

BY THE GRACE OF LULA

DILMA ROUSSEFF BECOMES BRAZIL'S FIRST FEMALE PRESIDENT

Jasper Eitze

Lula's plan has come off: on 31st October 2010 his candidate, the 62-year-old Dilma Rousseff (*Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT*), won 56 per cent of the vote in the second ballot, making her the first woman in Brazil's history to be elected as president. Lula himself was not allowed to stand again because of the two-term limit stipulated in the Brazilian constitution.

But Rousseff's victory indisputably belongs to Lula. Many observers think the new president is just there to keep Lula's seat warm until it is possible for him to return in four years time. Rousseff was specifically lined up to carry on Lula's political legacy and ensure continuity, above all in the areas of social policy and public investment.

Lula and his social policies – this was the central focus of the 2010 elections, something which even José Serra, presidential candidate of the centrist opposition party (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PSDB*) was not able to get away from. In the end, Serra suffered a clear defeat by Rousseff, winning 44 per cent of the vote in the runoff. Although he had started the election year in a good position, and he did not have a particularly strong opponent, Serra still failed to convince the electorate that he could offer a viable alternative to Lula's policies of the last eight years.

The government camp was also victorious in the congressional elections, which were held at the same time. There were no significant power shifts in the Senate or in the Chamber of Deputies. But the equally-important gubernatorial elections throughout Brazil allowed the



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opposition to build their influence and balance out losses made elsewhere. So there is no fear that the government of the PT and their allies will be left without an effective opposition. It is more a question of whether it will be clear over the next four years who is actually calling the shots in the fifth largest country on the planet. Even on the eve of the election, Lula made it clear that he could not “just disappear from one minute to the next”, and that he would be providing support to “Comrade Dilma”.

HOW THE VOTING WORKS

Every four years, autumn in Brazil brings with it a real voting marathon: the Brazilian people are obliged to vote in – if necessary – two ballots to elect its representatives to political office. They do this by means of a system which combines both majority voting and proportional representation. The first-past-the-post system is used for the presidential, gubernatorial, senate and mayoral elections, while proportional representation is the favored system for the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, state parliaments and local councils. The Brazilian majority system provides for a runoff between the two best-placed candidates in the first ballot, if neither of them achieves an absolute majority. An exception is made for Senate and Mayoral elections in cities with fewer than 200,000 inhabitants: here a relative majority victory in the first ballot is deemed to suffice. National and state elections are held in parallel every four years, while local elections are called at the halfway point in this four-year term.

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In Brazil, voting is compulsory for everyone between the ages of 18 and 70 and voluntary for 16-18 year-olds, citizens aged over 70 and illiterates. It is only possible to be excused from voting in certain cases, and there must be good reason. Fines for unjustified failure to vote vary according to region and the person’s particular situation, but normally only amount to a few euros. Anyone who is caught not voting and not paying the corresponding fine becomes ineligible to receive a public sector salary or government loan, and may not apply for an ID card or passport.

Since 2000, voting has been carried out using an electronic ballot box, where the voters enter the number of a candidate or his/her party. This method has been widely accepted and to date there have been no significant accusations of fraud or manipulation. This is without a doubt one of the reasons why the elections in Brazil have in the main run very smoothly. The electronic voting system speeds up the vote count, with the final result being known on election night itself: a remarkable achievement in view of the country's size and the remoteness of many of its regions.

In order to vote, the voter has to remember or note down the number of his preferred candidate. This comprises two to five digits, with the first two digits denoting the candidate's party. Other options include casting a "white" vote (abstention) or an invalid vote

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by entering a number which does not belong to any of the candidates. The number is displayed prominently on all campaign advertising next to blow-up photographs of the candidate, while the name or logo of the party is often nowhere to be found. A lot of voters don't even know which party their preferred candidate belongs to. Figure 1 shows the back of a flyer given out by a candidate standing for the Rio de Janeiro state parliament. Next to his own number are the numbers of his political associates who are standing for president or governor, but the spaces for Chamber of Deputies and Senate candidates are left blank.

