

# THE EU AND CHINA IN AFRICA

## PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION

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The EU and China in Africa  
Prospects for Cooperation

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## INTRODUCTION

Africa, once described as the hopeless continent, is better known today within an 'Africa rising' narrative. Despite on-going conflicts – in Mali, Chad or South Sudan to name a few – Africa's economic output continues to grow impressively. Indeed, six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world are in Africa. The continent has huge mineral resources and a young, fast-growing population set to reach two billion by 2050. It is therefore not surprising that both the EU and China are paying more attention to Africa even though they have very different strategies. To discuss the prospects for EU-China cooperation in

and with Africa, the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung and the EU-Asia Centre organised a roundtable on 1 December in Brussels.

Opening the roundtable, **Fraser Cameron**, *Director, EU-Asia Centre*, underlined that China, the EU and Africa are three very distinct partners with distinct problems of their own, yet this debate – the first of its kind – is needed to chart avenues for future cooperation. Both the EU and China have strategies for Africa while Africa has developed its own Vision 2063.



Fraser Cameron

Fraser Cameron, Birgitte Markussen





Sabina Woelkner



H.E. Ajay Bramdeo and Sabina Woelkner

**Sabina Woelkner**, *Head of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Brussels)*, highlighted that it is high time to deepen the discussion so as to have an open and non-biased debate on cooperation, but also on its potential limits. It is important to see how they match expectations from Africa based on values, but also strategic interests.

**Birgitte Markussen**, *Deputy Managing Director Africa, EEAS*, said that the EU has a number of guiding documents, most notably the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) and accompanying road map for

implementation. She explained that the agenda had moved from trade and development aid to viewing Africa as a political partner. The UN Agenda 2030 and Africa's 2063 Agenda are also guiding EU action. At the end of November, the European Commission adopted its New Consensus for Development and the New Partnership for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Markussen underscored **"We will invest in Africa's own development as if it were part of our own development"**. There are several important trends: (i) mobility and demography based on inclusive growth that includes young people and women; (ii) Europe needs strong partners – Europe

needs a strong Africa, and Europe and Africa must invest in each other; (iii) support to Africa's efforts in peace and security; (iv) challenges and benefits in migration flows; (v) human development – the fight against poverty, inequality and skills development; (vi) shared values, including democracy and the rule of law to name a few.

**H.E. Ajay Bramdeo**, *Ambassador of the AU to the EU*, considered it important that a discussion takes place between the EU and China, as major partners in Africa. He said that **"Africa was changing fast and can be a catalyst for renewed global**

**economic growth."** Africa has and seeks to have several partnerships, including with Turkey, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and the US amongst others. **"We need home-grown solutions owned by the continent and the people"**. Bramdeo added: **"we want an equal partnership and we know that we have to step up and be responsible."**

Bilateral relations with EU Member States complicate Africa's relations with the EU, but this is not the case for China. There is also scope for discussions between Africa, the EU and China on the EU External





He Wenping

Investment plan. Yet the burden of the cycle of indebtedness "is like an albatross around Africa's neck." Bramdeo also called for a greater African voice in global trade discussions.

**Prof. He Wenping**, Director, Division of African Studies, Institute of West Asia and Africa Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS Beijing), noted that China's historical engagement in Africa is not as deep as the EU's, but China has very strong trade and investment commitments in Africa. In addition, research on Africa in China is being stepped up in Chinese universities and think-tanks. "**Africa serves as a new frontier and development opportunity, but Africa also serves as a mirror for us to see ourselves clearly.**" For example,

Chinese entrepreneurs have become more aware of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and have improved localisation of business through their engagement in Africa. This leads to improvements and "**we learn how to engage with Africa, not as an object or a subject.**" There is abundant opportunity, even in the new 'Trump' era in the US.

## I. COOPERATION FORMATS

As the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) approaches its ten year anniversary, **Kristin de Peyron**, *Head of Division, EEAS*, highlighted that the **JAES deals with Africa as a continent and it is designed to be a partnership of equals**. She explained, "We have a set of jointly identified priorities and a road map, which aims to strengthen our political dialogue and to enhance inter-continental cooperation. This goes beyond development. It is inclusive and multi-stakeholder." Apart from JAES, there are other cooperation frameworks, including the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states that deals exclusively with sub-Saharan Africa, and

the Euro-Med Partnership, which deals exclusively with North African countries.

