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CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD'S LARGEST MUSLIM COUNTRY

JOKO WIDODO BECOMES INDONESIA'S SEVENTH PRESIDENT

Jan Woischnik

On 9 July 2014, the third direct presidential elections since the end of the Suharto era in 1998 took place in the world's fourth most populous country. Over 190 million voters were called upon to determine the succession to the departing President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who was barred from standing again after two terms in office. In Indonesia, the President combines the posts of Head of Government and Head of State. On 22 July, the KPU (General Elections Commission), which had been responsible for running the elections, announced the official final results: Joko Widodo ("Jokowi"), former Governor of the capital Jakarta, and his running mate Jusuf Kalla gained 53.15 per cent of the votes, an outright election victory. Their rival pairing, former General Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Hatta Rajasa, for their part, gained 46.85 per cent of the votes. The turnout was just under 71 per cent. The results confirmed those of the preceding parliamentary elections of 9 April 2014, in which Jokowi's party PDI-P, which had previously been in opposition, had won the highest vote with 18.95 per cent. However, the right to nominate a presidential candidate required at least a quarter of the votes, which meant that coalition negotiations were required on all sides.

Despite the clear winning margin of 6.3 per cent of the votes, corresponding to some 8.4 million voters, Prabowo has so far refused to acknowledge his defeat and congratulate Jokowi. On election day, he initially requested people to wait for the final results to be announced on 22 July.

President SBY, for his part, requested both camps to abstain from holding public victory celebrations until the announcement of the official final results. The two camps only heeded this request to a limited extent. But even after the results had become official, Prabowo was not ready to congratulate the election winner. Instead, quoting figures from some unreliable and totally unknown polling organisations, he maintained that it was he who had won the election. He stated that as the KPU had published “deviating” figures, this indicated that there must have been some “election fraud” and that he was therefore “withdrawing from the election process” – whatever that may mean. On 25 July, Prabowo, represented by a team of 95 lawyers, took an appeal against the election results to the Constitutional Court of Indonesia, providing several thousand pages of evidence and some witness statements that were obviously fabricated in part.



Joko Widodo, “Jokowi”, former Governor of Jakarta, is Indonesia’s new President. He is known to be down-to-earth and incorruptible and especially popular among young people. | Source: Øystein Solvang, NHD-INFO, flickr ©.

On 21 August, the Constitutional Court pronounced its unanimous non-appealable ruling, rejecting Prabowo’s claim. As fate would have it, this took place precisely 16 years after the former general had been given a dishonourable discharge from the military. The mood in Jakarta was tense and nervous. Many feared outbreaks of violence and chaos as happened in 1998, when the Suharto regime was toppled by democracy activists. Prabowo followers had

been demonstrating in front of the court building since the beginning of the court proceedings on 6 August, setting car tires on fire and showing their willingness to take violent action. In a statement issued through a lawyer, Prabowo said that “no responsibility could be accepted” for any violent acts by disappointed Prabowo followers. They would need to let off steam somehow, and “were allowed to do so in a democracy, where everything was permitted, after all”. The chairman of the Jakarta district association of Prabowo’s party GERINDRA threatened to kidnap the head of the electoral commission. The well-known TV channel Metro TV, whose owner Surya Paloh had joined the Jokowi camp with his party NasDem, “needed to be put to the torch” according to voices from Prabowo’s followers. There were rumours that foreign or international institutions such as the well-respected Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) could become targets of the outraged mob. Consequently, the security forces were out in large numbers in Jakarta on 21 August. 51,000 members of the national police force were on the streets, and the military bolstered their presence with 32,000 soldiers. Not once did Prabowo appeal for calm among his followers. In view of this behaviour on the part of the election loser, what would have happened to democracy in Indonesia had he won the presidential elections does not bear thinking about.

A NEW ERA IN INDONESIA

Now that the Constitutional Court has confirmed the election results, Jokowi will take office on 20 October 2014. The President-elect, whose four-party coalition will need to rely on support from other parties, stands for a protectionist economic policy, the fight against corruption, reforms in the areas of the rule of law and bureaucracy, as well as demands for mental and moral change. However, Jokowi’s victory can be seen above all as approval of him as a person and less of the party coalition supporting him, let alone its agenda. The people had a choice between two totally different personalities: on the one hand ex-military Prabowo Subianto, a man considered to be impulsive and choleric, who had also been accused of human rights violations, and on the other hand the highflyer Jokowi, who exhibits integrity and the common touch. The latter has no

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military history, does not belong to one of the typical political dynasties and is therefore something of an antitype of Indonesian politics. It is consequently appropriate to speak of a new era. For the first time, the country will be led by a man who does not come from the oligarchy, but has worked his way up within the democratic system. This fact will also be noted in other countries of the region.



