

THE STATE IN THE "THIRD WORLD"¹

Manfred Mols

Looking at a world atlas produced in the mid-1930s presents an image of political constructs of which only a minority, even by the standards of the time, could be described as states. These included most countries in Europe, those in both Americas, Japan, Thailand, with some reservations Australia and New Zealand and, with even greater reservations, a few political units in the Orient and in Africa as well as the Republic of China prior to the Japanese invasion. The large "global remainder" consisted of occupied areas, colonies, semi-colonies, mandated territories of the League of Nations and constructs and communities not defined in terms of state, or sometimes even political theory. This picture underwent substantial change in the second half of the 20th century.

Mankind today – across all continents and regions – lives in a world which is almost entirely organised into about 200 states which, again, in many cases are assumed to appear as "national" structures.² This state of affairs is reflected in terms of international law in both the name and programme of the "United Nations". The development of wide-spread changes occurring after the end of the Second World War has often been described. The findings, however, usually come across as superficial and structural when considered from the viewpoints of political analysis. Little use can be made of them, either in terms of political education or providing practical political advice or in terms of foreign or development policy – as they usually fail to cover the historical and cultural background in sufficient depth, reveal hardly adequate degrees of contextual



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- 1 | The author is well aware of both the discussion on and the criticism of the term "Third World". Nonetheless, some indeed do already talk about First and Second World. Cf. Parag Khanna, *Der Kampf um die Zweite Welt*, Berlin, 2008.
- 2 | Cf. Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, *States in a Changing World. A Contemporary Analysis*, Oxford, 1993.

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sensitivity and, above all, do not provide adequate evaluation criteria. Western development policy, including Germany's, is far too characterised by economic considerations, accompanied by what seem to be added-on

aims of promoting social change, to also include questions of sovereignty and politics to an adequate degree in their programmes. As well as deserving respect, some scepticism must be expressed as to whether this has been countered by the discussion about "good governance"³ which has been welcomed and conducted for over a decade now.⁴

What, therefore, are the various dilemmas confronting practical academic studies dealing with the topic of the state in the Third World? Only some of the difficulties can be discussed in an essay such as this – and without any claim of being able to offer any finalised analytical solutions. Just an incidental remark at this stage: Although the essay deals with the subject of the "State in the Third World", several references are made to Japan, which, in overall terms and from that country's own perspective, has long been counted as a part of the 'First World'. Japan is, therefore, taken as an indispensable reference point because in the second half of the 19th century, it managed, with a unique application of its own energy, to jump from a late-feudal structure into what was defined by the West as the modern era and yet, in the process, managed to place equal importance on retaining the key points of its own culture and history and has continued to operate according to this twin-track philosophy to the present day.

THE STATE AS A POLITICAL ORIENTATION SYMBOL FOR REGULATION IN THE MODERN AGE

The state is not some political structure, established, as it were, by nature, which has been present in some form or other throughout all of known history, but is actually a relatively modern form of organising communities for

3 | Cf. Heribert Weiland, Ingrid Wehr and Matthias Seifert (eds.), *Good Governance in der Sackgasse*, Baden-Baden, 2009.

4 | Manfred Mols, "Good Governance – ein Konzept auf der Suche nach entwicklungspolitischen Realismus", in: Weiland, Wehr and Seifert (eds.), *Good Governance in der Sackgasse*, n. 3, 53-68.

living together within a set of legal and power relationships. There is no clear guarantee that states will exist for all possible future time. It must remain open as to whether people will still be talking in 100 or 200 years time of a world of states encompassing the globe with the same certainty as occurs today. Nevertheless, two key features must be borne in mind, without which the idea of a state could not be conceived or without which it would not possess its current actual world-wide attractiveness: Firstly, successful, meaning stable and perhaps ever more expanding state structures have asserted themselves at a very early stage of their existence and really up to the present day due to the deployment and exuding of power, irrespective of whether this was driven more strongly by military, economic or also religious or cultural motives. It is often the case that a mixture of all of these can be identified (the Spanish conquests in the Americas are a graphic illustration of this inter-connection; the same holds true for U.S. policy towards the Pacific region, which had already set in by the beginning of the 19th century). Secondly, states, as well as the ways in which states grow, represent an ideal stage of development which, in terms of specific forms of organisation and achievement distinguishing the modern era in very many areas of life – although certainly with some changes in detail and also with sometimes considerable variations – is shared world-wide. The state remains nonetheless essentially a structure which came about in Europe and in its 'junior partner', the USA, supplemented amongst others by the "archaic modernity" of Japan⁵, and it continues to stand, with the assumption just referred to, for a western order, whose achievements are respected and which is regarded in the West itself, that is to say in Europe, the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and, for a number of years now, also South Korea and Taiwan and indeed in almost all other parts of the world, as the paradigm for political normality. This is also definitely true for that "Far West", Latin America,⁶ which has, however, never succeeded to date in becoming a full member of the

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5 | Cf. Thomas Immoos, *Japan. Archaische Moderne*, Munich, 1990.

6 | Cf. Alain Rouquier, *Introducción à L'Extrême Occident*, Paris, 1987.

developing international system through its unstable and loss-making economic track record.⁷

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A first dilemma in our investigation reveals itself at this point. Whenever and wherever the state is discussed and analysed in terms of the totally dominant self-image of the model in and from the West, it is accepted as being valid world-wide as the generally accepted standard for macro-level political structures. Non-Western political systems usually crop in contemporary political science textbooks as residual values, the mention of which cannot be entirely avoided in our age⁸, but which appear as structures at the edges of what really counts in the political world. Political education remains wedded to the "constitutional state of the modern age" (Carl-Joachim Friedrich) – and that is what increasingly distinguishes its present-day crisis, namely dispensing with any understanding of the state or politics encompassing culture and place. Political philosophy – occasionally presented with great claims of being "a synthesis of political insight and philosophical experience"⁹ – concentrates on experience from the Western world and avoids the issue as to what political and philosophical thinking is undertaken in non-Western regions of the world.

A very large proportion of our textbooks devoted to teaching Comparative Systems or Government (or whatever this cannon of subjects may be called) at most only takes account of Africa, Asia or even (relatively Western) Latin

7 | Cf. Manfred Mols, "Das politische Lateinamerika. Profil und Entwicklungstendenzen", *Aktuelle Analysen* 45, Munich, 2007; Manfred Mols, "Lateinamerikas internationale Zukunft. Der Subkontinent zwischen 'Dependencia' und Globalisierung", in: Stephan Scheuzger and Peter Fleer (eds.), *Die Moderne in Lateinamerika. Zentren und Peripherien des Wandels*, Frankfurt am Main, 2009.

8 | Cf. Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Theo Stammen, *Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft*, Munich, 2003; Andrew Heywood, *Politics*, Houndmills and London, 1997.

9 | Cf. Carl Karl Graf Ballestrem and Henning Ottmann, *Politische Philosophie im 21. Jahrhundert*, Munich, 1990.

