

The Municipal Elections in Israel 2013

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From the Editor's Desk

We are pleased to publish an issue in the *Arabs in Israel Update* series, summarizing the results of the municipal elections in Arab and Druze localities, which were held on October 22 (first round) and November 5 (second round), 2013. The publication of this issue follows a conference on the Arab local governments in Israel and the results of the local elections, organized by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation in November 21, 2013.

The time that elapsed since the elections affords some perspective as we examine the results. In retrospect, the recent election campaign does not signal a change in political voting patterns in the Arab municipal arena. One indication of the lack of change is the fact that 25 of the 73 Arab localities (one-third, similar to previous elections in 2008), held a second election round after an inconclusive result regarding the candidate elected to head the local government. As in the past, most of the localities in Israel that held a second round in the recent elections were Arab localities (25 of the 38 localities that held a second round, or 66%). These statistics point to the extent of political division that is typical of most Arab localities, and impedes a conclusive outcome in local government elections (see the statistics and analysis in the final section of the current issue).

Another reflection of the stability of the largely patriarchic voting patterns in Arab municipal politics is the negligible representation of Arab women in local Arab politics: Only eight women were elected as local council members (four in Nazareth, one in Sakhnin, and one in Eylabun, in addition to two in the mixed cities of Acre and Haifa). Although these figures represent an increase from the 2008 elections (when a total of six women were elected council members, mixed cities included), the percentage of women elected as council members in Arab localities remains negligible, at less than 1%. Despite the buzz on this issue before the elections, and although more Arab women than ever stood in realistic slots, the outcome does not herald a substantial change.

One of the main conclusions reached by several Arab intellectuals and scholars, in their discussions of the local election results in Arab localities, was that family and sectarian circles of belonging continue to play a dominant role in municipal Arab politics, while the power of political parties has diminished. In the attempt to explain this point, many commentators have directed their criticism at Arab body politic's internal ailments: Not only have Arabs failed to discard familial voting patterns, it seems to have become even more deeply entangled in them. Criticism was also directed at state institutions, which were accused of intentionally turning a blind eye to offensive practices in Arab localities during the elections, and taking insufficient action to eradicate them.

The time that elapsed since the elections has made it possible for us to collect the official statistics published by Israel's Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice, as well as data generously provided to us by the Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Balad (National Democratic Alliance) political parties and members of the Islamic Movement. In most localities where they competed, Hadash

and Balad competed independently in the elections, although in several localities such as Umm al-Fahm, they joined forces with local political elements and presented a joint list for the local councils. A unique collaboration between the two parties developed in Rameh, where the joint list won two seats on the local council (one for each party). All in all, 60 Hadash representatives (including three in mixed cities), and 24 Balad representatives (including five in mixed cities) were elected to local councils.

Compared to the previous 2008 elections, Hadash and Balad retained their political power in the local councils. Nonetheless, compared to the previous elections, when six Hadash candidates were elected to head local councils, only two were elected to this position in the 2013 elections, in Iksal and in Yafia'. At the time of publication of this issue, the election results for the position of mayor of Nazareth await a final legal ruling, and therefore it is too early to determine whether Hadash managed to maintain its four-decade-long dominance in Nazareth municipal politics. Balad, in contrast, boasted that the candidates that it directly supported in several localities, including Umm al-Fahm, Tira, Sakhnin, 'Arabeh, and Shefar'am, were elected as heads of the local councils. However, these winners were not official Balad candidates; they headed their own independent lists. Therefore, in summary, no Balad representative was elected head of a local council in the 2013 elections.

An interesting picture emerges regarding the Islamic Movement. Similar to the previous elections in 2008, the Movement's stronghold was the Bedouin localities in the Negev, where its candidates were elected in three of the seven localities that held elections. The Movement also competed successfully in the mixed cities of Ramleh and Lydda. Still, the Movement's popularity declined in the Galilee and northern regions as well as the central region ("the Triangle"). Not only the statistics, but also the Islamic Movement's strategy in the recent local elections point to the Movement's relative decline. In eight of the 16 localities in which the Movement presented candidates for election, the Movement set up alliances with local political lists rather than compete independently. This strategy raises the following question: After claiming for many years that it has transcended family-based and clan-based affiliations, was the Islamic Movement swayed by these elements and consequently became immersed in clan politics? Moreover, in light of the Movement's Northern Faction abstaining from participating in the 2013 local elections, are we now standing at a turning point at which the Islamist stream in Israel is gradually relinquishing the political dimension of its operations (at least in municipal politics) and withdrawing into itself for a reassessment of the situation?

This issue reviews the major issues that concern the Arab public in Israel in response to the announcement of the final election results. In this issue's lead editorial, Nohad Ali analyzes the implications of the Islamic Movement's decision not to participate in the recent electoral campaign in Umm al-Fahm. In the two essays that follow, Ziad Abu Habla addresses the fundamental question on how to improve the economic situation of the local Arab governments, while Nadia Hilo focuses on the results of the elections for the Tel Aviv-Jaffa city council, in which the city's Arab residents conspicuously lacked any representation. These essays are followed by translations of excerpts from several items and op-eds that appeared in Arabic language newspapers and websites. The final section of this issue is devoted to presenting statistical data on

election results in Arab and Druze localities and mixed cities, including the electoral results of Hadash, Balad, and the Islamic Movement.

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The editorials reflect the opinions of their authors only.

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The Editor

Editorials

Nohad Ali* / The Significance of the Islamic Movement's Abstention in Israel's Municipal Elections

The Islamic Movement in Israel started in the early 1970s as a national, religious minority movement in a Jewish, typically Western-oriented state. The Movement viewed both Israel's Jewish character and its Western orientation as problematic.

Initially, the Islamic Movement operated in the religious-community sphere, and in the late 1970s it became active in the national sphere. Operating in this sphere distinguished the Movement from its sister movements in the Arab and Islamic world: In those movements, national issues are not high on the agenda and occasionally even clash with their over-arching Islamic identity. In the early 1980s, the Movement turned to the municipal sphere where its success prompted its leaders to further expand operations in this arena. Local government election results show that the Movement made gains in almost all the towns in which it stood for election. In 1989, the Movement's candidate was elected mayor of Umm al-Fahm, Israel's second largest Arab city. After much hesitation, the Movement decided to run in the 14th Knesset elections in 1996. The decision caused the Movement to split into two factions: While some argue that the split was motivated by ideological differences, others claim that motives were personal and tactical (Ali, 1998).

The Movement's split did not prevent both factions from standing for the subsequent municipal elections held in 1998. The two factions officially competed independently, but only in rare cases did both factions compete for the mayorship of a specific town; rather, the two factions typically cooperated with each other during election campaigns. Cooperation was not the result of organizational coordination between the factions' leaders, but rather stemmed from local initiatives at the town level: Grassroots voices in support of unification were stronger than the calls for division voiced by the factions' leaders. Local leaders obviously refrained from criticizing the factions' leaders, and faction leaders preferred to avoid confrontation with the grassroots leaders. Both factions of the Islamic Movement ultimately enjoyed considerable success in their municipal election campaigns in the 1990s.

