

# African Elite Perspectives: AU and NEPAD

A comparative study across seven  
African countries

HENNIE KOTZÉ

---

CARLY STEYN

© KAS, 2003

All rights reserved

While copyright in this publication as a whole is vested in the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, copyright in the text rests with the individual authors, and no paper may be reproduced in whole or part without the express permission, in writing, of both authors and the publisher. It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the individual authors and that the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung does not necessarily subscribe to the opinions of contributors.

ISBN: 0-620-31460-5

Please note that \$ refers to US\$ unless otherwise indicated.

Published by:  
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung  
60 Hume Road  
Dunkeld 2196  
Johannesburg  
Republic of South Africa

PO Box 1383  
Houghton 2041  
Johannesburg  
Republic of South Africa

Telephone: (+27 +11) 214-2900

Telefax: (+27 +11) 214-2913/4

E-mail: [info@kas.org.za](mailto:info@kas.org.za)

[www.kas.org.za](http://www.kas.org.za)

Editing, DTP and production: Tyrus Text and Design

Cover design: Heather Botha

Reproduction: Rapid Repro

Printing: Stups Printing

# Table of contents

List of tables and figures	v
The authors	viii
Executive summary	1
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>	
<b>ELITES, NEPAD AND THE AFRICAN UNION</b>	9
1.1 Introduction	9
1.2 The role of the elite in Africa	11
1.3 Questions to be answered	12
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>	
<b>STRATEGY OF INQUIRY</b>	17
2.1 Elite surveys of the Centre for International and Comparative Politics	17
2.2 Composition of the sample	19
2.3 Country profiles	21
2.4 Important demographic attributes of the sample	22
2.4.1 <i>Gender</i>	26
2.4.2 <i>Age</i>	28
2.4.3 <i>Marital status</i>	28
2.4.4 <i>Number of dependents</i>	29
2.5 Socialisation patterns	30
2.5.1 <i>Geographical influences</i>	30
2.5.2 <i>Education</i>	31
2.5.3 <i>Political party support</i>	34
2.5.4 <i>National pride</i>	35
2.6. Conclusion	36
<b>CHAPTER 3</b>	
<b>NEPAD AND THE AFRICAN UNION: ISSUES OF ELITE CONFIDENCE AND OWNERSHIP</b>	39
3.1 Introduction	39
3.2 Levels of knowledge associated with NEPAD and the AU	43

3.3 Confidence in NEPAD	47
3.4 Advocates of NEPAD	51
3.5 NEPAD: For African's by Africans?	53
3.6 Issues of Unification	57
3.7 Issues of Sovereignty	64
3.8 Conclusion	67
<b>CHAPTER 4</b>	
<b>GOALS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE AFRICAN UNION AND NEPAD</b>	<b>71</b>
4.1 Introduction	71
4.2 Challenges facing the African continent	73
4.3 Goals of the AU and NEPAD	82
4.3.1 <i>Goals of the AU</i>	82
4.3.2 <i>Goals of the NEPAD</i>	86
4.4. NEPAD and the neo-liberal framework	91
4.5 NEPAD and the concept of partnership	92
4.6 Conclusion	97
<b>CHAPTER 5</b>	
<b>IMPLEMENTATION OF NEPAD</b>	<b>101</b>
5.1 Introduction	101
5.2 Nation and continent: Issues of capacity and political will	102
5.3 The African Peer Review Mechanism	109
5.4 Implementing NEPAD	112
5.5 Conclusion	118
<b>CHAPTER 6</b>	
<b>CONCLUDING REMARKS</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>129</b>
<b>List of abbreviations</b>	<b>136</b>

## List of tables and figures

### Tables

Table 1:	Composition of the sample	20
Table 2:	Development Policy and Governance Indexes	22
Table 3:	Marital status	29
Table 4:	Knowledge of AU and societal sector	46
Table 5:	Knowledge of NEPAD and societal sector	47
Table 6:	Confidence in NEPAD to improve economic prospects of continent, societal sector	49
Table 7:	Confidence in NEPAD to improve economic prospects of country, societal sector	49
Table 8:	Groups involved in advocating NEPAD	51
Table 9:	Sources of information	53
Table 10:	It is only the ruling elite that is actively involved in promoting NEPAD	55
Table 11:	It is only the ruling elite involved in advocating NEPAD, societal sector	55
Table 12:	Africans should speak with one voice at international forums	59
Table 13:	The commonalities amongst Africans are stronger than their differences	62
Table 14:	Problems facing the African continent	75
Table 15:	Obstacles facing the African continent	79
Table 16:	Goals of the African Union	84
Table 17:	Desired benefits of NEPAD	88
Table 18:	Conditionalities linked to aid	96
Table 19:	Economic blocs that can be relied upon to support the economic revival of the African continent	114
Table 20:	Reliable partners for NEPAD	117

### Figures

Figure 1:	Gender	27
Figure 2:	Elite age distribution	28

Figure 3: Number of dependents	29
Figure 4: Born in the country	30
Figure 5: Rural and urban	31
Figure 6: Education of elite respondents	32
Figure 7: Education levels of male elite respondents	33
Figure 8: Education levels of female elite respondents	33
Figure 9: Education level of respondent's father	34
Figure 10: Political party support	35
Figure 11: Pride in country	36
Figure 12: Familiarity with the AU	44
Figure 13: Familiarity with NEPAD	44
Figure 14: Knowledge of the AU	45
Figure 15: Knowledge of NEPAD	45
Figure 16: Confidence in NEPAD to improve the economic prospects of Africa	47
Figure 17: Confidence in NEPAD to improve the economic prospects of country	48
Figure 18: Country will strongly benefit from NEPAD	50
Figure 19: NEPAD does not embody the economic aspirations of all Africans	56
Figure 20: NEPAD is not perceived as a genuine African programme	57
Figure 21: Africa's ultimate aim should be the political unification of Africa	60
Figure 22: North and sub-Saharan Africa share the same value orientations	61
Figure 23: Africa has the capacity to create a continental bureaucracy that will realise the goals of the African Union	63
Figure 24: The African Union needs to control and sanction mechanism in order to achieve its goals	64
Figure 25: The interests of the continent should receive priority over the national interests of the country	65
Figure 26: The national interests of African countries will impede a move towards the solid integration of Africa	66
Figure 27: I am an African first and foremost, then a (country)	67
Figure 28: Agreement–disagreement with statement: 'Globalisation poses a threat to Africa's economic reconstruction'	92
Figure 29: Agreement or disagreement with statement:	93

	‘The dominant liberal economic framework discriminates against Africa’	
Figure 30:	The developed world has a moral responsibility to uplift Africa’s people	94
Figure 31:	An economic partnership with the developed world threatens Africa with a new form of colonisation	95
Figure 32:	Country has the capacity to implement NEPAD policies	103
Figure 33:	Country is playing a leading role in the NEPAD process	104
Figure 34:	Confidence in the state	105
Figure 35:	Confidence in the press	105
Figure 36:	Confidence in major companies	107
Figure 37:	Country has a national development plan which correlates with NEPAD	108
Figure 38:	Country’s destiny is intertwined with that of the rest of Africa	109
Figure 39:	The APRM will not lead to improved levels of good governance on the continent	112

### Boxes

Box 1:	Brief country profiles	22
Box 2:	Governance Index	81
Box 3:	Corruption Index	81
Box 4:	African Peer Review Mechanism Eminent Persons Panel	111

### Flow diagram

Development of NEPAD	42
----------------------	----

## The authors

### **Professor Hennie Kotzé**

Prior to his appointment as Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Stellenbosch in January 2003, Hennie Kotzé was professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at that university (1986–2002) where he taught Research Methodology, Public Policy-Making and Political Risk Analysis. He is engaged in research on the process of democratic consolidation in South Africa and value change on elite and mass levels in Africa. Hennie has authored/co-authored three books, edited six others and written some 60 academic articles on comparative politics.

### **Carly Steyn**

After completing her MPhil (Value Analysis and Policy Formulation) *cum laude*, Carly Steyn joined the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch, where she works primarily on the African Elite Survey and the World Values Survey. Carly has presented papers at both national and international conferences and her research interests include policy analysis and evaluation, information society studies, value studies, survey research and methodology and African politics.



## Executive summary

Outcomes of the African Union (AU) Summit in Maputo, July 2003 highlight the importance of African leaders to act together in order to ensure the upliftment and rejuvenation of the African continent. In a concerted effort to restore peace on the continent and to operationalise the policies of the AU, discussions revolved around the establishment of a Peace and Security Council, a Pan African Parliament, an African Court of Justice, the integration of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) into the AU and the activation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Mozambican President Joachim Chissano – who took over the revolving chairmanship from Thabo Mbeki – stressed the importance of African integration and cooperation in his opening speech:

“We must help each other to improve our governance on the basis of friendship and mutual trust. It is only in this way that we can dissipate the negative image of our continent as an incapable Africa without a future.”<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, however, African leaders failed to ratify the protocol necessary for the establishment of the Peace and Security Council, and only 17 of the 53 member states signed up to participate in the NEPAD Peer Review process. The Maputo Summit illustrates the fact that in order to realise the goals of African rejuvenation and upliftment, African leaders will have to commit collectively to these goals and principles. It was with this in mind that this publication of the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, embarked on a survey of African elite perceptions regarding the AU and NEPAD.

*African Elite Perspectives: AU and NEPAD* contains findings of a survey that

was conducted in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe in October and November 2002. The release of this publication is a milestone for both the Centre and African elite research in general. It allows us to analyse and make predictions regarding elite attitudes towards the two most influential bodies in African politics in the past decade (namely, the AU and NEPAD) as well as to draw important comparisons between African countries that represent a broad spectrum of African political and social climates.

#### WHY DO WE STUDY ELITES?

Easton asserts that all decision making regarding the allocation of scarce resources is made by the elite. Lasswell puts it more simply when he states that decision makers are those people who determine “who gets what, when (and) how”. A simple answer to the question on the relevance of studying elites as done by the present survey, points to the fact that an understanding of the attitudes of the elite may provide us with an indication of their policy preferences and performance judgments regarding policy issues implemented by the AU and NEPAD. The data provided by the current study will also provide us with an opportunity to assess the relevant degree of attitudinal variance among the elite in the various societal sectors and African countries, and perhaps point to areas where potential for conflict of interest exists.

#### THE SURVEY

Chapter two provides an analysis of the demographic attributes of the opinion leader sample. A positional sampling method was used in order to obtain a sample that closely resembles and is in line with the criteria set out by Laswell and Easton. Elites representative of eight societal sectors – namely, the private sector; non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs) and civic organisations; the public sector; professional, academic or analyst; the trade union sector; the political sector; the media; and the church – were included in the survey. In the South African case the data was collected by Markinor. In Algeria, Kenya and Nigeria survey institutions affiliated to Gallup International collected the data. In Uganda and Senegal the research was completed by Wilsken Agencies and Ba, Djibril and Associés respectively, while in Zimbabwe, the Mass Public Opinion Institute collected the data. The survey was quota controlled in terms of the societal sectors

selected in the different countries. In South Africa, 566 respondents were interviewed, while in Uganda only 97 respondents participated in the survey. Between 120 and 140 respondents completed the interview in the other African countries selected.

As far as the gender representatives of the samples are concerned, they revealed the so-called 'iron law of andrarchy' (rule by males). In all countries surveyed, males represented over 75% of the sample. South Africa and Algeria represented the highest percentage of females, with 22.3% and 25.2% respectively. When comparing the age distribution of elites between the various countries included in the survey, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Algeria and Kenya displayed relatively young age profiles. The majority of elite respondents in South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal were between the ages of 43 and 53. The majority of elite respondents in all countries surveyed were married and in Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda the majority of respondents had eight or more children.

Chapter two also focuses on the socialisation patterns of elites. According to the data, approximately 10% of elite respondents in Zimbabwe, Algeria, Senegal and South Africa were born outside of the countries. In Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, however, relatively fewer elites were born outside of the respective countries. Furthermore, the majority of respondents in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Zimbabwe grew up in urban areas. In Kenya and Uganda, however, over 60% of elite respondents grew up in rural areas.

The data presented in Chapter two reveals that the African elites included in the survey display high levels of education, with the majority of respondents in all countries surveyed (except Zimbabwe) in possession of a university education. Gender groupings displayed little difference in educational levels. When comparing the educational qualifications of respondents with those of their fathers, one can conclude that in many cases the respondents represent a first-generation elite. The majority of respondents' fathers in all countries surveyed had not received a university education. Variables reflecting strength of political party support and levels of national pride were also incorporated in the analysis.

Various criticisms have been levelled against the NEPAD strategy. The most publicised of these being that the initiative contains no civil society implementation plan and that little was done to assess the needs and aspirations of ordinary Africans during the formulation and drafting of the NEPAD policy. Studies conducted by Markinor and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa

report extremely low levels of awareness of NEPAD and the AU among the South African public. Chapter three therefore sets out to measure levels of elite knowledge surrounding the AU and NEPAD and whether they believe that the NEPAD strategy is indeed an elite-driven process.

The data presented in Chapter three reveals that elite respondents in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Kenya displayed slightly higher levels of familiarity with the AU and NEPAD than elites in Algeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe. When comparing the levels of knowledge regarding the AU and NEPAD across the various countries, it became evident that elite respondents in South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal displayed higher levels of knowledge in the bodies than the respondents in other countries. This may largely be due to the prominent positions that these countries have fulfilled in the drafting and design of the NEPAD initiative. When comparing levels of confidence in NEPAD across the various countries, those countries directly involved in the drafting of the policy displayed higher levels of confidence than those not directly involved. Similarly, when comparing levels of confidence across the various societal sectors, civil society's discontentment with the plan becomes evident. In South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zimbabwe, civil society displayed lower levels of confidence than their politician and civil servant counterparts.

When asked whether it is only the ruling elite that is actively involved in promoting NEPAD, the majority of respondents in all countries except Zimbabwe agreed with the statement, thereby reflecting the opinion that NEPAD is indeed an elite-driven process. When asked whether they agreed with the statement that 'NEPAD does not embody the economic aspirations of all Africans', the majority of respondents in Algeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zimbabwe agreed with the statement. It appears therefore that although the majority of elites in all countries except Zimbabwe believe that NEPAD is an elite-driven process, they differ with regard to the extent that they believe the policy not to reflect the needs and interests of the African population. Such sentiments could seriously hamper the credibility of the plan and point to the need for the architects of the plan to ensure that the needs and interests of civil society bodies and countries not directly involved in the drafting process, are represented and adequately addressed.

Chapter three also points to the important role which the media and business can play in promoting NEPAD. The majority of elites in all countries, except Zimbabwe, placed the media and business in the top four groups involved in advocating NEPAD. Similarly, when asked to indicate their most

frequently used sources of information, daily newspapers were ranked first in all countries surveyed.

The success of NEPAD also rests on the extent to which a common African identity can be called upon to ensure the successful implementation of the plan. In light of this, Chapter three also examines the extent to which elites believe African unification and integration should and can be achieved, and whether they believe that the interests of the nation may indeed impede a move towards the integration of the continent. Although support for the principle of unification and integration exists among the African elite, the practical implications of such principles will have to be resolved.

The extent to which African leaders can collectively agree on the most important goals of the AU and NEPAD, and then prioritise these goals accordingly, will undoubtedly have an impact on the success of the AU and NEPAD. Concern has, however, been expressed regarding the goals encapsulated by NEPAD and the AU. Firstly, the neo-liberal framework embraced by NEPAD has come under severe criticism that the alignment of African development goals with the Northern paradigm of globalisation may result in the neglect of the local needs and aspirations of the African people. Further concern has been expressed over the partnership with the developed world and the subsequent conditionalities contained within this agreement. Complaints abound regarding the marginal role that gender equity has been relegated within the document and apprehension has been expressed that safety and security issues may receive priority over issues of social welfare and poverty eradication.

Chapter four provides an analysis of elite perceptions relating to the challenges facing the African continent, the goals of the AU and NEPAD; followed by an analysis of elite perceptions surrounding globalisation and the neo-liberal framework, and the partnership with the developed world and the conditionalities attached.

The data presented in the chapter shows that issues of political stability, conflict and corruption have repeatedly been regarded as paramount by the African elite included in the survey. Such sentiments seem in line with the conditionalities linked to Western aid and should therefore, in principle, lead to little conflict on the partnership front. Poverty eradication was also regarded as paramount by a large percentage of the African elite, as was the issue of African unification. Of concern, however, was the scant attention placed on issues of gender equality by the African elites.

The NEPAD strategy has also come under severe criticism for embracing the

tenets of the neo-liberal paradigm and globalisation. Chapter four reveals that the majority of African elites included in the survey agreed with the statement that ‘globalisation poses a threat to Africa’s economic reconstruction’, thereby displaying a strong level of distrust for the impact of globalisation. Similarly, when asked whether the dominant liberal economic paradigm discriminates against Africa, the majority of elites in all countries surveyed agreed with the statement. These sentiments – coupled with the fact that a large percentage of the elites surveyed believe that the developed world has a moral responsibility towards Africa – may suggest a tendency among the African elite to shift the responsibility of Africa’s recovery to external development agents.

Chapter five examines issues surrounding the implementation of NEPAD by describing elite opinions regarding the perceived capacity of African states to implement NEPAD and the perceived confidence in the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism. The chapter concludes with an analysis describing which countries, in elite opinion, would prove the most beneficial partners for the NEPAD initiative. In one of the most striking findings of the study, Chapter five reveals that although the majority of elites in all the countries surveyed (except Zimbabwe) believe that their country has the capacity to implement the NEPAD policy, they displayed very little confidence in the institutions responsible for drafting, implementing, propagating and funding the NEPAD initiative. Only the majority of respondents in South Africa and Uganda expressed quite a lot of confidence in the institutions of state, while Zimbabwe expressed extremely low levels of confidence. This disturbing trend forces one to ask whether the institutions responsible for drafting, implementing, propagating and funding the NEPAD policies do, in fact, possess the capacity to do so.

The successful implementation of the NEPAD APRM is regarded by many as the test which will prove crucial in solidifying Western support for the NEPAD policy. The data presented in Chapter five reveals that elite respondents included in the survey expressed strong levels of confidence in the APRM. When asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that the ‘APRM will not lead to improved levels of governance on the continent’, the majority of respondents in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe agreed with the statement.

Chapter five concludes by examining elite opinion regarding which economic blocs can be relied on to support the economic revival of the African continent and who they regard as reliable partners for NEPAD. The fact that the majority of elite respondents in the various countries surveyed regarded the

European Union (EU), the G8 and other African states as economic blocs that can be relied on to support the economic revival of the African continent, bodes well for the partnership upon which NEPAD is largely based. Of particular significance is the fact that the African elite displayed a great deal of confidence in the reliability of other African states as partners – a perception that reinforces the concept of African ownership and control of the implementation process. Interesting also is the emergence of Japan as a reliable partner for NEPAD; a trend which reflects Japan's active involvement in the African continent.

The concluding chapter highlights some of the most interesting findings of the survey and attempts to contextualise these findings using the most recent AU Summit in Maputo as a point of reference. Ultimately, the report provides an invaluable source of data and information through which to interpret and evaluate the further development of the AU and NEPAD.

#### NOTE

- 1 *Cape Times*, 11 July 2003.

# Chapter 1

## ELITES, THE NEPAD AND THE AFRICAN UNION

*“As we Africans continue to struggle against the impact of globalisation and to turn the tide against marginalisation, underdevelopment and poverty for Africa’s renewal, we now also have to deal with the consequences of the war in Iraq and the situation in the Middle East. As Africans, we have fully understood that maximum unity and solidarity was needed, understanding that none other than ourselves could liberate the continent.”*

Opening speech of South African Foreign Affairs Minister  
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the AU in Maputo, July 2003

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

The considerable growth that has typified the world economy over the past three decades has for the better part passed Africa by.<sup>2</sup> Although much of the structural causes for this economic marginalisation can be found in the continent’s colonial heritage, the track records of post-colonial governments have left much to be desired.<sup>3</sup> With regard to the latter, a causal link has been drawn between weak states, political insecurity and the consequent reluctance by developed nations to invest in the continent. Coupled with a lack of economic growth, Africa’s increasing reliance on aid has plunged many of its states deeper and deeper into excessive levels of foreign debt. Regrettably the whole continent, including those countries with exemplary democratic credentials, has become tainted as one ravaged by bad governance and a dependency on the developed North. The need has arisen for Africa to show itself capable of overcoming these adversities. With the rapidly changing nature



of global economic and general societal trends, Africa finds itself at a juncture where it has to integrate or face the real possibility of being left behind.

It was in response to these circumstances that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was launched in Abuja, Nigeria in October 2001, followed by the replacement of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) by the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) in July 2002. The AU aims to "promote peace, security and stability on the continent" and reserves the right to "intervene in member states pursuant to a decision of the assembly in respect of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as the condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government".

As the policy initiative of the AU, NEPAD seeks to promote accelerated growth and sustainable development on the continent, to eradicate widespread and severe poverty and to halt Africa's marginalisation in the globalisation process.

Political developments in Africa over the past few months suggest a concerted effort by many African leaders to put an end to the conflict and strife that has plagued the continent for decades. As mentioned in the *Cape Times* of 1 July 2003 it seems that "African leaders are serious about getting rid of the rotten apples in their midst and moving away from the begging bowl mentality of the past". Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Comoros and Sierra Leone have all embarked on peace processes, while moves to restore peace in Liberia dominated talks at this years' AU Summit in Maputu. Seventeen countries have signed up to join the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),<sup>4</sup> and the AU Commission, headed by former Mali President Alpha Konare, has been established.<sup>5</sup>

But indecision and a lack of consensus among African leaders have delayed attempts to establish the AU structures necessary to drive the peace plans that have evoked a renewed optimism across the continent and internationally. The AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003 was unsuccessful in ratifying the protocol to establish the Peace and Security Council, the Pan African Parliament and the Court of Justice, due to an insufficient number of country votes. This disappointment prompted South African President and outgoing Chair to the AU, Thabo Mbeki, to call on all African leaders to put aside "their individual national interests for the sake of their collective interest in building a peaceful and prosperous continent".<sup>6</sup>

In order to succeed, the AU and the NEPAD strategy will require the

commitment of African leadership on the continent, since both initiatives rely on the principle of increased African integration and unification supported by the idea of African ownership and control. Designed by Africans for Africans, the NEPAD initiative seeks a coordinated effort among African leaders and civil society alike to implement the NEPAD policies within a climate of joint responsibility and accountability. Assuming then that elites are those persons who “hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private organisations and influential movements and who therefore are able to affect strategic decisions regularly,”<sup>7</sup> an analysis of elite perceptions regarding the AU and NEPAD will provide important insights into the future direction of the two initiatives.

It was with this in mind that the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, University of Stellenbosch, in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, conducted a survey focusing on elite perceptions regarding the AU and NEPAD. South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria were included in the survey as countries whose presidents are the main drivers of NEPAD and which have had a fair amount of exposure to the plan thus far. In addition, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe were selected as ‘outside countries’, to allow for more accurate and detailed comparisons.

## 1.2 THE ROLE OF THE ELITE IN AFRICA

As reflected above, African elites should play an important role in drafting, implementing and evaluating policy throughout the African continent. According to Taylor and Nel<sup>8</sup> the exposure of the African continent to the forces of globalisation has resulted in a transnational elite “comprising of transnational executives and their affiliates, globalising state bureaucrats, capitalist-inspired politicians and professionals and consumer elites”. The emergence of such an elite in Africa has become increasingly evident over the past three years, with the emergence of a group of African leaders spearheading negotiations between Africa and the developed world and placing Africa’s development challenges on the global agenda. NEPAD and the launch of the AU are two such initiatives forming the pinnacle of efforts by these new African leaders to rejuvenate the African continent.

The role of elites in Africa has therefore become increasingly important over the past decade. As the ‘switchmen of history’ elites are the societal agents through which broader forces such as ethnicity, class and religion are filtered to

ordinary people. In Lasswell's terms the elites can be described as those individuals who decide "who gets what, when (and) how", while David Easton describes them in his well known work *A Framework for Political Analysis*, as individuals engaged in political action "predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society".

They do not only fulfill the crucial allocation function, but they also play an important role in the problem definition and agenda-setting process of public policy issues. In so doing, they bring the problem to the attention of the policy makers and enhance the salience of some issues over others.

Elites therefore play an important role in defining and/or recognising important policy issues and deciding which issues will receive priority in relation to others.<sup>9</sup>

Elites also, however, play a role in shaping public opinion regarding certain policy issues. Page and Shapiro<sup>10</sup> suggest that the official rhetoric of those actors who provide interpretations of political events may do as much, or even more, to influence public opinion than policies themselves. When elites uphold a clear picture of what should be done, the public tends to see events from that point of view, with the most politically attentive members of the public most likely to adopt the elite position. When elites divide, the members of the public tend to follow elites, sharing their general ideological or partisan predisposition, with the most politically attentive members of the public mirroring most sharply the ideological divisions among the elite.

The important argument in elite theory is that "public policy is not determined by the demands and actions of the masses, but by ruling elite whose preferences are carried into effect by public officials and agencies".<sup>11</sup> To summarise: public policy is a product of elite interaction, reflecting their attitudes and values and serving their ends.

### 1.3 QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED

This report is the culmination of an effort to gauge the attitudinal patterns of the African elite on a selection of important issues regarding the AU and NEPAD. Through the use of various attitudinal and value scales, we have attempted to provide a picture of current elite thought regarding these two institutions that may arguably become the cornerstones of African development in this century. Based on the discussion above, numerous reasons can be advanced for the importance of studying elite attitudes towards such issues:

- *African elite policy preferences:* An understanding of the attitudes of the elite may provide us with an indication of their policy preferences and performance judgments regarding policy issues implemented by the AU and NEPAD. According to Feldman<sup>12</sup> political evaluations are in part based “on the extent to which policies and actions are consistent or inconsistent with certain important beliefs and values. Policies and actions are simply judged right or wrong because of their implications for deeply held values”. The converse is also true, because knowledge of the positions that the elite take on policy issues makes it possible to get an understanding of the attitude patterns on which important policy decisions are based. Such an analysis may also provide us with an idea as to which issues elites believe should receive priority within NEPAD and the AU, as well as providing an indication of the performance standards that could be used in evaluating the initiatives.
- *Extent of elite attitudinal congruence regarding NEPAD and the AU:* Both the AU and NEPAD incorporate policies that span the entire continent. Since the African continent is one reflective of vastly different needs and aspirations, continental-wide policies initiated by both the AU and NEPAD will have to take these varying needs into account. For NEPAD and the AU to be implemented successfully, however, a certain degree of attitudinal unity among the elite regarding the goals and principles on which they are based would prove necessary. The data provided by the current study will therefore provide us with the opportunity to assess the relevant degree of attitudinal unity among the elite and perhaps point to areas where potential for conflict of interest exists.
- *Extent of cross-national acceptance of NEPAD and the AU:* As mentioned, the success of NEPAD and the AU depends to a large extent on the acceptance of the underlying principles and beliefs upon which they are based. It has been argued that NEPAD is largely an elite-driven process and that it reflects only the political interests of the political elites in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Egypt. The data set out in the current report will allow us to assess whether the countries that have not been directly involved in the drafting of the process feel alienated from the policy.
- *Nature of public opinion surrounding the NEPAD and AU:* Since elites frame important policy issues and since public opinion follows elite positions on

these issues, an analysis of elite perceptions may provide us with a valuable indication of the nature of mass opinion regarding these issues.

It should be noted that, unlike public surveys, opinion leader surveys should not be used to draw conclusions about the attitudes of a whole population. Their value lies in their ability to discern particular trends among the most influential decision makers in both the public and private spheres.

