From conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction: Peacekeeping lessons for UNSC non-permanent members South Africa and Germany

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUHIP	AU High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KAS	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCP	National Congress Party
P5	Permanent Five
SADC	South African Development Community
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

FOREWORD

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its members – permanent and non-permanent – therefore have an important role to play in maintaining international stability. This has been a very busy year for the UNSC, with uprisings in the Arab world, post-election violence in Cote d'Ivoire and Resolution 1973 on Libya.

Germany and South Africa have been non-permanent members of the UNSC for almost a year and will serve on the council for another year. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) took this unique opportunity to discuss how Germany and South Africa could use their tenure to identify possible collaboration for conflict prevention on the African continent.

A series of conferences and workshops were held during 2011 to provide a platform for dialogue relating to conflict prevention in Africa. More specifically, the activities focused on strengthening collaboration between the South African and German governments on the one hand, and the relationship between foreign policy-makers and their respective civil societies on the other. These activities aimed at contributing to more effective engagement on African issues within the UNSC, better multilateral dialogue with other members, and advancement of the discussions on a potential reform of the UNSC.

The paper provides an in-depth study on lessons learned and the way forward. It discusses how South Africa and Germany – both regional middle powers – can draw from past experience on conflict prevention to adapt to future needs in this particular area. The paper specifically asks: What unique contribution can these countries make to define innovative policies linked to practical intervention strategies, not only to prevent conflicts from breaking out but to support post-conflict reconstruction and institutional capacity development, and to influence the UNSC on these issues?

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FROM CONFLICT PREVENTION TO POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: PEACEKEEPING LESSONS FOR UNSC NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS SOUTH AFRICA AND GERMANY

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1. INTRODUCTION

The word peacekeeping evokes powerful images of soldiers with blue helmets patrolling rubble-strewn streets in a country torn apart by war. The effectiveness and impact of such operations are often debated, especially in the contemporary world beset by multiple concurrent political, economic, climatic and geopolitical crises.

Intra-state conflicts often have far-reaching regional and international repercussions, as seen in such places as Afghanistan, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya and Somalia. International intervention in Libya's recent internal conflict has once again proven to be highly contentious. Germany's and South Africa's respective decisions and policy positions regarding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 drew much criticism and debate. Germany was criticised for abstaining from the Security Council vote and later for its decision not to contribute militarily to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Unified Protector in Libya.[1] Germany did, however, support the mission politically. South Africa voted in favour of the resolution but soon criticised NATO for interpreting the resolution too widely, and protested that the African Union (AU) was side-lined and made subservient to the United Nations (UN), NATO and the Arab League.

Regardless of controversies that sometimes accompany international interventions, it is important to note that the UN currently has seven operations in Africa alone, namely: UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS); UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI); UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); and the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

In addition, there are operations that the AU is directly involved in, such as the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The AU is the leading organisation doing the thankless job of importing peace into the war-torn streets of Mogadishu by way of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The AU is also involved in the complex process of keeping North and South Sudan talking through a transition that saw Southern Sudan appear as Africa's newest independent state. In this regard the AU High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP) has thus far proven itself to be a

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resilient mechanism to mediate in negotiations between the parties, and to deal with the potential political fall-out of Africa's biggest ever political divorce.[2]

South Africa and Germany are currently serving as non-permanent members of the UNSC. In this period of jointly serving on the UNSC it may be appropriate for these two countries to find areas of shared interest, where combined effort and cooperation can advance their national interests and the principles of their respective foreign policies in the international political space.

The first question to be addressed in this paper concerns how South Africa and Germany, as regional middle powers, can seek common ground for cooperation in the fields of conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping. Second, what unique contribution can these countries make to define innovative policies linked to practical intervention strategies that both prevent conflicts from breaking out and support post-conflict reconstruction and institutional capacity development, and how can they influence the UNSC on the issue?

In answering these questions the paper will first examine South African and German foreign policy. This is followed by a discussion of critical issues pertaining to intervention in African conflicts. The examples of AU interventions in Sudan and Somalia are then examined in order to identify lessons that can inform South African and German thinking on interventions in conflict. It will be argued that the problem of weak states and the political-economic exclusion of peripheral regions or marginalised groups in societies is central to the manifestation of conflict. The case of Sudan's civil wars will be used to illustrate the latter point.

South Africa's and Germany's engagements with conflict mediation and peacekeeping should not only deal with outbreaks of conflict or threats to security as surface manifestations. Conflicts that boil over into armed violence tell tales of social fragmentation. They therefore challenge those who seek stability on the continent to think anew about how such crises can be prevented or resolved once they have manifested in armed violence.

Multilateral interventions focus only on the onset of conflict. This leaves significant post-conflict intervention issues unaddressed, as well as problems related to mediation, reconciliation, institutional capacity-building and economic development interventions. By studying the Sudan and Somali examples, a case will be made for South Africa and Germany to step into this void through cooperative efforts aimed at providing much needed support for post-conflict social recovery and reconstruction. Depending on the convergence of interests between South Africa and Germany, the South African Development Partnership Agency (to be officially launched in 2012) can create an opportunity for cooperation in the realm of post-conflict recovery and economic development interventions.

2. SOUTH AFRICAN AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICIES

The main question this paper sets out to address concerns how South Africa and Germany, as regional middle powers, can seek common ground for cooperation in the fields of conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping. The short answer to this question can be found in the countries' respective foreign policies.

A recently tabled White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy highlights the fact that in Africa, '[d]ue to disruptions in economic activity and political instability, intra-state conflict continues to frustrate sustainable development'.[3] An example to illustrate this point is that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which brought Sudan's civil war to an end in 2005, not only had a positive impact on Sudan, but effectively created conditions conducive to regional growth.

The war in Southern Sudan had a particularly negative impact on security in Northern Uganda. Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia struggled for decades with flows of refugees and the negative consequences of civil war in Sudan. Since the signing of the CPA, Kenyan and Ugandan business, young professionals and entrepreneurs have been seeking opportunities in Africa's newest economic frontier. This means that with peace, opportunities for socio-political renewal and economic growth open up. This is why the White Paper's simple statement concerning the negative impact of intra-state conflict on development captures the essence of the challenges that armed conflict and related instability present to states and regions.

