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AFRICA AND THE EMERGING ECONOMIES



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
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EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,


At the end of March, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa will be coming together for the fifth summit of the BRICS. Under the motto “BRICS and Africa – partnerships for integration and industrialisation”, the heads of state will be holding discussions on the economic rise of Africa and the consequences for more intensive cooperation. One end product is to be a separate BRICS Development Bank. What the five countries have in common is a steep, albeit frequently fluctuating, economic upsurge over the last 20 years. Thanks to their enhanced status as regional powers, their global ambitions to exert influence in matters of politics and defence have increased at the same time, linked to clear interests in raw materials and export. Through enhanced South-South cooperation, they intend to further strengthen their role as a counterweight to Western dominance in international processes.

Nowhere else is this currently becoming clearer than in Africa. This continent, which received mainly Western development aid for a long time, is expected to triple its trading volume with the BRICS states from 150 billion U.S. dollars in 2010 to 530 billion U.S. dollars in 2015. In 2010, China overtook the USA as Africa’s largest trading partner, and in July 2012 it promised to double its financial commitment on the continent. This power shift is contributing to changes in regional and global power structures. Partly in fierce competition with each other, China, India and Brazil want to strengthen their role as powerful lobbyists for the Global South through an offensive on diplomatic, development and economic fronts. They demand a greater voice in international organisations; Brazil and India are aspiring to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. All three states are further linked by a rather reticent approach to the dissemination and enforcement of global values and standards. This represents a reversal compared to the situation of the last two decades when it was mainly Western influences that dominated international relations.

Regarding the involvement of the three BRICS states in Africa this means in concrete terms: governance is no

criterion in partner selection. Instead, economic gain is all-important. The focus is on commerce, raw material exploitation and infrastructure, while there is no call for or encouragement of democracy and human rights. Many African governments welcome this type of Africa policy, which does not ask questions about the right of the people to have their say or about criteria of the rule of law. After all, major investment is badly needed in Africa and the quality of Chinese products is rising all the time. But increasingly, criticisms are being voiced, particularly among the opposition and parts of the population. Especially Chinese companies frequently ignore environmental and social standards in Africa; but they are rarely punished. Where the exploitation of raw materials is concerned, hardly any of the created wealth stays in the country; revenues are relatively low and there is a lack of transparency.

In order for the strong involvement of the emerging economies in Africa to benefit the entire population, it must be possible for the people to demand greater accountability from their own governments. All too often, increased economic activity only benefits a small elite. This is why there is a need for clear rules regarding the adherence to standards and for a right for the civil society to have its say with respect to investments in their country involving billions in a climate of greater transparency. In July 2012, South African President Jacob Zuma said that inequitable trade relations with China were not sustainable in the long term and that one should not allow the mistakes from colonial times to be repeated. By encouraging the rule of law and democratic co-determination, Germany and the EU can help African states to clearly articulate and successfully pursue their interests vis-à-vis traditional and new partners from the BRICS countries to the benefit of their own populations.



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CHINA, INDIA AND BRAZIL IN AFRICA

EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Sebastian Barnet Fuchs

China, India and Brazil have been remarkably stepping up their involvement in Africa over the recent years. Although China is well ahead of the other two countries in terms of the volume of funding provided, all three countries are similar when it comes to their political and strategic aims with regard to Africa. These are very different from the policies and aims behind the development assistance provided by “traditional” donors in the Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC).¹ China, India and Brazil do not view their close ties with African governments as the donor-recipient relationship that has characterised Western development cooperation programmes for so long. Rather than aid projects, they focus on trade and direct investment. This provides African governments with greater economic and political room for manoeuvre. At the same time, the largely unconditional aid provided by these three emerging nations runs counter to the Western approach towards development assistance.

It is true that China, India and Brazil are driving forward economic development in Africa through a wide range of investments, but they are not setting any conditions in terms of democracy, good governance or human rights. These three areas play no role in their policy towards Africa. They are openly working with mineral-rich but often corrupt and autocratic African regimes.

1 | Author’s note: In this article, China’s policy in Africa will be given more emphasis than that of India and Brazil because of its greater scale and significance. This particularly relates to the last section which looks at the consequences of China’s involvement for Africa, traditional donors and the future of development policy.

This South-South cooperation calls into question many aspects of the approach taken by traditional donors and uses economic partnerships to create a counterbalance to the North and reduce Africa's dependence on these donors. But at the same time, new dependencies are being created to the emerging powers, China in particular. There are many examples of how African governments have made trade agreements with China to the detriment of their people (as happened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007). Additionally, these new actors in Africa often insist that recipient countries buy their products in return for aid (the principle of tied aid), and criticism is repeatedly voiced about their lax attitude towards environmental and social standards. An analysis of the characteristics that are common to the involvement of China, India and Brazil in Africa and a comparison with the traditional donors of the DAC will allow us to evaluate the potential consequences for the future of development policy.

There are many examples of how African governments have made trade agreements with China to the detriment of their people.

DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

As "emerging donors", China, India and Brazil have or have had a huge problem with poverty in their own countries. This is underlined by the fact that all three countries (together with Afghanistan) have received the very highest level of bilateral development funding according to Germany's Official Development Assistance ratings.² This will certainly change in the coming years, as many German-funded projects in these countries come to an end. But in India alone there are more people living in absolute poverty than in the whole of Africa. The three countries have been active in Africa as an important element of their foreign and economic policy since the 1950s, but they have massively increased their involvement over the last ten years. All three belong to the BRICS club and are emerging nations that have boomed economically over the last ten to 20 years. To some extent they are competing with each other to consolidate their status as regional powers. With

2 | Claudia Zilla, "Brasilien als 'Emerging Donor' – Politische Distanz und operative Nähe zu den traditionellen Gebern", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Mar 2012, 6, http://swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2012_S07_zll_harig.pdf (accessed 26 Nov 2012).

their policies towards Africa, they are trying to safeguard their supplies of raw materials and diversify their export markets, but they are also trying to take on the role of leaders in the global South. So it is not their involvement in Africa that is new, but rather the volume of trade and the aggressive diplomacy that China, India and Brazil are now exercising in Africa. One reason for their growing influence is the global financial and economic crisis that has hit the industrialised nations more severely than the emerging economies. The move by the G8 to become the G20 is symptomatic of this development.



South African President Jacob Zuma is welcomed by his Chinese colleague Hu Jintao on the meeting of the BRICS states on 14 April 2012. | Source: GovernmentZA / flickr (CC BY-ND).

The leading countries in the South-South cooperation are keen to differentiate themselves from the traditional development cooperation work of the OECD-DAC countries. China, India and Brazil all signed the outcome document at the end of the OECD's Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held from 29 November to 1 December 2011 in Busan, thereby committing themselves to greater transparency and accountability. But this agreement is non-binding, and the outcome document was greatly watered-down in order to persuade the emerging nations to sign. It provides no clear timetable and no measurable indicators. The agreement also contains the words: "The nature, modalities and responsibilities that apply to South-South cooperation differ from those that apply to

North-South cooperation.”³ This makes it more difficult to adopt a jointly-agreed and effective development policy based on clear principles, something that the OECD had been trying to achieve at its conferences in Rome (2002), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). In 2008 the volume of South-South cooperation stood at 3.96 billion U.S. dollars for China, 785 million U.S. dollars for India and 437 million U.S. dollars for Brazil.⁴

Germany and other traditional donors are observing these developments with a mixture of respect and scepticism. African governments now have more channels for development assistance open to them, but Western donors find themselves having to stand by and watch their form of development policy with its links to the promotion of good governance, human rights and democracy being undermined and decades of reform efforts in Africa being thwarted.

The African policies of the DAC countries and the new actors are based on different convictions and motivations. The traditional donors often have a colonial history on the continent. Part of their development assistance is linked to the Christian tradition of welfare and aiding the poor. Western governments often emphasise the values that form the basis of their policies on Africa and are rather reticent about their own economic interests.⁵ In contrast, China, India and Brazil were themselves colonised in the past and therefore have not the same historical burden or guilty conscience towards Africa. They confidently promote their own interests in Africa and invest wherever they expect to profit.⁶

The traditional donors generally have a colonial history on the continent. Part of their development assistance is linked to the Christian tradition of welfare and aiding the poor.

3 | Sebastian Barnet Fuchs, “Neue Akteure, bessere Wirksamkeit? Perspektiven der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit nach dem Gipfel von Busan”, *Analysen & Argumente*, 102, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, Apr 2011, 3, http://kas.de/wf/doc/kas_30878-544-1-30.pdf (accessed 26 Nov 2012).

4 | Thomas Fues, Sachin Chaturvedi and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, “Conclusion: towards a global consensus on development cooperation”, in: Thomas Fues, Sachin Chaturvedi and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds.), *Development Cooperation and Emerging Powers – New Partners or Old Patterns*, Zed Books, London/ New York, 2012, 255.

5 | *Ibid.*, 245.

6 | *Ibid.*

Statistically, China is responsible for the largest share of worldwide poverty reduction and hence for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goal to cut the poverty rate in half.

The success they have experienced in fighting poverty at home has also made them a credible role model for Africa. Statistically, China is responsible for the largest share of worldwide poverty reduction and hence for

the achievement of the Millennium Development Goal to cut the poverty rate in half. Between 1981 and 2004 China helped bring 600 million people out of abject poverty. The proportion of the population living in extreme poverty fell from 85 per cent to 15 per cent.⁷ According to UN figures, poverty in India will fall from 51 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in 2015.⁸ The proportion of Brazil's population who live in poverty has been reduced by one half, falling from 17 per cent to 8 per cent, with an annual decrease of 3.2 per cent.⁹

In their economic involvement with Africa, China, India and Brazil often get better deals than the DAC donor states. Sometimes they can supply technology and equipment better suited to conditions in developing countries than the expensive and technically sophisticated products offered by the Western industrialised nations. Normally, the new actors in the South-South cooperation combine direct investment (particularly in raw materials), trade and partially state-subsidised loans to assistance in the areas of healthcare, education and agriculture. This mixed approach combines development assistance with private business initiatives and the promotion of foreign trade. The new actors often offer "package solutions" such as the extraction of raw materials in exchange for infrastructure and assistance in areas such as healthcare. In China, state-owned construction, mining and financial companies often come together at the behest of the Chinese government to develop strategically important turnkey projects

7 | "Poverty around the World", *Global Issues*, 12 Nov 2011, <http://globalissues.org/article/4/poverty-around-the-world> (accessed 27 Nov 2012).

8 | "India's poverty rate will fall from 51% to 22% by 2015: UN report", *The Times of India*, 8 Jul 2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-08/developmental-issues/29751472_1_extreme-poverty-india-and-china-report (accessed 27 Nov 2012).

9 | "Fighting poverty in emerging markets, The gloves go on, Lessons from Brazil, China and India", *The Economist*, 26 Nov 2009, <http://economist.com/node/14979330> (accessed 26 Nov 2012).

that combine securing the supply of raw materials with infrastructure expansion.¹⁰ China, India and Brazil deliberately avoid any clear distinction being drawn between the individual areas. For them, “development assistance” is a term used by the West that no longer reflects the economic realities of Africa. Statements by the three countries focus on the principle of an economic win-win situation and a partnership of equals with African states.

One controversial difference to the approach of many traditional donors is the (claimed) principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. In contrast to Western, and particularly European, development cooperation,¹¹ the new actors do not make such assistance dependent on the degree or progress of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance. They work with autocratic and democratic governments alike. The only precondition is the opportunity for economic benefits on both sides. Such unconditional involvement increases the alternatives and the choice of funding that is available to African governments and increases the competitive pressure on donors. On the one hand, increased investment in Africa promises to bring more economic development. But unconditional assistance can lead to political reforms being postponed or cancelled altogether¹² and political freedoms can lag behind economic development. There is also the risk that African countries will fall into a new cycle of debt.¹³ With their strong economic involvement that is played by their own rules, the new actors are also inevitably interfering in the domestic affairs of their African partners and when there is an imbalance of economic power, new dependencies are bound to arise. So a partnership of equals is not always a given.

The new actors do not make assistance dependent on the degree or progress of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance. They work with autocratic and democratic governments alike.

10 | Hannah Edinger and Simon Schaefer, “Der freundliche Drache: Chinas strategische Ambitionen in Afrika”, *Afrikapost*, 3/2012, 32.

11 | Jörg Faust, Svea Koch, Nadia Molenaers, Heidi Tavakoli and Jan Vanheukelom, “The future of EU budget support: political conditions, differentiation and coordination”, European Think-Tanks Group, May 2012, [http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/\(ynDK_FileContainerByKey\)/MSIN-7NGJF6/\\$FILE/European%20Think-Tanks%20Group_Future%20of%20EU%20Budget%20Support_16.05.2012.pdf?Open](http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_FileContainerByKey)/MSIN-7NGJF6/$FILE/European%20Think-Tanks%20Group_Future%20of%20EU%20Budget%20Support_16.05.2012.pdf?Open) (accessed 27 Nov 2012).

12 | Zilla, n. 2, 8.

13 | Ibid.

A look at the African policy of China, India and Brazil makes it clear that none of these countries has a central agency to bring together or systematically coordinate their involvement in Africa and its many dimensions. The available information on their policies in Africa needs to be improved as it is lacking in transparency. This complicates the already difficult task of coordinating the various countries and organisations that are active in development cooperation work.

BRAZIL

In the 1960s Brazil viewed the African continent more as a rival in terms of gaining access to European and North American export markets and development assistance from the North, but from the 1970s onward

After the UN conference in Buenos Aires in 1978, when a plan of action was agreed on the promotion of technical cooperation between developing countries, Brazil intensified its African policy still further.

it began to expand its trade with West Africa.¹⁴ Brazil needed new markets, and it mainly exported manufactured goods, military equipment and aerospace technology in return for oil and oil derivatives. After the UN conference in Buenos Aires in 1978, when a plan of action was agreed on the promotion of technical cooperation between developing countries, Brazil intensified its African policy still further.¹⁵ The partnership was given an added boost by the economic upturn of the 1990s.

Of the three countries considered here, Brazil has the fewest reservations about dealing with the traditional donors. Brazil is one of the most active emerging nations in terms of triangular development cooperation¹⁶ and since 2008 it has maintained a strategic partnership with Germany that embraces numerous programmes of this type.¹⁷ This instrument of development policy allows a traditional donor to join together with an emerging country and make use of their comparative advantages to carry out joint programmes in developing countries. In the case of Brazil, approaches

14 | Dana de la Fontaine and Jurek Seifert, "Die Afrikapolitik Brasiliens – was steckt hinter der Süd-Süd Kooperation?", in: Franziska Stehnken, Antje Daniel, Helmut Asche and Rainer Öhlschläger (eds.), *Afrika und externe Akteure – Partner auf Augenhöhe?*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2010, 158.

15 | Cf. Buenos Aires Plan of Action, http://southsouthconference.org/?page_id=276 (accessed 27 Nov 2012).

16 | Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, n. 4, 130.

17 | Zilla, n. 2, 6-8.

and solutions that have been successfully implemented at home with the help of OECD countries are now being replicated in Africa. In Mozambique, Germany and Brazil are working together in the area of meteorology and in setting up a disaster early warning system. Germany is keen to use this partnership to strengthen Brazil's development structures, but also as a means of exerting influence on Brazil's development agenda.

After President Lula took office in 2003, Brazil's African policy must be viewed in the context of the country's new direction in terms of its overall foreign policy:¹⁸ Lula increasingly drove the debate on global distribution and fairness. He wanted to establish Brazil as the South's representative in the world, while at the same time expanding its role as the region's main economic power and meeting its need for economic diversification, raw materials and export markets. Discussions on Brazil's foreign policy constantly refer to the fact that the country bears a political, moral and historic obligation to Africa that compels it to strengthen its relations with the continent. Initiatives such as the Brazil-Africa-Forum, the opening of many new embassies in Africa and the dialogue forum between Brazil, India and South Africa (IBSA, since 2003) bear witness to this heightened sense of importance. Brazil is able to implement actions in Africa that have already had success at home, such as the Bolsa Família social programme or the Fome Zero nutrition programme. With 76 million Brazilians being of African origin, there is furthermore a close cultural connection. Traditionally, Brazil has particularly focused on technical cooperation in Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cap Verde, along with Sao Tomé and Príncipe. Between 2003 and 2008, the total volume of trade between Brazil and Africa grew from 12 to 26 billion U.S. dollars. This represents eight to nine per cent of Brazil's total export trade. Between 2003 and 2007, Brazil's exports increased by 244 per cent, with Africa becoming its number one trading partner.¹⁹ Angola, South Africa and Nigeria account for 48 per cent of all Brazilian exports to Africa.

Discussions on Brazil's foreign policy constantly refer to the fact that the country bears a political, moral and historic obligation to Africa that compels it to strengthen its relations with the continent.

18 | De la Fontaine and Seifert, n. 14, 160 et sqq.

19 | Ibid., 164-167.

New agreements are signed whenever a Brazilian president or minister visits one of Africa's developing countries, particularly in the areas of IT, nutrition, health, education, agriculture and biofuels. At the same time, Brazil acquires licences, mining rights and market access for its businesses.²⁰ But this has also attracted its share of criticism: in Mozambique the Brazilian firm Vale bought a 25-year licence for a coal mine, from which it planned to extract up to 11 million tons of coal each year. But now Vale stands accused of breach of contract because families that were forcibly evicted have not received the houses and compensation that were promised.²¹

In short, despite its comparatively low levels of funding, Brazil has developed a major economic and political presence in Africa. This is a key factor in whether Brazil can fulfil its role as leader of the South – not in its own backyard, where it has traditionally been viewed as the region's major power, but in Africa. Its involvement in Africa also allows

Brazil can offer credible, tried-and-tested solutions to problems such as AIDS, poverty and energy issues, and as a result it has garnered a great deal of respect in Africa.

it to trumpet its own development successes and push for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Brazil can offer credible, tried-and-tested solutions to problems such as AIDS, poverty and energy issues, and as a result it has garnered a great deal of respect in Africa. But whether it will be able to maintain a permanent leadership role in the global South remains to be seen.²²

INDIA

India's increasing self-confidence and its role as a regional power with global ambitions in terms of foreign, economic and security policy is a consequence of the growth of its currency reserves: from 5.8 billion U.S. dollars in 1991 to 300 billion U.S. dollars by the end of 2009.²³ Between 1990 and 2005, Indian trade with Africa multiplied ten-fold

20 | Ibid., 169.

21 | "Vale sieht sich in Afrika heftigen Protesten ausgesetzt", Emerging Markets Financial Services (EMFIS), 18 Jan 2012, http://emfis.de/global/global/nachrichten/beitrag/id/Vale_sieht_sich_in_Afrika_heftigen_Protesten_ausgesetzt_ID98581.html (accessed 27 Nov 2012).

22 | De la Fontaine and Seifert, n. 14, 170.

23 | Chaturvedi, "India and Development Cooperation: Expressing Southern Solidarity," in: Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, n. 4, 169.

to reach 9.14 billion euros. India's role as leader of the G77 and opinion leader against colonialism has created a reputation in Africa as representing the interests of poor countries. In April 2009 the first India-Africa Forum Summit was held in New Delhi. This rekindling of interest in the African continent can be explained by changes to its foreign and economic policy during the 1990s:²⁴ India increasingly turned away from socialism towards a market economy. Its critical and ideological stance against the West began to transform into a more pragmatic attitude.²⁵

India mainly exports information and telecommunications technology and research. It has established several leading technology institutes in Africa. It places great emphasis on training and the transfer of skills and technologies. India has a kind of trilateral partnership with the African Union and has supplied all 53 member states with telecommunications systems. Its preferred bilateral partners are Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa and countries with an Indian diaspora such as Kenya, Tanzania and Mauritius. These latter countries favour India when it comes to economic cooperation, meaning that economic success can be achieved more quickly.²⁶ The number of Indians living in Africa is estimated at two million, and the two regions have enjoyed close historic and cultural ties for centuries. Some countries in Africa, particularly in the South and South East, are part of the Commonwealth. But India is also involved with food supply, agriculture and infrastructure and is currently supporting a major infrastructure project, the construction of a new rail line from Ethiopia to Djibouti.

The number of Indians living in Africa is estimated at two million, and the two regions have enjoyed close historic and cultural ties for centuries.

India is constantly in competition with China.²⁷ After India caught up with China by joining the ranks of the nuclear powers in 1998, the two countries have increasingly found themselves rivals in the competition for resources in Africa as both countries have a growing need to safeguard their supplies of raw materials and energy. With massive support

24 | Arndt Michael, "Die indische Afrikapolitik – die wirtschaftliche und sicherheitspolitische Wiederentdeckung des afrikanischen Kontinents im 21. Jahrhundert", in: Stehnen, Daniel, Asche and Öhlschläger, n. 14, 140 et sqq.

25 | Ibid., 140.

26 | Ibid., 146.

27 | Ibid., 142 et seq.

from the state, China is often in a position to outstrip the competition from India (and Brazil²⁸). In 2004, India offered economic aid to the tune of 200 million U.S. dollars in order to win the contract for an oil field in Angola. China offered two billion U.S. dollars for the same oil field and was awarded the contract.²⁹

In terms of its maritime security strategy, India has turned its attention to East Africa and the Indian Ocean.³⁰ In 2007 it set up a naval monitoring station in Madagascar, and at present 7,400 Indian soldiers and police officers are stationed in Africa as part of UN peacekeeping missions. Indeed, India has taken on a major role in the UN's peacekeeping operations. Triangular cooperations with Germany are planned in the area of infrastructure, and the Indian Council of Medical Research is working with the Helmholtz Association of German Research Centres on a 4.5 million euro project to treat infectious diseases.³¹

India has taken on a major role in the UN's peacekeeping operations. Triangular cooperations with Germany are planned in the area of infrastructure.

In brief, India, like Brazil, is keen to develop its soft power. It also recognises the principle of non-interference and the provision of unconditional assistance, displaying a typically Indian reticence with respect to questions of universal values and norms.³² India sees itself as playing the role of the benign big brother and is courting the whole African continent in an attempt to find new partners, diversify and show the international community that it deserves a seat on the UN Security Council.

In Africa, India feels comfortable enough with its role in China's shadow. Although their interests often coincide, India is trying to take a different approach to China in its

28 | In early July 2011 the Chinese Jinchuan Group made an offer of 1.32 billion U.S. dollars for the South African mining company Meteorex, outbidding the Brazilian company Vale by more than 20 per cent. Cf. Edinger and Schaefer, n. 10, 34.

29 | "China beats India for Angola oil deal", 19 Oct 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-10/19/content_2110896.htm (accessed 28 Nov 2012).

30 | Japan is a close ally of India in its maritime security strategy, see Beatrice Gorawantschy and Benjamin Querner, "India's Arms Race – Challenges for foreign, security and defence policy", *KAS International Reports*, 6/2012, 58, <http://kas.de/wf/en/33.31265> (accessed 28 Nov 2012).

31 | Chaturvedi, n. 23, 177.

32 | Michael, n. 24, 143 et sqq.

African policy. India comes across as less aggressive, for example by using more local workers in its production processes. But aid is often tied to the purchase of Indian products. With its current level of funding, India is a new, medium-sized player in Africa, but it has the trump of the Indian diaspora up its sleeve, along with recognition of its traditional role as the leader of the G77. The agenda of the India-Africa Forum Summit shows that India is interested in working with all the countries of Africa.

CHINA

China is by far the most influential new player in Africa. In 2011 the balance of trade between China and Africa stood at 137.2 billion U.S. dollars. This is almost ten times as much as in 2000 and means that China is

In 2011 the balance of trade between China and Africa stood at 137.2 billion U.S. dollars. This is almost ten times as much as in 2000 and means that China is Africa's largest trading partner.

Africa's largest trading partner (conversely, Africa has only a two per cent share of Chinese foreign trade, comparable with its share of the EU's and Germany's foreign trade). Estimates suggest that by 2015 the balance of trade could reach 400 billion U.S. dollars, with more than half of this figure comprising imports of raw materials from Africa.³³ In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007, many European and American investors withdrew from Africa and broke their investment promises. Chinese investors, on the other hand, generally kept their promises and continued with their commitment to Africa. A slump in demand for raw materials on the part of Europe and the USA was made up for by China's huge hunger for raw materials from Africa. This served to greatly bolster China's reputation in Africa as a long-term partner.³⁴ 14 per cent of all Chinese direct investment is currently transacted in Africa and half of all loans made by China are in Africa. From 2004 to 2009 aid payments to Africa grew by 29 per cent per annum. Chinese development assistance amounted to around two billion U.S. dollars in 2010.

33 | Andreas Jahn, "Chinas Engagement in Afrika", presentation at the conference "China, Indien und Brasilien als neue Geber in Afrika: Konsequenzen für die Entwicklungspolitik", Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Cadenabbia, 11-14 Nov 2012.

34 | Edinger and Schaefer, n. 28, 34.

The boundary between China's state and non-state actors in Africa is somewhat fluid. China's policy in Africa is set by authorities at all levels, along with development banks, commercial banks, para-governmental bodies and state-owned, partly state-owned and purely private enterprises.³⁵ The main features of this policy are grants, interest-free loans, infrastructure projects (for which Western development assistance agencies have little available cash), technology packages, expert teams (particularly doctors), training and scholarships. Most projects are green field projects (new factories, roads, farms, shops and hotels) that are often strategically placed next to mining complexes.

Because its investments are backed by state funding, China can afford to take more risks than many of the European industrialised nations.

This is precisely the kind of investment that is needed to create jobs. Because its investments are backed by state funding, China can afford to take more risks than many of the European industrialised nations. And Chinese construction firms have recently become the biggest contractors for multilateral institutions in Africa.³⁶ Another characteristic of the policy is the increasingly frequent relocation of Chinese manufacturing plants to low cost countries. The World Bank predicts that 85 million Chinese jobs in the manufacturing sector will be moved abroad over the next three to five years, and Africa will be of prime importance in this respect. The Special Economic Zones that are being set up in Africa by China can be viewed as precursors to this shift.³⁷ These zones facilitate the establishment of (mostly Chinese) companies, and create jobs and industry clusters. But in doing this, China is gaining tremendous influence over local authorities and has a considerable degree of control over these zones.³⁸

In the past, China's development cooperation has been divided into two phases: from 1950 to 1980 it was predominantly used for political ends.³⁹ It was the goal of the new People's Republic to provide aid to its communist brothers in countries such as North Korea and North Vietnam

35 | Helmut Asche, "Chinas Funktionen in Afrika", in: Stehnen, Daniel, Asche and Öhlschläger, n. 14, 119.

