


## Turkish Youth 98

### The Silent Majority Highlighted





Konrad  
-Adenauer-  
Foundation

# **Turkish Youth 98**

## **The Silent Majority Highlighted**

**a study conducted by**

**ISTANBUL MULKIYELILER FOUNDATION  
SOCIAL RESEARCH CENTER**

**for**

**KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION**

## PREFACE

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
**W**ith this publication Konrad Adenauer Foundation offers a representative study about Turkish youth.

Turkish society is a young society as compared to the German one. Some 59% of all Turks are below 35 years of age, and yet there exists very few precise information or none whatever about this "silent majority". Purpose of this study is to obtain more accurate knowledge about the self - image of Turkish youth, about their values and their attitudes, as well as their problems and future expectations by way of sound, reliable empirical research.

Just because youth represents the future and hope of a country, we deemed it all the more relevant to get to know the hopes, wishes, and fears of young people. In Germany, Konrad Adenauer Foundation and other institutions have already carried out several similar juvenile studies. The same is true also for other European countries. So with this study we hope to make a contribution to international comparative research on youth.

Findings of this study should serve to initiate a more sensitive approach to the problems of youth in Turkish public opinion, and give impetus to a discussion as how to evaluate the situation of youth in Turkey, and of course how to improve it. By means of this publication we do hope to start a broad public discussion in academic circles, in the press and media, among politicians and youth - experts, in schools, in universities; a discussion not only about young people, but with them, too; that is a dialogue among generations.

I would especially like to thank to the members of the research - team from IMV - SAM: Ayla Ortaç, Mehmet Aközer, Dr. Ferhat Kentel, Emre Erdoğan, Cenap Nuhrat and Dr. Günter Seufert from Orient institute for their excellent cooperation by the realisation of this project.



Dr. Wulf Schönbohm  
Konrad Adenauer Foundation  
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## INTRODUCTION

**A** survey was conducted to explore various social and political aspects of the behaviour and attitudes of the youth in Turkey. The survey was preceded by a series of focus groups held in Istanbul in July 1998. Field work was completed in September-October 1998 in 11 provinces of the country. The following report presents survey findings.

The survey employed face-to-face interviewing of respondents in household environments. Sample size was set at 2200, which was distributed among selected provinces according to population size. Selection of provinces followed from a clustering of the eighty provinces in the country on the basis of a series of economic, social and cultural variables.

The sampling plan was guided by two basic assumptions:

1. The "youth" is conceptually an urban social segment.
2. Economic, social and cultural differences among urban environments in Turkey affect the attitudes and behaviour of young people who live in different urban environments.

The following economic, social and cultural variables were used as factors in the clustering of Turkish provinces:

- Per capita gross domestic product by provinces
- Rate of economic growth by provinces
- Rate of population growth by provinces
- UNDP HDI score (Human Development Index) by provinces
- Rate of high school (lycée) enrolment by provinces
- Percentage of university graduates by provinces
- Percentage of RP (Refah Partisi – Welfare Party) vote in 1995 General Elections by provinces (used as an indicator along the modern/traditional axis)

Multivariate analysis based on the above mentioned provincial data resulted in the identification of five clusters of provinces that differed from one another, as well as from national averages, in various dimensions. Since one of the clusters was too "small" (in terms of number of provinces included and population represented), it was included in a larger one that best approximated it in terms of factor scores. Thus, the sample was drawn from provinces grouped into four main clusters.

The sample was distributed among 11 provinces, two of which were selected from each of the four clusters; the remaining three comprised Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, the three largest metropolitan areas in the country. The resulting sampling plan is shown below.

Table 1

Strata	Population	Provinces	n
Istanbul	9,198,229	Istanbul	300
Ankara	3,684,916	Ankara	150
Izmir	3,174,413	Izmir	150
Cluster 1	12,589,581	Denizli	200
		Trabzon	200
Cluster 2	13,211,611	Sivas	200
		Diyarbakir	200
Cluster 3	9,955,500	Antalya	200
		Edirne	200
Cluster 4	10,732,012	Gaziantep	200
		Tokat	200
Total	62,546,262		2200

The survey was conducted according to the above plan and 2223 interviews were made in the said 11 provinces. Distribution of actual interviews by provinces is as follows:

Table 2

Strata	Provinces	n	%
Istanbul	Istanbul	310	13.9
Ankara	Ankara	156	7.0
Izmir	Izmir	159	7.2
Cluster 1	Denizli	206	9.3
	Trabzon	204	9.2
Cluster 2	Sivas	197	8.9
	Diyarbakir	204	9.2
Cluster 3	Antalya	195	8.8
	Edirne	201	9.1
Cluster 4	Gaziantep	188	8.5
	Tokat	203	9.1
Total		2223	100.2*

\* percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding

## I. DEMOGRAPHIC and SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA

### A. Distribution by sex, age and marital status

Table 3

Sex	Qty	%
Female	1087	48,9
Male	1136	51,1
Total	2223	100,0

Table 4

Age	Qty	%
15-20	1140	51,3
21-27	1083	48,7
Total	2223	100,0

Gender distribution by age groups is the same as that in the overall sample.

Table 5

Marital status	Qty	%
Single	1667	75,0
Engaged	100	4,5
Married	449	20,2
Other	7	0,3
Total	2223	100,0

Respondents included more than twice as many married women (28.5 percent) as married men (12.2 percent). In other words, an overwhelming majority (83.5 percent) of male respondents are single. Distribution of the engaged or betrothed varies only negligibly by sex.

About 14 percent of the respondents are parents, about one half (6.7 percent of the sample) with one child and slightly more than one third (4.9 percent of the sample) with two children.

### B. Distribution by locality, living quarters and household size

Distribution of respondents by province of residence is shown on the following table. About 72 percent live in cities, as opposed to 27 percent who live in small towns.

**Table 6**

Province lived	Oty	%
Istanbul	310	13.9
Ankara	154	6.9
Izmir	160	7.2
Antalya	195	8.8
Denizli	205	9.2
Diyarbakir	205	9.2
Edime	200	9.0
Gaziantep	189	8.5
Sivas	197	8.9
Tokat	203	9.1
Trabzon	205	9.2
Total	2223	99.9

More than one fourth (27 percent) of the respondents indicated having been born in a province other than the one they presently live in.

Highest incidence of birth in another province is seen among respondents interviewed in Antalya and Istanbul. Differences are also observed between

type of settlement that respondents were born in and that they currently live in. About two-thirds (64.7 percent) of the respondent indicated that they were born in cities, while 28.3 percent were born in small towns and 7 percent in villages.

Distribution by province of birth is shown on Table 7.

**Table 7**

Province born	%
Istanbul	9.5
Ankara	5.9
Izmir	5.2
Antalya	4.0
Denizli	7.0
Diyarbakir	8.7
Edime	6.8
Gaziantep	7.5
Sivas	8.6
Tokat	8.0
Trabzon	8.4
Other Mediterranean	2.2
East	4.0
Other Aegean	1.7
Other South-eastern	2.2
Other Central Anatolian	3.0
Other Black Sea	3.8
Other Marmara	1.3
Abroad	1.6
Total	99.4

The majority of respondents live either with the family they grew up in or the family they started themselves. Living with parents is more widespread than average among men (76.5 percent), while living with the spouse in the self-founded

family dwelling is more common among women (26.1 percent). Living in student housing does not vary by sex. "Moving out" to live with room-mates or alone, however, is more frequent among men (6.2 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively).

Table 8

Dwelling	Oty	%
With parents	1575	70.9
With sister/brother	38	1.7
With partner/husband/wife	388	17.5
Sharing the place with a friend/friends	106	4.8
In a "bachelor's room"	14	0.6
Alone	31	1.4
In student housing	46	2.1
Other	10	0.4
Refused	15	0.7
Total	2223	100.1

Average household size (4.5 people) is the same as the national average. Distribution of respondents by household size is as follows:

Table 9

Household size	Oty	%
1-2	212	9.8
3	347	15.6
4	634	28.5
5	457	20.6
6	217	9.8
7	119	5.4
8-9	96	4.3
More than 10	52	2.3
Refused	89	4.0
Total	2223	100.1

### C. Distribution by Socio-economic attributes

#### 1. Education

Respondents were asked to indicate the number of years that they attended school. Average years of schooling among the respondents (9.8 years) is well above the national average. Cumulative percentages point to about one fifth of the respondents as having a maximum of primary school level, about one third as having a maximum of secondary (middle) school level, and three-fourths as having a maximum of high school level of education. It should also be noted that female respondents have a lower average years of schooling (9.4 years) than male ones, as is the case in the country as a whole.

Table 10

Years of schooling	Oty	%
Did not attend school	49	2.2
1-5 years (primary school)	416	18.7
6-8 years (middle school)	288	13.0
9-11 years (high school)	922	41.5
12-17 years	548	24.6
Total	2223	100.0

Respondents are better educated than their parents. Distribution of parents by level of education is shown below.

Table 11

Level of education	Mother		Father	
	Qty	%	Qty	%
Did not complete any school	561	25.2	268	12.1
Primary school	1135	51.2	997	45.0
Middle school	185	8.3	307	13.9
High school	234	10.5	402	18.1
University/Master's/Doctoral degree	107	4.8	242	10.9
Total	2222	100.0	2216	100.0

One third of the respondents indicated that they know English well enough to read or to speak. The next most widely known language (other than Turkish) among the respondents is Kurdish, which appears to be the most common second language among parents. Parents are generally poorly versed in foreign languages.

Computer usage (or literacy) which is closely associated with education is clearly limited even among the young. One half of the respondents have never used a computer and another one-third have scarcely done so. An overwhelming majority (82 percent) never accessed the Internet, and 12 percent did so only a few times. Furthermore, variation is observed by sex, with female respondents falling behind male one. There is a difference of 7-11 percentage points between these subgroups with respect to complete unfamiliarity with computers or the Internet.

Regional variation in computer usage and Internet access is significant. Complete unfamiliarity with these is much higher than average in the relatively less developed Cluster 2 and Cluster 4 provinces (see Paragraph D, below), particularly in Diyarbakır and Gaziantep. Four-fifths (81 percent) in

Table 12

	Foreign language known					
	Self		Mother		Father	
	Qty	%	Qty	%	Qty	%
German	134	6.0	57	2.6	108	4.9
Arabic	29	1.3	21	0.9	37	1.7
French	27	1.2	13	0.6	45	2.0
English	748	33.6	71	3.2	153	6.9
Kurdish	175	7.9	196	8.8	196	8.8
Zaza language	30	1.3	36	1.6	34	1.5
Other	24	1.0	32	1.4	45	2.0

Diyarbakır and two-thirds (67 percent) of those in Gaziantep have never used a computer. Rates of no access to the Internet in these provinces is 96 percent and 92 percent, respectively.

## 2. Status of Studentship and/or Employment

The largest single group of respondents comprises students, whether at high school or university level. The majority, however, is made up of young people who have basically left their student years behind. Most of the respondents in this group are either working or seeking employment. Also included in this group of non-students are the notably high number of female respondents who simply stay at home. This is significant both in that the response was spontaneous (not included among the options) and in that these home-bound young women and girls are perhaps the least active segment of the youth, positioned outside of student and working life, alike. Distribution of respondents by studentship and/or employment is shown below.

Table 13

Status of studentship and/or employment	Qty	%
Student, not working	676	30.4
Working, not a student	629	28.3
Young girls and women staying at home	300	13.5
Unemployed, (seeking work), not a student	283	12.7
Both student and working	118	5.3
Student, preparing for university exams	114	5.1
Student, working only on vacations	49	2.2
Both working and preparing for exams	39	1.8
Unemployed, not seeking work	14	0.6
Total	2222	99.9

Three-fifths of the students interviewed are at the high school level and the remaining 40 percent are at the university

level, the ratio between the two closely approximating the national average (63 percent high school to 37 percent university students). Working students who account for a relatively small percentage of respondents, mostly take either irregular jobs or figure as small merchant-shopkeeper-family workers.

The largest group of the working youth, albeit unemployed at the time of the survey, is made up of blue-collar workers

Table 14

Job/profession, if working	Qty	%
Public or private sector worker	248	35.9
Craftsman/shopkeeper family employed	192	27.8
Private sector white collar	74	10.7
Public sector white collar	67	9.7
Public/private sector manager/specialist	44	6.4
Irregular jobs	44	6.4
Professional with private practice	12	1.7
Other	10	1.4
Total	691	100.0

Table 15

Father's job/profession	Qty	%
Craftsman/shopkeeper	697	33.2
Retired	489	23.3
Worker	333	15.9
Public sector white collar	253	12.1
Irregular jobs	111	5.3
Public/private sector manager/specialist	92	4.4
Unemployed	41	2.0
Professional with private practice	40	1.9
Private sector white collar	28	1.3
Other	13	0.6
Total	2097	100.0

Distribution by paternal occupation or professions indicates that the majority of respondents come from families where the father is a craftsman/shopkeeper, retired (white- or blue collar employee) or employed as a blue-collar worker.

An overwhelming majority (85 percent) of respondents' mothers are housewives. This high percentage of housewives may be explained in terms of the urban (large city and small town) bias in the sample, as about four fifths of the economically active female population in Turkey are employed in agriculture and the percentage of housewives is rising particularly in urban areas. Remaining mothers group into public employees (3.7 percent), retired employees (3.6 percent), manager/specialists (2.3 percent) and blue collar workers (2.2 percent).

### 3. Income

Distribution of respondents by monthly household and personal income is shown on the following table.

Table 16

(TL)*	Monthly household income		Personal	
	Household Qty	%	Qty	%
Less than 50 mil.	248	11.2	1423	64.0
50-100 million	897	40.4	354	15.9
101-200 million	699	31.4	98	4.4
201-300 million	216	9.7	19	0.9
301-400 million	46	2.1	5	0.2
401-500 million	40	1.8	4	0.2
More than 500 mil	48	2.2	6	0.3
Refused	29	1.3	314	14.1
Total	2223	100.1	2223	100.0

\* TL 165.000 = DM 1 at the time of survey

Parental allowance constitutes the main source of personal income for 57 percent of the respondents. This percentage, however, is significantly lower than that of respondents who live with their parents. It should be noted in this connection that 39 percent of the respondents who live alone are financed by their parents. Distribution by sex shows that more than 70 percent of respondents who earn their living are male, while almost all respondents who rely on the income of the spouse are women.

Table 17

Main source of personal income	Qty	%
Parents or family	1267	57.0
Regular full-time job	503	22.6
Partner	225	10.1
Irregular job	125	5.6
Regular part-time job	78	3.5
Training allowance or educational grant	13	0.6
Other	4	0.2
Refused	8	0.4
Total	2223	100

The average age of moving out from parental home (19.1 years) is very close to the average age of getting married (20 years). Among the 531 respondent who have moved out, 71 percent are married.

Cross tabulation of the moving-out age by level of personal income points to the much higher than average frequency of leaving home at an early age (particular at 14-17 years of age) among the lowest income group of respondents.

About 60 percent of the respondents stated that they have a room to themselves and 20 percent said they have their own flat, apartment, etc. Considering the fact 14.2 percent of those who have a room are also home-owners, the ratio of respondents with "just" a private room may be calculated at 51 percent. About 7 percent of the respondents are unmarried home-owners. Distribution of ownership/access to other goods and services is as follows:

**Table 18**

Ownership/possession	Qty	Cases %
Music set, disc or cassette player	1347	60.6
Private room	1327	59.7
Personal bank account	688	30.9
Bicycle	554	24.9
Independent residence (flat, house etc.)	451	20.3
Personal or supplementary credit card	363	16.3
Mobile phone	230	10.3
Personal computer	169	7.6
Car	162	7.3
Motorcycle	74	3.3

Based on level of education, as well as data on income, occupation and ownership, respondents are distributed in the following socio-economic (SES) categories (where A stands for the highest SES category):

**Table 19**

SES Group	Qty	%
A	102	4.6
B	234	10.5
C+	535	24.1
C	953	42.9
D	365	16.4
Unidentified*	34	1.5
Total	2223	100.0

\* refused/failed to respond to relevant questions

Factors generally used in calculating SES are education (30 percent), occupation (20 percent), income (20 percent) and ownership (30 percent). The above tabled SES distribution is based on a calculation that reflects these factor weights and also takes account of the following points:

- Since the respondent may still be in the course of completing his/her education, the factor of education was calculated on the basis of parental (maternal 40 percent, paternal 60 percent) level of education.
- To avoid a concentration of non-professional/non-employed student respondents in lower SES categories, parental profession/occupation (once again in 40:60 proportions) was taken into account.
- Household, rather than personal income was taken into account, ensuring a clearer differentiation among respondents.

- The factor of "ownership" was based on "luxury consumption" factor scores identified for cluster analysis (see below)

Raw SES scores calculated in the above manner was followed by an ordinal grouping of respondents into respective SES categories. To minimise the number of respondents without a socio-economic status ranking, raw SES scores were estimated through a regression analysis, wherever possible.

Table 20

Type of settlement born	Istanbul	Ankara	Izmir	1st Cluster	2nd Cluster	3rd Cluster	4th Cluster
City	76,8	75,6	62,3	50,0	63,6	74,5	57,3
Small town	9,1	8,9	27,7	45,1	30,3	20,5	39,4
Village	12,1	16,0	10,1	4,9	6,1	5,1	3,3
<b>Status of studentship and/or employment</b>							
Student, not working	29,3	32,1	35,2	29,8	29,5	36,9	30,2
Student, preparing for university exams	3,3	1,9	1,3	5,9	5,8	9,3	3,6
Student, working only on vacations	1,3	5,1	4,4	2,4	1,0	1,3	2,8
Both student and working	6,8	8,3	6,3	5,1	4,8	5,3	3,1
Working, not a student	29,3	28,8	30,8	32,5	22,2	28,3	28,1
Both working and preparing for exams	1,6	4,5	1,3	1,7	1,8	1,5	1,0
Unemployed, (seeking work), not a student	9,8	8,3	7,5	9,0	25,5	8,1	14,3
Young girls and women staying at home	17,3	9,6	13,2	13,2	15,2	8,8	15,9
Unemployed, not seeking work	1,3	1,3		0,2	0,3	0,5	1,0
<b>Socio-economic status (SES)</b>							
D	9,4	6,0	22,1	10,3	30,4	8,5	25,2
C	43,1	42,0	44,2	51,0	43,5	35,1	45,0
C+	25,4	30,7	19,5	22,5	17,7	33,6	22,9
B	14,0	12,7	11,7	12,0	6,3	15,2	5,1
A	8,0	8,7	2,6	4,2	2,0	7,5	1,8
<b>Marital status</b>							
Single	73,9	76,2	78,6	70,0	72,7	83,1	73,1
Engaged	5,2	5,1	1,9	5,6	4,8	1,8	5,6
Married	20,2	16,0	19,5	24,1	22,0	14,9	21,2

\* figures represents percentage of respondents

#### D. Distribution by Provinces and Selected Demographic/Socio-economic data

Distribution of respondents by various demographic and socio-economic attributes on the one hand, and by provinces and province clusters, on the other is summarised below. (To recall the sample plan, Cluster 1 includes Denizli and Trabzon, Cluster 2 includes Sivas and Diyarbakir, Cluster 3 includes Antalya and Edirne, Cluster 4 includes Gaziantep and Tokat).

As the table reveals, highest percentage of urban-born respondents are found in Istanbul, Ankara and the 3rd Cluster provinces of Antalya and Edirne. That percentage falls to lowest levels in the 1st Cluster provinces of Denizli and Trabzon, as well as the 4th Cluster provinces of Gaziantep and Tokat. Students are most concentrated in the 3rd Cluster and in the two large provinces of Izmir and Ankara, while they are least frequently found in the 2nd Cluster and Istanbul. A parallel distribution of housewives/home-bound girls is observed, with highest frequencies in Istanbul and the 2nd Cluster as opposed to lowest frequencies in Ankara and the 3rd Cluster.

Distribution by socio-economic status points to the relatively higher SES ranking of Istanbul, Ankara and the 3rd Cluster residents, as opposed to the distinctly low SES ranking of 2nd and 3rd Cluster residents. The ratio of highest ranking (A and B SES group) respondents to lowest ranking (D and C SES group) respondents, which may be taken as an indicator of relative equality in income distribution, is highest in the 3rd Cluster (0.5), Istanbul (0.4) and Ankara (0.4), and lowest in 4th and 2nd Clusters (suggesting greatest inequality

in income distribution in latter provinces).

Distribution by marital status shows that the highest percentage of single respondents are found in the 3rd Cluster, Izmir and Ankara, while the lowest percentage is observed in the 1st Cluster. Istanbul figures midway between the two.

Characterisation of provinces and province clusters by the above socio-economic and demographic variables allows for certain general observations. It may be suggested, for example, that Ankara, Izmir and the 3rd Cluster, which are marked by high percentage of students (indicating extensive education), low percentage of home-bound young women (pointing to greater female participation in the work force), and low percentage of married respondents (hinting at individual self-sufficiency), are relatively modern in outlook. By contrast, 2nd and 4th Clusters which are distinguished by polar opposite percentages in all of these indicators, appear to be more on the traditional side. Meanwhile, Istanbul which houses the largest group of the national population, as well as that of the youth, seems to have a dual character with elements of modernity and tradition co-existing in equal measure.

## II. INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL LIFE – AN OVERVIEW



This section will discuss individual and social aspects of everyday life, analysing data on leisure time activities, participation in various types of organisations and social relations that prevail among the youth. A more detailed account of family-, education- and work-related experiences and attitudes of the youth will be presented in successive sections of the report.

### A. Leisure time activity

Respondents were suggested a list of options and asked to indicate whether or not they engage in each of the leisure time activities included on the list. Frequency distribution of positive responses is tabled below. Also shown on the table is the distribution of spontaneous responses (under the option of "other" on the questionnaire).

Generally speaking, the total number of positive responses is not high. On the average, 3.8 activities were indicated per respondent, the most frequent response being "reading" books or newspapers/

Table 21

Leisure time activity	Qty	Response %	Cases %
Read books	1213	14.4	54.6
Read newspapers, magazines	1071	12.7	48.2
Practise a sport	1038	12.3	46.7
Play cards or backgammon	889	10.6	40.0
Go to a concert, theatre	809	9.6	36.4
Do handicrafts (ceramics, glass, woodworking, embroidery, etc)	689	8.2	31.0
Go to a match	641	7.6	28.8
Play a musical instrument	435	5.2	19.6
Go to a disco, bar, etc.	409	4.9	18.4
Use computer/ Internet	339	4.0	15.2
Draw/Paint	328	3.9	14.8
Do social or charitable work	272	3.2	12.2
Other (spontaneous)			
Go to a movie theatre	117	1.4	5.3
Listen to music	51	0.6	2.3
Go out	41	0.5	1.8
Watch TV	22	0.3	1.0
Write poems	7	0.1	0.3
Other hobbies	40	0.5	1.8
Total	8411	100.0	378.4

magazines. Next comes practising a sport. By contrast, the youth appears to spend little time on computer/Internet related activities, drawing or painting, or social/charitable work.

Significant variation in leisure time activity is observed by sex. Reading, for example, is slightly more pronounced than average among young women and girls. Doing handicrafts is almost exclusively a female activity. Sports, computer-related activities, going to discos, bars, and particularly matches, on the other hand, are distinctly male choices.

Studying and working segments of the youth differ in the extent to which they are active. Non-working students (30.4 percent of the sample) are over-represented in almost all types of activities, whereas the working non-student youth (28.3 percent of the sample) seems relatively excluded from many (with a few notable exceptions such as attending matches).

The following table summarises responses to the question on leisure time activity by provinces and province clusters. Several deviations from average percentages are apparent on the table.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup> Clusters, for example are marked by lower rates of concert/theatre and disco/bar attendance, along with higher rates of doing handicrafts. These stand in clear contrast to the three large metropolises (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir), and the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Clusters, where the opposite prevails. It may therefore be suggested that opportunities presented by the environment or the modern/traditional elements that prevail there are related to the way in which young people living in those places spend their leisure time.

Leisure time activity	Student, not working (%)	Working, not a student (%)
Read books	38.8	23.2
Read magazines	39.1	24.4
Practice a sport	39.5	29.7
Play cards/backgammon	35.4	32.8
Go to a concert/theatre	42.8	24.0
Go to a match	34.0	39.5
Play a musical instrument	39.6	24.0
Go to a disco, bar etc.	38.9	30.6
Use computer/internet	37.8	29.5
Painting	46.6	17.4
Do social or charitable work	29.4	34.2
Sample mean	30.4	28.3

Table 22

Table 23

Leisure time activity	Istanbul	Ankara	Izmir	1st Cluster	2nd Cluster	3rd Cluster	4th Cluster
Read books	50.8	47.4	57.2	57.6	53.0	60.1	51.7
Read newspapers, magazines	50.4	46.8	51.6	48.0	38.9	59.3	38.6
Practise a sport	52.8	59.6	50.3	46.3	39.1	53.8	35.8
Play cards or backgammon	44.0	42.9	46.5	36.3	31.3	56.8	28.4
Go to a concert, theatre	40.1	36.5	45.3	42.7	26.0	43.4	26.1
Do handicrafts (ceramics, woodwork, embroidery, etc)	24.8	23.7	25.8	37.1	37.1	21.5	38.4
Go to a match	30.9	29.5	30.2	28.3	26.3	33.6	25.1
Play a musical instrument	21.2	19.9	25.6	20.0	18.2	21.0	15.1
Go to a disco, bar, etc.	27.7	30.1	20.8	14.6	5.8	35.6	5.1
Use computer/internet	20.8	17.9	13.8	15.6	11.1	20.5	8.4
Paint	20.2	17.9	17.0	16.3	11.6	13.9	10.0
Do social or charitable work	14.3	8.3	12.6	11.5	12.4	10.1	14.1

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

Variation in responses by socio-economic status allows for classifying spare time activities in two main groups. On the one hand, doing handicrafts appears as a predominantly lower SES group activity, and on the other, is the group of activities, which include theatre/concert

attendance, practice of sports, reading newspapers / magazines, playing cards / backgammon, going to discos/bars, using computers, etc., and which become increasingly more frequent with rising SES. The distinction suggests that many types of activities are a function of SES, perhaps even to the extent that "being active" itself is part and parcel of SES.

Table 24

Leisure time activity	D	C	C+	B	A
Read books	38.4	52.2	63.2	68.4	57.8
Read newspapers, magazines	26.0	43.4	58.5	67.5	71.6
Practise a sport	31.0	41.0	53.3	65.0	73.5
Play cards or backgammon	19.7	35.2	49.3	58.5	65.7
Go to a concert, theatre	12.3	26.5	50.3	66.2	74.5
Do handicrafts (ceramics, glass, woodworking, embroidery, etc)	47.9	36.9	22.2	12.0	8.8
Go to a match	21.4	26.5	31.2	35.5	48.0
Play a musical instrument	14.2	17.4	21.7	26.5	29.4
Go to a disco, bar, etc.	3.0	11.9	23.9	40.2	52.0
Use computer/ internet	1.9	8.1	21.5	34.6	49.0
Painting	8.5	14.2	16.3	20.9	17.6
Do social or charitable work	7.4	10.9	13.8	17.9	17.6

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

## B. Places to meet with friends

The most common place where the young people get together with friends is their own home. Next common is a friend's home. In other words, the Turkish youth is observed to meet with friends largely in home environments. Outside of home, the most frequently used premises are cafés and cafeterias, followed by the "street" and places such as pastry shops, tea gardens, etc. in almost equal proportions. School canteens, clubs or social premises of various associations serve relatively few respondents as places to meet with friends.

Table 25

Gathering/meeting place with friends	Qty	Response %	Case %
My home	1058	26.1	48.2
A friends home	731	18.0	33.3
Café, cafeteria	601	14.8	27.4
On the street in the neighbourhood	444	10.9	20.2
Pastry shop, tea garden, park, etc.	412	10.2	18.8
Coffee shop	313	7.7	14.2
School (campus) canteen	265	6.5	12.1
Clubhouse or similar premises	136	3.4	6.2
Beerhouse	47	1.2	2.1
Work place	35	0.9	1.6
Other	13	0.3	0.6
Total	4055	100	184.7

The home environment is predominantly a female meeting place. The percentage of young women who entertain or visit friends at home is much higher than sample averages, reaching 73 percent in the

former, and 49 percent in the latter case. Outside of home, all meeting places seem to be masculine reserves: almost all of the respondents who see friends in coffee shops or beerhouses, 84 percent of those who meet friends in clubs, and three fourths of those whose meeting place is the street or the neighbourhood are male.

The younger age group respondents (aged 15-20) tend use school canteens, cafés or cafeterias, the street and the neighbourhood environment, pastry shops and tea garden more than their immediate elders. Use of other meeting places increases with age (in the 21-27 age group).

The following table summarises the frequency of using various meeting places by provinces and province clusters. Variation similar to the one observed with respect to leisure time activities is also apparent here. Frequency of meeting in cafés and cafeterias, which may be counted among public places, is relatively high in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> Clusters,

as well as in the metropolises, while it is respectively low in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Clusters that were previously termed "traditional". On the other hand, places such as pastry shops and tea gardens, which may also be

considered public, are typical of provincial urban areas, and are mentioned in significantly lower frequencies in the three large cities. Meanwhile, home gathering of friends, which may be considered "closed" or "withdrawn" in nature, is more common in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Clusters. This differentiation in meeting places hints at a distinction between the relatively modern and relatively traditional, as well as the intervening factor of the large city. It is also

Table 26

Gathering/meeting place with friends	Istanbul	Ankara	Izmir	1st Cluster	2nd Cluster	3rd Cluster	4th Cluster
My home	44.4	39.2	47.5	48.3	53.4	47.1	50.9
A friend's home	38.7	26.8	22.8	35.1	33.8	30.0	36.4
Café, cafeteria	29.8	28.1	27.8	27.3	12.6	49.4	17.4
On the street in neighbourhood	26.8	34.0	29.7	18.8	20.4	7.9	20.0
Pastry shop, tea garden, park, etc.	13.6	13.7	12.7	21.7	20.6	20.1	20.5
Coffee shop	11.3	11.8	14.6	15.6	20.9	9.9	13.5
School (campus) canteen	7.9	9.8	11.4	12.7	13.1	9.7	17.4
Clubhouse or similar premises	6.0	7.2	6.3	5.6	5.7	7.1	5.7
Beer-house	2.6	5.9	1.9	1.2	0.5	3.6	1.6
Work place	1.7	2.6	1.3	0.7	3.1	0.8	1.6

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

Table 27

Gathering/ meeting place	D	C	C+	B	A
My home	32.7	27.2	23.7	20.0	20.8
A friend's home	22.5	18.6	15.7	14.8	17.7
Café, cafeteria	4.6	11.7	19.6	26.1	25.5
Neighbourhood- street	17.3	12.1	7.8	6.5	5.2
Pastry shop	7.5	10.4	11.6	10.3	10.4
Coffee shop	9.0	9.2	5.6	5.6	5.2
School (campus) canteen	4.0	6.5	7.9	8.1	4.7
Clubhouse	1.1	2.7	5.0	3.8	6.8
Beerhouse	0.5	0.8	1.2	2.7	3.1
Work place	0.8	0.5	1.1	2.0	0.5

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

interesting to note in this connection that Istanbul is once again distinguished by a dual character, with the frequency of Istanbulite responses falling midway between the two ends.

Socio-economic status seems to have an affect on young people's choice of places to meet with friends. Reference to home environments, termed "closed" or "withdrawn" above, declines with increasing SES, while reference to cafés-cafeterias

increases with SES. The predominantly male coffee shop serves largely lower SES groups, whereas a direct positive relationship holds between SES and the beerhouse response. The street and neighbourhood environment also serve lower SES groups more than average.

### C. Membership in clubs, associations or similar organisations

The youth not only has a low tendency to meet with friends in public places, but also, and even more strikingly figures very weakly as members or participants of various clubs, associations or similar organisations. About 70 percent of respondents indicated that they are not involved in any such organisational activity (that rate rises above 90 percent among home-bound young women).

Table 28

Membership/participation in clubs, associations and similar organisations	Qty	Response %	Case %
Sport clubs/associations	337	13.5	15.2
Political parties	83	3.3	3.7
Culture and art societies	75	3.0	3.4
Political-social-cultural foundations or associations	74	3.0	3.3
Student clubs or associations	71	2.9	3.2
Social welfare or charitable organisations	58	2.3	2.6
Folklore clubs, associations	55	2.2	2.5
Special interest (hobby) clubs or societies	49	2.0	2.2
Environmental, nature or animal-protecting org.	47	1.9	2.1
Islamic community, foundations etc.	44	1.8	2.0
Trade unions	23	0.9	1.0
None of the above	1564	62.8	70.4
Other	11	0.4	0.5
Total	2491	100.0	112.1

One half of the respondents who are associated with a sports club indicated their sport branch as football, 18 percent indicated basketball and about 9 percent indicated volleyball. Relatively few

respondents are interested in water sports (4.6 percent) or nature related ones (1.4 percent).

Variation in organisational activity by sex shows that 80 percent of respondents who participate in sports club activity are male. Female involvement exceeds average levels in environmental and nature-protecting organisations, followed by folklore clubs, and to some extent by culture-arts and student associations. Men dominate all other types of organisations, especially political parties, labour unions, and Islamic foundations or associations. Thus, it is not surprising that respondents who do not participate in any such clubs or associations are largely female.

As young people age, they seem to participate less in sport, folklore, hobby or student club activity and more in political or social associations. Age does not seem to be factor in membership in culture and arts organisations.

Likewise, complete non-participants are almost equally distributed between the younger (15-20) and older (21-27) age groups.

