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**MILITARY TRANSFORMATIONS AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: CURRENT
EXPERIENCE, FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN CONFLICT THEATER**

Post-Conference Report

From 18-21 June, 2007, more than 60 professionals, academics, and former and current military personnel from 12 countries gathered in Jerusalem to discuss the impact of the revolution in military affairs on peace support operations. The group also examined prospects for the deployment of a peace support operation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict theater. The following report offers chronologically ordered summaries of presentations given at the conference.

Introduction

Dr. Lars Haensel, director of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, opened the conference with a short description of current developments in the Gaza strip. He mentioned that a peacekeeping operation in the Strip is off the table for the near future, but there is much to learn in the meantime from the experiences of UNTSO and UNIFIL.

Prof. Eyal Ben-Ari followed by pointing out the current relevancy of the topic of international intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; three years ago, the Israeli Government's official position was the complete rejection of third-party intervention while today the idea is publicly discussed and, until recently, was in place at the Rafah crossing.

Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov stated further that international intervention can benefit by differentiating its strategies for Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. Each area demands different kinds of conflict management and resolution strategies. Bar-Siman-Tov further stated that he does not foresee a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without international intervention.

Session One: Regional Peacekeeping Experience

Col. Roy Corrin Grøttheim, UNTSO's current Deputy Chief of Staff, gave an overview of UNTSO's force composition and its operations in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. Col. Grøttheim pointed out that UNTSO is the oldest UN peacekeeping mission, having been established in 1948

with Chapter VI authorization and a unique, open-ended mandate. UNTSO is a good example of classical peacekeeping. Its forces are unarmed and most of its tasks consist of monitoring and verification. It also has unique linkages with other missions; its observer groups in Lebanon and the Golan serve respectively under the command of UNIFIL and UNDOF.

Gen. Pietro Pistolese delivered a candid overview of the European Union Border Assistance Mission's (EUBAM) duties, responsibilities and challenges in implementing its mandate. According to Pistolese, the mission's most recurrent problem is the closure of the Rafah crossing, most often because of Israeli security concerns. The crossing is, on average, open for 23% of its normal operational hours. The long closures lead to huge crowds when the border does open, often resulting in violent confrontations.

The mission faces an additional difficulty because of the absence of agreed-upon security and customs protocols, making it impossible for EUBAM to carry out its mission to the satisfaction of both sides. In addition, the mission's mandate instructs Pistolese not to put personnel in danger, and since Hamas's election victory, EUBAM has not been able to use its own headquarters in Gaza City. At other times the Government of Israel has prevented EUBAM from entering the Gaza Strip. Finally, since Hamas's takeover of the Strip, Rafah has been captured, and EUBAM is no longer operational. The mission's future is unsure.

Brig. Gen. J. P. Nehra, UNIFIL's Deputy Force Commander, gave an overview of UNIFIL's composition, mandate and challenges following the release of UN Resolution 1701. Nehra explained that UNIFIL's current mandate is, in brief, ensuring the absence of hostile activity in its area of operation. The mission's greatest concerns are Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace, which he estimated occur 15-20 times daily, and the Lebanese Army's recent engagement with the Fatah al-Islam terrorist group.

Session one's last presenter, **Dr. Efrat Elron**, offered an update on the recent rocket barrage, which was fired from UNIFIL's area of operation and landed in and around the Israeli city of Qiryat Shemona. Dr. Elron also included lessons learned from the incident and the reactions of all parties concerned. She went on to offer an overview of UNIFIL's mandate, its requirements for success, and the nature and level of its coordination with the Israeli and Lebanese governments.

Special Presentation

Former Israeli Ambassador to the EU **Oded Eran** gave a special presentation to the group, describing some of the limits and challenges of European intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Eran, Israel's acceptance of the involvement of international forces has always been the result of necessity, usually caused by Israeli planning failures. Regarding intervention in the Gaza Strip, Eran reasoned that the EU will never agree to an extended mandate that involves confrontation with armed Palestinian groups unless it is directly invited to do so by

the official representatives of the Gaza Strip. As long as Hamas is in power, the EU will not receive that request and will not intervene.

