



EU-ASIA DIALOGUE

*Shaping a Common Future for Europe and Asia –
Sharing Policy Innovation and Best Practices in Addressing Common Challenges*

Conference Report

“Maritime Security: Lessons Learned from Europe and Asia”

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Report

Policy Conference

“Maritime Security: Lessons Learned from Europe and Asia”

On 19 September, 2013, the EU-Asia Dialogue and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) held a joint conference on “Maritime Security: Lessons Learned from Europe and Asia” in London, United Kingdom. This event of the cluster Maritime Piracy and Security was attended by 31 participants. They represented, among others, EEAS, European Commission, ReCAAP-ISC, International Maritime Organization, NATO, EUNAVFOR, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, EU-MARSIC, BIMCO, and Norwegian Coast Guards. In addition, researchers from France, Germany, India, Japan, People’s Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and United Kingdom attended the event. The topics discussed included law enforcement in the maritime domain, in particular the different roles of navies and coast guards, transnational organised crime at sea and obstacles in Euro-Asian collaboration. Following the conference in Seoul, one full panel was dedicated to the Arctic Sea and the influence the new Asian observer states China, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea can have in the Arctic Council.

Key note speaker and guest of honor was **Commodore Neil Brown**, Royal Navy, United Kingdom, who highlighted the growing interest in maritime issues. Historically, some navies faced constitutional barriers or had little interest in maritime security. This has changed, not only, but also, due to piracy. Commodore Brown stressed that the legal framework is critical and a system that is fair to all is required. The existing system for the oceans meets this criterion as it gives same rights and obligations to all coastal states. However, the system assumes that all states will meet their obligations, but this requires capacity which is missing, for instance, in the case of Somalia. This is not only true for Somalia, but for a majority of the 140 coastal states. If they are provided with this capacity, they will be able to help themselves.

Two lessons can be drawn from Somalia. First, the EU’s mission has been the most successful so far since it uses a comprehensive approach which is required in such situations. Second, the situation has started the cooperation with Asia (in particular



Japan and the Republic of Korea) in the Indian Ocean, being the natural meeting point of vessels and navies. However, for a sustainable success intra-regional cooperation is essential. This willingness to cooperate has been increased due to piracy and African states are now accepting training from Western nations.

Besides protection, prosecution is the second aspects to ensure maritime security. Prosecution needs political will and mutual trust as the countries have to cooperate on the basis of existing laws. For instance, a pirate from country A may commit a crime in country B on board a ship of country C, prosecuted by country D and finally caught in country E. This illustrates the critical role of cooperation and confidence among the states. The West can provide help to the coastal states to help themselves in coastal issues. However, governance on high sea is a far more difficult topic and needs to build up on existing capacities and experiences. Brown emphasized that if such cooperation will be successful, the existing laws will work and ensure the safety of the oceans.

The discussion brought up another problem which is the logistic challenge. In order to be successful in this regard, the states require both more ships and capacities. For instance, frigates and destroyers are used to cover large areas and can use their technology efficiently in this setting. Coastal areas require different tools. While aerial clearance is a key factor, it always faces the problem whom to address and who is responsible for the area. In fighting piracy, the root causes require more attention. Crime is endemic to many of these areas due to a lack of governance and capacity of the police and army. Sometimes it also takes a trigger effect. In 2001 piracy was brought at the top of the agenda since developed countries had an interest in dealing with it due to security and economic reasons. Lastly, information sharing is a key. Not only among military, but also industry and ships can provide useful data.