America in a few isolated examples.¹⁰ Even in the case of a benign willingness on the part of individual authors to set their understanding on a broader basis, the non-Western countries cited as examples crop up almost exclusively as deviations from the Western standard (of a state). The key and final point of this development has now come to focus on the well known discussion regarding so-called 'failed states'.¹¹ In this process, normality can appear in various disguises. Many of the group who consciously approached the Third World in the 1960s, studied the impulse by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman with their then pioneering collection of essays on *The Politics of the Developing Areas*¹² as a first serious attempt to arrive at new analytical strategies, while dispensing with the institutionalism theory of the state in the USA as here in Europe by seizing upon the new approaches of functionalist theories of systems which had then appeared – and which has been maintained as an approach up to the present, without in the meantime leaving their own subject of investigation (the Western state in the form of an exchange model between state and society).

The basic findings of the Western model as the one regarded as setting the standard for state and political modernisation could not be undermined. Special Edition 16 of *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* published in 1985 provides a concrete example of this, whereby it must be added that many of the academics still alive and active today have never surrendered their predominantly Western standards.¹³ If attention is paid today to non-Western countries and regions in terms of their statehood, signs appear in various

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10 | Cf. for example Jeffrey Kopstein, Mark Lichbach, *Comparative Politics. Interest, Identities, and Institutions in a Changing Global Order*, Cambridge USA (3rd ed.), 2009; Carol Ann Drogus, *Comparative Politics. Concepts and Cases in Context*, Washington D.C., 2009.

11 | Cf. Sigmar Schmidt, "'Demokratien mit Adjektiven'. Die Entwicklungschancen defekter Demokratien", in: *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit* No. 7/8, July/August, 2001, 219-223; Annette Büttner, *Staatszerfall als neues Phänomen in der internationalen Politik*, Marburg, 2004.

12 | Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Princeton, 1960.

13 | Cf. Franz Nuscheler (ed.), "Dritte Welt-Forschung. Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik", *PVS*, Special Edition 16, 1985.

connections that we are not seldom dealing with so-called hybrid states, that is to say with a mixed perspective, which is often presented as a swaying between democracy and forms of authoritarianism stemming from tradition. Even if there is no standard definition for this type, and definitions thus waver, the whole focus is on seeing the relativisation of a strong capacity for "governance"¹⁴ through restrictions which cannot be grasped any more in formal terms and which usually derive from outmoded traditions and/or inner-societal cultural contradictions. The warning is indirectly given at this point to take care with dichotomous thinking, as it works with binary contractions and imbalances – not to say prejudices as well, which ignores whatever is excluded or other possibilities by regarding matters stubbornly through its own sensory system. More modern trans-differentiation research tries to work out critically the loss of empiricism caused by this.¹⁵ Thinking which excluded alternatives, or reduced these to an ideal type, was wide-spread in the ways political science dealt with the non-Western world, and this has also by no means disappeared. At ideological levels (e.g. the correspondence which is repeatedly stated to exist between representative democracy and free markets), a more persistent and therewith dogmatic stance could be maintained than in more modern measurements of the quality of statehood.

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THE STATE AS A UNIVERSAL CRITERION FOR ASSESSING POLITICAL MODERNITY

One way which would seem to suggest itself to escape the basic dilemma of using the standard of the Western model one-sidedly would be to promote a greater understanding of politics and political order through Asian, African and Latin American Studies in our universities and other educational institutions. Such a demand can also not be avoided by referring to the fact that more than four fifths of the world itself is non-Western, even if parts of this

14 | Cf. Pierre Jom and B. Guy Peters, *Governance, Politics and the State*, London, 2000.

15 | Allolio-Näcle, Britta Kalscheuer and Anne Manzechke (eds.), *Differenzen anders denken. Bausteine zu einer Kulturtheorie der Transdifferenz*, Frankfurt am Main / New York, 2004.

“remainder” appear to subscribe to a policy of catching up in terms of development. Such thinking urgently needs to be considered, because the belief in the Western dominance of the world is disappearing.¹⁶ This is because it is a delusion to believe that development can be restricted solely to aspects of Western economic and technical or functional civilisation, a fact already pointed out decades ago by the Bolivian Felipe Mansilla in a forceful work¹⁷ – a conviction which brings problems, as can also be seen in the biographical pride of the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, expressed already in the title and contents of his memoirs (*From Third World to First*).¹⁸ The West deals with standards, which simply appear imposed from a political science perspective and against the background of long years of experience in other continents.

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One example instead of many: Klaus Schlichte discusses in his book *Der Staat in der Weltgesellschaft. Politische Herrschaft in Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika* aspects of assessing theories of legitimation according to criteria of law from works by Max Weber, Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas. This represents a sequencing of Western standards in pure form.¹⁹ Would it be possible to work with them for and in India or Bolivia or Libya? If professors there deal in the range of terms which are judged sceptically here and also find corresponding forms of publication from such countries as evidence of proof of their (mostly relative) currency, then that is less a trans-cultural confirmation of general utility than the result of academic training in the West or of consulting Western theoretical literature.

To be able to understand foreign cultures, or even to enter into discussions with them, is impossible without recourse to the substance of their own culture on the part of the

16 | Cf. Kishore Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere. The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*, New York, 2008.

17 | Cf. H.C.F. Mansilla, *Die Trugbilder der Entwicklung in der Dritten Welt*, Paderborn inter alia, 1986.

18 | Cf. Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First. The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*, Singapore, 2000.

19 | Cf. Klaus Schlichte, *Der Staat in der Weltgesellschaft. Politische Herrschaft in Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika*, Frankfurt am Main / New York 2005.

interpreter. It does then, however, make a difference whether the “undertaking of European rationality” is raised to the level of a universal standard or whether the perspective of discovering differences is adopted.²⁰ In this way, we cannot escape from the tension between universalism and historicity or particularity.²¹

The bias of Western perspectives and experience over years is not, however, the only obstacle to establishing an assessment of statehood in the Third World which is appropriate for its situation. The other part is no less difficult: The regulatory policy impulses towards a claim of validity which essentially resembles that of the West are largely missing, at least from a political science perspective, across the broad operating field which is still designated, albeit not entirely unproblematically, as the

“Third World”. Of course, there are regional and country specialists working on modules which deal with specific regions. Regional specialist academics, however, almost live a life of their own. Their reference groups are less (and sometimes hardly at all!) other political scientists or sociologists or even

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historians and geographers, but the representatives of the same regional or country points of focus. There are several reasons for this. With all due respect to outstanding intellectual accomplishments in China (Confucius and the long line of interpreters who followed), in India (the political reflections of the Hindu tradition, including thinking in categories of “wholes”) or in the dependence thinking in Latin America stretching right up the theology of liberation, there is no avoiding the accusation made against Western social sciences, including political science, that these matters generally are no longer at the heart of discussions among us or also in the USA. The West rarely listens: It

20 | Cf. Peter Weber-Schäfer, “‘Eurozentrismus’ contra ‘Universalismus’. Über die Möglichkeiten, nicht-europäische Kulturen zu verstehen”, in: Manfred Brocker and Heino Henrich Nau (eds.), *Ethnozentrismus. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen im interkulturellen Dialog*, Darmstadt, 1997, 241-255, 253.

21 | Cf. Manfred Mols, “Universale oder kulturspezifische Kategorien und Theorien? Bemerkungen aus politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht”, in: Brocker and Nau (eds.), *Ethnozentrismus*, n. 20, 225-240.

generally teaches its own experience with the state, politics, society, church and religion and about stereotypical market economy repetitions of its economic thinking, including its cost-benefit rationality (rational choice), without asking the question as to whether the latter actually makes sense for the entire world in view of given internal, and especially external, relationships.²² Universities in the Third World are seen as modern and are reckoned to be at the cutting edge, if they operate within this Western network of categories.

