

KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS

YOUNG PEOPLE AND THEIR POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT



■ **The Youth Factor – Innovative Election Campaign Methods in the USA and their Transferability to Germany**
Stefan Burgdörfer

■ **Uganda's Youth: Opportunities and Challenges in the Second Youngest Country in the World**
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■ **The President's Young Guard – Kirchnerist Youth Organisation La Cámpora Quietly and Secretly Turns Argentina Upside Down**
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■ **Elections in Ecuador – President Correa's Election Victory Allows for Unlimited Continuation of the "People's Revolution"**
Winfried Weck


■ **Israel and Climate Change**
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■ **Black Belt Politics – Lithuania's President Dalia Grybauskaitė**
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
■ **Non-Governmental Organisations in Russia: On the Situation one Year After Putin's Re-Election**
Lars Peter Schmidt / Johann C. Fuhrmann



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Klingelhöferstraße 23
10785 Berlin
Germany
Phone (030) 2 69 96-33 83
Fax (030) 2 69 96-35 63
Internet: <http://www.kas.de>
<http://www.kas.de/internationalreports>
e-mail: stefan.burgdoerfer@kas.de

Account Details:

Commerzbank AG, Bonn Branch,
Account № 110 63 43, Sort Code 380 400 07
IBAN DE64 3804 0007 0110 6343 00
BIC COBADEFF

Editor:

Dr. Gerhard Wahlers

Editorial Team:

Frank Priess
Dr. Wolfgang Maier
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Gisela Elsner
Dr. Stefan Friedrich
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Jens Paulus

Editor-in-chief:

Stefan Burgdörfer

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EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's motto for 2013 is "Prospects for Young People". What is important to us in this area on the one hand is their views, i.e. discovering more about young people's attitudes and exchanging ideas with them. On the other hand, our view is toward the *prospects* available to young people, that is, their opportunities for the future and the political framework required to realise these. Relevant issues in this context include sustainable politics, political participation and future-proofing our social security systems. However, when one looks towards Southern Europe and particularly the labour markets, the outlook for young people is anything but promising.


Particularly in the southern member states of the euro zone – Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece – youth unemployment is extremely high. In Spain it is nearly 55 per cent; in Greece, 64 per cent of 15 to 24-year-olds are unemployed. Many of those affected are very well qualified and are seeking to make use of their knowledge and acquired skills. The fact that they are not able to do so in their home countries is partly due to structural reasons. These originate in inadequate education and training systems and, not least, in an overregulated labour market. Current legislation tends to protect the person in a job, whatever their qualification and, as is the case in the public sector in Greece, disregards the question as to whether the particular job needs retaining. The trade unions also play a major role in preventing more favourable dynamics that would result in greater economic growth, a reduction in the pressures on the social security systems and savings in the public sector. In the private sector, it has been and still is young employees on temporary contracts who are the first to lose their jobs.

Ever greater numbers of young, well-qualified southern Europeans see no prospects in their own country. They are drawn to other European countries, particularly to Germany. Last year, the influx of southern Europeans to the Federal Republic has seen a shift in pace. A 45 per cent rise was recorded for Spain, followed by Greece and Portugal with 43 per cent each and Italy with 40 per cent. In total, almost 120,000 people migrated to Germany from these four countries. Young, well qualified people from Southern Europe working in this country for a while is beneficial to all sides. It takes the pressure off the strained labour market in their home country, they can plug labour gaps in Germany, the money they send back to support their families boosts the domestic economy there and finally, working temporarily in Germany means that they gain further skills and practical experience. Particularly in technical occupations, a long spell of unemployment carries the risk of failing to keep up with developments in the field. Not least, their search for a job in an economically more successful foreign country also helps the young people to avoid a psychological trap, namely the feeling that they are already on the scrapheap at their young age.

It is not surprising that the dissatisfaction of young people in Southern Europe is reflected in their voting habits. During the 2012 elections, young people in Greece voted for populist or extremist parties in greater proportions than the population as a whole, thus propping up political fringe elements that are not interested in reforms and a consistent austerity policy. 34 per cent of Greeks below the age of 24 voted for a radical party: the fascist Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) or the coalition of the radical left Syriza.


In December 2012, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung opened an office in Athens. Our involvement in Greece is geared particularly towards young people. We support young entrepreneurs and start-ups on the ground in order to help provide a more solid base for the business ideas of students and young people embarking on a career to facilitate their medium and long-term success. Further objectives include the provision of support to reforming endeavours, promoting an exchange of ideas between Greece and Germany and supporting civil society forces in their efforts to foster a democratic environment. The impression that the

existing policies and economic order are not capable of procuring prospects for young people will only crystallise if the reforming efforts in Greece, as well as in the other euro zone countries of Southern Europe, don't achieve a successful outcome. That would have serious long-term consequences: a loss of confidence in democracy, its values and its institutions.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Gerhard Wahlers". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial 'G'.

Dr. Gerhard Wahlers
Deputy Secretary General

gerhard.wahlers@kas.de



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Stefan Burgdörfer
is editor-in-chief of the
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THE YOUTH FACTOR

INNOVATIVE ELECTION CAMPAIGN METHODS IN THE USA AND THEIR TRANSFERABILITY TO GERMANY

Stefan Burgdörfer

How did Obama manage it yet again, and with such a margin? The interpretation of the election results, which saw U.S. President Barack Obama returned for a second term in November 2012, soon homed in on one decisive factor both in the U.S. media and in the reporting in Germany: the youth vote. According to the reports, Obama had been more skilled in mobilising young people to cast their vote than his Republican challenger. This had been achieved once again through innovative campaigning. While Obama's 2008 campaign had gone for social media in a big way and thereby won the election, "big data" had been the key to success this time, i.e. the collection of data about the electorate and the crafting of customised messages for different voter groups.

Some German media already appeared to be convinced of the potential that consistent use of the Internet also held for election campaigns in Germany after Obama's first election campaign. "Learning from Obama means learning to win", was the belief that inspired many op-eds to be written, lectures to be held and even a PhD thesis to be published – as if technical, political and social conditions were of no consequence so that an election could be won just by copying Obama's methods.¹ Those who argue in this vein may be surprised to learn that the campaign methods used in the U.S. elections, which have been amply commented on, are only playing a minor role in the 2013 election campaign for the German parliament, the Bundestag, which has just got underway. This is partly due to

1 | Jan Philipp Burgard, *Von Obama siegen lernen oder 'Yes, We Gähnt!?' Der Jahrhundertwahlkampf und die Lehren für die politische Kommunikation in Deutschland*, Nomos, 2012.

the great differences in funding – Obama's 2008 campaign cost 745 million U.S. dollars; during the election campaign for the Bundestag one year later, the SPD is estimated to have spent 29 million euros and the CDU/CSU 26.5 million euros.²

Quite apart from the funding, the strategies chosen by the German parties are also understandable when one considers the crucial voter groups in Germany. Even if a party were to use its limited funds entirely for addressing young people using online methods, it would not win the election in Germany even if it was successful in its efforts.³ Due to the demographic makeup of the USA, young people can tip the balance in the U.S. elections.⁴ Due to different demographics, this is not possible in Germany.

Due to the demographic makeup of the USA, young people can tip the balance in the U.S. elections. Due to different demographics, this is not possible in Germany.

When one takes a closer look, it was ultimately not the youth vote that determined the outcome of the elections in the United States either. During the 2012 elections, the Republican challenger, Mitt Romney, actually gained five percentage points in the 18-29 group compared to the Obama election in 2008. One contributing factor was,

- 2 | Andreas Jungherr and Harald Schoen, *Das Internet in Wahlkämpfen. Konzepte, Wirkungen und Kampagnenfunktionen*, Wiesbaden, 2013, 124.
- 3 | "Even if Bündnis 90/Die Grünen were able to mobilise all voters in the 18 to 21 group, for instance, – but only the voters in this age group – they would not get into the Bundestag, because they would fail to reach the five per cent threshold. But a party that would be able to mobilise all voters over 70 alone would actually attract 18.9 per cent of the votes. This means that losses among the older voters count more and cannot be compensated for easily by gains among the young." In: Sabine Pokorny, "Junge Wähler: Hoffnungslos verloren? Das Wahlverhalten der Generationen", *Forum Empirische Sozialforschung*, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin/Berlin, 2012, 6.
- 4 | In his second presidential election campaign, Barack Obama received less support from young voters than in the first one. But in some swing states, the young voices did contribute to or even facilitate the victory. "Young Voters Played Critical Role in Obama Re-Election Despite Dip in Support", *PBS NewsHour*, 26 Nov 2012, http://pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec12/youth_11-26.html (accessed 4 May 2013); cf. "Young Voters Supported Obama Less, But May Have Mattered More", Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 26 Nov 2012, <http://people-press.org/2012/11/26/young-voters-supported-obama-less-but-may-have-mattered-more> (accessed 4 May 2013).

however, that Obama's campaign and the reporting on it created the impression that the U.S. President and his camp were more innovative and dynamic than their counterparts. This "narrative", which was adopted by most of the German media, was written to a very large extent by the election team itself.

U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AS PLACES OF INNOVATION

Campaign strategists have sought inspiration from U.S. innovations from the very start of the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, albeit with a time lag. Following John F. Kennedy's example, for instance, Konrad Adenauer also drove through the crowds in an open-top car. The idea to

The first candidates debate between a U.S. President and his challenger took place back in 1960 – four decades before the first German TV debate.

print the picture of a politician on an election poster instead of an electioneering message was also adopted from the USA, in conjunction with an increasing personalisation of the election campaign. The first candidates debate between a U.S. President and his challenger, Nixon versus Kennedy, took place back in 1960 – four decades before the first German TV debate (Schröder versus Stoiber). Joint appearances with the candidate's spouse or with the entire family were also amongst U.S.-inspired innovations, as were rolled-up shirt sleeves, without which you could not imagine any campaign appearances taking place in the USA these days and which Gerhard Schröder also liked to sport. In the more recent past, the same has applied to campaign formats such as the town hall meeting, where a candidate faces questions by a selected audience, and of course to the use of social media.

The online campaigns of the U.S. have not been equalled, either in their impact or with respect to their funding. The same applies to the mobilisation of young people in particular as campaigners at grassroots level. The "ground game", i.e. taking the election campaign to the doorstep, as opposed to the "air game" via the mass media, is conducted to a very large extent by young volunteers. Campaign observers came to the following conclusion: "The fixation with the use of whichever was the latest communication technology distracted from the other, probably more important side of the Obama campaign both in 2008 and 2012: the traditional, almost old-fashioned election

campaign with countless offices, vast numbers of paid staff and volunteers, who are glued to the telephone, knock on doors, stick up posters and distribute stickers.”⁵ But this is a short-sighted view, because the activities on the ground are planned in great detail at a national level and are only effective in conjunction with technical tools. Even if the activities of volunteers represent a grassroots movement – and particularly the German media like to adopt this representation – the initialisation and coordination come from the top.

It was the campaign teams themselves that kept drawing attention to the dynamics and innovative approach of their campaign. After the elections, the media in Germany and in the USA only occasionally posed the question as to whether the impact of the campaigns might not have been overestimated. Scientific political studies, which had examined Obama’s first presidential election campaign, had already put forward this conclusion without the public taking any notice. The 2008 campaign did have the support of over 700 campaign offices, great numbers of them in the swing states. But this probably contributed less than one per cent to the election outcome. “Obama very likely would have won the national contest without these field offices.”⁶ The *National Journal* came to a very similar conclusion with respect to the November election: The forecasts of the TV network ABC and of the well-respected Pew Institute had Obama winning by three points – “and that was the result. The results in nearly every target state matched within a point the reliable polls before Election Day. Again, when compared with the country as a whole, President Obama did not overperform in states where his team conducted significant turnout operations.”⁷ Instead, it was actually just shifts in

After the elections, media only occasionally posed the question as to whether the impact of the campaigns might not have been overestimated. Scientific political studies had already put forward this conclusion.

5 | Matthias Rüb, “Obamas Wahlkampf. Schuh- und Mundwerk”, *FAZ.net*, 8 Nov 2012, <http://faz.net/themenarchiv/politik/-11954926.html> (accessed 29 Apr 2013).

6 | Seth E. Masket, “Did Obama’s Ground Game Matter? The Influence of Local Field Offices During the 2008 Presidential Elections”, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 73, No. 5, 2009, 1023-139, 1024.

7 | Matthew Dowd, “The Mythic Narrative of the 2012 Election”, *National Journal*, 19 Nov 2012, <http://nationaljournal.com/politics/the-mythic-narrative-of-the-2012-election-20121119> (accessed 29 Apr 2013).

the electorate, which had been going on for quite some time, that were responsible for Obama's election victory and for the continuing losses of the Republicans. "This is not a problem of turnout operations or bad campaigns or bad candidates. The Republican Party increasingly doesn't reflect the American demographic."⁸

Focusing on the methods and technologies means neglecting the element that should be crucial to the election outcome according to the principles of democratic theory: the issues.

It is indeed appropriate to question the simplistic causal explanation "good campaign, good outcome" critically. Focusing on the methods and technologies means neglecting the element that should be crucial to the election outcome according to the principles of democratic theory: the issues. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* recently used an image to describe the correlation between politics and coverage, which can also be applied to the story of the innovative campaign team, namely the image of the rainmaker: "He dances, it rains. The rainmaker asserts and possibly even believes that his dance had caused the rain to fall. His fellow Indians also believe it and back it up with stories; [...] but the rainmaker cannot make rain for all that. But as long as nobody says so, the rainmakers retain their power."⁹ The story of Obama as the successful campaigner makes him the successful campaigner. No doubt young voters did have an impact on the election outcome, but that does not prove that innovative campaigning methods were responsible for their support.

TAILORING YOUR MESSAGE TO THE VOTERS: MICROTARGETING

"Even before I entered my e-mail address and zip code on the homepage, my browser alerted me. Obama had just placed twenty-one cookies on my computer, ten times the number of an average website."¹⁰ This is how a journalist describes the experience he had with the Obama campaign. Internet specialists, who the U.S. President's campaign team had recruited a long time before the actual election

8 | Ibid.

9 | Volker Zastrow, "Das Amalgam", *FAZ.net*, 28 Jan 2013, <http://faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/-12040680.html> (accessed 29 Apr 2013).

10 | Jean-Michel Berg, "Cookies vom Präsidenten. Datensammler im US-Wahlkampf", *Bayern 2*, 26 Oct 2012, <http://br.de/radio/bayern2/sendungen/zuendfunk/politik-gesellschaft/us-wahlkampf-microtargeting100.html> (accessed 21 Mar 2012).

campaign, used every occasion when interested citizens made contact online to collect information about them. The more data on socio-demographic characteristics, interests and political preferences they could assemble, the better they would be able to tailor the campaign messages to the target group. This meant not only that voters could be addressed with messages that were more or less customised for them, but also that they might not be contacted again at all because the campaign teams had identified them as Republican sympathisers. Instead of targeting all citizens with an identical campaign statement or squandering their own resources in a futile effort to convince political opponents, the U.S. campaign teams started by identifying their target group on the basis of a huge volume of data.

Instead of targeting all citizens with an identical campaign statement, the U.S. campaign teams started by identifying their target group on the basis of a huge volume of data.

The underlying principle comes from the advertising sector: "The technology that makes such customized advertising possible is called microtargeting, which is similar to the techniques nonpolitical advertisers use to serve up, for example, hotel ads online to people who had shopped for vacations recently."¹¹ Many Internet users assume the ads they see on websites are aimed at all users of the particular site, in the same way that a newspaper advert reaches all readers equally. The opposite is actually the case. The ads each user sees are personalised, as are their search results in Google. This is facilitated by cookies, which online suppliers place on users' computers. It is therefore not the case that online contents are available for free; they do have their price, which consists of personal details the user divulges voluntarily, albeit often unwittingly.¹² The German media regard the fact that the Obama campaign used these methods not as a scandal but as innovative.

The systematic collection and analysis of data on voters and sympathisers started among the Democrats in 2004 when Howard Dean took up the post of Chairman of the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Dean, who had

11 | Tanzina Vega, "Online Data Helping Campaigns Customize Ads", *The New York Times*, 10 Feb 2012, <http://nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/politics/campaigns-use-microtargeting-to-attract-supporters.html> (accessed 29 Apr 2013).

12 | Eli Pariser, *The Filter Bubble. What the Internet Is Hiding from You*, New York, 2011, 6 et seq.

been unsuccessful in his attempt to become the Democrats' presidential candidate, but set standards in online campaigning even before Obama, gave instructions to set up a voter database as well as an organisation and information platform for exchange processes within the party.¹³ The aim was to identify street blocks and city districts, whose residents were receptive to the views promoted by the Democratic campaign, which meant that the campaign would not need to waste energy on convincing citizens who were sceptical or hostile to their views. "The Party manages a database centrally, defines data standards and makes a common user interface available" – this "facilitates the identification of potential voters and provides support for the route planning for doorstep campaigning and for compiling call lists".¹⁴

The parties now increasingly purchase data wholesale, partly from commercial providers, to gain information about the socio-demographic characteristics.

While the data was initially generated from party contacts with voters and sympathisers, the parties started using a different approach a few years ago and now increasingly purchase data wholesale, partly from commercial providers, to gain information about the socio-demographic characteristics as well as the ideological preferences of the residents of specific areas. The following remarkably frank statement appeared in the "Targeted Victory" blog, data collector of the Romney campaign: "The Romney campaign has focused on reaching voters through Facebook by buying sponsored results and marketing messages for voters on Facebook mobile."¹⁵ The parties use the knowledge gained in this way not only for their campaigning via the mass media but also for the door-to-door campaign, the "ground game".

13 | On the importance of Howard Dean and his innovations for Barack Obama's election campaigns cf. Daniel Kreiss, *Taking Our Country Back. The Crafting of Networked Politics from Howard Dean to Barack Obama*, Oxford University Press, 2012.

14 | Jungherr and Schoen, n. 2, 99.


15 | Rebecca Hucker, "Targeted Victory in the News: Sponsored Results and Search Advertisements", *Targeted Victory*, 5 Nov 2012, <http://targetedvictory.com/2012/11/targeted-victory-in-the-news-sponsored-results-and-search-advertisements> (accessed 29 Apr 2013).

YOUNG PEOPLE AS CAMPAIGNERS: THE GROUND GAME

At first glance, the door-to-door campaign looks almost antiquated compared to the possibilities of addressing people in a targeted manner over the Internet. But this is a deceptive impression, because the “ground game” is actually also conducted on the basis of collected and purchased data. The mostly young campaigners – who are considered volunteers, but receive expenses – make an important contribution to the election campaign and have gained increasingly in importance over the last few decades (Fig. 1). Over 100 million registered voters were contacted in person during the 2008 election campaign. In view of the efforts required to reach such a large number of people in person, it features remarkably little in the reporting, for instance compared to election debates, whose impact on the election outcome is highly controversial.

The mostly young campaigners make an important contribution to the election campaign and have gained increasingly in importance over the last few decades.

Fig. 1
**Proportion of voters contacted in person
in U.S. election campaigns 1956-2008**



Source: American National Election Studies; Nielsen, n. 21.

The Obama campaign benefited from the fact that it had been involved in collecting and analysing data for longer and more intensively than the Republican opponent. Andrew Rasiej, founder of the Personal Democracy Forum, which

offers services at the interface between technology and politics, describes the advantage as follows: “when you’re building big data resources, the longer you’re collecting data, the longer you’re analyzing data [...] the smarter the data becomes over time.”¹⁶ The campaign organisers prepared their volunteers in such a way that they had the appropriate message to hand on each doorstep.

The results from decades of scientific communication studies show the effort is worthwhile. Personal contact demonstrably influences voter behaviour more than the mass media. Not only has this finding from pioneering studies of election campaign research conducted in the 1940s¹⁷ been confirmed time and time again over the years, it was also found to apply across national borders. An analysis of the 2004 elections for the Landtag in the German *Bundesland* North Rhine-Westphalia yielded the following finding: “Other people are much more influential than the formal media when it comes to whether or not individuals vote.

If a campaigner going from door to door manages to persuade one family member to go and vote, there is a good chance that other family members will follow their example.

Unlike television and the press, their impact is largely direct. Other persons’ normative expectations are important cues that may drive citizens to the polls, but only if they originate from family members.”¹⁸ If a campaigner going from door to door manages to persuade one family member to go and vote for their candidate, there is a good chance that other family members will follow their example. Investing campaign funds “more in shoe leather”¹⁹ rather than in TV advertising may also make sense because personal contact has an impact that advertising messages propagated by the mass media can hardly achieve: “greater individual involvement in politics, increased neighbor-to-neighbor contact, the education of volunteers and contacted citizens about the issues of the day, and increased feelings of efficacy among participants”.²⁰

16 | Jennifer Martinez, “Data drove Obama’s ground game”, *The Hill*, 9 Nov 2012, <http://thehill.com/blogs/hillcon-valley/technology/266987> (accessed 29 Apr 2013).

17 | Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, *The People’s Choice. How the Voter Makes Up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign*, New York, 1944.

18 | Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck and Christian Mackenrodt, “Social networks and mass media as mobilizers and demobilizers: A study of turnout at a German local election”, *Electoral Studies*, No. 29, 2010, 392-404, here: 402.

19 | Masket, n. 6, 1024.

20 | Ibid.

Performing this persuading activity where it has the greatest impact requires enormous human and logistical resources. Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, a Danish scientist working in communications research who followed two campaigns of the U.S. Democrats for research purposes, illustrates the dimensions of the ground game: “The average district has a population of about 700,000 and between 300,000 and 400,000 registered voters. With high turnout expected in a presidential election year [...] the staffers working at the two campaigns I followed aimed at contacting more than 100,000 people at home. [...] these campaigns got through to an estimated 20 per cent of the electorate at least once, generating about 100,000 door knocks and around 150,000 phone calls [...]”²¹ The visits to people’s homes served three purposes of equal significance: convincing undecided voters, mobilising sympathisers and, an important point, collecting additional information about the electorate.



Young campaigners in Chicago: They are absolutely essential, but so are data and central coordination. | Source: Angela Radulescu, flickr (CC BY-NC-SA).

The Washington Post describes this approach by the example of Richard Russo, a volunteer campaign manager in Alexandria in the 2012 election campaign. Russo “gave five to six hours a week to the campaign for much of the year, making calls, knocking on doors and delivering the message

21 | Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, *Ground Wars: personalized communication in political campaigns*, Princeton University Press, 2012, 10.

that organizers told him to deliver. Through the evolution of those instructions as the year progressed, Russo could see the methodology that went into the field operation. Early in the year, he called voters simply to verify the accuracy of the list: were they [the voters] registered, were they likely to vote, which candidate did they lean toward? Over the summer, the script changed to persuasion; Russo's lists featured undecided voters open to supporting Obama. [...] Over the course of the campaign, those voters were contacted an average of seven times – often by the same volunteer."²²

To be able to conduct such an election campaign requires the unwavering commitment of the young helpers. But in addition, it also requires willingness on behalf of the parties to surrender a little of their responsibility, writes Kleis Nielsen: "Campaign organizations have a fairly standardized and institutionalized form, the wider campaign assemblages formed around them less so, build as they are in a much more contingent, modular, and ad-hoc manner."²³ Thousands of young volunteers, who established personal contact with voters without being party members themselves or having proved that they identify with the party through previous involvement – which German political party would see the opportunities in such a deployment rather than the risks?

AIR GAME AND NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING

The large number of niche channels via cable and satellite allows to reach specific social groups in a relatively precisely targeted manner.

Data acquired through microtargeting is not only used in the ground game but also in the air game. The latter term refers to campaigning via the mass media, i.e. all the channels that are "on air". The large number of niche channels via cable and satellite allow campaign strategists to reach specific social groups in a relatively precisely targeted manner. Political campaigns, "which have borrowed tricks from Madison Avenue for decades are now fully engaged on the latest technological frontier in advertising: aiming specific ads at potential supporters based on where they live, the

22 | Amy Gardner, "Obama's field operation came down to 'press on'", *The Washington Post*, 8 Nov 2012, http://washingtonpost.com/195c27a8-28fe-11e2-b4e0-346287b7e56c_story.html (accessed 29 Apr 2012).

23 | Nielsen, n. 21, 175.

Web sites they visit and their voting records.”²⁴ Election advertisers are more likely to reach Republicans through sports programmes, while Democrats prefer sitcoms. Republican humour is more in line with “America’s Funniest Home Videos”. The best medium to reach undecided voters is the local news.²⁵

Before the systematic collection and analysis of data had started, the news broadcasts of the local TV channels were the main vehicle for U.S. election campaign adverts. As different advertising spots were distributed across different programmes and formats, the number of spots increased considerably. This has pushed up the costs for the campaign teams, but it has probably also increased efficiency. A whole-page advert for Porsche in the German tabloid *Bild*, for instance, reaches more readers than

the same advert in a yachting or hunting magazine. But the wastage is probably lower in the latter case because there are fewer potential buyers among *Bild* readers than among the readers of these magazines. By the same token, it is more efficient to tar-

It is more efficient to target different voter groups with different messages in the ad breaks of different TV programmes than targeting all voters with the same spot during the main news broadcast.

get different voter groups with varying messages in the ad breaks of different TV programmes than targeting all voters with the same spot during the main news broadcast. However efficient it may be, there is a problem in terms of democratic principles. If you only address those voters who have already made up their mind, the politically interested are no longer presented with any deviating opinions. The campaign managers made the decision up front: not in favour of finding the common ground and appealing to all voter groups but in favour of confrontation and the exclusive mobilisation of their own followers.