Session 1: Law Enforcement in the Maritime Domain

The first presentation „Navies or coast guards: who should run the show?“ was delivered by **Vice Admiral Ahmad Puzi bin Haj AB Kahar**, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, Malaysia. The protection of the 77,000 vessels and thousands of fishing boats in the Strait of Malacca is done jointly by the royal navy and coastguards. Their roles vary, but they complement each other. Coastguards shall enforce law and order in areas of responsibility. The navy, on the other hand, has a ‘killing’ and fighting mission and works on intelligence cooperation. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) is responsible for the preservation of peace, security and safety in the Malaysian Maritime Zone (MMZ). MMEA also takes over tasks on the high sea such as search and rescue, preventing maritime pollution, preventing and suppressing piracy as well as drug trafficking. The tasks of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) are not divided into MMZ and



high sea, but in peace and crisis time. Its main role is to safeguard the territorial waters, coastline, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and defend them against all seaborne threats. In crisis time, RMN defends the national interest, carries out operations against the enemy and assists friendly forces in conflict. In peace time, it will collect data, carry out surveillance and patrols, support MMEA through information sharing and analysis of maritime security intelligence. In order to be most efficient and successful in the maritime domain, it is good to have a navy and coast guards who can tackle different areas of the law and complement each other.

The security challenges faced by Malaysia are quite diverse and include transnational organized crime, irregular seaborne migration, environmental issues, maritime boundary disputes, and terrorism.

In the Strait of Malacca, MMEA can be more efficient since the navy does not have the speed and necessary vessels for fast interception in this narrow area. On the other hand, the coastguards lack capacity for big and large scale interventions. Due to these differences in expertise, assets, weapons, roles and budget a joint coordinated approach between the two actors is desirable.

Prof. Wang Hanling, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, People's Republic of China, spoke on „Enforcement Agencies and Joint Patrols“. Before spring 2013 the Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies were separated into five agencies. This was characterized by a lack of coordination and sometimes conflicts over responsibility. From 1950-1980 the government had a strictly sectoral management. From the 1980s onwards, it was a sectoral and integrated approach with the establishment of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). However, there were still five agencies (dragons). These are the China Marine Surveillance (as part of SOA), Fishery Law Enforcement (CFLE as part of the Ministry of Agriculture), China Coast Guard (CCG as part of the Ministry of Public Security), Anti-smuggling Police (ASP as part of the General Administration of Customs), and Maritime Safety Administration (MSA as part of the Ministry of Transport). However, recent developments made it necessary to integrate the agencies. The reasons are rapid development of maritime economy, increasing demand for maritime security, imperative need for environmental and resource protection, and effective regulation of marine development activities. The new management system has three guiding principles: efficiency, effectiveness and economy. The central government reorganization took place in 2013 and the maritime domain was a crucial part of it. As a result the new and restructured State Oceanic Administration (SOA) is now managed by the Ministry of Land and Resources. Four former dragons – CSM/SOA, CFLE, CCG and ASP – are now integrated in this one agency. Only MSA remains a separate agency. Challenges of this reorganization are mission redefinition, co-ordination, new/revised legislation, human resource restructure, capacity building and further integration in the future. However, the



new China Coast Guard will enhance integrated law enforcement at sea with coordinated planning, construction, management and command.

The People's Republic of China is also closely involved in international joint patrols. These include escort missions in the Gulf of Aden, Sino-US joint inspection of fishing boats in the North Pacific and Sino-Vietnamese joint patrol in the Gulf of Beibu/Tonkin. The Sino-Vietnamese agreement was signed in December 2000 and initiated cooperation on maritime boundary and fishing in the area together with joint patrols to ensure law enforcement.

Mr. Michel Soula, NATO, Belgium, spoke on "Enforcement on the High Seas". While maritime security threats remain a global problem, the international community faces a key problem. Namely, that they have been too successful in counter-piracy activities which led to a mission fatigue. At the moment there seems to be too much focus on capacity building alone without focussing on maritime operations. But in order to be successful in the long run, both aspects need to be combined. Since NATO is an important law enforcement agency on the high seas, Soula described key maritime operations of the organization such as Operation Unified Protector, Operation Active Endeavour or Operation Ocean Shield. All these missions have contributed to air operations in Afghanistan, securing sea lanes of communication, ensuring the success of the Libya operation, and counter both piracy and terrorism. Based on these experiences, Soula recommended six lessons learnt.

- Maintaining a presence in areas of crucial concern;
- being able to reinforce speedily when the need arises;
- gathering and sharing intelligence;
- developing maritime situational awareness;
- involving partners; and
- co-operating with multinational institutions and agencies as well as with private industry.

