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KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS

25 YEARS AFTER THE FALL OF THE
BERLIN WALL – GERMANY'S INTER-
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

■ **25 Years of German-Hungarian Relations since 1989, the Year the Iron Curtain Fell**
Bence Bauer / András Hettyey

■ **Perspectives on Reunified Germany – Impressions from Poland**
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
■ **The German G7 Presidency: An Opportunity to Assume "New Responsibility" in International Politics**
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EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung has been active as a partner of German development cooperation around the world for over 50 years. Our key mission in this context is absolutely clear: to make a sustainable contribution to peace, freedom and democracy. For this reason, we are engaged in projects in over 100 countries. Moreover, we consult foreign and development policy circles with our expertise. In this respect, *KAS International Reports* have developed into an important and sought-after source of inspiration. The fact that our colleagues report from the regions they operate in and connect the analysis of political events with practical knowhow has become the journal's hallmark. The foundation is particularly proud to celebrate the 30th anniversary of *KAS International Reports* this year.

Historic highlights illustrate the extent to which international politics have changed since the first issue. In 1984, the Cold War was at its height, while at the end of the 1980s, the socialist regimes of the Eastern Bloc collapsed one after the other. This cleared the way for German reunification. In other countries, the upheaval entailed violence, manifested in a horrifying manner by the wars in the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, European integration made enormous progress in both political and geographic terms. New transport and communication technologies have furthered globalisation. However, they are also being exploited by the opponents of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. The attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in this context.


Over the years, *KAS International Reports* have consistently reflected on these diverse changes on all continents. With their contributions and from a unique angle, our authors have been able to shape the debate on matters of foreign and development policy in Germany. 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this discussion is now

more important than ever. The achievements of the last few decades, the peacebuilding influence of European integration, our civil liberties as well as our strong economy are not to be taken for granted. The preservation of our values relies on the well-being of our neighbours and a liberal international system. For this reason alone we condemn Russia's annexation of the Crimea, a violation of international law, and the redrawing of territorial borders by force. Germany bears special responsibility, not least because of its economic strength and its consolidated political situation. It is therefore not surprising that the question of our international engagement is becoming subject to more intensive discussions in the political and public arena as well as in our partner countries.

In this issue, our authors focus on the consequences of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe for German foreign policy. This goes along with a review of the tasks that have evolved for Germany on both the European and international level. In Poland, for example, the free trade union movement *Solidarność* began challenging the communist system in the early 1980s, fighting for freedom and democracy. As Bartosz T. Wieliński points out, the neighbours on the other side of the Oder-Neisse line were not unaware of those developments. Today, the relationship between Germans and Poles is more solid than ever, with some commentators even talking of a "German-Polish engine" within the European Union. Hungary's contribution to the peaceful revolution is not forgotten either, as underlined by Bence Bauer and András Hettyey. This is where the Iron Curtain opened first and permanently in 1989. In that regard, the Pan-European Picnic held at that time became a "fateful moment". It did not only accelerate the end of the GDR, but also sealed Hungary's orientation toward the West.

The changes in German foreign policy since 1989 are not only evident in retrospect. Germany's current G7 presidency is an opportunity to enter the debate about the country's increased international responsibility and to draw conclusions for the political practice. This is the topic Daniela Haarhuis examines in her contribution. Germany's G7 presidency will culminate in the summit of the Heads of State and Government in June 2015 at Schloss Elmau

in Bavaria. In the preparation of this event, Chancellor Angela Merkel has already named key questions to be covered: sustainable economic activities and quality of life, a new climate agreement as well as the post-MDG process. Moreover, in view of the threats posed to our system of values by Islamist fundamentalists and terrorists, that topic might also figure strongly on the agenda. Germany will contribute actively to this multi-faceted debate with dedication, ideas and financial commitments. Our partners are counting on it. This stance follows on logically from the past. Throughout the Cold War, Germany was a beneficiary of international security, enjoying the protection of the United States and NATO. Now the time has come to play a more active role in maintaining international security and thereby also creating opportunities for others to live in freedom and peace.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Gerhard Wahlers". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Dr. Gerhard Wahlers
Deputy Secretary General

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25 YEARS OF GERMAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS SINCE 1989, THE YEAR THE IRON CURTAIN FELL

Bence Bauer / András Hettyey

By opening its border in September 1989, Hungary demonstrated courage and humanity in support of the people seeking to escape from the GDR at the time. The chain reaction this triggered quickly sealed the fate of the German Democratic Republic, ultimately leading to German reunification as well as the expansion of European integration. With that decision by the Hungarian leadership, German-Hungarian relations experienced a peak. For a long time, the “miraculous year” of 1989 was considered the fulcrum of relations between the two countries, generating a fundamental affection for Hungary not only among Germans. 25 years on from these moving and dramatic events, it is time to take stock and put the relationship between the two countries under the spotlight – from the boundless enthusiasm during the years following the fall of the Iron Curtain to the normal everyday experience of living together within the European Union in 2014.

PRECEDING HISTORY

After the suppression of the Hungarian national uprising by Soviet troops in 1956, the communist state and party leadership around János Kádár attempted to placate the population with concessions and small gifts,¹ an approach subsequently referred to as “Goulash Communism”. This included a limited amount of private enterprise, relative modest prosperity, a comparatively good food supply, combined with opportunities to enjoy Western entertainment and leisure pursuits. These circumstances clearly set Hungary apart from the other states of the Warsaw Pact



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1 | Cf. György Dalos, *Der Vorhang geht auf*, Munich, 2009, 64.

and produced a folklore centered on CP General Secretary János Kádár. But they should not detract from the fact that the communist rulers continued to perceive the experience of the Hungarian uprising as a threat. They wanted to prevent a repetition at all cost. In their view, offering benefits to the population was a suitable means. The price they had to pay was ever-increasing public debt. A number of loans taken out in the 1980s, including a bridging loan from the International Monetary Fund, could only hold off the financial collapse for so long. By engaging in this risky behaviour, Hungary ultimately contributed to the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe.²

German-German Encounters on the Shores of the Balaton

While people in the GDR followed developments in Hungary closely and realised the differences compared to developments in their own country, to many visitors from the Federal Republic of Germany it was merely a low-cost holiday destination. Interestingly, Hungary functioned as a place of personal encounters between East and West Germans. Visits to Hungary offered many people the only opportunity to meet family and friends. Besides the capital Budapest, the main backdrop to these German-German encounters was Lake Balaton (*Plattensee* in German). This is where the Germans met up to spend their holidays. For GDR citizens in particular, Balaton was the epitome of a life in “the lap of luxury”, which they could never have afforded without help from their friends or relations from West Germany. Many of these encounters were documented right up to the year the Iron Curtain fell, not only in literature³ but also in the records of the GDR secret police (Stasi).⁴

MORE THAN A HOLE IN THE FENCE: THE OPENING OF THE BORDER IN 1989

The path leading to the opening of the border in September 1989 was characterised by numerous individual decisions as well as some misunderstandings and coincidences. Five

2 | Cf. *ibid.*, 67.

3 | Cf. Ingo Schulze, *Adam und Evelyn*, Berlin, 2008.

4 | Cf. Andrea Dunai, “Die Balaton-Brigade”, in: Jürgen Haase and János Can Togay (ed.), *Deutsche Einheit am Balaton*, Berlin, 2009, 109.

key moments are worth highlighting: the introduction of the Hungarian “World Passport”, the accession to the Refugee Convention of the United Nations (UN), the dismantling of the border fortifications, the opening up to the West going hand in hand with the loss of trust in the GDR, and finally the Pan-European Picnic as the shining hour of a civil society that believed in a Europe without borders. Without these background events and their joint impact, the dynamic at the Hungarian-Austrian border could not have developed, nor could all the other far-reaching events have happened during the year the Iron Curtain fell.



With the introduction of the so-called World Passport Hungarians started to use their right to travel and stocked up on western consumer goods. | Source: © Tamás Lobenwein, Norbert Lobenwein.

World Passport for Hungary

From 1 January 1988, Hungarians could apply for the so-called World Passport, i.e. a proper Hungarian passport, as a travel document that allowed them to travel to any country in the world – including Western countries.⁵ This development shone a spotlight on the discrepancy between the comparatively moderate communism in Hungary and the orthodox communism of the GDR, which GDR citizens holidaying in Hungary could not fail to notice. It encouraged many of them in their desire to turn their backs on the GDR for good. In 1988, only 283 persons from the

5 | This innovation led to proper shopping tourism in Austria. Cf. Hans Kaiser and Norbert Lobenwein, *89-09 – Momente, die die Welt bewegten*, Budapest, 2009, 24-25.

GDR⁶ were apprehended while attempting to illegally cross the Hungarian-Austrian border. The following year, up to 11 September when the border was officially opened, this number swelled to 7,200. The desperation of those intent on escaping grew day by day, as they felt imprisoned by an inflexible regime while their Hungarian “comrades” already had the freedom to travel wherever they wanted.

Hungary Signing up to the Refugee Convention

With Hungary’s accession to the UN Refugee Convention in March 1989, sending refugees back to the state that they had fled from was prohibited purely in legal terms.

One step that would subsequently prove crucial for GDR citizens’ intent on fleeing their country was Hungary becoming a signatory state of the UN Refugee Convention in March 1989, to take effect on 12 June 1989. Originally, Budapest did not have GDR citizens in mind at all when signing the Convention. The government’s intention was, in fact, to assist people who had fled to Hungary from Romania and to strengthen the application of human rights. What drove these refugees was the ruthless policy of razing villages put in place by Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu. In March 1988, he announced that the number of villages would be reduced from 13,000 to between 5,000 and 6,000 and that the inhabitants of the villages up for demolition would be relocated to “agro-industrial” cities.⁷ This affected particularly the ethnic German and Hungarian minorities, many of whom sought refuge in Hungary. Application of the UN Refugee Convention meant that sending refugees back to the state from which they had fled was prohibited purely in legal terms.⁸ It is said that 60,000 people came to Hungary from Romania in 1988.⁹

Hungary’s accession to the Convention made the authorities in East Berlin nervous. In line with agreements made with the Soviet Union, the Czech Republic and Romania,¹⁰ Hungary had also signed a bilateral agreement with the

6 | Cf. Árpád Bella, “Gedanken über die Grenztruppe der Wende”, in: Kaiser and Lobenwein, n. 5, 16-17.

7 | Cf. Andreas Oplatka, *Der erste Riss in der Mauer*, Vienna, 2009, 49.

8 | Cf. Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Die Chronik des Mauerfalls*, Berlin, 2009, 64.

9 | Cf. Joachim Jauer, *Urbi et Gorbis – Christen als Wegbereiter der Wende*, Freiburg, 2008, 143.

10 | Cf. Oplatka, n. 7, 53.

GDR (in 1969), which obligated the signatory states to ensure “that citizens of the other state will not travel to any third states for which their travel document is not valid”.¹¹ Furthermore, the agreement on mutual judicial assistance provided for the extradition of criminals, i.e. in the view of the GDR government also those who had committed a criminal offence by illegally crossing the border or illegally refusing to return pursuant to section 213 of the GDR Penal Code.¹² In principle, this agreement could no longer be applied after the Refugee Convention had entered into effect on 12 June 1989 without violating international law.

The head of the Hungarian state security services did agree with the GDR view that “the political and legal order of the GDR precludes the prosecution of GDR citizens by the state on the grounds of reasons cited in the Convention and there can therefore be no refugees within the meaning of the Convention from the GDR”.¹³ But what this meant in practice for actions to be taken in Hungary was still totally unclear. The GDR citizens did not consider themselves refugees, and they did not ask for asylum. Moreover, they were regarded rather as migrants by the Hungarian side. While a literal interpretation of the wording of the Convention would not have supported its actions, the Hungarian government subsequently referred to the spirit of the Refugee Convention¹⁴ when justifying its decision to allow East Germans to travel across the border to the West.

GDR citizens who were intent on leaving did not consider themselves refugees, and they did not ask for asylum. Moreover, they were regarded rather as migrants by the Hungarian side.

The Dismantling of the Border Fortifications

The alarm system (type SZ-100), which stretched over 246 kilometres, was installed between 1965 and 1971. It was erected some 500 to 2,000 metres inside the actual border. Any attempt to break through alerted the nearest guard post. By the late 1980s, the installation had become technically outdated and false alarms were not uncommon. To maintain the system operational would have required

11 | Hertle, n. 8, 62.

12 | Cf. Oplatka, n. 7, 131.

13 | Hertle, n. 8, 64.

14 | Cf. Oplatka, n. 7, 103.

extensive investments.¹⁵ Commander in Chief of the Hungarian border guards, János Székely, alerted the Ministry of the Interior to this fact back in 1987. In his report, he came to the conclusion that the system had outlived its usefulness, technically, politically and morally.¹⁶ On 26 October 1988, Minister of State Imre Pozsgay, considered a reformist, paid a visit to the border crossing of Hegyeshalom and concurred with Székely's assessment.¹⁷ Added to this was the fact that by then Hungarians were already able to travel freely using the "World Passport", which meant that there was no longer any reason to hermetically seal the border. In the Minister's view, the only people to potentially be stopped were citizens from "brother countries", the borders and any travel restrictions were still valid.



Hungarian border guards started to dismantle border fortifications in spring 1989, which was officially announced on 2 May 1989. | Source: © Tamás Lobenwein, Norbert Lobenwein.

But the crucial motivation for the decision by Miklós Németh's government to have the border fortifications dismantled was of a financial nature. The Prime Minister simply deleted the item for the replacement of the barbed wire fence system from the draft budget for 1989 because he was no longer prepared to commit the necessary funds to this purpose. The dismantling began on 18 April in strict

15 | Cf. Andreas S. Schmidt-Schweizer, "Die Öffnung der ungarischen Westgrenze für die DDR-Bürger im Sommer 1989", *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen*, 1, 1997, 36.

16 | Cf. Gyula Kurucz (ed.), *Das Tor zur deutschen Einheit*, Berlin, 2000, 107.

17 | Cf. Schmidt-Schweizer, n. 15, 39.

secrecy.¹⁸ When this work was continued at Hegyeshalom in front of representatives of the international press, nobody foresaw the consequences. Paradoxically, the Romanian leadership responded several weeks later by work to establish fortifications at the border to Hungary in order to stop people from fleeing there. Joachim Jauer, correspondent for the German TV network *ZDF* at that time, summarised the events in that day's broadcast: "A historic, a moving moment; today, Hungary ends the forcible split between East and West right here".¹⁹

GDR Refugees in Hungary

Many people in the GDR watched Jauer's reporting with great interest. What aroused even broader international attention were the TV recordings and pictures of the two Foreign Ministers of Austria and Hungary, Alois Mock and Gyula Horn. In a symbolic act, they cut the fence near Sopron on 27 June. In fact, by then the dismantling of the border fortification had advanced to such a degree that it had been necessary to re-erect a small section of barbed wire fencing for this event.²⁰ The picture of the two ministers in action with their wire cutters went around the world. GDR citizens, who had their summer holidays coming up, followed the events in Hungary closely. They realised a gap was opening up in the Iron Curtain that might allow access to the West. During that summer, hundreds of GDR citizens who were intent on leaving reached the embassies in Warsaw and Budapest and the Permanent Representation in East Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers of Austria and Hungary stirred international attention, when they cut the fence near Sopron on 27 June 1989 in a symbolic act.

In Hungary, the embassy of the Federal Republic had to be closed on 13 August 1989 – the 28th anniversary of the construction of the Berlin Wall – due to overcrowding.²¹ Csilla von Boeselager, Hungarian by birth and founder of

18 | Cf. *ibid.*, 40.

19 | Jauer, n. 9, 129.

20 | Speech by former Prime Minister Miklós Németh on the occasion of the Point Alpha Prize award ceremony on 15 Jun 2014 in Geisa, 3, http://pointalpha.com/sites/default/files/downloads/erwiderung_miklos_nemeth.pdf (accessed 27 Aug 2014).

21 | It is said that 171 persons intent on leaving the country were on the premises at that time. Cf. Jauer, n. 9, 157; Oplátka, n. 7, 153.

the Hungarian Maltese Charity Service, stepped in valiantly and organised assistance to the refugees. She was supported by the priest of the parish of the "Church of the Holy Family" in Budapest-Zugliget, Imre Kozma. Thanks to their efforts, the church premises were opened the very next day. As this refuge soon also became overcrowded with 200 to 300 new arrivals every day,²² refugees were cared for in Csillebérc and Zánka, with a total of 48,600 people being looked after over a period of three months.²³

During those August days, there was a lively diplomatic exchange between Bonn, Budapest and East Berlin. Secretary of State Jürgen Sudhoff shuttled repeatedly between Bonn and Budapest, and the ambassadors from Bonn and East Berlin beat a path to the door of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for separate meetings. The West German government was intent on the refugees being allowed to travel to the Federal Republic as soon as possible. The embassy of the Federal Republic equipped these people immediately with a passport. But as these passports did not have a valid Hungarian entry stamp, they could not be used to leave the country. The Hungarian decision-makers wanted to make absolutely sure that they were acting in line with the rule of law, which is why they did not allow people to leave the country with such West German passports issued retrospectively in Budapest. The Hungarian government therefore made it known that it considered the airlifting of the refugees from the embassy under the auspices of the International Red Cross in the night from 23 to 24 August from Budapest to Vienna a one-off humanitarian act. However, the Hungarians became increasingly supportive of West Germany. The situation of the refugees remaining in Hungary became increasingly tense by the day. Some found they could still not leave the country and travel to Austria. Others realised that people were at least no longer handed back over to the GDR. The Hungarian authorities also refrained from entering escape attempts on the passports. Sooner or later, so people thought correctly, they would be able to leave the country legally.²⁴

22 | Cf. Jauer, n. 9, 162.

23 | Cf. Hans Kaiser (ed.), *Der Grenzdurchbruch bei Sopron – Weg nach Europa*, Budapest, 2012, 193.

24 | Cf. Andreas Oplatka, "Eine Bresche im Eisernen Vorhang", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 26 Jun 2014, <http://nzz.ch/international/europa/1.18330432> (accessed 26 Aug 2014).



The invitation to the Pan-European Picnic even found its way to the GDR citizens vacationing in Hungary. | Source: © Stiftung Paneuropäisches Picknick '89.

The Pan-European Picnic in Sopron on 19 August 1989

The Pan-European Picnic was organised by figures from the Hungarian opposition from Debrecen and Sopron. Many of them came from the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), some were active in the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) or the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP). The idea of holding this picnic at the border was the brainchild of Ferenc Mészáros from Debrecen. Over dinner, after having earlier listened to a talk about a Europe without borders given by MEP Otto von Habsburg in Debrecen, the town that saw the dethronement of the Habsburg family, Mészáros discussed the idea of a friendly get-together at the Hungarian-Austrian border in the form of a picnic with Georg von Habsburg. Although this proposal was initially rejected, Mészáros brought it up again at a meeting of the Debrecen branch of the MDF on 30 June and found a supporter in Mária Filep. She embraced the idea enthusiastically, partly because she had been sensitised to the issue through

experiences in Transylvania (Romania) and in connection with refugees from there.²⁵

In Sopron²⁶ they found a location that was both suitable and historically relevant.²⁷ The organisers were also able to attract the reformist communist Imre Pozsgay and Otto von Habsburg himself as patrons. The flyer's slogan "Baue ab und nimm mit!" (i.e., "Take it down and take it away") was meant to promote the picnic as an event for people to join in. The participants were able to dismantle a short section of the Iron Curtain, which had been retained for forestry-related purposes, as an expression of a Europe without borders. It was not until a few days before the picnic that it became clear that a border crossing would be opened temporarily from 3 to 6 p.m., too late to obtain anything other than verbal permission from the Austrian side.²⁸ The idea was for Hungarian and Austrian participants to be allowed to cross the border with their passports.

It is still unclear how GDR citizens present in Hungary at the time found out about the event. Many of them reported that they had received the German flyers from strangers, and there were also intensive preparations made at the church of Father Kozma in Zugliget.²⁹ The fact is that the border guards commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Árpád Bella were entirely unprepared for the arrival of the East Germans in Sopron. Bella decided not to intervene and ordered his colleagues to turn their backs to the Hungarian side and to check only people coming across from Austria. This allowed 661 GDR citizens to cross

25 | Mária Filep gave a brief and succinct eight-minute account in Sopron at an event organised by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung entitled "Das Tor zur Freiheit in Europa" (The Gateway to Freedom in Europe) held on 18 Aug 2014, cf. live recording, 1:09:15 – 1:17:10.