To this end, the U.S. election campaigns are relying to a large extent on so-called negative campaigning, the function of which is to make the political adversary appear in a bad light. Until the end of September 2012, TV advertising for Obama and Romney had related almost exclusively to misjudgements and misconducts of the opposing candidate

24 | Vega, n. 11.

25 | Travis N. Ridout, Michael Franz, Kenneth M. Goldstein and William J. Feltus, “Separation by Television Program: Understanding the Targeting of Political Advertising in Presidential Elections”, *Political Communication*, 2012, 29:1, 1-23.

and his camp. Only eight per cent of the spots had praised the good points of their own candidate.²⁶ During the latest presidential election, both campaigns used the Internet to test the impact of their negative messages and attacks, reported the political scientist Mark Hauptmann, who conducted research on negative campaign advertising in the USA.²⁷ "As young people use social media more extensively than other groups, they come into greater contact with negative campaigning and also propagate these messages more quickly."

TRANSFERABILITY FROM THE U.S. TO GERMANY

"Where the collecting of data and money is concerned as well as the identification and addressing of target groups, the campaign organisers have risen to technological heights that we can doubtlessly not reach here in Germany. There is no point in trying to imitate them!" writes Ralf Guldenzopf, an expert on U.S. elections. "But that does not mean that we can no longer learn from them. On the contrary. Time and again, the USA provides a best case for the strategies and objectives of political communication."²⁸ So which strategies and methods can be transferred to the German election campaign? This is not only hampered by obstacles in terms of manpower and funding but also by legal restrictions and an understandable reluctance on the part of the parties, which are very much aware of the demographic mix and the concerns of their electorate.

The journalist and political scientist Jan Philipp Burgard reports on his involvement in Obama's first election campaign. He called potential voters and tried to convince them of Obama's qualities and to motivate them to promote the candidate among their circle. An elderly lady replied that she was not able to go door to door because she was bedridden. But she was happy to give a donation. Burgard did not just record her willingness to make a donation. The lady's state of health also entered into the campaign database.

26 | "The ads take aim", *The Economist*, 27 Oct 2012.

27 | Cf. Mark Hauptmann and Daniel Schmücking, "Vorsicht vor dem Bumerang", *politik & kommunikation*, Mar 2012, 56-58, http://www.lib.uni-jena.de/download/Negative_Campaigning.pdf (accessed 8 May 2013).

28 | Ralf Guldenzopf, "It's the Data, stupid!", *politik & kommunikation*, Aug 2012, http://politik-kommunikation.de/artikel/its_the_data_stupid (accessed 29 Apr 2013).

It is highly unlikely that the German public would accept German parties collecting – and using! – such data. Germans are generally not keen on being contacted by phone. The prohibition of cold calls in the law on unfair competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, UWG) thus is far stricter than the wording in the corresponding EU directive. Commercial providers must reckon with a penalty of up to 50,000 euros if they contact a person by telephone who had not given their prior explicit consent. Whether this prohibition also applies to political parties is a controversial question. After all, they do not make any commercial propositions. The prohibition explicitly does not apply to another type of non-commercial actor, namely opinion research institutes, which carry out anonymised surveys. However, the parties are reluctant to use this tool, fearing negative press as a result of a telephone campaign and possible complaints. “The opportunity of having the issue settled legally ahead of the Bundestag elections was squandered”, said election campaign expert Güldenzipf. If there had been legal action and a court case in response to the use of telephone advertising during a local election, the question would have been decided by now. But for understandable reasons, none of the local candidates wanted to subject their campaign to a court case.

Germans are generally not keen on being contacted by phone. The German parties are reluctant to use this tool, fearing negative press as a result of possible complaints.

The parties actually possess data, with which they would be able to operate. The CDU, for instance, has since 2005 been using a Customer Relations Management system, the CRM system from Microsoft that is also used by large and medium-sized companies to manage their customer relations. In the 2011 annual report of the Konrad-Adenauer-Haus (CDU headquarters), the Federal General Manager reported that there had been “an interface between CRM and the ZMD (central members file) for almost four years. [...] That way, the CRM system is providing a significant contribution towards making further improvements to the database for future campaigns and towards guaranteeing modern communication. CRM represents a valuable tool that will be available for upcoming election campaigns.”²⁹

29 | Report by the Federal Central Office, appendix to a report by the Secretary General, CDU, 2011, http://kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Bundesparteitage/2011-11-13-15_Bericht_24.Parteitag_Leipzig.pdf (accessed 28 Apr 2013).

But it is likely that the parties represented in the Bundestag will only make very sparing use of “big data” considering the reservations of the German public with respect to sharing personal information. Nor would there be sufficient funds to use this data to produce advertising spots and online campaigns tailored to small segments of the potential electorate. Such increased and more personalised online engagement would be necessary if the parties were intent on winning the youth vote. Still, contrary to the USA, this is not a priority objective in Germany. And the reasons for that are demographic.

During the 2008 U.S. elections, there were more voters in the 18-29 age group than voters over 65 for the first time in 20 years.³⁰ Obama benefited more from this situation

The trend in U.S. elections towards increased numbers of young voters continued during the presidential elections in 2013. 19 per cent of voters were under 30, one per cent more than four years previously.

that his Republican opponent John McCain, winning 66 per cent of the votes in this age group. The trend towards increased numbers of young voters continued during the presidential elections in 2013. 19 per cent of voters were under 30, one per cent more than four years previously. In Germany, though, only 16.4 per cent of registered voters were under 30 in the Bundestag elections, and due to the different demographic development there is a downward trend here.³¹ Almost half of the German voters, 49.8 per cent, were over 50. Furthermore, older people in Germany are also easier to mobilise than the younger ones. 80 per cent of registered voters aged between 60 and 70 cast their vote in 2009. The average was lowest amongst those aged 20 to 25. It was 59.1 per cent.

Two up and coming young politicians from the two large popular parties confirmed this finding during a podium discussion in Berlin in 2012: “Forget the youth vote” – this was the advice given to the campaign strategists at the party central offices whenever they played host to external pollsters. The young were not going to help win an election. In Germany with a population that is aging at a significantly increasing pace, a party that relied mainly on the

30 | Jungherr and Schoen, n. 2, 103.

31 | Federal Returning Officer, “Wahlbeteiligung nach Geschlecht und Altersgruppen seit 1983”, http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_09/veroeffentlichungen/repraesentative (accessed 28 Apr 2013).

Internet would even run the risk of alienating older voters. This was illustrated by the displeasure incurred by the SPD Party Chairman Sigmar Gabriel last year. Influenced by the success of the Pirate Party, which is strong on transparency and participation, Gabriel suggested that the SPD's candidate for chancellor should not be determined by the delegates or, as was the case with the candidates for the top posts in the Green Party, by all members, but to let all citizens have a say in the matter. His suggestion failed not least because of the fact that the party members, a majority of them being of relatively advanced age, opposed it. The young Social Democrat politician reports that these people would have wondered why they had attended meetings, organised events and paid membership fees for years if votes from outside the party, including those from people who were not necessarily close to the SPD, counted just as much. The young CDU politician confirms that without a doubt the party grassroots would not have welcomed such an opening up.



Big Dat, not billboards: Campaign expert Chris Kofinis interviewed by the author. | Source: KAS.

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK: DIFFERENT WORLDS

“Skip the billboards”, was the advice that Chris Kofinis gave to the assembled communications experts and campaign managers in Berlin in October 2012.³² The former professor

32 | He was speaking at the 10th International Conference for Political Communication at the Academy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, cf. “Kampagnen-Trends 2012”, KAS-Veranstaltungsbeiträge, Berlin, 16 Oct 2012, <http://kas.de/wf/de/33.32414> (accessed 21 Mar 2012).

at California State University provides assistance to the Democrats' election campaigns. According to him, billboards no longer play a role any more as they have proved to be ineffectual. "After all, it is unrealistic to assume", said Kofinis, "that I drive to work in the morning, see a politician on a billboard and spontaneously decide: Oh yes, I'll vote for him". As a campaign strategist, he still has to explain to politicians, who like to see themselves on billboards, why the campaign should not rely on this old-fashioned method. Amongst experts, though, it is obvious that the era of the billboard is over.

This year, the German public will experience an election campaign the likes of which the USA has not seen for some time. Of course there will be billboards; no candidate will want to do without them. "Negative Campaigning", a keystone of the U.S. election campaign, will be used to a far lesser extent by the German parties because the voters do not like it. Instead, there will be television advertising, strictly regulated in terms of frequency, length and broadcasting location, plus newspaper adverts, mailshots and campaign stands. Doorstep campaigning with large numbers of volunteers and campaign messages tailored to the regional and socio-demographic conditions will remain the exception. The reasons are partly to be found in the parties themselves. If they were to hand over responsibility for their campaign communication to that degree, they would lose some control.³³ That applies to the ground game on the one hand, particularly as this throws up the mobilisation question even if the required funds were available. But it also applies to the use of the Web 2.0, because although a higher degree of interaction would increase the credibility of the campaign, it would also make it more difficult to control. "Dynamics, diversity, paradoxes and polyphonic criticism"³⁴ – these are characteristics of the Web 2.0 that German parties, unlike their USA counterparts, view as risks rather than as opportunities. But surrendering a small

33 | Cf. Nathalie Knuth-Hahndorf, *Online-Campaigning dargestellt an den Wahlen zum deutschen Bundestag 1998-2009 im Vergleich zum US-amerikanischen Online-Campaigning im Rahmen der Präsidentschaftswahlen 2000-2008*, dissertation, Heidelberg University, 2010, 353.

34 | Ingo Caesar, *Social Web – politische und gesellschaftliche Partizipation im Netz. Beobachtungen und Prognosen*, Berlin, 2012, 55.

amount of control might well pay for the German parties. It may be a way of winning over young voters. Still, contrary to the USA, the youth vote will not make a crucial difference in Germany for the foreseeable future. That is why the parties are well advised to utilise their modest resources in a measured way.



Dr. Angelika Klein is Head of the KAS office for Uganda and South Sudan in Kampala.

UGANDA'S YOUTH

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE SECOND YOUNGEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD

Angelika Klein

Uganda has the second youngest population in the world after Niger: 78 per cent of its inhabitants are under 30 and 56 per cent under 18.¹ With an average birth rate of 6.2 children per woman and a growth rate of 3.3 per cent, the Ugandan population is one of the fastest growing in the world.² This demographic development entails challenges that need to be addressed: particularly in the labour market and in the education and health sectors. The politicians have the urgent task of developing concepts for tackling these issues because there are already processes underway that are far-reaching in their impact and partly irreversible. A massive rural exodus is only one example. Young unskilled workers are streaming from rural to urban areas in ever greater numbers, seeking to escape increasing lack of food supply in the country, domestic violence or neglect, or because they have lost their parents. Their search for educational and job opportunities, health care, social benefits and infrastructure is causing increasing unemployment in the urban centres as well as the proliferation of slums and criminality. Against the backdrop of an economic situation that is already depressed and a per

- 1 | USAid, "Navigating Challenges: Charting Hope: A Cross-Sector Situational Analysis on Youth in Uganda", 2011, <http://uganda.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/YouthMap%20Uganda%20Exec%20Version.pdf>, 2 (accessed 12 Apr 2013); cf. also Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, "Key Facts on Ugandas Population", 2012, http://popsec.org/key_facts.php (accessed 12 Apr 2013). According to DSW, 48 per cent are children, i.e. below 15 years of age: Stiftung Weltbevölkerung, "Länderdatenbank", <http://weltbevoelkerung.de/oberes-menue/publikationen-downloads/zu-unseren-themen/laenderdatenbank.html> (accessed 12 Apr 2013).
- 2 | Republic of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, n. 1.

capita income of 1,300 U.S. dollars in 2011, this is a devastating development. With respect to these circumstances, Uganda can be seen to reflect the situation of most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

What are the dangers, as well as the opportunities, that the population growth entails? What is the outlook for the masses of young people, whose number is ever increasing?

FROM "WHITE" TO "BLUE" COLLAR: MORE "TRAINING" INSTEAD OF "EDUCATION"

Malawi was the first African country to introduce free schooling in 1994, followed three years afterwards by Uganda. In 1997 Universal Primary Education (UPE) was announced. School fees for state schools were abolished for up to four children per household, and the President personally advocated that access to primary education should not only be free but compulsory as well. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni had made this the key issue of his 2006 re-election campaign. His threat to have non-compliant parents arrested has been quoted frequently. Although the number of children enrolled in school rose considerably as a result, there is still no regulatory framework in place that would make access to school not only free but also compulsory. The initial euphoria has given way to disillusionment because certain factors were left out of the equation. One of these was that it proved impossible to satisfy the need for more classrooms, teaching and learning materials as well as, most crucially, teaching staff. Over-

crowded classrooms filled with up to eighty pupils sitting on the floor without pen and paper are by no means uncommon to this day. And the teachers' inadequate training, huge deficiencies in subject knowledge and very low pay have been and still are contributing to the poor quality of the teaching and undermining the willingness of parents to send their children to school. Especially in rural areas, this willingness is not particularly high as it is. Many parents consider school a waste of time and put their children to work on the fields in their neighbourhood instead, supposedly to more profitable effect. They can also not afford the cost of school uniforms and lunches, and those who do have the means prefer private

The teachers' inadequate training, huge deficiencies in subject knowledge and very low pay are contributing to the poor quality of the teaching and undermining the willingness of parents to send their children to school.

schools. School buildings that have become dilapidated because they have not been renovated for decades, long journeys on foot to get to school, and – according to the latest headlines – the absence of toilets, which is putting girls in particular off attending school, are all things that further increase the frustration of parents and pupils, but also of teachers, whose work ethic has deteriorated alarmingly. Even rape is not an uncommon occurrence. The number of school drop outs is disconcertingly high, and only just over half the Ugandan population possess a certificate confirming that they have completed their primary education. This has resulted in a population with only rudimentary skills in reading and writing and other areas, the worst imaginable start for the country's youth.



Pupils participating at a "democracy fare" of the KAS: Deficient schooling is the reason for an only rudimentarily literate and skilled population. | Source: KAS Uganda, Acfode.

Those who succeed in continuing their education at the higher level not only need families with deep pockets, but will frequently come to the realisation that the acquired knowledge is not especially helpful in the search for work and in their subsequent working lives. The gap between the curriculum and the actual requirements, between theory and practice, is simply too large. One of the reasons is that Uganda's school and education system still takes its cues from the 1950s, the time when the country gained its independence from the UK. With the departure of the British civil servants, a gap emerged in the labour market

that needed to be filled urgently. Secondary education was therefore skewed primarily towards producing the administrators, accountants and office staff that the public sector needed.³

To the present day, white-collar jobs (in public administration and offices, in NGOs, etc.) are “more highly regarded” and prestigious than the usually more profitable occupations in skilled trades and commerce. The low regard for manual labour and craftsmanship that goes back to colonial times has resulted in a dearth of specialised expertise and practical knowledge, i.e. a skills shortage. Vocational and technical colleges are not sufficiently well established and are looked down upon – although it is precisely these types of institutions that could, at least in part, solve the problems of the Ugandan education and labour market. One response to the alarming skills shortage is frequently to employ skilled workers from India and other Asian countries while the Ugandan population can only provide amateurs and improvisers or unskilled labour. And although many Ugandans have misgivings about this situation, “education” is still held in high esteem and admired. “Training”, on the other hand, is derided and looked down upon.

Everybody who has the necessary means is therefore keen to go to university, which emulates an (obsolete) British academic system full “of pomp and circumstance” and doles out academic titles such as Bachelor and Master in an inflationary manner. Genuine opportunities to find a job with these qualifications are vanishingly rare; there is a wide gap between supply and demand. And the quality of the institutions of higher education is also becoming increasingly less impressive – there is insufficient funding for teaching and research. The times when the Makerere University in Kampala was not only the oldest but rightly so the most well-respected university

The quality of the institutions of higher education is becoming ever less impressive. The times when the Makerere University in Kampala was not only the oldest but also rightly so the most well-respected university in East Africa are over.

3 | Recently, the “National Curriculum Development Center” has taken on the task of implementing the reform – the curricula are to be revised by 2014 – and in its work it is referring to a position paper with recommendations on education policy prepared by KAS Uganda: KAS Office Uganda, “Young Leaders Think Thank Presents Education Policy Alternatives”, 26 Sep 2012, <http://kas.de/uganda/en/publications/32537> (accessed 12 Apr 2013).

in East Africa are over. The universities are thus sending some 400,000 young people into the labour market where there are less than 9,000 corresponding positions available. The unemployment rate is particularly high among young academics.

**“YOUNG, MALE – UNEMPLOYED”:
JOB PROSPECTS IN UGANDA**

Shifting from the outlook on education to that of work: According to estimates, youth unemployment in Uganda is between 70 and 83 per cent; around 80 per cent of the unemployed are aged under 30.⁴ “Young, male – penniless” meets “young, educated – jobless” – the volatility of such a mix should not be underestimated. The government has realised the danger. It has created a programme entitled “Skilling Uganda” to counteract it and to provide the market with what it demands. Similarly, the National Development Plan (2010/2011 to 2014/2015) is meant to ameliorate the situation. And the BTVET Act (Business, Technical and Vocational Education and Training Act) of 2008 is intended to provide training specifically for those jobs that are available in abundance. Unfortunately, few take advantage of the programme for financial reasons, and it is not very successful due to a lack of resources and inadequate coordination with the private sector.

The largest sector is agriculture, which, at over 75 per cent, offers most of the jobs. 60 per cent of the 80 per cent of Ugandans who work in agriculture are in the “youth” category.

The labour market actually offers a variety of opportunities. There has been a noticeable upturn particularly in the agricultural, telecommunication and IT sectors as well as in tourism. The largest sector, however, is still agriculture, which, at over 75 per cent, offers most of the jobs. 60 per cent of the 80 per cent of Ugandans who work in agriculture are in the “youth” category.⁵ There could be many opportunities to make their activities here more productive and profitable, but there is a lack of advanced technologies and there are some fundamental deficiencies as well: unclear ownership situations and very poor infrastructure (the lack of roads and vehicles frequently forces farmers to sell their produce to middlemen at dumping prices) leave the agricultural sector at subsistence level.

4 | USAid, n. 1, 8 et sqq.

5 | Ibid.

The government has also set up a number of programmes in other sectors to meet the challenges in the labour market, but the implementation leaves much to be desired. The population is generally not well informed about access options and eligibility criteria, is frequently put off by nepotism and excessive red tape, or simply has little confidence in government programmes. A considerable proportion of the funds also “disappears” in obscure channels and because of corruption. Nepotism is also a widespread problem in recruitment in Uganda. People are recruited far more often according to ethnic and family relationship criteria rather than qualifications and skills.

For all these reasons, large numbers of job seekers are absorbed by the informal sector. As is the case in most African countries, this is the sector that is experiencing the greatest boom: motorcycle taxis, domestic staff, casual workers (particularly in construction), small traders, etc. abound. It is estimated that there are over 800,000 micro-businesses in Uganda employing one and a half million people – over 90 per cent of those not employed in agriculture or the private sector. Trade represents around 72 per cent of the informal sector.⁶ The reasons for people moving into these highly insecure jobs are the fight for survival and destitution rather than prospering business start-ups or the drive for economic growth. It is easy to get in, difficult to get ahead, and there is no social security safety net whatsoever to support people when they leave these jobs. Another characteristic is that women make up 92 per cent of the informal sector in Uganda.⁷

YOUNG AND DYNAMIC? YOUNG – AND IN DANGER

Unlike in the West, where challenges in the health sector are linked to the consequences of an aging society, in Uganda it is the young people whose health is the main cause for concern. Of course, Uganda is no exception on a continent, where life expectancy is around age 50. The causes of the dangers to the younger generation are age-related – it is

6 | Worldbank, „Urbal Informal Sector in Uganda. Presenting during the Key Labour Market Issues Course“, Apr-May 2005, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/211247/Uganda_Urban%20Informal%20Sector.pdf (accessed 12 Apr 2013).

7 | Ibid.

the area of sexual and reproductive activities that holds the greatest risks. One important factor is still the scourge of HIV/Aids, which has afflicted Uganda particularly severely. Uganda used to be one of the African countries most devastated by Aids, but has been able to extricate itself from its stranglehold through a targeted information and health

In spite of one of the most advanced information campaigns on the continent and massive increases in donations, the achievements of the former star pupil in “the fight against Aids” have been reversed.

policy. The new infection rate, which had been as high as 15 per cent, and in some areas even 30 per cent, back in 1992, had dropped to five per cent by 2001.⁸ But in spite of one of the most advanced information campaigns on the continent and massive increases in donations, the achievements of the former prodigy in “the fight against Aids” have been reversed – with the new infection rate currently back up to between six and seven per cent.⁹ This is due to a number of different reasons. As is the case in many (not just African) countries, there is a trend towards a certain “carelessness” and “habituation” noticeable as a result of access to effective treatment and the increase in life expectancy. But the main reason is considered to be the fact that as the influence of evangelical groups increases, the so-called ABC Programme (abstinence, be faithful, condoms) is being skewed increasingly towards the first two aspects, while condoms are in part openly rejected.

Aids remains one of the great obstacles to development as the disease tends to affect young people in the “best years” of their productive lives and working capacity. It is estimated that there are currently 1.2 million people infected with HIV living in Uganda, including 150,000 children.¹⁰ Nearly two million – some 20 per cent of all Ugandan children – have been orphaned due to Aids. On the entire

8 | Uganda AIDS Commission, “National HIV&Aids Strategic Plan 2011/12-2014/15”, Dec 2011, 22 et sqq., <http://aidsuganda.org/images/stories/Publications/NSP.pdf> (accessed 30 Apr 2013).

9 | Flavia Lanyero, “Return to Abstinence, Museveni Tells Youth”, Daily Monitor, 3 Dec 2013, <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Return-to-abstinence--Museveni-tells-youth/-/688334/1635174/-/4nhsagz/-> (accessed 12 Apr 2013); cf. also UN, *Global Report. UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic*, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2010, 28, http://unaids.org/documents/20101123_global_report_em.pdf (accessed 12 Apr 2013).

10 | Avert, “HIV and Aids in Uganda”, <http://avert.org/aids-uganda.htm> (accessed 12 Apr 2013); UN, n. 9, 186.

continent, there are already an estimated 15 million children who have lost their mother, father or both.¹¹



The President at a conference in London: The success of the Museveni government in fighting HIV is significantly regressive. | Source: Russell Watkins, UK Department for International Development (CC BY-SA).

There are some signs of improvement in the second “problem area” of mother and infant mortality. Compared to 2001, the number of women dying in childbirth fell from 550 to 438 for every 100,000 live births.¹² During the same period, infant mortality fell from 99 to 54 per every 1,000 live births,¹³ which means the figure in Uganda is better than the African average (67). One of the reasons is that specialist medical staff assist with the birth in 59 per cent of cases, while it was only 42 per cent in 2006.¹⁴ Despite this, the number of women dying during or subsequent to childbirth remains alarmingly high and usually due to circumstances that could be remedied: dilapidated health centres that are difficult to get to, a lack of transport facilities as well as medication and equipment, untrained staff and power outages. In their desperation, hundreds of women went to the High Court in Kampala in 2012 to file a

11 | Ibid.

12 | Uganda Bureau of Statistics, “Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2011”, Aug 2012, 239, <http://ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/UDHS/UDHS2011.pdf> (accessed 12 Apr 2013).

13 | Ibid., 79.

14 | Ibid., 105.

lawsuit against the government and compel it to improve conditions through a court ruling, making reference to the “human right to health”. The lawsuit was rejected; the court did not want to interfere in “political matters”.

And therein lies the rub: it appears there is a lack of will to prioritise this issue. Particularly as there are other areas that do not appear to suffer from a lack of funding. However, health, and in particular the health of the younger generation, must not be neglected. Young people must be taken seriously as a factor affecting development and their potential must be utilised; they play a central role in economic, sustainable, social and societal development.

THE YOUNGER GENERATION AS A POLITICAL FACTOR: MOTIVATED, COMMITTED – FRUSTRATED

The politicians have come to the realisation that young people need to be taken seriously as a factor relevant to both development and politics. Quite apart from their enormous voter potential – young people under 30 made up over half of the electorate during the last Ugandan elections in 2011¹⁵ – the potential for young people effecting change is considerable. Their social and political influence

The importance of involving young people in political and social decision-making processes cannot be overestimated. Nor should the dangers resulting from their susceptibility be underestimated.

turns them into the most important target group for political education. The potential is there – and it needs to be utilised and channelled to good effect if one wants to avoid the situation where it forges its own path, as last happened during the “Arab Spring”. The importance of involving young people in political and social decision-making processes cannot be overestimated. Nor should the dangers resulting from their susceptibility be underestimated.

