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德国阿登纳基金会系列丛书

中德在世界政治中的角色
——相互挑战还是立场一致
**China and Germany as Actors
in World Politics - Mutual Challenges,
Common Positions?**

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本书所收录的文章是在2009年7月22日由德国阿登纳基金会与中国国际战略学会共同于北京举行的题为“中德关系现状与前景”国际研讨会上的部分发言

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The articles in this publication are based on speeches presented at the international Conference on "China and Germany as Actors in World Politics - Mutual Challenges, Common Positions?" held on July 22, 2009, in Beijing, organized by Konrad Adenauer Foundation together with China Institute for International Strategic Studies

序 言

梅 砚
Wolfgang Meyer

本书是康拉德·阿登纳基金会青年外交政策专家工作组成员在中国北京召开的一次国际会议上的论文汇编。会议于2009年7月召开，由中国国际问题研究所和德国阿登纳基金会主办。

2001年，阿登纳基金会成立了青年外交政策专家工作组，把对国外政治感兴趣也有能力的青年专家组织起来，在阿登纳基金会提供的平台上进行互利合作，推动外交政策议题。工作组的另外一个任务是，确认德国的外交政策专业知识和相关承诺以及两者间的相互关联。阿登纳基金会希望，通过建立并长期支持工作组，能够对德国的外交政策文化做出有意义的贡献。

该工作组由25位青年学者、记者和议会工作人员组成，其中一些人曾经或正在接受阿登纳基金会奖学金进行研究生或博士学位学习。五位学者参加了本次会议。

虽然工作组成员比较年轻，但作为德国外交政策制定过程中的重要声音，他们获得了国内和国际承认。

2003年，工作组出版了其第一份研究报告《21世纪的德国外交政策》，由前基民盟/基社盟议会党团外交和安全政策副主席、现任联邦财政部长沃尔夫冈·朔伊布勒博士介绍给媒体。工作组2009年出版的《脉动2020》描述了未来德国外交政策的愿景，由现任总理府国务部长、议员冯·克莱登先生推介给公众。工作组曾就外交政策议题在巴黎、伊斯坦布尔、(意大利)卡德纳比亚和莫斯科召开国际会议，并就外交政策和国际关系广泛发表文章。前基民盟/基社盟议会党团外交政策发言人、议员拉莫斯先生是工作组的第一任监护人。自2007年以来，北约防务学院研究主任卡尔·海因茨·坎普承担了这一工作。

近年来，其他诸多外交政策对话中也

越来越多地关注到了本书论文所涉及的主题：2008/9年的世界经济和金融危机以及能源安全问题。本书还涉及失败国家的挑战、中国和德国的基本政治思路等等。一个很具有创新意义而且面向未来的论文题目是：《网络战和网络恐怖主义：一项新安全挑战的德国视角和中国视角》。

2009年的会议增加了中德在这一领域的理解，并加强了阿登纳基金与其在华长期合作伙伴中国国际问题研究所之间的关系。本书编辑借此机会感谢中国国际战略学会、五位来自德国的学者以及所有支持这一项目的人士和机构，特别是德国驻华大使馆、阿登纳柏林总部、德国技术合作公司在华机构、中共中央对外联络部和中国外交部。

对国际关系的不同透视 — 德中两国在世界上

达斯汀·德黑兹
Dustin Dehéz

围绕德国和中华人民共和国在国际关系中所发挥作用而展开的讨论不仅打上了中德关系的烙印，而且甚至可以说更带有两国开辟越来越多的行动领域的印迹，不仅从地理上，而且也从政治上。在此，两国日益成为一个联系越来越密切的世界上的重要行为体，而且也面临着越来越激烈的碰撞危险，这既有建设性的一面，也有竞争的一面。中国崛起引发的讨论已经被有关国际体系中新的领导力量的崛起引发的讨论所取代。九十年代，标志着最后一个时代的冷战刚刚结束，那时，这一进程刚开始显现。尽管中华人民共和国被视作崛起中的民族，但与此同时，它也是一个新兴工业国，人们对于增长的可持续性普遍存有疑虑¹。与之相反，联邦德国刚刚完成了重新统一，统一给国民经济带来的巨大且长期的负担尚无法预见，统一后的德国最初被视为国际上的一支主导力量，它

摆脱了在冷战中所处的前沿地位，将在世界上显示自己的力量。撒切尔领导的英国政府最初拒不同意德国重新统一的原因也是出于对一个如此强大德国的担忧。不过，对德国在世界上发挥更大的特别是更为重要的作用而感到不快的两个重要原因使得德国的崛起同中国的发展之间有着明显的区别：其一是某个国家通过与另一个国家的统一而获得的力量的增加，其二则是德国历史上所扮演的欧洲最大的侵略者的角色。从1990年的角度出发，德国统一并非现代化进程的开始，亦非欧洲一体化的巩固，相反，它首先带来的是传统大国政策的危险。只有从时间史角度观察，才能将德国统一理解为欧洲一体化的顶点。与之相反，中国的崛起则是持续的，近来无疑也较上世纪九十年代更为迅速，但从历史角度来看，其力量的增加不那么突然，而且这种力量的增加更多是发展进程的结果，

¹ 从某种程度上讲，现在仍然如此，可参阅George J. Gilboy, *The Myth Behind China's Miracle*, 载于: *Foreign Affairs*, 83, 4/2004, 页 33-46。

其之前的发展及现状均不似单纯的经济份量看起来那么巩固。

因此，两国发展方向截然不同并且仍然在继续向着完全不同的方向发展便不足为奇了。中国在不可阻挡地继续崛起，金融危机似乎从结构上加快了这种崛起，而德国在国际上的份量却在下降，这也从德国的自我理解中反映了出来：联邦德国更多地将自己看作一个中等国家或者说是一个民事大国，这表现在德国只是在三心二意地争取获得联合国安理会常任理事国席位，因为德国只所以是一个中等国家，在于它并未将自己理解为传统意义上的一般性的领导大国，而是视自己为在那些联邦德国拥有特殊能力的有选择的政策领域的促进者，在这些领域中，它有能力获得国际支持，例如气候变化领域²。由于对自己角色所做的这种较为清醒的理解，联邦德国将自己归为所谓的二等国家的行列，这类国家在各自地区举足轻重，但在国际上却仅在特定政策领域引人注目。这与中华人民共和国不同，后者似乎已经超越了这种地位。

跨越门槛--对中国崛起的不悦

中国的崛起既引起了担忧，也令人满

怀希望，很多时候，既忧且盼的正是同样的行为体。但无论如何，中国的崛起都向国际体系提出了关键性的问题：国际体系能够消化得了一个国家赢得如此巨大的重要性吗？还是说国际体系在中国的影响之下将朝着另外一个方向发展，甚至是朝着一个突破了西方世界基本共识的方向发展呢？目前，这些抽象的问题仅能借助不多的指数加以回答，从中国目前已经对国际问题的发展施加决定性影响、因而此处也应当选择性地阐述并简短提及的某些例子上就可以看到这一点：中国在非洲特别是在苏丹和津巴布韦发挥的作用，它在联合国和北朝鲜发挥的作用，最后是军事和国际力量平衡。

中国在非洲发挥的作用

中华人民共和国在非洲主要着眼于对自己日益增长的国民经济所需的原材料进行勘探的日益活跃的经济活动令欧洲不无忧虑。当然，文献与媒体经济将中国对原材料的兴趣同中国愿意从安全政策的角度确保上述利益相提并论，即使这种确保从长远来看完全可能，并且或许也完全可信，但迄今为止，这一点并不突出。例如，马克斯正确地指出，迄今尚无任何证据表明中国对非洲国家提供的军事和培训援助能够排挤其他国家的影响，特别是美国和法

2 此处中等国家的定义系根据 Husar 和 Maihold，他们根据“良好的国际公民职责”对中等国家进行界定。参阅 Jörg Husar, Günther Maihold 著“新的领导大国 - 研究思路与行动领域 (Forschungsansätze und Handlungsfelder)”，载于 Jörg Husar, Günther Maihold, Stefan Mair (编): 新的领导大国: 德国外交政策伙伴 (Neue Führungsmächte: Partner deutscher Außenpolitik.) 巴登 - 巴登, Nomos, 2009, 7-30 页，此处可参阅第 11 页。

国。中华人民共和国参加了大约40多次安全会议，其中只有三次各有一个非洲国家与会，三次都是南非³。此外，中国在非洲的利益主要集中在原材料的勘探，但并非所有非洲国家都受到了损害。尽管非洲向中国开放其市场造成非洲产品与来自亚洲的极具竞争力的产品展开了竞争，但这种发展仍应一分为二。一方面，那些治国不力的非洲国家面临的荷兰病等传统问题要高出平均水平，中国的相关活动，特别是不设条件地发放贷款加剧了这些问题，恰恰对于欧洲的发展政策圈子而言，这是一个令人越来越头痛的问题。这方面的典型例子是苏丹和津巴布韦等国家，例如，中国公司到来之前，苏丹还在进口石油，但2007年时，它就已经从石油出口中赚得了20亿美元，但苏丹整体经济却没有获得大的发展⁴。此外，2006年在非洲工作的中国工人就已经达到75000名，在许多非洲国家，这些工人的存在都成为社会不稳定因素，中方很多时候并未对此予以足够的重视。另一方面，有些非洲国家也从中获益，仅中国与肯尼亚之间的贸易就在1980至1999之间翻了四番，而且肯尼亚的生产领域并未受到损害，仅在2003至2006年

间，该领域的年增长率就达到了4.5%至7%⁵。换言之，中国在非洲的活动造成了一种矛盾的结果。一方面，拥有较好结构的民主国家得以利用中国的投入，并加以积极的处理。另一方面，正是这种投入创造了条件，加大了治国不良、民主根基不牢的那些非洲国家启动并完成转轨进程的难度，与此同时，这种投入也瓦解了对政府启动转轨的压力，因为源自原材料出口的日益增多的资金流入使他们能够继续其裙带政策。当然，就中国在非洲发挥的作用而言，必须注意三点。第一，中非关系一直以来都是一种特殊的关系。冷战时期，中华人民共和国没有将自己理解为超级大国，而是第三世界的领导国家，这有别于美国和苏联，在这个背景下，北京自不结盟国家1955年召开的万隆会议以来，就同非洲国家保持着极为紧密的关系。第二，经常遭致批评的不附加任何条件的贷款同样并非什么新鲜事物，自20世纪60年代中期起，中华人民共和国向接受国发放的绝大多数贷款都是不附加任何条件的。第三，中国在非洲的经济影响绝非媒体通常所说的那么大。2004年，中国从非洲的进口仅占其进口总额的2.8%⁶。

3 Stephen Marks, 中国在非洲的安全政策 (Chinas Sicherheitspolitik in Afrika), 载于Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 1/2009, 第74-89页, 此处可参阅第78页及下。

4 参阅Bates Gill和James Reilly著The Tenous Hold of China Inc. in Africa. 载于The Washington Quarterly, 30, 3/2007, 第37-52页, 此处可参阅第40页。

5 可参阅Michael Chege和Edward Miguel等非洲学家的积极证人, Edward Miguel著“非洲的转折? (Africa's Turn?)”, 剑桥与伦敦, 麻省理工学院出版社, 2009年。

6 可参阅Piet Konings著“中国与非洲: 建立战略伙伴关系 (China and Africa: Building a Strategic Partnership.)”, 载于Journal of Developing Societies, 23, 3/2007, 第341-367页。

正是这种矛盾局面的后一个要素令人担心中国可能会继续阻止苏丹和津巴布韦冲突的解决。2004年和2005年时，中国要么就是对联合国安理会做出的旨在呼吁两国解决其内部冲突的决议投反对票，要么就是使相关决议大打折扣。中国的普遍认知是，针对苏丹和津巴布韦的决议危及其投资，有鉴于此，中国对非政策自2006年以来开始发生的微妙变化尚不够大⁷。中华人民共和国一直是这两个专制政权的保护人，今年三月，它宣布将苏丹从享有最惠贸易地位的国家名单中删除。刘贵今被任命为中国政府非洲事务特别大使或许也使中华人民共和国在安理会中采取了不那么对立的态度，这一切的基础是中国在干涉非洲国家内政的问题上采取了总体来看不那么严格的态度，以前，它致力于借助不干涉原则以阻挠对苏丹和津巴布韦进行制裁，而现在，它不再十分教条地援引这一原则⁸。不过，人们对这种变化仍然抱有疑虑，这不无道理。一方面，中国的相关立场基本上是遵从非盟的立场，而非盟自成立之日起便在软化这一原则。另一方面，中国对针对其自身侵犯人权或者对新疆反抗提出批评时做出的反应性抵抗表明，这一原则并没有被普遍放弃。

中国在联合国的作用及作为地区维护秩序的力量作用

目前，中国越来越将其发展转化为外交上的资本，有针对性地在国际关系中定位那些它能够进一步提升其形象和外交资本的行动领域。因此，中华人民共和国目前参加了诸多联合国国际维和行动，在当前世界经济危机的背景下，对变革世界经济秩序，使其发挥更好的作用表现出了明确的兴趣。

从参加联合国维和行动上可以最为清楚地看到中国外交更为进取。由于朝鲜战争，中华人民共和国一直对联合国体系持保留态度，直至1989年，它才首次派人参加联合国行动，即参加了联合国纳米比亚过渡时期援助团，不过最近十年来，中国所做的贡献增长了二十倍。2000年，中国参加联合国维和行动的士兵尚不到一百名，现在，中国始终位列出兵国前二十名，经常排在安理会其他成员国前面。目前，在所有出兵国中，中国排名第13位，在军事观察员方面列第12位，在警力方面排名第15⁹。此外，中华人民共和国目前已经通过联合国维和行动系统派出超过11000名士兵，它正在努力巩固和传播由此获得的军

7 参阅Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrecht和Andrew Small著“中国的新独裁外交（China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy.）”，载于Foreign Affairs, 87, 1/2008, 第38-56页，此处可参阅第42页。

8 Stephen Marks著“中国在非洲的安全厚重（Chinas Sicherheitspolitik in Afrika.）”，载于Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 1/2009, 第74-89页，此处可参阅第79-84页。

9 The Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009. London, Lynne Rienner, 第139, 141, 144页。

事能力，例如，在廊坊的维和警察培训中心。虽然中国的贡献主要集中于那些其外交政策日益关注自己的秩序政策的地区，例如东帝汶，这仍然是一个引人注目的进程¹⁰。国民经济的崛起加大了中国在国际关系中的分量，突出了它自己在外交上的特点，中国由此对联合国予以支持，并通过这种方式进一步赋予其合法性¹¹，这样一来，中国就创造了一个对德国外交政策来说同样具有核心意义的手段。主要由美国在第二次世界大战之后建立起来的现存世界秩序的确为中国等正在崛起的国家创造了理想的条件，因为这一世界秩序较之此前任何秩序都更难以逾越，与此同时，又降低了加入的门槛。

但中国崛起引发的承认与忧虑表现最为明显的是在亚洲地区安全问题上，此外，世界经济危机不仅让中国力量相对增加，而且还造成日本力量的相对下降，目前，这种下降改变了两个亚太大国带来的特殊挑战。不过，涉及秩序的关键性问题却首先与围绕台湾、克什米尔和朝鲜的冲突有关。

就台湾和克什米尔而言，人们更多担心的是中国经济和政治崛起可能使得冲突加剧¹²，出于同样的原因，另一方面，人们又希望中国在朝鲜半岛上发挥维护秩序之大国的作用，并遏制北朝鲜，中华人民共和国已经在六方会谈中投入了可观的政治资本¹³，北朝鲜2009年5月24日进行的核试验表明，中国和西方有着极为相同的利益，因为双方对维护当前国际秩序的关切再自然不过了。如果说北朝鲜的外交政策以往寄希望于通过有针对性的挑衅对中国和西方进行离间，以确保自己获得中国的支持，那么这种情况近两年来已经发生了根本性的变化。随着中国在六方会谈中投入大量外交资源，遏制北朝鲜，特别是阻止平壤政权继续扩散核技术和弹道运载系统已经成为事关中国国际威望的一个根本性的问题。夸张一点儿说，是否能够成功地遏制北朝鲜也决定了中华人民共和国事实上拥有多大的秩序政策影响这一问题，单凭这一点，西方在密切关注并记录着中国同北朝鲜的交往。在变化了的框架条件下，金正日政权采取的进一步挑衅行为将

10 中国首次向联合国东帝汶派遣了警察(United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, 联合国东帝汶过渡行政当局UNTAET)。可参阅Bates Gill, Chin-Hao Huang著"China's Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Its Significance and the Policy Implications.", 载于SIPRI Policy Brief, 2/2009。

11 因此，就中国情况而言，Hoge的要求是错误的，即亚洲国家的崛起要求在联合国安理会中有更多的表现。参阅James F. Hoge, A Global Power Shift in the Making.载于Foreign Affairs, 83, 4/2004, 第2-7页, 此处可参阅第7页。相反，此处可以看到，中国对维护目前的制度极为关心，可参阅Mark Beeson, Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power.载于Review of International Studies, 35, 1/2009, 第95-112页，此处可参阅第104-110页。

12 Hoge担心围绕台湾、朝鲜和克什米尔的冲突随时都可能升级为战争，参阅James F. Hoge, A Global Power Shift in the Making, 载于Foreign Affairs, 83, 4/2004, 第2-7页，此处可参阅第2页。

13 如果中华人民共和国没有提出明确倡议，或许根本就不会举行六方会谈。详见Joshua Kurlantzick著Charm Offensive. How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World. New Haven and London, 耶鲁大学出版社，2007,158-161页。

导致中国向西方靠拢，因为这样一来，与其说该政权打消了人们在北朝鲜政权不可靠这个问题上的共识，倒不如说该做法强化了这种共识。这涉及到一个关键性问题，即已经过时的长期以来的忠诚是否仍将主导中国的外交政策，又或者中华人民共和国是否真地能够摒弃与制度如此格格不入的盟友。中国外交迄今发生转变的方式以及比尔·克林顿政府以来的历届美国政府对中国的崛起所持的开放性态度均表明，中国的增长及由此获得的政治分量的增加并非必定导致美中两国新的制度对峙。如果中国也造成这种观点，那么就有可能形成一种对国际体系发挥稳定作用的外交政策。

中国的军事作用

近年来，中华人民共和国日益增长的军事潜力令人忧虑。尽管普遍认为中国要想在军事上与美国平起平坐尚需时日，但中国军队目前已经有能力在中国边远地区执行领土防御任务，而且已经拥有一定的海上能力¹⁴。中国军费缺少透明度也是人们对中国的崛起感到忧虑的原因之一，但仅能有条件地从中国有时公开有时却不那么公开的军费中了解中国军队的效率。中国的军民关系极为落后，更多带有传统共产

主义的色彩：共产党掌握着军队的领导权，必须要提出的是，对军民关系这种传统的理解还保留下来多少，因为共产主义国家对军队的控制从根本上有别于西方模式。西方将军事领域理解为精英圈子，与之相对的则是平等思想，这表现在颇为强调步兵力量，西方对军队与社会实行教条式的分离，而在社会主义制度中，军队则被纳入一党制度中，与西方军队专业自治相对的是共产主义国家中意识形态的自主¹⁵。这就造成了相对特殊的情况，即军队的现代化是以一种平民的方式进行的，在非社会主义国家，这种方式要么被视作不符合历史潮流一如华沙条约一，要么就是应当通过转型努力加以摒弃—见东欧社会主义国家（如格鲁吉亚和乌克兰），或者撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲地区（如埃塞俄比亚或者莫桑比克）。因此，应当提出下述问题，即中国借助经济发展能够建立一支什么样的武装力量，这支武装力量的现代化程度又究竟有多高。这一问题之所以具有普遍性，乃是因为中国的“和平崛起”¹⁶论已经不再立得住脚，至少人们在担心军事扩张表明中国不仅愿意通过软力量贯彻自己的利益，而且从长期来看也愿意用硬力量加以贯彻。

14 M. Taylor Fravel 著 China's Search for Military Power. 载于 The Washington Quarterly, 31, 3/2008, 第 125-141 页，此处可参阅第 126 页。

15 Claude E. Welch 著 Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality. 载于 Claude E. Welch (编): Civilian Control of the Military. Theory and Cases from Developing Countries. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1976, 第 1-41 页，此处可参阅第 18 页。

16 Joshua Kurlantzick 著 Charm Offensive. How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World. New Haven and London, 2007, 第 37 页

展望

可以肯定地说，中国将越来越从科学与政治基金会最近发表文章中所称的“阻挠者”¹⁷转变成为一个伙伴，这个伙伴仔细寻找着自己的前景及由此产生的合作可能性，在这一方面，它与德国不无相似之处。概括起来，可以说中德关系已经出现了接力棒的交接，这是由于各自原则立场的不同，二者相互交织地显现出来。在民族主义所扮演的角色方面，这一点表现得尤为清楚。在德国，尤其对知识分子和外交精英来说，民族主义多被归类为一种落后的态度，同时人们对它的认知也不无忧虑。而在中国，政治精英则日益对民族主义加以利用，以克服社会紧张。正因如此，在德国看来，现在的问题之一便是中国政府进行谨慎自由化尝试的速度是否足以缓和积累起来的社会化矛盾，它担心自由化速度过慢有可能造成政府远离民众。从这个意义上来说，人们密切关注着中国西部地区发生的事情，该地区居民部分为穆斯林。此外，对民族主义的不同认知也对德中两国对各自角色的理解产生了影响。德意志联邦共和国将自己理解为一种民事力量，根据这种角色模式，它将在特定政策领域发挥领导性大国的作用，但却不会从中推导出一般性的领导作用。相反，德国

的领导作用主要体现在它愿意将特定主权利让渡给超国家层面，例如欧洲联盟，或者国际刑事法院等国际组织。由此一来，联邦德国与中华人民共和国便截然不同，后者似乎恰恰在努力通过加强自己的主权来扩大外交资本。德国在世界大国音乐会上从前列退出，而中国则上升为全球性领导国家，这尽管让人担心中国崛起会造成摩擦，但另一方面，中华人民共和国也完全可以利用自己增加了的分量以巩固国际秩序。

本文系为中国国际战略学会与阿登纳基金会2009年7月22日在北京共同举办的“中国与德国：世界政治中的行为体-共同挑战，共同立场”国际研讨会而作。作者是杜塞尔多夫外交与安全政策研究所历史学家和研究员，也教授国际政治。

17 Stefan Mair, Pia Niedermeier 著“德国与新的领导国家：合作的潜力与局限（Deutschland und die neuen Führungsmächte - Potentiale und Grenzen der Kooperation.）”，载于Jörg Husar, Günther Maihold, Stefan Mair（编）：新的领导国家：德国外交政策的伙伴（Neue Führungsmächte: Partner deutscher Außenpolitik.），Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009, 第269-287页。

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在存在脆弱国家结构的地域 维护地区安全

克里斯多夫·格雷梅斯
Christoph Grams

脆弱国家是安全问题吗？

1989至1990年，冷战结束给人们带来了持久和平的希望，结果却令人失望。1993至1994年，前南斯拉夫内战造成的国际危机十分清楚地证明，所谓“历史的终结”并未来临。安全和安全保证仍然是世界舞台上的话题，2001年美国9·11袭击事件和随后的阿富汗战争（2001年至今）、伊拉克战争（2003）再次证明了这一趋势。其结果是，国际恐怖主义与跨境犯罪、大规模杀伤性武器扩散一道被视为这个时代的主要威胁之一。

新兴强国也出现在世界舞台之上。这些国家的贸易比重和经济实力令人瞩目，而且比欧洲、北美和日本这些“老牌强国”增长更快。这一点从国际论坛的扩大（例如从八国集团到二十国集团）得到了反映。同时，这些国家（例如中国、印度）不断增长的经济和财政实力正在转换为政治影

响力，它们对于维护国际秩序稳定的责任也在增加。

同时，全球化进程的不断深化也改变了上世纪90年代以来世界舞台的设定。要理解全球化，应该看到它的两大特点：一是相互依赖，二是不可控制。通讯、经济、生态、社会等各个领域的相互联系迅猛发展，从根本上改变了战略框架。这一改变直至今日仍在持续。经济、社会或生态领域的威胁，例如气候变化和移民等问题，会对全球安全产生影响。这种相互联系也使得国家机构正常运转的重要性日益突出，已成为国际稳定的支柱之一。

此外，在过去20年中，伴随着大量暴力和侵犯人权现象的内战的数目在增多，特别是在撒哈拉以南的非洲。这些内战带来了难民潮和有组织犯罪，往往造成整个地区的不稳定。有组织犯罪能够提供了资源，使得内战得以持续，恐怖组织为所欲

为(如血腥钻石)。非国家行为体在这些冲突中扮演了主要角色,这意味着许多团体对协定或契约不感兴趣。因此,“治理”以及如何阿富汗和刚果民主共和国等复杂情况下建立治理,已成为安全政策讨论中的主要议题之一。

上世纪九十年代,国际政治与国际安全领域旧的规则已经消亡。进入新的世纪,新的规则却尚未完全明确。不过,十分清楚的是,脆弱国家并不必然成为国际安全问题,但却必须作为带来风险的因素来看待。因此,保证国际秩序安全的策略如果想要成功,就必须从“治理”着手。

哪些国家是脆弱国家?