In the early 2000s, the Movement's developmental trajectory took a sharp turn: In a surprising step at the height of their success, the leaders of the northern faction decided to abandon the municipal arena and leave municipal politics to others. The leaders of the northern faction announced their decision in the media during the 2003 local government elections campaigns. Their decision did not apply to the city of Umm al-Fahm, the northern faction's bastion, because of the city's symbolic status, and, presumably, due to convenience and their chances of success there. The decision not to stand for election created a quandary for many actors—the Israeli

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establishment, politicians, Arab public leaders, and, of course, researchers of the Islamic Movement.

Researchers of the Islamic Movement in Israel have offered three explanations for the northern faction's withdrawal from municipal elections. The first group of scholars argued that the northern faction's abstention in the elections is a direct outcome of the same radicalization that led to its abstention in national Knesset elections. According to these scholars, this undeniable trend reflects the faction leaders' persistent refusal to recognize Israel. In an interview to *Globes* on August 18, 1985, Yosef Ginat argued that "these young people are the most radical, also in their negation of the state's existence, and they avoid any involvement in its civil settings." More or less similar arguments have appeared in publications by Rekhess (1997; 2000) and Kedar (2011) and are used extensively by Israeli right-wing politicians. According to this essentially ideological explanation, the northern faction is motivated by radical ideology that refuses to accept Israel's right to exist as a state and refuses to resign itself to the Muslims' status as a minority within a Jewish nation-state.

The second group of scholars criticizes the first, and rejects their ideological explanation. According to this group, no ideological significance should be attributed to the faction's participation in national or municipal elections. Scholar Aziz Haidar interprets the northern faction's abstention in the municipal elections as a sign of weakness, albeit temporary. He believes that the decision not to participate in the elections reflects the Arab public's gradual estrangement from the Islamic Movement in general, and from the northern faction in particular, in the wake of the October 2000 events and the arrest of its leader Sheikh Ra'id Salah. Haidar believes that abstention is an expression of the public sentiment that the Islamic Movement adopted overly radical positions on religious and nationalist issues, and also reflects public indifference at the Movement's attempt to portray Islam as the spearhead of the global battle against the West, since the local Muslims are busy worrying about everyday concerns (*Haaretz*, October 12, 2003).

Haidar's interpretation is, however, not supported by a scientific study. In fact, I believe that no study or public opinion survey has found evidence of the northern faction's weakness. Haidar's is an essentially instrumental explanation that implies that the northern faction will return to compete in municipal, and possibly national elections, when circumstances change. Moreover, the Islamic Movement's 2013 decision to include Umm al-Fahm, the Movement's stronghold, in its decision to abstain in the elections proves that Haidar's instrumental explanation is inaccurate.

Understandably, the leaders of the Islamic Movement's northern faction reject both explanations, especially the first explanation, which argues that abstention is grounded in ideology that is essentially based on non-recognition of Israel. The leaders of the faction have always said, "We should not have to declare our allegiance to the State of Israel every other day or kiss the blue identity card that we received from it. Our status as citizens of the state is a fact, and we are law-abiding citizens." They also scoff at the second, instrumental, explanation: "We stopped competing at the height of our power. It is a fact that we have made achievements in almost every town in which we stood for election. There was no case in which we suffered a complete loss, especially not in Umm al-Fahm." They also stated, "Whoever wants to assess our strength is invited to come to the 'Al-Aksa in Danger' Festival that we hold every year. The number of participants exceeds one hundred thousand." It should be

noted that attendees are not all necessarily members of the Islamic Movement's northern faction.

The third group of scholars, to which I belong, argues that the explanation for the northern faction's withdrawal from municipal elections is grounded in religious-fundamentalist principles (Ali, 2004; 2006). Engagement in politics, and especially in municipal elections, has diverted the Movement from its primary missions to "Islamize" the masses, cultivate the "new believer," and establish a self-sustaining community (*mujtama' isami*) (Ali, 2007). On the other hand, politics — especially municipal politics — requires an enormous investment of energy, is time consuming, triggers tension and rivalries between parties and individuals, corrupts, and even possibly alienates political rivals from religion as it is represented by the Islamic Movement.

This explanation has found expression in the northern faction's literature and in interviews with its leaders. "Our participation in municipal elections, and especially competing for the head of local governments, only created losses for us. Competing in the elections exacerbated the competition and internal divisions among people from the same town, and prevented overall agreement on the activities of the Islamic Movement," argued Movement leaders in 2003, when they decided to abstain in the elections (Ali, 2004).

These three explanations were proposed before the recent dramatic decision by the leaders of the northern faction to abstain from competing for the mayorship of Umm al-Fahm — the faction's bastion, fortress, and symbol. On September 13, 2013, the Islamic Movement issued a public statement announcing its decision. The statement emphasized that the decision to refrain from participating in the elections for the Umm al-Fahm municipality binds all Movement supporters, and the decision does not express a personal opinion for or against any candidate. The statement also stated that abstention applied to the elections for both the head of the municipality and for the municipal council. The statement further explained that the Movement never promised its indirect support to any of the candidates. Finally, the Movement leaders did not urge their supporters, "the sons of the Islamic Movement," to abstain from voting or even hint that they should do so. "The supporters have a right to vote according to their conscience for any candidate, provided that they do not unite in favor of any specific candidate." This announcement should not affect the validity of the explanations offered above, but it did evoke discomfort among some of the residents of Umm al-Fahm, especially since the incumbent mayor who ran in these elections was previously elected as a representative of the Islamic Movement.

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Ziyad Abu Habla* / The Arab Local Governments in Israel: Moving Toward Economic Independence

In recent years, local authorities in Israel, especially local authorities in the Arab sector, have been affected by a grave economic crisis resulting in the collapse of public services in several local governments (Ben Basat & Dahan, 2008). By the end of 2003, the total debt of Israel's local authorities reached approximately NIS 24 billion, 41% of which were due to their current liabilities. The financial crisis was manifest in the complete failure of performance in several areas, such as the limited ability to provide municipal services, difficulties in meeting payrolls, and a wave of legal complaints and foreclosures.

Today, 1.5 million Arabs are residents of Israel, creating a significant minority that accounts for close to 20% of the country's population. According to statistics for late 2013, 85 of the country's 257 local authorities belong to the Arab sector. Local authorities in the Arab sector suffer from fundamental issues, some of which are unique to this sector (Azaiza & Ghanem, 2008). Since 2011, many Arab local authorities have experienced financial strife. Arab local authorities have historically suffered from large deficits that reached 6.5% of their revenues (compared to 5.5% in the Jewish sector). In 2004, 44% of all Arab local authorities were late in paying their employees, compared to 12% of the local authorities in the Jewish sector. In addition, specific barriers in Arab society hinder the efficient operations and management of local authorities in the Arab sector. It is because of these barriers that the financial crisis in the Arab sector is more intense than in the Jewish local authorities. The depth of the financial crisis affecting Arab local authorities is evidenced by the fact that 23 of the 31 committees appointed since 2004 were in Arab local authorities, and in late 2008, 54 of the total accompanying comptrollers were assigned to Arab local authorities.

In 2004, Government Resolution 1475 provided that a comprehensive solution to the local authorities' deficits should be sought by increasing financial oversight, including the appointment of accompanying comptrollers, implementation of rehabilitation plans, merger of local authorities, and in extreme cases — dismissal and replacement of the elected council with an appointed committee to manage the local authorities' affairs.

