THE MAP OF AFRICA AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH SUDAN[1]

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When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ending its decades-long civil war was signed in 2005, the clock began to tick on Sudan's life as Africa's largest state. Although the break-up of Sudan was not then a foregone conclusion, both African and non-African leaders voiced fears that it could destabilise parts of the continent and lead to a domino effect of other nationalist secessions, most worryingly in large, conflict-ridden states like the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Nigeria.

This is "the beginning of the crack in Africa's map", predicted Africa's then-longest serving ruler in late 2010. "What is happening in Sudan", he warned, "could become a contagious disease that affects the whole of Africa."[2] History proved that Muammar Gaddafi was right to fear the consequences of a "contagious disease", though the one that would prove fatal for him was unrelated to events in Sudan. More apposite was the stark acknowledgement of Chad's President Idriss Deby: "We *all* have a south."[3] It was a warning to his fellow African leaders that Sudan's imminent split could herald a new bellicosity in existing north-south type disputes, especially where competition for scarce resources comes into play.

1 | A longer version of this article was published as Terence McNamee, "The first crack in Africa's map? Secession and Self-Determination after South Sudan", *Brenthurst Discussion Paper*, 2012-01, Johannesburg, The Brenthurst Foundation, 2012.
2 | AFP, "Sudan's Partition to be a 'Contagious Disease'", *Kaleej Times Online*, 10 Oct 2010, http://khaleejtimes.com/Display Article09.asp?xfile=data/theuae/2010/October/theuae_Octo ber257.xml&section=theuae (accessed 12 Feb 2012).
3 | Author's Emphasis.

On 9 July 2011, six years after the CPA was signed, the South formally went its own way, creating Africa's 54th state. What of the grim prophecies of Gaddafi, Deby and others? Is the continent's map set to be redrawn again? This fateful question was considered in detail at a high level workshop in September 2011.[4] The consensus, following two days of discussions, was that further changes to the map were unlikely any time soon. After the seismic unforeseen events in North Africa and the Arab world in 2011, however, no one could rule it out.

Six months on from achieving statehood, there is no evidence that South Sudan's secession has made independence more likely for other would-be states in Africa, as many had assumed. Just as the predictions that Eritrea's independence in the early 1990s would open a Pandora's Box of secessions from Cape Town to Cairo never materialised, South Sudan's successful struggle is unlikely to become a "precedent" for Casamance, Cabinda, the Ogaden or any other nationalist movement. Even Somaliland does not seem any closer to recognition despite wide acceptance that it already functions as a de facto sovereign state and probably deserves recognition, insofar as subjective judgements of that kind can be made.[5] The idea of self-determination is not on the wane in Africa – South Sudan's long struggle will surely embolden existing secessionist groups and may inspire new movements – but the obstacles to independent statehood appear as formidable as ever.

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Built into Africa's DNA is the fear that the slightest change in its "artificial" boundaries will unravel the entire multi-ethnic patchwork that characterises most states. The profound

4 | The title of this workshop convened by the Brenthurst Foundation in partnership with Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung was "The South Sudan Precedent: Maintaining Stability and Comity in Africa during a Time of Transition". The workshop rules stipulated that discussions were not for attribution, so the specific contributions and presentations of participants are not cited directly in this Paper. Although consensus was reached on a number of issues, it should not be assumed that all participants agree fully with the conclusions of this Paper. Any errors found therein are the author's alone.
5 | Cf. Harriet Gorka, "Somaliland – A Walk on Thin Ice", *KAS International Reports*, 7/2011, 79-98, http://kas.de/wf/en/33.23326 (accessed 12 Mar 2012).

aversion to tinkering with the post-colonial map of Africa has, alas, blunted the consequences of bad governance

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for many African leaders and regimes. They continue to neglect marginalised groups and divisions within their own societies at their peril, however. The democratic expectations of peoples living south of the Sahara have risen in response to the Arab Spring. Should they try to emulate the mass uprisings driven by the North Africa's rebellious youth – the current indicators suggest this is unlikely, but it is clearly a risk – then the borders of some states may not hold.[6]

THE SOUTH SUDAN EXCEPTION[7]