Would the encouragement of more consideration of themselves and their own culture be a more obvious alternative?²³ This is probably not a way out of the dilemma which can be used generally. It is certain that there have already been many failures due to simple linguistic understanding as also very quickly due to grasping the accumulated experience from practice underlying the expressions and theories deployed. This already applies within the regions abroad themselves and all the more so in terms of inter-regional relations. Could Chileans learn very much from the post-revolutionary ideas of Mexico in terms of the formula of *compromiso-respaldo*²⁴ claiming legitimation and quid pro quo? Or the Mexicans from *jeito*, the Brazilian figure of thought derived from the working out of forces of equilibrium?²⁵ Or would an educated Indian be able to make use of the Chinese *danwei* guidance collection or *guanxi* thought interpreted as social capital? There must be clarity as to the fact that there is no alternative to working with linguistic-cognitive structures, which A.B. Shamsul and other researchers have described as a "colonial knowledge".²⁶

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22 | Cf. in terms of critique also Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations – A Perspective Beyond Asia*, London, 2009, Introduction.

23 | Cf. Rajni Kothari, *Politics and the People. In Search of a Humane India*, Delhi, 1989.

24 | *compromiso* = among other meanings, a commitment (e.g. of the rulers) for a quid pro quo; *respaldo* = support "from below" with legitimising consequences.

25 | "Jeito" (Portuguese) = general vernacular expression for wheeling and dealing, a term, which also plays a role in describing the political game in Brazil.

26 | Edward W. Said had already anticipated this perspective in various works. Cf. Edward W. Said, *Kultur und Imperialismus*, Frankfurt am Main, 1974; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, London 2003 (first published 1978).

Shamsul is nonetheless of the opinion that this “colonial knowledge” offers modern Asia the basis for searching for its own identity. Terms such as “development”, “economic growth”, “social justice”, “nation” and “state” – as well as “democratisation”, “democracy” or “governance” – would therefore provide indispensable categories of comprehension for modern Asia (even if they still had to be translated into culturally specific terms), because they would offer the thought patterns for what is also happening in Asia politically from the perspectives of transformation. This is because thoughts are usually formed in these terms and the models, theorems and theories assigned to them in Asia and the remaining non-Western world and politics are conducted according to them. They are indispensable bridges to comprehension, without which neither the ASEAN Group nor the APEC nor MERCOSUR and many other inter-governmental cooperative bodies would be capable of working, as also would the extensive UN apparatus and its subsidiary organisations. This also applies to largest areas of international bi- or multi-lateral development aid. They thus simultaneously form a bridge for understanding, indispensable for as far as can be seen,

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to the international political and academic world, which are also both being subjected ever more to the pressure of globalisation in these regards. Without terms and models²⁷ enabling conceptual, and ultimately operational, politics to take place, only political and, of course, also economic and social hopelessness would remain, which would then express itself in slogans without any significance.

Claudia Derichs points out that in Asia appeals are often made to Asiatic traditions, which usually, on closer consideration, are presented as discursive postulates of intercultural equality with the political, social, economic and academic West. They are therefore usually “self-assertion discourses”, more a construction than a reconstruction for the purpose of legitimising a modern era not stemming

27 | Andreas Rödter has worked this out for the processes of German reunification of the end phase of the SED regimes. Cf. Andreas Rödter, *Deutschland einig Vaterland. Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung*, Munich, 2009.

from their own historical substance.²⁸ We correspondingly read in the work of the Japanese writer Shin'ichi: "Thus the search for national identity is more an effort to address new realities than a confirmation of traditions."²⁹ Do such self-assertion discourses therefore represent a self-deception? On the one hand, there is a need to take account of shades of an Asiatic protest such as is being articulated today from the Asiatic-Islamic side among others. "Since most secondary literature is of Western origin, human culture is rendered one-sided"³⁰, Hassan Hanafi writes. On the other hand, there are currently no alternatives spanning individual cultures and states – unless the trouble is taken to provide corrections of a cultural hermeneutic nature, which are, however, likely to turn out not to be that far removed from the not unproblematic "colonial knowledge", as otherwise precisely the type of inter-cultural, i.e. international, communication being called for would collapse.

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Do historically saturated cultural hermeneutic approaches³¹ perhaps offer a necessary, in any case supplementing, way in which Asia and the other non-Western worlds can approach matters? The answer is "yes", if excessive use is not made of them in the process, i.e. from the perspective of political science, one does not run up against a pronounced and then often over-demanding degree of specialisation, which remains incomprehensible for non-regional or country specialists from the non-European and non-North American world. The careful introduction of a hermeneutic may not offer an alternative to "colonial knowledge", but may well offer supplements and attempts to attain a deeper understanding of a specific culture, on which little value is placed in contemporary discussions in social sciences

28 | Cf. Claudia Derichs, "Geschichte von gestern – Geschichte von heute: Asiatische Perspektiven", in: Peter Birle et al. (eds.), *Globalisierung und Regionalismus. Herausforderungen für Staat und Demokratie in Asien und Lateinamerika*, Opladen, 2002, 19-36.

29 | Shin'ichi Kitaoka, "Japan's Identity and What it Means", in: Kenichi Ito et al. (eds.) *Japan's Identity – Neither the West Nor the East*, Tokyo, 1999, 27.

30 | Hassan Hanafi, "Western Democracy and Islamic Democracy", in: Hussin Mutalib (ed.), *Islam and Democracy. The South East Asian Experience*, Singapore, 2004, 1-9, 2.

31 | Cf. Ute Daniel, *Kompendium Kulturgeschichte. Theorie, Praxis, Schlüsselwörter*, 4th ed., Frankfurt am Main, 2004.

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focusing on methods and statistics. Not making excessive use means not falling into the temptation of following a total culturally hermeneutic historical diversion, which in reality would mean isolation. If China were only to remain comprehensible for Sinologists, Mexico for Mexicanists, Kenya for Africanists etc., it would not be possible, in a world-wide context, to understand either China or Mexico or Kenya and also not to deal with them adequately in terms of politics, economics, culture, social sciences etc. For Indonesia and the ASEAN area, central indigenous terms such as "musyawarah" (the typical form of forming a consensus there) can hardly be dispensed with, as it deals with forms of decision-making, which we in the West would rather regard as pre-political and the effects of which in Eastern and South East Asia reach out into the decision-making processes of ASEAN and from there into the operational practice of ASEAN+6 processes³² and even those of APEC. To address the Japanese pair of terms of "tatemae" and "honne" therefore makes sense, as they put names to the tension which characterises Japan between collective identification and individual reserve.

This places us before the recognition of a dilemma or perhaps also a compromise between Western terminology and cultural hermeneutic corrections. If we wish to indulge in a dialogue between the West and the non-Western world, on the one hand we cannot avoid the understanding of the world which is most widely accepted internationally, but we must also see that a relatively large cultural "remainder" is left over as "unique patterns", with which there is a problem dealing within the framework of what is possible. The fundamental condition in this remains the corresponding articulation from Asia, Africa and Latin America in options which we can understand. And it is here that the result is not very encouraging, especially as we quickly revert to the aporias already mentioned. It was presumably Raúl Prebisch, the first Director of CEPAL³³ and founder

32 | ASEAN+6 = The plan decided on in 2005 to form an East Asian Community, which, beyond the ten ASEAN nations, would include membership of the People's Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India.