Although it used most of the measures available, Israel's Union of Local Authorities (ULA) failed to resolve the financial crisis in the Arab sector local authorities (Abu Habla 2010, 2011, 2012). The ULA, which typically attributed the responsibility for the deficits to human resource expenses, failed to resolve the fundamental issues of Arab sector local governments that generally were the main reasons these local governments amassed deficits. The most important causes of the crisis in the Arab sector local authorities are:

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(a) **Socio-economic conditions:** The Arab population suffers from poor socio-economic conditions, including poverty and unemployment. Approximately 96% of all Arab local authorities belong to the bottom four socio-economic clusters of local authorities in Israel (Agmon, 2009). Approximately one-half of the Arab population lives in poverty (54%) compared to 15.9% of the Jewish population. Unemployment of Arab males is 14.1%, compared to 9.1% in the Jewish sector. These features are the main barriers to local authorities' management and their ability to collect municipal taxes. For example, the collection rate in the Arab sector (excluding discounts) rises steeply from 12% in local authorities in the bottom (tenth) cluster, to 50% in local authorities in the sixth cluster. In contrast, the collection rate in Jewish local authorities ranges from 40% in local authorities in the bottom cluster to 84% in local authorities in the top (first) cluster (Brender, 2005). Independent sources of revenues account for 23% of the total revenues of Arab local authorities, in contrast to 60% of the revenues of Jewish local authorities (Razin, 2002).

(b) **Planning and Development:** State land policy is based on centralized governmental ownership and control of land (Niv & Mushkin, 2002). The state currently controls 93% of the country's land (Israel Land Administration, 2013). Poor planning and neglect on part of successive government administrations created a grave structural imbalance in the local authorities' revenue sources: Only 2.4% of the country's employment / industrial zones are located in the Arab sector. The absence of industrial and commercial zones and public buildings in the Arab local authorities accounts for the paucity of independent revenue sources, which increases their dependence on government support. Government support accounts for 67% of the Arab local authorities revenues, compared to 36% of the revenues of Jewish local authorities. The Arab local authorities have limited ability to resolve these structural barriers related to planning and development (Khamaisi, 2008). Furthermore, as most government ministries and agencies do not maintain local offices in the Arab sector, Arab local authorities' benefits from municipal taxes by government agencies is negligible: Of the total NIS 1.1 billion in municipal taxes paid by government agencies, 0.2% were collected by the Arab sector, and the remaining 99.8% were collected by local authorities in the Jewish sector (Agmon, 2009).

(c) **Clan-based structure:** In most Arab local authorities, the management culture has an individualist-centralized orientation that originates from the sector's traditional, patriarchic, clan-based society (Al-Haj & Rosenfeld, 1990). Clan-based voting patterns, accompanied by an absence of laws that define the required qualifications of candidates for local government posts typically led to the election of individuals who are inadequately qualified for key leadership positions (Ben-Elia, 1999). Clan-based voting patterns leads to the mismanagement of local authority budgets, which range from NIS 30 million in local councils to NIS 150 million in municipalities.

(d) **Discriminatory budget allocations:** The government does not give equal treatment to Arab sector and non-Arab sector local authorities. Inequalities are reflected in differences in per capita balancing and development grants. Per capita balancing grants to Arab local authorities are 30% lower than the same grants awarded to Jewish local authorities (NIS 700 and NIS 1,040, respectively). Per capita development grants awarded to Arab local authorities are 46% of the grants awarded to Jewish local authorities (NIS 420 and NIS 910, respectively). At the same time, the government fails to provide Arab local authorities with the resources and budgets

required to improve its public services (Bulter, Travers, & Adonis, 1997), forcing local authorities to rely on independent recruitment of resources and sources of funding (Boddy & Fudge, 1984). The government grants matching funds for specific projects, provided that the recipient local authority raises 25% of the project budget. However, this policy has little application in the Arab sector, where municipal tax collection rates remain low at 23% due to the deep-seated problems of local authorities in this sector, despite the decade of government-appointed management committees.

Resolving the local government crisis in the Arab sector requires a fundamental change in both local and state government policies. At the local level, the Arab population should denounce the custom of clan-based voting. Legislative action should be taken to define minimum conditions and qualifications for candidates running for post of local authority head or council member. Voting rates of 90% in the local authority elections of 2003 guaranteed a representative for each local clan. As a result, the diversity of clan interests eclipsed considerations of proper governance, leading to mismanagement of local authorities. Budgets generally fail to pass due to narrow clan interests rather than professional disagreements. In fact, apparently 9 of the 23 government-appointed committees to date were appointed in response to the local authority's failure to approve its budget. Therefore, it is imperative to increase the election threshold. At the same time, the state government should change its policy toward Arab local authorities in order to facilitate their economic independence and non-reliance on the state government. To this end, the following measures are necessary:

1. Equitable allocation of balancing and development grants to Arab and Jewish local authorities.
1. Re-division of geographic jurisdictions: It is inconceivable that 44 Jewish regional authorities control 80% of the country's land and benefit from municipal taxes paid by industries and businesses operating in their jurisdictions.
2. Resolution of the land shortage: Development of employment and industrial zones will change the unbalanced revenue mix of the Arab local authorities. Joint Arab-Jewish industrial zones should be developed to serve weaker socio-economic populations.
3. Fair allocation of municipal tax revenues: Arab local authorities are recipients of less than 1% of the government's total municipal tax payments for public buildings. These buildings house institutions that serve the entire public: courts, military installations, jails, ministerial offices, and others. Therefore, the revenues generated by these public uses of property should benefit all local authorities equally.

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Nadia Hilou* / Reflections on the Results of the Local Elections in Jaffa

An analysis of all features of the recent elections in Arab towns exceeds the scope of this article; we will merely note two outstanding phenomena: the large number of candidates who were young or female, and the election of many new heads of local government. These developments did not, however, change the fact that election outcomes were ultimately determined by family- and clan-based considerations rather than on candidates' merits.

The following discussion focuses on an analysis of the election results in the city of Jaffa. Although Arabs have been represented on the Tel Aviv – Jaffa city council since 1993, not a single Arab representative managed to obtain a seat on the city council this time. After twenty years, Jaffa's Arab residents have no representation on the city council.

The features of the city of Jaffa

Jaffa — *Yafa*, in Arabic — is one of the world's most ancient seaports. In the period prior to the establishment of Israel, the city that was known as the “Bride of the Sea” was a major Palestinian city with a population of close to 120,000 and a bustling cultural and economic life. Numerous vessels passed through the dynamic Jaffa port every day, making Jaffa an extremely important center of commerce.

After 1948, Jaffa's population shrunk to a mere 3,500, and the following year the city was merged with Tel Aviv of which it has since then been a part. Today, Jaffa is one of Israel's six mixed cities. According to official statistics, it has a population of 46,000: 30,000 Jews and 16,000 Arabs. The local Arab leadership contends that the Arab population is larger and approaches 20,000, since some of the people who live in the city are not registered residents. Regarding religious segmentation, Muslims account for 75% of Jaffa's Arab public, while Christians account for the remaining 25%.

Representation of Jaffa's Arab population in Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipalities between 1993 and 2013

The Tel Aviv – Jaffa city council comprises 31 elected members. Until 1993, the Arab residents of Jaffa had no representative on the council: The municipality neglected Jaffa and the city's Arab residents felt alienated from the city's elected officials.