According to the Foreign Policy White Paper, South Africa has identified the following as critical issues in the area of African peace and security:

- The AU is determined to reinvigorate its peace and security initiatives.
- The need to strengthen the South African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, as well as the AU Peace and Security Council.
- The need to strengthen the link between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UNSC.
- The importance of the African Standby Force (ASF); South Africa is committed to working with its neighbours to maintain the readiness of the SADC Brigade.[4]

According to the Guidelines for Germany's Africa Policy, Germany sees a link between security, stability and modernisation on the African continent. South Africa's foreign policy focus on the negative impact of intra-state conflict on development and the German policy's emphasis on the link between security, stability and modernisation provide the basis for cooperation in the field of conflict prevention, resolution and peace-keeping. The Guidelines furthermore indicate that Germany backs African states' efforts to build an effective African security architecture. Of particular interest in this regard is German training of the ASF.[5] In terms of supporting the development of the ASF, there is a clear convergence of foreign policy objectives between South Africa and Germany.

However, the importance of developing the ASF does not only stem from South African and German foreign policy. One critical lesson from recent events in Libya and the controversial nature of the UN-sanctioned NATO intervention there is that a functional, operationally deployable ASF must be established to complement African mediation efforts with the threat of force, and thereby to avoid controversial international military interventions in African political crises.

The long-term strategic imperatives in terms of intervention in African conflicts are therefore to strengthen and develop the ASF, as well as continental and regional mediation support mechanisms. These two goals should be the basis for future cooperation between Germany and South Africa.

An important element of Germany's Africa policy is that Germany seeks to strengthen Africa's ability to take responsibility for its own affairs.[6] In terms of cooperation in the fields of conflict mediation and peacekeeping, Germany could position itself as a strategic partner to South Africa.

3. INTERNATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION: PROBLEMS AND CRITICAL ISSUES

Conflict does not happen outside of historical context, nor does it unfold in a socio-political or economic void. Owing to the destructive impact of armed conflict on infrastructure and people, as well as the potential for such conflicts to affect regional and international peace and security, analysis often focuses on the immediate reasons for armed violence. Multilateral mediation and peacekeeping interventions understandably focus on the immediate and most destructive manifestations of conflict – namely, armed violence, the proliferation of weapons, human rights abuses, humanitarian consequences and the displacement of civilians. Peacekeeping and mediation interventions therefore focus on the onset of conflict and are primarily concerned with engagements that can stem the tide of intra-state violence.

Military interventions are not free from controversy, however. Andreas Rinke argues that in the recent case of Libya, two basic concepts regarding international intervention collided. The first concept relates to the doctrine of 'responsibility to protect', which contends that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in cases where a state is unwilling or unable to protect its own citizens. The second concept '... criticize[s] the exaggerated emphasis that has been placed on resolving conflicts through armed force for decades'.[7]

During his speech to the 66th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 21 September 2011, Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan raised questions about armed interventions when he pointed out that:

> For too long, the international community has focused too little attention on mediation and preventive diplomacy, and far too much effort and resources on military aspects of peace and security. Yet, measures to address the root cause of conflict, including dialogue and mediation, can be far more effective as means to achieving sustainable peace and stability.[8]

This is an interesting statement coming from the

president of Nigeria since that country has a track record of being more inclined to deploy military forces to deal with regional political crises than, for example, South Africa.

One implication of Jonathan's statement is that successful intervention in 21st century conflicts cannot be based solely on the deployment of superior means of force. Such interventions may address immediate security crises, but they are essentially one-dimensional in that the provision of immediate material security cannot address much deeper sources of civil or intra-state conflict.

Armed conflicts are often rooted in long-standing grievances, perceptions of exclusion or the inability of a state to function as an integrated institution that accommodates and satisfies the needs and aspirations of all its people. The North African uprisings show that authoritarian governments and political repression can either translate into relatively bloodless revolution (Egypt and Tunisia) or civil war (Libya). Each case of conflict has its own sociological, political and economic root causes. The unique internal determinants of conflict means that interventions cannot be generic; they must be designed to address the peculiar social, security and political causes of the relevant crisis.

Oloo Adams argues that many countries in Africa host militias, armed opposition groups and Islamist insurgents:

> ... with the most affected being Somalia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan. In Kenya, militias emerged as a result of bad governance, which has led to the marginalisation of communities, economic disparities, a rise in poverty levels, and the inequitable distribution of national resources and services.[9]

The combination of bad governance and grievances concerning marginalisation thus poses a unique challenge not only to the internal politics of a country but, more importantly, to external actors that intend to intervene in such crises. Interventions in internal political crises therefore call for more than mere military responses. Since armed conflict is usually the surface manifestation of a much deeper socio-political crisis unfolding in a society, interventions require a multipronged and multidisciplinary approach. As noted by Adams, the problems of marginalisation, economic disparity, poverty, and inequitable distribution of resources and services have to be taken into consideration when designing an intervention.[10]

International interventions should therefore do more than merely douse the immediate flames of war. Kwesi Aning argues that several thematic issues bring the effectiveness of international mediation under criticism. These include the historical dynamics of a particular conflict, the nature and causes of conflict, the motivations of warring factions, the external dimensions of the conflict and the character or choices of the mediator.[11]

Countries such as Germany and South Africa can do important work within the UN to continually stress the fact that military interventions are one of many possible intervention strategies. Furthermore, military interventions are made controversial due to the power, influence and interests of the five permanent (P5) members of the UNSC.

In a report that reflects on South Africa's tenure on the UNSC, Lesley Masters points out that:

> To be effective in the UNSC, a member requires capacity to understand and handle the Council's complex agenda. It must figure out how to respond to the disproportionate power of the Permanent 5 – China, France, Russia, UK, and USA – and their willingness to use this power to ram through issues of self-interest.[12]

In this regard the UNSC non-permanent members have a duty to remind the P5 and the UN of the fact that military interventions serve a very limited function, namely: to provide a basic level of collective security and assurance against acts of violence perpetrated by peace spoilers. Calling for the demilitarisation of interventions does not mean that the use of force should be taken off the agenda as a viable means to bring about peace; rather, military intervention should ideally be the last resort when all other avenues for mediation and dialogue have been exhausted.