Logistical masterpiece: Parliamentary elections in April 2014 were held on the national, regional and community level. Altogether more than 19,000 candidates entered the elections. | Source: Sarah Tzinieris, flickr ©¹.

With this election, Indonesia has continued its democratic success story, which has already extended over 16 years, even though the election process was somewhat less smooth than usual because of Prabowo. But there were also many other differences this time, as there had been some unrest simmering in politics and society for a while. Joko Widodo's election victory is more than a regular changing of the guard involving him taking over from the incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who has engineered economic progress above all over the last ten years in this regionally and internationally up-and-coming G20 country. The 53-year-old Jokowi and his ascent are, in fact, an expression of a longing for a totally renewed political culture, far removed from corruption, patronage, nepotism, despotism and abuse of power. One will have to wait and see whether the hopes for fundamental political and social change and

the solving of socio-economic problems in the country many Indonesians attach to the election victory will materialise. Jokowi's lack of a solid power base in the governing party and in the national parliament, sketchy draft policies and the chronically inefficient bureaucracy represent the greatest challenges.

TREND FROM THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS CONFIRMED

Jokowi's party, which is considered both left-leaning liberal and nationalist, had already won the parliamentary elections after previously having been in opposition. By comparison with the previous elections in 2009, the party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of former President and Founding Father Sukarno, increased its votes by over five percentage points to 18.95 and therefore represents the new strongest force in the national parliament. As has been the case all along in Indonesia, there were numerous parties contesting the elections, ten of which managed to clear the 3.5 per cent hurdle. Prabowo's party, the nationalist GERINDRA, was only founded in 2008 and landed in third place in April. It gained nearly twelve per cent of the votes, an improvement of over seven per cent compared to 2009 (4.46 per cent).

The fact that the parliamentary elections proceeded without any significant problems at national, regional and local level can be seen as a credit to the election organisers and the voters. Transporting ballot papers, documents and ballot boxes to polling stations to all corners of the huge archipelago – over 6,000 of the 17,000 islands making up Indonesia are inhabited – was a logistical tour de force. Not to mention that local and provincial elections took place at the same time. All in all, voting for 523 representative bodies at the different levels took place in 545,000 polling stations. Over 19,000 candidates vied for the various seats. Over four million election helpers were involved in counting the resulting 750 million ballot papers, which came in 2,450 different formats.

Table 1

**Results of the parliamentary elections in Indonesia,
1999 to 2014 (in per cent)**

		2014	2009	2004	1999
Nationalist block	PDI-P	18.95	14.03	18.53	33.74
	GOLKAR	14.75	14.45	21.58	22.44
	GERINDRA	11.81	4.46	—	—
	PD	10.19	20.85	7.45	—
	NasDem	6.72	—	—	—
	HANURA	5.26	3.77	—	—
Islamist block	PKB	9.04	4.94	10.57	12.61
	PAN	7.59	6.01	6.44	7.12
	PKS	6.79	7.88	7.34	1.36
	PPP	6.53	5.32	8.15	10.71

PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan
(Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle)

GOLKAR Partai Golongan Karya
(Party of the Functional Groups)

GERINDRA Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya
(Great Indonesia Movement Party)

PD Partai Demokrat
(Democratic Party)

NasDem Partai Nasional Demokrat
(NasDem Party)

HANURA Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat
(The People’s Conscience Party)

PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
(National Awakening Party)

PAN Partai Amanat Nasional
(The National Mandate Party)

PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
(Prosperous Justice Party)

PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
(The United Development Party)


Sources: Iggried Diwi Wedhaswary, “PDI-P Pemenang Pemilu Legislatif 2014”, 10 May 2014, Kompas, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/05/10/0014480/PDI-P> (accessed 7 Oct 2014); General Election Commission, “BAB II. HASIL PEMILU 2009 (DPR-RI)”, http://kpu.go.id/dmdocuments/angka_26_30.pdf (accessed 7 Oct 2014); People’s Representative Council, <http://dpr.go.id/id/tentang-dpr/fraksi> (accessed 7 Oct 2014); Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Leo Suryadinata, *Emerging Democracy in Indonesia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005, 14, 22.



It was a tremendous challenge to distribute the ballots, documents and ballot boxes to the furthest corner of the huge archipelago in time. In remote areas, donkeys carried the ballot boxes to the counting stations. | Source: © Seno, ANTARA.

Fig. 1

Results from the Presidential Elections of 9 July 2014



Candidate	Partner	Party	Votes	Per cent
Joko Widodo	Jusuf Kalla	PDI-P	70,997,833	53.15
Prabowo Subianto	Hatta Rasaja	GERINDRA	62,576,444	46.85

Source: General Election Commission, http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/PPWP_-_Nasional_Rekapitulasi_2014_-_New_-_Final_2014_07_22.pdf (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

ANALYSIS OF JOKO WIDODO’S ELECTION VICTORY

Traditionally, individuals play a far larger role in Indonesian politics than parties and their agendas. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s victory in 2004 was above all due to the fact that he was able to portray himself successfully as a person untainted by the corruption scandals characterising the established political class. During the 2014 presidential elections, the focus on individuals in determining voter behaviour reached a new peak as Jokowi and Prabowo presented the electorate with a choice between two extremely different candidates.