Fig. 1

Ballot paper in the 2010 election



This emphasis on candidates over parties is encouraged by the system of proportional representation which is used to allocate seats in the Chamber of Deputies as well as in the state parliaments and local councils. For elections to the Chamber of Deputies and state parliament, each candidate's electoral district covers the whole state. So, for example, in the state of São Paulo each candidate

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has a voting catchment area of 40 million people, which corresponds to the whole of Great Britain with Northern Ireland. As a result of the open party lists, each candidate is not only up against opponents from other parties, but also against other candidates from within his own party. This weakens the parties as institutions, as elected candidates treat their win as a personal victory. Voter representation varies according to the particular state, so for example in the state of São Paulo there is only one representative per 600,000 head of population, while in Roraima, the poorest state, there is one representative per 50,000 inhabitants.

The parties gain in importance when it comes to the allocation of seats. First the number of valid votes in an electoral district is divided by the total number of seats allocated to that district. The resulting electoral quota is then used to divide the total of a party's (candidate) votes. The result of this calculation equals the number of seats to which a party or electoral alliance is entitled. For example, if 5,000,000 valid votes are cast, these are divided by 50 allocated seats, giving an electoral quota of 100,000. So a party whose candidates won 300,000 votes in total would gain three seats. The subsequent allocation of these seats would then depend on the number of votes received by each candidate. The candidate within a party or electoral alliance who wins the most votes is allocated the first seat; the candidate with the second-highest number of votes gets the second seat and so on. Smaller parties, which would not be able to achieve the electoral quota on their own, can win seats by forming an electoral alliance, under the condition that they put up at least one candidate who is likely to attract a large share of the vote so that seats can be allocated within the electoral alliance.

Another curious feature of this kind of seat allocation is the potential for votes to be transferred between candidates, giving results which do not always mirror the voters' intentions. So, for example, if an individual, very popular candidate wins a lot of votes, it can mean that his party gains several seats. In this way, other candidates from within his party can take up seats in the Chamber even though they may have won fewer votes than candidates from other parties or electoral alliances. As a result it is quite normal for well-known personalities from sport, music or show business to stand as party candidates. This is a lucrative deal for both sides: the party wins the extra votes and seats, and the victorious candidate gets to enjoy the rich financial rewards which are part and parcel of being a member of parliament in Brazil. This "pragmatism" on the part of many parties when handing out memberships and candidatures meets with regular criticism and is often presented as proof of the need for reform in the Brazilian electoral system and of the lack of ethics and sense of responsibility among the parties.

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The 2010 elections proved to be no exception: in the state of Rio de Janeiro two players of the 1994 football World Cup-winning team stood for the Democratic Labour Party – Romário (Chamber of Deputies) and Bebeto (State Parliament). But the comedian and singer Francisco Everardo Oliveira Silva, known as Tiririca, drew the most attention by standing as a Republican Party (PR) candidate for the Chamber of Deputies in the state of São Paulo. Thanks to his fame and clowning behavior he won 1.35 million votes, making him the candidate with the highest votes in the whole of the 2010 elections. Tiririca's success can also be seen as a protest vote against the system of compulsory voting. His campaign slogan read: "Vote for Tiririca, because it can't get any worse." At the time of writing, it is not clear whether Tiririca will actually take up his seat in the Chamber. It is suspected that he is illiterate and gave false information about his ability to read and write when registering as a candidate. He now has to go before the electoral court to answer charges of fraud, as under Brazilian law illiterates are not allowed to stand for political office.

PUBLIC SPENDING PROGRAM HELPS KICK-START ROUSSEFF'S CAMPAIGN

Not long after his re-election in 2006, Lula was already giving thought to the matter of his successor and his political legacy. Lula's plan was to transfer his personal popularity to a candidate of his own choosing. He selected his chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, pushing through her nomination despite resistance within the party. Rousseff does not have the common touch and charisma of her political mentor, instead having a reputation for being cool, dictatorial and moody. The most moving part of her story is her victory over cancer, which put her candidacy in danger during the year before the elections, and the torture she endured in the 1970s during her two-year detention for being involved in underground activities at the time of the military dictatorship.