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire's post-election crisis between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Outtara, military intervention in that country had a significant impact in that it aggressively imposed the terms of peace. However, although the immediate crisis (forcibly removing Gbagbo and his military supporters from the political equation) may have been dealt with, several

sources of tension and the root causes of the original conflict remain largely unaddressed. Although Ouattara won the election, a significant portion of the population voted for Gbagbo. Forces loyal to Gbagbo may well remain to challenge the legitimacy of the Ouattara regime.

Other underlying and historical tensions in the country point to the fact that although the military intervention to remove Gbagbo may have been successful, additional challenges remain, including religious polarisation, the country's north-south divisions, the need to develop a sense of shared citizenship, disarmament of militias, security sector reform and reconciliation between divergent political groupings.[13] This means that debate on interventions should first acknowledge the fact that military interventions are essentially one-dimensional and crisis driven. Once the crisis has been dealt with, the root causes of the conflict usually remain unaddressed.

Another controversial issue regarding military interventions in internal political crises is the extent to which P5 behaviour is shaped by their specific national interests. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, long-standing French influence and national interests shaped France's behaviour on the UNSC. Yusuf Bangura explains how French post-colonial policy and relations with West Africa are based on elite ties, which also impacted on the intervention.[14]

Although one might agree that there was a need for intervention in Côte d'Ivoire's post-election crisis when Gbagbo lost the election and refused to step down, it is necessary for non-permanent members of the UNSC to interrogate other members' national interests and ulterior motives, which, on occasion, can shape cases for military intervention in political crises.

Regardless of such controversies in UNSC intervention politics, a peacekeeping presence in a country is relevant merely as a guarantor of security. Military interventions can aim to stabilise a situation of conflict in order for the real work to continue at a political and societal level – that is, consolidating peace, building consensus on political processes and addressing the root causes of a conflict. The success of the latter tasks, however, does not depend on military capacity but on mediation and support for post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building and state-making processes. According to the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, in cases where peacekeepers are deployed in long-term operations, it is important to demilitarise the peacekeeping '... in order to increase local ownership of the peace'.[15] The demilitarisation of peacekeeping is therefore a crucial component of social peace-building processes within a post-conflict environment.

Once a peacekeeping operation has been deployed and the necessary work done to reach a political settlement, there is also a need to have a clear exit strategy for peacekeepers. In the case of the DRC, President Joseph Kabila has made several calls for the UN to withdraw MONUSCO forces from the country.[16] While some analysts argue that this is for internal political reasons, it should be noted that UN peacekeepers have been active in the DRC since 1999.

This raises the question – not only applicable to the case of the DRC – regarding the appropriate time for peacekeepers to withdraw. Furthermore, it can be asked whether the Congolese peacekeeping operation has achieved its objectives. If it has not, there is a need to assess how things can be done differently to capacitate the Congolese state to deal with its territorial governance challenges. How can the security and peacekeeping operation in the DRC be demilitarised as far as possible? In other words, how can the military component of an intervention be transformed into post-conflict reconstruction and institutional capacity-building engagements to encourage the evolution of a society and systems (institutions) to support it?

Following armed conflict the state often remains weak and incapable of penetrating its territory to provide much needed basic services to its population. Post-peacekeeping arrangements and projects aimed at developing a state's territorial reach and institutional capacity are a critical piece in the larger puzzle of peace building. The demilitarisation of an intervention can arguably take the form of drawing down the military component of an intervention while simultaneously devoting more resources to civilian, civil society and business engagements with economic development and reconstruction projects. For Germany and South Africa, this implies a vast area of political entrepreneurship, where the countries could develop strategies for post-conflict and post-peacekeeping interventions. Such interventions could be aimed at building state capacity, as well as continued mediation efforts to ensure that inclusive and consultative political change takes place. As noted above,

grievances related to economic marginalisation often play a role in sparking armed conflict, implying that another important area for constructive intervention comes at the level of bringing developmental projects to the field, which can address the real existential and economic survival concerns of the communities affected by conflict.

This section raises several critical issues and questions pertaining to peacekeeping and international interventions in conflict. Following on the discussion above, it is recommended that South Africa and Germany promote debate in the UN on the need to demilitarise international interventions both at the onset and at the end of conflict. Important related questions that these countries can take forward into debates at the UN include the following:

- How and when is the use of military force appropriate as a means of international intervention?
- When and under what conditions should peacekeepers be withdrawn?
- How can a military-led peacekeeping operation with limited post-conflict utility be transformed into a civilian-driven intervention that focuses on peace building, institutional capacity development and economic development interventions that can help a society to evolve away from patterns of armed conflict and violence?
- Are multilateral organisations such as the UN, AU and European Union (EU) paying enough attention to the root causes of the conflicts they intend to intervene in?

4. LESSONS FROM SUDAN'S DIVORCE

South Sudan celebrated its long-awaited independence on 9 July 2011. Since independence in 1956 Sudan went through two lengthy and destructive civil wars, first in the period 1955–1972 and then from 1983–2005. This conflict is often referred to as the African continent's 'longest' civil war. During the second civil war alone 2.5 million people died, millions more were displaced (internally and in the region), and hundreds of thousands became exiles and refugees on other continents. The Sudanese civil wars had a tremendous impact on the region, and in particular on such countries as Uganda, Ethiopia, Chad and the DRC.

It is not possible to provide a comprehensive overview of all the international interventions in Sudan, which have included the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-sponsored peace negotiations between the north and south that started in the 1990s, as well as interventions led by other regional and international bodies and which culminated in the signing of the CPA. This section will focus specifically on the African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP), which mediates negotiations between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on key political issues arising from South Sudan's secession from the rest of the country.