In spite of all the above-mentioned problems, the outlook is better than it appears; there are definitely a great many opportunities, and the impulses often come from the young people themselves. These days, young people are increasingly aware of the fact that they are in the majority and of the potential power this gives them. The younger generation in Uganda, as is the case in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, no longer wants to stand on the side-lines, no longer

15 | UN, n. 9, 17.

wants to be talked about, but wishes to be involved in the debate. It yearns for its potential to be acknowledged and furthered, to be seen as problem-solvers and no longer as problems to be solved. It wants to become involved in decision-making, take on responsibility. In short, young people want greater participation and are increasingly insisting on having this demand met as well. Currently, the main topics occupying the minds of Ugandan's young people are still unemployment, education and health; but issues of the future that will affect them in years to come, such as environmental protection, climate change and intergenerational equity, are also increasingly gaining their attention.

The young people of Uganda are becoming increasingly motivated but also frustrated as their engagement is not always finding an appropriate outlet or achieving the intended result. "Engaged but unempowered" is their accusation. However, some measures are now being taken at the political level to mobilise young people by setting up numerous programmes to allow them better access to decision-making, increase their empowerment and strengthen their competence.

YOUTH AS A TARGET GROUP

As far back as 2001, a National Youth Policy (NYP) was established to mobilise the country's youth (aged 15-24) as a "resource" and ensure that it would be involved in national development processes. The NYP thus concentrated on issues pertaining to youth involvement and to strengthening future leadership potential in civil society and government. The NYP, which has not amounted to much more than lip service and not produced many concrete measures or discernible strategies to date, is currently being revised. The new draft envisages more interaction and stronger cooperation with other society groups, amongst other things, and describes concrete steps to strengthen the sense of ownership and capacity building among the youth. Another national institution intended to represent youth interests is the so-called National Youth Council. It was founded in 1993 with the objective of bringing together the various youth associations under one umbrella organisation so they could speak with one voice.

In politics, there are even quota to ensure youth participation. In Parliament, there are not only quota for women, the disabled and soldiers, but also some seats reserved for youth representatives (aged 18-30), one of whom must be female. But with the Members of Parliament numbering approximately four hundred, the young MPs have hardly any influence or none at all, which means that this otherwise remarkable measure remains without impact in practice.

The Local Government Act of 1997 provides for one male and one female youth representative at all administrative levels, from the district down to the parish.

At a municipal and local level as well, youth representatives are given access to political decision-making bodies through quotas. The

Local Government Act of 1997 provides for one male and one female youth representative at all administrative levels, from the district down to the parish. But entrance to higher office is usually difficult for young people because of the nomination fees, which they have to pay themselves and which are also imposed in parliament.

Young people also have opportunities to become involved in party politics in the still young multi-party system, which was introduced in Uganda in 2006. All of the most important parties in Uganda have a youth organisation, which is meant to represent the youth interests in the particular political party. It is hoped that acting as an additional voice in the democratic interaction the young members will blow some fresh wind into the sails and provide new impulses for shaping policies. But the party youth wings lack training, assertiveness and leadership qualities – and as a result they often do not have the ear of the party executives.

It is not as if politicians take no action at all. When one adds other opportunities to become involved, the youth associations and initiatives, and also considers the numerous projects and support programmes of international organisations and NGOs, a lively picture emerges that is full of efforts to sufficiently provide for the needs of young people and to strengthen them in their respective roles. There is also a great deal being done for Uganda's young people in civil society in theory. But it appears the efforts have not (yet) brought forth sufficient fruit or that they fail through inadequate and ineffective implementation. In this young multi-party democracy, young people still don't have the

influence they might be afforded; they feel marginalised and excluded from essential decision-making processes. There are many reasons for this. One may be a tradition – widespread throughout Africa – that expects elders to be given unquestioned respect. The experience and acquired wisdom of age is a decisive factor in African society and a crucial prerequisite for recognition and power. The attitude of never questioning the standing or the opinion of their elders is instilled in children at a very young age and is deeply ingrained in people's thought patterns. Traditional African society assigns children and young people merely the roles of listener and pupil. And in spite of the self-assurance they may demonstrate amongst themselves, young people find it difficult to free themselves from this tradition. Similarly, older people do not always find it easy to take the young seriously, to acknowledge their potential and their innovative spirit, to value their creativity and allow them to make a contribution of their own.

Another reason for the marginalisation of young people and their difficulty in accessing political positions and key functions is the role money plays in politics. Young people generally lack the funds to organise election campaigns or to compete with the older candidates, who usually have greater financial means at their disposal owing to their age. Additionally, even putting themselves forward as candidates for political positions involves virtually insurmountable obstacles although legislation provides for their membership in political bodies. Both paying the nomination fees as well as collecting supporters' signatures are easier to accomplish for older and experienced candidates than for younger applicants. Finally, the role played by patronage and nepotism in politics – as in the labour market – is not to be underestimated. The connections a young person has with older party or committee members are more likely to be decisive for their inclusion in decision-making processes than their qualifications.

Quite apart from these obstacles, some of the reasons young people in Uganda are poorly integrated in political decision-making processes lie within themselves. They often have insufficient leadership and lobbying skills and are divided along party and ethnic lines. Particularly the latter means they are finding it hard to utilise the potential

of their numerical superiority. In addition, it is often the case that young people aspire to leadership positions without possessing the required training or qualifications. This prevents them from influencing decision-making processes to their advantage or from making active contributions to the shaping of Uganda's political and social landscape.

Young Ugandans thus have an ambivalent relationship to politics. On the one hand, what drives them to become involved in politics is often a desire for improvement – they wish to participate and make a difference. They recognised a long time ago that power is not the key to sustainable change. Young people have become part of the political process in a variety of ways – as candidates but also as election assistants and campaigners. And their turnout is very high.¹⁶

On the other hand, many young people have the impression that their voices do not count for a great deal and that their impact is even less significant.¹⁷ One factor that results in young people becoming increasingly frustrated with the role they can play in politics is the fact that politicians are trying to corrupt them and buy

Young people often respond to government programmes and politicians with rejection and cynicism due to the high level of corruption and bribery, which keeps coming to light in Ugandan politics.

their votes. Many young Ugandans are also in danger of becoming victims of manipulation because their frequently desperate situation makes them easy targets of empty promises.

Finally, young people often respond to government programmes and politicians with rejection and cynicism due to the high level of corruption and bribery, which keeps coming to light in Ugandan politics. The aim must therefore be to strengthen the former tendency and to weaken the latter in order to nurture and strengthen the motivation of Uganda's young people.

Young Ugandans are not "rebels". They have a desire to become involved in the existing system, but keep encountering obstacles and boundaries that appear insurmountable. But in spite of the frustration that this may entail, a "Ugandan Spring" is not likely to happen. The young people in Uganda as a group are still too "disorganised" and split along ethnic and social lines for that to happen. For

16 | UN, n. 9, 17.

17 | Cf. USAid, n. 1, 17 et seq.

them, the same applies as for the opposition. Many may take to the streets, but there is no “movement” to speak of. Protest actions are generally limited to the capital and are frequently not based on a specific agenda. The latter is usually reduced to the smallest common denominator, which unites the young people as well as the opposition and can best be described by the term “anti-attitude”. They also lack approaches to solve the issues and alternatives to put forward. This is one of the main problems preventing them from utilising their potential to good effect in order to steer Uganda in a direction that would benefit them in the future.

AFRICA GOING MOBILE? “NO AIRTIME!”

What is also missing is the mobilising power of new and social media. According to surveys, over 70 per cent of young people in Uganda have never had access to the Internet; the number of regular users is concentrated in the capital and does not exceed five to ten per cent.¹⁸ Although practically everybody (96 per cent) now has at least one mobile phone, hardly anybody has the means to actually pay for calls. Complaints about the lack of airtime has therefore become a “constant mantra”, and people are busy “beeping” or sending the occasional text. Weak networks and frequently interrupted connections also make calls and surfing a less than effective and productive experience. The underlying technology itself, which provides the prerequisites for using new media or social networks, is not widely available – not at all in rural areas and only to a limited extent in urban environments. In view of this, it hardly matters whether mobile phones are internet-enabled or not. And even when they are, their potential is not recognised or not utilised. Twitter, Facebook, etc. are used more for “gossip and chit-chat” and for socialising than as a communication platform for social issues or as a means for a serious exchange of opinions about political concerns. The radio is still the main means of information.

18 | Five per cent of young people in Uganda have access to the Internet on a daily basis, and around ten per cent occasionally (one to three times a week): USAid, n. 1, 18.

But as the number of young people increases and with technical facilities improving, it is only a matter of time before the younger generation in Sub-Saharan Africa too will begin networking and organising. Young people have generally become more political, more engaged – at least in Uganda. They have realised it is their future that is at stake, and they want to have a hand in shaping this future. The aim must be to devote greater attention to this phenomenon at the international level and to support the countries south of the Sahara in their efforts to create prospects for their young people. The democratic changes in this region create challenges but also numerous opportunities, which need to be recognised and supported.

THE PRESIDENT'S YOUNG GUARD

KIRCHNERIST YOUTH ORGANISATION LA CÁMPORA QUIETLY AND SECRETLY TURNS ARGENTINA UPSIDE DOWN

Kristin Wesemann

León Cristalli sounded as if he were possessed by the spirit of Ernesto “Che” Guevara: “We came to support the revolutionary process of el Comandante”,¹ shouted the militant supporter of Argentina’s President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, as he stood before the Venezuelan embassy in Buenos Aires, together with like-minded comrades. This day in January was merely a sick call without a patient, as Hugo Chávez underwent treatment in Havana. Nevertheless, the demonstration illustrated the high esteem in which the deceased autocrat from Caracas was held by Kirchner’s most loyal followers, La Cámpora.

Today, Argentina and Venezuela have close ties – economically, ideologically and personally. In 2003, the oil-rich republic in the north purchased government bonds from the economically reeling giant in the south, in a sense reinvigorating it financially. Since then, both nations have pursued a “new political model” that shifts the focus back onto a strong state, instead of being geared towards the West. At one time, Chávez is thought to have sent Kirchner coffee-loads of illegal cash to support her election campaign;² in 2012, she paved the way for his admission into the southern common market, Mercosur. However, Paraguay never ratified Chávez’s admission, which was agreed on in 2006 – the old familiar play to subsequently delay multinational resolutions – and was suspended as a consequence.



Dr. Kristin Wesemann is Resident Representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Argentina.

1 | “Marcha de organizaciones kirchneristas en Buenos Aires”, *La Nación*, 9 Jan 2013, <http://lanacion.com.ar/1544077> (accessed 20 Jan 2013).

2 | Claudia Zilla, “Eine ‘Chavezierung’ Argentinien?”, *SWP-Aktuell*, No. 31, Jun 2009, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 3, http://swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2009Akt31_zll_ks.pdf (accessed 15 Jan 2013).

Officially, Argentina cited the so-called "democracy clause" and warned that popular sovereignty must first be re-established in Paraguay after the dismissal of President Fernando Lugo.³ In Caracas, Chávez had Argentinean journalists arrested and interrogated without just cause.⁴ Kirchner sent him her most important supporters for the election campaign: the young members of La Cámpora.

In Argentina, any politician who harbours national ambitions needs their own, predominantly young, militant supporters. Yet in this respect, militancy need not be synonymous with violence. Rather, it stands for the absolute loyalty the members vow to their political leaders. Hardly any movement in South America leverages its power and

Were one to unite all parties represented in the German Bundestag, it would yield a constellation that would approximately attain the diversity of Peronism.

dominance in such a way from this model as Peronism. Its home – so to speak the summonable address – is the Justicialist Party,⁵ yet its various groupings are at times highly divergent in terms of ideology. Were one to

unite all parties represented in the German Bundestag, it would yield a constellation that would approximately attain the diversity of Peronism. An answer to the question of how a disparate entity can still cohere is found in "La Marcha Peronista", the anthem of this movement, which is sung with great fervour and teary eyes. The anthem goes: "This great leader knew how to win the masses and conquer the capital. We proclaim from our hearts ¡Viva Perón!"⁶ What use are programmes against such devotion?

Since Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1874) and the spiritual leader of the nation, Evita (1919-1952), a proven level of political militancy is the admission ticket to those places where power, state offices and positions are assigned. Militancy represents devotion to the movement, submission under one leader, as well as combativeness, which has many facets in Argentina: roadblocks, factory occupations,

3 | "Mercosur Suspends Paraguay over Lugo Impeachment", *BBC News*, 29 Jun 2012, <http://bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18636201> (accessed 19 Apr 2013).

4 | Kristin Wesemann, "Das nächste Feindbild", *KAS Länderbericht*, Dec 2012, 7, http://kas.de/wf/doc/kas_33158-1522-1-30.pdf (accessed 5 Jan 2013).

5 | Partido Justicialista (PJ).

6 | "La marcha peronista", *El Sitio Peronista*, <http://www.elsitio-peronista.com.ar/marcha.htm> (accessed 20 Jan 2013).

attacks. Boxers who go down and stay down after just a few punches are referred to as having a glass jaw. Top-tier political militants need to have both a steel jaw and a heart of steel. Insults have to be shrugged off, as do real punches, now and then.

YOUTH AS A LEGACY OF THE NATIONAL MODEL

In South America, the time after stepping down from office is planned early, often directly after entering office. Thoughts in the present focus on the future – one's own, that is – because one remembers all too well the fate of others. Often enough, former presidents have been seen fleeing the country because their successor had promised in their election campaign to “clean up house”. Others ended up in prison. Argentina was usually more civilised in this respect. Cristina Kirchner, who polarises the nation, turns it upside down, breaks with traditions and by now also has many enemies amongst the Peronists, should nevertheless know that she needs to be cautious. One day, she too will have to move out of the Casa Rosada, the pink-toned government palace. Should she fail to step down at the zenith of her power and instead be voted out of office, her successor will have no choice but to distance himself from her. Unless he is unable to do so and is bound to fealty. And that's the whole point when Cristina Kirchner says: “Young people are the most important pillar of the government – the guarantee that this project advances and becomes ever stronger.”⁷ The Argentinean Ministry of the Interior and the Instituto Nacional de Capacitación Política have even developed a “Manual of political empowerment” to fulfil this plan: “We want the national and popular model – to which we have contributed so much – to survive”, says the manual. “Our calling as militants guides us.”⁸

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7 | “Fuerte impulso de la Presidenta a la militancia juvenil”, *La Nación*, 23 Feb 2011, <http://lanacion.com.ar/1352203> (accessed 20 Jan 2013).

8 | Ministerio del Interior, Presidencia de la Nación und Formación Política Instituto Nacional de Capacitación Política, “Manual de Formación Política”, Buenos Aires, 2012, 9, http://mininterior.gov.ar/asuntos_politicos_y_allectorales/incap/publicaciones/Manual_FP.pdf (accessed 20 Jan 2013).

Argentina is a very young nation. The average age is just 30.5 years. (In Germany, the average age is 43.) When Cristina Kirchner was confirmed as president in October 2011, every second voter was younger than 35. And this figure is expected to rise in future. To this end, the Peronist party to which the president belongs, Frente para la Victoria (Front for Victory), dropped the statutory voting age from 18 to 16 years literally overnight in autumn last year. From 2013, the 25.2 million Argentines aged between 18 and 70 who are required to vote will be joined by 1.4 million young people able to vote in national elections. This is not yet mandatory.

Peronists in the capital stuck up masses of placards: "Beasts!! Now they're even snatching the sixteen-year-olds! They know no mercy."

The opposition has criticised the president's intentions across the board. Peronists in the capital stuck up masses of placards:

"Beasts!! Now they're even snatching the sixteen-year-olds! They know no mercy." The accusation: Cristina Kirchner wants to ensure her people achieve a two-thirds majority in the 2013 parliamentary elections. Only in this way can she amend the constitution and stand for a third term in 2015. The debate focusing on the so-called Re-Re-Elección may appear somewhat bizarre in these weeks amid crumbling approval ratings for the president, but by no means marks her defeat.

The "Re-Re" and the voting right for young people are ideas that stem primarily from La C mpora. When parliamentarians debated the new voting right at the end of October 2012, hundreds of militants were in attendance. And when the resolution was passed, they unrolled an enormous flag bearing Cristina's portrait over the heads of the representatives to celebrate their triumph.

When in Argentina mention is made of La C mpora, it is always a bit eerie. The image is akin to watching a good horror movie: it is not the blood and gore that spreads fear and sets nerves on edge. It is the unknown, the mysterious figure stalking through the mist towards a house, whose occupants are sound asleep, blissfully unaware of the approaching peril. It therefore remains a puzzle how the best-known of the president's militant groups of supporters is structured and functions.



Book cover of the publication “La Campora. The secret history of the legacies of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner”. | Source: © KAS Argentina.

THE HOLIEST OF ALL MILITANTS: PERON

Last year, journalist Laura Di Marco attempted to shed light on the murky situation. Her expose *La Campora. The secret history of the legacies of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner*⁹ sold like hot cakes. However, this work often relies on conjecture and hearsay, as a careful reading makes readily apparent. The history of the organisation that is told is nevertheless fascinating, in part due to the tragedies that some Camporists who are feared today have to offer.

Take for example “Wado”, whose real name is Eduardo de Pedro and is a child of the *desaparecidos*, the “Vanished” of the military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983, many of whom were never seen again. They were tortured, drugged, thrown from aeroplanes or otherwise murdered. Human rights campaigners estimate the number of victims to be 30,000. Official agencies speak of more than 11,000. When they were students, “Wado’s” parents joined the Montoneros, a kind of Peronist urban guerrilla group

9 | Laura Di Marco, *La Campora, Historia secreta de los herederos de Nestor y Cristina Kirchner*, Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 2012.

founded in 1970. Its members – both left-wing and nationalist – shrouded the country in their battle against all other political groupings with spectacular ambushes, kidnappings, blackmail and murder. They hoped for the return of Perón from his exile in Madrid and, together with him, wanted to establish a socialist Argentina. When the general returned home after 18 years of exile on 20 June 1973, he saw how divided his supporters were – supporters who should actually have been fighting for a better nation in his name, and in the name of Peronism.

A simple number suffices to describe the charisma Perón still possessed upon his return: three million compatriots awaited him. They travelled from all 23 provinces and the capital Buenos Aires, some under way for weeks on foot or by horse. Yet this mass was no longer united. Left and right-wing militant Peronists faced off irreconcilably at the welcoming celebration. And even before Perón landed, his adherents were killing one another. 13 people died and more than 100 were wounded. The “Ezeiza massacre” finally sealed the division of the Peronists.

Perón’s adherents were killing one another. 13 people died and more than 100 were wounded. The “Ezeiza massacre” finally sealed the division of the Peronists.

Perón opposed the Montoneros and expelled them from the party. He called them “fools” who should “get off his back”.¹⁰ In Argentina, presidents are allowed to say such things. Indeed, it is expected of them. The Montoneros were now “infiltrators, betraying us from the inside”, “more dangerous than our external enemies”.¹¹ The military dictatorship that came to power in March 1976 after the death of Perón and the unhappy presidency of his widow, Isabel Martínez, destroyed the Montoneros. Eduardo de Pedro’s parents were captured in 1977; his mother was nine months pregnant. “Wado”, one year old, was kidnapped, abandoned and found by relatives. In the 1990s, he began to search for his parents and sibling.

From the very beginning, President Néstor Kirchner campaigned for a second purge of the military dictatorship. Under the first president after the nation’s return to democracy, radical Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989), Argentina began to

10 | Ingo Malcher, *Tango Argentino. Porträt eines Landes*, Becksche Reihe, Munich, 2008, 53.

11 | *Ibid.*

investigate the crimes of the junta's officers and generals. Peronist president Carlos Menem (1989-1999) ended this phase by enacting amnesty laws. This was an attempt to appease both the politicians and the population and to prevent further military rebellions, which had repeatedly destabilised the nation under Alfonsín's presidency. These amnesty laws were not repealed until 2003 under Kirchner. This cleared the way for new trials and sentencing – until today. At the end of 2010, those responsible for the murder of “Wado's” parents and his sibling – members of notorious military intelligence service “Batallón de Inteligencia 601” – received prison sentences from 25 years to life. Despite all the failings the Kirchners can be accused of in other areas, such as economic orientation, one thing is certain: they are deserving of accolade by virtue of their contributions to purging the military dictatorship. In this respect, Argentina is more progressive than its neighbours, who have also experienced brutal dictators.

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Cristina Kirchner played a very active role in the “601” proceedings, and via these came to know “Wado”. According to Cámpora researcher Di Marco, he in turn “began to believe that Néstor and Cristina would continue the project for which his parents had fought”.¹² And so it was that he ended up in the Kirchnerist youth organisation. This is headed by the president's son, Máximo Kirchner. In addition to Eduardo de Pedro, the group has five more noteworthy members: Andrés “El Cuervo” (the raven) Larroque, Juan Cabandié, whose parents were likewise “Vanished”, Mariano Recalde, José María Ottavis Arias and Mayra Mendoza, the only woman. The group is named after Héctor José Cámpora, who was president for 49 days in early summer 1973 before Perón forced him to step down. Today, Cámpora has a reputation for being particularly loyal to Perón. Chronicler Martínez even describes him as subservient, awkward and totally lacking self-esteem. A reply he reportedly gave to Perón when the latter once asked him at the time has even outlasted his death: “It is always the time that you wish it to be, Mr. President.”¹³

12 | Di Marco, n. 9, 206.

13 | “Nicht einen Tag”, *Der Spiegel*, 19 Mar 1973, 110, <http://spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-42645370.html> (accessed 25 Apr 2013).

Di Marco is searching for parallels between La Cámpora and the Montoneros and finds them in the self-conception of both groups as “subjects of change”. Indeed, most first-generation Camporists are children of the Argentinean state crisis of 2001/2002. Back then, the economy and currency had collapsed. Many Argentines lost not only the majority of their savings, but above all any faith whatsoever in the nation’s politics. Street battles raged across the nation, together with bloody protests and looting. And everywhere, the youth also took part. Today, the leadership of La Cámpora has three pillars: the sons and daughters of the “Vanished” of the military dictatorship, former students who gravitated towards the left-wing political spectrum of the universities after the nation went bankrupt, and activists from social movements. Larroque “The Raven”, for instance, discovered La Cámpora via youth work.

How did this loose bundle of politically inquisitive individuals transform into the shadowy force that gained the trust of the president and now controls large parts of the country?

Nearly all the young Peronists had initially grouped behind Néstor Kirchner up to 2005. However, La Cámpora projected a particularly “young” image. It organises itself via the Internet and its logos are praised as works of art. The question is, how did this loose bundle of politically inquisitive individuals transform into the shadowy force that gained the trust of the president and now controls large parts of the country? It is established fact that Cristina Kirchner celebrated her overwhelming re-election result on 23 October 2011 with a very small gathering comprising only her son Máximo and his friends in the presidential residence in Olivos. For herself, widow of the great unifier Néstor, virtually no friends remained. She had always embodied the politics of her husband. And not even he trusted everybody, preferring to rely instead on his long-standing stalwarts, the “Penguins” from his home province of Santa Cruz. However, the Camporists have long displaced the predominantly older “Penguins”. “Secrecy and distrust”, writes journalist Di Marco, are the “hallmark” of La Cámpora.¹⁴ And in actual fact, only the leadership around Máximo is actually known by name. The son plays a dual role in this context: he has replaced the father as the political spin doctor, and as the man at the president’s side. Cristina Kirchner, who is visibly disinclined to expose herself to the masses, allows herself to be protected by

14 | Di Marco, n. 9, 206.

him. He and his confidants intercept the fervent avowals of loyalty of the supporters. And everyone around the president knows that the 36-year-old Máximo has a certain claim to the political legacy of the Kirchners. Aníbal Fernández, Interior Minister under Néstor, Minister of Justice for Cristina and today a senator with a definite penchant for her duties, already attested to Máximo's qualities as heir to the throne at an early stage: "He has the ability to come to power, far more so than others who have already been involved in politics for years."¹⁵ Only the fatherly friend from Caracas was even more direct in this assessment. Hugo Chávez assigned the young man a tremendous task at the funeral service for Néstor Kirchner: "You must continue along the path your father took."¹⁶

EMPLOYMENT AGENCY WITH PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

Consequently, the president's path leads via Máximo, and his selection committee is La Cámpora. Just like the president, this movement stands for a national and economic understanding that is referred to as "The Model". Nobody has a definition on hand. However, two baselines can be identified to which virtually the entire national policy of Argentina is currently attributable. First: the economy is controlled by politics. Second: **"Carne para todos" and "Fútbol para todos" are intended to ensure that inexpensive meat and publicly broadcast league matches are accessible to everyone. The slogan has long been the subject of mockery.** the economy is an instrument with which to improve the situation of the lower income classes. This is the justification behind the famous "para todos" ("for all") programmes. "Carne para todos" and "Fútbol para todos" are intended to ensure that inexpensive meat and publicly broadcast league matches are accessible to everyone. The slogan has long been the subject of mockery. For instance, when fans of hard, fast and loud guitar music meet at a festival, they speak of "Metal para todos".