Keynote Address

Brigadier Gen. (ret.) Yossi Kuperwasser delivered the conference's keynote speech and offered several arguments regarding the difficulties and probability of the intervention of international forces in the Gaza Strip based on his assessment of Hamas's political nature. Kuperwasser began his argument with an evaluation of why the Middle East has lagged in development in recent history. He argued that radical fundamentalist groups, such as Hamas, perpetuate a lack of accountability in Middle Eastern societies by continually blaming problems on the West. Kuperwasser stated further that Hamas's agenda is to change nothing less than the current world order and, as such, is not interested in stability. Consequently, Hamas will reject any external stabilizing force in the Gaza Strip, including a peace support operation. In Kuperwasser's estimation, Israel should rely on its own security forces to manage the Gaza Strip, and Hamas should be allowed to fail so that a better Palestinian leadership can emerge.

Session Two: Warfare in Transition

Prof. Christopher Dandeker opened session two with an assessment of the changing character of armed conflict. He addressed the theme of the "end of war," as explained in Gen. Sir Rupert Smith's book *The Utility of Force*, and explored the challenges posed by the changing character of armed conflict for peacekeeping operations, highlighting the ideas of *virtual battle*, the "acceptable condition," perceptions of legitimacy and tolerance for loss of life, and the increasing importance of force protection. Dandeker also reviewed current experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrating the different risks of a lack of political strategy as intervention moves along a spectrum of operation from amelioration to destruction.

Dr. Ilana Bet-El delivered a presentation on the role of the media in modern warfare, arguing that media is best related to like the weather: an element on the battlefield. Dr. Bet-El made the case that while most militaries expect the media to rally to their cause, the media's intention is to convey, in under a minute, the most compelling narrative it can find. In the context of modern warfare, where winning "hearts and minds" is a crucial component of success, militaries must devise narratives that are not only more compelling than those of their opponents, but more compelling than what the media can find or invent on its own.

Prof. Dan Schueftan gave an extended presentation, offering a thesis of modern asymmetrical warfare that he claimed was best embodied in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Schueftan, in new asymmetrical warfare, small, mobilized forces confront larger societies by militarily and psychologically attacking their Achilles heel and manipulating those societies into situations that neutralize their advantages. These small forces are led by elites that impose open-ended, long-

term conflicts on their own populations in order to take advantage of liberal societies' concern for human rights. Schueftan claimed that while third-world elites can cope indefinitely with their own population's suffering, modern, liberal societies cannot. Faced with guilt over the suffering of their opponents and pressure from the international community, liberal societies eventually give way to third-world elites. According to Schueftan, the situation is even more acute in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as Palestinians have continually voted only for those leaders who follow the above tactics.

Session Three: Peace Support Operations in the Changing World of Warfare

Prof. Allen Sens reviewed the theoretical literature on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the concept of Military Transformation, exploring the applicability of each to peace support operations. Sens argued that both literatures suffer from an overemphasis on technology, a high intensity conflict paradigm, and an excessive level of theoretical and doctrinal abstraction. Transformation literature, however, is more cognizant and inclusive of peace support and stabilization and reconstruction operations. As a result, the Military Transformation agenda may lead to improvements in the capacity of some militaries to conduct peace support operations, especially when those operations require major stabilization or counter-insurgency tasks.

Prof. David Last also addressed the current literature on the Revolution in Military Affairs, showing that almost all authors focus on the impact of the RMA on the military, not the impact of the military on the societies in which they fight. Last argued that the fields of sociology and political-economy are producing groundbreaking work in understanding counter-insurgency and have much to offer the field of PSOs in understanding how violence impacts societies.