36 | Edinger and Schaefer, n. 28, 33.

37 | Ibid.

38 | Matthias Heger, "Süd-Süd Investitionen als Chance für die DEG", DEG KfW-Bankengruppe, Jun 2011, 3.

39 | Li Xiaoyun, "China's Development Cooperation: overview", Präsentation bei der CAPE2012 conference, Overseas Development Institute, London, 14-15 Nov 2012.

and to encourage the spread of “proletarian internationalism”.⁴⁰ In 1964, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai announced the eight principles of foreign aid, bringing China a great deal of goodwill on the part of third world countries. These form the basis of the principle of equality and mutual benefit. The principle of equality is expressed in the way Chinese experts working on joint projects in other countries are not paid more than the standard local wage.⁴¹ The second principle is that of non-interference and non-conditionality. However, an obvious exception to this is the recognition of Taiwan. Any country that wishes to receive Chinese money has to break all diplomatic ties with the island state that China refuses to recognise. Of 54 countries in Africa, only four maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Gambia, SaoTomé and Swaziland. In 1996 Taiwan was recognised by another 11 African states, including South Africa, Liberia and Malawi.⁴²

In 1964, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai announced the eight principles of foreign aid, bringing China a great deal of goodwill on the part of third world countries.

From 1980 to 2000 Chinese development cooperation focused mainly on domestic economic interests. The Chinese government did not seem to have a problem with the fact that it was making foreign aid payments while there was still widespread poverty within its own borders – in the mid-1990s China was still one of the world’s largest aid recipients. Since the mid-1990s, economic assistance and cooperation have been seen as a vital strategy within its foreign policy. China is keen to secure energy and resources while improving access to international markets. This includes taking shareholdings in companies with a view to ensuring access to technical and commercial expertise. The revaluation of the Chinese currency made foreign investment and corporate takeovers even more attractive.⁴³ When the country opened up and became a socialist market economy after 1992, the cooperation system expanded to focus more on loans and other market-based instruments that China views as development cooperation in the broadest sense. The China EXIM Bank offers loans at below market interest rates, known as preferential loans.

40 | Zhou Hong, “China’s Evolving Aid Landscape: Crossing the River by feeling the Stones”, in: Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiro-poulos, n. 4, 255.

41 | *Ibid.*, 138.

42 | Jahn, n. 33.

43 | Edinger and Schaefer, n. 28, 32.

According to figures supplied by the Chinese embassy in Berlin, between 2001 and 2010 China extended loans amounting to 67.2 billion to African countries via the China EXIM Bank.⁴⁴ In 2010 the main beneficiary was Ghana, receiving the sum of 7.5 billion U.S. dollars. Contractual partners of the EXIM Bank often get a good deal thanks to state backing. But such contracts often stipulate that up to 70 per cent of the loan sum is tied to placing orders with Chinese firms.⁴⁵

Around 1.2 million Chinese are currently living in Africa. The social and cultural separation of the Chinese worker continues to be the subject of much controversy. The number of African workers on Chinese projects varies considerably from country to country. In Angola it is estimated at just 30 per cent, while in Tanzania it is around 80 per cent.⁴⁶ The huge influx of Chinese labour to the detriment of local workers and the frequent disregard for labour regulations by Chinese companies have led to regular protests, particularly in southern Africa. Protests are aimed equally at large Chinese construction firms and at small Chinese businesses that are starting to dominate the market in some African countries, particularly in the textile industry. In Namibia, business people, small traders, the construction industry, union representatives and most opposition politicians are unhappy with Chinese business practices. They claim that disregarding international standards often provides Chinese companies with an unfair advantage in the competition.⁴⁷ In 2006, when Zambian President Michael Sata was an opposition candidate, he strongly criticised Chinese involvement in Zambia. He warned that his country was facing a threat to its security and independence

44 | Jahn, n. 33.

45 | Andreas Seifert, "China in Afrika: Positive Effekte?", *IMI Magazin*, Informationsstelle Militarisation (IMI), Dec 2008, 27, <http://imi-online.de/download/AS-Dez08-ChinaAfrika.pdf> (accessed 31 Jan 2013).

46 | Helmut Asche and Margot Schüller, "Chinas Engagement in Afrika – Chancen und Risiken für Entwicklung", *Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)*, 2008, 35.

47 | See Ali Hensel, "Die Bürde der Arbeitslosigkeit in Namibia", *afrika süd*, No. 1, Jan/Feb 2010, <http://schattenblick.de/infopool/politik/ausland/paaf801.html> (accessed 31 Jan 2013); Gunnar Henrich and Vu Truong, "Das Ende der 'Charme Offensive'? Der Widerstand kleiner Länder in Südostasien und Afrika gegen die Hegemonialherrschaft Chinas", *IMS-Magazin*, <http://ims-magazin.de/index.php?id=1330677610,1,gastautor> (accessed 16 Jan 2013).

due to China's erosion of local labour regulations. In 2006 the Chinese ambassador in Lusaka openly threatened to break off relations with Zambia if Sata was elected president. When he lost this election (unlike the subsequent one in 2011), massive protests broke out against China, forcing the Chinese president to cancel a planned trip to the copper belt.⁴⁸

But China has ignored the criticisms and continues to expand its diplomatic relations with Africa. An impressive sign of its progress in this regard is the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held every three years. Almost all African heads of state and government attend this forum, showing the importance both sides attach to the relationship. At the fifth meeting in July 2012, Hu Jintao promised to double China's financial commitment. China also agreed to make available soft loans to the tune of 20 billion U.S. dollars for infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture and SMEs.⁴⁹ Over the next few years, thousands of nurses and other specialists are to be trained in Africa, and it is planned to award 18,000 scholarships to African students. In this way, China hopes to exert a long-term strategic influence over Africa's future elites.⁵⁰

Raw materials

China is the world's second-largest consumer of oil and the largest consumer of raw materials such as copper, coal, iron ore, nickel and zinc.⁵¹ 68 per cent of all timber imports, 27 per cent of all oil imports and 22 per cent of all minerals entering China come from Africa.⁵² China typically combines the extraction of raw materials with infrastructure initiatives. The countries that have entered into a privileged partnership with China generally have large deposits of raw materials: Sudan, South Sudan, Angola and Nigeria have oilfields; South Africa has coal and platinum reserves; the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia have copper and cobalt; Gabon has vast reserves of manganese. In addition to the privileged partnerships, China is very active in Guinea because of its huge deposits of aluminium

48 | Heinrich and Truong, n. 47.

49 | Edinger and Schaefer, n. 28, 32.

50 | Jahn, n. 33.

51 | Edinger and Schaefer, n. 28, 32.

52 | Jahn, n. 33.

and iron ore.⁵³ Major projects combining infrastructure initiatives with the extraction of raw materials are underway in several countries, including Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, the contract signed with the Congolese government has proven to be very detrimental for the country. It is hard to say what persuaded the government to sign such an agreement – perhaps it came down to short-termism, a corrupt system or a belief that the terms of the agreements would not be observed.⁵⁴



The Tamale Stadium in Ghana has been financed with Chinese development funds. | Source: Hiyori13 / flickr (CC BY-SA).

The most controversial case involving China's African policies over recent years is that of Sudan. Here China gained control of one of the few oil reserves that had not yet been divided up among Western companies. The People's Republic decided to get actively involved in the Sudan conflict in order to safeguard its oil supplies.⁵⁵ It supplied arms to Khartoum and later gave support to a mixed UN peacekeeping force from the African Union. China has also given military assistance to openly authoritarian or dictatorial regimes such as those in Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Zimbabwe. So in this area, China's African policy has two faces: on the one hand, China has supplied arms and has repeatedly blocked UN Security Council sanctions against Sudan and Zimbabwe. On the other hand, it has sent 1,400 soldiers to join UN peacekeeping missions.

53 | Ibid.

54 | Asche, n. 35, 124.

55 | Seifert, n. 45, 27.

China has attracted further criticism for its disregard of environmental and social standards. An obvious example of this is a Chinese consortium's investment in the Merowe dam in Sudan, which has come under fire due to forced resettlements and environmental issues.⁵⁶ China is particularly negligent when it comes to complying with regulations in the forestry and mining industries. There are constant reports of poor working conditions and low wages at copper mines that are under Chinese ownership.⁵⁷

To sum up, China has created for itself an image as a “mover and shaker” in Africa. Its projects are often highly visible (such as buildings for the African Union and rail projects).⁵⁸ In contrast, Western development cooperation is often slower, more expensive and less visible. It is, however, generally of better quality, carried out in a more participative fashion and at least always tries to encourage development. Promoting democracy, human rights and good governance costs time and is less visible than projects in the areas of infrastructure and industry. According to surveys, the majority of Africans have a positive attitude towards universal democracy and human rights.⁵⁹ In their development policies, the DAC donor countries both demand and promote these values alongside economic development, whereas the Chinese view is that political co-determination should follow in the wake of economic development – if at all.⁶⁰ These two differing views emerge very clearly during dialogue with China. With its African policy, China is also clearly pursuing geostrategic interests with regard to the strength of the African vote in the UN General Assembly, something that China would like to turn to its advantage.

Promoting democracy, human rights and good governance costs time and is less visible than projects in the areas of infrastructure and industry.

56 | “Riesiger Stausee bedroht Schätze”, *Die Welt*, 29 Mar 2007, <http://welt.de/wissenschaft/article783456/Riesiger-Stausee-bedroht-Schaetze.html> (accessed 28 Nov 2012).

57 | Asche and Schüller, n. 46, 61.

58 | Asche, n. 35, 127.

59 | *Ibid.*, 132.

60 | Asche (n. 35, 132) notes the following: experiences in Asia have been affected by China and the economic breakthrough of East Asia's five new industrialised nations (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong under British rule, and of course China). Some of these nations were built under authoritarian regimes. When democracy came (if at all), it was a result of economic modernisation and pressure from within.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Many African governments gain a direct benefit from China's involvement, as it allows them to push ahead with economic programmes that would otherwise not be possible.

Chinese involvement has attracted its share of criticism from opposition parties and particularly from trade unions.

Dictators and forward-looking governments alike benefit from China's engagement.⁶¹ However, Chinese involvement has attracted its share of criticism from opposition parties and particularly from trade unions. But with the possible exception of South Africa, none of the African countries has a China strategy, nor do they have a clear idea of how to deal with this new player. Likewise, the USA and Europe lack a coherent plan for how to handle China's new influence in Africa.⁶² In a speech at the China-Africa summit on 20 July 2012, South African President Jacob Zuma argued that lessons had been learned from Africa's economic relations with Europe. He said that the mistakes of the colonial era must not be repeated, as unequal trading relations – also with China – are not sustainable in the long run. Zuma advised African governments to work to ensure that China not only extracts raw materials but also invests more heavily in the processing industries.⁶³ Africa's own capacity must be encouraged if it is to gain a lasting benefit from Chinese value creation. This particularly applies to negotiations between China and African governments and regional bodies. Additionally, profits from cooperation projects with China, particularly in the area of raw materials extraction and land investments, must be used to benefit the whole population. Local food security and water supplies must be safeguarded when major investments are made in the agricultural sector. It would be advisable to draw up regional codes of conduct and a set of investment guidelines for negotiations with investors. These should be applied consistently to all the actors involved.⁶⁴ Other

61 | Ibid., 134.

62 | Ibid., 132.

63 | Jane Perlez, "With \$20 Billion Loan Pledge, China Strengthens Its Ties to African Nations", *The New York Times*, 19 Jul 2012, <http://nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/asia/china-pledges-20-billion-in-loans-to-african-nations.html> (accessed 28 Nov 2012).

64 | Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, *Rising Powers, South-South Cooperation and Africa*, South African Institute for International Affairs, Policy Briefing 47, 03/2012.

equally important issues include the involvement of the local workforce, investment in local industry and greater transparency in Chinese activities. Local actors must be more involved in Chinese cooperation initiatives, particularly civil society, as it has a keen instinct for the negative consequences of foreign investment.

In future it seems likely that China will face up to African criticisms in a more open fashion. Pressure to instigate reforms is being applied by peer reviews from other African countries, and the number of humanitarian operations under African leadership is growing. In this way, the principle of non-interference is softening. With protests and incidents in Chinese factories and mines becoming more frequent, it is likely that out of sheer self-preservation China will take more lasting responsibility in this area. Since it began its operations in Africa, China has learned a great deal about local customs. It now pays greater attention to how it is perceived in Africa and how it handles environmental and social regulations.⁶⁵ At the same time, there are many state-backed, parastatal and private Chinese actors in Africa that are certainly not all following a central master plan and not all under the control of the Chinese government. This has led to a very diverse African policy that is not free of contradictions.

In Germany, perceptions are generally critical: "Politicians and sections of German business are afraid that political alliances forged through decades of dearly-bought development cooperation and African export markets for German goods will simply collapse."⁶⁶ However, an increase in Africa's technological development thanks to the involvement of new actors could be an advantage for German business as it could boost demand for German expertise and technology.⁶⁷ Compared to Chinese companies, German firms generally set high standards in terms of quality, the environment and social issues. Of course, African countries have their choice of alternative partners who are often able to set projects in motion much more quickly. But it seems likely that there will always be

It seems likely that there will always be a niche for German companies, particularly in areas such as building supervision and quality inspection, perhaps as part of Chinese projects.

65 | Edinger and Schaefer, n. 28, 34.

66 | Andreas Wenzel, "Wer hat Angst vorm Roten Drachen?", *Afrikapost*, Mar 2012, 35.

67 | Cf. *ibid.*

a niche for German companies, particularly in areas such as building supervision and quality inspection, perhaps as part of Chinese projects. Nevertheless, in comparison to China, there is a general reticence on the part of German businesses to get involved in the African market.

CONCLUSION

In many respects, the African policy of China, India and Brazil is similar to that of the West, but there are still some fundamental differences. It is clear that these three emerging nations have driven development in Africa, with some benefits for the local population. The criticisms mentioned, such as interference in conflicts, lack of adherence to environmental and social standards and disregard for democracy and human rights do not only apply to these three countries. Such criticisms could also be levelled at many traditional donors over the last six decades of development cooperation on the African continent. Africa should have learned from its experiences with these traditional donors and now be in a better position to stand up to the three new countries and clearly articulate their own interests and that of their people. The involvement of the three emerging nations represents a great opportunity. Many African countries have become attractive to investors thanks to their rates of economic growth. It is in their interests to learn from the mistakes made in their dealings with traditional donors and to take advantage of the increased engagement on the part of emerging nations in order to drive forward their development.

The influence of Official Development Assistance (and hence the influence of conditionality) on development in Africa will start to dwindle in relative terms. At the same time, as African civil society becomes stronger, it will begin to put the new actors, and particularly China, under greater pressure to act more responsibly. Western donor countries would be well advised to set conditions in areas where they have the greatest leverage. Conversely, they should not be afraid of formulating economic and foreign trade policies that are interest-led, while still respecting standards and promoting diverse investments in Africa that have long-term benefits for both sides. As African countries become more developed, they will require fewer aid payments and

more direct investment. Up to 30 per cent of the national finances of some African countries are still dependent on aid payments, but this figure begins to drop once countries show steady growth. This trend is reflected in the business-oriented approach of the South-South cooperation. In face of the increased involvement of the emerging nations, their African partners in politics and civil society need to become stronger, so they can make informed decisions in accordance with their national development strategies about the kind of international assistance they need, the partnerships they seek to enter into, and the particular conditions of these partnerships.



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BRAZIL IN AFRICA

BRIDGING THE ATLANTIC?

Oliver Stuenkel

Brazil's presence in Africa is growing – nothing symbolises this reality better than the 37 Brazilian embassies that now exist across the continent, providing Brazil with a stronger diplomatic representation in Africa than traditional powers such as Great Britain. Yet what is Brazil's Africa strategy, and what are its interests? Are we witnessing an intense yet unsustainable rapprochement, as seen before, or is this just the beginning of a long-lasting and ever closer cooperation?

THE HISTORY OF BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS

After Brazil and the African continent were separated from each other millions of years ago, it was the slave trade from the 16th century until the 19th century that marked Brazil-Africa relations. More African slaves were brought to Brazil than to any other country, including the United States, creating irreversible and profound cultural ties between the two. Brazil was the last country in the Western Hemisphere to abolish slavery in 1888. In the first half of the 20th century, however, Brazil-Africa relations were marked by a mutual lack of interest as both Africa and Brazil looked north towards Europe and the United States, respectively.

After World War II, Brazilian elites sought to minimise the role blacks played in Brazil's national identity, and topics related to Africa were removed from the curriculum in Brazil's schools. As the struggle for decolonisation intensified, Brazil (under President Juscelino Kubitschek) refrained from actively supporting independence movements, principally because it sought the help of industrialised nations to develop economically, and also because it was reluctant to

offend its old ally Portugal, a colonial power in Africa. Yet, after many African nations gained independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Brazil's President Jânio Quadros took the first steps towards establishing

After many African nations gained independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Brazil's President Jânio Quadros took the first steps towards establishing stronger ties with them.

stronger ties with them. Quadros sent Raymundo de Souza Dantas, a black Brazilian journalist, to head the embassy in Accra. Dantas was the first black Ambassador in Brazil's history, yet he called his two-year stint in Ghana "traumatic and painful" and soon returned to Brazil, complaining that the government had not provided him with the necessary infrastructure to do his job properly. Ghana and Senegal soon opened embassies in Brazil, the first ones in Latin America. President Quadros also invited the Senegalese head of state Leopold Senghor to Brazil, who was paradoxically received in 1964 not by Quadros but by General Castelo Branco, who had deposed Quadros' successor Goulart in a military coup six months earlier. General Castelo Branco saw Africa mostly in the context of the threat of communism, but otherwise cared little about the continent.

In the early 1970s, Brazil-Africa relations again received a boost, Brazilian investments in countries such as Angola surged, and the number of Brazilian embassies across Africa reached 16. In 1972, Brazil's Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza visited nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1975, Brazil recognised the independence of Angola, thus ending the traditional alignment with Portugal – a hugely symbolic moment for Brazil-Africa relations. The oil shocks caused Brazil to turn to Nigeria and Angola as potential oil suppliers. Despite the advances, it took until 1983 for President Figueiredo to become the first Brazilian head of state to visit Sub-Saharan Africa.

Yet once again the activism proved unsustainable, and Brazil-Africa relations went into hibernation in the 1990s. President Fernando Collor put a clear focus on strengthening ties with the United States. President Cardoso's Foreign Minister Lampreia did not regard Africa as a priority in the post-Cold War scenario. While trade with Africa had made up ten per cent in the 1980s, it came down to two per cent of Brazil's overall trade in the 1990s.

It was President Lula who early on in his first term identified Africa as a priority in Brazil's effort to diversify its partnerships. Lula made 12 trips to Africa, visiting 21 countries. In the opposite direction, Brazil received 47 visits of African kings, presidents, and prime ministers from 27 nations. Brazil's Foreign Minister Celso Amorim made 67 official visits to African countries during his time with the Lula government. At first fiercely criticised by the opposition as an overly ideology-driven strategy, the wisdom of strengthening ties with Africa has now largely been accepted by the political mainstream in Brazil.



Brasil's former President Lula da Silva: During his term in office he aspired to "bridge the Atlantic". | Source: Alexander Bonilla / flickr (CC BY).

Notably, Lula's aspiration to "bridge the Atlantic" had both idealist and realist elements. Lula pointed to Brazil's "historic debt" to Africa, the existing cultural ties and sought to strengthen South-South relations in general to balance what he saw as overly powerful established powers. After all, Brazil has the world's largest black population outside of Nigeria. At the same time, Lula recognised that Africa's markets offered great potential for Brazilian companies. Unlike China and India, which are seeking to secure resources for their booming economies, Brazil is already a resource-rich country and a major oil exporter. From an economic point of view, Brazil sees Africa as an

opportunity to diversify its export markets in such sectors as agricultural machinery, biofuels, food and seeds, and providing help for its companies to internationalise their production. Supporters of Lula's move point out that Brazil is turning into a advocate for African interests in the international system, yet this remains controversial as Brazil's interests often diverge from those of small developing countries. Still, it was thanks to African votes that Brazil's José Graziano da Silva was elected FAO's Director-General in January 2012. African votes are also seen to be crucial should the UN General Assembly vote on UN Security Council Reform, which may provide Brazil with permanent membership, a long-term goal for policy makers in Brasília.

Lula administration's decision to reengage in Africa has had notable effects: There are now more African embassies in Brasília (34) than in any other capital in the Western Hemisphere except Washington, D.C. Trade has increased to 20 billion U.S. dollars, climbing back to six per cent of overall trade, and this share is expected to grow further. There is little doubt today that no emerging power can afford not to invest in Africa, one of the world economy's last frontiers.

BRAZIL AS AN EMERGING DONOR

Intertwined with Brazil's growing economic presence on the African continent is its newfound role as an aid donor. Yet similar to other emerging donors such as India and China, Brazil seeks to transcend the traditional interaction between donors and recipients and envisions an exchange between "equal" actors, with mutual benefits and responsibilities. Since 2005, Brazilian development projects have been an essential part of the country's Africa strategy. After a brief period of both receiving and sending aid, Northern donors are now ceasing to provide aid to Brazil, suggesting it is no longer seen as a developing country.

Will Brazil (along with India and China) seek to merely change some of the rules – say, dilute conditionalities – of the international aid regime? Or will it seek to undo the most basic organising principles of today's development aid regime? Will emerging donors come around to eventually adopting the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) position, or may we see emerging

Brazil is eager to assume more responsibility in institutions such as the World Bank, but it rejects key pillars of the aid regime such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

powers using their newfound status to pursue alternative visions of world order? When trying to understand whether emerging donors such as Brazil pose a serious challenge to the existing aid regime – a regime they often describe as unfair, outdated and dominated by former colonial powers – the evidence seems inconclusive so far.

Brazil is eager to assume more responsibility in institutions such as the World Bank, but it rejects key pillars of the aid regime such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. At the same time, it has signed the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, unlike other “emerging donors”. More research is necessary to gain a better understanding of what Brazil’s strategy will be as it emerges as an important player in the global aid regime.

The same uncertainty remains vis-à-vis humanitarian aid. In 2011, the UN’s World Food Program (WFP) distributed more than one million tons of food produced by Brazilian farmers, making Brazil one of the ten largest donors. An even larger quantity of Brazil’s humanitarian aid was provided bilaterally, helping Brazil project influence in a growing number of regions across the world, many of them in Africa, and promote its successfully applied domestic social policies that have contributed to reducing poverty at home.

Africa is now the primary focus of Brazil’s overall aid programme. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) has technical cooperation projects in 30 countries on the continent, even though most of these initiatives are very small. In 2010 a little over 50 per cent of ABC’s budget was allocated to projects in Africa and the amount of money spent there has risen by 105 per cent since 2005. Most of the resources are going to the Portuguese-speaking countries, and in a few cases are executed in close collaboration with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, or CPLP. Brazil has helped establish a fund within the CPLP for the promotion of the Portuguese language in Africa and East Timor as is now offering more scholarships to train Portuguese language teachers than Portugal itself, a member of the OECD’s Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC). Brazil is also providing funds (500 million U.S. dollars) to help São Tomé and Príncipe, a former Portuguese colony, to feed children at schools.

The notion that Brazil is a reservoir of vast experience dealing with development challenges at home also strikes a responding chord among African countries. Contrary to traditional donors, Brazil still faces significant poverty and inequality at home, and can thus present itself much more as a partner than wealthier European countries for which poverty is a distant memory.

Brazil's experience in dealing with poverty and development issues is also reflected in the way it allocates aid. According to ABC's recent data, most of the money is going to agricultural projects (21.86 per cent), followed by health (16.28 per cent) and education (12.12 per cent). These are all areas in which public policy in the country has evolved dramatically over the past two decades. Food security and agriculture are also major themes. In addition, Brazil provides cheap and generic anti-retroviral drugs to Mozambique for those infected with HIV. Brazil has longtime expertise in tropical medicine as well, and under President Dilma Rousseff, Brazil has financed several specialised health centers across Africa. In the area of education, the Brazilian government has increased the number of scholarships for African students to study at Brazilian universities, and it has begun to build vocational training centers in several countries.

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In some instances, Brazil also acted as a democracy promoter in Africa. For example, as part of Brazil's ongoing involvement in Guinea-Bissau, member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), Brazil had provided some electoral assistance to Guinea-Bissau from 2004 to 2005, and it continued to support efforts to stabilise the country by operating through the UN peace mission there. During a CPLP meeting in 2011, Brazil signed a memorandum of understanding to implement the Project in Support of the Electoral Cycles of the Portuguese-speaking African Countries and Timor-Leste. In addition, in the lead-up to the anticipated elections in Guinea-Bissau in April, 2012, Brazil made further financial contributions to the UNDP basket fund in support to the National Electoral Commission for assistance in the execution of the election.

Yet given the recent nature of Brazil's strategy of cooperation, little is known about Brazil's motives, priorities and internal decision making processes. It is not clear whether Brazil's recent efforts in places such as Somalia, for example, are ad hoc measures that are unlikely to find repetition, or whether they are the beginning of a broader strategy, turning development and humanitarian aid into one of Brazil's more important foreign policy tools.

CHALLENGES

Despite the promising developments, Brazil also faces some significant challenges when dealing with Africa. For example, the fact that race remains a potent marker of socioeconomic status in Brazil may also undermine attempts to forge stronger ties with African nations. Visiting delegations from Nigeria or South Africa are frequently baffled to see that very few blacks form part of Brazil's elites, contrasting Brazil's image as a color-blind society.

While Brazil's strategy of focusing first on Portuguese-speaking Africa (Angola and Mozambique, among others) is often portrayed as a shrewd idea, it may also be Brazil's greatest weakness as it seemingly reduces companies and the Brazilian government's need to adapt to non-Portuguese speaking countries – and hire staff that speaks English, French and Arabic. While Africa's Portuguese-speaking nations are strategically important, Brazil must seek to build a stronger presence in other African markets, such as Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya.

Many believe that Brazil does not have enough diplomats to represent the country in all those areas where Brazilian companies have long entered.