26 | László Magas, László Nagy, János Rumpf, Pál Csóka and Félix Ors were active in the local branch of the MDF.

27 | After the 1956 uprising, many Hungarians moved across the western borders. There was also a mass grave of participants in the uprising not far from the location of the picnic, at Sopronkőhida prison. László Magas, 1989 – "Das Jahr der Wunder", in: Kaiser and Lobenwein, n. 5, 64.

28 | Cf. László Nagy, A Páneurópai Piknik és az 1989. szeptember 11-i határnyitás, in: László Nagy, *Gazdaság és Társadalom: A soproni határáttörés*, Sopron, 2014, 19.

29 | Cf. Kurucz, n. 16, 92.

into Austria by early evening,³⁰ the largest mass escape since the construction of the Berlin Wall. This turned the Pan-European Picnic into a fateful moment for the GDR.



The term “border breakthrough” was used when GDR citizens stormed an old wooden gate close to Sopronpuszta during the Pan-European Picnic to cross the Hungarian-Austrian border. | Source: © Tamás Lobenwein, Norbert Lobenwein.



In view of the large number of people in Sopron, Lieutenant-Colonel Árpád Bella decided not to intervene and to let things run their course. Honoring his courage, he received several awards afterwards. | Source: © Tamás Lobenwein, Norbert Lobenwein.

30 | Cf. Krisztián Ungváry, “Ungarn und die BRD”, in: Haase and Can Togay, n. 4, 156.



The actual location of the Pan-European Picnic was not far from Sopronkőhida further inland. | Source: © Tamás Lobenwein, Norbert Lobenwein.

THE PERMANENT OPENING OF THE BORDER ON 11 SEPTEMBER 1989

Imre Pozsgay succinctly summed up the insights gained from the picnic, which the authorities had permitted partly by way of a test to probe Soviet response,³¹ as follows: "It was the people fleeing in panic on 19 August that evicted the GDR from the group of negotiating parties."³² This cleared the path for initiating serious talks between Hungary and the Federal Republic of Germany at the highest level. The fact that a solution to the refugee situation had become extremely urgent by then was demonstrated not only by the overcrowded refugee camps and the mass exodus at the picnic, but by far more tragic events. During the days following the picnic, the army used heavy weapons to prevent several GDR citizens from fleeing near Kópháza. Also, GDR refugee Kurt-Werner Schulz sustained a fatal head injury from shots from a machine gun wielded by a Hungarian border guard in a melee close to Kőszeg.³³

Finally, on 25 August, secret German-Hungarian negotiations took place at Gymnich Castle between Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Prime Minister Miklós Németh and Foreign Minister Gyula

31 | Cf. Kaiser, n. 23, 136.

32 | Imre Pozsgay, "Mit Deutschland und den Deutschen bei der Wende", in: Kaiser and Lobenwein, n. 5, 64.

33 | Kurt-Werner Schulz thereby became the last casualty of Germany's division. Cf. Oplatka, n. 7, 168.

Horn. According to reminiscences of Kohl and Németh, the Hungarians conveyed their decision, made three days earlier, to open the border for GDR citizens on a normal basis after debating their difficult situation due to their contractual links with the GDR.³⁴ Helmut Kohl was touched: “Tears came to my eyes when Németh had uttered this”.³⁵ In response to the question what was expected in return for this generous gesture, Németh asserted that Hungary would not sell people. Although the GDR leadership made frantic efforts to change Hungary’s mind, its pleas fell on deaf ears. Minister of State Imre Pozsgay stated the following opinion: “It is not up to Hungary to defend other countries’ borders.”³⁶ Subsequently, the Hungarian side negotiated exclusively with the Federal Republic of Germany and only reported decisions for information to its “actual” ally within the Warsaw Pact, the GDR. In legal terms, Hungary suspended the application of the 1969 agreement unilaterally, justifying this step with the Refugee Convention, which was considered to take priority over bilateral agreements. This allowed for people to leave Hungary with GDR documents. Finally, Foreign Minister Horn made an announcement that was broadcast on the evening news on 10 September that the border would be opened at midnight that night. Jubilant GDR citizens immediately set off on their journey towards the West. The GDR regime had come another step closer to its demise.



GDR citizens could only flee on foot from Hungary to Austria, leaving behind their belongings and many cars. In order to live in freedom, the refugees gave up their entire existence. | Source: © Tamás Lobenwein, Norbert Lobenwein.

34 | Cf. *ibid.*, 194.

35 | Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, Munich, 2005, 922.

36 | Jauer, n. 9, 181.

GERMAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS FROM 1990

The central foreign policy objective of the first freely elected Hungarian government was to integrate Hungary as quickly as possible into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

After the momentous events of 1989/1990, German-Hungarian relations initially took a positive course. The central foreign policy objective of the first freely elected Hungarian government under the conservative Prime

Minister József Antall was to integrate Hungary as quickly as possible into the Euro-Atlantic structures, which in concrete terms meant pursuing membership of the European Union and NATO.³⁷ Germany was one of the most important partners supporting these efforts, which were initially viewed with some scepticism in Western Europe. "Germany had become the strongest advocate of the interests of the accession hopes within the Community and the most important mediator between the West-European integration communities and the accession candidates."³⁸ Based on various geographic, economic and political considerations, Germany supported Hungary's efforts in its rapprochement with the EU and NATO (as well as those of the remaining countries in Central and Eastern Europe).

This common interest was strengthened further by two factors. For one, Helmut Kohl and József Antall developed a close friendly relationship.³⁹ Just a few weeks after the first free elections in April 1990, the Hungarian Prime

37 | The conservative MDF governed between 1990 and 1994, first under Prime Minister József Antall (until 1993) and after his death under Péter Boross (1993 to 1994) in a coalition with the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP). The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) governed from 1994 to 1998 and from 2002 to 2010, initially (until 2008) in coalitions with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and later (until 2010) on its own. The Prime Ministers were Gyula Horn (1994 to 1998), Péter Medgyessy (2002 to 2004), Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004 to 2009) and Gordon Bajnai (2009 to 2010), each nominated by the MSZP. From 1998 to 2002, the country was governed by the conservative FIDESZ under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in a coalition with the MDF and the FKGP. Since 2010, the FIDESZ-KDNP alliance has been in government, headed by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

38 | Peter Becker, *Die deutsche Europapolitik und die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union*, Baden-Baden, 2011, 24.

39 | Cf. András Hettyey and András Rácz, "German-Hungarian Relations: A marriage held together by money, not love?", in: Andris Spruds (ed.), *Friendship in the Making: Transforming relations between Germany and the Baltic-Visegrad countries*, Riga, 2012, 69.

Minister travelled to Germany and had a meeting with the Chancellor. Further high-ranking meetings followed over the next few years. In addition, economic relations between Hungary and the Federal Republic of Germany were expanded. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the trading volume between the two countries increased enormously. From 1990 to 2000, Hungarian exports to Germany rose by 500 per cent, and imports from Germany quadrupled between 1990 and 2004. Germany quickly became Hungary's most important trading partner. German companies, for their part, benefited from the fact that they had invested in Hungary very soon after the fall of the Iron Curtain. By 1994, investments in Hungary had risen to the equivalent of 1.4 billion euros.



On the first year anniversary on 19 August 1990, the first freely elected Prime Ministers of Hungary and the GDR, József Antall and Lothar de Maizière, met in Sopron. | Source: © Tamás Lobenwein, Norbert Lobenwein.

Contractually, bilateral relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Hungary were based on the "Agreement on Friendly Cooperation and Partnership in Europe", which was signed in Budapest on 6 February 1992. This agreement stipulates that Germany is "in favour of the prospect of the Republic of Hungary acceding to the European Union", and that it will promote accession "as soon as the political and economic conditions are fulfilled".⁴⁰ Furthermore, the contracting parties agreed to develop their

40 | Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Hungary on Friendly Cooperation and Partnership in Europe, signed in Budapest on 6 Feb 1992, <http://ungarisches-institut.de/dokumente/pdf/19920206-1.pdf> (accessed 11 Jul 2014).

The German-Hungarian Forum was established in 1990 as a platform for open dialogue in the areas of politics, civil society, the economy and culture.

economic relations, to further cooperation in the areas of science and technology, and to intensify cultural exchange in all areas and at all levels. This contractual basis was soon

complemented by a first cultural agreement, signed in 1994. The German-Hungarian Forum was established as early as 1990 to serve as a platform for open dialogue in the areas of politics, civil society, the economy and culture. After the Hungarian parliamentary elections in the spring of 1994, a socialist-liberal coalition formed around Prime Minister Gyula Horn. While the respective governments now belonged to different political camps, this did not affect the good relations. Prime Minister Horn was held in high esteem in Germany, as he had been Foreign Minister when the border was opened. Significantly, his first visit to the West took him to Germany.

During the period from 1994 to 1998, plans for Hungary's potential accession to the EU and NATO took shape. Germany acted as a reliable partner throughout the lengthy accession negotiations, including in complicated specific issues of integration. Besides the economic interests, Germany hoped the integration of the countries from the Central and Eastern European region would also help to guard against poverty, migration and nationalism. Wolfgang Schäuble, the leader of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag at the time, expressed it succinctly: "If it was only about economic integration, the accession of the Central and Eastern European states might not even be that urgent; but because security and stability are at stake, it is of paramount importance."⁴¹ Considering that the war in Yugoslavia was raging at the time close to Hungary's southern border, this was an important aspect.

After the 1998 elections, both countries had a new government. In Hungary, the conservative FIDESZ party gained the majority, and Viktor Orbán began his first premiership. In Germany, by contrast, a coalition was formed comprising the SPD and the Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. However, the changes in government in both countries did not affect the existing objectives, and the German government's policy

41 | Cited in Wolfgang Zellner and Pál Dunay, *Ungarns Außenpolitik 1990-1997*, Baden-Baden, 1998, 124.

on expansion continued to exhibit a high degree of continuity.⁴² Consistent support was provided with the accession negotiations between Hungary and the EU, which had just begun and would continue until 2002. In the meantime, Hungary achieved its other major foreign-policy goal when it became a member of NATO in March 1999. From that time onwards, Germany and Hungary were also linked by a security and defense alliance.

In 2001, the Andrassy University Budapest (AUB) was founded as a major cultural project of the two countries. This joint project involving the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Austria, the German Federal State of Baden-Württemberg and the Free State of Bavaria is the only university outside the German-speaking region whose study programmes are conducted in German. It offers Master's courses as well as an interdisciplinary PhD program. The university attracts special appreciation for acting as a role model. The former German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, for instance, stated in a speech at the university in May 2013: "Education is one of the crucial resources of a globalised world. It is no coincidence that foreign culture and education policy is one of the pillars of our foreign policy. As a place that is a living embodiment of the international spirit and a forum for the exchange of ideas on Europe's future, the Andrassy University Budapest is therefore particularly close to our heart."⁴³

Founded in 2001, the Andrassy University Budapest is a role model. Master's courses and an interdisciplinary PhD programme conducted in German are offered.

When considering the bilateral relations, one should also examine the disagreements and the different assessments of political events. When the Iraq crisis was at its height in January 2003, the then Hungarian Prime Minister, socialist Péter Medgyessy, signed the "open letter of the eight", in which the UK, Denmark, Poland and Spain amongst others affirmed their solidarity with the USA and their support for a US invasion of Iraq. The German government and Chancellor Schröder expressed firm opposition to such a military operation. The lack of prior consultation with the ally Hungary put considerable strain on German-Hungarian

42 | Cf. Becker, n. 38, 189.

43 | Speech by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle at the Andrassy University Budapest, 6 May 2013, http://auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2013/130506-BM_Andrassy_Universitaet.html (accessed 16 Jul 2014).

relations.⁴⁴ Another point of contention was the draft of a European constitution, where Hungary insisted on the inclusion of aspects of minority policy.

In 2004, Hungary acceded to the EU. Fears that a “wave” of cheap labour from the new Member States might drive up unemployment and depress wages turned out to be unfounded.

Apart from these incidents, the two countries did not lose sight of the common goal of Hungary's EU membership. On 1 May 2004, Hungary acceded together with the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. Because of fears in some old Member States that a “wave” of cheap labour from the new Member States might drive up unemployment and depress wages, the EU enacted transitional arrangements, which allowed Member States to restrict the freedom of movement for job seekers from the new Member States for a period of up to seven years. Germany availed itself of this option. However, these fears turned out to be unfounded. According to a study by the German Institute for the Study of Labor, there was neither a strong influx of cheap Eastern European labour, nor did wages go down in Germany. “Original reservations about an opening up of the German labour market to Eastern Europeans leading to “social distortions” in the country and a putative “benefit tourism” have not been confirmed by the results of years of observation.”⁴⁵

CURRENT STATE OF GERMAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS

On the whole, Hungary's EU membership has furthered the continued strengthening of German-Hungarian economic relations. In 2013, Germany was once again by far the most important trading partner, followed by Russia, Austria, Slovakia and Italy. Just over a quarter of Hungarian exports went to Germany. Between 2011 and 2013, the bilateral trading volume rose from some 36 billion euros to approximately 39 billion euros.⁴⁶ Conversely, Hungary was

44 | Cf. Hettyey and Rácz, n. 39, 87.

45 | Institute for the Study of Labor, “Zehn Jahre EU-Osterweiterung: IZA-Direktor Zimmermann zieht positive wirtschaftliche Bilanz”, 28 Apr 2014, <http://newsroom.iza.org/de/2014/04/28/zehn-jahre-eu-osterweiterung-iza-direktor-zimmermann-zieht-positive-wirtschaftliche-bilanz> (accessed 15 Jul 2014).

46 | German Federal Foreign Office, “Beziehungen zu Deutschland”, http://auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_FE29F375416C72E8187CC12BEC3B59A9/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Ungarn/Bilateral_node.html (accessed 11 Jul 2014).

ranked a respectable 16th on the list of Germany's largest trading partners, even above the emerging powers of India and Brazil. In Eastern Europe, Hungary was Germany's fourth largest trading partner behind Russia, Poland and the Czech Republic.⁴⁷

By 2012, the volume of foreign direct investments registered in Hungary amounted to some 78 billion euros, 19 billion of which came from German companies. There are over 3,000 businesses in Hungary that were founded entirely or in part with German capital, employing over 300,000 people in total, i.e. some seven to eight per cent of the Hungarian labour force. A number of major German companies have established subsidiaries in Hungary, including car manufacturers such as Audi, Mercedes and Opel as well as companies from various other sectors (SAP, ThyssenKrupp, Bosch and Deutsche Telekom). In one of its reports, the German-Hungarian Chamber of Industry and Commerce stresses the advantages Hungary offers to German investors as follows: "While Hungary has not been a "low wage country" for some time, it offers many foreign companies an attractive mix of productivity, qualifications, costs and regulatory framework where their workforce is concerned."⁴⁸ According to a survey, 84 per cent of the German companies intend to expand their investments by 2020.⁴⁹

By 2012, 19 billion euros of direct investments came from German companies. There are over 3,000 businesses in Hungary that were founded with German capital.

Representatives from both countries frequently mention that the stable economic exchange provides the foundation for close German-Hungarian relations. However, there have been occasions over recent years when the resilience of these relations has been put to the test. In the spring of 2010, after eight years of a socialist-liberal governing coalition, FIDESZ gained a two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament. The party of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán embarked on fundamental and far-reaching political and economic reforms. These included the new constitution,

47 | Cf. Hettyey and Rácz, n. 39, 76.

48 | Press release by the German-Hungarian Chamber of Industry and Commerce of 9 Dec 2010, http://ahkungarn.hu/fileadmin/ahk_ungarn/Dokumente/Bereich_CC/Presse/2010/2010-12-09_DUIHK_Verguetungsreport.pdf (accessed 15 Jul 2014).

49 | Cf. József Czukor, "Magyar-német kapcsolatok 2014 elején", *Külügyi Szemle*, 1/2014, 9.

which was adopted in April 2011. During the term from 2010 to 2014, the government also introduced a new media law, new electoral legislation as well as special taxes in the banking, energy and telecoms sectors. In terms of economic policy, the reforms were aimed particularly at reducing the high level of public debt.

These measures sparked repeated disagreements between the Hungarian government and its international partners, particularly the European Commission in Brussels. The German government, headed by Angela Merkel since 2005, also signalled its concerns about what was happening in Hungary. Criticism in the violation of democratic standards voiced by Berlin was a case in point.⁵⁰ In December 2010, for instance, deputy government spokesman Christoph Steegmans talked about the controversial media law, stating that the changes in the Hungarian media legislation were being “observed” very closely. This also applied “in particular to the implementation of the new provisions. As a future holder of the Presidency of the Council of the EU, Hungary naturally bears special responsibility for the image of the European Union in the world.”⁵¹

The German-Hungarian relationship is built on a solid foundation. Despite disagreements about the controversial media law, talks have never ceased.

Similar thoughts were expressed by government spokesman Steffen Seibert in October 2012: “Those who hold a two-thirds majority must remember that a two-thirds majority goes hand in hand with a great democratic responsibility towards those who are in the minority.”⁵² Nevertheless, the German-Hungarian relationship is built on a solid foundation. Talks never ceased during those months, and criticism remained constructive and trusting. Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Orbán have met three times for bilateral discussions since 2010, and President János Áder visited Berlin in March 2013.

50 | Cf. Hettyey and Rácz, n. 39, 71.

51 | The Federal Government, government press conference of 22 Dec 2010, <http://bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2010/12/2010-12-22-regpk.html> (accessed 11 Jul 2014).

52 | The Federal Government, government press conference of 10 Oct 2012, <http://bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2012/10/2012-10-10-regpk.html> (accessed 12 Jul 2014).

One topic to which discussions during these meetings return to time and again is the high level of public debt and the resulting economic crisis in the European Union. This issue in particular shows that Berlin and Budapest share a similar assessment of the situation. The Chancellor is known to stress that the solution to the problems has to be based on budget consolidation and structural reforms. In line with these goals, the Hungarian government began taking measures to curb new debt from 2010 onwards. In 2012, the budget deficit consequently amounted to just two per cent of GDP. This caused the European Commission to propose to the EU Finance Ministers in May 2013 to lift the excessive deficit procedure imposed on Hungary since 2004, which the EU Economic and Financial Affairs Council approved in June 2013.

Another important area of cooperation besides politics and the economy is security. Officers of the Hungarian Armed Forces receive training at the German Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Hamburg. When Hungarian soldiers served in Kosovo as part of the KFOR Mission, they were partly under German high command. German and Hungarian soldiers also worked together in Afghanistan.



On the 25th anniversary of the Pan-European Picnic, Prime Minister of Thuringia Christine Lieberknecht joined the memorial conference of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and visited the sight of the breakthrough in Sopronpuszta. | Source: © Szecsődi Balázs, KAS Ungarn.

There is also great diversity in the cultural relations between Germany and Hungary. Besides the Andrassy University, actors include the Goethe Institute in Budapest (from 1988), the secondary school Thomas Mann Gymnasium (from 1992), die Central Agency for Schools Abroad (ZfA) as well as the ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen). The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation all maintain a field office in Budapest and help to strengthen German-Hungarian relations through conferences, exhibitions and seminars. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) has sent several German-speaking lecturers as well as language assistants to Hungarian universities and other institutions of higher education. The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation awards research scholarships to Hungarian academics, provides support to academic conferences and gives donations to academic institutions.⁵³ In Germany, the Collegium Hungaricum Berlin and the Hungarian Cultural Institute in Stuttgart fulfil a similar role. There are also various instances of town twinning. The ethnic German minority living in Hungary adds to the colourful patchwork of German-Hungarian relations; numbering some 186,000, it represents the second-largest nationality in Hungary. To commemorate the large numbers of displaced Hungarian Germans, the Hungarian parliament took a decision in December 2012 to designate 19 January as a national day of remembrance for the expelled Hungarian Germans.

All in all, Germany and Hungary can be proud of their achievements over the last 25 years. Building on the events of the *annus mirabilis* of 1989, the two countries have succeeded in maintaining a trusting partnership, which can also weather occasional differences. Not only are there the frequently emphasised close economic links, the two countries also cooperate well in the areas of security, culture and education. Hungary therefore remains one of Germany's most important partners in Central and Eastern Europe, and Berlin will conversely always serve as an important point of reference for Budapest.

