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SECURITY POLICY

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Content

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

In the face of the European financial and debt crisis, Germany has gained in political importance due to its economic strength. As Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski put it, Germany's neighbours and allies expect Berlin to provide leadership and orientation. This applies as well to the area of security policy. U.S. President Barack Obama's reorientation towards the Asia Pacific Region and a conspicuous reticence on the part of the United States where security policy is concerned are having an impact on Germany and Europe. The European Union is faced with the task of taking on greater responsibility for stability in the world, particularly in its own backyard. So far, the cutbacks in the national defence budgets due to the economic and financial crisis have not resulted in greater cooperation.

One encouraging sign is that the Union parties CDU/CSU and the SPD were able to agree swiftly on stronger integration of the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, into NATO and EU structures in their coalition negotiations. In the run-up, the Working Group on Defence Policy was the first to complete its work with some concrete results. In the Coalition Agreement, which also acknowledges the important role played by political foundations, the Union and the SPD are calling for a "strengthening of cross-departmental cooperation for the purpose of an effective foreign and security policy, which will rely on civilian and military instruments complementing each other". There is indeed a need for closer cooperation, also at a European level. Besides taking measures to fend off threats, Germany and the other countries of the EU must also engage in global risk management that will cover a number of diffuse security risks. These include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, internal conflicts, refugees, migration and climate change. A further security challenge for the new German government is the fight against piracy. To an export country like Germany, being able to rely on secure maritime trade routes is of great importance. International cooperation is the only way to achieve these goals.

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung uses events and publica-
tions such as the "Prospects for German Foreign Policy"
series to draw attention to possible approaches to dealing
with foreign and security issues in view of changing cir-
cumstances around the world. Emerging economies with
strategic ambitions are seeking greater scope for political
and economic action, which they attempt to safeguard by
security measures. In their article in this issue describing
the case of Brazil, for instance, Adriana Erthal Abdenur and
Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto show how initiatives to
secure resources below the sea bed and the strengthening
of the country's military presence to secure trade routes
are calling new global players onto the field of maritime
security. Rearmament is leading to tensions and conflicts,
particularly in the South China Sea but also in the South
Atlantic. The authors from Brazil write about the danger that
"a renewed nationalism suggested by its approach in the
South Atlantic might generate tensions, particularly if states
that have previously contested Brazilian leadership in Latin
America come to view Brazil's approach with suspicion".
The opportunities and risks that Brazil's new activities entail
came under discussion in Rio de Janeiro in November.
The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung organises a Conference on
International Security there each year, to which it invites
representatives from civil society, politics and science.

Reactions within Germany to demands for a greater stra-
tegic engagement indicate that many Germans are still
uneasy about the increased responsibility resulting from the
country's rise in influence. But Germany does need a cul-
ture of discussing strategic matters with the requirements
being clearly spelt out. Through its work relating to mat-
ters of security policy at a national and international level
the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is making a contribution to
enhancing the strategic capability of German foreign policy.

Dr. Gerhard Wahlers
Deputy Secretary General

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
GLOBAL COMMONS

THE PROTECTION OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS AS A CHALLENGE FOR GERMAN SECURITY POLICY

Julian Voje

"Germany, whose economic prosperity depends on access to raw materials, goods and ideas, has an elementary interest in peaceful competition of thoughts and views, an open world trade system and unrestricted transportation routes." This quotation from the 2006 White Paper on security policy illustrates how closely Germany's interests are linked to the globalised economy.[1] Free access to resources and the free exchange of goods and knowledge are key pillars of Germany's foreign and security policy. In today's closely networked world, in which almost a quarter of jobs in Germany depend on exports,[2] an open world trade system and free transport routes are essential to continuing prosperity – in Germany and around the world. With increasing globalisation of markets, even geographically remote conflicts pose challenges for Germany's security policy.

The "interest in peaceful competition of thoughts and views, an open world trade system and unrestricted transportation routes" cited in the White Paper also reveals the Achilles heel of globalisation: all goods and knowledge made possible through today's interconnected markets must traverse unprotected transport routes – the global commons. These comprise the four "public spaces": the

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1 | Quoted from: Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, BMVg), *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, Berlin, 2006, 23, http://bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzM zMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMD Y3NmE2ODY1NmQ2NzY4MzEyMDIwMjAyMDIw/WB_2006_dt _mB.pdf (accessed 10 Sep 2013).
2 | Cf. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb), "Zahlen und Fakten. Globalisierung. Außenhandel", 9 Sep 2013, http://bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/globalisierung/ 52842/aussenhandel (accessed 1 Oct 2013).

high seas, airspace, outer space and cyberspace. They not only make transport possible but are also a resource in themselves. They are therefore also referred to as "global public goods" or "global commons",[3] although they are spaces and not goods that can be traded on the markets. A common feature of all the global commons is that they are not under the control either of any national organisation or of an international body such as the United Nations. Yet many countries throughout the world rely on free access to the global commons. This is in fact their greatest point of weakness, because as public goods they may in times of worldwide security challenges become the target of terrorists, criminals or other perpetrators of violence.

Fig. 1
International deployments of the Bundeswehr

STRATAIRMEDEVAC
Germany

Active Fence Turkey
Turkey

KFOR
Kosovo

ISAF
Afghanistan/Uzbekistan

UNIFIL
Lebanon

UNAMA
Afghanistan

MINUSMA/EUTM Mali
Mali/Senegal

EUSEC RD CONGO
DR of the Congo

UNAMID
Sudan/Darfur region

UNMISS
South Sudan

ATALANTA
Somali sea area

EUCap Nestor
Djibouti/Kenya/
The Seychelles/Somalia

EUTM SOM
Uganda

Source: Bundeswehr, as at Jul 2013.

3 | See e.g.: Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport Österreichs (BMLV), Österreichs Bundesheer, "Forum Alpbach: Mehr Sicherheit durch gerechte Nutzung von globalen Gütern", http://www.bmlv.gv.at/cms/artikel.php?ID=5748 (accessed 5 Oct 2013); Josef Wieland, "Globale Standards als globale Öffentliche Güter", in: Matthias Maring (ed.), *Globale öffentliche Güter in interdisziplinären Perspektiven*, Karlsruhe, 2012, 235-251, here: 242.

THE GLOBALISATION OF SECURITY POLICY

The world has changed rapidly since the end of the Cold War. Technical progress and a globalised economy have created the "flat world" described by Thomas Friedman.[4] Geographical distances are now losing their significance. This is beneficial for the transfer of goods and knowledge. For example, a smartphone may be conceived and patented in the USA, but its components are made in South Korea, Japan and other countries, and at the end of the chain it leaves China, where the parts are assembled, to be reimported into the USA.[5] Thanks to the Internet, news is spread around the world in seconds; books are digitalised and can be accessed (free) via the World Wide Web, no matter where they are physically located.

Security policy, too, is affected by these changes. After the end of the East-West confrontation, globalisation did not bring in its train the "end of history" envisaged by Francis Fukuyama,[6] in which peace prevails in the world because conflict is brought to an end by the spread of liberal values and democracy. Instead, the cessation of the Cold War resulted in the globalisation of security policy. Rather than being dominated by the stand-off between two heavily-armed blocs, the security scene would from now on be characterised by a host of geographically dispersed disputes. It was also becoming clear even then that the terrorism that was emerging, and hence private actors, would be a major determinant of future security policy. This globalisation of security policy did not pass Germany by. Since reunification the country has had to radically revise its foreign and security policy and in little more than two decades it has undergone a complete transformation. Out of a nation that was originally focused purely on defending itself and the alliance to which it belonged, with armed forces intended

Since reunification Germany has had to radically revise its foreign and security policy and in little more than two decades it has undergone a complete transformation.

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4 | Thomas Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*, New York, 2005.
5 | Cf. Wendy Kaufmann, "How the iPhone Figures in the U.S.-China Trade Gap", National Public Radio, 18 Jan 2011, http://npr.org/2011/01/18/133029198/Tracing-The-Trade-Deficit-Back-To-The-iPhone (accessed 12 Sep 2013).
6 | Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, 1992.

mainly to halt oncoming tanks, has grown a country whose army, the Bundeswehr, is an expeditionary force[7] with more than 6,000 soldiers currently stationed abroad.

Germany's engagement in security issues has developed gradually: first came its purely monetary "cheque book diplomacy" during the Desert Storm operation against Saddam Hussein, then the dispatch of a support unit to Somalia in 1992 and finally the Bundeswehr's first combat mission in Kosovo in 1999. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and Germany's subsequent "unconditional solidarity" (Gerhard Schröder) with the USA, together with the acute threat to all western states from Al-Qaeda, then took the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan.[8] The Defence Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, VPR) of May 2011 capture this globalisation of security policy succinctly: "Security is not defined in geographical terms only. Developments in regions at the periphery of Europe and outside the European zone of security and stability can have an immediate impact on the security of Germany. Crises and conflicts can occur at any time, at short notice and without prior warning and may require a rapid response even over large distances."[9]

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THE GLOBAL COMMONS AS THE "LUBE OIL" OF GLOBALISATION

As globalisation has advanced since the end of the Cold War, Germany has also become increasingly integrated into the world economy. It is now the third-largest exporter in the world, after China (no. 1) and the USA. In 2012 goods worth more than 1,000 billion euros were exported from Germany. Almost a quarter of jobs in Germany depend on

7 | Cf. BMVg, "Überblick: Die Armee im Einsatz", Berlin, 12 Jan 2011, http://bundeswehr.de/portal/poc/bwde?uri=ci:bw. bwde.einsaetze.im_einsatz_fuer_den_frieden (accessed 10 Oct 2013).

8 | Christian Hacke, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 2003, 391-424 and 468-483.

9 | BMVg, *Die Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, Berlin, 2011, 2, http://bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMy MmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3N mY2ODMyNzU3OTY4NjIyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Verteidigungs politische%20Richtlinien%20(27.05.11).pdf (accessed 10 Sep 2013).

exports. And since it has few natural resources, the import of resources without which industry cannot function – especially fossil fuels – is equally important. Imports and exports make up almost 70 per cent of Germany's gross domestic product.[10]

Eruption of the volcano Eyjafjallajökull on Iceland: Events like this have shown how vulnerable the international network of air routes is. | Source: © S. Olafs, picture alliance / dpa.

The global commons are the "lube oil" of this global economic engine. Without unrestricted use of the high seas, air space, outer space and cyberspace the international economy would grind to a halt. The goods and knowledge that are the hallmark of globalisation must be transported – either physically by air and water or digitally in space and cyberspace. Transport by sea accounts for the lion's share – 80 per cent – of all traded goods. The shipping of goods is particularly important to Germany, because 80 per cent of its goods are imported and exported by sea.[11] In terms of quantity, far fewer goods are transported by air than by sea: by this method of calculation, air freight

10 | Cf. bpb, n. 2.
11 | Cf. Peter Hefele, "Fragile Wertschöpfungsketten: Zur Notwendigkeit eines deutschen maritimen Engagements", *Analysen und Argumente*, No. 125, 5 Jul 2013, 1, http://kas.de/wf/de/33.34915 (accessed 9 Oct 2013); bpb, "Zahlen und Fakten. Globalisierung. Seefracht", 30 Jun 2010, http://bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/globalisierung/52531/seefracht (accessed 12 Oct 2013).

constitutes only one per cent of the global exchange of goods. In terms of their value, however, goods transported by air account for 40 per cent of global trade: this highlights the fact that airspace, too, is an important global common.[12] Worldwide passenger transport must also be taken into account: in 2010 alone there were more than 20 million flights.[13] When the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland erupted in 2010, crippling air travel for two months, the losses to the global economy amounted to 148 million euros per day.[14]

Fig. 2
Development of German foreign trade 1991 to 2012, imports, exports and export surplus in billion euros

Source: bpb (with data of the Federal Statistical Office), n. 2.

Among the global commons, the high seas are one of the oldest transport spaces. Although flying machines of various sorts have been in use since the end of the 18th century, it was only after the First World War and the invention of reliable propeller-driven aircraft that airspace was

12 | Cf. bpb, "Zahlen und Fakten. Globalisierung. Luftfracht", 30 Jun 2010, http://bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/ globalisierung/52528/luftfracht (accessed 12 Oct 2013).
13 | Mark Barrett, Dick Bedford, Elizabeth Skinner and Eva Vergles, *Assured Access to the Global Commons*, NATO, Norfolk, 3 Apr 2011, 14, http://www.act.nato.int/globalcommons-reports (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
14 | Barrett, Bedford, Skinner and Vergles, n. 13, 16.

increasingly opened up.[15] The latest members of the global commons "family" are outer space and cyberspace. The Sputnik crisis of 1957 signalled the onset of the conquest of space and 1991 saw the debut of the World Wide Web as a publicly available service.[16] A feature of all four global commons is that it is rapid technological progress that has made them usable in their present form. Outer space and cyberspace, in particular, are closely linked (satellites are essential for communication via the Internet), while at the same time it is they that make use of the first two global commons possible. The global "just-in-time" exchange of goods would no longer be conceivable without the use of GPS satellites and the near instantaneous exchange of information via the Internet.

If one therefore considers, firstly, the altered global security situation, with its implication that for Germany – as well as other countries – security is no longer defined only geographically and, secondly, the extent to which Germany is integrated into global economic flows, it becomes clear that today's world has become "flat" in several senses: flat because geographically distant events, such as those in Afghanistan, can have a direct impact on Germany's security – and flat because interruption of the flow of goods and data anywhere in the world would directly affect the economic prosperity of Germany. It is precisely at this interface between security policy and the economy that the particular importance of the global commons comes into play.

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WHAT ARE THE GLOBAL COMMONS?

Before exploring the subject of the global commons and their precise definition in detail, it is worth examining the meaning of the word *resource*, which is at the heart of these public goods. Some resources are *natural* – that is, they have not been produced and their supply is limited.

15 | Mort Rolleston, "Air Superiority", in: Scott Jasper (ed.),
     Securing Freedom in the Global Commons, Stanford, 2010,
     131-144, here: 132.
16 | Barrett, Bedford, Skinner and Vergles, n. 13, 36.

Fossil fuels, in particular, fall into this category.[17] Resources may also be important on account of their *spatial location.* Satellites, for example, are of this type, since they acquire their significance only on account of their position and function in orbit.[18]

These resources are located spatially in the global commons: fish as a food resource exist only in the oceans, a satellite is located in space. At the same time the high seas, as a transport route, are a distinct resource for shipping. The same applies to the other three global commons: on the one hand they contain natural and "location-dependent" resources (e.g. airspace: clean air; space: satellites; cyberspace: information), on the other they function as "vehicles" and are thus distinct resources in their own right. In addition, there is a fundamental distinction to be made between finite, material public goods and intangible, immaterial ones. The first group includes the natural resources that have already been mentioned. The second group comprises intellectual resources such as ideas, knowledge and the information that is available on the Internet.[19]

Cyberspace belongs to the intangible, immaterial goods. Uncontrolled access will in the long term destroy them or exclude other users from using them.

The global commons are thus a public good (although not purely). They can be freely accessed by anyone and are controllable by no one, or controllable only with difficulty.[20] The high seas, airspace and outer space fall into the first group of finite, material goods. Cyberspace belongs to the group of intangible, immaterial goods. Now, the fundamental problem of the global commons – and one that is

17 | Jochen Schumann, Ulrich Meyer and Wolfgang Ströbele (eds.), *Grundzüge der mikroökonomischen Theorie*, Berlin/ Heidelberg, 1999, 401.
18 | J. Susan Buck, *The Global Commons: An Introduction*, Washington D.C., 1998, 3.
19 | Ibid., p. 3.
20 | Joseph E. Stiglitz and Carl E. Walsh, *Mikroökonomie*, Munich, 2010, 293 et seq. Like national public goods (e.g. German motorways), global public goods are not purely public goods. In the case of a purely public good, the marginal cost of procuring an additional good is precisely zero and it is not possible to exclude an additional person from using it. None of the four global commons can be used by anyone to an unlimited extent free of charge. For example, an unlimited number of ships cannot pass through the Strait of Malacca, and it is not possible for every user to make unlimited use of the Internet.

also relevant to security policy – is that, while they constitute a public good and hence one that can be accessed freely by all consumers, *uncontrolled* access will in the long term destroy them or exclude other users (such as states or trading companies) from using them. In economics this phenomenon of the overuse of a public good is termed the "tragedy of the commons".[21]

This concept derives from the areas of common land (woods, meadows, ponds and lakes) that remained in communal ownership until the end of the 19th century. If these commons were not regulated by the community, they were at risk of being overused by individual members of the community and hence eventually destroyed. The thinking is that if each user maximises his own profit without restriction, the result is that the entire community is eventually left with nothing. In the case of the global commons, however, users of many global public goods can in practice be excluded from the outset (e.g. from free use of the Internet). The overuse of global public goods is a particularly important issue in development cooperation, although the focus here is usually on the natural resources within the global commons – e.g. the avoidance of overfishing in the oceans or the reduction of global air pollution. The global commons as a resource in their own right – as a "vehicle" – are less central to the debate.

The overuse of global public goods is a particularly important issue in development cooperation. The focus here is usually on the natural resources within the global commons.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS FOR SECURITY POLICY

From the point of view of security policy, free access to information on the World Wide Web is now just as important an aspect of the global commons as the free use of transport routes. The quotation from the security policy White Paper previously cited highlights this dependence of Germany, which "has a principal interest in peaceful competition of thoughts and views, an open world trade system and unrestricted transportation routes" – and hence a principle interest in free access to the high seas, airspace, outer space and cyberspace. In contrast to the case of

21 | Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the commons", Science 162, 1968, 1243-1248.

public goods provided on a national basis, such as natio-
nal defence or health care, there is in the global domain
no supervisory authority to control the public goods and
guarantee free access to them. While international agree-
ments exist in some areas – such as shipping
and aviation – no national or supranational
institution is able to ensure free, unimpeded
access to the global commons at all times
and in all places. The area that needs to be
overseen (which includes cyberspace) ren-
ders any comprehensive supervision simply impossible.
From the point of view of security policy, this is one of the
great weaknesses of the global commons: all actors are
free to determine both how they use these global public
goods and whether, if it lies within their power, to make
access difficult or impossible for other users.

One of the great weaknesses of the global commons is that all actors are free to determine both how they use these global public goods and whether to make access difficult or impossible for other users.

A tension therefore arises between the wish of all the
states that benefit from these spaces to have free access
to them, and the desire of individual actors to exploit
the commons in pursuit of their own agenda. As already
implied in the "tragedy of the commons", maintenance of
the global commons depends on cooperation between all
the actors involved. There are, however, three reasons why
this poses a particular challenge:

1. Not all countries are aware that joint use of the four
   commons can only be sustained in the long term
   through global cooperation. Power rivalries and the
   desire to improve one's own position in the short term –
   as can be seen, for example, in relationships between
   Russia, China and the USA – can make dealings with
   these vital arteries of the world economy a zero sum
   game. Two examples of this are the battle for resour-
   ces in the Arctic and the management of space debris
   (which can destroy satellites).

2. Some actors do not share the definition of the global
   commons. For example, some shipping lanes lie in the
   catchment area of coastal states that lay claim to the
   territory (e.g. on the Strait of Malacca[22]). Defining the

22 | NATO, *NATO Reports – Assured Access to the Global Commons:
     Workshop 6*, 2010, 3, http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/
     events/2010/gc/report06_singapore.pdf (accessed 7 Nov
     2013).

area as a public good seems to them to be simply a pretext for reducing their revenue. A similar situation exists in relation to the Internet. Because the Internet is not detached from the physical world, everything in cyberspace is also stored in a location that belongs to someone. Here again a tension arises between individual actors with particular interests (e.g. companies such as Google or service providers) and the welfare of users in general, who require uninterrupted free access.

3. As has already been made clear in the case of the Internet, one of the greatest challenges in connection with use of the global commons is the inclusion of private actors in an overall strategy for maintaining free access to them. The Internet depends on servers, shipping on ports, aviation on airports and satellite signals on corresponding stations on Earth. These things are not necessarily all in state hands: they may belong to private individuals or companies. Companies, in particular, maximise their profits with an eye on their return on investment and they are not intrinsically interested in the general good or in national prosperity. In this case the "tragedy of the commons" may involve an individual actor withdrawing his service for economic reasons, thereby denying people at large access to one of the global commons.

Moreover, from the point of view of security policy the global commons are not militarily and strategically relevant only in passive terms (if access to them is denied); they are also relevant in active terms. The atmosphere and the high seas play a particularly important part in military planning. In contrast to space and cyberspace, they are of practical geostrategic significance, because they serve as a vehicle for the physical transport of military equipment. More than a century ago, in 1890, the American historian and geopolitical commentator Alfred Thayer Mahan described the oceans as "a great highway […] a wide common"[23] that enables countries to exercise their military influence. If a nation has global sovereignty over

The global commons are only militarily and strategically relevant if access to them is denied. The atmosphere and the high seas play also a particularly important part in military planning.

23 | Cited from: Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History", in: David Jablonsky (ed.), *Roots of Strategy: Book 4*, Mechanicsburg, 1999, 79.

the seas and the air, it can project its military power without hindrance. If to these domains are added the third space of the global commons, outer space with the use of satellite-based data, and the possibilities of modern Internet communication in cyberspace, the efficiency of this power projection increases exponentially. Since the end of the Cold War the USA, for example, has had almost unlimited opportunities for using the first three of the global commons.[24] This has enabled it to intervene militarily in geographically remote places without a long preparatory phase – as was emphatically demonstrated in Iraq in 2003 and in Afghanistan in 2001. From the point of view of Germany's security policy, the supremacy of its NATO ally has always paid off. During the NATO deployment in Kosovo (1999), for example, the USA bore the main burden of the air operations.