Furthermore, there are worries among Brazilian analysts that Lula's drive into Africa will once again turn out to be unsustainable. A strong presence in Africa is to be welcomed,

but many believe that Brazil does not have enough diplomats to represent the country in all those areas where Brazilian companies have long entered. Several of Brazil's diplomatic missions in Africa are so small that one wonders how they can function properly. Smart strategies developed at the Foreign Ministry in Brasilia at home can fail to have the desired impact because there are not enough Foreign Service officers to implement the new policy. Complex bilateral negotiations can be negatively affected

if Brazil's negotiators have not been briefed properly due to a lack of diplomatic staff and on-the-ground knowledge of the domestic constraints the other side is facing. Finally, maintaining an understaffed embassy can send a negative signal to the host country, in some cases causing more damage than opening no embassy at all. As Brazil seeks to project more influence in Africa, its low number of diplomats thus poses severe limitations to its capacity to operationalise new policies.

In addition, the way Africans see Brazil will inevitably change as Brazil's economic presence in Africa grows. Brazilian economic and commercial interests in Africa – both public and private – loom much larger than ever before. Petrobras, Brazil's state-run oil company, invested 1.9 billion U.S. dollars in coal, oil, and natural gas in Nigeria during 2005 alone. It now operates in 28 African countries. In 2007, Brazilian mining corporation Vale invested a little over 700 million U.S. dollars in coal, oil and natural gas in Mozambique. Eletrobras is planning the construction of a six billion U.S. dollars hydroelectric power plant in Mozambique, which will most likely be financed by BNDES, the Brazilian development bank which provides more funds than the World Bank. Aside from BNDES, other Brazilian banks such as Banco do Brasil, Latin America's largest bank by assets and Brazil's biggest state-run bank, announced expansion plans last August to benefit from growing demand for loans and other products in Africa.

While its presence is still much smaller than that of India or China, Brazil must be careful to avoid some of the mistakes made by China, which runs the risk of facing a regional backlash. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Brazilians are well-liked across Africa. Now the challenge is to assure that even despite ever greater investments, such as Vale's recently signed one billion U.S.

dollar deal to build a railway in Malawi to transport coal from Mozambique, Brazil will continue to be seen as a partner, and not a new coloniser who merely seeks to exploit

Africa's resources. Since Brazil's investments in Africa are considerably smaller than China's, this risk seems manageable. Although Brazil's trade with Africa increased between 2000 and 2010 from four billion to 20

Although Brazil's trade with Africa increased between 2000 and 2010 from four billion to 20 billion U.S. dollars, its presence remains much smaller than China's.

billion U.S. dollars, its presence remains much smaller than China's (whose trade with Africa in 2011 exceeded 110 billion U.S. dollars).

Still, by offering technical expertise, Brazilian investors and policy makers seek to make clear that the African economy also benefits from the relationship. Agriculture, in particular, is an area where Brazilian expertise has made a significant difference in Africa. Given that soil and climate conditions are quite similar, the Brazilian agricultural research institute EMPRAPA has provided technical assistance in several African countries across the continent. Brazil is providing more than two million U.S. dollars to fund the development of rice crops production in Senegal, including providing genetically modified crops and the development of an experimental farm in Dakar. In the same way, Brazil's innovative social policies (such as Bolsa Familia) have been replicated in several African countries. Brazil is not only attractive to Africa in that it is the only BRIC country with a considerable African population, but also because it is the only emerging power that is able to reduce socio-economic inequality at home, thus enhancing social stability. Over the last 30 years, Brazil has also reversed its status as a food importer to become an important agribusiness producer of soybeans, amongst other products. Considering the challenge of food security that looms large in several African countries, Brazil's agricultural transformation is seen as a model by many African analysts.

In addition, Brazilian companies are keen to avoid the mistakes Chinese investors made by bringing their own workers to Africa. Quite to the contrary, Brazil seeks to employ as many Africans as possible in their projects – and Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction firm, is Angola's largest private employer. In Vale's mining operations in Mozambique, the vast majority of workers are locals, thus boosting the domestic economy.

In order to achieve these goals, civil society could take a more prominent role in Brazil's Africa strategy. It is also one of the key areas where Brazil can distinguish itself from China, and present itself as an open vibrant democracy with culture and arts that reflect Brazil's diversity. It is here that IBSA, a trilateral outfit comprising India, Brazil and

South Africa, can be useful. Perhaps IBSA's greatest value is in bringing India, Brazil and South Africa closer together on a societal level – allowing think tanks, civil society, academia, public sector specialists and foreign policymakers to engage and develop joint strategies to common problems. Seen from this perspective, IBSA has already been a success as it shifted its members' attention towards their fellow emerging powers. Given South Africa's great importance on the African continent, IBSA can thus indirectly strengthen Brazil-Africa relations as well.



Cape of Good Hope: Brazil expects to see a revival of the maritime route through the South Atlantic and is adjusting its strategy accordingly. | Source: icelight / flickr (CC BY).

Finally, Brazil is acquiring the military capacity, including several nuclear submarines, to increasingly control the South Atlantic that divides Brazil from Africa, yet it remains unclear how exactly Brazil seeks to employ this new-found strength. Security specialists both in the United States and in Southern Africa speculate as to whether Brazil will design a South-Atlantic Security Space akin to NATO and what the geopolitical implications of such a move would be. No matter what Brazil will decide, Brazil-Africa relations will be deeply affected.

In this context, one must also consider the growing strategic importance of the South Atlantic. As ever larger ships can no longer pass the Suez Canal, Brazil expects to see a revival of the Cape of Good Hope route. At the same time, piracy has turned into a problem, particularly as drug trafficking along the African coast is set to increase.

Guinea-Bissau runs the risk of becoming a narco-state, and other failed states similar to Somalia may arise.

In early 2012, Brazil's Minister of Defense traveled to Cape Verde to express Brazil's interest in strengthening military cooperation with the island state, located 300 kilometers off the coast of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, which is increasingly seen as a source of instability and a haven for pirates and drug-traffickers. Brazil also indicated it would donate two aircraft to the military of Cape Verde to increase its surveillance capacity.

As it lacks the naval capacity to control the area on its own, Brazil may resuscitate structures such as the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.

Brazil is thus beginning to regard the South Atlantic as its sphere of influence. As it lacks the naval capacity to control the area on its own, Brazil may resuscitate structures such as the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZPCAS)¹ and strengthen IBSA to jointly provide security in the area. As the strategic importance of the South Atlantic is bound to increase, so will Brazil's willingness to strengthen its presence there, possibly in cooperation with other leading actors of the "Global South".

CONCLUSION

As this brief overview shows, Brazil's entry into Africa is one of the most fascinating developments of the past decade. The challenge for the Brazilian government will now be to show that its narrative about the mutually beneficial partnership with African countries makes sense not only to African analysts, but also to the African populace. Africa has a long history of foreign intruders who – despite affirmations of benign intent – ended up harming the continent's prospects of development. In many aspects, Brazil has a great opportunity to show that its approach is more sustainable.

At the same time, Brazil has the chance to introduce new models in the development arena, which remains dominated by OECD countries. Given that only a decade ago Brazil was a recipient of aid and had not yet begun

1 | In 1986, Brazil initiated the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZPCAS), which sought to promote economic cooperation in the region and maintain peace and security – with a particular focus on the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

to provide aid to other countries in a systematic fashion, its progress has been remarkable, changing the way Brazil is perceived abroad and the way the country sees itself. Brazil's aid strategy thus underscores, more than anything, Brazil's ambition to play a more important role in international affairs and project global influence, but particularly in Africa.

Brazil is trailing both China and India in Africa, but if it carefully studies the role both countries play in Africa, it can avoid their mistakes and engage in Africa more effectively. Otherwise, the red carpet rolled out to welcome Brazil to the continent will quickly be rolled up and taken away.



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FROM LIBERATION MOVEMENT TO GOVERNMENT

PAST LEGACIES AND THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSITION IN AFRICA

Christopher Clapham

Liberation is defined by struggle. Throughout Africa, and indeed in much of the world, there are movements that have fought long and hard, with great heroism and often at great cost, to achieve the liberation of their peoples and territories from oppressive regimes. Examples range from external colonialists (as for example in Algeria and the former Portuguese territories of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique), domestic dictatorships or oligarchies (as in the struggles of the ANC in South Africa, the RPF in Rwanda, or the EPRDF in Ethiopia), to governments effectively entrenched in one part of the state territory which sought to impose control over other areas that viewed themselves as distinct, and as having the right to separate statehood (as in Eritrea and South Sudan). The length and intensity of these struggles have varied greatly, arguably the most extreme and costly example being the 30-year independence war in Eritrea. At the other end of the spectrum there are cases such as the Convention People's Party of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, which gained independence entirely by peaceful means, but still regarded themselves in key respects as liberation movements. In all cases, however, the consciousness and experience of struggle are critical.

Once liberation has been achieved, and the former liberation movement has assumed power as a national government, the experience of struggle has generally been regarded as an enormously positive legacy for the new state and the regime that rules it. The more intense the struggle, indeed, the greater the advantages conferred on the new government, by contrast especially with those

successor regimes that are often viewed in disparaging terms as having been handed their independence “on a plate”. First of all, the now victorious movement inherits from the struggle a powerful sense of legitimacy:

A victorious movement inherits from the struggle a powerful sense of legitimacy: these are people who have been prepared to sacrifice their lives for the cause.

these are people who have been prepared to sacrifice their lives for the cause, and who come to power with an abiding memory of the martyrs who through their death enabled them to do so. They have earned their independence, and with it the right to run the new government. They bring into government, moreover, the ideals that shaped the struggle itself. Struggle likewise imposes on those who undergo it the need for purpose and commitment, and the discipline required to maintain their cohesion at periods of great stress. Since liberation movements have to build their own organisation from the bottom up, in order to compete with powerful and hierarchically organised states, they must of necessity look to the grassroots, to recruit their fighters and ensure their support from among the ordinary people on whose behalf they are fighting. As time goes by, and the immediacy of the struggle fades, its memory or mythology nonetheless remains foundational for the state and government itself, and an inspiration for future generations. These are all solid advantages that cannot be overlooked.

Nonetheless, virtually all liberation movements have experienced considerable difficulties in actually making the transition from struggle to government. The persistence of this phenomenon in Africa was the wellspring for an international Dialogue of leading struggle veterans, policy makers and experts in early October 2012.¹ It took place in the year South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) marked its 100th anniversary. The struggle waged by the ANC against the apartheid regime during the second half of the 20th century is one of the world’s best-known and most admired liberation movements, yet in its centennial year it has faced a raft of criticism – both from within and outside South Africa – over its quality of governance, which some of the country’s most prominent voices have attributed to

1 | The Dialogue, entitled “From Liberation Movement to Government: Past legacies and the challenge of transition in Africa” was co-hosted by the Brentthurst Foundation and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

its failure to move beyond “liberation politics” and shed its struggle mindset.²

Experience from South Africa and indeed across Africa suggests that as the immediate euphoria of liberation subsides – one needs to be there at that magical moment to understand just how much liberation means to those who

As problems mount, it becomes all too easy to view the legacies of struggle not as a blessing but as a curse, and to envy those countries whose transition to majority rule has been marked instead by peace and continuity.

have trodden the long road to achieve it – problems characteristically arise that have to be traced back to the liberation movement itself. Few indeed are those movements that have actually delivered the aspirations that animated the struggle – aspirations of peace, of democracy, of popular participation in a cohesive national community that delivers welfare to its members. As problems mount, it becomes all too easy to view the legacies of struggle not as a blessing but as a curse, and to envy those countries whose transition to majority rule has been marked instead by peace and continuity.

The problems of liberation are structural ones, rooted in the experience of struggle and common to virtually every movement of this kind.³ The experience of struggle is for most of its participants so intense and so specific that it is easy to assume that the difficulties of liberation are the result of circumstances unique to that particular organisation: to its history, to the nature of the territory, or indeed to the personalities of individual leaders and their

2 | See Mamphela Ramphele, “Drop Struggle Politics”, *The Sunday Times* (South Africa), 23 Sep 2012.

3 | This paper is a personal summary of the discussions at a workshop that brought together a group of participants, including individuals prominent in liberation struggles in their own countries, other observers from those countries, and external scholars and commentators. In accordance with the rules required for frank and critical analysis, the contributions of individual participants cannot be acknowledged by name, and accordingly I can only deeply appreciate the numerous insights incorporated into this paper that I have derived from them. Equally, in attempting to fashion a more-or-less coherent narrative from a complex and wide-ranging debate, I must acknowledge the value of contributions that may not have been directly incorporated into the paper, or that may indeed differ from the views presented here. Participation in the discussion was a thoroughly rewarding experience, and I can only hope that this necessarily generalised summary will be of value, especially to those who find themselves confronting challenges analogous to those considered here.

relationships to one another. Every movement certainly has its own distinctive characteristics, and a range of variance is only to be expected as a result. But what is most striking, across the African continent and well beyond it, is the extent to which similar issues constantly recur. And these similarities in turn should foster not a sense of helplessness – that these problems are so entrenched that nothing can be done about them – but rather a sense that much can be learned about the ways in which different movements have tackled them.

THE LEGACY OF LIBERATION

Liberation struggles arise under very different circumstances and take very different forms. There is, however, a central and common theme, found more than anything else in the mentalities of those who come to power through struggle. This human legacy of struggle is at the same time both strangely difficult to pin down – why do people think in one way rather than another, and why can't they be induced to think in a different and more "constructive" way? – and also extremely difficult to change. Participation in the struggle is for most of those who go through it a life-defining experience. It changes who you are and how you think. Even long after the struggle has ended and its former participants have achieved leading positions in government, it remains extraordinarily vivid in the minds of former fighters. It brings with it a deep sense of conviction in the rightness of the cause, and the entitlement and responsibility of the survivors to continue to exercise the power and pursue the objectives for which they fought. In the case of bitter and protracted wars of liberation, these survivors carry with them abiding memories of the comrades who perished along the way, and a sense of obligation not to betray them. Meles Zenawi, late prime minister of Ethiopia, was originally called Legesse Zenawi, but adopted instead the name of Meles to perpetuate the memory of one of the founders of the Tigray People's Liberation Front who died early in the struggle. What was to others merely a simple name was to him a constant reminder of the human cost of victory.

Even long after the struggle has ended and its former participants have achieved leading positions in government, it brings with it the entitlement of the survivors to continue to exercise the power.



Meles Zenawi, late prime minister of Ethiopia, adopted the name of one of the founders of the liberation movement. | Source: Utenriksdept / flickr (CC BY-ND).

Leaders especially are deeply affected by taking their movement through to ultimate triumph, and readily assume a sense not only of the rightness of their cause, but of their entitlement to the power that follows. Power is not for them the result simply of a popular vote that may be reversed in a later election, still less of a coup d'état, but is instead the culmination of a lifetime mission. It is very hard indeed for them to recognise that anyone else could have any equivalent right to rule, while for the movement as a whole its record in the struggle confers – in the minds of former fighters – a virtually permanent claim on state power: those who did not participate in their struggle, including those who were too young to have had any chance of doing so, are expected to take second place to veterans. This claim may readily trump alternative legitimations for rule. The movement's members assume that the popular support derived from the promise of liberation conveys a permanent and unconditional attachment, and that rival politicians who seek to criticise its performance in office can consequently have no public support, and must therefore be suppressed by whatever means control of the state allows.

That said, the legacies of struggle may actually be far more ambivalent than the victors in that struggle assume. One very common problem – and an almost inevitable one, given the arbitrary territorial units imposed on Africa by colonial partition – is that the war of “national liberation” must often of necessity take place in what is actually a non-nation state. The struggle itself may play an important role in helping to unify a subject people against an oppressive former regime, and constitute a vital part of the mythology of national identity; however, victory may well have been won at the cost of suppressing dissidents or rivals in the struggle for liberation, who re-emerge once it has been achieved.

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One common feature of liberation war is the contest for “movement hegemony”, in the course of which vicious fighting often takes place between rival movements – as between ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe, ELF and EPLF in Eritrea, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in Angola – to determine which of them will be established as the “real” embodiment of national identity, as opposed to the “divisive” forces whom they have suppressed. Sometimes there are divergent factions and rival leaders within what is nominally the same organisation. These rivalries, too, often reflect and to some degree represent differences between major population groups, on the basis for instance of ethnicity or religion, so that the victory of one over another comes to be interpreted as bringing one group (not necessarily the largest) to power over others: what is presented from the viewpoint of the winners as “national” liberation may not look that way from the viewpoint of other elements in the population.

There are considerable differences, too, in the societies in which liberation war takes place, and correspondingly in the movements that emerge to fight. It is certainly one of the great strengths of liberation movements that they must build themselves up only from the support they draw from the oppressed peoples among whom they fight. These provide their fighters with their legitimacy, and the social networks on which they must rely in their long years in the “bush”.

But in benefitting from these linkages, it is also inevitable that they become to some degree dependent on them. It cannot be coincidental, for example, that Africa's strongest and most effective liberation movements, with the EPLF in Eritrea and the RPF in Rwanda as outstanding examples, have been built within societies which themselves have a long record of governance (however oppressive this may often have been), with the organisational attitudes and values entrenched in it. Movements derived from pastoralist societies with historically much more egalitarian cultures and traditions of deep hostility to settled governance (and here the different Somali movements directed against the oppressive rule of Mohamed Siyad Barre stand out particularly strongly) are likely to carry with them the anarchic traditions of their fighters.

In some cases the fighters have carried on the struggle in virtual isolation, and forced by circumstances to develop mechanisms that in many respects replicate the state they intend to construct.

Once the old regime has been ejected, and the former fighters seek to take over the state or establish a new state of their own, the skills and attitudes they bring to the task may vary enormously. Further differ-

ences arise from the way in which the liberation war itself has been fought. In some cases – and here, as so often, the EPLF stands at one extreme – the fighters have carried on the struggle in virtual isolation, locked into the “liberated areas” within their own territory, and forced by circumstances to develop attitudes of self-reliance and a set of organisational mechanisms that in many respects replicate the state they intend to construct after liberation. In others – and Namibia provides an apt example – the struggle is conducted for the most part externally, with a leadership located outside the territory, few if any liberated areas, and a high level of dependence on external support; rather than coming to power with an embryonic state system already in being, these movements are effectively parachuted into office as they return from exile, and must to a large extent accept the state structures they find in place. This in turn draws attention to the critical difference, examined in greater detail later, between those movements that come to power as the result of outright military victory, and those which are able (or obliged) to negotiate a handover with the outgoing regime.



Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe: “Locked within the mind-sets of the liberation war”. | Source: Al-Jazeera / flickr (CC BY-SA).

The moment at which a liberation movement comes to power is normally one of extraordinary catharsis. Whether this takes the form of sandaled fighters sliding into the capital city from the countryside, as the discredited remnants of the old regime flee or surrender, or a formal handover in the wake of a negotiated settlement and founding election, it has something definitive about it. The war-weary population is generally happy to accept that the long conflict is over, and – whatever misgivings they may have had about the victors when the war was undecided – that this is a regime which is here to stay, and to which they will need to adapt. In many cases, too, when the war has been fought against an illegitimate, oppressive and alien regime, the movement will be buoyed by a sense of legitimacy that was lacking in its predecessor. These are massive advantages that enable the movement to plan over the long term for the kind of state they wish to bring into being. All the same, there are also immediate challenges. The war itself may well have created major problems of dislocation, not least in the form of youths uprooted from their home societies, grown accustomed to living by the gun, who in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia constitute an outstanding threat to public order. The new regime’s own fighters need to be settled into the very different world of peacetime life; refugees have to find their way back, often to home areas shattered in the fighting, and start to re-establish a normal existence; landmines have to be cleared, and communications re-opened. There is little opportunity for the winners to relax and enjoy the fruits of victory. There

are also political tasks to be tackled, notably in creating a sense of national reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict.

Some liberation movements – with Nelson Mandela in South Africa as the outstanding example – have been extraordinarily fortunate in leaders who instinctively reached out beyond their original constituencies to embody a sense of the new nation. Others – such as Yoweri Museveni in Uganda or Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia – deliberately established new political structures intended to extend the legitimacy of the new regime beyond the limited areas of the country in which the war had been fought, and provide the basis for a new constitutional order. This is a task that needs constant reaffirmation and renewal, but in which a creative initiative in the immediate aftermath of the takeover is essential. Other leaders again, such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, remained locked within the mind-sets of the liberation war, with tragic eventual consequences. At this critical moment, individual leadership can often make all the difference.

As the new regime settles into office, further and perfectly understandable problems of transition resulting from the simple fact that running a liberation struggle is a very different kind of exercise from running a government. The ready assumption that the movement provides an all-purpose power tool which, like fitting a new attachment onto a piece of mechanical equipment, can be converted from one

use to another – transforming it from winning the war against oppression to winning the new war against poverty, ignorance and disease – is simply misconceived. Fighting a war is an enterprise with a single and readily identifiable goal, victory, to which all other

Fighting a war is an enterprise with a single and readily identifiable goal, victory, to which all other considerations must be subordinated. Running a government is not like that at all.

considerations must be subordinated. This in turn calls for unity of purpose, and justifies total dedication on the part of the fighters, and a top-down structure of command and control on the part of the leadership. Running a government is not like that at all. There are multiple goals, which are often to some degree at odds with one another, and which call for a difficult process of agenda-setting and priority identification. Different interests will be involved, and will all demand a privileged say in helping to shape government policy, whether these are derived from their

historic support for the struggle, or from their power within the political and economic structures the government has inherited. There is no end point, like the moment at which the former fighters take over the government, when victory is achieved.

The single-minded concentration of power and priorities required by the struggle readily converts into a limited and blinkered vision in the face of the multiple challenges of governance. Whereas dissent could previously be readily dismissed as disloyalty or even treason, effective governance calls for questioning attitudes through which mistakes can be identified and rectified, and groups with legitimate interests and grievances can be incorporated into the policy process. Flexibility must replace rigidity.

On top of this, the very movement from struggle to government potentially opens up sources of difference and dissent that were previously suppressed or obscured. Members of the movement who could work willingly

together in search of the common goal of victory may actually have had rather different ideas about what that victory was expected to achieve, which are rapidly exposed once it comes about. One obvious source of diversity lies between those who are prepared to

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respond pragmatically to the challenges of government, and those who retain a stronger commitment to the ideological goals around which the struggle was orchestrated.

This in turn can readily be associated with rivalries between "ins", who have gained important executive positions in the new government, and "outs", who have failed to achieve the level of prominence they expected or to which they felt entitled. The former groups are easily identified by their opponents as opportunists, the latter as radicals or even subversives. One almost universal pattern is the strengthening of the top leader, at the expense of other leading figures within the movement. During the struggle, even if there is a single identified leader, he (I am aware of no women in this position) will normally have run the movement in collaboration with a group of senior lieutenants, who may have exercised extremely important responsibilities, for instance on the military or diplomatic fronts. After victory, when the top leader assumes the position of head

of state, all of his former colleagues fall into subordinate roles, and a more or less obvious process of winnowing occurs, as these are shifted into less powerful positions or even dismissed altogether, and a new group of individuals personally associated with the leader (but without the same credentials from the struggle) comes to occupy key posts in his shadow.

Finally, there is the need to incorporate elements who were never part of the struggle at all, and who may indeed have been part of the very state machinery against which it was conducted. In some cases – with Eritrea as so often the extreme example – the liberators take over the entire state, and chase out any remnants of the old regime. In others – such as the simultaneous victory of the TPLF in Ethiopia – the movement wins the struggle in straightforward military terms, but then takes over an existing state apparatus with which it has to work. Sometimes again – as in Zimbabwe or South Africa – no outright military victory is achieved, but the old regime effectively concedes defeat, while retaining enough power to be able to negotiate a peaceful handover under agreed terms. In the last two scenarios, important parts of the old structure remain, most prominently in the state apparatus (including the security forces) and in the most highly developed parts of the national economy, which are critical to running the liberated state, and which seek to reach some kind of deal with the new regime.

In some cases, the movement wins the struggle in straightforward military terms, but then takes over an existing state apparatus with which it has to work.

One key discovery for a liberation movement gaining power is just how important it is to have a trained and effective bureaucracy, through which to implement the programmes that will constitute the real basis of “liberation” for the mass of the population. The bureaucracy itself, however much it may reflect in attitudes and composition the character of the old regime, nonetheless has key vested interests in keeping itself in being, and working with the new one. The basis for a settlement is therefore clear, despite the lingering distrust that may remain on either side. One sensitive problem from the new government’s point of view is that people in critical policy-making positions, faced with the inevitable difficulties of finding practical ways of coping with problems that fail to respond to the often simplistic

rhetoric of liberation, will then find themselves accused of being “sell-outs” to the vested interests entrenched in the government machinery.

Very similar and potentially more acute problems arise in the area of economic policy. Any new government, coming to power in the aftermath of what may have been a long period of liberation war, will be faced with problems of stabilisation and reconstruction,

at the same time as facing pressing demands from its own supporters to meet the expectations engendered by liberation. It is thus essential for it to maintain in operation the key productive sectors of the economy, which provide both the government revenues and much of the employment that are desperately needed. Leading businessmen, like leading bureaucrats, can generally be relied on to make their peace with the new regime, since their own operations depend on good relations with it.

Any new government will be faced with problems of stabilisation and reconstruction, at the same time as facing pressing demands from its own supporters to meet the expectations engendered by liberation.

In the early days of liberation movements, “socialist” structures of economic development appeared to provide a viable alternative to their “capitalist” rivals, and outright nationalisation of the most important sectors of the economy appeared to be an obvious option; but this approach was rarely if ever successful, and is now scarcely on the table. Nonetheless, the economic structures inherited from the old regime may stand in opposition to the aspirations of the movement, critically so when these involve control over agricultural land, which is often the central issue for rural populations whose support had been critical during the struggle itself. Other sectors, notably mining and industry, are likely to arouse demands from organised labour movements which had also backed the movement. In other sectors again, notably finance, newly appointed ministers find themselves having to cope with issues that lie entirely outside the experience they have gained during the struggle, and leave them particularly dependent on specialist expertise. It is unsurprising, therefore, that economic policy should form a key arena for critical choices in the post-liberation period.

WHAT HAPPENS AFTER LIBERATION?