Certain types of membership or participation may be related to the young person's status of studentship and employment. As might be expected, members in student clubs or associations are more frequently non-working students, whereas trade union or political party membership is more common among the working, non-student youth. It is noteworthy that only 59 percent of students are members of a student club. Sports club membership, on the other hand is more widespread among students than among the working youth. Of those who indicated membership in any club or association, 43 percent of students and 31.5 percent of the working youth mentioned sports club membership.

The following table summarises the distribution of membership or participation in clubs or associations by provinces and province clusters. Although sports club membership is most frequently mentioned in all sample strata, highest percentages are found in Ankara, Istanbul

and the 3rd Cluster, while the lowest appear in 1st, 2nd and 4th Clusters. Political, social or cultural associations or foundations, environmental organisations and student clubs enjoy highest participation once again in the large cities and the 3rd Cluster, while Ankara may be singled out for high membership in Islamic foundations or associations and Izmir for that in hobby clubs. This suggests a certain relationship between the level of development and the level of organisation, with higher levels of organisation in relatively modern areas. A notable exception is found in the prevalence of social and charitable organisations, as well as culture and arts organisations in the relatively traditional provinces of the 2nd and 4th Clusters. Also interesting is the fact that Istanbul once again reflects a dual character in differing from Ankara or Izmir, particularly in terms of the relative appeal of hobby clubs, labour unions, and political-social-cultural organisations.

Table 29

Membership/participation in associations/organisations	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1 <sup>st</sup> C.	2 <sup>nd</sup> C.	3 <sup>rd</sup> C.	4 <sup>th</sup> C.
Sport clubs/associations	18.9	13.2	25.6	12.2	11.6	18.7	11.5
Political parties	3.3	6.9	8.4	4.9	2.8	3.0	2.0
Culture and art societies	4.2	2.5	5.1	2.9	3.5	1.5	4.3
Political-social-cultural foundations/associations	5.5	2.5	7.1	2.9	1.8	4.0	1.5
Student clubs/associations	5.5	3.8	5.1	1.5	1.8	4.0	2.6
Social-welfare/charitable org.	3.9	2.5	7.1	1.0	1.5	2.0	3.3
Folklore clubs/associations	2.6	5.0	5.1	1.2	2.5	2.5	1.3
Hobby clubs/societies	2.6	6.3	3.2	1.7	1.8	2.0	1.0
Environmental/nature org.	3.3	4.4	3.8	0.2	1.0	4.0	0.8
Islamic community foundations/associations	1.3	2.5	4.5	1.7	1.8	1.0	2.6
Trade unions	0.7	1.3	1.3	1.7	0.8	1.3	0.5

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

Distribution of responses by SES groups points to a relationship between SES and organisational involvement, parallel to the one observed with respect to leisure time activity. In almost all types of organisations, participation increases

with SES. The single most significant exception to this is the more widespread participation in Islamic associations or foundations among lower SES groups. Participation in political party activity, on the other hand, increases with SES.

Table 30

Membership/participation in associations/org	D	C	C+	B	A
Sport clubs/associations	2.4	6.2	9.6	13.7	22.4
Political parties	1.4	1.8	1.9	2.9	4.2
Culture and art societies	0.9	1.0	2.5	4.5	4.7
Political-social-cultural foundations/associations	0.5	1.0	2.3	4.7	2.6
Student clubs/associations	0.2	1.2	2.6	3.4	4.2
Social welfare/charitable organisations	0.6	1.1	1.5	2.0	4.7
Folklore clubs/associations	0.6	1.2	1.4	2.5	2.6
Hobby clubs/societies	0.5	0.9	1.5	2.2	2.6
Environmental/nature organisations	0.3	0.7	1.1	2.7	3.6
Islamic community foundations/associations	1.3	1.2	0.7	0.9	1.0
Trade unions	0.0	0.4	0.8	1.3	1.0

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

## D. Relations

A series of questions were asked to understand the way in which the youth relates to various persons or bodies around them, to one another and to the opposite sex. Questions focused particularly on "close" relations and the attachment of the youth to certain social circles.

In general, respondents seem to find their mothers as the most understanding and their teachers as the least understanding persons around them. Distribution of responses identifying the best understanding three persons is shown on the following table.

Married respondents, and particularly the women refer to their partner or lover as the most understanding person more frequently than the sample as a whole. Younger age group (aged 15-20) and female respondents seem to enjoy greater paternal understanding than the older (21-27) or male respondents. Young men appear more able to establish sound friendships with both their kind and members of the opposite sex, while age turns out to be a significant factor in substituting fellow workers or employees for neighbourhood friends. Meanwhile, school friends seem more important to female than to male respondents.

Non-working students find both of their parents more understanding (mother 64.3 percent, father 37.1 percent) than

Table 31

Best understanding	Qty				Cases % Total
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	Total	
Mother	732	433	208	1373	61.8
Father	146	358	238	742	33.4
Sister/brother	283	276	294	853	38.4
Fellow student	199	206	202	607	27.3
Neighbourhood friend	198	235	238	671	30.2
Fellow worker/employee	55	82	86	223	10.0
Partner, girl/boy friend	415	235	212	862	38.8
Close friend from the opposite sex	26	87	110	223	10.0
Teacher/professor	6	15	43	64	2.9
Close relatives	22	15	22	59	2.7
Other friends	4	8	2	14	0.6
Nobody	127	8	18	153	6.9
Other	5	3	1	9	0.4
Total	2218	1961	1674	5853	263.4

average, which ceases to be the case once the young person stops being a student and starts working instead. Those percentages drop to 56.3 percent for the mother and 30.8 percent for the mother among working respondents who are no longer students. The percentage of those who say nobody understands them is also slightly higher (7.3 percent) than average in this group.

Distribution of responses to the question on the best understanding person by provinces and province clusters is shown on the following table. Total reference to "primary relations", including responses mentioning the mother, father, and/or brother/sister, is very high in all provinces and clusters. Still, it is particularly high in the relatively traditional 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> clusters, but relatively low in

large cities and the 3<sup>rd</sup> cluster. References to "partner/lover" and "friend from the opposite sex", however, do not vary along the traditional/modern axis. Considering these types of relations as being "private" in nature, it may be suggested that the extent of private relations is almost independent of the character of the living environment.

Distribution of responses by SES points to a decreasing emphasis on primary relations with increasing SES. There is a wide gap between the lowest (D) and highest (A) SES groups with reference to primary relations (mother, father, sister/brother). Neighbourhood friendship also loses significance with increasing SES. By contrast, the frequency of reference to "partner/lover" and to "fellow worker/employee" as the best understanding person is higher than average among higher SES groups.

Table 32

Best understanding	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1 <sup>st</sup> cluster	2 <sup>nd</sup> cluster	3 <sup>rd</sup> cluster	4 <sup>th</sup> cluster
Mother	51.5	57.9	50.0	61.5	69.9	57.1	73.1
Father	21.2	27.0	21.2	27.8	43.9	39.6	39.9
Sister/brother	36.5	39.6	33.3	43.4	44.9	36.4	32.2
Fellow student	26.7	18.2	30.8	26.8	25.3	31.1	28.6
Neighbourhood friend	32.2	39.6	30.1	33.4	28.8	23.5	29.4
Fellow worker/employee	11.7	6.9	10.9	9.8	9.3	10.4	10.5
Partner, girl/boy friend	37.1	34.6	38.5	43.2	31.8	45.7	36.8
Friend from the opposite sex	8.1	11.9	8.3	8.5	5.6	15.9	11.3
Teacher/professor	1.3	3.8	2.6	2.7	4.0	2.0	3.3
Close relatives	5.9	3.1	3.2	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.8
Nobody	5.2	6.9	6.4	6.3	7.1	8.6	6.9

\*Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

Table 33

Best understanding	D	C	C+	B	A
Mother	40.8	34.4	30.5	32.4	27.1
Father	23.8	16.4	18.0	19.6	15.6
Sister/brother	23.7	23.0	18.8	17.1	15.6
Fellow student	8.6	14.8	17.4	19.1	14.6
Neighbourhood friend	20.2	19.5	13.3	10.3	9.9
Fellow worker/employee	3.5	6.0	6.0	4.3	6.3
Partner, girl/boy friend	23.2	18.9	21.3	24.3	29.7
Friend from the opposite sex	2.5	4.5	7.5	7.2	9.4
Teacher/professor	1.9	1.7	1.7	0.7	1.0
Nobody	3.7	3.8	3.6	3.8	4.7

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

The preceding discussion highlights the generally close relations between young people and their family members, especially the mother. In a similar vein, family references seem equally strong among the youth. Respondents name the family as the most significant social environment that they need to adapt to in order to lead a happy and secure life.

One should not, however, overlook the relatively high significance of the workplace and of the circle of friends (albeit more secondary, even tertiary than primary). By contrast, native and religious references are markedly weak.

Table 34

The social circle the young person should adapt to	Qty				Case % Total
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	Total	
Family (s)he comes from	743	533	229	1505	67,7
Group of friends	244	468	591	1303	58,6
Job or work	627	350	290	1267	57,0
Family (s)he starts	240	357	292	889	40,0
People of the same world-view, life style	203	137	260	600	27,0
Neighbourhood community	92	215	171	478	21,5
Mosque community	46	64	84	194	8,7
Native folk	15	28	40	91	4,1
Other	5	2	8	15	0,7
Total	2215	2154	1973	6342	285,3

Variation by sex indicates that female respondents attach somewhat greater significance to both the family they grow up in and the family they start themselves. Men, by contrast, are more concerned than average with adapting to their professional or occupational circle, their neighbourhood environment, native folks, and especially their religious community.

Age seems to be a factor in shifting the family reference from the family of origin to the self-started family. The 20-27 age group is also less keen on neighbourhood relations and circle of friends, even to the extent that adapting to the professional or occupational group becomes more important than the youthful circle of friends. As young people move into the higher age group, they also find it more necessary to be in conformity with people who share a similar world-view/life-style and belong to the same religious community.

Table 35

The following table summarises the province and cluster distribution of responses to the question on which social circles would be decisive in ensuring a happy and secure life. Young people who live in large cities evidently find adapting to the family circle less significant than those who live in other provinces. Need to adapt to the religious community is more pronounced in 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> clusters, as well as in Ankara and Istanbul. World-view and life-style references are stronger in Istanbul and Izmir, whereas the circle of friends seem more significant in large cities (but surprisingly not in Izmir) along with the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> clusters.

Distribution of responses by SES points to the higher significance of primary relations, included references to the family, neighbourhood, religious community, and native folks, among lower SES groups. Significance of secondary relations, as reflected by more frequent references to professional-occupations circles and common world-view, on the other hand, increases along with SES.

The social circle that a young person should adapt to	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1 <sup>st</sup> cluster	2 <sup>nd</sup> cluster	3 <sup>rd</sup> cluster	4 <sup>th</sup> cluster
Family (s)he comes from	57.3	64.2	70.5	65.9	76.8	71.2	65.7
Group of friends	61.6	56.6	60.3	60.2	51.3	66.9	54.0
Job or work	53.1	59.1	57.1	57.6	59.3	61.1	51.9
Family s(he) starts	32.9	40.9	30.8	50.0	34.8	40.2	43.7
People of the same world-view, life style	32.6	32.7	24.4	26.1	22.7	27.8	25.3
Neighbourhood community	19.2	15.1	24.4	18.3	27.5	16.7	27.1
Mosque community	9.4	3.1	7.7	6.3	13.1	3.8	13.3
Native folk	2.0	1.3	4.5	3.2	6.3	2.8	6.9

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

Table 36

The social circle the young person should adapt to	D	C	C+	B	A
Family (s)he comes from	40.2	38.2	36.4	32.1	32.3
Group of friends	27.5	32.6	33.2	33.9	33.3
Job or work	30.3	28.5	33.0	36.9	36.5
Family (s)he starts	24.6	23.2	19.9	19.1	20.8
People of the same world-view, life style	10.8	12.9	17.0	19.8	21.4
Neighbourhood community	20.3	12.7	8.8	5.8	5.2
Mosque community	7.0	5.7	3.3	2.7	2.1
Native folk	3.7	2.7	1.5	0.9	1.0

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

About 40 percent of the respondents approve of pre-marital relations with the opposite sex and 45 percent feel that such relations are normal "within certain limits", that is to say, not sexual. About 15 percent, on the other hand, consider any relation with the opposite sex as being wrong. It should be noted, however, that 29 percent of the respondents have never had a lover or a boy/girl friend, and 64 percent of those respondents are female. Socio-economic status appears as a highly significant factor in relations with the opposite sex. As the following table shows, the rate of having a girl/boy friend regularly increases with SES.

more important than the family at least in this respect. Distribution of responses to this multiple response question is shown below.

Table 38

Source of information on sexual matters	Qty	Qty %	Case %
Friends	1526	45.9	68.6
Magazines/books	815	24.5	36.7
Parents	349	10.5	15.7
Sister/brother	278	8.4	12.5
Teacher/professor	126	3.8	5.7
Specialist-consultant	112	3.4	5.0
TV-media (spontaneous)	76	2.3	3.4
Other	40	1.2	1.8
Total	3322	100.0	149.4

Table 37

Girl/boy friend	D	C	C	B	A
Yes	54.4	66.5	79.7	85.9	28.0
No	45.6	33.5	20.3	14.1	2.0

Friends constitute the main source of information on sexual matters, which suggests that the circle of friends is

Friends remain as the major source of information on sexual matters, irrespective of SES, and here variation among different SES groups is relatively small. The second most important source of information, however, seems to become more available with increasing SES. This is also the case with respect to specialist advice.

Table 39

Source of information	D	C	C+	B	A
Friends	35.1	38.2	38.0	39.6	37.5
Magazines/books	14.1	18.9	23.1	24.7	24.5
Specialist-consultant	1.6	2.4	3.0	3.8	7.3

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

Although friends seem to be the most important source of sexual information, sexual matters were not indicated among the relatively common topic of conversation in friendly circles. It may be the case that respondents felt rather shy in admitting sexuality as a popular topic of conversation. Still, the overall isolation or "loneliness" of the youth in the face of sexual problems seems striking.

The primary, that is to say, the most frequently mentioned first topic of conversation among friends, other than football talk that interests mainly men, refers to quarrels between parents and family problems. This should be seen as a serious issue, especially in view of the significance that the youth attaches to the family and family life, to be discussed in greater detail in the following section. Distribution of responses on main topics of conversation is shown below.

Table 40

Most common topics of conversation with friends	1st	2nd	3rd	Qty	Case %
	1st	2nd	3rd	Total	Total
Small talk	89	239	399	727	32.7
Football, games	398	177	16	591	26.6
Partner, girl/boy friend	56	264	253	573	25.8
Job/workplace	196	263	86	547	24.6
Dress-outfit	294	214	37	545	24.5
School, courses, teachers	123	278	98	499	22.4
Money	51	264	171	486	21.9
Movies, music, entertainment	8	78	312	398	17.9
Quarrel between parents, family problems	382	1	2	385	17.3
Religion, faith	210	84	6	300	13.5
Sex	221	37	4	262	11.
Politics	5	39	206	250	11.2
Philosophy, literature, art	167	55	11	233	10.5
Other	6	9	22	37	1.7
Total	2206	2002	1625	5833	262.4

Variation in major topics of conversation by provinces and clusters of provinces is shown on the following table. Perhaps most significantly, the table points to certain recurring subjects of conversation among the youth, almost irrespective of environmental conditions. Small talk, football, professional or occupational life and dress-outfit are among these recurring themes. Talking about girl or boy friends, by contrast, is relatively rare in the more traditional 2nd and 4th cluster provinces, whereas more widespread than average in the relatively modern provinces.

Combined with the earlier discussed reference to the partner/lover as the person who understands the young respondents

best, this is a finding which seems to suggest that the youth in relatively traditional areas does enjoy a "privately owned" area of relations, but is relatively unable to talk about such private relations, thus failing to introduce them to the "public" domain. In these regions, the private domain seems more distinctly isolated from the public one.

Frequency of responses varies by socio-economic status. While lower SES groups tend to engage in small talk or take up topics such as money, dress, family problems and faith-religion more frequently than average, higher SES groups discuss partner-lover, professional or occupational life, politics, philosophy-literature-arts and sexual matters in respectively high proportions. As higher SES group respondents more freely talk about their part-

Table 41

Most common topics	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1st C.	2nd C.	3rd C.	4th C.	Row %
Small talk	10.8	12.7	9.3	12.9	13.2	11.4	15.0	12.5
Football, games	9.7	10.2	11.6	10.8	10.6	8.9	10.1	10.2
Partner, lover	10.7	11.5	11.1	9.3	7.4	13.8	6.9	9.8
Job/workplace	11.2	8.3	11.1	8.9	10.1	9.0	7.7	9.4
Dress-outfit	8.4	10.0	8.0	10.1	9.6	8.1	10.9	9.4
School, courses	7.5	9.3	7.5	8.1	8.0	8.5	10.8	8.6
Money	8.1	8.0	7.0	9.7	9.2	7.2	7.8	8.3
Movies, music, etc.	8.3	7.8	5.5	5.9	5.6	8.7	5.9	6.8
Family problems	6.9	7.3	9.0	6.1	7.6	5.0	6.2	6.6
Religion, faith	4.7	3.4	4.0	4.8	7.5	2.3	7.5	5.1
Sex	4.2	2.4	5.3	4.4	3.9	8.0	2.2	4.5
Politics	3.8	5.1	5.5	4.1	2.9	5.3	4.5	4.3
Philosophy, literature	4.2	3.7	4.3	4.6	3.6	3.5	4.1	4.0
Other	1.6	0.2	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.6

\*Figures indicate percentage of responses in total responses

ners or lovers, it may be the case that socio-economic status is a factor in carrying private relations to the public domain.

Table 42

Common topics of conversation	D	C	C+	B	A
Small talk	15.0	13.7	11.6	9.6	6.0
Football, games	9.5	10.2	10.8	8.5	11.0
Partner, girl/boy friend	8.9	9.1	10.5	11.1	14.1
Job/workplace	8.3	9.2	8.8	10.5	12.7
Dress-outfit	11.3	10.1	8.9	5.2	7.4
School, courses, etc.	5.8	7.7	11.5	9.1	7.6
Money	12.0	8.7	6.6	7.2	5.3
Movies, music, entertainment	5.5	6.0	6.9	11.2	6.0
Family problems	9.1	7.4	5.5	4.2	4.9
Religion, faith	6.8	5.6	4.7	3.4	3.5
Sex	2.9	4.1	4.6	6.2	9.2
Politics	2.7	4.4	4.2	5.2	6.0
Philosophy, literature, arts	1.8	3.1	4.9	8.2	5.3
Other	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.7

\*Figures indicate percentage of responses in total responses

Inquiring into the relations of the youth with older generations, respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they agreed with a series of statements.

Distribution of responses point to the comparably high percentages of confidence (70 percent) in older generations, on the one hand, and a basic need for their advice (67 percent), on the other.

Still, the percentage of respondents who feel they know what they need to know and do not want elderly advice is (higher 27.5 percent) than the percentage of those who distrust (20.4 percent) older people.

Responses to this set of questions do not vary significantly either by sex or age group.

Two sub-groups who are more convinced than average about older people's failure to understand them are the unemployed youth looking for a job (48 percent) and the home-staying young girls and women (46 percent). The same two groups, however, have greater than average

Table 43

Relations with older generations	Agree %	Disagree %	DK %
Older people don't understand me	41.5	50.7	7.8
I don't need the advice of the older people	27.5	67.3	5.1
I generally trust older people	69.6	20.4	9.9
Older people can keep up with new developments just as we can	43.6	42.7	13.7

confidence in older generations (74 percent and 77 percent, respectively). Respondents who are in the working (non-student) group seem relatively independent; they feel lower than average (29 percent) need for elderly advice, as do the small group of respondents who are preparing for university examinations. These two groups are also marked by a lower (4-12 percentage points lower) than average trust in older generations.

Evaluating the above table together with responses on another question, it becomes evident that the basic problem in intergenerational relations is lack of communication. As shown on the table, more than two-fifths of the respondents feel that older generations do not understand them.

As will be discussed under Section VII below, even a higher percentage (61 percent) indicated that they are unable to communicate with older generations and their families. It may therefore be suggested that the young people's trust in and need for the older generations does not ensure an adequate intercommunication between generations.

Absence of intergenerational communication is more distinctly apparent among lower SES groups. Intercommunication increases along with SES, and the youth becomes more independent and more convinced in the ability of older generations to keep up with times as one moves higher on socio-economic status.

Table 44

Relations with older generations	D	C	C+	B	A
Older people don't understand me	44.0	45.9	36.7	37.2	28.7
I don't need the advice of the older people	26.6	27.3	27.3	29.9	29.7
I generally trust older people	70.1	72.1	66.5	67.9	67.3
Older people can keep up with new developments	36.5	46.1	44.9	39.3	47.1

\*Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

### III. IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONS ON SOCIALIZATION

**T**his section will deal with the functional relevance of various institutions in socialising the youth, as well as the significance of these institutions in young people's lives. The study focuses on the family and on education as the fundamental institutions that contribute to the process of socialisation. It also aims at relating education, in particular, to economic activity or occupational life, which more appropriately belong in the youth's forthcoming adulthood.

#### A. Family and Family Life

The survey inquired into the youth's general attitude towards the family institution through a question on the most significant impact of the Turkish family. Asked to choose between the two options shown on the following table, an overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that the family is basically a protective institution.

Table 45

The most significant impact of the family

The family is the institution that protects the young person and offers him a warm home no matter what

The family works to have a restricting and hindering effect on the youth after a certain age

%

81,8

18,2

Opinion on the role of the family does not vary by sex, and varies only slightly by age group. The tendency to see the family as being restrictive is just about 1 percentage stronger among the older age group (aged 21-27). By contrast, socio-economic status seems to be a factor in defining the affect of the family.

Table 46

Family	D	C	C+	B	A
Protecting	87,0	81,7	81,6	78,2	72,5
Restricting	13,0	18,3	18,4	21,8	27,5

Students, in general, find the family more restrictive than average, whereas the working youth, as well as the home-staying young women see the family as being much less restrictive. The highest rate of reference to the restrictive nature of the family, however, is found among respondents who work and prepare for university examinations at the same time (31 percent).

It is worth noting in this connection that 47 percent of the respondents approve of families restricting the freedom of the youth so that youngsters may not get

into trouble. Opposition is also strong (45 percent), but these percentages still suggest that the larger part of the youth depends upon the family for protection. Once again, students and the working youth differ on respective opinion, as will be discussed under Section VII, paragraph A, below.

Although an overwhelming majority (82 percent) of respondents acknowledge the unconditionally protective nature of the family, they seem less inclined to discuss their serious problems within the family. About two-thirds of the respondents indicated that their family knows their close friends, whereas less than one half said that they discuss their serious problems within the family first. "Authority" may play a part in this: about 37 percent emphasised paternal authority in the family and 18 percent said that it would be considered disrespectful if they were to speak their minds.

The male tendency to discuss serious problems within the family is slightly weaker than average. Men constitute the majority (56 percent) of those who feel speaking their minds would be considered disrespectful. This attitude is shared more by the younger age group (aged 15-20) than the older one (57 percent to 43 percent).

Respondents' family experiences differ according to whether they are studying, working, doing both or neither. Comparing the following table with sample averages, it appears that closer relations exist between non-working students and their families, whereas the working and the unemployed youth, as well as the home-staying young girls and women perceive their families as being more authoritative and less tolerant. As might be expected, family quarrels are more common in the families of the unemployed.

Table 47

Family life	Qty	Case%
My family knows my close friends	1447	65.1
I discuss all my serious problems within the family, first	1092	49.1
The family does whatever the father says.	821	36.9
In my family, I'd be considered disrespectful of elders if I openly speak my mind	394	17.7
Everyone lead his/her own life; on some days, we don't even see each other.	263	11.8
Quarrels never seem to end within the family.	212	9.5

Table 48

Family life	Student, not working (%)	Working, not student (%)	Un employed (%)	Female staying at home (%)
My family knows my close friends	76.6	61.7	54.4	49.0
I discuss all my serious problems within the family, first	49.1	50.7	43.5	54.3
The family does whatever the father says.	28.7	40.1	45.2	45.0
In my family, I'd be considered disrespectful of elders if I openly speak my mind	15.7	18.8	20.5	19.3
Everyone lead his/her own life; on some days, we don't even see each other.	10.1	14.9	10.2	7.6
Quarrels never seem to end within the family.	7.2	10.8	14.5	10.6

The following table points to the relationship between respondents' perception of their family life and their respective SES ranking. Figures clearly suggest an inverse relationship between SES ranking and a more traditional family structure, which is implied by references to paternal authority and disrespectful behaviour. It is also the case that families are more frequently acquainted with close friends of their children as one moves up the SES scale.

When asked to indicate the most important virtue or attribute that they acquired from their families, most respondents named "honesty" by a very wide margin. Next comes respect for custom and tradition, followed by piety (or upholding religion), in the third place, and by capacity to think and act independently, in the fourth.

Table 49

Family life	D	C	C+	B	A
My family knows my close friends	27.3	35.1	38.6	41.1	40.6
I discuss all my serious problems within the family, first	24.8	27.6	27.2	27.6	22.9
The family does whatever the father says.	27.9	22.8	16.6	12.1	10.9
In my family, I'd be considered disrespectful of elders if I openly speak my mind	14.0	12.1	5.8	6.1	4.7
Everyone lead his/her own life; on some days, we don't even see each other.	6.3	5.5	7.0	7.2	12.0
Quarrels never seem to end within the family.	7.0	6.5	3.6	2.2	4.2

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

Table 50

Virtue/characteristic acquired from the family	Qty				Case %
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	Total	
Honesty	1205	571	9	1785	80.9
Respect for custom and tradition	28	164	755	947	42.9
Piety	57	498	246	801	36.3
Ability to think and act independently	760	3	11	774	35.1
Loyalty to the state and the nation	114	414	92	620	28.1
Consciousness to struggle for a better world	28	233	242	503	22.8
Civic consciousness	8	142	247	397	18.0
Other	5	6	12	23	1.0
Total	2205	2031	1614	5850	265.1

The frequency of reference to "honesty" and "respect for custom and tradition" is higher than average among women, whereas that to "religion", "loyalty to the state and the nation" and "civic consciousness" is higher than average among men. Variation by age group is nowhere more than 1 percentage point, except in the case of respect for custom and tradition. The frequency of reference to family taught respect for custom and tradition is about 4 percentage points higher than average among respondents aged 21-27.

The following table summarises responses to family taught virtues or attributes by provinces and province clusters.

References to "honesty" and "civic consciousness" are distributed almost evenly throughout the provinces and clusters. Frequency of reference to "respect for religion" is higher than average in more "traditional" clusters and in Istanbul, while the frequency of reference to "loyalty to the state and the nation" is higher than average in the 4<sup>th</sup>, 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> clusters and in Ankara. Reference to the "ability to think independently" is more pronounced in the relatively modern 3<sup>rd</sup> cluster and in Izmir. Thus, it appears that the environmental factor of modernity has a negative effect only on references to religion, and a somewhat positive effect on references to independent thinking.

Table 51

Virtue/characteristic acquired from the family	İstanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1 <sup>st</sup> C.	2 <sup>nd</sup> C.	3 <sup>rd</sup> C.	4 <sup>th</sup> C.	Sample
Honesty	31.2	32.8	30.7	29.1	29.5	31.3	30.9	30.5
Respect for custom/ tradition	14.7	18.8	18.0	15.8	19.2	13.2	15.7	16.2
Piety	14.9	7.3	12.9	13.3	18.5	6.7	18.1	13.7
Ability to think/act independently	12.8	14.5	12.2	14.1	9.3	18.6	11.3	13.2
Loyalty to the state and the nation	9.2	8.3	10.7	11.0	9.5	10.9	12.7	10.5
Consciousness to struggle for better world	10.0	10.5	7.5	9.7	7.4	10.6	5.4	8.6
Civic consciousness	6.1	7.0	8.0	6.9	6.2	8.5	5.5	6.8

\* Figures indicate percentage of responses in total responses

Distribution of responses by SES is shown below. The table suggests that reference to attributes such as "ability to think and act independently" and "consciousness to struggle for a better world" increases with SES, whereas an inverse relationship holds between SES and respect for religion or custom and tradition.

On an open ended question, respondents were asked to state what they expect or want from their families. As high as 21 percent had no response to this question. Several respondents, on the other hand, contributed more than one answer although they were asked to name the single most important thing they expect from their families. Still, it seems clear that the youth expects families to be understanding more than anything else. They also expect their families to love and respect them, and then, to provide moral and material support. Another 14 percent long for attention, which may be taken to voice similar demands.

Table 52

Virtue/characteristic acquired from the family	D	C	C+	B	A	row (%)
Honesty	31.6	30.7	30.1	29.4	30.2	30.5
Respect for custom/ tradition	17.8	16.9	16.2	12.4	14.2	16.3
Piety	18.7	16.0	11.0	6.3	6.7	13.7
Ability to think/act independently	7.4	11.7	15.7	20.0	18.7	13.2
Loyalty to the state and the nation	10.2	10.3	11.1	11.0	10.8	10.6
Consciousness to struggle for a better world	6.4	7.6	8.9	13.9	10.4	8.5
Civic consciousness	7.5	6.5	6.8	6.8	7.5	6.8

\* Figures indicate percentage of responses in total responses

Table 53

Expectations from the family	Qty				Case %
	1st	2nd	3rd	Total	
Understanding	493	43	7	543	31.0
Affection, respect	421	32		453	25.8
Moral and material support	328	15		343	19.6
Attention	141	32	2	175	10.0
Freedom	110	4	2	116	6.6
Peace	82	9	2	93	5.3
A better life	78	1		79	4.5
Help/Assistance	42	7	1	50	2.9
Being brought up as a good citizen	27	1		28	1.6
Other	30			30	1.7
Total	1752	144	14	1910	109.0

Men are more keen on moral and material support from the family (3 percentage points above average), while women ask for greater understanding (6 percentage points above average).

In conclusion, it may be argued that the youth tends to idealise the family, basically identifying it with security. This may at least partly explain why a large majority (70 percent) finds the meaning of life in the family and almost one half, primarily in the family.

## B. Education – School and School Life

Respondents referred to education as the most meaningful value in life, next to the family. They clearly attach much higher priority to the family, but 40 percent mentioned education among the most meaningful elements of life and about 10 percent mentioned education first.

The most frequent total response to the question on why the youth should receive education is a set phrase in the Turkish society: to benefit the country and the nation. However, another set phrase, "It is not formal education, but life experience that really counts," is among the two least frequent responses. Thus, the youth seems to endorse the "national" objective in education to a

large extent, but obviously does not subscribe to the traditional idealisation (or illusion) of the "school of life".

In terms of first priorities, on the other hand, the largest number of respondents feel that the reason for receiving education is "getting knowledge and training". Coupled with other related responses, this seems to suggest that the foremost reason for education is personal interest. In addition to "knowledge and training", "capacity for systematic thinking," "general culture" and "social esteem" may all be taken to refer to personal gain. This group of responses is followed by those that associate education with serving the country and the family. Meanwhile, the humanitarian dimension of education remains largely obscure.

There is some, but mostly insignificant variation in the above distribution of responses by either sex of age group. Examples of deviation from sample averages by a few percentage points include women attaching higher significance to acquiring a general culture, as opposed to men placing higher emphasis on pleasing and caring for their families and on serving the country and the nation. In a similar vein, the younger age group respondents (15-20) make more frequent reference to "knowledge and training", "general culture" and "pleasing the family" whereas the older age group (21-27) have a greater than average tendency to associate education with developing a capacity for systematic thought.

Reasons for education vary to a much greater extent by socio-economic status. The following table points to the higher

Table 54

Reason for receiving education	Qty			Case %
	1st	2nd	Total	
To benefit the country/nation	423	426	849	38.2
To get knowledge and training	528	261	789	35.5
To develop a capacity for systematic thinking	411	274	685	30.8
For the sake of social esteem/respectability	207	313	520	23.4
To become well versed in general culture	217	282	499	22.4
To benefit/care for his family	216	248	464	20.9
To please his family	68	114	182	8.2
What really counts is not formal education, but life-experience	85	84	169	7.6
To develop love for humanity	53	115	168	7.6
To make a living (spontaneous)	9	13	22	1.0
Other	6	3	9	0.4
Total	2223	2133	4356	196.0

significance of education in providing for the family, getting knowledge and training and benefiting the country among lower SES groups. Emphasis on acquiring a capacity for systematic thinking, on the other hand, increases with SES.

Table 55

Reason for receiving education	D	C	C+	B	A
To benefit his country/nation	20.6	23.4	20.0	17.1	15.6
To get knowledge and training	21.4	19.9	18.9	16.6	17.7
To develop a capacity for systematic thinking	10.0	13.9	20.9	26.3	24.5
For the sake of social esteem/respectability	12.5	12.4	13.3	12.4	13.5
To become well versed in general culture	13.2	12.4	11.5	13.5	10.9
To benefit/care for his family	16.8	13.7	7.7	7.2	4.7
To please his family	7.8	4.7	3.1	1.8	5.2
What really counts is not formal education, but life-experience	4.3	3.9	3.8	3.6	7.3
To develop love for humanity	5.7	3.9	4.5	3.4	1.6

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

Respondents were also asked to indicate the main purpose that education serves in Turkey. The two most frequent responses were once again "providing knowledge and teaching skills" and "raising generations that will benefit the

country and the nation". Although in reversed order, these two responses top the list of reasons (or purposes) on both tables, hinting at the role of education in socialising the youth. It may be suggested that in mentioning "honesty" as the most important virtue acquired from the family, respondents generally refer to

moral values, whereas they identify the primary function of education with development of individuals who are fit to benefit themselves and the society.

