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## **BETWEEN PARADISE AND PRISON – SENEGALESE MIGRANTS AND THE RESPONSE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

*Stefan Gehrold / Matthias Bunk*

For many years, African migrants have been trying to enter the European Union via the Italian island of Lampedusa and the Spanish Canary Islands. It has become an everyday occurrence to see boats full of African migrants being met by coast guards. The two affected countries, Italy and Spain, are complaining about a lack of support and solidarity of other EU states.

Now the situation is becoming even worse, and the latest developments in North Africa are a source of major concern as the problem is now in the EU's own back yard. Africans are trying to flee the developing situation in North Africa because they see their families being put in danger by the ongoing violent protests. And once again they are heading for Europe and trying to land on the Italian island by boat. So is Lampedusa becoming the flashpoint for an African-European dilemma? Yes and no. This current crisis is really only down to the unrest in North Africa, which has caused a short-term increase in the number of refugees. This type of phenomenon is not unknown, as the EU has had to deal with similar problems in the past (for instance as a result of the war in Yugoslavia). However, the problem remains the same. Irrespective of current conflicts and the debate over where the refugees should go, the problem of African refugees streaming into Europe is always going to be an issue. This article looks at some of the long-term trends in this debate.

## SENEGALESE MIGRATION TO EUROPE

At least two million people currently live in the EU without a proper residency permit.<sup>1</sup> While only a small proportion of these immigrants actually come from Africa, “in the public consciousness irregular immigration has a black face”.<sup>2</sup>

Part of the reason for this is the publicity surrounding the sometimes spectacular attempts by African migrants to enter Europe. The pictures of packed fishing boats and half-starving people washed up on European holiday beaches have burnt themselves into the public’s consciousness. Another factor is that the number of migrants coming out of Africa and into the EU is likely to increase in the future. One of the reasons for this is the obvious attraction of a rich Europe with its stagnating populations, while high population growth rates in Africa, which significantly reduce social and economic prospects at home, are putting pressure on people to leave. As the number of young people increases there will be further pressure on the environment and precious resources such as forests, water and land while the demand for education will continue to grow. The consequences of rapid population growth can only be mitigated by corresponding economic growth. Experience has shown, however, that overall economic growth, especially in West Africa, is insufficient to balance the growth in population.

**The number of migrants coming out of Africa and into the EU is likely to increase in the future. High population growth rates in Africa are putting pressure on people to leave.**

Senegal can be used as a good example of what is happening in many (West) African countries. As a result of its exposed position in the far southwest of the African continent the country is often used as a transit point for migrants from other countries in the region. Senegal there acts as

- 1 | Cf. Vesela Kovacheva, Dita Vogel, *The size of the irregular foreign resident population in the European Union in 2002, 2005 and 2008: aggregated estimates*. Hamburg Institute of International Economics. Database on Irregular Migration. Working Paper No. 4/2009, 10, in: [http://irregular-migration.hwwi.de/typo3\\_upload/groups/31/4.Background\\_Information/4.7.Working\\_Papers/WP4\\_Kovacheva-Vogel\\_2009\\_Europe\\_Estimate\\_Dec09.pdf](http://irregular-migration.hwwi.de/typo3_upload/groups/31/4.Background_Information/4.7.Working_Papers/WP4_Kovacheva-Vogel_2009_Europe_Estimate_Dec09.pdf) (accessed March 22, 2011).
- 2 | Charlotte Wiedemann, “Mythen der Migration,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 12, 2009, 12 et seq.

a kind of “doorman” for the European Union and has an important role to play in controlling immigration.<sup>3</sup>

### CHANGES TO THE FLOW OF MIGRANTS

Senegal has traditionally always been a favourite destination for migrants from other West African countries. However, this situation has changed somewhat in recent decades and these days it is the Senegalese who are leaving in droves and heading to Europe due to the economic and demographic upheavals in their country.<sup>4</sup>

There are many reasons why people want to migrate. Research into migration tends to differentiate between push and pull factors. Push factors “include political and military conflicts, environmental crises, population growth and the economic situation of the source countries and the behaviour of their governments”.<sup>5</sup> Pull factors on the other hand “are exerted by growing international economic disparities and a growing awareness of these disparities around the world due to the ready availability of pictures of western lifestyle via electronic mass media”.<sup>6</sup> Also “host countries either help to create or strengthen the pulling power of their country by either trying to attract immigrants or by granting residency status to illegal immigrants”.<sup>7</sup> Beyond these normal push and pull factors some immigration movements are stimulated by a combination of factors, this case they are called “mixed flows”. A decision to migrate is usually based on a number

