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KONRAD ADENAUER AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG'S INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Peter Molt

After Konrad Adenauer stepped down as Federal Chancellor on 16 October 1963, the Chairman of the CDU, Josef Hermann Dufhues, asked him if he would agree to a "Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung" (Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation) being formed out of the Eichholz Political Academy and the system of scholarships for gifted students that was in the process of being established. Dufhues made no reference to the Institute for International Solidarity, which had also been established under the umbrella of the Eichholz Political Academy, and which the majority of the CDU's Federal Executive Board found somewhat problematic, despite the fact it was Konrad Adenauer himself who had been the driving force behind the founding of this Institute.¹

FOUNDING OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

The Institute for International Solidarity started its work in 1962. The previous year there had been debate at the CDU's national headquarters as to how the CDU could best contribute to the efforts being made by the Nouvelles

1 | For the history of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, cf. Günter Beaugrand, *Die Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: Eine Chronik in Berichten und Interviews mit Zeitzeugen*, Sankt Augustin, 2003; for more on its international activity, cf. Josef Thesing (ed.), *In der Welt und für die Welt: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: 40 Jahre internationale Zusammenarbeit. Persönliche Erfahrungsberichte*, Sankt Augustin, 2002; Josef Thesing, "Peter Molt – ein weitsichtiger Akteur in der Gründungsphase der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung", in: Theodor Hanf, Hans N. Weiler and Helga Dickow (eds.), *Entwicklung als Beruf: Festschrift für Peter Molt*, Baden-Baden, 2009, 18-31.

Équipes Internationales (NEI), the umbrella organisation of European Christian Democrats, to spread Christian Democratic thinking to developing nations around the world. In November 1960, the NEI had set up a Christian Democratic Study and Documentation Centre (CIDCED) in Rome to debate fundamental issues common to the various Christian Democratic parties. It was also hoped that the Centre would make a significant contribution to promoting the influence and activities of Christian Democrats in Latin America and Africa.² This owed much to pressure from the Organización Demócrata Cristiana (ODCA) of the Latin American Christian Democratic parties, set up in Montevideo in 1947, whose political objectives at the time were inspired by European Christian social philosophers, especially Jacques Maritain. The ODCA, with the help of the CDUCE, the exile organisation for Christian Democratic parties in Eastern Europe, then succeeding in persuading the initially very hesitant NEI to organise the first World Christian Democratic Party Congress in Santiago, Chile, from 27 to 30 July 1961, and to set up the International Christian Democratic Union there, with Venezuelan politician Rafael Caldera subsequently being elected Chairman.³ Some months later, at its 15th Congress in Lucerne from 12 to 14 October 1961, the NEI reaffirmed the resolution made at its 14th Congress in Paris in 1960, which recognised Europe's commitment to supporting the efforts of developing nations to move towards political and economic independence, and to provide them with favourable trading relations and development assistance.⁴ The Lucerne congress also underlined its solidarity with the Christian Democratic parties in Latin America and its willingness to support them in achieving their ideals, and expressed the hope that Christian Democratic movements would also begin taking root in Africa.⁵

2 | Peter van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development: The Globalization of Socialism and Christian Democracy 1945-1965*, Leuven, 2006, 220-238.

3 | Caldera was later to be President of Venezuela (1969-1974 and 1994-1999) but at that time was Chairman of the Venezuelan Christian Democratic party COPEI and Speaker of Parliament.

4 | The Archive for Christian Democratic Policy (ACDP) at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, IX-002-102/2.

5 | Centre International Démocrate-Chrétien d'Études et de Documentation, Document No. 13, "Nouvelles Équipes Internationales. Résolutions adoptées par les congrès annuels (Decembre 1964)", in the author's archive.

The CDU needed to decide how it was going to contribute to the International Union's efforts other than by providing parties with direct financial assistance.

In light of these developments, the question for the CDU was whether it should continue to take a back seat role in the newly-formed International Union or whether to become more actively involved. It also needed to decide how it was going to contribute to the Union's efforts other than by providing parties with direct financial assistance, something that had been addressed by various delegates at the Lucerne congress in varying degrees of directness. In any case, the chronic poor state of the party's finances meant this was not an option. However, one potential solution was to offer educational opportunities to a target group of young democratic leaders as part of the work carried out by the Eichholz Political Academy. As a result, the Eichholz Political Academy, in cooperation with the CIDCED, invited experts from Christian Democratic parties in Italy, France, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and the host nation Germany to a conference on 27/28 November 1961, to discuss to what extent European Christian democrats should become involved in development policy as well as potential cooperation with like-minded parties and organisations in the developing nations. The delegates agreed that solidarity with political groups and social movements that recognised people's spiritual and religious bonds as a basis for political policymaking should be considered a common goal for all European Christian Democrats, and that development assistance should not be understood purely in economic terms, but also as a way of supporting political and social structures that promote policies based on religious responsibility.⁶ Following the conference, CDU General Manager Konrad Kraske agreed with Kai-Uwe von Hassel to set up an "Institute for International Solidarity" under the umbrella of the Eichholz Political Academy, based on a model proposed by the author.⁷

The conference was also attended by the Belgian August Vanistendael, General Secretary of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) and an old acquaint-

6 | ACDP, n. 4.

