Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

FORUM
EMPIRISCHE SOZIALFORSCHUNG

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INTEGRATION AND THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF GERMANS WITH AND WITHOUT A MIGRANT BACKGROUND AND FOREIGNERS LIVING IN GERMANY

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Published by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.

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Publisher: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. 2017

Translation: RedKeyTranslations, Marie Liedtke, Salzhemmendorf OT Benstorf
Cover image: © m.schuckart - fotolia.com
Layout: SWITSCH KommunikationsDesign, Cologne
Typesetting: workstation, Niederkassel.

This publication was published with financial support of the Federal Republic of Germany.

ISBN 978-3-95721-311-2

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1. INTRODUCTION

More refugees came to Germany in 2015 than ever before. Some 1.1 million asylum seekers were registered via the EASY data-collection system (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016: 1). The majority came from Syria, followed by Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania and Kosovo. 441,889 asylum applications were made in 2015, with applicants from Syria once again making up the largest group (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016: 7). Around one quarter of the asylum seekers are Christians while 63.3 percent are Muslims (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016: 1).

This development rekindled the debate on integration in Germany. People have, in fact, been migrating to Germany for many years. Between 1945 and 1950 alone, 8 million people expelled from Germany's former eastern territories resettled in the then West Germany (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016: 3), which had a population of some 51 million by 1950 (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung/Federal Agency for Civic Education 2016: 14). This was followed by an influx of *Gastarbeiter* ("guest workers"), *Aussiedler* (emigrants), *Spätaussiedler*[1] (late repatriates) and refugees from different countries at different times (such as during the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo).

This is the reason why roughly one in five people living in Germany has a migrant background. According to the Federal Statistical Office, the population of Germany included around 16.3 million people with a migrant background in 2014, representing 20.3 percent of the population. This

comprised 9.2 million Germans with a migrant background (11.3 percent of the population) and around 7.1 million foreigners[2] (9 percent of the population) (cf. Federal Statistical Office 2015: 38f.). The migrants include 3.1 million people who came to Germany as emigrants and late repatriates (3.8 percent of the population) (cf. Federal Statistical Office 2015: 7).

Several studies have looked at immigrants in general or by country of origin, but did not distinguish between migrants and foreigners (cf. for example Haug 2010, Hans 2010). However, citizenship is not only an indicator for integration, but can also lead to different levels of integration where other integration indicators are concerned, as our data shows. Stephanie Müssig and Susanne Worbs (2012) also showed differences between migrants and foreigners in terms of their political attitudes, such as party allegiance, interest in politics and non-electoral participation. Other studies have been restricted to particular groups of immigrants, such as those of Turkish origin (Pollack et al. 2016).

Therefore, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung decided to carry out a representative survey involving 1,021 Germans, 1,004 migrants and 1,009 foreigners,[3] using random telephone sampling. This was the only way of ensuring that all nationalities living in Germany were included in order to produce a representative sample of the population. The disproportionate design of the survey meant that the proportion of migrants and foreigners in the sample did not reflect their actual proportions of the population, so these two groups were given reduced weighting when analysing the total population. However, it was necessary to include such large numbers of migrants and foreigners in the survey in order to be able to draw distinctions between Germans, migrants and foreigners. It also made it possible to distinguish between immigrants originating from Turkey, Russia and Poland. There were too few respondents from any other countries to be able to produce separate, reliable analyses. The survey included 362 Muslims[4], so where appropriate we have also been able to examine this particular group in greater detail.[5]

Interviews were carried out with people who were resident in Germany as at the beginning of 2015 (see Chapter 8 for a detailed description of the sampling procedure). Therefore, refugees who have arrived in Germany since 2015 were not included in the survey. Refugees who came to Germany in earlier years were included in the sample but cannot be

precisely identified. The only way they can potentially be recognised is by the fact that they stated “political persecution” as their reason for coming to Germany.

1| Aussiedler refers to German nationals and their descendants who were born in Germany's former eastern territories and came to Germany after the Second World War (until 31.12.92). Spätaussiedler is the term used for this type of immigrant arriving from 1.1.93 onwards. In this study they are referred to as emigrants and late repatriates respectively.

2| In this report the terms "German with a migrant background" and "migrant" are used synonymously. The term "foreigner" is used for people who live in Germany but are not German citizens. The term "immigrant" is used to describe anyone who has immigrated to Germany or whose parents immigrated to Germany regardless of their nationality (so first and second-generation migrants and foreigners). In order to enhance readability, Germans without a migrant background are simply called "Germans" – in contrast to migrants, even though the latter are of course also German nationals.

3| The survey was restricted to people over 18, so the effects of the amendment to the nationality law of 2000 are not reflected in the survey as it does not include migrants born after 2000.

4| The representative random selection of the overall sample means that the Muslim respondents are also representative of Muslims living in Germany. Unlike some other studies, this survey is not restricted to Muslims from certain countries, but includes Muslims from all countries who have moved to Germany.

5| See Pokorny (2016) for an examination of the social and political participation of Germans, migrants and foreigners.

2. INTEGRATION IN GERMANY

Integration is currently a hot topic that has sparked a great deal of controversy. What are the basic requirements for successful integration? What do immigrants have to do in order to integrate?

Before we move on to a discussion of these questions, it is important to clarify what is meant by integration. Hartmut Esser (2001) distinguishes between "societal integration" and "social integration". By "societal integration" he means the integration of the parts of complete social systems, while "social integration" refers to the integration of individual actors into a social system (Esser 2001: 3). The focus of this study will be on social integration. Esser (2001: 8ff.) identifies four dimensions of social integration: acculturation, placement, interaction and identification.

Acculturation refers to knowledge involving cultural competencies, such as language skills. By placement, Esser (2001: 9) means "the adoption of a particular social position by an actor". Esser also includes citizenship, which gives members of society certain rights (such as the right to vote), in the placement dimension. The interaction dimension includes people's social contacts. The number of social contacts with Germans is often used as an indicator of an immigrant's degree of integration. Identification, on the other hand, refers to a person's emotional attitude towards society, in other words whether immigrants identify with German society.

However, it is possible for immigrants to be integrated into their host society – in this case German society – while also being integrated into their society of origin, i.e. that of the respective ethnic community in Germany. Esser (2001: 19) distinguishes between marginality, segmentation, multiple integration and assimilation, depending on which societies a person is – or is not – integrated into. Marginality refers to the situation when a person is neither integrated into their society of origin nor into their host society. When a person is solely integrated into their society of origin, Esser describes this as segmentation. In contrast, he speaks of multiple integration when a person is integrated into both their society of origin and that of their host country. According to Esser (2001: 20), this situation is particularly difficult to achieve and so tends to be an exception. Esser believes that assimilation as one-sided integration into the host society without integration into the society of origin is the only possible way to achieve social integration into the host society (Esser 2001: 21). From this perspective, integration is necessarily also assimilation.

Silke Hans (2010) takes this idea further by explicitly arguing that assimilation does not have to be one-sided. Therefore, assimilation does not mean the one-sided adaptation of migrants to the host society, but the adaptation of both groups to each other (Hans 2010: 58ff.). This adaptation leads to the erosion of differences between groups that are solely based on origin. In line with the dimensions of social integration, both Esser (2001: 22) and Hans (2010: 64ff.) break assimilation down into four categories: cultural, structural, social and identificational (cf. Koopmans 2016).

Cultural assimilation can take place in a number of ways, such as through the assimilation of social norms, language, religion or eating habits (Hans 2010: 71). In terms of language skills, this necessarily requires one-sided adaptation on the part of the immigrants to German society. When it comes to social norms and eating habits, this may involve Germans adapting to immigrants or the two groups adapting to each other, even though this is probably rarely the case in reality – perhaps with the exception of eating habits, which have changed significantly in Germany over the last 50 years.

Structural assimilation can be achieved through the labour market, the education system or through citizenship. It does not rely on immigrants

finding good positions in the labour market or on gaining particularly good educational qualifications. Immigrants are considered to be assimilated at group level if on average they achieve the same educational qualifications and positions in the labour market as Germans of the same age and gender. This may involve Germans assimilating to immigrants and immigrants assimilating to Germans (cf. Hans 2010: 69).

Social assimilation can happen through contact with neighbours, clubs, friendships and marriages. This kind of assimilation requires the two groups to be welcoming to each other. Immigrants can only have German friends if Germans are prepared to be friends with immigrants.

In contrast, assimilation based on feelings of identification refers to emotional ties and a sense of belonging to a society or local area. This is one-sided assimilation on the part of the immigrants to the host society.

Integration and assimilation are not necessarily identical, but the media and politicians tend to use the term integration to mean both. The word integration is in much greater use colloquially and crops up far more frequently in daily life, whereas the word assimilation often has a negative connotation. In her study, Hans (2010) shows that the majority of immigrants do in fact assimilate into German society. The first generation generally does not assimilate completely, but some members of the second generation become totally assimilated. When it comes to the consumption of high culture, Hans (2015) notes that third-generation immigrants are no different from young Germans.

The word integration is so widespread that we have generally used it in preference to assimilation in this study. However, by integration we mean the assimilation of immigrants and Germans to each other.

Hans (2010) shows how important it is to take a long-term view of the processes of assimilation. She uses data from the Socio-Economic Panel[1] to examine differences at both individual and group level. Cross-sectional studies have shown that Turkish immigrants are generally less integrated than other immigrant groups. However, when we study the Panel's data, it becomes clear that Turks do indeed have a lower level of assimilation when they arrive, but that subsequently the process of assimilation is no different from that of other groups. Their lower level of integration is attributed to the lower starting point on arrival, not to them making less

effort to integrate once they are in Germany (Hans 2010: 247f.). This is something that cross-sectional studies cannot reveal.

This is also a pure cross-sectional study, so when interpreting the data one needs to bear in mind that it merely represents a snapshot of the situation at the time of the survey. The sample includes migrants and foreigners who have been living in Germany for different lengths of time. Therefore, differences between the groups may arise from the fact that one group contains a particularly high number of migrants who have only arrived recently and are consequently less well integrated than migrants who have been living in Germany for a longer period. Wherever possible, this has been taken into account for the individual integration indicators by differentiating groups according to the length of time they have lived in Germany.

1| At this point it seems appropriate to make a few remarks about methodology. Cross-sectional surveys involve interviewing people once during a fixed period of time. When this kind of cross-sectional survey is carried out at regular intervals, addressing the same questions to different people, that is called a longitudinal study. Such studies make it possible to examine changes in society. When the same people are surveyed at regular intervals, that is called a panel study. Such studies make it possible to highlight changes at the level of the individual and society and thereby examine true causal connections.

2.1 CULTURAL INTEGRATION

In the cultural dimension, integration means the assimilation of Germans and immigrants in the areas of values, standards, religion and eating habits, as well as immigrants learning the language. In principle, the majority of respondents felt that immigrants should unilaterally adapt to German culture. 83 percent of migrants and 76 percent of foreigners believed that immigrants should adapt to German culture. Over three-quarters of Germans in fact also expected this of immigrant citizens. So there is a strong basic willingness to adapt, even when this adaptation is one-sided.

Agreement with the need to adapt was particularly strong among immigrants who had been living in Germany for 10 to 20 years (85 percent). Agreement was lowest among respondents who had been living in Germany for less than 5 years, but at 73 percent it was still very high. Immigrants of Turkish origin had below-average levels of willingness to adapt to German culture. This was particularly prevalent amongst foreigners of Turkish origin (54 percent agreement). The responses of Turkish immigrants who now hold a German passport were nearer the average (74 percent agreement). Muslims also indicated below-average levels of willingness to adapt to German culture (69 percent agreement), while emigrants and late repatriates had a slightly above-average belief that immigrants should adapt to German culture (88 percent agreement). Detlef Pollack et al. (2016: 3) also identified high levels of basic willingness to integrate among people of Turkish origin.[1] In this survey, 70 percent of the

respondents of Turkish origin said they were keen to integrate. However, the study by Pollack et al. (2016: 3) showed that only 39 percent of immigrants of Turkish origin believed that adopting more of German culture was a condition for successful integration. It may be the case that a willingness to adapt to German culture is not understood as meaning adopting German culture.