经验告诉我们,看待这个问题必须从全球的角度入手。多个机构的排行榜都证明了这一点(例如世界银行的低收入国家列表、联合国发展计划署的人类发展指数、世界银行的国别政策与机构评估、和平基金会的失败国家指数)。人们当然可以怀疑某一种指数的计算方法和统计数据,但这些排行的方向是一致的。

这些指数说明,脆弱国家具有如下特征:它们严重受制于贫困或战争与暴力冲突。这类国家大多处于后冲突阶段,重新陷入暴力冲突的风险很高;或者是被独裁统治,其大部分人口无法参与政治或经济

生活。人们通常能发现这些特征相互结合。地缘上,有着这些特征的国家主要集中在撒哈拉以南的非洲,但也有一些位于东南亚和中亚。

深入分析脆弱国家

理想的国家为其人民建立一个稳定的政权框架,在安全、法治和福利三个方面提供保障。国家不仅要在这方面订立标准,更重要的是,要有能力加以执行。判断标准通常并不是非此即彼,一个国家在这三个方面的执行力可能有差异:例如,在安全方面能力很强,但在福利方面很弱。这意味着如果要分析脆弱,必须根据不同的情况分析不同领域的脆弱性。失败国家很少是这种情况,正在走向失败的国家却通常是这种情况。

这并不意味着在分析脆弱国家的上述方面的时候,找不到规律或者分析工具。能力不足的国家政权留下的空白,会被各类本地治理机制填补,例如庇护主义、非正式的权力分享、将暴力或冲突作为工具、利用传统权力结构、将外部影响为己所用,等等。当地实权人物的这类应对脆弱国家结构的“管理工具”,往往会很快改变,或者同时使用。一旦作出决定要在某个特定的时间和地点进行干预,在当地结构如此复杂甚至未知的背景下,提倡“治理”就会变成一个完全不同的任务。

国家能力建设是答案吗？

如果实现特定地域的稳定和安全必须实行治理，就需要进行国家能力建设。国家能力建设的目的可定义为：国家结构和机构的可持续强化。一般来讲可以分为三个步骤：

- 一、加固现有结构（如有益）；
- 二、改造现有结构（使其发挥更大作用）；
- 三、建设（重建）不存在的结构。

说起来容易做起来难，以上已经谈到，必须对当地治理机制进行充分了解。这就要求非常熟悉当地的文化、地域和历史。即使对冲突的历史和当地情况十分了解，也必须牢记国家能力建设是多层次的政治。干预方必须要处理当地势力之间、当地与外部势力之间、已经进入当地的外部势力之间和战略层面的外部势力之间的关系。阿富汗国际安全援助部队每天的任务都告诉我们，这种多层次政治是多么的困难。

最后，国家能力建设不应混同于建立国家或建立和平，尽管这三者之间有重合之处。后者致力于在一个社会中建立和平与和解，其目标更为远大，也需要比国家能力建设付出更长的努力。

国家能力建设的策略

国家能力建设十分复杂。简单来说，它需要大量时间和资源——人力，预算，等等。鉴此，选择合适的方式和策略以最有效率地达到目的，就显得十分重要。关于国家能力建设主要有四种思想流派：

一、自由化优先

（一）重点：

- 一促进人权和民主化；
- 一放松管制、私有化；
- 一融入世界市场；

（二）时间：短期、中期；

（三）政治理论流派：自由主义理论（例如：民主/和平定律，市场导向的融合/贸易）。

二、安全优先

（一）重点：

一强化安全部门，例如安全部门改革（SSR），解除武装、复员和前战斗员重新融入社会（DD&R）；

一加强对强制的垄断；

一冲突方解除武装和相互隔离；

（二）时间：短期、中期；

（三）政治理论流派：现实主义（例如：克服国内安全困境）。

三、制度化优先

（一）重点：

- 加强法治；
- 加强行政能力（预算、征税等）；
- 加强或建立解决冲突的和平谈判机制；
- （二）时间：中期、长期；
- （三）政治理论流派：制度主义（谈判过程，参与方社会化）。

四、公民社会优先

- （一）重点：
 - 强化非国家行为体（非政府组织，工会，政党）；
 - 加强政治参与；
 - 促进边缘化群体的参与，和解政策；
- （二）时间：中期、长期；
- （三）政治理论流派：社会建构主义（例如：身份置换）

自然，这些策略并不会单独使用，而是根据当地实际情况的需要互相结合使用。更重要的是，思维方式必须灵活。如果总体情况变了，策略重点必须也随之改变。

目前国际安全与援助部队在阿富汗开展的任务就是一个很好的例子。开始的时候，它将自由化和安全作为双轨重点，一方面开展总统和议会的首次民主选举，另一方面击败了塔利班。2007/08年后，国际行动的唯一重点变成了安全，议会选举推迟到了2010年。

在进行国家能力建设时，要注意以下几方面的困难：

（一）干预总是会扰乱一或至少影响一当地的权力平衡。这也正是干预的目的。问题在于，要如何进行干预，才能避免影响升级，以至于阻碍干预达到其预期目的。

（二）为了达到预期目的，往往需要进行暴力干预。在干预实施之前，干预方应就如何处理影响升级和突发事件形成共识。干预部队应为应对突发事件做好准备。

（三）以国家能力建设为目的的干预，往往不是由一国，而是由联合国授权、多国共同执行的任务。因此，要取得成功，就要对任务所需的时间和资源有一致的理解。

（四）以国家能力建设为目的的干预，意在建立可持续的治理结构，在干预方撤离后仍然运作。是否要吸收当地现有的治理结构，需要充分了解当地情况后予以决定。

结论

1990年以来，随着国际秩序改变，国际行为体之间的相互依赖得以建立和加强，脆弱国家问题已成为国际政治中的主要话题之一。

在过去20年中，在前南斯拉夫、刚果民主共和国和阿富汗等地区进行了很多努力，试图找到应对这一挑战的办法。关于国家能力建设的总体概念、其成功的可能

性和限制的思考仍在继续，远未完善。

今后讨论这个问题的一个重要方面，在于与中国和印度等新兴世界大国互动。国家主权的概念已随着失败国家和正在失败的国家的不断增加而发生了改变——跨越国境线的国际责任，是维护所有国家稳定的关键。这一观念是否已被国际上接受？

权力会带来责任。如果这篇演讲对于国家能力建设的讨论有所帮助，那么它就发挥了应有的作用。

德国与金融危机：应吸取的经验

斯托米·阿妮卡·米尔德
Stormy-Annika Mildner

德国经济正在走向复苏--扩张性的财政和货币政策支撑下的缓慢而勉强的复苏。尽管出口额的恢复尚不足以弥补2008年第4季度和2009年第1季度的下降，德国的出口的确已重新开始增长。2009年12月出口额比上月增长3%，出口连续4个月实现增长。对于德国这样一个出口依赖型国家来说（德国出口额相当于国民生产总值的近50%），出口出现增长是个好迹象。这一增长背后的驱动力是全球出口需求，2008年10月以来低迷不振的全球贸易已经开始复苏。由此看来，德国经济的恣意衰退似乎已经停止。2010年德国GDP预计增长1%。尽管出现了一线希望，但我们不应奢望经济迅速复苏。经济复苏的曲线很有可能是L形而非V形，增长速度还不足以遏制失业率进一步上升。经济复苏仍然脆弱。

与人们最初的期望相悖，德国在2008至2009年间遭受经济金融危机的严重打

击，出现了战后最严重的经济萧条，特别是制造业受到很大负面影响。2009年，德国这个欧洲最大的经济体，经济萎缩了5%，出口下降近15%，失业率突破8%，政府赤字超过GDP的3%。据《经济学家》信息部预测，2010年失业率将上升至近10%。而政府预算方面的预测更加严峻，2008年的预算平衡将演变为2010年的赤字占GDP5.6%、2011年赤字占GDP5.3%，远远超出马斯特里赫特条约规定的3%上限¹。2010年的政府债务将占GDP的77%，显著超过了马约规定的60%。

经济衰退出现探底，应归功于史无前例的财政支出和经济干预。政府推出了总额超过800亿欧元的两个经济刺激计划，另拨款5000亿欧元用于援助出现困难的银行，成立1000亿欧元的“德国经济基金”向非金融企业提供信用和贷款担保。通过这些举措，决策者们试图平衡预算。在德

1 《经济学家》信息部，《德国国家报告》，2010年2月

国和其他国家，央行和政府都在特殊时期推出了特殊的政策。虽然评价德国危机管理的长期影响尚为时过早，但本文将进行初步总结，并讨论德国经济中一些依然存在的风险。

联邦财政部国务秘书于格·阿斯穆森 (Jörg Asmussen) 认为，经济政策制定过程中有着两大挑战。第一是危机管理。阿斯穆森认为，危机管理应着力解决各家银行在流动性和偿付能力方面的问题，推出并实施金融系统救援方案，并采取稳定实体经济的举措。第二是加强金融系统的恢复能力，这个挑战丝毫不亚于第一个²。

德国的政策制定者们面临的另一大挑战是在危机管理的同时制订推出战略。核心问题在于把握时机：过早收紧财政政策将危及增长，过晚行动又可能带来更大的政府赤字，使得公共财政难以为继。另一挑战在于金融管理与监督的改革。这些挑战并不是德国特有的，许多国家都面临着类似的问题。尚难评判的是，德国和其他国家是否能成功应对这些挑战。

回到正常轨道： 刺激计划和紧急救助

德国基民盟和社民党组成的大联盟政府为应对经济危机推出的首个财政计划，重点是刺激私营部门投资和投入长期基础设施建设，而不是刺激消费。2008年11月，在反复辩论和政治角力之后，大联盟政府推出首个刺激计划。这个计划制订得较为谨慎，在两年内拨款310亿欧元，通过鼓励投资和长期基础设施建设而非扩大消费以刺激增长。具体来说，这一计划保证中小企业继续获得贷款，将所谓短期工作从12个月延长至18个月，投入资金进行基础设施建设，为买房和装修减税。该计划还包括减免购买新车税款，以便为汽车工业提供支持³。现在看来，政府采取的动作不够及时、不够果断。原因之一是人们认为德国经济抗危机能力强，因为德国银行业十分稳定，表现良好。另一个原因在于主流经济思潮。杰出的经济学家和研究机构在过去十年里一直对凯恩斯主义的财政政策持反对态度⁴。

2008年秋至2009年初，随着危机持续发展，德国和欧元区的经济预测趋向悲观，大联合政府又制订了更为激进的第二个经济刺激计划。该计划于2009年2月获得通

2 于格·阿斯穆森，《掌控全球金融危机：德国的角度》，《华盛顿季刊》2009 32:3，197-204页

3 《联邦政府第一和第二经济刺激计划》，见：<http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2009/01/2009-01-12-konjunktur-2.html>

4 Sebastian Dullien，《德国经济学家应为默克尔的缓慢行动承担部分责任》，《欧元区观察》2008年3月12日

过，总额为两年内支出500亿欧元。该计划将170亿欧元用于新的公共投资和减税，包括减少工资税，加大对短期工作的支持，并向报废旧车并购置新车的消费者提供税收减免来进一步援助汽车工业。此外，政府为公共持股的德国复兴信贷银行(KfW)提供1000亿欧元信贷，以便为陷入困境的公司提供贷款，为中小企业推出特别贷款项目，并扩大出口担保。从占GDP的比例来衡量，德国的经济刺激计划是欧洲国家中规模最大的。

迄今为止，德国政府已从其信用支持基金中拨付97亿欧元。9100家公司获得了总额为57亿欧元的直接贷款和40亿欧元的贷款担保。直接贷款中的绝大部分(94%)提供给了小型公司。特别要求援助的行业之一是造船业。国家还为汽车制造商欧宝(Opel)提供了援助，这一决定引发了很大争议，因为欧宝的财政困难显然并不只是金融危机带来的信用困境造成的。默克尔总理为救援欧宝辩护，指责欧宝母公司--美国通用管理不善。2009年11月，通用偿还了国家对欧宝的援助。除欧宝以外，不少声名赫赫的德国公司要求国家担保，甚至已经提出正式申请，包括保时捷、宝马、制造业巨头豪赫蒂夫公司(Hochtief)、计算机芯片制造商英飞凌(Infineon)和万达船厂(Wadan)等。但是，回顾一下这些公司的历史，人们不得不对它们出现财务危机的原因提出疑问。大多数情况是，战略

上的错误判断和财务上的困难在危机之前就出现了。从这个意义上说，德国政府2009年6月拒绝零售商Arcandor的申请是正确的。不过，其它国家对德国的担保计划心存怀疑，认为它实际上是一种潜在的工业政策工具，用以救援经济上和战略上重要的企业，这与法国的传统相似。最后，该政策对于国际竞争和贸易的实际效果有待观察，这主要取决于这些措施在多大程度上集中援助各大公司和行业。

自动稳定功能： 无需新的综合性社会政策措施

政府不愿出台大规模的消费支持措施，原因主要有二。第一是德国广泛的社会保障网络，它是社会主义市场经济的基本组成部分。危机来临时，它能自动降低税收负担，并通过增加福利支出、失业救济和就业保护来增加公共开支（即所谓自动稳定功能）。

据国际货币基金组织(IMF)估计，德国2009年刺激政策开支占GDP的1.5%，比例略低于美国经济刺激计划（占GDP的2%）。但是，由于德国庞大的社会保障网络和强大的自动稳定功能，这一刺激计划的累积效果要远远大于表面上的比例数字。据IMF估计，德国经济的自动稳定功能对经济刺激计划做出的额外贡献，约相当于GDP的1.7%，使得2009年经济刺激计划占GDP的比例提高到3.2%。

德国经济的自动稳定功能主要包括失业保险、福利支出、就业保护、养老金计划和医疗保险。失业者若在提交申请前两年中工作了至少一年，即可领取失业保险（Arbeitslosengeld I）。有孩子的失业者可以领到相当于他们最近净收入67%的失业保险，没有孩子的可以领取60%。根据2005年生效的最新失业保险计划改革（HARTZ IV），失业救济（Arbeitslosenhilfe）和福利支出（Arbeitslosengeld II）合并为二期失业保险（Arbeitslosengeld II）。现在，根据最新计划，失业者每月能够领取351欧元，并加上适当面积住房的开支。有孩子的人可以领取额外的救济。保险计划为经济危机中的失业者提供救济，从而在经济下行时期自动为经济注入资金。

短期工作计划（Kurzarbeit program）是德国经济的特点之一，它也能在危机期间自动增加开支。德国联邦劳动署负责这一计划，为那些雇佣短期雇员的雇主提供补贴。该计划在2008年支出2.7亿欧元，2009年预计支出超过28.5亿欧元。这一短期工作补贴计划对于德国劳工市场的稳定效果广受称赞，特别是在经济下行只造成失业率小幅上升的情况下。但是，就业支持措施将会到期，经济下行的滞后效应终将影响劳工市场，就业率预计将上升。

大联合政府未采取大规模的消费导向的支出措施，其第二个原因是，德国严重

依赖出口，而刺激计划针对的是消费，其乘数效应十分有限。德国消费者的个人储蓄率一直较高。1991年储蓄率为13%，2001年降至9%，2001年后再次升至11%，与两德统一后的平均值相当（与此形成对比的是，美国1990年至今平均储蓄率不到4%）。政策制定者认为，在储蓄率居高不下的情况下，税收减免对于刺激德国经济增长的作用微乎其微，甚至可能导致储蓄进一步上升，起不到扩大出口需求的效果。所以，如上所述，德国决策者们将投资作为优先选项，推出了企业和出口信贷税收减免等措施。

稳定金融行业

在德国，人们认为金融危机基本上就是银行业的危机。因此，政治领袖和决策者们相信，处理银行的所谓问题资产，对于应对和最终克服危机至关重要。据IMF估计，全球银行业共持有3万亿欧元“有毒资产”，德国银行约持有其中3000亿。如何从银行的资产负债表上去除这些有毒资产，一直是德国政府的心头之患。

德国决策者们对银行采取救援行动相对较晚。这类对经济的直接干预被广泛认为是最后的手段。德国政府一开始曾计划对银行的救援进行个案处理，而不是采取默克尔所称的“一揽子方案”。其结果是，德国政府在没有与其他欧洲国家磋商的情

况下，推出了自己的存款担保计划。这一举措遭到欧洲国家的强烈批评。2008年10月6日，政府采取措施避免德国第二大不动产抵押贷款提供商Hypo Real Estate崩溃。为防止银行出现类似情况，政府宣布将为德国所有个人存款账户提供担保。关于一个协调一致的“欧洲救援计划”，德国政府认为，“各国应采取它们能力之内的措施，努力解决问题”⁵。德国前财政部长施泰因布吕克为政府那时的政策作出辩护。他说：“从某些角度看，我们可能犯了错误，我们把握时机可能不是那么完美。但我们只能根据当时掌握的信息来做出判断……我坚持认为，这次金融市场危机的深度和广度，在八九月份前还不明确。”⁶

但是，2008年秋天危机恶化后，政府改变了策略。他们在10月份跨出了第一步，议会通过法案，建立了金融市场稳定特别基金（德文缩写Soffin）--近5000亿欧元、德国战后规模最大的银行救助方案。该基金将4000亿欧元用于担保银行贷款，还包括1000亿欧元用于改善银行资本结构。建立基金意在保障银行、保险公司、养老基金和其它金融机构的稳定，以巩固金融体系。例如，该基金将520亿欧元用于支持德国地产融资抵押银行（Hypo Real Estate），在德国商业银行（Commerzbank）购入德累斯顿银行（Dresdner Bank）后将其部分

国有化，出资130亿欧元援助北方银行（HSH Nordbank）等等。

直到2009年5月，默克尔政府才制定计划，成立所谓“坏账银行”来帮助德国银行界摆脱有毒资产。施泰因布吕克制定的这个计划，要求德国银行界建立结构性投资工具，用于卸去有毒资产。将设立新的公司（即“坏账银行”），向原持有这些有毒资产的银行发行国家支持的债券，以便为有毒资产重新注资。重新注资的过程由金融市场稳定特别基金支持，无需投入另外的援助资金。这一计划当然也有风险：如果一家银行的“坏账银行”亏损严重，股东们就会损失部分甚至全部红利。在金融市场稳定特别基金指导下第一家成立“坏账银行”的是北威州州立银行--西德意志银行（Westdeutsche Landesbank）。该银行计划在2010年4月30日前将价值850亿欧元的有毒资产转移至新成立的公司。

绝大多数对金融领域影响深远的支持措施来自于金融市场稳定特别基金。截至2009年12月，金融市场稳定特别基金共接到2382亿欧元的援助申请，批准的措施达1480亿欧元。绝大多数援助措施是以贷款担保的形式实施的。这一做法现在看来是成功的。迄今为止，金融市场稳定特别基金尚未出现亏损⁷。

5 William Kole, 《世界金融危机考验欧盟》,《Times of India》2008年10月7日

6 《德国国会批准5000亿欧元金融救援计划》,《中国时报》(China Daily), 2008年10月18日。

7 《经济学家》信息部,《德国国家报告》,2010年2月

制定金融市场新规则

在德国政治的议事日程中，金融监管改革的优先度并不高。财政部长沃尔夫冈·朔伊布勒（Wolfgang Schäuble，基民盟）表示，鉴于金融监管改革将引起极大政治争议，在2010年下半年北威州选举之前将不会进行改革。以国有银行、合作银行和商业银行（所有权和目标不同）为三大支柱的银行系统，不会进行改革。

