

ON THE ROAD TO A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM?

RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOCAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Werner Böhler

Despite some losses, the African National Congress (ANC) once again showed that they are the dominant political force in South Africa after getting 62 per cent of the vote in the local elections on May 18, 2011. The opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) was able to increase its voter base to 23.9 per cent with some significant wins and to attract voters from outside its traditional groups of supporters for the first time. As a result the DA is the only party that was able to increase its share of the vote in these elections. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) is the third strongest party with 3.6 per cent despite some significant losses. The smaller parties were the biggest losers, even though it can be seen on closer analysis that there were some interesting differences between them. What was noticeable was the record turnout for a local election of 57.6 per cent (2006: 48 per cent).

23.6 million voters registered for these highly-anticipated local elections, of which around one million were first-time voters. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) set up 20,859 polling stations and printed 4,555 different voting slips. A total of 278 local parliaments were due to be elected, divided into 226 municipalities, 44 districts and 8 metropolitan municipalities (metros).

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

“Service delivery” was the key issue during the elections. Not long after the national and provincial elections on April 23, 2009 the inhabitants of many townships showed their



Dr. Werner Böhler is Resident Representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Johannesburg.

dissatisfaction over poor or totally non-existent public services such as water, electricity or roads in a series of often violent demonstrations. People's patience over unfulfilled promises has started to wear thin 17 years after the reintroduction of democracy to the country. The poor

In 2010 there were 111 demonstrations, spread throughout all nine provinces. At this year's 23 demonstrations the police used rubber bullets and live ammunition.

in particular feel especially let down by the many corruption scandals surrounding the democratic institutions and the ruling ANC. In 2006 there were only two significant demonstrations, but in 2010 the Municipal IQ agency reckons there were 111, spread throughout all nine provinces, albeit of varying sizes. At this year's 23 demonstrations the police used rubber bullets and live ammunition, a scene that was reminiscent of the apartheid years. In the Ficksburg township in the Free State a well-known community activist was shot by police as he tried to mediate between angry inhabitants and the police.

The opposition parties picked up on this theme during their election campaigns, reflecting it in their election slogans. The DA chose: "We deliver for all", the IFP: "It's about you" and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP): "Let's fix it". Right up until Election Day nobody was really sure how the protests in ANC strongholds would affect the party's results. In the last three weeks before the election the ANC felt forced to send practically the whole of the party leadership into the "crisis areas" to try and win people over. This kind of intensive campaigning in an attempt to mobilise their own voters, especially by the DA and the ANC, was a key factor in the high turnout.

The DA was the only party to put a team of people on its election posters led by Helen Zille, party leader and Premier of the Western Cape, and including Patricia de Lille, candidate for Mayor of Cape Town and Lindiwe Mazibuko, Speaker of the party. With these three the white, coloured and black skin colours were all represented. This helped to counter the charge from their political opponents that the DA was basically a "white male" party. The ANC used President Jacob Zuma as the face of their campaign. Other parties such as the IFP, Congress of the People (COPE), National Freedom Party (NFP), ACDP and Freedom Front Plus (FF+) also preferred to use a picture of their party leader.

The DA started campaigning early and set itself some ambitious goals:

- to significantly improve its share of the vote from the 14.8 per cent it won in the 2006 local elections and the 16.79 per cent in the 2009 national elections. The Independent Democrats (ID) joined the DA a few months before the local elections. This was a significant gain for the DA especially in terms of attracting the votes of coloureds, who make up the majority in the Western Cape.
- to significantly improve their share of the vote amongst the 80 per cent of voters who are black from the two per cent they had achieved in the past.
- to win another one of the eight metros in addition to Cape Town, as well as more local parliaments.

Since 2006 the DA has worked hard to create a new image for the party. The intention was to create in the DA “a home for people of all skin colours” based on the principles outlined in the strategy paper “Becoming a Party for All the People: A New Approach for the DA”. During the local elections the DA went on the offensive and challenged the idea that the ANC alone were the rightful heirs of the freedom fighters and of Nelson Mandela, the first President of the new South Africa. At their final rally in the OR Tambo Hall in Khayelitsha, the largest of the black townships in Cape Town, Helen Zille claimed that the DA were the real guardians of Mandela’s legacy, namely that of creating reconciliation between races. Zille came across as credible because she herself had been actively involved in the anti-apartheid movement and could speak fluent Xhosa. The reaction of the ANC’s General Secretary, Gwede Mantashe, with his call to “Stop stealing struggle heroes”¹ looked pretty hopeless in comparison.

During the local elections the DA challenged the idea that the ANC alone were the rightful heirs of the freedom fighters and of Nelson Mandela.