In 1993, as the municipal elections approached, the first group of young educated Jaffa residents organized a list that would run for seats on the city council. The group's initial nucleus of leaders included 12 members who established a local, apolitical list named “All of Us for Jaffa” (*Kulanu Lema'an Yafu*). The list united all political, sectarian, and religious streams, and its goal was to obtain, for the first time, seats on the city council and represent the city's Arab population. Notably, the list

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was supported by a handful of Jewish residents, headed by Shlomo Lahat (“Chich”), who had served as mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa between 1974 and 1993.

The list was headed by two attorneys: Khaled Kaboub, today a senior judge in the Tel Aviv District Court, and Nassim Shaker. I also had the privilege of being part of the list’s leadership group. In a historical turning point in 1993, the list won seats on the city council, for the first time in history. Between 1993 and 1998, the two list leaders served on the city council in rotation.

The list once again stood in the 1998 elections, this time headed by Attorney Ahmad Balaha and Attorney Nassim Shaker, and once again won a seat on the city council. The two leaders served in rotation.

As the 2003 elections grew near, cracks appeared in Jaffa’s unified forces. The Jaffa-based list no longer had the support of all residents. Ultimately, the list competed under the leadership of two candidates, but as it lacked its former unity, the list failed to pass the election threshold. That same year, however, Rif‘at (“Jimmy”) Tourk, a local Arab resident was placed in a realistic slot on the Meretz [a leftist party] ticket, and was elected to the city council. He was the only Arab member of the city council at the time.

In the 2008 elections, the Arabs of Jaffa gained another victory in their representation on the city council. Meretz managed to place Ahmad Masharawi, its candidate from Jaffa, in the city council, while the local list re-united after its failure in the previous elections and competed in the elections under two leaders: Omar Siksik and Sammy Abu Shihada. Although according to its official statements the list was designed to be apolitical, Siksik represented Hadash (The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) while Abu Shihada represented Balad (The National Democratic Alliance). The local list managed to gain a seat on the city council, and so Jaffa had two Arab representatives: one representing Meretz and other representing the local Jaffa list.

As in the past, the representatives served on the city council in rotation. The first to serve was Omar Siksik, who belonged to the opposition group in the city council. Before his turn came to serve, Abu Shihada negotiated with the mayor and ultimately joined the city’s coalition group. Some argue that his action was made unilaterally and led to the disintegration of the unified list, while others claim that the move had the support of all list members. In any case, this move drove a wedge between list members, and the list ultimately split into its two main factions (Hadash and Balad). In the recent municipal elections, the factions ran on separate tickets.

Results of the Most Recent Elections: October 2013

Jaffa has 32,000 residents who are eligible to vote; of these, 9,600 are Arabs. In the current elections, voting turnout was especially low (28%), even compared to the poor turnout in Tel Aviv (35%), and even more so compared to Arab towns (81%) and other mixed cities.

The most conspicuous outcome of the most recent elections is the lack of a single Arab representing Jaffa on the city council, for the first time in almost twenty years. It is difficult to estimate the number of Jewish and Arab voters among Jaffa residents accurately since a large number of voting booths catered to members of both groups.

We use estimates based on the locations of the voting booths, but it is impossible to accurately determine the number of Arab voters.

Notable phenomena included:

1. No Jewish party placed an Arab candidate in a realistic spot.

The Arab candidate on the Meretz list was placed in tenth place. Meretz won 1,100 Arab and Jewish votes in Jaffa total. Other parties that were active in Jaffa and won the support of Arabs similarly failed to place an Arab candidate in a realistic slot: “One Tel Aviv” (*Tel Aviv Achat*), headed by incumbent mayor Ron Huldai, slotted local representatives in unrealistic spots, and received 850 votes in Jaffa. The “Social Justice” list (*Tzedek Hevrati*), which also was active in Jaffa, included no Arab representative, and received votes from 334 residents of Jaffa.

2. Local political forces were divided.

Hadash, a traditional member of the Jaffa list, decided to join the “City for Us All” (*Ir LeKulanu*) list. Jaffa representative, Attorney Amir Badran, was slotted in fourth place, and he signed a rotation agreement with the candidate in the third place. According to this agreement, he potentially would join the city council two and a half years after the election. According to various estimates, the list received 980 votes in Jaffa.

The first five candidates on the Jaffa list, led by councilman Sammy Abu Shihada, included both female candidates and young candidates. Despite its pointed statements about representing all Jaffa’s political streams and movements, the list was ultimately identified with Balad. It received 1,864 votes in Jaffa and a total of 2,195 votes in the city, but failed to place a representative on the city council.

Another list headed by Jaffa resident Asma Aghbariya Zahalka had no chance of passing the election threshold. Her list received a total of 310 votes.

3. The Islamic Movement avoided involvement in the elections.

As in all other Arab localities, the Islamic Movement decided to refrain from all involvement in the elections. Although the Islamic Movement did not call for a ban on the elections, its non-involvement had, according to all estimates, an impact on Jaffa’s low voting turnout.

Jaffa today, after the elections

On October 23, 2013, the residents of Jaffa woke up to a new reality: They learned that they did not have a single Arab representative on the city council, for the first time in twenty years. Jaffa residents’ opinions on the elections were divided between disappointment, alienation, indifference, and possibly a sense of relief. The latter group presumed that there was no use in having one Arab representative out of thirty one councilmen, and that a single Arab representative could not influence municipal policy or effectively improve the lives of Jaffa’s residents. As for the Arab population of Jaffa after the elections — it is undoubtedly more divided.

The major issues in the local election campaign

General summary of the election campaign

- **Prof. As'ad Ghanem: The fact that the Arab local governments underwent incomplete modernization, and continue to be grounded in clan-based patterns is a catastrophe comparable to the catastrophe of 1948**

Prof. As'ad Ghanem, lecturer of Political Science at University of Haifa, commented on the local election results: “The local government elections caused a catastrophe that is similar to the *Nakbah* of 1948. [...] What distinguishes the mayoral candidates in the recent elections is their academic achievements [...] but the problem that emerges after the elections, and not only in the current elections, is that candidates' academic achievements are insignificant in indicating whether they can manage [the town's affairs] and implement progress, as their voters expect.” Ghanem adds, “In research literature, this is known as ‘incomplete modernization’: A mayor may have a doctoral degree, but he handles the problems in local governments as if they were tribal affairs. Instead of putting the interests of citizens in top priority, he follows the agenda of the people who elected him. He belongs to a specific tribe, clan, or family. [...] Such a reality does not promote the growth of a politically aware society living in a modern city. [...] When a newly elected head of a local government is unable to stop thinking about who did or did not vote for him, all those people who didn't vote for him feel neglected.” Prof. Ghanem also noted, “The clan phenomenon remains clearly widespread and is deeply rooted in our Arab towns. Not only is this preventing our progress and our becoming democratic, but this phenomenon also leads to withdrawal into ourselves and regression. After we have already established and led political parties and managed to create a dramatic change in our favor, we have now taken several steps backward by solidifying sectarian clan-based loyalties, with all their negative implications included.” [...]