金融经济危机期间，默克尔政府于2009年3月同意拓展德国联邦金融管理局（BaFin）的权限，授权它在认为银行有风险时可以提高流动性和资本权益方面的要求，还可以阻止向国外的母公司偿还股息或其他资金。金融机构被要求向金融管理局提供更多业务信息，包括但不限于他们的财务杠杆水平。不仅如此，管理局还有权审查金融机构董事会成员的资格。如果管理局认定一位董事的任职资格不够充分，它有权依法寻找替代人选。

除了这些小幅监管改革之外，大联合政府已开始讨论彻底改革金融监管体系，因为金融危机揭示了监管缺乏的现状。基民盟和自民党组成的新执政联盟继续了这一进程，提出授予德国中央银行监管银行业的全权，甚至可能包括监管保险公司。过

去，社民党一直反对将银行监管权并入央行。目前，联邦金融管理局负责监督金融机构、保险公司和证券交易企业，和德国央行共享银行的监管权。金融危机表明，未来金融体系的监管必须更加以系统为导向。这意味着必须考虑金融机构的相互联系。基民盟-自民党执政联盟认为，由一个机构而不是两个机构共同监管银行，能更好地处理这一挑战。

将联邦金融管理局的银行监管职能并入德国中央银行，不仅将导致金融管理局裁员，更需要处理许多技术性问题，首先就是职权分工。一个核心问题是，国家主权权力的执行，如何能与央行在货币政策方面的自主性并行不悖？德国央行行长韦伯（Axel Weber）一开始对这项改革计划持批判态度，现在他却试图化解人们的担忧。他说：“重要的是，要把制定货币政策和其他决策分开⁸。”这方面法国中央银行是一个好例子，它的银行监管部门在编制上与其他的部门分离，并且具有法律上的独立性。

德国对于本国的金融监管改革犹豫不决，在欧盟层面同样如此。尽管德国强烈支持单一市场，多次要求加强金融市场监管，但迄今为止，它在欧盟层面的辩论中没有起到一点积极作用。德国支持建立系

8 Tobias Beayer 和 Christine Mai, 《如何进行银行监管》(Wie die Bankaufsicht funktioniert), 《金融时报》德国版, 2009年10月8日, 8 October 2009.

统性风险监管，支持加强各国监管机构间的合作，但是却反对赋予新机构过大权力。韦伯警告说：“机构确实重要。但是，认为仅仅靠建立欧盟或全球范围的新监管机构、进行一些机构改革，就能够防止类似的危机，是非常不明智的。要建立一个恢复能力更强的金融体系，最终靠的是金融市场的监管。”⁹

目前，欧洲金融界的跨国业务不断增加，但金融机构的监督仍然主要由各国相关机构负责。金融危机再次证明了加强欧洲整体监管的必要性。有鉴于此，2008年10月，欧盟委员会成立了由国际货币基金组织前总裁雅克·德·拉罗西埃（Jacques de Larosière）牵头的金融监管临时高级别小组，就监管问题提出建议。小组于2009年2月提交了“拉罗西埃报告”。2009年5月，欧盟委员会对报告予以全面支持。5月27日，欧盟委员会提交了“关于欧洲金融监管的通报”。委员会同意加强欧洲央行在宏观监管方面的权力，以便防止系统性风险；各国应加强合作，强化对跨国金融机构进行微观审慎监管¹⁰。委员会计划成立欧洲系统风险委员会（ESRB）进行宏观审慎监管，成立多个欧洲监管机构（ESAs）负责微观审慎监管。2009年9月，

委员会通过了相关决议。这意味着，委员会并未采纳建立具有广泛权力的单一欧盟监管机构的宏伟计划。

拟议中的欧洲系统风险理事会（ESRC），后改名为欧洲系统风险委员会，旨在防止欧盟金融市场的严重混乱。金融领域的传统监管框架关注的是微观审慎监管，限制各家金融机构陷入财务困境的风险。这将导致金融市场的系统性风险被低估。欧洲金融风险委员会的任务是进行宏观审慎监管，监控和评估金融体系整体稳定性的风险（系统性风险）。该委员会将建立一个早期预警机制，在必要时可以提出采取行动的建议。委员会由欧盟各成员国央行行长、欧洲央行代表和欧盟委员会组成。

欧盟委员会建议，对于各金融机构的监管仍由各国相关部门负责，同时建立3个新的欧盟机构，以便更好地协调对于40多家跨国银行和保险公司的微观审慎监管。这些银行和公司共拥有欧盟三分之二的资产。这3个新机构是按照所监管的金融机构的性质划分的，分别是欧盟银行管理局（European Banking Authority, EBA），欧盟证券与市场管理局（European Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA），及欧盟保险

9 阿克塞尔·韦伯，《从制度上应对危机和监管问题的思考》（Institutional Responses to the Crisis and Thoughts on Regulatory Issues），在卢森堡中央银行“金融稳定与德国和土耳其的银行监管”研讨会上的发言，2009年11月3日

10 《欧盟领导人支持大幅改革金融监管》，EurActiv，2009年6月19日。见：<http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/eu-leaders-back-financial-supervision-overhaul/article-183341>。《委员会提出银行监管计划遭受批评》，EurActiv，2009年5月28日，见：<http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/commission-tables-banking-supervision-plan-faces-criticism/article-182687>。

及职业年金管理局(European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, EIOPA)。它们将取代目前的3个委员会(CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR),分别对欧盟银行、证券和保险进行监管。这些欧洲监管机构的任务包括:提出技术标准和管理原则的改进建议,处理各国监管机构的意见分歧,在紧急情况下起到协调作用,等等¹¹。

12月2日,欧盟财政部长会议通过了这一改革计划,但对新机构的权限作出一些修改¹²。特别值得注意的是,这些欧盟监管机构将无权在危机期间对相关金融机构直接下达指令。另外,欧盟监管机构的决定可以由经济与财政部长理事会(Ecofin)以简单多数推翻。

对欧盟委员会方案的反对声浪高涨。许多成员国担心,这一改革将使得它们不能有效控制在本国开展业务的金融机构,最终将影响它们在金融领域的职能。德国非常关心跨国银行倒闭时的责任分担。德国、英国和部分其它成员国一道,强烈反对新的监管机构有权作出任何令成员国承担财政后果的决定。财政部长朔伊布勒强调,欧盟监管机构应更加有效和高效,但不能削弱各成员国的权力。同样,各国议

会的权利应得到尊重(指议会在财政政策制定上的权威)¹³。基民盟在议会中的财政事务发言人伯恩哈德(Otto Bernhardt)主张,只有系统性的金融机构才需要欧盟层面的干预,中小金融机构不需要。他考虑的无疑是德国的储蓄机构(Sparkassen)¹⁴。

德国在二十国集团(G20)框架下关于国际监管的建议要更具有前瞻性一些,但取得的成果非常有限。默克尔总理呼吁应将社会市场经济的原则推广到全世界,她还坚决主张建立更加强大、更具权威性的全球金融监管体系。具体来说,2009年1月在巴黎举行的一次会议上,默克尔主张以联合国人权宪章为模板制定“联合国可持续经济活动宪章”,并建立联合国经济理事会,作为新的全球监管体系的基础。这一新建立的联合国机构旨在制订全球标准,保证我们“不会寅吃卯粮”。默克尔在演讲中还明确表示,她认为这次危机是一次“重组国际机构体系的机会”。现有的联合国经社理事会(ECOSOC)只是忙于写报告,并不具有任何监管全球经济的正式职能。她总结说,必须采取果断措施,因为危机证明,国际社会缺乏有效机构和充分监管,以应对全球化带来的风险。简单来说,默克尔主张建立一个“能真正反映全球性相互

11 《委员会立法加强欧洲金融监管》,布鲁塞尔,2009年9月23日

12 欧洲理事会新闻公报,经济与金融部长理事会第2981次会议,布鲁塞尔,2009年12月2日。见:http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/111706.pdf。

13 《欧盟金融市场监管机构确定》,奥地利《经济日报》,2009年12月2日

14 《德国央行对欧盟金融监管》,EurActiv,2009年11月13日

依存关系的21世纪的机构体系”。最后，默克尔说，在未来的日子里欧盟的任务是“在国际秩序中做社会市场经济的代言人”。

2009年4月初的G20伦敦峰会上，默克尔继续推动强化市场监管方面的国际标准。默克尔和她的政府全力支持欧盟起草的一份报告，该报告主张将金融市场监管拓展到所有金融机构（包括对冲基金、私人直接投资公司和评级机构），加强对于银行资本权益方面的要求，建立可以侦测资产价格泡沫并提出预警的国际体系。默克尔还与法国一道呼吁加强监管，严格约束瑞士等国出现的“避税天堂”。

退出战略：整合预算

尽管2010年经济政策不会有明显变化，政府已经在致力于制定经济刺激计划的退出战略，以保证在中期整合公共财政。这是因为，大联合政府最持久的一项成就就是避免财政赤字。2007年，金融危机爆发之前，联邦政府的预算接近平衡。1920年代的极度通货膨胀和经济混乱，在德国公众的集体记忆中仍然印象深刻。德国政治家和决策者们一直主张，赤字支出并不能带来长期增长，高额的政府债务将导致通货膨胀。

这种强烈的财政保守主义实际上超出了传统的基民盟的影响范围，放大到政治领域和公众观点中。这很大程度上也是由于1990年代的经验：重建东德所需的大幅开支，德国为此负上的国家债务，还有1990年代末期试图平衡预算带来的低增长率。

尽管危机还在继续，德国政治家和决策者们就开始计划，要保证在危机退去时，德国预算将重新平衡或接近平衡。2009年6月，德国议员们提出动议，通过修改宪法来限制公共债务。这一法案的目标是，在经济复苏期间加强财政纪律，并为经济下行预留空间，以防止结构性赤字和避免顺周期性政策¹⁵。

该法案以2/3多数在联邦议会得以通过，以13:3的多数在参议院通过。该法案主要针对州预算，从2020年开始，各州不得增加新债务，为偿还已有债务而追加的新债务除外。关于联邦预算，该法将于2016年生效，新增债务将被限制在GDP的0.35%之内。尽管该法还包含几项例外条款，允许联邦政府宣布紧急状态以绕过法案的大部分规定，但在经济增长期间，政府负有宪法规定的责任将债务缩减到特定水平，并增加政府收入¹⁶。为了摆脱目前

15 于格·阿斯穆森，《掌控全球金融危机：德国的角度》，《华盛顿季刊》2009 32:3，197-204页

16 《联邦参议院决定债务刹车》，明镜周刊网络版，2009年6月6日。6 June 2009. 《联邦预算刹车写入基本法》，FOCUS网络版，2009年6月12日。见：http://kurse.focus.de/news/UPDATE-Bundesrat-verankert_id_news_109095078.htm。参考《债务刹车在联邦参议院获得通过》，联邦财政部，2009年6月12日，见：http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nm_82/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Finanzpolitik/2009/06/20091206__PM25.html。

赤字支出的状况，重回金融危机爆发和经济衰退前的预算平衡，德国议员们将财政纪律上升到了宪法高度。

财政政策，和减税的时机与幅度一样，一直是2009年联邦选举以来基民盟-自民党新执政联盟中最具争议性的话题。基民盟希望在2011年开始财政整合的进程，但自民党却希望实施它筹划已久的减税计划。考虑到经济前景和罕见的高额政府赤字，如果不削减政府支出（即削减政府服务），减税似乎在近期并不现实。在目前公众关于政府干预和监管的呼声高涨的政治气候下，削减政府服务无疑是十分困难的。民调显示，德国公众对于赤字感到厌倦，在政府赤字增加的情况下反对减税。

结论：德国经济政策制定的挑战

同很多其他国家一样，2008至2009年是经济政策制定中不断尝试和犯错的混乱时期，实用主义而不是原则成为政策的基调。2010至2011年，德国政府面临的挑战主要有三：一是将经济导向可持续复苏的轨道；二是找到合适的时间和方式，中止扩张性的危机财政政策，以抑制可能的通胀压力；三是整合不断增长的政府赤字。

为此，德国必须采取措施应对其金融体系中的缺点（首先是国有银行体系），改革本国和欧洲金融监管结构。由于金融界

的强烈反对，这项任务将不会一帆风顺。更加困难的任务将是调整德国的增长策略。经济危机表明，德国的经济模式--出口导向型的增长，在国际需求的波动面前非常脆弱。但是，如何促进中长期的需求，这个问题并不容易解决。辩论中的解决方案之一是减税。但考虑到不断增加的赤字，这在近期内还做不到。另外，政府还需要在教育、研究和发展等领域，特别是可再生能源和基础设施建设方面持续进行大幅支出，以促进增长潜力和保证未来的经济增长。考虑到这些，减税也是不可取的。

在未来的日子里，经济政策制定不会是件容易的事。有一点是可以肯定的，那就是必须采取果断措施，拿出改革的勇气，才能将德国经济重新引入可持续发展的轨道。

全球能源供应

共同需求与挑战对中德关系的影响

安杰·诺措尔德
Antje Nötzold

考虑到德中两国在全球能源供应方面的共同需求、面临的共同挑战以及解决问题的可能性,我将重点阐述石油与天然气,尽管我很清楚煤炭在满足中国能源需求方面具有的重要性。不过,较之石油与天然气,国际煤炭贸易面临的风险及可能出现的紧缺不那么明显,因此,我首先将简单介绍一下石油与天然气储备、生产及消费在世界各国的分布情况,接下来介绍一下对上述能源的全球供应具有重要影响的因素。最后,由此得出结论,阐述世界各国在能源供应保障方面的相互依存,以及欧洲和德国改善能源供应的思路。


储备、生产与消费的全球分布

为便于理解,首先对在化石原料讨论中经常出现的两个概念加以界定区分:储备系指其存在已被证实的某种能源原材料的数量,借助目前的技术与可能性,能够对此加以经济性开采。与之相对的则是资

源,资源既包括其存在已被证实、但目前尚无法进行经济性开采或者开采在技术上不可行的总量,也包括根据地质数据从地质上尚待发现的总量。

经验表明,在全球石油储备的地区分布方面,近中东地区以占全球石油储备大约60%的高比例而颇为突出。与此同时,近中东地区的石油开采量则仅占全球开采量的大约30%,而所有其他地区的生产量均超出其占世界储备的比例。因此,近中东地区石油枯竭的时代将最后到来,不过这也意味着从中期来看,唯有该地区能够平衡其他地区开采量的下降,以满足全球需求。欧洲是继北美和亚太地区之后全球第三大消费地区,却仅仅拥有不足1.4%的微不足道的储备。

图 1：按地区的世界石油分布



根据英国石油公司 (编) "英国石油公司 2009 年 6 月世界能源统计年鉴 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009", 第 6,8 和第 11 页。


天然气储备在全球的分布情况也与此相似，不过有几个重要的不同之处，特别是独联体地区极为重要。俄罗斯和其他独联体国家地区拥有全部天然气储备的大约三分之一，俄罗斯是世界上拥有最多天然气储备的国家，紧随其后的是伊朗和卡塔尔。但独联体地区不仅拥有丰富的储备，占据世界生产中的最高比例，作为全球第二大天然气消费地区，该地区自己的消费量也相当大。近中东地区的天然气储量或许令人感到有些意外，究其原因，是因为该地区迄今的天然气开采量相对较小，占消费的比例几乎与从前一样高，也就是说到目前为止几乎没有出口天然气。在天然气

方面，欧洲同样是世界上第三大消费地区，而它拥有的储备比例却是最低的。

除了地区分布，我们再来看一下尚未开采的储备，按照目前的生产水平，现有石油储备和天然气储备分别还够使用大约 40 年和 67 年。然而，这些静态量的变化不仅与年开采量有关。根据开头提到的储备概念的定义，它是一个动态范畴，因此，存在着上调储备量的可能性。

除了正在进行开采的油气田目前的产能之外，储备还包括已经探明但尚待开采的油气。此外，还可能发现新的储备，一

图2：根据地区的全球天然气分布



根据英国石油公司（编）“英国石油公司2009年6月世界能源统计年鉴（BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009”，第22,24和第27页。

方面是发现新的油气，但其储量不大，因为事实上世界各国已经对所有含油的沉淀层与盆地进行了勘探，因此，最多还能够在水下较深的地方或者极地地区有可观的新发现。相反，对已知储备进行重新评估蕴含着较大的潜力，即通过技术进步、成本降低或者通过世界市场上的油价调节石油购买量，以此改变开采赢利，这对于将油矿归类为储备还是资源至关重要。这样一来，就能够延长开采期，提高油田开采率，并且利用诸如油沙矿、重油、油页岩等非传统石油。与此相应，将资源转而归类为储备也有着极大的潜力，可以从中期角度满足全球日益增长的需求。

对资源具体数量所做的研究要少得多，不过，即使将有关资源的估测一并纳入地区分布，就石油而言，近中东地区仍然占据主导地位。当然，独联体和非洲均拥有可观的资源潜力，在天然气方面，尤其是独联体国家拥有巨大的原材料资源。这样一来，即使未来储备具有巨大潜力也难以改变某些地区的主导地位，因此，能源供应的中期问题并非原材料的可耗尽性，而在于其数量的地区分布！

特别是最大的消费地区—欧洲，东南亚和北美—仅拥有较少的储备，因此，拥有尚未开采储备的地区与需求巨大的地区

从地理上来说相距遥远。例如，欧洲油气生产与消费之间的差异越来越大，早在2002年，欧盟石油需求的76%就依赖进口，天然气为49%。国际能源署预测，2030年，欧盟油气的进口依赖率将分别高达最多94%和81%，尽管欧洲提出了提高能效、扩大可再生能源的雄心勃勃的目标，但欧盟的进口需求仍将大幅度增加。2030年，欧盟甚至将成为最大的天然气消费地区，其需求增加幅度从绝对量上来看也将是最大的，由于北海开采量迅速下降，所有需求均需通过增加进口加以满足。

这一预测并非仅涉及欧洲，因为与此同时，全球油气需求都将继续强劲增加，主要是增长中的亚洲经济体的经济发展将对能源需求的增加产生巨大的影响。2004年，国际能源署预测，2030年整个南亚和东亚地区将占石油需求增量的40%和天然气增量的21%，而根据2009年的世界能源展望，仅中国就将占据全球石油需求增量的43%和煤炭需求增量的65%。

中华人民共和国的资源进口依赖性也将继续增加，根据国际能源署的预测，2030年，中国74%的石油需求将依赖进口，2002年，这一比例为34%。在该地区，这种情况不仅发生在中国。2030年，印度91%的石油需求只能通过进口加以满足，早在2004年，本地区最大的原油生产国印度尼西亚就已经成为石油净进口国。在此，世

界原材料市场上的新买家均致力于进口多元化，而与此同时，剩余储备却集中在少数几个地区和国家。尽管如此，各国能源战略并非必然发生冲突，因为能源供应的保障并非一场零和博弈。相反，各消费国的供应安全具有相互依赖性，这一点接下来还将做进一步的阐述。

储备的地理位置

考虑到现有全球能源供应的影响因素及风险，首先应探讨一下储备的地区位置。所谓的“战略椭圆”因占有世界传统石油储备和天然气储备的约70%而成为拥有最大剩余储备的地区。该椭圆包括近中东地区、中亚、里海和俄罗斯。由此，长期来看，全球能源需求将集中于该地区，因为这里的储备将最后告罄。

尽管前面论述了近中东地区和俄罗斯拥有优势开采量，但从中期来看，仍然存在着多元化的可能性。就石油而言，俄罗斯、非洲和里海地区的生产有望小幅增加，就天然气而言，里海地区、非洲特别是近中东地区的重要性将上升。尤其是液化天然气技术，即LNG，能够以经济的方式从较远的地区进口天然气。

在此，欧洲与主要储备区之间的地理位置较为优越，但同样也面临着相关地区的根本性问题，即政治和社会经济不稳定，

从而加剧能源短缺，引发价格激增，加大爆发供应危机的可能性。目前，14个原油出口国中，有10个被归类为不稳定，因此，全球能源需求的50%是由内政不稳定的国家满足的，这种不稳定对于能源进口国的供应安全构成了极大的风险。在此，不稳定非但可能造成暂时的供应中断，而且更重要的是限制了有关地区开采和出口设施的投资条件，因此从长期来看也限制了可能达到的开采量。特别是在战略椭圆地区，到2030年，仅油气领域就需要超过11万亿美元的投资，才能开发新的可开采的油气田，相当于每年数千亿美元。预计到2030年，每天的石油需求将达到1亿2千万桶，为满足这一需求，不仅必须新开发每天4000万桶的新增产能，而且必须对目前每天8000万桶的开采量中的大部分进行更新，因为许多油田将耗尽，必须予以代替。此外，还必须更新和扩建出口基础设施，提高储备开采能力，下面我还将谈到这样做的重大意义。

运输工具和供应流

另外一个影响因素源自化石能源生产与消费在地理上的不同分布。有些能源必须在世界上经过长距离输送，石油和天然气主要是通过油轮或者油气管道输送。管道较为可靠，不受环境因素的影响，若在同一大陆内输送最为经济，但管道的投资费用高，修建时间长，而且不灵活，因

为它们是固定在某个位置上的。此外，管道大多穿越过境国，这些国家的合作意愿与政治稳定对于供应稳定同样至关重要。即使距离较长，通过管道输送石油相对仍然较为有利。总的来说，天然气的输送成本要高很多，而且通过管道长距离输送天然气不够经济。当然，可以通过将天然气冷却至 -160°C 进行液化，再将其作为LNG（液化天然气）用特定的液货船进行运输。这种替代性选择初期成本要高很多，因为需要液化装置、特殊液货轮、配备存储设备和再气化设备的收货终端，但随着技术的进步，液化天然气的利润越来越高，这样，长距离的气体输送也变得经济了。由此，液化天然气便能够将新的进口地区特别是欧洲连接起来，迄今，欧洲通过管道输送绝大部分天然气，这样一来，便可以形成一个小规模的天然气现货市场，可以平衡短期的供货中断。目前，全球四分之三的石油通过油轮输送，因为这是最为有利的一种选择，运输也很灵活。不过，液化天然气贸易的增加加大了油轮运输的风险。