The DA used Cape Town and the Western Cape Province as a springboard for their main election theme, the issue of service delivery for everybody. The party has been in power there since 2006 in a coalition government, and on their own in the Western Cape since 2009. Four surveys in the last two years have confirmed that Cape Town is the

1 | *Sunday Times*, May 15, 2011, 4.

best city in the country in terms of service delivery. Among these is a survey carried out for the Ministry for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs by the BEE rating agency Empowerdex. Helen Zille also won the World Mayor Prize in 2008 in her capacity as mayor of Cape Town, which the urban affairs think-tank City Mayors awards each year to mayors who show particular commitment to their jobs.

During the elections DA candidates encouraged the voters to compare the delivery of services in the areas controlled by the DA to those where the ANC were in the majority. The DA had the advantage this time of being able to point to its own successes and to underline its suitability for government, in contrast to previous years. Since 2006

The DA has particularly focussed on attracting young blacks in order to prepare them for future candidacy and the possibility of taking over political positions.

the DA has also run an intensive training programme for younger party members in order to develop its own future politicians from within. It has particularly focussed on attracting young blacks in order to prepare them for future candidacy and the possibility of taking over political positions in the government or the party. Many of these new members were candidates in these local elections. Others are still too young but will play an important role in the next elections in 2014 and 2016. What is also important is the transparent and effective selection process for political candidates. The DA are very much against the idea of "cadre deployment" as practised by the ANC. Interested candidates have to apply to the Party just like members do and take part in a standard selection process. The goal of this process is to find the best candidates for particular official functions each and every time.

The DA implemented its election strategy effectively right up to Election Day. At no point did the party react to provocation from the ANC and their coalition partners like the ANCYL. "Service delivery for all" was the DA's motto throughout, which has some echoes of the ANC's election slogan in 1994: "A better future for all".

The ANC found themselves on the defensive as a result of the growing number of service delivery protests. The party's election campaign was also a bit sluggish, which was in part due to tensions within the party. Rumours

circulated about a secret service report on an alleged plot by senior party members against Jacob Zuma and this led to factions forming within the party. These quarrels should also be seen in the light of the questions being asked as to whether or not the ANC Party Congress at the end of 2012 will once again elect Jacob Zuma as party leader. If so, he will automatically be the ANC candidate for President according to the party's rules. Powerful wings within the party, that were responsible for the downfall of Thabo Mbeke and the election of Zuma to the party leadership at the Party Congress in Polokwane, are starting to openly question the wisdom of a second term in office for Zuma. Amongst these wings is the powerful ANC Youth League (ANCYL) and the confederation of trade unions COSATU that have allies throughout the party. The key issue here is not the unfulfilled promises that Zuma made to these groups in order to ensure his election as party leader in December 2007, but his failure to implement central political objectives.²

Rumours circulated about a secret service report on an alleged plot by senior party members against Jacob Zuma and this led to factions forming within the party.

The ANC once again relied on their previously successful "voter targeting" election strategy, in order to present the ANC to the wider voting public as the party of the freedom movement. This model incorporates the principle of a "broad church" in which a number of political movements are united in a single combined movement. Serious budget planning by the Finance Minister with calls for savings to be made, left-wing policies from the South African Communist Party (SACP) or various unions, and populist demands for the nationalisation/indigenisation of the mines or property by the ANCYL President, Julius Malema, are all brought together under one roof and this is one of the main reasons why the ANC were so successful in the elections, with a 60 to 70 per cent share of the vote.

The ANC also focused on trying to polarise voters in order to mobilise their own vote. This strategy was aimed at undermining the election concept employed by their main opponents the DA to attract more black voters and so take votes from the ANC. The ANC fought for the most part a negative campaign and tried to present the "official

2 | "Judging Jacob Zuma," *The Star*, May 16, 2011, 15;
 "President Zuma's scorecard," *The Star*, May 17, 2011, 15.

opposition" (DA) as being the party of the kind of racism that was well known from the past.³ ANCYL President Malema was particularly vocal in this area. He referred to Helen Zille as simply "the madam". At the final rally under the banner of "Siyanqoba" (we will win) in the FNB stadium (Soccer City) on the edge of Soweto he described the DA as a threat and suggested that "the DA is for whites, not for Africans, a party for minorities." Jacob Zuma repeated the message that every vote for the ANC would help to stop a return to racism. And he warned people not to elect a party that wanted to reintroduce apartheid by the back door. The SACP and the ANCYL described the DA's election posters as the "madam and the two stooges". Helen Zille for her part simply commented that the only weapon available to the ANC in these elections was the issue of racism and carried on with her own non-racist election strategy.

Jacob Zuma warned people not to elect a party that wanted to reintroduce apartheid by the back door. The SACP and the ANCYL described the DA's election posters as the "madam and the two stooges".