Apart from the theoretical insights which studies such as this can provide on the nature of elite perceptions regarding the AU and NEPAD, this report is also an attempt to:

- construct a fairly comprehensive image of the socio-economic background of opinion leaders in the various countries under investigation (Chapter 2);
- provide an analysis of elite knowledge of, and confidence in, NEPAD and the AU and whether the African elite accept ownership and responsibility for the two bodies (Chapter 3);
- analyse elite perceptions of the problems and challenges facing the African continent, the goals associated with the AU and NEPAD; globalisation and the neo-liberal framework; and the partnership with the developed world (Chapter 4);
- describe elite perceptions regarding the capacity of African states to implement NEPAD; the perceived confidence in the APRM; and countries that could prove beneficial partners for the African continent (Chapter 5); and
- provide concluding remarks regarding the most outstanding elite patterns and attitudinal trends (Chapter 6).

#### NOTES

- 2 R Cornwell, A New Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Security Review* 11(1), 2002, p. 91.
- 3 X Guma, Economic recovery in Africa, regional integration and good governance, in: S Gibb, T Hughes, G Mills, and T Vaahtoranta, (eds), *Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative*, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2002, p. 55.
- 4 *Cape Times*, 14 July 2003.
- 5 *Business Day*, 14 July 2003.
- 6 *Cape Times*, 11 July 2003.
- 7 See J Higley et al, *Elite Structure and Ideology*, Columbia University Press, New York,

1976, p. 17 for the original version of this definition. Higley and Gunther (1992:8) also write that “elites are the principle decision makers in the latest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications and cultural organisations and movements in society”. See also Field et al (1990:152) and other authors such as Putnam, 1976; McDonough, 1981; Moyser and Wagstaff, 1987; Higley and Moore, 1981 for definitions of elites that correspond to a great extent.

- 8 I Taylor and P Nel, ‘New Africa’, globalisation and the confines of elite reformism: Getting the rhetoric right, getting the strategy wrong, *Third World Quarterly* 23(1), 2002, pp. 163-180.
- 9 For further information on the role and function of elites in various contexts see R Herrera, Understanding the language of politics: A study of elites and masses, *Political Science Quarterly* 111(4), 1996. I McAllister, Party elites, voters and political attitudes: Testing three explanations for mass elite-differences, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XXIV(2), 1991. P Domke, M Lagos, M Capointe, M Meade and M Xenos, Elite messages and source cues: Moving beyond partisanship, *Political Communication* 17, 2000, pp. 395-402.
- 10 B Page and R Shapiro, What moves public opinion, *American Political Science Review* 77(1), 1983.
- 11 See J Anderson, *Public Policy Making: An Introduction*, 2nd ed, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1994.
- 12 S Feldman, Structure and consistency in public opinion: The role of core beliefs and values, *American Journal of Political Science* 32(1), 1988, p. 418.

# Chapter 2

## STRATEGY OF INQUIRY

*“Elites are those who occupy the society’s top positions of power and wealth. They are the people who exercise authority, influence, and control of resources within the society’s important organisations. They formulate policies, guide the activities, and decide the significant issues of government, the corporation, education, and other major societal institutions. And, perhaps most importantly, they are able to impose on society as a whole their explanation and justification for the dominant political and economic systems.”*

Marger<sup>13</sup>

### 2.1 ELITE SURVEYS OF THE CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Since 1990, the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch has conducted an in-depth analysis of the social, political and economic transformations taking place in South Africa. Six opinion leader surveys (1990, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000) have formed one of the core elements of this project and have allowed the Centre to build up an extensive database of South African elite perspectives. In the second half of 2002, a survey focusing on the AU and NEPAD was conducted in seven African countries in order to obtain accurate data on what elite perspectives regarding the two initiatives really entail. Key countries were selected and we had to decide how large the elite samples in each country should be. Here the availability of financial resources was an important factor.

Studies on elites suggest that in large societies such as the United States (US) there are probably between 5,000 and 10,000 people comprising the national

elite. In middle range societies, such as Germany and Australia, this group may vary between 500 and 1,000. Such persons are described as those “who hold widely varying attitudes and allegiances towards the existing social, economic and political order, including as it does the holders of key positions in powerful dissident or rebellious organisations and movements”.<sup>14</sup>

Three approaches have generally been used to identify elites within society and have ultimately informed the study of elites. The stratification approach “reflects reality as a coherent arrangement of classes or strata that are ordered hierarchically” and that at each level of the hierarchy, a high degree of congruency of power, wealth, knowledge and prestige exist.<sup>15</sup> The psychological approach asserts that elites can be differentiated from the masses due to a number of psychological characteristics, which have ultimately propelled them to the top of society. Lastly, the institutional approach divides the policy arena into a number of life domains, that is: economic institutions; political institutions; and cultural institutions. It is based on the assumption that the individuals or groups that occupy the most important positions within each of the domains are authorised to take decisions that have a number of large societal consequences.<sup>16</sup>

In the current study, an institutional or positional approach was employed for the selection of the elite.<sup>17</sup> Such a positional approach implies that the sector from which elites are selected must be regarded as important by experts on the African political scene in terms of the power and influence it has in policy issues (for example, parliament, the civil service, the business sector). The sector should also be regarded as important if it fulfills some or other formal representative function (for example, churches and trade unions). Operationally the elite is defined as comprising those people who fill top positions in the “largest and most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, professional, communications and cultural institutions in society”.<sup>18</sup>

It should be pointed out that this study does not claim to be a representative study of elites in the selected countries. It is only representative of persons in the top positions in the different sectors that were included in the sample in each country.

The value of the present research design is enhanced through the use of longitudinal study which makes use of comparisons of attitudinal patterns throughout the same sectors. Consequently, uniquely comprehensive and comparable sets of data on all major elite groups’ perceptions can be employed in the analysis. However, in the present study this only applies to the South



African part of the survey. For the other countries this will only be possible in a second survey of this nature.

## 2.2 COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

Using the operational definition, a positional sample was employed to select the respondents in the different countries for the particular survey. Such a procedure implies that individuals holding the most authoritative positions in influential institutions are approached to participate as respondents in the survey. The sectors from which respondents were selected include: the private sector, NGOs, CBOs, civic organisations, the public sector, professional, academic or analyst, the trade union sector, the political sector, the media and church sectors. Respondents were interviewed using a structured questionnaire on key issues relating to the AU and NEPAD.

In the South African case the sampling list was drawn up by the Centre for International and Comparative Politics. In the case of the other countries the lists were constructed by the research agencies in collaboration with experts on the politics of the particular country. The survey was quota controlled in terms of the societal sectors selected in the different countries. In South Africa, 566 respondents were interviewed while in Uganda only 97 respondents participated in the survey. Between 120 and 140 respondents completed the interview in the other African countries selected (*See Table 1*).

It should be pointed out, however, that it is virtually impossible to determine the boundaries of some sectors. How many trade union leaders or business people must be included, for example? Do all these people have the same degree of authority and/or influence? Seeing that the selection of the number of persons depended on certain assumptions about the configuration of power and influence at the national level as well as within sectors themselves, the grand total as well as the number of persons selected per sector may be regarded as arbitrary. Furthermore, cost factors also played an important part in the size of the sample. In a populous country such as Nigeria, a larger number of elites would have clearly been an advantage to the study. But compared to South Africa, a single interview in Nigeria was ten times more expensive, even though the questionnaire was shortened to reduce field costs.

Carefully chosen survey institutions were contracted to carry out the survey in the different countries. In South Africa, Markinor collected the data and in Algeria, Kenya, and Nigeria survey companies affiliated to Gallup International

**Table 1: Composition of the sample**

Sector	South Africa		Nigeria		Senegal		Kenya		Algeria		Uganda		Zimbabwe	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Private sector	91	16.1	11	8.5	33	24.3	18	15.0	17	14.3	5	5.2	32	22.9
NGO, CBO	84	14.8	4	3.1	22	16.2	22	18.3	9	7.6	10	10.3	17	12.1
Public sector	98	17.3	34	26.2	22	16.2	15	12.5	39	32.8	18	18.6	16	11.4
Professional/ analyst/ academic	77	13.6	10	7.7	21	15.4	22	18.3	19	16.0	29	29.9	31	22.1
Trade union	50	8.8	5	3.8	1	0.7	5	4.2	2	1.7			10	7.1
Politician	64	11.3	42	32.3	12	8.8	10	8.3			22	22.7	12	8.6
Media	49	8.7	15	11.5	12	8.8	12	10.0	27	22.7	4	4.1	14	10.0
Church	42	7.4	8	6.2	1	0.7	10	8.3			2	2.1	4	2.9
Other	10	1.8	1	0.8	5	3.7	6	5.0	4	3.4	6	6.2	4	2.9
Not classified	1	0.2			7	5.1			2	1.7	1	1.0		
<b>Total</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>

collected the data. In Uganda and Senegal the research was completed by Wilsken Agencies and Ba, Djibril and Associés respectively. In Zimbabwe, the data was collected by the Mass Public Opinion Institute. Respondents were contacted via telephone to set up an appointment for an interview. As part of the introduction they were sent an introductory letter, highlighting the main objectives of the survey and pointing out the confidential nature of the interview. Although the questionnaire was a self-administration type to prevent high substitution rates, face-to-face interviews were conducted.<sup>19</sup> The field work was conducted in the period October to November 2002. No incentives were given to the respondents for their participation. They were, however, promised a complimentary copy of the final report.

In both South Africa and Nigeria the final sample size was smaller than the initial estimate. In Nigeria, field costs were rendered too high to complete the original 150 interviews. As a result, only 130 interviews were completed and the questionnaire had to be shortened to ensure respondent participation and to lower the field costs. In South Africa, a high refusal rate coupled with the unavailability of a number of politicians resulted in the initial sample size of 700 being reduced to 560, while in Algeria 10 people stopped the interview because they felt that the main theme under investigation was not the AU or NEPAD, but rather their own political views.

In the sections to follow, the various country profiles will be presented, after which the samples, in terms of the most important demographic variables, will be described.

### 2.3 COUNTRY PROFILES

Due to the immense diversity of the African continent, careful consideration had to be given to the choice of countries that would form part of this survey. Cost and logistical infrastructure proved to be constraining factors to the survey, and our challenge was to find a balance between inclusiveness on the one hand and affordability on the other.

Most importantly, our sampling frame had to include elites representative of those states that took leadership in the design of the NEPAD policy. Hence, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Senegal were included in the survey as countries whose presidents were the main initiators and drivers of the plan. Zimbabwe was chosen due to NEPAD's critical attitude towards its leadership, while Kenya was included in the sample because of its regional hegemony and

**Table 2: Development Policy<sup>21</sup> and Governance Indexes<sup>22</sup>**

<i>Development Policy Index</i>		<i>Governance Index</i>	
Algeria	-0.62	Algeria	-0.93
Kenya	-0.66	Kenya	-0.72
Nigeria	-1.45	Nigeria	-1.96
Senegal	-1.55	Senegal	-1.40
South Africa	0.50	South Africa	0.48
Uganda	-2.18	Uganda	-2.86
Zimbabwe	-0.56	Zimbabwe	-1.19

the indifference which its previous leadership presented towards NEPAD. Uganda proved to be an interesting case study due to the fact that the country has recently been pampered by international donors despite its obvious democratic deficits. As is to be expected, the countries selected do vary considerably with regard to their economies and political climates.

A Developmental Policy Index and a Governance Index developed by Englebert<sup>20</sup> provides a useful tool in assessing the extent to which the countries included in the survey do indeed vary. According to the Development Policy Index, a score of zero represents the average level of policy choices across the world. A positive score indicates a tendency to adopt policies that are conducive to growth, while a negative score suggests that the government of the particular country in questions cannot afford to trade off current consumption and the rents of distortion for future growth. The Development Policy and Governance indexes for the countries included in the survey are summarised in *Table 2*.

From the indexes represented above, one can conclude that only South Africa functions above the global average<sup>23</sup> with regard to development policies and issues of governance. All other countries included in the survey display negative figures with regard to development and governance. The indexes also show what Englebert calls the “paradox of African state capacity”.<sup>24</sup> There are indeed important developmental differences within Africa. (*For brief country profiles see Box 1.*)

#### 2.4 IMPORTANT DEMOGRAPHIC ATTRIBUTES OF THE SAMPLE

Although it is generally accepted that people in societal leadership positions should also be demographically representative of the specific geographical area, comparative studies display little evidence that elites are representative of

**BOX 1: BRIEF COUNTRY PROFILES**

**South Africa** has been a multiparty democracy since 1994, after the first democratic elections were won by the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC once again secured a majority in the second democratic elections held in June 1999 and Thabo Mbeki, who replaced Nelson Mandela in December 1997, became the new president. The Democratic Alliance (DA) – formed through a merger between the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) in June 2000 – is the official opposition. In November 2001, however, the NNP left the DA to form an alliance with the ANC in order to secure greater control over the Western Province and Cape Town. Parties to the extreme right (Conservative Party and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging) and extreme left (Pan African Congress and Azanian People's Organisation) have been largely marginalised. South Africa comprises nine provincial legislatures, each with a premier and a 10-person executive council. The national parliament is comprised of a 400-member National Assembly and a 90-member National Council of Provinces. Legal cues are taken from the constitution, of which most of it can be amended by a two-thirds majority vote in parliament. South Africa has 44.8 million inhabitants, comprising four predominant ethnic groups: black (79%); white (9.6%); coloured (8.9%) and Indian (2.5%). The population growth rate currently stands at 0.02%, with a sex ratio of 1.02 male(s) per female and a life expectancy of 45.43 years at birth. This low life expectancy is largely due to the high prevalence rate of HIV in the country, which currently stands at 19.94%. In 2001, gross domestic product (GDP) stood at \$113.3 billion, with 50% of the population below the poverty line and a 37% unemployment rate (2001 est.). Adult literacy levels stand at 85%, with male literacy levels (86%) marginally higher than that of their female counterparts (85%). South Africa has a score of 0.695 on the Human Development Index and 0.689 on the Gender Related Development Index. The country's communication system is, however, the best developed in Africa and boasts more than five million main line telephones (2001), 7.06 million cellular phones (2001), six million televisions (2000) and three million internet users.

**Nigeria:** Following nearly 16 years of military rule, a new constitution was adopted in 1999, and a peaceful transition to civilian government was completed. On 29 May 2003, President Olusegun Obasanjo was inaugurated for a second term of office; marking the first time a civilian government succeeded another since the country gained independence in 1960. Although elections were marred by accusations of widespread fraud and vote rigging, a court challenge to postpone the inauguration was rejected. The People's Democratic Party has a comfortable majority in the National Assembly. The All People's Party is the second largest party, followed by the Alliance for Democracy. Nigeria is a federal republic with a US-style presidential system. The bicameral National Assembly comprises a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Each of the 36 states has an elected state governor and a state legislature. Politics in Nigeria is generally highly confrontational with the executive and the National Assembly frequently in opposition over policy issues. Ethnic and religious tensions are longstanding due to the ethnically heterogeneous nature of the country.

With a population of 129 million, Nigeria is Africa's most populated country and has a population growth rate of 2.54% (2002 est.) and life expectancy at birth of 50.59 years. Nigeria has a score of 0.462 on the Human Development Index, and scores 0.449 on the Gender Related Development Index. The adult literacy rate stands at only 57%, with males (67.3%) displaying a higher literacy rate than females (47.3%). GDP was \$40.9 billion in 2001 and GDP per head was \$323. Forty-five per cent of the Nigerian population live below the poverty line and 28% are unemployed. Nigeria possesses an inadequate telecommunications system, with only 500,000 (2000 est.) main line telephones in use, 200,000 (2001) cellular phones, six million televisions (1997) and 100,000 (2000) internet users.

**Senegal** gained independence from France in 1960, and has since been operating as a republic under multiparty rule. The *Parti Socialiste* ruled Senegal from independence in 1960 until March 2000, when President Abdou Diouf was defeated by opposition politician Abdoulaye Wade. In January 2001, a new constitution was passed, which ultimately allowed President Wade to dissolve the parliament which had become dominated by the *Parti Socialiste*. In April 2001, a legislative election was held, and Wade's electoral alliance, *Parti Democratique Sénégalais* obtained a large majority. Senegal has a unicameral legislature and a National Assembly of 120 seats. A gradual shift towards political pluralism has seen a number of parties secure cabinet positions, while the opposition can definitely not be perceived as a coherent bloc. The country has a long history of participating in international peacekeeping efforts, although Southern separatist groups engage in sporadic clashes with the government. The ethnically heterogeneous population of Senegal consists of approximately 589,000 inhabitants, of which 94% are Muslim, has a sex ratio of 1.03 male(s) per female and has a life expectancy at birth of 62.93 years. Literacy levels are low at 39.1%, with males (51.1%) displaying substantially higher levels of literacy than their female counterparts (28.9%). The real GDP growth rate stands at 5.7%, despite a 48% unemployment rate (2001 est). Senegal's Human Development Index stands at 0.431 and on the Gender Related Development Index, the country scores 0.421. In 2001 there were 234,916 main line telephones in use in Senegal, 373,965 cellular phones and 100,000 internet users.

**Algeria**, a republic divided into 48 provinces, has been independent from France since 1962. On 5 April 1999 President Bouteflika was elected as president and formed a bicameral parliament under the *Front de Libération* (FLN). The front *Islamique du Salut* emerged as the only real threat to the FLN, but in January 2000 the armed wing of the Fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front disbanded itself and many armed militants surrendered under an amnesty programme designed to promote national reconciliation. Seventy legal parties have been formed, but most of them remain insignificant. Residual fighting continues, however, as does large-scale unemployment and a housing shortage. With a predominantly Muslim population of approximately 32 million, Algeria has a sex ratio of 1.04 males per female and high life expectancy at birth of 70.24 years. Adult literacy levels currently stand at 61.6%, with males displaying a well above average level of literacy (73.9%) compared to Algerian females (49%). Twenty-three per cent of the Algerian population was below the poverty line in 1999 and 34% unemployed. In 2001,

real GDP growth stood at 1.8%, with a GDP of \$55.1 billion and a GDP per head of \$1,788. Algeria scores 0.697 on the Human Development Index and 0.679 on the Gender Related Development Index. In 1998, Algeria recorded 2.3 million main line telephones and 33,500 cellular phones in use.

Between 1969 and 1982, **Kenya** existed as a one-party state under the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Jomo Kenyatta became the first president of Kenya when the country became a republic in 1964. During this time, the entire Kenya African Democratic Union defected to KANU, rendering the country a de facto one-party state. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in both the 1992 and 1997 elections, but in December 2002 Daniel Arap Moi stepped down following fair and peaceful elections in which Mwai Kibaki from the Democratic Party of Kenya was elected as president. The Kenyan constitution gives the president wide-ranging power and is not suitably adapted to multiparty politics. With a population of approximately 31 million and a population growth rate of 1.15%, Kenya has a high HIV prevalence of 13.5%. The ethnically heterogeneous population consists of predominantly Protestants (45%) and Roman Catholics (33%) and boasts a relatively high literacy rate of 78.1%. Fifty per cent of Kenya's population is below the poverty line and 40% is unemployed. In 2001, real GDP growth stood at 1.2%, with a GDP of \$10.2 billion and a GDP per head of \$332. Kenya scores 0.513 on the Human Development Index and 0.511 on the Gender Related Development Index. In 2001, 310,000 main line telephones and 540,000 cellular phones were in use.

Between 1971 and 1979, the dictatorial regime of **Uganda's** Idi Amin was responsible for approximately 300,000 deaths. Guerrilla war and harsh human rights abuses under the rule of Milton Obote and the Uganda People's Congress claimed another 100,000 lives. In 1986, however, Yoweri Museveni, with the help of the National Resistance Army, seized power following an intense armed struggle and the National Resistance Movement became the new government of Uganda. During the 1990s, however, the government has promulgated a non-party presidential system with legislative elections. In 1996 and 2001, Museveni won the presidential elections by a large majority and has since continued with his policy of banning parties in Uganda. A national referendum held in 2000 found that the majority of Ugandans are still largely against a party system being reinstated in Uganda. With a population of 24.6 million and a life expectancy at birth of 43.8 years, Uganda has a 6.1% HIV prevalence rate. Only 62.7% of the Ugandan population can be regarded as literate, with males (74%) displaying substantially higher literacy levels than their female counterparts (54%). In 2001, GDP growth stood at 5.5%, with a GDP of \$5.7 billion and a GDP per head of \$238. Uganda's Human Development Index stands at 0.444, and the country scores 0.437 on the Gender Related Development Index. The telecommunications system in Uganda is weak with only 50,074 main line telephones recorded.

United Nations sanctions and guerrilla uprisings in **Zimbabwe** led to free elections including the black majority in 1979 and independence from the United Kingdom in 1980. Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's first prime minister, has been the country's only

ruler (and president since 1987) and has dominated the country's political system along with his Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) since independence. In September 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai was formed and has since become the official opposition to the government. Mugabe's controversial land redistribution campaign which commenced in 2000 caused an exodus of white farmers and has crippled the economy. Ignoring international condemnation, Mugabe was re-elected to power in March 2002. He has clamped down on all forms of opposition, and in so doing, severely undermined the MDC. With a population of 11.3 million and a high HIV prevalence rate of 25.06% (1999), real GDP growth stood at -7.3% in 2001. Although literacy levels are high at 85%, 60% of Zimbabwe's population was estimated to be below the poverty line in 1999. The country scores 0.551 on the Human Development Index and 0.545 on the Gender Related Development Index. With 212,000 main line telephones, 111,000 cellular phones (2001) and 100,000 internet users, Zimbabwe's telecommunications system can no longer be regarded as one of the best in Africa.

society in demographic terms. In most countries it is the privileged socio-economic groups that take up positions of leadership.

In order to determine how representative elites are of the groups that they represent, one could first look at their social and political origins. Putnam<sup>25</sup> notes that "the disproportionate advantage of male educated, high status recruits increases as we move up the political stratification system". The generalisation that political leaders are recruited in a disproportional way from the upper status professions and privileged families are almost without exception true as far as the social background of elites is concerned. The social background of the administrative elite is just as exclusive as that of the political leaders; while economic and other sub-elites come from even more privileged social backgrounds than the political and administrative elites. Other strategic elites, such as the military, academics, journalists and church leaders all display an exclusive background. In most modern societies, it is only the labour leaders who have relatively modest backgrounds.<sup>26</sup> This law of increasing disproportion seems to apply to nearly all political systems. In the case of the current study then, we do not expect the elite to 'look' like the general public in terms of basic demographic characteristics.


#### 2.4.1 GENDER


In 1976 Putnam<sup>27</sup> maintained that statistically women are the most under-represented group in political elites worldwide and that the number of highly



educated males increases as the level of authority increases. Although the representation of women throughout the elite has improved since then, males still dominate elite positions.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, Drew et al's<sup>29</sup> studies of elite recruitment in advanced capitalist democracies have found that economic and, to a lesser extent, political elites are recruited primarily from men with privileged social origins and higher education. We therefore do not expect a very different picture in the countries surveyed.

As far as gender is concerned, the samples reveal the so-called 'iron law of andrarchy' (or rule by males). In all countries surveyed, males represented over 75% of the sample. In Nigeria, only 7.7% of the sample comprised females. For South Africa and Algeria, this percentage was substantially higher at 22.3% and 25.2% respectively (*Figure 1*). Such a high representation of women in Algeria is, however, surprising given the fact that it is a predominantly Muslim country where adult literacy levels vary considerably between men and women. According to the Human Development Report 2003, women only occupied 4% of parliamentary seats in Algeria in 1997. The positional approach employed by the current study to select elites implies then that women do indeed occupy a number of top positions in Algeria. When comparing the representation of women across the various societal sectors in Algeria, 30% of the women surveyed occupied positions in the private sector, while 30% occupied positions in the public sector or civil service. This trend varies considerably from that observed in the other countries. In South Africa, Kenya and Senegal the majority of women surveyed occupied positions in NGOs or civic organisations. In Uganda and Zimbabwe the majority of females respondents occupied





positions in the professional and academic sectors, while in Nigeria, 60% of the women surveyed held positions in the civil service. Nowhere else in the sample did women hold a majority in the private sector.

#### 2.4.2 AGE<sup>30</sup>

When analysing the age distribution of elites, the elites in Zimbabwe, Uganda, Algeria and Kenya display relatively young age profiles, with the majority of elite respondents in Zimbabwe younger than 32, and the majority of elite respondents in Uganda, Algeria and Kenya between the ages of 33 and 42. The majority of respondents in South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal were, however, between the ages of 43 and 52 (*Figure 2*).

#### 2.4.3 MARITAL STATUS<sup>31</sup>

The majority of elite respondents surveyed in all countries were married, with Nigeria displaying the highest percentage of married respondents, followed by Senegal and South Africa (*Table 3*). In Algeria, only 50.5% of respondents were married, probably due to the high percentage of elites in Algeria that are


**Table 3: Marital status**

Marital status	South Africa	Nigeria	Senegal	Algeria	Kenya	Uganda	Zimbabwe
Married	73.1	88.5	76.9	50.4	69.2	69.1	65.7
Unmarried	10.4	7.7	10.8	43.7	14.2	13.4	24.3
Divorced	7.4	0.8	8.5	4.2	4.2	2.1	2.9
Widowed	2.1	3.1	2.3	0.8	2.5	3.1	0.7
Common law marriage	0.9			0.8	9.2	1	0.7
Never married	4.9		0.8			9.3	5.0
NA	1.1		0.8		0.8	2.1	0.7

younger than 32. Contrastingly, in Zimbabwe – which also has a fairly young elite – a relatively high number of them are married.

#### 2.4.4 NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS<sup>32</sup>

When comparing the number of dependents across the various countries it is clear that the majority of elite respondents in Nigeria (41.5%), Senegal (42.3%) and Uganda (47.4%) have eight or more children (*Figure 3*). The majority of elite respondents in South Africa, Algeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe have between one and four children.




## 2.5 SOCIALISATION PATTERNS


Socialisation, and more specifically political socialisation, are those developmental processes through which persons acquire political orientations and patterns of behaviour. These socialisation processes are life-long learning experiences which orientate the individual to those values and norms that are generally acceptable in a particular society. Political socialisation takes place by means of exposure to the agents of socialisation, which include the parents, the school, church, peer groups and political organisations. Factors such as place of birth, race and language group would therefore also play a pivotal role in the socialisation process.

According to Putnam, “fundamentally cognitive and normative orientations are probably initially acquired by adolescence, and, unlike opinions on transient issues, these basic orientations are probably relatively stable and perhaps even self-confirming”.<sup>33</sup> In the paragraphs below we will take a closer look at how a number of key socialisation agents manifest themselves in relation to elites in the seven surveyed African states.

### 2.5.1 GEOGRAPHICAL INFLUENCES

In order to tap into socialisation patterns, respondents were first asked whether they were in fact born in the country in question.<sup>34</sup> The data reflected in *Figure 4* shows that in the case of Zimbabwe, Algeria, Senegal and South Africa, approximately 10% of respondents were born outside of the specific countries surveyed. In South Africa, 5.1% of the respondents were born in Europe and 1.8% in another South African Development Community (SADC) country. In Senegal, 3.5% of the respondents were born in Europe, while 2.3% were born






in other Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) states. Of those not born in Algeria, the largest proportion was born in South Africa. Similarly, 2.1% of the Zimbabwean respondents were born in South Africa.

The environment into which an individual is born and where he/she is raised plays an important role in the socialisation of the individual. People that have grown up in a predominantly rural environment are exposed to less technology, media and other developmental resources than those who have grown up in urban areas.