7 | Kai-Uwe von Hassel, who at the time was still Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, was Deputy Chairman of the CDU and was especially committed to development cooperation work. For further details on the planned remit of the Institute for International Solidarity see the exchange of letters between Kraske and von Hassel. ACDP, 07-011-12150.

tance of Konrad Adenauer's, who considered him to be "an outstanding and great man [...] I only wish we had more capable people like him in Germany."⁸ Vanistendael arranged a meeting between Caldera and Chancellor Adenauer that took place at Konrad Adenauer's house in Rhöndorf on 2 February 1962.⁹ Vanistendael made a significant contribution to drawing up the "Memorandum from Latin American Christian Democrats",¹⁰ which Caldera gave to Adenauer at this meeting. This document set out concrete ways in which support could be given and for the first time proposed the establishment of a "Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung". The 46-year-old Caldera and the 86-year-old Adenauer saw eye-to-eye from the very beginning and Adenauer became Caldera's model of statesmanship.

Fig. 1



1962 German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer meets venezuelan politician Rafael Caldera. | Source: Archive for Christian Democratic Policy (ACDP).

8 | *Adenauer. Teegespräche 1961-1963*, Rhöndorfer Ausgabe, ed. by Hans-Peter Mensing, Berlin, 1992, No. 10, 114.

9 | Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Archive (StBKAH), III/60, 089-093.

10 | A copy of the handwritten German version (in the author's possession) is dated Caracas January 1962. The original was originally held in Vanistendael's private archive, but is now presumed to be in the archive of the Catholic University of Leuven, KADOC, "Plaatsingslijst van het archief August Vanistendael No. 653", Envelope, "Politische Akademie Eichholz 1961-62".

A few days later, on 8 February 1962, a meeting of the future board of the planned institute was held, chaired by Kai-Uwe von Hassel.¹¹ During a working discussion with Kraske¹² in early March 1962, Chancellor Adenauer verbally approved the establishment of the institute with the result that, following further preparatory work,¹³ the Institute for International Solidarity officially began its work on 1 July 1962. The Federal Chancellery proposed to the new Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) that it should earmark funds from its budget for education and social welfare projects in developing nations for the purposes of socio-political education, and that these funds be made available exclusively to the Eichholz Political Academy, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung for the purposes of financing INES, the educational institute of the Venezuelan Christian trade unions, as Adenauer had agreed to do, as well as similar proposals put forward by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.¹⁴

With the founding of the Institute for International Solidarity, the CDU not only gained an instrument for foreign and development policy,¹⁵ but the foundations had also been laid for the system of political *Stiftungen* (foundations). The pioneering role of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in particular is often referred to in histories of the political foundations. Since 1958, this particular foundation had been awarding scholarships to students in developing nations and, in close cooperation with the Federation of German Trade Unions,

11 | ACDP, 07-001-12150.

12 | The author took part in this discussion.

13 | Cf. various meetings, *ibid.*; fact-finding trips by the Member of Parliament Gewandt and the author to Latin America (report in the author's archive) and by Walter Molt, foreign affairs expert at CDU headquarters, to Africa, ACDP, 07-004-155/1.

14 | Molt memorandum dated 8 May 1962 on a meeting of the Interministerial Steering Committee for Development Assistance on 2 May 1962, ACDP, n. 11. Also Winfried Böll, "Staats- und Regierungsorganisationen in der Entwicklungspolitik – Komplementarität oder Konkurrenz?", in: Michael von Hauff and Werner Heinecke (eds.), *Komplementarität oder Konkurrenz? Zum Verhältnis von staatlichen und privaten Organisationen in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*, Ludwigsburg/Berlin, 1991, 18.

15 | The political foundations at that time – before the later decisions by the Constitutional Court – had close ties to the individual parties in terms of personnel. The CDU only started to recognise the true value of the Institute after 1969, when the party was in opposition.

had been running training courses for staff from unions and cooperatives, financed by the Cultural Section of the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Economics. However, like the Institute for International Solidarity, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung was only able to really begin its international activities in developing nations once the creation of the BMZ provided the financial wherewithal.¹⁶

The leaders of the SPD and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung realised that they would only be able to achieve a substantial expansion of their development policies if the ruling political parties had their own similar institutions.

So the politicians from the CDU, SPD and FDP who were responsible for finances agreed

that the international activities of foundations associated with political parties should be funded from the federal budget.¹⁷ The result was the creation of an international relations instrument, "something uniquely German, the like of which was to be found nowhere else in the world",¹⁸ which would become so successful that it became the role model for political foundation systems in the USA, Great Britain and other countries.

By the decision to fund foundations associated with political parties from the federal budget, an international relations instrument was created, which became the role model for political foundation systems in other countries.