Prof. Chris Kinsey offered an overview of the current use of private security companies in armed conflict and discussed prospects and obstacles for their deployment in peace support operations. Kinsey demonstrated that the use of private security forces has blossomed in recent years, and their deployment is spreading beyond traditional administrative and logistical support roles to the battlefield. Kinsey argued that private security companies will most likely see more engagement in PSOs as militaries become more specialized and defer more mission tasks. He cautions, however, that private security companies lack the legitimacy of state actors and are more likely to be perceived by local populations as neocolonialist agents.

Session Four: The Way that Western Militaries Adapt to Peace Support Operations

Prof. Karl Haltiner presented research investigating correlations between mandatory conscription in European states and participation in PSOs. Over the past 25 years, the vast majority of European states have abolished mandatory conscription, yet a handful still continue the practice. Haltiner's research showed a

strong correlation between the presence of border disputes and continued mandatory conscription. His research also demonstrated that European states with mandatory conscription are far less likely to participate in PSOs.

Eitan Shamir examined the idea of the “strategic corporal” and its relevance for peace support operations. The strategic corporal phenomenon is the occurrence of situations in which the tactical actions and decisions of junior commanders have a significant impact on the larger strategic level. According to Shamir, the phenomenon stems, to a large degree, from the nature of current military culture and leadership, which in turn can be traced to training and education programs of junior leaders. Shamir argues that soldiers are taught to make split second decisions and act, whereas in PSOs, it is often better to avoid action than to act incorrectly. Modern militaries, therefore, can avoid the strategic corporal phenomenon by adapting their training to the PSO context.

Prof. Pascal Vennesson examined the adaptation of modern militaries to peace support operation tasks through the use of resource dependency theory, which focuses on the interaction between external constraints and internal political processes. In applying the theory, Vennesson analyzed the response of American, British, Italian, French and German armies to contemporary threats and opportunities to understanding their adaptation to peace-support operations.

Prof. Joseph Soeters discussed various national military styles of responding to the hostilities and administrative challenges in Afghanistan. Soeters argues that in contrast to the approach taken by the US, Britain and Canada, the Dutch approach, which aims not to root the Taliban, but to make it irrelevant, has been more modest and risk-averse, more inclined towards interaction with local stakeholders on an equal basis, and has produced far less casualties. It remains unclear at present which national approach is more effective in the long run.

Session Five: The Multidimensional Aspects of Peace Support Operations

Robert Egnell examined general challenges and opportunities in implementing the “comprehensive approach” to civil-military relations as well as its specific utility in PSOs. The comprehensive approach advocates the creation of interdepartmental and interagency structures, which contradicts the stovepipe structure and culture that characterizes most governments and presents a serious challenge to most political, security and defense establishments. Egnell concluded that comprehensive approach implementation will demand as much transformation from civil partners as it will from the military.

Dr. Kobi Michael examined the importance of cultural intelligence in PSO CIMIC tasks. He differentiates between two types of cultural intelligence, one of which is environmental and necessary in developing the cognitive and behavioral abilities to adapt to the mission environment, and another that is operational and anthropological in its nature and necessary in understanding the enemy and the

conflict theater. Michael argues that both types of cultural intelligence play an important role in developing correct strategies and allocating the right resources to execute those strategies. Enhanced cultural intelligence leads to more accurate attribution and more effective intercultural behavior.

Prof. David Last delivered the last presentation of the day, focusing on the way that different communities need different types and levels of support in PSOs. Last offered, as a model, a Cartesian plane originally described by Coletta and Cullin (2002) that characterizes communities on one axis as community or society-oriented and inclusive or exclusive on the other axis. Those communities that are communal and exclusive are most devastated by violence and take longest to recover. These communities, consequently, demand different and intensified approaches in reconstruction efforts.