From the data reflected in *Figure 5*, one can conclude that the majority of elites in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Zimbabwe have grown up in urban areas. Elites in Algeria and Senegal display the highest level of urbanisation, while elites in Uganda and Kenya display the lowest levels of urbanisation.<sup>35</sup>

### 2.5.2 EDUCATION

Education is one aspect of social stratification which has a very high correlation with elite status. In most Western states, the elite display very high levels of university education. In comparison with the general public, people with this type of education are over-represented by a ratio varying between 10–20:1. According to Putnam,<sup>36</sup> developing states such as India, Turkey and Mexico show even higher ratios of educated people in the political elite than their Western counterparts. In most of the former communist states, tertiary education was almost an essential requirement for leadership positions.



According to the data presented in *Figure 6*, the majority of elites in all countries surveyed (except Zimbabwe) have a university education. In Senegal and Kenya 31.5% and 27.5% of respondents respectively are in possession of a Masters degree. Fifteen per cent of respondents in South Africa, 37.7% of respondents in Senegal and 16.5% of respondents in Uganda are in possession of a Doctors degree.<sup>37</sup>


When broken down among the gender groupings in the specific countries (*Figures 7 and 8*), the data displays only slight differences between the educational levels of male and females.

Once again, the majority of female elites in all countries surveyed have received a university education. Seventy-three per cent of female elites in Algeria are in possession of a university degree, while 55% of female elites in Senegal and 50% in Uganda are in possession of a Masters degree. Senegal and Uganda, once again, display the highest concentration of female elites in possession of a Doctors degree.


Considering that the adult literacy rates for females are substantially lower than that of their male counterparts in all countries except South Africa, the female respondents included in the survey are indeed representative of the countries' elite.


When we compare the educational qualification of respondents with their

**Figure 7: Education levels of male elite respondents**



**Figure 8: Education levels of female elite respondents**






fathers (*Figure 9*), the difference is educational level becomes apparent.<sup>38</sup> The majority of respondents' fathers in all countries surveyed had not received a university education. In South Africa 29.2 % of respondents' fathers had only a grade 8 or lower education. In Zimbabwe, the corresponding figure stood at 44.3% and in Kenya it stood at 39.2%. It may be true to say that in many cases the respondents are first-generation elite.

### 2.5.3 POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT

To what extent do the elite respondents participating in the study display strong partisan tendencies? Respondents were asked to indicate their strength of support for their parties of choice (*Figure 10*). The response categories were coded as 'strong', 'moderate', 'weak', 'not applicable', and 'no answer'.<sup>39</sup>

The majority of elite respondents in South Africa displayed strong partisan tendencies, with only 14.8% of respondents rendering the question 'not applicable'. Forty-two per cent of respondents in South Africa indicated strong levels of support for their respective parties,<sup>40</sup> while only 9% recorded weak support. Zimbabwean elites also reflected relatively strong partisan support with only 20% of respondents regarding the question as 'not applicable' and 40.7% of respondents expressing strong support for their respective parties.






Similarly, 50.5% of Ugandan elites surveyed expressed strong support for a political party. Elite respondents in Senegal, however, expressed relatively low party support, with 43.3% rendering the statement as ‘not applicable’. Similarly, only 29.2% of the Nigerian respondents expressed strong support for their parties. Sixty per cent of Algerian respondents refused to answer the question (arguably due to the relatively high levels of sensitivity to political issues in the country – as discussed earlier in this chapter).

#### 2.5.4 NATIONAL PRIDE

In order to gauge whether elite respondents are in fact nationally proud they were asked: How proud are you to be a South African/Nigerian/Senegalese, etc.? Response categories were coded as ‘very proud’, ‘quite proud’, ‘not very proud’ and ‘not proud at all’. According to the data presented in *Figure 11*, South Africans displayed the strongest levels of national pride, with 76.3% of respondents regarding themselves as ‘very proud’. Only 2.5% of South African respondents were not very proud to be South African. Although 73.8% of Nigerian respondents were very proud to be Nigerian, 8.5% expressed that they were not proud to be Nigerian.

Similarly, 10.8% of Kenyan respondents, 11.3% of Ugandan respondents and 13.6% of Zimbabwean respondents expressed that they were not proud. Algerian respondents expressed relatively strong levels of pride in their country, with 69.7% very proud and 17.6% quite proud. Likewise, 69.2% of Senegalese respondents were very proud to be Senegalese.



## 2.6 CONCLUSION

From the data presented above it is clear that the elite respondents included in the survey are indeed part of the higher strata of their respective societies and may, as a result, reflect different perceptions and values when compared to the populations within their respective countries. The demographic trends associated with the elite are, however, fairly similar across the various countries, with age, educational level and gender profiles reflecting similar degrees of variation.

As far as “opinions on contemporary issues: are concerned”, Putnam<sup>41</sup> does argue that one could expect such opinions to be more “responsive to contemporary experiences and constraints”. He goes on to argue that it would be surprising if an opinion leaders’ position on economic planning or his interpretation of his role as legislator revealed any lingering effects of the size of his home town or his father’s occupation.”

With regard to decision making, however, it is regarded as self-evident in politics that elites will give preference to the social groups from which they come. Therefore, if any distortion in the demographic elite exists, one could venture so far as to argue that scarce resources will also be distorted to the benefit of the particular group which dominates the decision-making process within the particular country. Since the iron law of andrarchy predominates

throughout our elite samples,<sup>42</sup> a strong gender bias may be evident within the decision-making processes in the African countries surveyed.

The next chapter will provide an analysis of elite perceptions surrounding confidence in, and ownership of, NEPAD and the AU, as well as an analysis of elite opinions regarding the primary principles upon which the two initiatives are based.

#### NOTES

- 13 M Marger, *Elites and Masses: An introduction to political sociology*, D. Van Nostrand Company, New York, 1981, p. 29.
- 14 G Field et al, A new elite framework for political sociology, *Revue Européenne de Sociologie Sociale* 28(1), 1990, p. 153.
- 15 J Higley and J Pakulski, Elite theory and research in postcommunist societies, in: K Fretznel-Zagórska and J Wasilewski (eds), *The Second Generation of Democratic Elites in Central and Eastern Europe*, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 2000, p. 31.
- 16 W Wesolowski, Theoretical aspects of elite research in postcommunist societies, in: K Fretznel-Zagórska and J Wasilewski, (eds), op cit, p. 18. See also J Higley and J Pakulski, op cit, p. 43; and W Welsh, *Leaders and Elites*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, USA, 1979. p. 22; and M Marger, op cit, p. 78.
- 17 Some years ago the literature on elites was characterised by a fierce debate on the merits of the various criteria for the selection of elites. However, these days the “positional approach” to the selection of elites is widely regarded as one of the best methods of selection. See Hoffman-Lange, in: G Moysen and M Wagstaff (eds), *Research Methods for Elite Studies*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1987, p. 30.
- 18 See Field et al, 1990. Other authors that use closely related operationalisations of national elites include: R Putman, *The Comparative Study of Elites*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J, Prentice Hall, 1976; P McDonough, *Power and Ideology in Brazil*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981.
- 19 In contrast to the 60-minute estimate, some of the interviews took up to two-and-a-half hours to complete. Complaints regarding the administration of the questionnaire included the fact that it was too long and that respondents suffered from fatigue. Some respondents in Algeria also refused to answer questions V298-V311 (dealing with aspects relating to political parties) due to their sensitive nature.
- 20 P Englebert, *State Legitimacy and Development in Africa*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2000, pp. 27-31.
- 21 This index was built from the following indicators: public investments in education; public investments in infrastructure; current government expenditure; distortions in the foreign exchange market; restrictions on free trade; and distortions in the financial sector.
- 22 Englebert also makes use of a governance index incorporating seven different dimensions of governance. These dimensions include:

- enforceability of contract;
  - the risk of appropriation of investments;
  - prevalence of corruption;
  - quality of government institutions;
  - quality of the bureaucracy;
  - extent of civil liberties; and
  - degree of linguistic alienation of citizens from the government.
- 23 A score of zero would represent the global average.
- 24 Englebert, op cit, p. 42.
- 25 Putnam, op cit, p. 26.
- 26 See also J Wasilewski, Polish post-transitional elite, in: Frentzel-Zagórska and Wasilewski (eds), op cit, p. 199.
- 27 Putnam, op cit, p. 32 as cited in Drew et al, *Gendering Elites: Economic and political leadership in 27 industrialised societies*. Ed. M Vianello and G Moore, MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000, p. 6.
- 28 Wasilewski, op cit, p. 199.
- 29 Drew et al, op cit.
- 30 Respondents were asked to indicate their year of birth.
- 31 The question posed to respondents read: What is your marital status?
- 32 The question posed to respondents read: How many dependents do you currently have?
- 33 Putnam, op cit, p. 93.
- 34 The question posed to respondents read: In which country were you born?
- 35 The question posed to respondents read: Where did you mainly grow up?
- 36 Putnam, op cit, p. 27.
- 37 The question posed to respondents read: What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
- 38 The question posed to respondents read: What is your father's highest qualification?
- 39 The question posed to respondents read: How strong is your support for this party/group/movement?
- 40 49.3% of elite respondents in the South African sample were ANC supporters.
- 41 Putnam, op cit, p. 93.
- 42 In all countries surveyed, less than 26% of the respondents were women.

## Chapter 3

### NEPAD AND THE AFRICAN UNION: ISSUES OF ELITE CONFIDENCE AND OWNERSHIP

*“The salvation of Africa lies primarily in Africa and with Africans themselves. Optimism must become a resounding virtue and widely disseminated psychological trait – even in the face of challenges ... . Robust optimism about Africa’s future is a major requirement for the self-confidence that Africans so badly need to deal with the challenges of this historical juncture. Regardless of what Africa’s detractors may say or do, Africans themselves must never lose faith in their own capacity and ability to change the course of events – to achieve the willed future for themselves.”*

Onimode<sup>43</sup>

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The AU and NEPAD are both relatively new names on the African political landscape. Borne out of a desire to revive a much-maligned continent, ravaged by exploitation, war and hunger, these initiatives have formed part of a concerted drive by African leaders to put the continent on a track towards growth, development and integration.

Plans for the regional economic and political integration of Africa have been regarded as paramount by a number of African governments for quite some time and have resulted in the launch of numerous initiatives aimed towards this end. In 1980, the Lagos Plan of Action was directed towards greater market integration on the continent, and in 1991 the Abuja Treaty established plans for the creation of an African Economic Community within 34 years. In 1999, the Sirte Declaration pre-empted the dissolution of the OAU and its replacement by the AU in July 2002. More recently, however, plans towards continental unity

and integration have been extended to include issues of good governance, peace and political stability through the establishment of NEPAD – a policy initiative of the AU.

Various criticisms have, however, been levelled against the AU and the NEPAD strategy, which will undoubtedly carry important implications for ownership of, and confidence in, the two bodies. The following chapter will therefore provide a brief overview of the development of the AU and the NEPAD initiative, describe elite perceptions regarding issues of confidence and ownership in the two initiatives, and analyse elite opinions surrounding the principles upon which the two initiatives are based.

During the summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya proposed the political unification of Africa through the establishment of a ‘United States of Africa’. Although a number of African leaders were opposed to Gaddafi’s radical suggestion, the OAU set up a committee of experts to design an African Union, which would advance the movement towards a single political and economic body across the African continent. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was presented at the OAU summit in July 2000 and implemented a year later, effectively replacing the OAU Charter (1963) by July 2002.<sup>44</sup>

The Act lists 14 objectives, including a commitment to accelerate the political, social and economic integration of the continent and the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. It aims to establish a common defence policy for the continent and promotes respect for territorial boundaries established at the achievement of independence, and non-interference in the internal affairs of another African state. The AU initially comprised 17 bodies, including: an Assembly of Heads of State; an Executive Council of Foreign Ministers; a Pan African Parliament; a Court of Justice; a Permanent Representative Committee of Ambassadors in Addis Ababa; seven specialised technical committees; an Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and three financial institutions.<sup>45</sup> At its inauguration in July 2002, however, three more bodies were added, namely the NEPAD, the APRM and the Peace and Security Council.


During the late 1990s, South African President Thabo Mbeki embarked on an African Renaissance and gained the support of two prominent African leaders, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria) and President Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria) for the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP). The plan was mandated by the OAU, and investigated the ways in which Africa could

overcome its debt crisis. 2001 saw the creation of the Omega Plan of Senegal's President Wade, which focused on regional infrastructural development and the promotion of educational projects. On 3 July 2001 the MAP and Omega plans were merged to form the New Africa Initiative, which was approved by the OAU Heads of State. The initiative was eventually renamed the New Partnership for Africa's Development and was signed and finalised on 23 October 2001.<sup>46</sup> It was a unique plan in that it was conceived in Africa by Africans and boasted the support of five prominent leaders: Mbeki (South Africa), Obasanjo (Nigeria), Bouteflika (Algeria), Wade (Senegal) and Mubarak (Egypt).

Gelb<sup>47</sup> asserts that NEPAD is an attempt by African leaders to collectively address "the continent's lack of development in the context of globalisation". Essentially, NEPAD is a holistic, integrated strategic framework, developed and conceived by African leaders that aims towards the socio-economic upliftment of the African continent and establishes new relations with the developed industrial democracies of the North. The actual NEPAD document provides a statement of the problems facing Africa and addresses key social, economic and political priorities that will put Africa on the path of sustainable growth. The goals of NEPAD, as stated in the official summarised version thereof, are the "promotion of accelerated growth and sustainable development, the eradication of widespread and severe poverty and the halting of Africa's marginalisation in the globalisation process".

As a result, the NEPAD strategy is based on a number of principles, the support of which are crucial for levels of confidence in, and ownership of, the policy. The principles include African ownership and control, African unification, solidarity and integration, and democracy and transparency. However, a lively debate is currently under way among Africans regarding the feasibility of the proposed partnership. In South Africa in particular, the partnership has resulted in heavy ideological clashes between civil society and government. Here, supporters of the partnership argue that it welcomes the forces of 'neo-liberal globalisation' to cure the continent's ills while at the same time embracing the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to integrate the continent into the global economy. Still others argue it is a plan by elites for elites and will ultimately ignore the needs of Africa's starving millions.

To what extent do the elites in the various African countries surveyed believe in the principles upon which the AU and the NEPAD strategy are based? Do the majority of elites believe that NEPAD is indeed an elite-driven process






that has taken little or no cognisance of the needs of Africa's millions? Do they believe that a common African identity is indeed feasible and that the interests of the continent should receive priority over the national interests of the respective states involved? These and other issues will be dealt with in the sections that follow.

### 3.2 LEVELS OF KNOWLEDGE ASSOCIATED WITH NEPAD AND THE AFRICAN UNION

Over the past year or two, numerous criticisms have been levelled against the NEPAD strategy, probably the most publicised of these being the accusation that the strategy is too elite driven and contains no civil society implementation plan. Various scholars have described the NEPAD strategy as marginalising the majority of significant players and ultimately defeating the principles of pluralism, democracy and transparency on which it is based.<sup>48</sup>


These criticisms have manifested themselves at the level of ordinary citizens. A survey conducted in South Africa by Markinor in April and May 2002 among 3,500 adults living in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in South Africa suggests an extremely low awareness of NEPAD among the South African public. Only 14% of respondents interviewed were aware of NEPAD, while 80% of respondents possessed no knowledge of the strategy.<sup>49</sup> Consequently, at a continental Civil Society meeting on the AU and NEPAD in Durban, 1–3 July 2002, participants encouraged and welcomed the growing interaction between civil society organisations and the AU, but challenged the NEPAD Implementation Committee to do the same. A more recent study conducted by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa reported that half of those surveyed had not heard about or did not know enough about the AU to form an opinion.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, at the Continental Experts Meeting on NEPAD and the AU held in June 2002, over 300 scholars from the African continent raised questions as to whether the African population could in fact claim ownership of NEPAD, given the lack of consultation and dialogue with civil society organisations.<sup>51</sup>


One would, however, expect the members of the elite to be more informed about the policies due to the role that they play in formulating and drafting national policy. Are the elite in the African countries surveyed familiar with the AU and NEPAD, and what level of knowledge do these elites possess? Are there differences in the levels of knowledge perceived between the elites representative of the various societal sectors?



Respondents in this African elite survey were asked whether they were familiar with NEPAD and the AU. The majority of elites in all countries surveyed indicated that they were indeed aware of the AU (*Figure 12*) and NEPAD (*Figure 13*). Elites in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Kenya displayed slightly higher levels of familiarity with the AU and NEPAD than the elites in Algeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, elites in all seven countries surveyed displayed greater familiarity with the AU than with the NEPAD.


When respondents were also asked to indicate specifically their level of knowledge regarding the AU on a scale<sup>52</sup> of 1 (nothing at all) to 5 (a great deal), all countries, except Algeria, expressed an above average knowledge of the AU (*Figure 14*). Nigeria (3.71) and South Africa (3.57) expressed the highest levels of knowledge, followed by Senegal (3.46), Kenya (3.45), Zimbabwe (3.50), Uganda (3.38) and Algeria (2.95).





When asked to indicate their level of knowledge regarding NEPAD<sup>53</sup> (Figure 15), only Zimbabwe and Algeria displayed a below average knowledge of the strategy. South Africa (3.62) and Senegal (3.56) expressed slightly higher mean values than the other countries, followed by Kenya (3.24), Nigeria (3.16), Uganda (3.09), Zimbabwe (2.99) and Algeria (2.50).

The relatively high levels of knowledge regarding NEPAD expressed by South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal may be due to the prominent positions that these countries have fulfilled in the drafting and design of the NEPAD initiative. Arguably, their medias would therefore cover aspects relating to the AU and NEPAD more frequently. In Nigeria, however, difficulties have been experienced in getting the ministries and stakeholders involved in the national development process to understand the internal workings of NEPAD. The National Planning Commission, for instance, has experienced extreme difficulty in enforcing NEPAD across all ministries at national and state levels, because



they are still trying to come to grips with the finer workings of the document. Initiatives aimed at popularising the NEPAD initiative in Nigeria have, however, commenced. Chinyere Asika, Senior Special Assistant on NEPAD to the President has briefed the Head of Service of the federation as well as key actors in the organised private sector, such as the Manufactures' Association of Nigeria, the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and the Auto-Parts Dealers' Association of Nigeria. As part of the strategy of popularising the initiative, all ministries at the national and state levels have been requested to create a NEPAD desk within the office of the director of Planning, Statistics and Research.

Interestingly, however, Algerian respondents displayed relatively low levels of knowledge with regard to the strategy, even though President Abdelaziz Bouteflika also played a leading role in the drafting of the NEPAD policy.

Upon further comparison of the levels of knowledge surrounding the AU between the various societal sectors represented in each country, it appears that the media possesses the strongest level of knowledge compared to the other sectors. When societal sectors are collapsed to comprise only civil society,<sup>54</sup> civil servants and politicians, the politicians display higher levels of knowledge than their civil servant and civil society counterparts in Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya and Uganda (*Table 4*). In South Africa, civil servants displayed the highest level of knowledge surrounding the AU. Only in Zimbabwe did civil society display the highest level of knowledge.

Similarly, comparisons of the levels of knowledge surrounding NEPAD between the various sectors also displays relatively high levels of knowledge within the media. When societal sectors are collapsed, only the civil society sectors in Senegal and Nigeria display higher levels of knowledge surrounding NEPAD than their politician and civil servant counterparts (*Table 5*). In South Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe, civil society displayed relatively lower knowledge of the NEPAD policy when compared with politicians and civil servants.

**Table 4: Knowledge of AU and societal sector**

	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
Civil society	3.47	3.72	3.47	2.93	3.43	3.31	3.55
Politicians	3.76	3.73	3.58		3.60	3.77	3.42
Civil servant	3.82	3.71	3.50	3.05	3.33	3.22	3.31
<b>N</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>140</b>

**Table 5: Knowledge of NEPAD and societal sector**


	South Africa	Nigeria	Senegal	Algeria	Kenya	Uganda	Zimbabwe
Civil society	3.54	3.15	3.61	2.48	3.17	3.00	2.94
Politicians	3.80	3.14	3.50		3.20	3.45	3.18
Civil servant	3.82	3.18	3.50	2.67	3.47	3.00	2.97
<b>N</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>140</b>

### 3.3 CONFIDENCE IN NEPAD

As mentioned in previous paragraphs, the exclusion of civil society in the drafting and implementation phase of the NEPAD strategy has resulted in a number of criticisms being levelled against the policy. From the statistics reflected in the section above, it would appear that this exclusion has adversely affected the levels of knowledge regarding the NEPAD policy among the members of civil society. This exclusion may, however, also have negatively affected confidence levels associated with the strategy. Concern has also been expressed that the policy reflects the perspectives and interests of the African leaders involved in the drafting of the NEPAD policy, and that it does not embody the needs and viewpoints of the whole of Africa. What may be important for larger countries such as South Africa and Nigeria, may not necessarily be beneficial for smaller countries involved in the process.<sup>55</sup>


With reference to this issue of confidence, respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 (no confidence) to 10 (complete confidence) how much confidence they have in NEPAD to improve the economic prospects of Africa (*Figure 16*). All

**Figure 16: Confidence in NEPAD to improve the economic prospects of Africa (means – 10-point scale)**



countries displayed an above-average level of confidence, with South Africa (6.59), Nigeria (6.51), Kenya (6.43) and Senegal (6.34) displaying higher levels of confidence than Algeria (6.08), Uganda (5.60) and Zimbabwe (5.59). Again, countries directly involved in the drafting and implementation of the NEPAD policy (i.e. South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria) displayed relatively higher levels of confidence in the policy than Uganda and Zimbabwe. Kenya, however, has also displayed relatively high levels of confidence in the policy, despite the fact that it is considered an ‘outside’ country. Although leftist groups in Kenya have warned that NEPAD should be discarded altogether, views towards the initiative have softened since Kenya was admitted to the Steering Committee late last year. The Kenyan government has started to implement a National Steering Council on NEPAD in order to initiate official public discussions surrounding the initiative. NGOs in Kenya have been particularly optimistic regarding NEPAD. Social development organisations such as Action Aid and the Social Development Forum have pledged support towards the initiative. Similarly, anti-corruption networks such as the Futa Magendo Network have also expressed enthusiasm surrounding the objectives of NEPAD.

Respondents were also asked to indicate their levels of confidence in the ability of NEPAD to improve the economic prospects of the country (*Figure 17*). South Africa (6.74), displayed the highest level of confidence, followed by Algeria (6.68), Nigeria (6.25), Senegal (6.22), Kenya (6.13), Uganda (5.60) and Zimbabwe (5.23). Once again, the countries directly involved in the NEPAD process have displayed higher levels of confidence than those countries not directly involved in the drafting of the strategy. Interestingly, Algeria displays



**Table 6: Confidence in NEPAD to improve economic prospects of continent, societal sector***(mean scores on a 10-point scale: 1=no confidence; 10=complete confidence)*

	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
Civil society	6.34	6.21	6.08	6.59	6.51	5.34	5.48
Politicians	6.89	6.64	7.42		5.80	6.23	6.17
Civil servants	7.40	6.76	7.09	5.28	6.60	5.67	5.81
<b>N</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>140</b>


higher levels of confidence in NEPAD's ability to solve the economic problems of the country than in NEPAD's ability to solve the economic problems of the continent. South Africa's leading role in the development of the strategy is clearly depicted in the higher levels of confidence expressed by the country's elites when compared to the other countries included in the survey.

When comparing the levels of confidence across the various societal sectors (*Table 6 and Table 7*), civil society's discontentment with the policy becomes evident. In South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zimbabwe, civil society displayed lower mean scores than their politician and civil servant counterparts. In Kenya, however, civil society displayed higher levels confidence than politicians and civil servants.

When asked to what degree they believed that their countries would benefit from NEPAD (*Figure 18*), the majority of respondents in all countries surveyed felt that their countries would indeed benefit from the initiative. Interestingly, the initiating countries – namely, Nigeria (84.6%), South Africa (80%), Senegal (65.9%) and Algeria (51.3%) – displayed the strongest level of agreement with the statement, followed by Uganda (52.5%), Kenya (42.8%) and Zimbabwe (37%).

**Table 7: Confidence in NEPAD to improve economic prospects of country, societal sector***(mean scores on a 10-point scale: 1=no confidence; 10=complete confidence)*

	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
Civil society	6.49	6.08	5.88	6.28	6.26	5.34	5.13
Politicians	7.09	6.26	7.58		5.80	6.27	6.00
Civil servants	8.50	6.44	6.98	7.72	5.73	5.61	5.31
<b>N</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>140</b>



Such sentiments echo the view expressed by Diescho<sup>56</sup> that African countries not directly involved in the drafting of the NEPAD policy may, initially, express some level of scepticism surrounding the initiative.

The data reflected in the sections above suggests that support for the NEPAD policy may indeed be fragmented along sectoral and country lines. In the majority of countries surveyed, members of civil society have expressed lower levels of confidence in the strategy, echoing the declaration issued by civil society organisations which met in Port Shepstone, South Africa on 4–8 July 2001 that:

“although the AU member states have endorsed NEPAD, a majority of the African populace is unaware of, let alone, familiar with, the initiative ... despite the goodwill demonstrated by governments, this fast track implementation of NEPAD without broad consultation with civil society, or at least ensuring a minimal level of awareness by the public raises a number of concerns.”<sup>57</sup>

Similarly, countries that have not been directly involved in the drafting of the NEPAD strategy have displayed lower levels of confidence in the strategy.

*A survey conducted among delegates at the World Economic Forum (2003) showed that 80% were upbeat about the continent’s potential, while 70% believed insufficient work was being done to promote NEPAD – Business Day, 12 June 2003.*



### 3.4 ADVOCATES OF NEPAD

As mentioned, the data presented in the previous section suggests that support for the NEPAD strategy is indeed fragmented along the lines of societal sector, with politicians and civil servants displaying greater confidence in the strategy than members of civil society. Consequently, when asked to indicate on a scale<sup>58</sup> of 1 (none at all) to 4 (a great deal) how much the following groups<sup>59</sup> are involved in advocating NEPAD in the respective countries, respondents in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Uganda regarded the government as having the most influence in advocating NEPAD, followed by the media (*Table 8*).<sup>60</sup> The business sector and academics were also perceived as playing an important role in promoting the policy.

In Kenya, however, the media was regarded as having the most influence, followed by the business sector and then the government. In Zimbabwe, churches were considered to have the most influence, followed by the government and trade unions. These exceptions in both Kenya and Zimbabwe are not surprising as the Kenyan government hesitantly came on board the NEPAD process, while the Zimbabwean leadership interprets NEPAD as an endeavour of neo-colonialism.

According to Diescho<sup>61</sup> “the role of an increasingly sophisticated – not sycophantic – media cannot be overemphasised in Africa – a public media that is mandated and able to focus on truthful reporting and comprehensive analysis rather than ‘packaged reportage’”.

Considering the fact that African parliaments got to learn about the NEPAD initiative through newspapers and television sets, after the architects of the plan had already spent precious time selling the idea to Western partners, the role and importance of the media in disseminating information on NEPAD should not be underestimated.<sup>62</sup>

**Table 8: Groups involved in advocating NEPAD**

<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
<b>Gov.</b>	<b>Gov.</b>	<b>Gov.</b>	<b>Gov.</b>	<b>Media</b>	<b>Gov.</b>	<b>Church</b>
<b>Media</b>	<b>Media</b>	<b>Media</b>	<b>Media</b>	<b>Business</b>	<b>Media</b>	<b>Gov.</b>
<b>Business</b>	<b>Business</b>	<b>Academic</b>	<b>Business</b>	<b>Gov.</b>	<b>Academic</b>	<b>Trade unions</b>
Academics	Academics	Business	Academic	Trade unions	Business	Civil society

Diescho goes on to argue that the role of business has also not been fully appreciated by the African political leaders and that business support for, and confidence in, the initiative could prove crucial to the success of the NEPAD policy. Most of \$64 billion in annual investment coming from the developed world is in fact coming from the private sector, not the governments. The private sector has, however, made contributions towards securing the success of the initiative. As a result, businesses have pledged support for the policy<sup>63</sup> and have committed to:

- developing best practice standards of corporate governance throughout Africa, supported by efficient accounting and auditing procedures and a commitment to eradicate corrupt practices;
- improving corporate social responsibility programmes and assisting in improving human capital and productivity; and
- providing support to African governments in their efforts to achieve best practice standards of economic governance.<sup>64</sup>

It is therefore encouraging to note that elites in most African countries surveyed realise the crucial role which the media and business can play in Africa.