The ANC's overriding goal was to defend the party's dominant position in the country. Under the election banner "Together we can build better communities" it aimed to motivate its own supporters to vote and played on the desire of many to be a part of the freedom movement and its social milieu. In order to achieve this they deliberately allowed minorities into their camp and accepted public criticism in order that critics from within their own ranks would still feel represented by the ANC. The political analyst Susan Booysen sees this as being a key operational component of the ANC's retention of power, "The creation of internal opposition islands to keep dissent in the ANC family".⁴ The General Secretary of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi, was a good example of this strategy in action, accusing leading members of the ANC of corruption and publicly calling for action, including suggesting that they should step down.

Using large-format advertisements in all media the ANC pointed to the great progress it had made along the road to finally moving the country away from its apartheid past. It listed its achievements in the areas of housing construction, water and electricity supplies and the social welfare

3 | *Business Day*, May 23, 2011, 8.

4 | *The Star*, May 17, 2011, 14.

that is paid out to 14 million people. Combining the claim that 17 years was not enough to be able to help everybody with their election campaign slogan they appealed to voters to stay faithful to the ANC and to re-elect them. They also publicly acknowledged their mistakes and failures. Leading party members, including Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, visited townships and complained about shortcomings in ANC-controlled areas and the failure of local party officers. The President himself said after an intensive "door-to-door" campaign that he now understood why the local communities were protesting so much. "I have seen the coalface of service delivery", was how Zuma summed up his impressions.

President Zuma himself said after an intensive "door-to-door" campaign that he now understood why the local communities were protesting so much.

"Door-to-door campaigning" was the backbone of the ANC's election campaign and is its real strength. It focused heavily on this strategy in the last days and weeks leading up to Election Day. No other party has the capacity, the members, the sympathisers or the financial resources for such a campaign. The DA therefore concentrated its efforts in the townships on rallies and the use of the "Delivery Bus". The DA presented its election manifesto at a kick-off campaign rally in Walter Sisulu Square in Klipptown, Soweto, where the Freedom Charter was signed in 1955. Huge rallies were also organised among others in Freedom Square in Mamelodi, Pretoria and in the Lebogang Township in the Govan Mveki Municipality in Mpumalanga. In this way the DA ensured it had an active presence in the townships throughout the election campaign.

It was hard for the smaller parties to get a look-in against the sheer size of the ANC's and DA's election campaigns. They either didn't have the right key political statements or when they did they largely went unheeded. When they did say something it tended to be very general and mostly ended with them promising to work on behalf of poor people and to run the local community administrations efficiently or to provide better service delivery.

SERVICE DELIVERY AND THE "OPEN TOILETS SAGA"

"The toilet election" was the headline in the *Mail & Guardian* of May 13, 2011. What lay behind this lead story was a major dispute between the DA and the ANC. The background to the dispute was an agreement between the DA-led ruling coalition in Cape Town and the Makhaza community in the Khayelitsha Township in 2007 to install 1,316 individual family toilets. As these

An agreement about family toilets stipulated that the city would provide the base plinth and the whole sanitary installation and the families would provide the external walls.

are more expensive than the prescribed community toilets for five families to share, the agreement stipulated that the city would provide the base plinth and the whole sanitary installation and the families would provide the external walls, which is what 96 per cent of families did. This agreement progressed without problem up until the last 55 toilets at the end of 2009. In January 2010 the ANCYL organised a protest with the remaining families and accused Helen Zille of racism and of making people answer the call of nature outdoors. Many of the 55 toilets were needlessly destroyed. All of this could have been seen as a minor incident if it had not been for the fact that the ANC wanted to show that the DA was racist and that their central election theme of "We deliver for all" lacked credibility. The ANCYL lodged a complaint with the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), which was headed by former ANC Member of Parliament Lawrence Mushwana. He accused the DA in his report of violating human rights.

When the election campaigns got underway this subject raised its head in the media again and was heavily exploited as propaganda by the ANC and the ANCYL in particular. The "open toilets saga" was ideal for combating the DA in the "service delivery" battle in the townships. However, the tables were turned when only ten days before the election the media started publishing reports about 1,600 open toilets in the ANC-controlled Moqhaka Community in the Free State, which had been there since 2003. In contrast to Makhaza in the Western Cape there was no agreement on external walls. Further research revealed that leading members of the ANC, including the mayor of the township, had taken part in the tender process and won the orders.

Because of the poor quality of the work they all had to be rebuilt.⁵ The Auditor General, who is responsible for checking public works, delivered a damning indictment of the Moqhaka Township because for four years in a row the receipts and accounts were not suitable for audit.

As part of a damage-limitation exercise leading members of the ANC went to Moqhaka one after the other to heavily criticise the responsible party members there. Julius Malema announced that “heads must roll”, which would apparently happen after the election.⁶ The “toilet wars” helped to turn the elections into the most exciting local elections in the history of democratic South Africa.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

National and provincial elections in South Africa are based on proportional representation. There are no constituencies where candidates directly oppose each other and there is no possibility to elect an individual candidate. Every voter has one vote which he can use to choose one party from the list.