The social programmes are often designed in such a way that the middle class is excluded from these benefits, although it is precisely this income bracket that pays for

15 | Juana Libedinsky, "Heredarás mi Reino", *Vanity Fair*, Dec 2012, <http://www.revistavanityfair.es/articulos/heredaras-mi-reino/10916/page/4> (accessed 8 Jan 2013).

16 | Juan Cruz Sanz, "Dar el salto, un desafío para Máximo K", *Clarín*, 30 Oct 2010. http://clarin.com/gobierno/_0_363563646.html (accessed 10 Jan 2013).

it all via taxes. Incomes have dropped in value on account of galloping inflation in excess of 20 per cent. However, child allowances – roughly 50 euros – are only available to families that have less than the minimum wage per month (2,670 pesos, just under 400 euros). Above all, the model should never be one thing: “neoliberal”. The 1990s under President Menem, the institutions of Bretton Woods, the European Union and the United States – all castigated Cristina Kirchner as a victim of her own deficient system. Her Argentina would fight its way out from under the yoke of capitalist imperialism. And it is precisely this point that bears the signature of La Cámpora. The group first rose to power under Cristina Kirchner at the moment her husband Néstor passed away in 2010, and its leaders made sure that the country’s streets and squares filled with people.



Cámpora office in the capital Buenos Aires. | Source: © KAS Argentina.

After all, an unwritten law in Argentina states that power and personality can be found where the masses are: poor mobilisation inevitably means poor governance. Until recently, the president was a master at mobilisation. However, organising mass rallies is somewhat more difficult. In common parlance, La Cámpora is now popularly referred to as “Agencia de Colocación”, or “the employment agency”. The positions they occupy today in government, governmental organisations and nationalised private enterprises have made the young militants wealthy, as well as less popular. “Blind obedience and a lack of work experience characterise the militant Kirchnerist elite that the nation

has reaped”, wrote traditional centrist newspaper *La Nación*, subsequently naming a long list of “occupied” state institutions.¹⁷ These lucrative positions are allocated behind the scenes, without any controls or public consultation. This means that frequently, names only become known once a decision has long been set in stone. Only then can researchers go to work and expose the connections to La Cámpora.

Lucrative positions are allocated behind the scenes, without any controls or public consultation. This means that frequently, names only become known once a decision has long been set in stone.

Yet it still comes to light at some point. After all, wherever there are winners, there are usually also losers. And the executive chair in which a Camporist sits is usually still warm from its predecessor. This was recently the case with Jorge Argüello, Ambassador of Argentina to the United States: dismissed after just one year and dispatched to Portugal. For some time already, La Cámpora had earmarked his successor, Cecilia Nahón in her late 30s, for a career in the foreign office, which is steeped in tradition. Just a few months after the re-election, Paula Ferraris – the young head of the strategically important secretariat for international coordination and cooperation, announced the end of her career to a good dozen veteran ambassadors on the fifth floor of the Palacio San Martín: “Diplomats who are over 50 years old are no longer tenable. We must fill these positions with those militant comrades-in-arms who allow us to pursue a foreign policy that reflects the process of change of this new phase.”¹⁸ In other words, forced retirement was practised on a grand scale, once again freeing up positions for loyal supporters of the president.

The new ambassador in the USA also had good contacts all the way to the top: Cecilia Nahón is an important confidant of Vice-Minister for Economic Affairs Axel Kicillof, who in turn is one of the key confidants of the president. German left and Marxist daily newspaper *Junge Welt* praises him as the “new strong arm of Argentine policy” and “passionate

17 | “El avance de la Cámpora”, *La Nación*, 4 Mar 2012, <http://lanacion.com.ar/1453557> (accessed 21 Jan 2013).

18 | Rodrigo Lloret, “Purga en Cancillería para haber lugar a los militantes”, *Perfil*, 23 Mar 2012, http://perfil.com/ediciones/2012/3/edicion_661/contenidos/noticia_0031.html (accessed 22 Jan 2013).

defender of the managed economy".¹⁹ Towards the people, however, he has to be increasingly careful. Only recently in early February, he had to seek refuge in the captain's cabin on the ferry from Montevideo to Buenos Aires. Fellow passengers had berated him harshly for his policies and threatened him with their fists.

He has Máximo Kirchner to thank for his evidently very special connection to Argentina's ruler. The two got to know each other at the University of Buenos Aires, where Kicillof belonged to TNT and the 501 movement. TNT can be translated to mean the eponymous explosive, or the motto "Tontos Pero No Tanto" (dumb, but not so dumb). 501 stands for the surfeit of the political class at the turn

The 501 movement is regarded as a kind of fun guerrilla movement in Argentina and attracted young people of various political persuasions. Only Menemists were unwelcome.

of the millennium. In Argentina, only those who are more than 500 kilometres from their home town – and thus from the ballot box – are exempt from voting. And in this way, the members of 501 circumvented the blanket electoral duty. They met up and together travelled the requisite 501 kilometres. The movement is regarded as a kind of fun guerrilla movement in Argentina and attracted young people of various political persuasions. Only Menemists were unwelcome. Yet Carlos Menem, president in the 1990s with his neoliberal-branded policies, was and still is considered responsible for the economic collapse of 2001/2002. One guiding principle from the statute of 501 is: "policy does not stem from the politicians, because they have kidnapped and gagged."²⁰ The aim was always to remain outside of the so-called system. The names of most members remain unknown to this day.

Kicillof led TNT together with General Secretary Nahón. As Vice-Minister for Economic Affairs, the theoretician of Marxist economics has become a practitioner, as well as a head-hunter. Nahón's earlier position in the Foreign Office was given to Augusto Costa, Kicillof's confidant in the Ministry for Economic Affairs. In his place came Mariana Laura González, his colleague from Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Argentino (Cenda), the think tank that

19 | Fernando Krakowiak, "Marxist mit Einfluss", *junge Welt*, 19 Nov 2012, 9, <http://jungewelt.de/2012/11-19/021.php> (accessed 22 Jan 2013).

20 | Quoted after: "Kicillof: Los primeros años", 7 *Miradas*, 12 Dec 2012, <http://7miradas.com/?p=10260> [21.01.2013].

hallmarks the economic policy of the nation. President Kirchner rules on such staffing decisions by presidential decree.²¹ These often involve strategically important positions with substantial budgets, like that of general director for the government's media and public relations, which was filled a few months ago by Hernán Reibel Maier, a childhood friend of Máximo. This young adherent was also appointed by presidential decree, much to the chagrin of the critical press. *Clarín*, the country's largest daily newspaper, wrote: "Hernán Reibel Maier now has control of the enormous budget of the official propaganda machine with which the government sponsors loyal media and censors independent and critical journalism, with the ultimate goal of stifling it."²² Like Kicillof and numerous other Camporists, the most famous being leader and founding member Mariano Recalde, Reibel Maier also began his career at Aerolíneas Argentinas, which was nationalised in 2008. A never-ending series of scandals has followed. And of course, the old adage that Woodward and Bernstein, the *Washington Post* reporters who exposed the Watergate Affair, once heard from their source "Deep Throat", also holds true in this case: "Follow the Money!"

The state-owned enterprise Aerolíneas Argentinas is generating millions in losses and its situation is dire. However, it has always served as a training centre for government supporters with ambitions for a good position.

The state-owned enterprise is generating millions in losses and its situation is dire. However, in some way it has always served as a training centre for government supporters with ambitions for a good position. Critical observers describe the strategy thus: La Cámpora relies on loyal followers in strategically important positions. This is explained by the subsequent step-by-step recruitment of further acolytes. In the case of General Director Reibel Maier, 40 additional active members were contracted in the space of just a short time.

THE POLITICAL DIVIDE BETWEEN THE RIVALS

All the same, the group is also politically involved. When it comes to the parliamentary elections in October (congress renews a third of the delegates and senators every two

21 | "Un hombre de Kicillof ocupará el puesto de Cecilia Nahón en Cancillería", *Infobae*, 28 Jan 2013, <http://infobae.com/notas/693556-.html> (accessed 2 Feb 2013).

22 | Leonardo Mindez, "Ahora La Cámpora tomó el control de la millonaria publicidad oficial", *Clarín*, 21 Feb 2012, http://clarin.com/politica/_0_650334992.html (accessed 21 Jan 2013).

years), it is not a question of “whether” the president and her supporters wish to determine the party’s candidates list themselves – the only uncertain factor is how successful they will be in doing so, as the governors are becoming restless. Control of Casa Rosada is even a cause of headache for Daniel Scioli, powerful governor of the key province of Buenos Aires. After his re-election last year, Cristina Kirchner encouraged him to appoint Cámpora ally Gabriel Mariotto as Vice-Governor. Mariotto had already made himself a career, first as a journalist and film-maker, then as a university lecturer, and subsequently as head of the Argentine Media Authority. And he had remained a loyal Kirchnerist throughout. Mariotto has long attained nationwide fame with attacks against his boss, Scioli, and thus repaid the trust of the nation’s leader. On the one hand, he and his confidants – including Cámpora co-founder José Ottavis – block legislative initiatives in the provincial parliament. On the other hand, they publicly needle Scioli and his team to such an extent that it often verges on insult. When Peronists from the provincial senate met together with the organisation La Juan Perón to find an answer to La Cámpora, Mariotto proclaimed that they were merely “dinosaurs” who had failed to understand that “history had changed” in 2003 with the inauguration of Néstor Kirchner.²³ Ottavis bowed a little lower. “If Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández have achieved anything”, said the leading Camporist, “then it is to return ideology to politics.”²⁴

Scioli is supported by an echelon of younger politicians, including the minister of his provincial cabinet. However, the DOS group has so far been a rarity in the public eye, likely at the behest of their beacon of hope.

Scioli, a candidate for the 2015 presidential election on whom the divided Peronists were able to agree, ignores such attacks. He is supported by an echelon of younger politicians, including the minister of his provincial cabinet. However, the DOS group – derived from the initials of Daniel Osvaldo Sciolis – has so far been a rarity in the public eye, likely at the behest of their beacon of hope. The governor takes a lot of hits without fighting back. This is partly attributable to the fact that his province needs the financial assistance of the national government in order to survive.

23 | “Mariotto y La Cámpora embisten contra ‘La Juan Domingo’ de Scioli”, *Perfil*, 7 May 2012, http://perfil.com/contenidos/2012/05/07/noticia_0013.html (accessed 20 Jan 2013).

24 | *Ibid.*

Other governors, such as Daniel Peralta (Santa Cruz province) and Juan Manuel De La Sota (Córdoba province), have broken ties with Cristina Kirchner, and they make no secret of it. Scioli understands that, ultimately, should he win the election, he can only unite the Peronist groups behind him as a champion of conciliation. He will also need the support of the long-standing Kirchner voters – and they will certainly not support any rebel who has made life difficult for their Cristina. Or, as Kirchnerist congressman Edgardo Depetri put it: “Anyone who opposes Cristina will lose.” Either she will be president for another term in 2015, or it will be “whoever she decides on”.²⁵

One way of attaining even greater power is via Argentina’s social insurance system. The Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social, or Anses, has again been completely under government control since 2008. It pays pensions, as well as unemployment and child allowances, and allocates mortgage loans, laptops and educational grants. For Cristina Kirchner and La Cámpora, however, it serves one primary function: that of “the most important political instrument of the current government”.²⁶ Diego Bossio, head of Anses and a close friend of La Cámpora, is a virtuoso at this game. He has employed hundreds of Camporists and had hundreds of Anses offices opened in the provinces. He has tasked his personnel with “spreading the social fairytale”, and this means from “door to door”.²⁷ The numerous new offices throughout the nation also hold seminars for young people. There, for instance, they should learn how to fill in forms correctly. Indeed a challenge in excessively bureaucratic Argentina, where the government wants to know more and more. Usually, however, other details – so-called “educational details” – are taught. The young students hear such phrases from their teachers as “You can be extremely useful to the nation by spreading its social policy.”²⁸

Argentina’s social insurance system pays pensions, unemployment and child allowances, and allocates mortgage loans, laptops and educational grants. For Kirchner and La Cámpora it is “the most important political instrument of the current government”.

25 | Jesús A. Cornjeo, “Mariotto dijo que el reclamo de Scioli es ‘electoralista’”, *La Nación*, 30 Jan 2013, 7.

26 | María Jastreblansky, “La Cámpora hace una ‘revolución’ en la Anses”, *La Nación*, 5 Oct 2012, <http://lanacion.com.ar/1411557> (accessed 20 Jan 2013).

27 | *Ibid.*

28 | *Ibid.*

And what's more, this isn't even practised in secret! Appearances by Anses leader Bossio are always meticulously orchestrated. He hands out good deeds or declares new policies surrounded by Camporists and other foot soldiers of the president, often accompanied by well-known ministers and even Cristina Kirchner herself. To put this into context, imagine the head of a European social services authority, accompanied by the prime minister or the minister for social affairs, handing out housing benefits to individual citizens at an election campaign booth, while being celebrated by the party's youth organisation. With the public television network broadcasting the event live for at least one hour on all of its channels! Yet in Argentina, virtually nobody is irritated by this any more. This is because La Cámpora has long provided for "political education" in elementary and high schools. The Directorate to Strengthen Democracy, to which the head of cabinet is subordinate and which is led by Camporist Franco Vitali, thought up the game "Hero of the Community". Camporists visit the schools with their flags and party symbols. The "Eternaut" makes his appearance – a militant Camporist with the face of Néstor Kirchner. A fifth-grader recalls: "The result of the game was that everything will be fine as long as we all follow the same path – and that means the path chosen by the government."²⁹

LA CÁMPORA SETS A PRECEDENT

In this respect, political commitment is thoroughly encouraged and socially recognised. Argentina's political youth is active, with well over 700 registered political parties. Universities in particular are highly politicised. The elections of student representatives attract almost as much media attention as the national parliaments. The militancy is synonymous with what is commonly referred to as a "hard slog": a difficult upwards struggle as a combination of responsibility for the party and self-interest, a life of membership between posting placards, manning election campaign booths in the pouring rain, meetings after work and political commitment on the district council. Peronism is more strongly oriented to individuals than any west-

29 | Laura Serra, "La Cámpora realiza talleres políticos en escuelas públicas", *La Nación*, 12 Aug 2012, <http://lanacion.com.ar/1498643> (accessed 20 Jan 2013).

European political party. Even Governor Juan Manuel De La Sota added fuel to the fire and had the young guard La Militante founded in Córdoba by a very close confidant ... his wife, Adriana Nazario. La Militante manages the youth agency in Córdoba, has the nation's spiritual leader Evita Perón in its logo and is committed to "Unity, Solidarity and Federalism". However, anti-Kirchnerism is more decisive than the triad of catchwords. Anyone unable to guarantee this has no place in La Militante and will, in the worst case, be shut out, like young provincial representative Marisa Gamaggio in early 2012. She attracted the negative attention of members with good contacts in the national government.

Other groups continue to openly affirm their commitment to Cristina Kirchner. Movimiento Evita, led by former unemployed leader Emilio Pérsico, is "ultra-Kirchnerist" and consequently often tangles with La Cámpora. They fight for the favour of the president. The Movimiento is primarily active in townships and has great influence on the allocation of social projects. Yet above all, Pérsico and his adherents can mobilise some 70,000 people.³⁰ A fact which is not-insignificant for the president. Added to this is a number of additional organisations characterised by absolute fealty to Cristina Kirchner: Kolina, founded in 2010, is under the command of Minister Débora Giorgi (Industry) and Alicia Kirchner (Social Affairs). The president's sister-in-law has control of the five-billion-peso programme Argentina trabaja (Argentina Works), which assigns publicly financed jobs – 80 per cent of which are in the Buenos Aires province. Kolina, now officially approved as a Kirchnerist party, aims to contest the party lists of the critical Peronists in the most densely populated region of the country (almost 14 million inhabitants), the prospects of which are absolutely possible in light of its many good deeds. An old proverb says: whoever wins the votes of the province will win the elections. Critics state

An old proverb says: whoever wins the votes of the province will win the elections. Critics state that the minister and her new party should step aside to clear the path for the Cámpora activists.

30 | Gabriel Sued, "El Movimiento Evita, otro polo de poder en el kirchnerismo", *La Nación*, 17 Jan 2012, <http://lanacion.com.ar/1441126> (accessed 21 Jan 2013).

that the minister and her new party should step aside to clear the path for the Cámpora activists.³¹

According to the motto “The More the Better”, we also have Nuevo Encuentro, the Kirchnerist party of Martín Sabbatella. He heads the controversial media supervisory authority and only recently attracted attention. Negative attention that is, from most Argentines, but positive attention from the president. Once again, this involved the Media Act, which proponents consider to be a contribution to media diversity, and opponents regard as an attack on the Clarín media corporation and critical journalism. The responsible court had just decided to further postpone implementation of the act. Sabbatella took the mic, called the ruling “a disgrace” and said that the Argentinean judiciary has been “colonised by the corporations”.³² Sabbatella is a major political entity in the province of Buenos Aires; for many years, he was a local politician and also held a representative’s seat in congress. For the president, he is an important antagonist in the unofficial battle against Scioli and could also be described as a test pilot for unconventional manoeuvres. After Sabbatella attacked the judges, Cristina Kirchner declared her intent to also “democratise” the judiciary.

The list of mainly youth-oriented support organisations could almost go on forever. Yet a large and diversified ensemble of organisations makes sense when flattering the government’s vanity should sound harmonious. However, the young Kirchnerists would prefer to take the stage in a united fashion in the struggle for their own identity, which is why they established Unidos y Organizados (United and Organised) in autumn 2012. This is a kind of umbrella organisation with the goal of explaining the president’s policies and organising the election campaign. After all is said and done, no matter the extent of the fear of La Cámpora and no matter how much

After all is said and done, no matter the extent of the fear of La Cámpora and no matter how much influence its opponents ascribe it, alone it is unable to mobilise the requisite masses.

31 | Ezequiel Spillman and Mariano Confalonieri, “Apuestan a Alicia para disputar contra el sciolismo”, *Perfil*, 20 May 2012, http://perfil.com/ediciones/2012/5/edicion_678/contenidos/noticia_0077.html (accessed 21 Jan 2013).

32 | Sebastian Abrevaya, “El fallo de la Cámara es una vergüenza”, *Página12*, 7 Dec 2012, <http://pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-209410-2012-12-07> (accessed 20 Jan 2013).

influence its opponents ascribe it, alone it is unable to mobilise the requisite masses. And so it endeavours to at least determine the direction. As Unidos y Organizados first gathered in congress in the new "Néstor Kirchner Hall of Youth", the Cámpora spearhead dictated the tone. Vice-president Amado Boudou, plagued by corruption, was in attendance, as was Julián Domínguez, President of the House of Representatives, Agustín Rossi, head of Block K in the same governmental body, head of cabinet Juan Manuel Abal Medina, home secretary Florencio Randazzo and Cámpora co-founders Andrés Larroque and Eduardo de Pedro. Nowadays, none of these men are particularly "young" (at best lacking career experience like their SED comrades in the blue shirts of the Free German Youth), but incredibly powerful all the same. And if it were up to them, that would stay so for quite some time. "Just so that nobody's surprised", said Larroque in this clique: "Cristina is the leader, and should there be a subcommand, then that is militancy."³³ And militancy has only one definition for a Camporist: La Cámpora.

33 | Mariano Confalonieri and Emilia Defino, "Lanzaron orgánicamente el cristinismo puro, fuera del PJ", *Perfil*, 16 Sep 2012, http://perfil.com/ediciones/2012/9/edicion_711/contenidos/noticia_0048.html (accessed 21 Jan 2013).



Winfried Weck is Resident Representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ecuador.

ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR

PRESIDENT CORREA'S ELECTION VICTORY ALLOWS FOR UNLIMITED CONTINUATION OF THE "PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION"

Winfried Weck

The incumbent president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, won the 17 February 2013 presidential election with 57.17 per cent of all votes in the first ballot with no problems, achieving an absolute majority and clearly prevailing over his seven fellow contenders. At the same, his movement Alianza PAÍS itself won a two-thirds majority in the Asamblea Nacional, Ecuador's national parliament.

Virtually no one in and around Ecuador was in doubt that Rafael Correa would be re-elected as president. The question was simply: how great a victory would he achieve, would a second ballot be necessary, and how would the majority ratios themselves be established in a likewise newly-elected parliament? Although the official final result of the presidential elections was announced by the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) on 8 March, the first election night projections had already proved to be true based on the distinctiveness of the results: Rafael Correa and his vice-presidential candidate, Jorge Glas, emerged from the first ballot as the clear winners with 57.17 per cent. The middle-class candidate, Guillermo Lasso, who had stood for election for the first time with his new political movement, CREO, followed as the runner-up and gained 22.68 per cent. On the one hand, that is a dramatic 34 percentage points below Correa's sterling results; on the other hand, Lasso could clearly distance himself from the other candidates with these results. Former President Lucio Gutiérrez won third place with only 6.73 per cent, followed by the second middle-class candidate, Mauricio Rodas, with 3.90 per cent, the banana magnate, Álvaro Noboa, with 3.72 per cent, the socialist collective candidate, Alberto Acosta, with 3.26 per cent,

the social democrat, Norman Wray, with 1.31 per cent, and finally the pastor Nelson Zavala with 1.23 per cent.

Table 1

Results of the 2013 parliamentary elections in Ecuador

Candidate	Votes	Share in per cent	Men pro rata	Share in per cent	Women pro rata	Share in per cent
Rafael Correa Delgado	4,918,482	57.17	2,390,913	56.54	2,527,569	57.79
Guillermo Lasso	1,951,102	22.68	977,474	23.12	973,628	22.26
Lucio Gutiérrez	578,875	6.73	308,806	7.30	270,069	6.17
Mauricio Esteban Rodas Espinel	335,532	3.90	144,358	3.41	191,174	4.37
Álvaro Noboa	319,956	3.72	166,202	3.93	153,754	3.52
Alberto Acosta	280,539	3.26	139,505	3.30	141,034	3.22
Norman Wray	112,525	1.31	51,818	1.23	60,707	1.39
Nelson Zavala	105,592	1.23	49,656	1.17	55,936	1.28

Source: CNE Ecuador.

In his first statements, Rafael Correa declared that he values this verdict of the electorate as a mandate to continue his government's so far successful economic course. At the same time, he surprised the audience of the Columbian radio station *LaFM*, which was the first foreign station he gave an interview with, with the declaration that he would not run for the presidency again in 2017 because the Ecuadorian constitution does not allow a third successive term of office. With this statement to a non-Ecuadorian station of all things, Correa has apparently particularly rejected the supposition discussed in international circles that, should he win a new term in 2013, he would change the constitution in order to be able to run again in 2017.¹

1 | At the same time, it can be taken as a political signal of good neighbourly relations that he straight away granted a Columbian station his first interview instead of a Venezuelan or Cuban radio station. In the same interview, Correa committed himself to Ecuadorian-Columbian relations, which, "despite all of the ideological differences" between his government and that of Columbian president Santos, would find itself in an "extraordinary momentum" (*El Comercio*, 19 Feb 2013). It is possible that this interview also represents a further indication that it is not in Correa's main interest to adopt the >

Guillermo Lasso presented himself as the polling day's second winner and wants to take over the opposition leadership. However, Mauricio Rodas also sees himself in this role.

The other important news item had already come on the evening of election from the runner-up, Guillermo Lasso, who gave his press conference from the country's biggest

city, Guayaquil. "We started at zero and rose to the second-strongest political power in Ecuador", said Lasso, who presented himself as the polling day's second winner. He said he wants to take over the opposition leadership himself. However, the second candidate from the middle-class opposition, the young lawyer Mauricio Rodas, also sees himself in this role. He regards the nearly four per cent of the votes he was able to pull in as a great success, and an incentive to continue his political project, SUMA, and to strengthen it nationally.

A SECURE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN PARLIAMENT

The future composition of the Asamblea Nacional is not only a consequence of the clear victory of the Alianza PAÍS presidential movement, which in total received about 52 per cent of the vote,² but is also the result of a combination of the new voting system according to national and provincial tickets and the newly implemented counting procedures in accordance with the D'Hondt method for the allocation of the most parliamentary seats, which normally favours larger parties. Because of these electoral regulations, 100 of the 137 parliamentary seats (72 per cent) will fall to the Alianza PAÍS. As such, it has a two-thirds majority and could also approve constitutional changes without a coalition partner. The electoral council, CNE, took a lot of time to make the count. They wanted to avoid at all

leading role of the Latin American new left and ALBA in the future. He has not only made several public statements against such requests, but also the term "socialism" virtually never appears in his political discourse, which is shaped by nationalism.