Having considered the defining features shared by the different global commons and the principal challenges associated with their use, it is worth examining the high seas, the atmosphere, space and cyberspace individually and considering their relevance to security policy.

GLOBAL COMMON I: THE HIGH SEAS

Modern logistics depend on the functioning, undisrupted transport of goods on the world's oceans. However, 75 per cent of these trade routes pass through narrow passages that make them susceptible to disruption.

As has already been described, the oldest transport corridor of the four global commons, the high seas,[25] plays a key part in both global and German trade. The oceans make up 70 per cent of the world's surface; 80 per cent of the world's population lives near the coast and modern "just-in-time" logistics depend on the functioning, undisrupted transport of goods on the world's oceans.

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24 | Cf. Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony", in: *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 5-46, here: 8.

25 | The high seas are defined in Article 86 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea as: "[…] all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State".

However, 75 per cent of these trade routes pass through narrow passages that make them susceptible to disruption.[26] But it is not only for global trade that the high seas are an important and in many places vulnerable transport space. For the NATO partners they will also continue to be a key geostrategic factor in crisis prevention and intervention. NATO missions will be inconceivable without the maritime dimension.[27] Three factors relating to the high seas have been identified as posing challenges for security policy: firstly, power rivalries played out on the oceans; secondly, criminally motivated attacks on ships (piracy); and thirdly, blocking of transport routes by terrorists.

Three factors relating to the high seas have been identified as posing challenges for security policy: power rivalries, piracy and blocking of transport routes by terrorists.

Two examples of maritime power rivalries will serve to illustrate the first of these factors: the exploitation of the mineral resources being discovered in the Arctic and the issue of unclarified ownership rights in the South China Sea are both giving rise to conflict in this global common. In the Arctic, Russia is keen to secure initial access rights to resources that may come to light as a result of global warming.[28] In the South China Sea, China sees itself as the pacemaker and is seeking to secure its access to important transport routes and rich fishing grounds.[29] Neither campaign has been without consequences. The USA, in particular, wants to secure its influence in both regions. Although these emerging conflicts will not necessarily develop into head-on confrontations, they are nevertheless at odds with the cooperation that maintenance of the global commons requires.

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26 | NATO, *Alliance Maritime Strategy*, 18 Mar 2011, 2, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110318_alliance_maritime-strategy_CM_2011_23.pdf (accessed 10 Oct 2013); Hefele, n. 11, 1.
27 | NATO, Maritime Strategy, 1-4; cf. also: Julian Voje, "Zur geostrategischen Bedeutung von U-Booten", *Internationales Magazin für Sicherheit* (IMS), No. 2, 2008, 48-49, here: 48.
28 | "Kampf um Rohstoffe: Russland schickt Raketenkreuzer in die Arktis", *Spiegel Online*, 15 Sep 2013, http://spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/a-922330.html (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
29 | Christoph Hein, "Säbelrasseln über dem Meer", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 Aug 2012, http://faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/-11851303.html (accessed 11 Oct 2013).

The second challenge for security policy, that of criminally motivated attacks, is a growing problem around the Horn of Africa and on the West African coast, with attacks by pirates ranging from relatively minor "hit-and-run" attacks on ports to the hijacking of entire merchant ships on the high seas. Anti-piracy missions such as the European Union's Operation Atalanta, in which Germany is involved, illustrate the attempts that are being made to protect shipping lanes.[30] The positive side effect of this piracy is the growth in cooperation between the affected states that it engenders. Although they are not engaged in joint operations, China, India, Russia and the USA are all active off the coast of Somalia.

Satellite picture of the Strait of Hormuz: Iran has repeatedly threatened the blocking of this vital artery of the global economy. | Source: Jacques Descloitres, NASA, flickr ☺①.

The third challenge for security policy arises from the activities of terrorists and other agents of violence who represent an asymmetric threat. Choke points of international shipping, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz, are targets for those seeking to capitalise on the lack of general control over this public common with the minimum means. A single attack could block these narrow channels and cause damage costing billions of

30 | Cf. David Petrovic, "Bekämpfung der Piraterie: Ein Aspekt maritimer Sicherheit für Deutschland", *Analysen und Argumente*, No. 129, 27 Sep 2013, http://kas.de/wf/de/33.35520 (accessed 10 Oct 2013).

euros.[31] Iran has repeatedly threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrating that it is not only private actors such as terrorists who have an interest in using the blocking of vital arteries of the global economy for their own purposes. Advancing technical developments – such as the recent invention of a missile launcher that can be transported in a cargo container and is capable of destroying an aircraft carrier by remote control,[32] – make it ever easier for attackers to achieve their aims.

GLOBAL COMMONS II AND III: GLOBAL AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE

Global airspace and outer space are closely connected. For one thing, there is no precise definition of where global airspace ends and outer space begins. A widely accepted distinction between the two areas puts the dividing line 80 kilometres above the Earth's surface, this being the last point at which a flying object still obtains aerodynamic lift.[33] At the same time, global airspace is heavily dependent on satellite-based communication. These days any flight, either commercial or military, involves the use of GPS signals, live air traffic control and satellite-based weather forecasting, to mention only a few of the issues involved. As in the maritime domain, there is in aviation an international flight zone that is available for use by all nations as a global common. No part of outer space is subject to any national jurisdiction.[34]

> As in the maritime domain, there is in aviation an international flight zone that is available for use by all nations as a global common. However, no part of outer space is subject to any national jurisdiction.

A feature common to both the maritime and the aviation zones is that they are very vulnerable and any attempt to secure them must rely heavily on cooperation between state and private bodies. In the field of aviation, the attacks of 11 September 2001 with the subsequent cancellation

31 | Jörg Eschenfelder, "Ein Anschlag genügt und alles steht still – Der bedrohte Welthandel. Piraten und Terroristen in der Straße von Malakka", *IMS*, No. 2, 2008, 20-22, http://ims-magazin.de/index.php?p=artikel&id=1233835500,1,gastautor (accessed 10 Oct 2013).
32 | "New Russian weapon system hides missiles in shipping container", *Homeland Security News Wire*, 28 Apr 2010, http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/new-russian-weapon-system-hides-missiles-shipping-container (accessed 10 Oct 2013).
33 | Cf. Rolleston, n. 15, 132.
34 | Barrett, Bedford, Skinner and Vergles, n. 13, 20 et seq.

of flights and the effects on air transport of the volcanic eruption in Iceland mentioned above illustrate the vulnerability of the world's closely interlinked flight network. Even minor attacks on airports can in the worst-case scenario force thousands of passengers to spend the night in the terminal.[35] Thus an attack on a major international airport, which would be relatively easy to organise, could cause disruption around the world.[36] All users therefore depend on airports – many of which are privately operated – being adequately secured. In addition, aviation is also affected by the development of new planes and weapon systems which in the wrong hands are capable of inflicting major damage. In particular, the increasing sophistication of drones and anti-aircraft missiles is one of the greatest emerging challenges to aviation.[37]

In outer space the principal issues relevant to German security policy are the management of space debris and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). Contrary to first impressions, outer space is very fragile and is reaching the threshold of its tolerance. Both government and private operators use this global common extensively: there are thought to be more than 1,100 satellites currently orbiting the Earth.[38] In 2007 China made history in space when it destroyed a defective weather satellite with an ASAT rocket; thousands of particles of space debris still remain in the Earth's orbit. There are also suspicions that the country is working on an "anti-satellite satellite" that could attack other objects with robotic arms. However, it is not actually very difficult to knock out a satellite – any object fired at sufficient speed will do the job – and satellites fitted with robotic arms could also be used to carry out maintenance tasks.[39]

35 | "Chaos am Münchener Flughafen", Sueddeutsche.de, 6 Jul 2012, http://sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/erding/1.1404698 (accessed 10 Oct 2013).
36 | Barrett, Bedford, Skinner and Vergles, n. 13, 23.
37 | Ibid., 24. On the problem of drones: Frank Sauer, "Drohnenkrieg. An der Schwelle einer neuen Drohnenökonomie", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 Aug 2013, http://faz.net/aktuell/politik/-12537028.html (accessed 10 Sep 2013).
38 | Cf. "SATCAT Boxscore", CelesTrak, http://celestrak.com/satcat/boxscore.asp (accessed 7 Nov 2013); cf. Barrett, Bedford, Skinner and Vergles, n. 13, 27.
39 | Dwayne Day, "China's ASAT enigma", *The Space Review*, 4 Mar 2013, http://thespacereview.com/article/2251/1 (accessed 7 Sep 2013); Robert Beckhusen, "China's Mystery Satellite Could Be a Dangerous New Weapon", https://medium.com/war-is-boring/630a858923ec (accessed 7 Oct 2013).

Other countries that want to have continued access to this global common must campaign for standardised legal regulations on the use of space. To prevent the "tragedy of the commons", all actors involved must act in unison. In addition, countries such as Germany that do not want to lose access to the use of space must invest in research and collaborate with private institutions. In its 2010 space strategy the German government acknowledged the importance of this global common and encouraged closer links between research and government planning.[40]

GLOBAL COMMON IV: CYBERSPACE

Cyberspace as the fourth global common is a particularly vivid example of the tension between interconnectedness and vulnerability. The interception of communications by the American National Security Agency (NSA) illustrates the efforts state institutions make to control this global common.[41] On the Internet boundaries between state and private actors are particularly blurred. Free access to information via Google, Facebook or YouTube is a public good, yet any server that transports data over the network is owned by a particular company or other service provider. The quantity of data involved ("big data"[42]) exceeds what the NSA has so far been able to collect.[43] Free access can thus become the subject of state monitoring and – as

On the Internet boundaries between state and private actors are blurred. Free access to information is a public good, yet any server is owned by someone.

40 | Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, BMWI), "Making Germany's space sector fit for the future. The space strategy of the German Federal Government", Berlin, 2010, http://dlr.de/dlr/PortalData/1/Resources/documents/raumfahrtstrategie_der_bundesreg_2010.pdf (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
41 | See also: "Wir brauchen international einheitliche Rahmenbedingungen bei der Cyberabwehr", Dr. Hans-Georg Maaßen, President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitutions (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), X. International Law Conference, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, event contributions, Berlin, 18 Oct 2013, http://kas.de/wf/de/33.35750 (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
42 | In fact the mass of available information is already being traded as the "oil" of the future, cf. Bitkom, *Big Data*, http://bitkom.org/de/publikationen/38337_73446.aspx (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
43 | Cf. "Grenzen der Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Sicherheit", X. KAS International Law Conference on the subject of "Cyber Security", event contributions, Berlin, 18 Oct 2013, http://kas.de/wf/de/33.35751 (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

in China and Myanmar – can result in users being denied access to information.[44]

Targeted attacks on companies and industrial espionage are part of everyday life for businesses in Germany and cause damage to the tune of billions of euros.

However, it is not only state institutions for whom cyber security is a matter of concern. The private sector is also affected by attacks on the Internet. Targeted attacks on companies (either ideologically motivated or designed to weaken a competitor) and industrial espionage are part of everyday life for businesses in Germany and cause damage to the tune of billions of euros. For perpetrators of organised crime, in particular, the Internet provides lucrative targets that can be homed in at low cost. If one also considers data in the ubiquitous "cloud", which must also be stored on a server, the vulnerability of this medium becomes even more evident.

The cyber attack on Estonia in 2007 and the attack on Iran in 2010 by the Stuxnet virus (reportedly developed by the USA and Israel[45]) have demonstrated that the Internet can also be used for military purposes – as a vehicle for a targeted attack on a state. The fundamental problem in dealing with such attacks is that the attackers are difficult or impossible to identify. It is hard to predict how and with what the attacked state will then respond.[46] Both the European Union and the German government have published strategies for dealing with cyber threats. Both strategies emphasise the role of private actors and of society as a whole in curbing the risks associated with the Internet and state that threats can only be contained by imposing international rules.[47]

44 | NATO, ACT Workshop Report, *NATO in the Cyber Commons*, 10 Oct 2010, 1, http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2010/gc/report05_tallinn.pdf (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

45 | Barton Gellmann and Ellen Nakashima, "U.S. spy agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011, documents show", *Washington Post*, 31 Aug 2013, http://washington-post.com/world/national-security/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

46 | NATO, too, has explored the threat of cyber attacks in some depth and has included cyber threats in its security strategy of 2010: NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf (accessed 10 Jul 2013).

47 | Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern, BMI), *Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland*, ‣

CONCLUSION

The globalised world of today has indeed become "flatter". As a result, security policy must be globally conceived. Conflicts at the other end of the world can have a direct impact on Germany's security. At the same time, Germany has entered into a virtually symbiotic relationship with the world economy. This intertwining of economic and security-related strands highlights the particular importance of the global commons: without free access to the high seas, global airspace, outer space and cyberspace the world, and hence Germany, cannot survive economically.

The global commons are the Achilles heel of globalisation. If every user accesses them without restriction, the risk is that ultimately no one will be able to access them at all. This applies to all four spaces of the global commons. Individual actors can "lame" entire spaces with limited means (as in the case of piracy) or with sophisticated weapons (as illustrated by the problem of drones). For example, blockage of the Strait of Malacca would very quickly cause damage worth billions of euros. The same applies to all the global commons.

For German security policy and for all countries that have an interest in free use of the global commons, this has implications in three areas. Firstly, they must be prepared to take active steps to counter acute disruption to one of the four commons. The campaign against piracy off the coast of Somalia is a successful example of joint action of this sort. The assumption of security-related responsibility for protection of the four "areas" – including by Germany, which is heavily dependent on them – must be internationally agreed. Secondly, existing rules that leave scope for interpretation (e.g. regarding the Strait of Malacca) must be improved, and rules must be drawn up for areas that are still largely unregulated (especially space). This issue must be pursued by the United Nations

The assumption of security-related responsibility for protection of the four global commons must be internationally agreed.

http://bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Informationsgesellschaft/cyber.pdf (accessed 10 Sep 2013); European Commission, *Cybersicherheitsplan der EU für ein offenes, freies und chancenreiches Internet*, 7 Feb 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/news-redirect/9589 (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

and by the EU as a "driver" – but also by Germany, which can make clear its interest in international rules. Thirdly, all countries must work to ensure that private actors understand that they are all "in the same boat" and must do their bit to conserve the global public commons. States should not, however, attempt to boost security by replacing the established provision of goods and services by private actors. The inability to control these actors is a major challenge, since they must work together for the good of all, but in it lies also their greatest benefit. A glance at the Internet with its free competition of ideas is sufficient to reveal this advantage. If all countries support the conservation of the global commons, all will continue to benefit from them in future.

BRAZIL'S MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

THE NEXUS BETWEEN SECURITY AND RESOURCES[1]

Adriana Erthal Abdenur / Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto

Although the South Atlantic has long been of strategic importance to states within and outside its perimeter, including Brazil, over the past half decade this geopolitical space has gained importance in Brazilian defense thinking. For Brazil, the state with the longest coastline along the South Atlantic, the discovery of significant deposits of oil and gas in the continental shelf's pre-salt layers has generated new interests and triggered new concerns. The prospect of tapping into these and other marine resources at a commercial scale, combined with the rapidly changing ecology of players in the area (including a growing presence by other emerging powers from outside the immediate vicinity), has prompted a reframing of the South Atlantic within Brazil's new national defense strategy. The growing assertiveness towards the South Atlantic is reflected not only in recently issued military doctrine documents, such as the 2008 National Defense Strategy and the Defense White Paper (made public in 2012), but also in the concrete initiatives launched by the Brazilian government both at home and abroad.

First, Brazil has begun modernising and expanding its military capacity with special attention to naval power in the South Atlantic, where priority is placed on enhancing patrolling capacity as part of the country's power of dissuasion. This strategy has entailed a significant upsurge in arms acquisition and development, including not just

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vessel acquisitions but also ongoing cooperation with France for the development of a nuclear-powered attack submarine. Domestically, this modernisation project has been accompanied by a campaign entitled the "Blue Amazon," aimed at mobilising popular support to the idea that Brazil has both vital resources and new security responsibilities in the South Atlantic. The new threats to national interests exploited in this campaign, which center on the notion that these resources give rise to greed by others, also help to structure key military exercises organised over the past few years. These include joint exercises such as IBSAMAR, the last one held with South Africa and India off the South African coast, as well as initiatives that include South American partners (e.g. ATLASUR, UNITAS). A number of the naval exercises simulate attacks targeting Brazilian offshore oil platforms in the South Atlantic.

A new ship for the Brazilian Navy: The "Amazonas" was built in Great Britain and presented to the public in 2012. | Source: © Marcelo Sayao, picture alliance / dpa.

Second, Brazil has filed a proposal with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regime to expand its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) based on the redefinition of its continental shelf. While at the time of this writing UNCLOS had not issued a final decision on the proposal, in the meantime Brazil has been investing heavily in scientific research programs, which allow it not only to plot its continental shelf with greater precision, but also to plot marine resources and maintain teams of researchers on its Atlantic islands – thereby boosting Brazil's presence in and its claim to this part of the South Atlantic.

Fig. 1

Exclusive economic zone and continental shelf off the Brazilian shore

Source: Own figure according to "Das Internationale Seerecht – ein potentes Regelwerk", *World Ocean Review*, No. 1, 2010, 202, http://worldoceanreview.com/wor-1 (accessed 25 Nov 2013); "Navio-Patrulha de 500 toneladas. Nova classe de navios para a proteção da 'Amazônia Azul'", *Marinha em Revista*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jun 2010, 20 et sqq., http://mar.mil.br/hotsites/marinhaemrevista/marco_2010/imagens (accessed 25 Nov 2013).

Finally, Brazil has been investing heavily in international cooperation aimed at creating a common South Atlantic identity – one that allows Brazil to actively pursue its own interests within the region. On the one hand, Brazil has diversified its bilateral defense cooperation with countries along the west coast of Africa. Most of these programs involve training of military staff, cooperation in continental shelf surveys, and – in a growing number of cases – provision of defense equipment and increased exports of Brazilian-made weapons. At the same time, Brazil works

to boost multilateral organisations, for instance helping to revive the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS). Through these platforms, Brazil emphasises the need to create a zone of peace and prosperity, while also stressing that the responsibility over the area belongs to the coastal countries along the South Atlantic.

Brazil's growing attention to the South Atlantic represents an opportunity for it to assume a role of trans-regional leadership on matters of defense and security, precisely at a time when NATO's role in the South Atlantic is increasingly questioned by the Brazilian government. In a recent speech at the UN Security Council, for instance, former Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota stated that "We are still concerned that NATO may be seeking to establish partnerships outside of its defensive zone, far beyond the North Atlantic, including in regions of peace, democracy, and social inclusion that do not accept the existence within that space of weapons of mass destruction."[2]

At the same time, Brazil's naval buildup and South Atlantic strategy is sometimes perceived as being at odds with the country's historic discourse of peace and stability. If Brazil's approach comes to be viewed as excessively assertive, these strategies may also eventually trigger new competitive dynamics in the South Atlantic.

BRAZIL AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

The South Atlantic has been important to Brazil during different historical periods, not only contributing to defense thinking but also helping to shape Brazilian cultures. Prior to colonisation, the Tupi and Tapuia indigenous groups fought for control of the coastal areas. The South Atlantic served not only as the route for Portuguese colonisation and slave trade from Africa, but also for French and Dutch incursions. During World War II, Brazil suffered more casualties in the South Atlantic than in any other war theater as a result of German U-boats torpedoeing Brazilian merchant

2 | Translated by the authors. Speech by former Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota at the UN Security Council, 6 Aug 2013, http://diplomaciapublica.itamaraty.gov. br/11-onu/35-organizacoes-regionais-e-a-onu-trabalhando-pela-paz-e-pela-seguranca-internacionais (accessed 16 Aug 2013).

ships operating from Brazil to Europe.[3] The Cold War converted the South Atlantic into a space where NATO and the Soviet Union vied for influence, and the 1980s brought renewed tensions with the Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982. Towards the end of the Cold War, the South Atlantic was also the focus of regional efforts. These multilateral platforms include the ZOPACAS, launched at Brazil's initiative and approved by the UNO in 1986. ZOPACAS, which brought together South American and African states along the South Atlantic, aimed to keep the area free of nuclear weapons and to minimise (and eventually eliminate) the military presence of countries from outside the region.

However, for the Brazilian government and Armed Forces, the South Atlantic was not among defense priorities. Rather, the major perceived threats to Brazilian sovereignty lay elsewhere: namely, in the Amazon, whose densely forested terrain makes its borders porous and difficult to patrol, and the river Plate region, where historic rivalry with Argentina included a brief nuclear arms race during the 1970s and 1980s. During the Malvinas/Falklands War, Brazil voiced support for Argentina but largely kept out of the dispute. In the early 1990s, with the transition from military back to civilian government, Brazil became one of the countries with the lowest levels of military expenditure (in relation to GDP). By the 1990s, Brazilian Navy officers complained of the deteriorating condition of Brazil's warships and other equipment, the low capacity of the country's fleet, and the inadequate lack of funding for training and exercises.[4] This took place against the backdrop of the debate on the role the Armed Forces should play within a democratised Brazil.[5] Although the Armed Forces had assumed a greater role in civilian tasks since

By the 1990s, Brazilian Navy officers complained of the deteriorating condition of Brazil's warships and other equipment, the low capacity of the country's fleet, and the inadequate lack of funding for training and exercises.

3 | Frank D. McCann, "Brazil and World War II: The Forgotten Ally. What did you do in the war, Zé Carioca?", *Estudios interdisciplinarios de America Latina y el Caribe*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1995.
4 | João Roberto Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker, "The Brazilian Military under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 42, 2000, No. 3, 143-170.
5 | Wendy Hunter, "The Brazilian military after the Cold War: In search of a mission", *Studies In Comparative International Development*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1994, 31-49.

the political transition, including tasks related to disaster relief and infrastructure construction, it had not yet reinvented itself within the post-Cold War context.