Fig. 1: Agreement with the statement "Immigrants who come to Germany should adapt their behavior to German culture" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.[2]

Things are very different when we look at actual adaptation in the area of religion. But that is hardly surprising as the composition of religious affiliation among Germans and immigrants is affected by the significant numbers of Muslim immigrants. Among Germans, 37 percent were Protestant, 28 percent Catholic, and 32 percent were not affiliated to any religion. Among migrants, around 25 percent were Protestant or Catholic, 9 percent Christian/Greek/Russian Orthodox, 18 percent Muslim and 17 percent were not affiliated to any religion. Among foreigners, just 6 percent were Protestant, 26 percent Catholic, 15 percent Christian/Greek/Russian Orthodox, 29 percent Muslim and 16 percent were unaffiliated.

What stood out was that the proportion of Muslims among migrants and foreigners was higher than among Germans, and the numbers of Protestants and unaffiliated individuals were much lower among immigrants. However, the proportion of Catholics was the same. The number of Muslims among indigenous Germans is so low that our sample did not contain any Muslims who did not have a migrant background.

Fig. 2: To which religion/denomination do you belong?



Among the migrants, the Muslim group comprises 40 percent Sunni, 17 percent Alevi[3] and 7 percent Shiite. 32 percent did not specify any religious affiliation and 4 percent stated they do not belong to any particular denomination of Islam.

The proportion of Alevi was lower among Muslims who do not hold a German passport. 47 percent of foreign Muslims described themselves as Sunni, 5 percent as Alevi and 3 percent as Shiite. 37 percent did not specify a particular denomination. 4 percent felt they belonged to another group and 3 percent did not belong to any specific group.

In the study by Sonja Haug et al. (2009: 97), the proportion of Sunnis, at 74.1 percent, was significantly higher than the figures given here. However, Haug et al. (2009) did not include the number of people who failed to respond to the question on religious affiliation. If we exclude everyone who failed to respond, then the proportion of Sunnis among all Muslims (with and without German passport) increases to 69 percent, and is therefore just slightly below the figure in the survey carried out by Haug et al.

Fig. 3: Would you be so kind as to tell me to which religious group within Islam you belong?



In both groups it is interesting to see how many Muslims – around one third – did not specify a particular denomination of Islam. This suggests that a not insignificant number of Muslims living in Germany are relatively secular. This theory is backed up by a comparison of religiosity between the different faiths. Muslims and Catholics have similar levels of self-assessed religiosity. Protestants are slightly more religious than Catholics and Muslims, and the unaffiliated are the least religious. However, the results show that people's personal sense of religiosity is not necessarily linked to their affiliation to a particular denomination. 14 percent of unaffiliated people can still be categorised as averagely religious, and 5 percent as very religious.

Fig. 4: How religious are you on a scale of 0-100? Results shown by denomination, "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



When we look at groups within Islam according to their level of religiosity, we see that many Muslims tend to be fairly secular in their everyday lives. Among Muslims who assessed themselves as being very religious on a scale of 0-100, almost one third were unable to state their denomination within Islam. The least religious tended to be Alevi, while the averagely or very religious were mostly Sunni.

Fig. 5: Would you be so kind as to tell me to which religious group within Islam you belong? Results shown by level of religiosity.



A comparison of levels of religiosity among Germans, migrants and foreigners showed that the Germans were slightly less religious than migrants and foreigners, but the difference is relatively small. There was no particular link between the religiosity of immigrants and the amount of time they had lived in Germany. Regardless of whether an immigrant had been in Germany less than 5 years, 5 to 10 years or 10 to 20 years, the distribution of religiosity was almost identical. Only migrants and foreigners who came to Germany more than 20 years previously were slightly more religious. Just one quarter of immigrants surveyed who had been living in Germany for more than 20 years claimed to be not very religious. 43 percent rated themselves as averagely religious, one third as very religious. However, this does not necessarily mean that immigrants become more religious the longer they live in Germany. There may also be a cohort effect, meaning that respondents who came to Germany 20 or more years earlier may have been more religious when they arrived than immigrants who arrived more recently. Immigrants who came to Germany less than 20 years earlier were more similar to the indigenous population in terms of their religiosity.

Pollack et al. (2016) found that immigrants of Turkish origin were significantly more religious, at 67 percent. However, this survey measured religiosity in a very different way. We asked people to assess their own religiosity on a scale of 0-100, while Pollack et al. used a scale of 0-7. Of course this means it is impossible to make a true comparison of the results.

Fig. 6: How religious are you on a scale of 0-100? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



The differences between Christians and Muslims were more pronounced when it came to how frequently they attended church (or mosque or synagogue). Catholic and Protestant respondents were most likely to state that they attended church several times a year. Weekly church attendance and total lack of attendance were both fairly rare. In Germany, most Christians attend church with average frequency, while Muslims are much less likely to be only occasional visitors to the mosque. 30 percent of Muslims said they attended mosque once a week, and another 30 percent that they never did. It is either a very set ritual or they avoid mosque completely. By contrast, Christians living in Germany tend to attend church occasionally but not regularly. However, the results of Pollack et al. (2016: 12) for immigrants of Turkish origin were very similar to our results for Muslims. According to their study, 28 percent of immigrants of Turkish origin attend mosque at least once a week.

Fig. 7: How often do you generally go to church/a mosque/a synagogue/a temple/a house of worship? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Although we have no panel data and can therefore, strictly speaking, make no statements on processes of adaptation, it does appear that immigrants living in Germany have not assimilated in terms of their religious affiliation. However, Germans and immigrants are very similar in terms of their level of religiosity, so one could assume that adaptation has taken place. But the available data does not provide proof of this; it may be that the immigrants who took part in the survey were similar to the German population in terms of their religiosity already when they migrated.

Migrants and foreigners take a more pessimistic view of sexual morality than Germans. One in five Germans agreed with the statement "The sexual morality of Western society is totally depraved", compared to one in three migrants and foreigners. However, 12 percent of migrants and 20 percent of foreigners were undecided on this question, so a relatively high proportion of immigrants were not prepared to judge the sexual morality of Western society (in comparison only 4 percent of Germans responded with "Do not know"). 35 percent of Muslims agreed with the statement, a higher percentage than among adherents of other religions. Among Catholics, Protestants and Muslims, agreement with this statement increased in line with the level of religiosity. The more religious the respondents, the more likely they were to believe the West is depraved in terms

of its sexual morality. Fewer very religious Catholics (27 percent) agreed with the statement than very religious Protestants (32 percent) and very religious Muslims (38 percent). 38 percent of immigrants of Turkish origin also agreed with the statement. Immigrants of Russian origin were particularly critical of Western sexual morality, with almost half believing that it is totally depraved. Length of residence in Germany had no notable influence on people's attitudes towards Western sexual morality. People over the age of 65 and people with lower educational qualifications had an above-average likelihood of agreeing with the statement.

Fig. 8: Agreement with the statement "The sexual morality of Western society is totally depraved" (Strongly agree, Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



This question about morality was complemented by questions about attitudes towards the Koran and Islam. These questions were addressed to all respondents, not only Muslims. Only one in ten Germans agreed with the statement "Only those who literally follow the rules of the Koran are true Muslims", compared to one in five migrants and foreigners. Not surprisingly, Muslims were most likely to agree with the literal interpretation of Islam. 31 percent of Muslims believe a true Muslim should follow the rules of the Koran literally.

Fig. 9: Agreement with the statement "Only those who literally follow the rules of the Koran are true Muslims" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Agreement was particularly strong among very religious Muslims. Half of them agreed that the Koran should be interpreted literally. At 11 percent, less religious Muslims agreed with the statement as frequently as Germans without a migrant background (a group that contained no Muslims). 12 percent of Muslims responded that they could not judge. They did not feel qualified to give an opinion about the interpretation of the Koran. This is hardly surprising in light of the large number of Muslims who were unable to specify their denomination of Islam.

Fig. 10: Agreement with the statement "Only those who literally follow the rules of the Koran are true Muslims" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); results shown by level of religiosity, "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Conversely, almost two thirds of Germans and over half of the migrants and foreigners agreed with the statement "I think it is important that the teaching of Islam be adapted to the conditions of the modern world". More than half of the Muslims also agreed that Islam should be adapted to the modern world.

Fig. 11: Agreement with the statement "I think it is important that the teaching of Islam be adapted to the conditions of the modern world" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



The more religious people were, the more likely they were to disagree with the above statement, mirroring the responses relating to the literal interpretation of the Koran. More than two thirds of the less religious Muslims were in favour of adaptation. And even half of the very religious Muslims believed that the teaching of Islam should be adapted to the modern world. Here too, 14 percent of the Muslim respondents stated that they could not judge. Male Muslims had an above-average likelihood of agreeing that teaching should be adapted to the modern world. Interestingly, 17 percent of Muslims agreed with both of these logically mutually exclusive statements, saying that it is necessary to interpret the Koran literally, but also agreeing that Islam should be adapted to the modern world. Perhaps secularisation has advanced so far among some Muslims that they either find it difficult to answer questions about the Koran and Islamic teaching or hold contradictory opinions. But overall it is clear that only a minority of Muslims believe in a literal interpretation of the Koran. The majority of Muslims think the teaching of Islam should be adapted to the conditions of modern societies.

Fig. 12: Agreement with the statement "I think it is important that the teaching of Islam be adapted to the conditions of the modern world" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); results shown by level of religiosity, "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.

The following question about attitudes towards religion was only addressed to Muslims because of the way it was worded. It is, therefore, impossible to compare Germans and immigrants, so we cannot check whether adaptation has occurred. However, this question should be treated in the context of cultural integration because it allows conclusions to be drawn about general cultural attitudes among Muslims.

Only 15 percent of Muslims agreed with the statement "If in my family, a Muslim woman marries a Christian, she brings shame on the family". The overwhelming majority disagreed with this statement. The more religious Muslim respondents were, the more strongly they believed that it would bring shame if a Muslim woman married a Christian. However, as has been shown, the proportion of very religious Muslims was quite low, at just 23 percent. And of these 23 percent, only one quarter were opposed to marriage between a Muslim female family member and a Christian. Muslims with lower educational qualifications had a slightly above-average likelihood of agreeing with the statement.

Fig. 13: Agreement with the statement "If in my family, a Muslim woman marries a Christian, she brings shame on the family" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); results shown by level of religiosity, "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Only a minority of the Muslim respondents agreed with a literal interpretation of the Koran or were opposed to marriage between a Muslim woman and a Christian. However, the majority of Muslims agreed that Islamic teaching should be adapted to the conditions of the modern world. It is only possible to make a limited comparison with the results produced by Pollack et al., whose survey was restricted to immigrants of Turkish origin, because it asked different questions. However, some of them should be briefly mentioned as they covered similar ground. According to the survey carried out by Pollack et al. (2016: 14), almost half of the immigrants of Turkish origin agreed with the statement "Following the rules of my religion is more important to me than following the laws of the country in which I live". This reveals a more fundamentalist attitude than was shown in our survey. But the responses to the following statement told a different story: "Muslims should strive to return to the social order that existed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad". With a 32 percent agreement rate, this is similar to the responses to our question about the literal interpretation of the Koran. Pollack et al. (2016: 14) also reported that half of the immigrants from Turkey believe that there is only one true religion, and that more than one third of immigrants with Turkish roots feel that only Islam is able to solve the problems of our times. With regard to Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Western Europe, Ruud Koopmans (2015: 470) even found that some 60 percent of Muslims want to go back to the roots of the Koran and three quarters of Muslims believe there is only one

true interpretation of the Koran.[4] 65 percent of Muslims from Turkey and Morocco who live in Western Europe believe that religious rules are more important than the laws of the country in which they live. In a comparison of six Western European countries, Koopmans showed that "Germany [...] has the lowest level of Islamic religious fundamentalism" [Koopmans 2015: 476).

The low level of adaptation in the area of religious affiliation is hardly surprising seeing that it is not an additive process as one has to give up one's old religion for the new one. Using other examples, Hans (2010) also comes to the conclusion that additive adaptation – where original characteristics can be retained – is more widespread and clearly easier to achieve. The strong agreement with the need to adapt Islam to the modern world may mean that it is not so much religious affiliation in itself but the specific perception of religion that represents an indicator of cultural integration.