In line with the above, respondents were also asked to indicate the most frequently used sources of information (*Table 9*). Responses were plotted on a scale of 1 (daily) to 5 (never) and items included daily newspapers, weekly newspapers, international newspapers, letters to the editor, editorials, news reports on radio, news reports on television, parliamentary debates, poll results, the internet, academic journals/books, magazines, research staff, pressure group activity, policy analysts, colleagues and consultants. In all countries surveyed daily newspapers were regarded as the most frequently cited sources of information. In Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Senegal and Algeria, news reports on television and radio were considered the second and third most utilised sources of information. In Zimbabwe, however, colleagues were considered the

*At the Africa Economic Summit 2003, held in Durban, South Africa, Reuel Khoza, Chairman of Eskom in South Africa was quoted as saying that research among South African based companies with operations in Africa had shown marked improvement in and awareness of attitudes to NEPAD. Where previously only 35% were positive and 65% cynical or negative, 80% now see NEPAD as a vehicle that could benefit Africa through socially responsible work.*

**Table 9: Sources of information**

<i>Rank</i>	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
1st	Daily newspapers	Daily newspapers	Daily newspapers	Daily newspapers	Daily newspapers	Daily newspapers
2nd	News on TV	News on radio	News on TV	News on TV	News on radio	Colleagues
3rd	News on radio	News on TV	News on radio	News on radio	News on TV	News on TV
<i>Least frequently used</i>	Poll Results	Research staff	Policy analysts	Consultants	Poll results	Poll Results
	Consultants	Pressure group	Research staff	Research staff	Policy analysts	Policy analysts
	Pressure group	Letters to editor	Pressure group	Pressure group	Pressure group	Pressure group

second most frequently utilised source, followed by news reports on television. Research staff, policy analysts and consultants, pressure group activities and poll results can be regarded as the least frequently consulted sources of information.

These results confirm the important role which can be played by the media in Africa. Unfortunately, however, as pointed out above, the media in Africa is seldom free from political, economic or legal interference. In the Free Press Survey conducted by Freedom House in 2003, only South Africa could be regarded as having a free media sector. The press in Senegal, Uganda and Nigeria was regarded as being only partly free, while the press in Kenya, Algeria and Zimbabwe was not regarded as free at all.

### 3.5 NEPAD: FOR AFRICAN'S BY AFRICANS?

As mentioned in the opening paragraphs, NEPAD has been labelled as an elite-driven process due to the lack of public participation and consultation in the process. Scholars at the African Scholars' Forum argued that NEPAD remains "unknown to the majority of African peoples, is barely understood by African developments agents, including those in government, and has drawn little

interest from African scholars”. They go on to assert that little public debate regarding the extent to which the policy “corresponds to the African reality, dream or vision” has been engaged.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, criticisms have also been levelled against the document which suggest that it encompasses only the perspectives and views of the leaders behind the initiative and that the strategy’s neo-liberal thrust ignores the needs of the broader African population.<sup>66</sup>

According to Taylor and Nel,<sup>67</sup> the dawn of the 21st century has seen the emergence of a group of prominent African leaders that have positioned themselves to play an integral role in negotiations between Africa and the developed world. These leaders (most notably from Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Senegal) represent the ‘New Africa’ and aim to propel African development back on to the international agenda. They have increasingly made their presence felt at a number of multilateral meetings, including the G7 Summit in Okinawa (July 2000) and Mbeki’s presence at the EU summit in Portugal in 2000 and his attendance at the G8 Summit in Genoa. However, despite the attempts made by these leaders to halt Africa’s marginalisation in an increasingly globalised world and to stall what has often been referred to as the ‘globalisation of apartheid’, numerous criticism has been levelled against these attempts. According to Herbert,<sup>68</sup> these African leaders have spent too much time ‘selling’ NEPAD to the developed world and have, as a result, done little to curb the anxieties prevalent among business, labour, the media and the NGO sector that NEPAD is really a strategy poised primarily towards donor nations in an attempt to accumulate aid. Such sentiments have even prompted a commentator in *Business Day* to label NEPAD as “top-down, non-consultative and so prone to neo-liberal economic mistakes that it must be tossed out and a new programme started from scratch”.

Such criticisms carry important implications for confidence in, and ownership of, the NEPAD strategy.<sup>69</sup> If perceptions exist that the policy reflects only the interests of a few elites and their partners in the developed world at

*On the basis of the above, we do not accept the NEPAD plan, as a process and in its content. We are committed to joint efforts for Africa’s development and emancipation, and we call upon all African peoples’ organisations and movements to continue their longstanding efforts to produce sustainable, just and viable alternatives that will benefit all the people of Africa.*

Declaration issued by civil society organisations that met in  
KwaZulu-Natal in July 2002.

**Table 10: It is only the ruling elite that is actively involved in promoting NEPAD**

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Mean</i>
South Africa	59.4	14.1	26.5	2.57
Nigeria	71.5	12.3	16.1	2.20
Senegal	66.4	7.5	26.1	2.44
Algeria	39.0	45.1	16.0	2.66
Kenya	53.3	24.2	22.5	2.60
Uganda	71.2	17.5	11.4	2.20
Zimbabwe	34.3	16.1	49.6	3.25

the expense of the needs of ordinary Africans, successful implementation of the plan may be seriously stymied. To what extent do elites in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe believe that NEPAD is indeed an elite-driven initiative that does not take the needs of ordinary Africans into account?

Elites were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) to what extent they concur with the statement: 'It is only the ruling elite in [the country] that is actively involved in promoting NEPAD' (*Table 10*).<sup>70</sup> The majority of respondents in all countries except Zimbabwe agreed with the statement, thereby reflecting the opinion that NEPAD is largely an elite-driven process.


When comparing the means, Uganda (2.20) displayed the strongest level of agreement with the statement, followed by Nigeria (2.20), Senegal (2.44), South Africa (2.57), Kenya (2.60), Algeria (2.66) and Zimbabwe (3.25).

When comparing the levels of agreement with the statement across the various societal sectors, civil society elites in South Africa, Senegal and Kenya displayed stronger support for the statement than their politician and civil servant counterparts (*Table 11*). In Nigeria, Algeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe,

**Table 11: It is only the ruling elite involved in advocating NEPAD, societal sector**

(comparison of means on a 5-point scale where 1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree)

	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
Civil society	2.38	2.19	2.38	2.67	2.54	2.23	3.26
Politicians	3.03	2.12	2.83	2.54	2.70	1.91	3.25
Civil servants	3.02	2.26	2.73		3.07	2.44	3.38
<b>N</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>140</b>



however, politicians expressed the strongest level of agreement with the statement.

When asked to what extent they agreed with the statement: ‘NEPAD does not embody the economic aspirations of all Africans’, the majority of respondents in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya disagreed with the statement (*Figure 19*). Elites in Algeria (49.5%) displayed the strongest level of agreement with the statement, followed by elites in Senegal (44.8%), Zimbabwe (41.3%) and Uganda (40.2%).

Similarly, when asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement: ‘NEPAD is not perceived as a genuine African programme’, the majority of respondents in Algeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe agreed with the statement (*Figure 20*). Such sentiments may be suggestive of the fact that elites in Uganda and Zimbabwe feel largely alienated from the NEPAD policy process, due to the fact that they were not included in the drafting of the policy. It was only until recently that the NEPAD initiative has gained popularity in Uganda with the establishment of a Parliamentary Forum on NEPAD.


As the main role-players within the strategy, South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal expressed relatively strong disagreement with the statement. It appears that although the majority of elites in all countries except Zimbabwe believe that the policy may indeed be elite driven, they differ with regard to the extent that they perceive it to not reflect the needs and interests of the African population. Respondents in South Africa and Nigeria, in particular, expressed relatively stronger opinions that the policy did indeed reflect the interests of the African population, thereby implying a confidence in the ability of elites to

represent the interests of the African people. As the main drivers of the partnership, elites in South Africa and Nigeria will have to take active measures to ensure that the image of the strategy as a “top-down programme driven by African elites and drawn up with the corporate forces and institutional instruments of globalisation, rather than being based on African people’s experience, knowledge and demands,”<sup>71</sup> is not perpetuated. In order to gain the support and confidence of countries such as Uganda and Zimbabwe, such perceptions will have to be changed.

### 3.6 ISSUES OF UNIFICATION

The success of the NEPAD policy also rests on the extent to which a common African identity can be called upon to ensure the successful implementation of the plan. These calls towards an African identity underlie the principles of regional and continental integration, and are explicitly stated in the NEPAD document and the Constitutive Act of the AU, and form the foundation of President Thabo Mbeki’s call for an African Renaissance.

As mentioned above, the NEPAD policy document makes explicit reference to the notion of African solidarity and integration. The policy attempts to “promote sub-regional and continental economic integration” by “ensuring that there is capacity to lead negotiations on behalf of the continent on major



development programmes that require coordination at a continental level” and guaranteeing that there is “capacity to accelerate implementation of major regional development cooperation agreements and projects already approved or in the pipeline”.<sup>72</sup>

But African political unity and developmental integration already had their roots in the principles of Pan Africanism, which found expression through demands for decolonisation and liberation from colonial rule and the establishment of the OAU. In 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) implemented efforts towards economic integration, and in 1994 the Lagos Plan of Action called for the establishment of an African Customs Union by 2014, an African economic community by 2025 and an African Union by 2034. During the late 1990s, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi advocated the transformation of the OAU into the United States of Africa. In July 2001, the Constitutive Act of the AU was ratified<sup>73</sup> and aims to: achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states; accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; encourage international cooperation; promote peace, security and stability on the continent; and promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.<sup>74</sup>

On 8 May 1996, Thabo Mbeki’s “I am an African” speech awakened the concept of an African Renaissance, which also encapsulates the ideas and principles of an African identity. A globalist interpretation of the concept seeks a “continental effort at increased economic integration,”<sup>75</sup> while the Africanist interpretation implies a reinterpretation and therefore a re-awakening of African history and culture away from its colonial understanding. In the words of Appiah (*In my Father’s House*) as cited in Vale and Maseko:<sup>76</sup>

“Identity is still in the making. There isn’t a final identity that is African. But at the same time, there is an identity coming into existence. And it has a certain context and a certain meaning.”

*No sporadic act nor pious resolution can resolve our present problems. Nothing will be of avail. Except the united act of a united Africa.*

Extract from an address given by Kwame Nkrumah to African Heads of State at the founding of the OAU on 24 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



The extent to which the elites believe that an African identity can and should be created carries important implications for confidence in, and ownership of, the AU and the NEPAD strategy. Respondents were therefore confronted with a number of questions measuring the extent to which they believed that such unity and integration are indeed plausible and possible given the current African context.


Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement: ‘Africans should speak with one voice at international forums’. Responses could be plotted on a scale<sup>77</sup> of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) and collapsed to represent only three categories, as indicated in *Table 12*.

**Table 12: Africans should speak with one voice at international forums**

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Mean</i> <sup>78</sup>
South Africa	70.1	14.3	15.6	2.12
Nigeria	87.7	5.4	6.9	1.65
Senegal	80.7	9.6	9.6	1.87
Algeria	82.5	11.7	5.8	1.78
Kenya	91.6	5.0	3.4	1.45
Uganda	84.3	8.3	7.3	1.75
Zimbabwe	69.8	5.0	25.2	2.27

The majority of respondents in all seven countries were in agreement with the statement, thereby suggesting strong support in favour of African unity at international forums. When comparing the means, the country that expressed the strongest support was Kenya (1.45), followed by Nigeria (1.65), Uganda (1.75), Algeria (1.78) and Senegal (1.87). Respondents in South Africa (2.12) and Zimbabwe (2.27), however, displayed little support for the statement when compared with the respondents from the other countries. Such statistics should, however, be interpreted with caution. A predominant view that Africans should speak with one voice at international forums may be less indicative of a need for African unity, than a perception that a climate of disunity at international forums and gatherings may actually hinder the African goal of re-integration into the global economy.

To verify these perceptions, respondents were also asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the statement: ‘Africa’s ultimate aim should be the political unification of Africa’ (*Figure 21*). Responses were ranked on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).<sup>79</sup>



The majority of respondents in all countries surveyed, except South Africa, agreed with the statement that Africa's ultimate aim should be the political unification of Africa. The majority of respondents in South Africa (43.5%), however, disagreed with the statement. Strongest support in favour of the statement was expressed by Senegal (81%), followed by Kenya (67%), Uganda (67%), Algeria (59.2%), Nigeria (56.9%), Zimbabwe (48.9%) and South Africa (39.1%).


Once again, elite respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa expressed relatively lower levels of support for the statement than respondents in the other countries. South Africa's relatively weaker support for African unification and integration may be explained through the country's privileged position (both politically and economically) on the continent. Vale and Maseko<sup>80</sup> maintain that South Africa's commitment to the 'Africanist project' may more easily be described as a strategic one, rather than one based upon the ideological principles of integration and unification. If the African Renaissance can indeed propel the African continent on a path of rapid socio-economic developments,

"South African capital is destined to play a special role through the development of trade, strategic partnerships and the like. In exchange for acting as the agent of globalisation, the continent will offer South Africa a preferential option on its traditionally promised largesse of oil, minerals and mining."<sup>81</sup>

The commitment of South Africa to the ideals of integration and unification may, however, also come at considerable cost to the country. According to Spicer,<sup>82</sup> the “diffusion of focus and benefits” associated with integration and unification may render such initiatives “vulnerable to being reduced to the pace of the continent’s poorer performers”. The lack of South African elite support towards the principles of integration and unification may therefore be indicative of this fear.

Similarly, Zimbabwean respondents also reflect relatively lower levels of support for continental integration and unification, albeit for different reasons than those associated with South Africa. Over the past year, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s controversial land reform policies have largely alienated the country from both international and regional affairs.<sup>83</sup> The emerging framework of NEPAD and the AU may challenge some of his past actions in terms of respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for human and property rights. This may require that issues of national sovereignty be sacrificed in order to achieve this end – a situation which may ultimately be to the detriment of the Zimbabwean state.<sup>84</sup>

Elite opinions regarding the feasibility of African unification and integration could also have an influence on support for, and confidence in, the AU and NEPAD policy. Respondents were therefore asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the statement that North and sub-Saharan Africa share the same value orientations (*Figure 22*). Once again, responses were ranked on a 5



point scale where 1 equals strongly agree, and 5 equals strongly disagree.<sup>85</sup> The majority of all countries surveyed, except Algeria, disagreed with the statement that North and sub-Saharan Africa share the same value orientations. Respondents in Algeria were equally divided between the two poles, while Zimbabwe (69.3%) expressed the strongest disagreement with the statement, followed by Senegal (64.2%), Uganda (54.7%), South Africa (51.6%), Nigeria (50.8%), Kenya (38.7%) and Algeria (37.1%).

When asked to what extent respondents agree with the statement that the commonalities among Africans are stronger than their differences, the majority of respondents agreed with the statement (*Table 13*). When comparing the means, Ugandan elites (1.78) expressed the strongest support for the statement, followed by Kenya (2.02), Senegal (2.03), Nigeria (2.38), South Africa (2.43), Algeria (2.48) and Zimbabwe (2.63).

**Table 13: The commonalities among Africans are stronger than their differences**

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Mean</i> <sup>86</sup>
South Africa	62.3	19.5	18.3	2.43
Nigeria	64.6	16.2	19.2	2.38
Senegal	78.5	12.6	8.9	2.03
Algeria	60.8	18.3	20.8	2.48
Kenya	74.8	12.6	12.6	2.02
Uganda	88.7	5.2	6.2	1.78
Zimbabwe	59.0	10.1	30.9	2.63


The data depicted in the tables above therefore suggests that although elites are aware of the difficulties associated with increased integration, they are of the opinion that commonalities among Africans do exist and that these commonalities can overcome the perceived differences.

Similarly, the AU also rests on a number of assumptions and principles that centre on national integration and unification. To what extent do the respondents surveyed feel that the AU is indeed capable of implementing the necessary structures and mechanisms that will realise the goals of integration and unification?

Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the statement: 'Africa has the capacity to create a continental bureaucracy that will realise the goals of the AU' (*Figure 23*). Responses were once again plotted on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).<sup>87</sup>

The majority of respondents in all countries surveyed agreed with the


**Figure 23: Africa has the capacity to create a continental bureaucracy that will realise the goals of the African Union**



statement, thereby displaying high levels of confidence in the ability of the African continent to implement the goals of the AU. Kenya (82.3%) displayed the strongest levels of agreement, followed by Nigeria (72.3%), Senegal (70.4%), Uganda (68%), Zimbabwe (59.1%), South Africa (52.8%) and Algeria (43.6%). Such strong sentiments of agreement expressed by Kenya may be due to the country's strong history with Pan Africanism, most notably through the work of Jomo Kenyatta (who established Africa's first genuine African Nationalist Movement) and Tom Mboya.

When asked whether 'the AU needs to control and sanction mechanisms in order to achieve its goals', the majority of respondents in all countries surveyed agreed with the statement (*Figure 24*). Zimbabwe displayed the strongest level of support for the statement, followed by South Africa, Senegal, Nigeria, Algeria, Kenya and Uganda.

The data reflected here therefore suggests that all countries surveyed believe that the mechanisms and structures associated with the AU's aims towards integration and unification are indeed feasible within the current African context. Perhaps such sentiments would prove beneficial in a time when the image and future of the AU is becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack and criticism. According to Ankomah,<sup>88</sup> the AU is currently threatened by a number of factors, including sabotage by loyalists of former OAU Secretary Salim Ahmed Salim and a non-payment of dues by member countries. At the AU summit in Abuja, Nigeria, only ten<sup>89</sup> of the AU's 52 member states voted in favour of peer



review, thereby suggesting reluctance among African states regarding Union interference in national issues.<sup>90</sup> At the most recent AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003, 17 member states had agreed to peer review.

### 3.7 ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY

Although support for African unification and integration seems quite strong among African elites (as suggested by the data provided above), criticisms have been levelled against the AU and the NEPAD initiative, suggesting that they may result in a conflict of interest between the goals of the continent and the national interests of the respective states. According to Diescho,<sup>91</sup> “the conflict between sovereignty and unity is one that African leaders have not been able to overcome, as they are protected by the sanctity of sovereignty”.


It is clear that the Constitutive Act of the AU remains ambiguous on issues of state sovereignty, since it proposes the right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states under conditions of autocratic rule.<sup>92</sup> According to articles 4(h) and (j) of the act, the AU reserves the “right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.<sup>93</sup> Similarly, the NEPAD structures proposed a peer review mechanism to be adopted by the AU, which is regarded by some as a possible infringement on the sovereign right of state. Although the APRM is voluntary, once in operation it

will function supranationally and may imply a loss of sovereignty. To what extent do African elites believe that the interests of the continent should receive priority over the national interests of the respective states, and do they believe that issues of national sovereignty may hinder the solid integration and unification of the continent?

Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement: ‘The interests of the continent should receive priority over the national interests of the respective states’ (Figure 25). Responses were once again ranked on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). The majority of respondents in South Africa, Nigeria and Zimbabwe disagreed with the statement, while the majority of respondents in Senegal, Kenya, Algeria and Uganda agreed with the statement.

It would appear, therefore, that the majority of countries surveyed are in favour of continental integration and would be prepared to sacrifice the national interests of their countries in order to achieve this goal. Once again, however, the majority of elite respondents in South Africa and Zimbabwe have expressed the opinion in support of national sovereignty. Similarly, Nigeria has also displayed slightly stronger support for the national interests of the country than the interests of the continent. Although South Africa and Nigeria have committed themselves in favour of an APRM, they have done little to quell tensions surrounding the crisis in Zimbabwe. Numerous scholars have asserted that the manner in which African Heads of State, most notably Mbeki and


**Figure 25: The interests of the continent should receive priority over the national interests of the country**




Obasanjo, deal with the crisis in Zimbabwe, will provide a true reflection of the extent of application and feasibility of the peer review mechanism. Up until now, however, little has been done to increase pressure on Zimbabwe, and Mbeki's 'fence straddling' has sparked controversy over the issue<sup>94</sup> prompting Arthur<sup>95</sup> to argue that "if one were to judge the performance of Mbeki on this issue, then critics would seem vindicated in suggesting that the peer review mechanism would be incapable of promoting good governance in Africa". Such issues have also resulted in friction among African states, as Kenya broke rank with Nigeria and Zimbabwe, demanding Zimbabwe's continued suspension from the Commonwealth. Similarly, Botswana and Senegal have criticised Zimbabwe for its undemocratic principles, thereby deepening African friction on the issue.<sup>96</sup>

The support of South African elites in favour of national sovereignty may, however, lead to a clash of interest with political leadership in South Africa who have sought to have the Pan African Parliament stationed in South Africa. The Pan African Parliament clearly implies a lack of sovereignty and may therefore be met with resistance by the South African elite.<sup>97</sup>

Although opinions with regard to the variable reflected in the previous section suggest that the majority of respondents in Algeria, Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda believe that the interests of the nation state should not always receive priority over the interests of the continent, the majority of elites in all countries surveyed share the opinion that the national interests of African countries will impede a move towards the solid integration of Africa (*Figure 26*). Kenya







expressed the strongest level of agreement (72.2%), followed by South Africa (61.5%), Uganda (61.5%), Algeria (59.3%), Nigeria (58.4%), Zimbabwe (57.7%) and Senegal (57%).

Finally, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement: 'I am an African first and foremost, then a South African/Nigerian/Kenyan, etc.' (Figure 27). The majority of respondents in South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe agreed with the statement, while the majority of respondents in Algeria and Nigeria disagreed with the statement. Kenyan elites (67.2%) expressed the strongest level of identification with the African continent, followed by Senegalese elites (64.4%), Ugandan elites (54.2%), South African elites (50%) and Zimbabwean elites (49.8%).

The data presented above therefore suggests that although the majority of African elites do, in principle, ascribe to the value of African identity, they are aware of the possible problems of implementation associated with a potential clash between national interests and continental interests. South African, Zimbabwean and Nigerian elites tend to place greater priority on the national interests of their respective countries, while elites in Kenya, Senegal, Algeria and Uganda display greater support for continental cooperation.

### 3.8 CONCLUSION

Although architects of the NEPAD initiative have succeeded in gaining support

for the initiative among Western partners, support for and confidence in the initiative among their own publics has left much to be desired. As the data presented in this chapter suggests, members of civil society have expressed lower levels of knowledge and confidence in the initiative than their civil servant and politician counterparts. Similarly, countries that have not been involved in drafting the NEPAD policy (most notably Uganda and Zimbabwe), have displayed lower levels of confidence in, and knowledge of, the policy.

It is quite clear that elites involved in the further implementation of the policy will have to ensure that the needs and interests of civil society bodies and those countries that are not directly involved in the process are represented and adequately addressed. The role of the media, as an independent and objective (yet informed) source of information regarding the policy should not be underestimated in this regard.

Furthermore, support for the principles of African ownership and control, African unification and integration will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in the success or failure of both the AU and the NEPAD initiative. Although support for such principles is evident in the data discussed above, the practical complexities of such principles will have to be resolved. The elite perceptions presented in this chapter should hint towards possible problems which may arise during policy articulation, implementation and evaluation and, as such, provide an invaluable point of departure from which to proceed.

The following chapter will attempt to gauge elite perceptions regarding the problems and challenges facing the African continent, the goals associated with the AU and NEPAD, globalisation, the neo-liberal framework and the partnership with the developed world.

#### NOTES

- 43 B Onimode as cited in J Ohiorhenuan, *Nepad and the dialectics of African under-Development*, *New Agenda* 7, 2002, p. 9.
- 44 A De Waal, 'What's new in the 'New Partnership for Africa's Development'?', *International Affairs* 78(3), 2002, p. 465.
- 45 J Cilliers, 'Towards the African Union', *African Security Review* 10(2), 2001.
- 46 De Waal, *op cit*, p. 468.
- 47 S Gelb, 'The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Opportunities and challenges', in: Gibb, Hughes, Mills, and Vaahtoranta, (eds.), *op cit*, 2002, p. 23.
- 48 Declaration issued by civil society organisations that met in Port Shepstone, KwaZulu-

- Natal, on 4-8 July 2002, "We do not accept NEPAD! Africa is not for sale!" *Global Dialogue*, 7(2), p. 8; African Scholars' Forum for Envisioning Africa, A focus on the New Partnership for Africa's Development, concept paper.
- 49 News 24.com, "South African's ask: What's NEPAD?"
- 50 *Mail and Guardian*, 18 July 2003.
- 51 Report of the Renaissance South Africa Outreach Programme, Continental Experts Meeting on the NEPAD and the AU, *New Agenda*, Fourth Quarter, 2002, p. 133.
- 52 Responses were recoded in the opposite direction.
- 53 The elite respondents' academic knowledge concerning the AU and NEPAD was not empirically tested. Responses in this survey merely reflect whether elites claim they have knowledge of NEPAD and the AU.
- 54 Comprised elites from the business sector, NGOs, CBOs and civic organisations, professionals and academics, trade unions, the media and churches.
- 55 P Arthur, Achieving and Sustaining African economic recovery through NEPAD, p.17.
- 56 J Diescho, *Understanding the NEPAD*, Namibia Institute for Democracy in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2002.
- 57 African Scholars' Forum for Envisioning Africa, op cit.
- 58 Responses were recoded in the opposite direction and all "don't know" responses were replaced with the series mean.
- 59 The groups listed included the government, opposition political parties, the business sector, civil society, trade unions, the media, academics and the churches.
- 60 Interestingly, when comparing these perceptions across the various societal sectors, the majority of respondents in all the main sectors in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria regarded the government as displaying the most involvement in NEPAD. Ugandan elites in all three sectors also regarded the government as displaying the most involvement.
- 61 Diescho, op cit, p. 59.
- 62 For a full description of the role of the media in the respective countries, see the Freedom House Press Survey 2003 at <[www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)>. According to the data presented in this survey, only South Africa could be regarded as boasting a free media. The media in Senegal, Uganda and Nigeria can be regarded as partly free from political, economic or legal interference, while the media in Algeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe could not be regarded as free at all.
- 63 M Spicer, Business and NEPAD/NAI: Charting a New Course Together, in: Gibb, Hughes, Mills, and Vaahtoranta, (eds), op cit, p. 108.
- 64 Business endorsement of the NEPAD <[www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/content/](http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/content/)>.
- 65 African Scholars' Forum for Envisioning Africa, op cit, p. 2.
- 66 Arthur, op cit, p. 17.
- 67 Taylor and Nel, op cit, p. 163-180.
- 68 R Herbert, *Implementing NEPAD: A critical assessment*, South African Institute of Internal Affairs, 2002, p. 12.
- 69 "We do not accept NEPAD! Africa is not for sale", op cit, p. 8.
- 70 The categories 'strongly agree' and 'agree' were collapsed to form a single category, 'agree'. Similarly, 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' were collapsed to form 'disagree'.
- 71 African Scholars' Forum for Envisioning Africa, op cit, p.2.