石油运输的主航线经过所谓的“堵塞点”及令人头痛的地方。通过这些运河和海峡运输的石油目前约3700万桶，近中东地区的石油几乎全部通过这些具有重要战略地位的“堵塞点”运输。目前，每天通过霍尔木兹海峡的石油为1700万桶，占全球石油需求的约20%。此外，对欧洲的出

口还须经过巴布厄耳曼德海峡和苏伊士运河,对亚洲的出口还要穿越马六甲海峡。除了上述海路的过度负荷之外,其安全对通道形成了更大的危险,有些通道极为狭窄,容易遭遇海盗袭击、恐怖袭击和事故,因此,上述运河和海峡便成为风险极高的地区。但危险并不仅仅是石油外溢,或者装有液化天然气的货轮的爆炸性,相反,某条重要的高道被封锁将严重影响运输通畅,从而危及油气供应。

资源市场的变化

供应中断通过其对全球原材料市场和石油价格的影响而涉及所有消费者,特别是通过自由开采能力的急剧下降。2008年中,经济危机爆发,此前数年,自由开采能力大幅下降,原因除了2004年以来需求持续增加以外,还包括90年代末期亚洲金融危机造成的低价期,1998年底至1999年初,石油价格甚至一度跌至每桶10美元以下。此外,未来需求也存在着不确定性,从而推迟了勘探行为以及长期提高产能的投资。由于所需的计划周期较长,短期内无法追赶上来。因此,必须利用全部开采能力以满足日益增长的需求,这样一来,可开采的储备能力所剩无几,而在危机和冲突时期,我们却需要这样的储备,以通过短期增产平衡供应中断的情况。如果没有剩余能力,市场就会因缺乏缓冲而对哪怕极小的生产中断做出过激反应,例如,对

中东发生更多恐怖袭击的担忧,尼日利亚和委内瑞拉等重要开采国的动乱与罢工,以及卡特里娜等出现在墨西哥湾的热带强旋风,这些会立刻表现为石油市场上的价格上涨。

由于去年夏天以来石油价格急剧下滑,以及世界经济危机引发的未来需求的不确定性,景气收缩时,可能会出现同样的情况。例如,美国已经做出了预测,称如果景气迅速收缩,石油供应可能出现短缺,因为许多开采国目前已经推迟了开发仅剩油田的费用日益攀升的投资项目。

全球依存和德国的政策思路

然而,短缺市场不仅助长了高油价,使得价格攀升无法预测,而且可能造成石油市场的政治化,导致各大进口国围绕夺取原材料的竞争加剧,但这却无益于任何消费方长期确保自己的能源供应。由于所有消费方的供应形势都面临刚才简述过的影响因素与风险,能源供应具有全球依存的特点,任何一方都不可能单独靠自己便长期解决问题。

在能源供应的全球系统中,生产方和消费方有着共同的利益。双方相互依赖,他们都在追求各自进口和出口市场的多元化。双方都希望拥有可靠、透明和可以计划的贸易关系,也都需要有安全的运输通道。同

样，能源消费国之间也存在着共同利益，因此，中国、德国和欧洲之间也有共同利益。所以，能源供应安全并不是一场零和博弈，能源消费国无疑也关心其他国家来满足自己的能源需求，以维系自己的经济力。目前的世界经济金融危机表明了全球经济与贸易的相互依存。

德国有关改善和确保能源供应的思路正是满足了这一点，这体现在欧盟的能源政策中。该思路建立在下述原则的基础之上，并致力于在全球贯彻这些原则，其主要内容是实行积极的需求管理，对能源混合加以调节，并通过促进可再生能源利用各种能源，通过更好的电厂、促进碳捕捉和储存技术以及从长期来看的合成能源促进更加清洁地利用能源的新技术。总地来说，除此之外，还应当降低能源总需求，方法是提高效率，将能源需求与经济增长脱钩以及节约能源。

第二个原则是注重市场机制。在此，欧洲和德国的政策着眼于推广能源领域的自由公正贸易原则，因为市场上提供的能源原材料越多，所有依赖进口的国家就能够越好地满足自己的需求，风险就能得到越好的分散，供需也越能形成现实的价格。为了在世界各国宣传这些原则，欧盟支持与生产国、过境国和所有其他消费国展开对话与合作。

借助这一思路，德国、欧盟和其他欧洲国家遵循的是具有全球认可原则的共同政策思路，正如在世界贸易组织框架内对其他贸易品那样。这样一来，能源供应的相关各方——生产国和消费国——就能够遵循市场经济原则，在相同的框架条件下行动。因为由于全球影响元素和世界经济的交融，从长期来看，对抗和地缘政治取向无力解决能源供应问题。

给网络和平一个机会！

德中两国对安全政策新挑战给出的答案*

弗兰克·藻厄尔
Frank Sauer

引言

自1990年代以来，思想库和国防部便发出了类似“新的武器是字节，而不是子弹！”这样激昂的预言。的确如此，信息时代的技术不仅能够改变我们久已熟悉的战争元素，而且以前的科幻似乎也已经触手可及，一个新的战场正在形成：网络空间。

事实上，网络空间相对而言出现得时间较晚，它已经以因特网的形式变革了我们的日常生活，不过，下文要进行批评性探讨的则是它在何种程度上涉及我们的安全政策。就其核心来说，这涉及的问题是我们是否真地面临来自网络世界的现实威胁，还是说更多面临着“网络炒作”，即网络空间作为潜在安全威胁源这一点被夸大了。

在澄清这个问题之前，第一步必须进

行重新架构，看看网络战争、网络恐怖主义和类似概念如何登上了安全政策的议事日程，以探寻说到此类“网络”现象时，我们面对的究竟是什么。最后是给德中外交与安全政策提出的几个思路与建议。中德两国对于实际出现的网络空间在安全政策上的重要性这一问题能够以及应当给出怎样的答案呢？

网络战争与网络恐怖主义

网络战争这一理念源自美国，1990年代开始成为学术界及军方与安全政策制订者们讨论的内容。然而，不仅美国，中国、俄罗斯以及较低程度上讲也包括德国都赋予网络空间以安全政策上的意义。

2001年，美国政府估计有30个国家制订了进攻性的网络战争计划。乔治·W·布

* 本文系作者根据2009年7月22日参加中国国际战略学会和阿登纳基金会在北京共同举办的题为“中德作为国际政治中的行为体：共同挑战，共同立场”研讨会所做报告改编。

什政府正式宣布美国面临“网络战争”的危险日益增加，甚至将“黑客袭击”比作冷战时期苏联核武器构成的威胁。贝拉克·奥巴马总统同样认为美国的安全在网络空间中受到了威胁，在政府中设立了“网络大总管”这一位置，以整合对这个问题的责任。就网络战争而言，美国军队奉行的是进攻性路线，很久以来，仅美国空军便组织了逾4万名士兵参加的“网络行动”，以确保美军在空中与太空以及网络空间的优势。目前，已经成立了专门的网络司令部。美国将中国视为挑战其网络空间霸权的最大竞争对手，中国也已经针对网络战争扩大了军队的编制与指导思想。或许由于缺乏其他选择，俄罗斯甚至保留了对来自网络空间的进攻予以核报复的权利。在德国，军事讨论中较少涉及网络战争这一话题，不过，联邦国防部、情报部门以及议员都越来越意识到这个问题的重要性，这表现在跨部、跨议会党团工作小组、图上军事演习以及联邦国防军专门成立的计算机应急责任团队等方面。“2006年白皮书”中虽然只是顺便提及网络空间，但联邦国防军已经成立了一支由空军指挥的秘密网络战争部队。

国际上，网络战争这一概念直到2007年4月才第一次引起公众舆论的注意，当时爱沙尼亚面临着一场“拒绝服务攻击”，报纸对“历史上首次网络战争”进行了报道。在数周时间里，这个网络密度极高的国家

遭受了一场针对网页的时强时弱的攻击，涉及政党、公司、银行、报纸和爱沙尼亚政府。在此期间，冰岛网络服务器遭到过度查询的狂轰滥炸，例如要求打开某个网页，最后，数据流迫使服务器一度拒绝回答，哪怕要求是合法的（拒绝服务的概念正是由此而来）。冰岛最大的银行汉莎银行估计网上银行业务中断造成的损失高达一百万美元。

这场攻击发生之间，爱沙尼亚政府将一座俄军士兵纪念碑从首都迁到了外地，由此引发了与俄罗斯之间的外交纷争，爱沙尼亚迅速指责克里姆林宫进行了一场“网络战争”。然而，这真是一场国与国之间战争的新形式吗？真是俄罗斯对爱沙尼亚发起的一次攻击吗？

迄今仍未得到最终澄清的是，发起者是否的确是俄罗斯政府和军方，还是私人。此外，针对爱沙尼亚的这场所谓的网络“战争”引起的后果从任何角度都无法与一场真正战争的后果相提并论。尽管公众生活受到了干扰，但基础设施并未破坏，也没有造成人员伤亡，夸张一点说，不能说几台自动提款机发生故障就出现了战争状态。此外，某些迹象表明，这仅仅涉及网络空间行为主义或者说是黑客行为，虽然后果极其严重。据此，发起者恐怕既不是克里姆林宫，也不是俄罗斯军方，而是因为拆走纪念铜像而感到民族自豪感受到伤害的

俄罗斯人。他们被网络论坛上的交流所煽动，采取了协调一致的行动，自主发起了一场针对爱沙尼亚的信息雪崩，因此，爱沙尼亚发生的这次事件并非“历史上第一次网络战争”。爱沙尼亚总理安西普在因特网上将这次事件与试图在现实世界里“封锁某个港口或机场”相提并论。这个比较是恰当的，这样的封锁对任何一个国家来说无疑都是严峻的，不过此处勉为其难地用“战争”这个字眼儿却显得有些夸张。

然而，来自网络空间的恐怖主义威胁的情况如何呢？多年来，众多所谓的“专家”一直声称大量作案人随时都能够轻而易举地发动后果严重的网络恐怖主义袭击。这就提出了一个问题，即为何时至今日，网络恐怖主义袭击的数字仍然是零。

该问题答案的第一部分来自下述事实，即恐怖主义分子迄今并没有利用网络发动袭击，而更多是进行宣传，做公关或者最多也就是用来准备进行袭击。基地组织及其遍布世界各地的同情者的例子表明，因特网因其覆盖面与速度而发挥着联络工具的重要作用，特别是作为宣传与招募的工具。因此，那些志同道合者不仅能够轻易接触文字信息和视频信息，也能不费吹灰之力地看到耗资不匪的有关袭击的录像。恐怖主义分子利用因特网进行“心理战”的一个典型例子就是那些展示斩首和类似暴行画面的录像。此外，加密电子邮件和网

络电话通话尽管保密性不够高，但却因为快捷直接而可以被用来达成约定，隐匿法亦可被用作秘密交换敏感信息。再加上移动电话与卫星电话，便可以在全球实现即时协调行动，有时候，甚至有可能舒服服地在家里通过谷歌地球便找到潜在的攻击目标。对于今天的恐怖主义分子来说，网络空间仅是常规袭击的一种辅助手段。

但是，对灾难性的、通过网络针对所谓的“关键性基础设施实施的袭击”的情况如何呢？最重要的关键性基础设施包括道路、铁路和空中交通的引导系统，气、水、电供应的控制系统，以及银行与电讯网络。现代工业国家的上述命脉真地受到了迫在眉睫的威胁了吗？恐怖主义分子能够通过因特网造成断电，淹没水坝以及引爆核电站吗？在此，努力做出具有区别性的评价而不是听信广为流传的恐怖情景更富有启发性，同时也给出了网络恐怖主义袭击数字迄今仍然为零这一问题的答案的第二个部分。

一方面，有些其他数据网络的关键电脑网络是孤岛解决方案，这是正确的。但另一方面，同样正确的是，这种分离一例如供电领域的负面例子新近表明的那样——并非始终得到了严格的遵守，从外部亦可接触到的关键性基础设施也存在可能被利用的安全缺陷。另一方面，上述专业化系统的操作以及有针对性的滥用也并非易事，

它要求掌握最低程度的专业知识。因此,尽管工业国家关键性基础设施无疑易受攻击,仍然能够肯定地认为,事实上仅有极少数恐怖主义分子能够对关键性基础设施发动一场与“有效恐怖主义”接近的网络袭击。因此,网络恐怖主义并不是“许多恐怖主义分子随时都能轻而易举地”发动起来的,相反,应当认为只有极少数恐怖主义分子有足够的力量实施这样的袭击。此外,袭击亦非轻而易举,而是需要认真的准备,并有相应的财力与技术资源才能做到。那么,“严重后果”的情况又如何呢?

爱沙尼亚的例子表明,即使全面的网络袭击也难以具有“戏剧性”,较之炸药甚至是“脏弹”袭击,网络袭击的效果根本无法与之相提并论。夸张一点儿说,自动取款机故障肯定令人恼火,但没有人会认为受到了恐怖。即使后果再严重一些,比如说大面积停电,那也得持续数日才会造成引人注目的影响。因此,仔细观察,迄今为止世界各国都没有发生任何值得一提的网络恐怖主义行为也就不足为奇了。从恐怖主义的角度来看,较容易造成严重的后果,2008年孟买大屠杀表明,配备简单装备、速射枪支和手榴弹的十个坚定的袭击者能够造成何等的恐怖。

网络炒作?

因此,尽管对网络战争和网络恐怖主

义威胁进行的批评性的总结尚不足以敲响警钟,网络空间却较以往任何时候都更占据了新闻头条。这里仅列举2009年发生的几个例子。二月,2008年10月以来蔓延开来的蠕虫病毒导致联邦国防军数百台计算机受感染;三月,发现了全球一千多台具有高信息含量的计算机带有鬼网—通过社会工程,外交部、大使馆以及国际组织的计算机遭到了有针对性的感染和监视;四月:[华尔街日报]报道,有关美军新型战斗机—联合攻击战斗机的可能涉及安全问题的数太字节数据被窃取;五月,德国2008年宪法保卫报告就计算机网络攻击问题写道:“2005年以来,德国也发现有针对机关和经济企业的大规模攻击。(…)探询活动(…)的主要委托方首推中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦的情报部门。”

所有这些计算机网络攻击都有两点引人注目之处。第一,使用的都是相似或者同样的手段。第二,发动计算机网络攻击的人始终在暗处。事实上,对计算机网络攻击进行分析的核心问题就是找出结果与原因之间的关联以及所使用手段的相似之处。不过,同样引人注目的是,攻击的动机显然各不相同,有些是窃取特定信息,有些则是不加选择地让整个系统被查一遍或者瘫痪—那么这究竟是怎么回事儿呢?间谍?经济刑事犯罪?“网络蹂躏”?

一般来说,媒体报道和安全政策文献

中总是充斥着各种概念、设计和意见。面对有关行为体、动机与手段的诸多概念，要想有个总体的了解，进行更为明晰的总结，下表一或许能够帮助我们定位。

该表借助关键行为体、其行动空间、行动手段与行动方式及其目标对最重要的“网络现象”进行了归类。通过这一概览，便很容易就能够将国家军队在现实世界中采取的具有事实武力效果的行动（所谓的信息战）同上面讲到的网络战争，即国家军队进行的单纯限制在虚拟空间中的战争区别开来。在两种情况下，目标都是一致的，但所用的手段则截然不同：一种情况下使用的是真正的武器，而另一种情况下则是虚拟的计算机网络攻击。

下一步，我们一眼就可以看出，虚拟世界的所有行为—无论是国家还是非国家性质的一使用的都是基本相同的手段和行为方式，这些手段和方式都可以归纳为我多次提到的计算机网络攻击这一概念。不过，同样很快就可以发现的是，各行为体的目标却可能大相径庭：国家军队借助信息战和网络战争始终着眼于战胜对方的军队，或者说是应当着眼于此，而恐怖主义分子的目标则是让平民陷入恐惧之中。以此类推，国家情报机关的间谍行为首要着眼于获取安全方面的情报，而非国家的刑事犯罪分子—特别是在经济间谍领域—则主要着眼于获得经济上的好处。

上述区分—例如对网络战争和网络恐怖主义的区分—并非学术上的指法练习，而是对安全实践有着重要的意义，因为归根结底，夸张地讲，遭到攻击后，防御应当瞄准真正的敌人。举个例子，如果网络进攻真地属于北约条约第五章范畴，那么任何人都不会希望防御联盟向A国宣战的理由仅仅是因为A国的某家企业或者某个私人黑客团伙对北约成员国B国的军火工业太感兴趣。

因此，可以做出如下结论：即使同在网络空间，战争、间谍和刑事犯罪也并非有着同样的含义。尽管如此，很多时候人们却是这样做的，因为在现实世界中，日复一日，那些司空见惯和不言而喻的区分颇为棘手，例如国家与非国家，攻击与防卫，军事与民事，或者是网络空间“某一武器”的定义标准。最后，还应当表明从中可以得出何种结论，以及从政治上能够对此做何反应。

结论

首先，可以得出以下结论：第一，不容否认的是，现代社会对关键基础设施的依赖造成其在许多方面容易遭到攻击，电力供应、交通引导系统以及电讯都是现代社会的命脉。此外，上述关键性基础设施相互之间的依赖性也可造成其中一个系统的失灵通过多米诺效应引发一系列重大后

表一：信息战与主要“网络现象”比较

	信息战	网络战争	网络恐怖主义	网络电子间谍/破坏	网络刑事犯罪	黑客行为
行为体	国家 (军队)		非国家 (恐怖主义分子)	国家 (军队/智能服务部门)	非国家 (刑事犯罪分子/ 商业刑事犯罪)	非国家 (积极分子)
空间	真实(现实)世界		虚拟世界			
手段	真正的暴力工具 (武器!)		虚拟“暴力”工具(?) 计算机网络攻击 ≈ “虚拟武器”			
方式	干扰/破坏 C ₃ 系统 & 信息基础设施		心理行为和信息行为 例如通过机器人网络的分散式拒绝服务 通过木马或者内核型蠕虫病毒窃取情报, 破坏或者操纵系统,			
目标	干扰/提供假情报 / 欺骗 / 宣传	获取重要 / 安全相关 / 有价值的情报				突出强调/ 信息失真
	对敌军获得优势	招募士兵/组织/协调 二>给公众带来恐慌	获得智能优势	赚钱 获得商业优势		引起关注

果。但是,同样可以得出如下第二个结论,即事情还没有到那个地步!也就是说,尽管网络战争和网络恐怖主义目前涉及到安全政策,不过这的确更多是网络炒作,而非现实威胁。

就恐怖主义而言,网络空间对恐怖主义分子来说也仍将仅仅充当其策划与实施常规打击的辅助性手段。此外,顶多可以说针对关键性基础设施的有限网络攻击具有可信性,此类攻击旨在“加强”常规攻击的效果,例如,通过干扰通讯网络阻止救援力量。然而,网络恐怖主义并没有对高度依赖关键性基础设施的工业国家的日常运行甚至存在构成严峻的威胁,在可以预见的时间内,不会发生“网络9·11”。在恐怖主义领域,更为令人担忧的情况是目前已经将网络恐怖主义滥用为限制言论自由的斗争性概念,这样一来,国家部门便打着“反恐”的旗号进行网络审查,以阻止不受其欢迎的网络活动。

就网络战争而言,仅限在网络空间的国与国之间进行的影响与真实的武力影响具有可比性的战争在相当长的一段时间内都将是军方的一厢情愿。爱沙尼亚的例子表明,即使断断续续的数据洪水持续了两周,其结果就其造成的损害来说也是相当有限的,尽管结果令人恼火并造成了干扰。

与此同时,有迹象表明该领域在不久

的将来有可能出现令人忧虑的情况,对此应进行进一步的观察,即网络空间不受约束的扩充军备和“战斗行为”。

在此,引人注目的是美国的信息作战行动联合条例和安全政策文献都没有关注伦理角度。战争国际法标准尽管在官方文件中有所提及,但需要考虑的是,计算机网络攻击目前事实上是发生在一个法律真空中,因为在网络空间中,对军事与非军事目标进行的区分或者以可靠的方式将某一后果归结到某个始作俑者身上要比真实战场上困难得多,爱沙尼亚的例子就表明了这一点。

科索沃战争期间,北约使用石墨炸弹令塞尔维亚变电站瘫痪,受到公众舆论的批评,提出批评是正确的,因为相关攻击的结果主要涉及平民。由于网络军事行为具有匿名性,此外实施时也不会造成自己方面的损失,有些国家今后就可能更容易被煽动采取此类攻击。此外,由于网络空间没有民事与军事基础设施之分,网络战争始终存在一种特殊的危险,即民事系统被殃及,或者今后再度完全有意识地成为军事目标的一部分。然而,为什么虚拟战争中就应当适用不同于扔下真的炸弹的规则呢?