However, neither the scholarships and seminars offered by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, nor the NEI's promotion of closer cooperation with Latin American Christian Demo-

16 | "While the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's international activities had already developed to an extent prior to the early 1960s, it was only with the establishment of the BMZ that the foundations were laid that would make it possible to them to undertake more comprehensive and above all continuous and long-term activity." Patrick von Zurmühlen, *Die internationale Arbeit der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes*, Bonn, 2007, 59.

17 | An unofficial allocation ratio of 40:40:20 was initially agreed between the foundations. An official ruling on budget items 2302 305 and 05 302 d & h was not made until the budget of 1965 (German Bundestag, 4th legislative period, Committee for Development Assistance, 46th sitting, 3 Dec 1964 and German Bundestag, 4th legislative period, Budget Committee, 157th sitting, 10 Dec 1964: "the MP Dr Althammer points out that there is no disagreement on the allocation ratio amongst the organisations involved."

18 | Rudolf Schloz, *Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik: Eine Bilanz nach 25 Jahren*, Munich, 1979, 107; similarly Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "Foreign political aid: The German political foundations and their US-counterparts", in: *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 1, Jan 1991, 33-64, and Von Zurmühlen, n. 16, 10, 31, 32, 259.

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crats, were enough to provide a firm foundation for the development policy work of the political foundations on a long-term basis. It was only when development policy became

more autonomous as a result of the formation of coalitions and the foreign policy situation in the early 1960s that a door was opened to a new political sphere that encouraged innovative, forward-thinking politicians and their staff who were able to take advantage of the opportunities presented.¹⁹

THE WORK OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMANY'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

The roots of German development policy can be traced back to the early 1950s. As the Federal Republic was not a member of the United Nations, the Adenauer government was looking for other possible ways of positioning Germany within the international community, such as by making financial contributions to UN organisations and programmes, the World Bank and European development cooperation activities. At that time, the Allies had been calling upon the young Federal Republic to make a greater financial contribution to early international development assistance programmes, but these demands had so far been resisted on account of the financial burdens imposed by the war, the country's lack of capital, the London Debt Agreement and the payments to Israel.

In the second half of the decade, the USA and Great Britain were facing ever greater challenges on account of the growing number of countries that had gained independence and the efforts of the Soviet Union to increase its influence on them. It was becoming clear that military resources alone would not suffice in the East-West conflict. There was also a need for economic and social assistance, an issue that President Harry S. Truman had already addressed in 1949 with his Point Four Program. The resulting financial burdens over and above existing military expenditure served to increase the balance of payments deficit in both countries.

19 | Michael Bohnet, *40 Jahre Brücken zwischen Entwicklungsforschung und Entwicklungspolitik: Ökologische, ökonomische, politische, soziale und kulturelle Bezüge*, Bonn, 2011, 45-47.

As a result they increased the pressure on Germany to make a greater contribution to development assistance as compensation for aid given to Germany under the Marshall Plan and for the cost of stationing troops in the country.

At the NATO Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government in December 1957, Chancellor Adenauer finally felt compelled to approve in principle that Germany should make a greater contribution.²⁰ Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano justified the additional financial burden to the German Bundestag on January 23, 1958 as follows: "Political developments since the collapse of 1945 and the country's geographical location have resulted in the German people being confronted with a unique set of tasks and challenges which we know we are not in a position to address on our own. We also have good reason to fear that these problems are likely to be resolved in a way that does not take into account the vital interests of the German people, especially if we lose the support of the free world by adopting misguided policies and are willing to take the fatal risk of accepting self-imposed isolation."²¹

However, there continued to be resistance within the cabinet to implementing this commitment. In addition to reservations about depart from market economy by paying subventions, as voiced by the Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard in particular, the majority was also concerned that Germany could become embroiled in the conflicts that were arising from the process of decolonisation.²² Added to this was the fact that the bilateral provision of technology and staff to assist the newly independent colonial countries of Africa and Asia as well as those that had gained independence from the USA in Latin America would not have been welcomed. As Adenauer correctly surmised,²³ the Allies wanted to retain their "domains".

The majority of the cabinet was concerned that Germany could become embroiled in the conflicts that were arising from the process of decolonisation.

20 | Speech by Adenauer on 16 Dec 1957 at the NATO summit in Paris, extracts of which were published in *Le Monde*, 17 Dec 1957, 2.

21 | Stenographic Minutes of the German Bundestag, 3rd session, 9th sitting, 1 Jan 1958, 298-299.

22 | 167th Meeting (cont.) of 16 Jan 1957, in: Cabinet Minutes of the Federal German government, German Federal Archives (BArch) (ed.), Vol. 10/1957, Munich, 2000, 101-102.

23 | StBKAH, n. 9; *Adenauer. Teegespräche 1961-1963*, n. 8, 358.

Another stumbling block proved to be the ongoing differences of opinion between the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance.