2 | Because of electoral law, which allows for a different counting formula for the 15 representatives elected through national tickets (Webster) than for the 103 elected through provincial tickets (D'Hondt), the CNE also has no overall result for the parliamentary elections in percentages. For the elections of the 15 representatives on the national level, Alianza PAÍS was allotted 53.17 per cent, CREO 11.56 per cent, PSC 9.35 per cent, PRE 4.98, PSP 4.97 per cent, Unity of the Lefts 4.71 per cent, SUMA 3.34 per cent, Avanza 2.88 per cent, PRIAN 2.73 per cent, Ruptura 2.51 per cent, and the Socialist Party 0.73 per cent.

costs the fatal errors that crept in during the registration process for the political parties and movements, a requirement for participation in the elections, which aroused harsh and cynical criticism.³ The official final result and the list of all of the parliamentarians entering the Asamblea Nacional were first made public together on 27 March, 38 days after the election on 17 February. However, the projection produced by the non-governmental organisation Participación Ciudadana (citizens' participation), a partner of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, anticipated the the final result (at least in its amount and impact) just 30 hours after the polling stations closed.

The new middle-class movement, CREO (Lasso), accordingly won eleven seats, followed by the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC, which already agreed to a coalition with CREO before the elections, but will not proceed with it in parliament) with six seats, and former President Gutiérrez's populist party, PSP, with five seats. Likewise, both the indigenous population's socialist-oriented political representation, called Pachakutik (as part of the Unity of the Lefts), as well as the new left-leaning movement supported by Rafael Correa, Avanza, won five seats. Former President Bucaram's traditional PRE and presidential candidate Mauricio Rodas' new centre movement, SUMA, each earned one seat. The remaining three seats are divided among regional movements.

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK BEFORE THE ELECTIONS

Ecuador's presidential democracy developed into a presidential autocracy under the aegis of Rafael Correa. What became apparent with the dissolution of parliament and the composition of a new constitution in 2007 has since intensified to a greater extent: the concentration of state power with the person in the presidency. On the one hand, this can be attributed to the structure of his personality, on the other hand to his political action. Correa's self-definition is not

The concentration of state power with the person in the presidency has become ever more apparent since 2007.

3 | The head of the CNE, Domingo Peres, had already announced on the day after the elections that the national electoral council would issue no provisional results or even projections concerning the parliamentary elections until 100 per cent of all the votes were counted and all the elected representatives were confirmed, which would take up several days.

Correas form of policymaking is accompanied by exercising constitutional provisions *al gusto*, which has led to the exclusion of organised civil society as a critical mass, and to extensive limitations on freedoms of opinion and press.

shaped by his own political profile, but rather by combating any form of criticism of his administration as an attack on his personal honour and his proclaimed *revolución ciudadana* (people's revolution), his political programme's motto. His form of policymaking has meanwhile led to the political neutralisation of the unicameral parliament, to consolidation of the institutional judiciary powers, and is therefore accompanied by exercising constitutional provisions *al gusto*, leading additionally to the exclusion of organised civil society as a critical mass, and to extensive limitations on freedoms of opinion and press. There can be no further question of a separation of the five powers – in addition to the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution introduced two additional state powers: the National Electoral Council ('electoral' power), and various institutions for transparency and social control (from which civil society has derived its constitutional character). Today the executive *and* legislative powers in Ecuador are concentrated in one person, Rafael Correa, and judicial independence must also be called into question.

The national parliament – referred to as the Asamblea Nacional for the first time in the 2008 constitution – is de facto politically irrelevant for three reasons: first, the president rules by legislative decree, which has always been effected by the previous government's coalition majority (Correa's movement Alianza PAÍS, as well as two other left-wing parties), and through declarations of states of emergency. In fact, the Ecuadorian constitution only accepts conventional reasons for declaring a state of emergency, such as in the event of war or a natural catastrophe, but the president fully avails himself of these instruments in all political spheres, from sport to parliament itself. There are currently more than 180 state of emergency declarations in force, although the constitutional logic only provides for *one* national emergency. Even the budgeting authority, as well as financial control have devolved from parliament to the president through states of emergency. The parliament is therefore currently excluded from any political or budgetary participation in more than 180 policy areas. The parliamentary governing majority has blocked every attempt by the opposition to call this procedure into question. This

leads us to the second reason for the parliament's powerlessness: with the governing coalition operating free from criticism, and because of the complete discord between the opposition groups, especially due to the prioritisation of individual representatives' personal interests, the representatives, their factions, and ultimately the entire Asamblea have been disavowed in the eyes of the public.

Because of the complete discord between the opposition groups, the representatives, their factions, and ultimately the entire Asamblea have been disavowed in the eyes of the public.

The incidents surrounding the verdict reached in the case of the citizen, Rafael Correa, versus the owners and editor of the *El Universo* daily newspaper in September 2011 further clearly demonstrated the state of affairs regarding freedom of the press, as well as due process and legal stability in Ecuador.⁴

Freedom of the press in the sense of what is understood by European and North American democratic thought no longer exists in Ecuador today. In the 7th year of *correismo*, critical commentary free from government intervention has become very difficult. Journalists who speak critically of the president's policies are officially labelled as hostiles and threats to the president himself or to his administration. The *Universo* case is the most blatant and most internationally well-known example of this development, but is certainly not the only case. Critical TV and radio stations or newspapers have been closed or confiscated by the government; critical editors-in-chief have been

4 | Because the editor of the largest Ecuadorian daily newspaper, *Universo*, had labelled the president as a dictator multiple times in an opinion piece, he brought these legal proceedings against him and the newspaper's three owners and claimed 80 million U.S. dollars in damages for pain and suffering. After the investigation was closed by the public prosecutor's office in July 2011, the judge in charge astonishingly needed only two days to read through the 6,000 pages of the investigation files and to sentence the *Universo* defendants three years' imprisonment and to pay a penalty of 40 million U.S. dollars. The facts of this case became even juicier when *Universo*'s lawyer found out that the document of the verdict was not stored on the judge's hard drive, but had instead been externally transferred via USB, and in fact was in a software format (Chucky Seven) that was not used by the court, but was used by Correa's lawyers. Regardless of this, the conviction was upheld two months later by a judicial committee by a two-to-one vote.

confronted with death threats. The government's media apparatus, which was limited to one single radio station (*Radio Nacional de Ecuador*) at the start of Correa's term in office, today comprises five TV stations, four radio stations, three daily newspapers, four magazines, and one press association at the national level. In addition, all broadcast media are regularly obligated to broadcast the president's official statements simultaneously on all channels. Between January 2007 and May 2011, a total of 1,025 of these *cadena*s were broadcast, with a total air time of more than 150 hours. The *cadena*s, which originally served the purpose of circulating important announcements during emergency situations, are used today as means of propaganda and confrontation. This was all the more transparent and evident during the publicity hype surrounding the scurrilous political romance between Rafael Correa and Julian Assange in the summer of 2012. The WikiLeaks founder had taken refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London in order to evade extradition to Sweden, where he had to face charges due to sexual allegations. To this day he remains in this self-imposed exile. An Ecuadorian journalist summed up this farce quite simply: if Assange were Ecuadorian, he would already have been jailed long ago.



Rafael Correa in an interview about Julian Assange: The WikiLeaks founder had taken refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London in order to evade extradition to Sweden. | Source: © Santiago Armas, Presidencia Ecuador, dpa.

Freedom of the press is not the only thing in danger; even the preservation of freedom of expression is in jeopardy. For currently nearly 200 people of indigenous origin – most of them federation officials – are on trial on terrorist charges because they spoke critically of government policy. A public expression of opinion which is critical of the government may by all means be sanctioned with imprisonment in today's Ecuador. Civil protest is criminalised, and protest by organised civil society against these developments has failed to appear. In fact, non-governmental organisations are found at all public levels (at the municipal, provincial, and national level), but have no influence on policy formation in daily practice. The reasons for this are complex: for one, in Ecuador there has so far never been a functional, efficient system of involving organised civil society in the political decision-making process in the sense of a pluralistic democracy, because so far the legislature, and the special interest groups themselves, have lacked awareness of this problem, as well as the skills to organise pluralistic opinion-making processes. At the same time, organisations share the same fate of *caudillismo* with the traditional parties: Frequently enough, NGOs rise and fall with the character of their set-up, and/or their decades-long leaders and their individual interests. Internally-structured democracy does not exist, and the selection, aggregation, and articulation of particular interests do not occur. The flourishing and strengthening of the indigenous movement in the 1990s and early 2000s could only temporarily belie these structural deficits. The president's polarising effect also deeply impacts organisations, and has contributed considerably to the current political marginalisation of many active special interest groups, especially on the national level, due to internal disputes. The indigenous organisations are one example of this. Many sceptical Ecuadorians already believe that the breakdown of civil society was a political calculation by the president from the start, and that it began when he divided organised civil society into five public authorities in the 2008 constitution, and, in doing so, even robbed them of their essential characteristic of being "non-governmental".

Civil protest is criminalised, and protest by organised civil society against these developments has failed to appear. Non-governmental organisations have no influence on policy formation.

Ecuador's traditional party system has been fundamentally altered by the decline and withdrawal of the Christian Democratic Party from political life in Ecuador (around 2002 to 2007), by the assembly and comprehensive presence of former President Lucio Gutiérrez's (2003-2005) populist Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), by the sudden emergence of the left-leaning movement, Alianza PAÍS, as the political power behind President Correa (since 2007), and the accompanying weakening of the traditional leftist parties. This has only reached a tentative conclusion with the controversial registration procedure for all existing and newly formed parties and movements for the presidential and parliamentary elections.

To this day the government profits from the stabilising effects from the introduction of the U.S. dollar as the national currency in 2000, and from high crude oil prices over the past few years.

The last decade has been marked by an appreciable increase in prosperity for practically every social class, which is noticeable in everyday life. Here the Correa government has taken important measures on the one hand, and revolutionary ones in light of Ecuador's history on the other, for example in the area of labour protection, tax collection, the social system, or within the framework of infrastructure activities. Having said that, to this day the government profits from the stabilising effects from the introduction of the U.S. dollar as the national currency in 2000, and from high crude oil prices over the past few years. Practically all Ecuadorians are able to benefit from social innovations, extensive infrastructure schemes, and positive macroeconomic development. The downside appears to be a substantial increase in foreign indebtedness and the pre-selling of oil production (especially to China) over a number of years in order to finance this so-called *revolución ciudadana* policy, as well as the immensely expanded public administration. Furthermore, consumers and parts of the economy are disturbed by the ever-higher import tariffs, even for goods that are not produced in Ecuador.

WHAT PREVIOUSLY TRANSPIRED: ELECTION PREPARATION DRAMATURGY

Nearly the entire 2012 political year revolved directly or indirectly around the presidential and parliamentary elections planned for 17 February 2013. In doing so, the process of shaping old and new political forces and alliances,

which began in April and continued until the beginning of November, stood at the centre of the political discussion and public interests.

The scandal over the legalisation of political actors

On 6 February 2012, the law concerning elections and political organisations in Ecuador (Ley orgánica electoral y de organizaciones políticas del Ecuador), known as the Código de la Democracia (Democracy Code), came into effect. This law, which was passed by the governmental majority in parliament and then modified once more by the president himself, governed the period of time and the implementation of the election process (adoption of the D'Hondt method for the allocation of provincial tickets in the parliamentary elections), and (increased) responsibilities of the electoral council, CNE; it contained marked reductions in freedom of the press for the period leading up to the election, and defined the requirements and the procedure for the registration of political parties and movements: political organisations at the national, regional, or local level had until 18 July 2012 to submit the valid signatures to the CNE of at least 1.5 per cent of all eligible voters (from the 2009 election year) who were members at the appropriate state level (in the case of parties) or were sympathisers (in the case of political movements) in order to register, and therefore to be able to participate with presidential and parliamentary candidates as legal entities (at the national level, this meant submission of 157,984 valid signatures). According to the CNE's first official publication on 19 July, 43 parties and movements delivered 3,036,808 signatures (this corresponds to just under 30 per cent of the entire electorate). As expected, the government movement Alianza PAÍS, as well as four other movements and six parties, were able to meet the registration requirements.

The Democracy Code contained reductions in freedom of the press for the period leading up to the election, and defined the requirements for the registration of political parties.

The scandal over the registration first began the moment the CNE published a weblink on 27 July that gave every citizen the ability to see all of the signatures submitted by the political parties and movements. On the first day alone, 293 citizens reported that they found their signatures on lists that they had never signed. Furthermore, the bulk of

this first group consisted of employees from all working levels at CNE and its various provincial representations, and who, according to the Democracy Code, were not eligible to participate in the registrations, and therefore had great self-interest in going public with this to absolve themselves of any suspicion. The first wave of fake or even forged signatures triggered a boom of questions on the CNE website.⁵ Within a few days, 43,533 suits were filed with the Public Attorney's Office for forgery of signatures.⁶ Some cases, especially those of the highest government officials and national representatives, right up to the Speaker, whose signatures were found on their political opponents' lists, were in fact so scurrilous and unlikely that it could not have merely been a matter of signature forgery.

One of the first to pipe up was President Correa, who denounced these events as one of the *partidocracia's* ("partocracy's") greatest frauds. In a statement on 28 July, he spoke of corporations that stole signatures and sold them to unscrupulous politicians.⁷ At the same time, he declared that his movement, Alianza PAÍS, had no need to forge signatures, and that they would never do this.⁸ In the same communiqué, he also cleared the CNE of any wrongdoing. The opposition party representatives disclaimed all guilt, and in turn accused the CNE of deception and manipulation of the results. In fact, according to article 320 of the Democracy Code, the electoral council, CNE, is responsible for

The practice of several parties and movements of hiring signature gatherers and paying them 40 cents for each signature practically invited forgery.

reviewing the signatures, and it is also accurate that all five CNE councillors appointed in November 2011 come from the Correa government's milieu. Yet the entire signatures scandal had several causes: for one, trade in data, in which the CNE employees were alleged to be enmeshed, was booming. Furthermore, the practice of several parties and movements of hiring signature gatherers and paying them 40 cents for each signature practically invited forgery – and apart from that, the registration of

5 | Consejo Nacional Electoral, official website, <http://cne.gob.ec> (accessed 30 Apr 2013).

6 | In the beginning of November, the number of lawsuits was over 73,000. "La Fiscalía dice que tiene indicios de responsables de firmas falsas", *El Comercio*, 15 Aug 2012.

7 | "Rafael advierte que falsificación dejaría afuera a grupos inscritos", *El Universo*, 29 Jul 2012.

8 | *Ibid.*

political organisations through the collection of thousands of signatures itself invites fraud, as has been shown in many countries.

But the software programme used by the CNE, which had been used since 2009 and had meanwhile already become completely out-dated, seems to be primarily

responsible for the signatures scandal, as its defective security filter seems to have opened the floodgates to manipulation. Otherwise, the extent of the exposed forgeries, at a total of 34 per cent of all signatures sub-

Alianza PAÍS submitted a total of 1,047,808 signatures, of which, following initial review of ten per cent of all lists submitted, 356,000 of the signatures were invalid.

mitted, is (to this day)⁹ hardly explicable: Alianza PAÍS, which had already been absolved of any blame in advance by its leader, Correa, submitted a total of 1,047,808 signatures, of which, following initial review of ten per cent of all lists submitted, it has been projected that over 356,000 were invalid. So Alianza PAÍS came up with nearly 700,000 valid signatures at the first go and without issue, but unfortunately was the only political organisation to complete the registration. All other parties and movements that had originally been declared to be registered by the CNE because they had submitted between 157,984 and 185,958 signatures, now fell short by between 35,215 and 53,678 signatures.¹⁰ As a result, the CNE had no choice but to reach the following decisions on 6 August: all political forces received the opportunity to submit their signatures later, by 24 September; all signatures already submitted should be manually verified; and all political organisations should be granted access to this process.

The delay in starting the manual verification until the beginning of September, which then had to be pushed back six times, was attributed by CNE head, Domingo Paredes, to technical problems, which was only borne out by the faulty software theory. At least the verification process progressed efficiently thanks to 2,400 short-term workers hired, so that nearly all the parties and movements that had already received acceptance of their registration in

9 | "Alianza País, sola en la papeleta electoral?", *El Comercio*, 8 Aug 2012.

10 | *Ibid.*

July could be verified by 10 October.¹¹ Only the new movement in the centre of the political spectrum, Concertación, missed the target by some 3,000 signatures. In total, 73 of the 166 political organisations (of those, eleven were national parties and movements) were able to register as legal entities; 93 did not qualify. On 18 October, the CNE officially called for elections for the Ecuadorian presidency, for the Asamblea Nacional, and for the Andean Parliament to be held on 17 February.¹² 11,558,237 Ecuadorians were called to vote in the elections for president and vice-president, as well as for 137 national and five Andean representatives.¹³ On 15 November, the registration period for all candidates (and tickets) for the three upcoming elections closed. The public election campaigns were limited to a fixed period from 4 January to 14 February. Additionally, no further media reports were permitted to be made from 48 hours before the election, and no more alcohol was permitted to be sold or served.

After the conclusion of the registration process on 10 October, all of the political forces lapsed into a hectic flurry of activity. On the one hand, alliances had to be forged (not least with the 37 registered regional groupings as well), and on the other hand, candidates had to be nominated to constituency tickets for the elections to the national parliament. The awareness that a joint candidate was necessary had already developed among

The Unity of the Lefts, comprised of six parties, had rejected a great opposition resolution modelled on Venezuela's, and nominated Alberto Acosta as its joint candidate by the beginning of September.

the many opposition actors in the run-up. Yet by July 2012, the Unity of the Lefts (Izquierda Unida), comprised of six parties, had already categorically rejected a great opposition resolution modelled on Venezuela's, and nominated Alberto Acosta as its joint candidate by the beginning of

11 | In the end, it turned out that Alianza PAÍS, for example, had even submitted a total of 1,534,264 signatures, of which 302,134 were invalidated by the movement itself, so that a total of 826,812 signatures, or 53.88 per cent, were recognised as valid, which represents a rate of 46.12 per cent invalid signatures in reverse. Cf. "A. País, inscrito con la mitad de sus firmas", *El Comercio*, 5 Sep 2012.

12 | The Andean Parliament, located in Bogotá, is the parliamentary advisory and regulatory body for the member states of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Ecuador, Columbia, Peru), although it has no legislative powers. Every member country provides five representatives.

13 | The right to vote in Ecuador begins at the age of 16 and includes members of the military and police.

September. So the following questions for the middle-class opposition were paramount: should the opposition come to an agreement on a joint presidential candidate? If yes, should this candidate be determined through *primarias* (primaries)? Who should then be permitted to participate? Only party members or the entire electorate? And would the defeated candidates subordinate themselves to this vote? Given the irreconcilable difficulties and especially the actors' individual interests, it was apparent at an early stage that the middle-class opposition would not succeed in coming to an agreement.

The following alliances presented candidates for the presidential election:

Unity of the Left: The alliance, which consists of six different socialist groups, including Pachakutik, the political wing of the indigenous organisation, CONAIE, as well as the communist teachers' movement, MPD (both were able to register), agreed on a joint candidate, Alberto Acosta, at the beginning of September 2012 through an elaborate nationwide process. He is considered to be Alianza PAÍS' actual founder and a former close companion of Correa. However, the two had already fallen out during the Montecristi constituent assembly in 2007/2008, which Acosta presided over as president because it did not wish to accept Correa's interference in the term of office. His vice-presidential candidate was Marcia Caicedo, a former CNE advisor and, together with Dennis Cevallos (PRE), she represented the Afro-Ecuadorian population among the presidential and vice-presidential candidates.

Alberto Acosta was nominated as a joint candidate for the movement at the beginning of September 2012 through an elaborate nationwide process.

Alianza PAÍS and Avanza: President Rafael Correa and his left-leaning movement received support from the new movement Avanza, established by the head of the national institute of social security (IESS), Ramiro González, who had severed ties with the social democratic group Izquierda Democrática (ID). Along with him, the previous Minister for the Strategic Sectors, Jorge Glas, entered the race.

Ruptura 25: The moderate-left youth movement that arose in 2004 succeeded in registering, and ran its own candidates for the first time, who happened to be the youngest

duo: Norman Wray, former parliamentary representative and municipal councillor for Quito, and Angela Mendoza (VP) campaigned for the presidency. Paco Moncayo, former Mayor of Quito and considered to be the R25 team's presidential candidate for a long time, also joined the campaign as the top candidate for parliament.

PRE: The traditional, but rather centre-left oriented party, Partido Roldoista Ecuatoriano, once again succeeded in registering without any big problems, whereas the presidential candidacy of their populist leader Abdala Bucaram and his co-candidate, Dennis Cevallos, was plagued with serious issues. A valid arrest warrant was issued for Bucaram, who was removed from office on 6 February 1997 after just under seven months as president because of mental instability through an unconstitutional deposition based on corruption charges, and he fled into exile to Panama, where he remains to this day. Because of this, PRE relied on evangelical Pastor Nelson Zavala, a newcomer to politics, who called for revision of the constitution to include God in his first ever statement.

SUMA: Young Mauricio Rodas' new movement, SUMA, succeeded in registering straightaway, and ran their leader for the presidency with environmental activist Inés Moreno as his running mate. SUMA was supported by parts of the centre movement Concertación, which only just missed out on registering.



"For a different Ecuador with progress, justice and respect": The middle-class candidate Guillermo Lasso followed as the runner-up and gained 22.68 per cent. | Source: CREO via Facebook, screenshot by the eds.

CREO and PSC: The new movement CREO ran Guillermo Lasso as its presidential candidate, a former banker with close ties to the Catholic church and who had already temporarily served as 'superminister' under the last Christian-democratic president, Jamil Mahuad, and had then also promoted dollarisation. CREO formed a coalition with the Christian-social party PSC and their split-off group, Madera de Guerrero, under their charismatic leader, Jaime Nebot, mayor of the country's largest city, Guayaquil. Additionally, the rest of the social democratic Izquierda Democrática (ID), parts of Concertación, and several registered local and regional political organisations joined this alliance. This alliance had a thoroughly good chance of success as the significant alternative to the entire centre/centre-left spectrum compared to the deeply fragmented Lefts. Lasso's vice-presidential candidate, Juan Carlos Solines, had his roots in Ecuadorian Christian-democracy and was the leader of Concertación.

PSP: Former president Lucio Gutiérrez's (2003-2005) nationwide populist and agenda-free party tried to arrange an alliance with similarly populist and agenda-free PRIAN, the banana baron Álvaro Noboa's political party, for a long time. This plan failed, in large part because there is only one available spot for the presidency. Presidential candidate Gutiérrez named the former beauty queen from the coastal province of Manabí, Perla Boyes, as his candidate for the vice presidency.

PRIAN: Banana producer Álvaro Noboa, Ecuador's wealthiest man, consequently ran for the presidency in 1998, and again in 2002, 2006, and 2009. To keep everything within the family, he placed his wife, Anabella Azín, by his side as his vice-presidential candidate.

This scenario demonstrates how cavalierly and egocentrically the oppositional powers and their protagonists have behaved, even given their common goal, stated many times, to end the Correa era. Altogether, three candidates from the centre to the left of the political spectrum stood for election as presidential candidates (Acosta, Wray, and Bucaram) against President Correa.

Three candidates from the centre to the left of the political spectrum stood for election as presidential candidates (Acosta, Wray, and Bucaram) against President Correa.

to end the Correa era. Altogether, three candidates from the centre to the left of the political spectrum stood for election as presidential candidates (Acosta, Wray, and Bucaram) against President Correa, who was already propagandising 21st century socialism. The number

of centre-right candidates was limited to two (Lasso and Rodas), solely due to Concertación's failed registration. And added to this were populists Gutiérrez and Noboa, who had incidentally run together in the second ballot in the 2002 presidential elections.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ELECTION PROCESS

The high representative and leader of the Union of South American Nations' (UNASUR) electoral monitoring team, María Emma Mejía, announced to the chairman of the CNE that, in the team's opinion, no appreciable problems occurred on election day. The team's report clearly conveyed that no electoral fraud was detected, and that seven of the eight presidential candidates' results were accepted. Only Álvaro Noboa could not come to terms with his political ousting, referring to abnormal polling results by an international institute.

The Organization of the Americas criticised the tight scheduling of the election process based on the mistake that occurred with the CNE's registration and permitting process.

The majority of international electoral monitors further attested to the CNE's transparent election process. But the Organization of the Americas (OAS) criticised the extremely tight

scheduling of the election process based on the grave mistake that occurred in late summer and autumn 2012 with the CNE's registration and permitting process for political parties and movements. In general, the ruling party's election preparation and campaign leadership featured much more prevalently at the centre of the criticism than the actual election procedure.

AN UTTERLY UN-AMERICANLY QUIET ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The regulations regarding the election process restricted the time period for the most fervent phase of the campaigning to 42 days, beginning on 4 January and ending on 14 February 2013. Following this, even the media were no longer permitted to report on matters relevant to the elections. During the proper election phase, candidates were not permitted to benefit from public offices, or to make use of public institutions or facilities.¹⁴

14 | This was also the reason President Correa took a leave of absence from his office.