Brazilian defense thinking on the South Atlantic began to change under the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The government worked to diversify Brazil's political partnerships with African countries, not only to boost transatlantic trade but also to garner support for Brazil's bid for a permanent seat in the UN's Security Council. The South Atlantic also gained economic importance for two key reasons. First, with the commodities boom of the 2000s, Brazil's foreign trade became a more important driver of its economic growth, and these exchanges are overwhelmingly marine: nearly 95 per cent of Brazil's foreign trade is conducted through South Atlantic sea routes. Second, the country's oil reserves are located offshore in the South Atlantic. In 2007, the discovery of large oil reserves in the pre-salt layers of the South Atlantic were announced, with Petrobras estimating reserves at over 50 billion barrels of oil – a volume four times greater than the current national reserves (approximately 14 billion barrels). In addition to vastly expanding the country's resources, the discovery has the potential of raising Brazil's profile within the international community.

From the defense outlook, the government considered these reserves as warranting greater dissuasion capacity. In addition, the Brazilian government also began paying greater attention to the so-called non-traditional security threats emerging in the South Atlantic. The transatlantic drug trade had grown dramatically, with some West African countries having become key transshipment points for distribution of drugs from Latin America to Europe and beyond. Finally, cases of piracy, once confined to the Somalian coast, have occurred in the Gulf of Guinea, which has become of global strategic importance due to oil exploration and shipping lanes.[6] The Brazilian government began to express concern that instability in the region could jeopardise Brazilian interests in the South Atlantic,[7]

6 | Adjoa Anyimadu, *Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean*, Chatham House, London, 2013.
7 | Interview with Brazilian Defense Minister Celso Amorim in Brasília, 6 Aug 2013.

and that piracy could eventually spread across the South Atlantic.

The Brazilian government's growing interests in the South Atlantic also broadened within a stage featuring a rapidly changing cast of actors. Besides the coastal states, many of which have announced plans for, or are currently undertaking their own, seabed surveys in search of marine resources, some countries from outside the area have a noticeable presence in (or quick access to) the South Atlantic. The United Kingdom has a string of island territories stretching from the English Channel almost down to Antarctica, including not only the Malvinas/Falklands but also Mid-Atlantic Ridge islands such as Ascencion and Saint Helena, which provide it with a military presence in the region. In 2008, the United States – which has access to the British string of islands through NATO – announced that it was reactivating its Fourth Fleet (which had been demobilised in 1950). Brazil's then Minister of Defense called the expansion of NATO forces in the South Atlantic "inappropriate," and the administration of President Dilma Rousseff continues to reject a broader role within the region by the alliance. The United States' ongoing "pivot" toward Asia and growing concern with China's rise and North Korean instability, however, suggest that its naval attention will be more focused on the Pacific.

Close cooperation in the context of the BRICS and beyond: South African President Jacob Zuma and Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff. | Source: Gary Kasparov, Government Communications (GCIS), Republic of South Africa ⊚①⊖.

In addition, there are growing commercial investment interests in the South Atlantic by other players, some focusing on oil and involving a complex mix of state and non-state actors. Russia has been expanding its ties with Latin America (with dozens of billions of U.S. dollars in investments in Venezuela alone), and China has extensive ties throughout the region that combine economic, political and military cooperation. These countries (and others) have also been carrying out seabed research within the South Atlantic in search of minerals and other marine resources.[8] While these players are not viewed by the Brazilian government as direct threats in the South Atlantic space – it is worth noting that, in addition to China being Brazil's top trading partner, Sinopec has invested in pre-salt exploration off the Brazilian coast – Brazil's defense strategy centers on the assumption that players from outside the region will covet Brazilian marine resources.[9]

Over the past decade, all of these factors have contributed to significant changes – both quantitative and qualitative – in Brazil's defense strategy and its relationship with the South Atlantic in particular. These changes can be summed up along three key elements: security buildup, international legal strategies, and South-South military cooperation.

Security Buildup

Until recently, Brazil spent relatively little with its Armed Forces as compared to its GDP,[10] which – within the Navy – translated into limitations on equipment and maintenance.

8 | Rodrigo F. de Moraes, "Do mare liberum ao mare clausum: evolução jurídica, importância jurídica, importância geopolítica e exploração econômica das águas jurisdicionais", in: Reginaldo Mattar Nasser and Rodrigo F. de Moraes, *O Brasil e a Segurança no seu Entorno Estratégico: América do Sul e Atlântico Sul*, Ipea, Brasília, 2013.
9 | Ana Alves, "China's Resource Quest in Brazil: The Changing Role of Economic Statecraft", *Portuguese Journal of International Affairs*, 6, 2012, 28-39.
10 | According to SIPRI, in 2012, Brazil's military expenditure was only 1.5 per cent of its GDP; however, Brazil remains Latin America's top military spender and one of the top 15 military spenders in 2011 and 2012, in spite of budget reductions, occupying 11th position in 2011 and 10th in 2012. See: "Trends in world military expenditure 2012", *SIPRI Fact Sheet 2013*, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf (accessed 16 Aug 2013).

Brazil's current fleet (encompassing around 100 commissioned ships) includes a mix of British-built frigates, Brazilian-built corvettes, diesel-electric submarines and a number of smaller vessels responsible for patrolling an extensive coastline (7,491 kilometres) and a vast marine territory (3,660,955 square kilometres, including waters surrounding Brazilian archipelagos). Despite the 2000 acquisition of an aircraft carrier (the "São Paulo", first commissioned in 1963 by the French Navy and bought by Brazil to replace the World War II-era "Minas Gerais") and a group of fixed wing aircraft, the Navy sustained that the Brazilian fleet otherwise remained rather limited in proportion to Brazil's growing interests in the South Atlantic. Moreover, despite the long Brazilian coastline, the fleet has been historically geographically concentrated in Rio de Janeiro, posing a strategic vulnerability that the new defense strategy aims to reduce.

The Navy's ability to secure resources and equipment began to change as Brazil experienced economic growth and as the South Atlantic assumed greater importance within Brazilian strategic thinking. According to the **According to the Brazilian government, the discovery of large oil and gas reserves demands renewed capacity to patrol the South Atlantic and dissuade potential enemies.** Brazilian government, the discovery of large oil and gas reserves demands renewed capacity to patrol the South Atlantic and dissuade potential enemies. Internally, the pre-salt oil findings also provided a political justification for increased spending even beyond simply upgrading or improving maintenance. This shift is reflected in the two key Brazilian defense documents. The National Defense Strategy, published in 2008, establishes (among other priorities) increases in military spending, with a renewed focus on protecting natural resources within the South Atlantic. The Defense White Paper, made public in 2012, lays out these plans in more specific detail, also stressing the need to geographically diversify Brazil's naval capacity – a task that may be accomplished by establishing a Second Fleet, probably in the state of Pará, at the mouth of the Amazon river (thus allowing Brazil to connect protection of the South Atlantic to that of the Amazon region).

As a result of these enhanced resources and changing defense priorities, over the past few years the Navy has embarked on a significant modernisation, development,

and acquisition program (with both nationally built and foreign-made vessels). For instance, Brazil has been acquiring several classes of vessels and expanding its submarine program, including a recent purchase of Scorpène submarines from France. Indeed, military spending, although beginning from a low base, has until recently risen significantly (among the armed forces, the Navy has increased spending the most).[11] As the Minister of Defense recently wrote regarding militarisation efforts, "Brazil's soft power needs to be hardened."[12]

The centerpiece of this expansion program is the development of a nuclear-energy attack submarine. The Brazilian government had considered the possibility of acquiring

In March 2008 Brazil acquired the hull for a nuclear-energy attack submarine, which it is currently developing in cooperation with France.

or developing a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines since the late 1970s, yet the project's high costs made it economically unfeasible.[13] With the transition back to civilian rule, and especially during the Fernando Collor de Mello administration (1900-1992), the federal government reduced the nuclear submarine program's budget.[14] In March 2008, however, Brazil acquired the hull for a nuclear-energy attack submarine, which it is currently developing in cooperation with France. The Brazilian company Odebrecht is the leading local partner in a joint venture with French shipbuilder DCNS, and President Rousseff recently inaugurated a new shipbuilding facility in Itaguaí, Rio de Janeiro, intended to expedite the project (the first submarine is due to be commissioned in 2023).

In justifying the expenditures, the government points to the nuclear submarine's speed and ability to patrol long distances without having to surface frequently, as well as

11 | According to Nascimento, the sum allocated to the program responsible for reequipping the Brazilian Navy has grown from 0.9 per cent of the Defense Ministry's budget in 2007 to six per cent of the budget in 2010. M. C. N. do Nascimento, „Uma década de gastos orçamentários na área de defesa nacional – 2000 a 2010: análises e tendências", *Revista Brasileira de Planejamento e Orçamento*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011, 43-57.
12 | Celso Amorim, "Hardening Brazil's Soft Power", *Project Syndicate*, 16 Jul 2013, http://project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-more-robust-defense-policy-for-brazil-by-celso-amorim (accessed 16 Aug 2013).
13 | João Roberto Martins Filho, „O projeto do nuclear submarine brasileiro", *Contexto Internacional*, 33, 2011.
14 | Ibid.

the potential for technology and knowledge transfer. Some critics, including military officers, have questioned the wisdom of investing so heavily in this particular component for the dissuasion strategy, potentially at the expense of other needs.[15] Some have also suggested that by joining the select member of countries that possess nuclear submarines (currently five states), Brazil could generate discomfort among neighbors and create a troublesome power imbalance within the South Atlantic.[16] Brazil's commitment to the project is reflected in the fact that, even as the defense budget for 2013 is undergoing cuts due to the recent economic slowdown, the government has guaranteed continued financing for the nuclear submarine project and other strategic projects developed by the Defense Ministry.[17]

Moreover, Brazil has been working to develop a new satellite and radar-based surveillance system, the Sistema de Gerenciamento da Amazônia Azul (Blue Amazon Management System, SisGAAz). In addition to aiding in sea rescues, the system is meant to enhance surveillance capability for the pre-salt oil area in the South Atlantic. The system will integrate several different technologies and platforms, including software-defined radios, satellite communications, and long-range radar, as well as a submarine acoustic sensing system. The new vessels and other equipment are being used in military exercises related to the rise of new threats related to marine natural resources, for instance through simulations that involve a foreign-flag merchant ship hijacked by terrorists intent on attacking Brazilian oil platforms in the Campos basin off the coast of Rio de Janeiro state.

One of the top defense priorities outlined in the New Security Strategy is the promotion of Brazil's defense industry, including through subsidies for arms production and

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15 | Ibid.
16 | Maurício Moraes, "Submarino nuclear pode desequilibrar região e gerar sentimento anti-Brasil", BBC, 19 Jul 2011, http://bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2011/07/110718_submarino_brasil_america_do_sul_mm.shtml (accessed 16 Aug 2013).
17 | Marta Beck and Cristiane Jungblut, „Passam de R$ 4 bi cortes no orçamento da Defesa", O Globo, 30 Jul 2013, http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/passam-de-4-bi-cortes-no-orcamento-da-defesa-9278334 (accessed 16 Aug 2013).

incentives for exports, with the goal of achieving greater military technological independence. Moreover, key projects, including a nuclear submarine fleet, are due for completion only within a decade at best; others, including plans to substitute the São Paulo for one or two aircraft carriers,

Despite its anti-NATO discourse, the Brazilian government still depends on partnerships with the United States and European countries for key cutting-edge military technologies. may not be implemented any time soon, especially in light of recent budgetary pressures. Some of the main efforts to acquire and develop military technology (including the nuclear submarine) include a significant component of technological transfer. Despite its anti-NATO discourse, the Brazilian government still depends on partnerships with the United States and European countries for key cutting-edge military technologies. The agreements signed over the past few years, including that with Great Britain, illustrate the combination of cooperation and distancing that have come to characterise Brazil's relations with NATO countries as regards the South Atlantic.

Legal and Institutional Strategies

In addition to increased naval spending, Brazil has either launched new or stepped up older institutional strategies aimed at reinforcing its claims in the South Atlantic. Domestically, the Navy launched in the mid-2000s the "Blue Amazon" campaign. The effort, which draws its name from an analogy with the resource-rich Amazon region, is geared at fostering a "marine mentality": promoting the idea that South Atlantic resources are of vital interest to all Brazilians, thus demanding new defense investments. Parts of the initiative target specifically Brazilian youth, with didactic and public information materials such as textbooks, comic strips and exhibits highlighting the strategic importance of the sea.[18] These materials – produced by an inter-ministerial committee and disseminated through the Ministry of Education – stress that Brazil's South Atlantic natural resources, particularly the oil reserves, demand a stronger defense force.

The Blue Amazon project also seeks to explain, and mobilise support for, Brazil's ongoing attempt to extend its national waters by 900.000 square kilometres. The initial

18 | Eliane Octaviano Martins, "Amazônia Azul, Pré-sal, soberania e jurisdição marítima", Revista CEI XIV(50), 88, 2010.

proposal was filed in June 2004 with the UNCLOS, which allows coastal states to claim sovereign rights over living and non-living resources of the sea and seabed in an exclusive economic zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from their coastal baselines, or from their continental shelves. Where the physical continental margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles, states have rights over seabed resources to the continental shelf's outer limit (subject to certain constraints defined in Article 76 of UNCLOS). Although the Brazilian government has scaled back its original proposal by roughly 20 per cent, it has continued efforts to refine the definition of the continental shelf (see fig. 1). In this endeavor, Brazil has the advantage of having clearly defined maritime boundaries with its neighbors (in contrast for instance to Argentina, which has overlapping claims with the United Kingdom in the vicinity of the Malvinas/Falklands).

In the meantime, Brazil continues a broad gamut of research programs for the South Atlantic. Some of these, conducted through the Navy's Brazilian Continental Shelf Survey Plan (Plano de Levantamento da Plataforma Continental Brasileira, LEPLAC), are high-tech surveys of the continental shelf, whose geographic definition serves as the basis for the extension proposal. Other efforts aim to foster knowledge of biodiversity within the maritime territory and coastal areas. Some of these programs require researchers to continually occupy (albeit in rotation) Brazilian islands within the South Atlantic, such as the São Pedro and São Paulo archipelago, which would otherwise be uninhabited – another way to strengthen Brazilian presence in the South Atlantic. A similar approach is seen in the drive to make some of these islands, such as Trindade, into World Heritage Sites.[19] In addition to boosting environmental conservation in those areas, the move uses international law and norms to further consolidate Brazilian sovereignty claims, as well as its *de facto* presence, in the South Atlantic.

19 | Silvia Helena Zanirato, "Estratégias brasileiras de poder e territorialização para o controle das ilhas do Atlântico Sul", *Scripta Nova. Revista Electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales*, Vol. 16, No. 418, 27, Universidad de Barcelona, 2012, http://www.ub.es/geocrit/sn/sn-418/sn-418-27.htm (accessed 25 Oct 2013).

The Brazilian government has also worked to maintain its Antarctic research program, which is run by the Navy and which the government deems vital for Brazil's participation in the Antarctic Treaty (to which Brazil acceded in 1975), especially through the meetings of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR). After a fire in 2012 destroyed most of the Brazilian Antarctic base, the Estação Comandante Almirante Ferraz, the government immediately launched an effort to build a new improved base, reflecting the importance accorded to Antarctica.[20]

Defense Cooperation

The third element in Brazilian strategy for the South Atlantic involves stepped up defense cooperation, not only with South American neighbors (particularly those along the South Atlantic, from the Guyana Shield states to the Patagonian countries) but also with the countries along the west coast of Africa – many of which are concerned that mining countries will lay exclusive claims to South Atlantic resources, perhaps forcing merchant ships to sail through costly roundabout routes. This diversification of ties entails redoubled efforts in bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation, both accompanied by a strong stress on South-South ties.

Through bilateral cooperation, the Brazilian government has worked to construct a "Goodwill Belt"[21] stretching all around the South Atlantic. The diversification of such ties reaches far beyond the countries prioritised by Brazil's South-South cooperation for development, which tends to focus on CPLP countries. In contrast, military cooperation agreements undersigned by Brazil over the past ten years

20 | Interview with Brazilian Defense Minister Celso Amorim in Brasília, 6 Aug 2013. Brazil's interests in Antarctica appear within a context of both cooperation and competition. Argentina and Chile helped Brazil to continue its Antarctic research program after the fire in 2012 at the Brazilian base. At the same time, several emerging powers have recently taken significant steps in strengthening their Antarctic programs, including China and India, and Brazil is interested in supporting a common South American position on the region.

21 | This is a translation of the expression "Cinturão de Boa Vontade" mentioned by Brazilian Defense Minister Celso Amorim in a speech at the Brazilian War College (ESG) in March 2012. The speech is available at: http://defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes03/esg_marco_2012.pdf (accessed 16 Aug 2013).

with states within the region encompass a far wider variety of countries, including many states without Portuguese as one of their official languages. One of Brazil's key defense partners, for instance, is Namibia. Brazil first undersigned an agreement with Namibia in 1994, but over the past decade it has greatly expanded cooperation efforts aimed at building the Namibian Navy through officer and cadet training, vessel provision, and logistics support. The agreements signed with Namibia have served as a model of sorts for more recent ties with

Brazil has also intensified military cooperation with strategic partners such as South Africa, with which it is developing an infrared-guided short range air-to-air missile.

other African countries along the South Atlantic. Brazil has also intensified military cooperation with strategic partners such as South Africa, with which it is developing (through IBSA) the A-DARTER, an infrared-guided short range air-to-air missile. More recently, the two countries have also discussed cooperating in a surveillance system for the South Atlantic.[22]

Brazil has also deepened defense cooperation with Angola and Nigeria. Both countries are increasingly important economic and political partners for Brazil and are also important purchasers of Brazilian defense equipment. Embraer, the domestic aviation company, recently sold SuperTucano jets to Angola, in addition to Burkina Faso and Mauritania. Nigeria recently undersigned new military cooperation agreements with Brazil, expressing interest in acquiring vessels produced by Brazilian Navy contractor Engepron. Deepening ties with the Nigerian Navy will also include cooperation in prospecting minerals in the South Atlantic. In addition to these large coastal states, Brazil has started or intensified defense cooperation with nearly all countries along the west coast of Africa. These programs focus heavily on naval issues and typically cover officer training, which is often carried out in Portuguese even in non-CPLP countries. Training can take place either in the partner country or in Brazil, and many South Atlantic countries on both the South American and African coasts, including Suriname, Senegal, and Angola have begun sending soldiers to the Jungle Warfare Instruction Center, commonly

22 | Brazil is holding talks with South Africa to develop an oceanographic satellite with an exclusive focus on the South Atlantic. For further information see: http://thebricspost.com/brazil-sa-to-jointly-develop-satellite-for-south-atlantic (accessed 16 Aug 2013).

called CIGS, in the Brazilian Amazon. Other cooperation components include equipment donations, including patrol vessels, and logistical support. Finally, Brazil helps many of these countries to conduct surveys of the African side of the Atlantic continental shelf, disseminating its model of research as well as its discourse of national sovereignty over marine resources.

On the multilateral side, Brazil has stepped up efforts to revive ZOPACAS, as part of its broader effort to construct a South Atlantic identity. Although the initiative dates to the late 1980s, when coastal countries in the region were concerned with proliferation, in the post-Cold War context there is more of a focus on joint responsibility regarding problems within the common maritime area so as to avoid interventions by outside powers. The ZOPACAS meeting held in Montevideo in January 2013, which included the presence of defense ministers, placed strong emphasis on sharing Brazil's knowledge in search and rescue operations, maritime surveillance, and continental shelf surveys (a separate statement mentioning the situations of instability in Guinea-Bissau and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was also issued during the meeting).

Aside from ZOPACAS, Brazil is part of other multilateral initiatives relevant to the South Atlantic, including the South America-Africa Summit and IBSA. Through the latter, Brazil has been participating in the IBSAMAR trilateral naval military exercises, so far held off the South African coast. Within the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), an organisation developed in the mid-1990s to initially promote cultural ties, Brazil has also supported defense cooperation and military exercises as well as strengthening state institutions in Guinea-Bissau. Although the BRICS grouping does not yet have a concrete cooperation program in the area of defense and security, there are security discussions underway that might hold relevance to the South Atlantic. For example, in a January 2013 meeting of high-level security representatives from the BRICS, discussions covered topics in non-traditional security, such as terrorism, piracy, and cybersecurity.[23] All

In a meeting of high-level security representatives from the BRICS, discussions covered topics in non-traditional security, such as terrorism, piracy, and cybersecurity.

23 | "BRICS", Ministry of External Affairs of India, New Delhi, Apr 2013, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/BRICS_ for_XP_April_2013.pdf (accessed 16 Aug 2013).

of these efforts may signal the growing geostrategic impor-
tance of the South Atlantic within regional, trans-regional,
and other multilateral platforms.

CONCLUSION

Brazil's growing interest in the South Atlantic is reflected
not only in the government's official discourse, which high-
lights the need to protect Brazilian marine resources, but
also in its practices, particularly when it comes to domestic
efforts to promote a "maritime mentality," its international
legal and institutional strategies, and its rapidly expanding
defense cooperation along the South Atlantic's perimeter.
In all these initiatives, there is a concerted effort not only
to ascertain Brazilian sovereignty over a portion of the
South Atlantic and disseminate the idea that its marine
resources are a new *locus* of potential threats, but also to
promote this perspective throughout the region in a bid to
keep out those states considered to be from outside the
region.