U.S. government pressure on the German government intensified in 1959 when the USA felt that the revolution under Fidel Castro and growing Russian involvement in Cuba posed a direct threat to its security, and it was worried that other, similar social revolutionary movements might grow in South America. There was also a danger that former French colonies such as Algeria and Guinea might

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move over to the communist camp. During this same period, Nikita Khrushchev's expansionist policies were ramping up tensions over the status of Berlin, and these tensions came to a head with the building of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 and the confrontation between Russian and American tanks at Checkpoint Charlie on 17 October of the same year. For Adenauer and his ministers, whose views were naturally shaped by their experiences of both World Wars, the world appeared to be on the brink of yet another world war, this time between the two superpowers. Adenauer was deeply concerned that the new, young U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, and his Secretary of State Dean Rusk would cave in to Russian pressure and abandon fundamental strategic positions with disastrous consequences for the status of Berlin.

For this reason, he put his Cabinet under increasing pressure to comply with the USA's desire for more development assistance. Adenauer was keen to send out clear signals in this respect. Initially, the OECD Development Assistance Committee agreed on German capital assistance in the sum of 3 billion Deutsche marks for the years 1960 to 1965. In this way, the ongoing quarrel over areas of responsibility between Germany's Federal Foreign Office and its Ministry of Economics – a dispute that threatened to hamper the implementation of the agreement and hinder the effectiveness of more German development assistance – became a foreign policy issue rather than an administrative problem.²⁴ As a result the German Chancellery was considering whether to hand over after the Bundestag elections of

24 | 124th Meeting on 31 May 1961, in: Cabinet Minutes of the Federal German government, Vol. 14/1961, BArch (ed.), Munich, 2000, 185-187.

1961 all responsibility for development assistance to the Foreign Office and create an additional State Secretary to be “Commissioner for the Coordination of Development Assistance”.²⁵ The Bundestag elections resulted in the CDU losing its overall majority, forcing it to enter into coalition talks with the FDP. During these negotiations, it was discussed whether to create a Ministry of Development, appoint a State Minister in the Foreign Office or set up a Ministry for Europe. This was due to the FDP’s critical attitude towards Adenauer’s foreign policy and its desire to have a minister in this area. For Adenauer, the advantage of a dedicated Ministry for Development Cooperation was that it would allow him to send out the desired signals in terms of foreign policy while overriding the bias and stonewalling that was prevalent in the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economics. Despite the vehement protests of Brentano and Erhard, who even threatened to resign, Konrad Adenauer was able to push through the creation of the BMZ,²⁶ particularly as he knew he had the support of the majority of his party. Walter Scheel, who was Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee at the European Parliament, was appointed Minister for Economic Cooperation. Adenauer suggested he appoint Friedrich Vialon to the post of State Secretary because of his administrative experience gained as head of the development assistance department at the Federal Chancellery. This helped the Chancellor to keep abreast of further developments and allowed him to intervene if necessary.

Despite the vehement protests of Brentano and Erhard, who even threatened to resign, Konrad Adenauer pushed through the creation of the BMZ.

Initially it was anticipated that the new ministry would simply play a coordinating role. After some difficult negotiations with Rolf Otto Lahr, the State Secretary in the Foreign Office who was responsible for this area and who also represented his colleagues in the Ministry of Economics, Scheel managed to hammer out a compromise. This included some clauses allowing the BMZ over the next few years to pursue “a strategy of consciously acquiring responsibility”.²⁷ The deliberate vagueness of the new ministry’s remit was

25 | Memo from Vialon to the Chancellor, 9 May 1961, ACDP, 001-475-015/10.

26 | See also Von Zurmühlen, n. 16, 62.

27 | Bastian Hein, *Die Westdeutschen und die Dritte Welt: Entwicklungspolitik und Entwicklungsdienste zwischen Reform und Revolte 1959-1964*, Munich, 2006, 46.

enshrined in a letter from State Secretary Hans Globke to all the ministries concerned. The timing of this letter was such that it was made virtually impossible for any objections to be raised, making it “a masterpiece of Adenauer-Globke virtuosity in their dealings with the Cabinet and the Administration”.²⁸ Budgetary responsibility for technical assistance was transferred from the Foreign Office to the new ministry, even though the approval of projects remained with the Interministerial Steering Committee for Development Assistance. But, as Adenauer expected, State Secretary Vialon proved to be the real architect of the ministry’s drive to gain a wider remit. The consolidation and gradual expansion of its responsibilities

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were achieved owing to his tact in dealing with the other ministries, and particularly the decision that the BMZ should take charge of all new fields in the area of development cooperation. So in the 1962 budget, the BMZ was given responsibility for educational and social assistance, including subsidies for church relief organisations, private organisations and political foundations.

By 1960, Adenauer had already proposed that churches should become partners in governmental development assistance projects and be funded accordingly.²⁹ Adenauer believed the churches could make a valuable contribution towards social stability in developing countries because of the social and cultural expertise of their missionaries. Another argument in favour of subsidising their relief organisations was the unexpected success of their fundraising campaigns that raised approximately the same amount of funds as the government’s contribution. By working with church relief organisations, the government gained long-term and reliable partners and supporters of its development policies. This also served to make development assistance more acceptable to the public as a whole.