Referring to recent years, Ghanem stated, “Class-based affiliations have re-surfaced. This brings us back to the nineteenth century or even earlier. Although we see that the mayor wears a suit and a tie, and has a car and an office, his conduct reflects a return to the past.” [...] He added, “We are witnessing a true political catastrophe that has been happening over the past twenty years. The parties began to serve as platforms for anonymous candidates, based on personal interests, and political activism has disappeared. The parties defend narrow interests, and at the same time, prevent the establishment of a united Arab party such as the entire public demands. [...] How can parties survive after their power has declined at the national and municipal levels? Hadash's last bastion [Nazareth] has fallen, the first bastion of the Islamic Movement [in Umm al-Fahm] has also collapsed, and the other parties are in no better condition.” (www.bokra.net, November 2, 2013)

- **Op-ed: The state intentionally ignores what goes on in the Arab localities during elections**

From an op-ed by Wissam Khalaila, doctoral student at the University of Haifa: “I’ll spare you an in-depth account of the hullabaloo that startled me out of bed at 2:00 a.m. the next morning. Nor will I criticize the fireworks set off next to my bedroom window. [...] The irony is that we live in a democratic state that embraces and boosts totalitarian systems. Hence, I believe this democracy is defaced, and thus fruitless. I will not deny that similar phenomena could be seen in small Jewish Israeli towns, but I doubt if they were quite as systematic. [...] So what went wrong? Why do Arab Israelis, raised in a democratic country, behave so sordidly? I do not know the answer, or rather have too many answers; one being the State of Israel. Is it possible such a powerful country is not aware of these miscarriages? Is it reasonable that people turning guns on each other go unpunished, or are punished only when it is irrelevant? The extent of power these mayors have acquired thanks to the law that allows them to run forever is frightening. There is no limit then to what they are capable of. [...] Because the government turns a blind eye to what is happening in the Arab Israeli communities, the catastrophe will cross the imaginary borders between these and their Jewish counterparts, eventually overwhelming everybody. It is time to wake up, before it is too late. (*Jerusalem Post*, October 29, 2013)

- **Dr. Nohad Ali: Political ideology has vanished from the local elections in Arab localities**

Dr. Nohad Ali summarized the local government election campaign in Arab localities: “In the last few decades we have witnessed changes in patterns of competitions and in local government election campaigns. These changes can be divided into four periods. The first period — from the 1950s to the end of the Military Government period — was characterized by the weakness of the Arab local governments. Local government heads and council members were appointed by the Military Government. [...] In the second period — from the 1970s to the end of the 1980s — most election candidates belonged to ideological parties. Lists were composed on the basis of ideological considerations. [...] Elections included one candidate representing a party and one candidate representing a family or an independent list. In most cases, the party representative was the victor. [...] In the third period, sectarianism [*hamulah*-based politics] emerged. Candidates represented families and clans, and party ideology became part of the clan’s ideology. In other words, an independent candidate representing a family might receive the support of a political party. [...] In the fourth period, at the beginning of this century, family-based affiliations grew stronger. Large families were breaking up into secondary units, and we therefore began to see several candidates from the same family.”

[...]

“The election results show that ideology has disappeared. In several localities we have witnessed the parties’ failure or decline in power in these elections: Balad (NDA) in Kufr Kana and Nazareth, and Hadash (DFPE) in Nazareth, Arabeh and Deir Hanna. The results clearly show that running in the elections and winning the elections have become dependent on a candidate’s personality. The key issue in the campaign is the person (the candidate), his family, and his finances. Unfortunately, the proportion of

educated individuals among [the candidates] has not increased — not among those running for head of the local government, nor among those running for a seat on the local council. Most of the candidates represented their family. Academic scholars have, in fact, failed to change the system, and they took part in the family endeavor.” (www.bokra.net, October 26, 2013)

- **Op-ed: Hadash’s decline attests to the Arab public’s desire for change**

Excerpt from an op-ed by Wadi’ ‘Awawdah, editor of the weekly *Hadith al-Nas*, entitled “Political upheaval”: “Many surprises were revealed when the results of the elections in Arab localities were published. The largest surprise was when Hadash lost its grasp on its stronghold, the municipality of Nazareth. [...] In addition to Hadash’s smarting, historical defeat in Nazareth, it also lost its grasp on the party’s other important strongholds such as Shefar‘am, Tamra, Arabeh and Sakhnin. [...] And even in Eylabun the party failed to tip the scale in its favor this time. [...] This state of affair attests to the public’s desire for change. At the same time, the results indicate a weakening of party values and a strengthening of personal, neighborhood, and sectarian values.” (*Hadith al-Nas*, October 25, 2013)

- **Op-ed: MK Basel Ghattas: The municipal arena is important to citizens and therefore parties should not neglect it**

Excerpt from an op-ed by MK Basel Ghattas (Balad): The elections confirmed the fact that Arab citizens and Arab society consider local elections as the most important factor influencing their lives. Therefore, local elections have become a key topic of public debate, and prompt thousands of people to work day and night for the success of the lists and their candidates. [...] The conclusion is that not only should the parties not abandon the local elections arena, they should increase their presence in these elections. [...] They should learn how to address the family-based, sectarian, and neighborhood-based reality. [...] The election results also attest to Hadash’s resonating failure in the local elections. [...] We believe that Hadash will conduct a serious self-reckoning and will discard its collective mentality. [...] We believe that it should consider cooperation with Balad, which achieved success in several localities.” (*Hadith al-Nas*, October 25, 2013)

- **Op-ed: Elected heads of localities are merely a tool of the state institutions’ injurious policy**

Excerpt of an op-ed by Ali Zoubeidat, journalist and essayist, entitled, “The struggle over nothing has ended”: “I will not participate in the festivities of the candidate who was elected mayor because I do not share this victory. [...] I similarly do not commiserate with the candidate who lost, because I was not a party to his defeat. [...] I gave up the fight, unlike 90% of the residents of my city who did participate in the municipal election ‘campaign.’ [...] Although, this is considered a serious act of betrayal according to the revolutionary dictionary, I have no regrets. Moreover, I decided to stay at home for at least two more days and not step out onto the streets until the city I know returns to order. [...] Was any mayor or local council elected on the basis of his challenge to the state’s racist institutions? I don’t think so. On the

contrary, many mayors were elected to execute the state's policy in our cities and villages, under the guise of nationalism and civic services." (*Hadith al-Nas*, October 25, 2013)

The role of clans and clan-based affiliations in municipal politics

- **Op-ed: Arab society is itself responsible for growing clan-based loyalties and the crisis in the local governments**

Excerpt from an op-ed by Ziyad Abu Habla (CPA), entitled "Voting for the Clan": "There are three main reasons for the growing sectarianism in the elections. The first is the marginal status of the Arab population. The state excludes Arabs from influence in its institutions, which enhances the status of Arab local governments as an alternative arena of interests and influence. The second reason is the Arab leadership's reluctance to combat sectarianism. The local and national Arab leadership hinges on the clan (*hamulah*) structure, and any campaign against sectarianism might endanger the status of influential individuals; therefore, from the leaders' perspective, this would be an unrealistic step. The third reason for the increasing sectarian element in the elections is the unwillingness of the Arab parties to undermine the clans' dominant status. These parties have accepted the existing social structure and are not interested in any confrontation with it. On the contrary, they are exploiting this structure to rake in party achievements in local elections in order to become part of the government in their localities. In this manner, many of the heads of the local governments who clearly belong to Arab parties competed under family-based lists in the elections, because their chances were better than had they competed as party members."

[...]