However, at local level the electoral system is similar to that in some German federal states. Every voter has two votes and receives two separate voting slips, one for individual candidates and one for parties. For district councils every voter receives a third voting slip for the composition of the local parliament. In the individual municipalities and wards there are several opposing candidates so the voter is in a position to make a decision based on the candidates’ manifestos and arguments. The fact that the opposite is the case in the national and provincial elections and the massive presence of well-known national figures during the local elections means that local decision-making criteria tend to get lost along the way. Another major reason for this is that big local development and housing projects in South Africa are financed by central government. However the voters in this election still showed a strong interest in local issues, especially as many of them were dissatisfied with their

The voters showed a strong interest in local issues, especially as many of them were dissatisfied with their own personal situations. This was another reason why there was a high turnout at the elections.

5 | *Mail & Guardian*, May 13, 2011, 2.

6 | *Sunday Times*, May 15, 2011, 7.

own personal situations. This was another reason why there was a high turnout at the elections. Susan Booyen summed up the mood like this: "If you think your vote will make a difference, you'll vote."⁷

ELECTION MONITORING⁸

The election campaigns and the election itself mostly went off without incident and these local elections can be considered to be the most peaceful since the beginning of democracy in the 1990s. Unfortunately there were two fatal attacks on an ANC and an IPF candidate. Despite complaints from the parties over small irregularities – Helen Zille complained that in polling stations she visited in Nelson Mandela Bay the second voting slip for the composition of the local council was not given out – there were no official complaints to the IEC electoral commission.

"Today is IEC day, not President's day. Everybody who votes goes straight to heaven", was how KAS election observers were greeted by a polling officer at a polling station in Diepsloot. He was parodying Jacob Zuma, who during the election campaign in the Eastern Cape had promised a direct route to heaven to all those who had the "right party membership card" in their pockets. Many people at the polling station appeared a little anxious, but in general terms there was a good atmosphere on a sunny Highfield winter's election day. The election process was transparent. Every polling station followed the same

The election process was transparent. Every polling station followed the same procedures, whether it was in an established school or in a tent in an informal settlement.

procedures, whether it was in an established school or in a tent in an informal settlement. The newspapers had ensured that the voters were ready and well-informed. There were also plenty of IEC election officials on hand.

7 | *Mail & Guardian*, May 20, 2011, 2.

8 | The KAS office in Johannesburg took part in the election monitoring, which was organised by the South African Civil Society Observation Coalition (SACSOC). KAS was able to choose which polling stations it visited independently. Two polling stations in each of the following townships were selected: Alexandra, near to the new Sandton City centre in the north of Johannesburg, Diepsloot, one of the newest townships, built in 1995 outside of Johannesburg, Kliptown Informal Settlement in Soweto and one polling station in Hillbrow, in the centre of Johannesburg and one in the Saxonworld suburb.

Once again there were some problems over the election tables outside the polling stations used by parties to drum up support. They are banned within 250 to 500 metres of the polling station and this was generally adhered to. Canvassing on election day in South Africa is not generally banned like it is in Germany. However, just as in the elections in 2009, the ANC election tables had official copies of the electoral registers for the individual wards, while party officials manning the tables of other parties, especially the DA, claimed that despite all their efforts they were not given access to these registers. An ANC party coordinator claimed that everything was in order as far as these lists were concerned and that every party could have copies. However the lady could not explain with any real credibility how that was possible and how the ANC came to have copies of the lists. She just kept referring to the "upper structures" who were responsible. Here they were just responsible for the local electoral area, in this case Alexandra. When asked she confirmed that by "upper structures" she meant the party leadership and not the IEC.

Canvassing on election day in South Africa is not generally banned. However, the ANC election tables had official copies of the electoral registers for the individual wards.

It seems questionable, if not downright illegal, that these lists were allowed to be used. This was 2009 all over again. The ANC representatives manning the election tables actively encouraged the voters in the queues to visit their table first. Many follow this instruction out of ignorance. It could also be put down to a fear of being watched or peer pressure, especially in the townships. Once at the election table the ANC ask for ID books to compare them to the electoral register. Voters then go into the polling station. What happens at these ANC party tables when there is no electoral observer present is not certain. When asked, ANC representatives claim that they are carrying out these "preliminary checks" as a service to take the pressure off the IEC staff in the polling stations. However, checking ID books against the electoral register is the responsibility of the IEC at the first table inside the polling station, so this observation could be seen as an instance of an attempted illegal influence on the voters' choices.