**A decision to migrate is usually based on a number of different factors. In Africa population growth is one of the main causes of migration.**

3 | Cf. Meng-Hsuan Chou, Marie Gibert, *From Cotonou to Circular Migration: the EU, Senegal and the 'Agreement Duplicité'*. Draft article for the conference on 'Migration: A World in Motion'. Maastricht 2010, 5, in: <https://www.appam.org/conferences/international/maastricht2010/sessions/downloads/296.1.pdf> (accessed March 16, 2011).

4 | Cf. Felix Gerdes, *focus Migration. Länderprofil Senegal*. Hamburg 2007, 1, in: [http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/typo3\\_upload/groups/3/focus\\_Migration\\_Publikationen/Laenderprofil/LP\\_10\\_Senegal.pdf](http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/typo3_upload/groups/3/focus_Migration_Publikationen/Laenderprofil/LP_10_Senegal.pdf) (accessed March 16, 2011). Cf. Internationale Organisation for Migration (IOM): *Migration au Sénégal. Profil National 2009*. Geneva 2009, 19.

5 | Stefan Luft, *Einleitung*, in: Helmut Reifeld (ed.), *Auf der Suche nach dem 'Land der Chancen'. Die Integration von Migranten in Schwellenländern*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Sankt Augustin/Berlin 2011, 11.

6 | Ibid.

7 | Ibid.

of different factors. In Africa population growth is one of the main causes of migration. There is no other region in the world where population numbers are growing so rapidly.

According to the 2009 report by the German Foundation for World Population (DSW) and the American Population Reference Bureau, in 2009 the population of Africa exceeded one billion.<sup>8</sup> And Africa will continue to grow. While Europe still had three times as many inhabitants as Africa in 1950, by 2050 the opposite will be the case: Africa will have around two billion inhabitants to Europe's approximately 600 million.<sup>9</sup>

The population of individual countries in West Africa grew by at least 1.3 per cent p.a. between 2000 and 2005, with some countries growing by more than four per cent p.a. In 2006 West Africa's 300 million inhabitants represented 4.6 per cent of the world's population. The main reason for this growth is the high birth rate which is well over three per cent in most African countries. As life expectancy is low, the populations tend to be young or sometimes very young. An extreme example of this rapid population growth is Nigeria which in 2050 will be the sixth biggest country in the world. The country currently accounts for almost four per cent of the world's population growth.

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#### **LOW ECONOMIC GROWTH – HIGH POPULATION GROWTH**

Population numbers in Senegal more than doubled between 1976 and 2008 from around 5 million inhabitants in 1976 to around 12 million in 2009.<sup>10</sup> However, economic growth was slower than that of the population. The majority of Senegalese people live under difficult economic circumstances. The per capita income of the country actually

8 | Cf. Claudia Ehrenstein, "Mehr als eine Milliarde Menschen leben in Afrika", *Welt Online*, in: <http://welt.de/politik/ausland/article4309886/Mehr-als-eine-Milliarde-Menschen-leben-in-Afrika> (accessed March 23, 2011).

9 | Cf. Ibid.

10 | Cf. Agence Nationale de la statistique et de la demographie (ANSND), *Situation économique et social du Sénégal en 2009*. Dakar 2010, 29, in: [http://www.ansd.sn/publications/annuelles/SES\\_2009.pdf](http://www.ansd.sn/publications/annuelles/SES_2009.pdf) (accessed March 23, 2011).

dropped significantly between 1960 and 2008 while population numbers continued to grow steadily. On top of this there is a high level of unemployment. The official unemployment rate in Senegal has remained unchanged for years and stands at 48 per cent. The real level may in fact be lower due to the informal sector of the economy.