"Opposition to clan-based voting patterns faces internal obstacles in the Arab population itself. Israel's Arab society is mostly rural, without a strong urban center, and there is no migration from villages to cities or from village to village. This situation creates a barrier to any change in the demographic balance inside the villages, and also prevents any threat to the family structure. [...] The results of the elections were equivalent to a declaration of no-confidence in the Arab parties — the latter either hide behind "Arab-Jewish alienation," as they did in the last Knesset elections, or behind "the sectarian and ethnic divide," as they did in the local government elections. The Arab population has proved that it has failed to adopt behavioral patterns that are in its best interests. On the contrary, this population is an active accomplice in the local government crisis and its poor economic situation." (*Haaretz*, November 25, 2013)

- **Op-ed: The political split stems from the dissolution of the family unit into secondary units**

Dr. Johnny Mansur, historian and lecturer at Beit Berl Academic College, addressed the results of the local government elections in Arab society. He stated, "We continue to operate in family and clan groupings, but now, the family unit has split into

secondary units. We have observed this in several places where several candidates from the same family ran in the elections. This is evidence of the disintegration and division of the family, which implies that the family is no longer controlled by a single individual, as it was in the past. We can summarize and state that except for isolated sites, elections in most places continue to be based on tribal and family loyalties.” Regarding the parties and the Arab leadership in the local elections, he added, “No real change in the rules of the game is evident. The Arab citizens have made no progress. We were in a state of social fragmentation instead of being united. [...] We also witnessed a dangerous phenomenon when intellectuals and educated individuals returned to the bosom of their families, and voted for their families. [...] Therefore, the question is, what does this have to do with change?” (www.bokra.net, October 23, 2013)

The election campaign in Nazareth

- **MK Hanin Zouabi: Nazareth residents cast a protest vote; What we now need is a fundamental, conceptual change.**

Excerpt from an op-ed by MK Hanin Zouabi (Balad), entitled, “Nazareth: Protest marks the end of an era”: “Nazareth emerged from these elections with historical results that mark the end of one era and the beginning of another.. [...] Nazareth residents cast a protest vote against the person they do not desire, and against conduct they do not desire. [...] At the same time, Nazareth needs more than a protest movement, it needs a genuine change — a conceptual change, not simply a change of government; a change in the logic and the people, not only in jobs and projects. [...] The city does not need spontaneous action, it needs a strategy and informed plans. [...] Nazareth residents need someone who will realize their aspirations and their dreams that are crashing as they face unfavorable circumstances. [...] We were the only ones who assumed responsibility for exposing the corruption committed by the previous administration, and exposing the sectarianism and its exploitation for political purposes. Our real job now is to continue what we started. [...] Our platform will be a compass for us in the city council, whatever our status in the council.” (www.arabs48.com, November 2, 2013).

- **Op-ed: Voting for Hadash and Ramez Jeraysi was a Christian-sectarian vote; Votes for Ali Salam were driven by frustration and bitterness against Hadash**

Excerpt from an op-ed by Rula Nasser-Mazawi, psychologist and career center director: “The election results indicated that voting in Nazareth was an expression of the struggle for survival [in the local government] and a struggle for visibility. Hadash voters, most of whom were Christians, once again voted for Hadash and for Ramez Jeraysi, to keep Hadash in the government and to ensure that the situation does not change. By doing so, they demonstrated their clear concern that the situation might deteriorate if another organization inherits management of the municipality. What helped the voters act this way was Hadash’s intimidating statements about “the other,” especially candidate Hanin Zouabi and her list, and Ali Salam, even though he had held a senior position in Hadash. [...] When the struggle is over survival and visibility, there is no place for common sense or logic. These people [who voted for Ali Salam

who opposed Ramez Jeraysi] were driven more by strong emotions than by logic: anger and bitterness caused by Hadash's attitude toward anyone who is not associated with it. Such emotions were the strongest motivation that brought people out to the ballots in the spirit of "a day of reckoning." Through their votes, the residents of Nazareth carried a clear message to any mayor, whoever he may be, "Beware! We demand a full reckoning. We may be patient, but be careful if our anger explodes!" (www.alarab.net, October 31, 2013)

The Islamic Movement after the local elections

- **Representative of the Islamic Movement in Kufr Manda: Islam does not accept family-based divisions**

Sheikh Fathi Zaydan, the Islamic Movement's representative in Kufr Manda, stated, "We, members of the Islamic Movements, believe in Islamic values. [...] We believe that all believers are brothers, and we believe that surnames are designed solely as a means of identification and recognition of lineage. But ultimately, the entire village is one family, and all Muslims, on any piece of land, are one family. [...] Therefore, family-based divisions that certain people tend to highlight are unacceptable to Islam. Islam also does not accept zealotry motivated by family ties." (www.panet.co.il, October 27, 2013)

- **How did the Islamic Movement disappear from Nazareth's political map?**

How did the road end for the unified list of Nazareth, [and how did its power drop] from ten members to one member? In the 1998 elections, the list, then headed by Suleiman Abu-Ahmad, won 10 of the 19 seats. In the 2003 and 2008 elections, the list, headed by Ahmad Zouabi, won 8 and 7 seats, respectively. But in the 2013 elections, the list, headed by Yusef Ayad, won only one seat. In contrast, the list supported by the [Islamic Movement's Southern Faction], headed by Tawfik Abu-Ahmad, won 481 votes in the mayoral elections and 1,120 votes in the city council elections, and did not pass the election threshold. (*Hadith al-Nas*, October 25, 2013)

Mixed cities: Success in Upper Nazareth, failure in Jaffa

- **Upper Nazareth: The Arab Joint Party for Co-existence almost doubled its power**

The Arab Joint Party for Co-Existence in Upper Nazareth thanked its voters and expressed its appreciation in view of the great success, as the list grew in strength by an additional seat on the council. [...] The list will lead the struggle against racism and the increasingly widespread corruption in the city and the municipality. [...] The announcement also stated, “Notably, the list lacked 128 votes to double its strength and win a fourth seat, which would have put the first Arab woman in Upper Nazareth’s city council.” (www.bokra.net, October 30, 2013)

- **Jaffa: Disputes among members of different political streams caused a lack of Arab representation in the city council**

The local elections in the city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa exposed Jaffa residents’ dismal failure. The Arab residents failed to place any representative in the municipality, in contrast to the previous elections, where the Arabs managed to place two representatives in the municipality. [...] Omar Siksik of Hadash (DFPE) stated, “There is no doubt that the disputes and disunity led to this dismal failure. We tried with all our might to run as a single joint list in these elections, but all our attempts failed, including our attempt to enter into an alliance with the City For All of Us list. [...] Former council member Ahmad Masharawi stated, “It is not possible for every independent Arab list to run in the elections and succeed. The truth is that I don’t understand the reasons for the disputes and disunity among the Arab streams and forces in Jaffa, and especially between Hadash (DFPE) and Balad (NDA). It seems to me that they are personal . Furthermore, even the Islamic Movement abstained from participating in the elections and sat on the sidelines. All this led to the outright failure and the public’s vote of no-confidence in these parties.” [...] Abed Satl of the Association for Jaffa (*Al-Rabitah*), stated, “We were not surprised that no Arab member entered the municipality. It was expected. We attribute this to the fragmentation of the political Arab streams and forces and especially the lack of unity between Hadash and Balad on the one hand, and the elections boycott by the Islamic Movement, on the other.” (www.bokra.net, October 24, 2013)

Results of the 2013 elections¹

Election results in Arab and Druze localities

Editor's note: The following table points to the features of the political competition that took place in Israel's Arab and Druze localities in the recent 2013 local elections. Voting turnout is one measure of the intensity of the political competition in each locality: Higher turnout rates are indicative of more emotionally charged election campaigns, and reflect voters' strong feelings that they are able to affect the political situation in their locality.