28 | Jürgen Dennert, *Entwicklungshilfe, geplant oder verwaltet? Entstehung und Konzeption des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit*, Bielefeld, 1968, 52. The Chancellor’s organisational directive of 29 Jan 1962 corresponded with this letter.

29 | 115th Meeting on 20 Jul 1961 agenda item 6, in: Cabinet Minutes of the Federal German government, Vol. 13/1960, BArch (ed.), Munich, 2003; 149th Meeting on 31 May 1961, n. 24.

The level of importance that Konrad Adenauer afforded socio-political development in developing countries is demonstrated even more clearly in the way he sanctioned political foundations to operate internationally. Prior to the formation of the new government there was no mention of the fact that political foundations would be included in the remit of the BMZ,³⁰ but Adenauer instinctively recognised the political potential that would be created by their participation. This is also attested to by a discussion Adenauer had with the head of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Günter Grunwald, in which he expressed his appreciation for the work of the foundation and asked Minister Heinrich Krone whether the CDU couldn't do "something similar".³¹

Adenauer instinctively recognised the political potential that would be opened up by including political foundations in the remit of the BMZ.

KONRAD ADENAUER AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN LATIN AMERICA

The key moment for Konrad Adenauer's initiative was the previously-mentioned discussion with Caldera on 2 February 1962. Adenauer already knew from Vanistendael about the efforts being made by the Christian Democrat World Union, but also about the Kennedy administration's monitoring of forces for reform in Latin America, which included the Christian Democrats. It is possible that the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Senator – later Vice-President – Hubert Humphrey also spoke with him directly on the topic of U.S. interests.³² That Adenauer went out of his way to receive Caldera in February 1962, despite a busy schedule, and the fact that he was recuperating from a serious illness, demonstrates that he considered the issue of supporting reforms in Latin America to be an ideal opportunity to convey to the U.S. President how Germany and the CDU were keen to help in containing the spread of communism in Latin America.

30 | Von Zurmühlen, n. 16, 63, reports that Günter Grunwald made contact with Scheel shortly after Scheel was sworn in (thus, around the time of the Eichholz meeting, see above and n. 6, ed.) and proposed that cooperation with parties and unions should be included in the remit of the new ministry.

31 | Von Zurmühlen, n. 16, 69.

32 | Von Zurmühlen recounts a request by Rusk and Humphrey that the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung should be more active in Latin America against communist infiltration as the USA did not have the right kind of access to the Latin Americans. Ibid., 121, 195.

Adenauer feared that the social and revolutionary unrest in Latin America could place such a strain on the USA that it would neglect its interests in Europe and Germany in terms of security policy.

Konrad Adenauer was not only deeply mistrustful of the fact that Kennedy was prepared to make concessions in respect of the Soviet Union's expansionist policies that could impact negatively on the status of Berlin and Germany, but he also had his doubts that the Americans could effectively deal with the fallout from the Cuban crisis. He feared that the social and revolutionary unrest in Latin America could place such a strain on the USA that it would start to neglect its interests in Europe and Germany in terms of security policy. He believed military and economic assistance were not enough to counter the impact of the social unrest. Even before the construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis of autumn 1961 he had been stressing the necessity of providing the countries of Latin America with significant economic aid and the importance of improved social conditions with regard to these countries' infiltration by communism, which was benefiting from the emergence of an intellectual proletariat. Indeed, Konrad Adenauer remained convinced that it was first and foremost the task of the USA to deal with Latin America, but he was ready to lend a helping hand.³³

Vanistendael's memo and the talks with Caldera served to cement his opinion still further. Konrad Adenauer was to repeatedly bring up his conversation with Caldera and Vanistendael in later interviews and discussions with journalists and foreign politicians, such as with the French president Charles de Gaulle on 15 February 1962 in Baden-Baden³⁴ and with Henry Kissinger, then one of Kennedy's advisors.³⁵ He stressed that the U.S. government and influential American trade unions were taking the wrong approach towards the Latin Americans and that they failed to understand their "state of mind". He believed that culturally they were much closer to the Europeans.³⁶ During talks

33 | 153th Meeting on 28 Jun 1961, agenda item 2, in: Cabinet Minutes of the Federal German government, Vol. 14/1961, BArch (ed.), Munich, 2004; *Adenauer. Teegespräche 1961-1963*, n. 8, 358.

34 | "Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1962", Institut für Zeitgeschichte (published on behalf of the Foreign Offices), 3 Vols., Munich, 2010, No. 73, 372 et sqq.; Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963. Fragmente*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1968, 136.

35 | StBKAH, III/60 040.