- 72 NEPAD policy document.
- 73 W Breytenbach, The African Renaissance and NEPAD: Help or hinder for cooperation and integration in Africa. Paper presented at Nepu/KAF workshop on the Monitoring of Regional Integration, Windhoek, 1 June 2002, p. 5.
- 74 Diescho, op cit, p. 35.
- 75 P Vale and S Maseko, South Africa and the African Renaissance, *International Affairs* 74(2), 1998, p. 271.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 In the case of 'no answer' responses were recoded as 'missing variables' and replaced by the series mean to enable the comparison of means.
- 78 Although, strictly speaking, means cannot be compared when categorical data is used, it does provide a way of placing countries in relation to one another on a single variable. Interpretation of the mean should, however, be done with caution.
- 79 The categories of 'strongly agree' and 'agree' were collapsed to form a single category, as were 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree'.
- 80 Vale and Maseko, op cit, p. 271.
- 81 Ibid.
- 82 Spicer, op cit, p. 109.
- 83 For a more detailed description of the situation in Zimbabwe see H Campbell, *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: the exhaustion of the patriarchal model of liberation*, David Philip, Cape Town, 2003.
- 84 *Business Day*, 19 September 2002.
- 85 'Strongly agree' and 'agree' and 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' were collapsed to form single categories.
- 86 Although, strictly speaking, means cannot be compared when categorical data is used, it does provide a way of placing countries in relation to one another on a single variable. Interpretation of the mean should, however, be done with caution.
- 87 'Strongly agree' and 'agree' and 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' were collapsed to form single categories.
- 88 B Ankomah, African Union in danger of being stillborn, *New African*, June 2002, pp. 16-22.
- 89 Algeria, the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and Uganda.
- 90 *Die Burger*, 11 March 2003.
- 91 Diescho, op cit.
- 92 Meyns 2002 as cited in Breytenbach, op cit.
- 93 Ankomah, op cit.
- 94 *Cape Times*, 24 March 2003.
- 95 Arthur, op cit, p. 19.
- 96 *Business Day*, 14 February 2003.
- 97 Insights of Prof. W Breytenbach, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch.

# Chapter 4

## GOALS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE AFRICAN UNION AND NEPAD

*The objective of the New Partnership for Africa's Development is to consolidate democracy and sound economic management on the continent. Through the programme African leaders are making a commitment to the African people and the world to work together in rebuilding the continent. It is a pledge to promote peace and stability, democracy, sound economic management and people-centered development, and to hold each other accountable in terms of the agreements outlined in the Programme.*

NEPAD policy document, p. 59.

### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, the unprecedented growth in the world economy has been staggering. During the past 30 years, the world's GDP has increased from \$4 trillion to \$23 trillion, while the GDP share of the world's richest 20% of countries grew from 70% to 80%. Despite this evidence of world development and growth, the number of people living in poverty has increased, as the world income for the poorest 20% of countries has declined from 2.4% to 1.4%.<sup>98</sup>

It is in response to these conditions, that the NEPAD document attempts to address this "new set of circumstances" brought about and compounded by globalisation, by preventing the further marginalisation of Africa in the global economy. The policy asserts that it is through colonialisation and the international economic system that Africa was integrated into the world economy as the supplier of cheap labour and raw materials. The economic policies promoted by Northern-controlled institutions such as the G8, the IMF,

the World Bank and the WTO have resulted in the increased removal of trade barriers, thereby allowing for the internationalisation of production and wealth in the hands of a small number of transnationals and multinationals at the expense of a large number of developing nations.<sup>99</sup>

Although arguing that the policies resulting from an increasingly globalised economic system have resulted in the marginalisation of Africa, the NEPAD policy does stress that the current economic revolution could provide the very environment and instruments with which Africa can liberate itself from the chains of poverty, famine, lawlessness and war.<sup>100</sup>

A number of debates surrounding the goals and means with which the NEPAD policy attempts to achieve this end have emerged in the literature. The neo-liberal framework embraced by the NEPAD policy has come under severe criticism from various camps which assert that the alignment of African developmental goals with the Northern paradigm of globalisation may result in the neglect of the local needs and aspirations of the African people.<sup>101</sup> Further concern has been expressed over the proposed partnership with the developed world and the subsequent conditionalities contained within this agreement. Many assert that this can be described as a 'slick begging bowl' which could hamper Africa's aims of rejuvenation and upliftment.

Additional concern has been expressed surrounding the goals and objectives contained in the document, with numerous complaints regarding the marginal role that gender equity has been relegated within the policy.<sup>102</sup> Apprehension has also been expressed that safety and security issues may receive priority over issues of development and social welfare due to the increased importance that security is currently afforded on the global agenda.<sup>103</sup>

Assuming that elites are "those persons who, individually, regularly and seriously have the power to affect organisational outcomes",<sup>104</sup> an analysis of the challenges facing the African continent and the most salient goals and objectives of NEPAD and the AU as perceived by African elites, may provide us with an idea of the policy issues that will receive increased attention in the months to come.

The following sections will provide a brief analysis of the problems facing the African continent and how NEPAD and the AU intend to address these problems. Elite perceptions relating to these challenges and goals will then be described, followed by an analysis of elite perceptions surrounding globalisation and the neo-liberal framework, the 'partnership' with the developed world and the conditionalities attached.

#### 4.2 CHALLENGES FACING THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

During the past few decades, Africa's position in the world economy has worsened considerably. Growth in manufacturing, which stood at 8.5% in the period 1960–65, declined to 3.6% in 1980/81 and 0.4% in 1982/83. Growth in the mining sector, which accounted for 9.8% of Africa's GDP and was 18.5% in 1965, fell to –13.2% in 1981/82 and to –24.6% in 1982/83 – clearly a significant decline.

External indebtedness increased from \$6 billion to \$32 billion between 1970 and 1979 and the agricultural growth rate declined from 1.4% between 1960 and 1965, to 0.4% in 1982/83.<sup>105</sup> Between 1997 and 1999, Africa's debt rose from \$159 billion to \$201 billion,<sup>106</sup> while, more recently, the African Development Bank<sup>107</sup> reports that between 2001 and 2002 African growth declined from 3.5% to 2.8%, while per capita income dropped from 1.1% to 0.5% for the same period.

The problems in Africa have been attributed to both poor economic policies and political governance on the part of African regimes on the one hand, and on an unfair international system on the other. But according to Mills and Oppenheimer:<sup>108</sup>

“The African challenge is a complex one, rooted in history and defined by ill-formed (sometimes dysfunctional) geographic and state units. It has domestic, regional and international dimensions, relating both to its colonial history and to the nature of the continent's transition to independence. Along with the growth of corruption, nepotism, populist redistribution and patronage politics, Africa's economic decline reflects both political and institutional failure.”

The externalist explanatory category suggests that constraints in the international community beyond the control of African governments can be used to explain Africa's poor economic, political and social performance. Chabal<sup>109</sup> asserts that Africa suffers from severe underdevelopment due to an absence of economic growth resulting from the effects of the colonial legacy and its current vulnerability in the world economic system. In an effort to reverse the effects of dependent colonial economic rule and to become more integrated in the global economy, African governments allocated a strong and increasingly interventionist role for the state in industrialisation. This was done through policies of import substitution and state-owned enterprises.<sup>110</sup>

But the decline in world commodity prices and soft concessional lending conditions with low interest rates, the new technological revolution, the rising scarcity of raw materials and the diversion of trade and investment from poor countries continually hampered Africa's chances of economic and social recovery.

From the mid 1980s Western creditors and international financial institutions encouraged African governments to introduce stabilisation policies by reducing government expenditures through a general rollback of the state. But these neo-liberal policies did nothing to improve the perilous situation in which most African states found themselves, and the massive capital flights, de-industrialisation and lack of access to social amenities resulted in increased unemployment, poverty and conflict in Africa.<sup>111</sup> Globalisation, many argue, has only worsened the precarious position in which African states find themselves.<sup>112</sup>

The internalist explanatory perspective argues, however, that Africa is not merely the victim of globalisation policies, but that Africa's myriad of social, economic and political problems can be explained through a history of poor political management. After independence, a neo-patrimonial political system emerged in Africa, based on vertical links of patronage between a political elite and their client constituencies. Political accountability was therefore rooted in the extent to which patrons were able to meet the expectations and needs of their clients. Political power could therefore be described as highly personalised, originating through the informal sector and resting on well-established norms of reciprocity.<sup>113</sup>

Such policies lead to the enrichment of a small core of political elites, largely through the exploitation of raw materials, the enormous financial resources obtained through structural adjustment programmes and the increasing number of politicians involved in illegal financial and commercial transactions. Africa therefore became a continent characterised by the enrichment of a political elite, without the development of their constituencies. According to Chabal, Africa can therefore not exclusively be perceived as the victim of globalisation, but that "Africa's present condition must be analysed from the dual perspective of its place in the formal and informal world market. Only then can the true impact of globalisation on the continent be assessed".<sup>114</sup>

In the light of these arguments, respondents were asked to judge on a 7-point scale<sup>115</sup> how problematic they thought a number of issues were for Africa's future with 1 being not problematic at all, and 7 being extremely problematic. Items listed included:



**Table 14: Problems facing the African continent***(Comparison of means on a 7-point scale, where 7=most problematic)*

	South Africa	Nigeria	Senegal	Algeria	Kenya	Uganda	Zimbabwe
1	HIV/AIDS (6.55)	Income disparities (6.04)	HIV/AIDS (6.28)	HIV/AIDS	HIV/AIDS (6.63)	HIV/AIDS (6.32)	HIV/AIDS (6.74)
2	Income disparities (6.02)	HIV/AIDS (5.95)	Secessionist movements (6.07)	Income disparities (5.83)	Income disparities (6.34)	Income disparities (5.84)	Income disparities (6.38)
3	Gender Equality (5.00)	Ecological problems (5.11)	Income disparities (6.00)	Ecological problems (5.52)	Stable and accountable democratic govts (5.70)	Ecological problems (5.11)	Domestic order and stability (5.42)
4	Globalisation (4.98)	Secessionist movements (5.04)	Domestic order and stability (5.54)	Secessionist movements (5.34)	Ecological problems (5.22)	Secessionist movements (4.93)	Secessionist movements (5.39)
5	Ecological Problems (4.70)	Stable and accountable democratic govts (4.88)	Stable and accountable democratic govts (5.53)	Domestic order and stability (5.26)	Globalisation (4.98)	Domestic order and stability (4.88)	Stable and accountable democratic govts (5.22)
6	Secessionist movements (4.68)	Domestic order and stability (4.66)	Ecological problems (5.51)	Stable and accountable democratic govts (5.25)	Gender equality (4.94)	Globalisation (4.85)	Globalisation (4.85)
7	Stable and accountable democratic govts (4.51)	Globalisation (4.14)	Globalisation (5.17)	Globalisation (4.78)	Secessionist movements (4.71)	Stable and accountable democratic govts (4.75)	Ecological problems (4.71)
8	Clash between traditional & modern (4.06)	Clash between traditional & modern (3.93)	Gender Equality (4.86)	Gender Equality (4.74)	Clash between traditional & modern (4.55)	Clash between traditional & modern (4.67)	Gender equality (4.43)
9	Domestic order and stability (3.64)	Gender equality (3.85)	Clash between traditional & modern (4.01)	Clash between traditional & modern (4.05)	Domestic order and stability (4.53)	Gender equality (4.45)	Clash between traditional & modern (3.80)

- globalisation;
- secessionist movements;
- world ecological problems;
- domestic order and stability in your own country;
- the clash between tradition and modernisation;
- stable and accountable democratic governments;
- large income disparities between rich and poor;
- the equality between men and women; and
- HIV/AIDS.

The data presented in *Table 14* suggests that HIV/AIDS and the large income disparities between rich and poor are perceived as the most problematic issues facing the African continent. In South Africa, Senegal, Algeria, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe, HIV/AIDS was regarded as the most problematic issue, followed by income disparities. World ecological problems were regarded as relatively important, ranking within the top five issues by respondents in South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Kenya and Uganda, while secessionist movements also ranked within the top five of the majority of countries surveyed, i.e. Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Globalisation was only placed in the top five problems in Kenya and South Africa, while importance placed on domestic order/stability and stable and accountable democratic governments varied considerably between countries.

Gender equality ranked relatively low in importance among all countries except South Africa, as did the clash between tradition and modernisation.

Although regarded as the most important problem facing the African continent by all countries except Nigeria, the issue of HIV/AIDS has received scant attention within the NEPAD document. According to Herbert<sup>116</sup> “NEPAD’s blind spot is the social, economic and governance impact of HIV/AIDS” since the document “accords HIV/AIDS no greater status than that of a problem of health”. Considering that the percentage of adults (aged 15 to 49) living with HIV/AIDS is more than 15% in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and between 5% and 10% in Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria,<sup>117</sup> one would assume the issue to receive greater priority within the NEPAD framework.

In 2000, HIV/AIDS was declared a development crisis by the World Bank and it is estimated that per capita growth in half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa (where the HIV epidemic is most prevalent) is falling between 0.5% and 1.2% each year as a direct result of AIDS. According to UNAIDS,<sup>118</sup> by 2010

per capita GDP in some of the hardest hit countries may drop by 8% and per capita consumption may fall even further. The World Bank<sup>119</sup> argues that the factor that could have the greatest effect on the size of the macro-economic impact of the epidemic is the percentage of AIDS treatment costs financed from savings. Since expenditure on AIDS treatment is likely to reduce the capital available for more productive investment, the higher the proportion of care financed from savings, the larger the reduction in growth resulting from the epidemic. The World Bank roughly estimates that a generalised epidemic would reduce per capita GDP by as much as half a percentage point a year. Furthermore, a number of economies in sub-Saharan Africa will be negatively affected due to the large impact HIV will have on their health sectors and the poor. In the average country, the annual treatment cost for an AIDS patient is approximately 2.7 times gross national product (GNP)/capita. Given the fact that Africa's per capita income has declined over the past year, the impact of HIV/AIDS on the continent should not be underestimated.

The majority of respondents in all countries surveyed regarded the large income disparities between the rich and the poor as a highly problematic issue facing the African continent. According to Guma,<sup>120</sup> Africa's economic statistics stand in stark contrast to those of the rest of the world. As world development indicators show, the richest 20% of countries in the world claim an 82% share of global exports, while the poorest 20% receive only a 1% share. Similarly, the world's richest 20% attract 75% of the world's foreign direct investment (FDI), whereas the poorest draw a meager 1%. And the situation seems to be steadily worsening, as growth on the African continent has slowed substantially since 1998.

As mentioned, secessionist movements ranked within the top five problems facing the African continent in all countries surveyed except South Africa and Kenya. Senegal, in particular, placed relatively strong importance on the problem of secessionist movements (6.09), along with domestic order and stability (5.54) and stable and democratic governments (5.53). This may be due to the fact that the Southern Casamance region in Senegal has been a problem area for the government since colonial times, due to the operation of the armed resistance movement, *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la casamance*. Similarly, both Algeria and Zimbabwe placed relatively strong importance on the problem of secessionist movements, domestic order and stability and strong democratic governments. Despite President Bouteflika's Civil Concorde Initiative offering limited amnesty to Islamic militants who surrender to authorities, Islamic-related violence remains a problem, especially from the

*Group Islamique Armee*, which launched devastating guerrilla attacks in the recent past. In Zimbabwe, war veterans and youth militia of President Mugabe's ZANU-PF have been granted free reign in intimidating, torturing and attacking supporters of the opposition MDC.

Of further concern, however, is the relatively low importance accorded to the issue of gender equality among the African elites. Such perceptions would echo the relatively low importance afforded to issues relating to gender equality within the NEPAD document.<sup>121</sup> (Discussed in subsequent sections.)

Respondents were also asked to select the five biggest obstacles that would inhibit the development of the African continent and rank them in order of importance. The obstacles listed included:

- HIV/AIDS;
- corruption;
- a lack of accountable African leaders;
- political instability;
- an unfair international trade regime;
- poverty;
- insufficient infrastructure;
- debt;
- negative stereotypes of the continent;
- ineffective bureaucracy;
- gender inequality; and
- income inequality between the very rich and very poor Africans.

According to the data reflected in *Table 15*, political instability can be regarded as the most challenging issue facing the African continent, since it appears in the top three of all countries surveyed. Similarly, corruption also appears in the top three of most challenging issues identified by all countries surveyed, except Zimbabwe. Poverty was placed in the top five issues of all countries surveyed, while a lack of accountable governments was placed in the top five by South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Uganda. Interestingly, HIV/AIDS loses its importance in relation to other issues identified, and is only regarded in the top three by South Africa and Kenya. Once again, gender inequality is not regarded as a challenge facing the African continent, along with negative stereotypes of the continent.

The data presented in *Table 15* highlights the importance placed by African elites on issues of good governance. As mentioned at the outset of this section,

**Table 15: Obstacles facing the African continent**<sup>122</sup>

	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
1	HIV/AIDS (73%)	Political instability (86.2%)	Corruption (69.7%)	Corruption (87.5%)	Corruption (88.3%)	Corruption (82.5%)	Political instability (67.9%)
2	Corruption (62.7%)	Corruption (85.4%)	Political instability (68.2%)	Political instability (78.3%)	HIV/AIDS (87.5%)	Political instability (78.4%)	Poverty (51.4%)
3	Political instability (61.8%)	Poverty (67.7%)	Lack of accountable leaders (59.8%)	Debt (65.8%)	Political instability (74.2%)	Poverty (67%)	Debt (47.1%)
4	Poverty (59.3%)	Lack of accountable leaders (64.6%)	Poverty (56.1%)	Lack of accountable leaders (54.2%)	Poverty (67.5%)	HIV/AIDS (62.9%)	International trade regimes (40.7%)
5	Lack of accountable leaders (53.4%)	HIV/AIDS (48.5%)	Insufficient infrastructure (49.2%)	Poverty (49.2%)	Debt (53.3%)	Lack of accountable leaders (50.5%)	HIV/AIDS (34.3%)
6	Debt (44.2%)	Debt (48.5%)	Debt (45.5%)	HIV/AIDS (30%)	Lack of accountable leaders (40.8)	International trade regimes (36.1%)	Lack of accountable leaders (31.4%)
7	International trade regimes (37.6%)	Insufficient infrastructure (33.8%)	HIV/AIDS (43.9%)	International trade regimes (30%)	Insufficient infrastructure (27.5%)	Debt (28.9%)	Corruption (20.7%)
8	Insufficient infrastructure (30.6%)	Income inequalities (26.9%)	International trade regimes (40.2%)	Insufficient infrastructure (27.5%)	International trade regimes (20.8%)	Insufficient infrastructure (28%)	Insufficient infrastructure (20%)
9	Ineffective bureaucracy (26.1%)	International trade regimes (13.1%)	Ineffective bureaucracy (24.2%)	Ineffective bureaucracy (24.2%)	Income inequalities (20%)	Income inequalities (20.6%)	Ineffective bureaucracy (15%)
10	Income inequalities (20.5%)	Ineffective bureaucracy (10.8%)	Income inequalities (13.6%)	Income inequalities (18.3%)	Ineffective bureaucracy (8.3%)	Gender inequality (14.4%)	Income inequalities (13.6%)

**Table 15: Obstacles facing the African continent (continued)**

	South Africa	Nigeria	Senegal	Algeria	Kenya	Uganda	Zimbabwe
11	Negative stereotypes (16.3%)	Negative stereotypes (10.8%)	Negative stereotypes (9.8%)	Gender Inequality (10%)	Negative stereotypes (5%)	Ineffective bureaucracy (13.4%)	Negative stereotypes (12.1%)
12	Gender inequality (11.3%)	Gender inequality (3.8%)	Gender inequality (6.8%)	Negative stereotypes (9.2%)	Gender inequality (5%)	Negative stereotypes (11.3%)	Gender inequality (7.9%)

problems in Africa cannot exclusively be attributed to issues of globalisation, but also stem from the large-scale neo-patrimonial policies introduced by African governments in an attempt to gain constituent support.

Such policies have resulted in cases of extreme political instability on a continent where one in five Africans live in conditions of conflict and the number of internally displaced persons reached 13.5 million by the second half of 2001.<sup>123</sup> Such conditions would undoubtedly warrant the high importance placed on issues of corruption, political instability and lack of accountable governments, and reiterate Claude Kabemba's<sup>124</sup> words that "Africa's bad shape is the result of misguided leadership, systematic corruption, economic mismanagement, senseless civil wars, political tyranny, flagrant violation of human rights, military vandalism and bad policies".

The sentiments reflected in the *Table 15* suggest that the majority of elites in all the countries surveyed regard issues of good governance as the primary obstacles facing the African continent. According to Johnson,<sup>125</sup> good governance may be summarised as follows:<sup>126</sup>

- Efficiency and rationality in allocating resources – in other words, sensible priorities;
- curbing corruption, which is strangling development and inhibiting investment;
- enhancing legitimate freedoms, of association, of speech, of press, of above all the individual;
- the rule of law, and so an unfettered judicial system;
- guarantees of civil and human rights;
- transparency – making information and statistics readily available; and,
- accountability to the people".

**Box 2: Governance Index**

South Africa	0.07	Nigeria	-1.36
Senegal	-0.68	Algeria	-1.27
Kenya	-0.83	Uganda	-1.31
Zimbabwe	-1.25		

Mutharika<sup>127</sup> describes good governance as policy rather than that which is the effect of ‘chance’. In Africa many of the donor agencies (for example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and donor states (for example, France, Britain and the US) confused Western-style democracy with the achievement of good governance. According to Keller,<sup>128</sup> these two concepts are related but not the same. Good governance can be attained without democracy, but the reverse is not true.

Since African elites included in the survey regard corruption, political stability and a lack of accountable governments as obstacles facing the African continent, one could possibly conclude that Africa’s poor governance record is perceived as an impediment to the rejuvenation of the continent.

The UN Human Development Report 2002 ranks countries in terms of governance and perceptions surrounding corruption. The Governance Index (*Box 2*) taken from the World Bank Governance Indicators data, measures the extent of political stability and lack of violence. It measures perceptions relating to the likelihood of destabilisation, such as ethnic tensions, armed conflict, social unrest, terrorist threats, internal conflict, fractionalisation of the political spectrum, constitutional changes and military coup. According to the data (where  $-2.5$ =weak and  $+2.5$ =strong), only South Africa reflected a positive score.

According to the Corruption Index (where 1=bad and 10=good), which measures official corruption as perceived by business people, academics and risk analysts as surveyed by Transparency International, South Africa obtained a score of 4.8, while Nigeria obtained a score of 1 (*Box 3*).

**Box 3: Corruption Index**

South Africa	4.8	Nigeria	1.0
Senegal	2.9	Kenya	2.0
Algeria	–	Uganda	1.9
Zimbabwe	2.9		

*There have been vast improvements in technology, communications, roads and business around the world, but unfortunately the rule of law and corruption have not improved and governance has remained stagnant. We have grossly underestimated the importance of these latter needs.*

Director of Global Governance and Regional Learning, Daniel Kaufman, at the 2003 African Development Summit held in Durban, South Africa

#### 4.3 GOALS OF THE AFRICAN UNION AND NEPAD

The AU was adopted in July 2001 through the Constitutive Act of the AU, which would ultimately replace the OAU Charter of 1963. Inspired by the ideals of Pan Africanism, the AU commits to promoting unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the people of Africa and African states.

As the policy framework for the AU, the NEPAD document provides a strategic framework for the socio-economic upliftment of Africa, aimed at integrating the continent into the global economy and placing it on a path of sustainable development. An analysis of the perceived goals and benefits of the AU and NEPAD could provide an indication of the most salient priorities of NEPAD, as perceived by the African opinion leaders.

##### 4.3.1 GOALS OF THE AFRICAN UNION

The Constitutive Act of the AU <sup>129</sup> lists 14 African objectives and includes a commitment to:

- achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the people of Africa;
- accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- encourage international cooperation;
- promote democratic principles and institutions;
- popular participation and good governance; and
- promote and protect human rights and support the promotion of peace, security and stability of the continent.

The Act ultimately aims at the establishment of a common defence policy for Africa, and is based on the principles of respect for democratic values, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.



Respondents were asked to indicate how important (1 being very unimportant and 5 being very important)<sup>130</sup> they believed it to be for the AU to pursue a number of goals. The goals listed included:

- working for peace in Africa;
- working to discourage human rights violations;
- working to solve environmental problems;
- promoting trade among African states;
- developing mechanisms to combat corrupt and accountable governments;
- improving the situation of women;
- participation of all interest groups in governing the country; and
- working to punish all African states that cause human rights violations.

Once again, African elites perceive issues of governance in Africa to be of primary concern for the AU.

According to the data presented in *Table 16*, the ‘promotion of peace in Africa’ was regarded as the most important goal of the AU in all countries surveyed. ‘Working to discourage human rights violations’ was perceived as the second most important goal in all countries except Zimbabwe, while ‘combating corruption’ was ranked third in South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Kenya and Uganda, and second in Zimbabwe.

These perceptions are compatible with the view expressed by Arthur<sup>131</sup> that issues related to security, conflict resolution and governance will most likely gain importance, due to the global war on terrorism. Only recently has South

*Claiming the right to determine our own future must also mean developing the capacity to deal with our own problems, especially insofar as the resolution of African conflicts is concerned. In this regard, the setting up of the Peace and Security Council is imperative. We must ensure that this protocol enters into force. Ratification is paramount, together with the development of the Common Defence and Security Policy which shall provide the guidelines that determine the actions of the Peace and Security Council. Angola, the DRC, Burundi, Comoros and Sierra Leone are all well on their way to peace. The Sudan and Cote d’Ivoire have made some progress, whilst Liberia and the Central African Republic remain a challenge. In applauding all those that have been involved in these peace-keeping processes, I call upon us to intensify our efforts to seek African solutions to African problems.*

Extract from the opening speech of South African Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the AU in Maputo, July 2003

**Table 16: Goals of the African Union**

(Comparison of means on a 5-point scale, where 5=very important)

	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
1	Peace in Africa (4.87)	Peace in Africa (4.91)	Peace in Africa (4.84)	Peace in Africa (4.79)	Peace in Africa (4.95)	Peace in Africa (4.86)	Peace in Africa (4.87)
2	Discourage human rights violations (4.81)	Discourage human rights violations (4.69)	Discourage human rights violations (4.63)	Discourage human rights violations (4.60)	Discourage human rights violations (4.80)	Discourage human rights violations (4.84)	Combat corruption (4.81)
3	Combat corruption (4.75)	Combat corruption (4.67)	Encourage trade among African states (4.61)	Combat corruption (4.47)	Combat corruption (4.76)	Combat corruption (4.72)	Encourage trade among African states (4.73)
4	Improve situation of women (4.62)	Encourage trade among African states (4.59)	Combat corruption (4.51)	Improve situation of women (4.40)	Promote trade among African states (4.73)	Promote trade among African states (4.70)	Discourage human rights violations (4.69)
5	Promote trade among African states (4.59)	Solve environ. problems (4.48)	Improve situation of women (4.92)	Solve environ. problems (4.38)	Solve environ. problems (4.62)	Solve environ. problems (4.52)	Solve environ. problems (4.48)
6	Solve environ. problems (4.45)	Punish states that violate human rights (4.45)	Solve environ. problems (4.48)	Promote trade among African states (4.31)	Punish states that violate human rights (4.37)	Improve situation of women (4.49)	Punish states that violate human rights (4.45)
7	Punish states that violate human rights (4.35)	Improve situation of women (4.16)	Punish states that violate human rights (4.16)	Punish states that violate human rights (4.25)	Improve situation of women (4.34)	Punish states that violate human rights (4.47)	Improve situation of women (4.42)
8	Participation of interest groups (4.07)	Participation of interest groups (4.03)	Participation of interest groups (3.26)	Participation of interest groups (3.56)	Participation of interest groups (4.27)	Participation of interest groups (4.15)	Participation of interest groups (4.33)

African Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Zuma called for a working document laying the foundations for a joint African security plan to be put forward to the Executive Council of the AU. Such a plan would not exclusively focus on military matters, but would also concentrate on the social, cultural, economic and political aspects of human security.<sup>132</sup>

The opinions expressed in *Table 16* reiterate the AU's renewed commitment to restoring peace on the continent. By banning the Central African Republic – where government under General Francois Bozize came to power by overthrowing the democratically elected government of former president Ange-Felix Pattasse – from the second AU Summit in Maputo, the AU Heads of State sent out a strong message that countries going against the core goals of democracy would be ostracised.<sup>133</sup> Initially, plans to set up a Peace and Security Council were drafted for this year's AU Summit in Maputo. These plans have, however, been put on hold due to the fact that only 12 member states have ratified the protocol (which needs the ratification of 27 states to be implemented).<sup>134</sup> According to one African diplomat attending the Maputo talks “the ministers have been very passionate about the need for the US to send troops to Liberia. The US has a shared history with Liberia and it would show that Bush is actually committed to something on the continent”.<sup>135</sup> The AU's commitment to restore peace on the continent is further reinforced by the fact that it has issued a deadline for a continent-wide cessation of hostilities by the end of the year.