For all the inequities and miseries southerners endured, first under colonial rule and then for half a century due to Khartoum's brutal neglect – to say nothing of the suffering caused by vicious intra-South conflicts that periodically erupted – it was still possible to believe in 2005 that something short of full independence would satisfy the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the main political opposition group in the south. With each passing year following the signing of the CPA, however, the likelihood that southerners might opt to remain in union with the North receded. Officials in the South became convinced, certainly by the time of the 2008 SPLM convention, that Khartoum would never implement the provisions of the CPA or respect

6 | Cf. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ed.), "Africa and the Arab Spring: A New Era of Democratic Expectations", *ACSS Special Report*, Washington, D.C., 11/2011, http://africacenter. org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ACSS-Special-Report-1.pdf (accessed 12 Mar 2012).

7 | The major political and cultural forces that, over more than a hundred years, drove a deep wedge between Sudan's largely Arab Muslim north and the predominantly black animist/ Christian south are largely uncontested, and will not be discussed in detail here. Cf. e.g., Hilde F. Johnson, *Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations That Ended Africa's Longest Civil War*, London, Sussex Academic Press, 2011; Anna C. Rader, "Overcoming the Past: War and Peace in Sudan and South Sudan", in: Jeffrey Herbst, Terence McNamee and Greg Mills (eds.), *On the Fault Line: Managing Tensions and Divisions within Societies*, London, Profile Books, 2012; Martin Pabst, "Southern Sudan Before Independence – Local Celebrations, Disappointment in Northern Sudan and International Concern", *KAS International Reports*, 3/2011, 32-51, http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.22142 (accessed 12 Mar 2012).

the benchmarks built into the agreement. Of signal impor-
tance was the sharply contrasting perspectives on the "One
country, two systems" concept: the North interpreted it as a
federal-type arrangement, to the South it meant a confe-
deration.

Fig. 1
Sudan and South Sudan

On the role of the international community, critics charge
that it buried its head in the sand until secession was all but
inevitable. After the CPA was signed, the key foreign players
instrumental in brokering the agreement promoted the idea
of unity, but they failed to remain actively engaged during
the vital initial implementation phase. They had their "eyes
wide shut", according to the International Crisis Group.[8]
Given the deteriorating situation in Sudan's western region

8 | Cf. International Crisis Group (ICG), "Sudan's Comprehensive
      Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead", *Africa Report 106*,
      31 Mar 2006.

of Darfur – the focus of far greater international attention than the North-South conflict – and the West's fixation with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it may have been unrealistic to expect otherwise. When the referendum results were announced in January 2011, no one was surprised that 99 per cent of southerners voted for secession.

Khartoum was the first government to recognise South Sudan as an independent state after the CPA expired. All permanent members of the UN Security Council swiftly followed suit. Crucially, the African Union admitted the Republic of South Sudan as its 54th member state less than three weeks later, on 27 July 2011 (South Sudan was admitted into the United Nations as its 193rd state on 14 July). South Sudan's new government in Juba has also applied or is in the process of applying for membership to a host of regional and international organisations, nearly all of which are sure to consent.

That South Sudan's legitimacy as an independent state has been so fulsomely acknowledged – the UN Secretary-General, some thirty African heads of state and numerous senior officials from the West attended the Independence celebrations in Juba – illustrates one of the main distinctions between its independence struggle and other self-determination movements in Africa that seek to imitate it. None could expect to attain the level of international legitimacy conferred on South Sudan, at least initially. Its eventual validity as a sovereign state was entrenched in the CPA: should North and South fail to establish new arrangements to keep them together, then both parties to the divorce would agree to part after six years if a referendum in the South confirmed that was the will of southerners. That was the price paid by the North in 2005 to end the war, though in hindsight Khartoum appears to have grossly underestimated Juba's capacity to mobilise popular support for independence.

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Currently, no would-be secessionist state in Africa has even tacit agreement of the parent government to secede under any circumstances, save in Ethiopia, where the right of "self-determination, up to and including secession" by one of the country's nine ethnically-based administrative

regions, is enshrined in the constitution.[9] Even then – and despite Ethiopia's decision to let Eritrea go in the early 1990s – in practice the government in Addis Ababa has been highly reluctant to extend powers to its "semi-autonomous" ethnic regions, which raises doubts about its commitment to the principle of secession.