In order to remain successful, NATO has to evolve from pure operations to a broader maritime dimension. The new conceptual framework of the Alliance' Maritime Strategy pays tribute to this development as NATO shall provide contributions to deterrence and collective defence, crisis management/response, cooperative security through partnerships, and maritime security. Another document for the future work of NATO is the Military Committee Concept for Maritime Security Operations (MSO) which names, among others, maritime situational awareness, freedom of navigations, anti-proliferation of WMDs, protection of critical infrastructure, maritime counter-terrorism, and capacity building as the key tasks for NATO. These new concepts are supported by the decision to



transfer the command for all maritime operations to the headquarter in Northwood.

In the discussion a number of points were raised about the Chinese reorganization of its agencies. MSA was not integrated yet as it also enforces international agreements, while the other agencies focus on domestic issues. However, nobody knows how long the integration will take. The Gulf of Tonkin is a good experience for China and it hopes that this can be duplicated in the South China Sea. The People's Republic of China is ready for such joint patrols and flexible on both bilateral and multilateral cooperation as they do not exclude each other. However, in the Chinese perspective territorial disputes have to be solved bilaterally. China is also very well aware of the threat in the Strait of Malacca which is why it enforces its activities in Myanmar and the possible canal in Thailand. The country is starting to use the Arctic, but sees a number of unpredictable influences – cost-effectiveness and the opening of the ice shield are among these factors.

A problem in the Strait of Malacca is also that it is no high seas and thus, by definition, not piracy, but armed robbery. This influences whether the navies or coast guards can become active. As a result the countries in the region use domestic laws to address the issue as their EEZs cover the territory. For instance, the cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia is very close although both are not member of ReCAAP.

It was also highlighted that maritime security should actually be part of development cooperation since it has to address under-development and poor governance structures as the cause of piracy. Fighting piracy will increase the amount of caught fish and strengthen tourism which will then have financial benefits.

Session II: Transnational Organised Crime at Sea

Dr. Chie Kojima, Musashino University, Japan, spoke on "The Problem of Ungoverned Maritime Space". Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides a clear governance structure, there is a feeling of ungoverned maritime space. This is due to four reasons. First, territorial waters of failed states lack functioning enforcement powers. Second, territorial waters of less-resources states lack personnel and financial resources. Third, territorial waters of some well-resources states lack political will. Fourth, the differentiation between EEZ and high seas is not always clear and thus, it is uncertain whether exclusive flag-state jurisdictions or universal jurisdictions are applicable.

The goals of governing maritime space should be to prevent imminent public order violations, suspend current public order violations, deter potential future public order violations, restore public order after it has been violated, correct the behavior that generates public order violations, rehabilitate victims, and reconstruct in a larger social sense to remove conditions that generate public order violations.



Kojima identified four key challenges to governance in the maritime domain – drug trafficking, migrants smuggling and human trafficking, piracy as well as armed robbery at sea, and unprotected human rights at sea.

When solving the problem of ungoverned space, several relations have to be addressed. Does freedom of navigation overrides world public order? Does security overrides human rights? Kojima concluded by saying that maritime security institutions and networks are building up, but are divided by public and private initiatives.

“The Situation of Piracy in Southeast Asia” was presented by **Ms Jane Chan**, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. The situation in the Strait of Malacca has significantly improved after 2004 due to regular patrols and the economic boom in Indonesia. However, since 2010/2011 a slight increase can be observed. This might be due to the financial crisis. This increase has a geographical component. While the attacks in the Strait of Malacca remain low, the attacks take place mainly in Indonesian waters. Most of them are attacks at night time and on vessels at anchor or in ports. They are characterized by low physical violence and as petty crimes with weapons.