Of concern, however, is the relatively little importance placed on improving the position of women in Africa – a view that once again confirms the opinions expressed by African elites in the previous section. These perceptions reiterate the meager attention allotted to gender issues within the NEPAD document itself and validates the various criticisms directed towards the gender-bias contained within the document.

Olofi<sup>136</sup> maintains that “the scant efforts made to formulate a gender goal in the area of gender equality and women's empowerment is an indication of the author's belief that women's integrity is due to their own inadequateness, hence more education is recommended”. Similarly, Dupree and Ogunsanya<sup>137</sup> argue that “NEPAD does not address gender-based constraints intrinsically linked to women's subordination, but instead addresses instrumental issues related to women's income-generating measures, education, training and access to credit”.

A publication by the World Bank entitled *Engendering Development*<sup>138</sup> argues that ignoring gender inequalities could come at a great cost to sustainable

growth and development. Studies conducted by the World Bank confirm that in a wide range of societies women are an important engine of growth and development. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, 80% of economically active women are in agricultural activities, primarily as subsistence farmers in female headed households or as day labourers on larger commercial farms.<sup>139</sup> Large gender inequalities therefore hinder development by reducing the productivity of farms and enterprises and thereby lowering prospects for reducing poverty and ensuring economic progress.

The participation of women in public life has also shown to reduce the levels of corruption in a country. In developing countries, however, women remain under-represented in both national and local assemblies and account for less than 10% of seats in parliament. The percentage of seats in parliament as held by women of the countries included in the current survey, reiterates the climate of gender inequality on the continent. In 2000, for instance, women only occupied 10% of seats in parliament in Zimbabwe. In 2001, women occupied 24.7% and 19.2% of seats in parliament in Uganda and Senegal respectively.<sup>140</sup>

By ensuring greater gender equality on the African continent, African governments may also take a step towards curbing the AIDS pandemic in Africa. UNAIDS<sup>141</sup> reports that sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world in which more women than men are infected with HIV and are dying of AIDS. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, it is estimated that 12.2 million women are infected, compared with 10.1 million men. Apart from a number of biological reasons for this high incidence of HIV among women, the poor socio-economic position of many women in Africa is the primary reason behind this trend.

#### 4.3.2 GOALS OF NEPAD

As the policy framework for the AU, NEPAD provides a strategic framework for the socio-economic upliftment of Africa, aimed at integrating the continent into the global economy and placing the continent on a path of sustainable development.

Gelb<sup>142</sup> maintains that NEPAD is an attempt by African leaders to collectively address “the continent’s lack of development in the context of globalisation”. Over the past two decades, Africa’s inability to capitalise on the process of globalisation has become increasingly evident, as resource outflows and unfavourable terms of trade have resulted in an even greater polarisation of wealth and poverty between developed and developing nations.<sup>143</sup> As a result,

*Part of NEPAD's problem is that it sets impossibly high expectations in the form of a wide agenda against which it has to deliver, a failure to prioritise worsened by the difficulty in managing the tension of inclusivity to be African-supported and yet exclusive and elitist to be successful.*

Greg Mills as cited in *Business Day*, 10 June 2003

NEPAD follows a two-tiered approach and seeks to address the “systemic risks to which Africa contributes”,<sup>144</sup> such as bad policy choices and the inability of African governments to provide goods and services to their citizens and attempts to “establish the conditions under which managed openness – increased integration with global markets can become possible for the continent”.

The NEPAD strategy identifies three preconditions for development and five priority sectors. The three preconditions include:

- peace, security, democracy and political governance;
- economic and corporate governance, with a focus on public finance management; and
- regional cooperation and integration.

The five priority sectors include:

- infrastructure;
- information and communication technology;
- human development, with a focus on health and education and skills development;
- agriculture; and
- promotion of diversification of production and exports, with a focus on market access for African exports to industrialised countries.

As maintained by Herbert<sup>145</sup> “NEPAD identifies the main political, governance and developmental challenges facing Africa, but no real effort has been made to identify what the top priorities are”. As a result, various scholars have speculated on the extent to which political or socio-economic goals will receive priority within the framework. Perceptions that NEPAD is purely a political process are congruent with the opinion expressed by Chabal,<sup>146</sup> which asserts that democracy and good governance should be seen as the preconditions for

**Table 17: Desired benefits of NEPAD (Ranked on a scale of 1-5)**

The percentages listed in the table refer to the percentage of respondents within each country that regarded the specific goal as the most important goal within the NEPAD document

	South Africa	Nigeria	Senegal	Algeria	Kenya	Uganda	Zimbabwe
1	Eradication of poverty (38.2%)	Eradication of poverty (28.5%)	African unification (26.3%)	Eradication of poverty (27.5%)	Eradication of poverty (30%)	Eradication of poverty (34%)	Democratic governance (24.3%)
2	Democratic governance (15.9%)	African unification (20.8%)	Improved infrastructure (19.4%)	Political stability (18.3%)	Increased FDI (15%)	African unification (15.5%)	Eradication of poverty (22.1%)
3	Political stability (10.8%)	Political stability (13.1%)	Eradication of poverty (14.2%)	Democratic governance (10.8%)	African unification (15%)	Stronger democratic governance (12.5%)	African unification (14.3%)
4	African unification (10.8%)	Democratic governance (10%)	Stronger democratic governance (12.7%)	African unification (10%)	Political stability (9.2%)	Political stability (8.2%)	Increased FDI (11.4%)
5	Increased FDI (6.4%)	Restore African dignity (7.7%)	Increased FDI (7.5%)	Improved infrastructure (5.8%)	Stronger democratic governance (8.3%)	Improved infrastructure (7.2%)	Political stability (10%)
6	Jobs for all (3.9%)	Increased FDI (6.2%)	Restore African dignity (3.7%)	Increased FDI (5%)	Improved infrastructure (5.8%)	Restore African dignity (6.2%)	Restore African dignity (6.4%)
7	Improved infrastructure (3.7%)	Food for all (5.4%)	Political stability (3%)	Education for all (4.2%)	Improved health care (5.8%)	Increased FDI (5.2%)	Improved infrastructure (2.9%)
8	Restore African dignity (3%)	Education for all (3.1%)	Education for all (3%)	Restore African dignity (4.2%)	Restore African dignity (3.3%)	Education for all (4.1%)	Food for all (2.1%)
9	Food for all (2.3%)	Improved infrastructure (2.3%)	Food for all (1.5%)	Food for all (3.3%)	Jobs for all (2.5%)	Improved health care (2.1%)	Reawaken cultural traditions (1.4%)
10	Improved health care (1.9%)	Improved health care (1.5%)	Improved social welfare (1.5%)	Jobs for all (1.7%)	Food for all (2.5%)	Jobs for all (2.1%)	Improved welfare (1.4%)

**Table 17: Desired benefits of NEPAD (Ranked on a scale of 1-5)** (continued)

	South Africa	Nigeria	Senegal	Algeria	Kenya	Uganda	Zimbabwe
11	Better education (1.9%)	Improved welfare (0.8%)	Reawaken cultural traditions (1.5%)	Improved health care (1.7%)	Education for all (0.8%)	Improved welfare (1%)	Jobs for all (1.4%)
12	Improved welfare (0.9%)	Jobs for all (0.8%)	Jobs for all (1.5%)	Improved welfare (1.7%)	Improved social welfare (0.8%)	Food for all (1%)	Improved health care (0.7%)
13	Shelter for all (0.7%)	Shelter for all <sup>147</sup> (4.6%)	Improved health care (2.2%) <sup>148</sup>	Shelter for all (1.7%)	Shelter for all <sup>149</sup> (2.5%)	Reawaken cultural traditions (2.1%) <sup>150</sup>	Shelter for all (0.7%)
14	Reawaken cultural traditions (0.4%)	Reawaken cultural traditions <sup>151</sup> (2.3%)	Shelter for all (1.5%) <sup>152</sup>	Reawaken cultural traditions (0.8%)	Reawaken cultural traditions (0.8%)	Shelter for all <sup>153</sup> (1%)	Education for all (2.1%) <sup>154</sup>

development. Democratic regimes, will ultimately promote good governance, which will lead to political stability, resulting in the consolidation of the rule of law, increased investment, economic growth, and ultimately development.

Which goals do the African elite believe should take precedence within the NEPAD document? Respondents were asked to select from a list what they regarded as the five most desirable benefits of NEPAD and to rank them on a scale of 1 (most desirable) to 5 (least desirable). The items listed included: African unification, the eradication of poverty, stronger democratic governance, improved infrastructure, the restoration of African dignity, political stability, improved health care, increased foreign investment, improved social welfare, better education for all, jobs for all, shelter for all, food for all, the re-awakening of African cultural traditions.

According to the data presented in *Table 17*, the eradication of poverty, African unification and stronger democratic governance are by far regarded as the most salient benefits of NEPAD, and appear within the top four priorities expressed within each country. Elite respondents in Algeria (27.5%), Kenya (30%), Uganda (34%), South Africa (38.2%) and Nigeria (28.5%) regarded the eradication of poverty as the most desirable benefit of NEPAD. Democratic governance appears within the top four benefits of all countries except Kenya,

who placed it in fifth position, while African unification appears in the top four priorities of all countries surveyed.

Although concerns have been expressed that issues relating to security and conflict resolution may take precedence over concerns towards poverty eradication and social assistance, African elites seem all too aware of the myriad of social problems affecting the African continent, and should therefore ensure that such issues are not relegated to the background within the NEPAD strategy.

Increased FDI has also featured relatively strongly as a desired benefit of NEPAD, ranking second in Kenya, fourth in Zimbabwe, fifth in South Africa and Senegal, sixth in Algeria and seventh in Uganda. Arthur<sup>155</sup> warns, however, that the NEPAD policy places too much emphasis on the importance of the private sector, especially FDI, as a source for poverty reduction and development. He goes on to assert that profit-seeking FDI would not necessarily flow into the priority sectors of sustainable and people-centered development, and could hamper the growth of local and indigenous industry.

According to the data presented in the previous sections, African elites are placing a substantial amount of importance on issues of good governance, political accountability and democracy. Such perceptions are compatible with the principles and objectives contained within the NEPAD document. As maintained by Gelb,<sup>156</sup> issues of good governance (both political and economic) are receiving priority within NEPAD.

On the political front, the NEPAD policy attempts to eradicate violent conflict and create enduring stability within society by ensuring low levels of internal social conflict through the entrenchment of a political system reflecting democratic values, respect for human rights and the application of a consistent legal framework.

On the economic front, NEPAD endeavours to guarantee transparent and consistent decision making and managerial processes within public and private organisations, to establish accountability for the use of resources and to facilitate effective controls over corruption and fraud. Similarly, Mills and Oppenheimer<sup>157</sup> maintain that continent-wide standards of governance and democracy and the policing of these imperatives by African states and external agents, would serve as a prerequisite for African development.

It was with these principles in mind that the APRM was established within the NEPAD policy framework to ensure that the “policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy,



Political, Economic and Corporate Governance” that was approved by the AU Summit in July 2002.<sup>158</sup> (Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.)

#### 4.4 NEPAD AND THE NEO-LIBERAL FRAMEWORK

As mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, a number of debates surrounding the goals and objectives upon which the NEPAD policy is based have emerged. One such debate is the extent to which the NEPAD policy embraces the neo-liberal paradigm, the proposed partnership with the developed world and the subsequent conditionalities evident within this agreement.


According to Gelb,<sup>159</sup> successful development in the age of globalisation requires “states to pursue a strategy of managed openness, which involves seeking to influence the sequencing, speed and scope of the engagement of their economies with globalisation”. Such “managed openness” does, however, place severe demands on the nation state, and ultimately results in the polarisation of wealth, power and resources as strong states become stronger, and weaker states weaker. It is this global inequality that prompts the NEPAD document to refer to Africa’s “peripheral and diminishing role in the world economy”,<sup>160</sup> and posits Africa on the path towards sustainable development by embracing the tenets of the neo-liberal framework.

But African experiences have shown that increased African integration into the world economy creates openness, economic liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, which ultimately lead to increased levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality. NEPAD has therefore come under fierce criticism for “embracing the Northern Paradigm of globalisation without the consideration of the local needs and aspirations of the African continent”.<sup>161</sup> Mills and Oppenheimer,<sup>162</sup> however, assert that “while globalisation has increased the cost of Africa’s ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and poverty reduction”.

Similarly, Gelb<sup>163</sup> asserts that Africa’s integration into the world economy could be successful, provided it is managed and re-regulated efficiently. He goes on to argue that “globalisation has the potential to support Africa’s economic recovery. But for that potential to be achieved, the conditions under which Africa participates need to be fundamentally changed”.

It is against the background of these arguments that respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they felt that globalisation poses a threat to Africa’s

**Figure 28: Agreement–disagreement with statement: ‘Globalisation poses a threat to Africa’s economic reconstruction’**



economic reconstruction (*Figure 28*). Responses were once again plotted on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) and then collapsed to include three categories, namely: agree, neutral and disagree.

The majority of respondents in all countries surveyed agreed with the statement, thereby displaying a strong level of distrust for the impact of globalisation on Africa. Uganda (71.1%) displayed the strongest level of agreement, followed by Kenya (64.2%), Algeria (62.2%), Zimbabwe (56.1%), Senegal (54.8%), South Africa (54.1%) and Nigeria (47.7%).

When asked whether the dominant liberal economic paradigm discriminates against Africa, the majority of respondents in all countries surveyed agreed with the statement (*Figure 29*). Uganda (74.2%) once again displayed the strongest level of agreement, followed by Nigeria (69.2%), Algeria (65.5%), Senegal (63.8%), South Africa (63.3%) and Kenya (60%).

Such perceptions may lead to a decrease in support for, and confidence in, the NEPAD strategy, as the majority of African elites display relatively high levels of distrust in the neo-liberal framework. The architects of the plan will therefore have to spend increased attention on ‘selling’ the plan and the possible benefits of increased African integration into the global economy.


#### 4.5 NEPAD AND THE CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP


The NEPAD policy proposes the concept of partnership on various levels.

Firstly, it proposes increased integration and cooperation within the African continent itself. It also proposes increased cooperation among the various tiers of society, i.e. the business sector, government and civil society. Lastly, it proposes a partnership with the developed world in order to realise the goals of sustainable development and integration into the global economy. According to Diescho<sup>164</sup> “partnership conveys the existence of a relationship stronger than cooperation, but weaker than a compact. It suggests joint effort and joint responsibility – the concept of interdependence”. At a plenary session at the WEF in Durban, South Africa 2003 it was suggested that NEPAD should in fact be spelled nePAD, so as to stress the importance of partnership at the various levels.<sup>165</sup>

But probably the most contentious issue of partnership is that with the developed world. At the Kananaskis Summit in 2002, the G8 countries pledged support towards NEPAD by adopting the Africa Action Plan, but stated that enhanced partnerships would only be formed with those African countries whose performance reflects NEPAD commitments. As a result, a number of conditionalities, on the part of both Africa and the Western donor nations, have been tied to the concept of partnership.

Africa’s obligations in terms of NEPAD include: the integration of Africa into the globalised world; the reduction of armed conflicts; the restructuring of African economies; and respect for human rights and good governance. Support





was pledged by the G8, the World Bank, the global coalition for Africa, the secretary general of the UN, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the EU and the African Development Bank.

G8 obligations include: a pledge of \$64 billion annually; the creation of markets for African exports; investment in African infrastructure; increased developmental aid; and to support debt reduction. Following the G8 meeting in Evian in June, critics claimed that the G8 failed to deliver on its promises yet again, although the US pledged \$15 billion to fight AIDS and an additional \$1 billion for the global fund against AIDS, Malaria and tuberculosis. Chirac tripled France's initial contribution to \$177 million and Europe hinted at contributing a further \$1 billion.<sup>166</sup>

Numerous criticisms have, however, been levelled against the policy regarding the proposed conditionalities. The Partnership has been referred to as a begging bowl that will merely reinforce Africa's subordinate position in the world economy, prompting Ken Owen<sup>167</sup> to caution "that the NEPAD could become an instrument by which cold-eyed Northern politicians blackmail weak African states into doing their will".<sup>168</sup>

These factors are borne largely from Africa's failed colonial legacy – a legacy which is used by many to warn against the trapping of a proposed partnership with the developed world. According to Onimode,<sup>169</sup> Mkandawire and Soludo,<sup>170</sup> the economic policies of the colonial times did not ensure that African countries were fully developed in the industrial and technological

sectors, which ultimately increased the dependence of many African states towards the colonial powers.

To what extent do African elites believe that the developed world has a moral responsibility to uplift the people of Africa, and do they believe that the notion of a partnership with the developed world may indeed threaten Africa with a new form of colonisation?


Respondents were asked to indicate their level of support (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) for the following statement: ‘The developed world has a moral responsibility to uplift Africa’s people’ (Figure 30).<sup>171</sup>

The majority of respondents in all countries surveyed agreed with the statement that the developed world has a moral responsibility to uplift the people of Africa. Algeria displayed the strongest level of agreement with the statement, followed by Senegal (77.8%), Nigeria (77.7%), Uganda (76.3%), South Africa (75.8%) and Zimbabwe (72.7%).

When asked whether an economic partnership with the developed world would lead to a new form of colonisation, the majority of respondents in Kenya and Uganda agreed with the statement (Figure 31). The majority of respondents in all other countries surveyed disagreed with the statement. South Africa (63.2%) expressed the strongest level of disagreement, followed by Nigeria (53.8%), Zimbabwe (50.0%), Senegal (49.7%) and Algeria (38.6%).

It would therefore seem from the above-mentioned attitudinal patterns that the majority of African elite believe that the developed world does indeed carry

**Figure 31: An economic partnership with the developed world threatens Africa with a new form of colonisation**



certain responsibilities towards the development of Africa and that such a collaboration would not necessarily imply detrimental outcomes for the African continent.

Assuming that the majority of African elites in the countries surveyed are not threatened by a partnership with the developed world, what conditionalities are these elites willing to accept. When asked to indicate the relative importance they believed the G8 countries should attach, in general, to a number of policy objectives and rank them in order of importance (1=most important; 5=least important), all countries surveyed agreed that the G8 should place the most importance on stable governments and economic growth (*Table 18*). In a Phd dissertation entitled ‘Measuring political risks as risks to foreign investment’,

**Table 18: Conditionalities linked to aid (Ranked on a scale of 1-5)**

*The percentages listed in the table refer to the percentage of respondents within each country that regarded the specific conditionality as the most important one to be considered.*

	South Africa	Nigeria	Senegal	Algeria	Kenya	Uganda	Zimbabwe
1	Stable govts. (42.9%)	Stable govts. (46.9%)	Stable govts. (49.25)	Stable govts. (52.5%)	Rapid economic growth (45%)	Rapid economic growth (33%)	Stable govts. (42.1%)
2	Rapid economic growth (23.7%)	Rapid economic growth (32.3%)	Rapid economic growth (18.2%)	Rapid economic growth (18.2%)	Stable govts. (30.8%)	Stable govts. (32%)	Rapid economic growth (20%)
3	Maintenance of civil liberties (16.8%)	Attitude towards G8 (6.9%)	Maintenance of civil liberties (15.9%)	Maintenance of civil liberties (13.3%)	Attitude towards G8 (11.7%)	Maintenance of civil liberties (13.4%)	Maintenance of civil liberties (18.6%)
4	Support of free enterprise (6%)	Support of free enterprise (5.4%)	Free enterprise (6.1%)	Avoid unprovoked aggression (5.8%)	Maintenance of civil liberties (8.3%)	Avoid unprovoked aggression (9.3%)	Support free enterprise (9.3%)
5	Avoid unprovoked aggression (5.7%)	Maintenance of civil liberties (4.6%)	Avoid unprovoked aggression (3.8%)	Attitude towards G8 (5%)	Support free enterprise (7.5%)	Attitude towards G8 (7.2%)	Avoid unprovoked aggression (7.1%)
6	Attitude towards G8 (3.5%)	Avoid unprovoked aggression (3.8%)	Attitude towards G8 (3%)	Support free enterprise (4.2%)	Avoid unprovoked aggression (0.8%)	Support free enterprise (5.2%)	Attitude towards G8 (1.4%)

Brink<sup>172</sup> identifies a number of factors that are taken into account when considering political risk. According to her analysis, political stability was regarded as one of the primary indicators of political risks. The majority of elites in the current study therefore recognise the fact that political stability should play an important role when establishing conditionalities.

#### 4.6 CONCLUSION

As mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, the goals associated with the AU and NEPAD have sparked numerous debates on the issue. Some scholars agree that the needs of the African continent are so diverse that a development plan spanning the entire continent would undoubtedly lead to severe tension and conflict between states regarding the priority sectors. Within country conflict, however, also poses a threat to the NEPAD policy. As the previous chapter has shown, civil society remains sceptical about the policy and describes NEPAD as a reflection of the needs and goals of a political elite that do not take the needs of their populations into account. To further complicate matters, many argue that the goals of Western donors, who are crucial to the concept of partnership and ultimately to the success of NEPAD, may differ fundamentally from the goals identified by the African states themselves.

Despite these difficulties, the majority of opinion leaders in the various countries surveyed regard issues of economic and political governance as important goals for the AU and NEPAD to pursue. Such sentiments seem in line with the conditionalities linked with Western aid, and should therefore, in principle, lead to minimal conflict on the partnership front.

Poverty eradication is also regarded as paramount by a large percentage of the surveyed elites, as is the issue of African unification. Worrying, however, is the scant importance placed on the problem of HIV/AIDS and gender equality. Although the NEPAD policy has also not paid adequate attention to these issues, civil society may express severe resentment towards the architects of the plan. Considering the already lower than average levels of confidence expressed by civil society towards the NEPAD policy, African leaders will have to address these and other issues more appropriately.

Worrying also is the fact that the majority of the respondents in all the countries surveyed are of the opinion that globalisation poses a threat to African economic recovery and that the dominant liberal economic framework discriminates against Africa. Since the NEPAD initiative arguably primarily aims

to integrate Africa into the global economy by embracing a number of principles upon which such an economy is based, the architects of the plan will have to exert an increased effort in selling the tenets of neo-liberalism to the people of Africa.

Of concern also is the fact that a large percentage of the elite in all the countries surveyed believe that the developed world has a moral responsibility towards the upliftment of the people of Africa. Such sentiments, coupled with a rejection of globalisation as a means with which the African continent can be rejuvenated, may suggest a tendency among the African elites to shift the responsibility of Africa's economic and political recovery to external agents such as the Western World and in particular to countries linked to the G8, the IMF and the World Bank.

But despite these concerns, the NEPAD initiative seems well on its way towards successful implementation. At the Africa Economic Summit held in Durban, South Africa, 2003, Wiseman Nkuhlu reported that already 20 projects aimed at improving African infrastructure have been compiled and are in the advanced stage.<sup>173</sup> The APRM – which according to many will be the true test of NEPAD – is set to start its review process in Ghana and Uganda within the next two months.

The following chapter will therefore describe elite opinions regarding the perceived capacity of African states to implement NEPAD, and their perceived confidence in the APRM.

#### NOTES

98 Cornwell, op cit, p. 91.

99 IO Olofi, NEPAD and globalisation: Matters arising. Paper presented at the workshop of studies of development in the era of globalisation, Dalhousie University, Canada, 2002.

100 Page 6, par. 28 of the NEPAD document states: "The world has entered the new millennium in the midst of an economic revolution. This revolution could provide both the context and the means for Africa's rejuvenation. While globalisation has increased the cost of Africa's ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed integration presents the best prospects for future economic prosperity and poverty reduction."

101 IDASA, issues briefing 38, 9 September 2002.

102 L Dupree and K Ogunsanya, *Mainstreaming women into NEPAD: Invisible Progress*, Peace and Governance Programme, Briefing Paper 8, 2003. Olofi, op cit, p. 4.

103 J Van der Westhuizen, *Selling NEPAD after 9/11: Can global security be linked to global welfare?* Paper prepared for Studies of Development in an Era of Globalisation research workshop, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, 9-10 August 2002.



- 104 Higley et al, op cit, p. 17.
- 105 Arthur, op cit.
- 106 A Pahad, The New Partnership for African Development, in: Gibb, Hughes, Mills and Vaahtoranta (eds), op cit, p. 3.
- 107 African Development Bank as cited in *EAfrica* 1, June 2003.
- 108 G Mills and J Oppenheimer, Making Africa succeed, in: Gibb, Hughes, Mills and Vaahtoranta (eds), op cit, p. 92.
- 109 P Chabal, Africa in the age of globalisation, *African Security Review* 10(2), 2001.
- 110 Arthur, op cit.
- 111 Ibid.
- 112 see Olofi, op cit, p. 7; Gelb, op cit, p. 91.
- 113 P Chabal, *Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation*, Macmillan Press, London, 1992, p. 5. See also R Sandbrook, *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985 and Englebert, op cit.
- 114 P Chabal, Africa in the age of globalisation, op cit.
- 115 In the case of 'no answer', responses were recoded as system missing and then replaced with the series mean.
- 116 Herbert, 2002, op cit, p. 15.
- 117 Africa Institute of South Africa, *Africa at a Glance: Facts and Figures 2001/2002*, p. 38.
- 118 <[www.unaids.org](http://www.unaids.org)>
- 119 <[www.worldbank.org/aids-econ](http://www.worldbank.org/aids-econ)>
- 120 Guma, op cit, p. 55.
- 121 Herbert, 2002, op cit, p. 473.
- 122 Percentages included reflect the frequency with which an item was selected, i.e. included in the top five obstacles facing the continent.
- 123 Mills and Oppenheimer, op cit, p. 92.
- 124 C Kabemba, The AU and NEPAD, *Inside AISA*, 4, August 2002, p. 2.
- 125 J Johnson, Aid and Good Governance in Africa, *The Round Table* 320, 1991, p. 396.
- 126 See also the discussions of Van Vuuren (1994) and McAuslan (1996) on the concept of good governance.
- 127 B Mutharika, *One Africa, One Destiny: Towards Democracy, Good Governance and Development*. Sapes, Harare, 1995, p. 116.
- 128 EJ Keller, Towards a New African Order?, *Africa Insight* 23(3), 1993, p. 126.
- 129 See <[www.au2002.gov.za/docu/key\\_oau/au\\_act.htm](http://www.au2002.gov.za/docu/key_oau/au_act.htm)>
- 130 Responses were recoded in the opposite direction. In the case of no answer, responses were recoded as system missing and replaced with the series mean.
- 131 Arthur, op cit.
- 132 *Business Day*, 28 March 2003.
- 133 *Business Day*, 7 July, 2003.
- 134 *Business Day*, 10 July 2003.
- 135 *Business Day*, 8 July 2003.
- 136 Olofi, op cit, p. 4.
- 137 Dupree and Ogunsanya, op cit.
- 138 A summarised version of the report is available on <[www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)>.
- 139 World Bank, *World Development Report*, 2003, p. 3.
- 140 United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, 2002.