Session Six: NATO and Western Militaries' Recent Experience with Peace Support Operations

Admr. Jean Dufourcq discussed some of the practical and strategic problems that NATO and the international community face in intervening in conflicts. Dufourcq stressed that international intervention, and PSOs in particular, must have a basis of political agreement and strategic planning to succeed. In analyzing potential NATO involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Dufourcq pointed to the absence of both political agreement and a common vision of the endgame as a fundamental obstacle to intervention.

Dr. Laure Borgomano Loup presented and discussed the current debate at NATO Headquarters on the comprehensive approach to international intervention. Borgomano Loup argued that the concept's development is an attempt to overcome the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and a NATO version of the American integrated Stability and Reconstruction Operations approach. She reviewed the various challenges that NATO faces in implementing the comprehensive approach and concluded that its implementation at NATO is unrealistic.

John Colston addressed NATO's problems as an organization designed to defend Europe in the case of large-scale conflict, an occurrence that is no longer probable. Following the Cold War, NATO has shifted to peace support operations, which Colston cites as the organization's "key means for protecting the domestic security of its member states." In addressing the RMA, Colston argued that NATO's need to maintain interoperability acts as a catalyst for military transformation among member states. In the question and answer period following his talk, Colston stated that without the consent of the "ruling party" in the Gaza Strip, NATO intervention there is unlikely.

Drawing on his years of service in Afghanistan, **Col. (ret). Mike Capstick** offered a laundry list of strategic mistakes and failures made by coalition forces

there, followed by three key lessons. Some of the coalition's major mistakes include the absence of any plan or strategy following the fall of the Taliban, an over-reliance on airpower, a dual military command, the enlistment of local warlords as policemen and a failure to anticipate the Taliban's use of strategic warfare. Capstick offered three lessons from his experience: a coherent strategy must be put into place either before engagement or in its early stages, the UN must be involved early-on and Afghanistan must be related to as a long-term state-building enterprise.

Dr. Christoph Grams, the final presenter in the session, offered an overview of German engagement in Afghanistan, discussing problems pertinent to quick impact projects, patrols, reconstruction work and information operations. Grams offered an overview of the debate in the German parliament over continued deployment in Afghanistan, highlighting German reticence to loss of life and engagement with the local population, both of which have become more prevalent following the increase in suicide bombers and IED's since 2005.

Session Seven: The UN and its Recent Experience with Peace Support Operations

Col. Willem van Dullemen offered an overview of the command structure of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and discussed some of the impacts of departmental challenges on missions in the field. One such challenge arises from the trade-off between troop deployment authorization and technological ability; troops from Western militaries bring sophisticated technology with them but require authorization to move outside of predefined deployment areas. Troops from Asian countries have more freedom of movement but lack the necessary technology. Van Dullemen also discussed the UN's reluctance to engage in peace enforcement operations, citing the organization's insufficient intelligence and logistic capabilities.

Dr. Liora Sion presented findings from an anthropological study of UN workers in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Among UN workers, Sion found professionalism to be a stronger determinant of behavior than either nationality or gender. In analyzing the attitudes of UN workers towards Israelis and Palestinians and vice versa, Sion found Israeli attitudes toward the UN overtly hostile while Palestinian attitudes were generally positive. UN worker attitudes were paternalistic in the case of UNRWA personnel in the OPT.

Session Eight: Assessing the Current Situation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Daniel Taub, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Deputy Legal Advisor, explored some of the dangers of involving third parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the polarization of both Israeli and Palestinian positions, the influence of the mediators on the process and loss of ownership over agreements. Taub continued with a review of Israeli fears of the UN and peacekeepers, citing an Israeli sentiment that peacekeepers are either difficult to get rid of (UNTSO) or disappear when they are needed (UNEF). In exploring the Israeli "change of heart" towards international intervention, Taub cited TIPH, UNIFIL and EUBAM, claiming

that Israeli acceptance of foreign forces is not only not new, but an accepted part of withdrawal from territories. Addressing the possibility of peacekeeping forces in the Gaza Strip, Taub questioned the ability of the UN to provide a mandate robust enough to meet Israel's requirements.