Before dealing with the AUHIP it is, however, necessary to reflect on some historical sources of the conflict in Sudan. Research on Sudan's internal conditions has identified several inter-linked levels of conflict that begin at the local community level, where tensions arise due to competition for access to basic subsistence resources (water, land, grazing rights for cattle, and clashes between the lifestyles of pastoralists and agrarian peasant farmers). In addition to the local level conflicts, Sudan's post-independence national question and conflicts stemmed from several sources, including issues pertaining to unity, national identity, distribution of power in the state system and – in the case of the second civil war – control over national resources, in particular oil.

Political grievances related to the centralisation of power in Khartoum played a major role in igniting the flames of war in Sudan. Internal armed struggles against the central state unfolded during the Eastern Front insurgency that occurred concurrently with the SPLM war in the south during the second civil war (1983–2005). Like the Eastern Front insurgency, the Darfur rebellion (2003) showed that Sudan's internal politics is largely defined by conflicts between the central state and marginalised peripheries. Economic marginalisation and northern domination appear to be the main grievances that armed rebels or opposition groups hold against the central state and the reigning political order in Sudan.[17]

Former South African president and chairperson of the AUHIP, Thabo Mbeki, argued in a lecture at the University of Khartoum on 5 January 2011 that political and economic power has been concentrated in Khartoum and its wider environs since British colonial occupation. As a consequence, the rest of the country

has remained marginalised and underdeveloped.[18] Arop Madut-Arop captures the political frustrations that led to decades of conflict in the following, rather blunt, statement that further explains Mbeki's assertion:

> ... Northerners and particularly those who have been led to believe that it is their God-given privilege to keep the southerners, westerners and easterners always at bay, by giving them empty promises through continuous conjuring of tricks must now read the message on the wall. The marginalised people of the rural Sudan have now refused [their] pariah position. They have now taken up arms to fight in order to obtain their fair share of the national cake. They would otherwise opt out of the Old Sudan.[19]

Madut-Arop's study of the rise of the SPLM and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) as liberation forces in Southern Sudan is one of the most comprehensive histories of these organisations yet compiled by a person of Southern Sudanese origin. Clearly, Southern Sudanese opted out of the 'Old Sudan' when they voted overwhelmingly in favour of secession from the rest of the country during a referendum held to decide this issue in January 2011.

State making, questions related to its institutional weaknesses and the manner in which the state was used as a mechanism to centralise power in Khartoum thus played a central role in fomenting resistance against the Sudanese state in post-colonial times. Thabo Mbeki observes in this regard that:

> Part of our tragedy is that throughout the years of independence, until the conclusion of the CPA in 2005, the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006 and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement again in 2006, ruling groups in this country failed successfully to resolve the problem posed by the polarisation of Sudan into one centre and many peripheral regions.[20]

It is against the background of half a century of conflict that the work of the AUHIP becomes relevant for the current discussion. According to the CPA, signed in 2005, Southern Sudanese were given the opportunity to decide whether they wanted to remain part of Sudan or to secede and form an independent state. The work of the AUHIP takes place in the crucial end-phase of the CPA, and at the time of writing (some months after South Sudan's independence) is still continuing.

NCP and SPLM representatives gathered in Mekelle, Ethiopia, in June 2010 to negotiate and sign into existence the Mekelle Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). According to this agreement:

> … the parties met in Mekelle, Ethiopia from 21st-22nd June, 2010 to explore the modalities for discussion of post-2011 referendum issues and arrangements on self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan in accordance with the provisions of section 67 of the Southern Sudan Referendum Act, 2009 ... .[21]

The signing of the Mekelle MOU was a crucial moment for Sudan. It created a framework within which parties from the north and south of the country could begin negotiations on a set of issues. The Mekelle MOU was followed by the formal launch of post-referendum negotiations in Khartoum on 10 July 2010.

Owing to the long history and destructive impact of Sudan's civil wars, the AU intervention to mediate and assist parties in Sudan to prepare for the outcome of the January 2011 referendum proved to be an important mechanism to keep the parties talking through a tense and significant period in the country's history. The Mekelle MOU structured the post-referendum negotiations in four working groups: citizenship; security; financial, economic and natural resources; and international treaties and legal issues. Each working group included three to five principal negotiators from each party, and was supported and assisted by technical experts.[22]

Based on the principle of negotiated change, the work of the AUHIP in Sudan made a tangible difference at several crucial junctures over the period July 2010 to July 2011, and after the independence of South Sudan. Highly controversial issues, including questions on post-referendum and post-independence management of the oil industry, are therefore handled by the AUHIP mediation team. In this regard it has to be noted that 75% of Sudan's oil reserves are located in the south. The AUHIP therefore has to mediate and prevent major economic disputes regarding control over oil resources from derailing the peaceful separation of the two countries. While northern Sudan lost 75% of its oil reserves as a result of southern independence, the south, for its part, is dependent on pipeline and refinery infrastructure in the north for oil exports.[23]

In addition to the controversial issue of managing the

country's oil industry and designing a new deal according to which revenues from exports are to be managed, the AUHIP also dealt with security threats that could have derailed both the January 2011 referendum and the 9 July independence celebrations. The *Sudan Tribune* reported on 25 October 2010 that talks on the Abyei referendum, held in Ethiopia, collapsed because the parties could not reach agreement on who would be allowed to vote in the referendum to determine whether this region should be incorporated into North or South Sudan.[24] According to the CPA, the Abyei region was to hold a separate referendum to determine its status. In the weeks before the referendum a series of incidents and clashes between the nomadic Misseriya (who migrate into Southern Sudan from the North on an annual basis), the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLM forces threatened to re-ignite war between the north and south.[25]

The clashes in Abyei and the potential these had to flare up into renewed armed conflict cast a long shadow over the referendum. The AUHIP intervened and managed to keep the NCP and SPLM from plunging back into war. Through the AUHIP intervention, agreement was ultimately reached to deploy Ethiopian troops under the banner of a UN peacekeeping mission in Abyei. This mission's goal is to demilitarise the border and thus to manage the security situation in this volatile and hotly contested region. Tesfa-Alem Tekle reported at the time that:

> The Ethiopian government has begun deploying its troops to monitor the troubled North-South Sudan frontier of Abyei region, a military official said on Wednesday. The decision to deploy peacekeepers to the volatile region was reached after leaders from North and South Sudan – under the broker of the African Union – signed an agreement last month in Addis Ababa to fully demilitarise the central region and to allow an Ethiopian peacekeeping force to move in to monitor Abyei.[26]

The AUHIP not only had responsibility to mediate negotiations on crucial issues such as citizenship and arrangements for the oil industry, it also acted as mediator in moments of crises in the run-up to the January 2011 referendum and the independence of South Sudan during July 2011. It is necessary to note that without the AUHIP's interventions during the closing months of the CPA process, tensions along the border regions and unresolved political and economic issues could have potentially led to renewed outbreaks of violence, if not war.