The three guiding documents for EU-Africa cooperation are notably the UN Agenda 2030, the African Union's Vision 2063 and the EU's Global Strategy. These documents contain information on all future cooperation in five specific areas: (i) peace and security; (ii) democracy, good governance and human rights; (iii) human development; (iv) inclusive and sustainable development, growth and inclusion; (v) global and emerging issues. Firstly, "Peace and security constitute the most developed part of the partnership. We have close cooperation between our







Faten Aggad and Zeng Aiping

peace and security councils on the EU and the AU side." Currently, the **EU supports African peace operations and intends to move more to conflict prevention and mediation in future cooperation.** Secondly, the EU and AU have an annual Human Rights Dialogue and work together on election observation missions. De Peyron noted that the AU has a partly developed governance structure, which is becoming stronger, and that the EU continues to support the capacity of AU institutions. However, in the EU perspective, the key challenge remains in the signature, ratification and implementation of Treaties. Thirdly, on-going cooperation in the field of human development is concentrated on education, student mobility, notably in the framework of Erasmus+, and migration. Fourthly, the Economic Partnership

Agreements (EPAs) foster sustainable development, growth and inclusion, and the EU also has its own experience to share in trade. Fifthly, political dialogue plays an important part in EU-Africa relations on global and emerging issues, including counter-terrorism. The next EU-Africa summit will discuss demography in Africa, with special focus on youth and jobs.

Sino-EU cooperation in Africa, according to **Dr. Zeng Aiping**, *Assistant Research Fellow at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and Deputy Executive Director of the China-Asian African Cooperation Centre (Beijing)*, is largely a European initiative. The question arises whether the EU intends to integrate China in its own Africa policy framework, or **to make China accept EU (or EU Member State)**



Kristin de Peyron

**norms, values and practices in Africa.** Nevertheless, there are commonalities between the EU's and China's Africa policies in the following areas: poverty reduction; creation of employment opportunities; economic and social development; sustainable development; peace, security and stability; regional and continental integration (notably vis-à-vis the African Union); tied aid and development assistance.

However, there are also a number of divergences, which differentiate China and EU relations with Africa. Firstly, the different historical relation with Africa means that China enjoys an advantageous relationship. Secondly, while the EU and China may have the same objectives, the approaches are notably very different. For example, the EU promotes

democracy, human rights and good governance as a pre-condition for engagement. China in contrast does not impose political conditionalities in its relations with Africa. **The Chinese principle of non-interference is in fact more attractive for African countries and a clear source of soft power for China in Africa.** In terms of infrastructure construction, China is not only more visible but also more welcomed. China's delivery of commitments is not only more efficient but also more attractive. Furthermore, the EU and China both have very different standards and practices in engineer contracting, labour and environmental regulations, which could imply that the current divergences are too challenging to envisage any Sino-EU cooperation in the near future. Dr. Zeng highlighted that the different approaches



Anna Stahl

could be complimentary, if each party can leverage their competitive advantage. For example, the EU has advantages in development funds, advanced technology and equipment, research and development (R&D), and management, whereas China can harness being cost-effective, delivering quickly, and in providing funds and equipment. The Merowe Dam Project in Sudan (2003-2010) is a suitable case study that can shed light on such complementarity. Dr. Zeng underlined that **it does not seem likely that either the EU or China will give up its norms and practices – the EU’s political agenda and China’s non interference** – in future cooperation. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that it is simply not a matter of the EU, Africa or China, but of multiple actors and conflicting interests. In his view, the best scenario is one in which Africa takes the lead, because cooperation is

‘a must’. Competition should be healthy and conflict should be avoided at all costs.

Drawing on the multiple actors in triangular cooperation, **Ms. Faten Aggad**, *Head of Programme, Africa’s Change Dynamics at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)* also highlighted the case study of EU-UK-China cooperation in the water sector in Tanzania.

**Dr. Anna Stahl**, *Research Fellow, EU-China Research Centre, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe (Bruges)*, highlighted that **the EU has a traditional North-South cooperation model with Africa**, based on three frameworks: 1) the ACP group, which has its roots in the postcolonial decade; (2) the European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) and (3) the EU and

South Africa Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), and now the Strategic Partnership with South Africa (2007). Although this is largely based on a donor-recipient model, there has been a shift since the first Africa-EU summit in Cairo in 2000 with the establishment of the African Union (AU). This shift towards a more regional partnership has been reinforced through consecutive communications:

the European Commission communication calling for a single ‘EU Africa Strategy’ (2005); Council Conclusions on the EU Strategy for Africa (2005); and the JAES adopted at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa-EU summit (2007). Dr. Stahl said, “the AU has come to be seen as a natural partner, in part, based on the similarity of its institutional structure.” She highlighted that the relationship has become more strategic and



Claude Kabemba



more security oriented. The main EU actors of the partnership are: the European Commission, and in particular DG DevCo; the Council of the EU and EU Member States; the EU Special Representative to the AU; the EEAS and the EU Delegation to the AU.