Table 56

The main purpose of educational institutions in Turkey	Qty			Case %
	1st	2nd	Total	
Providing knowledge and training	550	298	848	38.1
Raising people to benefit the country/nation	406	396	802	36.1
Teaching Kemalism	337	311	648	29.2
Providing general culture	284	335	619	27.9
Developing one's capacity for systematic thinking	245	266	511	23.0
Ensuring social esteem/respectability	229	256	485	21.8
Creating democratic/civic consciousness	79	159	238	10.8
Other	36	17	53	2.4
Total	2166	2038	4204	189.3

The younger age group (15-20) respondents more firmly believe that education in Turkey serves to provide knowledge and teach skills, on the one hand, and helps raise generations that will benefit the country and the nation, on the other. Variation by sex or age group is not significant in the distribution of other responses.

A closer analysis of figures on the preceding two tables, however, suggests that education does not always fulfil the expectations of the youth. "Capacity for systematic thinking" and "social esteem", which rank third and fourth, respectively, on the first table, appear lower down the list on the second table. In other words, respondents do not feel that education serves these two purposes well enough to meet their expectations.

Cross tabulation of responses also reveals a certain discrepancy between what the youth expects from education and what they feel education actually delivers in Turkey. The intensity of that discrepancy varies with the priorities of respective groups of respondents. While 56 percent of respondents who feel that education should provide knowledge and training say that education actually serves this purpose in Turkey, only 30 percent of those who hope to obtain social esteem through education feel that education indeed ensures social esteem in Turkey.

Table 57

Education should provide/does provide	Cross (%)
Knowledge-training	55.9
People to benefit the country/nation	48.1
General culture	38.5
Capacity for systematic thinking	34.2
Social esteem/respectability	30.2

As the above table points out, more than two thirds of respondents who hope to acquire a capacity for systematic thinking through education are left disappointed in this respect. An explanation of this shortcoming may be found in the major complaint that "education is largely based on memorising." Indeed, respondents are highly critical of the dominant element of memorising/reciting in education, placing it at the top of the list of complaints in terms of total responses. Furthermore, the inadequacy of teachers'/professors' knowledge, which is voiced most frequently as the first complaint, may be related to heavy reliance on memorising. Inadequacy of technical equipment and facilities, such as laboratories, computers, etc. and overcrowded classrooms are also relatively significant areas of complaint.

Table 58

Complaints about shortcomings in education	Qty				Case % Total
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	Total	
Education relies mainly on memorising	356	343	310	1009	45.3
Technical facilities such as laboratory and computer equipment are inadequate.	322	317	287	926	41.7
Teachers/professors are not knowledgeable	532	132	136	800	35.9
Classes are over-crowded	202	275	306	783	35.3
Students are not allowed to make choices according to their own tendencies/abilities.	156	206	249	611	27.5
Education does not prepare the student for working/professional life.	149	251	195	595	26.8
Teachers/professors lack the necessary pedagogical formation.	238	201	106	545	24.5
The curriculum is outdated/fails to incorporate new developments.	112	229	194	535	24.0
There are not enough teachers/professors; courses/hours go unattended	121	166	237	524	23.6
Other	9	4	6	19	0.9
Total	2197	2124	2026	6347	285.5

Variation by sub-groups points, first of all, to somewhat changing order of priorities among men and women. Female respondents complain more about overcrowded classrooms than about insufficient knowledge of teachers/professors. Men, on the other hand, are more concerned over the anachronistic nature of education; the complaint on "falling behind modern developments", which appears ninth on the above table, ranks fifth among male respondents. Variation by age groups is strong enough to change the order of priorities only towards the bottom of the list. The younger age group (15-20) respondents complain about pedagogical shortcomings of teachers/professors and about

teacher/professor shortages, while the older ones (21-27) are critical of the archaic nature of education to a greater extent.

The percentage of respondents who complain about the dominance of memorising in education increases regularly with rising levels of education. That percentage is lower than average (35 percent) among those who have finished primary school at best, but rises to 45 percent among middle- and high school graduates and to a striking 58 percent among respondents with more than 11 years of schooling. Complaint about the inadequacy of technical equipment and facilities, by contrast, is almost

evenly distributed among these groups and even slightly more pronounced (2 percentage points above average) among respondents with primary or secondary school education.

It is noteworthy that university students voice higher than average complaint about the predominance of memorising in education. As high as 57.7 of university students mentioned this problem among their top three complaints and 22.4 percent indicated it as their first complaint. Two other complaints mentioned more frequently than average by university students include disregard for the student's preferences and tendencies (38.8 percent) and failure to prepare the student for professional/occupational life (31.7 percent).

The survey also inquired into the level of satisfaction among university students with respect to their placement in institutions of higher learning. Thus, university students were asked whether or not they are enrolled in the institution and department that they wished to enter. In response, 65.9 percent of the university students said that they are enrolled in a department that teaches the subject they wish to study and 49.7 percent said that they are in the university or college that they wished to enter. These percentages are surprisingly high at first sight. When combined with complaints about the

quality and content of education, however, they seem to reflect a satisfaction which is largely formal in nature. In other words, students seem quite prepared to settle for the subject and the institution they are studying, but essentially unhappy with the quality of education they receive.

Respondents are observed to have several other problems that relate to education. Although these will be discussed in greater detail under the section on "The Youth and Its Problems" below, it seems appropriate to briefly mention them at this point.

- Slightly more than one half of the respondents feel that personality development of young people is hindered in schools.
- Problems in education are counted next only to unemployment among the most serious difficulties faced by the youth. About 64 percent of the respondents said that they do not get proper or adequate education, and about one half of the respondents indicated this difficulty in the first place.
- Education is a top priority issue among problems of the country as well. It is mentioned third most frequently (40 percent of the respondents), after unemployment and terrorism. In terms of first mention, education precedes terrorism.

On an open ended question, respondents were asked to name the single most important thing that they want from educational institutions and from their teachers/professors. About 18 percent did not respond to this question, while several respondents mentioned more than one desire. One half of those who did respond stated that they want high quality or good education. About 8 percent referred to the quality of the teaching staff, which is clearly related to the previous response. Recalling that they expect their families to love, respect and understand them, they apparently attach less significance to a warm educational environment than they do to high quality education.

Although not changing the order of priorities, it is observed that the younger age group respondents (15-20) express a significantly higher than average need for a warm and egalitarian environment of learning, while expectations of quality rise with age. Meanwhile, female respondents demand understanding and equality to a greater extent than male ones.

Despite the fact that the majority of respondents are no longer students, the youth in general is closely interested in educational matters. This may be related to widespread belief in the advantages of having had a good education (or having graduated from a good school or university) in finding a good job, as discussed below.

Table 59

Expectations from the school/university and teacher/professors	Qty				Case %
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	Total	
Good/high quality education	882	26		908	49.9
Affection-respect	181	12	1	194	10.7
Attention	184	9		193	10.6
Understanding	137	12	1	150	8.2
High-quality teachers/professors	131	9		140	7.7
Equality-freedom	109	7		116	6.4
Knowledge	83	10	1	94	5.2
To raise conscious and enlightened people	59	2		61	3.3
Improvement in the system of education	30	5		35	1.9
Technical facilities	13	1		14	0.8
Other	12	2		14	0.8
Total	1821	95	3	1919	105.5

### C. Career - Work and Professional Life

Respondents indicate unemployment as the foremost problem of both the country and themselves, but they are hardly interested in either a private or a public sector job. Rather, about of half of the respondent would like to start his/her own company, which may point not only to strong entrepreneurial tendencies, but also to a reluctance to take salaried jobs in either sector. Having grown up in conditions of chronically high inflation is probably a factor in the young generation's unwillingness to work on salary or wages. In view of the relatively high percentage of respondents who prefer being self-employed, it may also be the case that the youth is somewhat uncomfortable with institutional relations at the workplace.

Table 60

Type of employment preferred	Oty	%
Public sector	313	14.3
Private sector	380	17.4
Self-employed	420	19.2
Establish one's own company	1074	49.1
Total	2187	100.0

There is some variation by sex. Women are more interested than average in public, and particularly, private sector jobs whereas men prefer setting up their own companies or being self-employed.

Preference for self-employment grows stronger by age and interest in private sector jobs is slightly more pronounced (2 percentage points above average) among 15-20 age group respondents.

Respondents who are presently employed in family or small business and those who are blue-collar workers in the private or the public sector constitute the two major groups with high interest in starting their own companies.

Given the opportunity, 60 percent of the working respondents indicated a desire to change their present jobs. This percentage is even higher among blue collar workers in either the private or the public sector. More than three-fourths of blue collar workers wish to change their jobs. The respectively high rate of interest in starting their own companies points to widespread dissatisfaction among blue collar workers.

Respondents who are presently employed as managers/specialists or white collar workers in the public or the private sector figure prominently among the 40 percent who do not wish to change their jobs. As might be expected, this group of respondents has a higher than average interest in public or private sector employment.

The discussion so far provides certain clues into the respondents' perception of a "good job." It suggests that a significant aspect of a good job is seen as freedom from having to "submit" (starting own company, especially not being a blue collar worker). It should also be noted in this connection that the tendency to unconditionally submit to authority in the work place is low (11.4) among the respondents.

Another important dimension of a good job (one that respondents rather keep than change) seems to be job security. Both freedom from having to obey orders and job security are also concerns that were frequently raised in focus groups preceding the survey.

Whatever the subjective definition of a good job, the most frequently stated condition for finding such a job is good

formal education or diploma. More than two-thirds of the respondents feel that education plays a decisive role in finding a good job. Knowledge of a foreign language also appears as a significant factor and is closely connected with having graduated from a good school and university.

Distribution of responses by sub-groups shows that women and younger age group (15-20) respondents attach slightly higher than average (1-2 percentage points higher) significance to graduating from a good school/university, as well as to knowing a foreign language. Men and older age group (21-27) respondents, on the other hand, are more convinced that access to influential people constitutes an advantage in finding a good job. Men are also overrepresented in the group that feels honesty, industriousness and reliability help find a good job.

Table 61

Assets that constitute an advantage in finding a good job	Qty			Case %
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	Total	
Good formal education/diploma	1070	422	1492	67.5
Knowledge of a foreign language	331	680	1011	45.7
Honesty, industriousness and reliability	338	354	692	31.3
Computer skills	176	291	467	21.1
Influential acquaintances	189	269	458	20.1
Vocational training/apprenticeship	50	80	130	5.9
Good appearance	51	76	127	5.7
Other	6	15	21	0.9
Total	2211	2187	4398	198.2

Distribution of responses by SES groups points to the relatively higher significance of computer skills, vocational training/apprenticeship and access to influential people among lower SES group respondents. The fact that all SES groups (despite variations) recognise good education and knowledge of a foreign language as major requirements for finding a good job can be taken to reflect certain emphasis on merit as an overall concept.

Table 62

Assets that constitute an advantage in finding a good job	D	C	C+	B	A
Good formal education/diploma	39.4	34.9	36.7	39.1	42.7
Knowledge of a foreign language	25.6	23.2	26.0	25.4	30.2
Honesty, industriousness and reliability	16.5	18.1	16.3	16.2	14.6
Computer skills	12.5	12.5	11.6	8.8	7.3
Influential acquaintances	12.2	12.2	10.3	9.2	8.3
Vocational training/apprenticeship	4.3	4.2	2.3	1.3	0.0
Good appearance	4.4	3.4	2.0	2.9	2.1

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

In order to explore another dimension of the relationship between education and employment, university students were asked to indicate whether or not they would be able to find a job related to their education and working respondents were asked whether or not their present employment was related to the education they received. Distribution of responses gives reason to argue that the youth is rather too optimistic in this

respect. About 65 percent of university students feel that they will be able to find a job related to their education, whereas 70 percent of the working respondents say their employment is unrelated to their education.

Table 63

Student: will be able to find a job related to her/his education/training	%
Yes	64.7
No	17.4
Do not know	17.9
Total	100.0

Table 64

Working: employed in a job related to her/his education/training	%
Yes	30.3
No	69.7
Total	100.0

Percentage of respondents holding jobs that are related to their education increases with rising levels of education. It is 22 percent (8 percentage points lower than average) among regular job-holding respondents who have high school educa-

tion (11 years of schooling), but rapidly rises of the 50 percent mark among those who have had a minimum of 14 years of formal education. Thus, a relatively close relations appears to exist between higher education and employment. Whether or not there is a sound relationship between education and employment, however, seems still debatable.

Women and students who are not enrolled in departments or universities that they wished to study have lower than average hopes of finding a job related to their education. However, if the woman is working (only 30 percent of the working respondents are female), she is more likely to hold a job related to her education than her male counterparts.

At this point, recalling certain survey findings may shed light on how the youth is socialised into professional / occupational life and how they feel as they prepare for a career.

- As a meaningful life experience, professional success ranks midway between the family and education, on the higher end of the spectrum, and religion/faith on the relatively lower end of the spectrum.
- Respondents attach high significance to the need to adapt to the circle of fellow employees/professionals as a means of ensuring a happy and secure life. In terms of first priorities,

this is the second most important social circle, after the family.

- Employment and work are among the more common topics of conversation among friends.
- Unemployment is a severe problem for the youth. About 70 percent of the respondents said that unemployment and lack of job security are among the most serious difficulties they face.
- Connected with the previous point, respondents' major demands from the State (or the government) include employment and material support, as will be discussed below.

#### D. Institutional Gaps

Earlier sections of this report point to the overriding strength of the family as a social institution in Turkey. Respondents are inclined to idealise the family. They are even prepared to exchange their freedom for the protection that the family can provide, a tendency rather unexpected of the youth.

In social terms, this privileged status of the family may be associated with assigning the family most of the responsibility (or burden) for socialising the youth. In other words, other institutions that may serve to ease the burden on the family or act to balance its effect seem to be weak or lacking. It is difficult to say,

#### IV. WORLD-VIEW: VALUES AND ATTITUDES

for example, that educational institutions equip the youth with such tools as capacity for systematic thinking or civic consciousness, thus contributing to their process of individualisation. It therefore appears that the youth is effectively socialised into family life, rather than being raised as individuals who can fully participate in all walks of social life. The process may be seen as one of incomplete socialisation, perhaps reductionist in that social life is subsumed under family life.

As focus groups emphasised and as survey findings confirm, Turkey houses a young population that is largely "unable to live its youth". Young people seem mostly withdrawn and contained in the home or family environment. Their activities are limited, particularly in institutional terms. Even the large majority of respondents who say they practice sports have no association with sports clubs or organisations. In short, their institutional relations are not diversified.

It may thus be suggested that youthful life lacks colour and social experience of the youth lacks richness in Turkey, pointing to the need to develop institutions that will address the youth.



The survey included questions that directly involved the world-views, values and attitudes prevailing among young people. Some complementary data have already been discussed in the preceding sections. The present section will first deal with these sets of questions jointly and present general observations on the scale of values that define the youth in Turkey. It will then discuss their attitudes with respect to concepts, institutions and processes including relations with the opposite sex, marriage, role of women, authority, the State, tradition and religion.

##### A. Values

In direct inquiry into their system of values, respondents were asked to indicate a maximum of three high values in life. Distribution of responses to the question "Where does the meaning of life lie?" is shown on the following table.

Table 65

Where does the meaning of life lie?	1 <sup>st</sup>		2 <sup>nd</sup>		3 <sup>rd</sup>		Total		
	Qty	Response (%)	Qty	Response (%)	Qty	Response (%)	Qty	Response (%)	Case (%)
Family	1080	48.7	302	13.9	187	9.2	1569	24.4	70.6
Education	214	9.7	374	17.3	300	14.7	888	13.8	39.9
Partner/beloved	133	5.9	284	13.2	300	14.7	717	11.2	32.3
Struggle for an ideal	218	9.8	189	8.8	210	10.3	617	9.6	27.8
Professional success	107	4.8	213	9.9	288	14.1	608	9.5	27.4
Child/children	101	4.6	242	11.2	133	6.5	476	7.4	21.4
Religion, faith	134	6.0	203	9.4	132	6.5	469	7.3	21.1
Knowledge	63	2.8	128	5.9	204	10.0	395	6.2	17.8
Masterwork	85	3.8	124	5.7	96	4.7	305	4.8	13.7
Wealth, money	47	2.1	86	3.9	171	8.4	304	4.7	13.7
None (life has no meaning)	31	1.4	8	0.4	8	0.4	47	0.7	2.1
Other	3	0.1	4	0.2	7	0.3	14	0.2	0.6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2217</b>	<b>99.7</b>	<b>2159</b>	<b>99.8</b>	<b>2039</b>	<b>99.8</b>	<b>6409</b>	<b>99.8</b>	<b>288.4</b>

The above distribution allows for distinguishing two groups of values, with three ranks in each, along the hierarchy of respondents' values.

#### Group 2 includes:

- *Intellectual values* (education, knowledge)
- *Religious values* (religion, faith)
- *Material values* (wealth, money)

#### Group 1 includes:

- *Family values* (family, partner/lover, child)
- *Social values* (struggle to realise ideals, having a masterpiece to one's name)
- *Individual values* (professional success)

Combining these two groups results in the following hierarchy of values:

- *Family values*
- *Intellectual values*
- *Social values*
- *Individual values*
- *Religious values*
- *Material values*

The first conclusion that may be drawn from the above hierarchy of values is that a large segment of the youth in Turkey subscribes to a "secularised" world-view. That secularisation, however, is accompanied by a moralistic attitude.

The above interpretation is supported by the survey finding that points to the very high value respondents attach to "honesty". As discussed in the previous section, a very large majority of respondents mentioned "honesty" as the primary virtue acquired from the family. Even more significantly, this is a value that is evenly shared by respondents in all SES groups. "Honesty" was indicated with a frequency of about 30 percent throughout the SES groups. It may thus be suggested that "honesty" is a key concept of socialisation in the hierarchy of values that the youth shares in Turkey.

### 1. Family values

Family values seem to enjoy almost unchallenged primacy among the values of the youth. More than 40 percent of total responses to the question on "the meaning of life" refer to a concept included in this group of values (family, partner/lover, child). About three fifths of the respondents (59.2 percent) indicated one of these family values among those that convey meaning to life.

Emphasis on family values varies significantly by SES. As the following table reveals, the percentage of respondents who refer to the family or the child as imparting meaning to life declines with increasing SES. This is particularly true with respect to the "child" option, where the frequency of mention drops sharply in SES groups C+ and higher. The same high SES groups, on the other hand, attach greater than average significance to the "partner/lover". Thus, the

Table 66

Where does the meaning of life lie?	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total
Family	76.4	70.9	69.7	64.5	63.7	70.6
Partner/beloved	29.0	30.1	34.4	36.3	45.1	32.3
Child/children	27.7	25.2	16.8	11.9	9.8	21.4

Table 67

Where does the meaning of life lie?	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1 <sup>st</sup> C.	2 <sup>nd</sup> C.	3 <sup>rd</sup> C.	4 <sup>th</sup> C.
Family	63.8	67.3	67.9	69.5	76.8	65.9	77.7
Partner/beloved	27.7	36.5	41.7	35.9	23.5	38.1	29.9
Child/children	17.3	27.0	19.2	30.0	23.0	15.7	18.9

individual dimension of life shared by the woman and the man appears to gain in significance as one moves up the SES scale.

Distribution of references to family values by provinces and province clusters presents a clearer picture of differentiation along the traditional-modern axis.

In the relatively modern provinces of Ankara, Izmir and the 3<sup>rd</sup> cluster, more frequent reference is made to the "partner/lover" and less frequent reference is made to the "child", with an overall reduced emphasis on family values. A reverse tendency is observed as one moves toward the more traditional areas. Istanbul is a curious case where all three percentages fall below sample averages. This may imply that the persistent clash between modernity and tradition in this city has given rise to a general disenchantment with family values.

Distribution of responses by sex shows that young women attach greater significance to family values than young men. Frequency of respective references to such values is shown below.

Table 68

Where does the meaning of life lie?	Female (%)	Male (%)
Family	73.4	67.9
Partner/beloved	33.4	31.1
Child/children	27.3	15.8

The overall primacy of family values is also reflected in the youth's judgement and experience of family life. As discussed above, the family signifies protection or security for an overwhelming majority (81.8 percent) of respondents. At least one half of the respondents admit that they enjoy the understanding of older generations, more than two-thirds need their advice and in general, trust older people. About one half of the respondents discuss their serious problems within the family first. Perhaps more significantly, almost one half of the respondents seem willing to accept family restriction of their freedom so as to keep them out of trouble.

All these findings allow for re-emphasising the tendency among the youth to idealise the family. In view of this idealisation, it seems appropriate to relate their system of values to levels of significance that they attach to virtues or attributes acquired from the family. Frequent reference will therefore be made to these attributes under the following sub-headings.

## 2. Intellectual values

It is significant that the set of intellectual values (education and knowledge) should rank second in respondents' hierarchy of values. Total frequency of reference to education and knowledge as values

imparting meaning on life is 20 percent. Combined primary reference to these two values adds up to 12.5 percent.

Education is a significantly high value among the youth, as is also suggested by the survey finding that 58.9 percent of the respondents agree with the statement, which identifies the main responsibility of a young person as being a good student.

Distribution of references to "education" and "knowledge" by SES groups suggests that these values are relatively evenly shared throughout the SES groups. Still, respondents in SES Group D tend to place less emphasis on "knowledge" as compared to "education". One explanation of this may be that education as an instrument of upward social mobility overshadows the significance of knowledge as an individual asset.

Table 69

Where does the meaning of life lie?	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total
Education	42.5	38.8	41.9	40.6	43.3	39.9
Knowledge	14.0	18.3	19.6	18.4	17.6	17.8

In view of the priority attached to education, expectations of the youth from education seem relevant to an overall analysis of their world of values. Reference will therefore be made to such expectations under successive sub-headings.

### 3. Social values

Total frequency of reference to "struggle towards realising ideals" and "contributing a masterpiece" as values attaching meaning to life is 14.4 percent. Combined primary reference to these two values adds up to 13.6 percent.

Frequency of reference to "struggle towards realising ideals" does not vary by sex. The objective of a lasting masterpiece, on the other hand, seems to be more commonly a male one.

Distribution of responses by SES groups points to a variation that distinguishes SES Group B respondents by the very high emphasis they place on both values. Ranking between the highest and the middle-to-lower strata of the society, this segment of the youth seems to have a self-assumed "social mission".

Aside from this group, in general "strug-

gle for ideals" seems to become a higher value as one moves up on socio-economic status. Leaving a masterpiece, on the other hand, appears as a value evenly shared by respondents in all SES groups.

Table 70

Where does the meaning of life lie?	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total (%)
Struggle towards an ideal	17.8	26.8	29.7	38.8	32.4	27.8
Masterwork	13.7	13.1	12.7	19.2	12.7	13.7

About 83 percent of the respondents agree that the youth should have social responsibility, as will be discussed below. This is a finding which hints at the level of significance that respondents attach to social values. It is also worth recalling that 22.8 percent of the respondents mentioned "consciousness to struggle for a better world" among the most significant three attributes acquired from the family. The frequency of reference to this attribute generally increases with SES, but reaches the highest level, once again, in SES Group B.

Another indicator of the significance attached to social values may be found in the majority opinion that "lack of purpose, absence of ideals and overall insensitivity are widespread among the youth."

It seems paradoxical that the majority of respondents should see their own generation as being devoid of purpose, ideal or

sensitivity, but it is also meaningful in that it expresses the value attached to having a purpose and an ideal in life.

Ideals central to the social values of the youth point to the highly emphasised concepts of the State, the country and the nation. "Loyalty to the state and the nation" is mentioned among the most significant virtues acquired from the family by 28.1 percent of the respondents. Distribution of this response does not vary by SES. When asked the reason why the youth should receive an education, on the other hand, 38.2 percent of the respondents said "to benefit the country and the nation." This constitutes the largest group of respondents on that particular question, exceeding the number of those who expect education to provide them with knowledge and skills.

The concept of "citizenship" is notably under-emphasised in comparison to concepts of the State, the country and the nation. Only 18 percent of the respon-

Table 71

Lack of purpose, absence of ideals, and overall insensitivity are widespread among the youth	Qty	%
Agree	1335	60.8
Disagree	631	28.7
Do not know	231	10.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2197</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 72

Where does the meaning of life lie?	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total (%)
Professional success	18.9	25.2	32.3	35.5	34.3	27.4

dents indicated "civic consciousness" as a family imparted virtue, and this percentage does not vary by SES.

#### 4. Individual values

The significance that the respondents attach to individual values may be traced to the intensity of their expectations of personal performance. In this analysis, the emphasis on "professional success" as a meaningful life endeavour will be taken as a measure of that intensity. Further reference will be made in this context to virtues acquired from the family and expectations of the youth from education.

Professional success was indicated among the top three values that ascribe meaning to life by 27.4 percent of the respondents. In terms of total frequency of reference, professional success is mentioned equally frequently as "struggling for ideals" and more frequently than "religion and faith".

Significance attached to professional success clearly varies with SES. As the following table reveals, the tendency to associate the meaning of life with professional success grows stronger as one moves higher on SES.

Even more striking is the relationship between SES and emphasis on the "capacity to think and act independently" as an attribute acquired from the family.

The preceding table points to a SES-dependent negative relationship between emphasis on "capacity to think and act independently", on the one hand, and that on "respect for custom and tradition" and "piety/religion", on the other. This negative relationship is relatively moderate with respect to "respect for custom and tradition, but more pronounced with respect to religion. Respondents ranking C+ or higher on SES clearly attach much higher priority to capacity for independent thought and action as opposed to upholding religion.

Table 73

Virtue acquired from the family	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total (%)
Ability to think/act independently	19.2	30.8	42.2	53.7	49.0	34.9
Respect for custom/tradition	46.4	44.5	43.6	33.3	37.3	43.1
Piety/respect for religion	48.6	42.3	29.5	16.9	17.6	36.4

The relationship between the relative significance of individual values and the environmental factor of modernity may be observed in the varying primacy of professional success by provinces and province clusters. Figures on the following table distinguish the 3<sup>rd</sup> cluster in this respect, followed by Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul in roughly equal rates of emphasis. Professional success is ranked lowest in the 4<sup>th</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> clusters.

Educational expectations of the youth also reflect the significance they attach to individual development. As presented in the preceding section, more than 60 percent of the respondents indicated individual objectives of acquiring "knowledge and skills", "capacity for systematic thinking", "general culture" and "social esteem" as the first reason why the youth should receive an education. Among these objectives, "capacity for systematic thinking" is strongly related to SES. Frequency of reference to this objective in the first or second order varies as follows by SES.

Table 74

Where does the meaning of life lie?	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1 <sup>st</sup> C.	2 <sup>nd</sup> C.	3 <sup>rd</sup> C.	4 <sup>th</sup> C.
Professional success	28.7	28.9	30.1	26.3	25.8	35.4	19.2

It has already been pointed out that a positive relationship exists between emphasis on independent thought and action as a capacity acquired from the family and the environmental factor of modernity. In that case as well, the highest percentage is observed in the 3<sup>rd</sup> cluster and the lowest in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> clusters.

It may also be noted that 22.6 percent of SES Group C+ respondents, 32.1 percent of SES Group B respondents and 26.5 percent of SES Group A respondents mentioned "developing a capacity for systematic thought" as the first objective of education.

Table 75

The main reason why a young person should receive education	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)
To develop a capacity for systematic thinking	17.3	25.2	38.9	50.0	46.1

## 5. Religious values

Overall, 21.1 percent of the respondents indicated "religion and faith" among the top three value that impart meaning to life. This rate drops to 18.5 percent among women, while rising to 23.6 percent among men. Total frequency of reference to "religion and faith" varies by SES in the following manner:

Table 76

Where does the meaning of life lie?	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total (%)
Religion, faith	24.4	23.6	20.0	13.7	10.8	21.1

The negative relationship between rising SES and the significance attached to religion and faith is evident. The frequency of reference to religion and faith is particularly low among respondents ranking A and B on SES. The relationship between emphasis on religious values and relative conditions of modernity/tradition, on the other hand, may be observed on the following table. Highest percentage of respondents who associate religion and faith with the meaning of life are found in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> clusters. This percentage drops below the average in Istanbul, declining sharply in Izmir and the 3<sup>rd</sup> cluster.

Table 77

Where does the meaning of life lie?	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1 <sup>st</sup> Cluster	2 <sup>nd</sup> Cluster	3 <sup>rd</sup> Cluster	4 <sup>th</sup> Cluster
Religion, faith	20.2	8.8	16.7	23.2	27.5	8.1	32.7

A similar pattern is observed in the distribution of references to religion as a virtue acquired from the family. The emphasis is strongest among respondents in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> clusters: it is about one percentage point stronger than average in Istanbul and becomes weakest in Izmir and the 3<sup>rd</sup> cluster. The negative relationship between emphasis on religion as a virtue acquired from the family and SES has already been mentioned.

One point should be made clear before concluding the analysis on religious values. The significance of religion in attaching meaning to life should not be confused with or taken as a measure of the extent of religious faith and practice among the youth. As will be discussed below, religious belief is much more widespread among the youth, many of whom also practice their religion. It is significant in itself, however, that such a pronounced discrepancy should hold between religious values, on the one hand, and widespread religious faith and practice, on the other. This may be taken as a strong indicator of assigning a specific place to religion within the framework of a secularised world-view.

Table 78

Virtue acquired from the family	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1 <sup>st</sup> C.	2 <sup>nd</sup> C.	3 <sup>rd</sup> C.	4 <sup>th</sup> C.	Total (%)
Piety	14.9	7.3	12.9	13.3	18.5	6.7	18.1	13.7

Table 79

Where does the meaning of life lie?	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total (%)
Wealth, money	16.2	13.0	11.2	13.2	22.5	13.6

## 6. Material values

Material values appear lowest down the hierarchy of values that respondents uphold. Only 2.1 percent of the respondents mentioned "wealth and money" as the primary value that attaches meaning to life. Total frequency of mention (among top three values) remains at 13.6 percent. Still, it is noteworthy that this rate rises to 22.5 percent among respondents in SES Group A. Hence, it may be suggested that the affluence enjoyed by these respondents has a direct bearing on their world-view.

Emphasis on wealth and money is also stronger than average among SES Group D respondents. It seems to be the case that respondents ranking lowest on socio-economic status have a more vivid perception of the decisiveness of material well-being than respondents in the middle strata.

Meanwhile, there is a striking contrast between the relative significance that the youth attaches to material values and the bitter reality of material problems in their daily lives. As has already been mentioned, more than one-fifth (21.9 percent) of the respondents mentioned "money" among most common topics of conversation among friends. Furthermore, about one-fourth (24.7 percent) mentioned "employment and occupational life" among such common topics of conversation.

As will be discussed further down this report, about one-fifth (20.2 percent) of the respondents mentioned "lack of money" as the first major difficulty faced by the youth. Total number of respondent who referred to this problem (in first, second or third order) count as high as 59.5 percent.

The contrast between the relative insignificance of material values and the overriding importance of material problems in young people's daily lives allows for the following interpretation: the secularisation in the world-view of the youth in Turkey has failed to establish the economic outlook as the decisive point of view, despite the overwhelming weight of economic problems. Economics is very much eclipsed by moralistic attitudes within the secular world of values shared by the youth.

## 7. Hierarchy of values and SES ranking

The following table summarises findings discussed in this section with respect to the relationship between relative significance that the youth attaches to meaningful values in life and SES ranking.

Variation by SES groups is significant enough to bring about two changes in the hierarchy of values, as compared to the overall order presented at the beginning of this section. One such difference is observed in SES Group D, where religious values are attributed higher significance than individual values and rank fourth (rather than fifth). The other difference is that material values precede religious values in SES Group A, appearing fifth rather than last on the hierarchy.

The hierarchy of values remains unchanged with respect to other SES categories. Nevertheless, C group respondents attach higher than average significance to religious values, while respondents in SES Group C+ subscribe more to intellectual and individual values

Table 80

Where does the meaning of life lie?	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total (%)
Family values	85.4	84.2	5.2	84.5	82.2	84.6
Intellectual values	47.5	47.6	52.1	52.8	42.6	48.8
Social values	28.5	35.7	38.1	51.1	41.6	37.2
Individual values	19.1	25.2	32.3	35.6	34.7	27.4
Religious values	24.6	23.6	20.0	13.7	10.9	21.1
Material values	16.3	13.0	11.2	13.3	22.8	13.6

and those in SES Group B more to social and individual values. An additional tendency which brings B group respondent closer to A group respondents may be observed in the very low significance that B group respondents attach to religious values, almost as low as that ascribed to material values.

## B. Attitudes

This sub-section will be devoted to a discussion of young people's attitudes towards major social institutions and processes.

### 1. Relations between sexes, marriage and children

The attitude of the youth on matters such as relations between sexes, marriage and family structure is of particular importance, especially in view of the primacy of family values in their lives.

Survey findings point out that the majority of the youth subscribes to modern patterns of behaviour with respect to matrimony. About 70 percent of the respondents are against family arranged marriages and there is no significant variation in this attitude by sex. Still, the percentage of those who approve of arranged marriages is far from being negligible.

Table 81

Marriage arranged by families	Qty	(%)
Favour	457	20.6
Against	1538	69.3
DK	224	10.1
TOTAL	2219	100.0

The youth seems to have overcome traditional norms also in largely approving pre-marital relations between young men and women, but once again they are observed to have certain reservations. Only 15 percent of the respondents feel that pre-marital relations among the youth is "unacceptable because it runs counter to tradition and public morality," and this view is shared almost evenly among male and female respondents. As high as 45 percent, however, feel that such relations are normal provided that it remains within certain limits.