As the years after liberation extend into decades, and the memory of that magic moment fades into the distance, a further set of challenges emerges. Though the struggle remains a vivid source of legitimacy in the minds of former fighters, for most of the population whom they govern it becomes a rapidly wasting asset. The first and in many ways most basic challenge that the movement then faces is to retain as much as possible of the popular support that greeted it when it came to power, while coming to terms with the day-to-day demands of running an effective state, and with the need to work within constraints created especially by the global economy which were barely apparent during the struggle. It is almost inevitable that many of the unreasonably high popular expectations associated with victory, which members of the movement will have genuinely shared, will be disappointed by the realities of its performance in office, and the sheer impossibility of bringing about the level of transformation that had been promised.

Given that the regime now controls the apparatus of state power, rather than fighting against it as had been the case during the struggle, it will have a powerful temptation to use that power – augmented and legitimised by the incorporation of former fighters into the security services – to repress forms of dissent which, given the sense of legitimacy and entitlement conferred by the struggle, are assumed to have no genuine popular base.

There is a critical need to develop mechanisms through which popular voices can still be heard, even when these run counter to the attitudes of liberation leaders now in office.

The transformation from reliance on popular support to reliance on organised state power can be frighteningly swift. There is therefore a critical need to develop mechanisms through which popular voices can still be heard, even when these run counter to the attitudes of liberation leaders now in office. This is all the more difficult in that these attitudes were moulded in a context of struggle, in which discipline and leadership necessarily took precedence over democratic procedures: movements that were themselves non-democratic in origin, regardless of the popular aspirations they embodied, can scarcely be expected to promote democracy.

This need is all the greater given the rapid generational change underway in African societies. High birth rates and correspondingly young populations mean that within a couple of decades of liberation, most of the population will have no personal memory of the struggle at all, and calls by members of the ruling party to remember their heroic contribution will simply fall on uncomprehending ears. In some cases, as with the national service scheme in Eritrea, deliberate efforts were made by the ruling party to inculcate into rising generations the values of struggle, discipline and dedication to the cause that had driven their predecessors, but – try as one may – the post-liberation situation is so different that this objective is almost impossible to achieve.

Instead, the regime has to look to the delivery of tangible material benefits, in place of the symbolic and aspirational goals of liberation, bringing once more into focus the differences already noted between the relatively straightforward objectives of the struggle and the much more complex needs of development and peacetime governance. Whereas at the moment of takeover, the immediate need was to build alliances between the liberation movement and established interests – notably in the bureaucracy and the economy – whose support was required in order to ensure a smooth handover and maintain the productive base on which the delivery of services to the population depended, as time goes by the danger arises that these alliances may become too strong, rather than too weak. Post-liberation regimes very readily transform themselves into corporate states, in which a cadre of former senior fighters joins with other established interests to constitute a monolithic power block, essentially serving its own members and deaf to the needs and demands of ordinary people excluded from it. In countries like Angola, where the financial resources provided by oil or some other readily marketable asset generate enormous wealth, the patronage at the disposal of this group may be enough to protect them against any plausible challenge.

In other cases, such as Zimbabwe, the original alliance shatters as the political elite takes over (and in the process largely destroys) the productive structures needed to provide food, goods and employment to the mass of the

population. The precise forms through which governing elites extract resources from the economy vary from case to case. At its simplest, there may be straightforward corruption – always a very sensitive indicator of the extent to which a former liberation movement has remained faithful to its original ideals. Within economies that already have a strong capitalist bent, former fighters may establish their own businesses in sectors that are sensitive to political favours, or else be co-opted by existing companies in order to smooth relations with the regime. In other cases, nationalised industries are run by former liberation leaders, or else “partystatal” enterprises are created that are owned and run by the ruling party, and while formally competing with independent private companies, actually enjoy the very considerable advantages conferred by their closeness to the government. Even if such enterprises have as their formal rationale the provision of services to elderly or disabled fighters, they readily turn into mechanisms for elite patronage.

Leadership change is made all the more difficult by the fact that leaders of liberation movements often come to power while they are still relatively young. Rare indeed is the leader who voluntarily relinquishes power after just one or two terms at the top. The only such case to come to mind, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, was not only already elderly when he came to power, but (as a result of his long imprisonment) had not in recent years been directly engaged in the struggle; quite apart from his own personal qualities, it may have been easier for him to step down than for a leader who (like most) moved directly from commanding the liberation movement to the state. In other cases, leaders have remained in power for 30 years or more, long past the date at which a fresh vision was needed – in Cuba, to take a case from outside Africa, liberation leaders remain on the scene even after the passage of more than half a century.

In many cases, leaders have remained in power for 30 years or more, long past the date at which a fresh vision was needed.

Nor is it difficult for this privileged cadre to reproduce itself in the form of its own protégés or family members, who gain favoured access to top positions and are thus able to take over from their patrons or family members: in China, the oldest extant liberation regime, the children and even

grandchildren of Mao Zedong's companions on the "Long March" remain prominent in the Communist Party leadership, and equivalent processes can be observed in some African cases.

CONCLUSIONS

Liberation movements rarely face any immediate threat of overthrow once they have succeeded in gaining power. Not only their own victory, but the countrywide relief at the end of conflict, and the splintering and demoralisation of the forces of the former political order almost guarantee them a substantial tenure of office, in some cases, of which South Sudan is by far the most prominent, major issues of state consolidation in the immediate aftermath of victory remain to be resolved, and these must of necessity take precedence. Most of Africa's liberation movements, and notably those that triumphed in that remarkable decade and a half that led from Zimbabwe (1980) through Uganda (1986) to Namibia (1990), and thence to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somaliland (1991), and then Rwanda and South Africa (1994), have now put a generation of experience behind them. In only one of these, Somaliland, did the liberation movement dissolve itself on achieving its objective of establishing independent statehood from the collapsed Somali Republic, and has it been possible to hold open elections in which an opposition leader has peacefully succeeded to office by winning a popular vote. In only two others, Namibia and South Africa, has a national leader peacefully stood down, to be replaced by another head of state drawn from the liberation party – a process that in South Africa has now occurred on two occasions, with the succession of Mbeki to Mandela, and Zuma to Mbeki.⁴ One further leader, Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, died in office and has been succeeded by his deputy, Haile-Mariam Desalegn, who quite exceptionally had not been involved in any way in the liberation struggle. Elsewhere, even after 32 years in the case of Zimbabwe, and 26 in that of Uganda, the original liberation leaders remain in office.

Most of Africa's liberation movements have now put a generation of experience behind them. In only one of these, Somaliland, did the liberation movement dissolve itself on achieving its objective of establishing independent statehood.

4 | It is worth noting that President Sam Nujoma of Namibia was in power for a decade and a half and changed the constitution in order to serve a third term, whilst Nelson Mandela served for only one five year term before stepping down.

The threats facing these movements are correspondingly more insidious, and arise overwhelmingly from within: from the kinds of movements they are, and the (usually highly idealised) conceptions of themselves they hold. These are organisations that regard themselves as the embodiment of the very state they sought to establish through struggle. In their own minds, they are permanently entitled to govern, and – far from recognising internal splits and domestic opposition as signals that they have outlived their welcome – treat them instead as challenges to the rightful order they themselves represent, and consequently as pretexts for remaining in power. Yet the liberation credit is a finite one, and is characteristically exhausted in the minds of much of the population much sooner than leaders recognise. The moment soon arrives when the regime is judged not by its promises but by its performance, and if it has merely entrenched itself in positions of privilege reminiscent of its ousted predecessor, that judgement is likely to be a harsh one.

The recent wave of labour unrest in South Africa, especially the tragic events at Marikana in August 2012, which culminated in dozens of striking miners being shot dead by police, may well be regarded as trumpeting such a moment of truth for the ANC. Nevertheless, governments elsewhere have suffered similar shocks, revealing regimes that can no longer be regarded in any meaningful sense as “movements”, but which have instead solidified into a condition of stasis in which former fighters have become the complacent beneficiaries of state power. Africa’s permanent crisis of youth makes this an extremely hazardous posture, risking demands for a new “liberation” at the hands of a new generation of political or even religious demagogues. In some cases, with Ethiopia and Rwanda as the most prominent examples, former liberators have sought to reinvent themselves as “developmental states”, following Asian models in which a strong state committed to rapid economic development provides public order, infrastructure and other basic services, while seeking to establish conditions propitious for private sector investment. This has the great advantage – from the movement’s point of view – of continuing to guarantee the central role of the movement itself, while at the same time (if the strategy is successful) helping to meet popular demands for employment and public welfare.

It may also provide continuing opportunities for state or party owned businesses, or for “crony capitalists” associated with the regime, and delay the point at which challenges to the government’s continued tenure become acute. Whether it can provide a basis for overcoming social fissures as deep as those in Rwanda is altogether more problematic, though Ethiopia appears to provide rather more conducive terrain. Both of these two countries, too, have sought to articulate explicit strategies for national integration, though in paradoxically different ways: in Rwanda by abolishing any explicit recognition of the country’s historic ethnicities – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – and in Ethiopia by explicitly recognising such ethnicities within a federal system constructed on the basis of language. But in any event – and here the Namibian case is also worth citing – it is essential to ensure that strategies for national integration and reconciliation remain permanently at the forefront of government concern, and are not just temporary expedients introduced in order to smooth over the moment of handover.

It is essential to ensure that strategies for national integration and reconciliation remain permanently at the forefront of government concern.

As the moment of liberation fades into the distant background, the best one can hope for may be that the movement has succeeded in establishing a sufficient basis for national identity and integration for it to be able to retire as an active political force, leaving the field instead to rival political parties which may derive from splits within the original movement, or from the growth of conditions of tolerance in which formerly ostracised rivals come to be accepted as legitimate participants in the political process. Ghana, once at the forefront of African liberation politics, albeit within a non-violent nationalist party, has now – after too long an experience of military rule – developed into perhaps the most stable multi-party system on the continent. Tanzania, still under the rule of the former TANU (now transformed into the CCM) that led it to independence, appears to have established conventions of peaceful political interaction capable of surviving the demise of the movement itself. Both Angola and Mozambique, two of the earliest African states to gain independence through armed struggle, are still ruled by their original liberation parties, but under conditions that allow at least some political role for members of rival movements once engaged in vicious

conflict against the regime. In South Africa, long-established conventions of democratic and parliamentary politics – albeit formerly under the aegis of white minority rule – have strengthened in the transition to majority government, and continue to ensure a measure of openness that restricts the monopolistic tendencies that liberation movements have tended to impose elsewhere. The road from liberation is a long one, but allows the possibility of eventual reconciliation between the aspirations expressed in struggle on the one hand, and the need for stable and accountable governance on the other.

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WITHOUT PROSPECTS?

REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN EASTERN AFRICA

Angelika Mendes

The year 2012 brought more refugee crises than almost all years in the recent past. During the first nine months of the year, more than 700,000 refugees crossed international borders.¹ The crises of the previous year – including the drought in the Horn of Africa and fighting in Libya – and the millions of refugees who have been in exile for years mean a critical point has been reached. The ability of the international community to come up with solutions to these crises in solidarity with the countries affected, and to provide responses to the personal suffering associated with them put to the test. The right to asylum retains its central importance. The fact that many countries generously host refugees is a sign that should not be underestimated in view of the related social, political and economic challenges.

Eastern Africa is a region of the world that has provoked some of the largest flows of refugees for decades, whilst also hosting them. A dramatic point has also been reached there, as shown by the recent regulation imposed by the Kenyan government requiring all refugees previously living in the capital Nairobi to move to camps in the north-west and east of the country.² The capacities of host countries are limited, and refugees are quickly declared scapegoats for increasing insecurity or other unbearable conditions. The other countries which this article refers to – Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan – also host tens of thousands of refugees under circumstances which are far from ideal.



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- 1 | *UNHCR Global Appeal 2013. Staying resilient in a world in crisis*, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Dec 2012, <http://unhcr.org/ga13/index.xml> (accessed 30 Jan 2013).
- 2 | AFP, "Kenya orders all refugees back to camps", 18 Dec 2012.

Over the past 30 years, the number of forcibly displaced persons has almost tripled worldwide, from 16 to 42.5 million. Global and social trends lead to the assumption that this number will continue to grow in the next decade. The causes of displacement are varied and complex. Wars, armed conflicts, human rights infringements, repressive regimes as well as unbearable economic, social or political conditions, natural disasters and, above all, the international competition for mineral and energy resources force people to leave their homes. Often, the same reasons prevent a return and make reconstruction more difficult.

Even now, millions of people are fleeing due to natural disasters and other effects of climate change, which will only reveal their full effect in the future.

Both refugees and humanitarian organisations are currently exposed to great insecurity, because governments and armed groups are increasingly curtailing the freedom for humanitarian action. The growing gap between rich and poor will bring enormous challenges with it. Already now, millions of people are fleeing due to natural disasters and other effects of climate change, which will only reveal their full effect in the future. Population growth and increasing urbanisation are imposing additional pressure on existing systems.

WHO ARE THE REFUGEES? – VARIOUS DEFINITIONS

The definition of a refugee has been set down in the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951. It defines a refugee as "A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." In addition, the Convention states that refugees must be granted freedom of religion and movement as well as economic and social rights such as secure access to the job market, medical care and education. The principle of non-refoulement, i.e. that no-one may be forced to return to his home country while it may pose a threat to his life is a further right guaranteed under the Convention.

The Geneva Convention on Refugees is the first universal agreement to enter into force that is exclusively and comprehensively devoted to refugees and defines their fundamental rights. Signed by 146 countries, it remains the foundation for refugee work and provides the legal framework within which states can design their refugee policy. In 1967, the Convention was supplemented by an additional protocol removing geographical and time limitations. In 1969 and 1984, the OAU Refugee Convention (today: African Union) and the Latin American Cartagena Declaration were the first regional treaties introducing a local approach to dealing with the refugee question.

Catholic social teaching defines the term refugee more broadly, and speaks of “de facto” refugees, encompassing victims of armed conflicts, humanitarian disasters or the violation of human rights. Internally displaced persons and those forced to flee because of erroneous economic policy or natural disasters are also considered refugees according to this definition.

The term “de facto” refugee includes victims of armed conflicts, humanitarian disasters or the violation of human rights.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) flee their homes for the same reasons as refugees, although they remain within the borders of their home country. Often, they are even more vulnerable than refugees, because they are not protected by international agreements and laws, and remain under the protection of their government, even though it may be the cause of their flight. For Africa, this gap was closed when the Kampala Convention came into force on 6 December 2012. The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa is the first legally binding agreement in the world specifically dealing with the situation of IDPs. Given that there are four times as many IDPs as refugees in Africa this is an important step. Africa is thus setting new standards in shaping legal frameworks which contribute to the protection and assistance of IDPs. The convention is comprehensive and recognises manifold causes for displacement, ranging from armed conflict to natural disasters, the effects of climate change and even megatrends such as population growth and urbanisation. If implemented well, it can become a valuable instrument for governments both in preventing displacement and in finding appropriate solutions for

currently displaced persons. However, it depends on the will of these governments as to whether and when it will be implemented. While the mandates of most aid agencies do not include IDPs, there has been a lively discussion about a new global approach recently in order to improve assistance to IDPs – a very welcome step.

REFUGEES IN FIGURES

42.5 million people were displaced by violence in 2011. 80 per cent of all refugees and displaced persons flee to neighbouring countries.

Since 2007, the number of refugees has constantly exceeded 42 million. 42.5 million were forcibly displaced people in 2011, of whom 15.2 million were refugees.³ Although this is

a high figure, it was lower than in 2010, when the number of people affected was higher than at any time since the mid-1990s.⁴ Contrary to the widely held belief that Europe and the USA host most refugees, 80 per cent of all refugees and internally displaced persons flee to neighbouring countries. Pakistan hosts the largest number of forcibly displaced (1.6 million) followed by Iran, Kenya and Chad. Among the industrialised nations, Germany hosts the largest number of refugees (2011: 571,700). Since 2008, South Africa has been the world's largest recipient of individual asylum applications. One in six refugees worldwide comes from Afghanistan, followed by refugees from Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In sub-Saharan Africa, 60 per cent of refugees live in camps. Worldwide, however, half live in cities and only one third in camps. 49 per cent of all refugees and displaced persons are women and girls, with 46 per cent being children under 18 years.⁵ About 70 per cent are Muslims. In 2011, 3.2 million internally displaced persons returned home – the highest number in more than ten years. On the other hand, only about 532,000 refugees were able to return to their home countries – the lowest number in the past decade.

3 | “Forcibly displaced persons” includes refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons, IDPs.

4 | *A Year of crises. UNHCR Global Trends 2011*, UNHCR, Jun 2012, <http://unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4fd6f87f9&query=UNHCR%20Global%20Trends%20Report%202011> (accessed 30 Jan 2013).

5 | Ibid.



Temporary shelters in a transit centre outside Dollo Ado on the Somalia-Ethiopia border. About 15,000 refugees lived here in August 2011 until they were transferred to a camp. | Source: © Angelika Mendes.

In addition, refugee situations are no longer of a temporary nature. UNHCR estimates that refugees spend an average of 17 years in exile. Many Ethiopian and Sudanese refugees who live in Kakuma refugee camp in the northwest of Kenya have been there for 18 years, including many who were born in the camp.

CHALLENGES IN THE HOST COUNTRIES

Refugees face a multitude of challenges once they arrive in the host country. They experience discrimination and xenophobia, lack social networks and do not know the local language. Discrimination and hostility to foreigners form just as much part of this as lack of social contact and ignorance. Many countries restrict the freedom of movement of refugees just as much as their access to the job market and education. However, it is education in particular that has proven to be an effective tool in overcoming trauma, because it nourishes hope, offers prospects for a better future and, above all, has a subsequent positive effect

Only 76 per cent of all refugee children worldwide attend a primary school and 36 per cent a secondary school. Less than one per cent has access to higher education.

on income, quality of life and reconstruction. At present, only 76 per cent of all refugee children worldwide attend a primary school and 36 per cent a secondary school.⁶ Less than one per cent has access to higher education. The situation for refugees in cities and for girls is even worse. The quality of education is also significantly below the conventional level.

It is above all in long-lasting crisis situations that refugees become dependent on aid organisations. People who have lived in a refugee camp for 15 years and received free food rations, education, medical care and psycho-social support often have difficulties when they finally return home and have to reassume responsibility for themselves.

DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE REFUGEE CRISIS

Given the extent and number of refugee crises in the world, there seems to be no satisfactory solution. In refugee policy, people usually refer to three possible durable solutions for resolving refugee situations. The first and preferred solution is repatriation. It means the voluntary return to the home country as soon as it is regarded as safe and offers the necessary livelihoods for returnees.

The second possibility is integration in the host country. This requires the consent of the respective government, and requires a legal process which will lead to granting refugees more rights. At the same time, an economic, social and cultural integration process must take place. Tanzania made a historic decision in April 2010 when the government granted Tanzanian citizenship to 162,000 refugees who had fled Burundi in 1972 due to the civil war. "This is the most generous gesture that has ever been shown towards refugees", said the representative of the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) in Tanzania, Damas Missanga SJ, at the time.

6 | Sarah Dryden-Peterson, *Refugee Education. A Global Review*, UNHCR, Nov 2011, <http://unhcr.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/home/pendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4fe317589> (accessed 30 Jan 2013).

The third option is resettlement to a third country. This is the only possible alternative for people who face persecution even in the country in which they have sought protection, or else cannot remain in their country of asylum in the long term for other reasons. Of all 192 member states of the United Nations, 26 countries now accept refugees for resettlement. A number of states have been considered traditional resettlement states, including the Scandinavian countries, Australia, the USA, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and, since 2007, also Germany. 61,231 refugees were resettled in 2011. Despite the fact, that the number of countries participating in resettlement programmes increased from 14 to 26 between 2005 and 2012, the number of available places continues to stand at approx. 80,000 per year.⁷ The USA, Canada and Australia provide 90 per cent of all resettlement places, while 16 European countries together only account for eight per cent. The refugees who benefited most from resettlement programmes in all these countries came from Myanmar, Iraq and Somalia.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN EASTERN AFRICA

Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia, the countries of eastern Africa which this article is about, together comprise an area which is about twice as large as Western and Southern Europe together.⁸ The region is characterised by cultural diversity and is complex with regard to the causes of conflict. With neighbours such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad and Eritrea, it is surrounded by hot spots and failed states which produce significant flows of refugees.

Although it is difficult to find reliable figures, it is estimated that all five countries host about 1,476,000 refugees and 2.6 million internally displaced persons. Sudan,

7 | Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Standing Committee, 54th meeting, progress report on resettlement, UNHCR, 5 Jun 2012.

8 | This includes the following countries: Spain, Portugal, Andorra, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, San Marino, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria.

with 1.7 million, is the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons, whereas Kenya hosts the largest number of refugees (586,000).⁹

Sudan and South Sudan

Before its partition in 2011, Sudan was the largest country on the African continent. The region is characterised by two long-lasting wars. Six years after independence from Great Britain and Egypt in 1956, the country fell victim to its first civil war which lasted ten years and culminated in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which granted the South the right to self-determination. The discovery of oil in the southern part of the country in 1978 caused enormous problems in relations between North and South. When the North introduced Sharia law in 1983, this was the spark which ignited the civil war in the South again.

For more than 20 years, the government in Khartoum fought against the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), the main rebel grouping in Sudan, on grounds of religious differences between Muslims and Christians, disputes between Arabs and Africans, ethnic violence between certain groups and the struggle for mineral resources, above all the oil reserves in the South. It was one of the longest and worst wars of the 20th Century: Two million people died, four million were displaced in their own country and more than half a million fled the country.

The war did not finish until 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA included a ceasefire as well as articulating terms for sharing power and mineral resources, holding national elections in April 2010 and a referendum on independence in the South in January 2011. In this referendum, 99 per cent of the population voted for independence for the South, and on 9 July 2011 South Sudan declared itself to be a sovereign state independent from the North.

9 | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), *Eastern Africa: Displaced Populations Report*, No. 12, 31 Mar 2012 - 30 Sep 2012.

The new country faces enormous challenges. **“There is a paradox in the Sudan: Which is that the region which contains most of nation’s natural resources and arable land is also the least developed”,**¹⁰ remarks Sudan expert, Douglas H. Johnson. The security situation on the border with Sudan has deteriorated since independence – above all in the oil-rich regions of Abyei and in Upper Nile, Unity and South Kordofan, where the conflict has resulted in 70,000 people being displaced.¹¹ In September 2011, new fighting broke out between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in Blue Nile State. In January 2012, the UN reported air attacks and shooting by the SAF in South Kordofan. Since then, more than 175,000 Sudanese have fled to refugee camps on the other side of the border in South Sudan, while a further 40,000 have sought refuge in Ethiopia.¹² Furthermore, the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group regularly attacks villages in Western Bahr el Ghazal, Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria. In addition, there are clashes between tribal communities which led to the displacement of almost 16,000 people in May and June 2012 alone. Between July and September, floods following intensive rainfall caused many people to flee their homes. In spite of its own problems, South Sudan shelters more than 207,000 refugees from Sudan, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The example of South Sudan clearly shows what challenges refugees face when they return to their home country after years or decades of conflict. Education is essential for the long-term development of a country, the condition of the education system will therefore be discussed in more detail. Longterm conflicts pose major challenges to the development of any country. Two million people have returned home since the peace agreement, and have subsequently been confronted by enormous challenges. Most roads in South Sudan are in a bad condition, and sometimes inaccessible. Many districts are difficult to reach, and

10 | Douglas H. Johnson, *The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars*, Indiana University Press, 2002, 16.

11 | Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), “South Kordofan briefing”, 26 Jun 2011.

12 | UN OCHA, “Sudan humanitarian update”, III/2012, 1 Nov 2012.

road construction is proceeding at a snail's pace. Large parts of the population have no access to the few clinics or clean water. About 80 per cent of the population are small farmers, landmines hinder the farming of the extraordinarily fertile land. Almost all goods have to be imported, so prices are high. Half of the population lives below the poverty line, with an average income of less than one U.S. dollar a day. Corruption prevents progress in many areas.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognise the progress the South has been able to achieve since the end of the war. It has formed its own government and the capital Juba is growing. In the meantime, more than 20,000 kilometres of roads and about 80 per cent of the particularly badly affected land have been demined.¹³ Fields are being cultivated, permanent houses built. The first elections after 24 years in April 2010, the referendum in January and April 2010 and the independence celebrations in July 2011 all took place peacefully. More than two million people have returned, there is relatively good freedom of movement and the first signs of growth are apparent.



Outdoor lessons: a destroyed secondary school in Nimule, South Sudan. | Source: © Angelika Mendes.

13 | Wanjohi Kabukuru, "Clearing South Sudan of its deadly landmines", *Africa Renewal online*, UN Department of Public Information, 16 Jan 2012, <http://un.org/africarenewal/web-features/clearing-south-sudan-its-deadly-landmines> (accessed 30 Jan 2013).

The new autonomous government of the South faces the enormous challenge of building an education system from scratch, with very limited resources. After the war, primary school teaching mainly took place under trees, there were fewer than 20 secondary schools and hardly any qualified teachers. From time to time, individuals gathered the children to teach them the ABC. No-one was paid for this, and many teachers had only attended primary school for two or three years themselves.

With a currently estimated literacy rate of 24 per cent, the Sudanese population is hoping for improved educational prospects.¹⁴ Only seven per cent of the people who work as teachers have been trained to do so. 48 per cent have since received in-service training, but only 45 per cent have completed primary school.¹⁵ On average, teachers in South Sudan earn 200 U.S. dollars a month, but only three out of five teachers are paid by the government. The others teach without financial remuneration. Each teacher, paid or unpaid, is responsible for about 80 schoolchildren. About 75 per cent of primary schools and 22 per cent of secondary schools are temporary structures made from mud walls and have grass roofs, or teaching takes place under a tree and must be suspended when it rains.¹⁶ Building a permanent school building with seven classrooms, administration building and toilets costs about 62,000 euros. On average, 129 primary school children share one classroom.¹⁷

During the first four years after the peace agreement (2005-2009), the number of school children tripled from 343,000 – then the lowest proportion in the world – to 1.3 million.¹⁸

In 2009, South Sudan cut its education budget by 25 per cent, from 134 to 100 million U.S. dollars, due to reduced income from oil revenue.