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Rousseff only joined the PT in 2001, and until standing for President in 2010 she had never before run for political office. In order to overcome Rousseff's biggest drawback – the fact that nobody knew who she was – Lula made her the "mother" of his government's Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). This package, financed by both public and private investment, was designed to overcome obstacles in the area of infrastructure development. The first phase of the PAC started in early 2007 with planned investments of 503 billion real (approx. 220 billion euro) up to the beginning of 2010.¹ By that date, just over 60 per cent of the money had actually been used, but Rousseff nevertheless announced the second phase of the program (PAC 2), just two days before she resigned as minister in order to run for the presidency. The second phase plans for the investment of 960 billion real (over 400 billion euro) between 2011 and 2014.²

1 | The figures are taken from the website of the Brazil's Presidential Office: <http://casacivil.gov.br/pasta.2010-07-07.4625721238/caderno-de-lancamento-do-pac-2> (accessed November 2, 2010).

2 | Cf. <http://www.odocumento.com.br/materia.php?id=327608> (accessed November 2, 2010).

This announcement six months before the elections provoked criticism that PAC 2 largely consisted of existing programs which had been re-worked for the sake of the election campaign. And it was not clear why the Government was constantly being allowed to take center-stage in the run-up to the elections: in one or two instances the Supreme Electoral Court handed out fines to Lula for unauthorized campaigning.

Lula had already laid another cornerstone for Rousseff's election victory. His government's range of social programs had helped improve the quality of life of many poorer sections of the population. The *Bolsa Família* is of particular note – a form of welfare payment which is linked to children attending school and being vaccinated. Depending on their circumstances, families taking part in the program can receive a monthly payment of between 22 and 200 real (9 to 85 euro). In 2010 the *Bolsa Família* spent around six billion euro on helping almost 13 million families – a huge pool of potential voters.³ Lula knew from painful experience how decisive this type of action could be for the elections: during the presidential elections of 1994 he had enjoyed a consistent lead in the polls but was defeated in the very first round by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB). In his role as finance minister, Cardoso had managed to conquer hyperinflation, which particularly benefited the poor, the largest section of the Brazilian population. They showed their gratitude by voting for Cardoso.

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A buzzing economy, a clear reduction in poverty, dwindling social inequality, millions of new jobs – these were powerful arguments for the government during the presidential election campaign. Lula knew that the majority of voters, particularly the poorer and less-educated among them, would not ask which political camp should get the credit for the economic and social successes of recent years. In the election campaign, Rousseff promised to transform Brazil into a country of the middle-classes and one of the world's

3 | The figures are taken from the website of Brazil's Ministry of Social Affairs: <http://mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia> (accessed October 25, 2010).

most developed countries. And Lula for his part exhorted his supporters: "Those of you who believe in me, have no doubts, vote for Dilma."

In view of the Lula administration's high approval rating, Serra wanted to avoid the election turning into a kind of "Lula (socialist) v Cardoso (neoliberal)" plebiscite, which was what Lula intended. Serra stressed that he would both continue and expand Lula's successful social policies. Under the slogan "Brazil can do more", he also wanted to showcase his own policy areas where the Lula government had made little progress due

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to lack of structural reforms, particularly in areas of health, education and internal security. Serra only really criticized Lula on his foreign policy, which had led to him rubbing shoulders with dubious anti-democratic regimes such as Iran, Cuba and Venezuela. Serra tried to present himself as the best successor to Lula due to his previous experience and successes in office. These included a spell as health minister in the Cardoso government (1994 to 2002), where he pushed through the introduction of low-cost generic drugs.

GOVERNMENT DUO STEAMROLLER OPPOSITION CANDIDATES IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

When Serra resigned from his post as Governor of São Paulo at the end of March 2010, in order to run for President as the PSDB nominee, he was ahead of his PT rival in the polls. Most observers doubted that Lula would succeed in transferring his own popularity to Rousseff. They were proved wrong.