In other areas, such as the acquisition of language skills, additive adaptation is definitely possible. People do not have to give up their native language in order to learn German. The belief that people who live in Germany should learn to speak German was also very widespread. More than 90 percent of Germans, migrants and foreigners shared this opinion, and the proportion increased with the period of time people had been living in Germany. 90 percent of immigrants who had been living in Germany for less than 5 years tended to agree or strongly agreed, while 97 percent of those who arrived in Germany more than 20 years earlier were in favour of immigrants learning German. The study by Pollack et al. (2016: 6) also showed that 91 percent of Turkish immigrants believe that learning German is a prerequisite for good integration.

Fig. 14: Agreement with the statement "Anyone who lives in Germany should also learn the German language" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.

Three quarters of the migrants and as many as around half of the foreigners in fact speak mainly German at home (two responses were allowed because it is possible that two languages are spoken with equal frequency). A relatively large number of migrants speak Russian (23 percent), whereas foreigners speak another language as well as German. 17 percent of foreigners speak Turkish at home, but only 9 percent of migrants do so.

Fig. 15: What language do you mainly speak at home? Two responses are possible.



The length of time spent in Germany has a number of effects on the language that is mainly spoken at home. The longer respondents had been living in Germany, the more likely they were to speak mainly Ger-

man at home. Among immigrants who had been living in Germany for more than 20 years, 71 percent spoke German at home (migrants and foreigners collectively). This suggests a strong level of linguistic adaptation. A person may speak very good German in their everyday life, but they may still prefer to speak their native tongue at home. Therefore, speaking German within one's own four walls can be seen as a clear sign of linguistic and hence cultural integration.[5]

Russian is very commonly spoken at home among immigrants who arrived in Germany between 10 and 20 years ago. This is probably down to the fact that this was the time when particularly high numbers of emigrants and late repatriates arrived in Germany, who continued to speak their native language at home. More recently arrived migrants speak a number of other languages. They have not lived in Germany long enough to mainly speak German at home, but they obviously do not belong to two of the largest immigrant groups, the emigrants and late repatriates, and the Turks.

Fig. 16: What language do you mainly speak at home? Results shown by length of residence in Germany, two responses possible.



It becomes even more interesting if we not only examine the languages spoken by all migrants and foreigners, but break them down by country of origin: half of the immigrants of Turkish origin speak German at home.

As many as 60 percent of immigrants of Russian and Polish origin speak German at home. However, 71 percent of those of Turkish origin speak Turkish, 68 percent of those of Russian origin speak Russian and half of those of Polish origin speak Polish. Although we cannot be sure whether these same people speak both German and their native language at home, the figures suggest that the two languages are spoken relatively equally. For immigrants of Turkish origin, Pollack et al. (2016: 8) also found that 71 percent claimed to have a good or very good command of German.

Fig. 17: What language do you mainly speak at home? Results shown by country of origin, two responses possible.



While caution is necessary when interpreting the data because it is purely cross-sectional, our study shows that immigrants show great willingness to adapt in the area of cultural integration. There seems to be a general consensus among Germans, migrants and foreigners that immigrants should adapt to German culture. Only Turks (without German citizenship) living in Germany were slightly less likely to agree, but even in this group a narrow majority believed that immigrants should adapt.

There are greater differences where the question of religion is concerned, which is hardly surprising as people generally do not change their religion over the course of their lives. That said, Germans, migrants and foreigners displayed a similar degree of religiosity. Muslims in general did not display particularly high levels of religiosity, but there was a small group that leaned towards religious fundamentalism. They believe in a literal interpretation of the Koran and reject the idea of marriage between

Muslim women and Christians. However, the majority of the Muslim respondents stated the opinion that the teachings of Islam should be adapted to the modern world, showing that they are not fundamentalist but, on the contrary, open to cultural adaptation.

Unlike religious affiliation, language is an area where adaptation can be an additive process. Speaking a number of different languages is no problem. However, linguistic adaptation is generally one-sided, i.e. immigrants learn German. This data does not allow us to draw conclusions about the linguistic skills of immigrants. A large proportion of migrants and half of the foreigners stated that they spoke German at home. The proportion of people speaking German at home increased in line with the length of time they had lived in Germany. This also points to cultural adaptation on the part of immigrants living in Germany. This is particularly pleasing as studies show that the socio-cultural adaptation of Muslim immigrants is an important prerequisite for their structural integration into the labour market (cf. Koopmanns 2016).

1| The study by Pollock et al. (2016) only surveyed people of Turkish origin. It is not possible to draw a comparison with the indigenous German population, and the authors do not distinguish between migrants and foreigners.

2| The results presented in this study have been collected using a 4-point response scale: Strongly agree, Tend to agree, Tend to disagree, Strongly disagree.

3| Alevi should not be confused with the Alawites, a Shia sect, most of whom live in Syria.

4| Only limited comparisons can be drawn between the results of Koopman's study (2015) and the present study because it focused solely on Muslims from Turkey and Morocco. In addition, the survey was carried out in six countries: Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden.

5| It should be noted that we cannot draw any conclusions about how well immigrants speak German, only the fact that they speak German at home.

2.2 STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION

Education, employment and income are all potential indicators of structural integration. Acquiring citizenship can also be understood as an indication of structural integration because it brings with it certain rights, such as the right to vote. However, citizenship is not a suitable indicator of structural integration in the present survey because, according to our definition, all migrants have German nationality while all foreigners do not. Germans with a migrant background are by definition structurally integrated because they are German citizens, whereas foreigners are completely segmented. Some studies use citizenship as an indicator of integration involving feelings of identification. However, this is also not appropriate for our study, as gaining German citizenship is also linked to formal requirements rather than simply the desire to be a German citizen (cf. Hans 2010: 122ff). It may be that some of our respondents would have liked to acquire German citizenship but were prevented from doing so for formal reasons. Instead, it is possible to use the desire to acquire German citizenship as an indicator. In this case it actually relates to integration based on feelings of identification, but we can only use this indicator for foreigners. We will therefore leave the examination of the desire to acquire German citizenship until later on.

Our sample shows that migrants and foreigners have a somewhat higher formal level of education than Germans without a migrant background. However, Fig. 18 does not

include respondents who only had an elementary education or no school-leaving qualification. If we add them to the respondents who had a basic school-leaving certificate *(Hauptschulabschluss)*, then the proportion of migrants who had a low formal level of education increases to 19 percent and that of foreigners with a low level of education to 25 percent. In this respect migrants and foreigners seem to have high levels of structural integration, but other sources suggest that immigrants have lower levels of education (cf. for example Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung/Federal Agency for Civic Education 2016: 227).

The surprisingly high educational level of migrants and foreigners is also put into perspective when we take into account their countries of origin. 42 percent of immigrants of Turkish origin said they had a basic school-leaving certificate *(Hauptschulabschluss)* at most. 26 percent of them had a slightly higher school-leaving certificate *(Realschulabschluss)* and 28 percent had passed the university entrance examination *(Abitur)*. Immigrants of Russian and Polish origin tended to have a much higher level of education – higher than that achieved by Germans. This is not only down to the fact that a larger proportion of highly educated respondents took part in the survey. People in Russia and Poland generally have higher educational qualifications than Germans. According to the OECD's global education survey (OECD 2014: 55), 50 percent of Germans, 62 percent of Poles and 40 percent of Russians have an upper secondary qualification as their highest educational achievement.[1] In addition, a quarter of Germans, a quarter of Poles and half of all Russians have a tertiary qualification. 94 percent of the Russian population have an upper secondary qualification or higher (Germany: 78 percent, Poland: 87 percent). Therefore, migrants and foreigners from Poland and Russia who live in Germany also have higher levels of general education than the German population overall.

However, it is not only migrants and foreigners who have a relatively high level of education – Germans are also well educated. According to the Datenreport 2016 (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2016: 99), 36.6 percent of the German population have a basic school-leaving qualification *(Haupt/Volksschulabschluss)*, 30.3 percent have a higher school-leaving qualification *(Realschulabschluss)* or a qualification from a polytechnic secondary school and 28.7 percent hold a university or college entrance qualification. So there is clearly a distortion in this survey because more respondents with higher formal levels of education took part. This is not

unusual in surveys. The Politbarometer 2012 (summary of surveys carried out over the year) included an unweighted 22 percent of people with a basic school-leaving qualification *(Hauptschulabschluss)*, 37 percent with a slightly higher school-leaving qualification *(Realschulabschluss)* and 41 percent with a university entrance qualification *(Abitur or Fachabitur)* (Politbarometer 2012 (ZA6541); own calculations). These figures deviate only slightly from our figures for German respondents. Other surveys have generally used weighting to even out educational imbalances. Unfortunately, in our survey it was not possible to weight educational levels because there is no reliable data available on qualifications of foreigners living in Germany that are comparable to German qualifications. Consequently, it has not been possible to remove this slight distortion and this should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.

Fig. 18: Education



The majority of immigrants in the survey did not gain their educational qualifications in Germany. Only one quarter of migrants and 30 percent of foreigners have a German school-leaving qualification. Therefore, it is only possible to draw limited conclusions about the degree of integration based on the level of education. Indeed, this only makes sense for the second and subsequent generations of immigrants who were born, attended school and potentially acquired a vocational or professional qualification in Germany.

Fig. 19: Have you achieved your highest level of education in country of origin or in Germany? "Do not know" and Not specified" omitted.



However, it can be enlightening to compare school and vocational qualifications. In her study, Hans (2010) noted that there are no differences between immigrant groups in terms of the process of adaptation, but there are differences in the level at the time of migration. So it makes sense to look at vocational education by country of origin and according to the length of time spent in Germany. There are clear cross-sectional differences between Germans, migrants and foreigners with regard to their vocational qualifications. Germans without a migrant background are more likely than migrants and foreigners to have acquired a vocational qualification or completed an apprenticeship. Germans are also more likely to have attended a technical college. Migrants, and even more often foreigners, tend not to have a vocational qualification (or be in vocational education). However, the proportions of graduates from technical colleges and universities are very similar, with 31 percent of Germans, 31 percent of foreigners and 28 percent of migrants holding degrees.

When we look at the length of time that people have been living in Germany we see some interesting differences, probably as a result of the cohort effect at the time of immigration. The number of immigrants who had acquired a vocational qualification or completed an apprenticeship increased by up to 19 percentage points the longer they had been living in Germany. Only one in 10 immigrants who had been living in Germany for less than five years had acquired a vocational qualification. In contrast, 29 percent of immigrants who arrived more than 20 years earlier had done so. 44 percent of recent immigrants were graduates, whereas

this was only the case for 24 percent of those who had been living in Germany for more than 20 years. It should not be assumed that immigrants who have been living in Germany for longer are more likely to pursue a vocational qualification than a degree course. It is more the case that those who arrived in Germany more recently are more likely to have completed a degree and are therefore considered to be highly qualified.

When looking at countries of origin, it is noticeable that Turkish immigrants have an above-average likelihood of having no vocational or professional qualification. One in three immigrants from Turkey had no vocational or professional qualifications, and only 11 percent were graduates. In contrast, only 10 percent of immigrants of Russian origin had no vocational or professional qualification and, at 39 percent, an above-average proportion of them were graduates.

Therefore, the immigrants from Turkey were something of an anomaly. They were four times more likely than Germans to have no vocational or professional qualification. This could make it more difficult for them to integrate into the labour market.

Fig. 20: What is the highest general educational qualification that you have? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Figures are percentages. Basis: all respondents (GwithoutMB: n=1021; GwithMB: n=1004; Foreigners: n=1009)

The structural integration of immigrants is hampered by the fact that the vocational and professional qualifications of many migrants and foreigners were not recognised in Germany. 42 percent of migrants and 50 percent of foreigners said their qualifications were not recognised in Germany. This is where immigrants of Turkish origin have a relative advantage, with only 16 percent saying their qualification was not recognised. This is probably partly due to the fact that over one third of immigrants of Turkish origin who had a vocational or professional qualification completed their training in Germany. In total, only around one fifth of all immigrants gained their vocational or professional qualification in Germany.

In terms of employment, there is a high degree of structural assimilation between Germans, migrants and foreigners. There are only minimal differences with regard to employment. More than 40 percent of respondents were in full-time employment, and another 40 percent were not economically active. Only 12 percent stated they were in part-time employment. The number of immigrants of Turkish origin in work is surprising as this group contained an above-average percentage of people without any vocational qualification. Yet they had an above-average likelihood of being in full-time work and only average levels of being economically inactive. Half of the immigrants of Turkish origin were in full-time work.