These efforts are novel in at least three respects. First,
they are trans-regional, involving a clear focus not only on
South America, where Brazil has a long history of military
ties, but also western Africa, where its involvement was
until recently far more episodic. Second, Brazil's initiatives
in the South Atlantic highlight not only currently exploited
and known natural resources, but also (perhaps, even more
so) the area's potential resources, particularly those of
the marine subsoil. More specifically, the perception of an
imminent technological turn that will permit exploration of
the pre-salt oil in a commercial scale, and the assumption
that this exploration will generate substantial revenues
for the Brazilian government, have prompted Brazil to
adopt a more precautionary stance. And third, although
those efforts reflect a new degree of intensity in Brazil's
defense relations in the South Atlantic, those ties are not
entirely new, in that they include reviving the historic links
between South America and Africa, as well as the South
Atlantic and Antarctica (which, until its emergence within
Brazilian maritime strategy, was never cited among Brazil's
security priorities).

These multiple strategies have so far allowed Brazil to proceed with its naval modernisation program and to greatly expand its defense cooperation programs with partners along the South Atlantic perimeter. At some point though, a renewed nationalism suggested by its approach in the South Atlantic might generate tensions, particularly if states that have previously contested Brazilian leadership in Latin America come to view Brazil's approach with suspicion. Even with recent budget cuts imposed on the Armed Forces, key components of Brazil's South Atlantic strategy are likely to move forward, and they will no doubt alter, if not radically transform, power dynamics within the region.

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CENTRAL ASIA FACING ISAF WITH-DRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN

ISLAMIST THREATS AND REGIONAL SOLUTIONS

Thomas Kunze / Michail Logvinov

In 2014, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) combat mission in Afghanistan is due to be concluded. Though a security agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan allows for the Karzai regime to be able to continue to count on their support, the ISAF is a thing of the past. The withdrawal of troops and a large portion of material provisions has presented participating ISAF countries with logistical challenges. Particular emphasis is placed on the Central Asian countries that together make up the Northern Distribution Network (NDN): Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Part of the withdrawal is to be carried out using the NDN. On the one hand, this provides new economic and political opportunities for Central Asian countries. On the other hand, Islamist forces could take advantage of an emerging security vacuum due to the troop withdrawal to spread terror and fear throughout Afghanistan and its neighbouring Central Asian countries. Even comparatively secure Northern Afghanistan, which is primarily populated by Uzbeks and Tajiks, could become a new base for terrorist activity, threatening the secular regimes in the former Soviet Central Asian republics. Islamist ideas are already entrenched in their societies, and regional Islamist networks do exist.

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TROOP WITHDRAWAL: WHAT HAPPENS NEXT IN AFGHANISTAN?

The situation in Afghanistan is proving doubly difficult for those ISAF countries involved: transferring responsibility for security to local forces on the one hand, and the logistical complexity of the withdrawal on the other. According

to NATO, there are a total of 87,207 soldiers (as of August 2013) from 49 nations in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission, the largest numbers of troops being from the U.S. (60,000 troops), the United Kingdom (7,700 troops) and Germany (4,400 troops).[1]

However, the security situation in Afghanistan remains precarious and is in no way secured. Though the Taliban have been weakened by the international mission, they have not been driven away. According to NATO, approximately 8,000 to 12,000 troops will remain in Afghanistan in 2014 as part of the post-ISAF mission, "Resolute Support", to provide assistance with training, instruction and support for local security forces.[2] In June 2013, NATO Defence Ministers made a commitment that the remaining troops should no longer play a combat role.[3] This is to ensure that the responsibility for security in Afghanistan is completely transferred to local forces. However, it remains questionable as to whether or not they are ready for this. The Afghan soldiers are considered inadequately trained and the number of deserters is high. The political balance of power does not yet appear to be stable enough to guarantee that the government will not collapse or at least have their authority undermined following the withdrawal of troops. Afghanistan's political system is fragile and corruption is pervasive. The situation in eastern Afghan province of Nuristan provides a preview, as troops have already withdrawn from there in 2012. A large portion of the province, including major access roads used to provide the local population with supplies, is now controlled by the Taliban.[4]

In June 2013, NATO Defence Ministers made a commitment that the remaining troops should no longer play a combat role. This is to ensure that the responsibility for security in Afghanistan is completely transferred to local forces.

1 | Cf. NATO, "International Security Assistance Force: Key Facts and Figures", 1-2, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf (accessed 23 Nov 2013).
2 | Cf. Adrian Croft and Phil Stewart, "NATO considers post-2014 Afghan force of 8,000-12,000", Reuters, 22 Feb 2013, http://reuters.com/article/2013/02/22/us-afghanistan-usa-nato-idUSBRE91L0IC20130222 (accessed 23 Nov 2013).
3 | Cf. Karen Parrish, "NATO Defense Ministers Set Post-2014 Afghanistan Mission", American Forces Press Service, 5 Jun 2013, http://defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120218 (accessed 14 Oct 2013).
4 | Cf. „Taliban übernehmen nach ISAF Abzug die Kontrolle", *Stern*, 25 Sep 2013, http://stern.de/politik/ausland/afghanische-provinz-nuristan-taliban-uebernehmen-nach-isaf-abzug-die-kontrolle-2060563.html (accessed 1 Oct 2013).

Soldiers of the logistics support battalion: The Bundeswehr will leave behind equipment with a replacement value amounting to several million euros because the return transport is often too costly. | Source: © Sebastian Wilke, Bundeswehr.

LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES OF WITHDRAWAL

After international security forces were sent to Afghanistan based on UN Resolution 1386 passed on 20 December 2001, an enormous amount of equipment was imported into the country. At this juncture, it was not only a matter of weapons, munitions and military vehicles, but also aid materials and everyday commodities for the troops. With the withdrawal of the troops, this equipment must be sent back to its home country. For the Bundeswehr alone this means transferring approximately 1,200 vehicles and at least 4,000 containers worth of equipment, according to German federal government estimates.[5] In addition, the Bundeswehr will leave behind equipment with a replacement value of some 150 million euros because, for example, the cost of return transport of vehicles that are more than two years old is now more costly than the equipment's value.[6] This equipment will either be handed over to the Afghanis, sold or scrapped. According to the Federal

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5 | Cf. Federal Government of Germany, "Erster Seetransport eingelaufen", 10 Aug 2013, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2013/08/2013-08-08-rueckverlegung.html (accessed 23 Nov 2013).
6 | Cf. "Abzug aus Afghanistan: Bundeswehr lässt Kriegsgerät im Wert von 150 Millionen Euro zurück", *Spiegel Online,* 4 Aug 2013, http://spiegel.de/politik/ausland/a-914747.html (accessed 1 Oct 2013).

Ministry of Defence, this will be the case for approximately 42 per cent of all equipment in use.[7] This figure does not include weapons, as these should in no way be permitted to subsequently fall into the hands of the Taliban.

Fig. 1
**Logistics for military equipment and weapons:
Withdrawal routes from Afghanistan**

Source: Own depiction.

The withdrawal provides a significant logistical challenge for the largest contributors of troops, the U.S., the UK and Germany. Due to Afghanistan's geographical position, there are only limited routes of withdrawal through which to effect this transfer. The country has no direct access to the sea. In addition, Afghanistan is bordered by mountain ranges to the north and in the east. The west and south-east are bordered by Afghanistan's politically unstable neighbours, Pakistan and Iran, which have so far not been considered cooperative by the West. In addition, the infra-structural situation in Afghanistan itself is quite substand-ard due to poorly developed road networks.

Due to periodic riots and attacks, a direct route to the seaport of Karachi (Pakistan) through Afghani Kandahar or Pakistani Peshawar is considered too unsafe and unstable

7 | Cf. ibid.

for the transport of such a large amount of military equipment. Additionally, agreements made with the government in Islamabad are often not honoured by these regions. Pakistan closes the Afghan border time and again. Following the NATO air strike in 2011, during which Pakistani security forces were killed, the borders remained closed for nearly eight months.

One alternative for transporting the equipment is to do so by air. The Bundeswehr already transports military equipment back to Germany via Trabzon airport on the Black Sea in northern Turkey. Military aircraft first landed there in the spring of 2013 and equipment was then further transported to Germany by ship.[8] A total of 85 per cent of German equipment will be returned along this route.[9] Sensitive military equipment,

85 per cent of German equipment will be returned along the Turkey route. Sensitive military equipment, such as encryption technology, is always flown directly to Germany.

such as encryption technology, is always flown directly to Germany.[10] However, this route is very expensive. Surface transport combined with sea transport via the countries situated to the north of Afghanistan, the NDN, offers a more economical alternative. One route passes through Tajikistan to the Manas (Bishkek) military airbase in Kyrgyzstan, which may be used by the U.S. Army until 2014, and then is either flown or transported to ports in the Baltic Sea through Kazakhstan. For the Bundeswehr, which primarily operates in northern Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is emerging as an important route for withdrawal. The only railway line linking Afghanistan with Central Asia (the NDN) follows a route from Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan to Termez in southern Uzbekistan. As part of the Anti-Terrorism Alliance, Uzbekistan granted the Bundeswehr usage rights for the airport in Termez in 2001. There are two main routes available from Termez. One leads via Kazakhstan and Russia to the seaport of Riga. The other goes via

8 | Cf. Bundeswehr, "Chronologie des Einsatzes in Afghanistan ISAF", 21 Sep 2013, http://einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/!ut/p/c4/LcgxDoAgDEbhs3gBurt5C3Uxv1qhgRQjVRJOr4N50_dopi_FIx4mWZFopGmTfq1urTsvLFpg7SOi3ZzSv9gaOxw-QKUY1G3hypoXKTjojEP3AjH-VW0! (accessed 1 Oct 2013).

9 | Cf. interview with the head of the logistical transition point in Trabzon for the German Bundeswehr, Colonel Michael Sinn: Jan Henne and Michael Sinn, "Zwischenstopp in Trabzon", *GEO*, Aug 2013, 78.

10 | Cf. ibid.

Kazakhstan to the Caspian Sea or through Azerbaijan to the seaport of Poti in Georgia. However, the Bundeswehr only wants to transport approximately five per cent of its equipment using these routes.[11]

The U.S. is the largest contributor of troops and their forces and equipment are positioned in southern and eastern Afghanistan. For them, considering using NDN routes poses the difficulty of materials having to traverse a tunnel along the Salang Pass en route to the Hindu Kush in northern Afghanistan. This bottleneck leaves them potentially vulnerable to Taliban attacks, which the U.S. has thus far avoided by withdrawing the bulk of their equipment through the north.[12]

THE ISAF WITHDRAWAL AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CENTRAL ASIA

The opportunities unfolding for Central Asian (and Caucasian) countries through the provision of withdrawal routes and their resulting strategic importance appear to be relatively insignificant due to the low frequency of use. Nevertheless, these countries may gain financial, economic and political benefits. First of all, they are paid for the transit routes. Secondly, Central Asian countries have a means of applying pressure to gain greater influence on the international stage. The ISAF countries rely on the Central Asian countries and their willingness to cooperate.

Central Asian countries have a means of applying pressure to gain greater influence on the international stage. The ISAF countries rely on the Central Asian countries and their willingness to cooperate.

Uzbekistan, which was sanctioned by the U.S. and the European Union after the bloody suppression of an uprising in Andijan in 2005, has already been able to acquit themselves of these sanctions.[13] The U.S. is now permitted to sell military equipment to Uzbekistan, the justification being that this will provide the country with the opportunity to better protect itself against terrorism. The British are also making an effort with the Central Asian countries. In September 2013, the UK negotiated a

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11 | Cf. ibid.
12 | Cf. Jan Henne, "Operation Abzug", *GEO*, Aug 2013, 66-78, here: 78.
13 | Cf. an analysis for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute: Erkin Akhmadov, "U.S. lifts military embargo on Uzbekistan", 10 May 2011, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5641 (accessed 14 Oct 2013).

bilateral agreement with Dushanbe to strengthen economic relations and expand tourism.[14] The plans also include deliberations on a transit agreement that would allow the British military to withdraw troops from Afghanistan via Tajikistan.

Although the Central Asian states will reap short-term financial benefits from the withdrawal of ISAF troops, this remains economically irrelevant in the medium-term. Of crucial political importance will be whether these countries will decide to work together more closely as a result of a possible new security situation. The Russian-dominated transnational organisation, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), dominated by Russia and China, could play a significant role in this, assuming their member states undertake a similar security assessment. They have at least begun to discuss the issues of security and stability in Central Asia following the withdrawal of ISAF troops. This was demonstrated in a summit meeting of heads of state in Bishkek in October 2013.[15] For NATO, increased cooperation with the CSTO should not be ruled out in the future. Though Uzbekistan has turned its back on the 2012 military alliance, Tashkent participating in a new security policy assessment at a later date should not be ruled out. Because the U.S., Russia, the EU and not least the Central Asian states themselves are all striving towards the same objective: regional security and stability following the withdrawal of international troops.

THREATS TO CENTRAL ASIA: THE SPREAD OF RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM AND JIHAD

Just as the withdrawal of troops is providing Central Asia with opportunities, there are also risks. There is a great danger of radical Islamist groups taking advantage of the

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14 | Cf. National Information Agency of Tajikistan, "Meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the UK Ambassador", 1 Jul 2013, http://khovar.tj/eng/foreign-policy/4142-meeting-of-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-with-the-uk-ambassador.html (accessed 10 Oct 2013).

15 | Cf. AKIPress, "Bishkek to host conference on situation development in Central Asia after ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014", 3 Oct 2013, http://akipress.com/_en_news.php?id=137722 (accessed 8 Oct 2013).

power vacuum in Afghanistan and Islamic terrorism spreading to Central Asian countries. These countries fear that Afghanistan could once again become a shelter for radical Islamic terrorism after 2014, which could destabilise their own authoritarian-secular systems. Islamist groups in Central Asia have already attempted to overthrow the new regimes once before, following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), they fought hand in hand with the Mujahideen – from which the Taliban later emerged – against the "godless Soviets". Tajik and Uzbek jihadists always found refuge in northern Afghanistan.[16]

The highly populated Fergana Valley, geographically framed by Kyrgyzstan to the south, Uzbekistan to the east and Tajikistan to the north, is a focal point for Central Asian security policy. This region, densely populated by different ethnicities, has been shaped by past resource conflicts and violence among ethnic groups. Islamist underground organisations, already present during the Soviet era, formed the roots of a terrorist organisation that would later become the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU was founded in the early 1990s by Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Khojayev (Namangani). The Uzbekistani government's secular stance has meant it has become a declared enemy of the IMU. Yuldashev, the former Mullah of Namangan, was a gifted organiser and charismatic personality who was committed to the Sharia system. Namangani had gained combat experience in the Soviet war in Afghanistan.[17]

The Uzbekistani government's secular stance has meant it has become a declared enemy of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, founded in the early 1990s.

In 1991, they both challenged the Uzbek government. An angry crowd stormed offices and public buildings in Namangan. Uzbek President Islam Karimov was able to put an end to the uprising, first through negotiation and then

16 | Cf. Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad. The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, Yale, 2002, 248.
17 | A high-ranking PIW official is reported as saying, "[h]e is essentially a guerrilla leader, not an Islamic scholar, and he is easily influenced by those around him, such as today he is influenced by the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. […] He is a good person but not a deep person or intellectual in any way, and he has been shaped by his own military and political experiences rather than Islamic ideology, but he hates the Uzbek government […]". Rashid, *Jihad*, 143.

by taking drastic action. Yuldashev and Namangani fled to Tajikistan, then to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistani intelligence agency ISI is said to have come to Yuldashev's aid financially and to have provided him with refuge: "From 1995 to 1998 Yuldashev was based in Peshawar, the centre not only of Pakistani and Afghan Islamic activism but also of pan-Islamic jihadi groups. Here he met with the 'Arab-Afghans' […], who were later to introduce him to [Osama] bin Laden and other Afghan groups."[18]

The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) later split from the IMU. Both groups operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some of their militant members sympathise with waging the "holy war" in other countries. The research literature indicates that the IMU is supported by Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other organisations (Harakatul-Ansar and Al-Jihad). Perhaps it was even an initiative of Osama bin Laden's to launch an Uzbek jihadist group to combat the Karimov regime.[19]

After the German police had arrested three members of the Islamic Jihad Union in Sauerland in 2007, security experts stated that terrorist activity originating in Central Asia also constituted a direct threat to Germany. In contrast, Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev, the former leaders of the IMU, today pose no further threat. Namangani was killed during a U.S. campaign in northern Afghanistan in 2001. According to the Pakistani intelligence agency, Yuldashev died in August 2009 in an American drone attack in South Waziristan, a mountain region in north-western Pakistan on the Pakistani-Afghan border. Before his death, Osama bin Laden's confidant had threatened attacks on the Presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on a DVD: "Karimov, Bakiyev and Rahmonov had better remember that they will be punished for persecuting Muslims – in this life as well as before the judgement of heaven."[20]

On several occasions different places in Uzbekistan have been attacked by Islamist terrorists. In February 1999, six bombs exploded in Tashkent. Sixteen people were killed and more than 100 were injured in the attacks. The Islamic

18 | Ibid.
19 | Cf. ibid., 148.
20 | Peter Böhm, "Comeback der Islamisten", *Südwind*, Dec 2006, http://suedwind-magazin.at/start.asp?ID=236723 (accessed 27 Jun 2011).

Movement of Uzbekistan is said to have been responsible for the attacks. The IMU campaigned for the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan and the release of imprisoned Muslims: "On 13 Dzuma-d-ul-Avval 1420 (25 August 1999) the Emir of the 'Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan' and the chief commander of the Mujahideen, Muhhamad Tahrir, declared a 'jihad' on the Tashkent regime," according to a declaration.[21] In March and April 2004, new attacks were launched in Tashkent and Bukhara. Women with explosive belts and armed men attacked several police stations. This resulted in the deaths of 33 terrorists, ten policemen and four bystanders. In July 2004, two explosive devices were set off in front of the entrances to the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Tashkent, killing two Uzbek security guards. All these attacks were claimed by the Islamic Jihad Union.

During the Tajikistan civil war between 1991 and 1997 a post-Soviet secular camp faced off with an Islamic camp. With external support the secular forces were able to gain the upper hand. In Tajikistan a civil war raged from 1991 to 1997, claiming the lives of approximately 50,000 people according to United Nations estimates. Here, too, a post-Soviet secular camp faced off with an Islamic camp. With external support, the majority of which came from Russia and Uzbekistan, the secular forces, with President Emomali Rahmon as their leader, were able to gain the upper hand.

Social discontent, poor living conditions and indignation with the authoritarian regime have continued to play into the hands of militant Islamists in the Fergana Valley border triangle. As a result of the civil war in Tajikistan and other wars that ravaged the neighbouring Central Asia Caucasus region in the 1990s, militant Islamists declared a jihad against post-Soviet governments in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The line separating the jihadists from the Afghan Mujahideen was blurred.

21 | Quoted in: Uwe Halbach, *Sicherheit in Zentralasien, Teil II: Kleinkriege im Ferganatal und das Problem der "neuen Sicherheitsrisiken"* (Report by BIOst, No. 25), Cologne, 2000, 17, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-41650 (accessed 27 Nov 2013).

DRUG TRAFFICKING AS PART OF THE NETWORK
OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

In addition, militant Islamists were developing a symbiotic relationship with organised crime (drug and arms trafficking). The link between Islamism and drug-related crime strengthened with the instability in Afghanistan and the civil war in Tajikistan. Important routes for Afghan drug transport were the result of this.[22] Several drug routes from Afghanistan pass through Central Asia. Opium is transported via Turkmenistan to Russia and Turkey. The drugs also enter Russia and Europe via Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. One of the routes passes through the Fergana Valley.[23] In 2006, more than 20 per cent of processed heroin left Afghanistan using these northern routes. The high mountain region of Badakhshan (Tajikistan), as well as the Osh region (Kyrgyzstan), are of particular significance for Central Asian drug smuggling.[24]

In the 1990s, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was considered a terrorist organisation that was highly involved in the drug trade. Their activities were largely financed by the heroin trade.[25] "Islamic movements such as these," writes Uwe Halbach (SWP), "intend […] to destabilise Central Asia through terrorism, thereby securing regional drug routes without state intervention."[26] Against this backdrop, several of the IMU's terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan can be considered measures to ensure a courier system for Afghan opiates through Central Asia to Russia and the West. The U.S.

Several of the IMU's terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan can be considered measures to ensure a courier system for Afghan opiates through Central Asia to Russia and the West.

22 | Cf. Rainer Freitag-Wirminghaus, "Russland, islamische Republiken des Kaukasus und Zentralasiens", in: Werner Ende and Udo Steinbach (eds.), *Der Islam in der Gegenwart*, Munich, 2005, 277-305, here: 296.

23 | Cf. International Crisis Group (ICG), "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hisbut-Tahrir", *ICG Asia Report* 58, 2003, 16, http://crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/058-radical-islam-in-central-asia-responding-to-hizb-ut-tahrir.aspx (accessed 27 Nov 2013).

24 | Cf. ICG, "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict", ICG Asia Report 25, 26 Nov 2001, http://crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/025-central-asia-drugs-and-conflict.aspx (accessed 27 Nov 2013); Bernd Kuzmits, "Grenzüberschreitende Kooperation. Afghanistan und seine nördlichen Nachbarn", *Osteuropa*, Aug-Sep 2007, 417-432.

25 | Cf. Freitag-Wirminghaus, n. 22, 296.

26 | Halbach, n. 21, 17.

State Department considers the IJU and the IMU terrorist organisations.[27] In 2005, the Al-Qaeda/Taliban United Nations Sanctions Committee placed the organisations on the list of terrorist organisations based on Security Council Resolution 1267.[28]

INTERACTION BETWEEN LOCAL AND EXTERNAL ISLAMIST ORGANISATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA

After the fall of the Soviet Union, active states and organisations engaged in missions in the Islamic world on behalf of Central Asia's "forgotten Muslims". Among them were Pakistani organisations.