In early July, at the start of the official three-month campaign period, Rousseff and Serra were running neck-and-neck. Both candidates had entered the race with the support of electoral alliances, which gave them the benefit of additional campaign structures and guaranteed them free radio and TV airtime.⁴ After the first month of

4 | Serra's electoral alliance comprised six parties: PSDB, Democrats (DEM), Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), Partido do Mobilização Nacional (PMN) and Partido Trabalhista do Brasil (PT do B). Rousseff's alliance was even larger, with ten parties: PT, Partido do Movimento >

campaigning, Rousseff was already leading her opponent by around ten percentage points. Serra's rapid slide in the polls came as a surprise and caused him to position himself even closer to Lula: in mid-August the PSDB ran a TV ad with images of both Lula and Serra, with the accompanying commentary "men of history and experienced leaders". But instead of stemming Serra's collapse in the polls, the video just succeeded in attracting criticism. The government complained to the electoral court that Serra had used Lula's image without permission. Disquiet grew within Serra's own ranks over his closeness to Lula's policies.

In the meantime, Rousseff was extending her lead. One month before the first ballot on 3rd October, the PT candidate looked like she could expect 55 per cent of the vote, while Serra could only count on 33 per cent. With Lula's help, Rousseff outplayed Serra in her use of the most important communication medium, television. It seemed more and more likely that Rousseff could win a direct victory in the first round. Serra's camp seemed resigned to defeat, but also angry at their candidate's failure to present the voters with a clear alternative.

ROUSSEFF IS THWARTED IN THE FIRST ROUND

But hope was reignited in the Serra camp when, at the beginning of September, the press uncovered two scandals in Rousseff's political sphere. One of these scandals involved allegations of corruption around Rousseff's successor in the chief of staff's office (*Casa Civil*), Erenice Guerra. Until Rousseff's nomination, Guerra had been her right-hand woman. Lula sprang into action to mitigate the damage to his candidate, and just days after the scandal broke, Guerra resigned. At the same time, Lula tried to shift the focus of public debate by accusing the media who had uncovered the scandal as acting like "opposition parties" and of abusing their press freedom: "Press freedom doesn't mean spending all day making things up". Journalists, politicians, lawyers and intellectuals reacted with outrage and accused the president of being authoritarian.

Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB), Partido da República (PR), Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B), Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB), Partido Trabalhista Nacional (PTN), Partido Social Cristão (PSC) and Partido Trabalhista Cristão (PTC).

In the midst of this, the PT nominee's comfortable lead began to shrink for the first time since the start of the year. Serra himself made no particular moves to use the *Casa Civil* scandal to his own benefit in the campaign offensive, probably because he was afraid of stirring up memories of the corruption scandal which had engulfed his supporting Democrat party (DEM) less than a year previously. However, Marina Silva – the Green Party candidate (Partido Verde, PV) and only other serious contender alongside Rousseff and Serra – had no such inhibitions. Encouraged by her recent gains in the polls, where she had now passed the ten per cent mark, she intensified her attacks on Rousseff. Along with the *Casa Civil* scandal, Marina Silva opened up another front: as a devout evangelical Christian she attacked the PT candidate over her pre-campaign statements on the possible legalization of abortion. Rousseff did her best to defend herself by assuring members of the Catholic Church that she would not change Brazil's abortion laws. Rousseff began to wobble, but the majority of polls still predicted she would win a direct victory in the first round.

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But in the end Marina Silva's attacks had their effect. Coming into the home stretch of the first round she once again thwarted Rousseff, who had already started referring to herself as president. To everyone's amazement, the PT candidate failed to achieve the absolute majority needed for direct election by only winning 46.91 per cent of the vote. This result put Rousseff eight percentage points below the predictions of the previous week's polls. With 32.61 per cent of the vote, Serra exceeded expectations by two or three points. But the real winner on 3rd October was Marina Silva. She won 19.33 of the vote, three or four points more than anticipated. This impressive result meant the outsider dominated election coverage in the national and international press in the days following the ballot.