The regional response can be divided into top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down initiatives involve talks at the ASEAN Maritime Forum, ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting. The bottom-up actions are more decisive and include bilateral and multilateral efforts, Malacca Straits Patrols, ReCAAP-ISC and the Information Fusion Centre (IFC). The Malacca Strait Patrols are a coordinated, but not joint approach by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand on air, sea patrols and intelligence exchange. ReCAAP-ISC has been extremely successful, but faces the problem of finding the right agency to talk to as sometimes the navies and other times the coast guards are responsible. The IFC wants to achieve a multi-agency center which goes beyond piracy and provides an early warning of maritime security. It does so by providing capacity building through system training, maritime security workshops and information sharing exercises. Another initiative is the ASEAN Info-Sharing Portal (AIP) which was launched in 2012 as a common platform to reinforce information sharing procedures. The AIP has also an app available for smart phone to improve the communication. Shipping engagement has been an essential feature of the success in Southeast Asia. This includes navies, seafarer und industry who bring in the most important ideas. A new initiative is the maritime security chart of ReCAAP, IFC and the UK released in May 2013.

Chan concluded by highlighting reasons for the success in the region. Timely and accurate reporting, information sharing to provide a better picture of the threats as well as challenges help the agencies to act. Especially aggregated statistics can be misleading. The role of the shipping industry and local law enforcement cannot be underestimated. However, since reliance on the sea as a mode of transport is a fact, increased



cooperation and prioritization in the context of limited resources can make a difference.

Vice Admiral Hubert de Gaullier des Bordes, EU-MARSIC, France, spoke on "Countering Piracy at Sea". Piracy at high sea is particularly present in the Western Indian Ocean and the most appropriate solution would be to develop stronger regional cooperation. The Djibouti Code of Conduct tries to achieve this through information sharing, capacity building and other regional trainings. This shall help to reintroduce maritime administration in the fragile region which will also help to tackle the root causes of insecurity and enable the littoral states to take over.

If piracy can be encountered successfully, this will help and can be the foundation for maritime security development in the region. Although there are differences between piracy and armed robbery at sea, both topics are closely connected and should be resolved. Operation Atlanta has been very successful so far, but the influence of private guards is disputable. In order to be successful in the long run encountering piracy has to be part of a comprehensive interagency approach. As sharing of intelligence information is difficult since it will tackle the states' sovereignty, open-source information needs to be shared. This can be accompanied by a focus on maritime situational awareness instead of maritime domain awareness. Further, a better coordination among the various internationally funded projects can increase the effectiveness and efficiency. Besides information sharing, training on maritime information, legal frameworks, maritime administration and law enforcement has to be enhanced to ensure a proper use of the available data.

Four problems can be identified in the fight against piracy. Tensions can be recognized between cooperation and sovereignty. Cooperation means opening up to partners and give them access to certain information which some states might perceive as interference in their sovereignty. Second, financial resources are limited. Third, maritime security is still not a top priority for all countries in the Western Indian Ocean. Lastly, there is a mismatch between what security forces provide and vessels actually need. Thus, the shipping community has to communicate clearly what they expect from the region.

The discussion highlighted several challenges when encountering piracy. In Indonesia, piracy still ranks behind fishing, irregular migration and drug smuggling on the agenda. In addition, most ships do not bring business to the countries in Southeast Asia, but are transregional and pass through their waters. This makes them still responsible for their protection. There is also a question of responsibility. Most of the time armed robbery takes place in ports and are, thus, part of port security.

A vital question is whether the international community must provide public order to allow freedom of navigation. Governance of maritime domain should not limit freedom of navigation, but incorporate it with other goals such as fighting human trafficking on sea.



An interesting point raised was whether the South China Sea issues have an impact on transnational crimes such as illegal fishing. Piracy might not be considered in this case as it is a hit-and-run crime. For instance, do the tensions and the new claims 'create' more illegal fishing since former open territories are being claimed by a state or do the tensions and the presence of naval forces decrease illegal fishing. In this case it is also difficult to decide whether it is intentional or unintentional fishing. For example, a fisherman can be working in an old ground, but if this area is turned into territorial waters it falls under UNCLOS, putting the fishing grounds under restriction.