In 2009, South Sudan cut its education budget by 25 per cent, from 134 to 100 million U.S. dollars, due to reduced income from oil revenue. Education accounted for six per cent of the total budget, while one third of the budget was channelled into military equipment. At the same time, the

14 | Feinstein International Center, "Livelihoods, social protection and basic services in South Sudan", Aug 2012.

15 | UNICEF and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoSS), "A report of the study on socio-economic and cultural barriers to schooling in Southern Sudan", Nov 2008.

16 | World Bank, "Education in the Republic of South Sudan: Status and Challenges for a New System", 12 Sep 2012.

17 | Ibid.

18 | UNICEF and GoSS, n. 15.

South Sudanese display a hunger for education which is hardly matched by any other population in eastern Africa. After all, 60 per cent of children currently have an opportunity to receive education, compared to 40 per cent ten years ago.¹⁹

The future development of South Sudan needs a strong, visionary government which coordinates its ministries, defines clear roles and is prepared to get the necessary work done. The infrastructure needs to be improved, above all the electricity supply, followed by development in agriculture which – if carried out correctly – could turn South Sudan into the breadbasket of eastern Africa in the best case. The signing of various economic, trade and security agreements between both governments on 27 September 2012 in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, has sparked new hope. It opened up the possibility of oil exports resuming after they had been interrupted since the start of the year, and also included the establishment of a demilitarised border zone. However, a solution for the Abyei region and the border demarcation is still outstanding.

In August 2011, Sudan changed its legislation to the extent that obtaining South Sudanese citizenship automatically resulted in the loss of Sudanese citizenship. An estimated 350,000 South Sudanese, who have hardly any connections with South Sudan, live in Sudan. Mixed marriages, above all in the border area between North and South, mean there are a large number of people of mixed origin. Their situation has been successfully settled by the Four Freedoms agreement in September 2012. This grants the citizens of both countries the right of residence, freedom of movement, the right to own property and conduct economic activity in the respective other state.

For more than 40 years, the east of Sudan has been the setting for the most protracted refugee situation on the African continent.

In addition to the conflict at the border with South Sudan, there are two other regions worth mentioning. For more than 40 years, the east of Sudan has been the setting for the

most protracted refugee situation on the African continent. About 84,000 Eritrean refugees sought refuge there, the first arriving in 1968. Every month, an average of another 1800 cross the border into Sudan – a consequence not only

19 | World Bank, n. 16.

of Eritrea's policy of forced recruitment of young men and obliging them to serve in the military for their entire life, but also a combination of drought and an extremely weak economy which leads to impoverishment and an absence of viable prospects.

On the other side, in the west of the country, the conflict in Darfur has been going on for almost ten years between the Muslim/Arab government in Khartoum and various rebel groups who took up arms for the first time in 2003 because for too long, the government had neglected the region, mainly populated by the three ethnic groups Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa. Khartoum responded with brutal persecution of the civilian population. According to the United Nations, this conflict has claimed 300,000 victims so far, whereas Khartoum continues to claim that no more than 10,000 people have died. In March 2009, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, on grounds of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. In 2010, the accusation was extended to include genocide. Since 13 international humanitarian organisations were expelled from Darfur in March 2009, little has been published about the humanitarian situation in the area; even media agencies scarcely have access. Although violence flares up occasionally, it has generally declined: 200,000 internally displaced persons and refugees have been able to return home. In July 2011, the government and one of the rebel groups signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and on 8 February 2012, the Darfur Regional Authority was inaugurated in North Darfur, one of its tasks being to help displaced persons to return and to promote reconstruction and development. Furthermore, Khartoum has announced a new peace and development strategy in Darfur, and has reached an agreement with Chad and the UNHCR to regulate the return of refugees from Chad.

Kenya

Following the post-election violence in 2007/2008 which led to the deaths of more than 1,000 people and the displacement of 600,000, the situation in Kenya has largely stabilised. The country failed to set up a local tribunal to try the perpetrators, as a result of which the International

Criminal Court in The Hague has taken up the process with support of the coalition government. In January 2012, four prominent Kenyans, including Vice President Uhuru Kenyatta and the former minister William Ruto, were indicted for crimes against humanity. Both reject the indictment and publicly announced an alliance in December according to which Kenyatta will stand for the office of President and Ruto as the VP candidate. The next national elections are planned for 4 March 2013.

Economic growth is at 4.3 per cent, while property prices in Nairobi are ten times higher than five years ago.

The country has ushered in a new constitution in August 2010, the result of a process lasting more than 20 years, which is a reason for optimism. Economic growth is at 4.3 per cent, while property prices in Nairobi are ten times higher than five years ago. At the same time, Kenya is the country in eastern Africa with the greatest inequality in income distribution. The crime rate is high, particularly in the larger cities such as Nairobi. The International Corruption Index published by Transparency International in 2011 states that Kenya is still one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranked 154 of 183 countries.

In contrast to assumptions after the unrest following elections, the Kenyan government has made significant progress in finding solutions for internally displaced persons. On 4 October 2012, it passed a law offering legal protection to citizens displaced by violence, natural disasters or development projects. In addition, an institutional focal point for internal displacement was created. Successful progress is also being made with the return and resettlement of people who were displaced during the post-election violence.²⁰

In August 2012, tribal conflict broke out over land and water issues in the northeast of the country and in the coast province (Tana River Delta) claiming more than 100 victims and forcing 12,000 people to flee. In addition to the conflict over natural resources, some experts believe that the violence was sparked by widespread frustration with the economic situation, persistent impunity and political ambitions by certain politicians. For decades, the population of the coast province felt neglected by the government which had not created any jobs but had nevertheless given

thousands of hectares of land to its allies. The uprising in Mombasa led to the conclusion that there are deep social and political divisions in Kenya, in addition to differences of religious denomination, which might lead to a rise in violence in the run-up to the elections.

In October 2011, the Kenyan government deployed troops to Somalia to fight the Islamic militant group, Al Shabaab. For a country that had never before sent troops abroad, this represented the greatest security risk since independence.²¹ In July 2012, the Kenyan military intervention became part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Since then, security within Kenya has significantly deteriorated, above all in the capital Nairobi.²² Repeated bomb blasts and attacks with explosives, mostly in Nairobi's Somali neighbourhood Eastleigh and in Garissa, have strained relations between Kenyans and Somalis enormously, and led to demonstrations and uprisings.

This development is also tragic because 91 per cent of all refugees who seek refuge in Kenya come from Somalia – more than half a million. For many years, the government has shown enormous generosity in hosting Somali refugees but it is now responding with increasingly harsh regulations for Somalis, tens of thousands of whom live in Nairobi. A declaration by the government on 14 December 2012 stated: “As a result of the intolerable and uncontrollable danger to national security, the government has decided that all refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia must return to the Dadaab refugee camp.”²³ A few days later, the order was also extended to all refugees who do not come from Somalia. They were ordered to relocate to the Kakuma refugee camp.²⁴ UNHCR is now in negotiations with the government to ensure that the rights of refugees continue to be respected.²⁵

21 | International Crisis Group (ICG), “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia”, 15 Feb 2012.

22 | IRIN, “Kenya: Security concerns persist”, 10 Dec 2012.

23 | Associated Press, “After attacks, Kenya restricts refugee freedoms”, 14 Dec 2012.

24 | AFP, “Kenya orders all refugees back to camps”, 18 Dec 2012.

25 | “UNHCR urges Kenya to continue upholding refugee rights, cautions against stigmatizing refugees”, press release, UNHCR, 20 Dec 2012, <http://unhcr.org/50d2e9ec6.html> (accessed 30 Jan 2013).

Since the fall of the dictatorship under Siad Barre in 1990, the flow of refugees from Somalia never fully subsided, and with the drought in the Horn of Africa in 2011, it swelled to enormous proportions.

Kenya is currently sheltering about 630,000 refugees from nine countries. Four of Kenya's five refugee camps are located in Dadaab, close to the border with Somalia in the east of the country. These camps are now hosting 470,000 refugees, mainly of Somali origin, and are regarded as the largest refugee site in the world, as well as Kenya's fifth largest city. Since the fall of the dictatorship under Siad Barre in 1990, the flow of refugees from Somalia never fully subsided, and with the drought in the Horn of Africa in 2011, it swelled to enormous proportions. Every month, 2000 Somalis continue to cross the border into Kenya, which was officially closed in 2007. Human rights organisations have repeatedly warned that Kenya is unable to deal with the inflow of Somali refugees on its own.

Another refugee camp, Kakuma, is located in the north-west of Kenya, in the hot and dry savannah of the Turkana district, 92 kilometres south of the Sudanese border. This camp hosts more than 100,000 refugees. It was originally created for South Sudanese fleeing the civil war. It now hosts people from 13 different nationalities. The largest group are once again Somalis, followed by refugees from Sudan and South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Eritrea, Uganda, Rwanda and other countries. In recent months, it is above all the number of Sudanese which has increased because of the border conflict between the two Sudanese states. Clashes with the local Turkana population are common. Natural resources in the area are scarce. Nomadic pastoralists who often struggle to survive and have been neglected for decades by the central government, the Turkana feel provoked by the fact that for decades, tens of thousands of refugees have been supported by the international community – even though from an objective perspective the support offered is inadequate for a decent existence. Repeated negotiations have resulted in all aid agencies now including a certain number of locals in their programmes. However, these agencies are by no means capable of making up for the lack of government support in this region and it is not their mandate either.

Uganda

For 20 years, from 1986 to 2006, the northern Uganda was the setting for one of Africa's longest and most brutal conflicts. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) fought the Ugandan government, although quite soon it abandoned any political agenda and instead terrorised its own Acholi population, plundering villages and mutilating, torturing, raping and killing their inhabitants. Most of these actions were carried out by child soldiers.

UNICEF estimates that the LRA kidnapped 20,000 children in the course of the conflict turning them into child soldiers or sex slaves. They had to undergo induction rituals including torture, killing and eating of family members. "I was unhappy about killing, torturing or destroying the property of innocent people, but I had no choice", says Francis, who was a child soldier with the LRA for two years before he managed to flee. "The instructions were clear: Follow the commands and live, or refuse and die."

During the conflict, 95 per cent of the population (1.7 million) fled into protection camps set up by the government, although continued to be targets of LRA attacks. For years, 40,000 children referred to as night commuters walked to the towns every night to seek safety from these attacks.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and four other LRA commanders in 2005 on grounds of crimes against humanity and war crimes. From 2006 onwards, a ceasefire agreement negotiated as part of a peace process initiated upon in the South Sudanese city of Juba did stabilise the situation and allowed the displaced persons to return; the agreement failed in 2008, however. By March 2012, there were only about 30,000 displaced persons in transit camps. The people of northern Uganda now need to cope with the devastating consequences. Everyone has a terrible story to tell. Everyone has been traumatised in one way or another. Throughout the long years in the camp, traditional family structures have collapsed and cultural values and customs have been lost. There is no longer a guaranteed supply of food after long dependency on aid organisations, the infrastructure is inadequate, there is poor access to education

and the majority of the population do not have either work or a means of existence.

Child soldiers “suffer from sleeping disorders, have difficulties concentrating and are often depressed. Many of them are rejected by their community and their family”, says a psychologist.

Above all, the child soldiers are struggling to be reintegrated into society. “They suffer from sleeping disorders, have difficulties concentrating and are often depressed. Many of them are rejected by their community and

their family; they withdraw, are uncertain and are afraid of the future. Others become aggressive and seek distraction in alcohol and drugs”, says Stephanie Brosch, a psychologist and, until March 2012, the JRS project director in Kitgum. “However, stories from children and young people who regain hope after years of despair, show us that the situation is not hopeless, in spite of the difficulties that we are confronted with every day. The children seem determined not to abandon hope or to become bitter. They are trying everything to improve their lives”, says Brosch.

On the other hand, attempts to destroy the LRA have failed and have only sparked worse attacks. The rebel group with its leader Joseph Kony initially withdrew to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, since 2008, has also entered the Central African Republic terrorising the population in both countries, sparking new flows of refugees into South Sudan.

In October 2011, the U.S. government deployed 100 soldiers to assist Uganda and the Central African Republic in their fight against the LRA.²⁶ The African Union is also working to establish a regional intervention force comprising 5,000 from the four affected countries. However, the AU must also encourage leading politicians in the region as well as international donor countries to support a comprehensive military and civil-society solution otherwise the process will fail and tens of thousands of families will have to continue to live in fear.

26 | ICG, “Ending the LRA: Reason for optimism and political commitment”, 10 Jan 2012.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia was never colonised, and has the highest population density on the African continent after Nigeria. The modern history of the country has been dominated by military coups and conflicts with the neighbouring countries Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. Although the majority of the population are farmers and the country is the largest coffee producer on the continent, drought, floods and continued conflict are responsible for the fact that one Ethiopian in ten remains dependent on food aid. Ethiopia is one of the main recipients of foreign development aid.²⁷ In spite of this, the country hosts almost 370,000 refugees from Somalia, Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan. Every single month, about 1,000 young people, mostly men, flee because of the Eritrean regime and its policy of forced military recruitment. A considerable number of Ethiopians live abroad as refugees or economic migrants as a result of poverty and also because of the repressive political regime.

Ethiopia is one of the main recipients of foreign development aid. In spite of this, the country hosts almost 370,000 refugees from Somalia, Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan.

In 2009, the government passed a law placing restrictions on NGOs working on human rights and good governance in Ethiopia and receiving more than ten per cent of their funding from abroad. This has enormously restricted the work of many organisations, including those assisting refugees.

The 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa forced tens of thousands of refugees to cross the border from Somalia into Ethiopia where they are hosted until today in what has become the second-largest refugee site in the world: Dollo Ado. Five camps accommodate more than 170,000 refugees, and a sixth will open soon. In 2012, between 700 and 5,000 Somalis arrived in Dollo Ado every month. The influx will not stop for as long as Somalia has not stabilised and the war, which has now lasted for 20 years, has not come to an end. Like its neighbouring countries, Ethiopia is pursuing a camp policy in order to protect its scarce natural resources and infrastructure against the pressure of the influx of refugees. Refugees live in camps

27 | Wenzel Michalski, "Schützenhilfe für Diktatoren", *The European*, 15 Nov 2010, <http://theeuropean.de/wenzel-michalski/4845-korruption-in-aethiopien> (accessed 30 Jan 2013).

with restricted freedom of movement, access to education and opportunities for work, and are confronted on a daily basis with their own lack of prospects.



Somalian refugees carrying their few belongings to the transit centre out of Dollo Ado. | Source: © Angelika Mendes.

HIDDEN AND VULNERABLE: REFUGEES IN THE CITIES

Hand-in-hand with the global trend towards urbanisation, more and more refugees are seeking refuge in cities instead of camps. According to estimates, about half of the world's 15 million refugees live in cities, however the exact number of this largely hidden population is unknown. No accurate figures are available for eastern African cities. Based on unofficial estimates, about 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers are living in Nairobi (Kenya), while 52,000 are officially registered.²⁸ In Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), hosts 4,100 registered refugees whereas for 2010 alone the government estimated that the Somalis numbered 160,000.²⁹ About 40,000 refugees live in Kampala (Uganda), most of them from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region (Rwanda and Burundi).³⁰

28 | Sara Pavanello, Samir Elhawary and Sara Pantuliano, "Hidden and Exposed: Urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya", HPG Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Mar 2010, <http://odi.org.uk/publications/4786-urban-refugees-nairobi-kenya> (accessed 30 Jan 2013); UNHCR, "2013 UNHCR country operations profile – Kenya", <http://unhcr.org/pages/49e483a16.html> (accessed 30 Jan 2013).

29 | UN OCHA, n. 9.

30 | UNHCR, "2013 UNHCR country operations profile – Uganda", <http://unhcr.org/pages/49e483c06.html> (accessed 30 Jan 2013).

There are varied reasons for moving to the cities: harsh living conditions in the camps, lack of space, medical care and educational opportunities as well as lack of security. Refugees in camps report sexual abuse, brutal attacks, killings, abductions and alleged recruitment by militias. They leave the camps because they fear for their lives. Others, above all Ethiopians, Somalis and Sudanese, who have spent up to 20 years in camps, move to the cities because they long for normalcy, economic independence and security. The governments in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia are concerned about this development.

Life is not easy for refugees in the cities either. Large families share small rooms in poor neighbourhoods. They receive no aid, or significantly less than refugees in camps, and are expected to be economically independent. As a result of the policies of most countries, they have great difficulties in accessing the regular labour market.

In Ethiopia, for example, refugees in cities cannot receive a work permit. Although the Kenyan government does theoretically allow refugees to work, in practice the conditions imposed in order to obtain a work permit or to form a business make it impossible for refugees to access formal employment. Many had to leave behind their documents in the process of fleeing, while many others cannot afford to pay for the permits. Only Uganda allows refugees to access formal employment, not just theoretically but also practically.


CONCLUSION

Refugees in eastern Africa have lost everything, many even several times. They face major challenges, they do not belong anywhere, they are excluded from society and are without prospects. Some are highly skilled, many were doctors, university professors or lawyers in their home country. Now they depend on external aid. The international protection system for refugees can only respond to meet their needs to a limited extent.³¹ Often, host countries are unwilling to consider local integration and new approaches as a possible solution to the refugee problem,

31 | UNHCR, "The state of the world's refugees 2012. In search of solidarity".

and instead use traditional methods such as strict camp policies. Many countries could offer more places for resettlement, financial resources or technical assistance.

All in all, it will require greater international solidarity in order to address the challenges together. Global solidarity and equal sharing of cost and burden are essential as long as few countries host the majority of refugees in the world simply because they happen to be the geographical neighbours of the affected states. These countries need the support of the international community in order to meet their responsibilities and offer the necessary protection.



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KOREAN REUNIFICATION

POSSIBILITY OR PIPE DREAM?¹

Norbert Eschborn / Young-yoon Kim

On New Year's Day 2011, as has become its tradition the German tabloid newspaper BILD offered its readers a selection of satirical "headlines we would like to see in 2012". Surprisingly, one of the headlines referred to Korea. Alongside a photo of the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl a headline boasted: "He's still got what it takes! Kohl unifies Korea." However, that year there was to be no German-style reunification, and in 2013, the 60th anniversary of Korea's division into North and South, the peninsula is still no nearer to such reconciliation.

The Republic of Korea (as South Korea is officially known as) has committed itself to the reunification of South and North Korea on the basis of the principles of freedom and democracy, as was the case in West Germany before 1989/1990 in the preamble to its constitution of the time.² Leading politicians regularly trumpet the ideal of reunification – with varying degrees of frequency and credibility, depending on their particular political persuasion.³ Again, today's Korea is very similar to West Germany in this respect. But as happened in Germany, cracks have also begun to appear in the façade of unity on this issue. Having said that, none of the leading politicians have so far documented their despair like former Chancellor of West

1 | The authors would like to thank JuHong Lee, Jonas Kessner and Nadja Noll for the vital research they carried out during the preparation of this article.

2 | Art. 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, http://korea.assembly.go.kr/res/low_01_read.jsp (accessed 5 Nov 2012).

3 | Irrespective of the fact that reunification is not one of the 100 official political tasks and goals the administration of President Lee Myung-bak has set itself since 2008; cf. <http://korea.net/Government/Administration/Lee-Administrations-Main-Policies> (accessed 6 Nov 2012).

Germany, Willy Brandt, who in his 1989 memoirs described German reunification as the “central sham of the second German Republic”.⁴

Germany was divided for “only” 40 years. However, after Korea’s civil war (an experience that Germany was mercifully spared), which has clearly had a lasting effect on the people of South Korea, and after 60 years of division, the differences in the lives of people in the North and South of the Korean Peninsula are probably greater than ever, the interests of the people have shifted and the idea of one nation has perhaps become much less important than those who officially promote the idea of reunification in Seoul⁵ would like to admit.

WHAT STANDS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA AND HOW DO NORTH AND SOUTH KOREANS FEEL ABOUT REUNIFICATION?

Hardly a day goes by in South Korea without some discussion on the issue of reunification with the North. Government and private research institutes and civil society organisations regularly conduct surveys on the issue of reunification. The question is constantly being asked as to when Korean reunification might be possible. This question is particularly annoying in as much as nobody who answers it is actually in a position to give any real justification for their opinion.

Is Korean reunification actually possible, or is it destined to remain a pipe dream for the South Korean people? The answer to this question is not simple, because potential reunification is dependent on a whole number of complex factors. It would be more practical to pose the question the other way round: “Why have North and South Korea not been able to achieve reunification so far?” At least here there is a chance of finding some answers. An assessment of the seriousness of the political will on both sides, for example, would suggest that both nations’ respective positions are so different that there seems little potential

4 | Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 1990, 156 et seq.

5 | This would include, for example, the National Advisory Council for Democratic Peaceful Reunification, <http://nuac.go.kr> (accessed 6 Nov 2012).

for success. Another key issue is whether the topic of reunification is simply being exploited in an attempt to gain and expand political power in the region. Also, from South Korea's perspective, there do not appear to be any globally influential individuals in the world's major capitals who are in a position to champion Korea's reunification. In the many public debates on the issue in South Korea, mention is regularly made of the decisive role played by Mikhail Gorbachev in Germany's reunification. There is nobody of a similar stature who seems likely to promote reunification in Korea.



Cemented separation: A concrete bar, marking the border between North and South Korea, runs through the UN armistice commission buildings. | Source: © Norbert Eschborn.

It is clear that one of the keys to rapprochement between the two Korean nations lies in their internal relations. Could reunification come about through a redefining of these relations? Is it possible to change the status quo? If so, what changes would need to be made and what would be the key issues involved? In recent Korean history, there have been numerous attempts to change various aspects of the relations between the two countries that were thought to be hindering reunification, but so far they have been far from successful. Why is that the case? In 2011, the South Korean public TV network KBS (Korea Broadcasting System) carried out a survey amongst North Korean refugees

in China on the issue of reunification. The results were as follows:⁶

Would you like to see a unified Korea?

Very much	92%
Possibly	8%
Not at all	0%

If you would like to see reunification – what is the most important reason?

“We are one people”	42%
Better life	45%
To remove the enmity or tension between the two countries	5%
Possibility of freedom to travel	8%

In your opinion when do you think reunification might be possible?

Within 10 years	26%
Within 20 years	6%
Within 30 years	23%
Never	45%

Under what kind of political system should reunification take place?

Capitalism	2%
Socialism	58%
The “Chinese model” (two systems within one country)	40%

How do you view South Korea?

As an enemy state	3%
As our brothers	37%
As a colony of the USA	60%
As an independent state	0%

6 | Cf. *KBS special*, “The Grand Plan for Reunification”, first broadcast Part 1, 3 Dec 2011; Part 2, 4 Dec 2011. All translations from the Korean by Dr. Young-yoon Kim. 102 people were surveyed.

What do you think of the South Korean economy?

It offers the possibility of a much better life than in North Korea	80%
It offers the possibility for many people to become rich, but with huge differences between rich and poor	16%
It results in people there being poorer than in North Korea	4%

What should South Korea do to bring about reunification?

Achieve independence from U.S. rule	50%
Give support to the people of North Korea	28%
Drop hostile policies towards North Korea	22%
Put pressure on North Korea	0%

Which country do you like the most?

USA	4%
Russia	0%
South Korea	29%
China	66%
Japan	1%

The small size of the sample and the fact that it is not clear under precisely what circumstances the North Koreans were questioned in China must be taken into account when considering the significance of these results. That being said, there are a number of constants when it comes to North Koreans' attitudes towards reunification that point to the persistence of long-term attitudes and opinions gleaned from a socialist upbringing and education and the inherent indoctrination. This is especially obvious in the high correlation of positive answers that correspond to North Korean state doctrine, and also in the preferred option of reunification under a socialist system, the strong dislike of the USA and the associated poor opinion of South Korea. But in spite of all this criticism, there is also obvious admiration for what South Korea's economy has to offer, as well as a clear desire for better material circumstances in their own country. When 80 per cent of those questioned consider the quality of life in South Korea to be "much better" than their own, this shows that North Koreans are clearly

capable of differentiating their quality of life from that of others in spite of the fact that their country is cut off from the outside world. It also suggests that the promises made by the country's leaders that things will get better are not likely to be believed indefinitely. The somewhat cautious or even pessimistic estimations of when reunification might take place, or whether it is even likely to happen at all, also appear to suggest a high degree of realism. However, an evaluation of these responses must also take into account the fact that it is North Korea itself that creates and maintains an environment which gives rise to such opinions.

In August 2012, KBS also carried out a survey on the issue of reunification amongst South Koreans. The results of this second survey were as follows:⁷

How interested are you in the reunification of Korea?

Extremely	24.6%
Very much	49.2%
Not very	22.8%
Not at all	3.4%

What is your attitude towards reunification?

It should definitely happen	25.4%
It is desirable as long as it doesn't put too big a burden on South Korea	43%
Both Korean states should co-exist on the basis of mutual cooperation	24.6%
It should definitely not happen	7%

7 | Cf. 24th research edition of the KBS programme on reunification, "Examination of people's attitudes to the reunification of Korea 2012", first broadcast, 15 Oct 2012. 1,027 people were surveyed.

What would be your biggest concern in the event that reunification takes place?

Massive financial burden on the people of South Korea	54.1%
Social unrest, unemployment, crime	18.5%
Political and military conflict	15.3%
Mass migration from North Korea to South Korea	11.1%
International diplomatic difficulties	1%

What is the most important goal of reunification?

Economic cooperation, cultural exchange, reuniting of families, travel opportunities	68.9%
Strengthening South Korea's economic power	12%
Building trust between the two countries' militaries	11.6%
A summit meeting of the two countries' leaders	5.8%
Dismantling of national security legislation	1.7%

Which other country could be useful in helping to bring about reunification?

None	51.7%
China	21.6%
USA	19.5%
Japan	2.6%
Russia	2.1%
Other countries	2.5%

How willing are you to bear the costs of reunification?

Not willing at all	39.6%
Less than 1% of my annual income	41.4%
1-5% of my annual income	15.7%
5-10% of my annual income	2.6%
More than 10% of my annual income	0.6%

When do you think reunification might be possible?