The AUHIP is continuing with its crucial mediatory role between the NCP and SPLM after South Sudan's formal independence. A signal of the success of the AUHIP mediation effort is the fact that regardless of doomsday scenarios of a return to war predicted by some media outlets and analysts in the run-up to South Sudan's independence in July 2011, at the time of writing the two countries are still deeply committed to the negotiation process initiated in June 2010 with the signing of the Mekelle MOU.

A further sign of success of the mediation effort came in October 2011 when President Salva Kiir Mayardit made a state visit to Khartoum. At the conclusion of the visit the countries issued a joint communiqué in which they committed themselves to solve all pending issues by peaceful means, regardless of their sensitivity. The countries additionally agreed to set up joint committees to boost consultation between the political administrations in South and North Sudan.[27] It thus emerges that the AUHIP played, and continues to play, an important role as mediator in the rather complex process of disentangling the economies, dealing with shared borders and the political impact of secession on both countries.

Several lessons can be drawn from the AUHIP intervention in Sudan. In the first instance it is necessary to stress that mediation requires two Ts: time and trust. The Sudanese peace process lasted more than a decade – interventions began in the late 1990s. The AUHIP's intervention started at a crucial phase as Sudan prepared for the January 2011 referendum. In addition to the two Ts of mediation, it is clear that mediators need to have in-depth knowledge of the history and root causes of the conflict, as well as the strategic goals and interests of the parties to a negotiation. Lacking this, mediation is a futile exercise.

South Africa and Germany can learn a crucial lesson from the Sudan case, namely that mediated settlements cannot happen overnight. Negotiated settlements require commitment and perseverance both from the mediator(s) and the negotiating parties. It is therefore possible to assert that technical support to mediators and trust-building exercises to bring negotiating parties to the bargaining table are critical components of a successful mediation effort.

In the case of Sudan, several unresolved issues are still to be tackled; however, if the joint communiqué following President Kiir's state visit to Khartoum is anything to go by, the AUHIP mediation process paved the way for constructive engagement on issues that could have easily sparked division and conflict.

5. LESSONS FROM THE AMISOM OPERATION IN SOMALIA

This section explores some historical and contemporary questions and challenges that the AU operation is bound to encounter as the stabilisation mission in Somalia enters a new phase. The Somali experience of state failure and the AMISOM operation raises complex theoretical and practical policy questions regarding multilateral interventions in internal conflicts and cases of state failure.

As non-permanent members of the UNSC, these questions are relevant for South African and German policy due to the critical interventions that the AU and UN will have to devise to restore order throughout Somalia's deeply contested territorial space. The issue is also relevant to UNSC discussions due to the threats to international peace and security (such as pirate activities and terror networks) that have taken root in Somalia over the past decade.

The AU issued a press release on 10 October 2011, which announced that:

> In operations lasting 48hrs, combined [Transitional Federal Government] TFG and AMISOM forces have pushed forward and taken the remaining Al Shabaab strongholds in the far North East of Mogadishu. AMISOM can confirm that the former Pasta Factory and critical junction, Ex Control Bal'ad, are now in Government hands. Operations will now focus on the environs of the city and policing within the liberated areas.[28]

The AMISOM operation is the first multilateral intervention in Somalia in 20 years that has managed to gain control over the capital city. AMISOM was created by the AU Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007. At the time of AMISOM's creation Ethiopia had just launched a controversial United States (US)–backed intervention in Somalia to bring pressure to bear on the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had taken control of Mogadishu and Southern Somalia during the second half of 2006. The Ethiopian invasion led to a split in the UIC. The current TFG president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was a prominent leader of a more moderate Islamist faction of the UIC.

The creation of AMISOM was received with much scepticism. Several critical questions were raised regarding AU capacity to launch an effective military intervention in one of the world's most murderous internal conflicts.

When considering the recent relative successes of the AMISOM operation, it is necessary to recall that a US-led UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia began on 9 December 1992. This operation was doomed to failure when local resistance against US and UN forces led to the killing of several US soldiers and the release of footage showing how the dead bodies of US marines were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. By 31 March 1994 the US withdrew its troops, and by 1995 the UN packed its bags to leave the country too.[29]

Even though the AU can be credited for a breakthrough in its fight against a resilient al-Shabaab insurgency, al-Shabaab's withdrawal from Mogadishu heralds a new phase in the conflict. In the weeks since evacuating Mogadishu, al-Shabaab has turned to terror tactics and suicide missions to pressure the TFG, AMISOM and TFG fighters. The AU will therefore have a new dual challenge in Somalia: first, to consolidate military control over the city and pursue al-Shabaab elements in the vast territories still under its control in southern Somalia; and second, to act decisively on the non-military elements of its mandate including, most importantly, reconciliation efforts.

The AMISOM force comprises military, police and humanitarian components. It currently has 50 police officers deployed in Somalia from such countries as Burundi, Ghana, The Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda. The military component of the operation is the largest and comprises 9,595 troops drawn mainly from Uganda and Burundi.[30] AMISOM is mandated to launch peace support operations in Somalia in order to stabilise the country and to pave the way for humanitarian activities. AMISOM is mandated, among other things, to: support dialogue and reconciliation; provide protection for the TFG and its related institutions; assist with the implementation of a National Security Stabilisation Programme; provide technical support for disarmament and stabilisation

efforts; monitor security conditions in its areas of operation; and facilitate humanitarian operations, including the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people.[31]

This is a huge mandate given the depth of the security, social and political crises that have plagued Somalia for more than two decades of civil war. Nevertheless, the central political challenge confronting AMISOM relates to Somalia's biggest problem of state making. As argued above, the military component of an intervention serves an important, albeit narrow, function. In order to consolidate the military gains made against al-Shabaab, peace-building, state-making and institutional capacity development projects have to be established to lay the foundations for a new state order that is seen as legitimate by the Somali population.

