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THE PHILIPPINES AFTER THE MAY 10, 2010 ELECTIONS

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On May 10, 2010, elections were held in the Philippines. The president, vice president, the first chamber of parliament (House of Representatives), half of the 24 senators (second chamber of parliament), the governors of the 80 provinces, and the mayors and council members of the cities and municipalities of the country were elected into office. Presidential elections take place every six years in a political system that is broadly modeled on the political system of its former American colonial ruling power. The presidential elections represent a decisive point in Filipino politics for the following reasons. Different than in the United States, the extraordinarily powerful president cannot run for a second term and political parties do not play an important role in the country's entirely personalized election system.

SITUATION BEFORE THE ELECTIONS

In 2001, Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("GMA") became president following a national uprising by the middle-class in the greater Manila area. With the strong support of the church, the uprising was led against corrupt President Joseph Estrada, a popular actor among the poor population. GMA, an economist hailing from one of the wealthiest families in the country, was highly respected. She was generally thought capable of building on the successful presidency of Fidel V. Ramos. During his six years in office between 1992 and 1998, Ramos was able to stabilize the democracy, which had only been reinstated in 1986 after the end of the Marcos dictatorship, and give the country an economic upswing through his bold reforms. GMA supported herself in the parliament with a coalition

out of her own, relatively small, originally liberal party, Kambi, and the Christian democratic party, Lakas CMD.

Her popularity rating began to dramatically sink after having been in office for only a short time. During the next regular presidential election in 2004, she only managed to beat her most important opponent, an actor and ally of Estrada, by a slight margin. One year later, telephone conversations were made public indicating she rigged the election results with the apparent help of the national election commission. This and the, even for the Philippines, extraordinary levels of corruption, enrichment, and pacts with power-hungry and misanthropic clans in numerous provinces made her the most unpopular politician in the country's young history in only a short number of years. She withstood nine coup attempts by reform-orientated junior military officers. In May 2010 she ran for House of Representatives representing her hometown district. It was generally assumed that her goal was to bring about constitutional reforms to create a parliamentary system in which she would remain in power as the Prime Minister. The current Filipino constitution does not permit the re-election of a president following the end of the six-year term.

The national election commission permitted eight candidates to run for the presidential election including the former President Estrada. Opinion polls showed "Noynoy" Aquino in the lead.

ELECTION PROCESS AND RESULTS

The national election commission permitted eight candidates to run for the presidential election on May 10, 2010, which simultaneously took place along with the elections for the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the municipalities. One of the eight candidates was former President Estrada, who was sentenced to life in prison for stealing vast sums of state funds and corruption following his dismissal from office in 2001, but was later pardoned by GMA. Periodic opinion polls in the fall of 2009 showed "Noynoy" Aquino in the lead. Until then, Aquino was a relatively unknown, politically comparatively passive senator who was endorsed as the Liberal Party candidate in August 2009, following the death of his mother, Cory Aquino. She was beloved by the population and was the President in the years following the fall of the dictator Marcos and the reinstatement of democracy.

In some areas, politically motivated acts of violence and murder occurred leading up to the elections and on election day. These acts were mostly attributed to the ruling clans in individual provinces and cities. Not counting the massacre at Maguindanao in November 2009, where members of the resident ruling clan murdered 57 people, members of a rival family and accompanying journalists, the number of deaths of circa 60 was significantly less than the number of victims during previous elections. Previous elections were regularly fraught with massive irregularities, such as the buying of votes, voter intimidation, fraud and forgery during the counting and transfer of the tallied results. For this reason, this election was the first to use electronic

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voting machines at the circa 80,000 polling stations. These machines were supposed to electronically read the manually filled-out ballots and forward the results on electronically. About 75 percent of the 51 million eligible voters participated in the election.

The waiting times at many polling stations were several hours long because election workers were inadequately prepared and the absence of voting guidelines. On account of the long lines, many polling stations did not close until an hour after the prescribed time. A unquantifiable number of voters were unable to vote because they were still standing in line when their polling station closed.