Within 10 years	17.1%
Within 11-20 years	35.7%
Within 21-30 years	21.2%
After more than 30 years	14.8%
Never	11.2%

These results reflect the mainstream opinion in South Korean society for some time now, i.e. a resounding “Yes, but...” attitude towards reunification: a general sympathy towards the idea amongst around two-thirds of the population, a belief amongst the majority that this historic development could still happen within their lifetime and the alarmingly clear position of 81 per cent of those questioned that they would either not be willing to contribute towards these costs or only to a very limited extent. Financial concerns appear to be a common thread when it comes to South Koreans’ attitudes towards reunification and outweigh even the fear of social tensions should the two Korean nations be reunited. Surprisingly China is seen as a potentially more helpful partner than the USA when it comes to implementing such a massive undertaking, although only by a narrow margin. However, this assessment does in fact tally with the feeling commonly expressed, particularly amongst intellectuals, that it is the USA and not China who represent the biggest obstacle to Korean reunification.

THE HIGHS AND LOWS OF INTERNAL KOREAN RELATIONS SINCE 1945

The tragedy of the Korean Peninsula, which was colonised by Japan from 1910 to 1945, began with the ending of the Second World War when the country was occupied by both American and Soviet troops, between whose forces the dividing line ran along the 38th parallel. Up until 1970 there were apparently no joint efforts made to recognise both halves as one nation. For its part, South Korea unilaterally decreed in Article 3 of its constitution that the Republic of Korea included the whole of the Korean Peninsula and its associated islands, thus effectively laying claim

to sovereignty over North Korean territory. The United Nations also initially saw the Republic of Korea as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula. The South Koreans interpreted this to mean that North Korea was effectively an illegal entity, that land belonging to the Republic of Korea was being illegally occupied and the Republic of Korea's right to exercise sovereignty was being hindered. North Korea remained totally unconcerned by these interpretations. As far as Pyongyang was concerned, South Korea had been forcibly occupied and colonised by the "imperialist" United States. It was clearly stated in the preamble to the statute of the Workers' Party of Korea that the aim of North Korea was to establish a communist society throughout the whole of the Korean Peninsula.

After the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, both North and South Korea focused on maintaining and developing their respective political systems. Political, social and cultural exchange between the two Koreas was effectively suspended, with the result that the partitioning of the country was further intensified. North Korea put all its efforts into strengthening the one-man dictatorship of Kim Il-sung and preparing the ground for a reunification along communist lines. During the 1960s, North Korea repeatedly attempted to infiltrate the South using spies and armed partisans. It significantly strengthened its military power, while various

By the end of the 1960s, there was no dialogue or exchange taking place between the two Koreas whatsoever. The atmosphere was more one of extreme confrontation.

ideas and options for bringing about reunification by force of arms were considered by South Korea. Seoul declared anti-communism to be state policy and focused on developing its economy. There were no real attempts made to improve relations between the North and South. By the end of the 1960s, there was no dialogue or exchange taking place between the two Koreas whatsoever. The atmosphere was more one of extreme confrontation. This situation gradually improved due to political influences from outside, especially the Nixon Doctrine and the Sino-American summit of 1972. These developments had a huge influence on the Korean Peninsula, as it was from this time onwards that North-South relations started to change. In 1970, President Park Chung-hee suggested to the North that there should be *bona fide* competition between the two systems, while at the same time encouraging the creation of a political framework for peaceful reunification

through dialogue, exchange and cooperation. This effectively constituted recognition of North Korea's existence, including Kim Il-sung's claim to political power, and North Korea became a dialogue partner for South Korea.

On 23 June 1973, President Park released his Seven-Point Declaration for Peace and Unity, which confirmed that South Korea would establish diplomatic relations even with those countries that had different political and economic systems. Implicit within this statement was an acceptance of Pyongyang establishing diplomatic relations with Western countries. At the same time, South Korea was also proposing that both Koreas be allowed to join the United Nations. This proposal would have meant both sides recognising and accepting the existence of two Korean states, and was rejected by North Korea on this basis. Pyongyang for its part wanted to join the UN as a unified Korean state. In 1974, North Korea called for the signing of a peace agreement with the USA in order to avoid military confrontation. This was a change of strategy by North Korea, as up till then it had been calling for a peace agreement with South Korea itself. This new North Korean position was interpreted as an acceptance of the co-existence of both Koreas and the continuation of the division of the peninsula into two parts. The rule of Park Chung-hee, who was assassinated in 1979, will be remembered as a time when numerous contacts were established between the two nations. However, these contacts did not necessarily lead to an improvement of the situation on the peninsula or a rapprochement between North and South.

The Chun Doo-hwan regime came to power in 1980 and pursued an active reunification policy towards the North, which was officially committed to finding a peaceful road to reunification. Chun proposed a summit meeting of the heads of state and a total of twenty cooperation projects, all of which North Korea rejected. In 1984 South Korea received aid from North Korea after extensive flooding caused a state of emergency.

In 1984 South Korea received aid from North Korea after extensive flooding caused a state of emergency. This led to renewed dialogue between the two countries.

This led to renewed dialogue between the two countries, including discussions within the framework of Red Cross meetings, sports events and planned economic and parliamentary meetings. It also led, for the first time, to the

reuniting of families and cultural exchanges by artists from both countries. The Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988 should have provided an ideal opportunity to improve relations between the North and South. Because of its superior economic power at the time, South Korea felt confident of being able to develop its relationship with the North. The collapse of Cold War structures around the world at the end of the 1980s was also having a significant influence on the political situation on the Korean Peninsula and changed the relationship between North and South Korea. However, the North was suffering from shortages of food, energy and hard currency and instead decided to focus on bolstering its own system during this phase.

During this period, the next South Korean president, Roh Tae-woo, floated the idea of achieving reunification through a kind of Korean “Commonwealth”, especially in his “Special Declaration for National Unity and Prosperity” of 7 July 1988. This was later seen as being South Korea’s official policy towards the North. In October 1998, South Korea announced at the UN General Assembly that

In October 1998, South Korea announced at the UN General Assembly that it was prepared to address issues raised by North Korea, such as disarmament, a peace treaty, etc.

it was prepared to address issues raised by North Korea, such as disarmament, a peace treaty, etc. This gesture clearly had an effect on the North as it paved the way for a public meeting between the heads of government of the two countries. These high-ranking talks would eventually lead to the signing of a Basic Agreement between North and South Korea in 1991. This agreement established for the first time the basic foundations upon which relations between North and South Korea could be built. Both countries agreed to respect each other’s systems, to refrain from the use of force and to actively seek areas of cooperation in order to facilitate the creation of a national alliance. One of the other outcomes of the talks was that both sides would start to use the official state names “Republic of Korea” and “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. This was seen as a reflection of both Seoul’s and Pyongyang’s claims to have the right to be seen as independent players on the international stage following the successful application by both countries to join the United Nations.

In spite of this, both North and South continued to define their relationship not so much as one that is between two separate countries, but as a special kind of temporary relationship within a process of eventual unification. The main reason for this was that neither government wanted to totally abandon the option of reunification at some point in the future. For this reason, it was necessary to characterise the relationship between North and South Korea as an internal Korean matter, as had happened in Germany. As a result, expectations were high that it would actually be possible to introduce the appropriate institutional measures needed to satisfy the provisions of the Basic Agreement. Unfortunately, these hopes were dashed by North Korea's first nuclear crisis and the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, which made it impossible for a planned summit meeting to go ahead. What followed was a loss of impetus in the improvement of relations between North and South Korea, which to an extent was due to the worsening food shortages in North Korea since the mid-1990s.

The government of President Kim Dae-jung, who came to power in February 1998, began a policy of détente known as the "Sunshine Policy",⁸ for which the former civil rights campaigner Kim was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. This policy led to an increase in cooperation between North and South Korea in non-governmental areas. Humanitarian aid to North Korea was stepped up and various types of dialogue between the two countries were given a fresh impetus. A visit by Kim Dae-jung to Pyongyang and a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il led to the Joint Declaration of 15 June 2000. This document was a turning point in relations between the two countries. It was followed by substantive political discussions and increased cooperation, which resulted in the signing of numerous agreements, including the construction of an industrial complex in Kaesong (North Korea), where many South Korean companies set up new production facilities. The process of reuniting families also resumed. The atmosphere of mistrust that had lasted for half a century was beginning to change.

A summit meeting between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in 2000 led to a joint declaration which made political discussions and an increasing cooperation possible.

8 | A detailed explanation and defence of this policy has recently been published by one of its architects: Chung-in Moon, *The Sunshine Policy. In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea*, Seoul, 2012.

2002 saw the start of the so-called second nuclear crisis. North Korea was suspected of uranium enrichment and there was a hostile exchange of fire between the two sides on the Yellow Sea. In spite of this incident, the new relationship based on reconciliation and cooperation showed that it was capable of enduring, and in October 2007 there was a second summit meeting between the heads of state Roh Moo-yun and Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. This led to the Joint Declaration of 4 October 2007, which among other things envisaged closer economic cooperation.

This era of active cooperation between the two Koreas eventually came to an end when President Lee Myung-bak came to power in 2008. The second nuclear crisis had brought about a shift in public opinion amongst the people of South Korea, who were increasingly beginning to question the country's policy of greater openness and détente and were calling for a change of policy in light of the fact that the quality of life for people in North Korea had still not improved. The Lee Myung-bak government therefore altered the country's North Korea policy to one based on the principles of reciprocity and conditionality. Not surprisingly, other political initiatives coming out of

Tensions were further escalated in 2010 following the sinking of the South Korean frigate "Cheonan" and the North Korean bombardment of the island of Yeonpyeong.

Seoul, such as the offer of increased economic cooperation to help raise North Korea's average per capita income to 3,000 U.S. dollars within ten years in exchange for North Korean denuclearisation, met with resistance in Pyongyang. Tensions were further escalated in 2010 following the sinking of the South Korean frigate "Cheonan" (for which North Korea denies any responsibility) and the North Korean bombardment of the island of Yeonpyeong. Dialogue between the two countries was provisionally suspended. Despite this, international experts on Korea⁹ acknowledged that there were some positive aspects to Lee Myung-bak's North Korea policy, especially the attempt to persuade Pyongyang to adopt a rational approach to its

9 | Cf. Bradley O. Babson, "South-North Relations: Present Situation and Future Challenges and Opportunities", speech delivered at the conference Unification and the Korean Economy, 21/22 Oct 2012, Seoul. The conference was jointly organised by the Institute for Global Economics (IGE), the Korean Export-Import Bank, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), the Korea Development Institute (KDI) and the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE).

dealings with South Korea based on common interests and a sensible amount of give-and-take. This approach might have provided the basis for a respectful attitude towards dealing with each other and served as a prerequisite for a long-term process of reunification. North Korea, however, saw no material benefits in this policy and perceived it as an attempt by Seoul to force conditions such as denuclearisation on Pyongyang with the aim of promoting the South's long-term dominance of the Korean Peninsula.

CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN SEOUL IN 2013: HOW WILL IT DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF NORTH KOREA?¹⁰

The topic of Korea's internal relations was debated with interest during South Korea's 2012 presidential elections, but it was not necessarily one of the key issues in the election. The manifestos of the various candidates who stood for election on 19 December 2012 were not markedly different on this issue. What was clear, however, was that both the conservative candidate Park Geun-hye, daughter of the former president Park Chung-hee, and the candidate from the progressive camp, Moon Jae-in of the Democratic Party, wanted to make some changes to the country's North Korea policy. Park wanted to pursue a more careful approach, as she could not openly break with the policies of President Lee Myung-bak, her fellow party member, without losing support in the conservative Saenuri party. In contrast, Moon, as a former close ally of past president Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), wanted to revert to the "Sunshine Policy" that Roh had essentially carried over from his predecessor Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003). Moon, formerly President Roh's chief of staff and son of a displaced North Korean, was considered to be very much in favour of re-unification. His main goal was to put in place a comprehensive peace plan for the Korean Peninsula. He spoke in favour of more regional integration in Northeast Asia and a multilateral cooperation initiative, to be made possible through six-party talks.¹¹ North Korea's nuclear weapons

10 | The information in this section has been taken from statements made by close advisors to the presidential candidates on foreign and reunification policy issues during discussion forums organised by the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (KCRC) on 6 Nov 2012 in Seoul.

11 | This refers to talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue that have been held predominantly in Beijing since 2003. The regular participants are the two Koreas, the

programme would be abandoned as part of a peace agreement to be concluded between North and South Korea. An internal Korean economic coalition would help to generate profits for both Koreas and so act as the basis for reunification and provide an economic boost to Korea as a whole. His defeat in the presidential elections of December 2012 not only ensured that Moon's political ambitions would come to nothing, but also acted as a pointer to the kind of North Korea policy that could be expected from the new head of state.¹²

Trust is the key word in the foreign and reunification policies of newly-elected president Park Geun-hye, who will be sworn in on 25 February 2013.¹³ She believes the lack of fundamental trust within internal Korean relations is the main reason for the current problems between North and

South Korea.¹⁴ Experts see some similarities between her policies and those of President Lee-Myung-bak in terms of retaining certain ideas and principles. However, in contrast to Lee, Park is willing to develop a humanitarian

Park is willing to develop a humanitarian and cultural exchange with the North without preconditions, which should serve as the foundation for long-term cooperation.

and cultural exchange with the North without preconditions, which should serve as the foundation for long-term cooperation. As far as North Korea's nuclear programme is concerned, she is prepared to stand by her earlier statements and call for the programme to be stopped. There are three main strands to Park's position: the country's North Korea policy must be further developed; both North Korea and South Korea must be prepared to change and South Korea's North Korean policy should not be overhauled every time there is a change of government.

USA, China, Japan and Russia.

- 12 | Cf. Norbert Eschborn, "Park Geun-hye erreicht ihr Lebensziel", *KAS-Länderbericht*, 20 Dec 2012, <http://kas.de/korea/de/publications/33169> (accessed 22 Jan 2013).
- 13 | In the English translation, Ms Park's positions on foreign and reunification policy as well as on national security are therefore referred to by the title "*Trustpolitik* and a New Korea" by the Saenuri Party.
- 14 | An example of the problems that exist is the drastic reduction in the number of inter-Korean meetings and projects during President Lee Myung-bak's time in office (2008-2013) compared to the corresponding number under President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), cf. also Song Sang-ho, "Inter-Korean exchanges drop sharply under Lee", *The Korea Herald*, 19/20 Jan 2013, 3.

After the election, as her transitional team was preparing for her term in office, Park constantly repeated her position during discussions with high-ranking representatives from international governments and frequently confirmed that she was open to dialogue with the North, including the provision of humanitarian aid. However, in January 2013, the first doubts began surfacing in the media as to whether the country's North Korean policy during her time in office would really be able to effect change. One of the reasons for this was the surprising resignation from the transition team of an acknowledged expert on North Korea, Professor Choi Dae-seok, Head of the Institute for Unification Studies at the Ewha Women's University in Seoul. His resignation was never publicly explained, but members

of the press assumed that he must have been overruled during discussions on North Korea by "inter-Korean hawks" within the transition team. Experts with close ties to the opposition speculated that, with Choi leaving, not much could really be expected in the future from the new government's North Korea policy. This pessimistic outlook was based on the common perception in expert circles that Choi and his support for dialogue and rapprochement with the North were the main thing, if not the only thing, that distinguished Park from her predecessor Lee when it came to North Korean policy. Added to this is the worry that policy could once again be dictated by those who favour use of the military over dialogue when it comes to the concept of "defence vs. dialogue" (as the English-speaking press in South Korea like to call it).

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NORTH KOREA AS THE SPRINGBOARD FOR REUNIFICATION?

In his 2013 New Year's Address, which was followed with great interest by the Western media in particular, Kim Jong-un, First Secretary of the North Korean "Workers' Party", spoke about internal Korean relations as one of the six central topics of his speech. What he had to say was interpreted by experts as being more conciliatory towards the South than previous statements by the regime. This may have been partly because, with the new presidency of Park Geun-hye on the horizon, Pyongyang wanted to test the willingness of the new head of state to enter into

dialogue with the North (critics are concerned that this could turn out to be a willingness to compromise). To be fair, this was nothing new in terms of North Korea's policy, as the regime's New Year's Addresses in 2010 and 2011 also payed lip service to the idea of improving internal Korean relations.¹⁵ Kim Jong-un's specific references to the joint declarations released after the North-South summit meetings of 15 June 2000 and 4 October 2007 and his desire to see them fully implemented would appear to be ostensibly in line with this approach. Experienced observers in the South fear that this may be a strategy aimed at splitting South Korean public opinion and driving a wedge between Seoul and Washington, with Pyongyang ensuring that the options of "dialogue vs. confrontation" or "war vs. peace" are never far from the public debate. The fact that North Korea wants to replace the existing ceasefire agreement with a peace treaty is seen by some as

Particular attention has been paid to the opinion of some of those in the West who have warned against a romanticised false assessment of Kim's words and have called for an in-depth analysis of his true intentions.

clear evidence of such a strategy. In critically analysing the New Year's Address, particular attention has also been paid to the opinion of some of those in the West who have warned against a romanticised false assessment of Kim's words and have called for an in-depth analysis of his true intentions.¹⁶ This would appear to be fully justified, as, in light of the growing repressive measures introduced by the regime during Kim Jong-un's first year of rule (including further restrictions on freedom of assembly and freedom of travel, the strengthening of the country's borders and the procurement of several thousand surveillance cameras to be installed throughout the country, etc.) it would be wrong to speak of any genuine reform in the North. A popular uprising against the regime in North Korea – along the lines of the German example – which might then serve as a springboard for a process of reunification, can also be considered highly unlikely, given the prevailing circumstances in the country.

15 | Cf. Kim Jong-un, "The 2013 New Year's Address", 3 Jan 2013, http://kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_05_01.jsp?bid=EINGINSIGN&page=1 (accessed 22 Jan 2013).

16 | Christopher Green, "Ancestor Shadows and Strategic Fog: A Parting Shot at the Kim Jong-un Speech", *sino-nk*, 4 Jan 2013, <http://sinonk.com/2013/01/04/ancestor-shadows-and-strategic-fog-a-parting-shot-at-the-kim-jong-un-speech> (accessed 22 Jan 2013).

THE VALUE AND COMPLEXITY OF A POTENTIAL KOREAN REUNIFICATION

Any factual analysis of the relevant foreign policy, security and economic issues would show conclusively that, in the medium and long term, reunification could be of great benefit not only to the Korean Peninsula itself, but also to the wider Northeast Asia region as a whole.



Despite Kim Jong-un's New Year's Address: There can be no talk of reforms. | Source: © Norbert Eschborn.

Foreign Policy and Regional Security

One of the great benefits of reunification would be improved regional security through the re-establishment of peaceful relations. Currently "the unpredictable (conventional and nuclear) threat and aggression potential of North Korea represents the highest risk in the area of security policy

in Northeast Asia".¹⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Seoul therefore sees creating a reunified Korea as a necessary prerequisite to creating a stable security environment in the region, and there could even be a peace dividend for those neighbouring countries who are willing and able to support the reunification process.¹⁸

However, it is also important to recognise the reservations regarding Korean reunification that may still be held by certain stakeholders in the region, particularly China. Officially, Beijing has always supported the principle of Korean reunification by peaceful means. However, it has been more or less openly insinuated in Seoul that Beijing has no real interest in Korean reunification because China wants to keep North Korea as a *de facto* buffer state¹⁹ between itself and a South Korea that has strong ties to the USA. Beijing is also afraid of a mass influx of refugees into its own border provinces in the event that a rapid collapse of the Kim regime leads to a crisis situation. During the presidential elections, the tone of the campaigns was overwhelmingly positive towards China, which is hardly surprising given that South Korea is dependent on China for nearly 30 per cent of its exports. However, this has not prevented government representatives in Seoul from making indirect but nevertheless pointed criticisms of Beijing's actual position on the reunification issue. For example, South Korea's Unification Minister, Yu Woo-ik, stressed in autumn 2012 that "neighbouring countries now need to do away with their old ways of thinking regarding Korean unification. They should break free from the false impression that stable management of the status quo on the Korean peninsula best serves their national interests. This is a groundless misconception that needs to be closely reviewed."²⁰ According to Yu, this new way of thinking is all the more urgent as Northeast

17 | Peter Hefele, Benjamin Barth and Johanna Tensi, "Military build-up Dynamics and Conflict Management in East and Southeast Asia", *KAS International Reports*, 6/2012, 82, <http://kas.de/wf/en/33.31266> (accessed 24 Jan 2013).

18 | Kim Sung-hwan, luncheon speech, conference Unification and the Korean Economy, Seoul, 21/22 Oct 2012.

19 | During confidential talks, South Korean officials sometimes use the term "tribute state" when referring to North Korea, an allusion to the substantial amount of raw materials that Pyongyang delivers to Beijing under what are clearly preferential terms.

20 | Yu Woo-ik, keynote address, conference Unification and the Korean Economy, Seoul, 21/22 Jan 2012.

Asia is currently “riding a wave of paradigm shifts” and the Korean Peninsula cannot be excluded from these changes. A change in internal Korean relations is therefore inevitable. In light of this assessment of China’s real position on the issue, it is clear that not a great deal of credence has been given to the disclosures by Wikileaks over recent years suggesting that, even before the change of leadership in 2012, China’s leaders were tending towards the view that a reunified Korea under the leadership of South Korea might be acceptable, just as long as a unified Korea did not position itself in opposition to China.²¹ This notion seems less far-fetched when we consider that China now has a younger leadership elite who, in the spirit of the times, might be prepared in future to look at the considerable material and foreign policy support they provide to North Korea in a potentially more pragmatic and less ideological way than their predecessors and come to a different set of conclusions as a result. What does seem certain is that Beijing does not appreciate North Korea’s reluctance over recent years to accept outside advice, even from China, and it may even have some concerns about China’s long-term international reputation, given the nature of the regime they are supporting in Pyongyang. It would seem fair to assume, therefore, that there might be a certain openness on the part of Beijing to the idea of a solution based on a “unified Korea” as one of its preferred options for the Korean Peninsula, at least in the medium term.

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Support for Korean reunification constitutes official U.S. foreign policy, but we can only speculate as to the political significance of the somewhat sober and unenthusiastic approach to this issue adopted by Washington.²² In a recent statement on bilateral relations, the U.S. ambassador to

21 | Cf. Simon Tisdall, “WikiLeaks row: China wants Korean reunification, officials confirm”, *The Guardian*, 30 Nov 2010, <http://guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/30/china-wants-korean-reunification> (accessed 12 Nov 2012).

22 | The subject is not mentioned at all on the White House website. Significantly, the main reference on the U.S. Department of State website is to be found in the section “US relations with North Korea”: “The United States supports the peaceful reunification of Korea on terms acceptable to the Korean people and recognises that the future of the Korean Peninsula is primarily a matter for them to decide.”, <http://state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm> (accessed 19 Nov 2012).

South Korea made no mention of reunification.²³ It is no wonder that there is a widespread feeling amongst many of the Koreans from the student generation of the 1980s, i.e. those who were actively involved in the country's democracy movement, many of whom now have leading positions at universities, that the USA must bear at least some of the blame for the division of the country into two parts.²⁴

Improving peace and security on the Korean Peninsula necessarily means finding a solution to the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons, if only because a unified, but nuclear Korea "is the last thing regional powers want to see on the Korean Peninsula", as Seoul has made very clear.²⁵ A unified Korea would have a significant impact on the existing balance of power in the region and the South Koreans believe that the six-party talks that have been ongoing since 2009 are the ideal vehicle to address the implications of such a reunification. In the long term this could also serve as a forum for creating a multilateral security architecture for the East Asia region as a whole. Any progress in this direction would have to include the replacement of the existing Korean War ceasefire agreement with some form of peace agreement. But this too will only be possible with the cooperation of all the countries that have vital interests associated with the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea is well aware of this fact. For Seoul "it is of paramount importance, inter alia, to develop the Korea-China strategic cooperation in harmony with the Korea-U.S. alliance"²⁶ – something that will require a real balancing act to be undertaken by the two rival major powers.

Costs and Economic Prospects

So far, the government of President Lee Myung-bak has defined its position on the politically highly-sensitive issue of the costs of reunification as follows: "Unification costs would be substantially big, but certainly smaller than the tremendous amount of the cost we have to pay to maintain

23 | Sung Y. Kim, "ROK-U.S. Relations and Alliance", speech at the 45th Korean Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) Defense Forum, Seoul, 16 Nov 2012.

24 | Cf. Daniel Tudor, *Korea. The Impossible Country*, Tokio, 2012, 151.

25 | Kim Sung-hwan, n. 18.

26 | Ibid.

peace and stability under the divided nation. We have also clarified that unification costs are a one-time payment, while the benefits of the unification will be generated over a long period of time into the future.”²⁷ Considering the substantial differences between North and South Korea in terms of per capita income, standard of living, development and size of population, it is reasonable to assume that South Korea would have to bear the lion’s share of the costs of reunification and that these costs would be significantly higher than was the case in Germany. For this reason, an analysis of the economic benefits of reunification becomes all the more important when attempting to weigh up the trade-offs and returns of such an investment.

The debate on just how high the costs of reunification might be has been going on for more than 20 years. However, international experts²⁸ have criticised the inadequate or complete lack of economic modelling carried out by South Korean economists and think tanks. They argue that such models are necessary not only to ensure that the public discussions on what may well be a decisive issue in the reunification debate are based on accurate information, but also to ensure that public and elected officials are given expert advice and reliable data on which to base their decisions. This kind of criticism would appear to be justified, as estimates carried out between 1991 and 2012²⁹ range from 500 to 3,200 billion U.S. dollars, or an annual expenditure of between seven and twelve per cent of South Korea’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for a period of anywhere between ten and 40 years. Some of these estimates were arrived at by simply doubling the known costs of Germany’s reunification, based on the assumption that Korea’s reunification would be twice as expensive because North Korea’s economic potential is significantly lower than that of the GDR. What is clear to Korean experts, however, is that their country would have to ensure that the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were closely involved, in the

Estimates of the costs of reunification carried out between 1991 and 2012 range from 500 to 3,200 billion U.S. dollars.

27 | Yu Woo-ik, n. 20.

28 | E.g. the economist Michael Funke, who teaches at the University of Hamburg, during the conference Unification and the Korean Economy, Seoul, 21/22 Oct 2012.

29 | A detailed breakdown will not be provided at this point as there are many sources currently available on the internet.

early phases of reunification at least, even if the bulk of the costs were covered by transfer payments from the South to the North.

In 2009, Goldman Sachs produced an analysis of the economic potential of a unified Korea.³⁰ The report suggested that within 40 years the GDP of a unified Korea could exceed those of France, Germany and possibly even Japan. However, this assumed a gradual integration of the North and South and not an “instant German-style unification”.