The phenomenon of state failure has generated a lively but somewhat limited debate in the international system. Studies devoted to state failure focus either on existing cases where it has already happened, such as Somalia, or they attempt to trace the outline of theoretical models by way of which state failure may be predicted. Several authors such as Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair argue that although comprehensive ideas exist that suggest ways in which the international community can intervene to either prevent or rebuild failed and/or failing states, most of the suggested interventions are too costly, time consuming or impracticable given the mammoth task implied in the rebuilding of states.[32]

In addition to these inhibiting factors, Ottaway and Mair note that:

> ... it is not only lack of resources which constrains the effectiveness of the international community, it is also the lack of knowledge of which approaches to the stabilization of fragile states work and which instruments are best suited to perform this task.[33]

Neil Englehart notes that: 'Like most new fields, the theory of state failure is sparse and underdeveloped.'[34] This means that there is not only a lack of resources in the international community to launch robust engagements with the phenomenon, but, more importantly, there is a lack of theoretical or explanatory models which can assist to develop appropriate interventions.

The AMISOM intervention in Somalia can therefore be described as a political experiment. Neither the UN nor the US managed to engineer a breakthrough in their attempts at stabilisation and state making. To complicate matters further, the long-term absence of a centralised vertical power structure has resulted in the appearance of multiple actors, each with their own sources of local legitimacy and power, which occupy the territorial and governance spaces formerly controlled by the state. These actors include warlords, clans, sub-clans and insurgents such as al-Shabaab.

Not only is AMISOM confronted with the military challenge of al-Shabaab, it also has to engage with multiple contending centres of power in Somali politics. In a strange twist of political fate, Somalia in its stateless condition does not lack order. In fact it has an overabundance of agents of order that compete with each other or form complex local alliances to ensure territorial control and economic survival. The state-making process will therefore have to entail negotiations with actors and organisations that positioned themselves as alternative sources of power after the state collapsed.

A recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report on Somalia claims that at the core of Somalia's governance crisis is '... a deeply flawed centralising state model. The international community has not yet learned the lesson that re-establishing a European-style centralised state, based in Mogadishu, is almost certain to fail'.[35]

The ICG report contends that the predominant experience Somalis have had of a central state is one of predation. This is due to the fact that one clan or group of clans has always used its control of the state as a means to dominate resources at the expense of others. The ICG draws an important conclusion from this: '... [W]henever a new transitional government is created, Somalis are naturally wary and give it limited, or no, support, fearing it will only be used to dominate and marginalise them.'[36]

One of AMISOM's mandated tasks is to support dialogue and reconciliation. In this process it will have to contend with and understand the interplay between centres of power, identity and political manifestations at the local level. An example of such local power dynamics and alliances comes from a report by the Somali news agency Garowe. The report states that the port city of Kismayo was seized in August 2008 '... by a coalition of clan militias and Islamist fighters,

including al-Shabaab, Ras Kamboni and Anole'.[37] After al-Shabaab's withdrawal from Mogadishu, the group's control over Kismayo will become more important in its war effort.

The Garowe report indicates that two armed factions (Ras Kamboni and Anole) merged to form Hizbul Islam in early 2009. Al-Shabaab remains independent and has retained control over Kismayo since 2008. Important in this case are the political linkages between clan structures and political organisations. The report notes: 'While Al Shabaab is a multi-clan faction that primarily draws support from the outside [of Kismayo], Ras Kamboni and Anole draw support from the local Darod clans in Middle Jubba and Lower Jubba regions.'[38] This illustrates that local alignments between clans and political organisations can produce manifestations of power that are impossible to ignore.

This is a crucial feature of Somali power dynamics, which not only impacts on the processes of reconciliation but has direct bearing on both the stabilisation mission and state-making efforts. Clan and sub-clan structures are thus not only localised ethnic identities. The lack of an integrated state and government structure means that clans have become sites of 'order' in the post-collapse Somalia. Clan alliances with warlords, militias and groups such as al-Shabaab therefore create local systems of governance that provide order and continuity, while providing security and a means of economic survival.

Another pertinent point concerning the emergence of alternative governance structures in place of the state in Somalia is the presence of the UIC. This organisation disappeared after the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006. Yet, as Prunier argues, it was a complex organism '... made up of the fusion of several locally-based *shari'a* tribunals, each one having its own militia'.[39] As a political phenomenon, the UIC sent shockwaves through the region and the world because it was able to cobble together a vast network of divergent interests, and succeeded in displacing the menace of warlords from Mogadishu. In the short six months it occupied and controlled Mogadishu, the UIC managed to bring about stability, open the airports and seaports, and reintroduce low-level security for residents of the city.

The example of the UIC is not an uncommon phenomenon in contexts where states have either failed completely, as in Somalia, or where the state is plagued by perpetual institutional incapacity and armed insurgency. Menkhaus argues that Somalia may be at the forefront of a poorly understood trend which involves, in his words, '... the rise of informal systems of adaptation, security, and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a central government'.[40]

The UIC is therefore an important example of what Menkhaus refers to as organic forms of public order that arise in territories plagued by chronic internal conflict and state failure. In addition to the UIC, Menkhaus identifies other examples of organic forms of public order, such as coalitions of business groups, traditional authorities and civic groups, which have all developed their own internal coping mechanisms to ensure survival within a political environment characterised by severe division and conflict.

The rise of organic forms of public order is by and large brought about by the fact that most war-torn countries are, as Menkhaus indicates, beset by three interrelated but distinct crises, namely: protracted warfare; chronic lawlessness and criminality; and state failure. Owing to these interlinked crises, forces at the tribal, clan, business and political level seek to establish horizontal networks of power relations. These networks arise in response to the lack of state and government power, but will also potentially become forces opposed to the vertical power of a formally reconstituted state in Somalia.[41]

An African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) policy brief on the Somali peace process raises issues that are important not only for the AMISOM intervention but also for South African and German policy regarding debates in the UN on future interventions in Somalia.