Dr. Sufian Abu Zaida discussed the current situation in the Gaza Strip and outlined the ways in the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority contributed to Hamas's empowerment. To Israel's fault, Abu Zaida cited the destruction of the Palestinian security forces and the disempowerment of the Palestinian peace camp during the Disengagement. To the Palestinian's fault, Abu Zaida cited Fatah's corruption and mismanagement and Yassir Arafat's efforts to centralize control by stunting the growth of Palestinian security institutions.

Offering an international perspective, **Prof. Tami Jacoby** compared American and Canadian positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and discussed prospects for future Canadian involvement in a peacekeeping operation. Citing American disinterest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the election of George W. Bush, Jacoby characterized recent American involvement as a retrenchment from the Clinton years. Citing Canada's quick break of relations with the Palestinian Authority following Hamas's victory and increasing anti-Arab sentiment in Canada, Jacoby argued that the Canadian government has recently moved closer to Israel's position. On the question of peacekeeping in the conflict, Jacoby predicted that when Canadian forces return from Afghanistan, the public will not support sending them on another peacekeeping operation in the Middle East.

Session Nine: The Civilian and Humanitarian Aspects of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Lt. Col. Yigal Haccoun served as the IDF's senior representative in the mechanism that coordinated the evacuation of foreign nationals and refugees from Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War. He gave a detailed account of the modes of cooperation and communication with international bodies during the War.

Kevin Kennedy, the UN Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, gave an overview of the humanitarian situation in the OPT and reviewed the UN's efforts to alleviate the situation. Kennedy offered a dire assessment of Palestinian welfare in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, citing dramatic drops in GDP and employment rates since 2000. He continued with a description of UNRWA's relief program, claiming that UNRWA assistance moderates Palestinian violence towards Israel. On the Israeli side, Kennedy described "off the record" efforts to provide psychological services to the children of Sderot.

Arnold Verntken detailed the World Food Program's initiatives in the Palestinian Territories. His presentation focused on the nature of his cooperation with state and non-state actors in the Gaza Strip and West Bank as well as the difficulties in transporting food into the OPT.

Walid Salem discussed the interaction between Palestinian civil society and security forces. Salem attributes what he defines as a weak relationship to the absence of unity in Palestinian civil society and the foundation of Palestinian security forces along non-democratic lines. With the fall of the Palestinian unity government, Salem predicts that relationships between civil society, Hamas and Fatah will only become further splintered.

Session Ten: The Regional Actors' Angle

Dr. Yoram Meital discussed Egypt's policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reviewing Egyptian interests in Gaza and possible future scenarios. Meital argues that internal threats to Egypt's stability have fostered repulsion towards the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, yet the consequences of chaos in Gaza are unbearable, so Egypt tolerates Hamas governance. Meital cites as Egypt's foremost concerns a confrontation between Egypt and US-Israeli policy and the "Iraqization" of the Palestinian territories: a situation in which democracy is pursued under conditions of fragmentation and bloodshed.

Prof. Elie Podeh began his speech with a caveat: the dust has not settled in Gaza, and depending on how it does, the Arab Peace Plan may no longer be relevant. Assuming that the plan is still relevant, Podeh reviewed its advantages, disadvantages, and importance. Among the advantages, Podeh cited the full agreement of all 22 Arab states and the leadership of Saudi Arabia. Among the disadvantages, he cited the impossibility of negotiating with 22 states, and the difficulty of simultaneous negotiation. Podeh suggests that the plan is a breakthrough in the Arab position towards Israel and should be exploited by the Israeli government to enhance a peaceful dialogue with the Arab world, including the Palestinians.