In summing up, the author came to the conclusion that, while the North Korean planned economy may be stagnating and on the brink of collapse, it also had untapped potential in the form of valuable raw materials (the so-called “rare earth metals” that are particularly important in IT and communications technology),

North Korea’s working population will grow at a rate of 1.4 per cent per annum over a period of ten years, while South Korea’s will begin to shrink.

along with enormous potential for growth in productivity. Kwon believes that the country’s human resource potential also warrants closer consideration. By looking at data

from 2007, he concluded that North Korea’s population is growing twice as quickly as that of the South and that its working population will grow at a rate of 1.4 per cent per annum over a period of ten years, while South Korea’s will actually begin to shrink after 2013. The military could also potentially provide a significant addition to the workforce, as it currently represents around 16 per cent of the country’s males between the ages of 15 and 64.³¹

With the shift in the global economy towards East Asia, this combination of capital, human resources and raw materials could potentially turn a unified Korea into a major driver of growth in the region and at the same time further increase its geopolitical significance. For example, the overland transport of goods between Eurasia and the Asia Pacific region could become quicker and safer. The development of North Korea’s domestic economy could also act as an incentive to neighbouring Russia and China to integrate their underdeveloped regions around the borders with North Korea and set in motion an effective cross-border structural policy.

30 | Goohon Kwon, “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks”, *Global Economics Paper*, 188, 21 Sep 2009.

31 | *Ibid.*, 11.

The Korean Peninsula currently represents one of the world's most dangerous potential flashpoints. This fact has also been recognised by the international financial markets in the shape of the so-called "Korea discount", a regular devaluing of South Korean shares by investors who believe that the long-term risk of investing in the country has to be taken into account. However, if there were a unified, democratic Korea, then resource-intensive confrontations could be abandoned in favour of economic cooperation and so provide a "meaningful version of 'turning swords into ploughshares'".³² Behind these kinds of statements there is often a belief amongst political decision-makers in Seoul that their country could act as a link between Eurasia and the Asia Pacific region, or at the very least could be one of the major players in the Asia Pacific region. While they are aware of the financial risks involved in reunification, they generally tend to believe that it represents a unique opportunity they cannot afford to ignore.

REUNIFICATION AS AN ONGOING POLITICAL CHALLENGE

When viewed against the rapid political and economic changes that have swept the world over recent years, Korean reunification now appears to be a realistic prospect rather than a forlorn hope, even if the timetable still remains unclear. However, over the last 60 years North and South Korea have been heading down very different paths – indeed many in the South believe the two countries could not be any more different. These differences are one of the reasons why the South Korean public has so many doubts about reunification.

Korean reunification appears to be a realistic prospect rather than a forlorn hope, even if the timetable still remains unclear.

However, there is also public discussion about the fact that reunification is becoming an unavoidable historical challenge for Korea. Experts are unanimous in believing that when this historic phase commences, South Korea's political leaders must be totally prepared to deal with this critical moment. As South Korean Finance Minister Bahk Jaewan put it in 2012, "we must remember that our fear may come

from our ignorance".³³ With this comment, he was referring to the widespread ignorance within Korean society of the political factors and financial costs of unification.

The role of German reunification and its function as a role model in this debate is somewhat contradictory. There has been no lack of statements – particularly from politicians and official bodies – on the South Korean side about how much can be learned from the German model.³⁴ After carrying out a plethora of detailed analyses on the various aspects of German reunification, the South Koreans must be aware that the geopolitical, demographic and economic conditions in the two examples are so different that the German experience can hardly be used as a model at all,

In Seoul, German reunification is not viewed as being historically unavoidable, but as the wonderful result of a unique historical constellation.

but at best as an inspiration. Anyone who studies South Korea's praise for the German model will in fact realise that it mainly revolves around how to avoid the excessive mistakes it believes were committed during the German reunification process which must absolutely be avoided in the much thornier case of Korea. In Seoul, German reunification is not viewed as being historically unavoidable, but as the wonderful result of a unique historical constellation. Behind closed doors there are of course other, much more critical views being expressed, such as the assessment that it was a "costly mistake". The likelihood of making such a mistake can be ruled out in the reunification method preferred by many in South Korea: namely, a gradual integration of North and South Korea over the space of many years or decades, rather than the kind of "instant reunification" that happened in Germany. Such a process could lead to cooperation, then confederation, and finally unification.³⁵

33 | Bahk Jaewan (Minister for Strategy and Finance), "Unification from the Perspective of New Possibilities in the Korean Economy", dinner speech at the conference Unification and the Korean Economy, Seoul, 21/22 Oct 2012.

34 | These should be taken with a pinch of salt, as is shown by German reports on the German-Korean consultation committee for Korean reunification; cf. Jochen-Martin Gutsch, "Frontbesuch in Seoul", *Der Spiegel*, 2 Jan 2012, <http://spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-83422502.html> (accessed 13 Nov 2012).

35 | This is referred to by experts as the "China-Hong Kong model".

In future, every head of state in Seoul will be faced with the challenge of how to harmonise the Republic of Korea's constitutional aspirations of peaceful reunification with the country's social realities, in so far as emphasis is placed on Realpolitik by the "Blue House" (the President's official residence). All major surveys point to the fact that those who bear the main responsibility for creating reunification – today's generation of 30-somethings and South Korean youth – are generally hesitant, sceptical or even totally reject the project because they do not feel it has any relevance to their own lives and future prospects. In autumn 2012, the incumbent conservative government recognised the existence of this problem and described it with an unusual degree of clarity: "Unfortunately, today we are at a point in time when younger South Koreans enjoy a greater degree of prosperity than any other generation of South Koreans [sic!] lived before them. The prosperity has made them become complacent while being less conscious of the need for national unification. In the meantime, those who have focused on the cost Germany had to pay for its unification became hesitant to support Korean unification."³⁶

As with all statements containing a similarly accusatory undertone, many of the counter-arguments turn back on the accuser. Firstly, the current government has done little of note to increase the South Korean public's awareness of the advantages of reunification. It merely paid lip service with its "unification jars" initiative that was launched in the summer of 2012.³⁷ Secondly, observers note that there has been a lack of effective, serious initiatives to provide civic education in schools and colleges on these issues. It is hardly surprising that school children and students say they have a negative view of North Korea when they are simply taught that their neighbour is their communist enemy. They have very little knowledge or appreciation of the many thousand years of history of a united Korea before 1945, nor is there much sympathy for the sufferings of the oppressed people of North Korea. The integration of North Korean refugees

36 | Cf. Yu Woo-ik, n. 20.

37 | These ceramic jars were specially designed and inscribed for the collection of voluntary donations towards reunification, but to date they have had only moderate success. Cf. Shin Hyon-hee, "Unification jars' latest effort to raise funds", *The Korea Herald*, 26 Jun 2012. Unconfirmed diplomatic sources say that only 320,000 U.S. dollars has been donated since the fund was set up in the middle of 2012.

into South Korean society is also beset with problems caused by the sense of foreignness experienced on both sides. This all has the effect that today's young generation in the South are gradually moving away from "a common desire for unity"³⁸ and explains the indifference and scepticism displayed by young South Koreans towards the idea of reunification. Thirdly, their government deliberately denies them opportunities to learn more about the realities of life in North Korea. Whereas any foreign tourist visiting Seoul can easily book a bus trip to the border and enter the Joint Security Area on the North Korean border, this is only allowed for South Koreans if they obtain official permission in advance. It is a criminal offence under South Korean law to call up North Korean websites. Concern about escalating reunification costs in debates on the subject is often the first of many excuses used to avoid dealing with a topic that is considered fundamentally unpleasant and inopportune. This flies in the face of official assurances that people should not become complacent about prosperity but should use the power and impetus that has transformed South Korea from an aid recipient into a donor country³⁹ in the service of achieving the goal of reunification.⁴⁰

In 1990 Helmut Kohl warned that a country that shrinks from unification for financial reasons is abdicating its role in history.⁴¹ This warning does not as yet seem to have been taken seriously in the case of Korea. Over the coming years, the economically successful South Koreans, with their ambitions to be major international players in many areas, will have to explain to the world whether reunification of the Korean peninsula is really "an imperative that sets the heart racing"⁴² or merely a pipe dream on the part of its people.

38 | Cf. Hayoon Jung, lecture given at the symposium Social cohesion and political education after unification: Germany and Korea, 14 Nov 2012, Seoul. The symposium was jointly organised by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), the Korean Association for Democratic Civic Education (KADE) and the office of the Minister for Special Affairs (OMSA).

39 | In 2009, the Republic of Korea joined the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and hence received the status of donor country.

40 | Yu Woo-ik, n. 20.

41 | Helmut Kohl, *Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinigung. Meine Erinnerungen*, Knauer, München, 2009, 269.

42 | Kim Sung-hwan, n. 18.

UKRAINE AFTER THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

REVIEW AND OUTLOOK

Gabriele Baumann / Christine Rosenberger

The parliamentary elections held in Ukraine on 28 October 2012 were heralded in advance by the European Union as an important event on the path to democratic development in the country. It was regarded that the course of the electoral campaign as well as the electoral process itself would have a direct influence on the questions of whether and when the already negotiated association agreement can be signed. A review shows that the elections did not meet European standards. This is clearly reflected in the opinions of national and international electoral observers, the opposition parties as well as the High Representative of the EU and the European Commission. Signing of the agreement has now been made conditional on having the mistakes corrected and promulgating an electoral law which meets European standards, rather than having the law modified prior to each election in accordance with the requirements of the ruling party.

In spite of the massive manipulation and targeted use of administrative resources well in advance of the election day, the parliamentary elections produced a strong opposition. It had not been expected that such a clear result would be delivered. The former governing party, the Party of Regions (PR) led by President Viktor Yanukovich, did emerge as the strongest force, but was weakened. The objective of a two-thirds majority set during the election campaign was clearly missed, as a result of which the party will initially have to rely on support from the Communists and individual independent parties when it comes to voting.



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Voters in many regions withstood attempted vote rigging by the governing party as well as the influence of populist advertising campaigns, and instead voted for the opposition parties. Their vote is a clearly positive signal for the three opposition parties, the United Opposition Batkivshchyna (Fatherland), the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) under Vitali Klitschko and the right-wing, nationalist All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda. All three together were able to record a significant boost with about ten million electoral votes. It is therefore a matter of great importance for the opposition parties to meet the electorate's expectations by presenting joint solutions and alternatives for the reform process on the path towards a sustainable democracy in Ukraine. At the same time, it is a matter of creating fair and reliable starting conditions for the presidential elections in 2015. Last but not least, the country is also facing major economic and financial problems, and both government and the Parliament need to come up with solutions for these.

ELECTION RESULTS FROM OCTOBER 2012 – NEW ELECTIONS IN FIVE CONSTITUENCIES IN EARLY 2013

It was only two weeks after the elections that the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) was able to announce the official final result of the parliamentary elections. This was not so much a matter of the proportion of votes controlling how the 225 candidates from the party lists took their seats in Parliament, rather problems arose with determining the victor amongst directly elected candidates in several constituencies. Election day had been largely free from problems, but in some cases there were significant delays at the electoral district commissions in evaluating the voting records from the individual polling stations and entering these results into the central database. In many cases, this process took several days, while some electoral districts needed almost two weeks to achieve this. In one constituency, for example, the data was manipulated while being transferred to the servers of the Central Electoral Commission, in other constituencies there were power failures during the count. In the southern Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv (also known as Nikolayev), the Berkut special unit of the Ukrainian militia stormed a

Problems arose with determining the victor amongst directly elected candidates in several constituencies. Election day had been largely free from problems, but in some cases there were significant delays.

polling station in order to confiscate ballot papers. Scuffles ensued and tear gas was fired. In the Odessa Region, a court decision was taken to declare votes invalid in one constituency which would have led to the victory of a politician from the UDAR party.

During its session on 11 November, the CEC finally announced the victors in the still undeclared first-past-the-post constituencies, but also announced at the same time that it had been impossible for it to calculate the election results in five constituencies. As a result, only 220 out of the total of 225 candidates directly entering Parliament have been declared. It is assumed that new elections will be held in spring for the five first-past-the-post constituencies no. 94 (Obukhiv, Kiev Region), no. 132 (Pervomaisk, Mykolaiv Region), no. 194 and 197 (Cherkasy Region) as well as no. 223 (Shevchenko district in the city of Kiev).


Only 220 out of the total of 225 candidates directly entering Parliament have been declared. It is assumed that new elections will be held in spring for the five first-past-the-post constituencies.

Considering the official final result for the share of deputies elected by proportional representation, the PR occupies first place with 30 per cent of the votes, followed by the Fatherland party (25.54 per cent) and the UDAR with 13.96 per cent. The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) attracted a total of 13.1 per cent of the votes cast. The surprise winner in these parliamentary elections was without doubt the right-wing national party Svoboda, which was able to enter the Verkhovna Rada for the first time, with 10.44 per cent.

This result of the proportional representation voting represents a strengthening of the opposition parties and reflects the fall in support for the governing party amongst the population. After all, according to this partial result, the PR would not have been able to form a majority in order to continue its governing work: Even together with the CPU, the United Opposition together with UDAR and Svoboda would have been able to outvote the PR. These three opposition parties together would have enjoyed a slight majority.

Fig. 1

**Official final result of the parliamentary elections 2012
(by proportional representation, in per cent)**



Source: Central Electoral Commission.

However, the passage of a new electoral law¹ in autumn 2011 reintroduced the mix of proportional and directly elected deputies, as a result of which the votes cast by proportional representation (Fig. 1) only represent part of the election result. The first-past-the-post system is used for allocating the other half of the total of 450 seats in the Verkhovna Rada, from 225 constituencies nationwide. In contrast to the electoral law in Germany in which there is a correlation between first votes cast for directly elected candidates and the number of places in the list, victories in first-past-the-post constituencies deliver additional seats in Parliament according to Ukrainian electoral law. Continuously declining polling figures indicated in advance that the PR would not achieve a majority through the party list, as a result of which it concentrated at a very early stage in the election campaign on individual first-past-the-post

1 | A detailed presentation of the electoral law, the most important parties and their candidates as well as an analysis of the events during the electoral campaign can be found in Gabriele Baumann, Christine Rosenberger, Anna Portnova and Juliane Ziegler, *Wahlhandbuch Ukraine 2012*, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Kiev, Aug 2012, http://kas.de/wf/doc/kas_31911-1522-1-30.pdf (accessed 11.12.2012).

constituencies, and the use of administrative resources in order to support the directly elected candidates. Experienced electoral observers from the Ukrainian OPORA non-governmental organisation or the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) thus reported on attempted manipulations in the first-past-the-post constituencies above all: Candidates or charitable associations founded by them distributed presents in the form of food packages, domestic goods, equipment for schools and hospitals or even money to voters.² Parties and candidates with governing responsibility enjoyed a significant advantage over opposition candidates because of their greater resources, and frequently used their position of power in order to obstruct or intimidate opposition candidates. These unequal conditions during the electoral campaign were one of the central points of criticism expressed in the subsequent assessment of the elections in the OSCE report.


Candidates or charitable associations founded by them distributed presents in the form of food packages, domestic goods, equipment for schools and hospitals or even money to voters.

The return to the mixed electoral law which had last been used in the parliamentary elections of 2002 was also decided with opposition votes. In the final analysis, it paid off for the Party of the Regions: With the help of victories in 113 out of 225 first-past-the-post constituencies, the governing party was able to boost its number of deputies in the new Parliament significantly, and secure for itself a significant advantage over the other parties. With only 39 victories in first-past-the-post constituencies, the United Opposition clearly lagged behind the Party of the Regions. Svoboda succeeded in winning twelve constituencies, whereas UDAR candidates only achieved six constituencies. The Communists were unable to win in any of the 225 constituencies.

2 | Committee of Voters of Ukraine, *Report on results of long-term monitoring on preparations for parliamentary elections in Ukraine in June 2012*, Jun 2012, http://issuu.com/victoryklymar/docs/report_cvu_lto_12_jun/3 (accessed 4 Feb 2013); *The Fourth Report on the results of all-Ukrainian observation of Parliamentary elections – July 2012*, OPORA, 2 Aug 2012, <http://oporaua.org/en/news/1786-chetvertyj-zvit-za-rezultatamy-zagalnonacionalnogo-sposterezhennja-parlamentski-vybory-2012-roku> (accessed 4 Feb 2013).

Fig. 2

Number of mandates by party list and directly elected candidates 2012³



Source: Central Electoral Commission.

Adding together the mandates obtained via the party list and by directly elected candidates, the distribution of seats in the new Verkhovna Rada is such that no party was able to form a majority immediately. For this reason, the Party of the Regions was very highly dependent on the total of 43 independent candidates and seven directly elected representatives of tiny parties in its attempt to form a majority. The independents are non-party candidates who stood for election in their constituencies, and are officially independent from the political parties taking part. In many cases, these independent candidates deliberately eschewed all other parties. This applies above all to regionally known and popular personalities who, at the same time, possess sufficient financial means to support the costs of an electoral campaign. One member of this group, for example, is Petro Poroshenko, who won his constituency in the central Ukrainian city of Vinnytsia with more than 70 per cent of the vote. The owner of the nationally known Roshen sweet

3 | The presentation only considers the 445 mandates which have been allocated so far. It is assumed that new elections will be held in spring 2013 in the five disputed constituencies for which the Central Electoral Commission was not able to calculate a result.

factory was formerly a member of various parties and governments. For example, he was Foreign Minister under President Viktor Yushchenko, and from February to October 2012 Minister for Economic Affairs in the Azarov government. At the same time, thanks to the economic success of his company – he is one of the ten wealthiest Ukrainians and is thus occasionally referred to as the “chocolate king” – Poroshenko has the necessary financial wherewithal to conduct an election campaign without party support. As far as a further proportion of the formally independent candidates is concerned, it was to be assumed in many cases that their proximity to the PR was greater than officially admitted. If any of these candidates proved capable of winning in the election, it was already expected in advance that they would enter the parliamentary group of the PR. This concerns amongst others David Zhvaniya, who stood as an independent candidate in constituency 140 in the Odessa Region, attracted just under one third of all votes and thus won a seat in the Verkhovna Rada. The transfer of the independent, directly elected candidate from constituency 18 in the Vinnytsia Region to the parliamentary group of the Party of the Regions was equally unsurprising: Grigoriy Kaletnik clearly achieved first place amongst the candidates standing in his first-past-the-post constituency, with 46 per cent of the votes, and like Zhvaniya is now a member of the parliamentary group of the Party of the Regions.

The task that faced the PR following the announcement of the election results was to induce as many as possible of the total of 43 independent deputies and the seven deputies belonging to tiny parties to come across to the parliamentary group of the Party of the Regions. The Party of the Regions was not lacking possible leverage to increase the pressure on these candidates:


Some deputies found the decision to make the transfer was facilitated by the prospect of funding being allocated from the state budget to their constituencies. In the event that such suggestions did not bear fruit, the next step was to embark on “individual work” with every single candidate – such measures could even amount to a threat of an investigation for tax evasion in individual cases. As a result, it was announced when the new Verkhovna Rada first convened

Some deputies found the decision to make the transfer was facilitated by the prospect of funding. In the event that this did not bear fruit, the next step was to embark on “individual work”.

on 12 December that 25 of the independent candidates had changed to the parliamentary group of the PR, while two of the previously independent deputies switched to the UDAR parliamentary group and one moved over to the Communists. The Party of the Regions also attempted to win over deputies from the opposition parties to cooperate with the governing parliamentary group. According to media reports, for example, one UDAR deputy had been offered five million U.S. dollars to switch parliamentary group.⁴ The gloves have been and will presumably remain off when it comes to securing the majority in the new Parliament, as long as the governing parliamentary group continues to lack sufficient votes in order to command a majority by itself.

Fig. 3

Distribution of seats in the new Verkhovna Rada⁵



Source: Central Electoral Commission.

A study of the voting behaviour by region shows a clear east/west divide, which was already a characteristic of Ukraine in earlier elections: Whereas the inhabitants of Western and Central Ukraine voted for the United Opposition (except for the Lviv Region which was won by Svoboda), in the eastern and southern parts of the country, the PR swept the board by proportional representation. Basically, nothing has changed about this east/west divide:

4 | "Депутату от Кличко предлагали 5 миллионов за то, чтобы стать 'гушкой'" (Klitschko deputies were offered five million dollars to defect from their parliamentary group), *Ukrainska Pravda*, 7 Dec 2012, <http://pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2012/12/7/6978931> (accessed 4 Feb 2013).

5 | See n. 3.

Once again, the majority in Western and Central Ukraine including the capital Kiev voted for the Orange camp – 2007 for the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and (BYuT) and 2012 for the United Opposition Batkivshchyna, whereas the east and south of the country voted for the PR. There is only a single exception to this rule – the Trans-Carpathian or Zakarpattia Region in the extreme west, which had been part of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Ukraine or the Soviet Union during the 20th century, and is the only region in the west to have voted in the majority for the PR.

Table 1

Distribution of seats in the new Verkhovna Rada

	Party of the Regions	CPU	Independent candidates, small parties	Fatherland	UDAR	Svoboda
Mandates by proportional representation	72	32	0	62	34	25
Mandate by first-past-the-post election	113	0	43 + 7	39	6	12
Number of mandates	185	32	50	101	40	37
Of which deputies who did not join the parliamentary group	-1*	-1*	- 28	- 2**	0	-1*
Transferred to the corresponding parliamentary group	+ 25	+ 1	+5	0	+ 2	0
Total (majority at 226 mandates)	209	32	27	99	42	36

* The parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Rybak (PR) and his two deputies Igor Kalyetnik (CPU) and Ruslan Koshulinsky (Svoboda) had to set aside their parliamentary group membership in order to take up their office, and are counted in the group of independent deputies.

** Father and son Tabalov were candidates of the United Opposition Batkivshchyna, but did not join the parliamentary group, remaining independent.

Table 2
**Electoral winners by proportional representation
 in the regions (in per cent)**

Region	Electoral winners 2012	Proportion of the vote 2012	Electoral winners 2007	Proportion of the vote 2007
Western Ukraine				
Volhynia	Fatherland	39.46	BYuT	57.59
Lviv	Svoboda	38.01	BYuT	50.38
Zakarpattia	PR	30.87	Our Ukraine	31.11
Rivne	Fatherland	36.59	BYuT	50.97
Ternopil	Fatherland	39.04	BYuT	51.57
Ivano-Frankivsk	Fatherland	38.21	BYuT	50.67
Chernivtsi	Fatherland	39.60	BYuT	46.17
Central Ukraine				
Zhytomyr	Fatherland	36.15	BYuT	37.00
Khmelnyskyi	Fatherland	37.17	BYuT	48.16
Vinnysia	Fatherland	45.01	BYuT	49.97
Kiev Region	Fatherland	36.63	BYuT	53.38
Kiev city	Fatherland	30.96	BYuT	46.18
Cherkasy	Fatherland	37.77	BYuT	47.03
Kirovohrad	Fatherland	32.16	BYuT	37.57
Chernihiv	Fatherland	30.73	BYuT	41.92
Sumy	Fatherland	36.27	BYuT	44.45
Poltava	Fatherland	30.14	BYuT	37.86
Eastern Ukraine				
Kharkiv	PR	40.98	PR	49.16
Luhansk	PR	57.06	PR	73.53
Donetsk	PR	65.09	PR	72.05
Dnipropetrovsk	PR	35.79	PR	48.15
Zaporizhia	PR	40.95	PR	55.45

Southern Ukraine

Odessa	PR	41.90	PR	52.22
Mykolaiv	PR	40.51	PR	54.40
Kherson	PR	29.34	PR	43.23
Autonomous Republic of Crimea	PR	52.34	PR	60.99
Sevastopol city	PR	46.90	PR	64.53

Source: Central Electoral Commission.

Voter turnout at about 58 per cent nationwide was significantly lower than five years ago, when 65 per cent of those entitled to vote took part in the voting. The highest turnout was recorded in the Lviv Region with 67 per cent, while the lowest was in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where only one in two of those entitled to vote took part.

Table 3

Comparison of voter turnout: 2012 and 2007

	2012	2007
Number of registered voters	35.8 m	37.2 m
Number of voters who voted	20.8 m	24.2 m
Voter turnout	58.1%	65.1%
Region with the lowest voter turnout	49.5% (Crimea)	47.6% (Zakarpattia)
Region with the highest voter turnout	67.1% (Lviv)	71.2% (Ternopil)

Source: Central Electoral Commission.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE ELECTIONS

According to the OSCE report, significant irregularities and restricted transparency in adding up the results occurred to a greater or lesser extent in one third of the electoral district commissions during the course of the election night

and over the following two weeks.⁶ At the press conference held by the International Election Observation Commissions of the OSCE, Europarat, the European Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on 29 October, the heads of the individual missions did indeed themselves evaluate the procedure of the electoral day as largely calm and peaceful, although at the same time they expressed significant criticism regarding the uneven playing field that existed during the election campaign between the government candidates and opposition candidates, as well as the lack of transparency during the process of evaluating and transmitting the voting records following closure of the polling stations. The head of the short-term election observation mission of the OSCE, Walburga Habsburg Douglas, observed that Ukraine had taken a step back from democracy as a result of the abuse of power and the significant role played by money in these elections.⁷

Some members of the opposition proposed not taking up the mandates in protest. New elections were demanded throughout the country.

The three opposition parties, United Opposition, Svoboda and UDAR, claimed during the week following the elections that they had lost votes in 13 constituencies due to the irregularities. Some members of the opposition proposed not taking up the mandates in protest. New elections were demanded throughout the country. The first week following the election day was characterised by protest gatherings held in front of the building of the Central Electoral Commission in Kiev Yulia Tymoshenko embarked on a hunger strike in protest against the manipulations of the election results. The government did not respond until 2 November: Prime Minister Azarov declared on this day that neither the government nor the PR had anything to do with the complications which arose during the counting of votes in the problematic constituencies.⁸ On 6 November, the Central

6 | Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE), Election Observation Mission Ukraine, *Post-Election Interim Report 29 October-6 November 2012*, <http://osce.org/odihr/elections/97077> (accessed 7 Dec 2012).