Fig. 21: What employment situation applies to you? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



When we look at the reasons why people were economically inactive we see larger differences between Germans, migrants and foreigners. In all three groups, most people who were not economically active were pensioners, but there were clear differences in numbers. Three quarters of Germans who were not economically active were pensioners. In contrast, only half of the migrants and one third of the foreigners who were not economically active were pensioners. This is mainly due to age differences: migrants and foreigners are generally much younger than Germans, so of course these groups have fewer pensioners. Migrants and foreigners were more likely to be not working because they were still studying or unemployed. 7 percent of Germans who were not in work were unemployed, compared to 14 percent of migrants and 18 percent of foreigners. Foreigners who were not in work also had an above-average likelihood of being housewives or househusbands. One fifth of foreigners who were not economically active were housewives/househusbands, a proportion that is four times that among Germans and migrants.

There were also differences between the groups of respondents with respect to types of work. Migrants and foreigners had a below-average likelihood of being white-collar workers and an above-average likelihood of being blue-collar workers. The latter also applied to Muslims (30 percent) and immigrants of Turkish origin (33 percent).

However, there was no difference between the groups with regard to satisfaction with their current or last job. More than 80 percent of Germans, migrants and foreigners said they were happy in their work.

Fig. 22: How satisfied are you with your current/last predominantly held profession? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.

The high level of satisfaction that was also expressed by migrants and foreigners is surprising because they were more likely than Germans to be working in a job that did not correspond to their training. However, over half of the migrants and foreigners were working in jobs that did correspond to their training. This proportion increased slightly the longer they had lived in Germany. Half of all immigrants who had been living in Germany for less than 5 years were working in a job that corresponded to their training. This applied to two thirds of those who had been living in Germany for more than 20 years. Immigrants of Turkish origin had an average likelihood of working in a job that corresponded to their training. In contrast, Russian and Polish immigrants had an above-average likelihood of working in a job that did not correspond to their vocational or professional training. Half of the immigrants from Russia and Poland were not working in jobs that matched their qualification.

Fig. 23: Does your current/last predominantly held employment correspond to your professional training? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Among Germans who were working in a job that did not correspond to their training, only a minority said they would prefer to work in the occupation they trained for. But almost half of the migrants and more than half of the foreigners in the same situation said they would prefer to change rather than stay in their current job. As time spent living in Germany increased, the proportion of people who would prefer to work in the occupation they trained for declined. In view of the much higher figures among migrants and foreigners than among Germans, it is surprising but also pleasing that there was no difference in job satisfaction between the groups, despite this desire to work in a different occupation.

Fig. 24: Would you prefer/would you have preferred to work in the profession for which you studied? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Vocational and professional qualifications and job types show that immigrants are not yet fully structurally integrated. Migrant and foreign respondents had an above-average likelihood of having no vocational or professional qualification. This particularly applied to immigrants with Turkish roots. Where immigrants were in work, they had an above-average likelihood of being in blue-collar jobs and a below-average likelihood of being in white-collar jobs. Migrants and foreigners who were not economically active were less likely to be retired than Germans who were not working; they were more likely to be unemployed or still studying. Foreigners were more likely to be housewives/househusbands than Germans. There were very few differences between Germans, migrants and foreigners in terms of full-time work. Immigrants were as likely to be in full-time work as Germans. When we look at different countries of origin, we see that immigrants of Turkish origin deviated from the mean in that they were more likely to be in full-time work than Germans – despite the fact that they were much less likely to hold a vocational or professional qualification.

1| *The OECD's education report defines secondary and upper secondary and tertiary levels A and B as follows:*
"Lower secondary education: Completes provision of basic education, usually in a more subject oriented way with more specialist teachers. In some countries, the end of this level marks the end of compulsory education. Entry follows 6 years of primary education; duration is 3 years. In some countries, the end of this level marks the end of compulsory education.
"Upper secondary education: Stronger subject specialisation than at lower secondary level, with teachers usually more qualified. Students typically expected to have completed 9 years of education or lower secondary schooling before entry and are generally 15 or 16 years old.
Tertiary-type A education: Largely theory-based programmes designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry to advanced research programmes and professions with high skill requirements, such as medicine, dentistry or architecture. Duration at least 3 years full-time, though usually 4 or more years. These programmes are not exclusively offered at universities; and not all programmes nationally recognised as university programmes fulfil the criteria to be classified as tertiary-type A. Tertiary-type A programmes include second-degree programmes, such as the American master's degree.
Tertiary-type B education: Programmes are typically shorter than those of tertiary type A and focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labour market, although some theoretical foundations may be covered in the respective programmes. They have a minimum duration of two years full-time equivalent at the tertiary level." (OECD 2014: 27). In Russia the upper secondary level is generally completed by the age of 16 or 17, whereas in Germany the normal age for completing this stage is 19 to 20 (OECD 2014: 694). For a first qualification in tertiary-type A education, the usual age in Russia is 22 and in Germany 24 to 27. Russians generally complete a first qualification in tertiary-type B education at age 20, whereas Germans are usually 21 to 23 (OECD 2014: 697).

2.3 SOCIAL INTEGRATION

This study only includes one indicator of social integration, but one that suggests a high level of social integration. 86 percent of foreigners said they had been invited into a German family's home. Foreigners originating from Turkey were slightly less likely to be invited, at 80 percent. People who had been living in Germany for longer were more likely to have been invited into a German family's home. But at 73 percent, the figure was also high for people who had been living in Germany for less than five years. As many as 91 percent of foreigners who had been living in Germany for more than 20 years had been invited into a German family's home. However, this question was only addressed to people who did not hold a German passport so it is not possible to draw conclusions about the social integration of migrants. Using a single indicator also means it is impossible to draw more significant conclusions about the actual degree of social integration. However, other studies also point to high levels of social integration among most immigrants.

Fig. 25: Have you ever been invited by a German family to their home? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Haug (2010: 5) found that Turkish immigrants have less contact with German families than other immigrant groups. However, many Greek and Yugoslavian immigrants also have no contact with German families. With regard to work, school and university contacts, Haug (2010) identified two large groups. The first group has daily contact with Germans in these places, while the other group has no contact at all. It seems that it is all or nothing. However, Haug (2010) states that contacts with German neighbours are generally very frequent and contacts with German friends are also common: "In all groups, multiple integration, i.e. friendly contacts with their own group of origin and with Germans, is the most common" (Haug 2010: 6).

Pollack et al. (2016: 8) found that 61 percent of immigrants of Turkish origin had a great deal of contact with people of German origin. Over half of them also said they had a great deal of contact with Christians.

In her study, Hans (2013) also comes to the conclusion that most immigrants integrate into society over time: "The longer they stay, the more social contacts they establish with Germans, ultimately producing ethnically mixed networks of friends" (Hans 2013: 13). However, in contrast to Haug (2010), Hans (2013: 13) stresses that immigrants of Turkish origin tend to have a lower level of social integration, i.e. have fewer social contacts with Germans. However, she does not believe that this

means that they are less invested in the process. The individual process of integration among Turkish immigrants progresses no more slowly than among other immigrant groups. But they tend to start from a lower level upon their arrival in Germany, which is why they tend to have fewer social contacts with Germans.

2.4 IDENTIFICATIONAL INTEGRATION

One of the indicators for a sense of identification with Germany was whether foreigners who live here would like to become German citizens. Overall, one third of foreigners would like to take German nationality. Poles, Russians and Turks had a below-average desire to become German citizens. Clearly other groups of immigrants are much keener to be German citizens than these three groups. Of these three countries of origin, the desire for German citizenship was highest among Polish immigrants, followed by foreigners with Russian roots. Foreigners who come from Turkey were much less interested in gaining German citizenship. This is in line with the findings of Pollack et al. (2016: 6), who found that only one third of Turkish immigrants believe that efforts to gain German citizenship are a sign of good integration.

The proportion of immigrants who were undecided about whether they wanted to become German citizens declined over time. One quarter of recent arrivals were undecided in this respect, but this proportion dropped to 9 percent for those who had lived in Germany for longer. However, the number of people who did not want to become German citizens also increased over time. 35 percent of recent immigrants did not want to become German, while two thirds of those who had arrived more than 20 years earlier did not want German citizenship. This is not particularly surprising, as most immigrants who wanted to become German citizens and who had lived long enough in Germany to apply proba-

bly already had a German passport. Anyone who has lived in Germany for 20 years but still does not hold a German passport has probably made a conscious decision not to do so. The proportion of people who want to become German stays constant over a relatively long period of time. The desire to gain a German passport only begins to fall significantly after 20 years. Over 40 percent of people who had come to Germany within the previous 20 years were keen to take German nationality. Only 22 percent of immigrants who had been living in Germany for more than 20 years were interested in applying for German citizenship.

Fig. 26: Would you like to acquire German citizenship? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Along with a desire to acquire German citizenship, other indicators were used to measure emotional integration, such as people's bond with their country of origin or their parents' country of origin. Foreigners have a much stronger bond with their country of origin than migrants. Two thirds of foreigners stated that they felt connected or strongly connected to their country of origin, compared to 44 percent of migrants. Not surprisingly, the bond with the country of origin weakens in tandem with the length of time that people live in Germany. The longer immigrants had been living in Germany, the less close they felt to their country of origin. This could be considered an indicator of increased integration linked to the length of time living in Germany. Around two thirds of immigrants of Turkish origin felt connected with their country of origin. However, the study by Pollack et al. (2016: 3) showed higher levels of connection to the country of origin. In their survey, 85 percent of Turkish immigrants said they felt

closely or very closely connected to Turkey. However, 87 percent of immigrants from Turkey also said they felt closely or very closely connected to Germany.

Fig. 27: How strongly connected do you feel with your country of origin/your parents' country of origin? Results shown by length of time living in Germany, "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Emotional ties to a particular country often come to the fore in the area of sport. At the football World Cup and European Championships, many fans were shown in the media celebrating by waving both German and Turkish flags, thus demonstrating their love for both countries. But things look very different when Germany plays against one of the immigrants' countries of origin. Then only a minority of immigrants feel they can support both countries equally. A quarter of migrants and one fifth of foreigners said they would cheer both countries when they played each other at football. However, half of the migrants said they would support Germany, as opposed to just one fifth of foreigners, who generally still support their country of origin.

The longer people live in Germany, the more likely they are to only support Germany. Immigrants are less likely to support their country of origin the longer they live in Germany.

Fig. 28: Imagine that Germany is playing football against your country of origin/your parents' country of origin: Who would you cheer for?



Another indicator of an emotional bond with Germany is whether people would consider working in the public sector in Germany. Whether someone actually works as a police officer, judge or teacher depends on a number of factors and not solely on a desire to do so. However, such a desire can be seen as a sign of identification with the country in which they live. Possible responses were: " Current work/Have already worked in the German civil service", "Yes, still considering it", "Yes, but not anymore" and "No". If we understand integration to mean assimilation, then the proportion of people who are interested in working in the public sector should be at least similar among Germans and immigrants to reflect successful integration based on feelings of identification with the host society. And in fact there were very few differences between Germans and migrants in this respect. Slightly more Germans were civil servants, but slightly fewer Germans than migrants were considering working in the public sector. The proportions of Germans and migrants who had at some point considered working in the public sector, no longer do so or had never considered it, were similar. Foreigners were somewhat less well integrated than migrants in terms of this indicator, but the difference was less clear than might be expected. Overall, the proportion of foreigners who were working in the public sector, were thinking about it, or had thought about it, was slightly lower than for Germans and migrants. However, 60 percent of foreigners had never considered working in the public sector.

The length of stay in Germany had little influence over whether or not people wanted to work in the public sector. The proportion of immigrants who had never considered working in the public sector fell only slightly from 65 percent to 59 percent as the time they had been living in Germany increased.

Fig. 29: Have you ever thought seriously about working in the German civil service, for example as a police officer, in the German Army, as a teacher or a judge? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Immigrants of Turkish origin were not only more interested in working in the public sector than those of Russian and Polish origin but also more than Germans. Only 43 percent of immigrants of Turkish origin had never considered working in the public sector. Almost one in three Turkish immigrants was still considering working in the public sector, which means that more than three times as many immigrants of Turkish origin as indigenous Germans were interested in working in the public sector.