Pull factors tend to revolve around the desire to find work and social betterment, which would appear to be easier to achieve in Europe than at home. However, while existing immigrant networks in host countries make migrating easier and easier, many immigrants paradoxically often have very hazy ideas about the kind of day-to-day life that awaits them in Europe. For many of them, moving to this idealised "European paradise" actually results in a loss of quality of life. Often their experiences in their new home are "characterised by loneliness, financial need, exploitation, discrimination and massive social pressure to contribute to the upkeep of families back home who are convinced that the immigrants are well-off".<sup>11</sup>

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## EMIGRATION TO EUROPE

Not all migrants move to industrialised countries. The movement of people within Africa itself also plays an important role for financial and cultural reasons. However, since the 1990s Europe has become more and more the destination of choice for Senegalese migrants. More than half of all migrants in 2004 headed for Europe or North America. France, Spain and Italy are still the most popular destinations.<sup>12</sup>

In 2003/2004 around 648,600 Senegalese citizens lived abroad.<sup>13</sup> Only a small proportion of these immigrants actually entered Europe illegally: "The vast majority were allowed in on business or tourist visas and it was only when they stayed beyond the maximum time period allowed that

11 | Cf. Gerdes (2007), 2.


12 | Ibid, 6.

13 | Cf. Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration: *CARIM – Migration Profile Senegal*. 2010, 1. Available online at: [http://www.carim.org/public/migrationprofiles/MP\\_Senegal\\_EN.pdf](http://www.carim.org/public/migrationprofiles/MP_Senegal_EN.pdf) (accessed March 22, 2011).

they became irregular migrants.”<sup>14</sup> Because of different methods of estimating numbers and a lack of complete data it is difficult to get an accurate idea of the total number of Senegalese irregular migrants. According to the International Organisation for Migration, around 15,000 Senegalese reached the Canary Islands illegally in 2008.<sup>15</sup> During the same period a total of 19,775 Senegalese citizens were arrested in the 27 EU countries without a valid residency permit.<sup>16</sup>

Fig. 1

**Countries and regions of destination for migrants from Senegal**



Source: République du Sénégal (2004), quoted from Felix Gerdes, *focus Migration. Länderprofil Senegal*. Hamburg 2007, 4.

Overall the number of Senegalese living illegally in the EU cannot be counted. Stricter controls have led to continual changes in migration routes and numbers of migrants. However it is clear that Senegal has become an important transit point for migrants from other African countries who are trying to get to Europe.<sup>17</sup>

14 | Cf. Gerdes (2007), 6.

15 | Cf. IOM (2009), 58.

16 | Ibid.

17 | Cf. Hein de Haas: *Migration irrégulière d'Afrique Occidentale en Afrique du Nord et en Union européenne: Une vue d'ensemble des tendances générales*. Internationale Organisation für Migration, Geneva 2008, 17. Available online at: [http://www.heindehaas.com/Publications/MRS-32\\_FR.pdf](http://www.heindehaas.com/Publications/MRS-32_FR.pdf) (accessed March 23, 2011).

**In general it is better-qualified people who leave Senegal and try their luck in Europe. This brain drain has resulted in the Senegalese government being forced to rely on foreign expertise.**

In 2008 39,395 legal Senegalese migrants holding valid work permits immigrated to the OECD countries.<sup>18</sup> And according to UNESCO statistics, there were also over ten thousand students, mainly in France.<sup>19</sup> In general it is better-qualified people who decide to turn their backs on Senegal and try their luck in Europe. This brain drain has resulted in the Senegalese government being forced to rely on foreign expertise, despite investing heavily in tertiary education.<sup>20</sup>

Refugee migration is, however, less prevalent in Senegal. In comparison to other countries in the region, Senegal is relatively stable, even though armed conflict in the south-western region of Casamance has intensified once again since the beginning of the year. In 2007 around 16,000 Senegalese refugees fled abroad, but most of them went to the countries bordering Casamance, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.<sup>21</sup>

## SENEGALESE GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The Senegalese government's migration policies are somewhat contradictory. Issues relating to migration are handled in a decentralised way by various ministries, leading to inevitable overlaps. A ministry for Senegalese emigrants was set up (*Ministère des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur*) to exploit the potential of emigrants to help the country's development policies.<sup>22</sup> The Senegalese government also created the Office for Acceptance, Orientation and Follow Up of Actions for Returning Emigrants (*Bureau d'Accueil, d'Orientation et de Suivi des Actions de Réinsertion des Émigrés*, BAOS) and the Agency for the Promotion of Investments and Large Projects (*Agence pour la Promotion des Investissements et des Grands Travaux*, APIX). These bodies make use of expatriate Senegalese to help domestic

18 | Cf. OECD: *Database on immigrants in OECD countries 2008*. Quoted in IOM (2009), 55.

19 | Cf. UNESCO: *Statistiques mondiales sur l'éducation 2008*. Quoted in IOM (2009), 56.