7 | OSCE, Election Observation Mission Ukraine, "Ukrainian elections marred by lack of level playing field, say international observers", press release, 29 Oct 2012, <http://osce.org/odihr/elections/96673> (accessed 10 Dec 2012).

8 | "Азаров: Ни Партия регионов, ни Кабмин не причастны к проблемам на округах" (Asarov: Neither the Party of the Regions nor the cabinet of ministers were involved in the problems with the constituencies), *Ukrainska Pravda*, >

Electoral Commission decided at the recommendation of the Verkhovna Rada to announce new elections in five constituencies, since it regarded itself incapable of confirming an official final result there.

THE FIVE POLITICAL FORCES IN THE PARLIAMENT

Party of the Regions (PR)

The de facto victor of the parliamentary elections is also one of the major vote losers compared to the 2007 parliamentary elections: According to data from the Central Electoral Commission for 2007 and 2012, 1.9 million fewer voters checked the box for the Party of the Regions than had been the case five years before. This may be related on the one hand to disappointment felt by former Party of the Regions voters with the work done by the government, while on the other hand it may be connected to the lower voter turnout compared to 2007.

The PR focused its election campaign above all on the goal of increasing living standards, and in doing so was happy to refer repeatedly to what had already been achieved: The party included above all numerous investments in the infrastructure that the government undertook as part of the preparations for the UEFA Championships in summer 2012 – including expansion of motorways, building of new and/or renovation of stadiums and airports in the four host cities as well as the deployment of new high-speed trains on the most important routes.


The Party of Regions had always emphasised that it stands for modernisation and economic growth, and during the election campaign in the summer, it emphasised that the first positive effects of the reforms set in train by the government were starting to show. It included in this a reduction in the state deficit over the period 2010 to 2012 as well as a low inflation rate and repayment of a large part of the national debt at the start of 2012. However, the actual situation at the end of 2012 was significantly more negative: Industrial production declined by 4.2 per cent compared to the previous year in October alone, economic growth during 2012

The Party of Regions had always emphasised that it stands for modernisation and economic growth, and that the first positive effects of the reforms were starting to show.

was only 0.5 per cent, the current account deficit is 7.8 per cent of gross domestic product and support purchases for the currency by the national bank have rapidly decimated the currency reserves by 15 per cent since the start of the year.⁹ On top of all this, the Standard & Poor’s rating agency downgraded Ukraine to the score of B.

Fig. 4

Comparison of votes: Parliamentary elections 2007 and 2012 (in millions)



* 2007: Figures for BYuT

** 2012: Figures for the Fatherland-Party

Source: Central Electoral Commission.

With its 209-strong parliamentary group, the party clearly missed its self-appointed goal of capturing the simple parliamentary majority of 226 votes under its own steam. Nevertheless, the PR did succeed in having not only Mykola Azarov elected as head of government but also in appointing the parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Rybak –

9 | Ricardo Giucci and Robert Kirchner, "Braucht die Ukraine ein neues IWF-Programm?" (Does Ukraine need a new IMF programme?), German Advisory Group, newsletter, No. 51, Nov 2012, http://beratergruppe-ukraine.de/download/Newsletter/2012/Newsletter_51_2012_Deutsche%20Beratergruppe.pdf?PHPSESSID=02e450fc2207936eb4bf0e2d03e05033 (accessed 12 Dec 2012).

in each case with the help of the Communists and some independent deputies. Rybak, like President Yanukovich, comes from Donetsk and is deputy party chairman.

United Opposition Batkivshchyna (Fatherland)

Not only the PR but also the opposition was obliged to take losses compared to 2007: Five years ago, the Yulia Tymoshenko Block (BYuT) achieved just under a 31 per cent share of the vote with 7.2 million votes cast. For the 2012 parliamentary elections, the party of Yulia Tymoshenko merged with the Front Smin (Front for Change) of Arseniy Yatsenyuk and five other small opposition parties to form the United Opposition Batkivshchyna, in order to present a democratic alternative to the PR with a unified force. In the new Parliament, Batkivshchyna is now represented by 99 deputies, and the parliamentary group is chaired by Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Immediately before the constituent parliamentary session, it was announced that two deputies of Batkivshchyna would not remain in the opposition parliamentary group, but would function as independent deputies. The level of anger regarding the two defectors (father and son Tabalov) was expressed in the scuffles that broke out directly on the first day of the new parliamentary session: Deputies from the three opposition parties attempted to block access of the two defectors to the chamber by means of force, in order to prevent them from taking their oath and thus forcing them to lay down their mandate. However, this attempt failed.

Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR)

The UDAR under Vitali Klitschko was able to achieve a significant result as a newly founded party, attracting 2.8 million votes during its first parliamentary elections. With its pro-European and reform-oriented election ma-

nifesto, Vitali Klitschko and his team appealed above all to voters under 40 years old from Central and Western Ukraine, with a medium to high level of education. Many UDAR voters regarded this party as offering a promising alternative to the familiar faces of the United Opposition, the leadership elite of which had failed to live up to the hopes and expectations of the population for implementing

With its pro-European and reform-oriented election manifesto, Vitali Klitschko and his team appealed above all to voters under 40 years old from Central and Western Ukraine.

reforms in many respects during the years in government following the Orange Revolution of 2004; instead, this leadership had on occasion stymied itself with internal wrangling. UDAR was able to succeed because many Ukrainian voters with an opposition inclination were looking for a new face with a more European-oriented political culture. In its election manifesto, the party called for, amongst other things, the creation of a new relationship between the state and citizenry based on recognition of the independence and autonomy of the citizen in relation to the state. For this purpose, UDAR is striving for a reorientation with a view to the fundamental values of Ukrainian society, towards a strengthening of the principle of self-responsibility and liberating the citizen from excessive state influence. This objective also encompasses the requirement for strengthening of local self-administration and a more systematic integration of civil society into the political process. In economic terms, UDAR is promoting the creation of a legal framework for the Ukrainian economy to be flexible and competitive, and to be driven by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Within the political process, UDAR is demanding greater transparency and a political culture that is more strongly oriented towards the long-term requirements of the country than towards the personal gain of individual politicians. In the constituent session of the Parliament, the UDAR parliamentary group comprised 42 deputies, meaning that in addition to the 40 mandates achieved in the elections, two deputies who had stood as independent candidates decided to join the parliamentary group. The party leader Vitali Klitschko will also head the parliamentary group in Parliament.

Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)

The CPU gained more than twice as many votes as in the 2007 elections. In absolute terms, it was able to increase its electorate from 1.2 million to 2.7 million.

Even though it was unable to win a single constituency directly, the Communists – as well as the right-wing nationalist Svoboda party – emerged as the surprise victors of

these elections. The CPU gained more than twice as many votes as in the 2007 elections. In absolute terms, it was able to increase its electorate from 1.2 million to 2.7 million. The disappointment felt by many voters with the PR played into the hands of the CPU, because the core electorate of the PR and the CPU overlaps in many respects. As a result,

many disappointed citizens who had previously voted for the governing party regarded the Communists as a natural alternative: Both parties appeal above all to the electorate above 50 years of age in the southeast and east of the country, which tends to be Russian speaking, and with a medium standard of education. Its election campaign was critical of the government and the CPU promised a political reorientation in economic and social policy.

The parliamentary group of the Communists numbers 32 deputies: One of the independent candidates decided to join the CPU parliamentary group, whilst at the same time Igor Kalyetnik had to lay down his parliamentary group membership because he has taken the office of first deputy parliamentary speaker in the new Verkhovna Rada. The chairman of the parliamentary group is party leader Petro Symonenko.

All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda (Freedom)

The large gain in votes for the Svoboda party was one of the surprises of the election day. The party had previously drawn its chief support from the west of the country where Ukrainian nationalism is more pronounced, but was able to increase its reservoir of voters by just fewer than two million, to an increasing extent in Central Ukraine and even expanded eastward, although to a much lower extent. In 18 of the 27 regions, Svoboda overcame the five-per-cent hurdle, whilst it even finished ahead of the other parties amongst Ukrainian voters living abroad, with

23.6 per cent of the votes cast. In 2007, the party was still a long way from achieving the three-per-cent hurdle which applied at the time, attracting only 0.76 per cent of the votes nationwide. The significant increase

in approval for Svoboda is above all due to voters who cannot actually be called radical nationalists, and who consequently do not belong to Svoboda's original electorate: According to analysts, a significant proportion of Svoboda supporters voted for the party more from strategic considerations or as an expression of protest than because of their ideological identification with the extreme right

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grouping.¹⁰ In this way, some of the voters wanted to vote with a pronounced Ukrainian nationalist approach as a means of showing their rejection of various government initiatives such as the language law which they had regarded as anti-Ukrainian. Tactical considerations may also have played a role with many Svoboda voters: By using their vote to help the right-wing national party to overcome the five-per-cent hurdle and thus take its seats in the new Parliament, they ensured that the opposition forces in the Verkhovna Rada would be as inflexible as possible, and immune from “defectors” to the government camp (referred to as *tushki*), because of the party’s radical rejection of the government’s work and due to its being regarded as highly disciplined.¹¹

Svoboda’s agenda included not only populist measures such as nationalising some important key companies of the country, but also the quite sensible demand for lower taxes for small and medium enterprises.

During the electoral campaign, the party criticised the oligarchical economic structures prevailing in Ukraine, and positioned itself as an anti-liberal party. Its agenda presented during the electoral campaign included not only populist measures such as nationalising some important

key companies of the country, but also the quite sensible demand for lower taxes for small and medium enterprises.¹² An important goal in the party’s programme is to create a strong Ukrainian state along the lines of “social and national justice”. In accordance with the party’s intentions, the state should adopt its “deserved place amongst the leading countries of the world”, and ensure the continuous development of the Ukrainian nation.¹³ In order to achieve this, the party focuses

10 | Andreas Umland, “Nichtideologische Motivationen der Svoboda-Wähler: Hypothesen zum Elektorat der ukrainischen radikalen Nationalisten bei den Parlamentswahlen vom Oktober 2012” (Non-ideological motivations of Svoboda voters: Hypothesis on the electorate of the Ukrainian radical nationalists during the parliamentary elections in October 2012), *Ukraine-Analysis*, No. 109, 13 Nov 2012, Research Centre Eastern Europe at the University of Bremen and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde (DGO), 8 et seq., <http://www.laender-analysen.de/ukraine/pdf/UkraineAnalysen109.pdf> (accessed 11 Dec 2012).

11 | Ibid.

12 | Tadeusz A. Olszański, “The electoral success of the Svoboda Party – the consequences for Ukrainian politics”, Centre for Eastern Studies, *OSW Commentary*, No. 97, 28 Nov 2012, http://osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_97.pdf (accessed 10 Dec 2012).

13 | Vgl. Svoboda, “Програма ВО ‘Свобода’ – Програма захисту українців” (Programme of the Svoboda party – programme for the protection of Ukrainians), http://svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama (accessed 31 Jan 2013).

on its demand for the dismissal of the government which it regards as anti-Ukrainian.

The parliamentary group appointed its party leader Oleh Tyahnybok as its chairman. By the agreement of the three opposition parties, the Svoboda deputy Ruslan Koshulinsky was proposed for the post of deputy parliamentary speaker, and elected with the approval of 305

deputies. Due to his election, he had to set his membership of the parliamentary group in abeyance, as a result of which the Svoboda parliamentary group now only comprises 36

deputies. The fact that the three opposition parties united on Koshulinsky as their joint candidate underscores the increasingly important position adopted by Svoboda within the opposition. The Svoboda deputies displayed extreme inflexibility during the first parliamentary sessions, and through their influence the opposition as a whole has been radicalised.

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The electoral gains by the Svoboda party attracted international criticism. The high level of votes attracted by the party which had come to attention in the past through anti-Semitic statements gave rise to concern. For example, party leader Oleh Tyahnybok said in a speech in 2004 that Ukraine was governed by a "Muscovite-Jewish mafia", and that the country should finally be given back to Ukrainians. As a result, on 13 December, the European Parliament appealed to democratically minded parties in the Verkhovna Rada not to enter into a coalition with the Svoboda party or to support it, because its racist and anti-Semitic attitudes could not be brought into accord with European values and principles.¹⁴ Irrespective of this call, the parliamentary group chairman of Batkivshchyna, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, announced on the same day that his party wanted to continue its cooperation with Svoboda. There is a certain amount of ideological disagreement between Batkivshchyna and Svoboda, but nevertheless at the same time both parties are in pursuit of a common goal, explained Yatsenyuk in justification of this decision,

14 | European Parliament, "European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 on the situation in Ukraine (2012/2889(RSP))", <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0507+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (accessed 3 Jan 2013).

this goal being to dismiss the current government.¹⁵ As a result, cooperation with Svoboda can be explained above all through pragmatic arguments: It is only by the three opposition parties coming together that they can jointly stand a chance of opposing the governing party's projects.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEPUTIES IN THE NEW VERKHOVNA RADA

The new Parliament only differs insignificantly from the old one in terms of its gender and age structure. Eight per cent of the deputies in the fifth Verkhovna Rada (2007-2012) were female – 36 women out of 450 deputies – and 43 women are represented in the new Parliament. This amounts to just under ten per cent of the 445 mandates which have been allocated so far. In terms of the proportion of women in its Parliament, Ukraine is clearly in the last quarter of 190 investigated countries by international comparison.¹⁶ The age structure has scarcely changed compared to the last Parliament. The average age of the 445 deputies is 48 years. Of the five parties represented in Parliament, Svoboda is the youngest parliamentary group with an average age of 42 years. The two oldest parliamentary groups with an average age of 50 years are the PR and the Communists.

One particular feature of the new Verkhovna Rada concerns the many family relations between the individual deputies. Family ties have always played a role in the composition of previous Ukrainian parliaments, but in the latest parliamentary elections it appears that this phenomenon is especially prevalent. In total, about 50 of the elected representatives are related to political personalities at national or regional level. These clan-like structures are particularly pronounced in the Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk Regions.¹⁷

15 | "Яценюк пообещал сотрудничать со 'Свободой' несмотря на мнение Европарламента" (Yatsenyuk promises to continue cooperating with Svoboda despite the European Parliament's resolution), *Ukrainska Pravda*, 13 Dec 2012, <http://pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2012/12/13/6979670> (accessed 3 Jan 2013).

16 | Cf. Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in international parliaments", status 31 Oct 2012, <http://ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif311012.htm> (accessed 30 Nov 2012).

17 | Denis Rafalsky, "Family ties that bind parliament", *Kyiv Post*, 16 Nov 2012.

The best-known relatives are the second son of the President, Viktor Yanukovich junior, who is taking his place for the third time in the Verkhovna Rada, like the son of the Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov. The son of the Chief Prosecutor, Viktor Pshonka, will also sit in the new Parliament for the Party of the Regions. At the same time, some pairs of brothers won their respective constituencies – including the party leader of the Svoboda party, Oleh Tyahnybok and his younger brother as well as the Baloha brothers from the Zakarpattia Region, all of whom stood as direct candidates for the tiny United Centre party. As far as some of the newly elected deputies are concerned, their chief qualification for the office of deputy appears to be their family ties to high-ranking political personalities. These findings underscore the high level of nepotism which prevails in Ukraine.

FORMATION OF THE PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT AT THE TURN OF THE YEAR

On 12 December, the newly elected deputies of the seventh Verkhovna Rada met for the constituent parliamentary session. Of the 30 parliamentary committees, 13 will be chaired by deputies from the Party of the Regions, nine committees are chaired by deputies from the United Opposition, three will be led by UDAR representatives, two by CPU deputies, two by independents and one by a Svoboda representative. Immediately before the constituent session of the Parliament, President Viktor Yanukovich announced that he would propose Mykola Azarov to Parliament once again for confirmation as Prime Minister. On 13 December, Azarov was confirmed in his post with a majority of 252 votes (deputies of the Party of the Regions, the Communists and twelve independent delegates).

On 24 December, about ten days after the constitution of the Parliament, President Viktor Yanukovich appointed the members of the new government under Prime Minister Mykola Azarov. **By giving some key positions to close allies, Yanukovich has strengthened his immediate entourage, often referred to in the Ukrainian media as the “family”.** By giving some key positions to close allies, Yanukovich has strengthened his immediate entourage, often referred to in the Ukrainian media as the “family”. The members of the “family” include above all people who have personal relations with the President himself or with his eldest son Oleksandr, for example the former head of

the Ukrainian National Bank, Serhiy Arbuzov. In the new government, the latter holds the position of first deputy Prime Minister, and according to reports in the Ukrainian media he may well inherit Mykola Azarov's post as head of government before too long.

Oleksandr Klymenko has also had a new department created for him, namely the Ministry of Revenues and Duties. His responsibilities include above all taxation and customs questions.

Other appointments from the close entourage of the President include Olena Lukash, a former adviser to the President, for whom Yanukovych has created the new office of Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers. As a confidante of the President, she will represent the direct line between the Presidential palace and the Cabinet of Ministers, ensuring that the President's influence is extended to the Cabinet of Ministers. Oleksandr Klymenko has also had a new department created for him, namely the Ministry of Revenues and Duties. His responsibilities include above all taxation and customs questions, and in view of the importance of this role, the ministry is also referred to as a "super ministry" in the media. Other important posts have also fallen to personalities from Yanukovych's close entourage, such as the Ministry of Energy Generation and Coal Mining that is now headed by the former Environment Minister, Eduard Stavit-sky, and the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, to Oleh Proskuryakov. Minister of Finance Yuriy Kolobov, Minister of Internal Affairs Vitaliy Zakharchenko as well as the Russophile Minister of Education and Science, Youth and Sport, Dmytro Tabachnyk (known for his disputed education policy) remain in their post.

In addition to strengthening the position of persons close to the President within the government, another effect that is apparent is an increase in the influence of the Donetsk oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov, who is by far and away the richest Ukrainian and an important business partner of the President. For example, Ihor Prasolov, up to 2005 the Managing Director of the System Capital Management company owned by Akhmetov, is now the Minister of Economic Development and Trade. Another acquaintance of Akhmetov has been appointed deputy Prime Minister with responsibilities for regional development, construction and infrastructure: Oleksandr Vilkul was previously not only governor of the Dnipropetrovsk Region, but also, amongst

other things, the head of various companies owned by Akhmetov.

For many observers, it will not have been entirely surprising to see Natalia Korolevska appointed the Minister of Social Policy. This strategic move confirmed all the suspicions that Natalia Korolevska's Ukraine – Forward! party was merely a government project to divert votes away from the opposition parties. With a brash poster campaign on the streets of Ukraine, Ms. Korolevska and her team, including the popular elite footballer Andriy Shevchenko, had attempted to convince the Ukrainian population to join her project for a “new economy and a new land”. During the election campaign, she consistently denied having links to the government camp, and presented her party as a genuine opposition force. However, it appears that the Ukrainian population did not put its trust in these reassurances, as demonstrated by the poor performance of Ukraine – Forward! in the parliamentary elections: With only 1.58 per cent of the votes, the new party project did not manage to gain any seats in Parliament. The leadership candidate Korolevska will now sit in Azarov's cabinet, despite having publicly called for his replacement in the election campaign.

DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY

The year 2012 was by no means a good one for the Ukrainian economy: Growth declined significantly, the world bank attributed only minimum growth in gross domestic product (GDP) of 0.5 per cent for Ukraine in 2012.

Also, 2013 is not expected to deliver any significant improvements. Even now, it is clear that Ukraine will have to repay loans amounting to just under nine billion U.S. dollars to foreign creditors, with about 5.8 billion U.S. dollars of this going to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) alone. It remains to be clarified whether the IMF will resume the payments this year from its loan assistance programme which were frozen more than one year ago. In order to achieve this, the Ukrainian government would have to declare its agreement with a catalogue of wide-ranging demands by the IMF regarding adaptation of macroeconomic policies. It is highly probable that this would include the demand to surrender the fixed exchange

If the IMF is to will resume the payments which were frozen more than one year ago, the Ukrainian government would have to declare its agreement with a catalogue of wide-ranging demands.

rate between the hryvnia and the U.S. dollar, and instead introduce a flexible exchange rate. Secondly, the Ukrainian government would probably also have to declare its agreement with a raft of more restrictive measures in fiscal policy. Primarily in this regard is the IMF demand for a gradual increase in the prices for gas and heating for private households, which are kept artificially low by state subsidies. These impose an annual burden on the Ukrainian national budget of about six per cent of GDP, currently corresponding to about the same amount that Ukraine spends on education.

The Ukrainian population can scarcely be expected to appreciate these demands. The government in Kiev was correspondingly reluctant to take measures to increase the gas price directly ahead of the parliamentary elections. The parliamentary elections have now finished, but presidential elections are due within two years, so the next important political deadline is approaching. Such an unpopular measure as increasing the prices of gas is something that President Yanukovich will most likely not wish to implement before 2015, particularly since this would endanger his chances of re-election which appear in any

Putin is demanding that Kiev enters the customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as granting approval for the purchase of the Ukrainian gas transit system.

case to be in jeopardy. It appears much more convenient for the President and government to obtain commitments for price reductions on gas imports from Russia, thereby killing two birds with one stone: Firstly, this method would allow the strain on the Ukrainian budget to be reduced; secondly the country would not have to take the harsh medicine prescribed by the IMF, whilst nevertheless obtaining greater freedom for itself in financial terms. However, Russia's President Vladimir Putin will not grant these concessions without a quid pro quo from Ukraine. He is demanding that Kiev enters the customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as granting approval for the purchase of the Ukrainian gas transit system by Gazprom. Only then would it be realistic to expect the gas price to be reduced to the level paid by Belarus, namely only 166 U.S. dollars per 1,000 cubic metres of Russian gas. At the moment, Ukraine pays 426 U.S. dollars per 1,000 cubic metres, which is a significantly higher price than Germany does, for example. In the short term, such a financial easement would be a shot in the arm for the

Ukrainian national budget. At the same time it would only postpone a resolution of the structural problems that prevail in the Ukrainian economy.

IMPORTANCE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FOR RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

In mid-January 2013, the latest survey results on attitudes in the Ukrainian population towards the European Union or a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan were published. The Democratic Initiatives foundation surveyed more than 2,000 people nationwide. The majority, 42.4 per cent of those surveyed, declared themselves in favour of Ukraine joining the EU, whilst only 32.1 per cent were in favour of integration in the customs union – the younger the age of the survey population, the clearer the tendency in favour of the EU.¹⁸ As a result, many voters in Ukraine deliberately decided to support the opposition parties with their pro-European course. At the same time, however, a majority of those surveyed believes Ukraine is currently failing to proceed in either direction. This is due above all to the see-saw policy of the President and government of Ukraine between Russia and the EU: The association agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which not only includes a political section but also provides for an extensive free-trade zone between both partners, has still not been signed in spite of a preparatory phase that lasted more than five years. Most recently on 10 December, the European Union clearly expressed the conditions for signing the association agreement, in a decision by EU foreign ministers taken after the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012: Reforms in the area of the rule of law must be undertaken in accordance with European norms. Politically motivated justice must be revised, on the basis of the judgements of the European Court of Justice for Human Rights. As a result of negative experience with implementing the mixed electoral law during the parliamentary elections in 2012, the electoral law must be set on new and reliable footing.

18 | Cf. Survey by the Democratic Initiatives: "EU or customs union? Where do the citizens want to go?", http://dif.org.ua/modules/pages/files/1358144625_2255.pdf (accessed 17 Jan 2013).

At the start of 2013 it is apparent that the rhetoric is moving more and more towards the association agreement. The parliament announced to strive for a joint resolution on European integration.

If the European Union observes significant process in these three core areas during the course of this year, it might be possible for the association agreement to be signed at the EU summit of the Eastern Partnership in Vilnius in November 2013. A further delay beyond this date would be tantamount to killing off the agreement, which would have fatal consequences not only for the relationship between Ukraine and the EU, but also and in particular with regard to the urgently required process of reform and modernisation for the country. To what extent the new government and the Parliament will implement the reform agenda agreed jointly with the EU remains to be seen. At the start of 2013, at least, it is apparent that the rhetoric is moving more and more towards the association agreement. It is hoped that a declaration on the signature will be achieved during the EU-Ukraine summit on 25 February. Parliamentary speaker Rybak already announced during the first days of the new year that all five parliamentary groups in the newly elected Parliament were striving to reach a joint resolution on European integration, and entry to the customs union was not on the agenda.

OUTLOOK

The sullenness of the voters concerning the continuing difficult economic and social situation in Ukraine has reached a high level, and might increase further up to the presidential elections in early 2015. Preparations for this next key political event are set to dominate political life at the latest following the elections to the Kiev city council which are slated for May 2013. The United Opposition *Batkivshchyna* already selected Yulia Tymoshenko to be its presidential candidate on 7 December. However, it should by no means be ruled out that Vitali Klitschko (UDAR) and Oleh Tyahnybok (Svoboda) could also stand.

The governing party itself has already set things in motion to remain in power as well. On 6 November, the old Parliament passed the "Law on an All-Ukrainian Referendum" as an emergency measure with 265 votes, and President Yanukovich signed the law into force on 27 November. This promulgation lays the basis for changes to the constitution through referendums. In the event of a redrafting of the

constitution and at the initiative of citizens, the President can call a referendum. To make an application, it is necessary to have three million signatures of citizens from two thirds of the regions, each of which must have at least 100,000 signatures. In the past, changes to the constitution could not be approved without a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Immediately after signature of the law by the President on 28 November, Arseniy Yatsenyuk expressed his fear that a referendum could open the door for Ukraine to join the customs union, as well as having the president elected by Parliament, instead of the direct election by the population which has been practised so far. In addition, there would be a danger of manipulation similar to what happened in the presidential elections. Viktor Medvedchuk, the former director of the presidential administration under Leonid Kutschma and a close confidant of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, attracted attention during recent months with his Direct Democracy campaign. Medvedchuk has already announced that the first referendum after the law comes into force should be used for entry into the customs union.

In the meantime, the EU is keeping the door open for Ukraine. However, the more the signature of the association agreement is kicked into the long grass, the more people will notice that solutions are lacking regarding implementation of a European perspective for Ukraine. The more the discussion about Europe recedes into the background, the easier it will become to decide for a customs union with Russia as part of a referendum. It is thus important and even more urgent than in 2012 for Germany and Brussels to send a clear message to Kiev, in addition to disseminating information about the importance and content of the association agreement, to make it clear that the European Union represents the correct long-term partner in the reform process that is so important for the future of Ukraine.

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