The other features of the South Sudan struggle that set it apart may have echoes in other self-determination movements across the continent, though in scale and intensity Juba's case was exceptional. This includes the length of the struggle (at least half a century); the sharp racial and religious divide between[10] north and south; the extreme economic hardship experienced in the south due largely to policies implemented in the north; the sustained support given to the south by major external players, from the United States and Israel to Sudan's powerful neighbour, Ethiopia; and the level of coherence and organisation in the movement, though on this score much the same could be said of Somaliland or even the Western Sahara.

TROUBLED BEGINNING

None of this is to say that the African Union and the wider international community did not have serious misgivings about South Sudan going it alone. Myriad problems were foreseen, from a possible resumption of war with the North – this time an inter-state war, which might draw in the countries' neighbours – to seemingly insurmountable

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9 | Cf. Article 39 in the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, "Rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples", http://servat.unibe.ch/icl/et00000_.html (accessed 12 Mar 2012).

10 | The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) controversially admitted the Western Sahara – a vast, sparsely populated territory bordered by Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria – into its membership in 1982, prompting Morocco to withdraw from the organisation. Its successor, the African Union (AU), has maintained the position that the Western Sahara is a case of decolonisation rather than secession. Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (which claims sovereignty over the Western Sahara) have actively sought diplomatic recognition of their sovereignty over the disputed territory – a process which has seen several reversals for each, with formal recognition extended and withdrawn by foreign governments over the past two decades.

development challenges. How South Sudan would address these challenges in the future could either soften reservations about granting independence or cement international opinion against any further "balkanisation" of Africa. Six months on from independence, events on the ground suggest the latter scenario is more likely.

Security was always paramount in discussions about South Sudan's viability as an independent state. The principal concern was that renewed conflict with the North could erupt over the status of Abyei – the tiny region which straddles the north-south border and is claimed by both Khartoum and Juba – and other border-related disputes in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states in the North. Abyei is a highly symbolic source of tension, where southern-aligned Ngok

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Dinka communities are pitted against nomadic Misseriya Arabs who migrate through the territory to graze vast cattle herds during the dry season; control over parts of oil-producing Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states is contested by various northern- and southern-backed factions and rival nomadic tribes. By the end of 2011, fighting in the disputed states had resulted in more than 100,000 refugees, some of which had fled to Ethiopia, and attacks had spread to Unity State and Upper Nile. Juba accused Khartoum of aerial bombardments of refugee camps in both states, as well as supporting southern rebels suspected of attacks near southern oil installations. South Sudan's President Salva Kiir claimed that Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir was trying to drag Africa's newest state back into a "meaningless war".

Even if President Kiir's allegation was true, the conflicts within South Sudan between competing tribes and factions have been more deadly and potentially destabilising to the new state than recent North-South skirmishes. In the second half of 2011 clashes between rival ethnic groups in Jonglei state left thousands dead. In one incident alone, 600 ethnic Lou Nuer were massacred at the hands of fighters from the rival Murle community. The United Nations reported that some 350,000 people had been displaced due to inter-communal violence in 2011.[11]

11 | "UN says 120,000 South Sudan residents need humanitarian aid after wave of ethnic violence", *Associated Press*, 20 Jan 2012, ▸

Conflict between different groups often erupts over water sources, cattle and access to grazing lands, though the spiral into uncontrolled tit-for-tat violence is driven by deeper factors, too. South Sudan is bristling with small arms left over from decades of conflict. Poverty is rife across the whole of society though it is worst among the smaller ethnic minorities, many of whom feel marginalised and unrepresented in the new political dispensation, which privileges the more populous groups such as the Dinkas, according to the government's critics. Despite the SPLM's success in crushing several rebel factions and negotiating the surrender of others, and the conciliation efforts involving the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMISS), South Sudan's internal conflicts appear set to worsen in 2012.