While the first stirrings of jihad by militant Islamists in Central Asia were already being felt during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, after the fall of the Soviet Union, active states and organisations engaged in missions in the Islamic world on behalf of Central Asia's "forgotten Muslims". Among them were Saudi Arabia, Turkey's Nurcular Brotherhood, and Pakistani organisations.[29] They provided financial and "ideational" assistance. Persian-speaking Tajikistan could count on Iranian support. Although the populations of the former Soviet Central Asian republics predominantly stood in opposition to militant Islamism,[30] Islamist groups, such as the IMU, were able to recruit enough followers to successfully carry out controlled acts of terrorism in Central Asia from Afghanistan. The militant Islamists owed their power of penetration not least to the support of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

27 | "[T]he Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) also known as Jamaat al-Jihad, also known as the Libyan Society, also known as the Kazakh Jamaat, also known as the Jamaat Mujahidin, also known as the Jamiyat, also known as Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami, also known as Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov, also known as Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan, also known as al-Djihad al-Islami." See: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), "Alphabetical Listing of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons ('SDN List')", http://treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/sdnlist.txt (accessed 27 Nov 2013).

28 | Cf. Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Petra Pau und der Fraktion DIE LINKE" (Drucksache 16/7916), Berlin, 2008, 3.

29 | Cf. Brian Glyn Williams, "Jihad and Ethnicity in Post-Communist Eurasia. On the Trail of Transnational Islamic Holy Warriors in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Chechnya and Kosovo", in: *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 2, No. 3-4, Mar-Jun 2003, 3-24, here: 6.

30 | Halbach n. 21, 27.

The Central Asian region, including the Caucasus and China's Xinjiang province populated by Muslim Uyghurs, was attributed with great significance in Al-Qaeda's strategic planning. Experts underscore Central Asian terrorists' loyalty to Al-Qaeda, which has earned them a large number of Chechen, Tajik, Uzbek and Uyghur recruits for their campaign against the Northern Alliance and U.S. troops in Afghanistan.[31] In a letter to Taliban leader Mullah Omar in 2002, Osama bin Laden is even said to have pointed out Central Asia's prominent position in the anti-U.S. jihad.[32] During the 1990s, acts of terrorism in Central Asia and the North Caucasus were always brought about in cooperation with external actors. According to accusations, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Arab countries contributed to the destabilisation of the region.

According to the former head of the Kyrgyz security apparatus, Kalik Imankulov, a terrorist network was formed around 2002, operating as the Islamic Movement of Central Asia (IMCA).[33] This network included the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan, which brought together Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Tajik, Afghan, Chechen, Uzbek and Uyghur militants. The common goal was to establish an Islamic legal system in the area stretching from the Caucasus to Xinjiang. The creation of a "Central Asian caliphate", which was to include

31 | Cf. Michael Scheuer, "Central Asia in Al-Qaeda's Vision of the Anti-American Jihad, 1979-2006", in: *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006, 5-10, here: 7.

32 | "During the previous period, with the grace of Allah, we were successful in cooperation with our brothers in Tajikistan in various fields including training. We were able to train a good number of them, arm them and deliver them to Tajikistan. Moreover, Allah facilitated to us delivering weapons to them; we pray Allah grants us all victory. We need to cooperate all together to continue this matter, especially Jihad continuation in the Islamic Republics [of Central Asia which] will keep the enemies busy and divert them from the Afghani issue and ease the pressure. The enemies of Islam['] problem will become how to stop the spreading of Islam into the Islamic Republics and not the Afghani issue. Consequently, the efforts of the Russians and their American allies will be scattered. It is a fact that the Islamic Republics region is rich with significant scientific experience in conventional and non-conventional military industries, which will have a great role in future Jihad against the enemies of Islam." Quote as in: ibid., 8.

33 | Cf. Sergei Blagov, "Moscow on alert for Muslim militancy", 19 Sep 2002, http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/DI19Ag01.html (accessed 27 Nov 2013).

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, is the first step on the path toward the unification of Muslims in Central Asia and an Ummah (a community of Muslims under one "Islamic nation"). The expansion of theocracy to the adjacent territories of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and to the northwest of China is the second step in the IMCA's plan. There is no shortage of supra-regional structures for Islamist organisations in Central Asia. The largest and most well-known movement was the Islamic Rebirth Party (IRP), founded in 1990 in Russian Astrakhan. They achieved particular significance in Tajikistan.

After the civil war ended, the Tajik Islamists chose to cooperate with the secularists and initially decided not to challenge the non-Islamic state. In doing so, they distanced themselves from other Islamist forces.

As demonstrated by the progression of the civil war, which ended in 1997, there was broad Islamist support for their objectives in the region. What is peculiar about the IRP is that the organisation is the only legal party in Central Asia with a "religious mandate".[34] After the civil war ended, the Tajik Islamists chose to cooperate with the secularists and initially decided not to challenge the non-Islamic state. In doing so, they distanced themselves from other Islamist forces. This, in turn, meant that the IRP was considered as having been bought by the Tajik government. Thus two Central Asian Islamist organisations had changed their profile. The IMU increasingly became part of an international militant Islamist movement with ties to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; however, following 11 September 2001, they lost influence. The IRP shifted from an armed opposition group to a legal party involved in establishing the constitution.[35]

These developments benefitted the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir, HuT) in particular. Founded in East Jerusalem in 1953, the Islamist organisation initially operated as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. It later expanded its reach to become a transnationally active organisation, albeit a primarily Palestinian dominated one.[36] They are banned from operating in several countries, including Germany. By the 1980s, Hizb ut-Tahrir had already succeeded in smuggling propagandist literature to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. The organisation's first

34 | Cf. Freitag-Wirminghaus, n. 22, 294-295.
35 | Cf. ibid., 298-300.
36 | Cf. Guido Steinberg, *Der nahe und ferne Feind. Die Netzwerke des islamistischen Islamismus*, Munich, 2005, 39 et sqq.

cells were particularly active in the Fergana Valley.[37] From there, the Hizb ut-Tahrir expanded their network to include other regions in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. As the population of Central Asia had little knowledge of Arabic language and ideals, the Hizb ut-Tahrir rapidly adapted itself to meet the regional conditions. The first translations of programmatic writings and propagandist leaflets by the organisation began to emerge. Today, Hizb ut-Tahrir is the fastest growing Islamist movement in Central Asia – most likely because they are essentially able to operate with virtually no competition.

Worldwide commitment for the Ummah: Supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir demonstrate in Copenhagen in 2006. | Source: EPO ⓒⓕⓞ.

The establishment of the "Central Asian Caliphate" is one of Hizb ut-Tahrir's professed goals. Other objectives include the liberation of the Muslim world from Western influences and the introduction of Sharia law.[38] Hizb ut-Tahrir tends to present itself as non-violent, yet present aggressive anti-Semitism and anti-Western rhetoric as an integral part of their ideology. Moreover, the organisation legitimises jihad against Israel and the U.S., making it difficult to speak of a sincere renunciation of violence.[39] Experts believe the renunciation of violence is strategic in nature

37 | Cf. Zeyno Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir. Islam's Political Insurgency*, Washington D.C., 2004.
38 | Cf. n. 23, 4.
39 | Cf. ibid., 5.

and may be set aside given certain favourable conditions.[40] Hizb ut-Tahrir does not accept any political compromises or models except those of an Islamic state based on Sharia law. Every article of the Constitution, every dispensation of justice should be derived from Sharia law.[41] Hizb ut-Tahrir's treatises propose a three-stage model for bringing all Muslims together in a neo-Caliphate based on an interpretation of the Prophet Mohammed's mission to establish the first Islamic state. The first stage involves the recruitment of Muslims who will spread the party's propaganda throughout the world. The second step calls for interaction with the Ummah to assist them in working for Islam and toward the integration of Islam into everyday life, the state and society. The third and final stage comprises the process of taking power and the holistic and total implementation of the Islamic order. Beginning in Central Asia, Muslims everywhere should rise up and unite to form a caliphate.[42]

Hardly any reliable information is available regarding the number of Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Central Asia. Its decentralised cells operate in secret, taking incredibly strict security precautions. Only the heads of the cells know who the decision makers are in the higher-ranking structures. Hizb ut-Tahrir is considered tightly organised and pyramidal. Its organisational structure "ranges from local base units at the organisation's regional level to supra-regional leadership. […] The regional representative is appointed by the Central Political Council at the international level."[43] However, experts believe that

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40 | An HuT member strikes at the heart of the matter by stating the following: "Islam obliges Muslims to possess power so they can intimidate – I would not say terrorise – the enemies of Islam. In the beginning the Caliphate would strengthen itself internally and it would not initiate jihad. But after that, we would carry Islam as an intellectual call to all the world. And we will make people bordering the Caliphate believe in Islam. Only if they refuse, then we'll ask them to be ruled by Islam. And after all discussions and negotiations they still refuse, then the last resort will be a jihad to spread the spirit of Islam and the rule of Islam. This is done in the interest of all people to get them out of darkness and into the light." Quoted in: Zeyno Baran, Frederick S. Starr and Svante E. Cornell, *Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU*, Uppsala, 2006, 17.
41 | N. 23, 4.
42 | Cf. Freitag-Wirminghaus, n. 22, 299.
43 | Ibid., 298.

between 15,000 and 20,000 followers live in Central Asia.[44] Between 3,000 and 5,000 followers live in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.[45]

Akram Yuldashev, an Islamist activist and ideologue from the Hizb ut-Tahrir network,[46] founded a movement with a local agenda, now known as Akromiya, in Andijan (Uzbekistan). Akromiyists act on the assumption that a regional agenda can only be carried out on a local level. Yuldashev worked out a five-stage programme designed to enable Akromiya members to Islamise society and, in doing so, gain power. The first stage includes the Islamic education of members of its secret cells and ends with a vow of fidelity to the Koran. The second phase aims to establish a financial means of existence. The Akromiyists will start small businesses in which "brothers" may work or they will be employed with the support of like-minded people in public organisations. Members must give one-fifth of their profits to Akromiya. While the third stage focuses on spiritual indoctrination, the fourth and penultimate step to a true Islamic order aims to legitimise the coalition either by recruiting officials to their cause or by exploiting them. Once the movement and its supporters have been legitimised, the fifth step is to open up a legal means of acquiring power.[47] The coalition has succeeded in gaining influence in Adijan through this socio-economic approach by creating jobs to ease the strain of economic depression – "one [of the] most successful examples of the bottom-up approach of pro-Islamic social engineering."[48]

There was an uprising in Andijan in 2005, which was violently suppressed by the Uzbek authorities. According to reports by the Uzbek authorities, a group of armed members of the Islamist organisation Akromiya attacked a prison to free their associates. They were on trial for terrorist activities. The riots spread. There were rallies of solidarity on the city streets and serious clashes between

44 | N. 23, 17
45 | Baran, Starr and Cornell, n. 40, 24.
46 | Cf. Bakhtijar Babadžanov, "Ферганская долина: источник или жертва исламского фундаментализма?" (Fergana Valley: Root or victim of Islamic fundamentalism?), May 1999, http://ca-c.org/journal/cac-05-1999/st_21_babajanov.shtml (accessed 27 Nov 2013).
47 | Cf. ibid.
48 | Baran, Starr and Cornell, n. 40, 25.

armed supporters of the Akromiyists who had been arrested and the Uzbek security forces. Unarmed civilians who had joined in the demonstrations came into the line of fire. According to official information from Tashkent, the riots claimed 187 lives. Unofficial estimates are much higher.[49]

The jihad has also reached Kazakhstan, which is rich in resources and relatively stable when compared to the rest of the region. In 2011, terrorist attacks and threats by the Soldiers of the Caliphate (Jund al-Khilāfah, JaK), who had settled in Pakistan, against the regime increased. After an interview with the leader of the Zahir Baybars Battalion, Ravil Kusainov, was published on related internet forums on 9 November 2012, experts gained a bit more knowledge of this new player in the transnational jihad. According to the interview, the JaK Brigade is comprised of several battalions that are primarily active in Afghanistan, but also "in other parts of the world".[50] This was confirmed in September and October of 2012 when video footage was posted on jihadist forums of attacks on the U.S. base in the Afghan province of Khost that had taken place in June and July. Because of this, experts have speculated that the Brigade is working in cooperation with the Haqqani network, which is affiliated with Al-Qaeda. This group is interested in the developments in Kazakhstan and dedicates a significant portion of its resources to this country. According to Kusainov, his battalion is made up of 90 per cent Kazakhs but that the cell is an international one. "We believe," said one of the Emirs, "that the Central Asian region – in addition to the Islamic Maghreb and Yemen – is a candidate to become the core of the return of the Caliphate in the future."[51]

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49 | Cf. Thomas Kunze and Thomas Vogel, *Von der Sowjetunion in die Unabhängigkeit*, Berlin, 2011, 245-246.
50 | Cf. Maseh Zarif, "Jund al Khilafah Targets Kazakhstan", AEI Critical Threats Project, 15 Nov 2011, http://criticalthreats.org/other/zarif-jund-al-khilafah-targets-kazakhstan-november-15-2011 (accessed 12 Nov 2013).
51 | Jacob Zenn, "Kazakhstan Struggles to Contain Salafist-Inspired Terrorism", *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 10, No. 17, 14 Sep 2012, 7, http://eurodialogue.org/Kazakhstan-Struggles-to-Contain-Salafist-Inspired-Terrorism (accessed 27 Nov 2013).

THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM WITHIN THE FRAME-WORK OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND NETWORKS

With the Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC), the "Office for Coordinating the Campaign against Organised Crime and Other Violent Crimes in the Territories of the Commonwealth of Independent States", the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Russia, the post-Soviet Central Asian states and China have a range of collective institutions and means of operational and – conditionally – structural suppression of terrorism in post-Soviet territory. Institutions such as the CSTO and SCO have been committed to the fight against international terrorism and transnational organised crime since the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Suppression of terrorism in post-Soviet territory: Meeting of the SCO in Bishkek in 2013. | Source: Kremlin, Press and Information Office of the President ⓒⓘ.

In multilateral forums, Member States seek to promote the development of regional security plans with particular attention paid to transnational threats; they also hold joint counter-terror exercises and coordinate cooperation with other international organisations. Several terrorist attacks in Russia, the 1999/2000 armed incursions by the IMU in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the presence of Islamist training camps in Afghanistan and China's threat perception

with regard to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have all acted as a catalyst for regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

Against the backdrop of the real and perceived dangers of transnational terrorism and Islamism, CIS members were able to negotiate a cooperative agreement in the fight against terrorism in 1999, which buttressed the autocratic regimes in their own member states. One year later they founded the SCO's Counter Terrorism Centre (located in Tashkent), which took over laying the conceptual groundwork for joint counter-terrorism actions and exercises, coordinating cooperation in relevant policy areas, analysing and exchanging information and maintaining a database. As the SCO's communications and coordination centre for the fight against terrorism, the RATS contributed to the intensification of intelligence cooperation between the member states. The RATS database now includes information on 42 organisations and 1,100 individuals with (suspected) extremist backgrounds. However, no precise information is available on the analysis of this data. However, because supra-national networks are always dependent upon the cooperation of their members, there is a question of whether and to what extent the national security authorities are willing to share relevant information on the factors enabling terrorism in the region. Suspicion among the neighbouring Central Asian states themselves remains high, as does suspicion toward Russia and China. The ethnic and territorial complexity and energy and water issues in Central Asia have prevented the development of a regional security community, which is a prerequisite for collective efforts to fight terrorism. In the past, Central Asian states have not lived up to their potential for cooperation. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on joint action in the fight against terrorism, political and religious extremism and transnational organised crime in 2000. Following the IMU previously mentioned attacks, these countries even created a coordination centre for joint operations. However, the measures agreed on have largely only manifested themselves as political declarations. Consequently, efficient cooperation between regional security institutions is not to be expected as long as the rivalries

The ethnic and territorial complexity and energy and water issues in Central Asia have prevented the development of a regional security community, which is a prerequisite for collective efforts to fight terrorism.

in the region, which mainly have to do with the politics of energy and water supply, go unresolved.

This is also the case for the CSTO. The organisation is the result of the CIS' May 2002 Collective Security Treaty (CST). This was not a very promising development as the parties to the CST had not contributed to the defence against the IMU attacks in 1999 and 2000. Although they subsequently decided in October 2000 to assemble a rapid deployment force for Central Asia, the armed assaults and terrorists attacks that took place in 2004 and 2005 faced no intervention by the CSTO. In 2009, the CSTO member states once again declared their intention to create a task force (Collective Rapid Reaction Force, CRRF). The following year, however, hundreds died during the armed clashes in Kyrgyzstan without any intervention by the organisation. The SCO too remained idle. Military experts already criticise the CSTO as a "paper tiger" without any future.[52] Russia and Kazakhstan bear the brunt of the "rapid reaction" in post-Soviet territories, contributing nearly half of the CSTO budget. While Russia has provided 8,000 to 10,000 men and Kazakhstan approximately 3,000 men for the force, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan only want to make 300 men available each. So far Uzbekistan has not offered any forces.[53] If these negative threat scenarios became the reality and Islamist terrorism spread to Central Asia, the collective security system would be confronted with a number of problems. The old front and geopolitical thinking, and a decades-long tradition of political paternalism and subsidisation by Russia are severely restrictive and are still evident in Central Asia today. Despite the CSTO's reputedly successful anti-terrorism exercises,[54] the decision-makers in Russia and Central Asia cannot seriously call themselves "rapid reaction" actors with a planned rapid response task

> **Although it was decided in October 2000 to assemble a rapid deployment force for Central Asia, the armed assaults and terrorists attacks that took place in 2004 and 2005 faced no intervention by the CSTO.**

52 | Aleksandr Chramtschichin, "'Бумажные тигры' НАТО и ОДКБ" ('Paper tiger' of the NATO and the CSTO), *Independent Gazeta*, 6 Mar 2009, http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2009-03-06/1_tigers.html (accessed 14 Nov 2013).

53 | Cf. Michail Logvinov, *Russlands Kampf gegen den Internationalen Terrorismus*, Stuttgart, 2012, 127.

54 | Cf. Wiktor Michajlow, "'Рубеж' против террора" ('Border' against terror), *Independent Gazeta*, 26 Oct 2013, http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2010-03-26/16_rubezh.html (27 Nov 2013).

force of approximately 13,000 men. In order to quickly and efficiently respond to attacks by militant Islamists, CSTO countries need elite troops that are well-rehearsed, well-trained and, most importantly, are armed with modern military equipment and can be mobilised on very short notice and deployed to the location of incident to provide national security forces with support. Thousands of para-troopers that are to be stationed on military bases in the region instead provide an impression that it is more a matter of regional supremacy than a fight against terrorism and organised crime. Moreover, with regard to Russia's offers to cooperate with the Chinese dominated SCO and its proclamation that it wants to strengthen the exchange of information on joint counter-terrorism and the fight against drug and arms trafficking, experts have noted that these steps would "predominantly be of symbolic importance for Moscow." Above all else, for the Kremlin it is a matter of "emphasising Russia's leadership in coordinating multilateral security policy actions and Russia's role in linking together individual organisations."[55]

The SCO, which emerged from the security regime of the "Shanghai Five" in June 2001, declared war on the "three evil forces": terrorism, separatism and extremism.[56] The

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55 | Andrea Schmitz, "Partner aus Kalkül. Russische Politik in Zentralasien", SWP-Studie, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, 5 Mar 2008, 16, http://swp-berlin.org/file admin/contents/products/studien/2008_S05_smz_ks.pdf (accessed 27 Nov 2013).

56 | The *Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism* defines terrorism, separatism and extremism as follows: "1) 'terrorism' means: a) any act recognized as an offence in one of the treaties listed in the Annex to this Convention […] and as defined in this Treaty; b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as well as to organize, plan, aid and abet such act, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, violate public security or to compel public authorities or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, and prosecuted in accordance with the national laws of the Parties; 2) 'separatism' means any act intended to violate territorial integrity of a State including by annexation of any part of its territory or to disintegrate a State, committed in a violent manner, as well as planning and preparing, and abetting such act, and subject to criminal prosecuting in accordance with the national laws of the Parties; 3) 'Extremism' is an act aimed at seizing or keeping power through the use of violence or changing ▸

organisation adopted "The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism" in 2001.[57] On 16 June 2009, the SCO countries signed a successive convention against terrorism in Yekaterinburg, which adapted international standards to the current challenges facing the SCO and upheld the plans for combatting terrorism that had already been aligned to national legal systems.[58] In 2004, both a Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) were established in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). The SCO also gained observer status at the United Nations. However, the SCO was unable to establish itself as a genuine multilateral security organisation after 11 September 2001. Its security plans are still in their infancy and lack clearly defined military structures. In addition, the Tajik and Kyrgyz militaries are ill-equipped and inadequately trained. Furthermore, it is unlikely that China's special forces will be deployed outside its borders. Beijing and Moscow often behave like rivals who have little interest in genuine multilateralism. The SCO is based on the structural principle of bilateral agreements under the guise of multilateralism.[59] The same holds true for the joint fight against terrorism. Along with the U.S., China has invested significant resources in bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, providing the Central Asian armies with equipment, training and surveillance technology to protect their borders. Because of the divergent interests of the actors involved, the organisation's claim to establish itself as the regional hegemonic power in Central Asia has so far gone unfulfilled.

The SCO was unable to establish itself as a genuine multilateral security organisation after 11 September 2001. Its security plans are still in their infancy and lack clearly defined military structures.

violently the constitutional regime of a State, as well as a violent encroachment upon public security, including organisation, for the above purposes, of illegal armed formations and participation in them, criminally prosecuted in conformity with the national laws of the Parties." Cf. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 20 Apr 2006, http://english. scosummit2006.org/en_bjzl/2006-04/20/content_87.htm (accessed 27 Nov 2013).