Table 82

Pre-marital relations between sexes	Qty	percentage (%)
It is desirable because it helps young people to fully know one another.	890	40.5
It is normal provided that one does not go beyond a certain point.	979	44.6
It is unacceptable because it runs counter to tradition and public morality.	327	14.9
TOTAL	2196	100.0

Categorical objection to pre-marital relation among the youth is strongest in SES Group D respondents (27 percent). It is also stronger than average among SES Group C respondents (17 percent).

When it comes to pre-marital sexual relations, however, traditional norms clearly prevail.

Table 83

Pre-marital sexual relations	Qty	percentage (%)
Approve	545	24.6
Disapprove	1355	61.1
DK	319	14.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2219</b>	<b>100.1</b>

Furthermore, responses to this question vary significantly by sex. Only 16.4 percent of female respondent approve of pre-marital sex, as opposed to 68.3 percent who disapprove. By contrast, 32.4 percent of male respondents favour pre-marital sex and 54.1 percent are against it.

Distribution of responses also varies significantly by SES. As may be observed on the following table, the tendency to approve of pre-marital sex grow stronger with increasing SES. Variation is so pro-

nounced that the percentage of respondents who approve of pre-marital sex is higher than the percentage of those who are against it in SES Groups A and B.

Attitude towards intermarriage among people from different religions or sects may be seen as another indicator of erosion in traditional patterns of approach to marriage and the family. As high as 70 percent of the respondents who expressed an opinion on this matter (55.9 percent of the sample) are in favour of married couples who belong to different denominations, while 30 percent (23.9 percent of the sample) disapprove of such intermarriage.

Table 85

Marriage of people from different religions/religious sects	Qty	(%)
Approve	1242	55.9
Disapprove	532	23.9
DK	444	20.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2218</b>	<b>99.8</b>

Distribution of opinion on the "ideal" marrying age for men and for men is shown below.

Table 84

Pre-marital sexual relations	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)
Approve	10.4	19.1	26.5	46.6	61.8
Disapprove	77.0	67.0	57.0	38.9	25.5
DK	12.6	13.9	16.5	14.5	12.7

Table 86

Ideal marrying age	For women		For men	
	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)
15	7	0.3	2	0.1
16	10	0.5	1	0.0
17	14	0.6	3	0.1
18	126	5.7	14	0.6
19	101	4.6	7	0.3
20	518	23.6	92	4.2
21	116	5.3	44	2.0
22	241	11.0	148	6.7
23	248	11.3	166	7.5
24	212	9.6	159	7.2
25	384	17.5	844	29.3
26	78	3.5	218	9.9
27	45	2.0	197	9.0
28	48	2.2	197	9.0
29	7	0.3	47	2.1
30	33	1.5	221	10.1
31	2	0.1	4	0.2
32-	-	4	0.2	
33	1	0.0	8	0.4
34-	-	1	0.0	
35	7	0.3	19	0.9
40-	-	3	0.1	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2198</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>2199</b>	<b>99.9</b>
	<b>Mean:</b>		<b>Mean</b>	
	<b>22.43</b>		<b>25.5</b>	

The mean marrying ages that respondents consider ideal for women and for men (22.43 years and 25.5 years, respectively) are barely above the national averages among women and men who have been married at least once (21.95 years and 24.96 years, respectively in 1990 census figures). This implies that

the present generation of youth does not differ significantly from previous generations in their respective attitudes towards marrying age.

When asked to state their opinion on having children, only 3.7 percent of the respondents said they do not want children. As may be seen on the following table, 53.8 percent want one child or two children. Preference for one child or two children rises to 57.8 percent among female respondents. The sample mode is "two children", with 39.6 percent indicating this option. The tendency to welcome as many children as one is given, on the other hand, is weak. Only 6 percent of the respondents share this attitude, and that rate drops to 3.9 percent among women, while increasing to 8 percent among men.

Table 87

How do you feel about having children?	Qty	(%)
I don't want children	83	3.7
I'd like to have 1 child	316	14.2
I'd like to have 2 children	879	39.6
I'd like to have 3 or more children	143	6.4
I'd like to have as many children as I'm given	133	6.0
I'd like to have as many children as I can raise	488	22.0
Don't know, never thought about it	176	7.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2218</b>	<b>99.8</b>

Opinion on the desirable number of children varies by SES. Frequency of preference for no child or only one child increases with ascending socio-economic status, and conversely, preference for three or more children, as well as the tendency to welcome as many children as one is given, declines with rising SES. Only respondents in SES Group C+ have a markedly higher preference for having as many children as they can properly raise; this attitude is shared almost evenly among other SES groups.

Table 88

How do you feel about having children?	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)
Don't want any children	2.2	4.1	2.8	6.0	5.9
I'd like to have 1 child	10.4	12.9	14.4	20.1	22.5
I'd like to have 2 children	36.4	41	39.4	38.5	42.2
I'd like to have 3 or more children	13.2	6.5	4.9	1.7	2.9
I'd like to have as many children as I'm given	7.1	7.8	3.6	4.7	2.0
I'd like to have as many children as I can raise	21.1	20.9	26.1	18.8	20.6
Don't know, never thought about it.	9.6	6.7	8.8	10.3	3.9

The youth seems quite unequivocal in their attitudes towards birth control or family planning. As high as 83.2 percent of the respondents are in favour of birth control/family planning. Women are even stronger supporters of birth control (89.6 percent) as compared to men (77.2 percent).

Table 89

Birth control/family planning	Qty	(%)
Approve	1845	83.2
Disapprove	231	10.4
DK	141	6.4
TOTAL	2217	100.0

An equally high percentage of respondents endorse the modern attitude on the joint responsibility of man and wife in providing for the family. Four out of five respondents feel that both man and wife should contribute to the family budget. Women are even stronger proponents of joint responsibility than men. This view is held by 88.6 percent of female respondents and 84.7 percent of home-staying young women and girls, as opposed to 76.1 percent of men. Furthermore, 87.1 percent of respondents who depend on their partner's

income (and who are predominantly female) feel that man and wife should share the responsibility of providing for the family.

Table 90

Both man and wife should contribute to the family budget	Qty	(%)
Agree	1818	82.2
Disagree	224	10.1
DK	170	7.7
TOTAL	2212	100.0

Opinion in favour of the couple's joint contribution to the family income becomes more widespread with increasing level of education and with rising SES. Still, three fourths of respondents in SES Group D share this view. On the other hand, only 72.4 percent of respondents whose families face very serious problems of poverty (having a monthly household income of less than 50 million TL) share this view and that figure is about 10 percentage points lower than average. It may therefore be suggested that the tendency to assign income-earning responsibility to the woman along with the man reflects a choice in life-style more than a consent out of economic necessity. It is significant to note in this connection that the frequency of agreement in the common responsibility of man and wife to contribute to the family budget drops to 73.1 percent among respondents who refer to religious values as giving meaning to life.

Respondents are not equally convinced that a working mother can properly care for her children. Only 49.4 percent of the respondents share this view, while 44.1 percent disagree with it. Opinion varies, however, by sex: 55.9 percent of female respondents feel that a working mother can properly care for her children, as opposed to 38.3 percent who feel she cannot. The majority of male respondents subscribe to the latter view.

Table 91

A working mother can properly care for her child(ren)	Qty	(%)
Agree	1095	49.4
Disagree	977	44.1
DK	143	6.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2215</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Respondents seem even more convinced about the adverse effects of mother's employment on pre-school children. On this issue, variation of opinion by sex is small and the percentage of female respondents who agree is only slightly higher than that of male respondents.

Table 92

Pre-school children may suffer from having a working mother	Qty	(%)
Agree	1388	62.7
Disagree	645	29.1
DK	181	8.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2214</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 2. The role of women

To a large extent, the youth seems to depart from the traditional attitude that limits the role of the women to family responsibilities. Almost one half of the respondents disagree with the statement that what women really want is a home and children.

Table 93

What women really want is a home and children	Qty	(%)
Agree	866	39.1
Disagree	1051	47.5
DK	297	13.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2214</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Variation by sex, however, is significant. Agreement with the above statement rises to 43.2 percent among men while disagreement drops to 37.6 percent. By contrast, 57.8 percent of female respondents dispute this view, as opposed to 34.8 percent who agree with it. It is also noteworthy that 19.2 percent of male respondents would not (or could not) express opinion on this matter.

Limiting the female role to the home environment is clearly related to SES. The tendency to disagree with the statement increases with rising socio-economic status. The majority of respondents in SES Group D, on the other hand, share this view.

One half of the respondents disagree that being a housewife is just as satisfying as having regular employment. About one third, on the other hand, feel that it is equally satisfying.

Table 95

Being a housewife is just as satisfying as having regular employment	Qty	(%)
Agree	721	32.6
Disagree	1102	49.9
DK	386	17.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2209</b>	<b>100</b>

Disagreement with the above statement is lower than average among male respondents. Only 41.9 percent of the young men interviewed disagree with it, whereas 58.1 percent of female respondents challenge the view that being a housewife is equally satisfying.

A sizeable majority of respondents feels that employment is the key to a woman's independence. The argument is supported by 62.2 percent of the respondents.

Table 94

What women really want is home and children	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)
Agree	56.1	43.7	29.8	23.9	18.8
Disagree	31.2	44.0	56.3	60.3	62.4
DK	12.7	12.3	13.9	15.8	18.8

Table 96

Employment is the key to a woman's independence	Qty	(%)
Agree	1375	62.2
Disagree	579	26.2
DK	258	11.7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2212</b>	<b>100.1</b>

Once again, this is predominantly a female opinion. Only 52 percent of male respondents, as opposed to 72.7 percent of female respondents agree that employment is the key to a woman's independence. And once again, frequency of agreement with this statement increases with rising SES. This time, however, the majority (55.5 percent) of respondents in SES Group D agree with the statement.

The survey included a question on whether or not the youth assigns specific occupational roles to men and women. Respondents were asked to indicate if they had a preference for a male or a female professional/official in case they needed the services of such a professional. As the following table reveals, the youth does not have a sexist attitude with respect to occupational roles in general. Between 50 percent to 70 percent of the respondents indicated that the professional's sex does not matter, except for the baby-sitter and the taxi-driver.

Nevertheless, when the professional's sex does matter, a gender bias is apparent in all occupations other than that of the physician. Among these gender-specific occupations, only y two (other than baby-sitting) are assigned to women: these are the teacher and the psycholo-

Table 97

Professions	Woman		Man		No difference		TOTAL	
	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)
Lawyer	219	9.9	324	14.7	1663	75.4	2206	100.0
Baby-sister	1772	80.4	34	1.5	397	18.0	2203	99.9
Doctor/physician	313	14.1	307	13.9	1586	71.9	2206	99.9
Judge	108	4.9	619	28.1	1474	67.0	2201	100.0
Member of parliament	148	6.7	566	25.7	1487	67.6	2201	100.0
Teacher	363	16.4	137	6.2	1707	77.3	2207	99.9
Boss	342	15.5	575	26.1	1284	58.3	2201	99.9
Police officer	230	10.4	766	34.8	1206	54.8	2202	100.0
Psychologist	528	24.0	253	11.5	1420	64.5	2201	100.0
Taxi driver	112	5.1	1405	63.7	688	31.2	2205	100.0
Aircraft pilot	120	5.4	980	44.5	1102	50.0	2202	99.9

gist. The others, including taxi-shiver, aircraft pilot, judge, member of parliament, police officer, manager (director/boss) and lawyer, appear to be male dominated occupations.

Distribution of the above responses allows for the interpretation that male-specific occupations mostly relate to exercise of authority or power. Female-specific ones, on the other hand, largely focus on the human being and the individual.

### 3. Authority

The survey included a question that aimed to establish the attitude of the youth towards authority. The question was formulated as follows: "Some people feel that one should carry out instructions of his/her superiors in the workplace even if (s)he does not agree with them. Others insist that one should be convinced on the rightness of the orders before obeying them. What is your opinion on this matter?" Distribution of responses on the question is shown below.

Table 98

Carrying out instructions in the workplace	Qty	(%)
One should carry out instructions without questioning	251	11.4
Depends on the case	738	33.4
I should be convinced that instructions are right	966	43.7
Don't know	254	11.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2209</b>	<b>100.0</b>

As the table reveals, the tendency to obey orders without questioning them is weak (11.4 percent). Nevertheless, 33.4 percent of the respondents seem to feel that orders may indeed be obeyed without question depending upon the circumstances. This suggests a rather strong tendency of acquiescence among the youth towards authority. It may also be suggested that such an attitude is in conformity with a world-view that subsumes the "citizen" under such collective identities as "the State, the country, the nation" with respect to social responsibilities.

Distribution of responses does not vary significantly by sex. On the other hand, greater resistance to authority is observed among higher SES group respondents. At least one half of the respondents in SES Groups A and B would not obey orders that they doubt are right.

Table 99

Carrying out instructions	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)
One should carry out instructions without question	16.6	11.1	10.2	8.9	8.8
Depends on the case	29.3	34.8	34.6	32.1	33.3
I should be convinced that instructions are right	36.2	42.3	46.4	50.0	52.9
Don't know	17.9	11.7	8.8	8.9	4.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>99.9</b>

Attitude towards authority seems to be related to level of education. Distribution of responses to the question of obeying orders in the workplace by respective years of schooling of the respondents at the time of the survey is shown below.

compliance or opposition depending upon circumstances is equally strong (approaching one third) at all levels of education, except among respondents with 9-11 years of schooling (the sample mode), 38 percent of whom share this attitude.

Table 100

Carrying out instructions	5 (%)	6-8 (%)	9-11 (%)	12-15 (%)	15+ (%)
Years of schooling					
One should carry out instructions without question	17.9	13.3	9.3	6.4	11.1
Depends on the case	30.8	31.2	37.9	31.8	33.3
I should be convinced that instructions are right	35.7	41.8	40.4	54.4	50.0
Don't know	15.5	13.7	12.3	7.5	5.6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>

17.9 percent of the respondents with a maximum of five years of schooling feel that instructions should be carried out without question. This drops to 6.5 percent among respondents who have had 12 or more years of formal education. Nevertheless, the tendency to opt for

A relationship is observed between the family life-experience of the respondents and their attitudes towards authority. The submissive attitude (15.3 percent) is stronger than average among respondents whose families' "do what the father/husband says."

Another interesting indicator of the relationship between attitude towards authority and status in the society is found in the distribution of responses by respondents' present state of studentship and/or employment. This is especially relevant since the question was formulated to refer to "carrying our instruction in the workplace." Distribution of responses by status of studentship and/or employment is as follows.

Table 101

Carrying out instructions	Student (%)	Working student* (%)	Working, not a student (%)	Seeking a job (%)	Women /girls at home (%)	Total (%)
Carry out instructions without question	8.0	12.1	13.8	15.3	10.4	11.4
Depends on the case	33.1	34.4	33.6	34.4	32.3	33.4
Should be convinced						
Instructions are right	46.2	48.5	43.9	36.4	40.4	43.7
Don't know	12.6	4.8	8.6	13.9	16.8	11.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>99.8</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>

\* including those who work on vacations and those who work and prepare for examinations

As the above table reveals, non-student respondents who are either working or looking for a job have a stronger than average tendency to obey orders without questioning them. Thus, prospective or actual employment may help reinforce the acquiescent attitude among the youth.

When the acquiescent attitude towards authority is analysed in view of value

judgements in other aspects of life, a significant relationship is observed between the former attitude and respect for religion. Respondents who indicated "respect for religion" among the most important virtue acquired from the family have the strongest tendency to obey instructions without question (14.7 percent). In a similar vein, 15.3 percent of the respondents who referred to "religion and faith" as the major value that imparts meaning to life would obey orders without question. Both percentages are higher than average. By contrast

6.9 percent of the respondents who referred to "struggling for ideals" and only 4.7 percent of those who referred to "professional success" as the most meaningful life-experience would submit to instructions without questioning them.

Furthermore, the tendency to forego freedoms in exchange for family protection grows stronger with increasing sub-

missiveness in the face of authority. The percentage of respondents who feel that families should restrict the freedom of the youth to keep them out of trouble rises 8 points above average (to 54.7 percent) among respondents who would submit to authority in the workplace.

#### 4. The State

As already discussed, respondents refer to "loyalty to the State" less frequently than they do to "respect for custom and tradition" or "respect for religion" as the most significant virtue acquired from the family. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that as high as 28.1 percent assign the family (which is an institution of the civil society) a role that relates to the State. Furthermore, that percentage varies little throughout the SES categories. It may therefore be observed that "loyalty to the State" is an evenly shared value among all strata of the society.

Emphasis on "loyalty to the State" does not vary significantly along the traditional vs. modern axis, either. As the following table points out, this emphasis is significantly lower than average only in Izmir among the relatively modern provinces.

As for the expectations of the youth from the State, the State is clearly assigned an economic mission. On an open ended question, respondents, as young people living in Turkey, were asked to name their primary demand from the State. Distribution of responses is shown below.

Table 102

Virtue acquired from the family	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total (%)
Loyalty to the state and nation	26.6	27.2	29.9	29.4	28.4	28.1

Table 103

Virtue acquired from the family	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1st Cluster	2nd Cluster	3rd Cluster	4th Cluster	Total
Loyalty to the state and nation	9.2	8.3	10.7	11.0	9.5	10.9	12.7	10.5

Table 104

Expectations from the state	Qty	Response (%)	Case (%)
Employment/material support	708	31.6	34.2
Education	441	19.7	21.3
Establishment of social peace and order	283	12.6	13.7
Economic measures	161	7.2	7.8
Concern for youth	160	7.1	7.7
Democracy	108	4.8	5.2
Social services (health, social security, etc.)	81	3.6	3.9
Respect/concern/care for the person	62	2.8	3.0
Solving the problem of terrorism	56	2.5	2.7
Eliminating corruption/bribery	55	2.5	2.7
Freedom	48	2.1	2.3
Freedom of faith	25	1.1	1.2
Other	50	2.3	2.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2238</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>108.2</b>

The highest priority group of expectations from the State are economic in nature and include "employment and material support" and "economic measures", which add up to 38.8 percent of responses. "Education" and special "concern for the youth" account for 26.8 percent of responses. Other demands which are social in nature (unity, peace, a better world, social services, respect and care for the individual) account for 19 percent, while political demands (democracy, freedom, freedom of faith/conscience) add up to 8 percent of total responses. Total reference to topical issues of government (corruption, terrorism) remains at 5 percent.

Topmost demands from the State are economic and this is in conformity with the survey finding that points to economic problems as the youth's most serious difficulty. As will be discussed below, 70.4 percent of the respondents indicated "unemployment and lack of job security" and 59.6 percent referred to "lack of money" among the most serious difficulties faced by the youth.

The frequency distribution of demands from the State does not vary significantly by sex. Variation by SES, however, is significant.

Table 105

Expectations from the state	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total (%)
Economic	55.6	41.7	30.9	26.5	26.9	38.8
Youth oriented	18.6	24.4	31.8	34.9	32.7	26.8
Social	13.2	19.8	20.5	21.8	21.1	19.0
Political	7.1	7.6	9.6	8.4	8.6	8.0
Current/topical	4.0	5.1	5.0	4.2	9.6	5.0
Other	1.3	1.4	2.1	4.2	0.9	2.3
TOTAL	99.8	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.8	99.9

Among SES Group D respondents, economic demands from the State are much stronger than average (rising to 55.6 percent), whereas youth oriented ones remain below average. The exact opposite is true among respondents ranking C+ or higher on SES; in their case, youth oriented demands replace economic ones in primacy.

Since the youth assigns such an economic mission to the State, it is reasonable to expect them to favour a higher level of state intervention in the economy. The survey included a question on this issue. Respondents rated their preference for increased privatisation of the economy or increased state intervention on a scale of 10, where "0" stands for full privatisation and "10" stands for state regulated economy. The sample mean on this question is 5.28, that is, a slight tendency towards state intervention in the economy. Mean scores by SES groups are shown below.

Table 106

Role of the state in the economy	
SES	Mean
D	5.5424
C	5.7032
C+	4.6960
B	5.2424
A	3.9412

SES Groups A respondents clearly favour de-regulation of the economy. Other than that, no regular pattern of preference emerges by SES ranking. Such a pattern is evident, however, with respect to household income levels. As shown on the following table, expectations of state intervention in the economy rise with declining level of household income. High income groups, on the other hand, tend to favour privatisation to a greater extent.

Table 107

Role of the state in the economy	
Monthly household income	Mean
Less than 50 million TL	5.7893
50-100 million TL	5.6342
101-200 million TL	4.9810
201-300 million TL	4.7934
More than 301 million TL	4.4590

When the economic role of the State is defined in terms of direct contribution to people's income, expectations from the State become even more pronounced. Respondents were also asked to indicate their position on "Individuals should assume greater responsibility for their own means of living," on the one hand, and "The State should provide more support for the individuals in making their living," on the other (again on a scale of 10 where "0" stands for personal responsibility and "10" stands for state support). The sample mean score on this question is 5.98, tending towards state support. The following table reveals that this expectation is quite evenly shared among all SES categories.

Table 108

The state should support the individuals	
SES	Mean
D	6.1755
C	6.1033
C+	5.7302
B	5.9444
A	5.7941

Once again, the intensity of this demand appears to be associated with the level of household income. Only in this case, higher income groups also tend more to favour the State supporting individuals in making their living.

Table 109

The state should support individuals	
Monthly household income	Mean
Less than 50 million TL	6.4939
50-100 million TL	6.1234
101-200 million TL	5.7835
201-300 million TL	5.6869
More than 301 million TL	5.6865

Meanwhile, it may be suggested that there is a political dimension to the attitude of the youth with respect to the role of the State in the economy. Respondents who attach greater than average primacy to political demands (democracy, freedom) are also more in favour of state intervention in the economy. On the question of privatisation vs. increased state intervention, the mean score rises to 5.6765 among this group of respondents. They are followed by the group of respondents who are emphatic in their economic and social demands from the State.

Respondents who attach greater significance to the "social mission" of the State are more in favour of the State con-

tributing directly to the well-being of individuals. The respective mean score rises to 6.1372 among this group. It should still be noted, however, that this attitude is more evenly shared among all segments.

Although the youth seems to assign a more prominent role to the State in the economy, it does not appear conservative in its attitude towards competition. Respondents were asked to indicate their position between "Competition is good; it helps individuals and the society to develop," and "Competition is harmful; it gives rise hostility and disintegration among people," on a scale of 10. The sample mean score on this question is 4.04.

Attitude towards competition seems closely related to socio-economic status and household income. Greater approval is expressed for competition as one moves into higher SES groups and higher income levels.

Variation by socio-economic status in attitude towards the economic role of the State, towards its contribution to individual welfare and towards competition is graphically summarised below.

### Economic System and SES Groups




Table 110

Attitude towards competition			
SES	Mean	Monthly household income	Mean
D	5.0112	Less than 50 million TL	5.0165
C	4.3450	50-100 million TL	4.4510
C+	3.4178	101-200 million TL	3.6374
B	3.5684	201-300 million TL	3.3767
A	2.3725	More than 301 million TL	2.8582

Analysing attitude towards the economic role of the State in view of other values that the youth upholds, it is observed that respondents who are more emphatic about religious values tend to assign greater economic role to the State, as well as being more apprehensive about competition. This hints at certain religious undertones behind the paternalistic concept of the benevolent state has. A similarly greater economic function is expected of the State by respondents who attach greater than average significance to "children" among family values. This may also be taken to suggest a certain parallelism between the family and the State, where the State approximates the parental figure.

Finally, it is noteworthy that the demand for increased contribution of the State to individual well-being is highest among respondents who are more emphatic than an average in referring to "loyalty to the state and the nation" as the virtue acquired from the family. This may suggest that the relationship between the State and the individual resembles that of the patron and the client in the world-view of these respondents.

## 5. Tradition

The concept of "tradition" occupies a privileged status among the youth's system of values. As already pointed out, 42.9 percent of the respondents referred to "respect for custom and tradition" among the most important virtues acquired from the family. Although by a large margin, "tradition" comes next only to "honesty", and prevails over "respect for religion," to cite one example.

Women are observed to value tradition more than men. Reference to "respect for tradition" as a family imparted virtue rises to 47 percent among women, while dropping to 39.1 percent among men.

Correspondence is notably lacking between the relative significance attached to "tradition" and the clustering of provinces along the traditional-modern axis. As the following table reveals, reference to "respect for tradition" among family imparted virtues is more frequent in the relatively modern provinces of Izmir and Ankara than it is in the traditional 4<sup>th</sup> cluster. That frequency does not fall too far below the average in the modern 3<sup>rd</sup> cluster, either.

Table 111

Virtue acquired from the family	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1st Cluster	2nd Cluster	3rd Cluster	4th Cluster	Total
Respect for custom and tradition	14.7	18.8	18.0	15.8	19.2	13.2	15.7	16.2

These findings point to a distinction between tradition as a value and tradition as an environmental factor. Young people who no longer live in strictly traditional environments may also idealise tradition as a concept, sometimes even to a greater extent than those who remain in traditional environments. This attitude may signify an effort to conceptually compensate for the past decisiveness of tradition in everyday life.

A more consistent relationship holds between the significance attached to tradition as a value and socio-economic status. As respondents rise on SES, or, as modernity becomes incorporated into their lifestyles rather than existing merely as an environmental factor, the tendency to idealise tradition wanes. Variation by SES in the frequency of reference to "respect for tradition" among virtues acquired from the family is as follows:

Table 112

Virtue acquired from the family	D (%)	C (%)	C+ (%)	B (%)	A (%)	Total (%)
Respect for custom and tradition	46,4	44,5	43,6	33,3	37,3	43,1

Survey findings clearly suggest that an idealisation of tradition as a value does not necessarily imply traditional patterns of behaviour in actual life. The tendency to question tradition prevails also among respondents who value tradition.

The following table presents the overall distribution of responses agreeing or disagreeing with the statement, "Problems of the youth can never be solved without challenging tradition."

Table 113

Problems of the youth can never be solved without challenging tradition	Qty	(%)
Agree	1078	49,0
Disagree	680	30,9
Don't know	441	20,1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2199</b>	<b>100,0</b>

Agreement with the above statement reaches 46.5 percent even among respondents who refer to "respect for tradition" as a family imparted virtue; disagreement with the statement remains at 33.1 percent in this group. Perhaps more interestingly, women, who are observed to attach greater significance to tradition, figure slightly more prominently among supporters of this view (49.8 percent of women as opposed to 48.3 percent of men).

The complementary attitudes of respecting tradition as a high value and questioning tradition in actual life appear to signify a "reformist" or "liberal" conception of tradition. The youth seems to acknowledge the social significance of tradition as the basis of continuity

between generations, while believing, at the same time, that progress is possible only through "transforming tradition." It may therefore be concluded that "respect for tradition" has largely ceased to restrictively define the behavioural setting for the youth.

Several other survey findings, already discussed, support the above argument. For example, only 14.7 percent of the respondents disapprove of pre-marital relations between sexes because it runs counter to tradition. In a similar vein, only 10.4 of the respondents disapprove of birth control.

The reformist conception of tradition is reflected in a "moderate" tendency with respect to overcoming traditional patterns of thought and behaviour. Such a moderate attitude is apparent in the contrasting responses to two questions that address the "inviolability of human life."

One of these questions referred to capital punishment and the other to euthanasia. More than two-thirds of the respondents are against the death penalty: that is to say, they deny the State the right to punish an individual by taking his/her life. More than half of the respondents, however, also deny the individual the right to end his or her own life.

Table 114

Death penalty	Qty	(%)
Approve	487	21.9
Disapprove	1597	71.9
Don't know	136	6.1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2220</b>	<b>99.9</b>

Table 115

Euthanasia	Qty	(%)
Approve	685	30.9
Disapprove	1232	55.5
Don't know	302	13.6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2219</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Attitude against euthanasia does not vary by sex, but disapproval is still highest (62.2 percent) among home-staying young women and girls. Opposition to capital punishment, on the other hand, is much stronger among women (77 percent) than among men (67 percent). On this issue, home-staying female respondents do not differ from female respondents as a whole.

Approval for euthanasia increases with rising level of education; rate of approval reaches 40 percent among university students and approaches 50 percent among university graduates. A comparable tendency is lacking, however, with respect to capital punishment. In fact, opposition to death penalty drops several (2-3) percentage points below average among respondents at the university level of education.

It is worth emphasising at this point that the attitude of moderation prevailing among the youth with respect to "transforming tradition" largely reduces the potentials for intergenerational conflict. As already mentioned, 43.6 percent of the respondents agree that older people can keep up with new developments just as much as the youth can.

Another indicator of the way in which the youth relates to traditional patterns of

thought and behaviour may be found in the degree to which they share the socially prevailing prejudices. The survey question addressing this issue asked the respondents to express their attitude towards various ethnic, social, political, etc. groups on a four-option scale. Distribution of responses is shown on the following table. Mean scores shown on the final column point to a level of prejudice that grows stronger as the score approaches "1".

Table 116

Group	Invariably no good=1		Most are bad, but some		Most are good, but some are bad =3		Invariably good people=4		Mean
	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)	
Freemasons	924	54.4	366	21.6	340	20.0	68	4.0	1.74
Homosexuals	996	53.5	386	20.7	393	21.1	87	4.7	1.77
Non-believers	972	50.7	450	23.5	422	22.0	74	3.9	1.79
Greeks	853	45.5	541	28.9	420	22.4	61	3.3	1.83
Armenians	811	44.2	536	29.2	440	24.0	49	2.7	1.85
Jews	740	40.5	549	30.1	479	26.2	57	3.1	1.92
Anatolian Greeks	707	38.8	571	31.3	478	26.2	67	3.7	1.95
Gypsies	593	31.7	663	35.5	526	28.1	88	4.7	2.06
Prostitutes	666	34.8	575	29.9	548	28.5	129	6.7	2.07
Russians	541	30.0	608	33.7	569	31.8	84	4.7	2.11
Politicians	460	23.2	837	42.1	616	31.0	74	3.7	2.15
Socialists	456	25.4	429	23.9	699	39.0	210	11.7	2.37
Americans	368	20.1	527	28.8	817	44.6	120	6.6	2.38
Romanians	320	18.3	551	31.4	784	44.7	97	5.5	2.38
French	360	20.2	471	26.5	846	47.6	102	5.7	2.39
Arabs	301	16.5	61	33.7	773	42.3	137	7.5	2.41
Germans	326	17.6	545	29.4	876	47.3	106	5.7	2.41
Rich people	228	11.8	776	39.4	892	45.3	72	3.7	2.41
"Idealists" <sup>*</sup>	377	19.7	499	26.1	797	41.7	238	12.5	2.47
Blacks	209	11.8	419	23.6	1023	57.7	121	6.8	2.60
Alavites	222	11.7	447	23.5	1047	55.1	184	8.3	2.63

\* proponents of the nationalist ideology of MHP (*Ülküçü*, in Turkish)

The darker shaded first part of the table includes groups against whom the negative attitude prevails over the positive one, that is to say, total responses referring to the first two options add up to more than 50 percent. The lighter shaded section of the table includes groups towards whom the positive attitude prevails, with total responses referring to third and fourth options adding up to more than 50 percent. Thus, the first set includes groups that are "ostracised" by the majority of respondents, while the second includes groups that are "embraced" by the majority. The first three groups who top the list (freemasons, homosexuals and non-believers) are distinguished from all others in that more than 50 percent of respondents feel they are "invariably no good", thus ostracising all members of these groups.

## 6. Religion

It has already been pointed out that the primacy of religious values in the world-view of the youth falls short of the extensiveness of religious faith and practice among them. The following discussion will focus on the widespread nature of religious faith and practice among the youth.

As also mentioned above, 36.3 percent of the respondents referred to "respect for religion" among prime virtues they acquired from their families. The following table confirms that religious belief is in fact much more widespread among the youth.

About 90 percent of the respondents are believers in Islamic terms. Atheism or agnosticism, by contrast, remain at marginal levels. Furthermore, only about 5 percent of the respondents consider themselves "believers in their own terms" while being sceptical about the established forms of religious teaching. Believers in Islam account for more than

Table 117

Religious faith	Qt	(%)
I believe in God and in religion	1984	89.8
I believe in God, but I can't find/see an agreeable concept of religion	77	3.5
I consider myself a believer in my own terms, but this is rather different from what is usually known as religion	36	1.6
I don't give much thought to faith	60	2.7
I don't know whether or not God exists	20	0.9
I am an atheist. I don't believe in God, or in any religion..	33	1.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2210</b>	<b>100.0</b>

95 percent of the respondents in the more traditional 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> clusters of provinces.

Survey finds reflecting engagement in religious practice are tabled below.

Table 118

	Regularly		Sometimes		Never		Total	
	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)
Going to mosque	124	5.7	1145	52.7	905	41.6	2174	100.0
Observing prayer hours	318	14.6	1252	57.5	609	27.9	2179	100.0
Fasting	1526	69.4	468	21.3	205	9.3	2199	100.0
Praying	1300	59.3	721	32.9	172	7.8	2193	100.0
Going to "Cem Evi"	27	1.3	93	4.4	2000	94.3	2120	100.0
Reading and thinking on religion	493	22.9	1167	54.2	494	22.9	2154	100.0

Religious faith is almost equally widespread among men and women, but this is not the case when it comes to practice of religion.

