polish descent and resettlers are sceptical about Islam, above all, but also about Judaism. People of Russian descent are more likely to disapprove of a family member converting to Islam and to Christianity, whereas the majority of people of Turkish descent view conversion to Judaism and to Christianity negatively.

Tolerance vis-à-vis the practice of religion in everyday life tends to be positively influenced by one’s own attachment to a religion. Especially among religious Germans, there is great willingness to approve of the religious practice of other faiths. Different standards are sometimes applied in one’s own family: In this case, some religious people disapprove of certain faiths more strongly than people who are not religious. This tendency is also found among Germans without a migrant background, if albeit at a lower level.

Overall, the analysis has shown a variety of encouraging results. Although people with a migrant background differ from the mainstream of German society in terms of certain positions and attitudes, core values of German society are essentially shared by them. There is some catching up to do on the importance of freedom of the press, of expression and of assembly, as well as on non-violent conflict resolution.

Certain deficits in various aspects of tolerance are to be viewed critically: Some of these extend into the area of religious freedom. Certain religions are rejected in one's own family: both as son-in-law and in the form of family members converting. Moreover, a high level of disapproval of same-sex partnerships is apparent: especially among immigrants from Turkey.

Some of the differences in attitude here cannot be attributed solely to the greater religiosity of immigrants. Very religious Germans without a migrant background are also, on average, more secular and less traditional than very religious migrants. This becomes particularly clear in attitudes to assisted suicide, abortions or same-sex marriage.

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Public debate in the first half of 2020 was heavily focused on the repercussions of the Corona pandemic; other problems were largely pushed out of the public eye. One could almost forget that between 2015 and the end of 2019, the refugee issue dominated the public debate, with the well-known and sometimes severe repercussions on the political party landscape in Germany.

However, in the medium run this topic is likely to regain a higher priority on the political agenda. Therefore, the present study analyses the state of integration of the four largest immigrant groups in Germany: ethnic German "resettlers" and immigrants with a Turkish, Russian or Polish migrant background. The study focuses on cultural integration and social cohesion and compares attitudes towards state and society as well as value orientations of Germans and immigrants to detect differences and similarities.

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