Political observers and the media expressed massive doubt about whether or not the election would even take place or lead to a result. There were numerous indications that GMA was looking for ways to remain in power, despite the constitution prohibiting a second candidacy, or at least ensure that she would subsequently not be tried for corruption. It was speculated that hardware or software malfunctions with the electronic voting machines, nationwide electricity blackouts, and violent altercations could have led to a state of emergency or martial law and the subsequent partial or full cancellation of election. None of this happened. However, credible information does exist that only days before the election, former President Fidel Ramos and his former security advisor General Almonte prevented the military and police leadership from intervening and stopping the election. They apparently feared massive problems and a new uprising ("People Power") by

supporters of Aquino, should he lose on account of a rigged election. Even in the night before the election the national election commission would have canceled the election had it not been for a former general, who had taken on an important position at the commission. The general took matters into his own hands and ultimately gave the polling stations the final green light to proceed with the election. Speculations that Gen. Bangit, who had shortly before been appointed the Chief of Staff of the armed forces by GMA, was preparing a coup and that the generals loyal to the constitution would hectically attempt organize a preventive counter-coup, were the reasons behind the commission's initial worry.

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The results from about two thirds of the polling stations were known only a few hours after their closing. This routinely took several weeks during previous elections, when votes were still counted by hand. According to these results, Aquino had an almost uncatchable lead. When it was all over, he had 42.08 percent of the votes and with that the best result that any president ever had since the constitution was adopted in 1987.

The separate vice presidential election was surprisingly won by Jejomar Binay, the long-time mayor of Makati, the wealthiest city in the country, in metropolitan Manila. After failing to be endorsed as the presidential candidate by his party, Lakas-Kampi, as he had hoped, he contested the election together with Estrada. Mar Roxas, the vice presidential candidate and leader of the liberal party, who was leading in the polls up until the end, only came in second place, losing by about two percent.

Of the 229 spots being contested for the House of Representatives, more than 110 representatives were elected who campaigned as members of the ruling party, Lakas-Kampi CMD. As in previous elections, it has since come to light that many of them are joining the new president's party or declaring themselves as independents and collaborating with the Liberals. Their aim is to profit from lucrative positions on parliamentary committees as well as massive monetary appropriations. These payments are allocated annually by the president to the representatives from the

national budget for projects they propose for their districts. In addition to the district representatives, more than 40 additional representatives were elected by a proportional representation process from party lists of “marginalized population groups.” The national election commission admitted in total more than 160 such party lists of “marginalized” groups. Each group can send a maximum of two representatives to the House of Representatives. These party lists were often used by politicians in the oligarchy, who for various reasons were not nominated by their own party, as a springboard to get into the parliament. Among these was President GMA’s son, who represented the “Security Guard Party.”

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ELECTION RESULT ANALYSIS

The absolute dominating factor in the election was the majority of the population’s desire to definitively bring an end to the GMA-Era. Following the death of his mother, Aquino initially received more than 60 percent approval ratings in the polls after riding a wave of nostalgia and the desire to have a honest political leadership. Even after this feeling abated, he was able to consistently maintain ratings around 40 percent, because he made the return to honest and legitimate politics a core part of his campaign. More than any other promising candidate, he also called for investigations into the cases of corruption during the GMA presidency. Senator Villar, his strongest competitor for some time and a self-made multi-millionaire from a humble background, drastically lost ground and ultimately finished in third place. This was after an apparently justified rumor made the rounds two months before the election, that the President was financing his campaign. According to the rumor, she made a deal with him that would make her the Speaker of the House and later, following constitutional reforms, Prime Minister. Gilberto Teodoro, the former Defense Minister and respected attorney, never had a chance as the candidate for GMA’s governing party, Lakas Kampi CMD. Overall, the media viewed GMA’s support of him as a “kiss of death.” Not even his personal integrity, expertise, and popularity among educated young voters could compensate for this at any time.

Despite his earlier conviction, former President Estrada was able to celebrate a kind of comeback among the poor population after gaining more than 25 percent of the vote. This also shows that large sections of the poor class feel exploited by the political caste system dominated by rich families and that they want a change; a factor that initially benefited Villar. The strong level of dissatisfaction with the current political and economic situation can be summed up by the following examples. First, the son of dictator Marcos, who openly glorifies his dictator father, was well ahead of twelve senators during the nationwide election. Secondly, Imelda Marcos, the 80 year-old widow of the dictator, campaigned for a political office for the first time since the end of the dictatorship in 1986 and easily won her congressional district in her hometown.

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Another glaring characteristic of this election in comparison to previous ones is the reemerged dominance of political dynasties. The president, vice president, the majority of elected senators and provincial governors, and an extensive number of representatives and mayors hail from either the wealthiest families in the country or from families that have dominated the political and social lives in their home provinces for decades and who usually occupy powerful economic positions.