First of all, regular mosque attendance drops to 2 percent among women, as opposed to 9.2 percent among men. Likewise, the rate of going to the mosque from time to time is 34.8 percent among female respondents, as opposed to 69.6 percent among male ones. In other words, only 36.8 percent of the women are associated with the mosque, whereas that ratio rises to 78.8 percent among men.

It is evident, therefore, that the mosque remains as a predominantly male environment within the Turkish tradition of Islam. Survey findings suggest, however, that observing daily prayer hours (*namaz*) is also more common a practice among men than among women. While 79.2 percent of men regularly or some-

times attend to daily prayers, that ratio drops to 64.7 among women. Meanwhile 20.8 percent of male respondents and 35.3 percent of female respondents never observe prayer hours. Still, regular observance of daily prayer hours is strikingly high (24.2 percent) among home-staying young women and girls, rising to about 10 percentage points above the sample average.

More common and relatively informal religious practices such as fasting, praying or reading and thinking on religion do not vary significantly between men and women.

A concentration of regularly practising respondents (in all forms of practice) is observed in more traditional areas of the survey: 28 percent of the respondents in the 2<sup>nd</sup> cluster of provinces and 20 percent of those in the 4<sup>th</sup> cluster province are regular observers of daily prayer hours.

Table 119

	Istanbul	Izmir	Ankara	1 <sup>st</sup> Cluster	2 <sup>nd</sup> Cluster	3 <sup>rd</sup> Cluster	4 <sup>th</sup> Cluster
Fasting regularly	74.5	41.1	86.0	61.7	85.6	55.4	84.0
Praying regularly	63.3	42.4	62.6	46.5	71.7	51.5	70.5
Reading and thinking on religion regularly	17.9	15.4	25.2	21.5	28.1	15.5	32.8
Observing prayer hours ( <i>namaz</i> ) regularly	10.8	3.8	7.9	14.6	27.5	5.6	20.1
Going to mosque regularly	6.6	1.9	4.7	5.6	6.6	3.6	8.3

The following table points to the relationship between religious practice and socio-economic status. Regular practice of religion is observed to increase with declining SES. More than one fifth of the respondent ranking D on SES regularly observe prayer hours. Furthermore, the frequency of regular religious practice increases with declining household income: 35.5 percent of respondents

with a monthly household income of less than 50 million TL regularly observe prayer hours and 28.3 percent of them regularly read and think about religion. Regular observance of prayer hours is also higher than average (6 percentage points higher) among the unemployed youth and a similar tendency is observed among respondents who have primary or secondary (middle school) level of education.

Overall, only 15 percent of the respondents appear to be both believing and practising Muslims, observing formal rules of religious practice and living their lives as regulated by their faith. The much larger group of respondents seems to regard formal rules of practice as a secondary or optional dimension of religion. To cite a few examples, 37.3 percent of those who believe in God and in religion never go to the mosque and 22.2

Table 120

	D	C	C+	B	A
Fasting regularly	74.1	76.0	66.5	50.4	53.9
Praying regularly	62.0	64.0	55.6	50.9	44.0
Reading and thinking on religion regularly	22.7	25.8	23.1	18.9	7.1
Observing prayer hours ( <i>namaz</i> ) regularly	22.0	17.6	11.0	5.3	3.0
Going to mosque regularly	5.3	7.0	4.8	3.1	6.0

percent of them never observe prayer hours, while 56 percent go to the mosque on special occasions and 61.9 percent observe prayer hours only now and then

This pattern of behaviour seems to reflect the place of religion within the framework of a secularised life-style.

A further aspect of the above mentioned pattern is found in the higher rate of intellectual interest in religion (thinking and reflecting) as compared to religious rituals. As the preceding table reveals, the percentage of respondents who regularly read and reflect on religion is significantly higher than the percentage of those who regularly go to the mosque or observe prayer hours. Yet only 14 percent of those who regularly read or think about religion are regular mosque-goers and only 32.2 percent of them regularly observe prayer hours; 31.5 percent of them never go to the mosque and 15.4 percent never observe prayer hours.

Respondents who combine regular formal practice of religion with regular intellectual involvement in religion are strikingly rare. Only 3.2 percent of the respondents both go to the mosque and read/think on religion, regularly, and only 7.8 percent both observe prayer hours and read/think on religion, regularly. These percentages may actually be used as a basis to estimate the size of the "religiously agitated" group within the youth. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this group is formed largely by young people who live in relatively traditional areas, who have low levels of income, low levels of education and low ranking on SES, and that it includes a high percentage of home-staying young women and girls.

Time devoted to religious topics in conversation among the circle of friends may also be taken as a strong indicator of actual level of religious activity among the youth who regularly practices religion. Responses to an earlier discussed question shed light on this matter:

Table 121

Most common topics of conversation with friends	Going to mosque regularly (%)	Observing prayer hours regularly (%)	Total sample
Small talk	21.0	33.1	32.9
Football, games	44.4	23.7	26.7
Partner, girl/boy friend	19.4	16.7	25.9
Job/workplace	32.3	23.7	24.8
Dress-outfit	9.7	20.8	24.7
School, courses, teachers	25.0	17.4	22.6
Money	21.8	24.0	22.0
Movies, music, entertainment	16.1	13.9	18.0
Family problems	14.5	21.8	17.4
Religion, faith	25.8	33.8	13.6
Sex	16.9	8.2	11.9
Politics	10.5	10.1	11.3
Philosophy, literature	7.3	8.2	10.5
Other	3.2	2.2	1.7
Total	267.9	257.6	264.0

Only 25.8 percent of regular mosque-goers (1.5 percent of the sample) and 33.8 of regular observers of prayer hours (4.9 percent of the sample) indicated "religion/faith" among their most frequent topics of conversation with friends. A much higher percentage (44.4 percent) of regular mosque-goers and 23.7 percent of regular observers of prayer hours talk about football. Political discussions among both groups, on the other hand, are about as common (about 10 percent) as seen in the sample as a whole.

Topics of friendly conversation among regular mosque-goers or prayer hour observers are not very different from those of the other young people. They also appear to share a largely secularised world. Religion, along with formal rules of practice, seems to signify a system of norms that essentially regulates the sphere of private life for the majority of this group.

Within the commonly shared secularised world of the youth, fasting in Ramadan has the function of a cultural code that unifies them "seasonally" around a common system of religious reference. It is therefore hardly surprising that the percentage of those who never fast should remain under 10 percent. Fasting as a religious practice is quite distinct from other Islamic rituals, as suggested by the following findings:

Only 7.8 percent of regularly fasting respondents are regular mosque-goers and only 20.6 percent of them regularly observe prayer hours, whereas 32.1 percent of them never go to the mosque and 15.3 percent never observe prayer hours. Furthermore, one fourth of the regularly fasting groups do not even pray regularly (75.3 percent do). On the other hand, 8.3 percent of those who believe in God (but not in religion), who are unconventional in their beliefs or who do not give much thought to religion fast regularly and 35.7 percent of the same group fast now and then.

## V. IDENTITY and PERSONALITY

**G** The survey included an open ended question that aimed at investigating the dynamics of identity and personality formation. Respondents were asked to state a maximum of self-defining terms. In response 1833 respondents mentioned a total of 3354 terms of self-definition.

Terms of self definition were classified by implications of meaning, discourse and specific choice of wording. According to this classification, 54.5 percent of the terms refer to aspects of identity and 45.5 percent refer to aspects of personality. Meanwhile, concepts of "identity" and "personality", as used in this context, may be explained as follows:

Identity and personality formation may be described as two distinct processes through which individuals position themselves with respect to the society. Both help individuals to feel and express themselves as social actors. Furthermore, the two processes may simultaneously influence or jointly enter into the socialisation of any one individual. However, there is a basic distinction between the two: identity formation occurs at the collective level, whereas personality formation is individual in nature.

Identity formation is distinguished by a sense of belonging in a specific collectivity, which may be a nation, race, religious community, sect, class, political party, etc. The collective identity develops around such a feeling of belonging together and invariably requires a conception of "other" collectivities different from or opposed to itself. In other words, each collective identity tends to adopt a self definition in terms of the "other."

The collective identity is marked by being "different" with respect to the outside world, but in distinguishing itself from others, it also eliminates internal differences or fuses and replaces all inner variation in people's sense of identity. Thus, the collective identity becomes as powerful as the tendency to keep personal differences is weakened. In such a case, people who share the same identity also share the life experience and feelings of one another in what may be called a merged personality.

Personality formation, on the other hand, involves not an identification with a collectivity, but rather a specific combination of personal attributes and social roles (sex, family, occupation, ethical, etc.) that the individual acquires as a social being. Thus, self-defining terms that refer to personality forma-

tion reflect this specific combination of the individual's physical, psychological and socio-cultural attributes. The individual's choice of self-defining terms may reflect a conformist attitude towards established social norms or they may suggest a questioning of these norms. Either way, the emphasis on personality formation may be taken to signify that individuals keep their personal differences when assuming various roles that the society offers them.

#### A. General tendencies

Terms of self-definition that refer to identity formation were grouped into four categories according to their position with respect to the modernist project. Two of these categories are constituted by terms that directly **include** the respondents in or **exclude** them from modernist project. A third category is formed by terms that refer to a **neomodern** attitude, expressing identity development outside the official patterns of the modernist project in Turkey. The fourth category includes terms that signify a **politically** based identity formation.

Terms of self-definition that refer to aspects of personality are grouped into two categories. The first category includes terms that reflect **conformist** tendencies, while the second includes terms that reflect **individualistic** tendencies.

The frequency of mention of self-defining terms that refer to identity and personality formation is shown on the following table.

Among terms of self-definition that refer to identity formation, those that suggest exclusion from the modernist project are distinctly more emphasised than others (18.7 percent of responses). Respondents who referred to "Islamic faith" in mentioning a term included in this category account for 27 percent of all respondents who stated a self-defining term. It may therefore be suggested that religion forms the main axis along which the youth constructs an identity outside the modernist project. References to other axes (tradition, ethnic/regional background, sect, other religious faiths) are much less frequent. Meanwhile, it should be noted that terms with religious connotations refer more to a cultural or natural atmosphere than to an ideology (Islamism).

Table 122

	Qty	Response %	Case %
<b>IDENTITY DEFINITIONS</b>			
Non-conforming to the modernist project			
Religious (Islam)	495	14.8	27.0
Traditionalist	56	1.7	3.1
Ethnic/regional (Kurdish-South-eastern)	58	1.7	3.2
Other religious	10	0.3	0.5
Sectarian (Alavite)	7	0.2	0.4
Political			
Loyal to the country-nation (Loyalist)	298	8.9	16.3
Right-leaning/nationalist	117	3.6	6.4
Nationalist/"idealistic"	52	1.6	2.8
Left-leaning	54	1.6	2.9
Leftist	48	1.4	2.6
Dissenter/critical	27	0.8	1.5
Neo-modern			
Democrat/pluralist	209	6.2	11.4
Freethinking/independent individual	161	4.8	8.6
Contemporary/universalist	71	2.1	3.9
Conforming to the modernist project			
Kemalist/secularist	100	3.0	5.5
Good citizen	46	1.4	2.5
Socially responsible	16	0.5	0.9
<b>PERSONALITY DEFINITIONS</b>			
Conformist			
Occupation, social status	183	5.5	10.0
Ordinary social role	143	4.3	7.8
Sex	135	4.0	7.4
Family roles	71	2.1	3.9
Marital status	7	0.2	0.4
Locality (town, region)	7	0.2	0.4
Politically indifferent	41	1.2	2.2
Acquisitive/modest	257	7.7	14.0
Honest	177	5.3	9.7
Sentimental	51	1.5	2.8
Individualistic			
Resolute/self-reliant	101	3.0	5.5
Extrovert/pleasant	98	2.9	5.3
Rational/scientific-minded	81	2.4	4.4
Hard-working/hobbyist	76	2.3	4.1
Eccentric	56	1.7	3.1
Youthful	23	0.7	1.3
Sporty	14	0.4	0.8
Other	5	0.1	0.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3354</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>183.0</b>

\* proponents of the nationalist ideology of MHP

Terms of identity formation that express conformity with the modernist project are much less frequently offered than those that refer to the opposite tendency. The share of these responses within the total remains as low as 4.9 percent. Self-definition as "Kemalist-secularist", which is the most frequent response in this group, is mentioned by only 5.5 percent of the respondents.

Politicisation appears to form the second most significant axis of identity formation in general. Political terms of self-definition add up to 17.8 of the responses, coming close to the frequency of terms that suggest con-conformity with the modernist project. "Dissenting/critical" terms which express political opposition in a rather exhausted way and which usually resort to a leftist discourse are included in this group of responses. The really dominant set of terms in this group, however, are the ones that base social homogeneity on concepts of "country and nation" and reflect a rightist discourse. These terms were mentioned by 16.3 percent of the respondents.

Terms of self-definition that reflect a neo-modern attitude account for 13.1 percent of the responses, ranking third. The percentage of respondents who define themselves as "democrat-plural-

ist" (11.4 percent) is twice as high as those who define themselves as "Kemalist-secularist."

Among terms of self-definition that refer to personality, those that reflect conformism clearly outweigh the others. These terms emphasise social roles (professional, family-oriented, marital, sexual, residential) or moral attributes (honesty, modesty, emotion) and account for 32 percent of all responses. By contrast, individualistic terms of self-definition remain at a total of 13.4 percent of the responses. Included in this last set of terms are the ones that refer to "eccentricity", expressing a certain reaction to conformism and to prevailing moral norms.

Defining terms of identity/personality summarised above are observed to overlap and cross-cut in cases of individual respondents, as well as of respondent sub-groups. In this context, it may be suggested that at least a potential for pluralism is observable among the youth.

A significant overlapping is evident between the traditional-Islamic terms of identity and the nationalistic ones. More than one half of the respondents who defined themselves in nationalistic terms simultaneously referred to traditional-

Islamic terms. Conversely, 45 percent of respondents who defined themselves in traditional-Islamic terms also mentioned nationalistic ones.

Two fifths of the smallest group of respondents, who have ethnic-sectarian (Alavite-Kurd) terms of reference and who appear to have developed a sense of minority, also use neo-modern terms of self-definition, such as pluralist.

Meanwhile, two-fifths of the respondents who used individualistic terms of self definition (rational, self-reliant, etc.) also used moralistic ones (honest, acquiescent, etc.) and vice versa.

In addition to these strong associations, respondents who define themselves in conformity with the modernist project include considerably high percentages of those who also refer to tradition-Islam, nationalism, neo-modernity or ordinary social roles. In a similar vein, two thirds of the respondents who use traditional-Islamic terms of self-definition also refer to their ordinary social roles, and to a lower degree, also define themselves in neo-modern terms.

Respondents whose identity definitions refer to neo-modernity may make a parallel reference to conformist personality attributes, on the one hand, and to

individualistic ones, on the other. Respondents who choose to define themselves in nationalistic terms, may also emphasise ordinary social roles or neo-modern terms; those who prefer leftist terms of self-definition may simultaneously refer to ordinary social roles, to neo-modern identities, or even to traditional-Islamic and nationalistic ones. Oddly enough, a Kemalist youth may well have parallel Islamic references.

It is therefore evident that no set of identity or personality defining terms belong purely to a specific group and none other. Still, identity formation is observed to proceed largely along the axis of traditional, Islamic and rightist-nationalist references through the medium of cultural identification. If Islam or nationalism acts as a "loose" cultural background, a tendency to open up to other identities becomes apparent, giving rise to association with neo-modern identities, for example. If not, terms such as "Idealist" (*Ülkücü*) or "proponent of the Islamic cause" come to the fore, subduing co-references to other terms of self-definition.

Politicisation on the left-wing may be said to contribute little to a homogeneous identity formation.

## B. Demographic and socio-economic factors

Women are more vocal than men in referring to terms of identity that signify an effort to conform with the modernist project. They are also more emphatic than men about their social roles. Nationalism, by contrast, appears as an identity almost purely assumed by men. Men also dominate in traditional-Islamic and ethnic-sectarian references.

Identity formation in conformity with the modernist project and the tendency to emphasise personal attributes are more pronounced among youngest (15-17 years), while the tendency to emphasise social roles and refer to neo-modern terms is more pronounced among oldest (24-27 years) respondents.

Students are more inclined towards an identity formation along the lines of the modernist project. They are also more emphatic about personality definitions. By contrast, neo-modern, nationalistic and traditional-Islamic references are stronger than average among the working youth. Terms referring to ordinary social roles and moralistic-conformist personality definitions are also pronounced among working respondents.

Culturally defined (religious, ethnic, etc.) identities and conformist personality traits emphasising ordinary social roles are more prominent among lower SES group respondents. More than one half of the respondents who refer to tradition-Islam, and almost one half of the respondents who emphasise social roles (family roles, foremost among them) rank C on SES.

The frequency of nationalist, leftist and neo-modern references increase with rising SES. Frequency of conformity with the modernist project is also higher than average among SES Group C+ and B respondents. Individualistic personality references replace references to ordinary social roles, once again with rising SES. Respondents who refer to eccentric personality traits, to self-reliance and determination, in particular, are concentrated in highest SES categories.

Focusing on the relationship between the respondents' urban vs. rural background and identity/personality definitions, it is observed that the traditional-Islamic reference is more pronounced among respondents born in small towns or

villages. Modernist, neo-modern and nationalistic references, by contrast, are stronger among the city-born. Respondents with a small town background tend to emphasise ordinary social roles, while those with an urban background make more frequent reference to conformist-moralistic terms, on the one hand, and to individualist ones, on the other. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that respondents who use leftist terms of identity definition include a higher than average percent of those who have their backgrounds in a small town.

### C. Values and Attitudes

Respondents who are emphatic in their traditional-Islamic and nationalistic references attach greater than average significance to family and religious values among those that give meaning to life. Religious values have relatively high significance also for respondents who emphasise personal moralism. Modernist and neo-modern youth, on the other hand, attaches higher significance to intellectual and social values. Significance of social values is apparent also among respondents who refer to either moralistic or individualist personality attributes. Material values have

higher than average significance among nationalistic and neo-modern identity holders, as well as among individualistic personalities.

Strong reference to tradition-Islam, ethnicity-sect, nationalism and the modernist project is accompanied by higher than average approval for the "families" restricting the freedom of the youth so that they may not get into trouble." Opposition to this view is more pronounced among left-wing politicised, neo-modern and individualistic respondents.

Respondents conforming to the modernist project are the most ardent supporters of the view that problems of the youth can never be solved without challenging tradition. Agreement with this view is as widespread as average (48.5 percent) among respondents with a neo-modern identity. Both this group and respondents who refer to individualistic terms of self definition, however, join the traditional-Islamic and ethnic-sectarian identity holders in disagreement with the above statement at higher than average percentages.

#### D. Identities and Perception of the "Other"

One strong indicator of the relationship between identity formation and tendency to accept or reject the "other" is found in the extent to which different identity groups share the prejudice against segments considered "marginal" to the society.

As already discussed, more than one half of the respondents reject non-believers and homosexuals as being wholly or mostly bad people. This prejudice is most widespread among respondents with traditional-Islamic and nationalistic identity definitions; between 83 percent to 88 percent of these respondents tend to reject the said groups. It should be added that respondents with ethnic-sectarian identity references reject homosexual at a higher than average percentage. Meanwhile, the majority of even the leftist respondents are negatively disposed towards non-believers, although they appear to be the most tolerant of all.

The leftist and the nationalist segments of the youth who appear at opposite ends of the political axis of identity formation, are almost equally forceful in rejecting one another. Two thirds of

either group reject the other as being "no good" or "mostly no good."

Attitudes of rejecting or accepting the "other" among various identity groups may be traced to their opinion on the relations between the Western and Islamic segment of the society in Turkey. As might be expected, young people who emphasise their traditional-Islamic identity are more insistent than average that the modern-Western segments should adapt to the other, whereas young people who conform to the modernist project figure prominently among those who require the traditional-Islamic segments to do so. It is noteworthy that respondents with ethnic-sectarian identities tend to support both of the above views at higher than average percentages, but have a weaker than average tendency to support the mutually tolerant and accommodating views.

Nevertheless, two-thirds of the respondents who refer to their traditional-Islamic identities, as well as two thirds of those who conform to the modernist project, favour tolerance in relations between the Western and Islamic segments of the society. This is a significant indicator of the widespread nature of

being "open to the other". Furthermore, the majority of respondents who endorse this view not only accept differences between the two segments, but also feel that two should get to know one another and see what they share in common. This tendency suggests a position that distances itself from communal identities and a developing demand for pluralism. It is a tendency which is stronger among the youth who do not assume ideological or sharply politicised identities.

### E. Summary

Major conclusions of the discussion in this section are summarised below.

Identity formation among the youth takes place primarily along lines of tension between modernity and tradition. Young people who feel the impact of this tension relatively strongly develop equally strong identities that are either in conformity with the modernist project, or subscribe to traditional-Islamic lifestyle, depending upon respondent's socio-economic status, system of cultural reference and environment factors (urban-rural background). Between these poles, traditional-Islamic identity formation is observed to clearly prevail over the other in quantitative terms.

To the degree that this tension is perceived to threaten and felt to upset feelings of security, opposing identities tend to "withdraw" and give rise to community formation. Community formation may appear in classical forms, as observed among Islamic circles, or in novel forms, as observed among modernised ("Kemalist, secularist") circles.

The "centrally positioned" youth, relatively equidistant from both poles of modernity and tradition, seems to react to this tension mainly by developing a politicised identity. As the right-nationalist identity references are stronger than left-critical ones, it may be suggested that the traditional poles exerts a more effective pull. Politicised identities also tend towards community formation ("Idealist" - "Leftist") as the perceived threat of the tension increases.

Different segments of the youth who feel close to either one of the two poles in the face of the tension between modernity and tradition, seem to join in formulating a common solution, which is expressed in the neo-modern identity emphasising democratisation and pluralism. The distinguishing

**VI. TURKEY AND HER PROBLEMS**

feature of this identity formation is the strong sense of individualism and self-confidence which gives rise to an individual claim to pluralism.

It should still be remembered the above discussed identities frequently cut across one another. Furthermore, socialisation of a significant segment of the youth takes place outside the processes of identity formation. These young persons tend to define themselves in terms of their personalities and refer to either their social roles or their individualism in doing so. In this respect, the socially conforming attitude prevails over the individualistic one.



This section will be devoted to a discussion of young people's approach to the problems of the country, their perception of various bodies and institutions in relation to these problems, the way in which they position Turkey in the global context and their attitude towards Turkish modernisation, as well as towards interrelations between the Western and Islamic segments of the society.

**A. The Youth and Problems of the Country**

Respondents were asked to indicate the top three problems of the country which they would address if they were in government themselves. Distribution of responses, in order of indicated significance, is shown on the following table.

Table 123

The first problem the young people would address	1 <sup>st</sup>		2 <sup>nd</sup>		3 <sup>rd</sup>		Total		Case (%)
	Qty	%	Qty	%	Qty	%	Qty	(%)	
Unemployment	1006	45.4	324	14.7	171	7.9	1501	22.7	67.5
Terrorism	249	11.2	439	19.8	261	12.0	949	14.4	42.7
Education	288	12.9	245	11.1	375	17.3	906	13.7	40.8
Gap between the rich and poor	208	9.4	312	14.1	144	6.6	664	10.1	29.9
Corruption and bribery	61	2.7	125	5.7	247	11.4	433	6.5	19.5
Drug addiction	70	3.1	166	7.5	180	8.3	416	6.3	18.7
Problem of Kurds/ Southeast	98	4.4	174	7.9	139	6.4	411	6.2	18.5
Environmental pollution	26	1.2	93	4.2	134	6.2	253	3.8	11.4
Moral degradation	37	1.7	89	4.0	125	5.8	251	3.8	11.3
Social services (health, social security, etc.)	36	1.6	86	3.9	127	5.8	249	3.8	11.2
Lack of protection for Turkey's own culture	35	1.6	49	2.2	98	4.5	182	2.6	8.2
Reactionary/retrogressive religion	49	2.2	51	2.3	46	2.1	148	2.2	6.6
Uncontrolled urbanisation, squatter settlements	20	0.9	39	1.8	63	2.9	122	1.9	5.5
Unequal official status of sects	12	0.5	7	0.3	37	1.7	56	0.8	2.5
Rural/urban/inequality	8	0.4	9	0.4	21	0.9	38	0.6	1.7
Other	17	0.8	2	0.0	5	0.2	24	0.4	1.1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2218</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2210</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>2173</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6601</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>297.1</b>

The table clearly shows that the youth identifies unemployment as the most urgent problem in the country. About one half the respondents mentioned this problem first, and two-thirds indicated it among the top three problems of the country. It may be recalled that similarly high percentage of respondents named unemployment also as the major difficulty that they themselves face.

"Inadequacy of education", which is the second most frequently indicated difficulty faced by the youth, ranks third after terrorism among the urgent problems of the country.

Although roughly equal percentages of respondents mentioned "education" and "terrorism" among the most urgent problems of the country, respondents who indicated either problem in the

first order form mutually exclusive groups to a large extent. Furthermore, 70 percent of respondents who mentioned either "education" or "terrorism" among Turkey's top three problems, did not mention the other problem at all.

This grouping appears to be strongly related to socio-economic status. Respondents in SES groups D and C figure more prominently among those who emphasise terrorism as an urgent problem of the country and less prominently among those who refer to educational problems. By contrast, C+ and B group respondents are underrepresented among those who mention terrorism and over-represented among those who express concern over education.

The grouping is somewhat affected by the studying or working status of the respondent. Students, and especially non-working students, attach higher priority to educational problems, while home-staying female respondents and the unemployed youth express greater concern over terrorism.

Combining responses indicating "terrorism" with those referring to the Kurdish-Southeastern problem, it may be suggested that the youth regards the problem of "ethnic violence" in the country as being almost as significant as that of unemployment. However, this should not obscure the fact that the choice of terms employed to define the problem points to differences in approach. Among the combined references to the problem of "ethnic violence", 66.8 percent of the respondents indicated "terrorism", emphasising the dimension of violence, whereas 23.4 percent mentioned "Kurdish-South-eastern problem", emphasising the ethnic/regional dimension. The remaining 9.8 percent emphasised both dimensions of the problem.

This difference of conception is basically unrelated to respondents' SES or status of studentship/employment. However, respondents with urban backgrounds and living in cities tend to emphasise the ethnic dimension of the problem, whereas respondent who come from and live in small towns tend to emphasise the dimension of violence. It is also apparent that women have a stronger tendency than men to use the term "terrorism".

## B. Problems and Institutions

The survey included two (non-consecutive) questions that inquired into young people's perception of various bodies and institutions with respect to solving the problems of the country. The first question asked the respondents to indicate the bodies and institution than can best contribute to a solution of these

problems, and the second question asked them to indicate which bodies and institutions did at present make such a contribution. Both questions were multiple response (three responses), the second also required an ordering by level of significance. Distribution of responses is shown on the following two tables.

Table 124

Bodies/institutions that can contribute to solving the problems	Qty	Response (%)	Case (%)
Teachers	781	13.0	35.6
Youth	710	11.8	32.4
Parliament	696	11.6	31.7
Press/media	584	9.7	26.6
Government	520	8.7	23.7
President	429	7.2	19.6
Political parties	423	7.1	19.3
Scientists	405	6.8	18.5
NGOs	371	6.2	16.9
Businessmen	332	5.5	15.1
Army	242	4.0	11.0
Courts/judiciary	195	3.3	8.9
Clergy	156	2.6	7.1
Trade unions	82	1.4	3.7
Families	18	0.3	0.8
None of the above	43	0.7	2.0
Other	6	0.1	0.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5993</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>273.2</b>

Table 125

Bodies/institutions that contribute to solving prob.	1st		2nd		3rd		Total		Case (%)
	Qty	Resp (%)	Qty	Resp (%)	Qty	Resp (%)	Qty	Resp (%)	
Parliament	414	20.6	148	8.1	105	6.0	667	11.7	30.0
Press/media	169	8.4	191	9.9	256	14.7	606	10.6	27.2
Government	172	8.6	213	11.7	185	10.8	570	10.0	25.6
Teachers	224	11.1	181	9.9	137	7.9	542	9.5	24.4
Youth	117	5.8	175	9.6	196	11.3	488	8.6	22.0
Political parties	122	6.1	173	9.5	176	10.1	471	8.3	21.2
President	200	9.9	159	8.7	85	4.9	444	7.8	20.0
Businessmen	131	6.5	148	8.1	106	6.1	385	6.8	17.4
Army	127	6.3	99	5.4	116	6.7	342	6.0	15.4
Scientists	127	6.3	104	5.7	85	4.9	316	5.5	14.2
NGOs	100	4.9	96	5.3	113	6.5	309	5.4	13.9
Courts/judiciary	45	2.2	77	4.2	97	5.6	219	3.8	9.9
Clergy	38	1.9	35	1.9	42	2.4	115	2.0	5.2
Trade unions	24	1.2	38	2.1	41	2.4	103	1.8	4.6
None of the above	-	-	-	-	-	-	122	2.1	5.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>99.8</b>	<b>1827</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>1740</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>5699</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>256.5</b>

Teachers top the youth's list of bodies that can best contribute to solving the country's problems. It will be recalled, however, that more than one third of the respondent question the adequacy of the teachers' knowledge and about one fourth of the respondents complain about their pedagogical formation. It will also be recalled that there are problems of "understanding" between teachers and the youth. If the youth still sees the teachers as being most capable of solving the country's problems, this is probably due to the overwhelming significance they attach to education as a means of

transforming the society. This is an attitude that is shared more by students than by other respondents. Students also have a higher than average faith in the capacity of scientists to contribute to solutions. (Respondents who complain about the inadequate knowledge and pedagogical formation of teachers expect then much less [about 10 percentage points less] to help solve the country's problems.)

Working and unemployed youth, as well as home-staying women and girls, on the other hand, feel more strongly that political institutions such as the Parliament,

political parties and the President can solve the country's problems.

About one third of the respondents feel that the youth can contribute to solving Turkey's problems, placing the youth second to teachers, only. This may be taken to signify an overall expectation from the society. This group of the youth feel that they can help solve the country's problems and seem to ask for the opportunity. Respondents in this group are mostly students, includes those who work at the same time. It may thus be suggested that the status of the young person as a student has a reinforcing effect on his/her consciousness of social responsibility.

The youth assigns greater responsibility to political institutions (Parliament, government, President, political parties) than to extra-political bodies (Army, judiciary, religious bodies) in solving the problems of the country. This may a strong indicator of a maturing democracy. Higher priority attached to the legislative body as opposed to the executive ones supports the above argument.

There is a certain amount of parallelism between the table of institutions that "can" and the table of institutions that "do" contribute to solving the country's problems, according to the youth. This should

be taken to imply that the youth's expectations are largely fulfilled. Only a limited correspondence is observed between the perceived capacity and actual performance of various bodies and institutions. Perhaps more significantly, a considerable number of respondents who admit the actual contribution of certain bodies or institutions did not indicate those same bodies or institutions as being capable of solving the country's problems.

The degree to which each body or institution fulfils the expectations of the respective group of respondents who feel that these bodies or institutions can contribute to solving the country's problems is shown on the following table.

Table 126

Bodies/institutions seen capable of contributing to the solution of Turkey's problems	Percentage of respondents who admit the actual contribution of the body/institution
Teachers	68.0
Parliament	63.4
Youth	60.7
President	57.5
Press/media	56.5
Government	54.0
Clergy	52.2
Political parties	46.8
Businessmen	40.5
Army	38.5
Courts/judiciary	35.5
Trade unions	30.4
NGOs	8.7

As the above table reveals, the highest percentage of correspondence between the actual performance and the expected contribution of various bodies or institutions remains at 68 percent (in the case of teachers). Especially in the case of bodies or institutions that are seen to contribute much less they are seen capable of contributing, the percentage of respondents who see them as being capable of such contribution declines. In other words, these bodies or institutions perform relatively better according to respondents who do not feel they can have a significant contribution. The following table traces the trend in reverse, showing the percentage of respondents who feel that a certain body/institution

can contribute to solving the problems in the group of respondent who admit the actual the contribution of that body or institution.

Based on the above table, it may be argued that the favourable impression about the contribution of political parties, businessmen, NGOs, courts, the Army and trade unions, in particular, does not reflect opinion on the real potential of these bodies for solving the country's problems. Such favourable impression seems largely unfounded or misplaced.

### C. Turkey's Position in the World, Westernisation, and Relations between Western and Islamic Segments of the Society

Table 127

Bodies/institutions that contribute to solving Turkey's problems	Percentage of respondents who feel that the body or institution can contribute to solving the problems
Teachers	99.2
Youth	89.5
Clergy	71.2
Parliament	66.3
President	55.5
Press/media	55.5
Government	50.0
Political parties	46.7
Businessmen	35.1
NGOs	32.6
Courts/Judiciary	32.3
Army	27.3
Trade unions	23.9

Respondents were asked several questions that aimed at establishing opinion on Turkey's position in the world, policy of Westernisation and relations between the Western and Islamic segments of the Turkish society.

Respondents were asked to indicate a maximum of two international organisation which Turkey should be a member of. Distribution of responses is shown below.

Table 128

International organisation(s) that Turkey should join	Qty	(%) Response	(%) Case
European Union	1115	39.1	51.8
Organisation of Turkic republics	617	21.6	28.7
Organisation of Muslim countries	388	13.6	18.0
Organisation of Balkan countries	65	2.3	3.0
Should join none, but maintain good relations with all.	643	22.5	29.9
Other	24	0.8	1.1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2852</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>132.5</b>

It is noteworthy that 30 percent of the respondents (33.5 percent of women as opposed to 26.5 percent of men) would prefer Turkey remaining outside of all such international organisations. It seems to suggest that the youth is seriously influenced by the paradigm of self-sufficiency or peculiarity of Turkey.