A second measure of the intensity of the political struggle is suggested by the features of the competition over the available seats on the local councils: In those localities where a large number of lists competing in the elections and won seats on the local council, political divisions may impede effective coalition building and stable politics. On the other hand, where local councils comprises of officials elected from a small number of lists, there is a greater chance of maintaining an effective local coalition and maintaining political stability in the local council.

The Galilee and Northern Region

Locality	Voting rate (first round)	Local council				Head of the local government	
		No. of lists	No. of seats on the local council	No. of lists elected to the local council	Average no. of mandates per elected list	No. of candidates (first round)	Elected
'Arabeh	85%	14	13	9	1.4	3	Ali 'Asleh
'Ein Mahel	93%	10	11	8	1.4	2	Walid Abu Leil
'Eylabun	89%	10	9	8	1.1	2	Jiryis Matar
'Eylut	70%	4	9	3	3.0	3	Ibrahim Abu Ras
'Usfiyyah	82%	14	11	9	1.2	4	Wajih Kayyuf
Abu Sinan	84%	14	11	3	3.7	6	Nohad Meshleb
Basmat Tab'un	79%	9	9	6	1.5	6	Munir Zubeidat

¹ All data in this section are based on data analysis taken from the Ministry of Interior website (www.moin.gov.il) and the Ministry of Justice website (www.justice.gov.il), as well as data graciously provided to the editor by Hadah and Balad parties and members of the Islamic Movement.

(Cont'd)

Locality	Voting rate (first round)	Local council				Head of the local government	
		No. of lists	No. of seats on the local council	No. of lists elected to the local council	Average no. of mandates per elected list	No. of candidates (first round)	Elected
Beit Jann	91%	18	11	8	1.4	4	Bayan Qablan
Bi'ineh	68%	11	9	5	1.8	7	Abbas Titi
Bir al-Maksur	83%	13	9	6	1.5	10	Muhammad Ghadir
Bu'eine-Nujeidat	87%	15	9	7	1.3	5	Saleh Suleiman
Daburiyya	83%	13	9	6	1.5	6	Zuheir Yusef
Daliyat al-Carmel	88%	14	13	10	1.3	2	Tafiq Halabi
Deir al-Asad	90%	10	11	8	1.4	8	Ahmad Dabbah
Deir Hanna	92%	6	9	4	2.3	3	Samir Hussein
Fasutah	81%	12	9	7	1.3	3	Edgar Dekwar
Furaydis	89%	8	11	6	1.8	2	Yunis Mar'i
Ghajar	–	1	7	1	7.0	1	Ahmad Fatali
Horfeish	89%	12	9	9	1.0	2	Majed Amer
Iksal	83%	13	11	7	1.6	4	Abd al-Salam Darawshah
Jish	72%	9	9	6	1.5	3	Eliyas Eliyas
Jisr al-Zarqa	76%	13	11	6	1.8	3	Murad Ammash
Joulis	89%	16	9	9	1.0	6	Salman Amer
Judeideh-Makr	78%	19	13	10	1.3	6	Muhammad Shami
Ka'abiyah- Tabash-Hajajrah	91%	10	9	6	1.5	5	Zaydan Ka'abiyah
Kabul	91%	11	11	6	1.8	4	Saleh Rayyan
Kawkab Abu al-Heija	89%	14	9	7	1.3	6	Zaher Saleh
Kisra-Sume'a	78%	9	9	8	1.1	2	Nabih As'ad
Kufr Kama	80%	7	9	6	1.5	6	Zakariyah Nabsu
Kufr Kana	89%	9	13	9	1.4	7	Mujahid 'Awawdah
Kufr Manda	92%	14	13	9	1.4	4	Taha Abd al- Halim
Kufr Yasif	88%	13	9	8	1.1	5	'Awni Tuma
Maghar	73%	11	13	10	1.3	4	Ziyad Dagash
Majd al-Kurum	87%	12	11	8	1.4	4	Salim Salibi

(Cont'd)

Locality	Voting rate (first round)	Local council				Head of the local government	
		No. of lists	No. of seats on the local council	No. of lists elected to the local council	Average no. of mandates per elected list	No. of candidates (first round)	Elected
Mashad	87%	11	9	6	1.5	6	Muhammad Hasan
Mazra'ah	88%	11	9	7	1.3	4	Fuad Awad
Mi'ilya	80%	15	9	9	1.0	6	Hatem Araf
Nahaf	86%	14	11	7	1.6	8	'Omar Ismail
Nazareth	70%	7	19	5	3.8	5	Ramez Jeraysi / Ali Salam
Peki'in (Al-Buqay'ah)	86%	12	9	8	1.1	4	Ghazi Fares
Rameh	77%	9	9	6	1.5	3	Shawqi Latif
Reineh	77%	12	13	10	1.3	5	Khalid Tatur
Sajur	91%	11	9	6	1.5	3	Jaber Hamud
Sakhnin	92%	16	15	10	1.5	2	Mazen Ghanayem
Sha'ab	92%	10	9	6	1.5	2	Faysal Shuheibar
Shefar'am	77%	18	15	10	1.5	3	Amin Anabtawi
Shibli – Umm al-Ghanam	82%	8	9	5	1.8	5	Na'im Shibli
Tamra	90%	28	15	11	1.4	9	Suheil Diyab
Tor'an	90%	11	11	7	1.6	3	Imad Dahle
Tuba-Zangariyyah	78%	3	9	2	4.5	3	Hussein Heib
Yafi'	74%	7	13	5	2.6	2	Imran Kinaneh
Yanuah-Jatt	91%	12	9	9	1.0	2	Ma'di Hasbani
Yarka	90%	8	11	4	2.8	3	Wahib Hubeish
Zarzir	88%	10	9	5	1.8	6	'Atef Ghreifat
Regional average	84%	11.5	10.5	7	1.5	4.3	

The Triangle region

Locality	Voting rate (first round)	Local council				Head of the local government	
		No. of lists	No. of seats on the local council	No. of lists elected to the local council	Average no. of mandates per elected list	No. of candidates (first round)	Elected
‘Ar‘ara	79%	15	13	8	1.6	6	Madar Yunis
Basmah	83%	13	9	7	1.3	5	Ra‘id Kabaha
Jaljulyah	88%	12	9	9	1.0	2	Fa‘iq ‘Awdah
Kufr Bara	92%	13	9	9	1.0	3	Mahmud ‘Aasi
Kufr Qara	86%	14	13	8	1.6	6	Hasan ‘Atamneh
Kufr Qasem	92%	20	13	12	1.1	3	‘Adel Badir
Ma‘aleh ‘Iron	78%	11	11	7	1.6	4	Mustafa Aghbariya
Qalansawah	80%	16	13	10	1.3	8	Salameh ‘Abd al-Baset
Tira	81%	16	13	10	1.3	3	Ma‘mun ‘Abd al-Hay
Umm al-Fahm	62%	9	17	6	2.8	3	Khaled Hamdan Aghbariya
Zemer	87%	15	9	8	1.1	5	Diyab Ghanem
Regional average	83%	14	11.7	8.5	1.4	4.4	

Jerusalem region

Locality	Voting rate (first round)	Local council				Head of the local government	
		No. of lists	No. of seats on the local council	No. of lists elected to the local council	Average no. of mandates per elected list	No. of candidates (first round)	Elected
Abu Gosh	83%	5	9	3	3	3	Issa Jaber