33 | CEPAL = Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. An important UN institution which helped shape Latin American economic and development policy.

of UNCTAD³⁴, who coined the term of “desarrollismo”³⁵, the dominant doctrine of development and transition to independence in Latin America for about 20 years, and which seems to correspond to the Japanese conception of the “development state”, which also enjoyed considerable successes in parts of East and South East Asia. The leading terms from Latin America and Asia, however, have little connection to each other, as the Japanese included the state as a constructive stakeholder from the beginning, whereas in classic “cepalismo” it tended to be a marginal element.

COMPENSATORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE AND THE STATE AS FORMATION COMPONENT IN GLOBALISATION

“Statehood has only ever existed to a limited extent in developing societies since independence.”³⁶ This is certainly not true without exceptions, certainly not for Brazil and Mexico, only to a degree for Chile, also not more than a century later for India. It is nevertheless true in most cases. The limitation is caused by many factors. Pre-modern and insufficiently structured power relationships often overlapped with semi-colonial or openly imperialist paternalism, patched-up groupings together of ethnic groups from foreign spheres of interest, often not even with clear territorial boundaries, opaque relations of legitimation, a sovereignty refused by the ruling powers of Europe, later the USA and Japan, not rarely undefined belonging by the inhabitants of “border areas” to the units of rule (with several cases sometimes happening together, as in the case of North West Myanmar!) and much else besides. All of this was often set on differing ethnic, cultural-historical and religious foundations, stretching from old high cultures with still lingering effects on semi-civilised social creations which often did not deserve the name of a political unit,

Pre-modern and insufficiently structured power relationships often overlapped with semi-colonial or openly imperialist paternalism.

34 | UNCTAD = United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which should place an outstanding role in the so-called North-South Dialogue.

35 | “desarrollo” (Span.) = development.

36 | Joachim Betz, “Staatlichkeit von Entwicklungsländern: Ein Beitrag zur Debatte”, *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 17/3, 2007, 735-757.

such as in large areas of Africa, to the bureaucratic-patrimonially erected structures of rule, as was the case, for example, as regards the Spanish power relations applied in what were understood officially as parts of the empire in that part of the world later termed Latin America.

The non-Western world did not, of course, fail to notice in this process that the Western world was clearly superior to them in many regards (and by no means just in terms of weapons technology), meaning that imperialism and colonisation were not simply understood as the one-sided external imposition of a monopoly of force. Far-sighted rulers or political elites understood by the 19th century at the latest, and most certainly in the 20th century (e.g. in Siam), that there was no alternative to adopting a process of learning in the most pronounced manner possible if they were not to lose their own identity or autonomy completely. This was most impressively the case in Japan in the second half of the 19th century, but much less convincingly so, on the other hand, in China under Mao.

A consideration of the political science textbooks of our times reveals that they rarely diverge from this set vision of the future when considering the non-Western world, even if this did not have to mean that the illusions contained in this form of thinking or understanding cannot and could not be overseen. This is particularly shown in the on-going discussions regarding weak or even collapsing states, for which numerous comparative tables have meanwhile been produced, e.g. "Fund for State Index" of the journal, *Foreign Affairs*, with its index for "failed states" from the year 2009. The very critical cases cited there are the Congo, Zimbabwe, Sudan and the whole series of further African states with values above 100 (out of a maximum of 120 for the minus rating), which in the end reveals that about two thirds of the international grouping of states cannot, or can hardly ever, achieve the referent.

The Western model of civilisation and development also included that Western category of organisation and standards, which began to appear as a state or world of states and also with the corresponding societal world. This was true for the first start-up attempts by, among others, what today is Thailand (especially under King

Chulalongkorn), then, as already indicated, with greater decidedness and consistency for Japan after the “black ships” under America’s Commodore Perry had opened up the country in 1854 and the Japanese themselves tried to catch up with aspects of Western modernity as quickly as possible with an expenditure of energy unique in world history and which was only achieved later to some extent in post-Maoist China under Deng Xiaoping.

These days, civil society – sometimes, perhaps a little prematurely, also called bourgeois society – in states which have matured to some degree has, as it were, become the other side of the coin. Put in another way: A

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communal entity which has modern features to some extent cannot be imagined without a middle class capable of being effective and finally also articulating its desires. The West thus became an international referent in political and social terms as well, even if – in complete understandability – there are native reservations and attempts at preservation in most countries, which can then be adapted into political forms of style and behaviour – e.g. into a political and social clientilism, which runs counter to Western ideals of social and administrative rationality and mobility related to achievement.

The political scientific breakthrough to a targeted occupation with the non-Western world should be reckoned as beginning with Gabriel A. Almond’s year teaching in Stanford and his colleagues in the form of an analytical framework which was put forward with the aim of making available a comparative assessment method “for political systems of all kinds”.³⁷ Modern political science, which can be used at a global level, according to Almond, must deal with a network of categories aimed at behaviours and processes and it would befit it well to cover its theoretical requirements externally, if key theoretical impulses manifested themselves in advanced disciplines. In concrete terms, that could mean sociology, anthropology (ethnology), biology, economics, cybernetics, opinion polling – according to the respective problem posed and requirement.

AN INTERIM CONCLUSION

For both internal and external reasons, the failed states hardly offer the potential for any gain to an effective, larger autonomy, which was an absolutely key characteristic of the modern state from the beginning and has continued to remain so. Whether that means a verdict has been pronounced, as it were, of having to endure a pseudo-state fate of incapability to catch up in developmental terms, must remain unanswered here. This is said with all scepticism in terms of a world-wide positive overcoming of deficient statehood, precarious chances of individual and specific groups being effectively involved, the lowering of levels of marginalisation and missing or restricted economic responsibility or at least joint responsibility and despite all understandable objections to the “blessings” of developmental cooperation.³⁸ Such criticisms hit the mark

There are development movements for example in combating poverty, in medical advances and education. Still, is that sufficient to achieve those elements of governmental normality which are discussed here?

in many regards and have been taken on board in international considerations about development aid for years. Irrespective of that, it cannot be denied that there are many positive development movements in many areas, for example in combating poverty, in medical advances, policies on hygiene, education, the relative reduction of sexual discrimination and such like. In this regard as well, however, the question remains: Is that sufficient to achieve those elements of governmental normality which are being discussed in this essay within any recognisable future period and within the course of a policy of development aimed at catching up and also in circumstances of receiving significant external assistance? The developmental leap from political under-development to the welcome tendencies for improving relevant living conditions has not meant that the most advanced level of discussion concerning statehood has yet gone beyond what has been presented by the West.