The main economic concern prior to the expiration of the CPA was not simply whether South Sudan could be viable on its own but whether secession could turn the North into a failed state. The implications of secession for the North were immense: a potential loss of 75 per cent of its oil revenues, about half of government revenues (equal to about 20 per cent of GDP). As the IMF remarked, it meant "adjusting to a permanent shock" to the system.[12] To fill the huge fiscal gap, Khartoum counted on international commitments (brokered by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel) on debt relief and lifting of sanctions, but they have come to nothing. Until the North ceases military operations in contested areas, little change should be expected.

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In South Sudan, "everything [was] at zero" in the run-up to independence.[13] The country had virtually no electricity, roads, schools or clinics. Its banking sector was among the least developed in the world, corruption was rife and trade costs were astronomical. What it did inherit, however, was

http://sudanews.net/news/un-says-120000-south-sudan-residents-need-humanitarian-aid-after-wave-of-ethnic-violence (accessed 20 Mar 2012).

12 | Cf. "South Sudan Faces Hurdles as World's Newest Country", *IMF Survey*, 18 Jul 2011, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/car071811a.htm (accessed 12 Mar 2012).

13 | Cf. The Brenthurst Foundation, "'Everything is at Zero': Beyond the Referendum – Drivers and Choices for Development in Southern Sudan", *Brenthurst Discussion Paper*, 2010/05, 11/2010.

an oil industry producing 350,000 barrels per day, amoun-
ting to 1,000 U.S. dollars per year for each of its 8 million
citizens.[14] Oil money accounted for 97 per cent of South
Sudan's budget.

In the negotiations between Juba and Khartoum over
economic issues, a consensus was reached that whatever
the eventual outcome of the CPA both sides needed to
be viable entities – mindful that currently less than half
of Africa's states would probably pass a test of viability
based on international standards. Above all, that meant a
comprehensive oil-sharing agreement: three
quarters of Sudan's oil was produced in the
south but the pipeline and port facilities were
controlled by the North. Yet by Independence
Day there was still no agreement on pipeline
use. In January 2012, Juba began to shut down oil pro-
duction after accusing the North of seizing 815 million U.S.
dollars worth of crude. At the time of writing, speculation
was rife that Juba's increasingly bitter dispute over transit
fees charged by Khartoum could re-ignite a wider north-
south war. The UN Secretary General warned that the row
had become a significant threat to stability in the region.[15]

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THE STATUS QUO

In the light of South Sudan's troubled start – economic
warfare with the North, the emergence of Kashmir-like sce-
narios on its northern border, renewed internecine con-
flicts – should the international community have been more
cautious in signalling its approval of secession? The status
quo prior to 2005 was wholly unacceptable for the South;
that much is beyond doubt. Yet it seems reasonable to as-
sume that, at the very least, more effort to make unity
attractive would have been deployed by the key external
actors in the years after the CPA was signed. In the end,
the international community came round to accepting an
outcome that it would have preferred to avoid.

14 | Alex de Waal, "South Sudan's Doomsday Machine", *New York
     Times*, 24 Jan 2012, http://nytimes.com/2012/01/25/opinion/
     south-sudans-doomsday-machine.html (accessed 14 Mar
     2012).
15 | "South Sudan shuts oil output amid export row with Sudan",
     BBC, 29 Jan 2012, http://bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-1678
     1592 (accessed 12 Mar 2012).

The same might be asked of Eritrea, which emerged as a newly-independent state in 1993. In the aftermath of its remarkable independence struggle Eritrea appeared poised to establish a cohesive, highly organised and self-confident new nation, a model for the rest of the continent, even. Instead, it descended into a totalitarian mini-state. Isolated and highly secretive, the Eritrean regime became increasingly repressive towards its perceived foes at home and an exporter of instability into the region, fomenting conflict with its neighbours. Emblematic of its collapse was the seemingly pointless war it waged with the state it seceded from, Ethiopia, over a few tiny, valueless territories on their mutual border, which lasted two years and cost roughly 100,000 lives.

Historically, international opinion has been very positive about self-determination in principle: it is one of the most frequently cited parts of the UN Charter. In practice, however, the key institutions and the world's major

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powers have been extremely constraining when it comes to movements that pursue independent statehood, more or less irrespective of the legitimacy of their cause.[16] It is probably safe to assume that the Eritrean example has only reinforced the predilection for the status quo; the same holds true if South Sudan's troubles deepen in the coming years.