The Negev region

Locality	Voting rate (first round)	Local council				Head of the local government	
		No. of lists	No. of seats on the local council	No. of lists elected to the local council	Average no. of mandates per elected list	No. of candidates (first round)	Elected
‘Ar‘ara (Negev)	73%	5	11	5	2.2	3	Mutawi’ Abu ‘Arar
Hura	79%	3	11	3	3.7	2	Muhammad al-Nabari
Kseifa	83%	8	11	6	1.8	3	Salem Abu Rabi‘ah
Lakiya	76%	6	11	4	2.8	6	Salem Abu ‘Ayesh
Rahat	85%	11	17	8	2.1	7	Talal al-Qreinawi
Segev Shalom	84%	6	9	4	2.3	5	‘Amer Abu Mu‘ammar
Tel Sheva	78%	6	13	5	2.6	6	Tawman Abu Rukeik
Regional average	80%	6.4	11.8	5	2.4	4.6	

Achievements of Arab candidates elections in the mixed cities

City	No. of Arabs elected to the city council		No. of seats on the city council	Percentage of Arab city council members	Percentage of Arabs in the city's population
	Total	Of whom: women			
Acre	5	1	17	29.4%	30.3%
Haifa	3	1	31	9.7%	10.6%
Carmiel	0		17	–	2.5%
Ma'alot-Tarshiha	3		13	23.1%	19.9%
Upper Nazareth	3		17	17.6%	19.1%
Tel Aviv – Jaffa	0		31	–	4.1%
Lydda	4		19	21.1%	28.4%
Ramleh	3		17	17.6%	22.3%
Total	21	2	162	12.9%	11.1%

Achievements of Hadash, Balad, and the Islamic Movement

Elections for head of the local councils

Geographic region	Hadash	Islamic Movement
The Galilee and North	2 (Iksal, Yafi')	
The Triangle		1 (Kufr Qasem)
The Negev		1 (Hura)
Total	2	2

Elections for local councils

Geographic region	Hadash		Balad		Islamic Movement	
	Localities	Representatives	Localities	Representatives	Localities	Representatives
The Galilee and North	26	53	16	17	1	1
The Triangle	3	4	2	2	1	2
The Negev					3	10
Mixed cities	2	3	4	5	1	1
Total	31	60	22	24	5	14

Representatives elected members of local councils by affiliation (in alphabetical order)

Hadash: The party's representatives were elected as council members in the following localities: Abu Sinan (3 representatives), Umm al-Fahm (1), Iksal (2), Judeidah-Makr (2), Jaljulya (1), Deir al-Asad (2), Deir Hanna (3), Tira (2), Tamra (1), Tor'an (3), Yafi' (4), Kabul (1), Kawkab Abu al-Heija (2), Kufr Yasif (1), Kufr Kana (1), Maghar (1), Majd al-Kurum (2), Mazra'ah (2), Mi'ilya (1), Nazareth (8), Sakhin (2), 'Eylabun (2), 'Eyn Mahel (1), 'Arabeh (2), Peki'in (1), Rameh (1 out of 2 under a joint list with Balad), Reineh (1), Sha'ab (2), Shefar'am (2); and in the following mixed cities: Haifa (2), Upper Nazareth (1, under a joint list with Balad and other local political elements).

Balad: The party's representatives were elected as council members in the following localities: Umm al-Fahm (1 representative), Bu'eine-Nujeidat (1), Judeideh-Makr (1), Jisr al-Zarqa (1), Deir al-Asad (1), Tira (1), Tamra (1), Kabul (1), Kawkab Abu al-Heija (1), Kufr Yasif (1), Kufr Kana (2), Mazra'ah (1), Nazareth (1 out of 2 under a local list), Sakhnin (1), 'Eylabun (1), 'Arabeh (1), Rameh (1 out of 2 under a joint list with Hadash), Shefar'am (1); and in the following mixed cities: Haifa (1), Lydda (1), Ma'alot-Tarshiha (2), Upper Nazareth (1, under a joint list with Hadash and other local political elements).

Islamic Movement: The Movement's representatives were elected as council members in the following localities: Deir al-Asad (1), Tira (2), Hura (6), Rahat (2), Segev Shalom (2); and in the following mixed cities: Ramleh (1).

The Islamic Movement in the Local Elections: Campaigns and Results

Geographic region	Campaigns				Achievements			
	Head of the local council		Local council		Head of the local council		Local council	
	Candidate represents the Movement	Candidate supported by the Movement	List represents the Movement	Alliance or list supported by the Movement	Candidate represents the Movement	Candidate supported by the Movement	List represents the Movement	Alliance or list supported by the Movement
The Galilee and North	2 (Tamra, Deir al-Asad)	2 (Kabul, Nazareth)	3 (Tamra, Nazareth, Deir al-Asad)	3 (Sakhnin, Kufar Kana, Kabul)	1 (Kabul)		1 (Deir al-Asad)	3 (Sakhnin, Kufar Kana, Kabul)
The Triangle	2 (Jaljulya, Kufar Qasem)		1 (Tira)	2 (Jaljulya, Kufar Qasem)	1 (Kufar Qasem)		1 (Tira)	2 (Jaljulya, Kufar Qasem)
The Negev	3 (Hora, Rahat, Segev Shalom)	1 (Tel Sheva)	3 (Hura, Rahat, Segev Shalom)	1 (Tel Sheva)	1 (Hura)		3 (Hura, Rahat, Segev Shalom)	1 (Tel Sheva)
Mixed cities			1 (Ramleh)	2 (Acre, Lydda)			1 (Ramleh)	2 (Acre, Lydda)
Total	7	3	8	8	2	1	6	8

Editor's comment: It is not easy to track the Islamic Movement's political conduct in the most recent local government elections, and it is equally difficult to gage the Movement's strength following the elections. Recall that the Northern (ex-parliamentary) Faction headed by Sheikh Ra'id Salah did not participate in the elections, and made an official announcement of the fact before election day. The Movement's Southern (parliamentary) Faction headed by Sheikh Hamad Abu Da'abes participated in the elections but Movement members adopted one of two alternative strategies:

(a) Official participation in the elections by presenting a candidate and list that officially represent the Islamic Movement in specific localities;

(b) Unofficial participation: (1) In the campaign for head of the local council, the Movement publically supported a candidate (not necessarily a member of the Islamic Movement) who was not a political representative of the Movement; (2) In the campaign for council members, the Movement competed in each localities on joint lists with local political elements or through Movement members who campaigned as individuals under independent lists.

The table above indicates that the Islamic Movement failed in the majority of the localities in which it officially campaigned, as well as in localities where it supported an independent candidate for the head of the local council. In contrast, the Movement had relative success in localities where candidates for the local council stood on a list representing the Movement's alliance with local political elements. In Kufr Qasem, for example, Movement members ran as independent candidates in seven of the total 12 local lists elected to the local council. In Jaljulya, four of the nine lists elected for the local council included Movement members who ran as independent candidates.

In the following localities, the list supported by the Islamic Movement was elected to the local council (in alphabetical order): Jaljulya (4 representatives), Kabul (3), Kufr Qasem (8), Sakhnin (2), Tel Sheva (2). In the following mixed cities, the list supported by the Islamic Movement was elected to the local council (in alphabetical order): Acre (3), Lydda (1).