Less than two years previously, Marina Silva had still been a member of the PT and served as minister of the environment under Lula. During her term she sought to push through her agenda for the protection of the rainforest in the face of the development plans of other ministries. Despite one or two successes, such as a 60 per cent reduction in deforestation

in the Amazon area between 2004 and 2007, she lacked the necessary support within the Lula administration. In May 2008 she resigned from her post and the following year she changed allegiance to the PV, who nominated her as their candidate for president. During the 2010 elections her mainly environmental agenda proved popular among the educated urban middle-classes. In some urban centers such as Belo Horizonte and the Federal District of Brasília she even came out ahead of Rousseff and Serra in the first round.

THE DUEL BEFORE THE RUNOFF: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING

After the first round, Serra could still count himself in with a chance in the runoff on 31st October. The first opinion polls after 3rd October showed that Marina Silva's supporters were mostly transferring to the PSDB candidate. Rousseff's lead over Serra was now only six to eight points. Would the PV speak out in favor of one of the other candidates after their own candidate's elimination? Their pronouncement was eagerly awaited, but in the end the party declared itself officially neutral, saying their political agenda had little in common with that of the other parties. But their decision was more probably based on a lack of unity within the PV, as the party had no real agenda. After their official declaration of neutrality, certain leading politicians within the PV still showed their support for one or other of the two remaining candidates, based on their regional electoral alliances.

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In the second phase of campaigning, Rousseff and Serra started courting Marina Silva's supporters. The contest was focused on the two densely-populated states of Rio de Janeiro (16 million inhabitants) and Minas Gerais (21 million inhabitants) in Brazil's south east, where the Green candidate had carved out a particularly good level of support. But the PV's declaration of neutrality did not result in the campaigns giving more weight to environmental issues. Instead, Serra tried to channel the momentum he had gained in the first round by focusing his campaign on the ethical and religious debate surrounding abortion and corruption. Rousseff also seized hold of this, leading

to a bizarre situation where both candidates suddenly came across as being exceedingly pious. "Serra is one of the good guys" was the PSDB candidate's new campaign slogan. Serra played on Rousseff's changing position on the abortion issue, saying: "You know me, and you know I'm not going to change my mind the night before the election". The ruling party candidate tried to get the debate back to the "socialist v neoliberal" dichotomy by claiming Serra wanted to sell off state enterprises. The constant accusations and denials on both sides just dragged the campaign's level of debate even further into the mire. Added to this, the almost four-month long campaign had taken its toll, with both the campaigners and their financial resources being close to exhausted.

Despite all the polemics, the polls showed a steady lead for the PT candidate as the runoffs drew nearer. The *Casa Civil* scandal and abortion debate which had so quickly changed the climate of opinion before the first ballot proved to have little lasting effect. The claim that most Brazilian voters are desensitized to scandals because they are so used to them

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seemed to be borne out. Even comments made by the Pope had little effect: a few days before the runoff he once again warned Brazilian bishops that they had a duty to give their followers guidance, even on politically-delicate issues such as abortion. The Catholic Church in Brazil had previously attracted sharp criticism from the government because certain bishops had publicly come out against Rousseff due to her position on abortion. Despite all this, Rousseff still had a 13 point lead over her opponent, and this time it was confirmed by the second ballot.

A DETAILED LOOK AT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The results of the presidential elections display a clear geographical division in the country. In the more prosperous south, Serra was well ahead of Rousseff with 54 per cent of the vote, and in other regions he was able to increase his share compared to the first round. But the PT candidate clearly dominated in large areas of the north and in particular the north-east of the country, where she won around 70 per cent of votes. This was a region which had particularly benefited from the government's social programs. On top of this, Lula himself came from the north-east and enjoyed great popularity in the region. Another decisive factor in Rousseff's victory was that she was able to win through in the state of Minas Gerais, with the full support of the re-elected governor, Sérgio Cabral (PMDB). She won in Minas Gerais despite the state being a PSDB stronghold. The former governor and newly-elected state senator, Aécio Neves, had been a rival of Serra's within the party to win the presidential nomination. In the end Serra beat Neves to the nomination, not so much because of overall support within the party but because he was aided by the party coterie in São Paulo state, who wielded great influence within the PSDB. Because of this, Serra only had moderate support in Minas Gerais, and although it increased after the first round, it was by then too late to reverse the trend.