Fig. 30: Have you ever thought seriously about working in the German civil service, for example as a police officer, in the German Army, as a teacher or a judge? Results shown by country of origin, "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



People were also asked whether they liked living in Germany. The results were the same for Germans, migrants and foreigners. In all three groups, more than 90 percent of respondents said they liked living in Germany. This applied equally to Christians, Muslims, immigrants of Turkish origin and immigrants from Russia and Poland. In addition, more than 90 percent of immigrants who had arrived here in the previous five years liked living here, as did more than 90 percent of migrants and foreigners who had been living in Germany for more than 20 years. So using this indicator, integration based on feelings of identification with the host society was very high among all immigrants.

Pollack et al. (2016: 3) came to very similar conclusions. 90 percent of immigrants of Turkish origin questioned in the survey also stated that they were quite or very happy with their lives in Germany.

Fig. 31: Overall, do you like living in Germany? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



The indicators presented above show that integration based on feelings of identification with the host society is rather good. However, there is some evidence that a proportion of Muslims living here identify first and foremost with their religion. Half of the Muslims agreed with the statement "The Muhammad cartoons have offended me as a Muslim". There seemed to be a strong emotional impact involved, which increased with the level of religiosity. Only a quarter of the less devout Muslims felt offended compared to around two thirds of very religious Muslims.

Fig. 32: Agreement with the statement "The Muhammad cartoons have offended me as a Muslim" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); results shown by level of religiosity, "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Along with identification based on religious affiliation, the results show that some Muslims feel a certain sense of group solidarity. A minority of Muslims felt that the Islamic world was consciously discriminated against to some extent. Just 17 percent of Germans agreed with the statement "The West prevents economic development of the Islamic world", compared to one in five migrants and one in five foreigners. One in three Muslims agreed with this statement. On the other hand, one in five Muslims felt unable to give an opinion. But a large minority of Muslims showed a collective sense of victimisation. The feeling of being victims of the West was stronger among more religious Muslims. Half of the devout Muslims believed the West was preventing the economic development of the Islamic world.

Fig. 33: Agreement with the statement "The West prevents economic development of the Islamic world" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



This perception of being victims is also reflected in the statement "The events in Palestine are typical for dealing with all Muslims worldwide". Only 18 percent of Germans, 16 percent of migrants and 23 percent of foreigners agreed with this statement, compared to as many as 30 percent of Muslims. This too illustrates a sense of group solidarity among Muslims, which was more pronounced among more devout Muslims. Only 12 percent of less religious Muslims believed the events in Palestine were typical, whereas 38 percent of very religious Muslims agreed with the statement. But once again, 18 percent of Muslims responded with "Do not know", which means that one has to think of Muslims falling into different groups. Some base their identity on their religion and feel

a sense of solidarity with the Muslim community as a whole, while others are more indifferent and not prepared to give an opinion about Islam, the Koran or the potential victimisation of Muslims. Then there are those who are prepared to give an opinion, but who reject the role of victim and instead are in favour of Islam adapting to the modern world (see Chapter 2.1).

Fig. 34: Agreement with the statement "The events in Palestine are typical for dealing with all Muslims worldwide" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



The findings of Pollack et al. (2016: 17) were somewhat more clear-cut with regard to immigrants of Turkish origin, who spoke of "Islam as a religion under attack". The study showed that 83 percent of these immigrants felt enraged when Muslims immediately came under suspicion when a terror attack occurred. 73 percent of immigrants from Turkey supported a ban on books and films that attack religion and hurt the feelings of deeply religious people. On the other hand, the survey also showed that a majority of 61 percent of them believed that Islam was compatible with the Western world.

This kind of group solidarity is not restricted to Muslims, but is also displayed by immigrants of Russian origin as well as emigrants and late repatriates. 39 percent of Germans and around the same proportion of foreigners agreed with the statement "In international conflicts, the West tries to make Russia alone appear guilty". The figure was 46 percent for migrants, while more than half of the immigrants of Russian origin, emigrants and late repatriates believed that Russia was always

singled out for blame. Although the immigrants of Russian origin, emigrants and late repatriates presumably had good reasons for leaving their country and coming to Germany, they still felt a sense of solidarity with Russia. This solidarity can be activated by current events, which in turn may have an impact on the political views and potentially the political behaviour of this immigrant group.

Fig. 35: Agreement with the statement "In international conflicts, the West tries to make Russia alone appear guilty" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Overall, integration based on identification with the host society seems to be very high. It is true that there was not a strong desire to acquire German citizenship, particularly among Turks and Russians, but then this indicator only applies to immigrants who are not yet German citizens. Obviously, foreigners felt a greater bond with their home countries than migrants, but this bond weakens the longer people live in Germany. This suggests a process of integration happening over time. The responses to our question on football revealed a similar trend. At football matches between Germany and the respective country of origin, more migrants than foreigners would cheer for Germany. Here too, willingness to support the German team increased in line with the length of time the respondents had been living in Germany. The desire to work in the German public sector demonstrates quite a high level of identification with the host country. There were only minor differences between Germans, migrants and foreigners. Foreigners were just slightly less likely to consider working in the public sector. Immigrants of Turkish origin were particularly keen to work in the German public sector. The overwhelming majority of Germans and immigrants stated that they liked living in Germa-

ny, and this sense of satisfaction did not wane with the length of time people had lived in the country. People who come to Germany are clearly happy to do so, and those who stay do so because they feel at home and like living here. In parallel with these high levels of identification with Germany, some Muslims, immigrants of Russian origin, emigrants and late repatriates have something of a second identity. For the former, this is provided by their religion and for the latter by their country of origin – and this second identity can be activated by events such as the cartoons and conflicts involving Russia.

3. LIVING IN GERMANY

Along with questions about the various dimensions of integration, the survey participants were also asked a few general questions about living in Germany. They were asked whether everyone in Germany is provided with opportunities to make the most of their talents and abilities. Two thirds of Germans and three quarters of migrants and foreigners agreed that this was the case. So immigrants were actually more positive about Germany than Germans when asked about opportunities for personal development.

This opinion did not systematically change with the length of time people had lived in Germany. It is true that more recent immigrants were slightly less likely to agree with the statement (70 percent), but respondents who had arrived in Germany five to ten years earlier had the highest rate of agreement, at 83 percent. The rate of agreement then declined slightly, but was around the mean among immigrants who had been living in Germany for more than 20 years. Three quarters of respondents in this group thought everyone in Germany had opportunities to make the most of their talents and abilities.

Fig. 36: Do you believe that in Germany today, everyone has the opportunity to develop according to his talent and his abilities?



For many immigrants, respect is a crucial category. A qualitative study carried out by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung concluded that Muslims place great emphasis on being treated with respect (Neu 2011). Over half of the Germans, migrants and foreigners surveyed felt they were always treated with respect in Germany, while another third felt they were often treated with respect. So around 90 percent of respondents felt they were always or often treated with respect. Only a small minority responded that they were rarely or never treated with respect.

Fig. 37: Do you feel that you are treated with respect in Germany? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



An examination of the groups by country of origin reveals that immigrants of Turkish origin had a below-average likelihood of feeling they were treated with respect. Even so, 80 percent of them thought they were always or often treated with respect; but one fifth felt they were rarely or never shown respect. As the majority of Muslims living in Germany originate from Turkey, the figure for Muslims was very similar. The results for immigrants from Russia and Poland, on the other hand, were similar to those for Germans without a migrant background.

Fig. 38: Do you feel that you are treated with respect in Germany? Results shown by country of origin and religion, "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



There was a surprising degree of coincidence in the levels of agreement to the statement that people not looking "like a German" attract strange looks. 39 percent of Germans and migrants and a third of foreigners agreed with this statement. Clearly it is not only immigrants but Germans too who perceive a certain amount of discrimination. Immigrants of Turkish origin were particularly likely to agree with this statement. 45 percent of them thought that people give you strange looks if you don't look "like a German". Russian (27 percent) and Polish (34 percent) immigrants agreed with this statement much less frequently. 42 percent of Muslims agreed with the statement, once again very much in line with the response of the immigrants of Turkish origin. Among the Muslims, the perception of discrimination also increased with the level of religiosity. Muslims who claimed to be more religious were more likely to believe that people attracted strange looks if they did not look like Germans.

Fig. 39: Agreement with the statement "If you do not look like a German, you will be watched strangely" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



The study by Pollack et al. (2016: 7) reported an even greater proportion of immigrants of Turkish origin feeling that they face discrimination, with around half saying they felt like second-class citizens. And around half of them also thought they would never be accepted in German society, no matter how hard they tried. Paradoxically, only a quarter of the respondents explicitly described themselves as suffering discrimination.

In the first quarter of 2015, the period when the survey analysed here was carried out, half of the Germans said they felt Islam was part of Germany. Agreement with this statement was only slightly lower among migrants and foreigners. Immigrants of Turkish origin and Muslims were particularly likely to say that Islam is part of Germany. Almost two thirds of them agreed with this statement. However, agreement was below-average among immigrants from Russia and Poland. Only a quarter of them believed that Islam is part of Germany. So immigrants from Russia and Poland tend to be more sceptical towards Islam than Germans (it was not possible to carry out separate analyses for other immigrant groups from Eastern Europe because the sample size was too small).

Fig. 40: Agreement with the statement "Islam is part of Germany" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



4. VOTING BEHAVIOUR

Only German citizens are allowed to vote in Germany.[1] Despite this, we asked all respondents, including foreigners, how they would vote if there were a parliamentary election and they had a vote. The survey was carried out in the first quarter of 2015, which means that the data cannot be compared with current polls on voting intentions. We can therefore only make statements about eligible voters[2] and the hypothetical voting behaviour of foreigners. No statements can be made about actual voters because actual voter participation is unknown; but we can assume that migrants are less likely to vote.

It was interesting to note how many foreigners responded "Do not know". 39 percent of foreigners had no idea who they would vote for if they had a vote. It seems that many of them had never thought about it because they were not allowed to vote. But the number of "Do not knows" was also quite high among Germans and migrants. 16 percent of Germans and 19 percent of migrants were unable to say which party they would vote for. And 8 percent of Germans and migrants and 6 percent of foreigners said they would not exercise their vote, even if they had one. When we add in the people who would spoil their vote or abstain, 31 percent of Germans, 33 percent of migrants and 48 percent of foreigners expressed no voting preference. Thus, when asked about voting intentions, one in three Germans with or without a migrant background and almost half of the foreigners did not

name a party. There was no difference between Germans and migrants in this respect, whereas it may be that foreigners pay little attention to the German party system because they do not have a vote.

However, the proportion of first-generation immigrants who responded with "Do not know" declined in line with the length of time they had been living in Germany. More than half of the immigrants who came to Germany within the previous five years responded "Do not know" when asked who they would vote for, compared to just one fifth of people who had been in Germany for more than 20 years. The fact that the number of people who would not vote or would spoil their ballot did not increase significantly suggests that immigrants become more interested in the German party system the longer they live in Germany. It also suggests that they become increasingly integrated over time.

The following figures on voting intentions, percentages of votes and the potential of the political parties relate to respondents who said they would vote if they could. Respondents who said they would not vote were excluded from the analysis.

When this survey was carried out in the first quarter of 2015, the CDU/CSU was well ahead of the SPD among respondents with and without a migrant background who had the right to vote, at 40 percent. Foreigners would have been slightly less likely to vote CDU/CSU than Germans and migrants. 41 percent of foreigners would vote for the SPD, making this their preferred party. Migrants leant more towards the SPD than Germans without a migrant background, but overall they still preferred the CDU/CSU. For all other political parties, the votes varied by less than five percentage points across the different groups. Overall voting behaviour, particularly among Germans and migrants, was surprisingly similar.

Fig. 41: If there were federal elections next Sunday (and if you were allowed to vote in Germany), which party would you vote for? (Second vote); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



The SPD was particularly popular not only with foreigners but also with Muslims. Half of the Muslims who intended to vote would have voted for the SPD, and the same applied to migrants of Turkish origin. The CDU/CSU, on the other hand, was particularly popular with Catholics. More than half of the emigrants, late repatriates and migrants with Russian and Polish roots would have voted for the CDU/CSU. The Left *(DIE LINKE)* and the Greens (Die Grünen) were most popular with people who had no religious affiliation. The Left attracted slightly above-average support from emigrants, late repatriates and migrants from Turkey and Russia. The Greens had slightly above-average support among migrants of Turkish origin.