Should one have moved through the two metropolises of Quito and Guayaquil in January, one had to virtually forage for election adverts. Such an election campaign, which was completely atypically silent for a Latin American affair, had two causes: on the one hand, the president issued an executive order (*ordenanza*) that forbade placing election adverts on public property in the larger cities, which prevented the painting and posting of nearly every piece of inner-city masonry that is popular throughout Latin America. On the other hand, the election formalities stipulated a great reduction in the presidential candidates' financial resources, as well as those of their running mates. Whereas in 2006 each pair of candidates could still have access to 2.74 million U.S. dollars, this amount was now decreased to 1.74 million U.S. dollars. Both of these government measures, which were meant to serve as a muzzle for the challengers, and to prevent an excessively heated election campaign, were flanked by the drastic limitations on media that only report on election campaign activities, but were in no way permitted to assess them.

A violation of the Democracy Code involved dramatic threats of punishment, which led to a high level of uncertainty for many journalists and to the abandonment of election news coverage.

A violation of the Democracy Code involved dramatic threats of punishment, which led to a high level of uncertainty for many journalists and to the abandonment of election news coverage. And this was exactly what was intended, because then Rafael Correa could remain the only star candidate of the media world. According to a report by the NGO Participación Ciudadana (PC) from 9 February, he held by far the largest media presence of all the candidates.

The national electoral council, CNE, as the institution that really should have been the one to take action against this inequality criticised by the OAS' monitoring team, did not perform this duty by any means. This should come as no surprise since all five CNE board members are considered to be close to the government in one way or another. Though this may explain the office's inaction, it in no way justifies it. Complaints filed on behalf of the other candidates were generally dismissed by the CNE with flimsy explanations in favour of President Correa.

QUO VADIS, ECUADOR?

Although Correa's electoral victory was broadly expected, the unquestioned extensive and conspicuous results of both Rafael Correa and his movement, Alianza PAÍS came as somewhat of a surprise to most Ecuadorians and international observers. Ahead of the elections, it was still generally assumed that Correa would have to cope with further losses compared to his 45.2 per cent result in 2009, and that it was possible for him to be constrained by having to govern with an opposition majority in parliament. So where did this well-defined voter base come from? The explanation seems to lie less in the fact that the fragmented opposition could not agree on one or two candidates in the run-up to the election (parallels to the 2012 Venezuelan election outcome should not be dismissed). It is rather more a case of Ecuadorian voters having to decide between the undeniably successful social advances over the past few years, positively valued economic development, and assured political stability on the one hand, and the extensive democratic deficits on the other, especially in terms of civil freedoms and the separation of powers.

The electorate knew what it would receive with a vote for Correa. The other candidates, as by all means dark horses, ran the risk of reverting to the caudillismo.

The decision was clear. Furthermore, the electorate knew what it would receive with a vote for Correa, and this advantage seems to have outweighed the disadvantage in the eyes of the voters. However, the other candi-

dates, as by all means dark horses, ran the risk of reverting to the *caudillismo* and style of politics of the past century. This uncertainty seems to have been mirrored in all social classes. The explanatory models, according to which the poor and lower classes in particular would have voted for Correa, and the middle and upper classes would have turned towards the opposition, may nevertheless be right in their tendency to oversimplify; one needs only consider the bulk of thoroughly contented entrepreneurs who have come to appreciate the lack of international competition due to high import tariffs and the lack of any investment incentives for foreign businesses.

Above all, since election night, the politically interested public has been occupied with the question of what this result will possibly mean for the future of governance in Ecuador, and in particular with the combination of a clear voter base

in the case of the presidency and the government's two-thirds majority in parliament. And here the opinions differ significantly: according to one position, it is quite obvious that Correa will now govern autocratically. The election outcome and the extremely executive constitution would now de facto provide him with complete power, because he has the legislative majority behind him to change the constitution, and because the judiciary has been brought in line after the extensive judicial reforms over the past one and a half years. And in effect: the mandate is clear and gives a lot of leeway for governing free from opposition. Should, for example the economic developments necessitate the slaughter of holy cows or the extraction of crude oil reserves from the one-of-a-kind Yasuni National Park in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Correa's government could do this without risk of any damage domestically.

But there is also the conflicting position that believes governing with such a clear majority will become more difficult, and that Correa would be forced to act more carefully. This particularly relates to the clear losers in these elections, the socialist opposition and their traditional view of policymaking. Specifically, there is reason to fear that parties like the communist MPD, who no longer have any representation in parliament, will instead be represented only indirectly by those of their indigenous coalition partner, Pachakutik, and will shift their protest to the streets. Those who hold to this position reason that autocratic rule by Correa would involve civil unrest and rioting among the general public.

Some believe that by governing with such a clear majority, Correa would be forced to act more carefully because the opposition might shift their protest to the streets .

It is possible that the truth, which probably lies somewhere between these two arguments, is that Correa will indeed govern as he pleases (which, for the most part, he has done up until now) in order to advance his primary political objective, the further implementation of his "people's revolution", but that he will refrain from resorting to measures that could lead to political unrest, because such measures are ultimately unnecessary. During the fervent election campaign phase, he had already announced that he wanted to further "radicalise" the *revolución ciudadana* over the next four years of his administration. The aims, which have been pursued since 2007, of an "economic,

production, and employment revolution" (as it is known in the jargon of Alianza PAÍS), of social revolution, ethical revolution, political and constitutional revolution, and of revolution of sovereignty and integration should be pursued further and in greater depth. In the new legislative session, they would add to this list environmental revolution, urban revolution, revolution of knowledge and skills, revolution of justice, security, and cohabitation, and finally a revolution of culture (to avoid using the term "cultural revolution").

Time will tell what is truly hidden behind all of these concepts in policymaking. But past legislative sessions have explicitly experienced that precisely this form of political ideology is very expensive in reality. In addition to all the new projects, the previous accomplishments in the people's revolution, for example the expanded bureaucracy,

The Correa administration's economic policies are dependent on the relatively stable international price of crude oil. Additionally, Ecuador is endowed with considerable sources of raw materials awaiting extraction.

the extensive infrastructure activities, and the improved social services, also still need to be financed. At the moment, Ecuador's economic fortune, and the Correa administration's economic policies along with it, are dependent on the relatively stable international price of crude oil. Additionally, aside from its limited sources of low-grade crude oil, Ecuador is endowed with considerable sources of raw materials awaiting extraction. However, herein lies future potential for conflict, because these raw materials are too often found only in regions populated by indigenous peoples, who consider these resources to be the basis of their existence. The to some extent completely unsettled ownership questions may also contribute to a political and social explosion stemming from the potential profitable extraction of raw materials, which has the ability to collapse governments.

Also interesting will be the question of whether the civil opposition takes the trust bestowed on them by nearly a quarter of the Ecuadorian electorate seriously, and whether they accept the mandate to strengthen their political presence in civil society over the coming four years in parallel with likely imperceptible, and therefore frustrating, opposition politics, and to establish a nationwide political and organisational framework. Only by doing this can they present themselves as an alternative capable of governing in the next elections in 2017. It is already clear that Lasso

and CREO have replaced the previous self-proclaimed opposition leader and figurehead of the agenda-free political centre, ex-President Lucio Gutiérrez and his party, PSP, in the political landscape after he had emerged from the 2009 election with 28 per cent of the vote. For Gutiérrez is the big loser from this election, together with the socialist opposition. The unexpectedly poor performance will confront him and his PSP – as opposed to the ubiquitous and odds-defying Lefts – in the medium-term with the question of political survival.

The article was completed on 28 March 2013.



Dr. Nadine Mensel is a trainee at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Israel and member of the KAS Working Group of Young Foreign Policy Experts.

ISRAEL AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Nadine Mensel

Compared to other policy sectors, environmental policy in Israel has a tough job. The security situation in the region, the unresolved conflict with the Palestinians, the tensions within society and the socioeconomic challenges overshadow seemingly softer policy areas. This assumption is confirmed when one looks at public expenditure. In the two-year budget for 2011/2012, the Ministry of Environmental Protection was allocated close to six billion Israeli shekels in total. This amount corresponds to just a fraction of the funds of the Ministry of Defence, which had access to nearly one hundred billion shekels over the same period. The proportion of total government spending that the Environment Ministry had at its disposal was 0.84 per cent, while that of the Ministry of Defence was close to 14 per cent.¹

However, this reference to the financial resources should not lead to the conclusion that protection of the environment and nature is totally marginalised in Israel. Upon closer examination it is apparent that politicians and civil society have been steadily increasing their activities in this area over recent years. A change of attitude has been taking place in Israeli society for quite some time. Not only has the posture towards general environmental issues become more attentive, there has also been a noticeable sensitisation regarding the dangers of global warming. The understanding that a global phenomenon such as climate

1 | Cf. author's own calculations based on figures from the Israel Ministry of Finance, "State Budget. Proposal for Fiscal Years 2011-2012. Major Provisions of the Budget and Multi-Year Budget Plan", 2010, <http://financeisrael.mof.gov.il/Finance-Israel/Docs/En/publications/BudgetProposal2011-2012.pdf> (accessed 18 Jan 2013). The budget for the financial year 2013 has not yet been passed, which was one of the reasons for the early elections in Israel that took place on 22 January 2013.

change entails massive consequences for the regional or local ecosystem is becoming widespread. One of the catalysts of this development was no doubt the tragic event that occurred in December 2010, when a devastating forest fire swept across Mount Carmel. That catastrophe, which had been caused by arson, claimed 44 lives and destroyed a third of the forest cover on Mount Carmel.²

Israeli environment policy and the resulting activities focus mainly on climate protection. Obviously, the part that a small country such as Israel plays in global climate change, i.e. the anthropogenic impact on the greenhouse

The part that a small country such as Israel plays in global climate change is minimal. But the entire Middle East region will be severely affected by the consequences of global warming.

effect, is minimal. But focusing on this issue is appropriate because the entire Middle East region will be severely affected by the consequences of global warming. One particularly interesting question is which measures Israel should take to adapt to climate change on the one hand and to help mitigate further global warming on the other. Deliberations on environmental issues and climate policy are also influenced by security policy considerations. This illustrates that the boundaries between hard and soft policy areas are becoming increasingly blurred, which helps advocates of a coherent environment policy to make their case.

CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT

Specific Environmental Factors


In terms of geography, Israel is characterised primarily by arid and semi-arid climatic zones. The average annual temperature is 21.4 degrees Celsius, with temperatures fluctuating according to the time of year and location. In Jerusalem, the average temperature is 17.8 degrees Celsius, while it is seven degrees higher in Eilat. During the summer months from June to August, the figures rise to an average of 27.6 degrees Celsius overall, while dropping to

2 | Cf. Daniel E. Orenstein, Alon Tal and Char Miller, "Introduction", in: *Between Ruin and Restoration: An Environmental History of Israel*, Daniel E. Orenstein, Alon Tal and Char Miller (eds.), Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013, xi; Ehud Zion Waldoks and Abraham Rabinovich, "Carmel, and its people, prepare to rise from the ashes", *Jerusalem Post*, 10 Dec 2010, <http://www.jpost.com/Features/InTheSpotlight/Article.aspx?id=198830> (accessed 5 Mar 2013).

an average of 14.2 degrees Celsius in the winter between December and February. The latter are also the months that generally encompass the rainy season. Precipitation varies greatly throughout the country. In the south, annual rainfall might only amount to 100 millimetres. In the north, it can be up to 1,100 millimetres. Water thus represents one of the scarce resources in Israel, 45 per cent of whose landmass consists of desert. Since the early 1970s, there has been a noticeable change in temperature in the region, forecast to lead to an increase in average temperature of 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2020.³ Conservative scenarios described by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assume that there will be an increase in average temperature of 5 degrees Celsius in Israel by the end of this century compared to the period between 1960 and 1990.⁴

Fig. 1

Economic growth, population dynamics and carbon dioxide emissions in Israel, 2000 to 2011



Source: World Bank, n. 5.

3 | Cf. Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Coping with Climate Change. Special Issue. UN Copenhagen Climate Change Conference", 2009, http://old.sviva.gov.il/Environment/Static/Binaries/ModulKvatzim/P0525_1.pdf (accessed 5 Mar 2013), 6; Lucy Michaels and Pinhas Alpert, "Anthropogenic Climate Change in Israel", in: Orenstein et al., n. 2, 312.

4 | Cf. Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, n. 3, 6.

Demographic development and economic dynamics have a significant impact on environmental conditions. In Israel, both show an upward trend, i.e. there is growth in both the population and the economy (see Fig. 1). The per capita GDP was around 19,000 U.S. dollars (at current prices) in 2011, while it amounted to over 31,000 U.S. dollars ten years later.⁵ This does, however, entail greater pressures on the environment, affecting particularly the availability of usable water as well as the emission of climate-damaging gases, land use and energy demand. These lead to interactions with regard to climate change, which need to be examined more closely.

Causes for the Rise in Emissions

Reliable figures for the emission of greenhouse gases in Israel are available up to 2008. According to these, emissions have increased by five per cent since the turn of the millennium, rising to 78 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent⁶ (MtCO₂e).⁷ There has been no sign of the trend reversing so far. On the contrary, the volume of emitted gases is expected to double by 2030, taking the 2000 figures as the basis of comparison (72.4 MtCO₂e). According to calculations based on a business-as-usual scenario (BAU scenario), emissions would rise to 142 MtCO₂e within the next two decades.⁸ At 85 per cent, carbon dioxide represents the greatest proportion of climate-damaging

5 | Cf. World Bank, "World Development Indicators", <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx> (accessed 9 Mar 2013).

6 | The unit "carbon dioxide equivalent" (CO₂e) was devised in an attempt to put a figure on the greenhouse potential of climate-damaging emissions. The calculated value indicates the proportion by which a climate-damaging gas contributes to the greenhouse effect, using the potential of carbon dioxide as reference. The objective is the determination of the average warming potential over a defined period of time, usually 100 years.

7 | Cf. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Israel, Paris*, OECD Publishing, 2011, 150 and 153.


8 | Cf. Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, "A Carbon Cost Curve for Israel", Jerusalem, Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2009, 1; Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, *Israel's Second National Communication on Climate Change – Submitted under the United Nations Framework Convention*, Moshe Yanai Axelrod and Shoshana Gabbay (eds.), 2010, 20, http://www.environment.gov.il/Environment/Static/Binaries/index_pirsumim/p0578-english_1.pdf (accessed 18 Jan 2013).

gases, amounting to a total of 67.2 million tonnes (2009 status). Israel thus reaches just under 9.2 per cent of the carbon dioxide emissions for which the Federal Republic of Germany is responsible. But in a per capita comparison, the two countries are virtually identical at 8.97 compared to 8.98 tonnes.⁹ The main emitters are the energy and transport sectors (power generation and fuel combustion respectively). In Israel, electricity is produced almost exclusively from fossil fuels (Fig. 2).

What makes matters worse is that the entire energy and electricity production must take place within the country's borders because there are no cross-border power trunk lines, not even to states with which peace agreements exist (Egypt and Jordan). Israel's isolated position, which is partly due to security policy issues, thus has consequences for climate policy.

Fig. 2

Annual electricity production by national electricity provider Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) according to fuel type, 2010 (in per cent)



Source: IEC, n. 10, 4.

As average temperatures are due to rise due to climate change, the energy supply situation will become even more precarious. During the hot summer months of July and August, power consumption is currently already 1.04 to 2.12 billion kilowatt hours higher than during the months of January and February.¹⁰ Because of the expected rise

9 | Cf. n. 5.

10 | Cf. Israel Electric Corporation (IEC), "Statistical Report Year 2010", 2011, 26, <http://iec.co.il/EN/IR/Documents/stat2010.pdf> (accessed 9 Mar 2013).

in demand for cooling equipment and air conditioning, for instance, expansion of the energy generation capacities is unavoidable. This will put pressure on the providers¹¹ to guarantee the supply of electricity to private households and businesses without any shortages. Between 2000 and 2010, electricity consumption in Israel increased by 3.2 per cent year on year. Total consumption was close to 52 billion kilowatt hours in 2010, with total production amounting to just over 56 billion kilowatt hours.¹² At peak times, the IEC's capacities are utilised at over 92 per cent, which means there is a relatively high risk of supply shortages that may lead to power cuts.

Consequences for the Water Balance

Rising temperatures are also leading to rising sea levels due to melting of the polar ice caps. For Israel, a ten centimetre rise in sea level within a decade, as has been predicted by scientists for the Mediterranean region,¹³

means a loss of between 0.4 and two square kilometres of land and a retreat of the coastline by two to ten metres each decade.¹⁴ Apart from these changes to the landscape, such a development will also affect the aquifers, which will be increasingly contaminated by salt water.

For Israel, a ten centimetre rise in sea level within a decade means a loss of between 0.4 and two square kilometres of land and a retreat of the coastline by two to ten metres.

Furthermore, the expected reduction in rainfall will jeopardise water supplies. A ten per cent reduction in rainfall is expected by the end of this decade.¹⁵ When considering that three quarters of the available fresh water reserves in Israel come from rainfall,¹⁶ one realises that reduced precipitation (in combination with increased evaporation due

11 | The Israel Electric Corporation supplies not only the Israeli market, but also delivers electricity to the providers in the Palestinian Territories.

12 | Cf. n. 10, 4, 21 and 27.

13 | Cf. Fengjun Jin, Akio Kitoh and Pinhas Alpert, "Water Cycle Changes over the Mediterranean: a Comparison Study of a Super-high-resolution Global Model with CMIP3", in: *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, 368, 2010, 1-13.

14 | Cf. Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, n. 3, 6 et seq.

15 | Cf. Michaels and Alpert, n. 3, 313.

16 | Cf. Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Climate Change Adaptation in Israel", 2012, 4, http://old.sviva.gov.il/Environment/Static/Binaries/ModulKvatzim/Brochure-ClimateChangeAdaptationInIsrael-Nov2012_2.pdf (accessed 9 Mar 2013).

to higher temperatures) will put great stress on what is already a precarious water balance. One area under direct threat is the Sea of Galilee. Israel's only fresh water lake, it covers a quarter of the country's annual water consumption. If there is a reduction in precipitation in that area of the Upper Jordan River Basin and a simultaneous increase in evaporation – put at 20 per cent each in one scenario – this will translate into an annual loss of fresh water at 110 million cubic metres.¹⁷

Added to this is the fact that waters from the Sea of Galilee run through Jordan into the Dead Sea, whose mineral deposits are of considerable economic importance (particularly for the chemical industry and tourism). A circumstance that is equally significant in geopolitical terms is that the Jordan River forms a border. In the 1994 peace agreement with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the two contracting parties committed themselves to joint management of the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. Amongst other things, Jerusalem and Amman agreed that Israel would provide its neighbour with a specific volume of water each year.¹⁸ One question that has so far remained unanswered is what will happen when both rivers carry substantially less water due to climatic conditions and the precisely quantified transfer can no longer be realised on the basis of the natural resources. Once again it becomes evident how the issues of climate change have an impact on areas of security policy.

Further impacts of climate change Israel will have to expect include the danger of flash floods and flooding. While the absolute quantity of precipitation may decrease, the probability of heavy rain will increase. Relatively large volumes of rain falling in a short space of time exceed the soil absorption capacity and the carrying capacity of rivers and wadis, which may cause flooding.¹⁹ Furthermore, there will

17 | Cf. Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, *Israel's Second National Communication on Climate Change*, n. 8, 75.

18 | Cf. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Annex II: Water and Related Matters", 1994, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Israel-Jordan%20Peace%20Treaty%20Annex%20II> (accessed 10 Mar 2013).

19 | In the winter of 2012/2013, this affected several villages and cities, including Tel Aviv, where the Ayalon River burst its ▶

be related effects on flora and fauna from the climatic changes, which will also affect cultivated land. Plants and animals being driven out of their habitats, for instance by desertification and forest fires, in conjunction with the advance of non-native species threatens to cause fundamental changes in biodiversity.²⁰ Where agriculture is concerned, increased use of pesticides is to be expected, which will result in contamination of soil and groundwater. In addition, yields of certain crops will be affected, for instance because of fluctuations in the growing seasons due to climatic conditions.

Where agriculture is concerned, increased use of pesticides is to be expected, which will result in contamination of soil and groundwater.

ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE POLICY IN PRACTICE

Political Responsibilities

These worrying developments highlight the question as to what policy the government will apply in response. In Israel, environment and climate policy is not exclusively the responsibility of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Besides this key department, the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development, of National Infrastructures, of Industry, Trade and Labor, of Construction and Housing and of Finance all have some decision-making powers in this policy area.

This fragmentation of responsibilities regarding environment policy has an impact on policy formation and means that there are conflicting goals involved. Added to this is the need to balance diverging interests within the government coalition. Given this convoluted mix of responsibilities, there is also a need for coordination between the above-mentioned departments and authorities. Four topic-specific and cross-departmental committees are performing this task. The Ministry of Environmental Protection has main responsibility for the key area of "Sustainable Development"; the area of "National Infrastructure" is controlled by the Ministry of the Interior in consultation with

banks and disrupted some road and rail traffic. Cf. Jonathan Lis, Ilan Lior and Zafir Rinat, "Biggest Storm in Decade Wreaks Havoc in Israel, Shuts Down Ayalon Highway for 9 Hours", *Haaretz online*, 9 Jan 2013, <http://haaretz.com/news/1.492773> (accessed 9 Mar 2013).

seven government departments, local government bodies and non-government organisations (NGOs); the Ministry of Finance has overall responsibility for “Green Taxation” and also oversees the committee on “Climate Change”.²¹

Legal Framework and Government Action

Israeli environmental activists complain that there is still neither consistent environmental legislation nor a coherent climate strategy in place.

Central environment and climate-related legislation does not go very far back and has been created in a piecemeal fashion, as noted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).²² Israeli environmental activists share this assessment and add that it was only in the last few years that political decision-makers acquired an increasing awareness of the issues and showed a clearer willingness to take action. But they complain that there is still neither consistent environmental legislation nor a coherent climate strategy in place.²³ Pieces of legislation considered ground-breaking include the Protection of the Coastal Environment Law, in force since 2004, the Polluter Pays Law, 2008, further the Clean Air Law, which the Knesset approved in 2008 and which came into force in 2011, as well as the Packaging Law, 2011. Law enforcement tools complement these legal regulations. These include forty Environmental Inspectors, who pursue violations on behalf of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and prepare criminal prosecutions. The Ministry also funds a small environment unit of the regular Israeli police, which collaborates with the Environmental Inspectors.²⁴

The Israeli government neglected climate protection for a long time and did not become active in this field until relatively recently. A first step was the establishment of an inter-departmental steering committee in 2006 headed by the Scientific Adviser in the Ministry of Environmental Protection. The aim was to form a clear picture of the challenges facing Israel in its efforts to adapt to climate change. Later on, not only did the climate debate gain in depth, activity at the political level increased as well. This

21 | Cf. *ibid.*, 52.

22 | Cf. *ibid.*, 160.

23 | Conversation between the author and Naor Yerushalmi and Maya Crabtree, Director and Vice-Director of the The Israeli Union of Environmental NGOs, Life & Environment, on 12 Feb 2013 in Jerusalem.

24 | Cf. n. 7, 51.

was probably due in large measure to the Copenhagen UN Climate Conference, the 15th conference of the contracting states of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). "In the run-up to Copenhagen, Israel's leaders finally began to acknowledge the need to address climate change."²⁵ The first indication of this was a McKinsey study on the costs involved in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in Israel published in November 2009. The second one was the commitment by President Shimon Peres to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 announced at the climate conference in December 2009.

Table 1

Recommendations of the McKinsey study on the greenhouse gas abatement potential

1.	High penetration of concentrated solar thermal power generation
2.	High penetration of solar photovoltaic power generation
3.	Improved fuel efficiency of internal combustion engine vehicles
4.	Increased energy efficiency in new buildings as a result of improved planning and insulation
5.	Use of efficient lighting and lighting control systems
6.	Retrofit of residential buildings with improved insulation in order to improve heating and cooling efficiency
7.	Industry fuel transition – fuel oil to gas
8.	Use of landfill gas for electricity generation
9.	Increased penetration of electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids (assuming low-carbon power fuel mix)
10.	Use of wind turbines for power generation

Source: McKinsey & Company, n. 26, 3 et seq.

The analysis by McKinsey & Company²⁶ determined the abatement potential regarding the emissions of climate-damaging gases compared to a BAU scenario, in which

25 | Michaels and Alpert, n. 3, 322.

26 | Cf. McKinsey & Company, "Greenhouse Gas Abatement Potential in Israel. Israel's GHG Abatement Cost Curve", Translated Executive Summary, 2009, http://mckinsey.com/~media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/Sustainability/cost%20curve%20PDFs/israel_cost_curve_exec_summary_english.ashx (accessed 8 Mar 2013).

emissions forming Israel's carbon footprint would increase to 142 MtCO₂e by 2030. If the study's recommendations (see Table 1) were followed, it should be possible to cut these emissions by 52 MtCO₂e through technical means as well as measures to encourage behavioural change. The greatest impact could be achieved in the energy sector: firstly by converting to renewable energies for electricity generation and including a greater proportion of natural gas in the energy mix and secondly through improved the energy efficiency of buildings and technical equipment, for instance.