Prof. Alfred Pijpers began with a discussion of the political aspects of the European Union's relationship to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict followed by an analysis of the chances of an EU-led peace support operation in the area. Pijpers argued that the EU, as a civilian body, views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in civilian terms. Thus, threats such as terrorism become a problem of poverty, not security, making them possible for civilian bodies to manage. Pijpers also suggested that the EU suffers from a lack of perspective on the conflict, leading to the view that the conflict is only 40 years old and the result of the Israeli Occupation of Palestinian territories. This view, in turn, engenders the idea that if Israel would only leave the territories, the conflict would end. Turning to the idea of a peace support operation in the area, Pijpers argued that following its experience in Afghanistan, Europe is unlikely to deploy forces in the OPT.

Session Eleven: The Local Actors' Perspective

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom outlined possible roles for a peacekeeping force in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well problems the force might face. Brom began with the assertion that all of Israel's conflicts are asymmetrical and against non-state actors, making it very difficult for a third party to effectively intervene. He envisions the use of peacekeeping forces not as a buffer between Israelis and Palestinians, but as a force that assists the parties in cooperating on issues of territorial division. Yet in the end, no peacekeeping force can be deployed without the consent of Hamas, which is unlikely under current circumstances.

Yossi Alpher presented what he called the "Icing on the Cake Theory" of peacekeeping forces, which suggests that peacekeeping forces are like icing on the cake of political agreement between Israel and an Arab government. Without the cake, you cannot have icing. Alpher offered several examples of the theory: UNDOF is icing on the cake, UNIFIL is icing without the cake and Jordan is cake so good that it does not need icing. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, until a political agreement between the two sides is possible, peacekeeping forces cannot be deployed.

Summary and Conclusion Session

The summary and conclusion session began with short introduction by Kobi Michael and opening remarks from Eyal Ben-Ari and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov. Participants then added their own comments and asked questions of one another. What follows are summaries of Ben-Ari and Bar-Siman-Tov's presentations as well as highlights from the group discussion.

Eyal Ben-Ari addressed themes running throughout the conference, beginning with what he called a "distinct feeling of pessimism" about peace support operations. This pessimism, Ben-Ari contended, may be the result of mixing two peacekeeping templates. The first template is based on traditional peacekeeping following industrial war. The second template is based second generation peacekeeping, which is associated with postmodern warfare. The first template remains our reference point, putting the "conventional" in "unconventional warfare." Teasing out the difference between those two templates could help us discover the assumptions on which we base our discussions. If we are judging second generation peacekeeping with a traditional peacekeeping template, it could also be one of the reasons why we are pessimistic.

Ben-Ari continued by pointing out that much of the language we use to describe peace support operations was prevalent in 1950's anthropology and modernization theories. Terms like "nation building" carry strong assumptions that anthropologists no longer use but that peacekeeping scholars have adopted. We can develop our discussions by developing different or more complex understandings of the societies in which we deploy.

Lastly, Ben-Ari argued that given the various calls throughout the conference to conceptualize peacekeeping forces as hybrids or "hyphenated" soldiers, we need to talk more about troops being blended together. If we think about the police and

soldiers working together, then we can ask how they cooperate but maintain their own identity.

Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov began his summary by pointing out the gap, evinced in the discussions following Yossi Kuperwasser's speech, between Israeli and European thinking on third party intervention in the conflict. He went on to claim that the conflict cannot be solved without international intervention and that it is important to think of intervention on the levels of conflict management, resolution and reconciliation.

In addressing the new situation in Gaza, Bar-Siman-Tov called for a reframing of the conflict. It is still uncertain whether the situation is an opportunity or a risk and what its implications are for the two-state solution. He further argued that for the near future, international intervention should be directed at the level of conflict management. If resolution is not possible, then the situation should at least be kept as stable as possible.

Addressing immediate political prospects, Bar-Siman-Tov suggested that some kind of joint conflict management is possible between the Government of Israel and Abu Mazen, which can lead to the establishment of a security regime similar to the situation before the Intifada. At some point a Palestinian state should be formed with provisional borders and a confederation with Jordan should be considered if all parties are willing. If the current situation persists, then Israel and the international community will have to reconsider their paradigms.