What prevailed from an Indonesian perspective were the honesty, humility and restraint of an ordinary Muslim from the main island of Java. Jokowi's love of heavy metal and red-and-blue checked shirts have made him a favourite, particularly among the younger population. Since the former furniture trader from Surakarta became Governor of Jakarta in 2012, he has enjoyed a meteoric rise to power, turning into the media darling of Indonesian politics within a few months. For a long time, he only made veiled statements about potentially standing for president and referred to the leader of the PDI-P party Megawati Sukarnoputri and her decision-making powers. The daughter of the country's Founding Father Sukarno, who had been President herself from 2001 to 2004, became convinced by Jokowi's high approval ratings in all surveys. She nominated him as her party's leading candidate shortly before the parliamentary elections.

Since Jokowi became Governor of Jakarta in 2012, he rose into the media darling of Indonesian politics within a few months.

On the opposite side was Prabowo Subianto, former high-ranking military man and former son-in-law of the long-time Head of State Suharto. Prabowo has been accused of human rights violations in connection with the disappearances of students in the 1998 unrests as well as his military activities in East Timor. On 21 August 1998, he was given a dishonourable discharge from the army. Although his dubious past kept coming up during the election campaign, it did not diminish his popularity among 46 per cent of the voters. As a former general, he found it easy to portray himself as a decisive and forceful leader. He also fascinated many Indonesians because the incumbent President Yudhoyono was associated with poor decision-making and indecisiveness during his second term in office. Critics complain that while he enhanced the country's economic strength – GDP grew by an average of five to six per cent under his government – he very much neglected key political reforms such as the enforcement of legally guaranteed rights for religious minorities.

IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTION: WILD HAGGLING ABOUT POWER OPTIONS, COALITION PARTNERS AND THE POST OF VICE-PRESIDENT

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Since 2004, the people of Indonesia have chosen their President and Members of Parliament in direct elections. To be able to put forward a candidate for the highest office of state, a party or grouping needs to have gained 20 per cent of the seats or 25 per cent of the votes in the preceding parliamentary elections. This is not an easy hurdle to clear and virtually impossible in the Indonesian multi-party system without some clever coalition building. Also, the parties cannot readily be divided into opposing left-wing and right-wing camps. Instead, they tend to be either nationalist or religious in orientation, with the parties usually forming a nationalist block on one side and an Islamist block on the other, although the differences between these two camps are becoming increasingly smaller as well. In any case, it is very rare for a party to have a specific orientation in terms of policy or to show clear allegiance to a particular ideology. This is why elections are determined not so much by the party's positions on policy matters but rather by the candidates' popularity.

Accordingly, the outcome of the coalition negotiations after the announcement of the parliamentary election results was by no means certain. Within a few days, media mogul Surya Paloh announced his support for Jokowi's candidacy. Paloh's NasDem Party attracted 6.8 per cent of the votes. This meant that Jokowi's nomination was already constitutionally secured at this early stage. During the following few weeks, the moderate Islamist PKB as well as HANURA, a party led by former Commander of the Armed Forces Wiranto, declared their support for Jokowi as well.

Traditionally, Indonesia's political culture is characterised strongly by negotiating processes and concessions in political power games. All the more remarkable, therefore, that neither NasDem nor PKB or HANURA demanded an obvious quid pro quo for their support from Jokowi, such as the office of Vice President. In the end, this post went to Jusuf Kalla. The entrepreneur, veteran politician and former leader of the GOLKAR party is very well respected

among the people and formerly made a crucial contribution to the successful peace negotiations in the now semi-autonomous province of Aceh in the west of the country. He is the Chairman of the Indonesian Red Cross and heavily involved in various social causes. In addition, he enjoys considerable political support in his home province of Sulawesi as well as on Java. Furthermore, he had proved himself a forceful political strategist during his time as Vice President to SBY in the President's first term in office from 2004 to 2009. His appointment also makes sense because, although the HANURA and PKB parties had by then declared their support for Jokowi, it was clear that the coalition around Jokowi would only comprise 207 of 560 seats and therefore only some 40 per cent of the MPs in the national parliament.



Respected Vice-President: Businessman and long-time politician Jusuf Kalla is highly regarded by the people and is socially engaged. He is supposed to match President Jokowi's lack of experience at the national level. | Source: Sebastian Müller, flickr ©①②.