“Good governance” has, in the meantime, often been adopted as a slogan, but, as a working and theoretical concept, continues to provide a partial guarantee that governmental and social levels are being taken into account in different ways than previously. If the concept

38 | Cf. Paul Kevenhörster and Dirk van den Boom, *Entwicklungs- politik*, Wiesbaden, 2009.

is considered in its entirety, then it deals with a topical cluster of aspects and/or requirements, which go to make up a "normal state". This is why listings of such topoi make sense, such as, for example, are presented in the case of Joachim Betz under the heading "Individual dimensions of statehood" – namely, "Monopoly of force and capacity to raise taxation, state under the rule of law, democracy, welfare"³⁹, because they not only provide reminders of what is associated with modern statehood, but also of what is missing in Third World countries. This applies especially to countries which are below the threshold of emerging nations. A further operational and analytical level is, however, becoming accepted in all continents under the slogan of "global governance", that is to say the active implementation of aspects of globalisation right into areas of statehood. Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler have provided us with a very useful definition of "global governance":⁴⁰

A further operational and analytical level is becoming accepted in all continents: "global governance", that is to say the active implementation of aspects of globalisation right into areas of statehood.

- Global governance firstly means the redefinition of sovereignty, which – understood in the sense of self-determined sovereignty internally and externally – is undermined by the globalisation process. Global governance demands the acceptance of shared sovereignties through the transfer of operational capabilities to local, regional and global organisations in order to solve problems which nation states cannot solve single-handedly.
- Global governance, secondly, means the concentration of international cooperation through international regimes with binding cooperative rules aimed at a juridification of international cooperation.
- Global governance, thirdly, means a consciousness of common survival interests and promotes a foreign policy geared towards a world common weal in normative terms.

39 | Betz, "Staatlichkeit von Entwicklungsländern: Ein Beitrag zur Debatte", n. 36, 741 et sqq.

40 | In what follows, almost literally quoted from: Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler, "Global Governance. Herausforderungen an die deutsche Politik an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert", Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, *Policy Paper 2*, Bonn, 1986.

Messner and Nuscheler list an operational framework of Global Governance Architecture,⁴¹ consisting of the following levels: the nation state, UN organisations, regional integration projects, local politics and the respective national and global civil society. Modern, globally responsible and future-focused politics becomes politics at several levels in many regards, which has many supra-national elements imposed which are consciously desired, such as applies to the European Union, to a more limited, but factually tangible extent to the enormous UN area and inter-governmental fora for cooperation and dialogue which have become ever more numerous (APEC, the ASEAN Group, in rudimentary terms also UNASUR⁴² and ALBA⁴³).

The “new state reason” is strongly associated with the affirmative presentation of inner-societal governmental capability and inter-governmental recognition.

Klaus Dieter Wolf has presented the concept of a “new reason of state” in an extensive study:⁴⁴ Classic reason of state revolved around national interests, which were defined around the poles of security and self-assertion. The “new state reason” is strongly associated with the affirmative presentation of inner-societal governmental capability and inter-governmental recognition. It restricts governmental autonomy in its tabooed traditional understanding. At the same time, we observe a clear increase in external options as well as a stronger weighting of the influence of international or transnational forces, which cannot escape from the logic of a multi-plane form of politics. This multi-level politics in the optimum case creates a changed and enhance capacity for solving problems,⁴⁵ because social potentials can be used quite differently than in the classical nation state with its sovereignty having been fixed for all time, and because new and expanded resources which the individual state does not dispose of on its own are made available for problem solutions, which are primarily generated on international level.

41 | Ibid., 5.

42 | UNASUR = Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas).

43 | ALBA = Bolivian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América).

44 | Cf. Klaus Dieter Wolf, *Die Neue Staatsräson – Zwischenstaatliche Kooperation als Demokratieproblem in der Weltgesellschaft*, Baden-Baden, 2000.

45 | Cf. ibid., 64.

Nowadays and into the future, the state is and will remain the leading measurement for political legitimisation. It usually continues to be assigned the key weight in terms of having the power of veto. The new sovereignty lives from a multi-layered and also employed political networking, which provides it with a visibly enhanced flexibility, capacity to adapt to changed situations and opportunities to help determine matters in a complicated national-regional-global inter-play of world politics. Michael Zürn had already drawn attention in the sub-heading of his book *Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats* to the fact that globalisation and denationalisation go hand in hand.⁴⁶ For the Member States of the European Union, this has become ever more obvious, whereby they are in part supported by national constitutional law. In Latin America, with its different circles of cooperation and integration, there are at least some moves in similar directions, even if national sovereignty is likely to remain the decisive and braking taboo measurement for years to come there as well. The first tendencies of an impression of denationalisation are appearing even more hesitantly in East Asia. The discussion which commenced following the 1997/98 crisis in Asia about an East Asian currency, which has been revived in new variations with the economic and financial crisis of 2008/09, this time with China taking the lead, shows this clearly, especially as such considerations are not regarded as the initial loss of globalisation capacity in either Japan or China, South Korea or in leading ASEAN countries. A kind of equilibrium between globalisation and denationalisation will remain all the more stable, the less parts of the Third World can be acknowledged as having already achieved at least to some extent normal statehood, i.e. they would otherwise already be simply overcharged with governing their own state, let alone becoming involved in trans- or supra-governmental agencies.

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In the North American literature, four economic criteria of efficiency have been introduced via John Kador, which deal with four categories: "rule breaker", "rule maker", "rule

46 | Cf. Michael Zürn, *Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates. Globalisierung und Denationalisierung als Chance*, Frankfurt am Main, 1998.

taker", "rule sharer". The pair of terms of "rule maker" and "rule taker" is of most interest for the subject of this essay. In Latin American Studies, the criteria of "rule taker" and "rule maker" emerged in presenting the historically new situation of globalisation. They are not to be interpreted here as exclusive alternative courses of action. Following all historical experience with statehood or at least political units of rule, there has been no, or as good as no, political-economic-social unit, which could unilaterally dispense with "rule taking".⁴⁷ Overall, however, our late Western modernity has become the "rule maker" mechanism shaping the planet and this has continued to be the case until now despite all previous expectations of an Asian-Pacific or even Chinese century coming about.⁴⁸ The times are, however, passing in which individual modern powers can act as a unilateral "rule maker" in pursuing their own interests in their wider regional environment or even at global level.

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The "rule makers" of the 16th to 21st centuries were always sure to demonstrate an unequal amount of power, influence and international rule-setting capability than "the others", who, sometimes resisting, in other cases regarding their allocation of position as provisional, became "rule takers" or passengers in "band wagoning" in a world, which they had hardly any role in defining or helping to determine. At this point, some points must be added or recalled from preceding parts of this essay.

Globalisation is "the experience of an epoch being lived through"⁴⁹, that is to say a phenomenon, which concerns culture and politics, economics and society, knowledge and ideas of order, research and innovation, international integration and forms of cooperative capability, presents itself as a highly inter-linked bundle of interdependencies,

47 | Cf. Patricia Buckley Ebrey, *China: Eine illustrierte Geschichte*, Baden-Baden, 1996.

48 | Cf. Manfred Mols, "Lateinamerikas internationale Zukunft. Der Subkontinent zwischen 'Dependencia' und Globalisierung", in: Stephan Scheuzger and Peter Fleer (eds.), *Die Moderne in Lateinamerika. Zentren und Peripherien des Wandels*, Frankfurt am Main, 2009.

49 | Anthony Giddens, *Jenseits von Links und Rechts*, 2nd ed., Frankfurt am Main, 1997, Introduction.

from which not much can be removed, even if each country cannot fulfil all of these criteria, and certainly not to the same degree of intensity. Denmark lives integrated into the modern globalised world, without, however, belonging to the "rule makers" in every regard. It can, however, fulfil its role in the ever shifting equilibrium between "rule making" and "rule taking" without exhibiting every form of anti-modernist discrimination. Using Kador, it could be described as a "rule sharer". The same could not be said either for most African states or for Latin America (except perhaps Brazil and possibly also Mexico in this regard) and certainly also only for a handful of Asiatic countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, the developed areas of India and China.