Politicians could derive concrete implementation strategies from these recommendations if they interpreted the president's statement in Copenhagen as a call for action. In this connection it is important to know that although Israel is one of the signatories of the Framework Convention on Climate Change and joined the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, it is not part of the group of Annex I states of the Protocol, which have entered into binding commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. At the time of the ratification, Israel was not listed as an industrialised country, which is why commitments to reduce greenhouse gases were voluntary and no verification was required as is the case for the Annex I states.²⁷ In spite of this, the former Environment Minister Gilad Erdan (Likud) advocated that Israel should consider itself an industrialised economy even before joining the OECD – and thereby the group of industrialised nations – and demonstrate responsibility for its own ecological footprint accordingly.²⁸

Measures for Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation

The efforts made by the Israeli government in matters of climate protection aim both at adapting to climate change and at mitigating the greenhouse effect. Concrete measures in both areas of action require more in-depth scientific research. For this purpose, the Ministry of Environmental Protection set up a register for greenhouse gas emissions in 2010. Parties to this initiative, be they public or private

27 | Cf. Ofira Ayalon et al., "Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions Action Plan for the State of Israel", 2011, 1, http://events.awma.org/GHG2011/Abstracts/Session%207/Abstract%20%2316/Extended%20Abstract_16.pdf (accessed 18 Jan 2013).

28 | Cf. Michaels and Alpert, n. 3, 322.

institutions and organisations, are called upon to report their emissions annually on a voluntary basis.²⁹ Using the resulting database should make it easier in future to make more reliable statements about the development of greenhouse gas emissions. The success of this undertaking does, however, depend on the scope of the register. The more institutions become actively involved in the data collection, the more accurate the mapping of the emissions will be. The Environment Minister has further instructed the Israeli Climate Change Information Center (ICCIC), which opened at Haifa University in 2011, to disseminate the information and carry out the scientific analysis.³⁰

The Environment Minister has instructed the Israeli Climate Change Information Center to disseminate the information and carry out the scientific analysis.

Two years previously, the Ministry had already been instructed via a government decision to devise a national programme for climate change adaptation.³¹ Work on this programme is still ongoing, although initial suggestions from individual working groups are already available. The building sector, for one, is attributed a key role in this; it is considered equally in strategies for climate change adaptation and for the mitigation of the greenhouse effect. On the one hand, higher external temperatures demand intelligent architecture, for instance to facilitate the creation of acceptable living conditions in buildings as well as disruption-free working and production processes; on the other hand, modern construction methods contribute to lower energy consumption in the construction sector, which means lower emissions from power generation based on fossil fuels.

The general recommendation is that the principle of sustainability should be enforced more strongly for new buildings and that corresponding renovation measures should be encouraged for older buildings. The most important suggestions in this area envisage mandatory energy certificates for buildings, low-energy construction methods

29 | Cf. Ayalon et al., n. 27, 4; Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Climate Change Mitigation in Israel", 2012, 5, http://old.sviva.gov.il/Environment/Static/Binaries/ModulKvatzim/Brochure-ClimateChangeMitigationInIsrael-Nov2012_3.pdf (accessed 9 Mar 2013).

30 | Cf. n. 16, 2.

31 | Cf. *ibid.*

as well as use of renewable materials in construction. This corresponds to the catalogue of measures from the McKinsey study, which attributes “green” construction great potential for mitigating the greenhouse effect and for adapting to it successfully. There has been a standard for sustainable construction in existence since 2005.³² Although this was amended in July 2011, it is still assessed by critics as inadequate.³³ The responsible Ministry for Construction and Housing is therefore called upon to check the existing guidelines for effectiveness and to improve them as necessary.

Apart from the need to formulate and realise a coherent strategy for climate change adaptation, the simultaneous implementation of a national plan for reducing climate-damaging emissions is urgently required. Approved by the Israeli government in 2010, this mitigation plan envisages a 20 per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, in line with President Peres’ declaration of intent in Copenhagen. Over the course of the current decade, the state will be making available 2.2 billion shekels (around 450 million euros) to realise this ambitious target.³⁴ Due to the enormous potential for reducing emissions in the energy sector, the national plan concentrates on measures in this segment. These measures are building on existing government programmes. Firstly, support is to be provided for measures aimed at reducing electricity consumption, by 20 per cent by 2020 (government decision of September 2008). Secondly, the aim is to expand the proportion of renewable energies in electricity generation to ten per cent over the same period (government decision of January 2009).³⁵

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ENERGY SECTOR FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION

To reduce electricity consumption to the stated extent and thus make a contribution to the mitigation of global warming – even with continuing population and economic

32 | Cf. OECD, “Policies to Support Eco-innovation in Israel”, 2011, <http://www.oecd.org/israel/48354947.pdf> (accessed 5 Mar 2013), 20.

33 | N. 23.

34 | Cf. OECD, n. 32, 12.

35 | Cf. *ibid.*, 12 et seq.

growth – will require fundamental changes in behaviour. To this end, state authorities as well as the national electricity provider are promoting a change in attitude through increased public relations activities. What is involved in practice is that power-hungry devices are swapped for more efficient products; private households, for instance, can expect financial support if they decide in favour of a refrigerator with a high efficiency rating. Further opportunities to reduce overall electricity consumption once again lie in the construction sector, namely through inducements to use more energy efficient construction methods. Close to 60 per cent of electricity consumption in Israel is attributable to this sector (divided more or less equally between housing and business premises).³⁶ In addition, financial tools may be introduced to encourage electricity saving, such as special levies for businesses with particularly high electricity consumption. But there has not been sufficient progress in terms of legal regulations as yet to allow for such an option.



Prof. David Faiman from Ben-Gurion University is a pioneer in solar energy and photovoltaics. | Source: Nadine Mensele, KAS.

When considering the expansion of renewable energies, which represents the second cornerstone of the strategy to mitigate the greenhouse effect, the government wishes above all to utilise Israel's natural advantages. Solar energy is therefore of central importance, complemented

36 | Cf. Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, Israel's Second National Communication on Climate Change, n. 8, 136.

by wind energy and biomass to a lesser extent. The main technologies for generating energy to be considered in this context are photovoltaic installations and thermal solar power plants (solar thermal technology). Although the environmental conditions are favourable, utilisation has been lagging behind the opportunities, and the expansion of the infrastructure is proving to be more difficult than expected. One reason for this is the late introduction of feed-in tariffs. It was not until 2008 that the first regulatory framework for small-scale photovoltaic plants was set up. That actually had a considerable effect. Within one year, the production from this segment increased from one to 229 gigawatt hours. During the same year, electricity generation from alternative energy sources reached 0.4 per cent of total production. One should add that by this time two per cent of the available electricity were supposed to be covered by regenerative energies.³⁷

If the government wants to adhere to its ten per cent target for 2020, further huge efforts will be required, both in terms of legislation and infrastructure. David Faiman, a solar energy expert from the “Jacob Blaustein Institute for Desert Research” at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, has made the following calculation: “Israel would need to

install approximately 0.8 B kWh of new generating capacity each year until that time. Taking photovoltaics as a convenient and tangible technology, [...] this would mean the construction of approximately 450 MW per year.”³⁸ Rather than taking this route,

there seems to be a greater willingness to increase the proportion of natural gas in electricity generation. In fact, this share rose from just under a fifth to a third between 2006 and 2011.³⁹ Those advocating greater use of natural gas are being encouraged by the fact that there are not inconsiderable reserves of natural gas present in front of the Israeli Mediterranean coastline.⁴⁰ These circumstances

Those advocating greater use of natural gas are being encouraged by the fact that there are not inconsiderable reserves of natural gas present in front of the Israeli Mediterranean coastline.

37 | Cf. OECD, n. 7, 173.

38 | David Faiman, “Key Aspects of the BGU-KAS Energy Security Conference”, in: *Energy Security in Europe and Israel*, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Israel, Jerusalem, 2012, 3 et seq.

39 | Cf. n. 5.

40 | The explored fields “Tamar” and “Leviathan” hold up to 750 million cubic metres of natural gas, and one can work from the assumption that there are further fields with a total volume of up to 450 million cubic metres. Cf. Faiman, n. 38, 4.

are also advantageous in terms of energy security, because the reserves promise a reduction in the dependence on natural gas imports from Egypt, at least in the medium term. Be that as it may, the government should not relent in its efforts to continue investing in alternative energy production. State assistance in this sector includes support for practical research projects for instance, available since 2008, and financial support for start-ups in the area of environmental technologies ("clean technologies").⁴¹

IS THE NEW GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO GO "GREEN"?

There is still a great deal to be done in terms of environmental and climate protection where Israeli politics is concerned. Nor can the new government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu any longer afford to ignore environmental aspects when defining Israel's security interests. There is no question that the classic security policy has to take priority in view of the

unresolved Middle East conflict as well as the upheavals in the Arab World, which Israelis have been following with some concern.⁴²

But there should be increased promotion of a wider understanding of security that takes phenomena such as climate change into account. The main challenge is bringing the long-term consequences of global warming to people's attention now. A policy aimed at avoiding greenhouse gases and saving resources will entail continuously increasing costs for future measures to adapt to climate change. Amir Peretz, the new Environment Minister from the HaTnuah (the Movement) party, therefore has many tasks ahead of him.

A policy aimed at avoiding greenhouse gases and saving resources will entail continuously increasing costs for future measures to adapt to climate change.

It will take valiant efforts to ensure that thinking and acting to further sustainable development will achieve wider acceptance in politics and society. This is where the involvement of numerous environmental organisations and civil society initiatives is of great importance. The umbrella organisation Life & Environment, whose members include

41 | The financial support programmes are entitled "Tnufa", "Startery" and "Magnet". Cf. n. 32, 11.

42 | Cf. Amichai Magen, *The Crisis of Governance in the Middle East: Implications for Democracy, Development and Security*, International Institute for Counterterrorism and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Israel (eds.), Herzliya/Jerusalem, 2013.

over 130 NGOs from the environmental community, for instance organises an annual action day in the Knesset to enlist the support of Members of Parliament for legislation to benefit the environment and the climate. The largest environmental organisation, the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel, is currently targeting local communities as local elections are due in autumn. Community action is crucial for effective environmental protection by not only implementing national policy but also demanding more far-reaching steps. These communities can also provide encouragement to the general public to engage in environmentally aware conduct. One example of this is the case of 15 self-governing cities coming together to form Forum 15 in 2008, which has attracted three further communities since then. These cities have put the implementation of climate protection targets as well as measures against air pollution on their agenda.⁴³



Members of the environmental NGO Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel on a visit in the Galilee. | Source: Nadine Mensel, KAS.

In support of such initiatives – and particularly to convince the politicians of the feasibility of mitigating the impact of global warming – one should invoke the pioneering spirit that has accompanied the history of the modern state of Israel from the very beginning. In spite of adverse geo-physical conditions, Israel has worked its way up to become

43 | Cf. Forum 15, The Israeli Forum of Self-Government Cities, <http://forum15.org.il/en> (accessed 13 Mar 2013).

a high-tech country and has produced various innovations in the area of alternative energy generation and resource saving irrigation. The potential to meet the challenges of climate change is there. What is needed now is to devise an environmental and climate policy that neither thinks in short-term categories nor neglects to give serious consideration to the above-mentioned trends.



Robert von Lucius is a correspondent for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the author of the book *Drei Baltische Wege* (Three Baltic Paths). This article is based on a speech he delivered in the context of the award ceremony of the Charlemagne Prize of Aachen for Dr. Dalia Grybauskaitė, on 9 May 2013.

BLACK BELT POLITICS

LITHUANIA'S PRESIDENT DALIA GRYBAUSKAITĖ

Robert von Lucius

According to Dalia Grybauskaitė, Lithuania has always been part of Europe. But the country is also in a position to provide new and creative impulses, as are other recently admitted EU member states whose reforms require flexibility. These two sentences, uttered by the recipient of the 2013 International Charlemagne Prize of Aachen shortly after Lithuania's admission to the European Union one decade ago, convey a great deal: The president associates the centuries-old tradition of the Baltic nation with the quest for new horizons. Neither she nor her country lack self-confidence, a trait rooted in the past and present. She appreciates boundaries – as small nations do – but does not automatically treat them as limits.

Her role, her life and work, and her influence within the EU are hard to separate from the fate of her country and its region. As a result, it is imperative to put the background, character, and political ambitions of the president who earned the moniker “Iron Lady” into a wider context.

LITHUANIA, THE BALTIC STATES, AND EUROPE

Lithuania, of which Grybauskaitė has been president for four years, is the largest of the three Baltic states – its population is almost as large as that of Latvia and Estonia combined. The three are often lumped together because they were all occupied by and integrated into the Soviet Union; they later rose up together to liberate themselves and to declare their independence. Their shared experiences of history and their deeply anchored national identities are defined by oppression and violence. Stories of family members deported to Siberia, tortured, or violently killed are the ones that create bonds between people. Many

are especially concerned with the preservation of their language and culture. Lithuania's declaration of independence was the first – and perhaps decisive – step towards the dissolution of the Soviet empire. The courage of the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians paved the way for the fall of the Berlin wall and German unification. All three are paragons of market economics and pro-Western sympathies. Moreover, the three Baltic states together successfully endeavored to acquire membership in NATO and the European Union. With the aid of these dual memberships, they wanted to secure their newfound freedoms through alliances. But they also wanted to proclaim something that, though true, had disappeared from historical awareness: Since the early Middle Ages, the Baltic states have been – and remain – a core region of Europe.

Despite some historical and economic similarities, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania manifest fundamental differences in terms of language, religious denomination, and self-understanding. The Lithuanian language is the oldest Indo-Germanic language in use. Lithuanians are virtually all Catholic, and often deeply pious. Whereas Vilnius is a baroque city that has close cultural ties to Poland, Estonia is oriented to the North and to Finland in particular; Latvia is oriented to other Baltic Sea countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. And Lithuanians are cognisant of their heritage as a great power of yore, perhaps more than is helpful for the purpose of present and future acclimations. Without a short synopsis of this kind, both the politics of Lithuania and Dalia Grybauskaitė would be difficult to understand.

Lithuanians are cognisant of their heritage as a great power of yore, perhaps more than is helpful for the purpose of present and future acclimations.

The building that houses her office, the Presidential Palace in Vilnius, has accommodated Russian czars, Napoleon, as well as French and Polish kings. But the magnificent structure, which stands opposite the university with one of the richest traditions in Europe, has also lived through different days. Radical upheavals that left deeper marks than similar events in other countries once incubated there. The palace also served as a hangout for Soviet officers and later for an artists' club. Time and again, the palace is a place of gathering: During the author's last visit in Vilnius this past October, an arrival ceremony with military honours was

organised to receive Monaco's reigning monarch. This goes to show that Lithuania appreciates both great and smaller peers. The Lithuanian president approaches the task of strengthening the role and influence of putatively weaker and smaller states in Europe with particular alacrity. In the second half of this year, the Charlemagne Prize recipient will coordinate her office's efforts with those of Lithuania's foreign ministry to assume the presidency of the Council of the European Union. Assuredly, Grybauskaitė plans to do more than push paper – her energy, ambition, and political assets are harbingers of the progress she expects to make. She interprets the fact that Lithuania is the first of the newly admitted Baltic states to take the reins of the EU presidency as both a challenge and an opportunity.



Aachen mayor Marcel Philipp greeting Dalia Grybauskaitė at the award ceremony in Aachen's historic city hall on 9 May. | Source: © Andreas Herrmann, City of Aachen.

COMMITTED TECHNOCRAT

According to the Board of Directors of the Society for the Conferring of the Charlemagne Prize, the bestowal of the Charlemagne Prize on Dalia Grybauskaitė "pays tribute to one of the outstanding personalities in the Baltic region" roughly ten years after the signing of its membership agreements, which the board called "one of the great moving events of the revolutionary decade". The award recipient, the board continues, fostered confidence in her own people and in her European partners and paved the

way to a resolution of European problems with “courage and the right judgment, with determination and self-confidence”. The board concludes that Lithuania’s discipline and self-sacrificing spirit allowed the country to tackle its own economic crisis and the wider European debt crisis in an exemplary fashion.

Grybauskaitė found herself in two leadership positions during that period of time – initially as finance minister and later as president. In the intervening years, when she served as European Commissioner for Financial Programming and the Budget in Brussels, she could merely admonish (though she did occasionally rebuke) her compatriots when they took budgetary discipline lightly, thereby inviting the next economic crisis. Since her inauguration as president in May 2009, she has been back on-site in a leadership position, testing the elasticity of her constitutional mandates to the legal breaking point. She belongs to those who, in spite of their misgivings, are nudging Lithuania towards the European currency union. The accession is planned for one and a half years from now,

although the date has yet to be finalised. The country’s budget deficit and its inflation rate are flirting with the Maastricht convergence criteria. Lithuania would be the last of the three Baltic countries to adopt the euro; tiny

Lithuania would be the last of the three Baltic countries to adopt the euro. Estonia has already done so, and Latvia has applied for admission at the end of the year.

Estonia – economic poster child that it is – has already done so, and Latvia has applied for admission at the end of the year. In light of its EU ties, of course, Lithuania has been a *de facto* member of the currency union, but Lithuania’s economic conditions and domestic constraints had denied the largest Baltic state the opportunity to officially join until now. The Charlemagne Board of Directors recognises that an important signal is sent when, “in times of the greatest uncertainties when everyone is speculating on the disintegration of the Euro zone, the republic of Lithuania is still striving to become a member of the currency union”.

In Grybauskaitė’s politics, there are unbending positions, goals, and clear values that all point the way towards the currency union: stability, a strong and predictable regulatory framework, and the notion of Europe as key to Lithuania’s political aspirations. As a rule, Europe has always been a professional preoccupation of hers, though there were

two exceptions: first, when history and her family ties prior to the upheaval in 1990 dictated otherwise; and second, when she spent three years as plenipotentiary minister in Washington, a period that emerged as a brief interruption of her otherwise swift rise and European orientation.

If you want to understand Dalia Grybauskaitė as a person and as a politician, you cannot gloss over the years of Soviet occupation. Though some treat them as lost years, they sowed the seeds of her tenacity – and are likely responsible for the way she compartmentalises her personal life. Since the death of her parents, she has had no close relatives;

Grybauskaitė developed the reputation of someone who was almost always at her desk by six in the morning and who worked late into the night.

she is unmarried, childless, and evinces a certain detachment. Even in the early years of her career, she developed the reputation of someone who was almost always at her desk by six in the morning and who worked late into the night. In those early years – including her stint in Brussels – her sense of humor and her cheerfulness were more readily detectable. Under the weight of her duties, the formalities of office, and the austerity of the environment at the presidential palace, those traits receded, at least in official appearances.

Born in Vilnius on 1 March 1956 as the daughter of an electrician and a saleswoman, she worked for a short period at the Lithuanian National Philharmonic Society and later as a laboratory technician at a tannery in Leningrad (Saint Petersburg). In this way, she acquired the means to continue her education, something her parents were not able to provide for her. She enrolled in night classes at Saint Petersburg State University as a student of political economy. In 1983, she returned to the city of her birth to run the agriculture department at the Vilnius party academy. At the same time, she earned her doctorate in political economy, defending her thesis at the University in Moscow in 1988.

Her grandparents, like many Lithuanians, were deported to Siberia. Back then, she observed, everyone had two faces: one at home and another in public. Nonetheless, the first 34 years of her life does not fit the pattern of a dissident. Beyond this, little else is known. She seems to have been a goal-oriented woman who found a niche within the

party-apparatus, one into which she settled with little consternation. But perhaps there is truth to what she said during an interview with the *Financial Times* – that all of it was made possible by the magnificent and well-endowed library in Leningrad (and her considerable language skills) that allowed her to study the great economic thinkers ranging from Aristotle to Marx to Keynes to Smith, i.e. books and libraries as a place a refuge. The truth is likely to be found somewhere in the middle. She is a committed technocrat with a fondness for numbers. Whether intentional or not, that's what helped her navigate the years of transition – everyone wanted and needed her unimpeachable expertise. In any case, she had (and still has) rather conservative convictions – at least economically. On social issues closer to her heart, she supports and advances liberal arguments; she has, for instance, used her presidential veto authority to block legislative proposals far more often than her predecessors.

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POST-INDEPENDENCE ASCENDANCY

With the combination of technical expertise, respect for her work, independent thinking, and good contacts, Grybauskaitė laid the foundation for her rapid ascent after Lithuania declared its independence. As her nearly immediate transition into the prime minister's office after independence suggests, she was neither short on connections in circles associated with the resistance and revolutionary movements nor entirely bereft of her own convictions. The new conservative government tasked in her 1991 with drawing up an economic agenda for the administration. In the first half of the nineties, she successively tackled a series of assignments that paved the way for Lithuania's entry into the European Union. She became a director of various departments in the foreign ministry; later, she became deputy finance minister and acted as chief negotiator with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. She also served as deputy foreign minister for the free trade agreement with the EU. For a short while, she was also a special envoy at the Lithuanian Mission to the EU, where she administered the distribution of EU resources in Lithuania. She benefits from a two-folded reputation: she is known to be charming and intelligent and yet goal-oriented

and firm in negotiations. Her rise occurred during the period of conservative administrations. But she also rose when the social democrats were in power because Algirdas Brazauskas valued her and appointed her finance minister in 2001. Only after his death did her relationships with members on the left end of the political spectrum suffer for a year or two. In any case, she prizes her independence from political parties. Her abstention from party politics became clear again in 2009 when she eschewed party affiliations to participate in the presidential election as an independent candidate. She emerged triumphant after the first round of voting with 68.2 per cent of the votes – a miracle for a country in which elections have occasionally sparked discord and uncertainty. Her election made her the first woman to lead the independent Lithuania.

Juggling her responsibilities is not easy in a country that can feel like a small town, where everyone knows everyone and political elites know each other's weaknesses. It can be especially difficult when populist parties rise and fall every two years, quickly shuffling administrations in and out of power. Grybauskaitė lives modestly – how could someone who leaves little time for her personal life and does not pay heed to fashionable clothing otherwise spend her money? When she became president, she turned down half of the income she was entitled to.

Grybauskaitė lives modestly – how could someone who leaves little time for her personal life and does not pay heed to fashionable clothing otherwise spend her money?

Lithuanians have reason to listen to her when she warns that Lithuanian society is increasingly splitting into factions, making it difficult to find common ground. She says that Lithuanians are often caught in vicious cycles of unfulfilled responsibilities. Reforms always beget more reforms, but never with the consistency that could achieve results.

In this way, Grybauskaitė (who loves straight talk as much as the occasional caustic joke) speaks with more ease and credibility than others. A few weeks ago, for instance, she criticised the Lithuanian foreign minister for apologising to the Polish press for a decision his predecessor made. Reprimanding him, she insisted that only a figure with elected mandate (such as herself) could apologise in the name of the country. Shortly thereafter, she had stern words for the

Lithuanian ambassador in Washington after he praised the policies of the new foreign minister. She publicly accused him of politicising an issue and reminded him that all state employees – including diplomats – have a constitutional obligation to remain neutral. Such frank talk features prominently in her campaigning, as was the case recently when she said that five her of cabinet members should fear for their jobs after the election. She wants to pick a fight with the “oligarchs” and their “criminal shadows”. Recently, she said the links between companies that are “less than clean” and the media and politicians constitute a cancerous growth on society that impedes growth and thwarts the country and its citizens.

ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS AND KARATE

Ever since control of the parliament flipped from a conservative majority to one dominated by the Left, she has been deprived of the opportunity to pursue her political and economic goals in the legislature. These conditions have considerably weakened her, but they have not prevented her from speaking her mind. She even goes toe-to-toe with reputedly greater powers if she deems it necessary. She was one of the members of the commission that once upbraided France and Germany for failing to heed the strictures of the Stability and Growth Pact. She fulminates against southern EU member states and Moscow in equal measure. And she does not spare British Prime Minister David Cameron in her criticisms either. Commenting on his most recent EU speech, she said she expected exactly what he delivered – nothing more than a speech that was designed to impress the British public before the elections. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, herself the Charlemagne Prize recipient five years ago, is one of the few whose politics she admires: Germany is assuming, she said, “immense responsibility for Europe and for member states who can’t even get their homework done. That is exceptional.”

The Charlemagne Prize recipient’s determination applies to more than political issues of everyday concern; it is especially focused on relations with Moscow. Her approach is manifest in her refusal to attend the celebrations of the 65th anniversary of the Red Army’s victory over Nazi

The historically close relationship with Poland is not immune to Grybauskaitė's criticism, a marked change from her predecessor Valdas Adamkus. For him better relations with Warsaw were very important.

Germany – a touchy subject in all three Baltic states. From their perspective, liberation from their national socialist occupiers was tantamount to the Soviet yoke. She said she would head out to Moscow if her Russian counterpart came to Vilnius on the 20th anniversary of Lithuania's independence from the Soviet Union. That seemed to settle the matter. But even the historically close relationship with Poland is not immune to her criticism, a marked change from her predecessor Valdas Adamkus, for whom better relations with the country's sizeable neighbor to the west were very important.