Seeing that the opposition parties were expected to make up the majority in the national parliament, another point in Kalla's favour was that he has the necessary negotiating skills and powers of persuasion to create the required majorities for the policies of a potential Jokowi government. It was precisely these characteristics, however, that made some figures within the PDI-P doubt Kalla's suitability as Jokowi's right-hand man. Whether their fears will be substantiated, namely that he could become the de facto

President due to his wealth of experience, personal charisma and cross-party popularity, remains to be seen. At first glance, Kalla appears to be a smart choice, as he can compensate for Jokowi's structural deficits resulting from his lack of experience at a national level.

The boundaries between parties within the Indonesian party spectrum have become increasingly blurred. Ideological conviction and clear policy orientation tend to dwindle.

Prabowo, for his part, had already declared a coalition with the Islamist parties PPP, PKS and PAN in early May, although he and his party GERINDRA had made waves in the past with strongly nationalist statements. The boundaries between more nationalist and more religious parties within the Indonesian party spectrum have become increasingly blurred over recent years. Also, ideological conviction and clear policy orientation tend to dwindle as political power comes closer within reach. As a consequence, three of the four parties of the Islamist block, which had already formed part of the governing coalition under Yudhoyono, promised him their support. These coalition negotiations did, however, not run entirely smoothly either. While the then Chairman of the PPP Suryadharma Ali, for instance, has advocated a coalition between his party and Prabowo from the start, the party grassroots have been voicing sympathy for Jokowi for quite some time. Whether the PPP will join his camp after all once he has taken office still remains unclear.

Prabowo also brought on board a politician with vast experience at national level as his running mate. Hatta Rajasa, whose last post was that of Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, which made him one of the key figures in Yudhoyono's cabinet, is the leader of the moderate Islamist party PAN and can look back on 13 years of governmental responsibility in various roles. He is considered a knowledgeable economics expert and proved his skills in that field when he spoke out against the nationalisation of the mining sector proposed by Prabowo during the election campaign, pointing out that there were long-term contracts with international cooperation partners and companies involved, whose cancellation could have legal repercussions for Indonesia.

PRE-ELECTION “HORSE TRADING”

The fact that there would be a choice between just two tickets in the end was by no means a foregone conclusion. GOLKAR, Suharto’s proud former governing party and mainstay of his authoritarian rule, emerged from the parliamentary elections as the second strongest force with close to 15 per cent, and the demeanour of party leader Aburizal Bakrie, one of the richest men in the country, showed that he was well aware of the power this gave the party. His personal approval rating, however, was never particularly high; the former minister is a controversial figure, both within his party and in public. Initially, Bakrie made overtures to the governing Partai Demokrat (PD) and tried to bring PD politician Pramono Eddie Wibowo on board as his running mate to be able to stand for president himself. When the PD rebuffed him and decided to remain neutral – at least for the time being – it became clear that GOLKAR would not put forward a candidate of its own for the first time ever. Bakrie subsequently approached the PDI-P and offered his services as running mate for Jokowi. Observers reported, however, that he had demanded too many political and personal concessions from party leader Megawati in return for his support, with the result that she refused to include him in her coalition considerations.

In the end, Bakrie scored in his dealings with GERINDRA. In the event of his election victory, Prabowo promised him a *menteri utama*, a type of coordinating ministerial office. This was significant insofar as support from Bakrie and GOLKAR would give Prabowo’s coalition a nominal 49 per cent of parliamentary seats and thereby the parliamentary majority. But Bakrie’s search for coalition partners proved too much for the GOLKAR members in spite of their past willingness to engage in party political flexibility. Party-internal disputes ensued, culminating in some prominent GOLKAR politicians distancing themselves from their chairman and his support for Prabowo and promoting Jokowi instead. Once Jusuf Kalla, former GOLKAR chairman and still a party icon, was confirmed as Jokowi’s running mate, the party split was complete. Discussions have continued over whether GOLKAR might also join Jokowi’s camp once he has taken office. The party is planning to hold a special

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party conference at the beginning of 2015, where Bakrie could be deposed as party chairman. This would clear the way for GOLKAR to join the Jokowi camp.

In view of the low approval ratings, Yudhoyono decided against putting forward a Partai Demokrat presidential candidate.

The departing right-leaning liberal and nationalist governing party PD has also played a special role. Founded by Yudhoyono, the party has been in government since 2004 and gained a landslide victory in the 2009 elections after a first successful term. Five years later, however, it became the main election loser, dropping down to just below ten per cent due to massive corruption scandals involving people from Yudhoyono's inner circle. In spite of an elaborately staged internal party convention to select a leading candidate, Yudhoyono decided against the party putting forward a presidential candidate of its own in view of the low approval ratings. Neither was he willing to publicly support one of the two camps until the end, which is why the PD did not promote either of the two camps until very shortly before election day. At the last second, it voiced its support for the Prabowo camp, without, however, SBY himself having declared his approval. Whether the PD will remain in opposition during the day-to-day parliamentary activities now that Prabowo has lost the election remains to be seen. Its 61 MPs could provide valuable support to future Head of Government Jokowi. The only thing that may hinder this would be the existing close personal links with the Prabowo camp, as one of Yudhoyono's sons is married to the daughter of Vice President candidate Hatta Rajasa.