Kobi Michael asserted that there are now more than two actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Israel, Hamas and Fatah. Israel will have to deal with both Palestinian actors simultaneously using at least two different strategies.

In response to a question from Kobi Michael, **Mike Capstick** offered the following definition of security in peace support operations: "If at the end of the day, people can carry out their normal activities without constant fear of threat, then you've achieved security."

David Last suggested that peacekeeping stands to benefit by borrowing techniques from the field of evaluation, especially from rapid assessment processes, which are interactive and multidisciplinary in nature, utilize emic variables drawn from the community and take a team approach with locals. If those forms of evaluation are applied to security, then it quickly becomes apparent that physical security is not the only kind of security that matters.

Jim Fergusson argued that there is a need for a revolution in peacekeeping affairs. That revolution will be based on challenging our understanding of the basis of peacekeeping as well as its packaging. One fundamental problem with our current understanding is that it is based on Western thinking and categories. An additional problem is that it does not sufficiently factor in politics and reality.

Fergusson went on to address the question of when the West intervenes. He stated that humanitarian crises tend to force Western decision makers to intervene

even when they should not. Somalia is an example. He continued by making the argument that there is already a form of traditional peacekeeping in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the Separation Wall. Once the Wall is erected, people cannot clash with one another anymore. Hopefully, it will create the right conditions for negotiation one day.

Regarding Gaza, the unilateral withdrawal has brought major issues for Egypt into play. If the fence is completed and Israel withdraws from the West Bank, then Jordan is going to be faced with a similar problem. Israel may force the hands of other actors to deal with the problem of the Palestinian State.

Shlomo Brom commented on the implications of what happened in Gaza. He claimed that in a bizarre way, it will be easier to manage the conflict with Gaza because an address was created. Before there was no address for dialogue, peacekeeping, and no address for bombs. Now there is a clear address.

Mike Capstick asserted that the essence of Rupert Smith's book is that industrial age warfare has disappeared and that state-on-state conflict is now an unlikely scenario. Consequently, classical chapter 6 UN peacekeeping missions are now an endangered species.

Robert Egnell suggested that we view European peacekeeping not in terms of willingness, but in terms of risk tolerance. If the question is how many casualties Europe is willing to suffer for Israel's security, then we have good reason to be cynical. However, if the question is how many casualties Europe is willing to suffer for the Palestinians, then the answer is many casualties as long as there is progress towards peace.

In response, **Jean Dufourcq** asserted that Europe can only intervene if she can clearly explain her responsibilities, interests and values in doing so. If Europe engages her forces, then European publics will have to know why.

Laure Borgomano Loup reminded the group that several proposals were presented for improving the efficiency of crisis response operations (CROs: NATO's term for peace support operations). One was to improve cooperation between different military and civilian agencies. Another was the idea of hybridization. Gendarmerie is a good example. Borgomano Loup also asserted that international intervention can also arise in the form of regional security regimes with international guarantors, which does not necessarily mean sending in the troops.

Kobi Michael suggested that we challenge the discourse of peacekeeping. It is a military discourse because the main available knowledge infrastructure is a military knowledge infrastructure. This is not a coincidence; politicians and governments like to articulate visions, and the military has to cope with the problems they create. Militaries are rational organizations that cannot tolerate a conceptual vacuum. They have to conceptualize their environment, and they have to create a concordance between military operations and the environment in which

they operate, so they create knowledge. It is not necessarily the best kind of knowledge, but many times, it is the only knowledge that is available, and that is how peacekeeping operation knowledge becomes militarized.

Willem van Dullemen discussed the will of the international community to intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He asserted that for many nations, the calculation of whether or not to send in troops is mostly economic. If Israelis and Palestinians can establish a good political agreement, finding peacekeepers will not be a problem.