In a country with a population of 95 million covering more than 7,000 islands and the absence of reimbursement funding for national election campaign costs as well as organizationally and financially strong political parties, one fact is self evident – for the nationally elected positions (president, vice president, senators), the only candidates that stand a chance are ones who are themselves prominent and rich enough to raise double-digit million-dollar sums or who are financed accordingly by rich families.

The majority of the important regionally and locally elected positions (governors, congressional representatives, and the most important mayoral positions) are filled by the economically and politically dominating dynasties in each province. These positions are usually secured by maintaining the old patronage system in place during

the Spanish colonial era. This system employs the use of financial favors, the awarding of important positions, and social aid to secure the majority vote. However, under this system, acts of intimidation and in some cases brutal violence are used, if these positions were challenged by the dynasties of competing families, charismatic underdogs, or activists from the media and non-governmental organizations.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER THE ELECTIONS

Newly elected President Benigno "Noy" Aquino, who took office on June 30, faces daunting challenges.

- Four different factions are openly fighting each other in his political camp:
 1. The leading representatives of the Liberal Party. Upset following the defeat of their party's leader, Mar Roxas, in the vice presidential election, they also suspect that they were deliberately cheated by other parts of the "Aquino camp."
 2. Members and influential individuals of the wealthy "Aquino family."
 3. Numerous former cabinet members and influential colleagues of GMA. Over the years they have defected to the Aquino camp and, in light of the predictable defeat of Lakas Kampi CMD, increasingly so over the last months.
 4. The large group of primarily young and enthusiastic supporters of Noy. They stem from civil society and non-governmental organizations and greatly distrust the other three groups, viewing them as "Trapos," or traditional politicians.

Their respective opinions about the direction the administration's policy should take are vastly different and often contradictory.

- Since his liberal party was only able to secure less than 50 of the 229 election districts, it will prove difficult for Aquino to secure the congressional majority he needs to propose new legislation, despite the large number of defectors from other parties. If he does not want to be remembered as an incapable and passive president, he will in all likelihood have to enter into coalitions with other

groups in the House of Representatives, which would exacerbate the already difficult to reconcile difference of opinions in his government.

- It will be difficult for him to keep his most important promise of leading a legitimate government by fighting corruption, patronage, and preferential treatment. This is because he most likely can only secure the majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate necessary to pass legislation as well as the support from the governmental bureaucracy and influential social circles, if he resorts to past tactics – preferential treatment, monetary allocations from the budget, and corruption. The risk is great that he will lose his credibility in a vicious circle of ineffectiveness and making sacrifices.

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- If he tries to pass the extensive, urgently required reforms opening the import and export markets of the country and improving the representative and participatory character and efficacy of the political system – which would only be possible through constitutional amendments – he will have to deal with more than the demonetization that his own party expressed before the elections about constitutional changes. He will also encounter massive resistance from his own family and their allied families from the Filipino oligarchy, who during the post-Marcos era, shaped the constitution in such a way that they would remain in firm control of the government and the economy. Even simply implementing important reform measures that have long since been approved could prove very difficult. For example, that is why, during his term in an office that his family has had for generations, it remains to be seen whether or not he will lift the ban on state reforms that for decades his family has been fighting for using judicial means.

Furthermore, it can only be hoped that he will be successful in incorporating individuals willing to implement reforms along with reform-oriented groups from other political camps into his administration, and that he can distinguish himself as a decisive and clever leader; something for which thus far there have been no indications. On a positive note,

the candidates named for the most important offices in the new administration (Justice Minister, Finance Minister, and others) are predominately honorable and competent individuals.

THE POSITION OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

The parties in the traditional system following independence, the Nationalist Party and the Liberal Party, in the past at no time really established themselves nationally as membership-based and agenda-oriented parties. Starting at the end of the 1960s, the Christian democrats were formed out of various Christian social movements and have since developed into an agenda-oriented party, led primarily by Raul Manglapus. The party was not able to transform into an actual membership-based party after Marcos dismantled the democratic constitution in the early 1970s and Manglapus and many of his compatriots disappeared into exile or underground – a scene dominated primarily by communists.