ISLAM AS A FACTOR IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world; 88 per cent of its some 250 million inhabitants are avowed Muslims. Although it is not an Islamic state in terms of its constitution, the religion of Islam, its values and morality as well as some specific legal provisions play no small role in politics, for instance in the form of regional bylaws. And since the democratic transition of 1998 referred to as *reformasi* and the founding of numerous parties, Islamic parties have tipped the intricate balance in the Indonesian political landscape in many elections. This also applied to the 2014 election campaign, during which both presidential

candidates made efforts to secure the support of the various parties of the Islamic block, such as the PKS, PPP, PAN and PKB.

But Islam exerts its influence even more strongly in society itself, particularly in West Java, the most heavily populated part of the country, which frequently determines the election outcome. The presidential candidates correspondingly made great efforts to increase approval from the conservative Muslim voter groups. Jokowi, who is frequently labelled an *abangan*, i.e. a non-orthodox Muslim, made a point of meeting with functionaries of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), with 40 million members the country's largest Muslim mass organisation, shortly after the parliamentary elections. The talks appeared to pay off within a short space of time when the moderate Muslim party PKB, which has close links to the NU, declared its support for Jokowi. And the decision in favour of Jusuf Kalla as running mate was probably made to a large extent with an eye to the desirable effect of his appeal to devout voters. Kalla is involved in a number of Islamic associations, acting as head of the Indonesian Mosque Association, for instance, and he is held in high esteem, particularly by devout Muslims in rural areas.

Prabowo also had members of the Muslim mass organisation NU in mind when he nominated Mahfud MD, who had himself been considered a potential presidential candidate of the PKB or Jokowi's running mate for a long time, his campaign manager. As a former Chief Justice at the Constitutional Court, Defense Minister and MP, Mahfud MD is held in high esteem by many Indonesian Muslims. Prabowo also made efforts to win Muslim votes by bringing the other Muslim parties PAN, PPP and PKS into his coalition. He was not deterred in these efforts by the fact that he and his party GERINDRA were known more for their nationalism than for their commitment to religious values. When political influence and genuine opportunities to gain power are at stake, the ideological and policy differences between the parties, which are not large in any case, frequently become irrelevant altogether. (Even Jokowi, who had advocated measures to deal with the human rights violations perpetrated by the Indonesian military in the past, made no objection when HANURA, the party of former

Prabowo also efforts to win Muslim votes by bringing the other Muslim parties PAN, PPP and PKS into his coalition.

Commander of the Armed Forces Wiranto, announced its support for the presidential hopeful.)

The same political ambition explains why Prabowo and Hatta did not distance themselves explicitly from the hardliners of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and other vigilante groups. They reckoned that it was not sensible to miss out on the partly considerable political and social influence of such groupings, even if they kept resorting to violence. While neither Prabowo nor Hatta adopted the fundamentalist tendencies of these groups, they were not prepared to contemplate relinquishing potential votes from this milieu.



Jokowi wants to fight the social inequality in the country with comprehensive reforms. Among other things, he plans to raise the minimum wage and to restrict imports. As a result, there could be improvements, for example, in the local food industry. | Source: Joe Coyle, flickr ©①⑤.

JOKO WIDODO'S POLITICAL AGENDA: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM, CONTINUITY IN FOREIGN POLICY, AND MENTAL REVOLUTION

The election campaign centered on the different personalities of the presidential candidates. Discussions about issues, such as the economy and development, were few and far between and mostly superficial. Jokowi, whose party, the PDI-P, is considered both moderately left-wing and nationalist, did not deny that he considered the economic policies of his predecessor Yudhoyono as overly

“neoliberal”. Critics complain that although the departing Head of State had led the country into the club of the G20 states, he had also considerably widened the gap between rich and poor. Jokowi intends to raise the minimum wage to fight this increase in social inequality.



After two terms in office, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was not allowed to stand for re-election. He led Indonesia into the G-20, but failed to deliver in terms of important reforms. | Source: Dita Alangkara, Center for International Forestry (CIFOR), flickr ④④④.

Jokowi believes further that Indonesia needs to reduce its dependence on other countries; imports of food and energy should be reduced and support provided to domestic companies. It is hoped that by 2018 no further rice and wheat imports will be required. Indonesian oil and gas companies are to be given further incentives to spur on domestic energy production. The activities of foreign companies should no longer consist primarily of the exploitation of Indonesian natural resources, but should increasingly aim at creating new jobs. That is why Jokowi intends to uphold the decision taken under Yudhoyono to prohibit the export of unprocessed raw materials. This could represent the first step towards establishing a processing and manufacturing industry to tackle one of the greatest challenges, namely the low proportion of added value in the value chain of the Indonesian economy. At first glance, all these measures appear to be protectionist in nature. However, in front of representatives of foreign investors, Jokowi stressed that he would work towards improving the investment climate

by dismantling bureaucratic obstacles. Prabowo had, by comparison, sounded far more extreme during the election campaign with statements that were protectionist and aimed against foreign countries.