PERSPECTIVES ON REUNIFIED GERMANY

IMPRESSIONS FROM POLAND

Bartosz T. Wieliński

"To cheer for the Germans is evidence of a lack of respect for past generations"¹ posted well-known sports journalist Krzysztof Stanowski on his Facebook page, sparking a debate in Poland. It was 9 July 2014, one day after the Germany-Brazil semi-final in which the German team booted the host team out of the World Cup with a final score of seven goals to one. The well-known joke was revived: in football, there are 22 players on the field and at the end, the Germans win. But Stanowski dampened the mood. "The longer I live, the more I realise how little time has passed since these crimes were committed, since the genocide. I'm sorry, but I will not cheer for the Germans. You can tell me that they're different people now – and okay, maybe they are different. But they should stay away from me and my family," he wrote. Hundreds of his readers then asked him what he knew about the Second World War and why he believed that Germany had not changed. But Stanowski also found support for his attitude, which is why he emphasised his views in another post: "It's simply not right for Poles to cross our fingers for all of Berlin to explode with happiness (and if all of Berlin goes crazy, a great multitude of very old German men go crazy, too). This is a blow to history."²




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- 1 | Łukasz Woźnicki, "Dziennikarz sportowy o mundialu: 'Kibicowanie Niemcom to brak szacunku dla poprzednich pokoleń'" (A sports journalist on the World Cup. 'To cheer for the Germans is evidence of a lack of respect for past generations'), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 9 Jul 2014, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,16299944,Dziennikarz_sportowy_o_mundialu___Kibicowanie_Niemcom.html (accessed 8 Oct 2014).
- 2 | Krzysztof Stanowski, "Jak co wtorek..." (Just like any other Tuesday...), *Weszło*, 15 Jul 2014, <http://weszlo.com/2014/07/15/jak-co-wtorek-krzysztof-stanowski-72> (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

Fig. 1

Relations between the Polish People and selected Nations: Degree of Sympathy in 2000, 2005, and 2013



Source: Own illustration modified from Łada, n. 3, 20.

Recent polls conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs show that nearly 50 per cent of Poles feel sympathy towards the Germans whereas 15 per cent would not feel this. The decided majority is of the opinion that Poland and Germany must work together.³ Germany is Poland's most important trading partner. In 2013, the volume of trade between the two neighbouring countries was more than 78 billion euros. Imports from and exports to Germany each account for more than one-quarter of the total volume of Polish trade.⁴ In addition, economic relations are characterised by a high level of direct investment in both sides. Polish petroleum company Orlen is just one example of this in addition to numerous small and medium-sized companies. A total of nearly 1.4 billion euros was invested in the other side of the Oder in 2013.⁵ In economic terms,

3 | Cf. Agnieszka Łada, *Deutsch-Polnisches Barometer 2013. Das Bild Deutschlands und der Deutschen in der polnischen Gesellschaft nach zehn Jahren Gemeinsamer EU-Mitgliedschaft*, Instytut Spraw Publicznych (Institute of Public Affairs), Warsaw, 2013, http://kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36301-1522-1-30.pdf (accessed 23 Oct 2014).


4 | Cf. Germany Trade & Invest, "Wirtschaftsdaten kompakt – Polen", 27 May 2014, http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/DE/Trade/Fachdaten/PUB/2012/11/pub201211228003111_159160.pdf (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

5 | Cf. Jacek Lepiarz, "Polacy ostro handlują z Niemcami" (The Poles are trading heavily with Germany), *wGospodarce*, 2 Apr 2014, <http://wgospodarce.pl/informacje/12000-polacy-ostro-handluja-z-niemcami-okna-i-zywnosc-zdobywaja-portfele-niemieckich-klientow> (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

a quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, German-Polish relations could hardly show a better balance. However, this is only one side of the coin.

Fig. 2

Countries that Poland should cooperate the closest with according to the Polish people



Source: Own illustration modified from Łada, n. 3, 34.

Germany remains an enemy for the Polish conservative right-wing parties, and is a target of propagandist attacks. In recent months, the Law and Justice Party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS) led by Jarosław Kaczyński, along with groups of politicians who have left the PiS or were expelled, have ramped up their verbal attacks. Interestingly, climate policy was drawn into this. Voices from this camp warned that Germany wanted to destroy Polish mines with its demand for lower carbon dioxide emissions.⁶ Furthermore, they stated that Poles living in Germany were being deprived of the nationality because they will not be awarded the status of a national minority in Germany.⁷ Another accusation levelled by the Right is that German policy makers would go behind Poland's back to align with Moscow. This also includes the charge that former Polish

6 | Cf. "Niemcy dążą do zniszczenia polskiego węgla" (The Germans seek to destroy Polish coal), PiS, 20 Jun 2014, <http://www.pis.org.pl/article.php?id=23057> (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

7 | Cf. "Posłanka Pis: Niemcy dyskryminują Polaków" (Law and Justice Party MPs: Poles are discriminated against in Germany), *Telewizja Republika*, 31 Jan 2014, <http://telewizjarepublika.pl/poslanka-pis-niemcy-dyskryminuja-polakow-potrzebny-zespol-ds-mniejszosci-polskiej-w-niemczech,1360.html> (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

Prime Minister (and new President of the European Council) Donald Tusk was a puppet of Berlin, and that under his rule, Poland was a satellite state of Germany.⁸



Sporting neighbours: When the Polish and German national soccer teams compete, it is an emotional event that receives broad media attention, as pictured here during the EC qualification on 11 October 2014. | Source: © Adam Litwiniuk, ATP, picture alliance.

When Russia wrested the Crimea from Ukraine this spring, and in Poland (as in many other places) the conversation turned towards the necessity of increasing NATO's presence in Eastern Europe, Jarosław Kaczyński declared his refusal for German army units to be deployed in Poland: "I would not want any German troops. At least seven generations must pass before this could happen,"⁹ he said, referring to the German crimes committed during the Second World War. When Tusk was confirmed as President of the European Council on 30 August 2014, PiS politicians and journalists with similar views adopted the same tone: "Has the vassal been rewarded?" asked PiS MEP Zdzisław Krasnodębski via Twitter. "Tusk has been rewarded in this way, because he has not caused any trouble for Germany," added journalist Bronisław Wildenstein.¹⁰ Such remarks

8 | Cf. "Błaszczak: Polska 'satelitą Niemiec'" (Poland is a satellite state of Germany), *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 Aug 2014, <http://rp.pl/artukul/1134096.html> (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

9 | "Kaczyński nie życzy sobie niemieckich wojsk w Polsce" (Kaczyński does not want any German troops in Poland), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2 Apr 2014, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,15730311,Kaczynski_nie_zyczy_sobie_niemieckich_wojsk_w_Polsce_.html (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

10 | Sławomir Jastrzębowski, "Skrzytkuję Kaczyńskiego, jeśli na to zasłuży" (I criticise Kaczyński when he deserves it), *Super Express*, 5 Sep 2014.

from the PiS camp could be overlooked. However, polls from August show that one in three Poles would vote for that party. How does this fit with the opinion that only 15 per cent of respondents harbour antipathy towards the Germans?

In the context of German-Polish relations, football has always been a trigger of negative emotions. Prior to matches, resentments and old jokes are revived and the tabloids contribute accordingly. For example, the German tabloid *Bild* and the Polish *Fakt* (both belong to the Axel Springer Group) both published tasteless illustrations of Polish and German football players prior to the European Cup in 2008. Politicians from the ultra-conservative (and extremely anti-German) League of Polish Families even demanded that the Polish-born stars of the German national football team, Miroslav Klose and Lukas Podolski, renounce their Polish citizenship.¹¹ Whenever the two teams meet on the field, this seems to trigger this reflex described in certain media.

WOUNDS THAT HAVE YET TO HEAL

"The German-Polish relationship is neurotic,"¹² wrote esteemed journalist on both sides of the border and doyen of Polish experts on Germany, Adam Krzemiński, a few years ago. This diagnosis still applies today. But is there reason to fear that this assessment is not only shared by older, more conservative Poles, but also by the younger generation of 30 to 40-year-olds? This observation that something has broken down among younger people is not wrong. They dreamed of a Europe in which Poland would be just as normal a country as its Western neighbours. Due to their rather critical attitude towards their own history, they have distinguished themselves as advocates of reconciliation. At the same time, this means taking responsibility, for example for the pogrom against the Jewish citizens of Jedwabne in 1941.

11 | Cf. "Odebrać obywatelstwo Podolskiemu i Klose" (Podolski and Klose must be denied citizenship), *WP Wiadomości*, 9 June 2008, <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,48996,title,Orzechowski-odebrac-obywatelstwo-Podolskiemu-i-Klose,wid,10035827,wiadomosc.html> (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

12 | Adam Krzemiński, "Inny widoczny Znak" (Another visible sign), *Polityka*, 28 May 2009.

The subsequent generations view the past through the lens of films and comics; for them, history is told in black and white in a similar way to how it is represented by the conservative Right. Different symbols convey this attitude. These include the anchor symbol used by the Polish resistance movement. Young people wear the symbol of the Polish resistance movement in the Second World War on t-shirts; it is painted on walls next to the coats of arms of their football teams. There is also room for the “evil Germany” rhetoric in this patriotic fever, positioned against

A contentious issue in the political and public sphere is how to treat the Germans: as advocates on behalf of Poland's return to Europe or as descendants of criminals and revanchists.

the country where nothing has changed in half a century, the country that ambushed Poland, the country one should not cheer for at sports events. A contentious issue in the political sphere as well as civil society is how to treat the Germans: as friends, allies, advocates on behalf of Poland's return to Europe or as descendants of criminals and revanchists. Perceptions of their neighbours fluctuate back and forth between these images in a cyclical manner. The negative images gain the upper hand when the populist forces believe themselves to be safe. This up and down has affected German-Polish relations and has demonstrated that the nearly 25 years that have passed since reunification is too short a time to step out from under the shadow of this tragic history.

Another factor that affects political and societal relations is Russia. One example of this is that many Polish commentators think the efforts of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier to urge Russia to relent on the Ukraine conflict are naïve, whereas Berlin considers it rational, balanced and responsible. Some voices from the far right go even further and accuse the Germans of undermining NATO, pushing Ukraine into Russia's sphere of influence and enabling German companies to have better business relations with Russia.¹³ The symptoms of the German-Polish neurosis clearly do surface here.

13 | Cf. Krzysztof Rak, “Niemiecki adwokat Putina” (Putin's German solicitor), *Rzeczpospolita*, 2 Sep 2014; Piotr Gabryel, “Oto jak Niemcy zdradzają Polskę” (How Germany is betraying Poland), *Do rzeczy*, 1 Sep 2014.

RECONCILIATION AND SOLIDARITY

“The work of the Holy Spirit was seen there,”¹⁴ said Archbishop Alfons Nossol, remembering the Reconciliation Mass in Krzyżowa near Wrocław. The resistance group known as the Kreisau Circle, founded by Helmuth James von Moltke, was active there between 1940 and 1944. On 12 November 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first non-communist Prime Minister of Poland, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl met at this historic site. Archbishop Nossol continued: “This mass was a symbol of reconciliation between God and men, between men with God and between men and men. John Paul II taught us that we should love other people as we love our own. That patriotism cannot be based on the hatred of others, but on love. [...] That was a great moment in the history of both countries, as well as the Church.”



A sign of peace: The first non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki worked towards national reconciliation between Poland and Germany. On 8 November 1990, he discussed the future of both nations with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. | Source: © Jan Bauer, Zentralbild, picture alliance.

The reconciliation between Poles and Germans did not only just begin the year the Berlin Wall fell. As early as 1965, during the proceedings at the Second Vatican Council, the Polish bishops sent their fellow German Catholics a letter with the historic words: “We forgive and ask for forgiveness.” A similar gesture was made by German politicians.

14 | Cited in Bartosz T. Wieliński “Zaczęło się w Krzyżowej” (It began in Krzyżowa), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11 Dec 2009.

In December 1970, German Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt before the memorial to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto. When protests against the communist regime developed in Poland in the late 1970s, and the *Solidarność* trade union movement began in favour of political reforms, the authorities responded to the growing unrest in the country by declaring martial law in December 1981. During this period (until July 1983), Poland received 8.5 million aid packages from the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁵ The *Solidarność* factor is not an insignificant one. Without it, there never would have been a reunification as it was supported by many members of the Polish opposition.



The union *Solidarność* rebelled successfully against the communist regime in the early 1980s. Citizens in the GDR watched the strike movement of the shipyard workers in Gdansk closely, pictured here on 26 August 1980 with Lech Wałęsa, the union leader and later President of Poland. | Source: © picture alliance/AP Images.

In this context, one cannot claim that a simple chain reaction occurred in 1989 when, after the opposition won the Polish elections and the Mazowiecki government was formed, the communist system in the GDR and other Eastern Bloc countries collapsed. The Workers' Defence Committee (*Komitet Obrony Robotników*), an organisation that was formed by Polish dissidents in the second half of the 1970s, and *Solidarność* appealed to people in the GDR. Leaflets were written calling for solidarity with Polish workers, and the lettering of *Solidarność* appeared

15 | Cf. Bartosz T. Wieliński, "Od stanu wojennego do ślubu" (From a state of war to marriage), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 December 2011, http://wyborcza.pl/wyborcza/1,105226,10820519,Od_stanu_wojennego_do_slubu.html (accessed 8 Oct 2014).

in graffiti. The Stasi took harsh measures against such actions.¹⁶ But with effectively no success. *Solidarność* had an impact even behind prison walls. Political prisoners in Cottbus organised a hunger strike after the imposition of martial law to show solidarity with the opposition in their neighbouring country.¹⁷ In Poland, we are only just now learning of these stories. Until now, many believed that the East Germans had detested everything Polish because of communist propaganda.

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH RESISTANCE

Poland and reunified Germany have set their relationship on new footing. In 1989/1990, there were few or no mechanisms for cooperation between the two societies, for youth exchanges or local or municipal partnerships. The Oder-Neisse line was not yet recognised, and the status of Germans living in Poland and Poles living in Germany was unclear. Instead, there was mistrust, wounds from the past that had yet to heal and propagandist reflexes in politics and the media.

When Germany reunified, Poles did not think about whether Germany would seek a hegemonic position in Europe. The more important question was whether Germany would take back its lost territory (Masuria, Pomerania, Silesia). Throughout the 45 years the Polish People's Republic existed, Poles had been hounded by the fear of German revanchism. When Helmut Kohl opposed Polish demands to uphold the border along the Oder-Neisse line in 1990 prior to reunification,¹⁸ this was interpreted as a breach of trust. German politics came into play here, as the German Chancellor did not wish to disappoint the Federation of Expellees and its member organisations.¹⁹ Nevertheless he relented,

16 | Cf. Bartosz T. Wieliński, "Zdławić solidarność" (Stifling Solidarity), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 6 Dec 2012.

17 | Cf. Bartosz T. Wieliński, "Solidarność w tygrysyj klatce" (Solidarity in the tiger's cage), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17 July 2012.


18 | Róża Romaniec, "Trudna droga do traktatu" (A difficult road to agreement), *Deutsche Welle*, 13 Nov 2010, <http://dw.de/p/Q7zM> (accessed 08 Oct 2014).

19 | Officials for the Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen) went to the Opole region to promote a referendum on the future of Silesia as if the reunification of Germany would not only concern the GDR, but also the regions east of the Oder. Cf. Klaus Bachmann, "Widoczne znaki" (Visible signs), *Newsweek Polska*, 8 Sep 2009.

also thanks to Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's intervention. Shortly after reunification, on 14 November 1990, the border treaty was signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland.

Just one year later, the first round of talks on the accession of Poland to the European Union began. The Brussels delegation was welcomed by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the Polish plenipotentiary for European integration, with the words: "Ladies and gentlemen, we are not Africa."²⁰ In that respect, Warsaw expressed its wish that Poland was not to be treated as a developing country, but as a partner. The fact that this desire did not come about by chance was demonstrated by an event in 1995. The 50th anniversary of liberation was being celebrated in Berlin. Although the war claimed an enormous number of Polish victims, Poland was not invited.



Towards the EU: Jacek Saryusz-Wolski underlined from the very beginning of Poland's EU membership negotiations that the country was a full and equal partner. He has been a member of the European Parliament since 2004 and has served as its Deputy President. | Source: David Plas, European People's Party (EPP), flickr ©.

In the mid-1990s, Poles looked on their neighbours in eastern Germany with astonishment. On their way to western Germany, they could only marvel at the huge, sprawling building sites between the Oder and the Elbe. But news

20 | Cited in Bartosz T. Wieliński, "Mogliśmy być w niej wcześniej" (We could have been in it sooner), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 29 Apr 2014.

of unemployment, industrial wastelands and emigration to western German regions provided for incredulity. Citizens of the former GDR who experienced communism will certainly disagree, but, from a Polish perspective, the GDR was paradise. There was also the question of how Poland would have looked if as much money had been invested there as the Federal Republic of Germany issued for development between Rügen and the Ore Mountains.



The German-Polish rapprochement would have been more difficult to achieve without the diplomatic skills of Foreign Ministers Bronisław Geremek (r.) and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. | Source: © Heinrich Sanden, picture alliance.

Bronisław Geremek, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland who had a tragic accident in 2008, called the transformation of bilateral relations a “miracle”.²¹ One of his predecessors as Minister of Foreign Affairs, historian Władysław Bartoszewski, made it even clearer: “If someone would have said 60 years ago, as I stood hunched on the parade ground of the Auschwitz concentration camp, that I would have friends who were German, citizens of a democratic and friendly country, I would have taken him for a fool.”²² Personalities played a crucial role on both sides of this reconciliation. Without the tenacity and courage of people like Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Helmut Kohl, without the diplomatic skills of Polish Foreign Ministers Krzysztof

21 | Bronisław Geremek, “Polityka godziwa” (Moderate policy), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18 May 2004.

22 | Cited in Bartosz T. Wieliński, “Polska i Niemcy. Starzy przyjaciele i młodzi awanturnicy” (Poland and Germany. Old friends and young hooligans), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13 Aug 2009.

Skubiszewski, Bartoszewski, Geremek and Genscher, without the determination and understanding of many like-minded people, the German-Polish rapprochement would have been more difficult. But the list of meritorious personalities is not limited to heads of government and ministers. Mayors, teachers and activists from both societies cast their prejudices down and came to know their neighbours better.

POINTS OF CONTENTION

It may have seemed at the time of Poland's accession to the EU in May 2004 that Warsaw and Berlin would settle all disputes in a civilised manner as members of one family. However, these hopes were in vain. By 2002, a public conflict had developed. The United States under President George W. Bush prepared to invade Iraq because they accused the regime of Saddam Hussein of supporting the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda, which was responsible for the attacks on 11 September, and developing weapons of mass destruction. The Schröder government did not want to join the alliance formed for the war effort, instead seeking proximity to Paris and Moscow. In Poland, the public interpreted the German stance as an attempt to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States, to divide NATO and protect the Iraqi dictator.

In Poland, the public interpreted the German stance on the Iraq war in 2003 as an attempt to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States.

For Poland, the North Atlantic Alliance and its ties to the United States are sacred. They are considered an insurance policy in the event of a conflict with Russia. Because of this, the country ruled by President Kwaśniewski and Prime Minister Miller decided to lend its support to Washington. Elite Polish soldiers and troops were deployed to Iraq. At the time, Polish citizens knew nothing of the secret agreement finalised in 2002 between the Polish and U.S. intelligence agencies. It authorised the Americans to build a secret prison for Iraqi prisoners on the site of the training center in Stare Kiejkuty. This was only brought to light in 2005 by an American journalist, and the public has only recently learned of the harrowing details.