If we break down the voters by group, we can see that Rousseff appealed more to male voters, while women tended to vote for Serra. In terms of education levels, Serra was marginally ahead among university graduates but otherwise Rousseff had the upper hand. In terms of income levels, Serra was popular among the higher-income bracket, but the great majority of the population is low-earning, and clearly favored Rousseff.

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Table 1

Breakdown of voters

	1st ballot	Share of	2nd ballot	Share of
	Oct. 3, 2010	vote (%)	Oct. 31, 2010	vote (%)
Eligible voters	135,804,043	100.00	135,804,433	100.00
Votes cast	111,193,747	81.88	106,606,214	78.5
Non-voters	24,610,296	18.12	29,197,152	21.5

Source: website of the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court, <http://divulgacao.tse.gov.br> (accessed November 2, 2010).

Table 2

Valid votes

	1st ballot	Share of	2nd ballot	Share of
	Oct. 3, 2010	vote (%)	Oct. 31, 2010	vote (%)
Votes cast	111,193,747	100.00	106,606,214	100.00
Votes for candidates	101,590,153	91.36	99,463,917	93.3
"White" votes ⁵	3,479,340	3.13	2,452,597	2.3
Invalid votes ⁵	6,124,254	5.51	4,689,428	4.4

Source: website of the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court, <http://divulgacao.tse.gov.br> (accessed November 2, 2010).

Table 3

Results of the presidential elections

Candidate	Votes won		Share of valid votes in %	
	1st ballot	2nd ballot	1st ballot	2nd ballot
	Oct. 3, 2010	Oct. 31, 2010	Oct. 3, 2010	Oct. 31, 2010
Total	101,590,153	99,463,917	100.00	100.00
Dilma Rousseff (PT)	47,651,434	55,752,529	46.91	56.05
José Serra (PSDB)	33,132,283	43,711,388	32.61	43.95
Marina Silva (PV)	19,636,359	—	19.33	—
Other	1,170,077	—	1.15	—

Source: website of the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court, <http://divulgacao.tse.gov.br> (accessed November 2, 2010).

5 | "White" and invalid votes are not counted in calculation of election result.

CONGRESS AND GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS: MIXED FEELING AMONGST THE OPPOSITION PARTIES

The first round of presidential elections on 3rd October was held in parallel with congressional, gubernatorial and state parliament elections in the 27 federal states. In the Chamber of Deputies, the allocation of seats between government and opposition parties remained little-changed. The government made slight gains, and from 2011 it will hold around two-thirds of seats. The two main ruling parties around President-elect Dilma Rousseff, the PT and PMDB, easily won the most seats, with the PT taking over from the PMDB as the strongest faction in the Chamber of Deputies with a tally of 89 seats to 79. The PMDB won ten fewer seats than in the election four years previously.

The opposition parties had to accept bigger losses. The PSDB lost 13 seats, largely due to their deputies defecting to other factions at the start of the previous legislative period. The same is true for the DEM, the second-largest opposition party. By the time of the 2010 elections it had only retained 56 of the original 65 seats won in the 2006 elections because of wide scale defections. On 3rd October it sustained the heaviest losses of any party, winning only 43 seats, though this figure was in fact not as bad as initially feared. The DEM was able to make up for its losses in the congressional elections by gaining two new governors. In 2006 its sole gain was the Federal District, but in 2009 the governor was forced to leave office following a corruption scandal.

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Clear winners in the 2010 elections were the PSB. They increased their seats in the Chamber from 27 to 36, and topped this off with outstanding results in the gubernatorial elections, winning 6 governorships, mainly in the country's north-east. The PV were not able to profit from the "green wave" of support around their presidential candidate Marina Silva. They only managed to increase their seats in the Chamber from 13 to 15, leaving their level of representation in the lower midrange.