20 | Cf. Magatte Fall, "Migration des étudiants: quels enjeux pour le Sénégal?", in: *Accueillir*, 249-250. May-June 2009, 73. Available online at: [http://revues-plurielles.org/\\_uploads/pdf/47/250/124653\\_073\\_074.pdf](http://revues-plurielles.org/_uploads/pdf/47/250/124653_073_074.pdf) (accessed March 24, 2011).

21 | Cf. IOM (2009), 64.

22 | Cf. Gerdes (2007), 3.

investments, but there have been no resounding successes so far. With the support of international partners such as the International Organisation for Migration and the United Nations, three further programmes have been established to involve Senegalese who are living abroad.<sup>23</sup>

To date, Senegalese policies have done little to try to stop migration but instead they have concentrated on expanding legal emigration opportunities.<sup>24</sup> The government is hoping that emigration by its citizens will help relieve the country's strained employment situation. And many migrants contribute to the growth of the domestic economy by sending money back to Senegal. According to World Bank figures, the total amount of money transferred back to the country in 2010 was 1.164 billion U.S. dollars.<sup>25</sup> This represents around nine per cent of total GDP. The main beneficiaries of this money are the construction sector and to a lesser extent the manufacturing sector, as many expatriate Senegalese are suspicious of the government's handling of finances.<sup>26</sup>

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Any negative consequences of migration (risk of irregular migration, brain drain) have so far been largely played down, but there have been recent signs of a rethink. President Abdoulaye Wade has described the battle against youth unemployment and the resulting brain drain as being one of the main challenges of his presidency. Consequently the Senegalese government has launched the "Return to Agriculture" programme (*Retour vers l'Agriculture*, REVA) to create employment opportunities for young people in the agricultural sector.<sup>27</sup> A series of other projects are also aimed at reducing pressures to migrate by creating development opportunities.

23 | The "Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals" (TOKTEN) programme, the Co-Development Programme in Senegal and the "Migrations pour le développement en Afrique" (MIDA Sénégal). Cf. IOM (2009), 23.

24 | Cf. Gerdes (2007), 4.

25 | Cf. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/Senegal.pdf> (accessed March 24, 2011).

26 | Cf. Gerdes (2007), 8.

27 | Cf. Chou and Gibert (2010), 4 et seq.



**Senegal made bilateral agreements on migration policy with several European countries. France is the Senegalese government's main partner in this respect.**

International pressure because of huge flows of migrants to the Canary Islands has led to border controls being tightened up. In 2006/2007 the European border security agency Frontex carried out actions in Mauritanian and Senegalese waters designed to prevent crossings by would-be migrants.<sup>28</sup> In addition, Senegal made bilateral agreements on migration policy with several European countries. France, the former colonial power, continues to be the Senegalese government's main partner in this respect. In 2006 the two sides signed an agreement which covered a whole range of migration issues. Under the terms of this agreement France granted residency and work permits to Senegalese applicants in 108 different work categories, while the Senegalese government undertook to take back Senegalese citizens who had immigrated to France illegally (estimated to be 1,000 to 1,500 each year). The French government also agreed to fund further development projects to help ease migratory pressures.<sup>29</sup> Similar treaties have also been made with Spain and – since 2010 – Italy.<sup>30</sup>

## **EU MIGRATION POLICIES**

The first mention of migration policies relating to Africa was made in 1984 in the third version of the Lomé Convention (Lomé III), which, between 1975 and 2000, provided a framework for cooperation between the European Community and ACP countries.<sup>31</sup> In the Cotonou Agreement which followed on from the Lomé Convention in 2000, migration was primarily deemed to be the result of economic underdevelopment.<sup>32</sup>

It wasn't until the middle of 2000 that the EU turned its attention to the African continent as far as migration policy was concerned. This was triggered by the growing numbers of irregular migrants who were arriving in fishing boats on the European coast. The tragic consequences of attempts by mainly Sub-Saharan migrants to climb over barbed wire fences in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla

28 | Cf. Gerdes (2007), 4.

29 | Cf. Chou and Gibert (2010), 3 et seq.

30 | Cf. CARIM (2010), 4.

31 | Cf. Chou and Gibert (2010), 3 et seq.

32 | Cf. Cotonou Agreement: article 13, para. 4.

finally forced the European Union to pay more attention to managing the floods of migrants who were arriving from Africa.