从军事角度来看,网络空间存在着“无奇不有”的危险,目前的发展方向是形成

扩展的进攻能力，因为人们认为根本不可能在网络空间进行防御。为了对军备努力进行辩护，甚至已经开始提及网络“威慑”，完全罔顾下述事实，即以威慑相威胁要想奏效，就必须针对真正的对手，正如核武器领域的情况那样。但是，在网络空间准确无误地确认对手的身份却是一个关键性的问题，威慑政策因此是完全错误的。

因此，从政治上讲，应当避免陷入相互保证的破坏这一被误导的逻辑，避免推动网络空间的军备竞赛，而应当致力于网络空间的和平利用，因为在“网络空间战场”上，也应当确保手段的适当性及能够区分战斗人员与非战斗人员。德中两国的政策能够对这一挑战作何反应呢？

只要还来得及，只要网络空间的军备扩充尚能得到遏制，对于目前网络空间的发展给出的外交与安全政策的答案就必须是：给网络和平一个机会！

考虑到网络空间的安全政策挑战，国际社会面临着难得的机遇，能够在真正爆发“历史上”第一场“网络战争”之前及时从军备控制政策上对此做出反应，找到和平共处的规则。德中两国想必都极为关注这样一个进程，因为前面引用过的德国宪法保卫报告说得对，许多可疑的网络空间活动来自中国。美国谷歌公司及美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿女士2010年初对中国

进行的指责随后引起了全球关注。不过根据中国领导人的说法，将此前提及的建立幽灵门等活动归至中国头上是错误的，那么中方理应更为关心共同预防此类活动，澄清事实。德国关注的是免遭来自网络空间的袭击，经与欧洲伙伴协调一致，德国的外交与安全政策也可以在这个问题上奉行致力于达成多边协议和预防冲突的政策。因此，德中两德都可以在网络安全领域发挥榜样作用。

最后，我想提出三个具体的政策行动建议，看一下德中两国怎样才能携手并通过与国际社会的对话对网络空间出现的新挑战进行回应。

首先，中德两国应做出明确的外交宣示，承诺任何情况下都不会首先在冲突中使用网络战争能力。这种短期上来看可以从政治上加以实施的自我约束或者说不首先使用主义或许能够有助于在世界上形成一种克制文化，从长期上则有助于将网络攻击打上禁忌的烙印，正如核武器领域那样。

其次，从中期来看，中德两国应当致力于签订一个国际法条约。类似于太空条约，即和平利用外层空间条约，可以考虑签订一个和平利用网络空间条约，规定为了造福全人类而对网络空间加以和平利用。通过在联合国成立一个相应的委员会，该

条约未来也有望成为就网络空间进行国际安全讨论的一个多边论坛。

再次，为了最终长期解决从军事层面上对网络空间的民事与军事域不予区分的问题，德中两国的外交政策应当敦促人道国际法的进一步发展，达成可靠的定义与协议，对在国与国冲突中使用计算机网络攻击作为武器做出规定。这一无疑带有数据保护法和技术方面巨大难题的长期进程的目标应当是坚持网络空间“民事”与“军事”的可分性，以及能够对“武力”行为进行追溯。

当然，所有与网络空间安全政策相关的计划都涉及重大的责任。为保护公共安全而采取的调节性干预任何情况下都不得转变成对公民自由权利的过度限制。即使面临新的风险，也必须始终确保网络时代的最大福祉，即通过网络空间的无限开放性而新获得的自由。

开放的民主社会始终在某种程度上易受攻击，即使在网络时代，我们也必须并且能够直面这一现实。

Preface

Wolfgang Meyer

This volume makes available papers presented at an international conference in Beijing, People's Republic of China by members of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Working Group of Young Foreign Policy Experts. The conference was hosted by the prestigious China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) of Germany in July 2009.

The Working Group of Young Foreign Policy Experts was established by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in 2001 in order to bring together young experts with an interest and competency in foreign politics. KAS wished to offer them a visible platform for mutually beneficial cooperation on pressing foreign policy issues. In addition, the working group is tasked to improve the identification and subsequent interconnection of foreign policy expertise and relevant commitments in Germany. With the establishment as well as long-term support and promotion of this working group, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung aims to make a meaningful contribution to Germany's foreign policy culture.

The working group consists of about 25 young

academics, journalists, and parliamentary staffers. Some of them did or still receive a scholarship by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung for either graduate or Ph.D. studies. Five scholars participated in this conference. Irrespective of their relative youth, the group has gained national and international recognition as an important voice in German foreign policy discourses.

In 2003 the working group published its first study on "German Foreign Policy in the 21st Century" which the former Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Faction for Foreign and Security Policy and current Federal Minister of Finance, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, presented to the media. The 2009 publication "Impulse 2020" outlines visions for future German foreign politics. It has been presented to the public by the present Minister in the Federal Chancellor's office, Mr. Eckhart von Klaeden MP. The working group has organized international conferences on selected foreign policy topics in Paris, Istanbul, Cadenabbia (Italy) and Moscow and published widely on all aspects of foreign policy and international relations. Mr. Karl Lamers MP, former speaker on foreign politics in the CDU/

CSU Faction was the first patron of this group. Since 2007, Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp, Research Director at the NATO Defence College has served in this function.

The papers presented here address some issues which have been given prominence in other foreign policy dialogues in recent years and months: the world economic and financial crisis of 2008/9 and energy security represent such topics. More general topics include the challenge of failing states and basic approaches to political thinking in China and Germany. One topic stands out as innovative and future oriented: "Cyber-War and Cyber-Terrorism: German and Chinese Perspectives on a Novel Security Challenge".

The conference contributed to improving Sino-German understanding in this important domain. It helped strengthen the relations between the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and one of its long term partners in China, the China Institute of International Strategic Studies. The editors wish to thank the CIISS, the five scholars from Germany and all those who supported the program. Amongst them the German Embassy in Beijing, KAS headquarters in Berlin, the German Agency for International Cooperation (GtZ) in China, the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Foreign Ministry figured prominently.

Differing Perspectives towards International Relations- Germany and China in an International Setting

Dustin Dehéz

Discussions about the role of Germany and the People's Republic of China within international relations are not only characterized by the Sino-German relationship, but also-and perhaps to a greater extent-by the fact that the two states are continually increasing their spheres of activity geographically and politically. The two states are becoming important players in an increasingly interconnected world, and are in danger of coming up against each other both from a productive and competitive point of view. Discussions about the rise of China are being overtaken by the debate concerning the rise of new leading powers within the international system. This process started to become apparent, albeit only vaguely, during the 1990s, after the Cold War had ended, bringing with it the end of an era. Although the People's Republic was an emerging nation, it was still seen as a newly industrializing country and many doubted that its growth would be

sustainable.¹ By contrast, the Federal Republic had only just achieved reunification and the full, long-term economic costs of this were not yet known. Post-unification Germany was seen initially as a leading international power, which now liberated from the frontline of the Cold War, sought to exert its influence globally. Initial challenges to German reunification were fueled by the British government under Thatcher, not least of all due to a fear of a stronger Germany. The uneasiness towards a greater and, above all, more substantial role for Germany on the world stage had two main reasons; these explain, however, why the rise of Germany differs considerably from the developments in China: the sudden empowerment of a state by uniting with another and the historic role of Germany as the greatest aggressor within Europe. In 1990, unification was not seen as the beginning of a modernization process and consolidation of European integration. Rather,

¹ And this view is still held today to some extent, see George J. Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle," *Foreign Affairs*, 83 (2004): 33-46.

it brought with it initially the danger of power politics. Only with hindsight does one realize that German unification was the culmination of Europeanism. The rise of China, on the other hand, is still underway and this process has certainly been advancing more rapidly in recent times than during the last decade of the twentieth century; however, from an historical point of view, China's empowerment is less abrupt than that of its predecessor, instead stemming mainly from a process of development. It remains less consolidated than its sheer economic weight might seem to suggest.

It is no wonder, therefore, that both countries have developed, and continue to do so, in completely different directions. While the rise of China continues unrelentingly and even seems to have been structurally accelerated by the financial crisis, Germany has lost some of its international weight, and this is reflected in Germany's self-image: Germany tends to view itself as a middle power or civil power and this is evident in the country's halfhearted efforts to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations' Security Council. After all, as a middle power, Germany does not see itself as a classic, generalist leading power, rather it views itself as a driving force in specific political fields, in which the Federal Republic has particular skills and for which there may be a need to garner international support; climate change is one such example.² Thanks to its rather pragmatic understanding of its own role, the Federal Republic ranks among the so-called Secondary

Powers, i.e. states whose power is regionally important but is only evident and manifest internationally in particular political fields. This is in contrast to the People's Republic of China, which seems to have overcome this status.

Crossing the Threshold- Uneasiness towards the Rise of China

The rise of China is viewed alternately with hope and fear, and often by the same players; it throws up a number of crucial questions for the international system: can the international system absorb such a massive increase in significance from a single state? Or will the system now follow a different path under China's influence, a path that perhaps deviates from the political consensus within the Western world? These abstract questions can only be answered at present using a small number of indicators, derived from cases where China has already exerted considerable influence on the development of international problems, and which will be selectively addressed and dealt with in this paper: China's role in Africa, in particular in Sudan and Zimbabwe, in the United Nations, in North Korea, and, finally, in terms of the international and military balance of power.

China's Role in Africa

The increasing economic involvement of the People's Republic of China in Africa is viewed with growing concern in Europe, particularly its

2 The definition of a middle power follows that of Husar und Maihold, who link the role of the middle power to "good international citizenship." Jörg Husar, Günther Maihold, "Neue Führungsmächte - Forschungsansätze und Handlungsfelder," in *Neue Führungsmächte: Partner deutscher Außenpolitik*, ed. Jörg Husar, Günther Maihold, Stefan Mair (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 11.

involvement with regards raw materials, which China requires for its own, growing economy. However, academic literature and the media often equate Chinese interest in raw materials with its propensity to safeguard these interests in security terms. Even if such safeguards were possible and even plausible in the long-term, they have remained relatively unpronounced up to now. Marks rightly points out that there are still no indications that Chinese military and educational assistance in African states is designed to undermine the influence of other powers, above all the United States and France. The People's Republic has participated in more than forty security conferences; only at three of these was an African country present, and, in each case, this was South Africa.³ Moreover, although Chinese interest in Africa focuses primarily on the extraction of raw materials, not all African states have suffered as a result. Indeed, the opening up of the African market for China has led to a situation where Asia now faces extreme competition from African products; however, development is still two-tier: on the one hand, African countries with poor governance are struggling to a greater extent with the classic problems of Dutch disease, which is being aggravated by Chinese involvement, particularly in terms of unrestricted lending; and this is causing increased concern within European development circles. States such as Sudan or Zimbabwe are good examples of this. Prior to the arrival of Chinese companies,

Sudan used to import oil, although starting in 2007, it generated revenues of two million US dollars from oil exports; nevertheless, the Sudanese economy has not seen much benefit from this development.⁴ In addition, the presence of Chinese workers in many African countries in 2006, this number already amounted to seventy-five thousand has created a social explosion, which has not been sufficiently addressed by the Chinese side. On the other, though, some African countries have also benefited. Trade alone between China and Kenya quadrupled between 1980 and 1999, without any negative impact on Kenya's production sector. On the contrary, this sector grew between 2003 and 2006 by between four and one-half and seven percent per annum.⁵ In other words, China's involvement in Africa has produced a dilemma: on one side, states with fairly consolidated structures and democratic governance are in a position to benefit from Chinese involvement. On the other, this involvement creates conditions, which make it more difficult for African nations with poor governance and no democratic consolidation to implement and complete the process of transformation; at the same time, it also removes the pressure on these governments to start such a transformation, since the increased capital inflows from the export of raw materials allows them to follow their clientelistic policies. However, one must consider three points in connection with China's role in Africa: firstly, the Sino-African

3 Stephen Marks, "Chinas Sicherheitspolitik in Afrika," in *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 1 (2009): 74-89, here 78-79.

4 Bates Gill and James Reilly, "The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa," in *The Washington Quarterly* 30 (2007): 40.

5 See the positive assessments of Africanists such as Michael Chege and Edward Miguel; c.f. Edward Miguel, *Africa's Turn?* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2009).

relationship has always been a special one. During the Cold War, the People's Republic, in contrast to the United States and the Soviet Union, did not see itself as a superpower, rather as the leading power of the Third World. Against this backdrop, Beijing began nurturing relations with African states shortly after the Bandung Conference of non-aligned states in 1955. Secondly, the unrestricted lending, which is so often criticized, is also nothing new: the People's Republic started providing unrestricted loans to recipient nations as early on as the 1960s. And thirdly, the economic influence of China is nowhere near as great as it is often portrayed in the media: in 2004, only around 2.8 percent of Chinese imports were from Africa.⁶

It is precisely the latter part of this dilemma, which fuels concerns that China could continue blocking a solution to the conflicts in Sudan and Zimbabwe. In 2004 and 2005, China either voted against resolutions of the UN Security Council, which would have called on both states to settle their internal conflicts, or ensured that these resolutions were sufficiently tempered. Resolutions against Sudan and Zimbabwe were seen by China generally as a threat to its investment. The small change, which has been seen in China's African policy since 2006, does not go far enough.⁷ Indeed, the People's Republic of China, the guardian angel of these two regimes, announced in March this year that it would remove Sudan from its list of states

with preferential trade status. And, the appointment of Lui Guijin as the Chinese Government's Special Representative on African Affairs did lead to the People's Republic adopting a less confrontational position within the Security Council. Underlying this is China's less strict position by and large towards the issue of non-interference in the internal affairs of African states. Whereas the commandment of non-interference was strictly adhered to in the past so as to avoid sanctions against Sudan and Zimbabwe, today, China has less recourse to it.⁸ However, this shift is still met with some skepticism: on the one hand, the Chinese position broadly follows the position of the African Union, which has watered down this principle since it was founded; on the other, China's resistance, which has become almost a reflex, towards criticism of its own human rights' abuses or the uprisings in Xinjiang demonstrate that this principle has not been abandoned across the board.

China's Role in the United Nations and as a Regional Peacekeeping Power

Meanwhile, China has begun capitalizing on its own development increasingly in terms of foreign policy and has identified targeted fields for action within international relations, which it can use to enhance its profile and increase its foreign policy capital. As a result, the People's Republic has now become heavily involved in United Nations' peacekeeping missions and has

6 See also Piet Konings, "China and Africa: Building a Strategic Partnership," in *Journal of Developing Societies* 23 (2007): 341-67.

7 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrecht and Andrew Small, "China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy," in *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2008): 42.

8 Stephen Marks, "Chinas Sicherheitspolitik in Afrika," in *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 1 (2009): 79-84.

developed a decided interest in redesigning and improving the functioning of the economic system in the wake of the current global economic crisis.

China's increasingly active foreign policy can be best seen in the United Nations' peacekeeping missions. Following the Korean War, the People's Republic was always reserved in its dealings with the United Nations and provided troops for a UN mission for the first time in 1989 as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia. However, over the last ten years, China's contributions have increased twenty-fold. In 2000, there were still fewer than one hundred Chinese soldiers taking part in United Nations' peacekeeping missions. Meanwhile, China is now among the Top 20 nations providing troops and, as a result, often beats other members of the Security Council: at present, China ranks as number thirteen in terms of military observers and number twelve in terms of police forces.⁹ Furthermore, the People's Republic, which has now channeled more than eleven thousand soldiers into UN peacekeeping missions, is trying to retain and pass on the military experience it has gained, for example through the Peace-keeping Police Training Center in Langfang. Even if these contributions are focused primarily on regions where China's foreign policy displays

an increasing security interest, such as in East Timor, for example, this is still a significant process.¹⁰ While the economic rise of China continues to increase the country's importance within international relations and raise its foreign policy profile, it still supports the system of the United Nations, which it legitimizes through these actions.¹¹ As a result, China also strengthens a tool that is important for German foreign policy. In actual fact, the current world order, which was predominantly shaped by the United States at the end of the Second World War, creates the ideal conditions for emerging states, such as China. After all, this world order has proven more resilient than its forebears and offers easier access.

Recognition and concerns about the rise of China are most evident in questions about regional security in Asia. In addition, the global economic crisis has not just brought about the relative empowerment of China, but also the relative disempowerment of Japan, which means these challenges are currently channeled through two Asia-Pacific superpowers. However, the decisive security questions relate primarily to the conflicts involving Taiwan, Kashmir, and Korea. Whereas many fear intensification in relation to the disputes with Taiwan and Kashmir as a result of the economic and political rise of

9 The Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 139, 141, 144.

10 China first supplied policing forces to the United Nations' East Timor Mission (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UNTAET). See also Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, "China's Expanding Peace-keeping Role: Its Significance and the Policy Implications," in SIPRI Policy Brief 2 (2009).

11 Thus, Hoge's claim that the rise of Asian states requires increased representation on the United Nations' Security Council is false. James F. Hoge, "A Global Power Shift in the Making," in *Foreign Affairs* 83 (2004): 7. On the contrary, here it is clear how much China wishes to preserve the existence of the present system. See Mark Beeson, "Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power," in *Review of International Studies* 35 (2009): 104-10.

China,¹² there is hope that this rise means China is able to act as a peacekeeping power on the Korean peninsula and contain North Korea. The People's Republic of China has already invested considerable political capital in the Six-Party Talks.¹³ North Korea's nuclear test on May 24, 2009 made it clear that China and the West share the same interest, namely the preservation of the current international order. Whereas, in the past, North Korean foreign policy aimed to drive a wedge between China and the West with targeted provocative actions, so as to guarantee Chinese support, this dynamic has changed over the past two years. By using its diplomatic weight in the Six-Party Talks, China's reputation in the world now depends on a containment of North Korea and, in particular, on preventing the proliferation of further nuclear technology and ballistic missile systems by the regime in Pyongyang. In exaggerated terms, the issue of North Korean containment will decide exactly just how much peacekeeping influence the People's Republic of China actually possesses, and so the West is keeping a close eye on China's dealings with North Korea. In light of the changed situation, further provocative actions by Kim Jong Il's regime tend to lead to a Chinese rapprochement with the West, since it catalyzes rather than undermines consensus about the unpredictability of the North Korean regime. Here, the decisive question is whether old, traditional loyalties will continue to overshadow China's

foreign policy, or whether the People's Republic can - in the true sense of the word - afford to break ties with allies that are so out of kilter with the system. The nature of the present shift in Chinese foreign policy coupled with the openness of all American governments since the Clinton administration towards the rise of China has also made it clear that China's growth and the increased significance this brings with it do not inevitably have to lead to clashes in political systems between the United States and the People's Republic of China. If this point of view can establish itself in China, then this could catalyze foreign policy that stabilizes the international system.

China's Military Role

The growing military power of the People's Republic has been viewed for a few years now with some trepidation. Even if there is wide-ranging agreement that China still needs some time to catch up with the military power of the United States, Chinese forces are, today, still capable of defending their country, even in the outlying regions, and China has limited maritime capabilities.¹⁴ However, the lack of transparency in Chinese defense reports is also responsible for the uneasiness the West feels towards the rise of China. It is only possible to make a limited assessment of the capabilities of Chinese forces based on the defense reports that are at times more forthright than at others. Civil-military relations in China are far less modern, retaining

12 Hoge, for example, fears that the conflicts involving Taiwan, Korea and Kashmir could escalate at anytime into open hostilities. James F. Hoge, "A Global Power Shift in the Making," in *Foreign Affairs* 83 (2004): 2.

13 In this case, there would not have been any Six-Party Talks and the People's Republic of China would not have taken the initiative so clearly. See also Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive. How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 158-61.

14 M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Search for Military Power," *The Washington Quarterly* 31 (2008): 126.

their Communist characteristics: the Communist Party controls the military; although, one must ask how much remains of this traditional understanding of civil-military relations. After all, control of the armed forces within Communist systems differs considerably from that in Western models. The concept of egalitarianism starkly contrasts with Western elitism in military circles, and this is expressed through an emphasis on infantry forces; the involvement of the army in the one-party system within Communism differs from the strict divisions drawn between society and the armed forces, and the professional autonomy of Western armed forces does not exist in a Communist system, which sees the autonomy of the ideology as sovereign.¹⁵ This all leads to the relatively singular instance that armed forces, which are being modernized, are being led in a more civilian manner that, anywhere else, would be seen as either historically outdated, consider the Warsaw Pact or should be surmounted as part of transformation efforts, i.e. former Socialist states in Eastern Europe (e.g. Georgia or Ukraine) or sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Ethiopia or Mozambique). Thus, one must ask what type of armed forces China has achieved thanks to its economic growth and how modern these actually are. This question is particularly virulent, since the theory of the "peaceful rise"¹⁶ of China has already lost some ground and there is the fear on all sides that the expansion of the

military sector signals the propensity of China to enforce its own interests not just through the use of soft power, but also in the longer term through the use of hard power.

Outlook

It can certainly be said that China will increasingly shift from being, what the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), recently described as a "blocker"¹⁷ to a partner, which will explore its options and the resultant opportunities for cooperation and thus, will closely resemble the Federal Republic. There is also a changeover taking place within Sino-German relations, which is being fueled both by different fundamental positions and reflected in these mutual interconnections. This is particularly visible in terms of the role of nationalism. Whereas in Germany, nationalism is seen in intellectual circles and by the foreign policy elite as a backward approach, there is growing concern that China's political elite are increasingly using nationalism to bridge social divisions. It is for this reason that one of the persistent questions from a German point of view is whether the speed of the Chinese government's liberalization attempts is enough to diffuse the ambivalent social stratifications. There is a worry that if liberalization is not swift enough, this could lead to disaffection among the population

15 Claude E. Welch, "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality," in *Civilian Control of the Military. Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*, ed. Claude E. Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976): 18.

16 Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive. How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 37.

17 Stefan Mair and Pia Niedermeier, "Deutschland und die neuen Führungsmächte - Potentiale und Grenzen der Kooperation," in *Neue Führungsmächte: Partner deutscher Außenpolitik*, ed. Jörg Husar, Günther Maihold and Stefan Mair (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 269-87.

towards the government. In this regard, particular attention is being paid to the occurrences in the Western regions of China, which are partly Muslim. Furthermore, the different perceptions of nationalism also influence both Germany and China's understanding of its own role. The Federal Republic sees itself as a civil power, which seeks to establish itself as a leading power in particular areas of politics without adopting an overall leading position. If anything, Germany leads through its willingness to transfer particular areas of sovereignty to a supranational level, such as the European Union, or international organizations such as the International Criminal Court. Thus, one can observe an important difference between the Federal Republic and the People's Republic of China, which seems to be looking to increase its foreign policy capital by strengthening its sovereignty. While Germany is stepping out of the limelight within the international concert of powers and the rise of China puts it within the grand circle of leading powers, there is still a concern that the rise of China will create friction. On the other hand, the People's Republic still has a number of good opportunities to use the standing it has gained to strengthen the international system.

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Securing Regional Stability in Areas with Fragile State Structures

Christoph Grams

Fragile Statehood as a security problem?

The expectation of ever lasting peace in relief about the end of the Cold War in 1989/90 has been disappointed heavily. Not later than 1993/94, the international crisis -created through the civil war in former Yugoslavia- made rather clear that the "end of history" was not about to start. Security and its guarantee should stay as relevant topic on world stage - this trend was confirmed by the attacks on the United States in September 2001 and the following wars in Afghanistan (2001-today) and Iraq (2003). Consequently, international terrorism is seen as one of the main threats of our time - together with transnational crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Additionally, new powers appear on world stage, represented by their share in trade and economic strength that rises higher-than-average compared to the "old powers" in Europe, North America or Japan. Economic policy reflects that through the enlargement of international fora (i.e. from G8 to G20) most clearly. But this growing economic and financial strength trans-

lates also into political power - and will increase the responsibility of these powers (i.e. China, India) for the stability of the international order at the same time.