**China's relations are more recent and can be defined as 'South-South cooperation'.** The main actors include: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); the Special Representative on African Affairs; the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM); China's Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and other government policy banks; Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Chinese provinces. There are two main policy documents from the Chinese MFA: (i) China's Africa Policy (2006) and (ii) the Chinese Policy paper on Africa (2015). Both reflect that China's cooperation is based on the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence', including non-interference. The Ministry of Commerce also has two main policy documents: (i) the First Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid (2011) and (ii) the Second Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid. While Dr. Stahl's research shows a large increase in Chinese aid to Africa between 2001 and 2009, she warns "aid has a different definition in a Chinese context based on trade and investment. This is not the same as the EU definition based on the OECD definition." Dr. Stahl noted that there has been some convergence between the EU and Chinese approaches, especially as there is more emphasis on Sino-African security cooperation. Not only will China set up its first naval base in the Horn of Africa but there will also be a Peace Facility for Africa. At the regional level, the AU is now a member of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and there is a Chinese permanent mission to the AU. These recent developments show that there is potential for future security cooperation.

China is still trying to institutionalise its relations with Africa. **Dr. Claude Kabemba**, Executive Director, Southern Africa Resource Watch, recognised that China is still struggling to define itself, compared to the EU, which has an old and institutionalised cooperation that has legitimacy. The EU has strengthened its relations at three levels: at the continental level with the AU, at the regional level with the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and at the bilateral level. Dr. Kabemba noted that the **African RECs**

– such as the **Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC) – mostly survive from EU-funded projects and cooperation.** Moreover, future cooperation should be on an issue-by-issue basis: security, economics, market, humanitarian issues, peacekeeping.

**"Africa wants to move from a norm taker to a norm setter"** said Dr. Kabemba. However, the EU and China cannot intervene in Africa without thinking about African resources and the AU has defined this in its AU Resource Vision. Yet, Africa has not achieved policy coherence internally and there is an inclination in Africa to promote national policies. It is therefore no surprise that China and the EU Member States support bilateral relations. Similarly, the EU is not homogenous. Take for example, France in francophone West Africa. China is having a hard time to penetrate francophone countries. China should seek relations with strong African partners, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria to name a few. **China can actually benefit from the EU's legitimacy in Africa which is embedded in global norms** that have existed for a long time. However, if the EU and China were to cooperate, the existing norms would have to be adjusted and re-negotiated for China and Africa to assume ownership of them. In its current state such seems imposed and this may not work very well.

## II. TRADE AND INVESTMENT

It is common knowledge that trade and investment impact sustainable development. This panel reflected on how Africa can enter into win-win partnerships with China and the EU. A number of key areas were discussed such as the Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals, the implications of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and the possibility of an EU-Africa Free Trade Agreement.

**Prof. He Wenping**, Director, Division of African Studies, Institute of West Asia and Africa Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS, Beijing) explained that not only is China Africa's first trading partner, since 2009, but **China is the first trading partner of 143 countries in the world.** In her words, "China's is the 'factory of the world', and as such it enjoys a competitive advantage. In terms of investment, China is catching up rapidly. Look at the

buildings from Addis Ababa to the Djibouti railway. Chinese companies will be there to provide technology transfer and training for local staff. The Mombasa-Nairobi railway will be finished next year, and big projects are now being twinned with environmental protection." However, Prof. He said trade between China and Africa is not likely to double from \$200 billion to \$400 billion by 2020 because the current volume of trade is dropping, as is the price of raw materials.

China has focused on rail, road and air infrastructures that enhance connectivity. **Industrialisation is important and China wants to build infrastructure**, as the two are inherently linked. Industrialisation can bring about heavy infrastructure projects, which are sustainable, by comparison with earlier EU projects, which no longer work.





Hanna Deringer



Song Xinning

**He Wenping** also stated that **Industrial Parks and export zones need to be a key part of the strategy to that end.** However, African countries have a skills deficit despite a young population. Chinese labourers can fill the gap and finish projects on time, or even in advance. There is huge potential if the EU and China can join forces. For example, we have to see the results of the recent China - France Investment Fund of €200 million for renewable energy.