- 141 See <[www.unaids.org](http://www.unaids.org)>
- 142 Gelb, op cit.
- 143 P Bond, Thabo Mbeki's New Partnership for Africa's Development: Breaking or Shining the Chains of Global Apartheid?, Discussion paper, 2002, <[www.ipif.org/papers/NEPAD/index\\_body.html](http://www.ipif.org/papers/NEPAD/index_body.html)>
- 144 Gelb, op cit.
- 145 Herbert, 2002, op cit, p. 8.
- 146 R Chabal, The quest for good government and development in Africa: Is NEPAD the answer? *International Affairs* 78(3), 2002, pp. 445-462.
- 147 Regarded as second most desirable benefit by 4.6% of Nigerian respondents.
- 148 Regarded as second most important benefit by 2.2% of respondents.
- 149 Regarded as second most desirable benefit by 2.5% of respondents.
- 150 Regarded as second most desirable benefit by 2.1% of respondents.
- 151 Regarded as second most desirable benefit by 2.3% of respondents.
- 152 Regarded as third most important benefit by 1.5% of respondents.
- 153 Regarded as third most important benefit by 1% of respondents.
- 154 Regarded as third most desirable benefit by 2.1% of respondents.
- 155 Arthur, op cit.
- 156 Gelb, op cit, p. 28.
- 157 Mills and Oppenheimer, op cit.
- 158 UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Peer Review Mechanism: Process and Procedures, *African Security Review* 11(4), p. 8.
- 159 Gelb, op cit, p. 25.
- 160 S Gibb, Globalisation and African Economic Recovery: Compatibility or contradiction, in: Gibb, S., Hughes, T., Mills, G. and Vaahtoranta, T. (eds), op cit, p. 10.
- 161 IDASA, op cit.
- 162 Mills and Oppenheimer, op cit, p. 17.
- 163 Gibb, op cit.
- 164 Diescho, op cit, p. 20.
- 165 Personal observation.
- 166 *Cape Times*, 9 June 2003.
- 167 As cited in W Breytenbach, op cit.
- 168 Ibid.
- 169 Onimode, op cit.
- 170 Mkandawire, Thandika and Soludo, *Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment*. International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 1999.
- 171 Responses were once again collapsed to include: agree, neutral and disagree.
- 172 C Brink, Measuring political risk as risks to foreign investment: A computer-assisted model for analysing and managing political risk. Phd dissertation, University of Stellenbosch, 2002, p. 119.
- 173 Africa Economic Summit, Summary: Have African governments delivered on the promise of the NEPAD? Durban, South Africa, 11-13 June 2003.

# Chapter 5

## IMPLEMENTATION OF NEPAD

*“The NEPAD represents perhaps the most significant initiative ever advocated for moving the African continent from crisis to renewal in the past 40 years. Indeed, there is much riding on the NEPAD. In many ways, it represents one last opportunity to get the global economy to take Africa seriously ... . However, the consequences of failure will be costly and will undoubtedly return the continent to its marginalised status and prove the Afro-pessimists right. The management of the implementation therefore takes on great significance.”*

KR Hope<sup>174</sup>

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

Prior to the NEPAD initiative, the African continent has engaged in a number of developmental plans,<sup>175</sup> all of which have been less than successful given the current African situation. The Lagos Plan of Action in the 1980s, for instance, was fraught with a lack of political commitment from African leadership, a lack of coordination with other political and economic reforms, a lack of African ownership and control, and a lack of resources.<sup>176</sup> The successful implementation of the NEPAD initiative therefore depends firstly on the extent to which the African leadership believe that African states possess the necessary capacity to implement the NEPAD strategies, whether these strategies are indeed in line with national development needs and goals, and whether a political will to implement the policies successfully, exists.

Although the presence of a coordinated African leadership is crucial to the successful implementation of NEPAD, the plan also relies heavily on the notion


of productive partnership – a principle which many believe to be in direct contradiction with the idea of African ownership and control. This chapter therefore embarks from this point, and attempts to describe elite opinions regarding the perceived capacity of African states to implement NEPAD and the perceived confidence in the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism. The chapter will conclude with an analysis describing which countries, in elite opinion, would prove the most beneficial partners for the African continent.

#### 5.2 NATION AND CONTINENT: ISSUES OF CAPACITY AND POLITICAL WILL

As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the successful implementation of NEPAD is largely based on the extent to which African leadership and control can be maintained. According to Hope:<sup>177</sup>

“No initiative for Africa’s development, however well crafted and internationally accepted, can and/or will be successful if it is not owned by Africans themselves. The lessons of the failure of past initiatives points to an experience which shows that Africans must lead Africa out of poverty and that the most effective policies and programmes are those based on domestic processes of consultation and decision making. Ownership matters because it directly affects programme acceptance and implementation at the national and local levels.”

Hope goes on to argue that the management and implementation of NEPAD takes on great significance and warns that issues of bureaucracy and infighting may hamper the progress of such implementation. He asserts that great vigilance needs to be attained through the monitoring and exposure of actions and behaviours that may lead to infighting and contends that such monitoring should be the responsibility of all the NEPAD stakeholders, partners, donor countries, agents and civil society groups. At the G8 Summit in Evian, June 2003, the G8 donors maintained NEPAD required the establishment of an Executive Secretariat that would oversee the operationalisation of the AU and NEPAD policies. At the AU Summit in Maputo, July 2003, AU leaders appointed Alpha Konare, former President of Mali as Chairman of the Commission, replacing Amara Essy as former Secretary General to the AU. The NEPAD Secretariat at the Development Bank in Midrand, South Africa, will eventually be phased out.<sup>178</sup>




In the light of the above-mentioned concerns, respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they believed that their country has the capacity to implement NEPAD policies.

The data in *Figure 32* suggests that the majority of elite respondents in all the countries surveyed, except Zimbabwe, agreed with the statement, thereby displaying a high degree of confidence in the ability of their respective countries to implement the NEPAD strategies effectively. South Africa (85.2%) displayed the strongest level of agreement, followed by Nigeria (84.6%), Senegal and Algeria (64.4%), Kenya (63.3%), Uganda (55.7%) and Zimbabwe (41.6%). Interestingly, countries not directly involved in the drafting of the NEPAD process display lower levels of agreement than those countries directly involved in the drafting process.

When asked whether their country is playing a leading role in the NEPAD process (*Figure 33*), the majority of elites in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria agreed with the statement, while the majority of elites in Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe disagreed with the statement. Once again, countries directly involved in the drafting of the process displayed stronger levels of agreement with the statement than those not directly involved. It is particularly significant that the South African respondents recognised their country's major role in the NEPAD process.


Although the majority of the elites in six of the seven countries surveyed believe that their countries have the necessary capacity to implement the

**Figure 33: Country is playing a leading role in the NEPAD process**

NEPAD policies, the actual implementation of the plan has been somewhat slow and oftentimes fraught with difficulties. At a Black Management Forum in Cape Town on 10 October 2003, President Mbeki expressed concern that some of the NEPAD projects were in danger of not being properly implemented. President Mbeki was reported<sup>179</sup> as saying:


“We are not going to achieve some of the programmes we have set (out) to (achieve) because of the lack of capacity ... Even if we do have the resources, the institutions do not have the capacity, and African renewal needs capacity ... The embarrassing thing is that they (developed nations) have committed resources, but we do not have the capacity to implement.”

The success with which the NEPAD initiative will be implemented would therefore also largely depend on the extent to which the institutions of state in the respective African countries can indeed establish an implementation framework for the policy and whether such structures can be maintained in the long term. Elite respondents were therefore asked to indicate the level of confidence they had in the institutions of state,<sup>180</sup> press and major companies present in their countries. Since such institutions are largely responsible for the successful drafting, implementation, propagating and funding of state policies, the perceived confidence expressed by elites in such institutions should carry important implications for the implementation of NEPAD.



When asked to indicate their level of confidence in the state, only the majority of respondent elites in South Africa (66.1%) and Uganda (52.6%) expressed quite a lot of confidence (*Figure 34*).<sup>181</sup> The majority of respondents in Senegal (60.8%) and Kenya (64.7%), however, expressed little confidence in the institutions of state, while over 70% of respondents in both Algeria and Zimbabwe expressed low levels of confidence in the institutions of state. Arguably, such low levels of confidence reflect elite perceptions regarding the inability of state institutions to draft and implement state policies successfully. If such perceptions are indeed grounded in reality, then the drafting and implementation of NEPAD policies may be fraught with numerous difficulties.

When asked to indicate their levels of confidence in the press (*Figure 35*),




only elite respondents in South Africa (54.4%), Kenya (65%) and Uganda (77.1%) expressed quite a lot of confidence in the institutions responsible for propagating national plans and policies. Extremely low levels of confidence in the press were recorded in Zimbabwe (72.9%), while the majority of respondents in Senegal (54.3%) and Algeria (59.5%) expressed moderately low levels of confidence in the press. The relatively higher levels of confidence in the press in South Africa can largely be explained through reference to the fact that according to the Freedom House statistics,<sup>182</sup> the press in South Africa can be regarded as free, with a total ranking of only 25.<sup>183</sup> Similarly, the low levels of confidence in the press in Zimbabwe may largely be explained by the fact that the country's press is regarded as 'not at all free', with a high rating of 88. Uganda's moderately high levels of confidence in the press seems particularly high given the fact that the country's press is rated as only 'partly free' by Freedom House, with a rating of 45. Similarly, Kenya is rated 'not free at all' with a ranking of 68, although members of the elite reflect relatively strong levels of confidence in the press. Senegal, which is regarded as 'partly free' with a rating of 38, and Algeria, which is regarded as 'not at all free' with a score of 61, expressed relatively lower levels of confidence in the press.

As mentioned by Diescho<sup>184</sup> in Chapter 3, a sophisticated media, capable of accurate and in-depth analysis of events could play an important role in garnering local as well as international support for the NEPAD policies. Unfortunately, however, the relatively low levels of confidence in the press as expressed by half of the African countries included in the survey may hamper the successful propagation of NEPAD.

Similarly, when asked to indicate their levels of confidence in the major companies operating in the respective countries, the majority of elites respondents in South Africa (57%), Kenya (68.3%) and Uganda (51%), expressed quite a lot of confidence<sup>185</sup> (*Figure 36*). Once again, Algeria expressed extremely low levels of confidence in major companies (77.1%).

As mentioned in Chapter three, businesses have an important role to play concerning the implementation of NEPAD by developing guidelines for best practice standards of corporate and economic governance. At the African Economic Summit held in Durban, South Africa in June 2003, South African Minister of Trade and Industry Alec Erwin was quoted as saying "our view is that the structures (of NEPAD) are succeeding and that they can make a big difference. We are working together to forge this partnership which is the making of our future". His view was reiterated by Reuel Khoza, Chairman of






Eskom, who stated that “a working partnership is developing between governments and business. NEPAD is working already”.<sup>186</sup> In South Africa, the government has set up a group led by the Trade and Industry Department to work with businesses involved in Africa in the pursuit of common objectives. In Kenya, a NEPAD Secretariat and Steering Committee comprising both private sector and government members has also been established to advance issues of NEPAD in the region.

From the above-mentioned data patterns, it seems that only South Africa and Uganda, and to a lesser extent Kenya, possess quite a lot of confidence in the institutions responsible for drafting, implementing, propagating and funding national development plans and policies. Senegal, Algeria and Zimbabwe, however, have expressed relatively low levels of confidence in all three institutions – sentiments that may be reflective of the limited capacity demonstrated by such institutions in the respective countries.

According to Hope<sup>187</sup> and Diescho,<sup>188</sup> NEPAD faces a second implementation challenge, which will entail working out how to deal with the varying demands expressed by the participating countries, given the decision made by the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee to subsume under the NEPAD process all other initiatives promoted by individual countries. Although NEPAD is based on the principle of collective African action, the needs of the African continent are vast and difficulties may arise in trying to reconcile the different country needs.

In the light of the above-mentioned concerns, respondents were asked to

**Figure 37: Country has a national development plan which correlates with NEPAD**

indicate to what extent (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree) they agreed with the statement that their country possessed a national development plan which correlates with NEPAD.

According to the data presented in *Figure 37*, the majority of elite respondents in South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Senegal agreed with the statement. The majority of respondents in Zimbabwe disagreed with the statement, while the majority of elite respondents in Algeria reflected a neutral opinion towards the statement.

Respondents in South Africa (70.6%) displayed the strongest level of agreement with the statement, followed by elites in Nigeria (56.2%), Kenya (44.2%), Uganda (40.2%), Senegal (38.6%) Algeria (29.7%) and Zimbabwe (19.6%).

When asked to what extent they felt that their country's destiny is intertwined with that of the rest of Africa, the majority of respondents in all countries surveyed, except Algeria, agreed with the statement (*Figure 38*).

The data presented above therefore suggests that in the majority of cases the elites surveyed do feel that the development goals of their respective countries are in fact in line with the development goals of the continent and NEPAD. Such sentiments bode well for a smooth transition towards the implementation phase of the NEPAD policy.


Only time will tell, however, whether such sentiments will survive past the stage of mere rhetoric and stand up to the test of difficulties and challenges associated with concrete implementation plans.

### 5.3 THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

The APRM, approved by the AU Summit in July 2002, has been regarded as the true test as to whether the NEPAD policies can indeed be successfully implemented throughout the African continent. The aim of the APRM is to “ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the codes and standards contained in the Declaration on democratic, political, economic and corporate governance that was approved by the AU Summit in July 2002”.<sup>189</sup> As mentioned in the G8 Africa Action Plan:

“The African peer review process is an innovative and potentially decisive element in the attainment of the objectives of NEPAD. We welcome the adoption on June 11 by the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee of the Declaration of Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance and the African Peer Review Mechanism. The peer review process will inform our considerations of eligibility for enhanced partnerships. We will each make our own assessments in making these partnership decisions.”

Peer review can generally be described as the “systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state improve its policy making, adopt best practices and comply with established standards and principles”.<sup>190</sup> They are generally



performed on a non-adversarial basis and rely on the persuasion and influence of peer states involved in the process.

The APRM is a voluntary process open to all member states of the AU. Countries wishing to undergo the process must sign the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and agree to submit to and to facilitate periodic peer reviews. Approximately 18 months after the country has joined the APRM, it will undergo a base review, followed by mandatory reviews which take place three to five years thereafter and will be lead by a panel of Eminent Persons.<sup>191</sup> The APRM comprises five stages,<sup>192</sup> which include: the analysis of the governance and development environment of the country; country visits by peer review mission teams; the preparation of mission findings of the peer review; the discussion and adoption of the peer review reports by the NEPAD structures; and the formal and public tabling of the APRM reports in key regional and sub-regional structures.<sup>193</sup>

The APRM has, however, come under severe criticism from various camps and only 17 countries of the 53 African states have signed the accession document.<sup>194</sup> Following debates as to whether the APRM will focus on issues relating to political governance (as desired by the international donor community) and/or economic and corporate governance issues, it was decided that the functions of the APRM will be split into two sections. Issues of economic and corporate governance will be dealt with by NEPAD, while issues of political governance will become the responsibility of the AU and its Commission, which will ultimately liaise with the Panel of the Wise.<sup>195</sup> According to Arthur,<sup>196</sup> the mechanism is fundamentally flawed due to the fact that African leaders themselves will decide on who has complied with its principles. Many of these leaders have, however, assumed office through military coups and may therefore lack credibility and persuasive influence. This argument is, however, not solid enough as a panel of Eminent Persons (*Box 4*) has been appointed to oversee the peer review process.

The situation in Zimbabwe and African states' inability to deal with the crisis has made it increasingly difficult to promote the policy. Valeria Amos, the UK's top minister for Africa, argued that foreign investors feel that the NEPAD initiative will not work, due to the fact that African pressure on Zimbabwe has been so low key.<sup>197</sup> Complicating matters further is the fact that the successful implementation of the APRM is critical in gaining Western and G8 support for the NEPAD policy. The lack of interest expressed by many African Heads of State in the design and implementation of the APRM has raised doubts about

#### Box 4: African Peer Review Mechanism Eminent Persons Panel

In May 2003, the NEPAD Heads of State Implementation Committee announced a panel of the following six eminent persons who will oversee the APRM:


- **Adebayo Adedeji** (Nigeria). Former UN under secretary general and executive secretary to the UN Economic Commission for Africa.
- **Dorothy Njeuma** (Cameroon). Vice-president of the Executive Board of the Association of African Universities; she has also served in government positions.
- **Bethuelabdu Kiplagat** (Kenya). Chairman of the Nairobi Stock Exchange; he has also served in the Kenyan government.
- **Graça Machel** (Mozambique). Wife of former South African President Nelson Mandela who is involved in various charities and UN activities.
- **Marie-Angelique Savane** (Senegal). Former director for Africa in the UN Population Fund and co-founder of the Association of African Women for Research and Development.
- **Chris Stals** (South Africa). Monetary policy expert and former governor of the South African Reserve Bank.

the validity of the mechanism, as only one-third of invited African presidents deemed it important enough to attend a weekend meeting (8 and 9 March 2003) in Abuja, Nigeria.<sup>198</sup>

Herbert<sup>199</sup> maintains that the credibility of the peer review process has been seriously weakened due to the fact that the architects of the NEPAD initiative have “oversold” the peer review process, “raising impossible expectations about its ability to fix what are profound social, economic and political problems”. Furthermore, he maintains that the design of the process has largely taken place behind closed doors, resulting in considerable confusion among the media as to whether peer review would incorporate political governance or economic governance issues.

To what extent do the African elite display confidence in the peer review mechanism? Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) the extent to which they agreed with the following statement: ‘The NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism will not lead to improved levels of good governance’ (*Figure 39*).

The majority of respondents in South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe disagreed with the statement, thereby expressing support for the APRM as proposed by NEPAD. The majority of respondents in Algeria, however, expressed a neutral opinion towards the statement, although more respondents in Algeria agreed with the statement than disagreed with it.



South Africa (52.6%) displayed the strongest level of disagreement, followed by Nigeria (49.2%), Kenya (45.5%), Zimbabwe (44.3%), Senegal (40.4%), Uganda (38.2%) and Algeria (18.6%).

One could therefore conclude that the majority of elite respondents in all countries surveyed do believe that the APRM will indeed prove successful and lead to stronger levels of democratic governance on the continent. Since President Obasanjo of Nigeria has been charged with appointing the eminent persons responsible for overseeing the APRM,<sup>200</sup> the mechanism seems well on its way to fruition. Herbert<sup>201</sup> asserts that, if managed correctly, the APRM could assist in bringing the implementation of NEPAD to the national level. Most of the goals as outlined by the NEPAD policy document require action on the part of national governments. Since the AU and the NEPAD Secretariat cannot assume the role of implementation agent in the NEPAD process, the APRM may prove the most suitable body to do so. Only time will tell whether the mechanism itself can be successfully implemented – a test which will prove crucial in solidifying Western support for the NEPAD policy.

#### 5.4 IMPLEMENTING NEPAD

As mentioned in the previous chapters, NEPAD differs from the numerous African developmental plans that have gone before it due to the fact that it is

based on the principle of ‘partnership’ with the developed world. According to Diescho,<sup>202</sup> NEPAD comes at a time when there exists already a recognition by the international community that Africa has been marginalised and that something must be done. Since previously failed attempts by Western donors to rescue Africa from aspects of the malaise of underdevelopment, poverty and strife have proved unsuccessful, mere cooperation is no longer regarded as appropriate and has been replaced by what can be defined as mutually binding commitments or partnerships.

But such sentiments that mere cooperation might not be sufficient were aired as early as 1980 by the German Chancellor Willy Brandt<sup>203</sup> who issued the ‘North–South: A programme for survival’ report. In this report he explicitly stated that:

“We want to make clear that North and South cannot proceed with ‘business as usual’ only by adding a few bits here and there. What is required is intellectual reorientation, serious steps towards structural change, increased practical cooperation. A more relaxed climate of negotiations should do away with rhetorical warfare and unjustified expressions of distrust.”

Since then, however, a new international environment has emerged – one where Africa has increased access to international affairs, but at the same time is faced with more challenges that primarily originate from the West. These challenges include increased hegemony and power politics and unreasonable international rules of the game. In order to overcome such difficulties, Africa countries will have to present a clear-cut position on international structures and other issues, as well as stress their respective strong points and participate in world affairs with “a more active posture on the principle of equality and mutual benefit”.<sup>204</sup> They will also have to utilise the contradictions present among Western countries and take the opportunity to stress their own interests.

It was in the face of this changed international environment that the architects of NEPAD attempted to carve a niche for the African continent on the global agenda through the establishment of mutually beneficial partnerships with the developed world.

As mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, the successful implementation of NEPAD depends in part on the extent to which African ownership and control can be realised, and in part on the ease with which





doing so. Furthermore, the EU has nurtured long-standing economic and political multilateral ties with African countries through the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) process, which was recently renewed with the Cotonou Agreement.<sup>207</sup> In December 2001, Algerian President Bouteflika signed an Association Accord with the EU as part of the US's bid to build and improve relations with neighbours in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.

In the case of South Africa, Scandinavian states were ranked as the most important economic blocs that can be relied upon to support the economic revival of the African continent. Scandinavian countries have for a long time been involved with the country, financing the anti-apartheid movement within South Africa and abroad.

The scattered spread of the G8 may be indicative of the lack of trust in the willingness of the group to financially support Africa. At the 2000 G8 Summit in Okinawa, for instance, expected debt relief promises to Africa were never met. Despite this fact, however, there have been instances where Africa appeared to be placed high on the G8 agenda. Tony Blair, for instance, referred to Africa as the scar on the conscience of the world and in 2000, the G8 forum made an unprecedented move by inviting three African leaders (Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika) to its Summit in Okinawa. Such instances may explain why the G8 is ranked highly by Nigeria, Algeria and Kenya.<sup>208</sup> Since the implementation of the survey, however, general African perception of the G8 may have improved due to the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian, which proved to count in Africa's favour. Following the Summit, South African President Thabo Mbeki was quoted as saying that "Africa may have bitten off as much as it can chew",<sup>209</sup> reflecting the success with which the Summit was generally perceived.

Support for the US is also relatively scattered among the African countries included in the survey. In South Africa, for instance, it is ranked second last, while in Nigeria and Algeria it is ranked third. Over the past number of years the US has attempted to 'prove' its commitment to African development, particularly with the African Growth and Opportunity Act which aims to open US markets to African goods in selected sectors. The Bush Administration, for instance, has promised the African continent a dramatic increase in US development aid and to expand access for African products to US markets. President Bush recently pledged \$15 billion to fight AIDS in Africa and opened a further \$10 billion Millennium Challenge Account to boost US aid to countries that encourage democracy and a market economy.<sup>210</sup> But despite these efforts

on the part of the US, elites surveyed in Zimbabwe, South Africa and to a lesser extent Uganda, seem less than convinced of the US's efforts. This scepticism was evident during President Bush's most recent visit to the continent where he visited Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda and Nigeria. Cynicism regarding President Bush's motives abound, with suggestions that the Bush Administration's only interest in Africa lies in securing alternative oil sources should those in the Middle East become inaccessible, and to secure US leverage in the fight against terrorism. Prior to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the bombings of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi by Al Qaeda, signalled Africa's position as an environment where such acts of terrorism could flourish. In November 2001, the Clinton Administration's Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice was reported as saying that "Africa is unfortunately the world's soft underbelly for global terrorism" and in June 2003, five Al Qaeda suspects were arrested in Malawi by US officials.<sup>211</sup> The criticisms that Bush's interest in Africa is largely fuelled by his security policy following September 11, are further strengthened by the fact that US-Africa trade fell by 15% last year, while US aid to the continent decreased by 6%.<sup>212</sup>

Despite these concerns, however, Nigeria and Algeria ranked the US as the third economic bloc that can be relied on to support the economic revival of Africa. Even before the September 11, US FBI Director Louis Freeh visited Algiers to consolidate Algerian support in the fight against Osama Bin Laden and in July 2001, President Bouteflika was welcomed by President Bush at the White House, signalling the first meeting of such a kind for an Algerian Head of State in 16 years. During this visit, Bouteflika signed the Trade and Investment Framework with the US and following the September 11 attacks, the US hailed Algeria as a "key ally in the war against terrorism".

Interesting, however, is the great amount of confidence placed in the role that other African states can play in ensuring the economic revival of Africa. Such sentiments bode well for the successful implementation of NEPAD, since it rests on the principles of African ownership and control. The elites represented in this survey are therefore willing to accept the fact that Africa's economic revival is to a large extent the responsibility of African states themselves.

Respondents were also asked to indicate to what extent they approved or disapproved of the following countries as reliable partners for the NEPAD process. The countries listed include: Sweden, Japan, Denmark, Britain,

Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, China, France, Malaysia, Italy, the US, Taiwan and Russia. According to the data presented in *Table 20*, Japan was ranked as the most reliable partner for NEPAD in all countries surveyed, except South Africa, where it was ranked second.

Since the mid 1990s Japan has been very active, both politically and economically, in the African continent. In 1990, Japan became the top aid donor in the world and during the 1990s, sponsored two conferences on African development focusing on self-help and partnerships with the developed world. According to Cornelissen,<sup>213</sup> Africa's renewed enthusiasm to seek 'African solutions to African problems' resonates with Japan's own development philosophy. The prominence of Japan as a reliable partner for NEPAD may therefore be explained through reference to the dominant position the country has grafted for itself through multilateral initiatives (such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development [TICAD] held in 1993, 1998, and later in 2003) and bilaterally, through large disbursements to key African countries.

Both Kenya and Nigeria regard their former colonial power, namely Britain, as a reliable partner for NEPAD, ranking the country second behind Japan. Since the elections in Nigeria in 1999, Nigeria has been readmitted into the Commonwealth and the EU and sanctions against the country have been lifted, thereby securing the strong relationship with the UK experienced during the early years of independence. Similarly, Algeria displays relatively strong

**Table 20: Reliable partners for NEPAD**

<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Senegal</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>Uganda</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
Sweden	Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan
Japan	Britain	Canada	Germany	Britain	Denmark	Sweden
Denmark	US	France	Canada	China	Sweden	Denmark
Britain	Canada	Germany	France	Canada	China	Netherlands
Germany	China	US	Italy	France	Netherlands	France
Canada	France	Taiwan	China	Sweden	Britain	Canada
Netherlands	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland	Denmark	Canada	Switzerland
China	Netherlands	Denmark	Sweden	Switzerland	US	Germany
France	Switzerland	Italy	US	Netherlands	Malaysia	Italy
Switzerland	Taiwan	China	Denmark	Germany	France	China
Malaysia	Malaysia	Switzerland	Britain	Italy	Germany	Britain
Italy	Sweden	Sweden	Netherlands	Taiwan	Italy	US
US	Italy	Britain	Russia	US	Switzerland	Malaysia
Taiwan	Russia	Malaysia	Malaysia	Malaysia	Taiwan	Taiwan
Russia	Denmark	Russia	Taiwan	Russia	Russia	Russia

confidence in France as a reliable partner for NEPAD, thereby reflecting the strong, yet complex, relationship endured by Algeria and its former coloniser. In 2001, for instance, France provided 37% of Algeria's imports and ranked second on the list of destinations for Algerian exports.