ACCORD indicates that peace building is a prerequisite for and an enabler of state building. It argues that during the early 1990s Somaliland engaged in indigenous grassroots peace-building and reconciliation processes that laid the foundation for the establishment of a government and political institutions. These bottom-up political processes helped Somaliland to create a hybrid system, which combines indigenous Somali and Western democratic traditions.[42]

The lesson that South Africa and Germany can take from this is that state-making and peace-building processes have to work in tandem. Furthermore, political forces and local populations have to identify

with the political structures that grow from peace and reconciliation efforts. In this regard ACCORD recommends that external actors need to understand local processes better. External interventions need to learn from local processes and must integrate these into their intervention strategies. This is particularly important in the Somali context, where Somali nationalism and a fear of external intervention can easily be manipulated by insurgents to rally Somalis to the cause of armed struggle.

Michael Walls and Steve Kibble contend that Somaliland, which declared unilateral independence from Somalia in 1991, has thus far managed to marry traditional social institutions with precepts of the Western democratic nation-state model. Walls and Kibble argue that:

> Much of the process of democratisation has been enabled by an overwhelming public desire to avoid a return to conflict and by an accompanying urge to win international recognition, although we argue that yoking the two has also proved problematic. The nascent state remains weak and poorly funded, but has paradoxically enjoyed a degree of legitimacy exceeding that of many other governments, African and otherwise.[43]

It was noted earlier that AMISOM's intervention in Somalia can be described as a political experiment. Yet it can also be argued that local examples of peace-building and governance initiatives in Somaliland provide hope for similar efforts in the southern parts of the country that are still ravaged by war. The challenge for AMISOM and future interventions in Somalia is therefore to foster bottom-up peace-building, state-making and reconciliation processes.

6. LESSONS FROM SUDAN AND SOMALIA

The Sudanese and Somali interventions discussed above were chosen to illustrate current AU interventions that are relatively successful, given the length of the conflicts and crises which have affected these countries. The Sudanese case focuses on mediation, while the Somali case highlights the military intervention that the AU had to launch to deal with a resilient al-Shabaab insurgency. The main lesson to learn from these two interventions is that mediation and military interventions are tools in the AU peace and security apparatus.

A common theme in both the Sudanese and Somali cases discussed above concerns problems of state making, legitimacy and conflict. Lessons from the AU interventions in Sudan and Somalia can inform policy discussions and create a framework for future cooperation between South Africa and Germany in the fields of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

6.1 The two Ts of mediation

The lesson from the AUHIP's intervention in Sudan is that successful mediated negotiations rely on time and trust. Without these, mediation efforts run the risk of becoming superficial internationally sponsored conferences that produce no real results. The AUHIP's success stems in part from the fact that the parties trust the mediation team. Furthermore, while in-depth knowledge of the surface manifestations of a conflict is necessary, mediators also need to be well informed regarding historical dynamics, social conditions, and the demands, fears and strategic goals of the parties involved in the negotiations.

Conflict mediation requires specific skills and support mechanisms. South Africa could in this regard explore cooperation with Germany, which has supported IGAD's peace and security initiatives since 1990. The German government has supported the development of the IGAD secretariat and, importantly, IGAD's crisis-prevention and conflict-resolution initiatives.[44] This organisation is in the process of establishing and capacitating a Mediation Support Unit as an element of its larger Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution programme.[45]

The recommendation in this regard is that South Africa and Germany could seek to cooperate in the field of supporting the further development of mediation support mechanisms in other African regional economic communities. The goal of such a cooperative venture would be to make conflict-prevention and mediatory interventions at the onset of conflict more proactive and better resourced in order to deal with security crises.

It is also necessary for the AU and African regional organisations to pool knowledge and lessons learned from past interventions. In addition, the development of regional mediation support mechanisms can be linked to a series of continental and regional seminars that bring together mediators with hands-on

experience of negotiations and mediation. Experiences shared at such forums can be captured and developed to form the basis for an African institutional memory. Such knowledge and experience can assist regional organisations, political leaders, policy makers and international organisations to develop insight into approaches that have worked, why certain mediation efforts fail, and how best to approach conflict prevention as well as post-conflict peace-building processes.

6.2 The demilitarisation of intervention

It was argued earlier that as non-permanent members of the UNSC, South Africa and Germany can play a crucial role in debates concerning military interventions in conflict. As President Goodluck Jonathan noted in his speech to the UNGA, too many resources have in the past been devoted to the military aspects of peace and security. This means that, within the UN context, South Africa and Germany could engage with questions regarding the demilitarisation of international interventions.

There is a need to look into the demilitarisation of intervention both at the onset and end phases of international interventions. It is also necessary to ask whether resources devoted to the military components of peace and security can be made available for much needed post-conflict reconstruction, political reconciliation, institutional capacity development and economic development engagements.

Armed violence is often only the surface manifestation of much deeper social, political and economic crises within a society. This implies that military interventions are crisis driven and one-dimensional in that they only engage with the symptoms of what is a much larger socio-political crisis. South African and German engagements with questions of intervention, conflict prevention and mediation within the UN context could highlight the need to tailor interventions to address not only military and security threats, but also the root causes of conflict.

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire's post-election crisis, for example, the military intervention enforced the terms of peace but left the root causes of the conflict unaddressed. This can result in international interventions in fact laying the foundation for new grievances and sources of conflict to emerge. Much substantive work and comparative research is therefore needed to inform South African and German policy on these issues. As non-permanent members of the UNSC, South Africa and Germany can then take such policy recommendations to the UN.

6.3 Grievance politics and state failure

State failure can take several forms. In its most extreme form, state failure manifests as a total implosion of government and state institutions, as was the case in Somalia. Sudan, however, presents another type of limited state failure, where power was concentrated in the central government (Khartoum), leading to peripheral regions and marginalised groups rising up against the central state.