**Industrialisation and Global Value Chains (GVC) are the areas in which all actors have a joint interest,** according to **Hanna Deringer**, *Policy Analyst, European Centre for International Political Economy (Brussels)*. The EU economy is facing a dim economic outlook and needs competitive imports from new markets. African markets are growing at a very fast pace. Growth in China is high but slowing down. The EU's Trade for All Strategy outlines the EU's objective to integrate developing countries into

GVCs. China is interested in high-tech and wants third countries to build lower-end industrial goods. Therefore, African countries can be suppliers. After all, Africa has high participation in GVCs, but only as forward linkages via inputs and raw materials for further processing. A number of issues are holding back integration in Africa nonetheless: a lack of strong services sector, institutions and product standards. In this regard, it is important to address how African products can meet the standards in the EU market.

The EU has a number of special trading schemes for developing countries, such as the General System of Preference (GSP+) and Everything But Arms (EBA). African countries now have the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as one of the main frameworks for trade, and there is also the Aid for Trade Initiative. Against this background, Ms. Deringer recognised that the approaches of the EU and of China can be complementary. China focuses more on

infrastructure and productivity but also on knowledge sharing. The EU has a stronger focus on sustainable development, social and labour rights, but also on the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). **Future collaboration could hinge more in the area of services trade and regulatory barriers.**

**Yentyl Williams**, *EU-ACP Trade Researcher, University of Ghent and Founder of the ACP Young Professionals Network (ACP YPN)*, said that we must acknowledge the shifting paradigms from EU-ACP focused policy, to a more pan-African approach as defined in the EU's New Consensus for Development. Nevertheless, we should not forget that Africa is not a country, but an immense continent that is the landmass of China, the USA, India, Mexico, Japan and Western Europe put together. This should serve as a reminder to understand which Africa we are talking about. Moreover, the new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) add another layer of complexity since they have been criticised by EU and

ACP stakeholders alike for undermining endogenous African regional integration, institutions and by extension, also Africa's sustainable development.

Even where African countries could have benefited from duty-free and quota-free market access to spur export diversification, **African countries (and the ACP) did not benefit due to the preferential arrangement in place internally in Europe with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This is emblematic of the development-underdevelopment dialectic that fundamentally taints EU-Africa relations.**

China offers a new partnership to African countries. As the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo explains in her book, 'Winner takes all: China's race for resources and what it means for the world,' there is a difference between the economic and political development offered by China and 'the West'. Irrespective of the models, what is clear is that





Gu Jing and He Wenping



Gu Jing



Yentyl Williams

Africa's endogenous Agenda 2063 for development must take priority. In this light, an **EU-Africa FTA does not seem realistic**. The EU and the ECOWAS, EAC and SADC regions have negotiated long and hard to get a 'goods only' EPA agreement, which contrasts strongly with the 'comprehensive' Caribbean EPA that includes services, intellectual property and public procurement amongst others.

**Dr. Song Xinning**, *China Director, Confucius Institute, (Dutch-speaking) Free University of Brussels*, wondered how should we look at China's image in Africa. According to the Afrobarometer survey, which was conducted across 36 African countries, 63% of respondents have a positive view of China's growing presence. China is the second development model after the US, and Europe comes third. Dr. Song noted that "**Africa is the**

**backyard of Europe but now Europe** is third as a development model, and it **is not defined as 'Europe' but as a colonial power.**" Nevertheless, **China's engagement in Africa should not be overestimated**. 53% of China's foreign trade is in Asia, and China has less trade with the EU than with Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, **China has more trade with Taiwan than the whole of Africa**. China does have big investments in Africa, but these are loans, these are not Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). 85% of China's FDI are in Asia, the EU and the US, with only ca. 4% in Africa. There is therefore more competition than cooperation between the EU and China. It is more realistic to talk about China and EU Member State cooperation in certain African countries, and this should be in line with what Africa wants from its Agenda 2063.



### III. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Could Africa's demographic dividend be considered as a window of opportunity, or should the growing population be seen as a demographic disaster? This panel examined demographic trends and migrations flows and their impacts on employment and sustainable development.