36 | StBKAH, n. 9.

in Bonn with the president's brother, U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy on 24 February 1962, he handed over the memorandum that Caldera had given him with the request that it should be reviewed. He believed the South Americans felt mistreated by the USA and that the struggle against communism was first and foremost an ideological struggle. For this reason, the West urgently needed its own unified ideology, one that should be based on Christian and humanitarian principles. The feeling was that in the recent past the American government had unfortunately not always paid proper attention to maintaining the West's ideological unity.³⁷

During his final trip to visit John F. Kennedy in Washington on 14 November 1962, Adenauer placed himself squarely behind the strong American reaction to the Soviet Union's attempt at stationing missiles on Cuban soil. In this respect, Adenauer brought up the situation in South America and his good personal relationship with Caldera, who had "established a CDU there". He broached the subject of whether the USA and Europe could join together to create a Marshall plan for South America.³⁸ One thing that he did not bring up in these talks, but that he had considered beforehand, was the question of whether the Christian unions and Christian-Democratic parties should receive direct funding.³⁹ However, the U.S. Department of State had already been informed by its embassy in Bonn of the projects the Institute for International Solidarity had in the pipeline.⁴⁰

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37 | StBKAH, III/60 001. Other documented comments on this: *Adenauer. Teegespräche 1961-1963*, n. 8, No. 10, 114-116; "Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik 1962", n. 34, No. 296, 1316-1320.

38 | "Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik 1962", n. 34, No. 445, 1903 and notes 14, 15.

39 | Horst Osterheld, *Ich gehe nicht leichten Herzens: Adenauers letzte Kanzlerjahre – ein dokumentarischer Bericht*, Mainz, 1986, 160.

40 | In the summer of 1962 the U.S. embassy in Bonn asked the CDU's General Manager Kraske to keep it informed about the activities of the Institute for International Solidarity in Latin America in this respect. Kraske instructed the author to keep the U.S. embassy regularly informed.

After these talks, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer pressed on with his initiative of supporting the Latin American Christian Democrat parties through the provision of socio-political education.⁴¹ At this time, presidential elections were looming in Chile, and the Chilean Christian Democratic Party (PDC) believed its candidate, Eduardo Frei, had a good chance of victory. But there was also a chance that the United Left

The campaign for the Chilean presidential elections in 1964 was the first time that the Cold War was played out in Latin America via a democratic vote.

under Salvador Allende could come out on top. The U.S. administration feared a second Cuba – not without justification, as it was to turn out 6 years later,⁴² – that is to say, a communist, totalitarian regime with close ties to the Soviet Union. The campaign for the Chilean presidential elections held on 4 September 1964 was the first time the Cold War was played out in Latin America via a democratic vote. In fact, Eduardo Frei's election campaign was largely funded – without his knowledge – by the U.S. government, at least after April 1964.⁴³ However, at the instigation of the German Chancellery, a significant contribution was made to the PDC's election campaign even earlier than that, in the summer of 1963,⁴⁴ and after his victory Eduardo Frei thanked Adenauer for it personally. This assistance was important to help kick off the campaign, but it was also very significant for Chilean public opinion. The early help from Germany served to cover up the funding that came later from the U.S. government. If this funding had been public knowledge it could have had an extremely negative impact on the outcome of the elections.⁴⁵

41 | Cf. Osterheld, n. 39.

42 | This was Eduardo Frei's personal analysis of the 1970 presidential elections and the events that followed as written in a letter to Mariano Rumor, who was then president of the IUUC. Cristián Gazmuri, *Eduardo Frei Montalva y su Época*, Santiago de Chile, 2000, 476-496.

43 | "Chile 1964: CIA Covert Support in Frei Election Detailed", *The National Security Archive*, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20040925/index.htm> (accessed 10 Feb 2012).

44 | According to Heinrich Gewandt MdB, who was involved in this transaction, the U.S. administration made it clear to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that it would welcome assistance for Frei's election campaign. The Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, received the same message (as told to the author by Gewandt and by Aldo Moro's Cabinet Secretary, Sereno Freato).

45 | *Der Spiegel* reported on the election aid given to Frei and quoted Adenauer's previously unpublished words: "Communists and Socialists help each other. Why shouldn't we help each other?" The problems that arose for the Institute for International Solidarity as a result of the election aid are discussed further on. *Der Spiegel*, 16 Sep 1964, No. 38, 94-96.

However, Konrad Adenauer did not restrict himself to being an advocate of the Kennedy administration and to supplying financial assistance. He also continued to follow political developments in Latin America with great interest. Along with Vanistendael, Hermann Görgen also proved to be a good source of information. Görgen had been a member of the Bundestag from 1957 to 1961: from 1957 he was "Representative of the Press and Information Office for Special Assignments in Latin America" and from 1959 he also held the post of "Chancellor's Special Representative for Brazil".⁴⁶ During the last few years of his administration, and also afterwards, Adenauer was always keen to discuss ideas with his new partners whenever he had the time, and he was always prepared to meet with them.⁴⁷ He also continued to concern himself with the question of providing financial aid to Christian democrats in Latin America. On his initiative, Johannes Schauff, a former MP of the catholic "Zentrumspartei" in the 1930s who had fled to Brazil after Hitler seized power, was made a member of the board of the Institute in 1963.⁴⁸ And when the Fondation Internationale de Solidarité was founded in Rome in 1965 by politicians from various European Christian Democratic parties in order to support Latin American Christian democrats, Schauff was persuaded by Adenauer to take up the position of chairman.⁴⁹

Adenauer continued to concern himself with the question of providing financial aid to Christian democrats in Latin America.