Also striking is the finding that the youth would like to see Turkey in membership of the European Union much more than in any other international organisation. Furthermore, it cannot be reasonably argued that segments of the youth who favour Turkey's membership in organisations of Islamic or Turkic countries form a bloc in opposition to those who favour Turkey's membership in the EU. About 60 percent of the respondents who expressed opinion in favour of Turkey's membership in an organisation of Turkic republics along with another

international organisation, referred to the EU as the other desirable international organisation, whereas 37 percent of the same group favoured membership in an organisation of Islamic countries along with that in an organisation of Turkic republics. Two thirds (66 percent) of respondents who favour membership in the EU along with another organisation, favour membership in an organisation of Turkic republics.

Parallel preference among respondents who favour membership in an organisation of Islamic republics is highest for an organisation of Turkic republics (61 percent); it remains at about 34 percent with respect to the EU.

It may be added that women favour Turkey's membership in Islamic or Turkic organisation less than the men do.

Few respondents seem to assign a significant place to Turkey among the Balkan countries. It is more frequently those who favour Turkey's membership in the EU that express a parallel preference for membership in an organisation of Balkan countries.

Respondents were asked to express agreement or disagreement with a series of statements that aimed at establishing their views with respect to Turkey's involvement with the EU. Distribution of responses is shown below.

Table 129

	Agree		Disagree		DK		TOTAL	
	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)	Qty	(%)
Entering the European union would make us lose our own values	684	30.0	1213	54.7	340	15.3	2217	100.0
Joining the EU would enhance democracy and human rights in Turkey	1535	69.2	386	17.4	296	13.4	2217	100.0
Joining the EU would help Turkish economy	1590	71.8	281	12.7	344	15.5	2215	100.0
We should find ways of developing on our own rather than placing our hopes with Europe	1210	54.6	594	26.8	414	18.7	2218	100.0

The percentage of respondents who feel that joining the EU would further develop Turkish economy or democracy is about 20 percentage points higher than that in favour of Turkey's membership in the EU. In other words, even some respondent who do not favour Turkey's membership in the EU agree that Turkey would benefit from such membership. In fact, about one half of the respondents who favour Turkey's association with Islamic countries agree that Turkish democracy would benefit from membership in the EU; more than one half of the same group feel that this would benefit the economy. The respective percentages are even higher among respondents who favours Turkey's association with Turkey republics: 64 percent of these feel that membership in the EU would bene-

fit Turkish democracy, and 71 percent feel that it would benefit Turkish economy.

Respondents who admit the democratic and/or economic benefits of membership in the EU but do not favour Turkey's joining it are observed to be more worried than average that such membership would result Turkey's losing her own values. It should be added that 18 percent of respondent who favour Turkey's EU membership share this concern over losing our own values.

Respondents who feel that "Turkey should find ways of developing on her own rather than placing hopes with Europe" are not limited to those who do not favour EU membership. Two fifths of

respondents who favour EU membership share this view. Furthermore, about one half of those who admit the economic and democratic benefits of joining EU feel that Turkey should find ways of developing on her own.

Meanwhile, 1034 respondents were observed to make no reference to EU membership as being favourable for Turkey. Distribution of their preferences is shown on the following table.

Table 130

Favoured membership of Turkey in international organisations other than EU	Qty	(%)	(%)
Organisation of Turkic Republics	351	27.7	33.9
Organisation of Muslim countries	298	23.4	28.8
Organisation of Balkan countries	20	1.6	1.9
Should join none, but maintain good relations with all	579	45.6	55.9
Other	21	1.7	2.0
Total	1269	100.0	122.5

As the table points out, the strongest tendency among respondents who do not favour EU membership is to keep Turkey out of all international organisations. In this case, the percentage of respondents who call for staying outside of international organisation is more than 20 percentage points higher than average. The

next strongest preference among this group is in favour of an Islamic association.

Respondents who do not favour EU membership are found more frequently among lower SES group and less educated segments of the youth. Respondents in SES groups D and C, with a monthly household income of less than 100 million TL and with primary or secondary school education figure prominently in this group.

These respondents also attach greater significance than average to traditional values. As high as 45 percent of them believe than joining the EU would make Turkey lose her own values. Emphasis on religious values appears to have a strong bearing on this attitude. Religious values are assigned a priority over individual or social values among respondents who do not favour EU membership. These respondents consider "respect for religion" a high virtue, next to only "honesty" and well before "capacity for independent thought and action."

Another indicator of the largely traditional attitudes of respondents who do not favour EU membership is found in their perception of female social roles. The majority of these young people (as opposed to the sample minority) feel

that "what a woman really wants is a home and children." Their agreement to "joint contribution of man and wife to the family budget" or recognition of "employment as the key to a woman's independence" are also 6 percentage pointer lower than average.

The questioning attitude towards the Western world is even more clearly reflected in the youth's wider approach to the Turkish policy of Westernisation. The following table presents the distribution of responses to statements formulated in this context.

Table 131

Turkish policy of Westernisation	Oty	percentage (%)
Turkish policy of Westernisation is right, but the Europeans are hypocritical and prejudiced against us.	781	35.2
Westernisation in Turkey is superficial and mere imitation.	581	26.2
Westernisation in Turkey was a mistake all the way from the outset	216	9.7
DK	638	28.8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2216</b>	<b>99.9</b>

Only 10 percent of the respondents totally reject Turkish policy of Westernisation as being wrong from the outset. More than one fourth, however,

criticise it as being superficial. An even larger group approves of Turkish Westernisation, but shares certain feelings of helplessness or frustration in the face of European "prejudice and hypocrisy". It may therefore be suggested that the majority of the Turkish youth perceives the policy of Westernisation as being problematic in one way or another.

Respondent who are ranked C on socio-economic status are over-represented among those who totally reject Turkish policy of Westernisation. It is also worth noting that 44 percent of respondents in SES Group D did not express an opinion on this matter. Higher SES groups respondents, on the other hand, are more critical than average about the superficial nature of Turkish Westernisation.

The problem of Westernisation is variously reflected in the Turkish social experience and one such reflection is found in the relations between the Western and Islamic segments of the society. Responses to the survey question on this issue shows that the majority of the youth favours basically tolerant attitudes.

Table 132

Relations between the Modern/Western and traditional/Islamic segments of the society	Qty	(%)
Different segments should get to know and understand one another, also trying to see what they share in common.	997	45.9
Nobody needs to adapt to the other; each should keep its differences and lead its own life.	639	29.4
Modern/Western segments should adapt to the Islamic and traditional segments in view of the realities of Turkey.	279	12.9
Islamic/traditional segments should adapt to the modern/ Western segments in view of the developments in the world.	255	11.8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2170</b>	<b>100.0</b>

As the preceding table reveals, less than one fourth of the respondents insist that either one or the other segment of the society should adapt to the other, and this group is almost equally divided into those who require the Islamic segment and those who require the Western segment to give in.

Among respondents favouring co-existence rather than a one-sided adaptation, those who prefer to keep differences and separate life-styles remain in the minority. The largest group, that is 45.9 percent of the respondents, feels the need for a mutual effort to understand one another and find out what they share in common.

The tolerant attitude that is observed with respect to relations between the Western and Islamic segments of the society is also evident in the approval for wearing headscarves on campus on democratic grounds. Only 11.2 percent of the youth approves of females students wearing headscarves on campus because it is an Islamic requirement. On the opposite pole of this "ideological" attitude appear respondents who are against female students wearing headscarves on campus because it runs counter to principles of Kemalism (15.4 percent).

Table 133

Should female university students be allowed to wear headscarves on campus?	Qty	(%)
Yes, because it is their right in a democratic country	1176	53.1
No, because it runs counter to principles of Kemalism	342	15.4
Yes, because it is Islamic precept	247	11.2
No, because it is an ideologically based behaviour	240	10.8
DK	210	9.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2215</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Opposition to wearing headscarves on campus on grounds that "it is an ideologically based behaviour" may be related to a concern over the state of strife that needs to be eliminated from the universities.

It should be noted that the majority of respondents who oppose headscarves

on campus (whether because it is "against principles of Kemalism" or because it is "ideologically guided") favour peaceful co-existence of Islamic and Western segments of the society. Only one fifth of these respondents insist that the Islamic segments of the society should adapt to their Western counterparts.

Women provide less support for female students wearing headscarves on campus than men do: 55 percent of male as opposed to 51 percent of female respondents favour it on grounds of democratic rights. Women are against headscarves on campus more because it runs counter to principles of Kemalism (17 percent) than because they feel it is an ideologically-based behaviour (12 percent).

Perhaps more significantly, as high as 39 percent of female students are against headscarves on campus (for either one or the other reason), while only 48 percent of them favour headscarves because it is a democratic right. Their approval for headscarves on Islamic grounds remains as low as 5 percent. It may thus be suggested that the controversy over headscarves on campus has a more seriously discomforting effect and results in greater difference of opinion among young women.

## **VII. THE YOUTH AND ITS PROBLEMS**



his section will focus on the way in which the youth relates to the society, the roles that they assign to themselves and major difficulties that they face as young people. The definition and problems which received some attention in the preceding sections will here be discussed in greater detail.

### **A. Relations between the Youth and the Society**

The survey inquired into the self-perception of the youth as a social segment and into potential areas of conflict between the youth and society. Respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with a series of statements that addressed these issues. Distribution of responses is shown on the following table, which lists the statements descending order of the level of agreement.

Table 134

Statement	Agree		Disagree		DK		N
	Qty	%	Qty	%	Qty	%	
Young people should have social responsibility	1808	82.6	187	8.5	193	8.8	2188
Young people are unable to live their youth in Turkey today	1365	61.4	624	28.4	206	9.4	2195
Young people can't communicate with their families or older generations	1353	61.7	640	29.2	201	9.2	2194
Lack of purpose, absence of ideals, and overall insensitivity are widespread among the youth	1334	60.7	632	28.8	231	10.5	2197
Young people are excluded from decision making processes in all spheres of social life	1301	59.2	651	29.6	246	11.2	2198
The main responsibility of a young person is to be a good student	1298	58.9	784	35.6	120	5.4	2202
At present, young people are pacified in Turkey	1262	57.3	588	26.7	351	15.9	2201
Problems of the youth are in fact common to the society as a whole	1197	54.6	743	33.9	254	11.6	2194
Educational institutions hinder development of the young people's personalities	1130	51.5	619	37.3	246	11.2	2195
Young persons are constantly under pressure in the family, in school, and in employment	1091	49.6	834	37.9	274	12.5	2199
The problems of the youth can never be solved unless we are prepared to challenge tradition	1078	49.0	680	30.9	441	20.1	2199
Families should limit the freedoms of young people so as to prevent their getting into trouble/engaging in harmful practices	1024	46.6	984	44.8	189	8.6	2197

Perhaps the most striking finding on the above table is the widespread agreement on the social responsibility of the youth. While 83 percent of the respondents hold the youth socially responsible, only 8.5 percent are against assigning the youth such a responsibility. (Variation by either

sex or age group remains at about 1 percentage point.) This seems to suggest that the historic responsibility that is assigned to the youth in Turkey is indeed internalised and that the youth finds the "childish" attitude of refusing social responsibility as quite unbecoming.

On the other hand, 59 percent of the respondents feel that being a good student is the major responsibility of a young person. In other words, the social responsibility mentioned above is conditional at best and needs to be defined in more specific terms. Survey findings provide certain clues to the conditions and limits of the social responsibility that the youth is willing to accept.

1. 59 percent of the respondents feel that the youth is excluded from decision making processes in all spheres of social life, and 57 percent indicate that the youth is pacified (or silenced) in Turkey. It may therefore be suggested that the majority of the youth wants to make themselves heard. In other words, the youth will accept social responsibility, but the society must listen to what the youth has to say.
2. 61 percent of the respondents admit that lack of purpose, lack of ideal and overall insensitivity are widespread among the youth. The highness of that percentage deserves serious thought in itself. It is also related to the youth's conception of responsibility, however, in that it points to a high level of self-criticism. The youth is not only critical of the society, but also of its young members.

3. 36 percent of the respondents do not limit the major responsibility of the youth to being a good student. This group presumably attaches greater significance to social responsibility than it does to the "youthful" responsibility of being a good student. It may further be suggested that the group who attaches primacy to being a good student does so on condition that the serious problems in education are solved.
4. It seems contradictory that high percentages of respondents assign both social and primarily academic responsibility to the youth. One explanation may be that the youth is unwilling to or is not prepared to assume economic responsibility. This was clearly pointed out in focus groups where participants said, "The youth should not have economic responsibility."

The preceding table points to widespread agreement on two other issues. One is that "young people are unable to live their youth in Turkey," and the other refers to lack of intergenerational communication. Level of agreement with each statement exceeds 61 percent.

Other survey findings also suggest that the youth is not lived or perhaps does not live in Turkey. It is therefore difficult to disagree with the respondents on this matter.

In view of other survey findings, however, it is somewhat surprising that the majority of respondents should point to the inability of the youth to communicate with their families and older generations. Recalling earlier discussions, it is the family and above all, the mother, who is said to understand the young person best. In fact, the percentage of respondents who say that older generations do not understand them (41.5 percent) is lower than those who disagree with that view (50.7 percent). It may therefore be suggested that respondents regard lack of intergenerational communication as a social, rather than a personal problem. Another explanation may be that communication implies a two-way process, whereas understanding refers to a one-way (and unequal) relationship.

Two other statements on the preceding table enjoy majority agreement. Firstly, 54.6 percent of the respondents feel that the problems of the youth are in fact the same as the problems of the society as a whole. This is a view repeatedly expressed in focus groups, and the percentage of agreement is very high from a

specific perspective: failing to distinguish the problems of the youth is essentially associated with failing to distinguish the youth as a social segment. (The tendency was apparent also in focus groups where participants kept speaking on general social problems.) Older age group respondents (21-27) have a stronger than average tendency to equate the problems of the youth with those of the society. The opposite is true for the lowest (D) and the highest (A) SES group respondents, whose level of agreement with the statement is 8-9 percentage points below the average. In other words, younger age group (15-20) and A or D SES group respondents are more inclined to distinguish their problems from those of the society.

Secondly, the majority of respondents feel that school life hinders personality development. Agreement with this statement is higher than average among older age group (21-27) respondents, as well as among middle-to-higher SES Groups (C+, B, A).

The sharpest difference of opinion is expressed with respect to whether or not "families should restrict the freedom of young people so that they may not get into trouble." About 47 percent of the respondent agree as against 45 percent who disagree. As might be expected, rate of agreement with the statement

is lower than average (42 percent) among respondents who feel that young people are "constantly under pressure, in the family, in school, and in the workplace," but taken by itself, that percentage is still high. As already mentioned, this may be related to young people's need for protection (or to lack of self-confidence).

Attitude towards restriction of freedom varies significantly by sex, age and SES. Men approve of restrictions (50 percent) more than women do (43 percent). A similar, but less pronounced tendency is observed among younger age group

(15-20) respondents (49 percent) as opposed to older age group (21-27) respondents (44 percent). Most significantly however, the tendency to oppose family restriction of freedom regularly grows stronger with rising SES.

A similar variation by SES is observed on the question of assigning the youth social responsibility. The tendency to assign the youth social responsibility is stronger than average among higher SES group (A, B, C+) respondents who oppose family imposed restrictions on their freedom.

Table 135

Families should limit the freedoms of young people so as to prevent their getting into trouble/engaging in harmful practices	Agree		Disagree		DK	
	Qty	%	Qty	%	Qty	%
SES group						
A	36	35.3	59	57.8	7	6.9
B	94	40.2	126	53.8	14	6.0
C+	231	43.9	262	49.8	33	6.3
C	468	49.5	397	42.0	81	8.6
D	185	52.0	120	33.7	51	14.3
Sample average (%)		46.6		44.8		8.6

Table 136

Young people should have social responsibility	Agree		Disagree		DK	
	Qty	%	Qty	%	Qty	%
SES group						
A	90	89.1	7	6.9	4	4.0
B	211	90.9	11	4.7	10	4.3
C+	457	86.9	38	7.2	31	5.9
C	760	80.9	89	9.5	90	9.6
D	263	73.7	39	10.9	55	15.4
Sample average (%)		82.6		8.5		8.8

In summary, respondents clearly assign themselves a socially responsible role, but it is less certain that they are adequately equipped to assume such a role.

### B. Problems of the Youth

"Problems of the youth can never be solved unless we are prepared to challenge tradition." This statement appears very low down the list of statements discussed above as only 49 percent of the respondents expressed agreement with it. There is another notable aspect to the distribution of responses on this statement: a large group of respondents are hesitant to say whether or not tradition must be challenged. About one fifth (20.1 percent) had no clear position on this matter, a higher percentage than observed in any of the other statements.

Indeed, the following table suggests that urgent problems of the youth have little to do with tradition. Unemployment, problems in education and sheer poverty top the list of difficulties faced by the youth: in short no jobs, no education, no money

Inability to get adequate or the desired education is the most frequently stated primary difficulty faced by the youth. In fact, three fourths (74.9 percent) of university or college students who said that they are studying the subject they wished to study and 71.5 percent of those who said that they are enrolled in the university or college they wished to enter mentioned this concern among their most serious difficulties. It appears that for many young persons, even being enrolled in a university does not mean receiving the education he or she wants.

Table 137

Most important difficulties faced by the youth in Turkey	Qty				Case %
	1st	2nd	3rd	Total	
Unemployment/absence of job security	708	612	245	1565	70.4
Not getting adequate/desired education	719	368	328	1415	63.7
Lack of money	443	501	381	1325	59.6
Not being taken seriously/not being respected	128	225	309	662	29.8
Having nobody to consult/provide guidance	90	193	309	592	26.6
Education being hindered by youth events	41	90	232	363	16.3
Being forced to enter a youth group	32	74	123	229	10.3
Sexual problems	29	71	88	188	8.5
Lack of sporting facilities	21	64	61	146	6.6
Other	4	2	4	10	0.4
Total	2215	2200	2080	6495	292.2

Mention of educational problems in the first order is about 6 percentage points more frequent than average among highest SES group (A and B) respondents. Variation by sex or age groups is largely insignificant (1-2 percentage points above average among men and 15-20 age group).

Unemployment or insecure employment follows difficulties in education in terms of first mention, but appears at the top of the list in terms of total reference. More than 70 percent of the respondents indicated unemployment and lack of job security among their major concerns, without any variation by sex. Still, men make more frequent primary reference to unemployment, whereas women tend to refer to it in second or third place.

Poverty (or lack of money) is largely related to unemployment. In general, men emphasise this problem more than women do.

Table 138

Distribution of responses by SES shows that lack of money is mentioned more frequently than average by lower SES group (D and C) respondents in first order, by middle SES group (C+) respondents in second order, and by higher SES group (A and B) respondents in third order. In SES Group A, secondary mention is also more frequent than average. The following table points to the relationship between top three difficulties faced by the youth and status of studentship or employment of the respondent.

Focusing on percentages that are higher than average allows for distinguishing the working youth from the studying youth. Women who stay at home (neither work, nor study) appear closer to the working youth in their priorities.

Although much less frequently indicated than the first three difficulties, two relatively serious difficulties faced by the youth include "not being taken seriously/not being respected," and "having nobody to consult/no guidance."

Status of studentship and/or employment	Un-employment		Problems in education		Lack of money		N
	Qty	%	Qty	%	Qty	%	
Student, not working	434	64.2	456	67.5	342	50.6	676
Working, not a student	447	71.1	386	61.4	394	62.6	629
Women staying at home (not working, not a student)	225	75.0	176	58.7	214	71.3	300
Unemployed (seeking work), not a student	229	80.9	171	60.4	183	64.7	283
Both student and working	85	72.0	75	63.6	67	56.8	118
Student, preparing for university exams	82	71.9	81	71.1	60	52.6	114
Sample average		70.4			63.7		59.6

Respondents in SES groups C and C+ feel most uncomfortable about not being taken seriously or not being respected, whereas both A and D group respondents care less than average about being taken seriously. Women find it more difficult to cope with disrespect than men do, and younger age group (15-20) respondents are similarly more offended than older age group (21-27) respondents.

Women and younger age group respondents also seem to have greater than average need for advice or guidance. There is little variation by SES in this respect. Only SES Group C+ respondents mentioned this difficulty less frequently than average.

Difficulties presented by youth events and strife among youth groups are mentioned much less frequently than the preceding two problem areas. Difficulties such as "lack of sports facilities" and "sexual problems" which might be expected to have a more direct effect on the youth are rarely mentioned. An overwhelming majority of respondents who mentioned these two difficulties are male. More frequent than average reference to youth events and youth groups is seen among male and younger age (15-20) respondents.

### C. Groups within the Youth

On an open ended question, respondents were asked to name the groups that are formed within the youth in Turkey, and responses were classified as shown on the following table. Although a maximum of five responses was accepted, and average of 1.5 responses were received per respondent.

Table 139

Reference	Group	Frequency in order mentioned					Total response	Case %
		1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	5 <sup>th</sup>		
Politics	Political groups- in general	455	64	22	4	1	546	24.6
	Rightist groups	534	186	37	6	2	765	34.4
	Leftist groups	116	406	91	12	2	627	28.2
	Separatist/illegal groups	25	15	13	8	2	63	2.8
	Other political groups	27	5	6	1		39	1.8
Religion	Islamic groups	137	129	90	15	5	376	16.9
	Religious reactionary groups (negative value judgement)	26	24	34	10	2	96	4.3
	Faith/sect differences	16	22	34	8	2	82	3.7
	Secularists	10	8	7	5	3	33	1.5
	Proponents of faith incompatible with Turkish culture	6	1	2	6		15	0.7
SES	SES groups	35	46	31	16	4	132	5.9
	Indifferent, "carefree" groups	6	8	12	6	2	33	1.5
Activity	Social/cultural activity groups	16	16	16	4		52	2.3
	Fans of different kinds of music	27	31	21	8	2	89	4.0
	NGOs	13	18	10	5		46	2.1
Social circle	School groups	14	14	12	2	1	43	1.9
	Friend groups	44	28	16	4	2	94	4.2
	Gangs (violent)	112	39	29	7	1	187	8.4
Sport	Fans	24	40	19	11	3	97	4.4
Other	Ethnic groups	6	10	7	7		30	1.3
	Marginal groups	16	5	5	4		30	1.3
	Other	8	9	4	6	4	31	1.4
Total		1673	1123	518	154	38	3506	157.6

As the above table reveals, when asked to name a youth group, respondents almost immediately think about groups formed around political references. About one fourth of the respondents named political groups in general, without any mention of a specific political tendency. Most frequently named groups among the politically referenced are the

"rightist" ones (including Ülkü Ocakları, MHP, BBP, Turkish groups, nationalists, etc.), followed by "leftist" ones (social democrats, socialists, revolutionaries, anarchists, ÖDP, IP, SIP, etc.). Groups along political major political party lines (with or without naming the party) were rarely mentioned as a form of youth groups.

At least some of the groups classified under the religious reference on the table also have a political dimension. Responses were classified in this manner because political Islam is often indistinguishable from Islam as such. In case of groups with a religious reference, only a few responses had clearly negative connotations. Again, groups based on faith or sect (Alavite, Sunnite, believers, non-believers, atheists) were infrequently mentioned. Islamic groups (including Muslims, religious groups, religious foundations, Islamic parties, Islamic RP, neo-Islam, religious orders, etc.) were named by 17 percent of the respondents; although not accompanied by such terms as "reactionary" or "Shariah", these were essentially defined in opposition to "secularists".

It is noteworthy that school groups or friend groups, which may be expected to form the immediate social circle of the youth are named relatively infrequently, whereas gangs bent on violence are named much more frequently. Gangs were also named more frequently than socio-economically based groups.

Youth groups seem rarely associated with groups formed around activities such as theatre, arts, culture. This is also true for trade unions, associations, environmental organisation, feminist groups and other NGO activities. Sport club fan groups were mentioned more frequently than these.

Men figure prominently among respondents who named political groups and gangs, whereas women tend to mention Islamic groups first. Younger age group respondents named groups formed around culture and arts activities and around varying music preferences (rock, rap, arabesque, etc.) more frequently than average. Islamic groups were mentioned more frequently than average among older age group (21-27) respondents.

When asked to name the political party that best addresses the problems of the youth, 41 percent of the respondents who primarily referred to political groupings among the youth said "none". In other words, respondents largely believe that political parties in general are not interested in the youth.

### VIII. THE PRESENT, THE FUTURE AND POLITICS

**C**his section will focus on the youth's perception of the present and outlook on the future in personal and national terms, as well on political tendencies that prevail among the young.

#### A. The Present and the Future

Respondents were asked to indicate how fortunate or unfortunate they considered themselves with respect to the generation of their parents and with respect to the next generation after them. Distribution of responses is shown on the following table.

Table 140

	Parents		Next generation	
	Qty	%	Qty	%
More fortunate	1830	82.9	608	27.9
Same	171	7.7	260	11.9
Less fortunate	207	9.4	1313	60.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2208</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2181</b>	<b>100.0</b>

More than four-fifths of the respondents fit within the conventional pattern in considering themselves more fortunate than their parents. Those who do not are more often found among respondents in SES Group D ("less fortunate" 5 percentage points higher than average). Respondents who are no longer stu-

dents, but earn their own living or seek employment also have a greater than average tendency to consider themselves less fortunate than their parents. Their feelings of misfortune may be related to their greater emphasis on such difficulties as poverty and lack of access to advice and guidance.

It seems also within conventional patterns that respondents should consider the next generation more fortunate than themselves. Still, the percentage of respondents who feel that the next generation is more fortunate than themselves is much lower than the percentage of those who consider themselves more fortunate than their parents. In other words, the present day youth is less optimistic about future generations than they are about themselves. Furthermore, 42.4 percent of respondent who consider themselves less fortunate than their parents, feel that prospects for the next generation are even worse.

Respondents who consider the next generation less fortunate than themselves emphasise certain problems of the youth. These include disrespect for the youth, interruptions in education due to various events and sexual problems. They also have high concern over prospects for social unrest and widespread poverty in the country. It should be added that the

tendency to consider the next generation less fortunate than themselves is stronger particularly among higher SES group respondents.

Findings discussed above hint at respondents' level of satisfaction with their lives and expectations for the future. On two other questions, respondents were directly asked to express (on a scale of 10) their level of satisfaction with their lives and to estimate their position in five years from the present. Distribution of responses is shown below.

than one half rated theirs between 6-10 points.

Level of satisfaction is clearly related to SES. The mean score falls to 4.9 points in SES Group D, while reaching 6.5 in SES Group B and 6.8 in SES Group A.

Respondents who have had better than secondary school education and those who are still students (albeit working at the same time) are relatively happier with their lives. Quite the opposite is true in the case of the strictly working and the unemployed.

Table 141

How happy are with your life?			How happy will you be in five years' time?		
Score	Qty	(%)	Score	Qty	(%)
0	87	3.9	0	59	2.7
1	43	1.9	1	34	1.6
2	63	2.8	2	45	2.1
3	111	5.0	3	72	3.3
4	147	6.6	4	81	3.7
5	583	26.3	5	299	13.7
6	302	13.6	6	224	10.3
7	297	13.4	7	286	13.1
8	260	11.7	8	441	20.2
9	120	5.4	9	295	13.5
10	207	9.3	10	346	15.9
	2220	100.0		2182	100.1
Mean 5.913			Mean 6.942		

In general, respondents seem moderately happy with their lives. Only one fifth of the respondents rated their present conditions of life below 4 points, while more

A relationship also holds between level of satisfaction with life and identity formation. Respondents who tend to assume politically leftist, ethnic-sectari-

an or neo-modern identities are the most dissatisfied with personal conditions of life. Respondents who refer to tradition-Islam or conform to the modernist project in their respective identities, on the other hand, appear as the most satisfied segments of the youth.

A negative relationship is notably lacking between the youth's major problem of inadequate education and satisfaction with life; those who emphasise the former do not appear less satisfied than average. Those who refer to poverty, unemployment or sexual problems, on the other hand, are more dissatisfied than average. A similarly high level of dissatisfaction is observed among respondents who indicate that the youth is "under constant pressure," "pacified" or "unable to live its youth."

In general, respondents expect their personal conditions of life to improve in the near future. This optimism is reflected in the overall mean score. Only 13.4 percent of the respondents estimate their personal conditions of life to remain under 4 points in the near future, while 73 percent rate theirs between 6-10 points.

Once again, optimism prevails to a greater extent among higher SES group respondents. Still, the mean score for SES Group D remains higher than 6 points.

Greater optimism also prevails among the better educated and currently studying respondents.

Respondents who define themselves in ethnic-sectarian terms are observed to be the most pessimistic. By contrast, both the left-tending and the neo-modern terms of self-definition seem associated with relative optimism, paralleling the overall sample outlook.

The survey inquired into the youth's future expectations also in more specific terms. Respondents were presented a series of opposing prospective cases and asked to indicate the one which they thought was more likely to materialise in 10 years from now. Distribution of responses is shown below.

Table 142

Prospect	%	Prospect	%
Find no job/remain unemployed	47.7	Find a good/better job	52.3
Have comfortable means of life	59.5	Be short of money	40.5
Increasing threat to social peace/greater anarchy and terrorism	42.1	Establishment of social peace and order	57.9
Increased freedom, greater democracy	73.0	Oppressive regime restricting freedoms	27.0
Greater effect of Islamic values in social life and public administration	31.6	Turkey having a more Western outlook	68.4
Increased environmental awareness and protection	48.4	Increased environmental pollution and carelessness	51.6
More widespread poverty in the country	48.8	Higher standard of life for all in the country	51.2
Greater peace and order throughout the world	58.3	More wars/greater threat to peace in the world	41.7

Despite relative optimism in general, 48 percent of the respondents feel that unemployment is a higher probability than a good job. This seems to suggest that the threat of unemployment has become an ordinary part of life in Turkish society. Respondents who fear prospects of unemployment are only slightly less optimistic about their future. In fact, about one fourth of these respondents also feel that they are more likely to have a comfortable means of in 10 years from now.

Unemployment worries the unemployed youth most (53 percent), but well over one half (54.5 percent) of these young persons look forward to a more

comfortable life in 10 years. This is also true for respondents in SES Group D, one half of whom expect a more comfortable life despite seeing higher prospects for unemployment.

Respondents are notably less optimistic about higher standards of life in the country than they are about their own mean of life. While 59.5 percent of the respondents look forward to a more comfortable life in personal terms, 51.6 percent expect improvement in national standards of life. About one third of the personally optimistic group fear for widespread poverty in the country, and about one fourth of the personally pessimistic group believe in the likelihood of overall improvement in national stan-

dards of life. This discrepancy between material expectations in personal and social terms may point to the perceived relevance of unequal distribution of income to the personal conditions of the individual.

The majority of respondents are pessimistic about environmental conditions. They feel that environmental pollution will increase in the next 10 years.

Social and political prospects, on the other hand, are seen to be brighter. Social peace and order is expected to prevail (57.9 percent) and democracy is expected to govern (73 percent). Nevertheless, a strong relationship is apparent between economic and socio-political expectations. Two thirds of the respondents who believe in the likelihood of widespread poverty also expect social unrest, and about 45 percent of the same group expect an oppressive regime, restricting freedoms. Only one tenth of the respondents who expect an overall improvement in life standards feel that an oppressive regime is likely to be established.

Respondents who are pessimistic about Turkey's economic and political future also expect Islam to exert greater influence on social and public life. About 45 percent of respondents who expect an oppressive regime to restrict freedoms in

the country believe that Islamic values will prevail in social life and public administration. This finding needs to be variously interpreted, however, in view of both negative and positive values that are attached to greater effect of Islamic values.

When effective Islam is conceived as a desirable development, it is seen to guarantee freedoms and stand antithetical to an oppressive regime. Indeed, three fifths of the respondents who expect Islam to prevail in social and public life also believe in the likelihood of increased democracy in the country.

Pessimism in Turkey's economic and socio-political future is paralleled by a pessimism with respect to peace in the world. Two thirds of the respondents who fear for social unrest in the country also see a serious threat to world peace. In a similar vein, about 70 percent of those who see an oppressive regime in Turkey's near future are pessimistic about world peace, and nearly two thirds of those who expect widespread poverty in the country feel that the world is threatened by wars.

Thus, socio-political optimism and pessimism emerge as two opposing tendencies among different segments of the youth. Analysing these tendencies by

SES, it becomes evident that higher SES groups are more pessimistic about economic welfare, social peace and world peace.

Although the youth is relatively satisfied and optimistic about personal conditions of life, they have an apparent tendency to see conditions in the country as a restricting factor. Indeed, as high as two-fifths of the respondents indicated a desire to live in another country. Distribution of responses on this issue, as well as respective countries of choice, is shown below.

Table 143

Would you like to live in another country?	Qty	%
Yes	902	40.7
No	1214	54.8
DK	100	4.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2216</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Even one third of the respondents who identify "benefiting the country and the nation" among the top two objectives in education express a desire to live in another country. Likewise, 37 percent of the respondents who refer to "loyalty to the State and the nation" among the most significant virtues acquired from the family wish to live abroad.

Table 144

Which country would you like to live in?	Qty	%
USA	234	26.2
Other American countries	24	2.7
<b>Total America</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>28.9</b>
Germany	215	24.1
France	99	11.1
UK	71	8.0
The Netherlands	42	4.7
Switzerland	38	4.3
Other European countries	80	9.0
<b>Total Europe</b>	<b>545</b>	<b>61.2</b>
Far East	37	4.1
Australia	25	2.8
Africa	4	0.4
Other	17	1.9
Whichever/No difference	7	0.8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>893</b>	<b>100.1</b>

The desire to live in another country is particularly strong among younger age group (15-20) respondents, students and unmarried young people. But it is also almost as strong as average among the working youth. By contrast, young people who have started their own family life have a lower than average desire (33 percent) to live abroad.