What can definitely be seen as positive compared to 2009 is the fact that party agents from each of the five most important parties were present at all the polling stations to observe the election process and they were all given a specific place in the polling station. What is also good to note is that the party observers were generally on good terms with each other, as is usually the case in a democracy, and were mostly younger people. There was another difference worth noting and that is that the DA was present with its own party table at nearly every polling station. The tables were manned by their own members, there were leaflets and posters available and even a van with large party stickers on the doors delivering new supplies. What was impressive is the fact that it was blacks from the local neighbourhoods who were doing all these jobs. This was a big difference to 2009 and is a further reason to be optimistic that a multi-party democracy is emerging in South Africa. However, it should also be noted that the smaller parties were unfortunately not able to be present with party tables at all the polling stations, especially in Johannesburg.

ELECTION RESULTS

The results of the local elections once again confirmed the ANC as the dominant party in South Africa with 62 per cent of the vote. The real winners, however, were the DA with 23.9 per cent. The two parties were well ahead of the other parties and between them secured over 85 per cent of the vote. The results confirmed the trend seen since the election in 2004. The ANC continues to lose votes while the DA steadily improves its results in comparison. Jacob Zuma took over a 70 per cent parliamentary majority from Thabo Mbeki following the 2004 elections. 66.35 per cent in 2006 and 65.9 per cent in 2009 amounts to a loss of eight per cent in seven years. In 2004 the DA won 12.37 per cent of the vote and has almost doubled its share of the vote during the same period.

The ANC continues to lose votes while the DA steadily improves its results in comparison. Jacob Zuma had a loss of eight per cent in seven years.

Table 1

Local election results 2011

Party	Councils	Seats	%
ANC	198	5,633	62.0
DA	18	1,555	23.9
IFP	5	352	3.6
NFP	2	224	2.4
COPE	0	236	2.1
UDM	0	65	0.6
ACDP	0	40	0.6
FF PLUS	0	38	0.5
PAC	0	40	0.4
APC	0	28	0.3
UCDP	0	25	0.2
AZAPO	0	15	0.2
Independents	0	45	1.1
Other	2	140	2.0
Total		8,436	

Source: Electoral Commission/*Centurion*, May 21, 2011

A further category is made up of three parties which achieved between two and four per cent each. The largest is the IFP with 3.6 per cent. Shortly before Election Day there was a split in the party caused by disagreements amongst the leaders. They lost nearly five per cent of the vote compared to the local elections in 2006. The newly-formed NFP did better than expected with 2.4 per cent of the vote. Both parties are very strong in KwaZulu/Natal Province and so were trying to win over the same voters, with the result that their votes were split between the two parties.

COPE only managed 2.1 per cent of the vote, thus killing off the hopes that had grown with their results in the 2009 elections where they won 7.42 per cent of the vote. The poor showing was the result of a bitter power struggle between the party's two leaders Mosiuoa Lekota and Mbhazima Shilowa. Lekota came out on top but it remains to be seen whether COPE can once again be really successful. A few days before the election there was speculation that Mbhazima Shilowa had rejoined the ANC, as so many COPE members had before.

The remaining parties all got less than one per cent of the vote and can all be lumped together in an also-ran category. This includes the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the ACDP, FF+ and the Pan African Congress of Azania (PAC), who got more than one per cent of the vote in 2006, but whose vote was only half as big this time. 195 parties in total had registered with the IEC and of these 133 took part in the elections. There was also a record 748 independent candidates in the election, most of whom were

Although the small parties and the independents won over 400 of the 8,000 ward council seats, their influence is likely to be largely insignificant.

former ANC office holders. The main reason for this was disagreements over the selection process for candidates, where recommendations by local party organisations were often ignored by the party leadership. Although the small parties and the independents won over 400 of the 8,000 ward council seats, their influence is likely to be largely insignificant.

PROVINCES AND METROS

The ANC suffered losses in eight of the nine provinces. Its biggest losses were in the three Cape provinces with eight per cent in the Eastern Cape and six per cent in both the Northern Cape and Western Cape. Even losing 2.5 per cent in the Gauteng Province was painful especially as this is the province with the largest population (around 11 million) and the strongest economy, the party and unions of the Tripartite Alliance are based there and Pretoria is the seat of the Government. It was only in KwaZulu/Natal that the ANC was able to enjoy significant gains. with an increase of ten per cent. These gains can be put down to the poor showing of the IFP and the "Zuma factor".

The DA on the other hand won additional votes everywhere where they had candidates and easily beat their own election goal of 20 per cent of the vote. Their most remarkable result was in the Eastern Cape Province, the province where the ANC originated, where they were able to repeat their success in the North West Province by doubling their vote. In the Western Cape they improved on their 2006 results by nearly 18 per cent, winning 57.08 per cent of the vote. They also had significant gains in the Gauteng Province with an additional seven per cent and in the Northern Cape with an extra eight per cent.