46 | Hermann Görgen also founded the Latin America Centre in Bonn and the German-Brazilian Society. For more on his life, see: Hermann Görgen, *Ein Leben gegen Hitler*, Münster, 1997.

47 | It is unclear whether Eduardo Frei, who met German Chancellor Erhard in 1963 during a short pre-election trip, also spoke to Adenauer. However, he did meet him during his state visit on 21 Jul 1965 (StBKAH, 04, 18). There is also evidence that in 1963 Adenauer held talks with the chairman of Brazil's Christian Democratic party, Labour Minister Franco Montoro and a delegation of Christian Democratic politicians headed up by Tomás Reyes Vicuña, at that time the Secretary General of the ODCA. When, in his capacity as President of the IUCD, Caldera attended the CDU party conference in Düsseldorf in 1965, Adenauer as Chairman of the CDU hosted a dinner in his honour (ACDP, 007-004-155/1).

48 | Dieter Marc Schneider, *Johannes Schauff (1902-1990): Migration und "stabilitas" im Zeitalter der Totalitarismen*, Munich, 2001, 97-98, 137.

49 | *Ibid.* 141-144.

Adenauer viewed Christian democracy in Latin America not only as a force against communism but also as part of a worldwide Christian democratic community of values, as is evidenced by many of his utterances.⁵⁰ His approval of this

Adenauer succeeded in creating close personal bonds with like-minded politicians in neighbouring countries as a pre-condition for European unity.

cooperation was also most probably a result of his own experiences in the post-war years, when it was necessary to bring Germany and hence the CDU out of its international isolation. Adenauer succeeded in creating close personal bonds with like-minded politicians in neighbouring countries as a pre-condition for European unity. The NEI and confidential talks with Christian democrat politicians played a significant role in this.⁵¹ The decline of its French partners, the MRP, meant that the NEI would lose some of its importance, but nevertheless Adenauer continued to favour the value-based association of Christian democrats over merely temporary, pragmatic ties with parties such as the Gaullist UNR.⁵² In this respect, the decision by the Institute for International Solidarity to initially focus its projects on cooperation with the Christian democratic parties and Christian social movements in Latin America that represented a moral and value-based option corresponded with Adenauer's beliefs and experiences relating to the possibility of international political cooperation between like-minded parties and social organisations based on common values.

INITIAL SUCCESSES AND PROBLEMS FOR THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

A start was made in 1962 by setting up seminars for young Latin American politicians with the authorisation of the Trade Union Institute in Caracas, and by deploying its first Resident Representatives in Latin America. In the years that followed, it quickly began supporting a network of trade union educational institutes and started a close cooperation with the Institute for Christian-Democratic Education

50 | StBKA, n. 9; idem, II/46; StBKAH, II/46, 188 (translation); idem, II/46, 185; idem, II/42, 265; Osterheld, n. 39, 132 and note 2; foreword to Peter Molt (ed.), *Politica Alemana, Vision Cristiana*, Bonn, 1965, 1.

51 | Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer – der Aufstieg 1876-1952*, Stuttgart, 1986, 557-564.

52 | Konrad Adenauer, *Die letzten Lebensjahre 1963-67. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, Gespräche, Interviews und Reden*, Rhöndorfer Ausgabe, Paderborn, 2009, Vol. II, No. 76, 234, 308, 464.

(IFEDEC) under Aristides Calvani.⁵³ By 1966, subsidies had been approved for a network of seven trade union and three political educational institutes in Latin America. The approach was simple: the Institute followed the example set by the Eichholz Political Academy in supporting its partners in the basic political, social, economic and organisational training of its staff. The Resident Representatives who were appointed to carry out training brought with them their experiences of the post-war era in Europe.⁵⁴ At the same time, these projects resulted in a great deal of personal contact between Latin America's leading Christian democrats and CDU politicians. In contrast, the Institute had a much more difficult time in Africa, because here every partner had to be individually sought out in each country, and almost every country was governed by military dictatorships and one-party rulers, which meant that the activities of independent trade unions and democratic parties were either limited or non-existent.

The Institute for International Solidarity supported its partners in the basic political, social, economic and organisational training of its staff.