Since then a series of measures has been carried out. In December 2005 the EU member states passed the “Global Approach to Migration” and the “Priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean” action plan. The Joint Approach included the promotion of a partnership with countries and regional organisations outside the EU and the coordination of various policy areas such as foreign relations, development, employment, justice and internal affairs.<sup>33</sup>

The “Joint Approach on Migration Issues” is a ground-breaking programme. Since its publication it has been the point of reference for all relevant strategy papers for policy relating to asylum and migration. In fact the number of discussion platforms grew considerably after it was agreed. A series of inter-ministerial meetings took place in European and African cities to cement this European-African dialogue. In December 2005 the European Council approved the EU’s Africa strategy, without Africans being directly involved. This EU-Africa strategy formed the basis of a joint strategy which was worked on by representatives of the EU and African countries, and it was ratified at the EU-Africa summit on December 9, 2007 in Lisbon. Action plans were drawn up for the following three years.

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After a first action plan for 2008 to 2010, heads of state and government of both continents agreed a second action plan for 2011 to 2013 at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Africa summit held in November 2010 in the Libyan capital of Tripoli. Like its predecessor, this included eight main sections – including one on migration issues. Along with the objective of cementing the dialogue and cooperation between Africa and Europe on migration, mobility, employment and training, the plan included a series of concrete steps such as the creation of an institute to handle money being sent

33 | Cf. European Council, “Global Approach to Migration,” 15-16 December 2005. Brussels 2005. 15914/1/05 REV 1.

back to Africa and an ACP research centre for migration.<sup>34</sup> However, the threat made by Libya's President Gaddafi at the conference in November to flood Europe with African immigrants unless Europe paid the sum of five billion Euro goes to show how neighbourly relations are still strained when it comes to questions of immigration.<sup>35</sup>

## REACTIVE VERSUS PREVENTIVE STRATEGIES

When studying migration, ideally a distinction is drawn between two opposite but complementary concepts in the area of European migration policy. On the one hand we have the restrictive and tightly-controlled approach. This is aimed at reducing irregular migration by means of various control mechanisms and border controls in other countries. In this approach, repatriation agreements are also agreed so that illegal immigrants to the EU are sent back to their homelands or to transit countries. This kind of reactive, short-term prevention of immigration is known as "remote control"<sup>36</sup>, or as the "coercive approach".<sup>37</sup>

**The restrictive and tightly-controlled approach is aimed at reducing irregular migration by means of various control mechanisms and border controls in other countries.**

An alternative to this security-focused approach is a more comprehensive concept. This is based on a preventive approach known as the "root causes approach".<sup>38</sup> Because this often also takes account of the interests of EU member states, the countries of origin and the migrants themselves, this is often also termed the "comprehensive approach".<sup>39</sup> This approach also focuses predominantly on reducing undesired migration but it is based more on long-term

34 | Cf. Joint Africa EU Strategy, *Action Plan 2011-2013*.

35 | Cf. Richard Fuchs, "Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe", *Das Parlament*, 10-11/2011, in: <http://www.das-parlament.de/2011/10-11/Themenausgabe/33656335.html> (accessed March 18, 2011).

36 | Cf. Maria Ilies, "Irregular Immigration Policy in the European Community: Action at all Stages of the Irregular Migration Flow." Real Instituto Elcano. Madrid. 2009 (Working Paper, 38), 19, in: [http://realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\\_eng/Content?WCM\\_GLOBAL\\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\\_in/zonas\\_in/dt38-2009](http://realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/dt38-2009) (accessed May 4, 2011).

37 | Cf. Meng-Hsouan Chou, "EU and the Migration-Development Nexus: What Prospects for EUWide Policies?" Centre on Migration, Policy and Society. Oxford 2006 (Working Paper, 37), 2.

38 | Cf. Christina Boswell, "The 'external dimension' of EU immigration and asylum policy," *International Affairs*, 3/2010, 624.

39 | Cf. Chou (2006), 2.

prevention strategies rather than the short-term avoidance of irregular migration.