Transatlantic relations provided the backdrop for further differences. The new government led by the Law and Justice Party in 2005 with President Lech Kaczyński soon afterwards brought about media-led taunts. This was triggered by a satirical piece in the newspaper *taz* in June 2006: "Jarosław [Kaczyński] lives with his own mother, but at least it's without a marriage certificate."²³ The line "Poland's new potato", published in the "Villains who want to rule the world" series, reinforced the notion that Germans are not exactly well known for their humour. This post appeared again in the press kit President Kaczyński had received in preparation for the Weimar Triangle anniversary summit. After reading this, he cancelled his visit to Germany, officially citing health reasons. The former foreign minister compared the *taz* with the Nazi newspaper *Der Stürmer* and the Polish public prosecutor's office opened an investigation against the German author for insulting a head of state. When he became Prime Minister in July 2006, Jarosław Kaczyński set about depriving the German minority of their privileges. The manoeuvres of the German Navy in the Baltic Sea, which caused a Polish ferry to have to change its course, were inflated to the point of scandal.²⁴



Jarosław Kaczyński, chairman of the national-conservative PiS and former Polish Prime Minister, is known to criticise Germany primarily to score domestic points. | Source: Piotr Drabik, flickr ©©.

23 | Peter Köhler, "Polens neue Kartoffel", *taz.die tageszeitung*, 26 Jun 2006.

24 | Cf. Andrzej Kraśnicki, Jr. and Bartosz T. Wieliński, "Polski protest w sprawie Bundesmarine" (Polish protest of German Navy issues), 24 Aug 2006.

But the most acrimonious dispute was in regards to history. It involved claims that the Prussian Trust made against Poland, which demanded reparations for expellees for their property they had to leave behind in Polish territory. At the same time, the discussions on the Centre Against Expulsions, which was supported by the Federation of Expellees, emerged. Regardless of who ruled in Warsaw, those projects would face resistance in Poland. If

After 1989, post-war expulsions and the handling of these legacies were the subject of intense debates.

descendants of erstwhile expellees were to have received reparations, this would have turned the post-war European order on its head. After 1989, post-war expulsions and the handling of these legacies were the subject of intense scholarly and societal debate. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that many Polish citizens and communities look after German cultural monuments or cemeteries.

With regard to the Centre Against Expulsions, the Polish argument was that an exhibition project on all expulsions that took place in the 20th century – as advocated by Erika Steinbach – would cover over the singularity of Nazi crimes. It was feared that this project would be a manipulation of history. The German side showed understanding with these concerns. Schröder had already announced that Berlin would support Warsaw if the question of reparations for expellees should be tried before a court of law. The construction of the “Centre” was challenged outright by the German Left. When Angela Merkel became Chancellor, she reiterated Schröder’s commitment.²⁵ She also decided it would not be the Federation of Expellees which would commemorate the expulsions, but that the federal government would build a museum for the displaced. However, this was not enough for the Kaczyński government in power at the time.

In December 2006, when the Prussian Trust announced it would file suit against Poland with the European Court of Human Rights, Polish Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga said the border treaty with Germany would have to be renegotiated. In June 2007, the Polish government tried to torpedo the negotiations on the EU Reform Treaty of Lisbon.

25 | Cf. Bartosz T. Wieliński, “Rząd Niemiec po stronie Polski” (The German Federal Government on Poland’s side), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 5 Aug 2006.

The atmosphere of German-Polish relations rapidly deteriorated and was heading towards a low point. The mutual accusations were similar to those of the 1960s and 1970s: that the Germans were revanchists and still had not finished with Nazism.



The chemistry is good: German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the new President of the European Council Donald Tusk have a friendly relationship. After Tusk's election as Prime Minister in 2007, bilateral relations experienced a noticeable improvement. | Source: European People's Party (EPP), flickr ©.

OUTLOOK

In October 2007, Donald Tusk and his Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) emerged victorious from the elections. The climate of bilateral relations improved noticeably. Progress began to be made on the individual issues briefly discussed here. The European Court of Human Rights dismissed the suit filed by the Prussian Trust. Two renowned historians from Poland were invited to participate in the scholarly committee that prepared the museum exhibition on expellees. Two years ago, Angela Merkel made known in an interview with the *Gazeta Wyborcza* that she was a fan of Poland. This statement very probably stems from her youth, when she often visited the neighbouring country on holiday. There, she felt a freedom that would have been unthinkable in the GDR. Since the beginning of her chancellorship, she has travelled to Poland more than ten times on official state visits. The fact that Merkel and Tusk have a personal chemistry was certainly conducive to strengthening the bilateral relationship.

At the European level, the two countries have formed an informal alliance. Germany supported Poland in the EU budget negotiations. In return, Tusk joined in with Berlin's position to focus on consolidating budgets and initiating reforms in the face of the financial crisis. The bond between the capitals was so strong that some journalists posed the idea that Poland should replace the increasingly ailing France in the Franco-German engine of the EU. "Poland has ceased to be a problem; it now solves problems,"²⁶ was said among diplomats. The image of Poland in Germany has changed for the better. "Polish economy" no longer means chaos, rather order, stability and growing prosperity. The culmination of this rapprochement was the choice of Donald Tusk as the President of the European Council. Without the support of the Chancellor, this would not have been possible.

However, the picture is clouded by the crisis in Ukraine. At the political and public level, people in Poland prefer a more explicit stance towards the Kremlin. They seem to be rather disappointed with the approach of the German government as they do not believe the Russian president will be pacified with words alone. German business relations with Russia are also a source of criticism. In the eyes of the Polish people, the Germans are increasingly seen as those who do not stand on the side of Ukrainians fighting for their freedom. If Berlin is truly perceived in this way, this could negatively impact the future of German-Polish relations. Currently, anti-German voices are gaining in popularity in the political arena. Therefore, it is surely time to once again be more proactive if what has been achieved together over the past 25 years is to be continued.

A REVIEW OF (WEST) GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Peter Molt

Over the years, there have been regular calls for Germany to have an active policy on Africa, combined with criticisms that Africa is neglected by German politicians. Hans-Ulrich Klose MP (SPD), one of the country's most experienced foreign politicians, was being self-critical when he remarked that Africa is viewed as a problem continent that only has a role in terms of development cooperation and humanitarian aid.¹ According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), over 50 per cent of bilateral development aid now goes to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.² The German Bundestag regularly debates the situation there; the region has been visited by the German President, Chancellor and Foreign Minister; and non-governmental organisations and partnerships are involved in countless projects. Germany provides relatively high levels of aid and is involved in a wide range of activities – so why is it considered to be less committed and largely ineffectual in comparison with not just the USA, but also France and Britain? One reason lies in the global political situation at the time when the Federal Republic of Germany began to be involved in Western development cooperation.



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- 1 | Cf. Horst Köhler (ed.), *Schicksal Afrika. Denkanstöße und Erfahrungsberichte*, Hamburg, 2010, 55. Klose was First Mayor of Hamburg from 1974 to 1981. From 1983 to 2013 he was a member of the German Bundestag. In 1998 he became chairman of the foreign policy committee and was its vice-chairman from 2002 to 2013.
- 2 | Cf. Gerd Müller, "Die neue Afrika-Politik des BMZ", Bundestagsrede, 21 Mar 2014, <http://bmz.de/20140321-1> (accessed 23 Aug 2014).



Beginning of development cooperation: in 1961 the German Ministry of Development Cooperation was founded. Walter Scheel (FDP) was the first Minister of Development Cooperation, pictured here on the reception for the Foreign and Economic Minister of Gabun, Jean Hilaire Aubamé and Gustave Auguilé, on 18 May 1962 in Bonn. | Source: Fumey, Bundesarchiv, F012936-0011 ©©©.

DEVELOPMENT POLICY – SHARED OR SOLE RESPONSIBILITY?

In the summer of 1961 (so before the BMZ was set up in November of that year), the German federal government decided to get involved in international development cooperation by contributing 4.35 billion Deutsche Marks, a significant sum at the time. It also decided to join the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which was set up within the restructured OECD to coordinate international development assistance, and the IDA, the World Bank's subsidiary for funding the world's least developed countries.³ This was primarily a result of pressure from the U.S. government. At the time, Britain and the USA were struggling with a large balance of payment deficits

3 | On 14 December 1960, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which had administered the U.S.-financed Marshall Plan for Europe's recovery since 1948, became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the DAC was set up within it to coordinate development cooperation. The International Development Association (IDA) was established in September 1960 as a subsidiary of the World Bank. It is funded by the contributions of its members and grants concessionary loans with terms of 25 to 40 years, interest-free repayments for five to ten years and interest rates of 1.25 to 2.8 per cent.

because of the need to provide foreign aid and station their troops on foreign soil. Germany was enjoying a balance of payment surplus at the time, so it was asked to make a corresponding contribution. However, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer raised fundamental objections to this, as a German contribution to the cost of troop deployments was an uncomfortable reminder of the occupation costs. Instead, he offered to make a significant contribution to international development aid.

However, this burden-sharing was not without precedent. Since the 1950s, one of the aims of French policy had been to ensure Germany's involvement in "developing" the colonies. The question of how to deal with the colonies was raised during the negotiations prior to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). The German Foreign Office was opposed to involving the colonies in the EEC. It felt that this would implicate Germany in colonial policies and lessen the pro-German sentiment prevalent in developing countries that had already gained their independence. The German Ministry for Economic Affairs saw it as an obstacle to its favoured European free trade zone. Adenauer finally decided to give in to French demands for a development fund for the colonies because he was not prepared to let the EEC stumble over this hurdle. Germany shouldered one third of the cost of this fund, which was dominated by French interests until the signing of the Lomé Convention in 1975.

Under initial pressure from the Allies, the years that followed saw German development cooperation growing as part of German foreign policy. Its aim was for the Federal Republic to fully return to the family of nations and hence ensure non-recognition of the GDR in line with the Hallstein Doctrine. In this, it was supported by wavering but nevertheless positive public opinion. When diplomatic relations were gradually initiated with the new nations, Bonn promised to support them in their economic development, as long as they recognised the Federal Republic of Germany as the sole representative of the German people. This caused concern among the former colonial powers, which were keen to ensure that their former colonies were still largely

Following diplomatic relations with the new nations, the Federal Republic of Germany promised economic development, as long as it was recognised as the sole representative of the German people.

bound to them in a kind of informal empire. So Germany's development policy began to concentrate on working with Asian and Latin American countries and it initially had only limited influence in Sub-Saharan Africa.



The first group of development aid workers from the German Development Service, founded on 24 June 1963, went on its mission to Tanzania only one year later in 1964. | Source: © Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst, dpa-Bildarchiv, picture alliance.

The story of the beginnings of German development policy was reflected in its structure. It was only able to pursue its objectives within a bilateral framework. So West German contributions to multilateral aid were limited to those required as a result of its membership of international organisations. This meant that German influence continued to be weak in the region. Another consequence was that funding was handed out in a blanket fashion, because all new countries seeking it had to be given an equal share. A plethora of small projects were set up, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their effectiveness was limited, largely because their focus was all too often on areas where there was little chance of success but which were important to governments for political reasons. Due to solicitation from the U.S. government, Germany was also obliged to work with countries whose former colonial masters had grappled with political problems, such as the “socialist” regimes in Guinea and Ghana, or the political confusion that beset Sudan.

A SHIFT TO NEEDS-BASED DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The first grand coalition in 1966 and the change of government in 1969 provided Germany with a new direction for its development cooperation. When Erhard Eppler (SPD) took over as minister for economic cooperation in 1968, he pitted himself against the domination of foreign policy and foreign trade interests. He wanted an autonomous development policy which focused on the needs of the developing countries and which gave them the tools to build their own political systems, societies and economies. His views were strongly influenced by the report of the Pearson Commission (set up by the World Bank), which concluded that the United Nations' First Development Decade had failed. He was also swayed by criticisms of the newly-established Third World Movement. The idea was to help developing countries to catch up by increasing official development assistance (ODA); responding to calls for a new international economic order; paying attention to the imminent depletion of natural global

resources and by shifting away from the industrialised world's policies for unbridled growth. This meant a policy of cooperation between North and South and a greater role

Development cooperation was to be distanced from major infrastructure projects and industrialisation and focus on reducing poverty.

for the United Nations. Germany had been a member since 1973 and it was now time for it to become more actively involved. Development cooperation was to be distanced from major infrastructure projects and industrialisation and focus on reducing poverty by improving small-scale farming, creating a welfare structure to bridge the gap between the haves and the have-nots, establishing a policy on population and providing food aid. Eppler believed this would make a greater contribution to world peace than military interventions.

But he faced a great many obstacles when trying to execute his plans. For the Marxist-inspired student movement of 1968, his proposals were just a distraction from the true goal – a socialist government of the people, if necessary achieved through revolution. The German Foreign Office, led by Walter Scheel (FDP) after 1969, considered his ideas

to be harmful to German interests,⁴ and in economic circles they were accused of being anti-business. Lack of support for his plans within the German government led Eppler to step down in 1974, but his ideas continued to be influential. He succeeded in expanding the powers of the BMZ, cementing development policy as an autonomous policy area and communicating to the public at large a view of development policy as an overriding humanitarian and ethical obligation. As a result, since the 1980s, the public debate in Germany on the direction of development policy has been much more strongly imbued with humanitarian and ethical considerations than in the USA, France or Britain.



More international responsibility: The Federal Republic of Germany was accepted to the United Nations in 1973, marked by the flag ceremony in front of the UN Headquarters in New York. With Germany's UN membership, the range of development cooperation increased. | Source: Joachim Spremberg, German Federal Archive, 183-M0925-306 ©🇩🇪.

However, Eppler's failure was more a result of global politics than of internal opposition and lack of funding. Other major donors such as the USA, France, Japan and the UK had their own ideas. The oil crisis of 1973 led to a glut of petrodollars that needed to be invested – often in major projects which later proved to be unviable. There was also significant opposition from African leaders. In the early 1970s, Sub-Saharan Africa was dominated by dictators such as Mobutu, Ahidjo, Houphouet-Boigny, Sekou Touré

4 | For example, Secretary of State Peter Hermes (1975-1979) under Foreign Minister Genscher (Peter Hermes, *Meine Zeitgeschichte 1922-1987*, Paderborn, 2007, 222-223).

and Idi Amin, to name but a few. There was no way that African leaders and the new elites were going to renounce industrialisation, plantations and mining. They believed these to be the economic future of their countries and their own personal cash cows, in contrast to the unproductive agriculture practised by peasant farmers and nomads. Towards the end of the colonial era, an elite that was imbued by the experience of the developmental efforts of late colonialism believed in the omnipotence of bureaucracy and the state; in developing and supervising a “backward” population that needed educating; and in maintaining their own income and status as the privileged “ruling class”^{5,6}. The endogenous reasons that impeded Africa’s development were underestimated.

On top of this, for a variety of reasons Western donors made deals with authoritarian regimes and came up with solutions that either served their own interests or arose from patronising post-colonial attitudes. The few reform-minded governments had little scope for developing the “right” policies, and indeed there was heated debate about the content of these policies. In the 1970s it became clear how difficult it was to effect social and political change from the outside. The shift towards the basic needs strategy promoted by World Bank President Robert McNamara was an escape to a minimalist strategy designed to – at the very least – improve the lives of the rural and urban poor. But when this also miscarried, after 1980 the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for all intents and purposes returned to its structural adjustment strategy, which linked the granting of loans to programs of economic reform and modernisation.

In practical terms, Germany’s development policies in Sub-Saharan Africa remained remarkably unaffected by this shift in aims and strategy. Official policy statements and strategic concepts only had a limited impact on the

5 | Andreas Eckert, *Herrschen und Verwalten. Afrikanische Bürokraten, staatliche Ordnung und Politik in Tanzania 1920-1970*, Munich, 2007, 265; Hartmut Elsenhans, *Abhängiger Kapitalismus oder bürokratische Entwicklungsgesellschaft. Versuch über den Staat in der Dritten Welt*, Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1981.

6 | Cf. i.a. Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940. The Past of the Present*, Cambridge, 2002.

project work, and often their effects were felt so late that the next paradigm shift was already on the horizon while negotiations were underway with the recipient country. The fact that development cooperation remained practical and

While the former colonial nations had already experiences with Western politics, administration and business, technical cooperation was strongly influenced by German concepts.

project-oriented was also due to the conditions that had prevailed since the 1960s. The key areas were still covered by the successors to the colonial administrations. So the Germans focused on projects whose technical quality made them stand out from those of other donors and which, more importantly, proved their worth to the host government. While the former colonial nations were already experienced in dealing with Western practices in the areas of politics, administration and business (even if this was mainly in the economic interest of the mother country), technical cooperation was strongly influenced by German concepts⁷ of dual education, model villages and rural cooperatives. But there was a failure to understand how these kinds of models would only rarely succeed because of the very different social structures and mentalities involved and the competition with other donors. The only exception to this was the dual education model. Capital assistance was mainly focused on infrastructure projects. German development cooperation kept its distance from large-scale industrial projects because of the bad experiences of the past. It also kept away from the construction of major dams for power and irrigation because of the environmental and resettlement problems they entailed.⁸

The rivalry between West and East Germany took on a new aspect when the two states were admitted to the United Nations.⁹ The GDR focused its efforts on states that supported the Soviet bloc, such as Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. It also supported the independence movements in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Meanwhile, West Germany assisted countries with a more Western,

7 | Exceptions to this were the Nangbeto Dam in Togo, built between 1984 and 1987, and the Manantali Dam, built in Mali between 1981 and 1987.

8 | Cf. *ibid.*, 202-204.

9 | Cf. Rolf Hofmeier, "Five Decades of German-African relations. Limited Interests, low political profile and substantial aid donor", in: Ulf Engel and Robert Kappel (eds.), *Germany's Africa Policy Revisited. Interests, images and incrementalism*, Münster, 2002, 44.

market-oriented approach. But overall, the West German government's interest in Africa continued to fade during the later years of the socialist/liberal coalition and under Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Internationally, Bonn supported the structural adjustment programs set up by the World Bank and IMF and the European Economic Community's Africa Programme, but it continued to respect the particular French and British spheres of influence.

The importance of development policy continued to wane after reunification in 1990. This was certainly a consequence of the end of the rivalry between the two German states.

After its reunification in 1990, Germany had new responsibilities in Central and Eastern Europe, thus tying up its financial capital.

In addition, Germany now had new responsibilities in Central and Eastern Europe which were tying up its human and financial capital. From 1987/1988 to 1998, the ratio of development aid to GDP fell from 0.53 to 0.26 per cent. This had an impact on Sub-Saharan Africa. With the end of apartheid in South Africa (Germany's main economic partner) and Namibian independence, the Federal Republic no longer had any specific foreign interests in the region. The German Foreign Office formulated its Accra Guidelines and certain regional concepts, but they were not "easy to manage or implement and of no use as guidelines for developing specific strategies".¹⁰ In practical terms, the BMZ took over the lead in terms of concepts and policies. In contrast to political trends in Germany, it was confronted with the efforts of the United Nations, the European Union and other international organisations to use the end of the Cold War as a new impetus for development policy and as a chance to create a "new development architecture".

DEVELOPMENT POLICY AS GLOBAL STRUCTURAL POLICY

It fell to the SPD/Greens coalition created in 1998 to tackle the debt relief initiative for heavily debt-ridden countries, the new European Union agreement with the ACP countries (Cotonou Agreement) and above all the UN's Millennium Declaration and Goals. In line with the global trend, development policy was now to be treated as a distinct policy area that should evolve into a global structural and

10 | Ulrich Golaszinski, *Subsahara-Afrika. Die Wiederentdeckung eines Kontinents*, Bonn, 2007.

peace policy. This new development architecture certainly related to global development cooperation, but its focus was on the crisis-ridden region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis agreed on an action plan for Africa. The EU also drew up a strategy for Africa. The German government supported all these initiatives, partly because it was keen for Germany to be seen in its new role as a responsible global power. But in practice, this new direction in development policy had little effect, and it was sorely lacking in funding.



Development policies of industrial nations: The G8 (now G7) introduced an Africa Action Plan in 2002. On the agenda: debt reduction, promotion of security, strengthening of economic growth. The group underlined these goals again at the G8 Summit in Lough, Northern Ireland in 2013. | Source: Tom Robinson, Crown, UK MoD, flickr ©©©©.