**Fraser Cameron** noted that migration is big business in Africa and a major political issue in the EU. **Mr. Abdel Rahmane Diop**, *Head of Office, International Organisation for Migration (IOM, Burkina Faso)* stated

that it is important to define 'a migrant'. **In the IOM definition, a migrant is someone who is in movement, voluntarily or involuntarily, and there is no timeframe limitation.** Moreover, there are three types of migration: (i) internal migration (often linked to urbanisation); (ii) international migration outside Africa and (iii) international migration inside Africa. The origins of migrants differ widely from one host country to another. For example, in Italy, the main migrants come from Nigeria, Eritrea and then West African countries respectively. The reasons for



Fraser Cameron, Abdel Rahmane Diop, Zhou Yuyuan



Li Wentao

migration differ vastly also, from fleeing conflict, to voluntary migration, or environmental migration based on land degradation. Furthermore, there is a gender bias as women migrants mostly move to join their husbands and families. African migrants in Europe are developing their own ways of life in Europe and living in Europe is largely perceived as a success. This perception is largely influenced by the media and the IOM has developed the 'I am a migrant' campaign to raise awareness on migration.

**Prof. Zhou Yuyuan**, *Senior Fellow, Centre for West Asian and African Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS Shanghai)*, stated that

while international migration is a top priority for the EU, it is less so for China. China became a formal member of IOM only in May 2016. Although China needs cheap labour and personnel from African countries, this could result in a 'brain drain'. Prof. Zhou explained that one can provide new ways to view trilateral cooperation at two functional levels. Firstly, there can be cooperation on the 'problem' of migration, which focuses on employment, human resources and security issues. In this regard, **we need to find a more people-centered regime of governance. International and local Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) work well on the ground**, although in practice there is little opportunity



to do so. Secondly, there is room for cooperation on international migration to be regarded as 'functional', where the focus is on economic migration.

**Dr. Li Wentao**, Deputy Director of African Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR Beijing), said that the biggest African community is in Guandong, which is one of the richest provinces closest to Hong Kong. There are approx. 300,000 to 500,000 Africans, of which the majority are students and businessmen. Some come to buy Chinese goods for export and some are recipients of Chinese government scholarships.

**Africans moving to China are generally highly educated and have the financial capabilities to move around.** Although irregular migration exists, it is not an issue per se, as Africans mostly overstay because of visa issues. This is very different from the EU case, where migrants want citizenship.



Abdel Rahmane Diop

## IV. PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

The peace-development nexus is well known. However, there are a number of evolving peace building capabilities and missions of the African Union, as well as Chinese peace keeping and conflict prevention on the continent. This panel looked into the evolving nature of peacekeeping missions and partnerships on the continent.

**Ms. Andrea Ostheimer de Sosa**, Head of Department for sub-Saharan Africa of KAS and Co-Chair of the Working Group Africa-EU Relations at the European Network of Political Foundations (Brussels) noted that African military operations received support from China during the years of the Cold War. However, in the past four to five years, there have been changes as China has deployed combat troops in Mali and South Sudan. Moreover, China is building a naval base in Djibouti. China has

traditionally been reluctant to get involved in internal conflicts. Nevertheless, in the case of Darfur, where the crisis has been upgraded to one of international concern, **China as a UN Security Council member has to take its responsibility.** Such a case is not purely a domestic issue and China has shown increasing flexibility in handling these issues. It can be summarised broadly that the peacemaking era has been a test for China, whereas the peacekeeping era is a new challenge. For peacekeeping, China has been involved in the UN and ranks first among the P5 in the UN Security Council. China lost three peacekeepers recently: one in Mali and two in South Sudan. Such deaths do not evoke positive feelings about China's involvement in international conflicts amongst Chinese citizens, but this can be overcome by educating the population.



He Wenping, Andrea Ostheimer, Thierry Tardy





Although there may be many conflicts in different African countries, **Prof. He** underscored that “There is no reason for China to get involved. We must keep apace with changes and the increasing demand from Africa itself.” It is the same in terms of African leadership. Whereas American or French diplomats may state their preferred leader, China does not interfere. 2012 was a turning point for China’s peace and security cooperation in Africa. That year, peace and security was one of the priority areas at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This was in part due to the 2011 Libya war whereby 37,000 Chinese had to be evacuated. As a result, Djibouti is seen as a logistical base for the Chinese. It has taught China that **security in Africa is not just an African issue but also a Chinese one**. In other African countries, if a crisis were to break out, it would frankly be a mission impossible. In this regard, South Sudan is one of the new test grounds. Chinese President Xi Jinping said China would have 8,000 peacekeepers on standby. In addition, China has also committed to support the African Union for other crisis zones, such as Somalia. Merely re-building a country has been described as ‘free-riding’, and that is why China is committing to upstream, midstream and down-stream actions. However, as in the case of Burundi, a lot of money has been spent, which now seems to be wasted. These cases need to be carefully thought through. Triangular cooperation needs to be handled well, otherwise it will be considered as a form of domination. It has worked where the UK trained African and Chinese peacekeepers. Nevertheless, African sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.