In the past the European Union has used a mixture of reactive and preventive approaches in their migration policy. The “classical” reactive instruments include above all the coordination of visa policies, stationing EU border police at airports in the countries of origin and tightening the EU’s external borders. European border administration dates from the late 1960s, but over the last ten years the establishment of various European databases and the founding of the European border security agency Frontex in 2004 have given it a shot in the arm.<sup>40</sup>

The European Union is also driving forward agreement on repatriation treaties. Countries which have signed these agreements with the EU are obliged to take back any of their citizens who have migrated to Europe illegally, while abiding by the Geneva Convention. They may also be obliged to take back stateless people or citizens of other countries who travelled to the EU illegally from within their jurisdiction.<sup>41</sup> Since 2002, 13 of these treaties have been signed, but none of them with African countries,<sup>42</sup> however the Cotonou Agreement deals with the expulsion of illegal immigrants from the European Union to their countries of origin.<sup>43</sup>

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In parallel to these control-oriented measures, the European Union is also making efforts to achieve long-term stability in the countries of origin. But in practice there was a long period when very few specific steps were taken in

40 | Cf. Johannes Pollack, Peter Slominski: “Experimentalist but not accountable governance? The role of Frontex in managing the EU’s external borders,” in: *West European Politics*, 5/2009, 908.

41 | Cf. [http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/fsj/immigration/reasons/wai/fsj\\_immigration\\_relations\\_de.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/reasons/wai/fsj_immigration_relations_de.htm) (accessed March 16, 2011).

42 | A complete list of repatriation agreements can be viewed at: <http://mirem.eu/datasets/agreements/european-union> (accessed March 16, 2011). Treaties have been signed with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Hong Kong, Macao, Moldova, Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Sri Lanka and the Ukraine. Negotiations are underway with Algeria, the Cap Verde Islands, Morocco and Turkey.

43 | Cf. Chou and Gibert (2010), 3.

this direction. It is only in recent years that there has been a change of perspective which has resulted in concrete policies. In the framework of the 2005 "Global Approach to Migration" the European Union has tried to more actively manage the flow of migrants and to develop an equal partnership with third countries by drawing security and development issues into the equation.<sup>44</sup> Along with the conventional instruments for controlling migration, other measures were designed with the aim of promoting the long-term development of the countries of origin and transit countries, along with offering legal immigration opportunities.

**Along with the conventional instruments for controlling migration, other measures were designed with the aim of promoting the long-term development of the countries of origin.**

One such planned step is to set up Regional Protection Programmes. The EU hopes these will strengthen the protection capacity of the regions which are most affected by large influxes of refugees and improve refugee protection.<sup>45</sup> The first pilot projects have begun in Tanzania, the Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. This attempt to strengthen the infrastructure of third countries and to involve international bodies such as the United Nations Refugee Agency in European migration policy could be interpreted as a comprehensive plan on the part of the European Union to prevent migration.<sup>46</sup> Some writers have criticised the Regional Protection Programmes as being an expression of a restrictive policy of externalisation in the tradition of the control policies which were pursued up until now.<sup>47</sup>

Another step being taken by the EU is the establishment of "Mobility Partnerships" with non-member states to provide a favourable solution to migration issues for both parties.

44 | Cf. Steffen Angenendt, "Die Zukunft der europäischen Migrationspolitik. Triebkräfte, Hemmnisse und Handlungsmöglichkeiten," *Schriften zu Europa*, 4. Berlin 2008, 45.

45 | Cf. European Commission: *Communication on Regional Protection Programmes*. COM (2005) 388 final.

46 | Cf. <http://migrationsrecht.net/nachrichten-auslaenderrecht-europa-und-eu/254-eu-frattini-regionale-schutzprogramme-auffanglager-illegale-einwanderung.html> (accessed March 16, 2011).

47 | Cf. Petra Bendel, "Everything under control? The European Union's policies and politics of immigration," in: Thomas Faist, Andreas Ette (eds.), *Between Autonomy and the European Union: The Europeanization of National Immigration Policies*. London 2007, 43.

These are agreements between selected member states of the European Union and third countries which commit both parties to certain actions. Security issues and development policies are given equal weight. For example, the countries of origin agree to take back their citizens and improve their border controls. For their part, the EU will provide information on employment opportunities, promote mobility for highly-qualified would-be migrants, open up opportunities for legal migration, ease visa restrictions for certain professions and give the third country partners preferential conditions when dealing in services or investments.<sup>48</sup> In the African region, pilot projects were set up in 2008 in the Cap Verde Islands. In 2008 the EU also opened the "Migration Information and Management Centre" in Mali to inform potential migrants about the risks and opportunities of emigrating and to run its own research projects. However, the Centre is likely to close soon due to disagreements about how it should be financed.