The OECD's Development Assistance Committee criticised the poor implementation of this reorientation in its 1999 and 2002 peer review reports. According to these reports, German development cooperation had continued to focus on large infrastructure projects, supporting the market economy, capacity building for institutions and the growth of the private sector. It was still very labour-intensive; there was no sharing of technical assistance with other donors; and there was only limited employment of local staff. Little use was made of the capacities of the recipient countries' administrations, so they were not given an opportunity to grow stronger. Technical help was still mainly provided by German experts, so it was too broad-based and too expensive. Programs were only rarely given

budget support or funded jointly with other donors. The practice of keeping key areas of programs, and particularly their financial management, in their own hands went against the principle of individual responsibility for the recipients. Local representation – which should involve liaison between donors and where decisions should be made in conjunction with the recipients – continued to be inadequate as decisions were still being made centrally in Germany. German development assistance activities were still being distributed in the same way, by region and according to country categories. There was no obvious adjustment in line with Africa's growing development needs and the strategy of combating poverty.¹¹

The lack of focus on Sub-Saharan Africa also attracted criticism within Germany itself. The “Memorandum on a New Foundation for Germany's Africa Policy”, written by German experts on Africa, called for an Africa policy based on a concept of structural stability that finally bid farewell to over-optimistic formats and clichés of disaster.¹² If anything was to be achieved, it was time for development cooperation to include more international (and particularly European) cooperation and coordination. It needed to be more political, promote human rights and democracy more consistently, and above all conduct political dialogue. It had to be linked to security, agriculture, foreign trade, environmental and international cultural policy in order to create coherence. These arguments were well received, but the classification of Sub-Saharan countries fuelled a great deal of controversy. Alongside countries that were potentially in transition, there were also low-income countries with few opportunities to develop and hence limited

German experts on Africa called for a development cooperation which is linked to security, foreign trade, environmental and international cultural policy.

11 | Cf. DAC-OECD, *Development Co-operation Review Series. Germany*. No. 29, Paris, 1998; DAC-OECD, “Development Cooperation Review Germany Development Cooperation Review. Main Findings and Recommendations”, *DAC Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2001, 12 and 17.

12 | Cf. Ulf Engel, Robert Kappel, Stephan Klingebiel, Stefan Mair, Andreas Mehler and Siegmar Schmidt, “Memorandum zur Neubegründung der deutschen Afrikapolitik. Frieden und Entwicklung durch strukturelle Stabilität”, Institut für Afrikanistik der Universität Leipzig, Oct 2000, http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/afrika_memorandum.pdf (accessed 2 Sep 2014). For the critics' view see Cord Jakobeit and Heribert Weiland (eds.), *Das 'Afrika-Memorandum' und seine Kritiker. Eine Dokumentation*, Hamburg, 2002.

prospects. According to the Memorandum, it should be assumed that around 50 per cent of countries had almost no prospects of economic growth and therefore no foundation for building structural stability. In individual cases it was possible to provide assistance for establishing institutions and capacity building, but otherwise assistance was necessarily limited to emergency aid. This statement triggered some strong protests.¹³ However, the conclusions of the Memorandum harked back to the modernisation theory in its belief that market economy reforms alone are not enough. It claimed that lasting structural stability can only be achieved through a combination of political and economic reforms. But neither the authors nor the critics could say how this should happen under the prevailing circumstances and with the instruments that were available.

The German government reacted to the debate, with the Foreign Office and BMZ putting forward two concepts for a German policy on Africa.¹⁴ These two separate programs showed that the ranks of experts, governmental departments and parties all had different criteria and opinions when it came to Africa policy. After the decades in which Germany's Africa policy was oriented towards the expectations of France and the USA, while at the same time being required to raise Germany's profile and improve its economic interests as an exporting country, it was now difficult to find a new direction in the changed circumstances.


13 | The Memorandum drew on the indices that were available at the time. The useful Bertelsmann Transformations Index was not created until a few years later. If we evaluate the Memorandum from a modern perspective, it is clear that the general prognosis was not as wrong as it was claimed at the time, and that the overall picture of Sub-Saharan Africa has improved little since the dawn of the new millennium. In certain cases there have been some serious anomalies that are linked to the fact that "no other systems are more vulnerable to crisis and conflict than Africa's numerous pseudo-democracies, which at best have adapted themselves to the calls for electoral democracy from their development aid donors". Denis Tull, "Deutsche Afrikapolitik. Ein Beitrag zu einer überfälligen Debatte", 2014, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10574.pdf> (accessed 28 Aug 2014).

14 | Cf. *BMZ aktuell*, *BMZ Konzeption für Afrika*, 2001. Also as an article by Federal Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul in *E+Z*, issue 42, 2001, 158 et sqq. Expanded in the BMZ position paper on development cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa, *BMZ aktuell* 091, *Neue Politische Dynamik in Afrika*, 2004.

So the restructuring of development policy only progressed around the peripheries, such as by amalgamating organisations that handled personnel and practical cooperation.¹⁵ Project-based assistance was only converted into sectoral program-based assistance and budget support at a low level. Firstly, this was because it was only possible for new commitments, and secondly because the departments and ministries of the partner countries that were closely involved in the projects were inclined to be reticent. This also applied to the much-heralded New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which was supposed to advance Sub-Saharan Africa through closer cooperation and reciprocal monitoring of whether the Millennium Development Goals were being fulfilled in Africa.¹⁶

Fig. 1

Selected donor countries in 2013, ODA compared to 2012, in billion U.S. dollars



Source: Own illustration modified from BMZ, "Geber im Vergleich 2013 – Veränderungen gegenüber 2012", as at 22 Apr 2014, http://bmz.de/de/ministerium/zahlen_fakten/geber/index.html (accessed 4 Nov 2014) with temporary data from OECD and DAC.

15 | In 2011 the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, the Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst and Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung GmbH merged to create the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

16 | The NEPAD Secretariat was supported by GIZ.

In 2002, 40 out of 49 Sub-Saharan countries received developmental assistance. This was to be whittled down to 26 “partner and priority countries”. The BMZ expected German development cooperation to increase in effectiveness. It was spread thinly across a number of countries, so this was to be achieved by making it more focused. In 2002, 40 out of 49 Sub-Saharan countries received developmental assistance. This was to be whittled down to 26 “partner and priority countries”. But this proved to be only partially successful. In 2012, 38 countries were still receiving bilateral ODA subsidies for ongoing projects from the BMZ budget or that of other ministries. And German development cooperation in the individual countries still at best represented ten per cent (and generally only five per cent) of the annual payments made by DAC member countries,¹⁷ so they inevitably had little impact.

Interest in the new program-based cooperation and the concentration on African countries was also limited in the state’s organisations for implementing these policies. The “baskets” funded by numerous donors and implementation via authorities and organisations in the partner countries helped to reduce staffing requirements, but this also resulted in a reduction in practical engagement and capacity, often forcing experts to take on the thankless task of being watchdogs. So there was a strong tendency to continue with technical projects such as water supply, waste disposal, transportation and education. Reports on recent years have shown that the majority of funding still goes to project-based assistance and that some 15 per cent of promised funding never actually materialises. Germany’s share of development aid to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa was less than that of other donors.¹⁸

But change is on the horizon. The German government can no longer work on the assumption that security policy in Africa should be left to the USA, France and Britain. Germany will have to step up and be more involved in stabilis-

17 | Cf. OECD Aid Statistics, “Net Disbursements of ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa by Donor”, <http://oecd.org/dac/stats/TAB29e.xls> (accessed 11 Nov 2014).

18 | In contrast to the figures initially quoted (see n. 2), the payments made to 35 sub-Saharan countries in 2012 represented just 38 per cent of bilateral aid. Germany’s share of development aid for this region was less than the average for the DAC countries.

ing the region against the threats posed by the international drugs and arms trades and Islamic terrorism. With one eye on public opinion at home, the German government is keen to avoid direct military intervention wherever possible, but it supports the efforts of the European Commission and the security structures of the African Union.¹⁹

Guiding principles of German development policy

1. Reducing poverty
2. Securing peace and achieving democracy
3. Steering globalisation in a fair direction
4. Protecting the environment

Main topics and areas of work

- Poverty reduction
- Promoting education
- Securing peace and human rights
- Strengthening health care and social security systems, fighting AIDS, addressing population dynamics
- Fostering good governance
- Protecting the climate (adaptation and mitigation), preserving the environment and natural resources, promoting renewable energy, energy efficiency as well as the issue of raw materials and raw materials initiative (GERI)
- Discussing migration as opportunity for development
- Addressing religion and development
- Facilitating sport for development
- Promoting urban and rural development as well as food security
- Expanding economic cooperation and financing of development as well as transition assistance

Source: BMZ, "Was wir machen. Themen", http://bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen (accessed 29 Oct 2014).

INTERIM RESULT: 55 YEARS OF GERMAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Germany is on the brink of greater political involvement in Africa. The political significance of Sub-Saharan Africa has soared because of population growth, a security situation that is beset by open and latent conflicts and the growing flood of migrants to Europe. German security and

19 | A military cooperation in the form of training for African countries has been in place since 1961, but it has never been of political significance. This also applies to the deployment of German troops in Somalia in 1993/1994 and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2006.

development policy will have to focus even more strongly on this region in the years to come. What can we learn from this?



Not every development project is a success. From the 1970s to the 1990s, projects to support small farms have strengthened government control systems instead. | Source: Sustainable Sanitation Alliance (SuSanA), GIZ, flickr ©.

In the early days, German development policy on Sub-Saharan Africa focused on introducing tried-and-tested German models such as dual education and the cooperative system. Large infrastructure projects were also initiated. The results of this approach have been mixed, particularly if we consider their unanticipated or unintended side effects. So, for example, the rural development projects that ran from the 1970s to the 1990s contributed to governments increasing their control over small farmers and setting so many restrictions that they were stripped of all motivation.²⁰ Another example is vocational training. The German model of vocational schools was rolled out in Africa. It has indeed created some advanced technical colleges, but it has failed to develop a broad base of skilled workers and small business-owners. And there is still no effective coordination of the bilateral activities of the various donors. The DAC was originally established with this intention, but it simply satisfied itself with introducing some very general

20 | Cf. Peter Molt, "Politik und landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Afrika südlich der Sahara", in: M. Domrös et al. (eds.), *Festschrift für Wendelin Klaer zum 65. Geburtstag*, Mainzer Geographische Studien Vol. 34, Mainz, 1990, 333-350.

standard procedures. These found their way into the Paris Declaration as guidelines which proved to be more political than practical. Budget support combined with a complex bureaucratic system for monitoring and approval was proposed as the preferred form of development cooperation.

This was proposed despite the fact that it would often inevitably lead to centralised bureaucracy being reinforced, and that it could only be partially justified.²¹

Table 1

State visits of German Federal Presidents in Sub-Saharan Africa

Federal President	Year	Country
Theodor Heuss (1949-1959)	—	—
Heinrich Lübke (1959-1969)	1962	Guinea
		Senegal
	1964	Ethiopia
	1966	Madagascar
		Kenya
		Cameroon
		Togo
		Mali
	1969	Côte d'Ivoire
		Niger
Gustav Heinemann (1969-1974)	—	—
Walter Scheel (1974-1979)	—	—
Karl Carstens (1979-1984)	1983	Côte d'Ivoire
		Niger
Richard von Weizsäcker (1984-1994)	1988	Mali
		Nigeria
		Zimbabwe
		Somalia
	1992	Tanzania

Federal President	Year	Country
Roman Herzog (1994-1999)	1996	Ethiopia
	1998	South Africa
		Namibia
Joahannes Rau (1999-2004)	2002	Mali
		South Africa
Horst Köhler (2004-2010)	2004	Sierra Leone
		Benin
		Djibouti
		Ethiopia
	2006	Mozambique
		Madagascar
		Botswana
	2007	Ghana
	2008	Uganda
		Nigeria
Christian Wulff (2010-2012)	—	—
Joachim Gauck (seit 2012)	2013	Ethiopia
		South Africa

Source: Own research on the impact of the Federal Presidents, http://bundespraesident.de/EN/TheGermanFederalPresidents/thegermanfederalpresidents-node.html;jsessionid=40793D6BF07E03D9647AA98B7AB8E9E6.2_cid388 (accessed 11 Nov 2014).

German development cooperation has always treated Sub-Saharan Africa as of secondary importance. It has also been notably fragmented and random in the way it selected its spheres of activity.²² Its political influence has been mini-

22 | In an analysis of German development policy over 15 years ("Germany's Development Policy since 1998"), in: Hanns W. Maull (ed.), *Germany's Uncertain Power. Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*. Basingstoke, 2006, 233-246), the author wrote: "In relation to its poverty and unresolved problems, Sub-Saharan Africa has been given inadequate attention in German development cooperation [...] It can only be ▶

mal, with the exception of Namibia. Here, former Foreign Minister Genscher should be given credit for the work he did to ensure the former colony's relatively smooth transition to independence and to ending apartheid in South Africa. So German policy on Africa can certainly be accused of some major shortcomings, but compared to the former colonial powers it has not made any catastrophic decisions. Africans tend to view German development cooperation as somewhat patronising but nevertheless reliable and technically proficient. Germany's reputation is generally good, in contrast to countries like France, which are viewed in a very negative light. Indeed, a quite virulent antipathy has developed among intellectuals and civil society.²³



Germany enjoys a good reputation in Africa. One reason is the personal commitment of former Federal President Horst Köhler. During his presidency and until now, he has been particularly interested in the German public learning about African issues, e.g. as was the case during his visit to Tanzania in 2011. | Source: © KAS Tanzania.

concluded that the BMZ's regional focus is based on a combination of explicit normative criteria, implicit strategic considerations and individual country preferences at the working level of the ministry and organisations that implement it. The normative criteria are given particular emphasis, particularly to the outside world, and the public is becoming increasingly aware of the cases that have clearly deviated from this requirement when setting the agenda. This combination of criteria heightens the credibility problem that besets German development cooperation."

23 | Cf. Tull, n. 13.

The political dimension has been lacking in the “technical” advice that was often very limited in terms of topics and financial investment. However, this has been alleviated by the political foundations’ intensive dialogue with reform-minded elites. But Germany’s representation in Africa has to date been weaker than in other parts of the world. This is in line with the earlier quote from Klose about the lack of interest on the part of politicians, who have never found enough time to create a lasting relationship and exchange of political ideas with trustworthy African partners. This cooperative dialogue cannot be contested by representatives of the various ministries responsible, but it requires the participation of members of government, parliamentarians, academics and leading representatives of social groups. In the past, Germany has rarely established close relationships with African leaders, but now these are essential.

Regrets about the lack of a clear agenda are allayed by the realisation that other Western donors have also had little success in promoting political, economic and social reform. Their forms of development cooperation have also proved to be generally unsuitable. External impulses are unlikely to succeed if a structural crisis has not led

African politicians have honed the fine art of responding diplomatically to external demands while continuing to pursue their own interests.

to an internal push for reform with a view to creating a legitimate political order of government that is effective and responsible yet subject to scrutiny.²⁴ African politicians have honed the fine art of responding diplomatically to external demands while continuing to pursue their own interests. The result is a facade of a Western-type state which conceals hybrid and blurred power structures.

24 | The ongoing constitutional debates are mainly dominated by questions of power politics, and particularly by presidential powers and terms of office. Meanwhile, issues such as parliamentary supervision, equal opportunities, electoral representation, civil rights, subsidiarity and decentralisation are being put on the back burner. See also Alexander Stroh and Christian von Soest, “Den Machterhalt im Blick. Verfassungsreformen in Subsahara-Afrika”, *GIGA Focus*, No. 4/2011, http://giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_afrika_1104.pdf (accessed 3 Sep 2014); Alexander Stroh und Johanna Klotz, “Präsidentialismus in Afrika”, *GIGA Focus*, Nr. 9/2011, http://giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_afrika_1109.pdf (accessed 3 Sep 2014).

It seems reasonable to ask to what extent the Western model of a constitutional state is really achievable in Africa's multi-ethnic, network-dominated societies. What applies to political systems is also relevant to the corresponding calls for better governance.²⁵ Which models are best suited to addressing the local conditions and making use of the potential there is to promote sustainably human development? For example, would it not be more beneficial for the region's economic and social development if small and medium-sized agricultural, commercial and industrial "entrepreneurs" were given greater scope for development? This would make it possible for individual initiatives and for the many Africans who are full of ideas to make the most of opportunities and create the kind of economic momentum²⁶ that is unlikely to be created by government investment or by domestic or foreign investors who are either constrained or sponsored by the state.

Today, African countries are extremely diverse, politically, socially and economically. And the arrival of new players such as China and India has diluted still further the often overestimated significance of Germany's development cooperation. This has always been minor compared to that of France, Britain, the USA and the international organisations. The reforms that are needed can only be inched forward from the outside, making it all the more important to develop the empathy and flexibility that are required. In this respect, German development cooperation will have to place more distance between itself and the forms and practices of previous years, as set out in the new concept for Germany's Africa policy.²⁷ Then perhaps the 1990 goal of

The arrival of new players such as China and India has watered down still further the often overestimated significance of Germany's development cooperation.

25 | Cf. Peter Molt, "Good Governance – Realistisches Konzept zur Überwindung der afrikanischen Krise?", in: Heribert Weiland, Ingrid Wehr and Mathias Seifert (eds.), *Good Governance in der Sackgasse?*, Baden-Baden, 2009, 318-337.

26 | Here we will not be addressing the widespread reports that Africa is experiencing an economic boom, which have given rise to high hopes for the continent. See also a critical view from Robert Kappel, "Afrika: weder hoffnungsloser Fall noch Aufstiegs Wunder", *Giga Focus*, Hamburg, 2013, http://giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_afrika_1309.pdf (accessed 28 Aug 2014).

27 | Cf. German government, "Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung", 21 May 2014, http://bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2014/05/2014-05-21-afrikapolitische-leitlinien.pdf (accessed 15 Sep 2014).

taking on greater global responsibility will also be achieved in Sub-Saharan Africa. But Germany and its European partners will have to continue to grapple with the issue of how to develop a realistic, forward-looking policy on Africa.

THE GERMAN G7 PRESIDENCY

AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSUME “NEW RESPONSIBILITY” IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Daniela Haarhuis

At this year’s Munich Security Conference, President Joachim Gauck called for a “new German foreign policy”. His remarks should not go unheeded, but be translated into concrete action. Opportunities for doing so originate in situations where Germany assumes leadership responsibility in international organisations and networks. One obvious case in point is Germany’s current G7 Presidency, which is due to culminate in June 2015 at the G7 Summit in Elmau, Bavaria. This paper provides insight into the significance of the G7 in terms of history and political science, outlines the current interests of the individual G7 countries with respect to various issues and suggests topics where Germany could potentially exercise its “new international responsibility”.



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THE GROUP OF SEVEN – A POWERFUL CIVIL NETWORK

There are numerous international organisations and conferences. Why should Germany make special efforts with respect to the G7? Because this forum still represents the most powerful civil network there is – notwithstanding all the prophecies of doom about the decline of the USA and its “key allies” and the much-vaunted rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). To comprehend this significance, it is worth taking a brief look back at how the G7 (Group of Seven) originated and at the development it has undergone.

From the G4 to the G8 and the G7

In 1973, the finance ministers of the UK, France, Germany and the USA met to debate coordinate economic and monetary policies at the highest level.

During the uncertain years after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the regime of fixed international exchange rates

that was linked to the price of gold, and the 1973 oil crisis, it became obvious that there was a need to better coordinate economic and monetary policies at the highest level. In March 1973, the finance ministers of the UK, France, Germany and the USA met in the White House library to debate the matter. That is why these core members of the G7 are also known as the “Library Group”.¹ In September of the same year, the Japanese finance minister joined this group, creating the G5 at finance minister level. The transition from the meeting of finance ministers, the “Library Group”, to the higher-level meeting of the Heads of State and Government (with a parallel meeting of the finance and foreign ministers) followed as a logical consequence. In 1975 and, respectively, 1976, Italy and Canada joined, creating the G7. It is a small club, the heads of state know each other well, debate informally and are on first name terms. The open political format provides the participants with an environment that is ideal for the direct exchange of ideas with their colleagues.²

In its original composition, the group represented the dominant economic powers of the time; furthermore, these states are all based on a democratic constitution and the non-U.S. members are largely “Atlantic-oriented” as well as militarily allied to the USA.³ In the 1990s, the G7 made a decision to offer membership to Russia – a step that may appear strange in retrospect, but was in fact intended to encourage Russia to develop into a democracy with a free market economy, to become involved in international formats and to accept the values and rules of the G7.⁴

1 | Gordon S. Smith, “G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance”, *CIGI Papers*, No. 6, May 2011, 4, <http://cigionline.org/sites/default/files/G20No6.pdf> (accessed 4 Oct 2014).