Simultaneously, the increasing dynamics of globalization changed the setting of the global stage during the 1990s. Globalization can be understood as a condition defined by mutually assured dependence and as being not controllable. The dramatic rise of interconnectedness in nearly all dimensions (communications, economy, ecology, social life) changed the strategic framework fundamentally and continues to do this until today. Economic, social or ecological risks can have global impact on security (i.e. climate change, migration). Through this interconnectedness, functioning statehood gains even more importance as a pillar of international stability than it used to have before.

Additionally, we have seen in the last 20 years a growing number of intra-state conflicts with massive violence and human rights abuses, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. These dramatic intra-states conflicts feature the potential of destabilising whole regions through

flows of refugees, often mingle with organized crime that offers the necessary resources to continue with fighting (i.e. "blood diamonds") and offer terroristic structures the freedom to act as they wish. Non-state-actors play a major role in these kind of conflicts which means that many of those groups are not interested in agreements or contracts. Therefore, "Governance" (and the question of how to create it in complex scenarios like Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of Congo) became a major topic of security policy discussions.

If the 1990s witnessed the death of the old rule sets in international politics and security, the new century has not brought yet the new ones clearly into the spotlight. But it became clear that fragile statehood is not a problem as such for international security necessarily, but has to be seen as promoting factor for risks and evolving threads. Therefore, strategies of securing stability for the international order have to start with "Governance" if they want to succeed.

Who is affected by fragile statehood?

Experiences show that the global scope of the problem is relevant. Different rankings by various development institutions (i.a. List of Low Income Countries/World Bank, Human Development Index/UNDP, Governance Indicator/World Bank, Country Policy and Institutional Assessments/World Bank, Failed States Index/Fund for Peace) illustrate that clearly. Surely, one can doubt methodology and statistic outreach of single statements made in these rankings, but they all conform with the overall picture.

These rankings show the following characteristics of countries affected by fragile statehood: They are higher-than-the-average affected by poverty or by war and violent conflict. Often they are countries in post-conflict situations bearing a high risk of falling back into violent conflict or they show characteristics of authoritarian rule that excludes huge parts of their populations from political and economic participation. Usually, one may find these characteristics in combinations. Geographically, countries affected by these symptoms are mainly located in Sub-Sahara Africa, but also in South East / Central Asia.

Getting closer to fragile statehood

The ideal state guarantees in three dimensions a stable framework for its citizens: Security, Rule of Law and Welfare. In these dimensions the state defines the standards and most important is capable to enforce them. But as usually, the picture is not just black or white: A state's ability to enforce standards can differ in the aforementioned dimensions - being strong on security, but being weak on welfare at the same time. That means: If one speaks about fragility, one has always to speak about a spectrum of fragility in specific cases. Failed states are rarely, but failing states are frequently.

This diagnostics does not mean that no set of rules or instruments are existing in the dimensions of weak statehood. Mechanisms of local governance fill the blank space left by the incapable public structures: Clientelism, informal power sharing, instrumentalization of violence

/ conflicts, mobilization of traditional structures or the optimization of external influence for own goals can be named. These "management instruments" of local elites for coping with fragility might change quickly or exist in parallel. Against this background of complex and too often unknown local structures the promotion of "Governance" becomes a very different task if the decision was made to intervene in a specific scenario.

Statebuilding as an answer?

If "Governance" is the answer to the strategic quest of both stabilization and security in areas of special interest, statebuilding comes to the fore. It can be defined by its goal: the sustainable consolidation of state structures and institutions. In general it has to follow three steps:

1. Stabilization of existing structures (if useful),
2. Transformation of existing structures (to enable them to perform better),
3. (Re-)Construction of non-existing structures.

That is easier said than done. As showed, the mechanisms of local governance have to be understood extremely well what requires cultural, regional, and historical expertise of the given scenario. Even if one understands the scenario and the conflict history fully, one has to consider and bear in mind that statebuilding is multi-level politics. The intervening force has to handle the interaction between the local actors, between the local and the external actors, between the different external actors in the field and between the external actors on the strategic level. How difficult that multi-level

politics can be demonstrates the ISAF mission in Afghanistan every day.

Finally, statebuilding should not be confused with Nationbuilding or Peacebuilding, although it overlaps. The latter aim to build peace and reconciliation within a society what is far more ambitious and requires a longer engagement than statebuilding.

Strategies of statebuilding

Statebuilding is complicated. Thus, the reflection about different approaches or strategies in order to decide how to achieve the objectives in the most efficient way is of great importance - simply spoken: It needs a lot of time and requires a lot of resources (Personel, Budgets, etc.). Four main schools of thought are existing:

I. Liberalization first

- a) Priorities:
 - Promotion of Human Rights and democratization
 - De-regulation and privatization
 - Integration into the world market
- b) Time Horizon: short / medium-term
- c) Paradigma of political theory: Liberal approaches (i.e. democracy/peace theorem, market-oriented integration / trade).

II. Security first

- a) Priorities:
 - Strengthening of security sector (i.e. SSR, DD&R)
 - Strengthening of monopoly of coercion
 - Disarmament and segregation of conflict parties
- b) Time Horizon: Short / medium-term

c) Paradigma: Realism (i.e. overcoming the intra-state security dilemma)

III. Institutionalization first

a) Priorities:

- Strengthening "Rule of Law"
- Strengthening of administrative capacities (i.e. budgeting, taxes)
- Strengthening / establishment of institutions for peaceful conflict negotiation

b) Time Horizont: medium / long-term

c) Paradigma: Institutionalism (i.e. bargaining processes, socialization of actors)

IV. Civil Society first

a) Priorities:

- Promotion of non-state-actors (i.e. NGOs, unions, parties)
- Improvement of political participation
- Mobilization of marginalised groups, policies of reconciliation.

b) Time Horizont: medium / long-term

c) Paradigma: Social Constructivism (i.e. Change of identities).

Reasonably, these strategies will not be implemented purely, but rather combined with each other - depending on the needs of the specific scenario. Furthermore, flexible thinking has to be at place: If the overall situation changes, the strategic emphasis might have to change as well.

The current ISAF mission in Afghanistan is a good example for this: Once, it started with a twofold emphasis on liberalization and security which was expressed by the first democratic elections of President and Parliament on the one hand and the defeat of the Taliban on the other hand.

Since 2007/08, the single emphasis of the international engagement is on security and accompanied by the postponement of the elections for parliament in 2010.

If one conducts statebuilding several general difficulties have to be observed:

(a) Interventions always disrupt or at least influence the local power balance, because that is their aim. But the question is how interventions can be conducted in order to avoid escalations which undermine the goal of intervening itself.

(b) Interventions sometimes have to be violent in order to accomplish their goals. On the intervening side should be a consensus about the handling of escalations and spoilers before the intervention starts. Intervention forces have to be prepared properly in order to deal with spoilers if necessary.

(b) Interventions for statebuilding are usually not a national, but a multi-national endeavour that is mandated by the United Nations (UN). Hereby, it is critical for success that there is a coherent understanding of time horizons and resources in order to have success.

(d) Interventions for statebuilding aim to build up sustainable governance structures which are still functioning after leaving the scenario. A choice about integration or non-integration of local governance structures has to be made what requires a broad knowledge about the scenario.

Conclusion

Through the changes of the international order and the establishment of new and strong

dependencies between its actors the problem of fragile statehood has become a major topic of international politics since 1990.

In the recent 20 years many efforts in different regional contexts (i.e. Ex-Yugoslavia, Democratic Republic of Congo/DRC, Afghanistan) have been made in order to find an answer to this challenge. Being far away of ultimate perfection the thinking about the general idea of statebuilding and both its chances and limits continues.

An important aspect of these future debates will be the interaction with the emerging global powers China and India. The concept of national sovereignty has changed with the growing number of failed and failing states, international responsibility over national borders is the key to sustain stability for all. Is this perception shared internationally?

Power is followed by responsibility. If this presentation assists this debate it accomplished what it ought to accomplish.

Germany and the Financial Crisis: Lessons to Be Learned

Stormy-Annika Mildner

Germany is on its way to economic recovery, albeit a slow and hesitant recovery sustained mainly by expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. Even if exports have not regained the losses suffered in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, Germany's exports are growing again. In December 2009, export revenues increased by 3 percent month on month, the fourth consecutive month of expansion. For a country as export dependent as Germany (exports amount close to 50 percent of GDP), an increase in exports is a good sign. Driver for this development is global export demand: Global trade, which had collapsed in October 2008, has begun to recover again. Thus, the free fall of the German economy appears to have stopped. GDP is expected to grow by 1 percent in 2010. But despite these glimmers of hope, a rapid recovery should not be expected. Most likely, the recovery will be L-shaped rather than following a V-curve, and growth rates will not be strong enough to prevent further increases of unemployment; economic recovery remains fragile.

Despite initial hopes, Germany has been hit hard by the global economic and financial crisis in 2008/2009. The economic slump, which affected in particular the manufacturing sector, is Germany's most serious downturn of the postwar era. In 2009, Europe's largest economy shrunk by 5 percent, its exports by almost 15 percent. The unemployment rate hit 8 percent, and the government deficit as percentage of GDP went up to more than 3 percent. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, unemployment will rise to almost 10 percent in 2010. The outlook for the government budget is particularly grim: The budget will move from being balanced in 2008 to a deficit of 5.6 percent of GDP in 2010 and 5.3 percent of GDP in 2011, way above the limit set by the Maastricht criteria of 3 percent.¹ With 77 percent of GDP in 2010, government debt will also exceed the Maastricht limit of 60 percent quite substantially.

That the recession has bottomed out can be attributed to unprecedented fiscal spending and intervention in the economy. The government has passed two stimulus packages totalling over

1 Economist Intelligence Unit, Germany Country Report, February 2010.

€ 80 billion, set aside an additional € 500 billion to rescue troubled banks, and created a € 100 billion "Germany Economy Fund" to provide credit and loan guarantees to non-financial companies. In doing so, policymakers have thrown out plans for a balanced budget. In Germany, as elsewhere, unusual times have called for unusual policy measures taken by both the central bank and the government. While it is too early to judge the long-term effects of German crisis management, this article will serve as a preliminary summary and will discuss some of the risks remaining in the German economy.

Jörg Asmussen, state secretary of the Federal Ministry of Finance, identified two challenges for economic policy-making: The first challenge is crisis management. According to Asmussen, crisis management needed to focus on the resolution of bank-specific problems regarding liquidity and solvency, financial system rescue packages and their implementation, as well as the measures necessary to stabilize the real economy. The second challenge, in no way smaller than the first one, was to enhance the resilience of the financial system.²

Another great challenge for German policy-makers is to design exit strategies out of crisis management. A central question in this context is timing: Tightening fiscal policy too early could endanger growth, acting too late could lead to an even bigger government deficit with the consequence of unsustainable public finances.

Another challenge lies in the reform of financial regulation and oversight. These challenges are not unique as many countries are facing similar problems. The jury is still undecided, whether Germany, and others, will succeed in managing these challenges.

Getting back on Track: Stimulus Packages and Bail-Outs

In its immediate fiscal response to the economic crisis, the focus of the German government, at that point the Grand Coalition between the CDU and SPD, had been on spurring private sector investment and on long-term infrastructure spending, rather than on driving consumption. The Grand Coalition's first stimulus package was passed in November 2008 and came only after much political debate and hand-wringing, and what emerged was a decidedly modest stimulus package. It earmarked approximately €31 billion over two years and, importantly, sought to support growth by incentivizing investment and long-term infrastructure projects more than it did consumption. More specifically, it ensured continued credit flows to small- and medium-sized businesses, extended so-called short-term work from 12 to 18 months, provided infrastructure spending, and a tax write-off for spending on housing and renovations. Furthermore, it offered help for the auto industry by including a tax exemption for purchases of new cars.³ In retrospect the government did not act quickly or decisively enough. One reason for this

2 Jörg Asmussen, "Mastering Global Financial Crisis: A German Perspective," in: *The Washington Quarterly*, 2009 32:3, pp. 197-204.

3 "Die Bundesregierung. „Konjunkturpaket I und II: Impulse für die Wirtschaft.“ Accessed at <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2009/01/2009-01-12-konjunktur-2.html>.

is that the German economy was regarded as crisis-proof, with a stable banking sector and solid banking performance. Another reason lies in mainstream economic thinking: Leading economists and research institutes had consistently argued against Keynesian fiscal policy over the past decade.⁴

As the crisis continued and economic forecasts in Germany and the euro zone grew more grim throughout the fall of 2008 and into early 2009, the Grand Coalition moved toward a second and more aggressive stimulus program. Totalling nearly € 50 billion over two years, the package passed in February 2009 called for € 17 billion in new public investment and tax relief, including reductions in payroll contributions, further support of short-term work as well as continued assistance to the auto industry by granting tax breaks to people who scrapped older cars and bought new ones (cash-for-clunkers, or Abwrackprämie). The government also appropriated an additional € 100 billion in credits for the publicly-held KfW bank to underwrite credit to struggling companies, as well as a special credit program for small- and medium-sized businesses and increased availability of export guarantees. Measured in GDP, the German stimulus was the largest one in Europe.

So far, the German government has distributed €9.7 billion from its credit support fund. 9100 companies have received €5.7 billion of direct lending and €4 billion in loan guarantees. Most of the direct loans went to small companies (94 percent). One of the sectors seeking support in

particular was the ship-building industry. State aid was also granted to the car manufacturer Opel. This decision was highly controversial as Opel's financial distress was clearly not solely a consequence of the credit crunch brought on by the financial crisis. Chancellor Merkel eventually justified the rescue of Opel by pointing at the mismanagement of its US parent company, General Motors GM paid back the state aid in November 2009. Besides Opel, a number of high-profile German companies have either made inquiries or already filed applications for state guarantees, including Porsche, BMW, the construction giant Hochtief, the computer chip manufacturer Infineon and the Wadan shipyards. A look at the history of these companies, however, raises questions regarding the causes of the financial challenges facing these companies. In many cases, strategic misjudgements and financial difficulties preceded the current financial crisis. In this regard the German government rightly rejected a bid by the retailer Arcandor in June 2009. Nonetheless, other countries view the German guarantee programme with suspicion, seeing it as a potential industrial policy tool for rescuing economically and strategically important companies comparable to the French tradition. In the end, the actual effect that this will have on international competition and trade remains to be seen and will largely depend on the degree to which the measures are concentrated on individual (large) companies and industries.

4 Sebastian Dullien, "German Economists have to take some Blame for Merkel's Slow Reaction," in: Eurozone Watch, 3.12.2008.

Automatic Stabilizers: No Need for new Extensive Social Policy Measures

There were two reasons why the government shied away from extensive consumption support measures. The first one is the extensive German social safety net, a fundamental component of the social market economy. During a crisis, it automatically lowers the tax burden and provides for increasing public spending into the economy through increased welfare checks, unemployment benefits, and job protections (automatic stabilization).

According to IMF estimates, Germany's 2009 stimulus spending was 1.5 percent of GDP, slightly lower than for example the U.S.'s stimulus plan, which accounted for nearly 2 percent of GDP. However, because of Germany's large social safety net and its larger automatic stabilizers, the cumulative effect of the German stimulus spending is actually much higher than the stimulus figures imply. According to the IMF, Germany's automatic stabilizers contributed an additional 1.7 percent of GDP to the stimulus measures, making total stimulus spending 3.2 percent of GDP in 2009.

Germany's automatic stabilizers consist mainly of unemployment insurance, welfare payments, job protections, a pension scheme, and health insurance. Unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld I) can be received by persons who have worked at least one year during the two years prior to filing the application. They will receive 67 percent of their most recent net income if they have children and 60 percent otherwise; payments will continue for a period of one year.

Under the recently reformed unemployment insurance program, HARTZ IV, which took effect in 2005, unemployment payments (Arbeitslosenhilfe) and welfare payments (Sozialhilfe) were merged to Arbeitslosengeld II. Currently, the HARTZ IV program provides citizens with € 351 per month, plus the cost of adequate housing. Additional benefits are available for people with young children. During economic downturns, the HARTZ IV program automatically pumps money into the economy by providing for individuals who have lost their job as a result of the crisis.

The Kurzarbeit program (short-term work program) is another feature of the German economy that has automatically increased its expenditures during the crisis. The agency that oversees the program, the German Federal Labor Office, which spent \$270 million in 2008, is expecting to dole out more than \$2.85 billion in 2009 as it seeks to compensate employers who place their employees on short-term work. The short-time working benefit scheme is lauded for its stabilizing effects on the German labor market as the economic downturn led only to a mild increase in unemployment. However, as job support measures will expire and the lagged effects of the downturn will feed through the labor market, employment is expected to increase.

The second reason for the Grand Coalition not to undertake massive consumption-oriented spending was that the multiplier effect of consumption-targeted stimulus spending is exceedingly low in Germany because the country is heavily export-dependent. German consumers have also demonstrated a historically

high personal savings rate. While savings rates declined from a high of about 13 percent in 1991 to near 9 percent in 2000, since 2001 savings rates have once again begun to reach the post-unification average of approximately 11 percent. (In contrast, savings rates in the United States since 1990 have averaged less than 4 percent.) With this high savings rate of consumers, policymakers argue that tax rebates will do little if anything to stimulate growth in the German economy and probably just lead to more saving and thus do little to spur export demand. Instead, as laid out above, German policymakers made investment the priority, providing tax breaks for businesses and export credits, among other measures.

Stabilizing the Financial Sector

In Germany, the financial crisis was largely interpreted as a crisis of the banking system. Thus, leading politicians and policymakers were convinced that dealing with banks' so-called troubled assets was central to addressing and eventually overcoming the crisis. While the IMF estimated that banks around the world hold about €3 trillion of toxic assets, German banks were probably holding approximately €300 billion. How to remove these toxic assets from banks' balance sheets was (and still is) one of the vexing policy issues facing the German government.

German policymakers were relatively late in stepping in to save the banks. Such a direct

intervention in the economy was widely viewed as a last resort, and the German government initially wanted to save banks on a case-by-case basis, rather than using what Merkel called a blanket approach. As a consequence, the German government set up its own deposit guarantees without consulting its European partners, a move harshly criticized by its European peers. On 6 October 2008, the government stepped in to avoid the collapse of Germany's second largest mortgage lender, Hypo Real Estate (HRE). In an attempt to prevent a subsequent run on banks, the government announced it would guarantee all personal bank deposits in the country. With regard to a concerted European rescue plan, the German government believed that "each must endeavor to solve the problem with the means and methods available to them."⁵ Former German finance minister Peer Steinbrück defended the government's original approach: "In some judgments we may have been wrong and our timing was perhaps not perfect, but you can only make a judgment based on the information you have at the time. And I maintain that the scope of this financial market crisis was not clear until deep into August or September."⁶

After the worsening of the crisis in fall 2008, however, the government changed its tactics: The first step taken in this direction was in October, when the Bundestag passed a law creating the Special Fund for Financial Market Stabilization (known by its German acronym, Soffin), a bank bailout package of nearly €500 billion, the largest ever in postwar Germany.

5 William Kole, "European Union tested by world economic crisis," *Times of India*. 7 October 2008.

6 "German Parliament Approves 500b Euro Financial Bailout," *China Daily*, 18 October 2008.

Along with € 400 billion to guarantee banks' loans, it also contained € 100 billion for re-capitalization. The fund was established to safeguard the stability of banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other financial institutions in Germany in order to stabilize the financial system. It was used, for example, to shore-up Hypo Real Estate with nearly € 52 billion, to partially nationalize Commerzbank after its purchase of Dresdner Bank, as well as spending € 13 billion to bailout HSH Nordbank.

But it was not until mid-May 2009 that Chancellor Merkel's government put together a plan for a so-called "Bad Bank" to help rid German banks of their toxic assets. The plan, created by Steinbrück, called for German banks to set up structural investment vehicles, in which they could then off-load their toxic securities. These toxic assets would be refinanced by the new companies by issuing state-backed bonds to the banks which originally held the assets. The refinancing was to be funded through Soffin, meaning that there would be no need for additional bailout funds. The plan was of course not without its own risks: if a bank's "bad bank" sees significant losses, then shareholders would have to forego all or part of their dividend. The first bank to establish such a bad bank under the direction of Soffin was the state bank of Nordrhein-Westfalen, WestLB. The bank plans to transfer toxic assets worth € 85bn to the new institution by April 30, 2010.

Most of the far reaching support for the financial sector came out of Soffin. By December 2009, Soffin had received applications for support

worth € 238.2 billion and had approved support measures of € 148 billion. Most of the help was granted in form of loan guarantees. This approach seems to have been successful. So far Soffin has not realized any losses.⁷

Setting New Rules for Financial Markets

The reform of financial regulatory oversight does currently not rank high on the German political agenda. According to Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) the issue will not be tackled before the second half of 2010 and the state elections in Nordrhein-Westfalen due to the political explosiveness of the issue. Reforms of the three pillar banking system - public sector banks, cooperatives, and commercial banks, which differ with respect to ownership and objectives - are not planned.

Amidst the financial and economic crisis, Chancellor Merkel's cabinet agreed to extend the powers of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (German: Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht; BaFin) in March 2009. BaFin was granted the power to increase liquidity and equity requirements for banks if it deems them to be at risk. BaFin was also given the power to prevent the payout of dividends and other funds to foreign parent companies. Financial institutions will be required to share more operational information with BaFin, including but not limited to leverage levels of financial institutions'. Finally, BaFin was also allowed to vet members of financial institutions' boards to ensure that they are adequately

7 Economist Intelligence Unit, Germany Country Report, February 2010.

qualified. If BaFin decides an individual is not sufficiently qualified, then it has the legal authority to find a replacement.

Apart from these small regulatory reforms, the coalition began to debate an overhaul of the financial oversight architecture as the financial crisis had also disclosed regulatory deficits. This was picked up by the new coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals, proposing to entrust the Bundesbank with full banking supervision (maybe even with the supervision of insurance companies). In the past, the SPD had always opposed such a merger. Currently BaFin oversees banking institutes, insurance companies and securities trading enterprises. It shares its banking supervision with the Bundesbank. The financial crisis has shown that supervision of the financial system will have to become more systemically-oriented in the future. This implies that the interconnectedness of financial institutions must be taken into consideration, which can best be met, according to the CDU/FDP, by having one and not two banking supervisors.