The Senate elections produced more obvious gains and losses among the main factions than were seen in the Chamber of Deputies. The PMDB came out on top as the biggest faction, increasing their seats from 17 to 21, which represents around one quarter of all Senate seats. The party's dominance is mainly thanks to its strength in the smaller states of the north and north-east, which despite their low population density command the same number of seats as the densely-populated states of southern and south-eastern Brazil. The PT also increased their tally from 8 to 14 seats, in the process replacing the PSDB as the second-largest faction in the Senate. The PSDB lost

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6 seats, dropping from 16 to 10, and the DEM's share shrank from 13 to 6. As a result, Rousseff is likely to have an easier time in the future than Lula had during his two terms of office. She can – at least in theory – expect the support of around two-thirds of senators. But even so the new president will still have to constantly negotiate with the majorities in the Senate and Chamber in order to push through her policies because of the many vested interests involved.

There may be a slight belated change to the allocation of seats, as at the time of writing Brazil's Supreme Court still has to make a final ruling on whether the election of certain candidates to the Chamber and Senate was legitimate. This is because of a law passed just a few months before the elections known as the *Ficha Limpa* (clean record) law, springing from a popular initiative which forces the withdrawal of any candidate who has been convicted of a crime. From the start it was contested whether or not this law could be constitutionally enforced before the 2010 elections. As a result, the indicted candidates stood for election anyway, and some of them were voted in. It is possible that their votes will now be annulled retrospectively.

In the gubernatorial elections, the opposition did surprisingly well, to some extent making up for their losses elsewhere. Their victories in almost all the densely-populated, economically-strong states of Brazil's south and south-east are of particular note. As of 2011, the PSDB will be the party with the most governorships, taking over

this honor from the PMDB. Governors carry a lot of weight within Brazil's political system, and the new president will not be able to govern without their support. The opposition will be in a position to not only curb Rousseff's wide-ranging powers but also – with an eye to the next elections – to build strong powerbases in different regions of the country.

Table 4

Results of elections to Chamber of Deputies

Party	2010 elections – seats won	Number of seats held before 2010 elections	2006 elections – seats won
gesamt	513	513	513
PT	88	79	83
PMDB	79	90	89
PSDB	53	58	66
DEM (PFL)	43	56	65
PP	41	40	41
PR (PL/PRONA)	41	43	25
PSB	34	27	27
PDT	28	23	24
PTB (mit PAN)	21	21	23
PSC	17	16	9
PC do B	15	12	13
PV	15	14	13
PPS	12	15	22
PRB	8	7	1
PMN	4	3	3
PSOL	3	3	3
PT do B	3	1	1
PHS	2	3	2
PRTB	2	—	—
PRP	2	—	—
PSL	1	—	—
PTC	1	2	3

Source: <http://eleicoes.uol.com.br/2010/raio-x/2/deputado-federal/composicao-do-congresso>, <http://www2.camara.gov.br/deputados/liderancas-e-bancadas> (accessed November 2, 2010).

Table 5
Results of Senate elections⁶

Party	2010 elections – seats won	2006 elections – seats won	Seat allocation before 2010 elections	Seat allocation from 2011
Total	54	27	81	81
PMDB	16	4	17	20
PT	11	2	8	14
PSDB	5	5	16	11
PP	4	1	1	5
PSB	3	1	2	3
PR (PL/PRONA)	3	1	4	4
DEM (PFL)	2	6	13	6
PDT	2	1	6	4
PSOL	2	—	1	2
PTB	1	3	7	6
PC do B	1	1	1	2
PPS	1	1	—	1
PRB	1	—	2	1
PSC	1	—	1	1
PMN	1	—	—	1
PRTB	—	1	—	—
PV	—	—	1	—
Independent	—	—	1	—

Sources: <http://g1.globo.com/especiais/eleicoes-2010/noticia/2010/10/saiba-nova-composicao-do-senado.html>, <http://noticias.terra.com.br/eleicoes2006/interna/0,,OI1169151-EI6653,00.html> (accessed November 2, 2010).

Table 6
New allocation of Governorships

Party	2010 elections – Number of Governors	2006 elections – Number of Governors
PSDB	8	6
PMDB	5	7
PT	5	5
PSB	6	3
DEM (formerly PFL)	2	1
PP	1	1
PMN	1	—
PTB	1	—
PPS	—	2
PDT	—	2

Source: <http://eleicoes.uol.com.br/2010/raio-x/2/governador/votacao-por-estado> (accessed November 2, 2010).