2 | Cf. *ibid.*

3 | Cf. *ibid.*

4 | Cf. *ibid.*

Table 1
**Demographic and selected economic data of
 G7 members, 2013**

Member	Population (2013, in million)	GDP (in trillion U.S. dollars)	GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)	Trade (2012, in trillion U.S. dollars)
Canada	36.16	1.83	51,958	0.938
France	66.03	2.73	41,421	1.211
Germany	80.62	3.63	45,085	2.676
Italy	59.83	2.07	34,619	0.932
Japan	127.34	4.90	38,492	1.607
United Kingdom	64.10	2.52	44,141	1.121
United States	316.13	16.80	54,678	3.865
European Union*	505.57	18.40	36,392	—
Russia**	143.50	2.10	14,612	0.864

* The European Commission has an observer status.

** Russia became a member of the G7 in 1998 (then G8) and was suspended in March 2014.

Source: The World Bank, "World Development Indicators",
<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variable-selection/selectvariables.aspx> (accessed 3 Nov 2014).

On 14 July 1989, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sent a letter to former French President François Mitterrand, expressing his wish to become involved with the G7. Russia subsequently acceded to the Group in 1998, and the G7 became the G8. One interesting point in this context is the Russian interpretation of the event. In a description of the situation, then incumbent President Boris Yeltsin maintained that the expansion of NATO and Russia's inclusion in the G8 as a compensatory measure were in no way linked. "Russia is one of the most influential countries in the world. Its makeup is unique. We have huge reserves of natural resources, advanced technology, an unbelievable internal market, a highly qualified labor market, and a dynamic society. That is why we were included in the Eight."⁵ There

5 | Peter I. Hajnal, *The G8 System and the G20 – Evolution, Role and Documentation*, Ashgate, 2007, 42 citing Boris Yeltsin, *Midnight Diaries*, London, 2000, 137.

is one point that should be borne in mind – also in view of current events: international recognition and specifically membership of the G7/G8 have been (and still are) of great importance to Russia. Despite assertions to the contrary, Russia felt hurt by the exclusion⁶ from the G8 in March 2014, which had become inevitable due to the crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.



Open dialogue: The small circle of participants and the informal format facilitate direct exchange among colleagues. Cooperation and joint problem solving are paramount. | Source: Tom Robinson, Crown, UK MoD, flickr [@1999](#).

G7 and G20

After Russia had been included in 1998, critical voices could be heard. Some people demanded that Russia's membership should be suspended due to its failure to meet democratic standards.⁷ Others thought that if membership was extended to Russia, this should also apply to other economically significant countries such as China and India.⁸ China itself has always rejected the idea of joining the G8, stating it would not want to find itself at the "children's table"

6 | In fact, it was not referred to as an exclusion, but phrased as follows in The Hague Declaration of 24 Mar 2014: "We will suspend our participation in the G8 until Russia changes course and the environment comes back to where the G8 is able to have a meaningful discussion."

7 | This included Senators Joe Lieberman and John McCain in 2005, cf. references in Hajnal, n. 5, 42.

8 | This included e.g. Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1996 and 2004, cf. references *ibid.*, 41.

like Russia.⁹ In fact, strategic considerations led to Russia's inclusion. For one, it was to signal to Russia that it could belong, and secondly, it was to serve as an appeasing gesture to allay Moscow's fears about the impending eastward expansion of NATO. Or, to use the words of former U.S. President Bill Clinton: "I told Yeltsin that if he would agree to NATO-expansion and the NATO-Russia partnership, I would make a commitment not to station troops or missiles in the new countries prematurely, and to support Russia's membership at the new G-8, the World Trade Organization, and other international organizations."¹⁰ The idea was to seek to counteract the crisis affecting the Russian state at the time – Russia was suffering from internal instability and rampant crime in the 1990s – from the outside by promising Russia a place in the international community in conjunction with economic support.

Crises have repeatedly caused changes within the G7 configuration, and subsequent to the financial crisis in Asia and Latin America and as a consequence of the debate over an expansion of the G8, the Group of Twenty (G20) was founded in 1999 to develop a dialogue platform for monetary policy issues within a North-South dialogue. There had also been an increasing realisation within the G8 that many monetary policy issues could no longer be resolved within the "small" G8 format. The choice of members of the G20 also gave rise to some obvious questions.¹¹ Why is Mexico included but not Chile? Why was Indonesia invited but not Malaysia? Why is South Africa the only representative of the African continent? The answer is simple: politics are guided by interests, and the chosen states share more interests with the G7 members than others.¹²

There had also been an increasing realisation within the G8 that many monetary policy issues could no longer be resolved within the "small" G8 format.

9 | More extensive details regarding China's potential inclusion *ibid.*, 41; Yi Kang Wu, "International economic system at the new era", in: Jiemian Yang (ed.), *International system in changing and shaping*, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 2006, 48-63.

10 | *Ibid.*, 41.

11 | The members are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

12 | The response regarding Mexico versus Chile is as follows: Mexico plays a bridging role on the American continent and, as a neighbouring country of the USA, is of strategic importance for that country. South Africa was to be rewarded for ▶



Global governance: Since 1999 another component does exist in the international architecture of networking, the G20. This group of industrial countries and emerging economies forms 85 per cent of the worldwide economic performance. | Source: Crown, The Prime Minister's Office, flickr @1@3@.

The G20 meetings were initially limited to meetings of the finance ministers and the central bank governors, but the next major economic and financial crisis in 2007/08 brought about the realisation that the G20 meetings should also be held at the level of the Heads of State and Government; this took place in 2008 in Washington. Like the G7, the G20 is an informal meeting without a founding treaty or permanent secretariat, the purpose of which is policy coordination. As the G20 represents approximately two thirds of the world's population, 85 per cent of global GDP and over 75 per cent of global trade,¹³ it has replaced the G7 as the "Global Economic Council of leading industrialised nations". It does, however, remain the case that it is easier for the G7 countries to coordinate their affairs, as the number of participants is smaller and, crucially, as there is a shared value base within the G7, differing from that of countries such as China and Saudi Arabia in particular.

its engagement in the fight against landmines and its support for the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Cf. on South Africa Peter Draper, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos and Keri Leicher, "South Africa's Objectives at the G20", *KAS International Reports*, 5/2010, 114 et seq., <http://kas.de/wf/en/33.19454> (accessed 27 Oct 2014). Another country sharing the same interests would be Switzerland, whose G20 membership does, however, depend on a reform of its status as a tax haven.

13 | Cf. G20, "G20 Members", https://g20.org/about_g20/g20_members (accessed 26 Oct 2014).

THE G7 SEEN FROM A POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE

As an informal forum of Heads of State and Government, the G7 is an interesting format, whose examination from a political science perspective will provide a better understanding of its role and significance. As explained

previously, the G7 came into being in response to the financial crisis of the 1970s. At the time, the realms of political science were still dominated by the remnants of "Classical Realism", while the concept of "interdependence" was on the rise and also having an impact on practical politics. Classical Realism is based on the idea that the variables of power and interest determine international relations. The standard work is *Politics Among Nations* by Hans J. Morgenthau. States play the central role; according to Morgenthau, the foundation for the responsible exercising of power is morally founded diplomacy, the concept of statesmanship, namely continuous diplomatic efforts to strive for better realisation of liberty and justice.¹⁴ One representative of this school of thought, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was involved in the founding of the G7, and consequently the elements of power and interest are reflected in an exclusive club consisting of just seven countries. This outlook sparked protest from within civil society and prompted allegations that "those in power" conduct "backroom politics" to the detriment of poorer countries.

The G7 came into being in response to the financial crisis of the 1970s. At the time, the realms of political science were still dominated by the remnants of "Classical Realism".

But the concept of interdependence has also had an impact on the G7 at its inception. Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods currency system and the first oil crisis of 1973, the individual states were engaged in devising separate solutions to overcome the crisis. Although these efforts were not successful, they did bring about the realisation that there was a need for coordination between the states. The idea of the G7 was a logical consequence. The term interdependence cropped up with increasing frequency in speeches, particularly by U.S. politicians, while the concept was also covered in academic papers in economic

14 | Cf. in detail Andreas Jacobs, "Realismus", in: Siegfried Schieder and Manuela Spindler (eds.), *Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen*, Opladen, 2003, 35-59.

and political science circles, including *The Economics of Interdependence* by U.S. economist Richard Cooper and the standard work from a political science perspective *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition* by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye. Furthered by the simultaneous CSCE process as part of a policy of détente between East and West, some doubt developed with respect to the prevalent paradigm of realism, which gave priority to high politics (= security and the importance of military might as the predominant means of conducting politics). Taking center stage instead were issues of international political economics, which also involved questions of safeguarding prosperity and resource availability. To this end, states need to engage in an exchange and work together.¹⁵



Critical voices: The exclusive character of the G7 is often grounds for criticism. For example in 2005, various civil society groups organised the "Make Poverty History March" in Edinburgh to draw attention to the needs of developing countries. | Source: Nick Thompson, flickr ©1③©.

15 | Cf. in detail Manuela Spindler, "Interdependenz", in: Schieder and Spindler, n. 14, 89-116.

From a political science perspective, the G7 is therefore a symbiosis of the theory of realism and the concept of interdependence. Besides power politics, it offers its critics the desired element of cooperation and joint problem-solving. The binding force is provided not just by economic power but also, crucially, by a common value base of democracy, liberty and the rule of law. The importance of the G7 should, however, not be overstated when examining it under the aspect of global governance, i.e. collaborative action by and distribution of tasks between states, civil society, international organisations and integration zones. In no way does the G7 represent a “global government”. Instead, it is part of a complex global governance architecture. The G7 is one further network within this larger network.¹⁶

The G7 is part of a complex global governance architecture with the basis of values of democracy, freedom and rule of law.

POLITICAL SITUATION

Before detailing the potential areas of discussion for the German G7 Presidency, past achievements and current interests of the individual G7 states will be described. Overall, there are several different phases to be distinguished, which summarise the most important issues:

The informal character of the G7 meetings and the private contacts it engenders have been of fundamental significance throughout the different phases and remain so today.¹⁷ What the meetings offer is a forum for cooperation,

16 | Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order*, Princeton, Oxford, 2004, 16, 19, 54: “Network of networks’ concept”; accordingly, the financial architecture is a combination of different networks: G7, G8, the Basel Committee, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc. Finance ministers hold regular meetings under the arrangements of the G7, G20 or the IMF Board of Governors. The G7/G8 became centers around which new groups with even more members formed, which in turn cooperated with other organisations. Consequently, networking by the G7/G8 takes place in a wide international context.

17 | Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter wrote: “[...] with an opportunity to discuss complicated matters personally, in private, rather than to depend on subordinates or diplomatic messages – or the news media – it is easier to resolve many differences. Finally, it is not politically dangerous to approve a controversial point if six other leaders do the same.” Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, Fayetteville, 1982, 538 et seq.

coordination, rapprochement, the opportunity to demonstrate leadership as well as establish links between economic, political and security issues. In terms of concrete achievements, this has, for instance, led to the establishment of the The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2001 and the decision to cancel debts in the amount of 56 billion U.S. dollars for the poorest countries of the world, which was implemented by international monetary organisations in 2005. In addition, the governments of the G7 have approved numerous action plans (for Africa, on non-proliferation, against organised crime, for energy efficiency).

Table 2

Phases and fields of action of the G7

Phase	Fields of action
First phase 1975 to 1978	Reviving economic growth
Second phase 1979 to 1982	Holding down inflation
Third phase 1983 to 1988	Rise of politics (disarmament issues)
Fourth phase 1989 to 1993	Managing the end of the Cold War (inclusion of Russia)
Fifth phase 1994 to 1997	Strengthening international institutions for globalization
Sixth phase 1998 to 2000/2001	Globalisation and development issues
Seventh Phase 2002 to 2010	The fight against terrorism
Eighth phase since 2011	Crisis management (e.g. the Arab Spring, Ukraine and increased emphasis on the fight against terror)

Source: Listing according to Hajnal, n. 5, with reference to Nicholas Bayne, *Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the 21st Century*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005; the last phase added by the author.

To determine realistic potential agenda objectives for the 2015 G7 Summit in Elmau, it is helpful to take a look at where the interests of the individual G7 countries currently lie:

United States: U.S. politics are still dominated by domestic issues. Although the Supreme Court has confirmed the healthcare reform as lawful, "Obamacare" is still a red rag to the Republicans, which is bringing out conservative

forces in full. Domestic politics are characterised by a general stance of opposition, which is occasionally overcome by single-handed actions by the President. One example is his stipulation of CO₂ reductions for U.S. coal-fired power stations. Obama is attempting to continue governing the country with this policy of so-called executive orders – strongly criticised by his political opponents – until the end of his current term in office. He has signaled his support in the area of climate policy, which the G7 can refer to in its pursuit of a new climate policy. One needs to bear in mind that this issue is set to displace the Republicans' ideological battle against the healthcare reform in the domestic arena. Nevertheless, it provides the President with an opportunity to shift this controversial issue from the minefield of domestic politics to the more congenial environment of foreign affairs in order to make his mark in this area towards the end of his term (presidential elections in November 2016).



Development politics: Because of their economic strength the G7-members bear responsibility for the developing countries. Debt relief plays an important role. Therefore, the dialogue with African Heads of State and Government, like here in Canada in June 2010, takes place on a regular basis. | Source: Crown, The Prime Minister's Office, flickr @①②③.

In a speech given at the United States Military Academy at West Point in May 2014, Obama further gave an outline of U.S. foreign policy: military action will be taken when the security of the USA is threatened; otherwise, the threshold for military operations must be set at a higher

level. Diplomacy and development assistance are assigned a central role. The U.S. President also ascribed particular importance to the Syrian issue, intensive refugee relief as well as efforts to combat climate change. A further area of outstanding current significance is the fight against the terrorist organisation Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. There is further a need to find a solution to the Ukraine issue, which will also be a factor in determining the future relationship with Russia. There are areas of overlap with German interests present here, which can find a place on the G7 agenda.

Canada: As Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper is governing with a comfortable majority and domestic policy debates are mostly restricted to penal code reform, the scope for action is wider. Furthermore, the free trade agreement between Canada and the European Union (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA) was signed in September 2014, although it still awaits approval by the EU Parliament and ratification by the European states and Canada. Traditionally, Canada has had a very close relationship with the USA, while

Due to the attack on the government district in Ottawa in October 2014, the topic of terrorism has moved to the very top of Prime Minister Harper's the agenda.

remaining intent on preserving its independence. As collaboration in NATO and the G7/G20 is valued highly and Canadian foreign policy is generally characterised by a strong reference to values (e.g. Canada has been a strong advocate of the International Criminal Court), it is likely that Harper has a special interest in the topics of development assistance and refugee relief.¹⁸ Due to the attack on the government district of the Canadian capital Ottawa in October 2014, the topic of terrorism has also moved to the very top of the agenda.

UK: There are elections to the House of Commons coming up in May 2015. This means that a potential new Prime Minister would have an immediate opportunity for his inaugural visit at the G7 summit in June. While the polls still put the opposition Labour Party in front, the incumbent David Cameron appears to be more popular among the population than opposition leader Ed Miliband, not least

¹⁸ | One important topic in Canada is the so-called Muskoka Initiative of 2010, which is due to end in 2015 and might be extended. This is a program to reduce mortality among mothers and young children.

because the UK has emerged from the economic crisis. The foreign affairs debate is currently dominated by the question of the UK's role in the world (in conjunction with the ubiquitous question of its role within the EU). In 2013, the British Parliament voted against military action for the first time after news about the use of poison gas in Syria had emerged. Previously, British forces had always played a leading role in international military action. This does not, however, alter the fact that London will be prepared to consider international initiatives put forward within the G7.

France: The country has been enduring a number of domestic and economic crises for some time, which have become even more acute in the last two years. The regional and European elections produced catastrophic results for the Socialist Party of President François Hollande and have given the populist right-wing parties a new boost. The economic reforms will remain the crucial domestic policy topic in 2015. By contrast with the

UK, France is not going through a phase of redefining its position on the world stage, but acting as Washington's new strategic

ally. France is not going through a phase of redefining its position on the world stage, but acting as Washington's new strategic ally.

ally. This is partly due to the fact that Germany is, for the time being, still reluctant to exercise its "new international responsibility". Taking advantage of this situation, France is conducting talks with the USA to resolve questions relating to Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, the Iranian nuclear program, the Syrian civil war as well as the crises in Ukraine and Crimea. Where matters of foreign affairs and security are concerned, Paris is likely to be open to initiatives within the G7 as long as France will play a sufficiently significant role and the financial burden remains within reasonable limits.

Italy: Following numerous governments formed in recent years, the cabinet around Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has only been in charge since February 2014. As in the case of France, its main task is to overcome the economic crisis and to remain in office as a stable government. Breaking up the sclerotic structures in the labour market is a particularly urgent task. But this may take Renzi's party, the Democratic Party, to a breaking point. Where its activities in foreign affairs are concerned, Italy still acts as one of the world's largest providers of troops. At the European

level Renzi was successful in having his candidate, Federica Mogherini, appointed EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Italy's good relations with Russia are also of importance. So far, Rome has not made much of an impact as a G7 initiator, but it is not likely to oppose new initiatives either, as long as the cost burden will be distributed fairly based on financial capability.

Japan: With his economic development policy, known as "Abenomics", Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is adopting a new approach in economic and foreign policy. The intention is to stimulate the stagnating economy and to position the country as a major power, with an eye on its neighbour China. However, this approach elicited international criticism when Abe paid a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. The shrine is considered a sign of Japanese nationalism, and because it involves hero worship of Japanese war dead it symbolises Japan's failure to adequately address the past, particularly where the war crimes perpetrated by Japan in World War II are concerned. By engaging

In view of China's efforts to establish itself as the leading global military power, Japan needs support from its neighbours and from the West more than ever.

in such activities, Japan risks arousing the displeasure of its international partners, particularly at the present time. In view of China's conduct in the South China Sea and the efforts made by the People's Republic to establish itself as the leading global military power, Japan needs support from its neighbours and from the West more than ever. The G7 summit in 2015 will therefore be important to Tokyo as an opportunity to demonstrate that the important players look favourably upon it.

CONCLUSIONS FOR THE AGENDA

Germany took over the G7 Presidency at the Brussels Summit in June 2014. Meetings of the foreign, finance and energy ministers are already taking place, and preparations for the summit in June 2015 are in full swing at the ministries.¹⁹ Which topics will eventually be debated in Elmau depends on the challenges that will be current at the time. The G7 meetings are still intended to provide an informal forum that leaves some scope to the Heads of State and

19 | The proposals for the agenda are intended to complement the existing topics by providing further key discussion points and impulses.

Government in determining the proceedings, particularly with respect to the issues to be discussed. Chancellor Angela Merkel has already specified some issues that Germany should promote within the G7: sustainable economic activities, quality of life and tax equity as well as a new international climate agreement and further development of the Millennium Development Goals.²⁰ Considering Germany's "new international responsibility" and the G7's current phase of "crisis management", here are some proposals for further points to be included in the agenda:

Chancellor Merkel has already specified issues for the G7: sustainable economic activities, a new international climate agreement and development of the Millennium Development Goals.

1. Strengthen community of values and the transatlantic friendship: As outlined in the overview of the individual G7 countries, four of them are facing major economic challenges. This can make them susceptible to extreme political positions (a case in point being the gains made by the populist right-wing parties in France). This gives rise to the question of the responsibility to provide leadership in international crises. Germany is not yet willing to accept this responsibility, the UK is, as of recently, no longer willing to do so, while France is currently accepting it together with the USA, who is thankful to have a partner in Europe in this context. Russia is actively conducting geopolitics in its neighbouring countries, and, as evidenced by the skirmishes in the South China Sea, China's policies vis-à-vis the outside world are also becoming more aggressive, despite its official protestations. Added to this is the fact that the situation in many Arab countries is still tense and that stability in the region is a long way off. In the countries where democratisation efforts are taking place ("Arab Spring"), this will naturally take some time. The civil war in Syria is posing a serious threat to the region and encouraging the emergence of Islamist terrorist associations.