By their nature states seek to prevent balkanisation – not just within their own borders but elsewhere, because new states are generally perceived as destabilising to the international system and also (being smaller) potentially unviable, and thus a drain on the resources of existing states. In the case of South Sudan, concerns over viability helped shape the international response, though they were balanced by fears over what might result if the South was forced to remain in the union. A strong case could be made based on existing governance structures that Somaliland is a more viable state, although its quest for

16 | Cf. Jon Temin, "Secession and Precedent in Sudan and Africa", *Peace Brief 68*, United States Institute of Peace, 2011; Alan Schwartz, "Scenarios for Sudan: Avoiding Political Violence Through 2011", *Special Report*, United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

international recognition has been stymied, at least partly, by the refusal of Somalia to consent to a divorce.

Secessionist movements hoping that South Sudan's successful struggle provides legal analogies to bolster their cause are likely to be disappointed. The laws and norms governing who receives international recognition and who doesn't are, in reality, fairly arbitrary and inconsistent.[17] Their legitimacy is almost certain to be assessed on a case by case basis – casus sui generis. What is certain is that the criteria will remain extremely stringent. It doubtless helped

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the cause of secession in both South Sudan and Eritrea that popular support was virtually ubiquitous: each achieved 99 per cent support for independence in their respective referenda. It was also to the advantage of the secessionist campaign in South Sudan, as well as Kosovo, that they were at war with a regime charged with crimes against humanity. But neither of the above are sufficient conditions for international recognition, highlighted by the fact that Kosovo is still recognised by less than half of the UN General Assembly (80 countries).

International law provides few pointers in deciding on future independence movements, in Africa as elsewhere. Inevitably, there will be more cases where the principles of "self-determination" and "territorial integrity" collide, with no clear track to reconcile the two. The right to unilaterally establish a new state based on the principle of self-determination outside the colonial context is not recognised in international law. Even an extraordinary case of secession under extreme conditions such as genocide has thus far not found wide acceptance among either scholars or the international community.[18]

It is this lack of consistency on questions of self-determination that may encourage a new wave of claims for the right to secession, as much as the so-called "precedent" of South Sudan might. The danger, as stressed by a number of legal scholars, is that historically self-determination has

17 | Ibid.
18 | Cf. Heidi Tagliavini, "A Clash of Principles: territorial integrity versus self-determination", presented at International Peace Institute, Vienna, 23-25 May 2011.

served as a kind of "political dynamite" in some corners of the world, with the potential to disrupt the very basis of peaceful co-existence among nations. Perhaps nowhere was this more evident than in twentieth-century Europe. At the same time, Europe has transcended many of its more intractable divisions over time via innovative governance arrangements and mechanisms, some of which are highly pertinent to Africa.

ENDURING RESOLUTION 16

Talk of secession in Africa usually starts and ends with Resolution 16, adopted at the first ordinary summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. The resolution declared that all member states of the OAU pledged to respect the borders that obtained when they achieved independence. Adherence to the principle of Uti possidetis ("as you possess") was a necessary evil, the argument went: the lines drawn by colonial map makers paid scant attention to traditional boundaries and instead sliced through tribes, ethnic groups, even families, in some cases dividing them across two or more states. Any attempt to untangle the mapmakers' legacy would be a recipe for endless war and chaos.

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The pledge to respect colonially-inherited borders and the principle of non-interference in states' internal affairs was intended to prevent Africa's newly-independent states from squabbling and promote stability on the continent. If "stability" meant "preserving the sanctity of Africa's borders", then it has been a notable success: besides South Sudan, only Eritrea has seceded in the past half century. If it meant preventing conflict, refugee crises and other humanitarian disasters, history's verdict is also clear.

Resolution 16 suited the leaders of Africa's newly-independent states. Most were authoritarian and feared that their economic and political power bases would be undermined by secessionist groups within their territory. This may partly explain why the resolution has over time come to be seen more as a prohibition against secession than an instrument to prevent inter-state wars.