III Session: Obstacles in Euro-Asian Collaboration

Mr. Yoshihisa Endo, ReCAAP-ISC, Singapore, talked about "Information sharing between Europe and Asia". ReCAAP-ISC is the first successful regional organization in Asia to enhance cooperation in combating piracy. ReCAAP has three pillars of which information sharing is the key one with the two others being capacity-building and co-operation arrangements. In order to share the information, each signatory state has a focal point which collects data and facilitates its country's law enforcement investigations. This ensures a two-way dialogue from the local to the regional level and vice-versa. In order to get a comprehensive picture, the shipping industry, think tanks and International Organizations are also included in the process.

Being faced with many transnational crimes nowadays, it is essential to share information. This helps to fill gaps, creates situational awareness, shows lessons learned by other countries and facilitates more effective planning. Information sharing should take place at all time and not when an incident happens as this will create a smoother flow of the data. Thus, incident report, periodical reports, publications and conferences are necessary. Based on these reports, regional organizations such as ReCAAP-ISC can draft warnings, incident alerts for high risk areas and provide the focal points with prevention advices.

Benefits from information sharing are situational awareness, timeliness of information, access to broad network of information, participation in training activities, building of confidence, cooperation in other fields, and engagement with other stakeholders.

On the other hand, obstacles or restrictions for not sharing information are no access to information, no first-hand information, no access to classified and more confidential data, a lack of cooperation partners, and fewer capacities.

"A European Union's Perspective on Euro-Asian Collaboration" was provided by **Mr. Christian Dupont**, European Commission DG MOVE, Belgium. The European Union has a strong interest in dialogue with Asia on maritime security as any competition between the main actors will not be useful. Traditional threats to maritime security are mainly



diplomatic and military, such as territorial disputes. Non-traditional threats to maritime security happen on a day to day basis. They include transnational organized crime, piracy, terrorism, and illegal fishing. The EU defines maritime security as “means the combination of preventing measures intended to protect shipping and port facilities against threats of intentional unlawful acts”. Often the EU takes a maritime transport perspective on maritime security.

The current developments in the EU include implementation and control of ISPS (International Ship and Port Facility Service) measures, working towards a maritime security strategy to improve civilian-military cooperation and wanting to apply best management practices not only in Somalia, but elsewhere.

EU-Asia cooperation should focus on several topics. It should ensure the free flow of goods from East to West to East. It should develop a common understanding on basics such as UNCLOS. In addition, a dialogue structure needs to be established and specific initiatives joined. Both regions have to ensure the thorough implementation of international instruments, the ISPS Code and pay attention to the joint IMO/ILO Code of Conduct on Port security. Finally, they should cooperate on capacity building and maritime governance. However, the EU has the problem that its current mandate does not allow for cooperation on maritime security. Thus, the countries have to take the way of high-level cooperation or establish new instruments to cooperate.

Mr. Giles Noakes, BIMCO, United Kingdom, provided “A shipping industry’s perspective”. The main reason for keeping the SLOCs secure is trade. Only secure SLOCs can ensure reliability, predictability and meeting of schedules. Ships are vulnerable at all stages of their journey – in ports, while on route, during off-loading and, in particular, at choke points. This risk has even increased with the growing number of container ships. Important choke points are in the Middle East. The Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden are examples in case. The Strait of Hormuz is no problem according to Noakes since Iran is a nett-importer and will not close this access.

The industry has a perception of being at strategic risk which includes terrorism, drug and weapon smuggling. States often fear a loss of authority if they act outside their territory, but if they do not act, this will cause insecurity. The industry is also afraid that maritime security might not be in the vital interest of states anymore. Therefore, they feel under threat, especially on the high seas where states have limited desire for ownership. Thus, nations have to realize that their economies are highly dependent on trade via the oceans. Noakes recognized a vicious circle in the areas of choke points. There is no investment because of lack of trust and this results in economic instability. This again reinforces political and military instability which in return leads to a lack of investment. He suggested applying the 1,000 ship navy concept which is based on a common interest in accordance with capabilities. The first step is maritime domain



Centre in Singapore

awareness by collecting oceanwide and local data. This information then needs to be processed and shared. The final step is regulating the Seas and carrying out the enforcement.