The desire to live abroad is especially pronounced among higher SES group (A and B) respondents; about 55 percent of respondents in these SES categories expressed such a desire. Thus, the desire to live abroad is not positively related to pessimism in personal conditions of life.

Rather the opposite is true. Respondents who have high hopes for a good job and comfortable means of life in the near future have a stronger desire to live abroad than their pessimistic counterparts. Furthermore, respondents who see a more Western outlook in Turkey's near future have a higher preference to live abroad than do the respondents who expect Islam to prevail in social and public life in the country.

It may therefore be suggested that an optimistic outlook on the future is accompanied by a tendency to look for opportunities in other countries to fulfil these optimistic expectations. It is worth noting at this point that respondents who wish to live abroad attach greater than average significance to professional success and material wealth. Furthermore, these respondents differ from the others in their higher emphasis on not being taken seriously/not being respected and on sexual problems.

The USA and Germany are the most highly preferred two countries. Their relative appeal to different segments of the youth may be summarised as follows.

The US has greater appeal for women and Germany for men. Higher interest in the US is also apparent among respondents who complain about not being taken seriously, obstruction of personality development in schools, inability to live their youth or sexual problems. On the other hand, respondents who have greater interest in sports facilities, who attach greater significance to professional success and material wealth prefer Germany over the US. Although the desire to live in another country is weak among respondents who value religion highly, this segment of the youth also has a greater than average interest in living in Germany.

## B. Political Tendencies

The tendency to participate in organised political activity is very weak among the respondents. Only 3.7 percent indicated membership in a political party. Other than these, only 2.5 percent of the respondents are members of a political, social or cultural organisation (foundation or association). As will be recalled, only 10 percent of the respondents discuss politics among friends.

The respondents find political parties just as far from the youth as they keep themselves away from politics and political parties. When asked to name the political party that shows concern for the youth and its problems, 16 percent of the respondents did not (or could not) name any such party. Almost one half of the remaining respondents spontaneously said "none". This percentage is particularly high since "none" was not included among the options.

The majority of respondent were under voting age at the time of the previous elections. Excluding them, more than one fifth of the respondents who qualified for the vote in 1995 appear to have refrained from voting or cast a blank vote. That rate may be estimated to reach 30 percent in the event of a present day election. The tendency points to an

increasing reaction among the youth against the political system.

Furthermore, nearly one half of those who did not vote in 1995 and around 60 percent of those who cast a blank vote would cast an invalid vote or not go to the ballot at present.

Focusing on respective percentages that are higher than average, young following enjoyed by major political parties may be described as follows:

### **ANAP**

- Women, including home-staying ones
- Equal distribution among age groups
- Slightly stronger preference among higher SES groups
- Unemployed and part-time employed
- Satisfied with personal conditions of life, optimistic in personal and national terms
- Concerned over terrorism and environmental problems
- Demand employment and material support from the State
- No particular appeal among any group with a well constructed identity, but high appeal among groups referring to both moralistic-conformist and individualistic terms of personality.

**CHP**

- Students
- Higher SES groups (C+ or above)
- Dissatisfied with personal conditions of life, relatively optimistic future outlook
- Emphatic about reactionary religion, gap between the rich and the poor, and problems in education
- Expect the State to address education, democracy and social services
- Highly favour State intervention in the economy
- Highest appeal for respondents with a well constructed identity conforming to the modernist project

**DSP**

- Unemployed
- SES Group C
- Dissatisfied with personal conditions of life and pessimistic about personal future and about political future of the country
- Emphatic on problems of drug addiction, corruption/bribery
- Expect the State to deal with terrorism and problems in education
- Moderately in favour of State intervention in the economy
- Second highest (after CHP) appeal for respondents with a well constructed identity conforming to the modernist project

**DYP**

- Highest percentage of women (60 percent), particularly home-staying ones
- Youngest respondents (lowest mean age)
- Lower SES Groups (D and C)
- Highest satisfaction with personal conditions of life and highest level of personal optimism
- Expect the State to provide employment and material support
- Favour privatisation, but also demand (at about the average level) State contribution to individual means of subsistence
- No particular appeal among any group with a well constructed identity, but high appeal among groups referring to moralistic-conformist terms of personality.

**FP**

- Men (57 percent)
- Non-student, working (highest next to MHP), unemployed, home-staying female respondents
- Oldest respondents (highest mean age)
- SES Group C
- Average level of satisfaction and optimism, but see high prospects (next highest to HADEP) for an oppressive regime

- Emphatic about problems of moral degradation and loss of national culture
- Expect the State to provide employment, material support, freedom of faith
- Highest appeal for respondents with a well constructed traditional-Islamic identity, but faces serious competition from MHP in this respect.

**MHP**

- Men (70 percent)
- Youngest respondents (similar to DYP following)
- Working (distinctly)
- SES Group C
- Highly satisfied with personal conditions of life (next highest to DYP)
- Emphatic about terrorism
- Average approval for the economic role of the State
- Expect the State to prevent terrorism, fight corruption, show concern for the youth establish social unity and peace
- Very high appeal for respondents with a well constructed nationalistic identity (more than one fourth)

Largest group: "alienated" or "reacting" by not voting or voting blank

- SES groups C+ and B
- Emphatic about problems of moral degradation, education, and inability of the society to uphold its own values (rather than economic problems)
- Expect the State to guarantee/safeguard democracy, human rights, respect for the human being and to fight corruption
- High appeal for respondents with a well constructed neo-modern, politically left or ethnic-sectarian identities, and also for those with individualistic terms of personality definition

Findings on the relationship between patterns of religious behaviour and political tendency may be summarised as follows:

- 22 percent of regular observers of prayer hours are inclined towards FP. In this respect FP is followed by MHP (14 percent) and ANAP (11 percent).

- 27 percent of respondents who regularly read and reflect on religion as well as regularly observing prayer hours have FP tendencies. Once again, FP is followed by MHP (16 percent) and ANAP (9 percent). It is noteworthy that 24 percent of this group intends not to vote or cast a blank vote.
- 31 percent of respondents who both regularly read/reflect on religion and discuss religious matters among friends favour FP: 18 percent favour MHP. The share of the non-voting in this group is slightly above 14 percent.

The above findings point out that "religious agitation" is very largely channelled in the FP base. The share of FP following among religiously sensitive respondents is several times greater than the average potential vote of this party.

MHP also enjoys high favour among this group, but still falls far behind FP. The tendency to protest all political parties, however, is far from negligible in this segment of the youth as well. It may therefore be suggested that despite the existence of political parties with strong religious colour, the problem of representation remains unsolved for this segment of young voters as well as the others.

The last part of this section will be devoted to survey findings on political roles assigned to prominent (political or non-political) figures. Respondents were asked to name a maximum of three persons (from a list of 22) whom they wished to see in responsible posts of government.

Distribution of responses is shown on the following table.

Table 145

Should play a predominant role in national government	Oty	Response (%)	Case (%)
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	435	10.2	21.6
Sakip Sabancı	422	9.9	20.9
Mesut Yılmaz	365	8.5	18.1
Deniz Baykal	320	7.5	15.9
Bülent Ecevit	318	7.4	15.8
Zülfü Livaneli	284	6.6	14.1
Süleyman Demirel	271	6.3	13.4
Devlet Bahçeli	230	5.4	11.4
Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu	216	5.0	10.7
Tansu Çiller	206	4.8	10.2
Tuğrul Türkeş	153	3.6	7.6
Çevik Bir	127	3.0	6.3
Fethullah Gülen	127	3.0	6.3
Necmettin Erbakan	125	2.9	6.2
Mümlaz Soysal	124	2.9	6.1
Ütkü Üras	72	1.7	3.6
Murat Bozıak	62	1.4	3.1
Rüştü Saracoğlu	30	0.7	1.5
Besim Tibuk	24	0.6	1.2
Şerafettin Elçi	14	0.3	0.7
İzzettin Doğan	13	0.3	0.6
Erol Yarar	10	0.2	0.5
None of the above	274	6.4	13.6
Other	61	1.4	3.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4283</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>212.3</b>

As high as 13.6 percent of the respondents do not wish to see any of these persons in government. This may constitute a measure of the youth's reaction not only to the political system, but also to the political élite. As might be expected, such a reaction is strongest among respondents who would not vote or would vote blank in elections. About 15 percent of undecided young voters also share this attitude.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of FP is ranked first and was named by a much higher number of respondents than those who would vote for FP. This may point to a significant distinction between personal attributes and party membership in terms of young people's political criteria. No doubt Erdoğan's appeal is largely limited to respondents with right-wing tendencies, MHP foremost among them.

But he was also named by 14 percent of the non-voting or blank-voting respondents, which points to the significance of personal charisma.

Erdoğan enjoys particular favour among SES Group C respondents, 54 percent of whom wish to see him in government. His sympathisers are characterised by primary or secondary level of education with high emphasis on traditional values. They feel more strongly than average (20 percentage points higher) that membership in the EU will cost Turkish society its own values. They also feel twice as strongly as average that Turkish policy of Westernisation was a mistake from the outset. Their high demand for State-provided employment and material support, on the other hand, hints at Erdoğan being seen as a "fresh" paternal figure.

The high favour Sakıp Sabancı enjoys as a businessman (over all incumbent party leaders), may reflect expectations of renewal in the political élite. It should be noted that respondents who favour Sabancı and those who favour Erdoğan form almost mutually exclusive groups (only 74 respondents named both).

This may be associated with the significantly high irrelevance of political tendencies among supporters of Sabancı. Followers of all political parties, other than FP, seem to favour Sabancı to a considerable extent. ANAP, DSP and DYP voters in particular, as well as non-voting and blank-voting respondents at higher than average rates, favour Sabancı in government.

Support for Sabancı is almost evenly distributed throughout the SES groups but is more marked than average among SES Group C+ respondents. Those who favour him reflect the average tendency on the issue of Westernisation. They approve of Turkey's membership in the EU and reject the view that this would result in a loss of national values. Thus, Sabancı, in contrast to Erdoğan, seems to stand for expectations focusing on a new type of élite among respondents who are open to the West and adopt modern lifestyles. Still, those who favour Sabancı also expect the State to provide jobs and material support for individuals, at higher rates than average. In other words, search for a paternal figure in the person of Sabancı may well be effective.

## IX. CLUSTERING OF THE YOUTH

### B

A multivariate analysis was made to identify the clusters into which the youth may be grouped with respect to their life-styles. This section will discuss the findings of the analysis.

### A. Variables and Factors

The analysis is based on two variable constructs, one reflecting consumption/ownership patterns, and the other leisure time activities among the youth. Variable components of each constructed variable are shown on the following table.

Table 146

Consumption/ownership variables	Leisure variables
Private room	Reading books
Checking account	Reading magazines
Credit card	Doing handicrafts
Car	Social/charitable work
Mobile telephone	Playing cards/backgammon
Personal computer	Go to a match
Bicycle	Using computer/Internet
Music set	Playing a musical instrument
	Painting/Drawing
	Going to a disco, bar etc.
	Practising a sport
	Going to a concert/theater

Analysis of the first set of variables (consumption/ownership) identified two factors that explain 43.9 percent of total variance, as shown below.

Table 147

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2
Room	0.01	0.69
Checking account	0.65	0.23
Credit card	0.73	0.11
Car	0.64	-0.05
Mobile telephone	0.69	0.06
Personal computer	0.33	0.35
Bicycle	-0.02	0.69
Music set	0.22	0.62
	Luxury consumption	Modest consumption
Variance explained	28.7	15.2

The first factor explains 28.7 percent of total variance. Variables in high positive relationship with this factor are credit card, mobile telephone, checking account, car and personal computer ownership. In view of the limited access to these items in the society, this dimension of ownership/consumption was labelled **luxury consumption**.

The second factor explains 15.2 percent of total variance. Variables in high positive relationship with this factor are personal room, bicycle, music set and personal computer ownership. In view of the relatively widespread access to these items in the society, this dimension of ownership/consumption was labelled **modest consumption**.

Analysis of the second set of variables (leisure) identified three factors that explain 44.4 percent of total variance, as shown below.

Table 148

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Reading books	-0.20	0.53	0.34
Reading magazines	-0.03	0.70	0.24
Doing handicrafts	-0.65	-0.07	0.03
Social/charitable work	0.10	0.05	0.56
Playing cards/backgammon	0.53	0.36	-0.06
Going to a match	0.76	-0.08	0.13
Using computer/Internet	0.17	0.53	0.04
Playing a musical instrument	0.10	0.13	0.47
Painting/Drawing	-0.06	0.09	0.69
Going to a disco, bar etc.	0.42	0.49	-0.15
Practising a sport	0.65	0.11	0.33
Going to a concert/theater	0.14	0.70	0.13
	Public life	Cultural life	Introversion
Variance explained	22.8	13.0	8.6

The first factor explains 22.8 percent of total variance. It is in high positive relationship with **going to matches, practising a sport, playing cards/backgammon and going to a bar/disco**, and in high negative relationship with **doing handicrafts**. Since these activities are generally involve presence in public localities such as a sports hall, stadium, coffee shop or a

disco/bar, this dimension of leisure time activity was labelled **public life**.

The second factor explains 13 percent of total variance. Variable in high positive relationship with this factor are **reading magazines, going to theatre/concert, reading books, using computer/Internet, going to a disco/ bar and playing cards/backgammon**. In view of the prominence of cultural variables among these, this dimension was labelled **cultural life**.

The third factor explains 8.6 percent of total variance. It is in high positive relationship with **drawing/painting, social/charitable work, playing a musical instrument, reading books and practising a sport**. Since most of these may be done alone, this dimension was labelled **introversion**.

## B. Clusters

Analysis based on the five factors described above identified four cluster centres around which respondents were grouped. Factor significances by clusters are shown on the following table.

Table 149

Cluster	Luxury consumption	Modest consumption	Public life	Cultural life	Introversion	N	%
1	-0.36	-0.59	-0.37	-0.55	-0.38	1050	47.2
2	-0.11	0.93	0.39	0.93	-0.40	515	23.2
3	2.16	-0.11	0.72	0.44	-0.08	256	11.5
4	-0.29	0.44	0.02	-0.03	1.57	402	18.1
Total						2223	100.0

Cluster 1: The largest cluster, including 950 respondents, is marked by negative factor significances on all dimensions. This may be taken to signify that this group of respondents does not share a "youthful life-style or belong within the "youth culture". Their patterns of consumption are not even modestly diversified. They are not present in the public sphere. Their cultural activities are very limited and they do not enjoy a rich extrovert life. This cluster will therefore be referred to as the "outsiders" in the following discussion.

Cluster 2: The next largest cluster, including 515 respondents, is marked positive factor significances on three dimensions: **modest consumption, cultural life and public life**. In other words, these respondents both appear on the public scene and engage in cultural activities in their leisure time. They also have modest consumption patterns. The prominence of cultural life in their life-style points to an effort to develop a youth culture founded on intellectual aspirations. This cluster will therefore be referred to as "aspiring intellectuals" in the following discussion.

Cluster 3: The smallest cluster, including 256 respondents, is characterised by **luxury consumption, public life and cultural life**. These respondents have the means for extravagant consumption, as well as the public presence associated with their activities. In view of these factors, this cluster will be referred to as "**the affluent**" in the following discussion.

Cluster 4: This last cluster, including 402 respondents, is characterised by **introversion**. It also shows a positive factor significance on **modest consumption**. Respondents in this cluster are hardly present in public life. Their youthful life is shaped by largely individual intellectual, artistic or sports activities. This relatively withdrawn cluster will therefore be referred to as "**introverts**" in the following discussion.

## 1. Demographic and socio-economic attributes

Selected demographic and socio-economic data by clusters are shown below.

Table 150

	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
<b>Sex</b>				
Female	57.0	41.9	24.2	52.5
Male	43.0	58.1	75.8	47.5
<b>Age</b>				
15-20 years	47.7	60.6	23.8	66.2
21-27 years	52.3	39.4	76.2	33.8
<b>Type of settlement born</b>				
City	57.8	74.8	74.6	63.7
Small town	32.4	20.4	23.0	31.1
Village	9.8	4.9	2.3	5.2
<b>Status of employment/studentship</b>				
Student, not working	18.7	49.1	15.6	46.5
Student, preparing for univ. exams	3.7	8.5	2.0	6.5
Student, working on vacations	1.9	2.3	1.2	3.5
Both student and working	2.6	6.0	12.5	7.0
Working, not a student	29.6	19.4	57.8	17.7
Working and preparing for exams	1.2	2.9	2.0	1.5
Seeking work, not a student	17.9	8.9	3.9	9.7
Women/girls staying at home	23.7	2.1	4.3	7.2
Not working, not seeking a job	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.5
<b>Marital status</b>				
Single	66.0	89.5	68.4	85.8
Engaged	3.7	4.9	6.6	4.7
Married	30.3	5.6	25.0	9.5
<b>Province lived at present</b>				
Istanbul	10.1	16.4	21.1	15.8
Izmir	6.0	9.0	5.9	8.8
Ankara	5.8	7.6	9.8	7.8
1 <sup>st</sup> Cluster	17.2	18.0	18.8	22.4
2 <sup>nd</sup> Cluster	24.0	9.6	10.2	17.3
3 <sup>rd</sup> Cluster	12.0	30.1	24.2	13.6
4 <sup>th</sup> Cluster	24.9	9.2	10.2	14.3
<b>SES</b>				
D	29.0	4.1	0.0	10.7
C	54.4	34.9	6.5	49.4
C+	14.8	38.0	30.6	28.4
B	1.6	19.4	32.7	9.5
A	0.1	3.5	30.2	2.0
<b>Total</b>	1050	515	256	402

•Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

the "outsiders" are quite evenly distributed by age group. They are very largely (33.4 percent) ranked low on SES. Women, small-town or village-born (total 42.2 percent), working and married young people figure prominently among them. They are mostly found in relatively less developed, traditional areas (2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> province clusters).

The "aspiring intellectuals" are mostly city-born, student (66.9 percent) and single. Younger age group male respondents are more frequently found among them. They are ranked middle to upper grades on SES (72.9 percent). They live in relatively modern areas (3<sup>rd</sup> province cluster and Istanbul).

The "affluent" also rank middle or high on SES (62.9) percent, and live in relatively modern areas (Istanbul, Ankara and 3<sup>rd</sup> province cluster). They are predominantly male. They are distinguished from the "aspiring intellectuals" by the high concentration of older age group (21-27), working (57.8 percent) and married young people among them.

The "introverts" have a relatively even composition in terms of sex. The majority is in the younger age group, student (61.8 percent) and single. They generally rank lower than middle on SES. More frequently than average, they are born in a small town or a village (36.3 percent).

## 2. Individual and social life

Distribution of responses on "the person who understands the respondent best" by clusters is shown on the following table.

	Best understanding person	Outsiders		Introverts
		Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	
Mother	65.0	56.1	52.7	66.4
Father	35.8	32.6	27.0	32.1
Sister/brother	39.0	37.1	33.2	41.5
Fellow student	17.9	41.9	17.2	39.6
Neighbourhood friend	33.8	23.9	23.8	32.8
Fellow worker/employee	9.9	7.8	18.8	7.7
Partner, boy/girl friend	38.2	40.4	56.3	27.1
Close friend from the opposite sex	6.2	14.4	16.8	10.2
Teacher/professor	2.5	2.9	1.2	5.0
Nobody	7.6	6.8	7.9	4.5
Total	1050	515	256	402

\* Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

The "outsiders" respond to this question mostly by referring to primary relations. Neighbourhood friendship and partner/girl or boy friend are also frequently mentioned. In view of the high concentration of married respondents in this cluster (higher than among the affluent), however, the reference to the partner/girl or boy friend is notably weak.

The "aspiring intellectuals" also make strong reference to primary relations, the mother being foremost among them. But this is accompanied by frequent references to partner/girl-boy friend and to fellow students. This points to a growing significance of secondary relations in their lives which may be associated with modern patterns of behaviour.

The "affluent" are marked by the lowest level of reference to primary relations. In fact, primary relations seem to have been replaced by secondary ones, as evidenced by strong references to partner/girl-boy friend, fellow employee and friends from the opposite sex.

The "introverts" emphasise primary relations, accompanied by references to school and neighbourhood friendship. Both the weakest reference to the partner/girl-boy friend and the strongest reference to the teacher/professor are found in this group.

Distribution of responses to the question whether or not the respondent ever had a lover/girl-boy friend is shown in the following table. The "affluent" and the "aspiring intellectuals" are most highly involved in such relations. Having a lover/girl-boy friend is rarest among the "outsiders" and relatively rare among the "introverts".

Table 152

	Yes	No	Total
Outsiders	58.0	42.0	1036
Aspiring Intellectuals	87.9	12.1	513
The affluent	90.6	9.4	254
Introverts	72.8	27.3	400

The following table presents distribution of responses on popular topics of conversation among friends.

Table 153

	Main topics of conversation	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts row %
Family problems	8.3	5.0	4.0	6.3	6.6
Sex	3.4	6.8	6.1	3.0	4.5
Religion, faith	6.2	3.6	3.4	5.7	5.1
Philosophy, literature, art	2.1	5.0	4.4	6.9	4.0
Football, games	9.0	10.4	12.6	10.9	10.1
Dress-outfit	11.0	6.9	5.6	10.9	9.3
Job/workplace	9.1	8.2	16.1	7.2	9.4
School, courses, teachers	6.5	11.4	4.4	12.4	8.6
Money	10.2	6.5	10.1	5.1	8.3
Partner, girl/boy friend	8.7	12.7	10.0	8.6	9.8
Small talk	15.7	9.8	10.0	9.8	12.5
Movies, music	5.2	8.9	5.9	8.6	6.8
Politics	3.8	4.4	6.6	3.9	4.3
Other	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.6
Total Response	2612	1432	700	1069	5832

\*Figures indicate percentage of responses in total responses

Small talk and topical football seem common in all groups. Other than that, each group tends to discuss certain matters more than others:

The "outsiders" talk more about dress-outfit, money and work-employment.

The "aspiring intellectuals" talk more about partner/lover, and school-courses. They also discuss movies, music and entertainment more frequently than average.

The "affluent" mostly talk about work-employment, money and partner/lover. They also discuss politics more frequently than average.

The "introverts" talk about school-courses and dress-outfit, as well as movies, music and entertainment more frequently than average, but talk about partner/lover less frequently.

In general, groups with a high concentration of students tend to discuss school life or events and groups with a high concentration of working respondents discuss work or employment. The partner or the lover comes up mostly in conversations among the "affluent" and "aspiring intellectuals". Recalling the high percentage of married respondents among the "outsiders", the finding that this group largely avoids the subject may point to a distinction between the "out-

siders" and the "affluent" in their respective ability to introduce private life into the public sphere.

On an open-ended, single-response question, respondents were asked to name what frightens or scares them most in life. Distribution of classified responses by clusters of respondents is shown below.

Table 154

	Fear Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
Loneliness/being left alone	11.5	15.0	11.0	11.7
Lovelessness/unhappiness	12.8	11.1	13.8	11.7
Poverty/unemployment	10.1	6.9	7.8	10.6
Failure/being unsuccessful	5.3	13.6	8.7	9.7
Lie/slander/betrayal	6.7	7.2	12.4	6.3
Anxiety over social status/esteem	1.1	2.8	2.8	5.4
Authority	3.6	1.8	0.9	2.6
Violence	2.4	0.9	0.5	0.6
Threatening personalities	1.3	0.2	0.9	0.3
God	12.3	6.2	7.8	10.9
The other world/supernatural powers	0.8	0.7	1.4	1.4
Death	9.5	9.2	9.6	8.6
Depression	3.3	4.8	3.2	4.9
Common phobia	11.3	12.0	9.2	10.9
Disease/health	4.4	4.8	8.3	2.9
Other	3.6	2.5	1.8	1.7
Total	892	433	218	350

References to moral or emotional insecurity as giving rise to a fear (being left alone, unloved, unhappy, etc.) are frequent in all clusters. Fears originating in material insecurity (poverty, unemployment, failure, etc.), on the other hand,

are stronger among the "aspiring intellectuals" and "introverts" (about 19 percent) than among "outsiders" and the "affluent" (about 15 percent). Anxiety over social standing (lie, slander, betrayal, loss of status or esteem) is most pronounced among the "affluent", followed by the "introverts." The "outsiders" seem most fearful of authority, violence and threatening personalities; this is also the group which is least insistent on "being convinced of the rightness of

instructions before obeying them", which suggests a relationship between fear of authority and submissiveness. Furthermore, "fear of God" is most pronounced in this group.

Places of meeting with friends varies by clusters of respondents as shown on the following table.

"**Outsiders**" and "**introverts**" make the strongest reference to "withdrawn" or "closed" environments such the respondent's or a friend's home. The coffee shop and the street or the neighbourhood are also among the common meeting places of the "**outsiders**." The "**aspiring intellectuals**", by contrast, tend to gather more in public places such as cafés, cafeterias, pastry shops and canteens.

A similar tendency is observed among the "**affluent**". In short, most frequent use of withdrawn environments is observed among the "**introverts**" and the "**outsiders**", while the most frequent use of public places is seen among the "**affluent**" and the "**aspiring intellectuals**."

Distribution of membership or participation in various organisations or associations is shown on the following table.

Table 155

	Meeting place	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts row %
My home	31.3	21.6	16.8	25.0	26.1
A friend's home	22.2	13.2	14.5	16.3	18.0
Street/neighbourhood	13.5	6.8	7.3	12.7	10.9
Coffee shop	9.1	6.2	9.4	5.3	7.7
Pastry shop	8.2	11.4	12.4	12.0	10.2
Café, cafeteria	7.4	25.1	23.7	14.0	14.8
School (campus) canteen	4.5	9.6	2.9	9.8	6.5
Clubhouse	1.9	3.6	7.8	3.8	3.4
Workplace	1.0	0.5	1.5	0.5	0.9
Beerhouse	0.8	1.5	3.4	0.3	1.2
Other	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3
Column Total (n)	1847	975	477	756	4055

\*Figures indicate percentage of responses in total responses

Table 156

Type of organisation	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts	Row %
Social welfare or charitable organisations	1.3	1.9	7.0	4.0	2.6
Islamic community, foundation, group	1.9	1.4	2.3	2.7	2.0
Environmental, nature/animal protecting organisations	0.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	2.1
Culture and art associations	1.0	5.2	3.9	6.7	3.4
Student clubs or associations	0.5	6.8	5.5	4.2	3.2
Hobby clubs	1.0	2.9	2.3	4.5	2.2
Folklore clubs	0.5	3.7	3.1	5.7	2.5
Trade unions	0.5	1.9	3.1	0.0	1.0
Political-social-cultural foundations or associations	1.3	5.8	4.7	4.5	3.3
Political parties	1.9	2.7	9.8	6.0	3.7
Sport clubs/associations	6.4	22.7	28.1	20.1	15.2
Total (N)	1050	515	256	402	2223

• Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

The "outsiders" have no involvement that exceeds the average in any type of organisation or association. They may therefore be defined in terms of low organisational involvement.

By contrast, the "aspiring intellectuals" join or participate in the activities of environmental organisations, culture and arts societies, political/social/cultural associations or foundations and sports clubs at higher rates than average.

The "affluent" have greater than average presence in social welfare and charitable organisations, student clubs or associations, political/social/cultural

associations or foundations, political parties and sports clubs.

The "introverts" seem to have greater than average interest in social welfare and charitable organisations, culture and arts societies, hobby or folklore clubs, and notably, political parties and sports clubs.

### 3. Values and attitudes

Cluster distribution of responses to the question on "Where does the meaning of life lie?" is shown below.

Table 157

Meaning of life	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
Family	73.7	62.3	73.8	70.9
Masterwork	12.3	15.5	10.9	16.9
Child/children	29.1	10.9	17.6	17.2
Religion, faith	25.6	13.0	17.2	22.1
Education	36.3	46.4	34.0	45.0
Knowledge	15.2	20.2	17.2	21.6
Partner/beloved	31.2	37.3	39.5	23.9
Struggle towards an ideal	22.1	35.1	29.7	31.8
Professional success	22.4	33.2	33.2	29.1
Wealth, money	14.8	13.8	17.2	8.5
None (life has no meaning)	2.7	1.7	1.2	1.7
Total	1050	515	256	402

\*Figures indicate the percentage of cases in the total number of respondents in that category.

The overwhelming significance of the family is apparent in all clusters. Education is also commonly confirmed as a meaningful life experience. Other than those two, each group tends to attach greater significance to certain relations and endeavours more than others:

- The “**outsiders**” emphasise the significance of the partner/lover, children and religion/faith.
- The “**aspiring intellectuals**” emphasise the significance of the partner/lover, struggle for an ideal and professional success.
- The “**affluent**” emphasise the significance of the partner/lover, professional success and struggle for an ideal, but also of money to a larger extent than average.

- The “**introverts**” emphasise the significance of struggle for an ideal, professional success, knowledge and religion/faith.

The order of significance assigned to the partner/lover does not change much in clusters with high percentages of married respondents (**outsiders** and the **affluent**) and the cluster with a low percentage of married respondents (**aspiring intellectuals**); this reference is notably weak only among the **introverts**. The child seems to attach meaning to life for the “**outsiders**”, among whom a high percentage (30 percent) of married respondents are found. In general, however, the concept of “meaning of life” seems to be shaped more or less independently in terms of the clusters of respondents here identified.

Distribution of responses on the question of "the most significant virtue acquired from the family" is shown below.

Table 158

Virtue acquired from family	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
Honesty	30.9	31.1	28.6	30.1
Respect for custom and tradition	18.0	13.2	17.5	14.6
Piety/respect for religion	17.3	8.3	11.3	12.9
Loyalty to the state and the nation	10.7	10.0	10.6	10.9
Ability to think and act independently	9.5	18.2	15.2	15.1
Civic consciousness	6.8	7.0	6.5	6.6
Consciousness to struggle for a better world	6.3	11.9	9.7	9.4
Other	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.4
Total	2712	1256	679	1102

Honesty and loyalty to the State and the nation appear as common denominators in that they receive relatively even mention throughout the four clusters. The "outsiders" and the "affluent" seem to regard respect for custom and tradition as a high virtue acquired from the family, whereas capacity for independent thought and action receives high emphasis from the "aspiring intellectuals" and respect for religion is similarly emphasised by the "outsiders."

When respect for custom and tradition, respect for religion and loyalty to the State/nation are regarded as "traditional" values and when civic consciousness, consciousness to struggle for a better

world and capacity for independent thought and action are regarded as "modern" virtues, the following overall picture emerges: "aspiring intellectuals" appear on the modern side of the axis

and "outsiders" appear on the traditional side, whereas the "affluent" and the "introverts" are placed in the middle.

Rates of agreement with following statements reflect opinion on social role of women.




Table 159

	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
A working mother can also properly care for her child(ren)	46.0	55.3	48.8	51.1
Pre-school children may suffer from the mother's working.	63.7	62.1	62.5	61.1
What women really want is a home and children.	47.4	26.2	35.5	36.2
Being a housewife is just as satisfying as having regular employment	37.2	22.9	31.8	33.8
Employment is the key to a woman's independence	58.1	70.3	64.5	60.8
Both man and wife should contribute the family budget.	78.5	87.7	80.9	85.8

To summarise the above table,

- the “**outsiders**” tend to assign women largely passive or home-bound roles in the society,
- the “**aspiring intellectuals**” assign women more active social roles,
- the “**affluent**” are closer to the “**aspiring intellectuals**” on the attitude towards women, and
- the “**introverts**” are similarly closer to the “**outsiders**” on the attitude towards women.

The “**aspiring intellectuals**” are in strongest agreement with the view that man and wife should jointly contribute to the family budget.

The survey inquired into attitudes with respect to the recognition of authority as being absolute or conditional. Distribution of responses by clusters of respondents is as follows:

Table 160

Obeying instruction in the workplace	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
One should obey instructions without questioning them.	12.5	8.2	12.2	12.0
Depends on the case	33.5	35.1	35.7	29.6
I should be convinced that instructions are right	39.5	49.1	45.9	46.4
DK	14.5	7.6	6.3	12.0
Total	1042	513	255	399

As the above table points out, the "aspiring intellectuals" are the most reluctant to obey instructions without question; all other groups seem equally (about 12 percent) prepared to do so. By contrast, the "outsiders" are the least insistent on making sure that the instructions are right. Recalling that these two groups appear at the opposite ends of the modern/traditional axis suggested above, it may be argued that respondents closer to traditional values tend to be more submissive.

Respondents were asked to indicate approval or disapproval on a series of issues. Distribution of favourable opinion on these issues is shown below.

Table 161

Issue	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
Euthanasia	22.5	41.4	45.9	29.6
Death penalty	20.4	23.9	27.0	20.1
Birth control	80.0	87.9	85.9	84.1
Pre-marital sexual relations	12.8	39.3	46.3	22.9
Cloning	12.0	28.6	20.4	22.9
Marriage arranged by families	29.1	8.6	16.9	16.2
Marriage of people from different religious sects	49.9	63.9	64.8	56.2

- The "outsiders" express higher than average approval only for marriage arranged by families. Their level of approval remains lower than average in all other cases.

- The "aspiring intellectuals" express high approval in all instances except for arranged marriage, and to some extent, capital punishment.
- The "affluent" seem to highly favour all of the suggested practices, except for cloning and arranged marriage.
- The "introverts" express generally low approval for the said practices, with the possible exceptions of cloning and birth control.