Integrating BaFin's banking supervision into the Bundesbank would not only entail job losses at BaFin, but what is more, many technical issues need to be resolved first with regard to the division of competencies. One central question is: How can the execution of sovereign powers be aligned with the autonomy that a central bank enjoys with regard to the conduct of monetary

policy? While initially being critical about the reform proposal himself, President of the German Bundesbank, Axel Weber, tried to dispel these worries: "It is important to separate monetary decision-making from other decisions".⁸ The French central bank could be a model for this. Its bank regulations department is organizationally separated from the other departments and legally independent.

Germany's hesitant approach towards national financial regulatory reform is mirrored on the European level. Although the country, which is a strong supporter of the Single Market, repeatedly called for stringent financial market supervision, so far it has played anything but a catalyst in the European debate. While it supported the establishment of a systemic risk regulator and a stronger cooperation between national regulatory bodies, Germany was critical of giving the new institutions too much power. Axel Weber warned that "Institutions matter. However, it would be very unwise to believe that the creation of new bodies at the European or global level and some institutional reform alone will prevent the reoccurrence of a similar crisis. Ultimately, it is the regulation of financial markets that matters when it comes to creating a more resilient financial system".⁹

Currently, financial institutions in Europe are mainly controlled by national authorities even though the industry is increasingly engaged in cross-border activities. The financial crisis

8 Quoted in: Tobias Beayer and Christine Mai, „Wie die Bankaufsicht funktioniert“, Financial Times Deutschland, 8 October 2009.

9 Axel Weber, Institutional Responses to the Crisis and Thoughts on Regulatory Issues, Introductory remarks at the Central Bank of Luxembourg conference "Financial Stability and Banking Regulation in Germany and Turkey", Luxembourg, 3 November 2009.

restated the need for better European supervision. Therefore, an ad hoc high-level group on financial supervision, lead by Jacques de Larosière, formerly managing director of the International Monetary Fund, was established by the EU executive in October 2008 to issue proposals on financial supervision. The panel presented its findings in February 2009, the Larosière Report, which was fully endorsed by the European Commission in May 2009. On May 27 the Commission proposed a "Communication on Financial Supervision in Europe". The Commission agreed that the European Central Bank's (ECB) powers over macro-supervision to prevent systemic risks should be strengthened and that national cooperation over micro-prudential supervision of cross-border financial groups needed to be enhanced.¹⁰ The Commission planned a European Systemic Risk Board for macro-prudential supervision (ESRB) and European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) for micro-prudential supervision. The Commission adopted its proposal late September 2009. Thus, the Commission decided against the ambitious idea of establishing a single EU supervisor with binding powers.

The newly-proposed European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC, later changed to European Systemic Risk Board), is to prevent major disruptions in the EU financial markets. Traditionally, the framework for regulating the financial sector is focused on micro-prudential regulation, i.e. limiting the risk of financial distress of individual financial institutions. As a

result, the systemic risk in the financial markets was underestimated. European Systemic Risk Council's task will provide macro-prudential supervision, i.e. to monitor and assess risks to the stability of the financial system as a whole (systemic risks). The board is to function as an early warning mechanism and can make, if necessary, recommendations for action where needed. Members of the Board are the member states' Central Bank Governors, representatives of the European Central Bank and the European Commission.

While oversight of specific financial institutions would remain in the hands of national authorities, the Commission proposed three new EU authorities to better coordinate micro-prudential supervision of around 40 cross-border banks and insurance firms which alone hold two-thirds of the EU's total assets. The three authorities will replace the existing committees supervising EU banks, insurances and securities (CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR) and would be divided into three sub-groups to oversee different kinds of financial institutions: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). The European Supervisory Authorities' tasks are, among other things, to develop proposals for technical standards and better regulation principles, resolving cases of disagreement between national supervisors and play a coordination role in emergency situations.¹¹

10 EurActiv, EU Leaders Back Financial Supervision Overhaul, 19 June 2009, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/eu-leaders-back-financial-supervision-overhaul/article-183341>; EurActiv, Commission Tables Banking Supervision Plan, Faces Criticism, 28 May 2009, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/commission-tables-banking-supervision-plan-faces-criticism/article-182687>.

On December 2, EU finance ministers agreed on the proposed reforms, albeit with quite a few changes with regard to the power of the new institutions.¹² In particular, the European regulators will not have the authority to give direct orders to the relevant financial institution during a crisis. Furthermore, decisions by the European regulators can be overturned by a simple majority within the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin).

Opposition towards the Commission's plans is significant. Many European member states fear that the reform could deprive them of effective control over the financial institutions operating in their territory, ultimately affecting their fiscal responsibilities. An issue high on the German agenda is the problem of burden sharing in the case of a cross-border bank failure. Germany, together with the UK, belonged to a group of member states which strongly opposed that the new authorities should be able to take any decisions with fiscal consequences for member states. Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble emphasized that European supervisory structures needed to be made more efficient and effective, however without weakening national authority. Likewise, the rights of national Parliaments needed to be respected (referring to their authority over fiscal policy-making).¹³ The CDU's speaker for financial issues in the Bundestag, Otto Bernhardt, argued that European intervention was only desirable with

regard to systemic relevant financial institutions, not medium and small financial companies. Without doubt he was thinking about Germany's Sparkassen (thrift institutions).¹⁴

Germany's proposals on the international level in the realm of the G20 were a bit more proactive but have met little success so far. Along with Chancellor Merkel's calls for globalizing the principles of the social market economy, she also strongly advocated a more muscular and authoritative global financial regulatory system. Specifically, Merkel called for the creation a "UN Charter of Sustainable Economic Activity" modeled upon the UN Charter of Human Rights and a United Nations Economic Council as the foundation of a new global regulatory system in a January 2009 conference in Paris. The role of this new UN organization would be to determine global standards and make sure "that we don't live beyond our means." In the speech Merkel also made it clear she sees the crisis as a "chance to reorganize the international architecture of institutions." The existing UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) busied itself only with writing reports and lacked any real formative power to regulate the global economy. Drastic measures were needed, she concluded, because the severity of the crisis proved that the global community lacked sufficient institutions and regulations to deal with the risks of globalization. In short, what Merkel called for was a "twenty-first century institutional archi-

11 Commission Adopts Legislative Proposal to Strengthen Financial Supervision in Europe, Brussels, 23 September 2009.

12 Council of the European Union, Press Release, 2981st Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs Brussels, 2 December 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/111706.pdf.

13 „EU-Finanzmarktaufsicht beschlossen“, in: Wirtschaftsblatt December 2, 2009.

14 EurActiv, Bundesbank vs. EU-Finanzaufsicht, November 13, 2009.

ecture that truly reflects global interdependence." Finally, Merkel said that in the coming years it would be the task of the EU to be "a voice for the social market economy in the international order."

At the G20 summit in London at the beginning of April 2009, Merkel continued to push for stronger international standards for market regulation. Merkel and her government have thrown their weight behind a report, drawn up for the EU, that argues for an extension of financial market supervision to all financial institutions (including hedge funds, private equity firms, and rating agencies), a tightening of equity requirements for banks, and an international system that could detect-and warn against-asset price bubbles. Merkel has also joined ranks with the French in calling for regulations that clamp-down on tax havens in countries like Switzerland.

Exit Strategies: Consolidating the Budget

While 2010 will not see a considerable change in economic policy-making, the government is already focused on exit strategies from its fiscal stimulus in order to ensure that consolidation of the public finances can take place in the medium term. For one of the enduring successes of the Grand Coalition had been to avoid deficit spending and, in 2007, the federal government was nearing a balanced budget before the outbreak of the financial crisis. With hyperinflation and economic chaos of the 1920s

hanging heavy in the nation's collective memory, German politicians and policymakers have argued that deficit spending is ineffective in fostering long-term growth and that a high level of government debt would lead to inflation. This strong fiscal conservatism reached in fact beyond the traditional CDU base and across political and public opinion. Much of this is also due to the experiences of the 1990s: The large expenditures required for rebuilding eastern Germany, the national debt that Germany incurred in doing so, and their attempts to balance the budget in the late 1990s led to slow growth rates.

Already in the midst of the crisis, German politicians and policymakers moved to ensure that, once the crisis subsides, the country will once again have a balanced, or at least nearly balanced, budget: In June 2009, German legislators moved to limit public debt levels through a constitutional amendment. The objective is to limit structural deficits and to avoid pro-cyclical policies by enhancing budgetary disciplines in periods of economic recovery while creating the necessary room to accommodate economic downturns.¹⁵

Passed by the required two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and by the upper house, the Bundesrat, by a margin of 13-3, the law is primarily aimed at states' budgets and only allows states to take on new debt to pay off old debt beginning in 2020. For the federal budget, the new law will take effect in 2016 and will limit new borrowing to 0.35 percent of the

15 Jörg Asmussen, "Mastering Global Financial Crisis: A German Perspective," in: *The Washington Quarterly*, 2009 32:3, pp. 197-204.

country's GDP. While the new amendment includes several exception clauses, allowing the federal government to bypass most of the law's provisions by declaring an emergency, governments will be constitutionally obligated to reduce their debts to the specified levels during times of economic growth and increasing government revenue.¹⁶ Seeking to move away from the current deficit spending and towards the days of balanced budgets before the outbreak of the financial crisis and recession, German lawmakers made fiscal discipline a matter of constitutional law.

Fiscal policy, such as the timing and size of tax cuts, has been one of the most contentious issues in the new coalition of CDU and FDP after the federal elections 2009. The CDU wants to start the process of fiscal consolidation in 2011, the FDP, however, wants to implement its long proposed tax cuts. Given the fiscal outlook and the unusually large government deficit, tax cuts seem not to be an option in the immediate future without also reducing government spending, i.e. cutting government services. Without doubt this will prove difficult within the current climate of increasing popular calls for government intervention and regulation. Polls show that the German public is weary about the deficit and critical towards further tax cuts in the light of increasing government deficits.

Conclusion: Challenges for German Economic Policy-Making

As for many other countries, 2008/2009 was a period of trial and error and muddling through in economic policy-making, in which not so much principles but pragmatism set the tone. In 2010/2011, the German government faces three main challenges: 1. placing the economy on a sustainable recovery path, 2. finding the right time and way to end expansionary fiscal crisis-policy in order to curb possible inflationary pressure, and 3. consolidating the increasing government deficit.

Thus, Germany needs to address shortcomings in its financial system (foremost the state banking system - Landesbanken) as well as the national and European financial regulatory architecture. Due to strong opposition from the financial sector this is not going to be an easy task. Even more difficult, however, will be re-adjusting Germany's growth strategy. The economic crisis has shown that the German economic model, export-oriented growth, is highly vulnerable to international demand fluctuation. But the question of how to foster demand in the medium- and long-term is not easy to answer. One of the debated solutions is lowering taxes. Given the increasing deficit, this is not an immediate option, however. Lowering taxes is also not advisable as there is a great need

16 "Bundesrat beschließt Schuldenbremsen," Spiegel Online, 6 June 2009. „Bundesrat verankert Schuldenbremse im Grundgesetz," FOCUS Online, 12 June 2009. Accessed at http://kurse.focus.de/news/UPDATE-Bundesrat-verankert_id_news_109095078.htm. Cf. "Schuldenbremsen durch den Bundesrat verabschiedet," Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 12 June 2009. Accessed at http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nr_82/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Finanzpolitik/2009/06/20091206__PM25.html.

for continued government spending in the areas of education, research and development, in particular with regard to renewable energies, and infrastructure in order to foster growth potentials and to thus secure future economic growth.

For the coming years, economic policy-making will remain anything but easy. One thing is certain: It will take decisive action and great reform willingness to reset Germany on a sustainable economic growth path.

Global Energy Supplies

Implications of common requirements and challenges for German-Chinese relations

Antje Nötzold


In view of the common requirements, challenges and possible solutions of Germany and China with respect to global energy supplies, I shall focus on crude oil and natural gas, although I am well aware of the significance that coal has for covering China's energy needs. However, global trade in coal is subject to risks and possible bottlenecks to a far lesser extent than oil and gas. I shall therefore start with a brief description of the distribution of reserves, the production and the consumption of oil and gas followed by an explanation of the important factors affecting worldwide supplies of these fuels. I shall go on to describe the resulting worldwide interdependence with respect to securing energy supplies and conclude by setting out the European approach to improving energy supplies, which also represents that pursued by Germany.

Worldwide distribution of reserves, production and consumption

To facilitate understanding, two terms often used in the discussion on fossil fuels need to be distinguished from one another first: Reserves are those quantities of an energy commodity whose existence has been proved and which can be recovered economically by currently available technical means. Distinct from this are resources; these are either quantities that have been proved but whose exploitation is currently not economically or technically viable or quantities that are surmised to be present on the basis of geological indicators.

Looking at the regional distribution of worldwide oil reserves, the Middle East stands out as the region holding the majority of the reserves with some 60 percent, as expected. At the same time, however, the Middle East only contributes around 30 percent to worldwide oil production,

Fig. 1: Worldwide distribution of crude oil by region



Based on: British Petroleum (ed.): BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, p. 6, 8, 11.


while the remaining regions produce more than the quantities corresponding to their respective proportions of world reserves. Accordingly, oil in the Middle East will be the last to run out, which in turn means that only this region will be able to compensate for the decline in production in other regions in the medium term in order for worldwide demand to be fulfilled. After North America and Asia Pacific, Europe is the third largest consumer region, yet it has only marginal reserves itself amounting to a mere 1.4 percent.

It's a similar picture for the worldwide distribution of natural gas reserves; there are, however, a few significant differences, especially with respect to the significance of the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The region encompassing Russia and the

other CIS states owns roughly one third of all gas reserves, with Russia on its own being the country with the largest gas reserves worldwide, followed by Iran and Qatar. But the CIS region does not only have the greatest reserves and the largest proportion of world production, it also consumes a large amount itself as the second largest natural gas consumer worldwide. What might come as somewhat of a surprise is the magnitude of the gas reserves in the Middle East; this is due to the fact that there has been comparatively little gas production in this region to date and that consumption is roughly equivalent so that hardly any gas has been exported in the past. Europe is also the third largest consumer of natural gas, while once again owning the smallest proportion of the reserves.

When we look at the remaining quantity of

Fig. 2: Worldwide distribution of natural gas by region



Based on: British Petroleum (ed.): BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, p. 22, 24, 27.

reserves, disregarding the regional distribution for the moment, current oil reserves are sufficient for some 40 years and natural gas reserves for a further 67 years with production staying at current levels. But these statistics are not only affected by the yearly production volumes. According to the earlier definition of the term reserves this is a dynamic category, which means that there are possibilities of increasing the reserve quantities.

In addition to current capacities from the fields already in production, the reserves also include known deposits that are available for exploration. In addition, there are further possibilities of new reserves. For one, the discovery of new deposits, whose potential would, however, be small, since all oil-bearing sediments and basins around the world have already been examined.

This means that there are at best chances of finding significant new deposits at great ocean depths or in the polar regions. Greater potential might lie in a reevaluation of known deposits due to technical advances, falling costs, or changing assumptions about the oil price on the world market and therefore the profitability of extraction, which determines how reserves or resources are categorized. Production periods might, for instance, be extended or the recovery rate of fields increased, and non-conventional oils such as oil sands, extra-heavy oil or oil shale might be utilized. Accordingly, the recategorization of resources into reserves offers considerable potential for covering the globally rising demand in the medium term.

There are far fewer surveys about the precise scale of the resources, but even if the assum-

ptions on resources are included in the considerations concerning regional distribution, the Middle East remains dominant with respect to crude oil. But the CIS and Africa also possess a considerable resource potential. In the case of natural gas, it is the CIS in particular that has enormous resources. All this means that the potential of future reserves also does little to change the fact that a small number of regions dominate so that the medium-term problem of energy supplies lies less in the finite nature of the raw materials and more in the regional distribution of their deposits!

This is particularly significant since the largest consumer regions - Europe, South-East Asia and North America - only have small reserves of their own and the regions with the remaining reserves and those with the greatest demand are geographically disparate. In Europe, for instance, there is an increasing gap between the region's own production and its consumption of oil and gas. As early as 2002, the EU had to import 76 percent of the oil it required as well as 49 percent of its natural gas. For 2030, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is forecasting that the EU will be dependent on imports for 94 of the oil and 81 of the gas it will need. In spite of the ambitious European targets for increasing energy efficiency and developing renewable energy sources, the EU's import requirements will rise considerably. With respect to natural gas, the EU will actually be the consumer with distinctly the strongest increase in demand in the period up to 2030, which will need to be covered entirely by additional imports because of the rapid decline in its own production in the North Sea.

Europe is not alone with this prognosis, since the demand for oil and gas will increase strongly around the world at the same time, with the growing Asian economies in particular having enormous influence by boosting the demand for fuels in the course of their economic development. While the IEA forecast in 2004 that by 2030 the region encompassing South and Eastern Asia would be responsible for 40 percent of the additional demand for crude oil and 21 percent for natural gas, respectively, the World Energy Outlook 2009 foresees that 43 percent of the additional demand for oil and 65 percent of the demand for coal by 2030 will come from China alone.

And dependence on the import of resources will continue to increase in the People's Republic as well so that it will have to import 74 percent of its oil requirements in 2030 compared to 34 percent in 2002 according to a prognosis by the IEA. China is not alone in the region with this development. India too will have to cover as much as 91 percent of its crude oil requirement from imports in 2030, and Indonesia, the largest crude oil producer in the region, had already become a net oil importer by 2004. In this situation, the new consumers are trying to diversify their imports on the global commodity markets, while the remaining reserves are concentrated in a small number of regions and countries. In spite of this, it is by no means inevitable for conflicts to arise between the countries' energy strategies, since securing their energy supplies does not represent a zero sum game. Instead, the different consumers are dependent on one another in this objective, as I shall explain in more detail later on.

Geopolitical situation regarding the reserves

On the question of the existing influencing factors and risks affecting global energy supplies, the geopolitical situation of the reserves shall be considered first. With around 70 percent of the conventional global oil and gas reserves, the so-called "strategic ellipsis" represents the region with the largest remaining reserves. It comprises the regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caspian Sea area plus Russia. In the long term, the entire global energy demand will therefore concentrate on these three regions, since this is where the reserves will be the last to run out.

In spite of the above-mentioned dominating production volumes in the Middle East and Russia, there will still be opportunities for diversification in the medium term. For oil, slight increases in production are expected in Russia, Africa and the Caspian Sea area. For gas, the significance of the Caspian Sea area, Africa and especially the Middle East will grow. In this context, the technology of liquefied natural gas in particular, referred to as LNG, will allow gas to be imported cost-effectively from more remote regions as well.

In this scenario, Europe is in an advantageous position geographically through its relative proximity to the main reserve regions, but it is affected like all consumers by the fundamental problems of those regions, namely their political and socio-economic instabilities, which increasingly make it more difficult to exclude the possibility of energy bottlenecks through drastic price increases or even more serious supply

crises. Today, ten of the 14 leading oil exporting states are classed as unstable, which means that 50 percent of worldwide energy demand is covered by countries whose domestic political instability represents a high risk to the reliable provisioning of all fuel importers. Such instabilities not only make temporary supply disruptions or stoppages likely but also affect particularly the conditions for investments in the production and export installations of the regions and thereby in the long term also the possible production volumes. Especially in the regions of the strategic ellipsis, investments in excess of eleven trillion US dollars will be required in the period to 2030 in the oil and gas sector alone to allow new fields to be opened up for production, which corresponds to several hundred billion US dollars a year. To cover the expected oil demand of 120 million barrels a day in 2030, it will not only be necessary for the additional 40 million barrels of daily production capacity to be newly developed. A large proportion of the current production of 80 million barrels will also need to be sourced from elsewhere, since many fields are becoming depleted and will therefore need to be replaced. Furthermore, the export infrastructure will need to be refurbished and expanded, and the reserve production capacities, on whose essential importance I shall speak later, will need to be increased.

Means of transport and supply lines

One further influencing factor is the geographic distance between the areas of fossil fuel production and consumption. The fuels need to be transported around the world, partly over vast

distances. Crude oil and natural gas are transported mainly by tanker or pipeline. While pipelines are reliable, unaffected by environmental factors and most economical within the same continent, they do require high investments, take a long time to build and are inflexible since they are tied to a specific route. In most cases, they also cross transit countries, whose willingness to cooperate and whose political stability are also crucial to a steady supply. Transporting oil by pipeline is relatively low-cost, even over long distances. The transportation of natural gas is generally considerably more cost-intensive and the use of pipelines uneconomical over longer distances. However, natural gas can be liquefied by cooling it to $-160\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ and then transported in special tankers as LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). Although this alternative is initially considerably more capital-intensive, since liquefaction installations, special tankers, terminals with storage containers and regasification installations are required, technological advances are making LNG more economical all the time and thereby the transportation of gas over even large distances as well. This means that LNG might open up new import regions, especially in Europe, which is procuring its natural gas predominantly via pipeline at the moment, and allow a limited spot market for natural gas to be established, which might compensate for short-term disruptions to supplies. Three quarters of all crude oil is already transported by tanker these days, since it is the cheaper alternative and provides flexibility. A growing additional trade in LNG will however increase the risks involved in tanker transportation.

The main shipping routes of oil transportation are characterized by so-called choke points. A total of roughly 37 million barrels of crude oil a day are being transported through these canals, straits and waterways. Virtually the entire oil from the Middle East is exported through these strategically important choke points. Some 17 million barrels and thereby around 20 percent of worldwide oil demand pass through the Strait of Hormuz every day for instance. For exports to Europe, the tankers also have to pass through the Bab el-Mandab passage and the Suez Canal, and those bound for Asia through the Strait of Malacca amongst others. Besides these waterways becoming overcrowded, the security of the tankers represents an even greater risk in the sometimes very narrow sections, where they are vulnerable to piracy, terror attacks and accidents. The mentioned canals and straits therefore represent high risk areas. There are not only the dangers from leaking oil or the explosion hazard of LNG tankers to consider, but the blockade of an important trade route would seriously disrupt transportation and thereby the supplies of oil and gas.