However, the DA was not able to achieve one of its main election goals to win a second metro after Cape Town. They did make progress however and strengthened their role as the party of opposition. They improved their vote in the six most important metros: from 16.7 per cent to 23.2 per cent in Durban, from 25.8 per cent to 30.1 per cent in Ekurhuleni (East Rand), from 24.39 per cent to 40.13 per cent in Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth), from 27.01 per cent to 34.62 per cent in Tshwane (Pretoria) and from 41.9 per cent to 60.92 per cent in Cape Town.

The DA achieved a comprehensive election victory in the Western Cape Province. They can now govern the province on their own without their former coalition partner NNP for the first time. Patricia de Lille, who is (still) leader of the Independent Democrats became mayor. Before the elections the ANC had announced that it wanted to win back the majority in the province and the party leadership was heavily involved in campaigning in the area.

In Tony Ehrenreich, General Secretary of COSATU in the Western Cape, the coloured community had a heavyweight political candidate in the running. However, internal conflicts within the provincial party and attacks on the coloured community by the government spokesman Jimmy Manyi as well as an open letter from Planning Minister Trevor Manuel, in which he accused Manyi of being racist, put an end to his chances.

Table 2

**Results of the local elections of May 18, 2011
by province (in per cent)**

Party	Province	2011	2006	2000
ANC	Eastern Cape	73.44	81.75	74.49
	Free State	71.74	76.61	72.10
	Gauteng	60.21	62.50	59.79
	KwaZulu/Natal	56.57	46.67	33.83
	Limpopo	81.63	83.98	n/a
	Mpumalanga	78.90	80.57	79.95
	North West	74.99	76.60	71.42
	Northern Cape	63.57	69.90	64.53
	Western Cape	34.07	40.17	40.29
	Total		62.00	66.35

Party	Province	2011	2006	2000
DA	Eastern Cape	14.26	7.64	10.46
	Free State	19.34	12.50	17.83
	Gauteng	33.04	26.39	31.27
	KwaZulu/Natal	10.75	8.42	13.63
	Limpopo	6.65	5.49	n/a
	Mpumalanga	13.81	10.39	12.96
	North West	16.14	8.68	10.02
	Northern Cape	22.27	14.03	29.32
	Western Cape	57.08	39.33	50.60 ⁹
	Total		23.90	14.77
IFP	Eastern Cape	0.00	0.07	0.43
	Free State	0.04	0.07	0.29
	Gauteng	0.95	1.98	2.28
	KwaZulu/Natal	17.33	38.48	48.91
	Limpopo	0.00	0.03	n/a
	Mpumalanga	0.17	0.99	1.49
	North West	0.00	0.21	0.00
	Northern Cape	0.00	0.10	0.14
	Western Cape	0.07	0.09	0.17
	Total		3.60	8.05
NFP	Eastern Cape	0.08		
	Free State	0.08		
	Gauteng	0.58		
	KwaZulu/Natal	11.06		
	Limpopo	0.30		
	Mpumalanga	0.47		
	North West	0.27		
	Northern Cape	0.00		
	Western Cape	0.05		
	Total		2.40	
COPE	Eastern Cape	4.17		
	Free State	3.62		
	Gauteng	1.08		
	KwaZulu/Natal	0.34		
	Limpopo	3.88		

9 | Merger of the Democratic Party (DP), New National Party (NNP) and Federal Alliance into the new Democratic Alliance from June 2000. In December 2000 the NNP left the DA and joined the ANC.

Party	Province	2011	2006	2000
	Mpumalanga	1.15		
	North West	2.87		
	Northern Cape	11.91		
	Western Cape	1.94		
	Total	2.10		

Source: <http://www.elections.org.za> (accessed June 24, 2011).

DA-led city and provincial governments also had good results in some settlements within marginal constituencies.

The DA won 16 of the 30 municipalities in

the Western Cape while the ANC could only secure an outright majority in one of them,

Beaufort West. Smaller parties will now have a significant role to play in coalition negotia-

tions. Here, as in the Northern Cape, it

appears that COPE and the DA have come to an agreement

that will form the basis of a coalition partnership. It remains

to be seen whether this will lead to further cooperation at

a provincial or national level with an eye to the future

as COPE also consider discussions with the ANC to be an

option. By forming a coalition with the Independent Civic

Organisation South Africa (ICOSA) the ANC has assured

itself of a majority in three of the remaining twelve local

authorities – Oudtshoorn, Cape Agulhas and Kannaland.

Smaller parties will now have a significant role to play in coalition negotiations. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to further cooperation between COPE and DA.