Besides people who say they intend to vote for them, political parties have an additional potential, namely voters who favour a different party but could also imagine voting for them. Among all the respondents who intended to vote, the SPD attracted 16 percent of these potential voters. When added to the 27 percent who said they would vote for the SPD, the party could theoretically gain 43 percent of the total votes. However, parties generally fail to gain the support of all their potential voters. The main parties in particular usually have large numbers of potential voters

because many different groups of voters feel they could vote for them. But the total of all potential votes comes to well over 100 percent, so no party can fully exploit its own potential. That said, the CDU/CSU were not far off achieving this in our survey. With 40 percent of the intended vote, they had already attracted most of their potential voters, with "only" another 8 percent remaining. So in theory, the CDU/CSU could win 48 percent of the vote. This shows that it is far better at exploiting its potential than the SPD. The Greens also had very high numbers of potential voters, but they are relatively weak at mobilising them. 17 percent of people who said they could imagine voting for another party mentioned the Greens, but only 13 percent said they would actually vote for them. So the Greens had more potential votes than intended votes. All the other parties had between 3 and 5 percent in potential votes. That may not sound like much, but for the smaller parties it can decide whether or not they gain a seat in the Bundestag. With 4 percent of the intended votes in our survey, the FDP would not gain a seat in parliament, but they could try and hope to enter parliament after all by mobilising at least part of their additional 5 percent potential.

The potential vote figures show that voters are very flexible. Most voters would consider voting for one of two or three parties, and they would potentially switch between them in different elections. So at each election the parties have to win over as many potential voters as possible because of the steady decline in the number of core voters who are loyal to "their" party.

Fig. 42: If there were federal elections next Sunday (and if you were allowed to vote in Germany), which party would you vote for? (Voting intention). And could you also imagine voting for another party? If so, which? (Potential); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



With a figure of 14 percent, it is striking that Germans with a migrant background were more likely to feel they could potentially vote for the CDU/CSU than Germans. As the number of migrants who said that they would vote CDU/CSU was 40 percent, the Union could theoretically win up to 54 percent of the migrant vote. Meanwhile, 32 percent of migrants said they would vote for the SPD, and another 19 percent said they would potentially do so, meaning that the SPD could theoretically gain up to 51 percent of the migrant vote. The Greens could at best attract support from 25 percent of the migrants (compared to 32 percent of the Germans).

41 percent of foreigners said they would vote for the SPD, and another 14 percent could imagine doing so, meaning that the SPD could win 55 percent of the foreigners' vote if they were eligible to vote. The Union could theoretically gain a maximum of 46 percent of the foreigners' vote (intended vote of 34 percent plus potential of 12 percent). The Greens were slightly more popular among foreigners than among migrants, but only 12 percent of foreigners said they would vote for the Greens if they

had a vote. However, another 20 percent said they could imagine voting for the Greens. This means that the Greens could in theory win a maximum 32 percent of the foreigners' vote, which is the same as for Germans without a migrant background.

Along with their (potential) voting intentions, the respondents were also asked whether there was a party that they would definitely not vote for. More than half said they would never vote for an extreme right-wing party. A quarter of respondents said they would never vote for the AfD. In contrast, only 6 percent said they would never vote for an extreme left-wing party, although 17 percent stated they would never vote for The Left (DIE LINKE). The figures for all other parties were below 10 percent.

The number of migrants and foreigners who said they would never vote for an extreme right-wing party was lower than among Germans. However, above-average numbers of migrants and foreigners said they did not know if there was a party they would never vote for or that there was no party they would never vote for.

Fig. 43: Is there any party you would definitely not vote for? If so, which one? (Multiple answers possible); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



1| Of course this does not apply to local and European elections, in which other EU citizens also have the right to vote.

2| 1.4% of the electorate are migrants of Turkish origin, another 1.4% are migrants of Russian origin and 1.3% have a Polish migrant background.

5. POLITICAL PARTIES

Voting behaviour is determined by a range of factors. While candidates are becoming increasingly influential, the parties and how they are perceived of course still play a key role. Among Germans, support for the SPD and the CDU was equally split. On a scale of -5 to +5 both major parties received a score of 1.5. The Greens and the CSU were also in the positive range, but well behind the SPD and the CDU. The Left, the FDP and the AfD were all in the negative range, with the AfD scoring as low as -2.4.

Fig. 44: Opinions about political parties among Germans without a migrant background: What do you generally think about the individual political parties? Scale of +5 to -5; "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Migrants, on the other hand, rated the SPD slightly higher than the CDU, with the Greens once again in third place. With a rating of 0.6, the CSU attracted a better rating from migrants than from Germans. The Left was also more popular with migrants and was rated in the positive range, whereas this group generally had a negative view of the FDP and the AfD. But these latter two parties were still more popular with migrants than with Germans. Migrants seemed to have a slightly better opinion of all the parties than Germans.[1] However, above-average numbers of migrants felt unable to give an opinion about the parties. Depending on the party, between 17 percent (CDU) and 38 percent (AfD) of migrants said they did not know the party, could not judge it, did not know what to respond or did not want to respond.

Fig. 45: Opinion about political parties among Germans with a migrant background: What do you generally think about the individual political parties? Scale of +5 to -5; "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Foreigners gave even higher ratings for almost all the parties. Apart from the AfD, foreigners gave all parties a positive or at least neutral rating. At 2.2, the SPD received the highest rating, just ahead of the CDU at 2.0. Once again the Greens came in third place. With a score of 1.4 they proved to be much more popular with foreigners than with Germans (0.7). The Greens were followed by the CSU and The Left, with foreigners giving them similar ratings to migrants. Unlike Germans and migrants, foreigners did not give the FDP a negative rating, but gave it an average score of 0. The AfD was once again in the negative range, but with a score of -1.3 foreigners rated it more highly than Germans and migrants. However, even more foreigners than migrants were un-

able to provide ratings for the parties. Between 38 percent (CDU) and 60 percent (AfD) of foreigners failed to rate the parties.

Fig. 46: Opinion of political parties among foreigners: What do you generally think about the individual political parties? Scale of +5 to -5; "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



So far, we have only seen a difference between Germans, migrants and foreigners with respect to the level of the ratings. Almost all the parties were given the worst ratings by Germans and the best ratings by foreigners. However, the order in which the parties were ranked is surprisingly consistent. For Germans, the SPD and the CDU were neck-and-neck, while for migrants and foreigners the SPD was just ahead of the CDU. Otherwise the order was the same. However, Muslims ranked the parties in a slightly different order. They still gave the best rating to the SPD, but in their ranking, the Greens (1.3) beat the CDU to second place. For Muslims, the CDU came in third with a rating of 1.0. The Left rather than the CSU took fourth place with a score of 0.4. Muslims placed the CSU just in the negative range with an average rating of -0.1. The FDP and the AfD once again found themselves in the negative range, with the AfD receiving far and away the worst score.

Fig. 47: Opinion of political parties among Muslims: What do you generally think about the individual political parties? Scale of +5 to -5; "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



While Muslims showed a slightly less favourable opinion of the CDU and the CSU, there is no evidence that they dislike Christian-influenced parties on principle. Three quarters of Muslim respondents said they could imagine voting for a Christian-influenced party. The proportion increased with a decreasing level of religiosity (for the proportion of Muslims who were not very, averagely or very religious see Chapter 2.1). But even half of the very devout Muslims said they could imagine voting for a Christian-influenced party.

Fig. 48: Agreement with the statement "As a Muslim, I can imagine voting for a Christian-influenced party" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); results shown by level of religiosity, "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



In contrast to Muslims, emigrants and late repatriates gave the CDU an above-average positive rating. At 2.1, it came out ahead of the SPD. Emigrants and late repatriates ranked the CSU in third place and gave it a higher score than any other group. The Greens had less support from this group than from Muslims and came in fourth place, followed by The Left, the FDP and the AfD. The FDP and the AfD were also given a negative rating by emigrants and late repatriates, but this group gave the AfD a much higher rating than the other groups. Immigrants of Russian origin gave the AfD the best rating, which was only just in the negative range at -0.3.

Fig. 49: Opinion of political parties among emigrants and late repatriates: What do you generally think about the individual political parties? Scale of +5 to -5; "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



The analysis so far has shown that migrants and foreigners generally have a more positive view of German political parties than Germans do. Correspondingly, only a minority of them agreed with the statement that no party represent the interests of migrants. Around one fifth of Germans, migrants and foreigners agreed with the statement, but the overwhelming majority thought there were parties that represent the interests of migrants. Immigrants of Turkish origin were slightly more pessimistic than other immigrants. 28 percent of the immigrants from Turkey thought that none of the parties represent the interests of migrants.

Fig. 50: Agreement with the statement "No party in Germany represents the interests of migrants" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



When asked specifically about the CDU, around half of the Germans and migrants thought the CDU was doing enough to help foreigners and migrants to integrate. Agreement was slightly lower among foreigners at 41 percent. However, below-average numbers of foreigners disagreed with this statement. Instead, one third of foreigners responded with "Do not know". The number of "Do not know" responses was particularly high among recent immigrants, at 45 percent. They were still relatively new in Germany, knew little about the German party system and therefore probably found it difficult to answer this question. Among immigrants who had arrived in Germany more than 20 years earlier, only 19 percent answered this question with "Do not know". Half of them believed the CDU does enough to help migrants and foreigners to integrate. That means that immigrants who had lived in Germany for more than 20 years had come to hold the same opinions as Germans in this respect.

Fig. 51: If you think generally about the politics of the CDU: All in all, would you say that the CDU is sufficiently committed to the integration of foreigners living in Germany and for Germans with a migrant background? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Half of the Germans and migrants maintained that the CDU was doing enough for emigrants and late repatriates, but the figure was much lower among foreigners, at 32 percent. Once again this is due to the fact that half of all foreigners responded to the question with "Do not know", a proportion that declined with the length of time spent in Germany. The longer foreigners had been living in Germany, the more likely they were to feel able to answer this question. Agreement was very high among emigrants and late repatriates. More than half of them felt the CDU was doing enough to look after their interests. This opinion was also reflected in their voting behaviour.

Fig. 52: And what about emigrants and late repatriates: Do you feel that the CDU is sufficiently committed for that group or not? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



1| *However, the differences may have resulted from the survey methodology. It is possible that migrants are less inclined to use the negative part of the scale, but this is pure speculation and cannot be empirically proved or disproved. This would require specific methodological research.*

6. POLITICAL AGENDA

The political agenda covered in this survey was closely related to the circumstances at the time. The questions would no doubt have a different focus if the survey were repeated today. One would expect migrants and foreigners – however well integrated – to home in on different topics than Germans. One could assume that issues of integration policy, for instance, would play a greater role. But an examination of perceived problems carried out in 2009 revealed only minor differences between Germans and migrants. They only differed in two areas: migrants were more likely to bring up the issue of domestic security, while Germans were a little more concerned about retirement and pensions (Wüst 2014: 121f). All other differences were not found to be statistically significant in that study or could be attributed to the sociodemographic composition of the groups.

Our present study also reveals only minor differences. Interviewees were asked an open-ended question (without possible responses) about the main political problem in Germany. They were only allowed to name one problem. For all three groups, there was no one political problem that dominated during the first quarter of 2015. Germans were most likely to mention the general issue of foreigners and refugees (26 percent). 13 percent of migrants and foreigners also said this was the most critical issue, making this area slightly less important for them than for Germans.

7 percent of Germans, 13 percent of migrants and 14 percent of foreigners said that the most important political issue related to jobs/unemployment/labour market policy. So people with a migrant background were slightly more concerned about unemployment. It was mentioned particularly frequently by immigrants of Turkish origin, at 20 percent.

All other differences were even less significant. 7 percent of Germans, 5 percent of migrants and only 2 percent of foreigners said that schools and education policy was the most important issue. There were also no differences among the three groups in terms of the frequency of mentioning the topics of social deprivation/social gradient/poverty and limiting immigration/too many migrants/”Überfremdung” (excessive foreign influence). All other issues were only mentioned by very few respondents. Overall, the differences in the problems perceived by Germans, migrants and foreigners are so slight that we cannot say that immigrants have a specific agenda.