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Following the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, the Christian democratic groups, which had again been active since the early 1980s, allied themselves with the broad democratic coalition under President Cory Aquino. Their leaders were incorporated into the government without any systematic party reforms taking place to create a membership base. After Aquino's presidency, agenda reforms were increased by his successor, Fidel V. Ramos – who was also supported by the Christian democratic party alliance, "Lakas CMD" – and particularly by his security advisor, the forward-thinking Christian democrat Jose T. Almonte, who was also known as the "thoughtful General." This work almost exclusively benefited the administration, because the party barely existed and the various mini Christian democratic parties in the coalition never really merged.

After their uncharismatic party leader, Jose de Venecia, suffered a massive defeat in the 1998 presidential election at the hands of the actor Joseph Estrada, the political hopes of the Christian democrats rested increasingly on GMA, who had been elected Vice President. GMA and her small, once liberal Kampi Party had created a coalition with the Lakas Christian democrats headed by Jose de

Venecia. Following the national uprising against Estrada and GMA's appointment to the presidency in 2001, Lakas Party leader de Venecia again became the Speaker of the House and secured a congressional majority for GMA. Even her first speeches and statements were heavily influenced by Christian democratic ideals. However, the party itself trickled along, without there being any attempt to systematically build up and establish the party as an agenda-oriented and membership-based party.

In the aftermath of the GMA losing credibility, due primarily to election fraud and corruption, the Christian democrats in the governing coalition in the years following 2003 were also placed in a difficult situation. As key allies of the President, they, too, were affected by her dwindling popularity. Fidel Ramos, who had saved the beleaguered President from being overthrown through massive efforts on his part, subsequently felt cheated by her and began to distance himself. In 2008, GMA forced Jose de Venecia out of his office as Speaker of the House after he stood by his son, who had made one of the many corruption scandals of the presidential family public. At the same time, GMA let resolutions be drafted by statutory, but not legitimate, governmental councils concerning the formal merger of Lakas-Kampi CMD and excluded de Venecia

from the party. De Venecia was not able to defend himself against this within the party, because Lakas CMD did not transform into a membership-based and agenda-oriented party under his leadership. His attempt to have the merger declared illegal by the national election commission and the supreme court was unsuccessful.

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At the end of October 2009, the national council of Lakas Kampi CMD decided to endorse Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro ("Gibo") as their top candidate for the 2010 presidential election. Gibo had built up a good reputation as a Harvard graduate, respected attorney, and legitimate and decisive politician. The position of the Christian democrats overall remained in chaos. The Christian democrats from Lakas CMD partially left the party with de Venecia and supported Noynoy Aquino, Villar, Senator Gordon, or even Estrada during the election. Some did remain with Lakas and supported Gibo. The following was to be expected:

- Lakas Kampi CMD would fall apart after the election, which was barely winnable anyways.
- Jose de Venecia, who is not popular in the Philippines, would no longer have a chance to rebuild a politically relevant party of "Lakas originals."
- Christian democrats, who switched over to Noynoy's liberal camp or Senator Villar's camp during the election, would again be interested in belonging to an independent, centrist (Christian/Muslim) democratic movement.

In March 2010, Gibo resigned from his office as Party Chairman of Lakas Kampi CMD, a position he had accepted with his nomination as the party's presidential candidate. The reason for this was that GMA had begun redirecting funds that had been allocated to support Lakas candidates in municipal elections. She redirected the funds directly or through her husband to

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the election campaign of Senator Villar, who at this point, this stood a good of winning the presidential election. Francis Manglapus, who is the son of the former Christian democratic leader and Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus and a close confidant of Gibo, remained the full-time party president of the Lakas Party. However, he immediately resigned following the elections, after GMA again took over the honorary office of Party Chairman. Whether or not the Christian democrats – who are allied with value-oriented Muslim groups – will be able to gain considerable influence in the Filipino politics in the foreseeable future will depend on several factors. It will depend on whether or not they will be able to find supporters among young, value-oriented multipliers from academic circles, the private economy, and civil society to mobilize a new, unencumbered political movement. It also depends on whether or not they can subsequently build this new „centrist“ democratic movement up with a clear agenda and strict organization.