In Nelson Mandela Bay the DA increased its vote by 15

per cent. COPE only won 4.17 per cent of the vote, after

winning 7.42 per cent in 2009, despite fielding a heavy-

weight candidate in the shape of Smuts Nghonyama,

former Communication Chief of the ANC under Thabo

Mbeki. This dashed any hopes of forming a coalition to

oust the ANC. However, winning 40 per cent of the vote

in this now former ANC stronghold was still a remarkable

achievement for the DA. This would have seemed impos-

sible only a few short years ago. The ANC now finds itself in

a difficult position with only a very slim majority of 51 per

cent. The opposition is likely to use its 45 per cent support

to introduce some of its own initiatives into parliament

that may well run counter to the ANC's controlled welfare

state. But by the same token, this is exactly what ANC election candidates promised their supporters was likely to happen. The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan area includes the port of Coega, which is important to the automotive industry in particular (including Volkswagen). Here too it is probable that there will be difference of opinion with regard to promoting private enterprise.

The ANC won the three Gauteng metros Johannesburg, Tshwane (Pretoria) and Ekurhuleni and won all the municipalities as well, with the exception of Midvaal. However the individual results show some interesting features. In Johannesburg the ANC won 56 per cent of the vote compared to the DA's 37 per cent. This represents a loss of nine per cent for the ANC. Key reasons for the

In Johannesburg the ANC won 56 per cent of the vote compared to the DA's 37 per cent. This represents a loss of nine per cent for the ANC.

ANC's poor performance include service delivery problems and the disaster with incorrect electricity bills. The DA took every opportunity to point out to the voters how different it was in Cape Town and also had a very attractive candidate in 30 year old Mmusi Maimane from Soweto. The Minister of Arts and Culture, Paul Mashatile, who has his power base in the Alexandra township, claimed in a statement that losing the three Johannesburg townships of Lenasia, Westbury and Riverlea had been particularly painful for the ANC. In Ekurhuleni and Tshwane the ANC remained stable, suffering only minor losses, with the DA only managing to gain around five per cent. The Midvaal municipality was hotly contested and is the only one now controlled by the DA. Both parties really wanted to win Midvaal. In the end the DA was able to maintain the 57 per cent it won in 2006 and the ANC finished up with 42 per cent.

In KwaZulu/Natal there were significant changes in voting patterns. The ANC increased its majority by ten per cent to 56.57 per cent. With only 17.33 per cent of the vote, the IFP lost a significant amount of influence in its home province. The newly formed NFP achieved 11.06 per cent. The KwaZulu/Natal province is divided into 50 municipalities, ten district municipalities and Durban as a metro. The ANC won 29 municipalities and four district municipalities with a clear majority. Only in the Zululand district were the IFP able to win two municipalities and the NFP one.

This was a bitter defeat for the traditional IFP under the leadership of Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi. It was particularly painful for them to lose their majority in the Zululand district, which includes the former Zulu capital of Ulundi. The three parties have been locked in coalition negotiations since the results were announced. The ANC is focusing on Zanele Magwaza-Msibi in order to try and build a majority with the NFP that is capable of governing. The IFP also intends to negotiate with the NFP. Cooperation in one or other of the municipalities would however require a rapprochement of the two parties, which seems hard to imagine given the split between them only three months ago.

The IFP also intends to negotiate with the NFP. A cooperation requires a rapprochement of the two parties. This seems hard to imagine given the split between them only three months ago.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The elections were described as free and fair by the IEC and international election observers. This was also the impression of the KAS electoral observers, with the exception of the party lists on the ANC voting tables. As a result this election can be seen as a further step towards consolidating democracy in South Africa.

However the use of the race card by leading ANC members in the election and personal smear campaigns against political opponents should be looked at very critically. The president of the ANCYL in particular peppered many of his election speeches with the phrase “we black people and the others”. And he is not alone in this. The personal smear campaigns waged against political opponents should also not be tolerated. Julius Malema called Helen Zille a “cockroach” and the General Secretary of COSATU in KwaZulu/Natal called her “a genetically modified individual”.¹⁰ And the bad-mouthing continued after the elections – at a victory celebration in Nelson Mandela Bay the president of the local ANC went as far as to call for the local newspaper, *The Herald*, to be burned to the ground: “Burn *The Herald*! Fire to the *Herald*! [...] Down with white political parties!”¹¹ Faced with such a tirade it might have been expected that the ANC leadership would intervene or

10 | *The Sowetan*, May 16, 2011, 2.

11 | *Sunday Times*, May 22, 2011, 5; *Business Day*, May 26, 2011, 3.

the IEC would want to have their say, but they remained silent. This remains a challenge for the future. The ANC need to return to their original aspirations of creating a rainbow nation and an inclusive society in South Africa, as is written into the preamble of the country's constitution.