One might also expect to see differences in the opinions of Germans, migrants and foreigners when it comes to the competence of political parties to find solutions. In an earlier study, migrants were slightly more likely to say that none of the parties was able to find a solution to the most important problem. The study also found "that voters with a migrant background fall into two different political camps" (Wüst 2014: 126). On the one side were the emigrants and late repatriates, who had an above-average likelihood of attributing problem-solving capabilities to the CDU. On the other side were the migrants from other countries of origin, who had an above-average likelihood of attributing competence to the SPD and the Greens.

Fig. 53: And which party, in your opinion, is best suited to solve this problem? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



These findings were only partially reflected in the data examined in this study. At 30 percent, Germans were most likely to believe that none of the parties were capable of resolving the problem. They were followed by migrants, one in five of whom echoed this view. In contrast, only 17 percent of foreigners believed that none of the parties had the competence to solve the problems. However, migrants and foreigners had a higher proportion of "Do not know" responses. 12 percent of Germans, a quarter of migrants and 41 percent of foreigners responded with "Do not know", but this proportion declined with the length of time people had lived in Germany.

Overall, more than half of the foreigners (58 percent) did not name a specific party, but the proportion was also high among Germans and migrants, at 42 percent and 46 percent respectively.

The CDU/CSU was mentioned as being the most capable by one quarter of Germans and migrants. At 16 percent, foreigners had a slightly below-average belief in the Union as the most capable party. Although emigrants and late repatriates had an above-average likelihood of voting for the CDU or CSU, our study differed from the Wüst survey (2014) in that they only had an average frequency of attributing problem-solving capabilities to the Union (26 percent).

The proportion of people who thought the SPD was best placed to resolve their most important problem was roughly similar among Germans, migrants and foreigners. Above-average numbers of immigrants of Turkish origin considered the SPD to be the most capable. But only a below-average proportion of emigrants and late repatriates did so.

For all the other parties, feelings about their problem-solving capability were similar across all groups.

So the data only shows a very minor split. Immigrants from Turkey preferred the SPD, while emigrants and late repatriates considered the SPD to be less competent. Our study does not confirm the findings of Wüst from 2009 that emigrants and late repatriates strongly believe the Union is most capable of finding solutions. Emigrants, late repatriates and Germans without a migrant background all took a similar view of the CDU and CSU's problem-solving capabilities.

Foreigners seemed to have particular difficulty deciding which party is best at solving problems, but what did people think about whether politicians with a migrant background represent the interests of migrants and foreigners? The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung wanted to know whether politicians with a migrant background were better at representing the interests of immigrants than politicians who do not have a migrant background. One third of immigrants in the survey thought this was the case. They felt that politicians with a migrant background were in a better position to represent their interests. However, 44 percent thought that they were not. 20 percent answered "Do not know" or did not answer the question. People who had been living in Germany for a longer period were less likely to believe that politicians with a migrant background were better at representing their interests. 44 percent of recent immigrants believed that politicians with a migrant background would be better at representing their interests. This proportion declined to one in three among people who had been in Germany for more than 20 years.

People who had said yes were asked to name a politician who they would expect to do this. 12 percent thought Cem Özdemir could be better at representing their interests. Other politicians were only mentioned very infrequently. Interviewees mentioned the names of politicians with and without a migrant background, despite the fact that the question was

about politicians with a migrant background. This suggests that Cem Özdemir was the only well-known politician with a migrant background at the time and so he was the only one who people thought would be better at representing the interests of migrants. While one third of immigrants believed that a politician with a migrant background would be better at representing their interests, no politician had yet convinced the majority of people to this effect. Three quarters of immigrants were unable to name a politician at all and responded with "Do not know".

The respondents were also asked about the biggest problem that migrants and foreigners face in Germany. Even here, there were surprisingly few differences between Germans, migrants and foreigners. Language and language problems were perceived as the most significant problem by all three groups. One quarter of Germans, migrants and foreigners believed that language was the main problem for immigrants.

The issue of integration/willingness to integrate/adaptation to German society and culture was mentioned slightly less often by foreigners (9 percent) than by respondents who were German citizens (Germans: 14 percent; migrants: 13 percent).

In contrast, there were some slight differences regarding the issue of Germans' prejudice towards migrants/stereotyping/lack of mutual understanding. Interestingly, at 13 percent, this issue was mentioned most often by Germans. 9 percent of migrants and just 5 percent of foreigners felt that prejudice was the main problem for migrants and foreigners.

There were only minor differences between the groups with regard to their views on the lack of acceptance and recognition experienced by migrants/discrimination against migrants/intolerance. Roughly 1 in 10 Germans, 1 in 10 migrants and 7 percent of foreigners said that this was the biggest problem faced by migrants and foreigners in Germany.

The flipside – migrants isolating themselves/rejecting German culture/refusing to integrate – was considered to be a problem by 8 percent of Germans and 7 percent of migrants. Only 3 percent of foreigners saw this as a problem.

Even when talking about the greatest problem affecting migrants and foreigners rather than the most significant problem in Germany general-

ly, many respondents were either unable to name a party that could solve the problem or specifically stated that none of the parties was capable of doing so. One third of Germans believed that none of the parties had the competence, while 15 percent answered "Do not know" (total: 44 percent).

The percentage of migrants who thought none of the parties was capable of solving the problem was lower, at 20 percent, but the number of "Do not know" responses was higher, at 31 percent. This means that half of all the migrants did not specify a party.

Two thirds of foreigners replied "Do not know" or "No party". 17 percent of foreigners felt that none of the parties was capable of finding solutions, and a further 47 percent responded "Do not know". This is surprising, as the question was not about a "German" problem but about resolving the issues faced by migrants and foreigners in Germany. So a smaller proportion of migrants and foreigners than Germans felt that none of the parties was competent. It seems that migrants and foreigners are not sufficiently familiar with the German parties to feel they are in a position to answer the question about their problem-solving capabilities. However, people who have lived in Germany for a longer period were less likely to respond with "Do not know".

All three groups in the survey considered the Union and the SPD to be equally competent. Both parties were rated better by Germans than by immigrants. One fifth of Germans believed the CDU/CSU were in the best position to resolve the main problem faced by migrants and foreigners, while 17 percent thought the SPD was more capable. 17 percent of migrants specified the Union and 14 percent the SPD. Foreigners living in Germany had the least confidence in the capability of the CDU and SPD to resolve problems. Only around 1 in 10 foreigners believed the Union or the SPD was capable in this respect. Once again, emigrants and late repatriates had an average likelihood of believing the Union was the most capable party (20 percent), while they were much less likely to perceive the SPD as competent (5 percent). However, migrants and foreigners with Turkish roots had an above-average likelihood of naming the SPD as the most competent party.

Views of the other parties were very similar across all groups.

7. POLITICAL ATTITUDES

The survey reveals only minor differences between Germans, migrants and foreigners in terms of voting behaviour and political problems. The level of satisfaction with democracy was also similar in all three groups. 90 percent of foreigners and 88 percent of migrants and Germans said they were satisfied with democracy. So the level of satisfaction with democracy is very high in all three groups.

In the foreigners' group, Turks were slightly less satisfied with democracy in Germany than foreigners as a whole. 83 percent were very or somewhat satisfied with democracy. Poles living in Germany had a particularly high level of satisfaction with democracy. 95 percent of Poles were very or somewhat satisfied with democracy. The number of people who were very satisfied with democracy declined in line with the length of time they had been living in Germany, whereas the number of those who were somewhat satisfied increased. Among recent immigrants, 48 percent were very satisfied with democracy and 45 percent somewhat satisfied. Among immigrants who had been living in Germany for more than 20 years, 28 percent wwere very satisfied and 61 percent somewhat satisfied. Feelings of dissatisfaction, on the other hand, appear to increase insignificantly over time. 3 percent of immigrants who came to Germany in the previous five years and 9 percent who came to Germany more than 20 years previously said they were dissatisfied with democracy. Therefore, it seems that immigrants'

satisfaction with democracy declines the longer they live in Germany, but their dissatisfaction does not increase. Overall, the overwhelming majority of immigrants surveyed were very or somewhat satisfied with democracy in Germany.

Fig. 54: "Now let's talk about the democracy in Germany. All in all, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with democracy as it exists in Germany?" "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Among the few respondents who expressed dissatisfaction, it is not possible to identify any obvious reasons for this, so it seems to be a more general feeling of dissatisfaction. 43 percent of the Germans who expressed dissatisfaction said that they were dissatisfied with politics or politicians. They stated that politicians were out of touch with the people and failed to keep their election promises and they complained that politics was not transparent. Among the migrants who expressed dissatisfaction, only 16 percent mentioned politics/politicians as the reason for it, and the figure was as low as 5 percent among the dissatisfied foreigners.

Alongside the generally very high levels of satisfaction with democracy, there was also some evidence of certain – if relatively small – amounts of cultural pessimism, anti-capitalism, criticism of elites, homophobia, xenophobia, propensity to violence, authoritarianism and conspiracy theories. The survey only included one item for each of these dimensions rather than a whole range of questions, so the results should be approached with some caution. However, they provide a useful first impression.[1]

Only a minority of people expressed cultural pessimism. Just below 40 percent of Germans, migrants and foreigners complained that our society no longer provided ideals that give people direction. This attitude was equally prevalent in all three groups. At 46 percent, Russian immigrants showed a slightly above-average tendency towards cultural pessimism. This also applied to respondents with lower formal levels of education. 18-to-24-year-olds, on the other hand, expressed below-average levels of pessimism, but otherwise there were no significant differences between the groups. Surprisingly, people's level of religiosity did not seem to affect their response.

Fig. 55: Agreement with the statement "In today's society there are no longer ideals to which you can orientate yourself" (Strongly agree/ Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Just over 40 percent of Germans, migrants and foreigners expressed an anti-capitalist attitude. Interestingly, immigrants of Turkish origin had an above-average likelihood of agreeing with the statement "Capitalism ruins the world" (60 percent), while immigrants of Russian origin showed a below-average level of agreement (33 percent). However, the latter had an above-average likelihood of responding with "Do not know" (27 percent). It should be noted that this attitude is not fundamentally directed against Germany's economic system.

Fig. 56: Agreement with the statement "Capitalism ruins the world" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Around half of the respondents expressed criticism of elites, agreeing with the statement "'Those up there' just do what they want". There were no significant differences between Germans, migrants and foreigners with regard to this statement either. However, immigrants of Turkish origin were more likely to be critical of elites. Almost two thirds of them thought that "those up there" just do what they want. The longer immigrants had been living in Germany, the more likely they were to be critical of elites. Only 1 in 3 immigrants who came to Germany in the previous five years agreed with this statement. In contrast, 59 percent of immigrants who had lived in Germany for more than 20 years were critical of elites. If we view integration as the adaptation of the two groups to each other, then some immigrants actually "overshot the mark" over the course of their time in Germany. At first they were less critical of elites than Germans, but after 20 years they were equally critical or even more critical. But of course this may be the result of a cohort effect rather than a process of adaptation. That would mean that immigrants who arrived more than 20 years previously were already more critical at that time than more recent generations of immigrants. Young people between the ages of 18 and 24 were less critical of elites than the average, and the level of criticism also declined in line with increasing levels of education.

Fig. 57: Agreement with the statement "'Those up there' just do what they want" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Besides cultural pessimism, anti-capitalism and criticism of elites, the survey also measured levels of homophobia. Unlike the first three statements, the statement "I do not want any gay friends" revealed differences between Germans, migrants and foreigners. Only 6 percent of Germans said they did not want any gay friends, whereas the figure was around 25 percent for migrants and foreigners. Immigrants of Turkish origin had an average likelihood of agreeing with this statement. Immigrants of Russian origin had an above-average likelihood of agreeing with the statement. 37 percent of immigrants from Russia said they did not want any gay friends. The figures also showed that across all religious denominations with an adequate number of cases (Catholic, Protestant and Muslim), people who were more religious were more likely to be against homosexuals, though to varying degrees. Among Catholics, rejection of homosexuals ranged from 3 percent (not very religious) to 10 percent (very religious), and among Protestants between 5 percent and 11 percent. Rejection of homosexuality was higher among Muslims. 15 percent of less religious Muslims did not want to have gay friends, while this applied to a third of very devout Muslims. So in terms of attitude in this area, assimilation by immigrants to the German population seems to have some way to go. Indeed, other studies have shown that levels of rejection are even higher. In a study carried out by Koopmans (2015: 477), 57 percent of Western European Muslims from Turkey and Morocco said they did not want to have gay friends.