However, after the Institute's initial successes, administrative challenges emerged because neither the BMZ nor the Institute for International Solidarity were able to adapt the requirements of the Federal Budget Code to suit these new foreign initiatives.⁵⁵ More serious still was the increasingly critical attitude of Germany's ambassadors in Latin America, who either rejected the basic principles behind the programme or refused to give the IIS projects their blessing under pressure from right-wing members of the government and their supporters. After the Chilean Christian democrats were victorious in the 1964 elections, the IIS found itself in the crosshairs of both the left-wing and right-wing media, who denounced it as being the instrument foreign intervention into internal politics.⁵⁶

53 | Professor Aristides Calvani (1918-1986), 1969-1974 Venezuelan foreign minister, was the closest and most effective partner of the Institute for International Solidarity.

54 | See also the report by the relevant BMZ official: ACDP, I-475-018/4.

55 | ACDP, 12-001-679.

56 | Referred to the above-mentioned article in *Der Spiegel*, n. 45.

Fig. 2



Peter Molt, chairman of the Institute for International Solidarity, in conversation with Konrad Adenauer in 1962. | Source: ACDP.

These problems might have been resolved more easily if there had not been some fundamental differences of opinion amongst the leadership of both the Stiftung and the party about issues relating to work, personnel and areas of responsibility. It is mainly thanks to the efforts of Bruno Heck, who served as a CDU minister from 1963 and as CDU Secretary-General from 1967 to 1989, and of Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Deputy Party Chairman until 1969, that the international activities of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung managed to survive these turbulent times and subsequently went from strength to strength. The administrative problems that also affected other political foundations were eventually resolved by the German Federal Audit Office. The political reservations of the German ambassadors came to nothing because Karl Carstens, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office between 1960 and 1966, naturally gave priority to the USA's interest in the Institute's work in Latin America.⁵⁷ His successor, Klaus Schütz, was of the same opinion.⁵⁸

57 | ACDP, n. 55.

58 | ACDP, 12-001-671.

WHAT COUNTS

What counts in the difficult first years of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's international activity is that – despite all the differences of opinion, setbacks and disappointments – Konrad Adenauer's keen sense for lasting political developments proved to be both correct and seminal, even in this peripheral area of high politics. Undoubtedly his main interest in development policy at the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s was motivated by foreign policy. He wanted to use development cooperation to maintain what he viewed as the highly-endangered status quo in the German and Berlin questions. He trusted France and Great Britain to manage the process of consolidating the new, ex-colonial states without curtailing their European security policy. On the other hand, he viewed Latin America – until then the preserve of U.S. policy – as a region that had sunk into a crisis that was having a direct effect on U.S. security due to the proliferation of Fidelism and the rabid anti-Americanism of the time. He believed this crisis could lead the government in Washington to be more flexible in its policies towards Europe and Germany. He believed bolstering authoritarian regimes, increasing trade, providing more loans or just conventional diplomacy were not enough to stabilise the South American continent. So, mainly with an eye on Latin America, he opened up three new windows of opportunity as a means of making a German contribution to the global challenge: encouraging church social work via church relief organisations; supporting value-based democratic reformists via political foundations; and improving the effectiveness of foreign relations by institutionalising an independent development policy.

In terms of foreign relations, the international work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung achieved the desired results. Latin America experts in the U.S. government and administration considered both foundations to be partners who were providing effective support for the forces of democratic reform in Latin America.⁵⁹

59 | Cf. John E. Rielly, "German Political Foundations and the National Endowment for Democracy: A Memoir", in: Hanf et al., n. 1, and a memo from the author to the board of the IIS, ACDP, 12-001-615.

In Latin America itself, the work of church relief organisations certainly increased Germany's standing, but the activities of the Institute for International Solidarity also struck a chord with the Christian democrats and Christian trade unions that were so important for the reform process at that time. They were not only strengthened in terms of their organisation, but the Institute also managed to conduct a fruitful dialogue with them about the principles of democratic and Christian social welfare and government.

In the CDU, the international activity of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung was a major factor in helping younger members of parliament to gather more experience and in creating a core of experts who had worked in the Stiftung's overseas offices, where they gained the kind of insight into the political and social realities of their host countries that diplomats, businessmen and technical development experts could never hope to achieve, as much as they wanted to. Within the framework of the Institute there also emerged the first drafts of the CDU's development policies. The Institute paved the way for the later Federal Committee for Development Policy thanks to its establishment of a development assistance forum. In 1975 the CDU was the first party in Germany to hold a congress on development policy. A sign of the success of the basic principles and working methods the Institute for International Solidarity had pursued for a decade in the face of opposition from all sides was the fact that two Latin American politicians attended the congress who had been partners of the Stiftung for many years, along with their like-minded colleagues, and a few years later they were to lead their countries back to democracy: Napoleon Duarte, President of El Salvador from 1984 to 1989, and Patricio Aylwin, President of Chile from 1990 to 1994.

The Congress was held under the banner of "Partnership and Solidarity" and dealt with the basic principle that had set the IIS's direction right from the start: that the common good can best be achieved through free, democratic, pluralistic and market-based structures. A major impetus could be provided by conducting a dialogue that respected the other party's cultural background and possible courses of action and by working together with parties and social movements that held the same fundamental values.