State subsidies to keep petrol prices down have put a heavy burden on the national budget in recent years. Jokowi has announced his intention to gradually reduce the subsidies over five years. This would provide savings of 30 billion

In view of declining moral standards, citizenship, history, patriotism and character building should feature more strongly in the school curriculum in future.

U.S. dollars a year, which are then to flow into the improvement of the crumbling infrastructure and the construction of new roads, airports and harbours. The plans envisage the building of 2,000 kilometers of road, ten new airports and ten new seaports. In the areas of education and health, Jokowi has adhered to the fundamental concepts familiar from his past political activities. All Indonesians are to be given the opportunity of twelve years of state-funded education (*Indonesia Pintar* or "Smart Indonesia"). In view of declining moral standards, citizenship, history, patriotism and character building should feature more strongly in the school curriculum in future according to Jokowi and his election campaign team. The state should also fund healthcare, and everybody should have guaranteed access to medical services (*Indonesia Sehat* or "Healthy Indonesia"). Jokowi had already introduced free health insurance for the needy during his term as Governor of Jakarta.

The President-elect also wants to conduct reforms in the areas of the rule of law and bureaucracy, where stricter rules will apply in recruitment and where public services are to be improved. Religious intolerance is to be curbed and the protection of minorities enhanced. In addition, he advocates measures to deal with historic human rights violations as well as comprehensive efforts to come to terms with the past. Plans include investigations of the unrest in May 1998 and the disappearance of several students. Also to be covered are the events of 1965, which have not been revisited in earnest to date, when several 100,000 communists or purported communists were murdered. A Commission on Truth and Reconciliation is to take up its work to this end.

It appears that Jokowi intends to continue the foreign and security policies of his predecessor. He seems to be in favour of Indonesia playing a strong and constructive role in ASEAN and in regional and global forums. In addition, he announced that he intends to continue cooperation with institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which his rival Prabowo had intended to scale back. Moreover, Indonesia shall expand its capacities as a maritime power, a status the archipelago is predestined for according to Jokowi. His plans further include an increase in military expenditure to 1.5 per cent of GDP over the next five years. Hardly surprising in view of the likely arms race in Southeast Asia. Steps to comprehensively upgrade the armed forces had already been introduced under Yudhoyono, including the purchase of armaments from abroad (including Germany).

During the election campaign, Jokowi not only promised economic and social programs, but also promoted a mental-moral renewal. His agenda included a manifesto, which called for a "mental revolution" (*revolusi mental*) and for people to change their attitudes. He praised the numerous reforms of the last 16 years and the achievements relating to the democratic constitution including free and fair elections as well as the progress made in terms of regional autonomy and decentralisation. At the same time, he stressed that all democratic, constitutional and civil achievements since the *reformasi* would remain limited unless there were "mental reforms" taking place in people's heads. Problematic habits such as corruption, intolerance and ignoring the principles of the rule of law should no longer be tolerated. He himself would take the first step to ensure that the decision-makers in the country's political and state institutions would in future work in a reliable, responsible and incorruptible manner. A start in the right direction is to be made by appointing people to high political and public posts on the basis of competence and qualifications.

Corruption, intolerance and ignoring the rule of law should no longer be tolerated. Institutions in future must work in a reliable, responsible and incorruptible manner.

Old Wine in New Skins?

Jokowi's rise and his rather unusual CV for Indonesian circumstances does not necessarily mean that all his political recommendations, projects and plans are entirely new, let alone revolutionary. Since it gained its independence, the country has been continually veering between socialist-protectionist and free-market policy approaches. While Indonesia's Founding Father Sukarno was one of the initiators of the "Non-Aligned Movement" and pursued a socialist economic policy in areas such as land reform, his successor Suharto modelled his approach more closely on the USA and the West – at least in terms of economic policy. Under Yudhoyono, the archipelago finally became far more open to foreign investment, privatisation and free-market reforms. Jokowi's policy of a moderate curbing of foreign influences on important sectors of the economy therefore resembles more a revival of old-established ideas than a completely new political concept.

Although their personalities could not be any more different, Jokowi's and Prabowo's ideas and concepts are very similar in many respects.