Fig. 58: Agreement with the statement " I do not want any gay friends" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



The statement "Jews cannot be trusted" is sometimes used in surveys as a way of measuring anti-Semitism, but it is unclear whether this provides an effective reflection of anti-Semitism. This statement does not measure xenophobia. In our study, the statement was intended to measure whether people felt a sense of alienation towards Jews. Among the indigenous population, the opinion that Jews cannot be trusted was an extremely marginal one. Only 2 percent of the Germans surveyed agreed with it. While agreement with the statement was higher among migrants and foreigners, the percentages were still low. 7 percent of migrants and 10 percent of foreigners thought that Jews cannot be trusted. The highest levels of agreement came from Muslims and immigrants of Turkish origin. 15 percent of Muslims and 17 percent of immigrants from Turkey thought that Jews cannot be trusted. Pollack et al. (2016: 5) came to very similar conclusions in their survey of immigrants of Turkish origin. 21 percent of them had a fairly or very negative attitude towards Jews according to the study carried out in Münster. Koopmans' analysis (2015: 477) for six Western European countries actually indicated that as many as 45 percent of Muslim immigrants from Turkey and Morocco believed that Jews cannot be trusted.

Fig. 59: Agreement with the statement: "Jews cannot be trusted" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Our survey also measured propensity to violence. Germans had the least propensity to violence. Only 4 percent of Germans agreed with the statement "In every democratic society there are conflicts that must be settled by force". A higher proportion of migrants (14 percent) and foreigners (16 percent) believed violence is justified. And 17 percent of immigrants of Turkish origin also accepted the need for the use of force. This result is in line with the findings of Pollack et al. (2016: 15), who found that one fifth of immigrants of Turkish origin believed that violence was justified in order to defend Islam. Our survey showed the same level of agreement with the idea of the use of force to solve conflicts among immigrants of Russian origin and Muslims. One in five immigrants from Russia and one in five Muslims thought that some conflicts could only be resolved by force.

Fig. 60: Agreement with the statement "In every democratic society, there are conflicts that must be settled by force" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree; "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



There were no notable differences between Germans and migrants when it came to leanings towards authoritarianism. Around 1 in 3 Germans and 1 in 3 migrants believed there should once again be someone who gives clear directions. At 39 percent, foreigners were slightly more likely to agree with the statement. The highest levels of agreement with having someone who gives clear directions were found among immigrants of Turkish origin (42 percent) and Muslims (43 percent). The level of agreement declines in line with increasing levels of education.

Fig. 61: Agreement with the statement "There should again be someone who gives clear directions" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



We chose the following statement as an example of a conspiracy theory: "The USA is actually behind the attacks of September 11." Only 12 percent of Germans supported this conspiracy theory. It was more popular among migrants and foreigners, with almost a third of migrants believing the USA was actually behind the attacks. Agreement was slightly lower among foreigners at 28 percent. When we look at the individual groups of immigrants, it is those of Turkish and Russian origin who stand out. Almost 1 in 3 immigrants of Russian origin believed the USA was behind the 9/11 attacks. The same applies to almost half of the immigrants of Turkish origin (46 percent). However, only 18 percent of immigrants of Polish origin agreed with the statement. Muslims (42 percent) agreed with this conspiracy theory almost as often as immigrants of Turkish origin, probably because of the large overlap between these two groups. More devout Muslims were more likely to believe the USA was behind the attacks. One quarter of less religious Muslims agreed with this conspiracy theory, but as many as half of the very religious Muslims believed it. In every group, older people were less likely to agree with the conspiracy theory.

Fig. 62: Agreement with the statement "The USA is actually behind the attacks of September 11" (Strongly agree/Tend to agree); "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



The results reveal two sides of a coin. On the one hand, Germans, migrants and foreigners expressed high levels of satisfaction with democracy; on the other hand, some minority groups expressed attitudes that do not sit comfortably with democracy or have a populist flavour.

This is where there is a need for civic education and preventative measures.

1| The study was designed to be a multiple issue survey so all the topics had to be addressed briefly. For this reason, only one item per dimension was covered. Due to time constraints, it was impossible to ask more detailed questions on each dimension.

8. EXPLANATION OF THE SAMPLING PROCEDURE[1]

Rather than using onomastic sampling, we made a purely random selection in order to gain a representative sample of all three sub-groups. Onomastic sampling is commonly used in studies on migration and draws on findings from the study of proper names (cf. Humpert/Schneiderheinze: 2000). It generally involves using a lexicon of names to draw up a list of names for each nationality that is to be included in the study, and this list is then compared against telephone book entries. This method has a number of disadvantages. Firstly, names that occur in a number of languages cannot be clearly assigned to a particular nationality. Secondly, it means that only households that are listed in the telephone book can be included in the sample; households that are unlisted cannot be part of the sampling procedure (Humpert/Schneiderheinze 2000: 55). Thirdly, it is necessary to draw up lists of names for every nationality. So for practical reasons it is only possible to include nationalities that are relatively strongly represented in Germany. Small minorities of immigrants are generally not included in onomastic surveys, so the selection cannot be representative of all migrants and foreigners who live in Germany. However, name-based selection can make sense for certain groups. For example, an onomastic sample could be useful if the survey is only to include Turks living in Germany. A fourth disadvantage is the difficulty of tracing emigrants. They are allowed to change their names so that

they sound more German, but this means that many of them can no longer be identified by their name. A good example of this is the singer Helene Fischer, whose name no longer reflects her Russian roots. This is why it is now possible to carry out a "toponomastic" sampling procedure (cf. Salentin: 2007), where the sampling is based on nationality and place of birth as given in the resident register. Including the place of birth makes it possible to identify emigrants as well. However, it becomes more difficult with second-generation emigrants: "Of course it is not possible to identify the children of first-generation emigrants by their place of birth, which by definition is the home country" (Salentin 2007: 32). Procedures that use the local resident registers are also very expensive and time-consuming.

In theory, an alternative way of sampling for migrant surveys would be via the Central Register of Foreigners. But this does not include emigrants or migrants with German citizenship. And only the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is allowed access to the Central Register of Foreigners for the purposes of research (cf. Babka von Gostomski/Pupeter 2008: 153).

As the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung intended to carry out a representative survey of the migrants and foreigners (including emigrants) living in Germany, the only solution was to use a totally random selection procedure. This meant that everyone over the age of 18 who lived in Germany had an equal chance of being included in the sample and taking part in the survey. That was the only way to allow the results of the sample to be extrapolated to the entire population, i.e. to all people living in Germany aged 18 and above. However, the disadvantage of random sampling is that it entails more extensive and time-consuming screening for immigrants and particularly for foreigners because they only make up a small part of the total population, at around 11 percent (migrants) and 9 percent (foreigners). It was therefore necessary to create a gross sample of 320,757 telephone numbers in order to conduct 3,034 interviews.

As younger people increasingly do not have a landline but only a mobile phone, we used a "dual frame approach". 60 percent of the gross sample were selected via their landline number and the remaining 40 percent via their mobile number.

USUMA GmbH was contracted by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung to carry out 3,034 30-minute interviews between 8 January and 18 April 2015. This involved 1,021 interviews with Germans without a migrant background, 1,004 interviews with migrants and 1,009 interviews with foreigners living in Germany. 495 Interviews were carried out in other languages (Russian: 187, Turkish: 123, Polish: 75, English: 70, Italian: 40). The questionnaire was translated into English, Russian, Turkish, Polish and Italian so that we could ensure that people with a poor knowledge of German could also take part in the survey in order to avoid any distortion.

The disproportionate design of the sample resulted in an above-average proportion of immigrants, so the data had to be weighted. The weighting of the data was done mainly using the Federal Statistics Office publication "Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund - Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus" [Population with a migrant background – results of the microcensus].

Of the 1,004 migrants surveyed, 28 percent were born in Germany. 11 percent were born in Poland, 19 percent in the Russian Federation or former Soviet Union, and 7 percent in Turkey. Three quarters of migrants stated that they held German nationality only, and one quarter were also citizens of at least one other country. 22 percent of the respondents with dual nationality had German and Polish passports. 19 percent were Russian and 12 percent were Turkish citizens.

Of the 1,009 foreigners surveyed, 9 percent were born in Germany. 15 percent were born in Turkey and 8 percent in Poland. 19 percent of the foreigners living in Germany were Turkish citizens. 8 percent stated they had an Italian passport and another 8 percent a Polish one.

In absolute terms, 362 Muslims were surveyed. After weighting, this corresponds to 4 percent of the total sample. This is close to the estimated proportion of Muslims in the overall population given by Haug et al. (2009: 80). 27 percent of the surveyed Muslims had solely German nationality, 10 percent held dual nationality, but the majority (62 percent) of them were citizens of another country.

4 percent of the sample comprised emigrants and late repatriates, which also corresponds to their actual proportion of the population.

In our survey, a large number of immigrants with direct experience of migration had been living in Germany for more than 15 years, and migrants had been living in Germany significantly longer than foreigners. Three quarters of migrants had been living in Germany for 15 years or more, whereas this applied to only half of the foreigners. One quarter of foreigners had been living in Germany for less than 5 years, whereas only 2 percent of migrants came to Germany within the previous five years. This is hardly surprising, as immigrants have to live in Germany for at least eight years before they can apply for citizenship.

Fig. 63: How many years ago did you (for the first time) move to the current territory of the Federal Republic of Germany? "Do not know" and "Not specified" omitted.



Almost half of the migrants who moved to Germany themselves said that they came in order to reunite with their family. 17 percent of migrants came to Germany for economic reasons, and 15 percent for political reasons. All other reasons played only a minor role. Foreigners living in Germany most frequently mentioned economic reasons (37 percent). Only one quarter of foreigners came to Germany for family

reasons. A further 15 percent said they came to be with a partner, 13 percent came to study or train in Germany, and 12 percent came for political reasons.

1| This chapter is almost identical to that previously published in Pokorny (2016).

9. CONCLUSION

It is clear that much still remains to be done. Some immigrants know so little about the German political party system and German politicians that they have no idea who to vote for, which party they trust to solve problems, or which politician with a migrant background could potentially represent their interests. However, these issues are less prevalent among migrants and foreigners who have lived in Germany for a longer period. It seems that immigrants simply need time to familiarise themselves with the political landscape in Germany.

The results for the various integration indicators show a similar tendency. Immigrants become more integrated the longer they live in Germany. Their emotional bond with their home country gradually weakens and they feel more strongly connected to their host country of Germany. However, immigrants should not be expected to completely give up their identity of origin. It is clear that forms of integration that have made the most progress are those that involve additive integration. It is easier to have German friends in addition to friends from one's country of origin than it is to give up one's religion and convert to another.

In addition to their identification with Germany, some of the immigrants retain an identification with their religious group and/or their country of origin and the latter can be activated by certain events. Muslims' sense of solidarity tends to re-

volve around their religion, while immigrants of Russian origin feel solidarity with Russia. Both of these groups also have a slightly above-average willingness to resolve conflicts using force. Despite a high level of satisfaction with democracy, some minorities express attitudes that are problematic from a democratic point of view. This is clearly an area where civic education and preventative action could be improved.

Integration is taking place, but it does take time. Legislation on integration is needed to accelerate this process, particularly with regard to cultural and structural integration. If it is not to take 20 or 30 years or even two or three generations before an immigrant is adequately integrated, then immigrants must be supported and actively encouraged in the process. This is the aim of the new Integration Act. However, the legislators are focusing on structural integration into the labour market and cultural integration in the form of language skills. Social integration, encouraging identification with the host society and other aspects of cultural integration that go beyond language have so far been ignored. Our study has identified a particular need for cultural integration with regard to attitudes towards religious issues.

Germany has repeatedly demonstrated that it is capable of taking in and integrating large numbers of immigrants. Immigrants are happy to live in Germany and show great willingness to adapt to its culture, but more has to be done. That said, integration is on the right path and this willingness to integrate represents an essential prerequisite to a speedy process of integration.

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