Given Japan's high ranking in *Table 20*, ASEAN's low ranking in *Table 19*, seems puzzling. Part of Japan's TICAD initiative has been to promote South-South cooperation (that is, ties between Asian countries and regional blocs and their African counterparts). ASEAN has also formed part of the TICAD process, and over the past few years, an African-Asian Business Forum has been established with the objective of strengthening economic ties between the two blocs. *Table 19* therefore seems to indicate that such efforts have to date not been successful, and that when it comes to regional blocs, African countries place more faith in the Western powers.<sup>214</sup>

Although the NEPAD document acknowledges the fact that efforts to realise the renewal of the African continent would probably be greatly enhanced through coordinated collaboration with the developed world, such efforts would, however, prove futile if African states themselves are unable to secure structures through which to implement the NEPAD processes. During the G8 Summit in Evian in June earlier this year, substantial funds were committed by the developed countries to improve peace and security, health and agriculture on the African continent. Such commitments from the developed world do, however, place a burden on the African continent to ensure the implementation of the development plans as outlined in NEPAD. President Mbeki expressed such a view following the Summit, when he commented on the commitments made by the G8 by saying that "if we had taken a bigger bite we would not have been able to process it and it would create disappointment". He referred to the potential of such commitments placing a "burden" on Africa to produce results and called on African leaders to improve the capacity of their implementation structures, so as to ensure the success of NEPAD.<sup>215</sup>

## 5.5 CONCLUSION

In many ways, NEPAD provides the African continent with a final opportunity to be taken seriously by the international community. Failure in this regard would prove extremely costly and could hamper any future chances Africa may have to integrate fully into the global economy. The successful implementation of the NEPAD process is therefore crucial to this end. As the current chapter

has attempted to show, the perceptions indicated that successful implementation of NEPAD rests on the extent to which African leadership can forge a productive partnership with the developed world while at the same time maintaining a high degree of African ownership and control.

As shown in the current chapter, the majority of opinion leaders in all countries surveyed are of the opinion that their countries have the capacity to implement the NEPAD policies successfully. The majority of elites in Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe, however, do not feel that their countries are playing a leading role in the NEPAD process. Of particular concern, are the relatively low levels of confidence that the elite respondents have in the institutions responsible for drafting, implementing, propagating and funding the NEPAD initiative. Only South Africa and Uganda expressed quite a lot of confidence in such institutions, while Zimbabwe expressed extremely low levels of confidence. Although the elites in the majority of countries surveyed believe that their respective countries possess a national developmental plan that correlates with NEPAD and that their countries' destiny is intertwined with that of the rest of Africa, the NEPAD Steering Committee will have to ensure that they are not "duplicating what other regional and international organisations have been mandated to do" and that the NEPAD structures are "not pursuing country actions that are of less priority in the regional context".<sup>216</sup>

The fact that the majority of elite respondents in the various countries surveyed have regarded the EU, the G8 and other African states as economic blocs that can be relied upon to support the economic revival of the African continent, bodes well for the partnership upon which NEPAD is largely based. Of particular importance, however, is the fact the African elites surveyed have also displayed a great deal of confidence in the reliability of other African states to improve the economic prospects in Africa – a perception which ultimately reinforces the concept of African ownership and control through the implementation process.

#### NOTES

- 174 KR Hope, From crisis to renewal: Towards a successful implementation of the NEPAD, *African Affairs* 101, 2002, pp. 387-402.
- 175 Some of these plans include the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (1980); Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (1986-1990) later converted into the UN Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development; the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme

- for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (1989); the African Charter for Popular Participation and Development (1990); and the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (1991). (A Adedeji, From Lagos to NEPAD, *New Agenda*, Fourth Quarter, 2002, p. 32.)
- 176 Hope, op cit, pp. 387-402.
- 177 Ibid, p. 396.
- 178 Insights of Prof. W Breytenbach, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch.
- 179 *Cape Argus*, October 10 2003.
- 180 An 'institutions of state' index was constructed by combining confidence levels associated with the government, civil service and parliament.
- 181 Unfortunately, these questions of elite confidence were not included in the Nigerian survey due to time and cost constraints.
- 182 See <[www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2003/pfs2003.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2003/pfs2003.pdf)>
- 183 According to the Freedom House statistics, the lower the ranking the greater the level of press freedom in the country.
- 184 Diescho, op cit, p. 59.
- 185 Response categories 'a great deal' and 'quite a lot' were collapsed to form a single category.
- 186 Opinions expressed at the session entitled, Walking the talk: Business challenges for the NEPAD, Africa Economic Summit, Durban, South Africa, 2003.
- 187 Hope, op cit, pp. 387-402.
- 188 Diescho, op cit, p. 57.
- 189 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, op cit, p. 7.
- 190 F Pagani, Peer Review as a tool for cooperation and change, *African Security Review*, 11(2), 2002, p. 16.
- 191 J Cilliers, *NEPAD's Peer Review Mechanism*, Institute for Security Studies. Issue Paper 64, November 2002. p. 3.
- 192 For more information on these five stages see: R Herbert, Becoming My Brother's Keeper, *E-Africa: The Electronic Journal of Governance and Innovation*, South African Institute of International Affairs, October 2003, p. 7.
- 193 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, op cit, p. 11.
- 194 *Business Day*, 30 June 2003.
- 195 Insights of Prof. W Breytenbach, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch.
- 196 Arthur, op cit, p.17.
- 197 *Business Day*, 1 April 2003.
- 198 *Business Day*, 11 March 2003.
- 199 Herbert, 2003, op cit, p. 8.
- 200 *Business Day*, 11 March 2003.
- 201 Herbert, 2003, op cit, p. 9.
- 202 Diescho, op cit, p. 19.
- 203 Ibid.
- 204 H Zhang, Across the wall: Sino-African political cooperations towards the 21st century, *Africa Insight* 31(2), 2001, p. 34.
- 205 The question was phrased as follows: We would like to know your reaction to each of

the economic blocs mentioned in the statement: The following economic blocs can be relied on to support the economic revival of the African continent. Respondents were asked whether they strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; or strongly disagree.

- 206 The table was compiled by ranking the items according to the mean values calculated per country.
- 207 Insights provided by Scarlett Cornelissen, Department Political Science, University of Stellenbosch.
- 208 Ibid.
- 209 *Cape Times*, 4 June 2003.
- 210 *Cape Times*, 8 July 2003.
- 211 *Business Day*, 8 July 2003.
- 212 *Cape Times*, 8 July 2003.
- 213 See S Cornelissen and I Taylor, The political economy of China and Japan's relationship with Africa: A comparative perspective, *Pacific Affairs* 13(4), 2000, pp. 615-633; and S Cornelissen, (forthcoming), Japan-Africa relations: patterns and prospects, in: I Taylor and P Williams (eds) *Into Africa: External involvement in the African continent after the cold war*, Routledge, London.
- 214 Insights provided by Scarlett Cornelissen, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch.
- 215 *Cape Times*, 4 June 2003.
- 216 Hope, op cit, pp. 387-402.

## Chapter 6

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

*“We need to give NEPAD a chance to establish itself. It is time for Africa to pull up its socks and start working.”*

African Affairs Consultant Herman Hanekom,  
as cited in *Cape Times*, 14 July 2003

Since elites are those individuals that occupy positions of power and influence in both the public and private sectors, a study of African elite perceptions regarding the AU and NEPAD provides us with important information through which to interpret and evaluate the further development of the two bodies. From such attitudinal data we are able tentatively to anticipate the direction that certain policy issues will take, which policy issues could possibly receive priority over others, as well as the possible nature of public opinion surrounding such policy. Most importantly, however, we are able to ascertain whether these perceptions are in fact in line with the actions currently being taken by African leaders, using the most recent AU Summit in July 2003 and the African Economic Summit in June 2003 as points of departure for such an analysis. In so doing, we should be able to ascertain with a certain degree of accuracy where possible conflicts of interest could arise, or in which areas African leaders will realise their ambitions with relative ease. In a report of this



nature, however, the discussion can only be exploratory and cautiously interpretative, although some of these themes will be extended in articles for academic journals.

The report set out to measure elite perceptions surrounding confidence in and ownership of the AU and the NEPAD policy, whether the African elite believe NEPAD to be an elite-driven process and whether the interests of the African continent should in fact receive priority over the national interests of the respective states involved. The report also attempted to describe elite perceptions surrounding the challenges facing the African continent, obstacles to African development and the desired goals and benefits of the AU and NEPAD. It also attempted to provide an analysis of elite perceptions surrounding the neo-liberal framework upon which NEPAD is based and explores elite attitudes towards the concept of partnership as contained within the NEPAD policy document. The report concludes with a description of the extent to which the African elites believe their respective countries have the capacity to implement the NEPAD policies and whether they do in fact have confidence in the institutions responsible for drafting, implementing, propagating and funding these policies.

As mentioned in Chapter two, the countries included in the study have had varied levels of exposure to the NEPAD initiative. They are also representative of an array of political and economic climates and would, as such, display slightly different trends with regard to the strength and direction of attitudes and opinions measured by the survey. In the majority of instances, South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Kenya have displayed similar attitudinal trends, with Algeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe differing from these in a number of instances.

Some of the most interesting and relevant findings discussed in the report are highlighted below:

- The success of NEPAD and the AU depends to a large degree on the extent to which African ownership and control of the two initiatives can be created and maintained. The data presented in the study shows, however, that those countries directly involved in the drafting and implementation of the NEPAD initiative display significantly higher levels of confidence in NEPAD than those countries not directly involved. Both Uganda and Zimbabwe displayed relatively lower levels of confidence in the strategy and may, as such, view the policies associated with NEPAD with a certain degree of distrust and caution. The fact that only 17 (out of 53 African states) have

committed themselves to the African Peer Review may be indicative of the underlying sentiments among African leaders not included in the drafting of the NEPAD initiative that the interests of their respective states have not been adequately taken into account. Interestingly, two African countries that have not yet signed up for peer review are Botswana and Mauritius. Since these two countries are generally regarded as among the most democratic and better governed on the continent, their refusal to commit to peer review raises concerns regarding the credibility of NEPAD among the well-governed. Does this not perhaps suggest that such states feel they do not need NEPAD and that they will cope, as in the past, bilaterally with the outside world?

In the majority of instances, civil society support for the initiative has also been less than impressive when compared to the support expressed by their civil servant and politician counterparts. This signals the discontent expressed by civil society in the majority of African countries at their exclusion from the drafting and formulation of the NEPAD policy. In order to prevent such sentiments from hampering the credibility of the NEPAD initiative, the architects of the plan (most notably Mbeki, Wade, Bouteflika, Obasanjo and Mubarak) will have to spend an increasing amount of time selling the plan to their African counterparts, while ensuring that programmes aimed at promoting the initiative at the grassroots level are initiated.

- The success of both NEPAD and the AU rests on the extent to which a common African identity can be called upon to uplift the continent, and finds realisation in the Pan African concepts of African Unification and integration. Through the establishment of a Peace and Security Council (assisted by an African Standby Force and a Rapid Deployment Force), a Pan African Parliament and a Court of Justice, it is hoped that the continent can collectively address problems associated with civil war, corruption and poor democratic governance. Although respondents included in the survey supported the general principles of African unification and integration, only the majority of elite respondents in Senegal, Algeria and Uganda believed that the interests of the continent should receive priority over the national interests of the country.

This problem of sovereignty came to the fore at the AU Summit in Maputo, July 2003, when the Union failed to amass enough votes to ratify

the protocols that would ensure the establishment of the Peace and Security Council and the Pan African Parliament. According to Peter Fabricius (as cited in the *Cape Times*, 21 July 2003), this disappointment may largely be due to political resistance to the concept of supra-national institutions. By withholding their votes in support of such institutions, African leaders are effectively expressing reluctance to cede some of their national powers to the AU. This may also explain why only 17 countries have signed up for peer review. Failure by African leaders to address these issues of national sovereignty may prove the one factor that could hamper the establishment of the AU structures necessary to achieve its goals.

- The extent to which African leaders can reach consensus on the goals of the AU and NEPAD and prioritise these goals accordingly will undoubtedly have an impact on the successful implementation of NEPAD. As the current study has shown, issues of political stability and corruption have repeatedly been regarded as paramount by the African elite included in the survey. Matters surrounding peace and conflict resolution dominated the AU Summit in Maputo, as attention focused on the importance of regional and international peace-keeping efforts. The most recent coup in São Tomé and Príncipe, renewed fighting in Burundi, talks of US troop deployment in Liberia, requests by Ugandan parliamentarians for private military intervention against Lord's Resistance Army and Kenya's pleas for peacekeeping in Somalia have all added to the urgency with which conflict on the continent is addressed.<sup>217</sup> One can conclude that the perceptions of African elites included in the survey regarding the goals of the AU and NEPAD are in line with the agenda of African leaders and Heads of State responsible for implementing the AU and NEPAD structures aimed at peacekeeping, and that they should have the support of the African elite in so doing.

The issue of HIV/AIDS was also regarded as an important obstacle to African development by the elites included in the survey. Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter four, AIDS has received scant attention within the NEPAD document, to the disappointment of numerous civil society organisations. Delegates at the AU Summit did, however, recognise the importance of fighting the AIDS pandemic after the UN's programme on HIV/AIDS warned an audience of 40 Heads of State and senior officials that the disease has become Africa's biggest challenge. According to the agency,

approximately 1,000 adults and children were dying of AIDS every day in some of the worst affected countries in Africa, where an estimated 30 million of the 42 million infected adults worldwide live.<sup>218</sup> As a result, the Summit agreed on a declaration making AIDS the continent's "top development enemy".<sup>219</sup> It seems therefore that HIV/AIDS will receive the attention that the African elites included in the survey claim it deserves.

Unfortunately, only a minority of elite respondents included in the survey regarded the improved position of women and gender equality as important goals for the AU and NEPAD. The NEPAD document does recognise gender inequality as a development challenge, but criticisms suggest that the issue does not receive the attention that it deserves. In a bold gesture to accelerate the representation of women throughout African structures and institutions, more than half of the officials appointed to the AU commission were women. This sends a strong message that African political leadership is in fact serious about promoting gender equality on the continent.

- The eventual success of NEPAD and the AU will, however, ultimately depend on whether, once all the structures are in place, they are eventually efficiently implemented. Although NEPAD has received support from the international community – most notably through the sizeable donations made by the G8 at this year's Summit in Evian – the success of NEPAD depends on whether African governments and institutions of state do in fact possess the capacity to implement them. As captured in the notion of 'African solutions to African problems', African leaders will have only themselves to hold accountable should NEPAD fail. Following the Summit in Evian, South African President Thabo Mbeki addressed these capacity concerns and asserted that Africa may have bitten off more than it can chew. In so doing, Mbeki was attesting to the fact that African states may not (as yet) have the capacity to absorb the funds received from international donors.

In one of the most striking findings of the current study, it was reported that elite respondents in all countries surveyed except Zimbabwe believed that their countries have the capacity to implement the NEPAD policies. But when asked how much confidence they have in the institutions of state, only the majority of elites in South Africa and Uganda displayed quite a lot of confidence. This disturbing trend forces one to ask whether the

institutions responsible for drafting, implementing, propagating and funding the NEPAD policies do in fact possess the capacity to implement the policies.

The study has therefore shown that in some instances, elite perceptions regarding the AU and NEPAD are in line with the perceptions espoused by the African leaders responsible for driving the initiatives. In other instances, however, the opinions held by the African elite may hinder the credibility of the plan. Issues that will have to be addressed include democratising NEPAD so that it reflects the needs and aspirations of both civil society and smaller African countries. Here the role of business and media in the NEPAD process should not be underestimated. Issues of national sovereignty will also have to be addressed so as to ensure that the AU and NEPAD structures can be successfully put in place. Lastly, African governments will have to ensure that the institutions responsible for implementing the NEPAD policy do in fact have the capacity to do so.

The fact remains, however, that NEPAD and the AU represent bold initiatives designed ‘for Africans by Africans’ that have the potential to uplift and revive the African continent. The time has come, however, to move beyond mere rhetoric and to ensure that the principles and goals enshrined within the two bodies are successfully brought to fruition. In the words of South African President Thabo Mkebi, “the ball is now in Africa’s court”.

#### NOTES

217 *Business Day*, 21 July 2003.

218 *Cape Times*, 11 July 2003.

219 *Cape Times*, 14 July 2003.

## Bibliography

- Adedeji, A. 2002. From Lagos to NEPAD, *New Agenda*, Fourth Quarter, p. 32.
- Africa Economic Summit, 2003. Summary: Have African Governments Delivered on the Promise of the NEPAD? Durban, South Africa, 11-13 June 2003.
- Africa Institute of South Africa. *Africa at a Glance: Facts and Figures 2001/2002*, p. 38.
- African Scholars' Forum for Envisioning Africa. A focus on the New Partnership for Africa's Development, concept paper, p. 2.
- Anderson, J. 1994. *Public Policy Making: An Introduction*, 2nd ed, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston.
- Ankomah, B. 2002. African Union in danger of being stillborn, *New African*, June 2002, pp. 16-22.
- Arthur, P. *Achieving and sustaining African economic recovery through NEPAD*. Bibliographic details unknown, p. 17.
- Bond, P. 2002. Thabo Mbeki's New Partnership for Africa's Development: Breaking or shining the chains of global apartheid?, discussion paper.
- Breytenbach, W. 2002. The African Renaissance and NEPAD: Help or hinder for cooperation and integration in Africa. Paper presented at Nepru/KAF Workshop on the Monitoring of Regional Integration, Windhoek, 1 June 2002, p. 5.
- Brink, C. 2002. Measuring political risk as risks to foreign investment : A computer-assisted model for analysing and managing political risk. Phd dissertation, University of Stellenbosch, p. 119.
- Campbell, H. 2003. *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The exhaustion of the patriarchal model of liberation*, David Philip, Cape Town.
- Chabal, P. 2001. Africa in the age of globalisation, *African Security Review* 10(2).
- Chabal, P. 1992. *Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation*, Macmillan Press, London, p. 5.
- Chabal, R. 2002. The quest for good government and development in Africa: Is NEPAD the answer?, *International Affairs* 78(3), pp. 445-462.
- Cilliers, J. 2001. Towards the African Union, *African Security Review* 10(2).

- Cilliers, J. 2002. *NEPAD's Peer Review Mechanism*, Institute for Security Studies, Issue Paper 64, November 2002, p. 3.
- Cornelissen, S. (forthcoming). Japan-Africa relations: patterns and prospects, in: I Taylor and P Williams (eds), *Into Africa: External Involvement in the African Continent after the cold war*, Routledge, London.
- Cornelissen, S. and Taylor, I. 2000. The political economy of China and Japan's relationship with Africa: A comparative perspective, *Pacific Affairs*, 13(4), pp. 615-633.
- Cornwell, R. 2002. A New Partnership for Africa's Development, *African Security Review* 11(1), p. 91.
- De Waal, A. 2002. What's new in the 'New Partnership for Africa's Development'?, *International Affairs* 78(3), pp. 465, 468.
- Diescho, J. 2002. *Understanding the NEPAD*, Namibia Institute for Democracy in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 19, 35, 59.
- Domke, P., Lagos, M., Capointe, M., Meade, M. and Xenos, M. 2000. Elite messages and source cues: Moving beyond partisanship, *Political Communication* 17, pp. 395-402.
- Drew et al, 2000. Gendering elites: Economic and political leadership in 27 industrialised societies. Ed, M Vianello and G Moore, MacMillan Press Ltd, p. 6.
- Dupree, L. and Ogunsanya, K. 2003. *Mainstreaming women into NEPAD: Invisible Progress*. Peace and Governance Programme. Briefing Paper No. 8.
- Englebert, P. 2000. *State Legitimacy and Development in Africa*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp. 27-31, 42.
- Feldman, S. 1988. Structure and consistency in public opinion: The role of core beliefs and values, *American Journal of Political Science* 32(1), p. 418.
- Field, G. et al. 1990. A new elite framework for political sociology, *Revue Européenne de Sociologie Sociale* 28(1), p. 153.
- Gelb, S. 2002. NEPAD: Opportunities and challenges, in: Gibb, S., Hughes, T., Mills, G. and Vaahtoranta, T. (eds.), *Charting A New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative*. The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, pp. 23, 25, 28.
- Gibb, S. 2002. Globalisation and African economic recovery: Compatibility or contradiction, in: Gibb, S., Hughes, T., Mills, G. and Vaahtoranta, T. (eds), *Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative*. The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg.

- Guma, X. 2002. Economic recovery in Africa, regional integration and good governance, in: Gibb, S. Hughes, T. Mills, G. and Vaahtoranta, T (eds), *Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative*. The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, p. 55.
- Herbert, R. 2003. Becoming my brother's keeper, *E-Africa: Electronic Journal of Governance and Innovation*, SAIIA, October 2003, pp. 7-9.
- Herbert, R. 2002. *Implementing NEPAD: A critical assessment*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, p. 12.
- Herrera, R. 1996. Understanding the language of politics: A study of elites and masses, *Political Science Quarterly* 111(4).
- Higley, J. and Gunther, R. 1992. *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 8.
- Higley, J. and Moore, G. 1981. Elite integration in stable democracies: A reconsideration, *European Sociological Review* 7(1).
- Higley, J. et al. 1976. *Elite Structure and Ideology*, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 17.
- Higley, J. and Pakulski, J. 2000. Elite theory and research in post-communist Societies, in: Fretzel-Zagorska, K. and Wasilewski, J. (eds) *The Second Generation of Democratic Elites in Central and Eastern Europe*, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, pp. 31, 43.
- Hope, K.R. 2002. From crisis to renewal: Towards a successful implementation of the NEPAD, *African Affairs* 101, pp. 387-402.
- IDASA. 2002. Issue briefing 38, 9 September 2002.
- Johnson, J. 1991. Aid and good governance in Africa, *The Round Table* 320, p 396.
- Kabemba, C. 2002. The AU and NEPAD, *Inside AISA* 4, August 2002, p. 2.
- Keller, E.J. 1993. Towards a New African Order?, *Africa Insight*, 23(3), p. 126.
- Marger, M. 1981. *Elites and Masses: An introduction to political sociology*, D. Van Nostrand Company, New York, pp. 29, 78.
- McAllister, I. 1991. Party elites, voters and political attitudes: Testing three explanations for mass elite-differences, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* XXIV(2).
- McAuslan, P. 1996. Good governance and aid in Africa, *Journal of African Law* 40(2).
- McDonough, P. 1981. *Power and Ideology in Brazil*, Princeton University, Princeton.



- Mills, G. and Oppenheimer, 2002. Making Africa succeed, in: Gibb, S., Hughes, T., Mills, G. and Vaahtoranta, T. (eds), *Charting A New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, pp. 17, 92.
- Mkandawire, Thandika and Soludo, C. 1999. *Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa.
- Moyser, G. and Wagstaff, M. (eds). 1987. *Research Methods for Elite Studies*, Allen & Unwin, London, p. 30.
- Mutharika, B. 1995. *One Africa, One destiny: Towards Democracy, Good Governance and Development*, Sapes, Harare, p. 116.
- Nagan, W.P. 2002. Post conflict governance: Preventing future conflict and ensuring development, in: Gibb, S., Hughes, T., Mills, G. and Vaahtoranta, T. (eds), *Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative*, SAIIA, Johannesburg.
- Ohiorhenuan, J. 2002. NEPAD and the dialectics of African underdevelopment, *New Agenda* 7, p. 9.
- Olofi, I.O. 2002. NEPAD and globalisation: Matters arising. Paper presented at the workshop of Studies of development in the era of globalisation, Dalhousie University, Canada, pp. 4, 7.
- Onimode, B. 1988. *A Political Economy of the African Crisis*, Zed Books, London.
- Pagani, F. 2002. Peer Review as a tool for cooperation and change, *African Security Review*, 11(2), p. 16.
- Page, B. and Shapiro R.. 1983. What moves public opinion? *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77(1).
- Pahad, A. 2002. The New Partnership for African Development, in: Gibb, S., Hughes, T., Mills, G. and Vaahtoranta, T. (eds), *Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, p. 3.
- Putman, R. 1976. *The Comparative Study of Elites*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J; Prentice Hall, pp. 27, 32, 93.
- Report of the Renaissance South Africa Outreach Programme, Continental Experts Meeting on the NEPAD and the AU, *New Agenda*, Fourth Quarter 2002, p. 133.
- Sandbrook, R. 1985. *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

- SAIIA. 2003. *E-Africa: Electronic Journal of Governance and Innovation*, June 2003.
- Spicer, M. 2002. Business and NEPAD/NAI: Charting a new course together, in: Gibb, S., Hughes, T., Mills, G. and Vaahtoranta, T. (eds), *Charting a New Course: Globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, pp. 108-109.
- Taylor, I. and Nel, P. 2002. 'New Africa', globalisation and the confines of elite reformism: Getting the rhetoric right, getting the strategy wrong, *Third World Quarterly* 23(1), pp. 163-180.
- UN Development Programme. 2002. *Human Development Report*.
- UN Economic Commission for Africa. 2002. The African Peer Review Mechanism: Process and procedures, *African Security Review* 11(4), pp. 7-11.
- Vale, P. and Maseko, S. 1998. South Africa and the African Renaissance, *International Affairs*, 74 (2), p. 271.
- Van der Westhuizen, J. 2002. Selling NEPAD after 9/11: Can global security be linked to global welfare? Paper prepared for Studies of Development in an Era of Globalisation, research workshop, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, 9-10 August 2002.
- Van Vuuren, W. 1994. Transition politics and democracy as good governance, *Africanus* 24(1).
- Wasilewski, J. 2000. Polish post-transitional elite, in: Frentzel-Zagórska, K. and Wasilewski, J. (eds) *The Second Generation of Democratic Elites in Central and Eastern Europe*, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, p. 199.
- "We do not accept NEPAD! Africa is not for sale". 2002. Declaration issued by civil society organisations which met in Port Shepstone, Kwazulu-Natal, on 4-8 July, *Global Dialogue*, 7(2), July 2002.
- Welsh, W. 1979. *Leaders and Elites*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, USA, p. 22.
- Wesolowski, W. 2000. Theoretical aspects of elite research in post-communist Societies, in Frentzel-Zagórska, K. and Wasilewski, J. (eds) *The Second Generation of Democratic Elites in Central and Eastern Europe*, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, p. 18.
- World Bank. 2003. *World Development Report, 2003*, p. 3.
- Zhang, H. 2001. Across the wall: Sino-African political cooperations towards the 21st century, *Africa Insight* 31 (2), p. 34; *Cape Times*, 4 June 2003.

## NEWSPAPERS

*Business Day*, 1 April 2003  
*Business Day*, 10 July 2003  
*Business Day*, 11 March 2003  
*Business Day*, 14 February 2003  
*Business Day*, 14 July 2003  
*Business Day*, 19 September 2002  
*Business Day*, 21 July 2003  
*Business Day*, 28 March 2003  
*Business Day*, 30 June 2003  
*Business Day*, 7 July, 2003  
*Business Day*, 8 July 2003  
*Business Day*, 11 March 2003

*Cape Argus*, 10 October 2003

*Cape Times*, 11 July 2003  
*Cape Times*, 14 July 2003  
*Cape Times*, 24 March 2003  
*Cape Times*, 4 June 2003  
*Cape Times*, 8 July 2003  
*Cape Times*, 8 July 2003  
*Cape Times*, 9 June 2003

*Die Burger*, 11 March 2003

*Mail and Guardian*, 18 July 2003

## WEBSITES

[www.ipif.org/papers/NEPAD/index\\_body.html](http://www.ipif.org/papers/NEPAD/index_body.html)  
[www.worldbank.org/aids-econ](http://www.worldbank.org/aids-econ)  
[www.unaids.org](http://www.unaids.org)  
[News24.com](http://News24.com)  
[www.au2002.gov.za/doca/key\\_oau/au\\_act.htm](http://www.au2002.gov.za/doca/key_oau/au_act.htm)  
[www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2003/pfs2003.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2003/pfs2003.pdf)  
[www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

[www.unaids.org](http://www.unaids.org)  
[www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/content/](http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/content/)  
[www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

## List of abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CBO	Community-based organisation
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DA	Democratic Alliance
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
FLN	<i>Front de Libération</i>
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNP	Gross national product
FDI	Foreign direct investment
KANU	Kenya African National Union
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MAP	Millennium Africa Recovery Plan
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NNP	New National Party
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
SADC	South African Development Community
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front