In Germany, the situation has been complicated by the divisive impact of the NSA scandal, which has elicited justified criticism, but has unfortunately also had the

20 | Cf. The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, "G7-Agenda: nachhaltiges Wirtschaften", *Die Kanzlerin direkt*, Podcast, http://bpa.fms-dnl.eviscomedia.com/mpeg4/2014/Die_Kanzlerin_direkt_21_14.mp4 (accessed 27 Oct 2014).

Emphasising the values shared by the G7 countries combined with a commitment to the transatlantic partnership is essential.

effect of making latent anti-Americanism acceptable once again. This attitude has been fuelled further by the controversy over the so-called chlorine-washed chicken in connection with the free trade agreement currently under negotiation (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP), which, for some people, appears to be developing into an iconic object comparable to the "Juchtenkäfer" (hermit beetle) that dogged the construction of the Stuttgart main railway station.²¹ In view of this situation, emphasising the values shared by the G7 countries combined with a commitment to the transatlantic partnership is essential. Any criticism that this would encourage the formation of a bloc in opposition to Russia can be countered by pointing out that there will always be power blocs in international politics. The question for each individual is: do you prefer to live in a transatlantic liberal country or in a country dominated by Russian or Chinese-style autocratic rule?

In the context of the G7, the governments commit themselves to the shared values in each Summit Declaration. This formulaic statement must be followed up with action and appropriate, in this case positive, policy signals. It is now up to Germany to show its willingness to provide international leadership and to create a forum for commitment to a shared community of values and to the transatlantic friendship in Elmau, where the world's press will be watching.

2. **G7, NATO and Russia:** Another obvious measure in conjunction with the public commitment to values and to the transatlantic friendship would be to set security-related standards. This does not mean sabre rattling, rather re-examining the NATO military alliance and its orientation; after all, six members of the G7 are also key actors within NATO (Japan is not a member). As the issue of relations with Russia has repeatedly come

21 | In 2011, the Administrative Court Baden-Württemberg stopped the infrastructure project Stuttgart main station, which had evoked considerable public protests. It had to be reviewed whether species protection had been sufficiently taken into account. One of the potentially endangered species was the hermit beetle that became a symbol of the opponents to the project.

down to the relationship between NATO and Russia, the G7 summit is the obvious informal arena to discuss the approach to take in order to successfully de-escalate the situation.

3. Anti-corruption plan for Ukraine: Supporting Ukraine in its striving for self-determination with respect to its political orientation was the right decision. The fact remains, however, that the new President Poroshenko also originates from the old system. One of the mainstays of that system is a dizzying level of corruption, which prevents reforms from making a sustained impact in Ukraine. It is not right for democracy to depend on how much a person can or has to pay for a seat in parliament. If the G7 wishes to support Ukraine on its chosen path and take advantage of the fact that Ukrainian oligarchs are showing greater willingness to compromise out of fear of a Russian takeover, then now is the time to act. Conceivably, an anti-corruption plan could be devised in collaboration with Kiev, with regular implementation checks over the next five years. This could be linked to financial incentives for Ukraine, as already put into practice by the International Monetary Fund in connection with its loans before the crisis in Ukraine.



Controversial, but fundamental questions make the top of the agenda: refugee and development policies, the relationship to Russia and a strong community of values. During its G7 presidency, Germany takes on special responsibility. | Source: Crown, The Prime Minister's Office, flickr ©@©©.

4. Refugee relief: The fight against terrorist Islamism will be an important point on the agenda in Elmau. A declaration of commitment to better cooperation in the fight against terrorism is highly likely. But this must go hand in hand with efforts to eliminate the breeding ground for terrorist Islamism. Terrorist organisations exploit the suffering of civilians in conflict areas to recruit new "fighters". Can one really afford not to significantly step up the aid funds invested in refugee relief in view of the heightened threat levels in the G7 countries? Aside from necessary military measures, measures of development assistance are therefore urgently needed. The situation of refugees in conflict areas and in refugee camps must be improved by providing food aid, medical supplies and, above all, schooling. That is the only way to eliminate the breeding ground of terrorist Islamism. Germany will have to show leadership in this area by initiating large-scale action as well as mobilising the necessary financial underpinning. In addition, Jordan, Libya and Turkey, countries that currently have to cope with the massive influx of refugees, as well as Egypt as the regional power should be invited to attend the G7 summit and be involved in the initiative.

Pandemic/Ebola action plan: One further important point is and must be the fight against pandemics such as the highly infectious disease Ebola that is currently rampaging Western Africa. The World Health Organization initiated an action plan to fight the disease back in July 2014 with a budget of 100 million U.S. dollars. The U.S. has announced the dispatch of at least 3,000 soldiers to the affected region. Germany should also make available medical expertise and additional funds for combating this crisis. A pandemic/Ebola action plan will need to be devised at G7 level and its implementation initiated as soon as possible, because the danger of the disease spreading to further countries has not yet been averted.

There are areas where Germany can exercise its new international responsibility without departing from the traditional course of its existing foreign and security policy. 25 years on from the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany must now prove through its actions that it is up to the challenge.

A NEW LONG WAR?

THE CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE ISLAMIC CALIPHATE

Dustin Dehez

The timing was deliberately chosen. On the first night of Ramadan this year, the spokesman for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)¹ announced the establishment of a new caliphate. He used the opportunity to call on all Muslims to declare their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS' leader and self-proclaimed new caliph. The group is trying to bolster its claims for legitimacy by claiming to continue the original caliphate that existed between 632 and 661 and to legitimise its own claims to power. Shortly before this, ISIS fighters had bulldozers drive up to the border between Iraq and Syria and tear down the fortifications in front of rolling cameras. ISIS has declared nothing short of the end of the old national boundaries that were drawn in 1916 as part of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.² This was preceded by the militia's rapid advances in Iraq, which culminated in the capture of many cities in the Sunni region of the country.

Mosul, Fallujah and Tikrit were the first to fall into the hands of ISIS, and in Syria, the militia controls the city of ar-Raqqa and parts of Deir ez-Zour and Aleppo provinces. In October, they eventually began a concentrated attack on one of the last Kurdish enclaves in Syria near the



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- 1 | Many acronyms and names are used to designate the Islamic State, from ISIS (used here) to Da'ish or ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).
- 2 | In the Sykes-Picot Agreement, France and Britain agreed to divide the Middle East following the end of World War I; it is so named for the diplomats who negotiated it, Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot. The borders designated in the initially confidential document survived the end of the colonial era and are therefore considered by many to be illegitimate. Cf. specifically Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire*, London, 2013, 264-267. However, there are also observers who consider the role played by the agreement to be overblown; cf. Toby Dodge, "Can Iraq Be Saved?", *Survival*, 56, 2014, 7-20.

Turkish border: the city of Kobane (Ain al-Arab) was only able to hold out thanks to an allied air campaign. Though less publicised, the militia's advance into the Iraqi province of Anbar began simultaneously; now 80 per cent of the province is under ISIS control. With the proclamation of the caliphate, some observers had initially suspected that ISIS would focus on consolidating its position in the occupied territories. However, further offensives demonstrated that the militia was seeking to do both: to tighten its rule as well as expand its territory.

Fig. 1

Presumed dominion of the terror militia Islamic State



Source: Own illustration referring to Peter Mühlbauer, "Salafisten greifen syrisches Kurdengebiet an", Telepolis, 8 Jul 2014, http://heise.de/tp/bild/42/42198/42198_1.html (accessed 6 Nov 2014), map © Lesniewski / Fotolia, racken.

Not since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 has any Islamic fundamentalist group been so close to controlling a de facto state. However, the consequences extend far beyond Iraq and Syria. It is not only the militia's rapid advance throughout much of these countries that cause concern, but also the many atrocities and the ambitious government-like structures, which demonstrate the extent of the militia's totalitarian beliefs. Considering ISIS' gains to date, to date, the international community's response is hardly convincing. Though the United States has once again taken the initiative, forging an international coalition against the militia and, together with its allies, conducting air strikes on positions held by ISIS, the Obama

administration has already stated its intention to limit its involvement to air strikes. Even though France, the UK and several Arab countries have joined in on the operation, a coherent strategy to which all participating countries could subscribe, has yet to be formulated.

MILITARY TERRITORIAL GAINS

Just how great a risk ISIS poses became clear when its fighters quickly advanced into Mosul in June. Government forces in the city were routed and left behind materials and weapons in an uncoordinated withdrawal. The Iraqi government lost control of their borders with Syria and Jordan. In what came as a surprise to many observers, the Iraqi government quickly lost and military structures disintegrated. However, this meltdown of the security forces was aided by Baghdad's politics in three ways. First, the marginalisation of the Sunni regions of the country meant that the Iraqi security forces had no longer access to valuable intelligence information from the Sunni tribes, and thus were no longer able to correctly assess the situation in those areas. The surrender of Mosul makes this abundantly clear. ISIS had infiltrated the city months before it was able to raise the black flag of the fundamentalists. Its supporters collected taxes from local business people and liquidated potential adversaries. The Iraqi security forces, the government and public prosecutors mostly just stood by as the State's monopoly on the means of coercion disintegrated even before the first ISIS units entered the city.³

Second, over the past few years, despite all the American support in terms of equipment, the Iraqi army has not evolved into a cohesive force. Its composition essentially follows former Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki's Shia-dominated agenda. Officers' ranks were not awarded according to skills and prior performance but for money. This, in turn, has resulted in officers recouping their outlay through so-called ghost soldiers: soldiers who existed only on the payrolls, but whose pay and equipment went straight into

3 | Cf. Letta Tayler, "Before the Fall. ISIS was wreaking havoc in Mosul long before it took over the city", *Foreign Policy*, 13 Jun 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/12/before_the_fall_iraq_isis_mosul (accessed 3 Nov 2014).

the pockets of corrupt officers.⁴ Therefore, the Iraqi armed forces have never had the strength they appeared to have on paper. Put differently, the Iraqi army primarily lacked a sense of internal cohesion, by far the most important factor in determining an army's combat readiness.⁵



Fragile structure: The Iraq army is especially lacking internal cohesion. Corruption and a poor officer rank system lead to limited strength to fight. | Source: James Selesnick, U.S. Army, flickr ©⁶.

Third, the marginalisation of the Sunni regions led to the security forces remaining totally ignorant of the fact that ISIS was purposefully liquidating moderate Sunni leaders. ISIS deliberately eliminated in particular those tribal elders who had come to an arrangement with the American troops and the Iraqi government to restore security and stability during the coalition's counterinsurgency campaign. This first laid the groundwork for ISIS' territorial gains and, second, makes the liberation of these territories much more difficult. Third, the tactics first used by the Iraqi government against ISIS have unnecessarily complicated the situation. The use of barrel bombs (oil drums repurposed into bombs) has been particularly counterproductive in this context.⁶ In September 2014, ISIS began

4 | Obtaining the rank of general in the Iraqi army is said to cost approximately 30,000 U.S. dollars. Cf. Dodge, n. 2, 12.

5 | Cf. Florence Gaub, *Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning from Iraq and Lebanon*, Carlisle, 2011.

6 | Andrew McGregor, "Iraqi Counter-Insurgent Tactics under Fire", *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 12, No. 12, 13 Jun 2013, 1, <http://jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue12.pdf> (accessed 6 Nov 2014).

similar disruptive operations on the northern outskirts of Baghdad. Since the summer, bombings have once again become an everyday occurrence. Even the headquarters of the Iraqi military intelligence service came under attack in September. Despite coalition air strikes, the militia is edging closer to the Iraqi capital.

Estimates of ISIS' strength vary widely, but most observers put the number at between 20,000 and 50,000 fighters, with a significant proportion coming from abroad.⁷ This also explains the escalating agenda of the self-proclaimed caliphate. The militia's capability to simultaneously wage war on so many different fronts with this number of fighters, forcing both the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi and Syrian armies to go on the defensive while at the same time fighting other rebel groups in Syria, suggests special organisational skills. Fighting units are rotated between different fronts with relative ease, suggesting high mobility and good supply lines. The offensive against the city of Kobane on the Turkish border and the simultaneous advance in the Iraqi province of Anbar demonstrate the persistence of the Islamists, who are able to carry out attacks on several fronts even in the face of constant air strikes by coalition forces.

Due to the militia's capability to simultaneously wage war on so many different fronts suggests special organisational skills.

In view of the rapid territorial gains and the ability to drive back the Iraqi troops, some Syrian tribes and militias have sought to negotiate with ISIS, probably in part to escape the fate of conquest. In the province of Deir ez-Zour, several militias have professed their loyalty to the new caliphate. Some tribes have also expressed their support or negotiated a surrender. Its brutal actions against any kind of resistance aid ISIS in this context. In mid-August, the group executed 700 members of the Sheitat tribe in the Syrian province of Deir ez-Zour; only one hundred of them were fighters.⁸ The Iraqi army's attempts to recapture lost

7 | David Ignatius estimates that nearly half of the fighters come from neither Syria nor Iraq. David Ignatius, "The Islamic State's challenge to the United States", *The Washington Post*, 31 Jul 2014, <http://wapo.st/1xbJRsi> (accessed 3 Nov 2014); "Islamic State 'has 50,000 fighters in Syria'", *Al Jazeera*, 19 Aug 2014, <http://aje.me/1EkX5Fr> (accessed 3 Nov 2014).

8 | Cf. "Islamic Sate group 'executes 700' in Syria", *Al Jazeera*, 17 Aug 2014, <http://aje.me/1siZ1qe> (accessed 3 Nov 2014).

ground continue to prove futile. The next level of escalation was achieved when the Islamists began a new offensive on the long front with the Kurdish region of Iraq capturing the cities of Sinjar, Zumar and Wana in quick succession. However, in the process, the Islamic State has also created powerful enemies. The flight of the Yazidi religious minority to the Kurdish controlled territory called the United States and Europe to action; they are now moving to halt the advance of ISIS with the help of Kurdish forces and their own air strikes. Although the Kurdish Peshmerga have been able to stop the advance of ISIS into the Kurdish region of Iraq, and despite the air strikes by the coalition forces, ISIS continues to conquer more and more parts of Syria and is consolidating its control in Iraq.



For fear of the IS and the ongoing civil war, thousands of people flee Syria. They are seeking refuge in the neighboring countries Jordan, Lebanon or here in Turkey. | Source: EU/ECHO, flickr ©11©.

STRUCTURE OF ISIS AND DIFFERENTIATION FROM AL-QAEDA

Many observers attribute ISIS' roots to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the organisation under the leadership of Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that had mounted attacks throughout large parts of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. However, al-Zarqawi, whom al-Qaeda granted the title of "Emir in the Country of Two Rivers", largely operated autonomously from al-Qaeda and was responsible not only for the escalating civil war in Iraq. In 2005, his organisation perpetrated three simultaneous attacks on

hotels in Jordan. In June 2006, al-Zarqawi was killed in an American bombing raid, and the coalition forces' counter-insurgency strategy that began shortly thereafter coupled with the deployment of additional troops to Iraq quickly quashed al-Qaeda's ability to operate there. Though there is a certain overlap in the people involved in both ISIS and AQI, the two groups have since gone their separate ways.

ISIS is thus the first Islamist terrorist organisation to not even attempt to gain ideological endorsement from al-Qaeda. While the two organisations share key goals, a dispute between ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has so far prevented a formal alliance. In fact, both organisations had remained in what could almost be considered a partnership of convenience until 2004.⁹ However, when al-Baghdadi announced in April 2013 that his organisation would expand into Syria and would no longer call itself the Islamic State of Iraq, but rather the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, a rivalry arose for supremacy in fundamentalist circles. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, head of another Islamic fundamentalist group, al-Nusra, particularly disapproved of this step and gained support from al-Zawahiri in his attempt to keep ISIS out of Syria, who in turn urged ISIS to only fight in Iraq.¹⁰ Al-Baghdadi ignored the request, not least because it would have implied recognition of the hated Sykes-Picot lines. In January 2014, this rivalry eventually led to an open split, with al-Nusra fighters continuing their affiliation with al-Qaeda and fighting against ISIS units. Al-Nusra hence rejects the establishment of a new caliphate and belittles it as "twitter caliphate".

In April 2013, the organisation announced that it would expand into Syria and would call itself the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

Behind this rivalry for leadership in fundamentalist circles lies an old conflict over the strategy for establishing a new caliphate. While the movement loyal to al-Qaeda first wants to fight the so-called far enemy (i.e. Western

9 | Cf. Yoram Schweitzer, "ISIS: A Risk Assessment", *INSS Insight*, No. 564, 23 Jun 2013, <http://inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7116> (accessed 3 Nov 2014); in greater detail: Aaron Y. Zelin, "The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement", Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 20, 6/2014, http://washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf (accessed 3 Nov 2014).

10 | Cf. Zelin, *ibid.*, 4.

democracies), ISIS is reverting to the methods of the Islamic fundamentalist forces who were active in the 1990s, aiming first at near enemies, rival militias and secular regimes.¹¹ Al-Qaeda therefore considers the proclamation of a caliphate premature because a new caliphate will only be able to hold its own once international opponents are neutralised. The recent announcement by al-Qaeda that it is seeking to establish a cell in India is likely a sign that al-Qaeda will not simply cede this leadership role. However, the division between ISIS and al-Qaeda should not be interpreted too rigidly. Since al-Qaeda itself is no longer the centralised organisation it used to be until 2007 and has since relied heavily on the strength of its regional affiliates, from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), coalitions of opportunity between its offshoots and ISIS are conceivable. The coalition air strikes in particular may boost efforts to come to some kind of truce among Islamists.

Territorial gains were made possible because various Sunni groups had taken up arms against the Iraqi government and entered into alliances of convenience with ISIS.

The rapid advance has also boosted speculation that the rebels are a coherent and tightly managed group. This is, of course, not true.

In fact, these territorial gains were made possible because various Sunni groups had taken up arms against the Iraqi government and entered into alliances of convenience with the ISIS militias. Among others, those groups include the General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries, consisting mainly of former officers of Saddam Hussein's disbanded Iraqi army; its alliance of convenience with ISIS is likely to be temporary. The Military Council of Tribal Revolutionaries, said to be supported primarily in the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, as well as the Military Council of Anbar Tribal Revolutionaries, which unites the remaining forces of Anbar's Awakening, also belong to this alliance along with a few rather more religiously motivated groups,¹² of which Jam'at Ansar al-Islam (JAI) is probably the most well-known. The extent of coherence with which ISIS can operate in Iraq can therefore not yet be determined with certainty.

11 | Cf. Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy. Why Jihad Went Global*, Cambridge, 2005.

12 | A detailed examination of the groups can be found in Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel, "A Marriage of Convenience: The Many Faces of Iraq's Sunni Insurgency", *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 12, No. 15, 25 Jul 2014, 4-6, http://jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue15_01.pdf (accessed 6 Nov 2014).

It appears to be more certain that the proclamation of the caliphate has heralded a changing of the guard on the part of fundamentalist organisations. Al-Qaeda's rise was inextricably linked with the return of fighters from the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which now dates back decades. For the latest generation of fundamentalists, especially those moving from Europe to the Middle East, that war against the Soviet Union is not even a distant memory. Moreover, over the past few years, al-Qaeda has not succeeded in carrying out any more major attacks that could have been used to attract support. Their leading figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri, still serves as a spiritual frontfigure, but other key players are long since dead and, similar to al-Zawahiri, those remaining are not considered charismatic.

In contrast, the proclamation of a new caliphate overshadows al-Qaeda. The caliphate is much better suited to serve as what al-Qaeda is named for and what it always wanted to be: a base. Since ISIS has been challenging al-Qaeda as the most important fundamentalist organisation, the Islamist scene has rearranged itself. The leader of the Somali group al-Shabaab, Mukhtar al-Zubir, has reiterated his oath of loyalty to al-Qaeda, while others are now following ISIS, including Ansar al-Sharia in Libya.¹³ Only time will tell the extent of this rearrangement, which primarily depends on whether ISIS will be able to establish itself in large parts of Syria and Iraq in the long run.

Since ISIS has been challenging al-Qaeda as the most fundamentalist organisation, the Islamist scene has rearranged itself.