Senegal has been sounded out about the possibility of a Mobility Partnership, but to date there has been no agreement. This is due to hesitancy on the part of the Senegalese government which fears losing the advantages offered by the current agreement. The EU has so far not succeeded in providing sufficient incentives to dispel the doubts of its prospective partners and bring the talks to a successful conclusion.<sup>49</sup>

#### **AFRICAN-EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP**

Reactions to the increasing rates of migration vary greatly. In academic circles and on the street there is much talk of fortress Europe, strengthening the coast guard, more expulsions, building walls and the deployment of navy and air forces. But these will never provide a long-term solution. What is needed is a European-African partnership to prevent uncontrolled and unsustainable migration to Europe and to develop Africa's human resources, as the physically mobile are also usually the intellectually mobile.

48 | Cf. Petra Bendel, "Europäische Migrationspolitik. Bestandsaufnahme und Trends," Expert opinion for the Department of Economic and Social Policy at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Bonn 2009, 18.

49 | Chou and Gibert (2010), 10.

Table 1

**Timeline of the African-European partnership**

2000	First EU-Africa summit in Cairo
2001	Founding of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development)
2002	Founding of the AU
2003	Mission Artémis in the Congo
2005	Adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa
2007	Adoption of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy (at the Lisbon summit)
2008-2010	Implementation of first action plan

In December 2005 the EU's Africa Strategy was passed by the European Council, a strategy which was, however, drawn up without any direct contribution from African countries. Based on the EU-Africa Strategy, representatives of the EU and African countries drew up a joint strategy which was ratified at the 2<sup>nd</sup> EU-Africa summit on 9 December 2007 in Lisbon. The 2005 strategy was based on three principles: a true partnership with equal dialogue between partners, subsidiary and solidary dealings with the AU and ongoing political exchanges on a variety of levels.

**ACTION PLAN 2008-2010**

To implement the strategy, three-year action plans were drawn up. These action plans defined a partnership "as political relations between interested partners who have organised themselves on a voluntary basis around a shared vision with the intention of launching concrete activities".<sup>50</sup> The EU should act in a subsidiary way so that appropriate steps could be taken to support the wishes of the AU. The AU sees the Council as their point of contact for the EU.

The first action plan (2008 bis 2010) includes eight "partnerships":

50 | First Action Plan (2008-2010), For the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, in: [http://aEEP-conference.org/documents/eas2007\\_action\\_plan\\_2008\\_2010.pdf](http://aEEP-conference.org/documents/eas2007_action_plan_2008_2010.pdf) (accessed May 4, 2011).

1. Peace and security
2. Democracy and human rights
3. Trade and infrastructure
4. Achieving millennium development goals
5. Energy and climate change
6. Migration
7. Mobility and employment
8. Development of knowledge-based societies

An EU-AU ministerial troika meets twice a year to manage the implementation of the action plan. On the European side this applies to the Council, the Presidency and the Commission and on the African side the Commission and the current and preceding Presidencies. Implementation teams are drawing up concrete proposals for each of the eight partnerships, with the collaboration of non-governmental parties and civil society.<sup>51</sup> The heads of state and government will meet every three years, the commissions on an annual basis. There will also be a multitude of contacts and working groups at parliamentary level, supplemented by collaboration with the European Economic and Social Committee and the African Economic Council, and contacts with regional bodies and civil society. Regional associations will also be assisted with integration: the West African CEDEAO, the Central African CEEAC, the development authority IGAD and the South African SADC.

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## FIRST RESULTS

On November 20 and 21, 2008 the ministerial troika met in Addis Ababa, home of the African Union. At this meeting the implementation of the joint EU-Africa Strategy and the first Action Plan were reviewed for the first time. The second meeting of the ministerial troika took place on April 28, 2009 in Luxembourg and continued the political dialogue.

In the area of strategies to counter climate change, efforts were stepped up to promote a global, multilateral dialogue and a joint strategy was taken to the climate

51 | Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Africa and the EU," December 1, 2010, in: <http://auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa/Aussenpolitik/Regionalabkommen/EU-AfrikaStrategie> (accessed April 13, 2011).



summit in Copenhagen. The joint declaration is the result of the 11<sup>th</sup> ministerial troika meeting in Addis Ababa. It also goes back to the results of the African Environment Ministers Conference on Climate Change which took place on November 20 in Algiers which produced the Algiers Declaration on climate change.<sup>52</sup>

In the peace and security area, support was given to the efforts of the AUC to set up a rapid deployment force, to combat terrorism and to restrict the arms trade. 300 million Euro was provided to carry out the steps set out in the action plan, money which should be used to finance peace-keeping missions in Africa. The latter's effectiveness will be supported by a crisis reaction mechanism for emergency action.