Jokowi's ideas have not always shown to differ greatly from those of his opponent either. Although their personalities could not be any more different, their ideas and concepts are

very similar in many respects. Each initially tried to present himself as the legitimate heir of Founding Father Sukarno and to satisfy the people's great longing for a new national identity during the election campaign. While Jokowi's candidacy was announced close to Sukarno's place of birth to catch the headlines, Prabowo used many prestigious symbols of independence and the colours white and red typical of Sukarno and Indonesia. His proposal for solving important issues such as food and energy security was to purchase gigantic swathes of land, which would then be made available to Indonesians for their free use. All in all, his ideas on economic policy, which he refers to as *ekonomi kerakyatan* (people's economy), are not that far removed from Jokowi's. He made explicit reference to nationalist experiments of the Sukarno era, which were realised under Article 33 of the 1945 constitution. According to this, the economy is to be organised according to a cooperative principle, and the state is to manage the most important industries. The former general already made headlines during the election campaign with constant protectionist and

nationalist statements. He said that it was crucial that the influence of international companies and the exploitation of Indonesia this entailed were stopped. He also addressed the same target group as Jokowi: above all the “little people”, who are longing for significant improvements in the social, economic and political conditions after the institutional and democratic stagnation under Yudhoyono.

Where appointments are concerned, Jokowi is not using entirely new methods. Due to the sheer size of their six-party coalition, Prabowo and Hatta almost exclusively relied on stalwarts of the involved parties as well as numerous members of the security apparatus to make up their campaign team. But Jokowi, who had stressed during the campaign that he would not fill posts according to party allegiance, did include some party functionaries from the PDI-P, HANURA and PKB. At the same time, however, he brought new faces into his team, including people such as Anies Baswedan, education expert and Rector of the well-respected private Paramadina University, and Rizal Sukma, Executive Director of the CSIS think tank and one of the country’s most distinguished experts on foreign affairs and security policy. It will be interesting to see whether Jokowi will remain true to his election campaign promise and award ministerial posts not on the basis of party allegiance to reflect the party configuration in parliament but on the basis of competence. His demands for a renewal of political culture also sound familiar. Calls for greater transparency, responsibility and efforts to curb corruption are traditionally well received by the population, but at the same time they do give rise to questions of feasibility.

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Outlook: Challenges and Opportunities

Despite the victory of the political antitype Jokowi, which many had longed for, it is by no means certain that the hopes for a fundamental change in political culture and for substantial further development of Indonesian democratisation that the population has invested in the presidency will be fulfilled in all areas in the medium and long term. The period of *reformasi*, which began in 1998 after the Suharto era had come to an end, initiated far-reaching

democratisation, decentralisation and the establishment of numerous civil liberties. Many citizens believe that the positive development has stalled in recent years. Despite a few spectacular cases, the fight against corruption is not progressing sufficiently, the incomplete decentralisation is showing some downsides, and the efforts to enforce the standards of law and order are often half-hearted. Added to this is the fact that the reputation of the political class among the population is veering towards an all-time low after numerous cases of corruption and abuse of power. All these developments have played a significant part in facilitating Joko Widodo's election victory, but whether the new President will prevail in the medium and long term remains to be seen.

To be able to enforce the ambitious reforming agenda will first of all require parliamentary and party-political power. Jokowi enjoys both of these only to a limited degree. The four parties currently forming his coalition only have some 40 per cent of the seats in parliament, which means that new majorities will need to be forged for all political undertakings. Furthermore, the Prabowo coalition will be able to counter the government with projects of its own or torpedo its democratic reforming agenda. This was recently demonstrated in dramatic fashion circa four weeks before Jokowi has taken office. On 26 September, the national parliament adopted a bill that the two camps had fiercely fought over, scrapping the direct election of mayors, district chiefs and provincial governors. In future, these are to be appointed by the respective local and regional parliaments (or the parties represented in them) – as was the case during Suharto's New Order regime. Jokowi had clearly spoken out in favour of retaining direct elections, but only 135 of the 560 MPs followed his lead.

This gave Prabowo and his camp an opportunity to demonstrate their power. Direct elections had been introduced in 2004 and had generally been celebrated as an important democratic achievement of the post-*reformasi* era. During the same year, Yudhoyono was the first President to be directly elected. Jokowi has suffered a clear defeat before he has even moved into the Presidential Palace. The blame for this debacle has been attributed mainly to Yudhoyono (who was still the acting President on 26 September),

whose Partai Demokrat had also taken up a clear position against the bill before the vote. However, the party leader was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly on the day. Because there were some disagreements about questions of detail with respect to the bill, the PD MPs left the building before the vote – apparently against Yudhoyono’s instructions – handing victory to the Prabowo camp. The fear is that the existing power sharing configuration – with the Jokowi camp having a majority in the executive and the Prabowo camp the majority in the legislature – will produce similar situations in future and may even result in a further dismantling of democratic achievements, including the scrapping of the direct election of the President, without which a newcomer such as Jokowi could never have come to power. For his sake, it is therefore to be hoped that the PD in particular and GOLKAR will ultimately join his camp. President Yudhoyono from the PD has not made any clear statements on this issue lately, and GOLKAR has a special party conference coming up.