One of the key unspoken aims of Resolution 16 was to forge coherent "nation-states" out of the ethnic, religious and linguistic mosaics that newly-independent states inherited. The influential anti-colonial philosopher Frantz Fanon feared that "post-liberation culture and politics might take the road of retrogression, if not tragedy. The project of national liberation might turn into an empty shell; the nation might be passed over for the race, and the tribe might be preferred to the state."[19] Undoubtedly, separate identities within states have not yet disappeared; in nearly all states, ethnic divisions have arguably become more pronounced. It is for this reason that some have questioned whether Africa's self-determination project has failed, or at the very least is still straining to "create" Nigerians, Congolese and so on.

None of the secessionist groups in either Nigeria or DRC currently possess the strength or cohesiveness to mount a direct challenge to their borders. Nevertheless, these two anchor states of Africa are vital test-beds for how African governments might address self-determination movements in the future.

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Numerous African states face current or potential threats to their territorial integrity from within. Most of these movements, however, are poorly organised and not very effective at galvanising their own people or international support to their cause. For the most part their modus operandi has been to either try (unsuccessfully) to take over power in the center or alternatively build parallel structures on the ground.

CONCLUSION

The fate of Muammar Gaddafi – dragged through the streets of his home-town, beaten and taunted, and then brutally executed – is a salutary reminder, if any was needed, that events have a way of building on themselves. At the start of 2011 no one would have imagined that the founder of the African Union and ruler of Libya for more than four decades

19 | Quoted after Achille Mbembe, "Fanon's Nightmare, Our Reality", *Mail & Guardian*, 23 Dec 2011, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-12-23-fanons-nightmare-our-reality (accessed 20 Mar 2012).

could meet such an ignominious end. The fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, the on-going rebellion in Syria – can anyone reliably predict how the chains of events will unfold in 2012? In the same vein, for all the powerful constraints on secession highlighted in this article, the much-feared balkanisation of Africa must never be dismissed as fanciful.

Similarly, it is hard to imagine how war-ravaged and grossly underdeveloped South Sudan could be bloodier or poorer as an independent state than it has been in the past forty years as an isolated region. Yet the final verdict cannot be delivered for many years, perhaps even a generation. By that time we will know how successfully the new government in Juba tackled the formidable divisions left unresolved by secession, and whether their neighbours let them get on with the task of nation-building.

The South Sudan case, as argued in this article, is likely to remain an exception rather than a precedent. The breakup of Sudan might usefully be conceived as one "extreme" on a spectrum of policy options to address critical eruptions along fault lines in states. It is somewhat paradoxical to argue that the formal slicing of Sudan in two constituted a successful management of a fault line, since it represented the failure of a state, but maybe it was.

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Even if not a precedent, South Sudan is sure to be a source of inspiration for other would-be states in Africa, such as Somaliland, well into the future. Doubtless it will inject fresh political energy into some self-determination movements, who may feel less reluctant to wield the threat of secession in order to extract concessions from governments or mobilise supporters to their cause. The break-up of Sudan might also serve as a constructive warning to governments on the need to pay closer attention to the concerns and grievances of marginalised areas within their borders.

Changing the status of borders to create new states will always carry grave risks, as the new triggers for violence in Sudan and South Sudan attest. Drawing a new international border will never be a panacea – it certainly did not prevent Eritrea and Ethiopia from waging all-out war – for intrac-

table intra-state conflicts. Nevertheless, the formation of new states may over the long term be part of the solution in some very specific cases, where the interests of national and international security are best served by changes to the territorial status quo.

It is often remarked that Africa has fetishized its map, especially when compared to other continents. In 2000 only 5 states in Europe had the same frontiers they had in 1900. States are not permanent entities; historically, in other parts of the world they have been permitted to fail when they did not work, but not so in Africa.

In most states confronted with self-determination movements in Africa, however, there is scope to improve governments' responses in ways that might dissuade secessionists from seeking full statehood. Above all, leaders need to think more innovatively about autonomy. Done well, federalist-type arrangements, with the appropriate processes and institutions, in particular viable revenue-sharing arrangements, can produce successful long-term responses to internal divisions, although to date African countries (even nominally Federal ones) have typically been highly reluctant to empower their regions and peripheries in ways that enable grievances and societal fissures to be managed effectively at their source. Europe provides a range of local and regional self-rule arrangements of potential relevance to Africa, as they have been largely successful in reconciling its various peoples' split allegiances.