The 8<sup>th</sup> partnership is concerned with knowledge, the information society and space travel. In this respect the African Union has already established and developed 19 landmark projects. Up to 63 million Euro has been earmarked in 2010 for research projects relating to the improvement of sanitary conditions, water supply and food security in Africa.<sup>53</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Since 2000 the EU and Africa have been working to develop a partnership which serves the interests of both parties. Some of the structures they have developed have attracted

criticism, particularly for the fact that a lot of partnership items have so far remained no more than good intentions and there has been little progress of any substance. It is not enough to simply organise meetings.

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And the complexity of the political structures and the problems faced by many African countries make it very difficult to exert any external influence. The EU has been involved from the start in particularly important areas

52 | Europa Press Releases, "Africa and the European Union join forces to work together against climate change", December 2, 2008, in: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1853> (accessed April 13, 2011).

53 | Europa Press Releases, "EU-African Union Scientific Partnership: €63 million to support research for Africa," July 30, 2009, in: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1205&language=EN> (accessed April 13, 2011).

such as energy and good governance. In comparison with the first EU strategy (2005) the emphasis is now more on consultation.

The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership uses the potential of science and technology to meet Africa's challenges. The EU stresses that it is not only working for Africa, but also with Africa. In the area of peace and security there has been some progress: along with the development of appropriate structures, steps have also been taken to counter the spread of small arms and terrorism.

However, it is still necessary to strengthen the role of civil society, particularly on the African side. This also applies to the economy. Various interim agreements with individual countries have made the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in its present form not conducive to development. One of the Strategy's major goals is the promotion of regional integration. African parliaments seem to be too weak to take on their intended role as the drivers of representative democracy. There is a great need for collaboration and dialogue to be effectively coordinated.

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## OUTLOOK

The revolutionary upheavals in the Arab world have also had an effect on Senegal. Some of the countries involved are transit countries for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. It remains to be seen whether the new governments in Tunisia (and possibly in Libya) will be prepared to prevent irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean to the same extent as the former regimes. The removal of border controls makes it likely that Europe will be under even more pressure from migrants, even if predictions of a new Migration Period are somewhat overblown. But there will be a trend towards more restrictive controls and the role of the European border control agency Frontex will become more significant. Indeed, between 2005 and 2010 the Frontex budget has already climbed from 6.3 to almost 88 million Euro.<sup>54</sup>

54 | Cf. [http://www.frontex.europa.eu/budget\\_and\\_finance](http://www.frontex.europa.eu/budget_and_finance) (accessed March 24, 2011).

Nevertheless, in the long term it is only sustainable actions to improve the economic, social and political situations in the countries of origin and transit countries which will produce a noticeable reduction in migrant numbers. New methods of collaboration which take the “comprehensive approach” may be a useful first step towards the agreement of a coherent migration policy between the EU and Africa. Mobility partnerships present an opportunity, but also a danger. They offer the opportunity to manage migration in a more orderly way and to satisfy the EU’s demand for (qualified) workers while also meeting the partner countries’ desire for legal immigration opportunities.<sup>55</sup> But there is also the risk that many migrants will prefer to stay in Europe rather than returning home, thus robbing their homelands of resources needed to help in their technological and economic development.

In order to avoid uncontrolled and unsustainable migration to Europe and to promote the development of human resources in Africa, it is crucial to strengthen the European-African partnership. It is in the interests of both sides to work together within the terms of the EU-Africa Strategy. This partnership is absolutely essential for a variety of reasons, of which the problem of migration is only one. Europeans have to learn that it is in their interest for their neighbours to develop and that these interests can in fact overlap. Only then will the structures which are presently being built be understood and supported by the citizens of Europe. Both continents have made their first steps, but they now have to continue along the path.

55 | Cf. Meng-Hsouan Chou, “European Union Migration Strategy towards West Africa: the Origin and Outlook of ‘Mobility Partnerships’ with Cape Verde and Senegal”. Conference speech: “Information and Ideas on the European Union”. Los Angeles, 2009, 22, in: [http://unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/chou\\_08C.pdf](http://unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/chou_08C.pdf) (accessed March 24, 2011).