Changes within the resource markets

Such disruptions to the supply affect all consumers through the repercussions for the global raw material market and the oil pricing, especially in view of the extremely low level of free production capacities. Up to the onset of the economic crisis in the middle of 2008, there had been a dramatic decline in the free production capacities over several years. In addition to the enormous increase in demand since 2004, the reasons included the phase of low oil prices at

the end of the nineties resulting from the financial crisis in Asia. Between the end of 1998 and the beginning of 1999, the oil price even fell to below 10 US dollars per barrel. There was also uncertainty about future demand, which meant that exploration activities and investments for long-term capacity increases were put on hold. Due to the long planning phases involved, this cannot be remedied at short notice. Consequently, the entire production capacity needed to be used to satisfy rising demand. This in turn meant that there were hardly any reserve capacities available in production that could compensate for possible supply disruptions in times of crisis and conflict by temporarily increasing production. If there are hardly any capacities available, the market reacts very sensitively to even the smallest losses of production because of the lack of a buffer. Examples of this included fears of further terror attacks in the Middle East, unrest and strikes in important production countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela, as well as hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico such as Katrina, which were immediately reflected in sudden price rises in the oil market.

As a consequence of the large drop in oil prices since last summer and uncertainties about future demand because of the worldwide economic crisis, there is a threat of this situation recurring when the economy starts recovering. The IEA has already forecast possible bottlenecks in the supply of oil, for instance, if the economic recovery is swift, since many production countries are currently postponing investment plans for projects to develop the last few fields, which are getting ever more costly.

Worldwide interdependence and political approach pursued by Germany

However, a tight market not only promotes excessive oil prices and unforeseen sudden price increases, but it can also lead to a politicization of the oil market and intensify rivalries between the large importing countries in their efforts to maintain access to the commodities. However, this is of no help to any consumer trying to secure energy supplies for the long term. But since the supply situation is shaped by the same influencing factors and risks for all consumers, as outlined earlier, energy supplies are characterized by worldwide interdependence and no party can bring about a lasting solution on its own.

In this worldwide energy supply system, producers and consumers have common interests. They depend on one another and are all intent on diversifying their import and export markets, respectively. Both desire reliable, transparent and consistent trade relationships and both need secure transport channels. Similarly, energy consumers share common interests - and therefore so do China and Germany as part of Europe. Securing energy supplies is therefore not a zero sum game. It must be in the interest of every energy consumer that other countries are able to satisfy their energy requirements and sustain their economic strength. The current financial and global economic crisis has brought out the interdependence within the global economy and within trade.

The German approach to the improvement and securing of energy supplies, which is reflected

in the European energy policy, takes this into account. It is based on the following principles and promotes their implementation at an international level. One essential component is active demand management to control the energy mix and the use of individual fuels by providing support for sources of renewable energy and new technologies for clean energy usage through better power stations, the promotion of carbon capture and storage technology, or fusion energy in the long term. One general further objective is to reduce energy demand overall through improvements in energy efficiency, the decoupling of energy demand from economic growth, and energy savings.

The second principle is the reliance on market mechanisms. In this context the European and German policy aims for the proliferation of the principles of free and fair trade in the energy sector as well. Because the greater the volumes of fuel offered on the market, the easier will it be for all import-dependent parties to satisfy their demand, for risks to be spread, and for demand and supply to permit realistic pricing. To promote these principles worldwide, the EU is encouraging dialog and collaboration with both producers and transit countries as well as with other consumers.

With this approach, Germany, the EU and the other European states are aiming to apply a joint policy based on principles shared worldwide - such as those applying to other commodities regulated by the WTO. This would enable all parties acting within the energy supply scene - both producers and consumers - to be guided by free-market principles and to operate under the same rules and conditions. Because rivalry

and energy provision oriented along geopolitical lines will not solve the energy supply problem in the long term in view of global economic integration and the fact that the influencing factors affect the entire world.

Give Cyber-Peace a Chance! **German and Chinese responses** **to a new** **security policy challenge***

Frank Sauer

Introduction

"Bytes, not bullets, are the new ammo!" the enthusiastic prophecies of think-tanks and defense ministries have read along these lines since the 1990s. And it is true - the technologies of the information age not only allow for the transformation of standard, routine elements of warfare; what to date had been nothing more than Science Fiction now appears to be within reach - a new theater of war is emerging: cyberspace.

In actual fact, "cyberspace" is a relatively recent phenomenon - but one that has already revolutionized our daily lives with the Internet. This article will critically evaluate the extent to which it is also relevant in terms of security policy. The key issue is whether the virtual world really poses a serious threat, or whether what we are dealing with here is instead "cyber hype", that is, the overestimation of cyberspace as the source of potential security risks.

Before we can illuminate this issue, the first step must be to reconstruct how cyber war, cyber terrorism and similar terms made it onto the security policy agenda. The second step will then be to investigate what precisely it is we are dealing with when talking about "cyber" phenomena. Lastly, several thought-provoking impulses and suggestions for German and Chinese foreign and security policy will be put forward. How could, or should China and Germany respond to the issue of cyberspace with respect to security policy in practice?

Cyber War and Cyber Terrorism

The concept of cyber war, which originated in the USA, has been the subject of debate in academic circles and among representatives of the military and security policy since the early 1990s. Now, however, cyberspace is attributed importance with respect to security policy not only in the USA, but also in China and Russia, as well as, to a slightly lesser degree, in Germany.

* This essay is based on a speech presented by the author on July 22, 2009 in Peking at a conference jointly staged by the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) called "China and Germany as Actors in World Politics: Mutual Challenges, Common Positions".

In 2001, the US government believed that 30 states have aggressive cyber war programs in place. George W. Bush's administration officially declared "cyber warfare" to be a growing threat for the USA, and even went as far as comparing "hack attacks" with the risk posed by Soviet nuclear weapons during the Cold War. President Barack Obama also considers American security in cyberspace to be under threat and has appointed a "cyber czar" in his administration to coordinate approaches regarding this issue. As far as cyber war is concerned, the American military forces take a proactive approach. For some time now, the US Air Force alone has deployed more than 40,000 soldiers in "cyber operations", to secure the supremacy of the American forces not only in the air and in space, but also in cyberspace. A dedicated Cyber Command has even been appointed. In the USA, China is seen as the greatest competition for supremacy in cyberspace. China has also expanded its forces with the necessary staff and a doctrine on cyber warfare. Russia even reserves the right - possibly due to the lack of any alternative - to use nuclear force to retaliate against a cyberspace attack. In Germany, the subject of cyber war is afforded slightly less attention in military discourse. However, the Federal Ministry of Defense, the secret service and even members of parliament have a steadily growing awareness of the subject, which is reflected, for instance, in inter-ministerial and inter-party task forces, simulations and a dedicated Computer Emergency Response Team for the German Federal Armed Forces. While the "White Paper 2006" only mentioned cyberspace in passing, the Federal Armed Forces have already set up an undercover cyber war unit under the command of the air force.

Cyber war garnered worldwide media interest among the general public for the first time in April 2007, when Estonia was facing a "Denial of Service attack" and newspapers reported the "first cyber war in history". This particularly intensively networked country faced an attack that varied in intensity on the websites of political parties, companies, banks, newspapers and the Estonian government that went on for several weeks. Estonian web servers were bombarded with excessive requests - such as requests to access a website - for such a prolonged period that, in view of the flood of data, they were forced also to refuse legitimate requests and to temporarily shut down their services (hence the term Denial of Service). The Estonian Hanseatic Bank, the largest national bank, calculated losses due to the suspension of online banking services at US\$ 1 million.

Prior to the attack, the Estonian government had removed a Russian war memorial from the capital leading to diplomatic recriminations with Russia. As a result, Estonia was quick to accuse the Kremlin of waging "cyber warfare". But was this really a new form of inter-state warfare; a Russian attack against Estonia?

To this day it has not been conclusively ascertained whether the attack did in fact originate from the Russian government and military or whether it was carried out by private individuals. The consequences of the alleged cyber "war" on Estonia can by no means be compared with the effects of real war. While public life was made more difficult, no infrastructure was destroyed, nor were there any people hurt or killed. To put it bluntly: a couple of out of order ATMs do not a war make! There are also several

indications that this is just another - particularly serious - case of cyberspace activism or "hacktivism". Accordingly, it is unlikely that the attacks originated from the Kremlin and the Russian military; it is more likely that they were carried out by nationalistic Russians offended by the removal of the monument, who, spurred on by and coordinated through discussions in Internet forums, took it upon themselves to initiate the data flood against Estonia. Thus, the incident in Estonia was not the "first cyber war in history". Estonian Prime Minister Ansip compared the events on the Internet with an attempt in the real world to "block a port or an airport". This is a fitting comparison and without doubt this kind of blockade represents a serious situation for any nation; however it appears somewhat excessive to use the word "war" in this context.

What about the terrorist threat from cyberspace? For years now, many so-called "experts" have claimed that cyber terrorist attacks could easily be carried out by a large number of potential perpetrators, and with serious consequences. The issue here, then, is why, to date, there has not been a single terrorist cyber attack.

The first part of the answer to this question results from the fact that, thus far, terrorists have used the Internet not to carry out attacks, but rather for propaganda, PR or at most preparing attacks. The example of al-Qaeda and its many supporters around the world shows that on account of its wide audience and speed, the Internet plays a central role as an instrument for communication, but above all as a means of disseminating propaganda and recruiting new

followers. The Internet allows text and audio messages, as well as expensive video recordings of attacks to be made easily available for kindred spirits across the globe. A drastic example of how terrorists use the Internet to wage psychological warfare is the videos depicting be-heading and similar atrocities. In addition, while they may not be entirely confidential, encrypted e-mails and Voice-over-IP calls can be used for talks and steganography can be used to secretly exchange sensitive information extremely quickly and directly. Together with mobile and satellite telephones, this facilitates the global coordination of activities in real time. Possible targets can even be researched from the comfort of home using Google Earth. Only as an aid for conventional attacks does cyberspace play an important role for terrorists today.

What about the fears of catastrophic, Internet-based attacks on "critical infrastructure"? Critical infrastructure includes, first and foremost, signals systems for road, rail and air traffic, control systems in gas, water and electricity supply as well as banking and telecommunications networks. Are these lifelines of modern industrialized societies actually under serious threat? Could terrorists use the Internet to cause black-outs, to flood dams or to detonate nuclear energy plants? Evaluating this question using a more differentiated approach, rather than merely joining the bandwagon of horror scenarios in circulation, is considerably more informative and provides the second part of the answer to the question of why there have not been any terrorist cyber attacks to date.

While it is correct on the one hand that certain critical computer networks are insular solutions,

distinct from other data networks, it is also true that this separation - as negative examples from the electricity supply network have recently illustrated - is not always observed strictly enough and that critical infrastructure that can be accessed from outside also has security deficits that could potentially be exploited. On the other hand, the operation and the targeted abuse of such specialized systems is not a trivial undertaking, but demands a certain minimum level of expert knowledge. Thus, despite the undeniable vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure in industrialized societies, it can by all means be assumed that, in fact, only a very small number of terrorists would be capable of carrying out a cyber attack on critical infrastructure that comes even close to "effective terrorism". Consequently, cyber terrorism is not a possibility "for a large number of potential perpetrators at any time, and with great ease". On the contrary: it can be assumed that only very few terrorists have the skills necessary to carry out such attacks. Attacks, incidentally, cannot be carried out easily but only with intensive preparation and with the corresponding financial and technical resources. What, then, of the "serious consequences"?

The Estonia example demonstrates that even a widespread cyber attack causes little "drama". Compared to attacks with explosives or even "dirty bombs", the effects of cyber attacks have, to date, been far less severe. To put it bluntly: while out of order ATMs are certainly an annoyance, no one feels terrorized through this inconvenience. Even more serious consequences, such as widespread power cuts, would have to last several days before these caused dramatic consequences. Thus, on closer exam-

ination, it is not surprising that there have not, to date, been any notable acts of cyber terrorism. From the point of view of the terrorists, there are other, far simpler methods of achieving serious consequences - the massacre in Bombay in 2008 demonstrated the degree of terror that ten determined attackers can spread using the comparably simple means of automatic rifles and hand grenades.

Cyber Hype?

Thus, although a critical evaluation of the threat posed by cyber war and cyber terrorism suggests that it is not a cause for serious alarm, cyberspace is nevertheless more present than ever in the headlines, as some examples from 2009 show. February: the Conficker worm in circulation since October 2008 infected hundreds of computers of the German Federal Armed Forces. March: Ghostnet, comprising more than one thousand computers worldwide containing very high value information is discovered - computers in foreign ministries, embassies and international organizations were specifically infected and spied on by means of Social Engineering. April: the Wall Street Journal reports that several terabytes of potentially security-relevant information about the Joint Strike Fighter, the US military's new fighter plane, were stolen. May: the Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2008 states in regard to attacks on computer networks: "Broad-based attacks against authorities and business enterprises have also been registered in Germany since 2005. Spying activities are mainly ordered by the intelligence services of the People's Republic of China and of the Russian Federation."

There are two particularly striking things about all of these computer network attacks: first, the same or similar instruments are used in each case. Second, the instigators of computer network attacks are never identified. In fact, whether an effect can be attributed to a cause and the similarity of the means used are the main problems when analyzing attacks on computer networks. It is also striking that the attacks are obviously motivated by different goals: in some cases, specific information is accessed, while in others the target systems are scanned or shut down at random. So what exactly is it we dealing with here? Espionage? Economic crime? "Cyber vandalism"?

As a rule, both the media reports and the terms, concepts and opinions put forward in security policy literature vary hugely. Table 1, below, is intended as a guide to help navigate the jungle of terms used to describe players, motives and instruments involved and to facilitate a clearer assessment.

The table categorizes some of the most important "cyber phenomena" according to the crucial players, their scope, the instruments employed or their approach, as well as their objectives. This overview can be used to clearly distinguish between operations implemented by state military in the real world employing physical force ("Information Based Warfare:") and the cyber warfare referred to above, i.e. 'warfare' restricted exclusively to the virtual sphere by the state military. The objectives in both instances are the same; the means, however - physical weapons on the one hand, and virtual attacks on computer networks on the other - could not be more different.

In the next step it becomes immediately apparent that all players that operate in the virtual world - irrespective of whether these are state players or not - resort to more or less the same instruments and methods - summarized here under the term "computer network attacks". Equally it also quickly becomes apparent that the various players differ significantly in their objectives: while the goal of the state military when employing Information Based Warfare and cyber war is or should always to overcome enemy troops, the terrorists' goal is to instill fear and uncertainty among the civilian population. By analogy, espionage by state secret services primarily aims to obtain security-relevant information, while criminal non-state actors - primarily in economic espionage - hope mainly to make financial gains.

These distinctions - for instance between cyber war and cyber terrorism - are more than just an academic exercise; they are of paramount importance for security policy in practice. After all, let us be frank, defense following an attack should be targeted at the correct enemy. If, for instance, cyber attacks are indeed to be included in Article 5 of the NATO agreement in future, then surely it is not in anyone's interests for the military alliance to declare war on state A simply because a company or a private group of hackers in state A showed too great an interest in information on the armaments industry in NATO state B?

It can be seen that war, espionage and criminality do not all mean the same in cyberspace as they do in the real world. Often, however, attacks are countered as if this were the case, since the customary and accepted distinctions

Table 1: Comparison of information-based warfare and the main "Cyber Phenomena"

	Information Based War-fare	Cyber War	Cyber Terrorism	Cyber Espionage / Sabotage	Cyber Crime	Hacktivism
Agent	State (Military)	Non-State (Terrorists)		State (Military / Intelligence Services)	Non-State (Criminals / Business Crime)	Non-State (Activists)
Space	Physical (Real) World		Virtual World			
Means	Physical Means of Violence (Weapons)		Virtual Means of "Violence" (?)			
Mode	Disrupt / Destroy C3Systems & Information Infrastructure		PsyOps and InfoOps as e.g. in: Distributed Denial-of-Service via Botnet			
Goals	Disrupt / Disinform / Deceive / Propagate		Information Theft, Destruction or System Manipulation via Trojan or Rootkit	Extract Crucial / Valuable Information	Accentuate / Distort Information	Create Publicity
	Gain Advantage Over Enemy Military Forces		Recruit/ Organize / Coordinate ⇨ Terrorize Population	Gain Intelligence Advantage	Make Money Gain Business Advantage	

in the real world, such as state as opposed to non-state; attack as opposed to defense; military as opposed to civilian or even the criteria defining what constitutes a "weapon" are considerably more difficult in cyberspace. Next, the consequences and the suggested political response will be illuminated.

Conclusion

First, it cannot be denied that modern society's reliance on critical infrastructure brings with it a number of vulnerabilities. Electricity supply, traffic control systems and telecommunications networks are the lifelines of modern society. The mutual dependency of these critical infrastructures can furthermore mean that the failure of one of these systems can have a domino effect of more widespread consequence. Second, however, we aren't quite at that stage yet! This means that while cyber war and cyber terror are already relevant to security policy, at present they are more cyber hype than a concrete and immediate threat.

As far as terrorism is concerned, cyberspace will continue to act merely as an aid for terrorists planning and implementing conventional attacks. In addition, limited cyber attacks on critical infrastructure at most appear plausible, to intensify the effects of "conventional" attacks, for instance in that disruptions to communication networks hamper the work of emergency services. However, cyber terrorism does not pose a serious threat to the functioning or indeed the existence of even an industrialized nation that is particularly reliant on critical infrastructure. There is unlikely to be a "Cyber-9/11" in the foreseeable future. A worrying

development in the area of terrorism is rather that cyber terrorism is already being misused today as a battle cry to restrict freedom of speech. Thus, state bodies censor content and prevent access to unpopular Internet activities under the guise of "tackling terrorism".

As regards cyber war, a war fought between states exclusively in cyberspace, with effects comparable to those of physical violence, this is liable to remain a military pipe dream for some time yet. The example of Estonia illustrates that, while the consequences of a data flood lasting a total of two weeks (with breaks) can be irritating and disruptive, the overall extent of the damage remains manageable.

Nevertheless, looking to the near future, we are beginning to see a worrying trend, which will now be examined in more detail. This is the risk of unregulated armament and "hostilities" in cyberspace.

What is striking in this context is that the ethical aspects of attacks on computer networks have not played a role in any key document, such as the American Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, nor in the literature on security policy. While categories of the laws on armed conflict are mentioned in official documents, it must be borne in mind that attacks on computer networks currently take place de facto in a lawless sphere, since it is considerably more difficult in cyberspace to distinguish between military and non-military targets or to attribute an effect to a cause, as the Estonia example clearly illustrates, than it is on the physical battleground.

When NATO brought Serbian substations to a standstill during the Kosovo conflict using graphite bombs, it was, justifiably, subject to a great deal of public criticism, since the results of these attacks affected primarily the civilian population. The anonymity of military cyber operations, which furthermore can be carried out without the risk of casualties to one's own side, means that states could in future be tempted to carry out such attacks. Furthermore, since in cyberspace there is no distinction between civilian and military infrastructure, there is always a particular risk in cyber war that civilian systems will also be affected or, in the future, very deliberately made the target of military maneuvers. But why should different rules apply in a virtual war than when real bombs are dropped?

From the military perspective, in cyberspace "anything goes" and current efforts are aimed at developing additional offensive capacity, since defense is considered a practical impossibility in cyberspace. In justification of these armament efforts, there is already talk of cyber "deterrence" - in blatant disregard of the fact that a deterrent threat (as in the field of nuclear weapons) can be effective only if it is aimed at the correct target. However, unequivocally determining identity in cyberspace is precisely the crucial problem, rendering the deterrent logic completely misplaced.

Instead of succumbing to a misguided logic of mutually assured destruction and forcing any kind of armaments movement in cyberspace, political efforts ought instead to concentrate on ensuring the peaceful use of cyberspace. After

all, even on the "battlefield of cyberspace" the proportionality of the means and the identification of combatants and non-combatants should be observed. How should German and Chinese policies respond to this challenge?

As long as it is not too late and the negative results of the 'cyberspace arms race' can be checked, the foreign and security policy response to current developments in cyberspace must be: Give Cyber Peace a chance!

With regard to the security policy challenges posed by cyberspace, the international community is facing a unique situation, given that it has the opportunity to take action in terms of armament policy now and to find rules for peaceful cooperation before it is too late and the first "cyber war" in history does actually break out. Germany and China are likely to have a great interest in this process, since the German Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2008 mentioned above is correct: many questionable activities in cyberspace do indeed originate from China. The allegations against China raised by the US company Google and by the US Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton at the beginning of 2010, made it the focus of worldwide attention. However, since, according to the Chinese government, activities such as the creation of the aforementioned Ghostnet are erroneously attributed to China, there is likely to be even greater interest on the Chinese side in preventing such activities by means of concerted action and clarification of the situation. In turn, Germany's interests lie in protecting itself against attacks from cyberspace. In consultation with its European partners, Germany's foreign

and security policy could also promote policies aimed at tackling this issue by means of multi-lateral agreement and conflict resolution. As such, Germany and China could both take convincing leading roles in the field of cyber security.

Therefore, I would like to conclude by presenting three specific recommendations as to how Germany and China could join in dialogue with the international community and, through political action, together respond to the new challenges posed by cyberspace.

First: China and Germany should issue a clear foreign policy statement to the effect that neither will be first to use cyber war capacities in the event of a conflict. A self-denying ordinance of this kind, which can be implemented at short notice, or a no-first-use doctrine, could, as in the context of nuclear weapons, help to establish a culture of restraint and in the longer term stigmatize cyber attacks as taboo.

Second: in the medium-term, China and Germany should work towards the conclusion of an international agreement. Comparable with the "Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space", a Cyberspace agreement, a "Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Cyberspace" is conceivable, which would govern the peaceful use of cyberspace for the good of all mankind. In combination with a United Nations committee, this treaty could also provide a multilateral forum for international security debate with respect to cyberspace in the future.

Third: in order, lastly, to tackle in the long-term the problem posed by the confusion between

the civilian and military spheres in cyberspace using a multilateral approach, German and Chinese foreign policy should push for the development of international humanitarian law so that stable definitions and agreements are reached, which will regulate the use of computer network attacks as weapons in inter-state conflicts. The insistence on the distinct identification of "civilian" and "military", or, as the case may be, the ability to trace acts of "violence" in cyberspace too should be the goal of this long-term process, which without doubt involves some extremely challenging technical and data protection law issues.

All projects linked with security policy in cyberspace bear an onerous responsibility. Regulative actions to protect public security may not at any time involve a disproportionate restriction of civil rights. The greatest blessings of the Internet Age - newly won freedoms created through the boundless openness of cyberspace - must continue to be protected, even in the face of new risks.

We will, however, have and will be able to live with the residual vulnerability that cannot be avoided in an open, democratic society even in the Cyber Age.