Religious faith seems most widespread among the "outsiders", followed by the "introverts." The percentage of atheists reaches the highest level (2.7 percent) among "aspiring intellectuals". Belief in "extra-religious" God, on the other hand, is most widespread among the "affluent."

Variation among clusters by religious faith is shown on the following table.

Table 162

	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
I believe in God and in religion	94.9	83.0	84.1	88.4
I believe in God, but I can't find an agreeable concept of religion	1.7	4.9	9.9	2.3
I consider myself a believer in my own terms, but this is rather different from what is usually known as religion	0.9	1.9	2.0	3.0
I don't give much thought to faith	1.3	5.7	2.4	2.8
I don't know whether or not God exists	0.5	1.8	0.0	1.5
I am an atheist	0.7	2.7	1.6	2.0
<b>TOTAL (N)</b>	<b>1048</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>397</b>

The relationship between religious faith and relative position along the axis of modernity/tradition is graphically shown below.



The graph clearly demonstrates the negative relationship between modernity and frequency of response expressing belief in God. This response is least frequent among "aspiring intellectuals" who appear highest on the modernity scale, while being most frequent among "outsiders" who appear lowest on that scale.

#### 4. Identity and personality

In terms of identity formation, "outsiders" and the "introverts" are distinguished by their higher than average reference to a traditional-Islamic identity. In personal terms of self-definition, "outsiders" emphasise ordinary social roles, whereas the "introverts" have more strongly individualistic references. Conformity to the modernist project, left-wing politicisation and neo-modern attitudes prevail among "aspiring intellectuals."

"Aspiring intellectuals" and the "affluent" join in emphasising individualistic personality attributes. The "affluent" also have a high tendency to assume modernist and neo-modern identities, but in contrast to the "aspiring intellectuals", they tend towards right-wing politicisation.

### 5. Problems of the country

Respondents were asked to indicate the most important problem of the country that they would address if they were in government themselves. Cluster distribution of responses is shown below.

All groups place high emphasis on unemployment, terrorism, problems in education and the gap between the rich and the poor, although in varying order of priorities.

The "outsiders" express greater than average concern over unemployment, terrorism and gap between the rich and the poor, while underrating problems of education and social services.

The "aspiring intellectuals" are the most concerned. They place high emphasis on the gap between the rich and the poor, social services, drug addiction, educational problems, corruption, reactionary religion and environmental problems. They attach less than average significance to terrorism, Kurdish/South-east-

Table 163

Problem	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
Unemployment	74.6	62.7	55.1	63.2
Terrorism	45.2	37.7	43.8	41.8
Education	36.2	47.0	43.8	42.8
Gap between rich and poor	32.5	29.5	25.8	26.1
Corruption and bribery	19.3	18.3	25.4	17.7
Problem of Kurds/the Southeast	19.0	16.9	19.9	18.2
Drug addiction	17.2	20.2	15.2	22.9
Moral degradation	12.0	10.3	11.3	10.7
Environmental pollution	9.8	14.6	10.5	11.9
Social services ( health, social security, etc.)	9.1	14.4	10.9	12.7
Lack of protection for Turkey's own culture	6.8	6.2	10.2	13.2
Reactionary/retrogressive religion	4.9	9.3	9.8	5.5
Unplanned/uncontrolled urbanisation	4.7	5.4	5.5	7.7
Unequal official status of sects	2.6	2.1	3.1	2.5
Rural/urban/inequality	1.3	1.7	2.7	2.0
Total (N)	1050	515	256	402

ern problem, and lack of protection for Turkey's own culture.

The "affluent", by contrast are emphatic about terrorism, Kurdish/South-eastern problem, and lack of protection for Turkey's own culture, as well as about reactionary religion. They attach lower than average significance to unemployment, gap between the rich and the poor.

The "introverts" make more frequent than average reference to drug addiction, unplanned/uncontrolled urbanisation and lack of protection for Turkey's own culture. They are less concerned about corruption, gap between the rich and the poor and reactionary religion.

Distribution of opinion on the relationship between the modern/Western and traditional/Islamic segments of the society is as follows:

Majority opinion in all groups favours tolerance, but that opinion is strongest among "aspiring intellectuals". The call for the modern/Western segment to adapt to the traditional/Islamic one is strongest among the "outsiders", followed by the "introverts." It is much weaker among the "aspiring intellectuals" and the "affluent".

Rate of approval for Turkey's membership in various international organisations varies as follows:

Table 164


	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
Western segments should adapt to Islamic	16.2	7.7	8.8	13.2
Islamic segments should adapt to Western	11.8	12.3	11.6	3510.9
They should keep differences and live their own way	30.4	30.5	26.9	27.2
They should try to understand each other and what they have in common	41.5	49.5	52.6	48.7
Total (N)	1022	505	249	394

Table 165

Membership approved	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introvertsrow	%
European Union	33.1	48.6	43.7	39.1	39.1
Organisation of Islamic countries	17.8	7.8	10.8	12.3	13.6
Organisation of Turkic republics	21.9	20.5	21.0	22.8	21.6
Organisation of Balkan countries	1.8	2.8	3.3	2.1	2.3
None of the above	24.4	19.9	20.4	22.6	22.5
Other	0.9	0.4	0.9	1.1	0.8
Total (N)	1322	669	334	527	2852

The "aspiring intellectuals" are the strongest supporters of Turkey's membership in the European Union. They are followed by the "affluent" in this respect. Weakest support for EU membership is provided by the "outsiders", who favour membership in an Islamic organisation more strongly than average. The isolationist attitude is also most pronounced among the "outsiders".

Variation in attitude towards the economic role of the State and its contribution to individual subsistence, as well as in opinion on the social consequences of competition, is graphically represented below. (The graph reflects mean scores for each group, based on a scale of 10.)



As the graph demonstrates, the "affluent" are the least in favour of state intervention in the economy; the attitude in other clusters is close to the average. There is little difference of opinion with respect to the State supporting the individuals in making their living. The "aspiring intellectuals" and the "affluent" are the least worried about the potentially harmful effects of competition. Meanwhile tendency in favour of privatisation among the "affluent" seems related to their endorsement of free market economy.

## 6. The youth and its problems

Respondents were asked to indicate the most serious difficulties face by the youth in Turkey. Distribution of responses by clusters of respondents is shown below.

Table 166

Major difficulty	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
Unemployment	73.3	67.2	70.3	66.9
Lack of money	69.0	47.4	54.3	54.0
Not getting adequate/desired education	60.2	69.7	64.1	64.7
Not being taken seriously	27.0	35.3	29.3	30.3
Having nobody to get advice/guidance	26.0	27.0	30.5	25.4
Education hindered by youth events	13.9	16.9	15.2	22.6
Being forced to enter a youth groups	8.4	12.0	10.9	12.7
Lack of sporting facilities	7.0	6.2	6.3	6.0
Sexual problems	7.0	9.7	11.7	8.5
Total (N)	1050	515	256	402

The first three problems remain unchanged in all clusters, pointing to the severity of these problems for the youth as whole. Priorities do change, however, as apparent on the above table. It is noteworthy that interruptions in education due to youth events bother the "introverts" more than the "aspiring

intellectuals", especially in view of the relatively equal percentages of students in these two groups. Sexual problems are mentioned more frequently than average by the "affluent" and the "aspiring intellectuals"; the latter group also voices stronger complaint about not being taken seriously or not being respected.

Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they agreed with a series of statements related to the youth. The following table presents cluster distribution of agreement with these statements.

Table 167

Statement agreed with	Outsiders	Aspiring intellectuals	The affluent	Introverts
At present, young people are pacified in Turkey	54.1	62.0	61.4	57.1
The main responsibility of a young person is to be a good student	65.2	47.3	50.6	63.2
Young people are excluded from decision making in all spheres of social life	57.2	63.9	62.6	56.1
Educational institutions hinder development of young people's personalities	47.9	57.7	57.5	48.9
Young people can't communicate with their families or older generations	60.7	63.9	61.1	61.7
Problems of the youth are in fact common to the society as a whole	52.4	55.2	58.9	56.5
Young people should have social responsibility	78.7	87.4	89.7	82.1
Young people are unable to live their youth in Turkey today	61.6	61.9	64.0	63.0
Families should limit freedoms of young people so that they may not get into trouble	51.9	36.6	44.9	46.9
Young persons are constantly under pressure in the family, in school, and in employment	47.1	53.0	53.0	49.6
Lack of purpose, absence of ideals, and overall insensitivity are widespread among the youth	60.5	60.7	63.6	59.3
The problems of the youth can never be solved unless we are prepared to challenge tradition	47.1	52.1	52.0	48.1

The table shows that level of agreement varies little among the four clusters with two statements: the youth cannot communicate with older generations and the youth is unable to live its youth.

Comparable levels of agreement are observed between the "aspiring intellectuals" and the "affluent" with respect to a series of statements: young people are silenced in Turkey, they are excluded

from decision making processes, their personality development is hindered, they are under constant pressure, the youth should have social responsibility and problems of the youth cannot be solved without challenging tradition. Thus, these groups are found in agreement with respect to assigning the youth an active role, while the other two groups seem more reluctant.


The "outsiders" and the "introverts" are found close to one another in agreement that the main responsibility of a young person is to be a good student. The other two groups differ.

The "affluent" express the strongest agreement with the view that lack of purpose or ideal is widespread among the youth and the view that the problems of the youth are the same as those of the society as a whole. The strongest approval for the family imposed restrictions on the freedom of the youth comes from the "outsiders."

## 7. The present, the future and politics

Respondents were asked to compare their conditions of life with those of their parent's and of the next generation. Cluster distribution of responses is graphically presented below.


Satisfaction and Groups



The "introverts" are the only ones who consider themselves more fortunate than both their parents' and the next generation at rates higher than average. The opposite is true in the case of "outsiders" who feel less fortunate than both the earlier and the next generation. The other two groups, the "affluent" and the "aspiring intellectuals" feel more fortunate than their parents, but less fortunate than the next generation.

Variation in respondents' level of satisfaction in present conditions of life and their expectations for the near future is graphically shown below.

## Pleasure of Life



The "affluent" and the "aspiring intellectuals" are the happiest of all with their present conditions of life; they are also the most optimistic about the near future. The most dissatisfied and the most pessimistic group is formed by the "outsiders."

In terms of their interest in politics, it may be observed that the percentage of undecided is highest among the "outsiders" and lowest among the "introverts". The tendency not to vote or vote blank is strongest among the "aspiring intellectuals" (total 34 percent), followed by the "introverts" and the "affluent".

Respondents were asked to indicate the persons whom they wished to see in government. Distribution of responses

suggests that Sabancı and Yılmaz enjoy high popularity among all clusters, while Erdoğan seems to appeal to all but the "aspiring intellectuals". This last group favours Baykal and the "affluent" favour Ecevit highly.

The percentage of respondents who do not wish to see any of these persons in government is highest among the "aspiring intellectuals". Strongest support for Uras, Soysal and Bozlak, as well as weakest support for Bahçeli, Türkeş and Yazıcıoğlu is also found in this group. Tibuk, known for his liberalism, enjoys highest popularity among the "affluent", while Çevik Bir is least popular among the "outsiders".

**QUESTIONNAIRE ON**  
**TURKISH YOUTH**

*August 1998*

QUESTIONNAIRE ON TURKISH YOUTH

August 1998

İMV-SAM (İstanbul Mülkiye Foundation - Social Research Center)

Tel: 284 88 72 / 284 88 73)

Good morning/afternoon. We are conducting a study among young people living in Turkey. We will appreciate it greatly if you would participate.

Q.1 Respondent's sex: 1.Female 2.Male

Q. 2 How old are you? .....

Q. 3 Which province were you born in? (If born abroad, indicate country.) What is your present province of residence?

Province born	
Province lived	

Q.4 Were you born and do you presently live in a city, a small town or a village?

Type of settlement	Born	Presently live
City		
Small town		
Village		

Q.5 (IF PROVINCE OF BIRTH AND RESIDENCE DIFFERENT) How many years ago did you come to live here? .....

Q. 6 What is your status of studentship and/or employment?

1.	Student, not working
2.	Student, preparing for university exams
3.	Student, working only on vacations
4.	Both student and working
5.	Working, not a student
6.	Both working and preparing for exams
7.	Unemployed (seeking work), not a student
8.	Other (specify)

Q. 7 (IF STUDENT) What kind of work do you do? (IF WORKING or UNEMPLOYED/ SEEKING WORK) what is your occupation or profession? Specify.

STUDENT (3, 4) Job/ Profession	
WORKING (5, 6, 7) Job/ Profession	

Q.8 What grade are you in or up to what grade did you attend school? (If finished last attended school/university, write "Graduate" across that option.)

School/University	Grade
Did not attend school	
Primary school	
Middle school	
Vocational middle school	
High school	
Vocational high school	
Junior college (2-year undergraduate program)	
University (undergraduate)	
Graduate (master's/doctoral)	

Q. 9 What level of education did your parents complete?

	Mother	Father
Did not complete any school		
Primary school		
Middle school		
High school		
University		
Master's / Doctoral degree		

Q. 10 What is your parents' occupation or profession?

Write out parents' profession/occupation	
Mother	
Father	

Q. 11 Do you or your parents know a foreign language well enough to read or speak? If so what language(s)?

Foreign language	Self	Mother	Father
German			
Arabic			
French			
English			
Other (specify)			

Q. 12 What is your monthly household income and the money you personally get per month?

	Household	Personal
Less than 50 million TL		
50-100 million TL		
101-200 million TL		
201-300 million TL		
301-400 million TL		
401-500 million TL		
More than 500 million TL		

Q. 13 What is your main personal source of income? (If more than one, mention the most significant.)

Parents or family	Regular part-time job
Training allowance or educational grant	Casual work
Partner	Other (specify)
Regular full-time job	

Q. 14 Are you single, married or engaged?

Single	
Engaged	
Married	
Other (specify)	

Q. 15 (IF MARRIED) How old were you when you got married? .....

Q. 16 Do you have children? If so, how many?

Qty	
YES	
NO	

Q. 17 How many people live in your household? .....

Q. 18 Do you live with your parents/family, your friend(s), your partner, alone or (IF STUDENT, during the academic year) in student housing?

With parents	In a "bachelor's room"
With sister/brother	Alone
With partner/husband/wife	In student housing
Sharing the place with a friend/friends	Other (specify)

Q. 19 (IF PERMANENTLY MOVED OUT OF PARENTS' HOME) How old were you when you left home? .....

Q. 20 Which of the following do you have/own/possess?

Independent residence (flat, house, etc.)	
Private room	
My own bank account	
My own or supplementary credit card	
Motorcycle	
Car	
Mobile telephone	
Personal computer	
Bicycle	
Music set, disc or cassette player	

Q.21 What do you do in your leisure time? (INTERVIEWER: Read one by one, mark all **POSITIVE responses.**)

Read books	
Read newspapers, magazines	
Do handicrafts (ceramics, glass, woodworking, embroidery, etc)	
Do social or charitable work	
Play cards or backgammon	
Go to a match	
Use computer/Internet	
Play a musical instrument	
Painting	
Go to a disco, bar, etc.	
Practice a sport	
Go to a concert, theatre	
Other (specify)	

Q.22 Where do you generally gather/meet with friends? (Indicate the two most frequently used options.)

My home	Cafe, cafeteria	
A friend's home	Beer-house	
School (campus) canteen	Pastry shop, tea garden, park, etc.	
Coffee shop	On street within the neighbourhood	
Clubhouse or similar premises	Other (specify)	

Q.23 I will now mention various kinds of clubs, social organisation or associations. Please indicate if you are a member of or regularly participate in the activities of any such organisation. (INTERVIEWER: Read one by one, mark all **POSITIVE responses.**)

Social welfare or charitable organisations		
Islamic community, foundation, group		
Environmental, nature or animal-protecting organisations		
Culture and arts societies		
Student clubs or associations		
Special interest (hobby) clubs or societies		
Folklore clubs, associations		
Trade unions		
Political-social-cultural foundations or associations		
Political parties		
Sport clubs/associations		
None of the above		
Other (specify)		

Q.24 (IF FREQUENTS A SPORTS CLUB) What branch of sporting activity do you participate in?

Sport branch	
--------------	--

Q.25 Who understands you best? (Indicate three, starting with "1" for the best understanding.)

Mother		Father	
Sister/brother		Fellow student	
Neighbourhood friend		Fellow worker/employee	
Partner or girl/boy friend		Close friend from the opposite sex	
Teacher/ professor		Nobody	
Other (specify)			

Q.26 What are the most common topics of conversation among your group of friends? (Indicate 3, starting with "1" for the topic most frequently talked on.)

Quarrel between parents, family problems		Sex	
Religion, faith		Philosophy, literature, arts	
Football, games		Dress, outfit	
Job/workplace		School, courses, teachers	
Money		Partner, girl/boy friend	
Small talk		Movies, music, entertainment	
Politics		Other (specify)	

Q.27 Which of the following should a person adapt to in order to live a happy and confident life? (Indicate three, starting with "1" for the most significant.)

Job or work		
Family (s)he comes from		
Neighbourhood community		
Family (s)he starts		
Mosque community		
Native folk		
Group of friends		
People of the same world-view, life-style		
Other (specify)		

Q.28 Where, would you say, lies the meaning of life? (Indicate 3, starting with "1" for the most significant.)

Family	Masterwork	
Child/Children	Religion, faith	
Education	Knowledge	
Partner, beloved	Struggle towards an ideal	
Professional success	Wealth, money	
Life has no meaning	Other (specify)	

Q.29 Do you think most people are trustworthy? Or should one be always on guard when entering into any sort of relationship or doing business with others?

Most people are trustworthy	
Most people are untrustworthy	
Most people are trustworthy, but one should still be careful	

Q.30 Which of the following statements reflect or describe your family life? (**Multiple response. Indicate all that hold.**)

Everyone lead his/her own life; on some days, we don't even see each other.	
Quarrels never seem to end within the family.	
My family knows my close friends.	
The family does whatever the father says.	
I discuss all my serious problems within the family, first.	
In my family, I'd be considered disrespectful of elders if I openly speak my mind.	

Q.31 Which of the following statements would you say describes the most significant impact of the family in Turkey? (**SINGLE RESPONSE**)

The family works to have a restricting and hindering effect on the youth after a certain age.	
The family is the institution that protects the young person and offers him a warm home no matter what.	

Q.32 The family may help a young person get a wide variety of characteristics, some of which I shall now mention. Which ones did your family give you? (**MAXIMUM OF 3 RESPONSES**)

Ability to think and act independently	Honesty	
Loyalty to the state and the nation	Piety	
Consciousness to struggle for a better world	Civic consciousness	
Respect for custom and tradition	Other (specify)	

Q.33 When you think about your relations with older generations, do you tend to agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Agree	Disagree	Don't know
Older people don't understand me.			
I know all I need to know; I don't need the advice of older people.			
I generally trust older people.			
Older people can keep up with new developments just as much as we can.			

S.34 Do you tend to agree or disagree with the following statements? (**INTERVIEWER: READ EACH STATEMENT, ONE BY ONE, AND RECORD RESPONSE IN APPROPRIATE CELL**)

	Agree	Disagree	DK
At present, young people are pacified in Turkey.	1	2	3
The main responsibility of a young person is to be a good student	1	2	3
Young people are excluded from decision making processes in all spheres of social life.	1	2	3
Educational institutions hinder the development of young people's personalities.	1	2	3
Young people can't communicate with their families or older generations	1	2	3
Problems of the youth are in fact common to the society as a whole.	1	2	3
Young people must have social responsibility	1	2	3
Young people are unable to live their youth in Turkey today.	1	2	3
Families should limit the freedoms of young people so as to prevent their getting into trouble/engaging in harmful practices.	1	2	3
Young people are constantly under pressure within the family, in school, and in employment.	1	2	3
Lack of purpose, absence of ideals, and overall insensitivity are widespread among the youth.	1	2	3
The problems of the youth can never be solved unless we are prepared to challenge tradition.	1	2	3

Q.35 Effort is needed on the part of many persons and institutions to solve various problems that Turkey faces today. Which of the following persons or institutions can contribute most to solving those problems? (**SHOW CARD, MAXIMUM 3 RESPONSES**)

Parliament		Political parties	
President		Courts /judiciary)	
Scientists		Youth	
Businessmen		Press/Media	
Clergy		Trade unions	
Teachers		NGOs	
Government		Other (specify)	
Army			

Q.36 Many young people complain about the inadequacy of education in schools/universities. What would you say is the most important complaint? (**Indicate two, starting with "1" for the most important. SHOW CARD**)

Teachers/professors are not knowledgeable enough.	
Teachers/professors lack the necessary pedagogical training.	
Technical facilities such as laboratory and computer equipment are inadequate.	
The curriculum is outdated/fails to incorporate modern developments.	
Education is mainly based on memorising.	
Education does not prepare the student for business/professional life.	
The student is not given a chance to make choices according to his own tendencies/abilities.	
Classes are over-crowded.	
There are not enough teachers/professors; courses/hours go unattended.	
Other (specify)	

Q. 37 What is the main reason why a young person should receive education? (**Indicate two, starting with "1" for the most important reason. SHOW CARD**)

To get knowledge and training	
To develop a capacity for systematic thinking	
To become well versed in general culture	
For the sake of social esteem/respectability	
To please his/her family	
To benefit/care for his/her family	
To benefit his/her country/nation	
To develop love for humanity	
What really counts is not formal education, but life-experience.	
Other (specify)	

Q.38 (**UNIVERSITY STUDENTS**) Is your present faculty/department the one that you wished to enter? Please indicate both in terms of your subject of study, and in terms of the specific university/college.

Subject desired	University/college desired
YES	
NO	

Q.39 What kind of employment would you like to have? **(SINGLE RESPONSE)**

Public sector		Private sector	
Self-employed		Establish my own company	

Q.40 Which of the following assets constitutes the greatest advantage for young person's finding a good job? **(Indicate two, starting with "1" for the most significant. SHOW CARD)**

Good formal education/diploma	
Knowledge of a foreign language	
Computer skills	
Influential acquaintances	
Good appearance	
Vocational training/apprenticeship	
Honesty, industriousness and reliability	
Other (specify)	
Don't know	

Q.41 **(UNIVERSITY STUDENTS)** Do you think you will be able to find a job in your own field of study?

1) Yes                    2) No                    3) I don't know/I'm not sure

Q.42 **(WORKING YOUTH)** Are you employed in a job that is related to your field of education/training?

1) Yes                    2) No

Q.43 **(WORKING YOUTH)** Would you take another job if you could?

1) Yes                    2) No

Q.44 Different people have different views on carrying out orders in the workplace. Some feel that one should obey the instructions of his superiors even though he disagrees with them. Others argue that one should be convinced that instructions refer to the right thing to do before he obeys them. What is your position on this subject?

One should carry out instructions without question	
Depends on the case	
I should be convinced that instructions are right	
Don't know	

Q.45 Among the difficulties faced by the youth in Turkey, which would you say are the most important? **(Indicate three, starting with "1" for the most important. SHOW CARD)**

Not getting the education that he wants/is adequate	
Unemployment/absence of job security	
Lack of money	
Not being taken seriously/not being respected	
Pressure from the family/environment	
Sexual problems	
Lack of sporting facilities	
Having no one to consult/seek guidance from	
Being forced to enter one of the groups among the youth	
Education hindered by social struggles among youth	
Other (specify)	

Q.46 Which political party do you think shows more concern for the problems of the youth?

1) ANAP	3) DSP	5) FP	7) MHP
2) CHP	4) DYP	6) HADEP	8) Other (specify) .....

Q.47 What frightens you most in life? (**SINGLE RESPONSE**) .....

Q.48 If young people like you were governing Turkey today, what would be the first problem that they would address? (**Indicate three, starting with "1" for the most important. SHOW CARD**)

Unemployment	
Gap between the rich and the poor	
Problem of Kurds/the Southeast	
Reactionary/ retrogressive religion	
Terrorism	
Moral degradation, loss of values	
Drug addiction	
Unplanned/uncontrolled urbanisation, squatter settlements	
Rural/urban gap/inequality	
Environmental pollution	
Education	
Social services (health, social security, etc.)	
Corruption/Bribery	
Unequal official status of sects	
Lack of protection for Turkey's own culture	
Other (specify)	

Q.49 Effort is made by many persons and institutions to solve various problems that Turkey faces today. Which of the following persons or institutions have the greatest contribution to solving those problems? (**SHOW CARD, MAXIMUM 3 RESPONSES**)

Parliament		Teachers	
Youth		President	
Government		Press/Media	
Scientists		Army	
Trade unions		Businessmen	
Political parties		NGOs	
Clergy		Courts /judiciary)	
Other (specify)			

Q.50 Which of the following pairs of views do you tend to support? Please indicate by placing yourself at a point between 0 and 10.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Privatisation should become more extensive. State intervention in the economy should be increased.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

People should assume greater responsibility in earning their living. The state should support the people in earning their living.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Competition is good. It leads to individual and the social development

Competition is harmful. It leads to hostility and disintegration.

Q.51 Who among the following persons would you prefer to play a prominent role in national government? (**MAXIMUM OF THREE NAMES**)

Devlet Bahçeli	Şerafettin Elçi	Besim Tibuk
Deniz Baykal	Necmettin Erbakan	Tuğrul Türkeş
Çevik Bir	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Ufuk Uras
Murat Bozlak	Fetullah Gülen	Erol Yarar
Tansu Çiller	Zülfü Livaneli	Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu
Süleyman Demirel	Sakıp Sabancı	Mesut Yılmaz
İzzettin Doğan	Rüştü Saracoğlu	Other (specify).....
Bülent Ecevit	Mümtaz Soysal	.....

Q.52 Would you like to live in another country?

1) Yes                    2) No                    c) Don't know

(IF YES) Which country? .....

Q.53 Comparing yourself with your parents and the generation after you, do you in **personal terms**, consider yourself to be more or less fortunate than them?

	More fortunate	The same	Less fortunate
Parents			
Younger generation			

Q.54 Very generally speaking, how happy are you with your life? Please indicate by assigning it a point between 0 and 10.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Unhappy

Happy

Q.55 Do you think this will change in the near future or how happy do you think you will be, let us say, in five years' time. Please estimate between 0 and 10 points.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Unhappy

Happy

5.56 I shall now read you a list of opposing pairs of phrases on different subjects. In about ten years' time, which one of each set of conditions do you feel is **more likely** to materialise? (Select only one option in each row.)

Find no job / remain unemployed	Find a good/better job
Have comfortable means of life	Be short of money
Increasing threat to social peace/ greater anarchy and terrorism	Establishment of social peace and order
Increased freedom, greater democracy	Oppressive regime restricting freedoms
Greater effect of Islamic values in social life and public administration	Turkey having a more Western outlook
Increased environmental awareness and protection	Increased environmental pollution and carelessness
More widespread poverty in the country	Higher standard of life for all in the country
Greater peace and order throughout the world	More wars/greater threat to peace in the world

Q.57 What main purpose do schools and universities serve in Turkey? (**Indicate two, starting with "1" for the most significant. SHOW CARD**)

Providing knowledge and training
Developing one's capacity for systematic thinking
Providing general culture
Ensuring social esteem/respectability
Raising people to benefit the country/nation
Teaching Kemalism
Creating democratic/civic consciousness
Other (specify)

Q.58 People speak about the existence of modern, Western-oriented segments and traditional, Islamic segments of the society in Turkey. Which of the following views do you tend to support more with respect to relations between these two segments (**SINGLE RESPONSE**)

Modern/Western segments should adapt to the Islamic and traditional segments in view of the realities of Turkey.
Islamic/traditional segments should adapt to the modern/ Western segments in view of developments in the world.
Nobody needs to adapt to the other; each should keep its differences and lead its own life.
Different segment should get to know and understand one another, also trying to see what they share in common.

Q.59 In terms of religious faith, which one of the following statements more closely describes your position? (**SINGLE RESPONSE**)

I believe in God and in religion.
I believe in God, but I can't find/see an agreeable concept of religion.
I consider myself a believer in my own terms, but this is rather different from what is usually known as religion.
I don't give much thought to faith.
I don't know whether or not God exists.
I am an atheist. I don't believe in God, or in any religion.

Q.60 Which of the following practices do you regularly or sometimes engage in association with your religious faith?

	Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Going to the mosque			
Observing prayer hours ( <i>namaz</i> )			
Fasting			
Praying			
Going to "Cem Evi"			
Reading and thinking on religion			
Other (specify)			

Q.61 Do you think female university students should be allowed to attend class wearing headscarves? (**SINGLE RESPONSE**)

Yes, because it is their right in a democratic country	
Yes, because it is an Islamic precept	
No, because it runs counter to principles of Kemalism	
No, because it ideologically based behaviour	
Don't know	

Q.62 Suppose you needed the services of the following list of persons. Would you prefer that person to be a man or a woman?

	Woman	Man	No difference
Lawyer			
Baby-sitter			
Doctor (physician)			
Judge			
Member of Parliament			
Teacher			
Boss			
Police officer			
Psychologist			
Taxi driver			
Aircraft pilot			

Q.63 Do you agree or disagree with the following statements on the changing role of women?

	Agree	Disagree	DK
A working mother can also properly care for her child(ren).			
Pre-school children may suffer from the mother's working.			
What women really want is a home and children.			
Being a housewife is just as satisfying as having regular employment.			
Employment is the key to a woman's independence.			
Both man and wife should contribute the family budget.			

Q.64 How do you tend to feel about the following people? That they are 1) Invariably no good; that 2) Most are bad, but some are good; that 3) Most are good, but some are bad; or that they are 4) Invariably good people?

Arabs	Rich people	Politicians	
Russians	French	Alavites	
Greeks	Greeks	Americans	
Homosexuals	Germans	Jews	
Blacks	Romanians	Freemasons	
Gypsies	Armenians	"Idealists"*	
Prostitutes	Socialists Unbelievers		

\* extreme nationalists

Q.65 Would you indicate whether you are in favour of or against the following.

	Favour	Against	DK
Euthanasia			
Death penalty			
Birth control/family planning			
Pre-marital sexual relations			
Cloning			
Marriage arranged by families			
Marriage of people from different religious sects			

Q.66 With respect to pre-marital relations between the two sexes, which of the statements more closely reflect your view? (SINGLE RESPONSE)

It is highly desirable because it helps young people to fully know one another.	
It is normal provided that one does not go beyond a certain point.	
It is unacceptable because it runs counter to tradition and public morality.	

Q.67 Where did you get your knowledge on sexual matters and the opposite sex?

Parents	
Friends	
Brother/sister	
Books/magazines	
Teacher	
Specialist-advisor	
Other (specify)	

Q.68 Have you ever had a girl/boy friend?

1) Yes 2) No

Q. 69 Have you ever used a computer, the Internet, a mobile telephone or e-mail? If so, how frequently?

	No, Never	Yes, a few times	Yes, use it frequently
Computer			
Internet			
Mobile telephone			
E-mail			

Q.70 What, in your opinion, is the ideal marrying age for men? For women?

Age	
For men	
For women	

Q.71 How do you feel about having a child/children?

Don't want to have children	
I'd like to have 1 child	
I'd like to have 2 children	
I'd like to have 3 or more children	
I'd like to have as many children as I'm given	
I'd like to have as many children as I can raise	
Don't know, never thought about it	

Q.72 What international organisation(s) should Turkey be a member of? (**MAXIMUM OF TWO RESPONSES**)

European Union	
Organisation of Muslim countries	
Organisation of Turkic republics	
Organisation of Balkan countries	
Should be a member of none, but maintain good relations with all	
Other (specify)	

Q.73 With respect to Turkeys relations with Europe and the European Union, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Agree	Disagree	DK
Entering the European Union would make us lose our own values.			
Joining the EU would facilitate development of democracy and human rights in Turkey.			
We should find ways of developing on our own rather than placing our hopes with Europe.			
Joining the EU would help Turkish economy.			

Q. 74 On the 75 years of Republican Westernisation policy, which of the following views is closest to your own? (**SINGLE RESPONSE**)

Westernisation in Turkey is superficial and a mere imitation.	
Westernisation in Turkey was a mistake all the way from the outset.	
Turkish policy of Westernisation is right, but the Europeans are hypocritical and prejudiced against us.	
Don't know	

Q.75 One can speak about various youth groups in Turkey, as well as in other countries. What would you say are the groups that one can find among young people in Turkey. Would you name the first few that come to your mind.

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Q.76 As you know, people in Turkey and around the world define themselves in terms of their professions, their sex, race, religion, faith, nationality, political views, etc. How would you define yourself?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Q.77 What was your vote on the last general elections of 24 December 1995?  
**(INTERVIEWER: Do NOT show options!)**

1) ANAP	5) HADEP	9) Did not vote on purpose
2) CHP	6) MHP	10) Voted blank
3) DSP	7) RP	11) Could not vote, was busy
4) DYP	8) Other (specify) .....	

Q.78 (ASK ALL) What would your vote be if elections were held next Sunday?  
(INTERVIEWER: Do NOT show options!)

1) ANAP	5) HADEP	9) Did not vote on purpose
2) CHP	6) MHP	10) Voted blank
3) DSP	7) RP	11) Could not vote, was busy
4) DYP	8) Other (specify) .....	

Q.79 As a young person living in Turkey, what do you expect from the state? What should the state do for the youth?

.....

Q.80 As a young person living in Turkey, what do you expect from your family?

.....

Q.81 As a young person living in Turkey, what do you expect from the school/university and your teachers/professors?

.....

Respondent's Name:

Address:

Telephone:

Interviewer:

Date :

Time:

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