In Jusuf Kalla, a former vice-president, minister and mediator, Jokowi has the support of a smart political operator at national level. But SBY’s second term in office showed how difficult it can be to push through political projects; in his six-party coalition, he had to make great efforts to obtain approval every single time. Prabowo has already made it known that the future parliamentary opposition will block *all* (sic!) of the new government’s projects. But there will probably also be some challenges awaiting Jokowi from within his own party, the PDI-P. Party leader Megawati Sukarnoputri remains the strong woman behind the scenes, who performed the role of king-maker and was instrumental in securing his candidacy – after some considerable hesitation. Critics therefore maintain that he will only be able to exert as much power as Megawati will deem appropriate. But not much is known about her commitment to reforms.

Party leader Megawati Sukarnoputri remains the strong woman in the background, who performed the role of king-maker and was instrumental in securing Jokowi’s candidacy.

Furthermore, Jokowi is neither a board member nor chairman of an influential provincial association or some other party organisation. This lack of a power base could turn into a serious deficiency during the coming five years of his term in office. Without the absolute loyalty of his party,

unconditional support from the associations throughout the country and without political networks of any kind, pushing through his reform agenda, introducing a new political style and meeting national challenges will probably be difficult. The parliamentary elections in April showed already that the support Jokowi can expect from the PDI-P has its limits. In the run-up to the elections, analysts had expected that the party would gain at least 25 per cent of the votes, but it obtained only a fifth of the votes in the end. This was not least due to the fact that some party officials were not prepared to canvass for votes with their prominent leading candidate. The otherwise smart decision to bring Jusuf Kalla on board will not be able to make up for this power deficit either. By standing as Jokowi's running mate, he caused a split in his own party GOLKAR and no longer enjoys its unconditional support.



King-maker: The former President and current PDI-P chairwoman, Megawati Sukarnoputri, appointed Jokowi as the top candidate shortly before the parliamentary elections. She maintains great influence on policy-making. | Source: © KAS Indonesia.

Besides these challenges, Jokowi will probably first and foremost have to reinvent himself in line with his visionary ideas of a “mental revolution” of Indonesia. With its social, ethnic and political complexity and geographic fragmentation, this huge nation cannot be governed in the same way as the provincial city of Solo or the capital Jakarta. In a country of 17,000 islands spanning three time zones and including remote areas difficult to access, he will no longer be able to employ the so-called *blusukan*, unannounced

visits among the people, during which he used to learn about their problems on the ground and which made him stand out and endeared him to the people when he was Governor of Jakarta. If he cannot clearly demonstrate the same great willingness to change that he expects of the population for all to see, his credibility may suffer sooner or later.

It also remains to be seen whether Jokowi's ideas, which frequently appear sketchy, will lead to feasible concepts and can therefore contribute to improvements in the social and political situation. One of the demands he put forward in connection with his call for a mental-moral change and improvements in the education system, for instance, is that more emphasis should be placed on character building in primary schools; at the same time he announced that he wanted 80 per cent of school hours to be used to develop the pupils' character and only 20 per cent for knowledge-based subjects such as the sciences. In view of the numerous challenges in education, such as the high ratio of inadequately trained and poorly paid teachers as well as outmoded teaching methods, one has to ask whether character building is a suitable means to ensure that Indonesia will in future no longer come bottom in the ranking of 65 countries in the OECD PISA tests in the areas of reading, maths and science. Education will, in fact, take on a much greater significance in coming years, once a common market has been established in the ASEAN region in 2015, with free movement of labour and an influx of qualified employees from neighbouring states confronting the Indonesian labour market.

If Jokowi succeeds in implementing his economic plans as announced, this will also have some consequences for the cooperation with the EU and Germany. Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia rose to become one of the G20 states. For the steadily increasing middle class, who is focused on acquisition and consumption, foreign imports will play an increasingly significant role. Within the EU, Germany is Indonesia's most important trading partner. If the economic policy will be conducted along protectionist lines, a continued positive development of the bilateral trade relations may be in doubt.

Notwithstanding all these challenges, the hope remains that the *Jokowimentum* can be sustained and will result in policies that will allow Indonesia to take further important steps. Never since democratisation began in 1998 have the mood for change and the desire for a political and social renewal been as intense as they are today. The fact that close to 60 per cent of MPs were newcomers to the national parliament after the parliamentary elections in April gives some hope that the change towards a new political culture will be supported by large numbers of the political decision-makers. Indonesia is also a very young country in terms of its demography. Almost 30 per cent of voters in the parliamentary elections were under 30. Jokowi has a large following in this age group in particular. These two facts together, i.e. the young population and its support, could play an important role in ensuring that Jokowi and his ideas will determine the future of the country.

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