She exhorts her fellow citizens not to trade their liberties for short-term benefits – whether in the voting booth, in their efforts to secure energy independence (Russia consistently hassles its smaller neighbors), or in their dealings with the international community. The fact that Lithuania overcame occupation, Siberia, and energy blockades over the course of five decades is not a miracle, but a testament to the resolute will of the Lithuanian people to unite, she declared in February on the occasion of the 95th anniversary of the re-establishment of Lithuania (incidentally, in the presence of the Polish President Bronisław Komorowski).

Her determination displays itself in her political and private life. She is unyielding on the subjects of fiscal discipline, independence, and values. When she left for Brussels, she said she was in pursuit of challenges, not a vacation. Her practice of martial arts exhibits the same quality. She may be the only head of state with a black belt in Karate. The idea, she stresses, is to avoid physical violence and bodily contact. For her, that's a philosophy of life – a discipline that avoids attacks and structures work.

But the Charlemagne Prize recipient's determination does not deprive her of an openness to new ideas and reforms, nor does it rob her of her ability to adapt – she says she does not fear reforms or change. That much was clear from her tenure as finance minister, when, amid public inertia and division, she pushed through reforms that were the envy of her eastern European peers and which some countries on Europe's southern periphery would do well to emulate: a system of collecting taxes electronically, an overhauled

tariffs system, and measures to tackle corruption stemming from these two areas. She opposed any attempts to increase subsidies to the Lithuanian agricultural industry. Her pragmatic approach to privatisations attracted foreign investors to Lithuania. It was no coincidence that the percentage of the workforce engaged in industrial activity was higher than in Germany when Lithuania joined the EU. During her time in office, she not only presided over a budget surplus – at nine per cent, the country recorded the EU's highest economic growth rate on her watch. When she lowered the corporate tax rate, Lithuania reaped the highest revenues. The country did experience two severe economic downturns within a single decade, but on both occasions, Grybauskaitė abstained from seeking help from the EU or the IMF. She acted early to move Lithuania's currency, the litas, off the U.S. dollar and to peg it to the euro, a step that laid the groundwork for the euro's official adoption at the start of 2015, and one of the reasons for the awarding of what is perhaps the most important European prize. In her words, Europe is not experiencing a sovereign-debt crisis – it is experiencing a crisis of political responsibility.

GRYBAUSKAITĖ IN BRUSSELS

When the Lithuanian government appointed her a European Commissioner in 2004, the choice was logical and obvious. Among her cohort, she was the only one who acquitted herself well before the relevant parliamentary committees. The decision that made bigger waves was the suggestion of then EU President-elect José Manuel Durão Barroso that she become the European Commissioner for Financial Programming and the Budget. It made her, the representative of an EU newcomer (and, with 3.3 million inhabitants, relatively small country), one of the most important officials in the Union. No doubt Barroso does not regret going out on a limb. His keen sense of human nature informed his choice, but so did his intuition that small players are the ones who have the courage to act independently and to make hard choices. This was also a personal coup for Dalia Grybauskaitė, who managed to cement her influence during her years in Brussels. She also laid the groundwork for the important work she hoped to accomplish as president upon her return to Lithuania – even in spite of the grumbling during the recent months of her term.



Dalia Grybauskaitė as EU Commissioner: When the Lithuanian government appointed her in 2004, the choice was logical and obvious. | Source: © European Commission, P-010866/00-28.

In Brussels, she was one of the few commissioners who developed a reputation for being something other than an advocate or a lobbyist for her home country. She frequently singled out Lithuania for criticism. During the boom years, she repeatedly cautioned political elites not to sequester themselves while the problems of their countrymen and countrywomen went unaddressed. When she later aspired to represent all Lithuanians as president, however, she wore the livery of a different cause; she became more traditional and more conscious of her nationality.

Nonetheless, Grybauskaitė's tenure as commissioner was not always marked by complaisance, something southern EU members quickly realised when fish, olive, or sugar subsidies were broached. As was her custom, she ran the numbers with equal rigor and enthusiasm. She was convinced, then as now, that the Union was spending too much money on agriculture and too little on research. Under her supervision, expenditures on growth and employment exceeded expenditures for agriculture for fiscal year 2008. This was consistent with her quest to create a knowledge-based economic system, and it also fit well with her conception of herself as a well-intentioned firebrand within the EU. She has not yet ceased to speak frankly: At the beginning of the year, she cautioned that standing around with outstretched hands "in the manner of some southern EU members" would not automatically translate into greater competitiveness or innovation.

Her assertive and successful policy of austerity may well be the greatest single contribution of the Charlemagne Prize recipient. With it, she wants to enhance the middle- and long-term prosperity of Lithuanians, guarantee the country's stability, and, indirectly, demonstrate to larger and more affluent European countries how to satisfy European and economic demands without doing a disservice to populations at home. Of course, there is a flipside to everything, particularly budget cuts, as several debates over the last few months have illustrated. In Lithuania, and in northeastern Europe in general, the cuts affect all of Europe. One of them reveals a dilemma that the president faced at the beginning of her term: Expenditures aimed at reforming politics in large neighbors such as Ukraine and Belarus (and other countries to the south of them – such as Georgia) were on the chopping block. Unusual projects – or those favourable to Europe more broadly – were allowed to expire or were cancelled altogether. These projects were attempts to strengthen democratic movements in Ukraine and Belarus – daring approaches in light of Lithuania's size and economic importance relative to its two large southern neighbors. Not that any of these changes alter Lithuania's foreign policy; Lithuania still tries to support the Belorussian opposition and to bring about change through dialogue, pressure, and prudent rapprochement.

The extent to which this emphasis on reforms has been successful may appear dubious. Under President Alexander Lukashenko's rule, Belarus remains Europe's last remaining dictatorship despite all of the efforts on behalf of Vilnius and Warsaw. Vilnius repeatedly lobbied unsuccessfully for change. Countless memorandums about intra-European policy were drafted in the foreign ministry in Vilnius that went unheeded. They were directed primarily at Belarus and Ukraine, but they also outlined a vision for an "axis of freedom" consisting of Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia. For Lithuania and then-President Adamkus, who was the driving force, the goals were to integrate this string of states into European democracy; to extend a zone of peace and stability eastwards; and to cement Lithuania's role as an intermediary between the EU, NATO (i.e. between Europe and the United States), and its eastern and southern neighbors.

For Lithuania and then-President Adamkus the goals were to cement Lithuania's role as an intermediary between the EU, NATO and its eastern and southern neighbors.

In the meantime, many in Brussels, especially southern European countries, cared little about what was happening in the former Soviet Union. There were efforts at discreet and active intervention that tested the limits of diplomatic convention. One example relates to the financing of radio stations that provided isolated regions with access to news that was independent of government monopolies. There were also civil rights groups based in Lithuania and Poland that tried to bolster democratic opposition groups in Ukraine and Belarus. And there was also the case of the European Humanities University, an institution critical of the Belorussian regime that moved from Minsk to Vilnius after it was forced to close.

The reaction of the Russian KGB demonstrates that the Lithuanian actions constituted more than imperial pretensions. Their letter to the Duma explained that Vilnius was on track to “export revolution to Belarus”.

The reaction of the Russian KGB demonstrates that these actions constituted more than imperial pretensions; referring to the upheaval in the Ukraine, the agency's letter to the Duma explained that Vilnius was on track to “export revolution to Belarus”.

All of this arose not merely out of the desire to contribute meaningfully to the EU and to NATO as a political newcomer, but also out of gratitude for the support it received from abroad during its own era of resistance in the late 1980s; the country would like to take its turn helping others that are oppressed. History, too, may have played a role; after all, the territories encompassing Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland were once largely ruled by Vilnius.

REFORMS AND FOREIGN POLICY REORIENTATION

For the small political elite in Vilnius, backing and managing all of this was as daring as it was expensive. Consistent with Dalia Grybauskaitė's emphasis on budget discipline, the projects were cut. But her decision was not solely based on economics; it was the result of a foreign policy reorientation that accompanied the transfer of power from Adamkus to Grybauskaitė. Adamkus closely coordinated his Europe policy, energy strategy, and regional policy (“axis of freedom”) with Poland. The incoming President Grybauskaitė changed that approach. The new key player would no longer be Warsaw, but Brussels (and Berlin in a limited sense), a decision that was shaped by her background and her political persuasions. Her reorientation

cannot be divorced from the close and complicated relationship between Lithuania and Poland, two countries that were once part of a single commonwealth. Linguistically, culturally, and in terms of their Catholic faith and baroque-themed architecture, the two have always been intertwined, a recipe for tensions and an exceedingly complicated relationship. Dalia Grybauskaitė facilitated greater emphasis on the national characteristics of Lithuania, and greater skepticism vis-à-vis Poland.

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Grybauskaitė effected a foreign policy departure away from Warsaw and towards Brussels and its institutions. Deeper EU integration is more important to her than any eastward expansion of influence. The same applies to Grybauskaitė's energy policy; she is seeking a secure energy supply within the framework of the EU. This reorientation has led to a waning of efforts to realise the vision of the "axis of freedom". The consequences of this decision for the region – and, indirectly, for Europe – will be hard to judge. Who could possibly know what developments would have taken place in Belarus or Ukraine? And who knows to what degree the support for reform-minded organisations would have changed anything? The desire for reforms in both countries abated in any case. Whether this was an indirect and unintended consequence of Lithuania's disciplined policy of austerity – the one to be honored and acclaimed with the Charlemagne Prize – is a question that will remain unanswered. These policies enabled Russian influence to return to cities that had just begun to lose themselves, such as Minsk and Kiev. It would be simplistic to reduce these events to austerity mandates recommended by a finance minister, commissioner, or president. The European Union's lack of political and financial support for these Polish and Lithuanian reform approaches is also related – it was a case of a European-wide failure of disinterest.

Respect for Dalia Grybauskaitė is a function of several characteristics: her immunity to corruption, her business-like approach, her unassailable competence, and her ability to adapt. But it is also a function of her successes as finance minister, commissioner, and president. Her unyielding insistence on austerity was not always easy to defend, especially when hostile parties on the Left publicised unflattering

statistics comparing minimum wages to other countries such as Greece. And yet the people of Lithuania have certainly noticed that the president's disciplined approach is bearing fruit. Cities as well as rural areas are doing slightly though unmistakably better – in contrast to neighboring Latvia, where the economic and social trends seem to point in the opposite direction; the relationships between Lithuania and Latvia in terms of quality of life and optimism have been inverted. Many regard the president as their "rescuer". Others call Dalia Grybauskaitė a "knight in shining armor". This knight is emblazoned on the coat of arms of this historic and culturally rich country, which, though geographically peripheral, belongs culturally at the heart of Europe.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN RUSSIA

ON THE SITUATION ONE YEAR AFTER PUTIN'S RE-ELECTION

Lars Peter Schmidt / Johann C. Fuhrmann

A year has passed since Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency, but the promised opening up of the political system has not materialised. Instead, the Russian state is making vigorous attempts to extend its influence over society and restrict the scope for democracy in order to suppress criticism at home and political influence from abroad. In doing so, the Kremlin is not only harming Russian civil society and the political opposition but also increasingly isolating itself from its political partners in the west.

When Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel opened the Hanover Trade Fair in April, there were visible signs of tension between the two leaders. The German Chancellor added her own clear statement to the critical words of the German Foreign Minister: both described the Russian authorities' raids on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Russia as "unacceptable". The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung were among those on the receiving end of the inspections. These were by no means isolated cases. According to Russian media representatives, at least 256 NGOs in 55 of Russia's 83 regions have been investigated. They include partner organisations of the German foundations such as the Moscow Helsinki Group – a human rights organisation – and Memorial, an organisation that works to publicise the truth about violent crimes of the Stalin era and campaigns for the rights of political minorities.

The Kremlin clearly has difficulty handling the changed political mood in Russia, which found its expression in the protests of the new Russian middle class during last



Dr. Lars Peter Schmidt is Resident Representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Moscow and Country Officer for the Russian Federation.



Johann C. Fuhrmann is a trainee in the Moscow Office. He studied political science and international relations at Sciences Po, Paris, and the London School of Economics.

year's parliamentary and presidential elections. Since then non-governmental organisations have also come under increasing pressure from the Kremlin. For example, the Russian organisation Golos (vote) published reports on

USAID was expelled from Russia in September 2012. The Russian Foreign Ministry justified this action by claiming that the organisation was meddling in politics.

election fraud; it received large-scale financial support for its work from the USA and this has been interpreted by the Russian government as influence from abroad. As a result the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was expelled from Russia in September 2012. The Russian Foreign Ministry justified this action by claiming the organisation was meddling in politics and that this had swayed the elections. USAID had been active in Russia since 1991, investing around 2.1 billion euros in civil society projects; much of its work involved promoting the political opposition. In the Kremlin and on state television the West, in particular the USA is regarded as the initiator of the protests of the past year and held responsible for them.

SMALL REFORMS, LARGE BACKWARD STEPS

After the first protests of the urban middle class in Moscow and Saint Petersburg towards the end of 2011, Putin and Medvedev promised the people greater involvement in political decision-making processes. In place of a programme, Putin published seven essays in advance of the presidential elections; one of the topics he addressed was the political agenda of the protest movement. With regard to domestic policy he promised reforms to strengthen the social influence of civil society.

According to Putin, Russian society is no longer as it has been just ten years ago. Under the leadership of himself and Medvedev, he says, a middle class has arisen that is becoming increasingly vociferous in its call for political participation. Putin states in his essay on democracy and state policy published in February last year that this wish must and will be met and appropriate mechanisms must be developed. One of the consequences was the decision to reintroduce regional elections; in 2012 these were held in some of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation for the first time in eight years. The process of founding new political parties was also significantly simplified: the

minimum number of new members required before a party can be approved has been reduced from 40,000 to 500. Yet Putin's assumption of office was followed by a series of laws aimed at tightening the state's control over civil society affairs. For example, the criminal offence of libel in relation to political comments in the media has been reintroduced and is punishable with a fine of 500,000 roubles (around 12,500 euros). The law on freedom of assembly and the right to demonstrate has also been tightened. In September 2012 the Russian state дума passed a law widening the definition of treason and espionage and increasing the penalties for these crimes. Anyone convicted now faces a prison sentence of between 12 and 20 years. The fact that the central concepts in this legislation, such as "treason" and "espionage", are defined very loosely or not at all creates additional uncertainty.

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TIGHTER CRACKDOWN ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

In June 2012 a law was passed stipulating that non-governmental organisations which receive money from abroad must be registered as "foreign agents" – a term that in Russian is equivalent to espionage. For this reason the choice of words was criticised by many people, among them Alexander Konovalov, the Russian Minister of Justice. The law, which came into force in November, requires NGOs to publish their accounts and their sources of funding. But under a law in place since 2006, Russian NGOs that receive money from abroad were already obliged to provide regular financial reports on their income and expenditure. Foreign NGOs, such as the political foundations, also had to submit quarterly financial reports to the Ministry of Justice and undergo an external audit. Critics therefore assume that the purpose of the new legislation is not to increase transparency but instead to discredit NGOs that receive funds from abroad and to portray them as representatives of western interests that oppose Russian views. In the period that followed, no genuine organisation was prepared to be classed as an "agent" under the law. After Putin called on the Russian state authorities to enforce the law, numerous NGOs – including the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Moscow and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Saint

Petersburg – were investigated. To justify their actions, the Russian authorities referred to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, a United States law passed in 1938 that is said to have served as a model for the Russian regulations. The American law dates back to before the Second World War and it is not directed at all non-governmental organisations in the USA but specifically against agent activities. The law was never used in the USA to sanction mass investigations of the sort that the Russian authorities have been carrying out since March.

Political foundations and NGOs have been an established part of German-Russian relations for decades; in consequence the raids have attracted strong international criticism. At the same time the Russian government party itself maintains an affiliated foundation that is active both in Russia and abroad. The Centre for Social-Conservative Policy states that, in addition to its headquarters in Moscow, it has more than 20 regional offices and conference centres in Russia. The foundation's European office is based in Berlin. An overseas office in Singapore is responsible for projects in Asia.

There was a swift response in Germany to the inspections at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the seizure of computers from the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Saint Petersburg. After intervention by the German Foreign Minister and invitation the Russian ambassador to a meeting at the Foreign Office, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's

Golos must register as a foreign agent – despite the fact that Golos had received no further funding from foreign sources since the law was passed.

computers were returned a few days later and proceedings were dropped. But even the clear international criticism did not halt the crackdown on Russian NGOs. At the end of April a Moscow court ruled that the election watchdog Golos must register as a foreign agent – despite the fact that Golos had received no further funding from foreign sources since the law was passed. In 2012, though, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee had awarded the organisation the Andrei Sakharov Prize, worth 50,000 euros. The fact that Golos had returned the prize appeared to have no bearing on the court's verdict.

The action taken against NGOs has triggered a great deal of insecurity in Russian civil society. Organisations can no longer accept financial support from abroad unless they register as foreign agents. Because civil society organisations are chronically underfunded, many NGOs will simply be unable to refuse foreign payments. The Kremlin has held out the prospect of funding for NGOs, but it is feared that the money will go only to organisations that toe the Kremlin line. An additional source of frustration is the lack of transparency with which the law on agents – which is in fact directed against politically active, Russian NGOs that receive money from abroad – is implemented by the state authorities. For example, the German political foundations are not Russian organisations at all. They are registered with the Russian Ministry of Justice as branches of foreign NGOs and are therefore not legal entities within the meaning of the law on agents. Another organisation investigated under the law was Caritas in Saint Petersburg, a charity which runs social projects for homeless people, street children and others. The classification of Caritas as a “politically active” NGO is absurd. The former Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin has already expressed the fear that work will become much harder for the majority of NGOs, because they will be more under state control than ever.

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Constant changes in the rules and regulations also make the secondment of foreign workers to NGOs, political foundations and scientific organisations increasingly difficult. New regulations that are in the process of being drawn up will require foreign NGO staff to apply under a quota for foreign workers in Russia. Once permission has been granted under this quota, the necessary work permit can be applied for. The process involves extensive medical checks and permits must be renewed annually. Prospective workers must also apply to the Russian Federation’s migration service for a residence permit, which is likewise valid for only one year. Critics fear that the new process could make it significantly easier for foreign NGO staff to be refused entry to the country. If an application is rejected, the Russian state could cite the quota for foreign workers as the reason for turning down the request, instead of stating that political motives were involved. At the end of last year staff of the German foundations encountered

problems when they attempted to extend their work and residence permits, because the division of responsibilities was unclear. After intervention, however, it proved possible to extend the relevant permits for a year under a special regulation. Overall the situation for foreign NGOs with seconded staff has become significantly more difficult.

THE NAVALNY TRIAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM

It is not only NGOs that are coming under increasing pressure. The Kremlin is also taking firmer action against opposition politicians. Alexei Navalny, who is regarded as one of the leading figures behind the protest demonstrations, has gone on trial in the city of Kirov in connection with a corruption scandal. The prosecution claims that in 2009 Navalny exploited his position as advisor to the governor of Kirov and misappropriated around 16 million roubles (about 400,000 euros) through shady timber deals. The majority of Russians suspect that there are political motives behind the trial. During a television appearance at the end of April that lasted more than four hours,

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Putin stressed he was certain an objective verdict would be reached in the Navalny trial. Anyone who fights corruption must himself be clean, said Putin. At almost the same time the trial was opened, the Russian state duma passed a law barring candidates with a criminal record from standing for the presidency. If Navalny is convicted – and even if he receives a suspended sentence – he will therefore be disqualified from standing against Putin in future elections. Navalny uncovered a number of corruption scandals in which Russian politicians were involved and published the details on the Internet. In the elections for an opposition council, in which 170,000 Russians voted in October 2012, Navalny won the most votes. Navalny was a member of the liberal Yabloko party but was expelled from it for making racist statements. His juggling of liberal and radical right-wing political positions makes it difficult for his views to be converted into a coherent programme capable of winning over a majority of voters. Not least, therefore, the trial reveals the growing impatience of those in power in the Kremlin who are currently clamping down firmly on criticism from within the country.

Current developments in the legal system are being viewed with growing concern by judges of the Russian Constitutional Court. Legal certainty for companies and private individuals had been growing steadily over the past few years. But in recent months a growing number of verdicts are alleged to have been politically motivated. Both in Russia and abroad the Navalny trial has revived doubts about the independence of the courts. Plans for judicial reform are also attracting mounting criticism. It has been proposed that the country's three highest courts should be merged and moved to Saint Petersburg. The Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Arbitration and the Constitutional Court deal with very different issues; from a legal point of view it is therefore questionable whether it is even practical to merge them. Critics fear that the special position of the Constitutional Court could be marginalised. The court's task is to examine whether laws and legislative measures are compatible with the constitution. To prevent corruption in connection with court cases, it has also been suggested that a "federal service to protect the courts" should be set up to protect judges from external influence and threats.

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

In its dealings with other countries Russia is particularly concerned to demonstrate its strength and power of action. It is in this light that last October's cancellation of the Nunn-Lugar programme with the USA must be seen. Since 1991 outdated biological, chemical and nuclear weapons have been disposed of through this programme, which is financed by the USA. The U.S. State Department has said that it was informed by the Russians that foreign assistance with the disposal of weapons was no longer required.

The tension between Russia and the USA has mounted in recent months as Washington and Moscow have taken to provoking each other with new laws. Growing criticism of

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human rights abuses issued from the USA culminated in President Obama's signing of the Magnitsky Act in December 2012. Magnitsky was a lawyer working for an American law firm in Russia; he was arrested for alleged tax offences after he had uncovered and publicised a corruption scandal

in which state bodies were involved. Magnitsky died in November 2009 after being held for almost a year without trial. It was clear that he had been mistreated by Russian officials before his death. The Russian authorities closed their investigation without reaching any conclusion. In response the Magnitsky Act was passed, barring 18 individuals suspected of involvement in the case from entering the USA. Of these suspects, 15 were Russians.

The Kremlin reacted swiftly: Russia cancelled the adoption agreement with the USA. The decision is unofficially named after Dima Yakovlev, a Russian toddler who died in the USA after being left unattended in a car during a heatwave. The boy's adoptive father was acquitted by a U.S. court. The ban on the adoption of Russian children by American citizens was, however, perceived by many Russians as an inappropriate response to the Magnitsky Act. According to official figures there are more than 100,000 Russian orphans living in children's homes – often in poor conditions. Putin is using anti-American feelings at home to score political points. Both sides are at present far away from anything approaching constructive dialogue.

UNITED RUSSIA?

Within the governing party, voices can now be heard criticising the developments of recent months. The influence of Parliament – and of the ministries – appears to be declining. Politically, Medvedev has virtually ceased to play a leading role. Meetings with Putin now appear to take place very rarely. Most recently, Putin strongly criticised Medvedev and his government team in his speech to parliament on 17 April 2013. In particular, the government's economic and educational policy came under fire from the parliamentarians. The growth figures for the current year have been repeatedly revised downwards – the original figure of five per cent now stands at 2.4 per cent. The Russian economy continues to be heavily dependent on commodity exports. This increases the risk of economic recession if energy prices fall on the world market. Attempts to diversify the economy have so far yielded little success. Considerable attention was aroused in this connection by a corruption scandal involving the Skolkovo

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innovation centre set up under President Medvedev; the centre is intended to become a Russian version of America's Silicon Valley. It emerged in February that two officials had allegedly misappropriated 23.8 million roubles (about 600,000 euros) earmarked for construction of the centre.

An inter-generational conflict in Russian politics is becoming increasingly apparent: the old elites with their Soviet-era background are fuelling anti-western and anti-American resentment. The younger generation of Russian politicians is more open to the West – and in particular to Germany and Europe – than the current holders of power. They are coming to realise that Russia needs cooperation with Europe if the country and its 142 million inhabitants are to continue to be a major player in international politics. Following the suppression of the wave of protest in Russian cities, however, the power of the old elites now seems more firmly entrenched than it was just a year ago.

OUTLOOK

Given the political developments in Russia there is little hope of any rapid improvement in relations between Russia and its foreign partners. Following the suppression of the Russian protest movement, it seems likely that political change will only be able to take place from within the system. Even within the governing party there are reform-oriented forces with whom cooperative and constructive dialogue should be pursued. There are also potential points of contact in connection with the German-Russian dialogue on the rule of law, in which the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung plays a part. The growing internal criticism of recent developments in the Russian legal system makes it increasingly important to exchange opinions and ideas in this area. It is not yet clear what long-term effect the stigma of the Kremlin's crackdown on NGOs will have on cooperation between the German foundations and their Russian partners.

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The Kremlin's present attitude is not only damaging Russia's own civil society and the country's democratic development; it is also a source of increasing annoyance to its partners. Partly because of suppression by the Kremlin, however, the political opposition is not at present in

a position to generate political profit from the repressive measures. The opposition still lacks a unifying leadership figure who can bring together the different strands within the movement and meld them into a political programme capable of commanding a majority in an election. Many young people are abandoning politics as they become increasingly disillusioned. Members of the educated elite, in particular, concentrate on accumulating wealth or seek employment elsewhere in Western countries.

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