57 | See SCO, http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=68 (accessed 16 Jun 2001).

58 | „Президент РФ внес на ратификацию в Госдуму конвенцию ШОС против терроризма" (Russian President on the ratification of the SCO Convention against Terrorism in the State Duma), *Russian Gazeta*, 29 Jun 2010, http://rg.ru/2010/06/ 29/shos-anons.html (accessed 27 Nov 2013).

59 | Schmitz, n. 55, 23-24.

CONCLUSION

Because of its strategic location, Central Asian nations will somewhat benefit economically and politically as a result of the ISAF troop withdrawal through a number of economic and political opportunities for the countries of Central Asia, even if the relocation rate through the NDN is relatively low. This is because the participating ISAF countries will pay a considerable amount for the transit routes and are willing to accommodate the region economically and politically in order to gain their favour for cooperation. Furthermore, the withdrawal of troops will mean a deterioration of the security situation in the region through the possible expansion of resurgent terrorist groups. The trepidation felt by Central Asian states in the face of threats of Islamist terror is not unfounded. Repeated attacks of varying degrees of severity have occurred, demonstrating that terrorism and jihad are possible in Central Asia.

Yet the region remains relatively stable. On the one hand, this can be explained by the fact that Central Asian regimes will combat burgeoning terrorism in their authoritarian countries with full force. On the other hand, the fight against the ISAF troops and the Pakistani military has exhausted the capacities of the jihadists. Once such capacities have been restored, destabilising developments in the territory between the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush cannot be excluded. Islamist networks already exist in Central Asia. The Central Asian states are only moderately prepared for transnational developments. Closer cooperation in terms of regional security within the existing structures of the SCO, the CSTO and furthermore with NATO would serve the common security policy interests. Though a possible increase in Islamism in Central Asia is not the automatic result of the withdrawal of ISAF troops from Afghanistan, such a scenario cannot be ruled out.

END TO AN ERA

TRANSFER OF POWER IN GEORGIA

Canan Atilgan / David Aprasidze

In conjunction with the parliamentary elections in 2012, the presidential elections in Georgia in October 2013 marked a turning point in the political history of the young state. By holding free and fair elections on two occasions within one year, the country has passed the test of democracy twice over. And it was not just the observance of democratic principles that was impressive but above all the fact that there was an orderly and peaceful transfer of power for the first time since the country gained its independence 22 years ago. The events have also consolidated Georgia's unique position as a democratic country in a region where most political systems can hardly be considered solid democracies. However controversial the President of the Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili, may be, he deserves credit for the peaceful transfer of power and it will be his legacy.

However, the election results also illustrate the political crossroads at which the small Caucasus country finds itself. With the departure of President Saakashvili and the swearing in of Giorgi Margvelashvili on 17 November 2013, the era of the Rose Revolution has come to an end. The young, modern, westward-looking political elite, which had formed around Saakashvili, had to hand over power after ten years. The consequences that the departure of this political leadership will bring in the areas of domestic and foreign policy remain to be seen. At the same time there is a power shift taking place in the country's political order. The constitutional changes approved in 2010 have now fully come into force, transforming the political system from a super-presidential to a semi-parliamentarian one. The change of the head of state coincided with the resignation of Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, who occupied the

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post of head of government for just one year. This means that there will be no charismatic figure occupying either of the highest public offices of the country for the first time in Georgia's history. The question remains as to whether Ivanishvili will in fact turn his back on politics or take up the role of "grey eminence".

TWO ELECTIONS THAT ARE CHANGING GEORGIA

For the first time since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the governing party of President Saakashvili had a serious competitor for the majority in the Georgian Parliament in the October 2012 parliamentary elections. The challenger,

Pointed provocations as well as an election campaign conducted with tough and aggressive rhetoric did not suggest that the election "losers" would be ready to accept the outcome.

the opposition coalition named Georgian Dream (GD) formed around Georgian billionaire Ivanishvili, won the elections and thereby gained the majority in Parliament, much to the surprise of the government elite. Saakashvili's party, the United National Movement (UNM) was only able to attract 40 per cent of the votes and gain 65 seats, while the GD alliance won 54 per cent of the votes and 85 seats.[1] The extreme political polarisation ahead of the parliamentary elections, pointed provocations as well as an election campaign conducted with tough and aggressive rhetoric did not suggest that the election "losers" would be ready to accept the outcome and fulfil their political responsibilities in opposition. President Saakashvili allayed this concern, which was widespread among national and international observers, by conceding his party's election defeat. He thereby confirmed his commitment to democratic rules. Saakashvili, who was still in charge of nominating someone for Prime Minister in the course of the formation of the new government, proposed Ivanishvili for the post, thus clearing the way for the two major parties to "cohabit".

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1 | With respect to the parliamentary elections cf. Canan Atilgan and Christina Schmitz, "Kann Iwanischwili den 'Traum' erfüllen?", *KAS-Länderbericht*, 4 Oct 2012, http://kas.de/wf/doc/kas_32328-1522-1-30.pdf (accessed 29 Oct 2013).

Fig. 1

Official final results of the 2012 parliamentary elections (proportional representation, in per cent)

Source: Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC).

After the parliamentary elections, the outcome of the presidential elections was essentially predictable. The new governing coalition and above all Prime Minister Ivanish-vili portrayed themselves successfully as "victors over the authoritarian regime" and "the nation's saviours". Surveys indicated clearly that the UNM had fallen dramatically in popularity. By the summer of 2013, support for the UNM had dropped to just ten per cent.[2] This was no doubt partly due to the policy of the new government to uncover the "machinations" of the UNM government under the motto of "restoration of justice" and to initiate prosecutions. This resulted in a selective pursuit of justice, which manifested in politically motivated arrests of individuals from the UNM camp, which has drawn international criticism. The most prominent case is that of Ivane Merabishvili, former Prime Minister and Secretary General of the UNM. Merabishvili had been envisaged as the UNM's presidential candidate. But he was arrested in May 2013 and thereby removed from the political scene. He has been on remand ever since, accused of abuse of office. And his is only one case

2 | Luis Navarro, "Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a June 2013 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC", National Democratic Institute (NDI), http://civil.ge/files/files/2013/NDI-Georgia-June2013-survey-political.pdf (accessed 29 Oct 2013).

of many. There are several UNM functionaries in custody. The party puts the number of people being summoned at 2,500.[3] The UNM has been generally under enormous pressure since it lost power. 13 Members of Parliament have since left the party ranks, partly under pressure from the GD, partly voluntarily, leaving just 52 MPs representing the party in Parliament. Local authorities that are still controlled by the UNM have also been affected. In Tbilisi alone, the UNM lost twelve of its city councillors to the GD, which now has 25 seats in the 47-strong city council. There is therefore an early transfer of power taking place at local level ahead of the local elections, which are scheduled for 2014. Against this backdrop, it was a great challenge for the UNM to set itself up as an opposition party and make preparations for the presidential elections.

Ivane Merabishvili arrested: Since May 2013 the former Secretary General of the UNM has been on remand, accused of abuse of office. | Source: © Irakli Gedenidse, picture alliance, dpa.

In spite of the strained relations between the parties in government and in opposition, this cohabiting has not resulted in political paralysis. Georgian politicians have used the situation to practice the art of compromise. President Saakashvili and Prime Minister Ivanishvili had been forced into this power sharing, a situation that presents a challenge even in established democracies and represented a totally new experience for Georgian politicians.

3 | Cf. Canan Atilgan and Moritz Esken, "Ein politischer Neubeginn?", *KAS-Länderbericht*, 28 Oct 2013, http://kas.de/wf/doc/kas_35870-1522-1-30.pdf (accessed 27 Nov 2013).

Saakashvili's party naturally tried to disrupt the governing coalition's activities in Parliament. While the President himself approved several pieces of government legislation, he also repeatedly used his power of veto. He thus blocked the appointment of ambassadors, who had been nominated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the ambassador to Germany.[4] Since February 2013, the country's business in Berlin has been conducted by the Permanent Representative. Saakashvili has refused to sign several pieces of legislation.[5] However, so far the government majority in Parliament has been able to overcome the President's veto in every case.[6] Having said that, the GD majority had to rely on some opposition voices to approve constitutional amendments. In spite of heated discussions, the opponents succeeded in coming to an agreement even on as controversial a question as the premature curtailment of the President's powers.[7]

Fig. 2
Seat distribution in the Georgian Parliament (as at October 2013)

GT	85
UNM	52
Other	13

Source: Parliament of Georgia.

4 | "FM Says President Drags Out Appointing New Ambassadors", Civil Georgia, 16 Mar 2013, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25852 (accessed 5 Nov 2013).
5 | "Saakashvili Vetoes Bill Setting 3-Year Trial Period for Judges", Civil Georgia, 30 Oct 2013, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26639 (accessed 5 Nov 2013).
6 | According to the Georgian constitution, laws the President has vetoed can be resubmitted to Parliament and then approved.
7 | "Constitutional Amendment Passed Unanimously", Civil Georgia, 21 Mar 2013, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25873 (accessed 5 Nov 2013).

The presidential election has now brought an end to this difficult, yet instructive phase of transition. Giorgi Margvelashvili, an unknown protégé of Prime Minister Ivanishvili, was elected Georgia's fourth president with 62 per cent of the votes. The UNM candidate, David Bakradze, received 22 per cent of the votes. The third highest result was achieved by Nino Burjanadze from the Democratic Movement – United Georgia party. 20 further candidates attracted less than six per cent in total.[8]

Fig. 3

Official final results of the 2013 presidential elections (in per cent)

■ Giorgi Margvelashvili (GD)   ▨ David Bakradze (UNM)
■ Nino Burjanadze (DMUG)   ■ Other

Source: CEC.

The UNM realised that its candidate was unlikely to win and tried to present the image of a democratic and consolidated party. One of the main measures it took to this end was to choose the presidential candidate through preliminary elections in different areas of the country with a view to strengthening transparency and democracy within the party. David Bakradze was able to win against three other candidates from his own party. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had held the post of Chairman of Parliament until 2012, is known to the Georgian public as a level-headed and pragmatic politician. He conducted his election campaign under the slogan "Let's control the government together". Through the experiment of holding preliminary elections, the UNM distinguished itself very

8 | On the presidential election cf. Atilgan and Schmitz, n. 1.

publicly from the GD, whose candidate had been selected personally by the Prime Minister without any further consultation.

Coming third in the presidential elections may herald a political comeback for Nino Burjanadze. The Chair of the Democratic Movement party is a well-known political figure in Georgia. She had already served as acting head of state and as Chair of Parliament during the period from 2001 to 2008. Until a disagreement with Saakash-vili in the course of the 2008 parliamentary elections, she had been one of his closest allies. She subsequently formed a political movement of her own. But her attempts to unite the opposition against Saakashvili failed. In recent years, Nino Burjanadze has fallen out of favour with the public particularly due to her close links to Putin and Russia. However, support for her rallied last year, as many Georgians agreed with her fierce criticism of Saakashvili and his fellow campaigners. These are obviously former GD voters who advocated a harsher approach to dealing with the previous government or who did not rate the political competence of GD candidate Marg-velashvili very highly. Burjanadze is thus filling a political vacuum in the Georgian political landscape.

Until a disagreement with Saakashvili in the course of the 2008 parliamentary elections, Nino Burjanadze had been one of his closest allies. She subsequently formed a political movement of her own.

The presidential elections enabled the GD to consolidate its power, while the UNM has been able to establish itself largely successfully as the opposition. This transfer of power has brought the era of the Rose Revolution formally to an end.

TAKING STOCK OF THE LEGACY OF THE ROSE REVOLUTION

The 2003 Rose Revolution was an attempt to make a rad-ical break with the Soviet past. The Soviet nomenclature had to make way for a new political leadership of young elites, most of whose members had been educated in the West. Extensive modernisation of Georgia was the motto of the energetic government led by Saakashvili. Georgia did in fact implement comprehensive reforms within months. The radical reforms of the administration that Saakashvili pressed ahead with were praised as exemplary

by international observers. Today, Georgia is ranked 51st in the corruption index of Transparency International, outdoing many EU member states such as the Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania. Back in 2004, Georgia had been ranked 99th. The government abolished some rules and regulations that had become obsolete and were impeding investment, and it initiated new infrastructure projects. As a result, Georgia's economy achieved remarkable growth rates. As far as foreign policy was concerned, the priority was for Georgia to join the European Union and NATO.

Fig. 4

Growth in GDP 2004-2012 (in per cent)

Source: The World Bank.

There is no question that without the approach of radical modernisation, the outlook for Georgia's future development would now be rather bleak. However, the gap between democratisation and modernisation has become ever wider over recent years. The process of political transformation has come to be characterised by inconsistent democratisation efforts and a more authoritarian leadership style. Although the government included the establishment of a liberal democracy and membership in European and Euro-Atlantic structures among its political goals, there were increasing signs of restriction of political freedoms, manipulation during elections and persecution of the opposition. Georgia therefore had to be counted among the group of hybrid regimes. The government suffered a loss of image due to its conduct in the fight against crime. While the policy of cracking down hard had

an impact on the high crime figures, it entailed serious breaches of human rights. The number of prison population rose fourfold within a brief period of time.[9]

In the area of foreign affairs, Saakashvili's government failed to bring a positive dynamic to the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The President did succeed in bringing the autonomous Republic of Adjara on the Black Sea, which was governed by the authoritarian leader Aslan Abashidze, back under central control. But other, occasionally aggressive attempts to change the status quo in Abkhazia and South Ossetia merely resulted in escalating the conflicts that had lain dormant since the beginning of the 1990s and ultimately triggered the brief war between Georgia and Russia in 2008. The gulf between the centre and Abkhazia and South Ossetia has since widened even further. Russia was treated mainly as a taboo subject. And discussions about Georgia's stance in foreign affairs were not encouraged either. To strengthen his position, Saakashvili kept referring to the referendum of January 2008, in which 72.5 per cent of the population voiced their agreement with the country joining NATO.[10]

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Nevertheless, it can be said that the results of the ten years since the Rose Revolution have been relatively positive overall. When Saakashvili took power, Georgia was considered a "failed state". Today, the country is even seen as a model of modernisation in the region. The differences become more obvious in a regional comparison. After 20 years of independence, Georgia's neighbouring republics are still ruled by old networks based on family ties and patronage and a widespread Soviet-style political culture of individual indifference. Although Saakashvili's leadership style has rightly been criticised, he and his government have succeeded in many respects in making a break

9 | Mariam "Gabedava, Zero Tolerance and (near) Zero Acquittal", Transparency International Georgia, 30 Nov 2010, http://transparency.ge/en/blog/pzero-tolerance-and-near-zero-acquittalp (accessed 5 Nov 2013); "Criminal Justice Statistics", National Statistics Office of Georgia (GEOSTAT), http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=602&lang=eng (accessed 5 Nov 2013).
10 | "CEC Announces Plebiscite Results", Civil Georgia, 11 Jan 2008, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=16868 (accessed 5 Nov 2013).

with the country's Soviet past and laid the institutional groundwork for peaceful change and transfer of power. There is now a political consensus within Georgia that the country should aim for membership in NATO and in the EU and establish modern political institutions.

Former President with relatively positive record: When Saakashvili took power, Georgia was considered a "failed state". | Source: David Plas, European People's Party (EPP), flickr ©①.

THE END OF SUPERPRESIDENTIALISM

On 17 November, when the new President was officially sworn in, constitutional amendments came into force. These will bring about a transformation of the political system from a presidential democracy to one where Parliament and the Prime Minister exert greater influence. The Georgian Parliament and the government have been strengthened. The new President retains key powers in the areas of foreign affairs and security, and the position will continue to be filled through direct elections. Otherwise, the President will fulfil more symbolic and representative functions in future. The Prime Minister now has the most wide-ranging authority, which makes him the most powerful actor in the Georgian state system. He will no longer be appointed by the President, but elected by Parliament.

The constitutional amendments were drawn up by a state commission, which was convened under the Saakashvili government to review the country's constitution. That had been adopted in 1995 and amended several times since. Significant amendments were made in 2004, after the Rose

Revolution. The President was given extensive powers, which attracted criticism both at national and international level. The remit of the Constitutional Commission of 2009 was to restore the disturbed balance between executive and legislative branches. Critics frequently complained that the government was attempting to extend Saakashvili's rule by shifting the centre of power from the President to the Prime Minister, i.e. that it had a Putin model in mind. According to the constitution, Saakashvili was barred from standing again in presidential elections, but could have taken the post of Prime Minister.

In 2010, the Commission presented a plan that was approved by the Georgian Parliament. The new political system strengthens the position of Prime Minister, with the President still occupying an important political role, particularly due to the direct mandate. The one-year period of cohabitation has shown, however, that while the institutional framework is important, the way it plays out in a specific political context is crucial. The loss of the parliamentary majority curtailed Saakashvili's scope for political action although he was still the most powerful figure in Georgia's political system according to the constitution. While he succeeded in delaying a number of processes through his veto, there was not much he could do to influence the political agenda.

The majority situation in Parliament will therefore play a more significant role than in the past. 52 seats had given the UNM just enough influence to prevent new constitutional amendments. With the previously approved constitutional amendments coming into force, the proportion of votes required for constitutional amendments has been increased further so that future decisions will require the approval of 113 Members of Parliament. More far-reaching plans will therefore always require cross-party cooperation in future.

DEPARTURE OF CHARISMATIC POLITICIANS FROM THE SCENE

While the new political system strengthens the role of the Prime Minister compared to that of the President, it also makes him dependent on parliamentary majorities and

forces him into cooperation and possibly into coalitions. In conjunction with the election results, this diminishes the relevance of charismatic leaders, who used to be instrumental in determining Georgian politics after independence.

All three presidents – Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikheil Saakashvili – had had some experience at a national level as well as an international reputation and broad support before they took office. They all had clear ideas about the country's direction in terms of domestic and foreign policy, and they all left a legacy. The legacy of the first President Gamsakhurdia, who stood out mainly because of his nationalism, was a country torn by two separatist conflicts and a civil war. Shevardnadze's legacy probably included Georgia's corrupt structures. We must, however, give him credit for the adoption of the 1995 constitution and the strategic decision in favour of a pro-Western stance in foreign policy. Saakashvili will enter the annals of history as a radical moderniser and challenger of Russia.

The new Prime Minister Garibashvili is a close confidant of his extremely wealthy predecessor Ivanishvili. His political career also began just under a year ago – as an election campaigner for Ivanishvili.

By comparison with these three presidents, President Giorgi Margvelashvili and Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili have neither great political experience nor special political charisma. Margvelashvili studied philosophy and has worked for various international organisations operating in Tbilisi. He came to public prominence as rector of the "Georgian Institute of Public Affairs", a private institution of higher education, and as a political commentator. His political career started when Ivanishvili brought him into his cabinet as Minister for Education in 2012 after the parliamentary elections. The new Prime Minister Garibashvili is also a close confidant of his extremely wealthy predecessor Ivanishvili, and his political career also began just under a year ago – as an election campaigner for Ivanishvili. Since then, he has not only replaced his mentor as Prime Minister but also as Chairman of the GD. The 31-year-old Garibashvili previously worked as a manager for Ivanishvili's companies and for his foundation.[11]

11 | Official biography: "Irakli Garibashvili", Government of
     Georgia, http://government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG
     &sec_id=124&info_id=200 (accessed 6 Nov 2013).

Both the Prime Minister and the President are thus totally dependent on their patron Ivanishvili, who has seen his mission to elbow Saakashvili out of the political scene, which he had announced two years ago, come to fruition. During his term as Prime Minister, Ivanishvili's leadership style frequently drew criticism. He took all important decisions on political appointments by himself. It is quite obvious that his primary criteria were not political experience and competence but loyalty and personal trust. His family doctor became Minister for Health and he elevated his solicitor to the position of Chief Public Prosecutor; the latter in the meantime has resigned his position to coincide with Ivanishvili's resignation. Similar criteria were applied for the nomination of the presidential candidate Margvelashvili and the appointment of Prime Minister Garibashvili. Although the coalition presented the appointment decisions as the result of internal and democratic consultations, it was an open secret from the start that proposals put forward by Ivanishvili were not up for discussion. Minister of Defence Irakli Alasania, Chairman of the Free Democrat coalition partner, was ousted from his position of First Deputy Prime Minister because he had discussed the possibility of his candidacy for the presidential elections within the party.[12]

"The Nation's Saviours"? President Margvelashvili (right) and Prime Minister Ivanishvili at a press conference on 28 October. | Source: © Zurab Kurtsikidze, picture alliance, dpa.

12 | "PM Ivanishvili Demotes Alasania", Civil Georgia, 23 Jan 2013, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25670 (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

Ivanishvili has announced his intention to become active in civil society in future without giving greater details about this new role. It is not clear whether and how he will exercise some power in an informal manner. This will determine to a large extent whether the new President and the new Prime Minister will be able to establish themselves as independent actors or whether they will be demoted to "Georgian Medvedevs".

A NEW BEGINNING OR OLD AUTHORITIES?