Denmark lives integrated into the modern globalised world, without, however, belonging to the "rule makers". The same could not be said either for most African states or Latin America.

"Developing countries are usually distinguished economically and socially by disparities, by asymmetrical integration into the world economy, by precarious political systems", wrote Jochen Hippler in the *APuZ*.⁵⁰ He rightly characterises the latter as follows: We are dealing with a "context of the most severe social problems [...] and a usually uneven, often authoritarian, dictatorial or neo-patrimonial distribution of power, [...] in which social and political elites often are only concerned with their own problems and often hardly with those of society as a whole. The societies are also frequently fragmented linguistically, ethnically and religiously, meaning political and economic conflicts are not rarely expressed in 'cultural' forms and therewith become more difficult to solve".⁵¹ According to Hippler, this means that under the conditions of globalisation, the chances of a state-forming and "nation-building" process, which have been discussed for a long time, disappear, because the presumptions of modernisation, with their juridifications and impulses geared towards pluralistic liberalisations, tend to have destabilising rather than constructive roles in not a few cases.

It could therefore not be by chance that already years ago there was talk by political scientists experienced in the field

50 | Ibid.

51 | Ibid.

of dictatorship “as a state model for the Third World”.⁵² The deflections from dictatorship may have changed, especially as many countries place value on formal elections being held. “Electoral authoritarianism”, which is spoken of in terms of Africa⁵³, is in the end a new variation of dictatorship, which can also be found in the Near and Middle East. That does not exclude the fact that in individual cases, the beginnings of democratic consolidation are present (such as in Ghana).⁵⁴ Latin America has remained stuck in a kind of limbo position. Following the wave of (re-)democratisation⁵⁵ which set in towards the close of the 1970s, the outcome – accepting all the differences from country to country – has in most cases been hybrid forms made up of authoritarianism, clientism, patrimonialism and the first signs of a semi-competitive pluralism. Latin America could also not appeal to belonging to the group of states which has recently achieved their independence. Almost all of its states can look back over just short of 200 years of independence.

From the political scientific perspective, a complete key contribution has to be an active participation in the overall regulatory structure of the world.

The question remains, however: What would such states have to achieve to exist in a globalised economy or to secure a role in helping to shape this? From the political scientific perspective, a complete key contribution has to be an active and constructive participation in the overall regulatory structure of the world and its possible improvements in the direction of a global generalizability. Kishore Mahbubani⁵⁶ and others⁵⁷ encourage the targeted return to the “governance” side of humans living together, in which a lot is learnt from the West, but by no means everything should be adopted as a whole. “Good governance is not associated with any single political system or ideology.

52 | Cf. Hans F. Illy, Rüdiger Sielaff and Nikolaus Werz, *Diktatur – Staatsmodell für die Dritte Welt?*, Freiburg / Würzburg, 1980.

53 | Cf. Gero Erdmann and Christian von Soest, “Diktatur in Afrika”, *GIGA Focus* No. 8, Hamburg, 2008.

54 | Cf. Sebastian Elischer, “Afrikas neues Vorbild? Ghana auf dem Weg der demokratischen Konsolidierung”, *GIGA Focus* No. 1, Hamburg, 2009.

55 | Cf. Manfred Mols, *Demokratie in Lateinamerika*, Stuttgart, 1985.

56 | Cf. Kishore Mahbubani, *Can Asians Think*, Singapore / Kuala Lumpur, 1999.

57 | Cf. Michael Yeoh et al. (eds.), *Globalisation and its Impact on Asia. Sharing Knowledge, Ideas and Information*, Selangor, 2003.

It is associated with the willingness and ability of the government to develop economic, social and administrative systems that are resilient enough to handle the challenges" brought about in the new economic era we are moving into it."⁵⁸

As understandable as Mahbubani's position may be, the question must, however, also definitely be raised at the same time as to whether there are currently sufficient forces in the West (or are likely to be tomorrow or the day after tomorrow), which could collaborate in such a regulatory programme for fusing civilisations. The times of Ibn Chaldun in the Arabic-Moslem world have passed. The idea developed by Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aime Césaire and Léon Damas of *négritude* did not develop into anything beyond an attempt at developing an instrument of protection against French paternalism. In the countries of Latin America today which have stronger Indian heritages, indigenous aggregation and even restitution attempts have been playing almost unknown roles for years. They are pleas for a probably overdue indigenous participation in the operations of the state, social structures, the economy and culture. Yet they remain virtually meaningless before the forum of a world undergoing globalisation. This type of searching for an identity has correspondingly been criticised precisely from the Japanese side: The "search for national identity is more an endeavour to come to terms with new realities than a confirmation of traditions".⁵⁹

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Global, active statehood requires regulatory inputs, active own involvement in research and development, handling the problem of sovereignty without taboos and finally a variety of activities for becoming involved in institutional structures dealing with foreign policy, non-domestic social and non-domestic economic issues of the world in ways which Stefan Fröhlich has described in a similar way for the European Union.⁶⁰ Interestingly, Fröhlich's work contains

58 | Mahbubani, *Can Asians Think*, n. 56, 31.

59 | Kitaoka, "Japan's Identity and What it Means", in: Ito et al. (eds.), *Japan's Identity*, n. 29, 27.

60 | Cf. Stefan Fröhlich, *Die Europäische Union als Globaler Akteur: Eine Einführung*, Wiesbaden, 2008.

a sub-title with the heading “‘Pax Americana’ or misuse of the claim to global leadership as a key challenge”.⁶¹ Europe’s leading states and also the Union itself can protect themselves, as they are equipped with sufficient potential to ensure their own involvement in the process of globalisation. Does this also apply in the meantime for most states and countries of the non-Western world?

A direction for politics and discussions pointing towards the goal of modernisation must include, apart from regulatory policies which do not just cover the economic field and active participation in the progressive technologisation of the world, the potentials for mastering which include more than just the co-responsibility required for the world-wide mitigation of global climatic catastrophe, secure and ecologically defensible sources of energy and water, together with social structures and patterns of attitudes adjusted to match our age and its demands. As far as many Third World countries are concerned, much has been done over years, via urbanisation, industrialisation, rationalisation of working processes, modern forms of communication, education etc. which would seem to confirm

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Max Weber’s global-historical rationalisation thesis. Urs Schoettli has advanced the thesis that in China a sort of modern bourgeois society is gradually developing, which is pushing forward from the pre-modern age into an ever more noticeable modern age, which places taboos on ever fewer old incrustations and is influencing politics.⁶² Modern literature dealing with Asia correspondingly reveals a whole series of previously unknown challenges in East and South East Asia to modernistic approaches going beyond democratisations,⁶³ but behind which, however, there is also always pressure from the West to adopt “normal” (that is to say, Western) standards of civilisation, which in the end would correspond to Western international and Western economic interests.

This brings us to a delicate point concerning the development of statehood in the Third World. It has become almost a (purely Western?) fashion to talk about trends

61 | Ibid. 156 et sqq.

62 | Cf. Urs Schoettli, *China. Die neue Weltmacht*, Paderborn, 2007.