The experience from Southeast Asia provides some lessons learned. The establishment of regional mechanism, the achievement of political stability on land, national law enforcement and addressing the root cause are some of them. However, due to the large area and high number of ships in the Gulf of Guinea and off the coast of Somalia, other mechanisms are required.

Noakes concluded by saying that effective and efficient partnerships are the key to solving the problem. Significant disruption of commerce is easily possible and the growing demand for energy in Asia brings in another perspective. As the vulnerability is increasing with globalization, the shipping industry is strongly worried and demands a global solution to secure trade.

Session IV: The Arctic and Maritime Security

Commodore Lars Saunes, Coast Guard, Norway, addressed the issue of “Operational difficulties in the Arctic”. The Norwegian Coast Guard is part of the military organization and shall uphold the country’s sovereignty, conduct maritime law enforcement and handle security challenges on a lower scale.

The country sees the Arctic as a stable region with low tensions, good military cooperation and high attention. However, the region is experiencing increased activities which have an impact on the operational level. Claims and disputes are not likely to escalate into a conflict as the claims are accepted and overlapping claims are settled on a bilateral basis (e.g. agreement between Norway and Russia in 2010). The biggest operational challenge is the climate. The commercial activities are expected to increase with the climate change. The most important industries are fisheries, oil, gas, minerals and maritime transport. The Arctic is a potential highway for trade and also for transporting resources out of the region. Whether or not the trade will increase depends on the profits, safety and predictability of the route. Especially the increased activity of huge cruise ships is seen as a problem. These activities increase the risks and require a robust response with surveillance, communication and trained forces.

Saunes does not see big security challenges in the region. Out of eight members of the Arctic Council five are NATO allies and the relations with Sweden, Finland and Russia are peaceful. There is close military cooperation among the member states as well as bi- and multilateral agreements. NATO does not intend to increase its activities in the region, but in case of wartime, the collective defence framework would be applied. Norway has a close cooperation with Russia and there is joint military training on search and rescue, safety as well as security. While the resources are often seen as a potential problem,



Norway and Russia cooperate on the extraction and fishery.

The Arctic Council does not see need to establish a separate international framework for the Arctic. Existing laws such as UNCLOS and Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) can be applied. UNCLOS will also regulate maritime borders. If this is accepted by all states, neither flag planting nor war ships will result in tensions. The resources will stay uncontested as well. Thus, a race for resources is unlikely.

Saunes concluded that the operational challenges increased which requires enhanced international cooperation as well as a comprehensive approach between military forces and civilian agencies.

Dr Heike Deggim, International Maritime Organization, United Kingdom, spoke on "Regulating the High North". The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been working on the polar areas before the polar code discussion started. Thus, there are a number of existing regulatory frameworks for ice-covered areas. UNCLOS clarifies that coastal states can enforce laws to prevent marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone (Art. 234). Second, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) includes aspects on navigational requirements. These are usage of meteorological services and warnings, use of ice patrol service, and provision of information on danger to navigation. In 2008 the Intact Stability Act was adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee. The document includes a part on icing considerations for ships operating in such areas (chapter 6). In 2009 the IMO Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters were introduced which is a set of recommendations. The International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) states a number of aspects on the Antarctic to achieve a zero discharge protection, but very little on the Arctic. An example is the prevention of oil pollution in polar regions. The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) includes a training guidance for personnel on ships operating in ice-covered waters and measures to ensure the competency of masters and officers of ships operating in polar waters. In addition, there are guidelines for fishing vessels on ice accretion, especially on the ice allowance for stability calculations.

A new IMO instrument which is currently under development is the Mandatory Polar Code. This code will have a mandatory part A and a recommendatory part B. It will be a completely new polar manual which will, however, add on to SOLAS and MARPOL. In order to make it mandatory to MARPOL and SOLAS, these two conventions have to be amended though. The two most difficult topics in the discussions are environmental protection and energy efficiency. There are clashes between environmental organization and the Arctic countries over the degree of environmental protection. In particular, the case of heavy fuel oil (HFO) is strongly debated. With regard to energy efficiency (EEDI),



the case of cargo ships having ice-breaking capabilities is problematic. While they use the most energy, they shall be exempted from the requirements as they will otherwise not have enough energy for ice-breaking.