The ANC celebrated its victory in front of the party's headquarters in Johannesburg, hoping in this way to demonstrate its strength and pre-eminence in the elections. But it also seems that it was trying to strengthen the ANC's internal relations with its coalition partners. As the Party Congress draws ever closer at the end of 2012 and the decision looms as to who will lead the ANC in the 2014 national and provincial elections, internal tensions and factions are beginning to appear. Jacob Zuma has if anything come out of the local elections in

In the ANC the talk is of "collective leadership" – an euphemism for the increasing practice of shifting important decisions to ANC party headquarters.

a weaker position. The performance of his party is less than pleasing and is only to some extent tolerable because of the result in KwaZulu/Natal. The ANC had already lost the other eight provinces in the 2009 elections. It was also blamed for the polarisation during the election campaign which lost the vote of the country's minorities, though others also have to bear responsibility for this. In the ANC the talk is of "collective leadership" – an euphemism for the increasing practice of shifting important decisions to ANC party headquarters. The President thus is becoming a "lame duck".¹²

Here we should once again mention Jacob Zuma's past record. Julius Malema had already demonstrated his powerful position during the election campaign. His fingers were in every pie, whether it was the toilet saga, altercations about party lists, or hotly-contested battles in municipalities and metros such as Midvaal or Nelson Mandela Bay. Just a year ago he was hauled up in front of a party committee for publicly criticising President Zuma's policy decisions. Since then Julius Malema has been in the opposition camp when it comes to a second term for Jacob Zuma. His revitalized popularity also guaranteed his re-election as ANCYL president on June 16, 2011 at the Party Congress. In the Zuma camp it is feared, not without

12 | Sam Mkokeli, *Business Day*, May 20, 2011, 15.

cause, that Malema will come out publicly for a change of leadership after his election. This could quickly result in a movement which would attract other factions within the party. The trade union association COSATU has for some time been distancing itself from Zuma. The garbage collectors' strike when the election campaign was at its height was only settled after three weeks at the end of April and may be a taste of further strikes to come which could damage Zuma's popularity. In a first statement about his poor performance in the Western Cape, Tony Ehrenreich complained: "It's a deep unhappiness with the ANC".¹³ Minister of Human Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale, a multi-millionaire and former BEE businessman, may stand for the office of Party President. And the name of Vice-President Kgalema Motlanthe has often come up, but it seems he is unwilling to stand against Zuma.

Things seem to be moving towards a two-party system, which after these elections appears less of a one-sided proposition. The DA has finally managed to position itself as a political alternative to the ANC, and initial studies confirm that the DA has also succeeded in increasing its vote amongst the black population. Around 20 per cent of DA voters are black, corresponding to five to six per cent of the overall black population. In the 2009 elections this was just two per cent. But it is still likely to be difficult to win majorities in rural, mainly black provinces in the foreseeable future without a coalition partner. This is why the well-known political analyst Aubrey Matshiqi thinks that a new political party will be formed within the next 3 years which will include the DA but which will be able to attract more black voters. This may be a possibility, but it is hard to imagine the DA giving up its carefully-constructed image and total re-branding which it has carried out since the 2009 elections, or indeed whether this would be a good move. In her commentary in *Business Day* on May 24, 2011 Palesa Morudu tends towards the view that there is room for a third large party as an alternative to the protectionist approach of the ANC and the "Open Opportunity Society" idea of the DA. It remains to be seen how things will develop. Above all it will

Maybe there is room for a third large party as an alternative to the protectionist approach of the ANC and the "Open Opportunity Society" idea of the DA.

depend on the three smaller parties in the middle category whether they can develop this alternative.

In this respect, the coalitions which need to be formed are something new in South Africa. In the current phase of coalition-building, the IFP, NFP and COPE are important in ensuring a majority for one of the two big parties. In KwaZulu/Natal, in Zululand district for example, the IFP and NFP in combination were able to win a majority and form a government. In the interests of a pluralistic, inclusive society, as set out in the constitution, it would be desirable if other parties could be involved in wider power-sharing. For these three parties, the coalition talks could be crucial in determining whether they can consolidate and expand their voter base in future elections and start to catch up with the DA and ANC.

The results of this election could give a boost to the idea of having a single election day by combining the local elections with the national and provincial elections. The ANC is supporting this project and as the dominant party would have the most to gain. The opposition parties, along with non-governmental organisations, universities and research institutes are all vehemently against the introduction of a single election day, saying the local elections would lose their distinctiveness as they would be overshadowed by the national and provincial elections.

“What of the future?” asks Allister Sparks in his commentary in *Business Day* on May 25, 2011. His experience of the recent past shows that “Leviathan parties” are not likely to be in a position to stop a downward trend once it has taken hold. Anthony Butler makes the same argument, saying: “The end of any dominant party’s dominance is, ultimately, inevitable.”¹⁴ So it must be the goal of democrats to ensure that this process culminates in a democratic multi-party system and not in an authoritarian one-party state. The opposition parties not least have to take responsibility for this.

14 | *Business Day*, May 27, 2011, 11.