Georgia's party political landscape is reorganising. The GD as coalition is composed of groups covering the entire ideo-logical spectrum from socialist to liberal to ultranationalist. The GD Members of Parliament include both functionaries of the new government and a relatively large number of former bureaucrats and businesspeople from the Shevard-nadze era, who saw the transfer of power as an opportunity to return to power themselves. Given the GD's composi-tion, it looks less like a coalition of new political strategists and visionaries than an alliance of committed Saakashvili opponents, who have little in common beyond this anti-pathy. The liberal party of Defence Minister Alasania or the Republican Party, who is said to attract many intellectuals, must get along with staunch conservatives. The one factor that unites this disparate group is no doubt Ivanishvili. Without him as the binding force, the coalition will find it difficult to maintain the alliance and retain its capability to govern. Much will depend on whether Ivanishvili will indeed turn his back on politics. Without collaborating with the GD, its coalition partners cannot take any effective political action.[13] The GD as the strongest part within the coalition may depend on its coalition partners formally to form the parliamentary majority, but if the coalition were to break up, a number of MPs from the other parties would join the GD.[14]

13 | The coalition comprises the following parties: Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia, Republican Party of Georgia, Free Democrats, National Forum, Industry Will Save Georgia and the Conservative Party of Georgia.

14 | Shortly after the parliamentary elections, the National Forum announced it would join with Ivanishvili's party. The party leadership subsequently abandoned this idea. Cf. "'National Forum' joins 'Georgian Dream'", Prime news, http://prime-news.ge/?p=87865&lang=en (accessed 6 Nov 2013).

The future of the UNM is uncertain, although this has been the first time in the history of the young republic that a governing party did not immediately sink into oblivion after being voted out. The party has survived the

first wave of attacks by the new rulers and stabilised its core vote. Members of the party estimate its popular support at between 20 and 25 per cent. The 22 per cent of votes attracted by the UNM presidential candidate David Bakradze confirm this assumption. Having said that, the UNM lost access to administrative resources after the presidential elections, which is of great significance in emerging economies such as Georgia. Provincial governors, who were appointed by Saakashvili, resigned after the presidential elections. In line with the constitutional amendment, their successors are now determined by the government. Against this backdrop, it is not yet clear whether the governing coalition will allow the UNM opposition room for action in the political arena or in fact intends to marginalise the political opposition. After all, Georgia has known nothing other than one party exercising its power at all levels since its independence. The decisive factor in this context will be the way that Saakashvili is dealt with, whom the UNM confirmed as Chairman at the latest party conference. There have been various indications, from Prime Minister Ivanishvili among others, that criminal proceedings will be initiated against Saakashvili. The outcome of those proceedings will determine not only the chances of the UNM's political survival but also its capability to regenerate and to communicate this fact to the country's citizens in a credible manner.

The elections have illustrated several structural problems in Georgian politics. The campaigns were dominated less by political ideas than the personalities of Ivanishvili and Saakashvili. The GD did not win the elections because it offered a convincing programme but mainly because large sections of the population saw Ivanishvili as the new saviour. The focus on personalities thus represents a major challenge for the consolidation of a democratic political culture. The departure of the charismatic leaders Saakashvili and Ivanishvili could create a power vacuum, which the poorly developed party landscape may not be able to fill. Political parties will either have to learn to place

their programmes and convictions centre stage, engage in cross-party cooperation and form coalitions, or this vacuum will be filled by a new charismatic leadership. The latter would entail the risk that ultraconservative forces in particular and their radical ideas would receive greater support. These forces are themselves subject to influence by Georgia's powerful Orthodox Church, which is increasingly fomenting conflict within Georgia's heterogeneous society with its intolerant views.

The Orthodox Church plays a special role in Georgian society. While the authority exercised by formal political institutions is waning, the Church is the country's most popular social institution.[15] It also enjoys a special position vis-à-vis the state as it relies on state funding. According to Georgian experts, the Church was instrumental in driving the change in political mood during the 2012 presidential elections.[16] The Church and its Patriarch Ilia II do not shy away from commenting on political matters. But the political ideas of the Church do not always follow the line of logic. The idea of the Georgian monarchy being restored may seem absurd, but the Church thinks otherwise. In 2007, the Patriarch publicly advocated the restoration of the monarchy. A few years ago, he was heavily involved in arranging a wedding linking two Georgian royal houses and he recently baptised the new-born son from this marriage. The ceremony had all the hallmarks of the baptism of a successor to the throne.[17]

The far-reaching influence of the Church can be felt at all political levels today. The Church tolerates national radicalism, anti-Western views and intolerance of minorities

15 | According to the latest surveys, Patriarch Ilia II is the most authoritative person in Georgia, receiving support from 92 per cent of respondents. Ivanishvili only received 69 per cent. Navarro, n. 2.

16 | Interview with Prof. Gigi Tevzadze: Maya Chalaganidze, "ოცნების გამარჯვების მნიშვნელოვანი ფაქტორი იყო ეკლესია" (The Church was an important factor in the victory of the Georgian Dream), 24 Saati, 14 Oct 2012, http://24saati.ge/index.php/category/news/interview/2012-10-14/32683 (accessed 6 Nov 2013).

17 | "ბაგრატიონების შთამომავლის ნათლობას პატრიარქმა ისტორიული უწოდა" (The Patriarch described the baptism of the successor to the Bagrationi dynasty as historic), Netgazeti.ge, 3 Nov 2013, http://netgazeti.ge/GE/105/News/25112 (accessed 6 Nov 2013).

and partly even encourages them. One striking example is the violence perpetrated against people taking part in a demonstration against homophobia in May 2013, where agitators included representatives from the Church.[18] The values the Church advocates are not always in line with the principles of a liberal, democratic and free society. When the Patriarch lauds Stalin as a great Georgian and religious person,[19] it is no wonder that new statues are being erected to Stalin in the country. Thomas de Waal, who knows Georgia well, is correct

Saakashvili occasionally used undemocratic methods to enforce liberal principles. The question now is how to find a compromise with tradition without relinquishing liberal achievements.

in stating: "Over the past year, Georgia has become, for want of a better word, more Georgian. It is simultaneously more democratic, more open, more nationalistic, and more Christian Orthodox. It now looks as though Saakashvili's 'mental revolution' was mostly a mirage."[20] The Saakashvili government did indeed occasionally use undemocratic methods to enforce liberal principles. The question now is how to find a compromise with tradition without relinquishing liberal achievements.

CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY OR MERE LIP SERVICE: IVANISHVILI'S BUSINESS PLAN

Back in 2011, when Ivanishvili announced his entry into politics, he promised the development of a democratic system, which even Europeans would admire.[21] He spoke of his intention to control his government from within civil society. As a responsible citizen, he saw education and the strengthening of civil society as his new principles.[22] How the separation of powers, transparency and

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18 | Silvia Stöber, "Georgien: Zwischen Moderne und Mittelalter", Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 31 May 2013, http://boell.de/de/node/277339 (accessed 6 Nov 2013).

19 | Maya Metskhvarishvili, "ილია მეორე: რუსეთი ძალიან მიყვარს, სტალინი მორწმუნე იყო" (Ilia II: I love Russia. Stalin was a religious person), Netgazeti.ge, 31 Jul 2013, http://netgazeti.ge/GE/105/News/22214 (accessed 5 Nov 2013).

20 | Thomas de Waal, "So Long, Saakashvili", *Foreign Affairs*, 29 Oct 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/09/so-long-saakashvili/grk6 (accessed 5 Nov 2013).

21 | "Ivanishvili's First-Ever TV Interview", Civil Georgia, 17 Oct 2011, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24039 (accessed 5 Nov 2013).

22 | Ivanishvili's open letter to society (unofficial translation): "PM on His Intended Pre-Term Resignation", Civil Georgia, 2 Sep 2013, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26408 (accessed 6 Nov 2013).

Now that Ivanishvili has officially withdrawn from politics, he will no longer have to account for his actions to the Georgian voters. He could therefore build up an "autonomous power" that is independent of the state.

accountability could be guaranteed in such a system remained open. Ivanishvili has a fortune that is vast by Georgian standards. It was estimated at 5.3 billion U.S. dollars in 2012,[23] one third of Georgia's GDP.[24] Now that he has officially withdrawn from politics, he will no longer have to account for his actions to the Georgian voters. He could therefore build up an "autonomous power" that is independent of the state. Without holding public office, he would not be subject to any formal restrictions. He would not have to deal with the day-to-day tasks of government, nor could he be held to account for any government failures. On the contrary, he has a free hand in keeping the government under control by informal means. Shortly before his resignation, Ivanishvili said he would leave it to his successor to determine the composition of the new government, but that he would be prepared to make himself available as an advisor to both the Prime Minister and the President. As the incumbents are some of his closest confidants, they will hardly be in a position to reject the offer.

Ivanishvili's concept resembles a business plan for managing a company. This concept of a politically bland and technocratic government can make for a certain degree of efficiency. But one cannot expect it to consolidate democratic institutions. Instead, power is transferred to the informal level, which makes it more difficult to control.

CONTINUITY OR A CHANGE OF COURSE?

A further challenge arises from the country's foreign policy orientation. Since it came into office, the new government has ruffled feathers both at home and abroad. After an entire year of GD government, there is still no clarity as to how the government defines the country's strategic interests. Under President Shevardnadze, a Western orientation came to dominate Georgian foreign policy. Georgia took part in various regional economic projects, some of which had geopolitical implications, including the construction of

23 | "Bidzina Ivanishvili", Forbes, Mar 2013, http://forbes.com/ profile/bidzina-ivanishvili (accessed 7 Nov 2013).
24 | "Gross Domestic Product (GDP)", GEOSTAT, http://geostat.ge/ index.php?action=page&p_id=119&lang=eng (accessed 7 Nov 2013).

oil and gas pipelines. Under the Saakashvili government, the Western orientation was formalised in security and foreign policy concepts. Among other things, Georgia made joining NATO one of its objectives and it participated in peacekeeping operations organised by the Alliance. Georgia's Western course was clearly defined and communicated to the outside world with equal clarity.

At first glance, it appears that the GD government is staying true to the course set by its predecessors. New President Margvelashvili called foreign policy the only area in politics where he can envisage collaborating with the UNM.[25] In March 2013, Parliament approved a cross-party resolution on foreign policy and confirmed Georgia's Euro-Atlantic course. According to this resolution, Georgia will not seek membership in regional organisations whose members do not acknowledge its territorial integrity. These include in particular the CIS and the Eurasian Union, which are dominated by Russia.[26] The Association Agreement with the EU was initialled in November, and the prospects for it being signed next year are looking good.

At the same time, the GD is striving for a rapprochement with Russia to improve the poor relationship between the two countries, which was badly disrupted by the war in August 2008. Shortly after he took office as Prime Minister, Ivanishvili appointed Georgia's former ambassador to Moscow, Zurab Abashidze, as his special representative in negotiations with Russia. It is no secret that Ivanishvili, who lived in Russia in the nineties and built his fortune there, is far more open towards the big neighbouring country than his predecessor Saakashvili. His reluctance to voice any criticism of Russia and Vladimir Putin has been noticeable. Undoubtedly, the new rhetoric style represents a significant prerequisite to a normalisation of relations. But even with Ivanishvili on its side, the

It is no secret that Ivanishvili, who lived in Russia in the nineties and built his fortune there, is far more open towards the big neighbouring country than his predecessor Saakashvili.

25 | "გიორგი მარგველაშვილს ,ნაციონალებთან' თანამშრომლობა მხოლოდ საგარეო საკითხებში წარმოუდგენია" (Giorgi Margvelashvili can only envisage collaboration with the UNM in the area of foreign policy), InterPressNews, 28 Oct 2013, http://interpressnews.ge/geo/politika/258046 (accessed 29 Oct 2013).
26 | "Parliament Adopts Bipartisan Resolution on Foreign Policy", Civil Gerorgia, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id= 25828 (accessed 29 Oct 2013).

degree to which the Georgian government can influence the Kremlin remains limited. Although the government was successful in persuading Russia to lift the 2006 embargo on wine and mineral water, further breakthroughs in Russian-Georgian relations are unlikely. On the contrary, Russia has caused a further escalation. Russian troops have strengthened the borders with the separatist Republic of South Ossetia with barbed wire, in places cutting right through Georgian villages.

There is no clear strategy on the Georgian side. It would be naive to believe that Georgian politicians can improve the relationship with Russia without making political concessions to Moscow. The same applies with respect to Euro-Atlantic integration. Normalisation of the relationship with Russia and integration into NATO are aspirations that are mutually exclusive in the medium term. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a future government would be able to bridge this chasm.

With the parliamentary and presidential elections, Georgia has passed a significant litmus test of democracy. The international community should acknowledge this achievement and take it into account in the course of the process of Georgia aligning more closely with European structures. At the same time, the international community should be vigilant and see to it that the achieved democratic standards are not reversed. This will require constructive and close cooperation with the new government, but also efforts to strengthen political elite figures within the government who make a clear commitment to Western values. Georgia represents a special case in the region. While there are still some structural problems in its political system, important prerequisites to democratic consolidation are present. A further strengthening of the party landscape, the establishment of a political culture of cooperation, and consolidation of the Western orientation can make the country into a model for development in the post-Soviet region.

THE FAR-RIGHT JOBBIK PARTY AND THE SITUATION OF POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN HUNGARY

Frank Spengler / Mark Alexander Friedrich

The considerable numbers of votes the far-right party commonly known as Jobbik[1] has attracted in elections, attacks on Roma people and the open anti-Semitism of some Members of Parliament have generated negative headlines about Hungary throughout Europe in recent years. In contrast, there has been little sign of left-wing extremism. The strength of the right-wing as well as the weakness of the left-wing extremists can be attributed to a combination of historic and current factors. On the one hand, Hungary's experience with almost half a century of communism and nostalgia for the country's former glory play a role, creating a climate that is not conducive to left-wing extremism; on the other hand, the loss of trust in the political elites,[2] particularly during Ferenc Gyurcsány's time in power, the economic situation and the country's ethnic composition have contributed to a strengthening of right-wing extremism in the country.

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1 | Proportion of votes in the 2009 European elections: 14.77 per cent; proportion of votes in the 2010 elections for the Hungarian National Assembly: 16.67 per cent.
2 | Where trust in various institutions is concerned there is a downward trend, be it with regard to the political parties, the government or the European Union (*Eurobarometer* 78, 2012). Trust in political parties in particular is very low. Not even a fifth of Hungarian respondents stated that they trust them. Hungary also features in the lower third within the EU in terms of satisfaction with democracy.

VIRTUALLY INSIGNIFICANT:
LEFT-WING EXTREMISM IN HUNGARY

In contrast, there is no extreme left-wing political scene to speak of in Hungary, in line with many other countries of the former Eastern Bloc. No party from the far left has succeeded in entering the National Assembly, nor have there been any major public demonstrations or gatherings. This is mostly due to historic reasons. While the left-wing debate in the West has been shaped mainly by the "Generation of '68" and its spiritual successors, the experiences under communism were instrumental in shaping the Left in Hungary. The Hungarian left is thus hankering back to the relative prosperity and security of the Kádár era[3] and indulges in nostalgia. Many Hungarians, however, link this past with the lack of freedom and the suppression following the popular uprising of 1956. To most people, socialism therefore does not represent a social utopia but a failed political system.

However, it is not only history that hinders the Hungarian left; there are also structural problems preventing it from gaining in strength. There is no party in Hungary that offers a modern image of left-wing politics. Instead, the Left is fragmented and suffering from internal disputes. In the 1990s, the Workers' Party[4] (Munkáspart) was still the strongest force in the left-wing party spectrum. In 1998, it only just failed to gain entry to the National Assembly with approximately four per cent. The party subsequently never won as many votes again. The backward-looking stance influencing its activities, which included annual events to commemorate the death of János Kádár for instance,

3 | The communism that developed in Hungary subsequent to the popular uprising of 1956 was relatively open in comparison to that of the GDR, for instance, and brought about relative prosperity for the population. This so-called "goulash communism" was secured by the state providing certain services and guaranteeing jobs. This model was not financially sustainable and was at the root of the financial difficulties Hungary experienced after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
4 | Up to 1993 Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspart); from 2005 Hungarian Communist Workers' Party (Magyar Kommunista Munkáspart); since 2013, due to a change in the law prohibiting the word "communist" in the party name, simply Hungarian Workers' Party (Magyar Munkáspart).

caused a steady decline in support for the Workers' Party. It obtained a mere 0.1 per cent of the votes during the 2010 parliamentary elections. However, that is still more than the 0.03 per cent achieved by the second party on the far left, the Workers' Party 2006 (Munkáspart 2006), which had split off from the Workers' Party. Besides organising small-scale demonstrations and engaging in a debate about wearing the Red Star[5] in public, the Left did and does not play a role in Hungarian political discourse. Apart from these parties lacking in depth where political issues are concerned, they are also short on well-known leadership figures and an intellectual elite as well as efficient communication channels.

Besides organising small-scale demonstrations and engaging in a debate about wearing the Red Star in public, the Left did and does not play a role in Hungarian political discourse.

One should note, however, that the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP), which has supplied the Prime Minister five times[6] since the fall of the Iron Curtain, is the legal successor to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspart, MSZMP). While the party does not publicly advocate the continuation of the communist policies of the old era, former MSZMP party functionaries did set the tone for a long time. Many of today's generation of MSZP politicians had also undergone training in the youth organisations of the old system. On the one hand, the role the party plays means there is a democratic party that some old-guard communists feel themselves able to vote for, but on the other hand it has become clear, particularly in connection with the 2006 protests, that the party's historical legacy can also be damaging to Hungarian democracy. The party's communist legacy did provide some advantages in the political competition

5 | The government has repeatedly attempted to prohibit the wearing of the Red Star in public. However, there have been two rulings on this matter by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): "Vajnai v. Hungary" (ECtHR 33629/06, 8 Jul 2008) and "Fratanoló v. Hungary" (ECtHR 29459/10, 3 Nov 2011). Currently, the wearing of symbols of totalitarian ideologies, including the Red Star, is prohibited once again after a change in the law.
6 | The last Prime Minister before the fall of the Iron Curtain, Milós Németh, was in office until the first free elections in 1990, by which time the party had already been renamed MSZP. Gyula Horn (1994-1998) and Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004-2009) were members of the party, while Péter Medgyessy (2002-2004) and Gordon Bajnai (2009-2010) were independents, but led an MSZP government.

at the beginning of the new era, for instance through the organisational structures in the early nineties and the financial means of the predecessor party, which were instrumental in the election victory of Gyula Horn in 1994.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN HUNGARY

In contrast to the radical left, the radical right is very well organised and plays a significant role both in the social and the political arena. Its importance has grown considerably particularly over the last decade. Contrary to many West European countries, however, this development is not dominated by issues of immigration and multiculturalism in Hungary. Instead, the country's economic development, the failure of the socialist government under Prime Minister Gyurcsány and, above all, problems with the integration of the Roma have created a political landscape in which right-wing extremists have succeeded in gaining ever greater prominence.

One factor that still plays an important part in the world view of the Hungarian extreme right is the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. With this treaty, which formed part of the WWI Paris Peace Treaties and which sealed the breakup of the Kingdom of Hungary, Hungary lost approximately two thirds of its territory and 52 per cent of its population. Many Hungarians suddenly found themselves outside their country of birth. Some three million Hungarians are still living outside the national borders today. For many Hungarians, Trianon thus represents a trauma they have not yet come to terms with. The subject of Trianon therefore unifies not just the Hungarian right but also to a large degree society as a whole. There are still occasional demands from the extreme political right for a revision of the treaty. The perceived injustice is also being exploited as a means to create external enemies and to depict Hungary as a victim of international conspiracies. That said, there were and still are differences between the various groups on the right. The first far-right organisations and parties emerged directly after the fall of communism. But they differed from the current extreme right, particularly Jobbik, in their conduct, their followers and their significance.

THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE FALL OF THE IRON CURTAIN

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, many Hungarians were hoping for a clean break from the communist past. However, due to the significant involvement of the old elites as well as a desire for reconciliation in the country, many measures taken by the first democratically elected government under József Antall were less radical than some people in the country would have wished. Particularly the bilateral treaty between Hungary and Ukraine and the renunciation of territorial claims against Ukraine that this entailed riled the political right against the government. In response to this policy, the author and journalist István Csurka left the governing MDF and founded the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP). While the newly founded party failed to clear the five per cent hurdle by a considerable margin in 1994, it achieved entry into the National Assembly in 1998 with just under 5.5 per cent of the votes. Although the party claimed to be "neither right-wing nor left-wing, but Christian and Hungarian", Csurka in particular repeatedly attracted attention through anti-Semitic statements. But there is no unanimity, and not just among experts in political science, on whether the MIÉP can be classed as a far-right party. In fact, MIÉP voters were recruited from an anti-communist, centre-right milieu and the party's views do not appear very radical particularly in comparison with today's Jobbik. The MIÉP did, however, help far-right views gain a foothold in political discourse. The party never achieved substantial backing from all sections of society and its success in the 1998 elections proved to be a one-off. Four years later, it was not able to replicate this election result and it failed to return to the National Assembly.

> There is no unanimity on whether the MIÉP can be classed as a far-right party. It did, however, help far-right views gain a foothold in political discourse.

THE RISE OF JOBBIK

In response to seeing their political clout decline, the MIÉP entered into an alliance with Jobbik, which had been founded in 2003, and the Independent Smallholders' Party (Független Kisgazda-, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt, FKgP) to contest the 2006 elections as MIÉP – Jobbik a Harmadik

Út.[7] Although the electoral alliance failed to pass the five per cent hurdle and subsequently dissolved, it had given Jobbik the opportunity to take part in national elections for the first time and to gain experience. While the MIÉP sank into oblivion (particularly after Csurká's death in January 2013), Jobbik rose up to become the new force on the right in Hungary. It ranked third during the European elections in 2009 (14.77 per cent) as well as in the 2010 elections to the Hungarian National Assembly (16.67 per cent).

Members of the "Hungarian Guard" during their inauguration on 25 August 2007 in Budapest. | Source: © Tamas Kovacs, picture alliance, epa.