A presentation on “Why does the Arctic matter for Asia? – A Korean Perspective” was given by **Prof. Seokwoo Lee**, Inha University, Republic of Korea. On 15 May 2013, the Republic of Korea became a permanent observer to the Arctic Council. Most of Korea’s interest is connected to economy. They include scientific research in the Arctic, opening of a new Arctic route, transforming Busan Port into a logistics-oriented hub port, potential participation in hydrocarbon resource development and exploitation, boosting the shipping and offshore platform industries, entering into the Arctic fisheries industry, and increasing participation in Arctic governance. Although the Korean interest has developed only recently, it is very strong due to the trade opening. While Singapore and Hong Kong fear less business, South Korea hopes to increase its share.

Within the Arctic Council, South Korea wants to establish and maintain good relations with Arctic Council members and permanent participants. They also want to help build a comprehensive Arctic strategy. The country actually has a pan-government Arctic development plan. However, they are aware of the challenges and the limitations as a permanent observer. For the Republic of Korea these challenges are scientific research in the Arctic, limitations on using the Nordic route, balancing economic goals with environmental concerns and geopolitical changes in East Asia following the opening of Arctic routes.

The final presentation on “India as an Observer in the Arctic Council” was delivered by **Commander Rikeesh Sharma**, National Maritime Foundation, India. India has a long-term scientific, commercial and environmental interest in the Arctic. It wants to study the connections between the Arctic climate and the Indian monsoon, the effects of global warming, the dynamics of Arctic glaciers, and comparative studies on flora and fauna in the two polar regions. The country wants to contribute scientific temper to be a good advocate and symbiotic relationships to achieve global governance. Being strongly involved in the international trading routes and with 70-80 per cent of trade being maritime, the new shipping route via the Arctic is certainly of interest to India. If the new routes are not well managed from the start, regional disputes can become a threat. These can be maritime boundaries, continental shelf delimitation, threats to SLOC security and energy flows, resource protection and natural disasters. As a reaction, India has developed a new Indian Maritime Doctrine in 2009. The objective of the Indian maritime strategy is to provide the overarching rationale for creating and utilization of the Indian navy during peace, crisis & conflict. This shall help to engage other nations, prevent conflicts and build capacities. Challenges to cooperation are inadequate



governance at organizational level, lack of knowledge and management techniques and absence of strategies for effective implementation.

Sharma concluded by highlighting that combating irregular threats depends on continued national efforts and regional initiatives. As likely scenarios see a possible moderate rise in irregular threats in the future, joint efforts by maritime and law enforcement agencies is required.

The conference identified current development and possibilities for future Europe-Asia cooperation. Although the situation on piracy has improved significantly over the past years, maritime security should not be taken for granted. The business sector is afraid that the attention will decrease due to the recent progress, but the SLOCs require a constant surveillance to ensure their security. At the end of the day, they are vital for the global trade. For instance, the piracy situation in Southeast Asia improved much over the past years, but recent data still identifies severe hotspots that need to be monitored closely. Besides piracy and the territorial disputes, Europe and Asia are confronted with additional non-traditional security issues on sea. Examples for this are transnational organized crime at sea, resource sharing and fishing on high sea. The EU can share its experiences with Asia on how these topics were addressed previously to ease tensions. In this context information sharing is one of the key approaches. In addition, it is necessary to establish a clear distinction in the tasks of the navies and coast guards. Due to their different capacities and capabilities, they can complement each other very well, but their responsibilities have to be regulated to avoid inefficiency. The Arctic will be a topic of growing interest to Europe-Asia cooperation and should be addressed at an early stage. While IMO is working on polar legislations and several existing ones take care of specific segments, the international community lacks a comprehensive policy on the Arctic. It will be crucial to establish such legal measures and enforce them to ensure the mutual benefit of the opening of the Northwest Passage.



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