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

ISIS pursues a twofold strategy. It immediately begins building its own, sometimes quite extensive government structures in the areas it controls. One can use the Syrian city of ar-Raqqa, which ISIS completely took over at the beginning of the year, to study its conceptions of "government". After it had succeeded in capturing the last of

13 | In early October, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) followed suit and also declared its loyalty; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is also based in Pakistan, congratulated al-Baghdadi. Cf. Jacob Zenn, "Islamic State Finds new Ally in Pakistan's TTP", *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 12, No. 19, 10 Oct 2014, 2-3, <http://jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue19.pdf> (accessed 6 Nov 2014). TTP further declared that jihadists would be sent to Syria.

Police tasks are carried out by al-Hisba, a religious police force that monitors compliance with *sharia*, Ramadan and a strict dress code. the Syrian government forces' bases in November 2013, the militia had complete control of the city and the region. Killed government soldiers were beheaded, their

heads subsequently put on display. With this macabre demonstration of force, ISIS signalled it would not tolerate any resistance. At the same time it began to levy taxes and introduce new policing and judicial structures.¹⁴ Police tasks are carried out by al-Hisba, a religious police force that monitors compliance with *sharia*, Ramadan and a strict dress code.

But the real pillars of the governmental structures are the courts, with which ISIS combines two functions. First, they ensure that the Islamic legal system covers all parts of society. Dispensation of justice thus follows only religiously based laws; people are prosecuted for consuming alcohol, tobacco and drugs, and family and business disputes are decided in accordance with Islamic law as a matter of principle. Secondly, however, the rapid establishment of these courts also provides for a noticeable re-establishment of semi-public structures, and the harsh sentences handed down, even for very minor cases, are proving dissuasive. In this way, the militia aims to establish a kind of legal certainty that promises to gain them legitimacy, at least temporarily.¹⁵ Although ISIS seeks for all cases to be brought to court, one can assume that torture and murder outside the courts are also a matter of course. The judgements of these courts and the application of justice under ISIS therefore have no basis in the rule of law.

In material terms, ISIS has been able to secure funding for its activities. Capturing Mosul provided additional assets that were not taken or destroyed by the fleeing Iraqi security forces. Furthermore, the Islamists now control the production of nearly 80,000 barrels of oil a day, which are either sold through middlemen at below-market prices or are delivered as directly as possible to end users, providing

14 | Apparently, stores are charged two U.S. dollars a month in taxes. Borzou Daragahi and Erika Solomon, "Fuelling Isis Inc", *Financial Times*, 22 Sep 2014, 7.

15 | Cf. Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds, "ISIS Governance in Syria", *Middle East Security Report*, No. 22, Jul 2014, http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS_Governance.pdf (accessed 6 Nov 2014).

the organisation with a steady flow of money.¹⁶ Abductions and looting of cultural treasures in areas controlled by ISIS have provided it with additional income; according to estimates, ISIS has nearly one billion U.S. dollars in funds at its disposal.¹⁷ ISIS and the al-Qaeda offshoot al-Nusra have fought over the oil wells and refineries, but here, too, ISIS seems to have prevailed. In addition, due to its rapid conquest of other Iraqi regions and the uncoordinated withdrawal of the Iraqi security forces, ISIS is now in possession of numerous captured weapons without the need to spend a great deal of its own funds on arms. In the fight against other Syrian rebel groups, this factor has ensured a military superiority that will be difficult to compensate against.

After establishing judicial structures, the militia then focuses on education. Boys are familiarised with the Quran and with handling weapons as early as possible. But ISIS' plans to extend beyond that. As such, the Islamic State has created its own structures for municipal functions, including the maintenance and construction of water and power lines as well as the running of bakeries. However, it is questionable whether this level of institutional permeation can be maintained. In the medium term, ISIS is reliant on foreign volunteers making up for its lack of expertise. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi therefore followed the proclamation of a caliphate by calling upon all Muslims worldwide to fulfil their religious obligation and emigrate to the caliphate (*hidshra*).¹⁸ Although many of ISIS' actions are aimed at gaining the goodwill of the people in conquered towns and cities, this seems to usually only last a short time. If the militia feels secure somewhere, efforts to "purify" society in accordance with the group's fundamentalist beliefs take priority. The militia does not shy away from mass executions for this purpose. Though

Efforts to "purify" society in accordance with the group's fundamentalist beliefs take priority. The militia does not shy away from mass executions for this purpose.

16 | The *Financial Times* estimates that 3.2 million U.S. dollars is being generated daily from the sale of this oil. Cf. Daragahi and Solomon, n. 14.

17 | Cf. Sam Jones, "Unrivalled riches help Isis aspire to role of state", *Financial Times*, 23 Jun 2014, 3.

18 | Cf. Stephan Rosiny, "'Des Kalifen neue Kleider'. Der Islamische Staat in Irak und Syrien", *GIGA Focus Nahost*, No. 6, 2014, 5, http://giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/gf_nahost_1406.pdf (accessed 6 Nov 2014).

Christians are still tolerated in Raqqa under payment of a penalty tax, in other areas held by ISIS, all those of other faiths are faced with the demand to convert. Those refusing run the risk of execution. The fate of the Iraqi Yazidis can therefore be seen as the harbinger of what may also threaten other religious communities. By comparison, the desecration of Christian churches and the destruction of Shia mosques seem relatively minor events.

The area controlled by the self-proclaimed Islamic State is now so vast that al-Baghdadi does not rule it directly, instead dividing up the country into so-called wilayah. This entails the establishment of a federal governmental structure, even though the regions are not strictly bounded; ar-Raqqa, where control is particularly consolidated, is

An Islamic State that regulates every aspect of religious and political life in the strictest possible manner cannot be particularly desirable, especially for the Iraqi tribes.

controlled by a specially appointed emir, Abu Luqman. However, ISIS' far-reaching ideas on governance also provide opportunities for the Iraqi government and the international community. What the militia has already

implemented in the Syrian provinces of ar-Raqqa and Aleppo provides a glimpse into what it seeks for Mosul and other Iraqi areas it controls. The idea of an Islamic State that regulates every aspect of religious and political life in the strictest possible manner cannot be particularly desirable, especially for the Iraqi tribes who only formed an alliance of convenience with ISIS in the first place out of frustration with al-Maliki's government. ISIS seems to have realised the danger of this and is attempting to secure the loyalty of the tribes. In the province of Aleppo, the organisation maintains an office for tribal affairs and public communication so that it does not lose the tribes in the area under its control. ISIS generally puts considerable effort into public relations activities. According to one of its annual reports, which have been published since 2012, ISIS was responsible for more than 10,000 operations before it even started its offensive against the Iraqi army. Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether the mixture of an absolute claim to power, terror and rudimentary government services can provide stability in the long term. The Islamic State's claim to sole representation inevitably invites conflict.

REACTIONS IN IRAQ AND THE REGION

ISIS' offensive in Iraq took the Iraqi army by surprise, and in many areas led to the virtual overnight collapse of its military structure. **Given the disintegration of the Iraqi armed forces, the political process in Iraq was once again the focus of international attention.**

The completely uncoordinated withdrawal of Iraqi forces left large quantities of modern weapons, often from American stocks, to fall into the hands of ISIS. For a period, the disintegration of the armed forces had prompted fears that even Baghdad could fall. Given this alarming development, the political process in Iraq was once again the focus of international attention. Nearly all actors quickly agreed that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki bore significant responsibility for the dramatic deterioration of the situation. That al-Maliki did not intend to unite the country but would continue to divide it became clear on the very day in 2011 that then U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Iraq to attend the formal end of U.S. troop presence in Iraq. Since the so-called surge, the U.S. troops had been perceived by many Sunnis as a guarantee for their safety and their participation in the political process.¹⁹ It was only this guarantee that allowed for al-Qaeda's support in Iraq to be undermined and, to some extent, for relative peace to be brought to the country.²⁰ As Panetta watched the departure of the last American soldiers, Iraqi security forces attempted to arrest Kurdish Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi,²¹ although he was able to withdraw to Kurdish Northern Iraq.

But al-Maliki had thereby already achieved what he sought to achieve. The arrest warrant and subsequent death sentences *in absentia* against the country's Sunni Vice President left no doubt: the era of attempting to unite the country through political balance was over. Even in previous years, Maliki had sent plenty of signals that he would seek

19 | Cf. Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends. General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way out of Iraq*, New York, 2008.

20 | The term "surge" denotes the strategy that the United States began in 2007 to strengthen the troop presence in Iraq and simultaneously initiate a counterinsurgency. Cf. Peter R. Mansoor, *Surge. My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*, New Haven, 2013.

21 | Cf. Bill Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations After the U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map?*, Carlisle, 2014, 16-17.

complete power. It was not only on this matter that the constitution that provided for a referendum on the final status of the city of Kirkuk was ignored. Maliki similarly pushed aside the Erbil Agreement reached in November 2010. Against this background, it was still doubtful, whether the Shia forces in the country and the region would also withdraw their support for al-Maliki.



Seeking autonomy: The Iraqi city of Erbil is the seat of government of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. President Masoud Barzani decided to fight against ISIS after also Kurdish cities became occupied. | Source: Jeffrey Beall, flickr ©¹.

Al-Maliki's fall from power began when the most important cleric in Shia Islam, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, expressed his disenchantment with the prime minister. Al-Sistani had already played a significant role in the stabilisation of the country under the presence of the Americans and advocated sectarian reconciliation. He asked volunteers to join the security forces to stop the advance of ISIS. He also demanded that the government stop discriminating against Iraqi Sunnis and that instead it should allow them to participate in the political process and partake in the revenues from the sale of commodities. Signs of distancing itself from al-Maliki's regime also came from Iran, the one major ally of the government in Baghdad. Furthermore, the Obama administration had already been seeking al-Maliki's resignation since June. In other words, thanks to his sectarian agenda, al-Maliki managed to lose the support of both Washington and Tehran.

The fact that al-Maliki was ultimately forced to give up his office also relates to his desire to cement his own claims to power and the dominance of Iraqi Shiites in the structures of governance. In this way, he has undermined the formal chain of command of the armed forces from the outset. He established an office that granted him direct access to the Iraqi army. Since the withdrawal of the American troops in 2011, he has also merged Shiite militias and regular army units in many places. His attempt to exploit the armed forces to retain his own power ultimately cost him support. After both Iran and the Iran-backed Shiite militias, especially Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AHH), and the Shia parties on top of that withdrew their allegiance to al-Maliki, instead supporting his party rival, Haider al-Abadi, a coup aided by the army was no longer possible either. It is definitely a reflection of his style of government that it was not the situation in the country itself that prompted the Prime Minister to resign. Meanwhile, al-Abadi has implemented the mandate to form a new government, though important offices – those of the Interior Minister and the Minister of Defence – initially remained unfilled.²² The hopes of the international community now rest on him succeeding in governing better and more inclusively.



Overcoming the divide: As of 8 September 2014, Haider al-Abadi (l.) is Iraq's new Head of Government, here together with his Italian colleague, Matteo Renzi. The Iraqi Prime Minister is facing the task of governing more inclusively and handling the security situation. | Source: Tiberio Barchielli, Filippo Attili, flickr ©①③②.

22 | These offices were only filled on 18 Oct 2014 with the appointment of Sunni politician Khalid al-Obeidi as Minister of Defence and Mohammed Salim al-Ghabban as Interior Minister.

After ISIS conquered Kurdish cities as well, Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq, declared his intention to fight the terrorists to his last breath. ISIS had originally declared its intention not to fight the Kurdistan Regional Government and its Peshmerga. After the collapse of the Iraqi government troops and their withdrawal from areas claimed by the Kurds, the Peshmerga also took position there. The Regional Government in the long disputed city of Kirkuk in particular has created facts on the ground. At least this has resulted in indirectly implementing the spirit of the Iraqi constitution, as referenda were supposed to be held for the areas in dispute between Baghdad and Erbil, namely Kirkuk, Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Ninawa.²³ The Kurdistan Regional Government has also long undermined Baghdad's claim that it only sells Iraqi oil through the Iraqi Oil Marketing Company. Instead, it is partially sold directly to Turkey. Under al-Maliki, Iraqi Kurds were well on the road to independence. Now the threat posed by the Islamic State has forced them to cooperate more closely with Baghdad. The irony here is that the Iraqi army did in fact have the weapons to fight ISIS, but not the necessary cohesion and discipline. The Kurds, in turn, lack the necessary equipment to counter an army that is well-equipped with captured weapons. It is also clear that even though the Western hope that Kurdish forces will stop ISIS' advance is justified, any attempt to recapture the occupied territory is something Kurdish forces will not be able to accomplish on their own.

ISIS' offensives have so far been focused on Iraq and Syria, but the agenda of the Islamists extends beyond these territories. It has become clear from some of the skirmishes that have already taken place that the Islamic State is willing to make more enemies. In early August, ISIS fighters entered Lebanon for a short time to free members of their own militia from the hands of the Lebanese security forces.²⁴ Members of the militia had already engaged in combat with Iranian border forces in mid-June. So far,

23 | Cf. Maksut Kosker, "Oil Fuels the Kurdistan-ISIS Conflict", *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 12, No. 14, 10 Jul 2014, 6-7, http://jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue14_01.pdf (accessed 6 Nov 2014).

24 | Cf. James Traub, "The Arab War on Terror", *Foreign Policy*, 22 Sep 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/22/the_arab_war_on_terror (accessed 3 Nov 2014).

they have only stopped short of the Jordanian and Turkish borders. However, their activities to date do not suggest that this reluctance to enter Jordan will be permanent. Nearly 600,000 refugees from the Syrian civil war have fled to Jordan already, and the advance of ISIS will only boost this influx further.




Allied partners: To protect the NATO-member Turkey against attacks from war torn Syria, the alliance decided in December 2012 to station air defense systems, here the Patriot, in the border region. The German Bundeswehr is involved in Operation Active Fence since early 2013. | Source: © Carsten Vennemann, Bundeswehr.

THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION

The United States has now formed a coalition of almost 60 countries to combat ISIS. However, the contributions of the countries in this coalition of the willing vary considerably, and even the United States, which leads the alliance, is keen to emphasise the limits of its own commitment. The Obama administration has therefore made it clear from the outset that its direct involvement would be limited to air strikes and to providing instructors to the Iraqi army as well as to training moderate Syrian rebels. Although the air campaign around the Syrian city of Kobane received the main media attention, the United States has focused its activities on Iraq.

Washington was, in fact, only ready to take military action in Syria after a long period of reluctance.²⁵ Obama did not announce plans to form an international coalition against ISIS and extend the attacks to Syria until 10 September. Against the backdrop of the clearly articulated limits of its own commitment of resources, the strategy's ambitious objective comes as a surprise. Destroying ISIS, as President Obama announced, is unlikely to be possible without ground troops, and the effectiveness of the air strikes in particular suffers from a lack of ground reconnaissance. President Obama has appointed retired General John Allen as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, appointing experienced Iraq expert Brett McGurk as his deputy. Still, it took months for the 500 million U.S. dollar aid package for the Syrian opposition to pass Congress. Congress, although under the leadership of the Republicans, is willing to help the administration, but demands regular reports.



On 10 September, President Obama announced the forming of an international coalition against ISIS and extension of the operation to Syria. He also assigned the already retired four-star general John R. Allen, here at a press conference at the Pentagon in March 2012, to be the coordinator of the campaign. | Source: Kap Kim, U.S. Army, flickr ©.

25 | Nouri al-Maliki had already asked the United States in November 2013 to at least provide additional support to the Iraqi air force. Cf. Eli Lake, "Why the White House Ignored All Those Warnings About ISIS", *Daily Beast*, 6 Jul 2014, <http://thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/06/why-the-white-house-ignored-all-those-warnings-about-isis.html> (accessed 3 Nov 2014).

In fact, a number of unresolved questions accompany this strategy: first, the government considers the granting of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) in 2001 the legal basis for the air strikes, even though it had asked Congress to repeal this authorisation only months before. The President has not yet called on Congress to issue an amendment. Second, the United States does not want to completely dominate the coalition, but the Arab allies in particular are currently waiting for a greater commitment by the Americans. And third, it is unclear how long Washington can hold the coalition together, especially since it is now already becoming clear that, to a certain extent, the coalition members are pursuing their own objectives in the region. Egypt would rather intervene in Libya than participate in the fight against ISIS, and though Saudi Arabia has sided with Washington, it fears that the United States appears too willing to compromise with Tehran in order to secure Iranian support for its strategy in Iraq. And NATO ally Turkey is particularly struggling against the United States' "Iraq first" strategy, instead calling for action to be taken against Syrian dictator Assad, whom Ankara considers a greater problem. Against this backdrop hangs the threat of a war that could last for years with no clear victory. The American intelligence services at least seem to share this assessment, as they anticipate a prolonged conflict.²⁶ The point is essentially that any strategy to combat the self-proclaimed Islamic State that only considers the problem to be an Iraqi one cannot succeed, nor can the coalition succeed as long as there is no consensus on the solution to be sought in Syria.

OUTLOOK

Historian and sociologist Charles Tilly once coined the phrase that "war makes states". He was referring to the fact that the establishment and consolidation of effective state structures are greatly facilitated in times of war, since it is war that forces a government to raise extraordinary revenues and conscripts for the army. With respect to ISIS, this dictum is not entirely far-fetched. The militia leadership seems aware that its forces will only be able to hold

26 | Cf. David Ignatius, "The Islamic State's Potential Weakness", *The Washington Post*, 14 Aug 2014, <http://wapo.st/1uAjnSi> (accessed 3 Nov 2014).

all those fronts on which they are currently waging war if sufficient support and supplies are available in the areas they control. Nevertheless, the creation of quasi-governmental structures is not all that is required to fight a multi-front war against the Iraqi and Lebanese governments, the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Syrian regime, other rebel groups, the United States and the West as a whole. From the start, ISIS has tried to implement its own vision of governance – that of the new caliphate – regardless of the military situation.

These quasi-governmental structures are relevant from a Western perspective. A strategy to combat ISIS cannot succeed if ISIS is treated solely as just another terrorist organisation. It stands out from ideologically related organisations precisely because it does not subordinate its perceived mission to shape society to gaining victory over its enemies, rather seeking to link the two. For those actors fighting against ISIS this means they will have to adjust to a long and bitterly fought conflict, and that the liberation of areas currently held by ISIS should be combined with the establishment of public structures. The well-known maxim from the debate on counterinsurgency strategies applies here: this opponent must be “outgoverned” rather than outgunned. Iraq must therefore oppose ISIS through better government structures in the hope of reclaiming the legitimacy that it has lost. A new government under a new prime minister is an important step in the right direction, but is not sufficient. After the start of the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq in 2007, the coalition forces succeeded in prising the Sunni groups away from al-Qaeda. For the Sunnis, the American presence in the country guaranteed the promise of participation in the political process. Whether they would once again be willing to accept such a promise without a comparable guarantee, however, is questionable. It is nevertheless true that the key to victory against the Islamic State still lies in the hands of the Sunnis.

Should a better, more inclusive government not emerge and the country's various political groups not be offered participation in the political process, it would absolutely be possible for a new state to arise and confirm historian Charles Tilly's dictum. After all, the threat posed by ISIS at

least ensures the cooperation of the Kurdish parties with each other and, in fact, provides a basis on which a secular State can be established. In the end, the first successful counter-offensive did not come from Iraqi government forces or other Syrian rebels, but from Kurdish forces. History would take an interesting turn if the proclamation of the caliphate were to lead to the creation of an independent Kurdish State.

This manuscript was completed on 19 October 2014.

PROSPECTS FOR GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

The current public discourse on questions of international politics in Germany is not commensurate with the colossal challenges that the country is facing. What do developments in the Middle East, in Africa as well as in Asia and in the Americas mean for Germany and Europe? In what areas should German foreign politics become engaged more strongly – which topics should the German public be exposed to more intensely?

**THE GERMAN G7
PRESIDENCY (III)**
Climate Policy –
Emissions Trading
System, Energy
System Transfor-
mation, Adapta-
bility

**THE GERMAN G7
PRESIDENCY (II)**
Placing Emphasis
on Economic As-
pects to Further
Development
and Prosperity

**THE GERMAN G7
PRESIDENCY (I)**
The G7 as an
Opportunity –
Returning to
Value-based Glo-
bal Governance

**GLOBAL MEGA-
TRENDS (III)**
Raw Materials –
Explore Alterna-
tives and Create
New Paradigms

**GLOBAL MEGA-
TRENDS (II)**
Demographic
Change

**GLOBAL MEGA-
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