PERSPECTIVES

Over the last 20 years it has become apparent that the political system in the Philippines, which was heavily shaped by the 1987 constitution, massively hampers real democratic representation and participation. It also codifies the hostage-taking as well as the domination of

the Filipino government and economy by the country's ruling families. The following most notably belong to the significant institutional weaknesses of the Filipino system:

1. *The long term of office and the enormous financial and personal leeway the president possesses when making decisions, virtually no congressional and judicial oversight of the president's actions, and the fact that the president cannot run for a second term in office.* On the one hand, necessary political and even personnel corrections in such a system are made extremely difficult. On the other

hand, there is an absence of any real incentive to champion citizen-oriented policies (case in point: the efforts to be re-elected). Finally, any possibility of passing medium-term and thus long-term reform policies is hampered by the overall short period each president has to influence policies.

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2. *The voting right.* The representatives in the House of Representatives, with the exception of the party list candidates, are exclusively elected based on personality in the voting districts. Against the backdrop of the mostly still intact old patronage structures, the political parties therefore do not influence the selection of the representatives, have no incentives to pursue policy on the national level, and basically have little reason to exist other than to conduct election campaigns on behalf of and with money from their respective self-appointed leaders and sponsors.
3. *The allowance of party lists for "marginalized population group" to elect 20 percent of the congressional representatives according to a proportional representation voting system.* Due to the absence of legally defining criteria for "marginalized population groups," the national election commission has since approved 180 such party lists, of which more than 160 participated in the May 10th election. Each party list can send a maximum of two representatives to the House of Representatives, even if the percentage share of the votes they received according to the proportional system would justify a higher number. This results

in the further fragmentation of the parliament, the interests of actually marginalized population groups being disregarded by the “regular parties,” and the exploitation of these party lists by members of the family dynasties. In exchange for financing the expensive, nationwide election campaigns of the individual party lists, these members let themselves be nominated to the top position. Overall, this proportional element in the Filipino electoral law thus has the opposite effect from a real proportional element. In addition to direct voting in the election districts, a real proportional element would include the election of a relevant number of representatives from all election-approved parties, including regional and national party lists. This would help integrate the interests of minority groups in the agendas of the large parties, strengthen the political positions of the parties, and contribute to the work of the parliament.

The direct election of the Vice President by the people usually means that, from the beginning of his/her term, the President has a competitor, whose main interest is improving his/her own political position for the coming presidential election.

4. *The national election of 24 senators to the Senate.* In the absence of party and public campaign funding, the individual, expensive national election campaigns for senators can almost only be successfully challenged by dynasty members or public figures, such as actors or media personalities, financially supported by dynasties. The Senate’s sweeping blocking powers applicable to all national legislative proposals effectively give the dominant families in the country an effective tool, with which they can block all unwelcome reforms, even if these are supported by a reform-oriented President and a majority in the Senate.
5. *The direct election of the Vice President by the people separate from the presidential election.* At best, this means a government can be founded on a broad majority in the likewise independently elected two parliamentary chambers. However, it usually means that, from the beginning of his/her term, the President has a competitor, whose main interest is improving his/her own political position for the coming presidential election or even working to undermine the President’s policies and bring about the President’s premature dismissal through a vote of non-confidence.

6. *"Pork barrels," or the direct annual appropriation of money from the government's budget to members of the House of Representatives for "projects" they selected or proposed in their district.* These projects are neither necessarily aligned with the government's development plans nor with local participatory development mechanisms provided for in the "Local Government Code." In light of the substantial total sum (calculated between 200 and 300 million euros), the ability to finance individual representatives with varying sums, and the direct influence the President has on the allocation process, pork barrels are an ideal instrument the President has to control the House of Representatives and to weaken its regulatory function over the executive. In addition to the representative's affiliation with or financial support from the local dominating family or dynasty, the ability to obtain government spending for projects in their districts is an important criterion for improving a representative's re-election chances.

The absence of laws on party and election campaign funding is cementing the influence of the dynasties. It also fuels the corruption of the elected representative.

7. *The absence of laws on parties and, in particular, party and election campaign funding regulated and supported by the government.* This means that all candidates are completely financially dependent on wealthy sponsors, cementing the influence that dynasties and wealthy families have on both the regional and national level. It also fuels the corruption of the elected representative, who attempts to at least regain the money that was invested in the election campaign.
8. *The lack of regulatory framework legislation with respect to opening access to the national and regional/local markets, protection against unfair competition, and the prevention or control of cartels and monopolies.* The reason for this is that wealthy families control the lucrative national and local markets and submarkets and have no interest in opening these up to competition. That competition, however, would lead to more growth, jobs, and better conditions for effectively fighting poverty.