The party originated from an anti-communist and national-conservative student group founded in 1999. But Jobbik has since become radicalised and it now shows distinct differences compared to the MIÉP, manifesting particularly in the type of voter it attracts. While the supporters of the MIÉP comprised mainly disaffected MDF voters and predominantly older Budapest inhabitants of above-average education, Jobbik's voters are frequently characterised by a markedly lower level of education and rural origins. Many of them therefore do not originate from the centre-right camp, but are disaffected former supporters of the socialists. Where its origins as well as many of its positions on

7 | A play on words involving the two meanings of the Hungarian word *jobbik* – namely "better" and "more to the right". Correspondingly: "MIÉP – the better third way" or "MIÉP – the more right-leaning third way".

social issues are concerned, Jobbik is more akin to a social movement with left-wing views. The party has also had some success in expanding its influence among the country's university students over recent years.

Jobbik is headed by the Member of Parliament Gábor Vona. The former teacher was one of the founding members of Jobbik's predecessor party in 1999. He was appointed one of the vice-chairmen at the 2003 founding party conference. He has been Jobbik's chairman since November 2006.

In public, Jobbik distances itself from a far-right stance and refers to itself as a national movement that occasionally uses radical methods. It purports to act as a "new force" and "on behalf of the Hungarian people". The party maintains that it is not its own views that are "extreme" but the "neo-liberal policies" particularly of the previous socialist government. Jobbik frequently uses strong symbolism, such as the map of Greater Hungary and the red and white striped flag of the House of Arpád,[8] and it depicts politics as a battle, to an even greater extent than is usual in the traditionally florid Hungarian rhetoric. Political opponents are frequently equated with criminals, for instance when Vona called former Prime Minister Gyurcsány and the MSZP "rezsibűnöző",[9] which translates as "utility cost criminals", in the current debate on home utility costs.

Jobbik frequently uses strong symbolism, such as the map of Greater Hungary and the red and white striped flag of the House of Arpád, and it depicts politics as a battle.

From the very start, Jobbik was intent on distancing itself from the established parties and portraying itself as "anti-party". It thus features the term *mozgalom,* meaning movement, in its name and demonstrates a dismissive stance towards the entire political class as well as

8 | The Árpáds, Hungary's first ruling dynasty, ruled from 1001 to 1301. Their coat of arms and flag showed the horizontal red and white Árpád stripes (*Árpád sávok*), which can still be found in Hungary's coat of arms today. During World War II, Hungary's fascist party (the Arrow Cross Party) used the "Árpád Stripes" as part of their flag. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the flag was occasionally sighted at political gatherings. But it has been used mainly by the MIÉP since its departure from the National Assembly in 2002 as a symbol of the Hungarian right.

9 | *Rezsi* = home utility costs and *bűnöző* = criminal.

the other parties. While this stance was initially directed above all against parties from the left, Jobbik has subsequently openly attacked the governing party FIDESZ and the centre-right camp, from the time of the campaign for the 2009 European elections at the latest. By doing so, it is attempting to establish an alternative public space, particularly on the Internet, where it can successfully disseminate its ideas. The kuruc.info website, which is sympathetic to Jobbik, is one of the most-visited websites of the country. The party is making efforts to open up further areas of political influence. To this end, an environmental foundation with close links to Jobbik, the Green Answer Association (Zöld Válasz Egyesület), was

Jobbik is attempting to disguise nationalist views as environmental policy, addressing issues such as regional food supply and criticism of multinational companies.

established. With this measure, Jobbik is attempting to disguise nationalist views as environmental policy, similar to what the NPD did in Germany in the 1980s. Issues discussed include the regional food supply and criticism of multinational companies. But the party's efforts to establish its presence in everyday life go even further. A taxi company sympathetic to Jobbik (Nemzeti Taxi – National Taxi) has been operating for a number of years. The company's logo, the map of Greater Hungary, is emblazoned on the car doors. Jobbik is thereby succeeding in inveigling its way into the everyday lives of the country's citizens.

The remarkable increase in support for Jobbik can be attributed to a number of factors. This development began during the protests and unrest of 2006, which followed the publication of the secretly recorded "Őszöd speech" (*Őszödi beszéd*) by Ferenc Gyurcsány. In this "speech of lies", the then Prime Minister explained that he had lied to the people about the country's true economic situation "throughout the last year-and-a-half to two years" in order to secure his re-election in 2006. This caused weeks of occasionally bloody protests, during which far-right rioters were particularly conspicuous. The police used that as a pretext for employing brutal tactics against peaceful demonstrators. Gyurcsány's speech appeared to confirm the distrust of the political elite many Hungarians had harboured already and the approach taken by the representatives of state power (particularly the police). The opposition, including FIDESZ, denounced the government as illegitimate and called Prime Minister Gyurcsány a "left-wing terrorist", making reference

to MSZP's communist past. As the government refused to resign, the demonstrations dragged on and offered Jobbik an opportunity to raise its profile. Jobbik went on to enjoy increasing popularity, at the latest by the time the economic crisis hit Hungary, facilitated by the party's success in drawing attention to its anti-capitalist stance. Support for Jobbik soared nearly eight-fold between the 2006 and 2010 elections. No doubt it would be wrong to attribute the responsibility for Jobbik's rise entirely to the Gyurcsány government, but its actions made a crucial contribution.

Even though Hungary's disturbing economic development up to 2010 by no means fully explains Jobbik's current position, the party's rise is closely linked to this development. In spite of the economic challenges arising from the country's communist past and the associated dominant role played by the state since the fall of communism, Hungary was considered a paragon among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe when it joined the EU in 2004. However, Hungary was slow in initiating the necessary reforms. The country's economic situation deteriorated steadily. One case in point is government debt, which rose from under 56 at the time the socialists took power in 2002 to almost 82 per cent of GDP by the time they were voted out in 2010. The economic situation of the population also deteriorated severely during this period. Apart from the general negative development of the country's economy, this was to a large extent due to the fact that many people had taken on excessive debt by obtaining foreign currency loans (mostly in Swiss francs). Before the crisis, the banks had offered these loans as secure alternatives with better interest rates. Due to the weakness of the forint against the foreign currencies, many banking customers could no longer afford to pay off their loans. This situation offered Jobbik an opportunity to criticise the established parties, above all the socialist government under Prime Minister Gyurcsány. Banks and foreign investors also represented welcome targets for attacks by Jobbik. The party depicted itself as the protector of the Hungarian people and promised to advocate support for citizens who had got into financial straits.

In spite of the economic challenges, Hungary was considered a paragon among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe when it joined the EU in 2004.

ANTI-ROMANYISM AND THE HUNGARIAN GUARD

Besides left-wing social views, strong anti-Romanyism represents an important element in Jobbik rhetoric. It was the first party to make an issue of the high level of criminality among the Roma population. It promulgated the term "Gypsy crime" (*cigánybűnözés*). The "lynching of Olaszliszka", where a group of Roma battered a teacher to death subsequent to a traffic accident in October 2006, and the murder of the Romanian handball player Marian

In conjunction with the prejudices against the Roma the field was wide open for Jobbik to present itself as the only party representing the "interests" of the Hungarian people on this issue.

Cozma in February 2009 in particular helped to ensure that the term "Gypsy crime" featured in the headlines throughout the country. In conjunction with widespread social prejudice against the Roma and a failure by the established parties to pick up on the issue early on, this left the field wide open for Jobbik to present itself as the only party representing the "interests" of the Hungarian people on this issue. This applied particularly to the eastern areas of the country where Roma make up a relatively high percentage of the population. And as the police found themselves exposed to constant criticism – sometimes for acting "too softly", sometimes "too harshly" – they were not capable of getting the crime problem under control. The Hungarian police were unable to counter the increasing provocations by the right-wing extremists. Their scope for action was further restricted by the introduction of the civil rights of free speech and freedom of assembly after the fall of the Iron Curtain in line with the U.S. model. The courts were not capable of improving the situation through jurisdiction either.

Given this social climate, Jobbik succeeded in strengthening its profile as the protector of the Hungarian people, especially with the founding of the Hungarian Guard Movement (Magyar Gárda Mozgalom), Hungarian Guard for short. This group, which was founded by Vona in 2007 and has since been banned, stood out particularly through their uniforms, which were reminiscent of those worn by the Arrow Cross men.[10] The paramilitary organisation took to marching in housing estates with a high percentage of Roma residents.

10 | The Arrow Cross Party was a national-socialist party in Hungary, founded by Ferenc Szálasi in 1939.

Above all, Jobbik exploited the population's distrust of state institutions and gave the suggestion of a sense of security. While the founding of the organisation gave the impression that Jobbik was the only party that had a solution to the problem of "Gypsy crime", its rhetoric in actual fact merely fuelled existing anxieties, which only exacerbated the problem in many places. With the establishment of the Hungarian Guard, the number of local Jobbik branches increased throughout the country. While a ban of the organisation was initiated in 2007, it did not come into force until 2 July 2009. Within a very short time, namely on 25 July 2009, the New Hungarian Guard Movement (Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom) or New Hungarian Guard for short was set up. Its membership is largely identical to that of the old organisation, as are its leadership and its objectives. In 2010, Jobbik Member of Parliament Tamás Gaudi-Nagy filed an action with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg to have the ban of the original Hungarian Guard lifted. But this was rejected in July 2013.[11] However, the speed with which the founding of the New Hungarian Guard followed the ban showed that the banning of organisations does not get to the root of the problem. The governing coalition of FIDESZ and KDNP therefore amended the right of assembly and prohibited marches in uniform of a provocative nature.

This amendment could become an effective tool to take action against groups such as the Hungarian Guard. This does not, however, have any impact on the underlying problem, namely the social situation of many Roma and the prevailing prejudice. During the last few years, the Hungarian government has implemented a number of important measures to tackle this challenge facing society as a whole. These measures are based on the "EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020", which was approved by the European Council on 24 June 2011 towards the end of the Hungarian Council Presidency. Having this initiative approved was a great achievement for the Hungarian Council Presidency. But it can only succeed in conjunction with effective national mechanisms. There is now some hope that the coordination and control on the part of the European Commission, which were

> With the establishment of the Hungarian Guard, the number of local Jobbik branches increased throughout the country.

11 | "Vona v. Hungary" (ECtHR 35943/10, 9 Jul 2013).

agreed as part of the "Roma Integration Strategy", will help to strengthen efforts towards full social inclusion of the Roma in Hungary as well. The implementation of the EU-wide Roma inclusion strategy by the Hungarian government is also an expression of the political will to resolve the issues by taking concrete action. In Hungary, responsibility for the implementation of the measures at a national level, for instance in the areas of education and improved access to the labour market, lies with the Ministry for Human Resources.

ANTI-SEMITISM

There are signs of widespread anti-Semitism in Jobbik and among the Hungarian far right, particularly in Budapest. It is frequently directed against the state of Israel and the positions of power allegedly occupied by Jews in Hungary and around the world. Jobbik thus militates against Israeli and Jewish investments in the country. During a demonstration against the Jewish World Congress, which took place in Budapest in May 2013, Vona declared that the "Israeli conquerors, these investors, should look for another country in the world because Hungary is not for sale". Márton Gyöngyösi, a Jobbik Member of Parliament, caused a particular stir when he asked in 2012 to "tally up people of Jewish ancestry who live here, especially in the Hungarian Parliament and the Hungarian government, who, indeed, pose a national security risk to Hungary". Gyöngyösi's statements triggered a large demonstration, which included representatives from the government and from the opposition. The rules governing the proceedings at the National Assembly were changed to allow Members of Parliament to be excluded from the remaining sessions of the day or to be fined if they insult national, ethnic or religious groups or individuals.

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The current government has introduced comprehensive measures to combat anti-Semitism in Hungary. The 4th Amendment to the Hungarian Fundamental Law of March 2013 created a legal framework to enable action to be taken against so-called hate speech. This provision was applied just one month later, when a motorcade of far-right bikers was banned, which had been planned to coincide

with the "March of the Living" to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and which was to take place under the slogan "Adj gázt!" which roughly translated means "Step on the gas!" Holocaust denial is a criminal offence these days. 2014 has been declared Holocaust Memorial Year and a Memorial Committee has been set up. The Holocaust was introduced as a mandatory subject of study at Hungarian schools in 2000 under the first Orbán government. In addition, the government supports Jewish culture and Jewish life in Hungary. The cornerstone for the first new synagogue in 80 years was thus laid recently.

He initiated extensive measures for the fight against right-wing extremism: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (right), with Hans-Gert Pöttering, chairman of the KAS and former President of the European Parliament. | Source: KAS.

Contrary to the stance towards Roma and Jews, xenophobia directed at migrants is less widespread, probably partly due to the relatively low numbers involved. Expressions of hostility towards gay people are, however, very common, and they regularly originate from the Jobbik camp. The party's election programme includes a demand for homosexuality to be criminalised. In view of this climate, the "Budapest Pride" parade could only go ahead under strong police protection.

JOBBIK REGARDS THE EU AS THE ENEMY

Where European integration is concerned, Jobbik is decidedly in the opposition camp. In this context, it collaborates at a European level with the Alliance of European National Movements (AEMN), with the British National Party (BNP) around Nick Griffin, with the Italian Fiamma Tricolore, with the Spanish Republican Social Movement as well as the Bulgarian National-Democratic Party. Jobbik also has links to the French Front National and other far-right and populist right-wing European parties. In Jobbik's view, the opening up of borders resulting from European integration does not provide the solution for the problems of the Hungarian diaspora. It also keeps criticising the surrender of national sovereignty and the violation of Hungarian interests resulting from membership of the European Union.

Jobbik has issued several statements stressing that Hungary should strive for closer cooperation with Russia instead of the EU. In this context, Vona maintains: "Without Russia there is no Europe, without it our continent has no future. The political centre must be shifted eastward from its current position, and if that became reality, Hungary could assume a major role as intermediary." At first glance, this stance appears to be inconsistent with the party's nationalist views. It is also surprising when you consider Hungary's past. But it can be explained on account of the increasing importance placed on Russia's national sovereignty under President Putin as well as strong anti-American sentiments. There have also been reports in the media implying that Jobbik received Russian funding for its election campaigns. Jobbik vehemently denied that. It is a fact, however, that leading Jobbik politicians regularly travel to Russia and meet up with Russian parliamentarians.

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One person who has made the headlines was former Jobbik Member of the European Parliament Csanád Szegedi. He had been a co-founder of the Hungarian Guard and was considered one of the strong men of the next generation to follow Vona. He found out about a year ago that he had Jewish ancestors. He left Jobbik, but retained his seat in the EU Parliament.

THE RADICAL RIGHT BESIDES JOBBIK

Some far-right groups and parties were established in Hungary directly after the fall of communism, such as the World National People's Rule Party (Világnemzeti Népuralmista Párt, VNP). However, this only existed for a brief period in 1993 and 1994, subsequently joining with other far-right groups to form the Hungarian Hungarist Movement (Magyar Hungarista Mozgalom, MHM) on 20 April of all dates, which was promptly banned shortly afterwards. Groups such as the Hungarian Skins and Blood and Honour, which was banned in 2006, emerged during this period, but never represented more than fringe organisations. The MIÉP and subsequently Jobbik were the first organisations to progress beyond this status. Nonetheless, there have been a few other groups and individuals on the far right besides Jobbik in recent years that have come to general prominence. But the public's interest was very short-lived and the parties and groups played only a minor role in the overall political landscape.

The Patriotic Bikers, an association registered since 2008, are a case in point. In the past, they made their presence felt at various far-right demonstrations, particularly in conjunction with events organised by Jobbik, but also attracted attention by disrupting other events, particularly those held by left-wing parties. Some activists from the far right have also succeeded in entering public discourse over the last few years with individual actions. One example is Diána Bácsfi and her Hungarian Future Group (Magyar Jövő Csoport). They first attracted attention in December 2003 by putting up posters in the centre of Budapest depicting the Arrow Cross men's motto "kitartás", meaning "persistence", and the statement "We are coming!" (*jövünk!*). Apart from venerating Ferenc Szálasi,[12] Bácsfi made headlines particularly by denying the Holocaust and giving the

12 | Ferenc Szálasi was a fascist politician before and during World War II. After the regent of the Kingdom of Hungary, Miklós Horthy, had been deposed by the German occupation force (during an operation codenamed "Fall Margarethe"), Szálasi was installed as Prime Minister on 15 October 1944. His term in office saw the second wave of deportations of the Holocaust in Hungary. Szálasi surrendered to U.S. troops on 1 May 1945 after fleeing Budapest to escape from the Red Army. Szálasi was executed as a war criminal in Budapest in 1946.

Hitler salute. These actions resulted in her being thrown out of Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, prosecuted and fined. Bácsfi and her group subsequently disappeared from public view. She has since distanced herself from her past.

While Bácsfi and the Patriotic Bikers attracted attention mainly through words and PR stunts, there were and still are some groups whose potential for doing damage

György Budaházy founded the Hunnia organisation, which rejects Hungary's entry into the EU and demands a reinstatement of the Hungarian borders before the Treaty of Trianon.

is probably much greater. This includes the right-wing extremist György Budaházy, who has been the subject of criminal proceedings for years with long periods spent in prison on remand. Collaborating with László Toroczkai, he had founded the Hunnia organisation, which rejects Hungary's entry into the EU and demands a reinstatement of the Hungarian borders before the Treaty of Trianon. They repeatedly committed violent acts, in some cases using Molotov cocktails. Amongst other things, Budaházy was prosecuted and fined for damaging the Soviet war memorial in Budapest. However, he was acquitted in other lengthy trials. In 2010, Budaházy attempted to stand as an independent candidate in the elections for the National Assembly to obtain immunity. But the electoral commission did not accept all the submitted "letters of recommendation" (*kopogtató cédula*), which are required for each candidacy, and so he was not allowed to stand. But owing to his trials and some public appearances that drew the attention of the media, Budaházy is nonetheless one of the most well-known right-wing extremists in the country.

One organisation that political observers view as a risk to public order is the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement[13] (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjusági Mozgalom, HVIM). This group was heavily involved in the rioting during the demonstrations against Prime Minister Gyurcsány in 2006 and in the storming of the state television station. It was established in 2001 by László Toroczkai, co-founder of the

13 | *Vármegye* were regional administrative units used in the Kingdom of Hungary since 1000, corresponding roughly to the medieval "Grafschaften" (counties) in what is now Germany. Although Hungary had a different administrative structure by then, the term "64 vármegye" became established in the 1920s when speaking about Hungary before the Treaty of Trianon.

Hunnia organisation, and has close links to Jobbik although it calls itself independent. The group professes nationalist, racist and anti-Semitic views. Its members have publicly threatened violence on several occasions. Its vice president, Gábor Barcsa-Turner, for instance, stated in an interview with a Canadian newspaper in August 2012 that the Hungarians living outside Hungary who had recently voiced negative views about the country had better not return to Hungary because "the neo-Nazis and fascists will hang you for your disgusting reports". The group is one of three Hungarian organisations to whom Anders Behring Breivik, the perpetrator of the Utøya killings, sent his "manifesto" directly before the act. The group distanced itself from his actions. During a demonstration against György Budaházy's arrest, Béla Incza, a leading member of the 64 Counties, explained that he thought the Werwolf organisation[14] was an inspirational model. He further called upon those present to learn martial arts and self-defence because the time may come when "everybody goes to work in the morning and blows something up in the evening".

Apart from the excesses in 2006 and a blockade of the Elisabeth Bridge in Budapest in 2002, far-right groups have so far limited themselves to protests. There have, however, been repeated cases of individuals perpetrating crimes motivated by race hatred. The best-known example is a series of murders in 2008 and 2009, which became known as the "Roma murders" in the media. In ten attacks, the perpetrators, which were frequently referred to as the "death brigades", killed six Roma and seriously injured five others. They first threw Molotov cocktails at Roma houses and then shot at people fleeing their homes. The perpetrators made a point of selecting localities where tensions existed already between the local Roma and the majority population. They aimed at exacerbating these tensions. However, efforts to put the "death brigades" out of action ultimately succeeded. In 2009, four suspects were tracked down through their mobile phones and arrested. The three alleged main perpetrators received life sentences in February 2013 in the trial court, the fourth was sentenced to 13 years in prison for aiding and abetting. The accused

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14 | National-socialist guerrilla and underground movement founded by Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler towards the end of World War II.

stated they would appeal their sentences. The government declared its intention to provide financial support to the victims.

CONCLUSION

The likelihood of a strengthening of the radical left in Hungary will probably remain low in the future. The problem of right-wing extremism, however, remains. This is exemplified by the continued support for Jobbik. Although the "Roma murders" and the emergence of other far-right groups over the last decade have illustrated that the problems extend beyond Jobbik, the presence and strength of this party ensure that the majority of people with far-right views gravitate towards this group. As a result, the problem of right-wing radicalism is very much a reality in Hungary.

In the past, left-wing media and parties regularly blamed the conservative camp for the strengthening of right-wing extremism, even occasionally putting the centre-right parties into the same camp as Jobbik. By contrast, the government draws attention to the fact that Jobbik only succeeded in entering the National Assembly as a consequence of the mismanagement by its predecessors. In the meantime, the government has reacted to the provocations from the far right of the political spectrum. Only recently, Deputy Prime Minister Tibor Navracsics stressed Hungary's responsibility in connection with the Holocaust and the importance of the fight against racism, discrimination and anti-Semitism in his opening speech at a conference on the subject of "Jewish Life and Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Europe" held in Budapest. However, the successful implementation of the government's strategy is conditional on improvements in the country's economic and social conditions. The current upward economic trend offers some cause for optimism. But the Hungarian government must make continued concerted efforts to combat racism and discrimination and take effective action to further the integration of the Roma people into Hungarian society. If it is not successful in these endeavours, Jobbik will remain a political force to be reckoned with for the foreseeable future. The upcoming parliamentary elections in the spring of 2014 could be the first indicator.

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