MISSED OPPORTUNITY

The opposition could have achieved more in the 2010 elections. In order to successfully compete with the government's campaign machinery, the parties should have united to select a candidate much earlier than they did. Serra did not announce his candidacy until early 2010, whereas Rousseff and Marina Silva had confirmed that they were running many months earlier. This late start meant that it was difficult for Serra to attract large sections of the electorate, particularly in the north-east of Brazil. Serra ended up lagging behind his rival in other areas too, including the state of Rio de Janeiro, despite it being the birthplace of his running mate, Índio da Costa.

On top of this there was the "Lula" factor and the positive developments in Brazil over recent years, which made it more difficult for the opposition to persuade voters to change their allegiance in the 2010 elections. Unsure how to deal with the president's enormous popularity, Serra tried to compete with Rousseff to take over the mantle as Lula's successor – but this proved to be a poor choice of strategy. When it came to continuing Lula's policies, why should the people put their trust in the opposition instead of in the candidate who came with Lula's personal recommendation? Rousseff would, however, have had no chance in the elections without the support of her political mentor. The majority of votes were not won by her, but by Lula.

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Because of his failure to distance himself from the government in terms of his policies, Serra instead fixed his attention on religious and moral issues, which, however, also failed to mobilize new voters. He also managed to scare off some of his traditional supporters among the middle-classes through ill-advised budgetary proposals such as the introduction of a 13th month for the *Bolsa Família* or the raising of the state pension.

6 | The 81 senators are elected for an 8-year term, with either one-third or two-thirds of the Senate being renewed in the elections every four years.

Serra also left it too late to mobilize the support of his internal party rival and former governor of Minas Gerais, Aécio Neves, who was elected to the Senate with a huge majority. After this outstanding election result, Neves seems more likely than ever to take over a leading role within the PSDB in 2011, in the course of a seemingly necessary restructuring of the party. So from Neves' point of view, Serra's defeat did not come at a bad time.

Marina Silva of the PV should also not be written off. She can be expected to do well in the next elections after her excellent results in 2010. It is largely due to her that the

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words environment and climate-change have finally entered the vocabulary of Brazilian politics. It is still too early to talk about a true "green wave" in Brazilian politics, but the debate on these issues is likely to intensify before the next elections in 2014. In 2012 Rio de Janeiro will be hosting the UN climate

summit "Rio+20", and Brazil is sure to want to make the most of its role as host country. The football World Cup in 2014 and Olympic Games in 2016 will also help to push the topics of environment and sustainability higher up the agenda.

But there are many other challenges which President Rousseff's new government will have to face. Under Lula, structural reforms were put on the back burner, for example in the areas of education, growth-stifling bureaucracy, the need to be more competitive in foreign trade, and the danger of inflation, partly caused by the massive public spending of the last few years. It seems unlikely that Rousseff will cause Lula's domestic and foreign policies to lurch to the left, although this is often suspected because of her dogmatic personality and guerrilla past. It is more conceivable that her government will simply intensify some areas of Lula's existing policies, such as the somewhat leftist/nationalist positions taken in matters of foreign policy – if for no other reason than to show Brazil's growing – and not exactly unassuming – self-confidence.

In order to govern, the new President will above all need a good portion of her political mentor's negotiating skills. Lula's ability as a mediator allowed him to keep the diverse conglomerate of factions who supported his government working together in Congress, particularly the PMDB. But Rousseff's more dogmatic character makes it unlikely that she will have the necessary qualities to follow in his footsteps in this respect, which could present her with a problem. For Lula's political success would not have been possible without his pragmatism. So, for example, he was able to continue his predecessor's rather liberal economic and financial policies despite resistance from within his own party. It was only thanks to the booming economy that Lula was able to build up his social programs and launch his massive program for growth. But the success of these partly credit-financed projects is not a given. Sometime soon the bubble could burst and the hidden deficits could once again come to light. The good times – from Brazil's point of view – which the country has experienced in recent years will at some stage be followed by less good times. Then the country will have to show that it is really ready to face the future.

Article current as at 7th November 2010.