9. *The continuing, completely insufficient decentralization of political decision-making competencies to the regions, provinces, cities, and municipalities, including the corresponding decentralization fiscal competencies.* No other steps have been taken since the first big step was made in 1991 with the drafting and implementing of the "Local Government Codes." The ordinances of the codes are only implemented in isolated areas that have particularly involved political leaders. Despite years of intensive debate, no headway has been made on the urgently needed regionalization of decision-making competencies, administrative structures, and financial funds. Finally, the problems associated with minorities can effectively only be solved by creating a constitutional basis for actual autonomy regulations or by building up federalist structures.

Experience has shown that many extremely concrete initiatives addressing these system shortcomings, which were embraced by the Filipino public and introduced by domestic as well as international actors, make no headway. The reason for this being, that there is no organized Filipino political movement that insistently pursues these reforms in day-to-day politics. This would naturally be the task of centrist political parties which, in light of the very prevalent fundamental Christian values in Filipino society, would exist in a very party-friendly atmosphere.

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Experienced Filipino Christian-democrats, who began forming such a party in the 1960s together with Bruno Heck and Raul Manglapus, meanwhile say that their biggest mistake was that they did not more seriously pursue the creation of an agenda-oriented, membership-based party. Admittedly, such a project will not be easy due to the lack of incentives in Filipino election law for politically-active parties. On the other hand, if the political and economic problems in the Philippines are to be solved for the medium and long term, no alternative presents itself, other than to systematically and wholeheartedly begin undertaking such a project.

Such a new, centrist–democratic movement could be addressed and incorporated by the numerous remaining Christian democratic and Muslim democratic congressional representatives, provincial governors, mayors, and local council members who have neither been taken up under the wings of the president’s liberal party nor want to remain in Lakas Kampi CMD; party which is once again being led by former President GMA, who has been completely discredited politically. Gilberto Teodoro could again come into the picture in this capacity. Despite his disappointing performance in the election, he remains popular especially among young, educated Filipinos who value his expertise and his honest election campaign. However, it remains to be seen to what extent newly elected Vice President Binay will be successful in his attempt to revive the PDP – one of the Christian democratic groups when democracy was reinstated in the 1980s – from the top down using massive funding, and to use the party as a vehicle for his 2016 presidential election campaign.

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Meanwhile, even in the liberal spectrum there are trends to specifically work towards forming earnest, agenda-oriented, and membership-based parties. This is particularly the case for the Liberal Party and their President, Mar Roxas (who lost the vice presidential election) and socially-democratic oriented groups that have organized themselves in the form of “party lists.” They hope that these parties will become instruments that help stabilize the democracy and the rule of law, as well as create more just and viable economic and social order. It does not seem impossible then that such liberal, social democratic, and Christian/Muslim democratic movements could work together to formulate and gradually implement lasting reforms.

Of course, especially important for the near future will be the success of the new Aquino administration with respect to correcting the institutional weaknesses of the Filipino democracy. Above all, the following have to be seen as touchstones by the reform and future-oriented new administration:

- Correcting the current voting law for the House of Representatives and the transformation of the party list system into an actual proportional representation element.
- Legislation regarding party and election campaign funding that ensures a certain separation between sponsors and the ruling families and dynasties.
- Creating legal ordinances and supervisory boards that open markets and prevent the concentration of economic power.

In addition, massive funding to improve the infrastructure in the education, health, and research sectors must be given priority, if Aquino wants to make good on his promise to be a president for all Filipinos, not just the upper and middle class. The undoubtedly good intention to govern honestly and legitimately and what it means for the country cannot at all be overrated. But good intentions alone would not suffice to bring about a wave of democratic stabilization and success in fighting poverty.

This article was finished on June 30, 2010.

Remarks:

The figures mentioned in this article concerning the May 10, 2010 elections were taken from the preliminary election results from the website of the national Filipino election commission. The final results for many areas are not yet available.

The evaluations and assessments in this article are based primarily on personal conversations that the author had over the course of the last nine months with many influential individuals in Filipino politics on the national level. These include former President F. V. Ramos, General Jose Almonte, Vice President Binay, Gilberto Teodoro, Francis Manglapus, as well as advisors and close confidants of President Benigno Aquino and Senator Manny Villar. In addition, this article drew from reports and commentaries from the most important, large newspapers of the country as well as analyses from various respected Internet media sources, including *Newsbreak* and *Malaya*.