63 | Cf. e.g. Daniel A. Bell, *East Meets West*, Princeton, 2000.

towards democracy which can be ascertained almost everywhere (and even if these democracies have to be provided with qualifying adjectives). The pro-modernist, pro-democratic literature can hardly be overlooked, in which elections taking place almost world-wide are cited as the evidence base for the accuracy of such "records of proof" while cheerfully referring to Huntington's "Third Wave"⁶⁴. Can democracy really be exported or imported? The examples which are frequently cited as paradigms of (West) Germany and Japan are not much use in this connection, as they overlook Western historical pre-conditions for both countries.

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NEGATIVE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR STATEHOOD IN THE NON-WESTERN WORLD

The non-Western political world has relatively little which has developed historically and which projects into the present, if the cultural spheres such as India with its accumulation of principalities and local power structures are disregarded. Rulers feuded and subjected peoples to their rule, whereby not only political claims to rule represented the primary motive, but also repeatedly visions of religious subjugation (including Islam versus Hindu forms of religion in this context). The British later colonised India to the extent of declaring an Indian Empire. Arbitrary internal and external border demarcations formed the rule. This applies to an even greater extent as regards Africa, where the European colonial powers drew up borders cutting right through ethnic units. The same also applies to the successor states of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East. In Latin America as well, Spaniards and Portuguese and later the de facto hegemony of the USA demonstrated little sensitivity towards what had already developed in these areas. Without indulging in overly gross simplifications, it can be said that the logics employed in "state and nation-building" are relatively artificial imitations of processes, which also did not actually run smoothly and still reveal clear fracture lines.

64 | Samuel Phillips Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

In individual cases in some overseas territories, sometimes due to the involvement of persons capable of promoting integration, initial approaches to developing national patterns of identification were established, e.g. the establishment of a *mexicanidad* following the Mexican Revolution or a *brasilidade* by Getúlio Vargas and some of his successors. Mao and Deng Xiaoping are to be cited in terms of modern China, Ho Chi Minh and the victorious

Vietnam War for Vietnam. The example of Turkish *Kemalismo* shows quite clearly, however, that such initiatives by far-sighted statesmen still determine borders even up to today. Non-Western states are almost

Non-Western states are almost always artificial, constructed structures, usually created through conquests and acculturation processes imposed from outside.

always artificial, constructed structures, usually created through conquests and acculturation processes imposed from outside. It is almost always a question of the period of assimilation which determines whether they can be regarded as having grown or whether attitudes of community or even civil society can take root within them. A past which may be ever so important, but is very distant in terms of time, is no guarantee for an integrated present. The legacies of the high civilisations of the Euphrates, Tigris and Nile have had just as little lasting impact as a legacy of the Inca Empire. Peru, for example, is today a country with a very high rate of marginalisation. Traditions which have passed away do not count, because they represent breaks. A Pharaonic tradition on the Nile does not have anything to offer any more for today's Egypt, and the same is true – despite many endeavours aimed at revitalisation – of the culture of the Incas or Aztecs and the peoples neighbouring them. In the current literature dealing with theories of statehood, considerable efforts are devoted to trying to prove the existence of a modern understanding of statehood in the Third World. Many of these efforts boil down to a "disguised modernity", i.e. a sort of search to find connections with a modern, Western identity, which will not surrender the traditional and established to the whole.

Another element which serves to weigh things down is frequently sovereignty which is refused externally. Losses of sovereignty are incurred today in more indirect, but nevertheless very effective, ways, for example through investments, chances for access to markets being conceded

or impeded, increasing integration into networks in social and political areas, via previously unknown (sub-)regional link-ups between powers which have moved closer to each other, such as China, India, Venezuela, South Africa, problems of security etc. Consideration of the totality of international and in part also regional forms of integration as apply in the modern world of states, leads rapidly to the recognition that there are only a few states in the developing world, which can actively participate in this. The advances in civilisation of the Western World can hardly be attained by most of the other countries in the world. The worn-out development slogan of "Helping countries to help themselves" hardly applies here, if at all. This also applies to regulatory areas, where not only innovative proposals, but also the powers to shape and implement policies are also required.

The advances in civilisation of the Western World can hardly be attained by most of the other countries in the world. The worn-out development slogan of "Helping countries to help themselves" hardly applies here.

Secondly, there is a considerable deficit in home-grown achievements in the double area of "Research and Development" in most countries of this developing world. This means they contribute little or nothing to the advancement of our present, technologically-based world civilisation and remain in corresponding dependence on what is processed in these regards in the West, including Japan and, ever more, also in South Korea, China and Singapore.⁶⁵ This is even more true in terms of basic, regulatory discussions, such as the financial and real economies have required for approx. two years and which likewise affect their political operating environments. In this regard, the Third World is at the mercy of the economic and hegemonial power structures of the still dominant world of the Western industrial countries and increasingly also China and India, which – like the USA – are less in evidence in engaging constructively to bring about improvement than through attitudes of refusal, which, among other areas, also gain attention in terms of environmental policies.

Related to all this is a relatively low level of integration with the meshes of global networking. Africa specialists report that in Africa there are only approx. 130 groupings, "which are to serve the purposes of promoting cooperation

65 | Cf. *UNESCO Science Report*, Paris, 2005.

between governments or supranational integration." And further: "Most of these just consist of an office and some staff. They are often copies of non-African institutions, however they try to outdo their prototypes not through working successfully, but through ambitious statutes and concepts."⁶⁶ Generalisations can be made again and again in these regards. International networks are so densely composed today that any state which was reasonably capable of surviving would have to keep up in diplomatic terms, certainly not in the style and to the extent of leading European states, but most likely in terms of having the right to join in discussions to some extent. This includes a minimum of personnel resources, a considerable level of professional qualifications, discrete administrative resources and a minimum of budgetary means so as to be able to participate in projects and supra-national joint tasks.⁶⁷ How is it possible for countries to be heard in the financial institutions in Washington in terms of presenting their own views or also in the OECD or elsewhere, if the ability to articulate is reduced to accepting ideas devised elsewhere or still having most of these financed from external sources? Mutatis mutandis, this also applies to the dependency of the large donors, the EU (not least Germany and France), the USA, Japan and increasingly also from the "developing country" of China.

There is a de facto world-wide trend towards forming regional unions, which has in the meantime affected all continents and regions. Very little of this is effective.

This brings us to a decisive point in terms of the structure of international politics and aid. There is a de facto world-wide trend towards forming regional unions, which has

in the meantime affected all continents and regions. Very little of this is effective or in terms of the targets set (if the ASEAN process of expanding step-by-step to an "Asian Community" is disregarded). Ensuring national sovereignty at almost any price forms a barrier against initiatives aimed at reaching out. Crucial institutional features are missing, binding mechanisms for the international settlement of disputes are missing and, not least, broad support from the populations involved is missing. A further factor enters

66 | Cf. Peter Molt and Helga Dickow, *Kulturen und Konflikte im Vergleich*, Baden-Baden, 2007, 45.