There is a need for cooperation and collaborative work in the field of international intervention to deal with cases of total or partial state failure. In this regard it is necessary to stress the fact that in the case of Somalia, the collapse and total failure of the state allowed multiple contending sites of order and power to fill the void left by the state's disappearance. Efforts at re-establishing a state apparatus therefore need to be sensitive to the local power manifestations in a society.

For South Africa and Germany this means that there are possible areas of cooperation in terms of post-conflict institutional capacity development, mediation and reconciliation projects.

It is furthermore necessary for South Africa and Germany to champion rigorous engagements within the UN and AU contexts to find mechanisms through which the problem of state failure can be addressed. As noted in the discussion on Somalia, a reconstituted state will be doomed to failure if it assumes a centralised posture.

Interventions in cases such as Somalia therefore call for an understanding of the local power dynamics and networks of alliances through which clans and political organisations have managed to survive two decades of conflict.

Interventions in cases of conflict that stem from state failure also need to be sensitive to the reconstruction of a state model, which will have to flow from processes, principles and practices that are organic to that particular society. Failing this, the state will be perceived as the enemy and a vehicle used by groups to dominate society and hoard resources to the detriment of others.

Lessons can be learned from the organic, bottom-up peace-building processes that Somaliland engaged in during the 1990s, which resulted in a relatively stable – although internationally unrecognised – proto-state that emerged from the rubble of the collapsed central state and government.

7. A PLATFORM FOR COOPERATION: SADPA

This paper highlights specific contentious issues, such as the demilitarisation of interventions, the need to understand root causes of conflict and the practical challenges interventions face when dealing with cases of partial or total state failure. As non-permanent members of the UNSC, South Africa and Germany can champion debates and lead or inform discussions within the UN, EU and AU to find more constructive mechanisms through which the international community can engage with these complex challenges.

But these substantive issues do not address the practical steps that South Africa and Germany can take to cooperate in the field of conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping. As noted above, there is a need for interventions that not only address immediate security crises and outbreaks of armed violence. Processes of post-conflict reconciliation, economic development and institutional capacity-building deserve much more attention in international interventions. Weak institutions, poor security sector performance (and reform) and a lack of economic opportunity in post-conflict contexts often lead to a perpetuation of political instability and social uncertainty.

One possible platform that South Africa and Germany can use for cooperation (depending on convergence of interests and foreign policy objectives) is the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), which South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) intends launching in 2012. As a new institutional mechanism, SADPA will need some time to be established and staffed.

The objectives of SADPA will be to assume responsibility for outgoing South African development cooperation and assistance. The agency will replace the African Renaissance Fund, which has until now been one of the vehicles used by the South African government to channel assistance to African states.[46] SADPA will also promote development, human rights, good governance, security sector reform, and conflict-prevention and -resolution initiatives on the continent.[47] If South Africa and Germany are to explore areas of cooperation in these fields, SADPA may be the most viable instrument through which cooperation can be pursued. Germany could consider donor support to the SADPA fund and, upon request from DIRCO, could cooperate directly with SADPA in projects on the African continent.

CONCLUSION

Cooperation in the realm of conflict mediation, peace-keeping and resolution between South Africa and Germany will depend on a convergence of interests and shared foreign policy objectives. Such cooperation will also have to be a 'learning experience'. This means that lessons have to be learned from current mediation and peacekeeping efforts. The goal would be to identify which approaches work and to learn why some interventions are doomed to failure.

As argued above, Germany's policy towards Africa emphasises that African countries should take the lead in seeking solutions to their internal and regional problems. This means that in the process of seeking areas for cooperation, South Africa should ideally take the lead in identifying issues.

Both South Africa and Germany have in the past made a case for reform of the UNSC. Cooperation in conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and resolution can in the long term strengthen the case for their inclusion in a transformed Security Council. In this regard South Africa advocates for an international system and institutions that are not based on distribution of power but on a rule-based equitable system.

This particular approach may be debatable; however, in the context of shifting global balances of power (between emerging markets and ailing developed economies) it may open a path for finding a new and more rational distribution of power and responsibility in the governance of the inter-state system.

This paper has explored several substantive issues, including questions related to the demilitarisation of intervention and how more attention can be paid to post-conflict institutional capacity development and peace-building processes. The lessons from Sudan and Somalia should be taken as indications of the complex nature of conflicts, and the various methods that states

and multilateral organisations need to deploy to intervene in intra-state conflicts.

In this regard it is necessary to conclude that both military and mediation interventions remain relevant as intervention mechanisms. Over-reliance on military interventions leads to one-dimensional engagements that can often foment new grievances, while leaving the root causes of conflicts unaddressed. The unique contribution that South Africa and Germany can make in this regard is to design nuanced intervention strategies aimed more specifically at post-conflict disarmament, reconciliation and institutional capacity development. South Africa has since 1994 demonstrated its willingness and ability to engage in such operations.

As argued above, armed conflict leaves the state weak and incapable of penetrating its territory to provide much needed basic services to its population. Post-peacekeeping arrangements and projects aimed at developing the state's territorial reach and institutional capacity is a critical piece in the larger puzzle of peace building.

The process of peace building in post-conflict settings is, in the long term, more important than the deployment of military forces to intervene in a conflict. This is because post-conflict development and reconstruction, and the development of inclusive political economies are the best guarantee against conflicts re-emerging or preventing new conflicts from breaking out.

If South Africa and Germany are to seek closer cooperation, SADPA may be an appropriate vehicle for such initiatives. DIRCO has indicated that in addition to its developmental focus, SADPA will aim to make inroads for South African investment and business engagements in African economies. South Africa is the leading economy on the African continent, while Germany holds that position in the European context. Well-designed cooperative ventures can therefore strengthen the two countries' ability to prevent and resolve conflicts, as well as opening up economic opportunities for them.

The world's economic and political governance systems are under severe strain. The global financial crisis and multiple unpredictable political developments (such as the Arab Spring of 2011) are reshaping regions and presenting the international system with new conflicts and challenges. The unpredictable long-term consequences of these global uncertainties means that regional middle powers such as Germany and South Africa need to adopt a more decisive approach to finding solutions to internal and global crises that are bound to redefine the world system in decades to come.

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