67 | Cf. Claudia Derichs, Thomas Heberer and Nor Sausmikant, *Why Ideas Matter: Ideen und Diskurse in der Politik Chinas, Japans und Malaysias*, Hamburg, 2004.

into the equation at this point: the largely non-existence of civil society potential. Centralised-paternalistic-autocratic traditions of rule can hardly be eradicated, because they have been accepted for centuries, and sometimes even longer, as natural forms of cultural life which have evolved through history. And all of this continues to be perpetuated and kept alive in spite of a rapidly changing world. Political science has only recently come to consider the question, "whether 'universal' concepts are not after all just ideological products of the Western cultural sphere".⁶⁸ There may be a large degree of agreement in regard to the subject of the state: A modern political structure which is worthy of this name must be able to cope with challenges which the group around Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba had discussed under the heading of "Crises and Sequences in Political Development". Certain performance capacities for effective statehood are meant, namely stabilising basic elements of problems of legitimacy, amounting to a general acceptance of governmental actions on the part of the populations concerned, the solution of the problem of participation as the pre-condition for this, acceptable services for distribution, the creation of a wide-spread feeling of identification with the state and the surrounding society; finally, the task of penetration for governments and state structures.

Political science has only recently come to consider the question, "whether 'universal' concepts are not after all just ideological products of the Western cultural sphere".

This all amounts to a political culture, which enables collectivity and individuation, sub-autonomies within civil society within the framework of practicable subsidiarity in the recognition of associations and social networks. Statehood under the rule of law for all, institutions interacting with each other in accordance with firm rules and equality before the existing laws for all, respect for human and civic rights, authentic representation not imposed from above, separation of state and religion, a functioning and transparent separation of powers, social welfare "from above" and from societies themselves as a kind of third party effect, the relinquishing of one-sided monopolies of power and interpretation in the economy, society, the media and – not least – the conduct of conflict "externally", including in forms which can be solved and even predicted.

68 | Brocker and Nau (eds.), *Ethnozentrismus*, n. 20, VII.

The chance of implementing Western characteristics is shown in capacities for action, effectiveness and dealing with the future, which are otherwise little widespread.

Gender equality as a basic principle also especially needs to be included in this. This all resembles a listing of Western attributes of statehood and seems to accord with the initial thesis of this paper, according to which the West has been defining the structures and goals of its state-focused political associations for centuries and presents itself as the global model – and, if necessary, imposes this with force.⁶⁹ The chance of implementing Western characteristics is indeed shown in capacities for action, effectiveness and dealing with the future, which are otherwise little widespread. If today's political scientists talk of a "return of cultures"⁷⁰ and in the process rightly assess their current and future influence in "establishing a culturally distinct memory",⁷¹ then attention would also have to be drawn at the same time to the concrete influential effects on our globalised, networked world civilisation in political terms as well. Otherwise, one is left with the impression of that general word of warning of historians that no future can be built without a past.

THE DEGREE OF DIALOGUE AND DISCOURSE

A chance to dissolve the state-focused contrast between the First and the Third World exists in allowing rapprochement in conversations between different, usually highly divergent derivations of ideological, religious or perhaps academic kinds to arise. The real challenge in the coming together of different cultures for all those who are in principle willing to enter into a dialogue is to understand the other political world in its hermeneutic-cultural stance and to use this also to think one's way into differing forms and visions of life according to hermeneutic criteria.

This is easier to say than to put into practice. If Franz Wimmer represents the thesis in his professorial study published in 1990 that "the equating of history with European peoples is still the natural association",⁷² then the other cultures will only continue to occupy marginal

69 | Mols 2011, forthcoming.

70 | Cf. Winfried Röhrich, *Rückkehr der Kulturen. Die neuen Mächte in der Weltpolitik*, Baden-Baden, 2010.

71 | Ibid.

72 | Franz Wimmer, *Interkulturelle Philosophie. Geschichte und Theorie*, Vol. 1, Vienna, 1990, 15.

positions, which can be “perceived as a deficient form, which are an obstacle to the further development of mankind”.⁷³ This does not, however, take us any further in terms of an ever increasingly globalising mankind. Dialogues are exchange processes between persons or groups equipped with ideas or experiences. If Friedrich Schlegel still represented the viewpoint in 1810 that Europe was “not the centre, but the embodiment of all of mankind”⁷⁴ – then this expresses not just a Western hubris, such as can also be found in Schiller’s inaugural address at Jena, but we are faced with a European disposition towards intellectual superiority, which was then later adopted almost seamlessly by the USA in its self-assuredness, “The First New Nation” (Lipset) or in Hannah Arendt’s dictum of the “*novo ordo seclorum*”. Nelson Rockefeller had already presented arguments which were on no less huge a scale and equally naive decades before in his semi-official *Report on the Americas*: “There is no nation in all of history (sic!) better than our own system of political democracy.”⁷⁵ No dialogue can take place in the face of such assertions, i.e. a patient exposition of one’s own position and a willingness to listen to the other party in a respectful manner.

The term of ‘discourse’, which has become wide-spread in academic discussions particularly through the works of Habermas should not be equated with dialogue in terms of the inter-cultural relationship. Discourses are complexes of opinions and ideas which can be presented; they can be right or wrong, true or untrue, stimulating or repugnant. They are indispensable elements of what are in principle open societies. “The public, which must abandon the sound board of all enlightening activities, is not a systemically fixed institution, but a connection for communication in the lived-in world consisting of contents and commentaries and in the end also opinions”, writes Walter Reese-Schäfer, paying regard to Habermas.⁷⁶ The more differentiated the social, economic, religious,

Discourses are complexes of opinions and ideas which can be presented. They can be right or wrong, true or untrue, stimulating or repugnant.

73 | Ibid. 25.

74 | Ibid. 40.

75 | Manfred (first name wrongly given as Martin) Mols, “Quality of Life in the Americas”, in: *Zeitschrift für Politik* 17/4, 1970, 392-438, 414.

76 | Cf. Walter Reese-Schäfer, *Jürgen Habermas*, Frankfurt am Main, 2001, 112.

ideological and of course also academic structures, associations and opinions are, then the more they indicate forms of modernity, which point in the direction of structures displaying the social-political features distinguished by the name of state.

A world state remains a dream and utopia, because it would blur the identity of the local and what has grown up in ethnic and cultural terms and because its functioning is more than questionable. We should basically not strive for world cultural-political-social uniformity, but proceed on the basis that the concrete lived-in worlds remain hybrid structures and avoid regarding these as simple marginal positions.⁷⁷ This does not mean stasis or standstill, but dynamism in a condition of permanent acculturation,⁷⁸ without which mankind has never survived at any time in all of known history. Perhaps one can even go so far as to maintain that hybridity virtually constitutes an essential element for transformation, change, adjustment and is a pre-condition for functional dialogues. Political foundations acquire an enhanced responsibility with their indispensable political educational work in this regard.⁷⁹ It is not sufficient to pass on our model visions of state, society, desirable social order etc. "to the outside", but also to become ourselves acquainted with what is being discussed "out there".

77 | Cf. Monika Fludernik and Miriam Nandi, "Hybridität. Theorie und Praxis", *Polylog* 8, 2001, 7-24.

78 | Cf. *ibid.*, 19.

79 | On-going gratitude needs to be expressed to Josef Thesing for presenting the thoughts of Eduardo Frei Montalva (Chile) or Aristides Calvani (Venezuela) to an interested German readership through good translations. Cf. inter alia Manfred Mols and Josef Thesing, *Der Staat in Lateinamerika*, Mainz, 1995.