Over the past five years, there has been a qualitative shift for China and its peace missions, which follows clear quantitative trends according to **Dr. Thierry Tardy**, *Senior Analyst, EU Institute for Security Studies (Paris)*. He explained that the situation today is fundamentally different from 2012: China is the new peacekeeping actor with 1,600 Chinese troops and a presence in sixteen African countries and six

UN peacekeeping missions. China ranks 12<sup>th</sup> among Troop Contributing Countries (TCC). Financially, China ranks second in terms of budget, providing 10.3% of the peacekeeping budget compared to less than 4% five years ago. The qualitative shift occurred when China provided combat troops to Mali in 2013 and then to South Sudan. However, this development entails some uncertainties. Firstly, what does this

mean for China’s medium-to-long term cooperation in UN missions? In other words, could China become the first TCC? Secondly, what is the propensity of China to embrace tough peacekeeping mandates in sub-Saharan Africa? Thirdly, can China bring together the security and economic components of its operations in Africa for a more comprehensive approach? Fourthly, to what extent will China translate its troop presence into a political role at the UN Security Council and the UN in general? Currently, China is passive at the UN Security Council and seems happy with the liberal peacekeeping of the Western powers, intervening only when it comes to Security Sector Reform (SSR). But that could change and **China could become a norm breaker or a norm setter if it wants to hold the pen and design the mandates at the UN**. In addition, China could be pushing to head the Department for Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) – where it is currently under-represented – and this could lead to another qualitative shift.



Andrea Ostheimer, Thierry Tardy, Paul Melly

In its current state, the EU-China partnership is underdeveloped. Therefore, any future cooperation would amount to a qualitative evolution. However, it is yet to be seen whether this will be on an EU-China basis or an EU Member State and China basis. **The Chinese preference would be for a EU Member State partnership, in part, because the EU is not a strong peacekeeping actor in Africa**. In Tardy’s words, “a two player game is easier than a three or four player game”. Nevertheless, the EU and China tandem in Africa is more foreseeable, than the trilateral EU-Africa-China cooperation in peace and security affairs. At the political level, dialogue





Frédéric Maduraud



Festus K. Aubyn



Thierry Tardy and Paul Melly

at the EU level is needed because China and the EU will diverge. At the operational level, China brings strategic enablers. However, this could be an excuse for EU Member States not to commit. Lastly, at the financial level, the EU and China are already involved in similar projects.

**Mr. Paul Melly**, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House (London) thought there is a key point to be made for the role of China in mediation: "Had China been available to play a bigger role, an extra leverage could have been applied, especially for the Democratic Republic of Congo. **China has scope to play a higher profile role if it becomes part of the crisis management**". But political mediation and crisis intervention need to be balanced. This could change the current image of a China led by the search for minerals. However, China can contribute to crises because small-scale action can help diffuse bigger problems in the long run. Take for example, the road to Timbuktu, bearing in mind that Africa is a long way from peacekeeping, which is managed by the 'blue helmets', and it will take time before Africa can build the expertise to do

it alone. Currently, there is a more general task of mediation and managing attacks from armed groups who are not one of the combating parties. China may be at the stage of joining more muscular efforts, as we have the framework and China has the security interest. French and African cooperation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is one such example of effective cooperation. Informal links are being developed continually for exchanging information, intelligence and technology via the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It will be an interesting challenge for the Chinese to develop ways to work with the EU and wider UN peacekeeping.

The AU peace and security architecture has allowed for peace and security missions. For example, AU interventions in Somali, Mali, and Central African Republic, as well as in the case of the Ebola outbreak, show the commitment of African countries to resolve their own problems. **Dr. Festus Aubyn**, Research Fellow, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC Accra), underscored that "the AU has its own capabilities. Indeed, the saying, 'African solutions to African problems' is important."

Counter-insurgency sometimes takes place alongside humanitarian missions or some missions are handed over to UN peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, by 2020, Africa should provide 25% of the funding for African missions. In spite of all this, **the AU cannot do it alone and needs China and the EU**. At the last FOCAC meeting, China pledged \$60million in support. At the sub-regional level, there has been support to the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) for South Sudan amongst others. Yet, China has somehow proceeded on an ad hoc basis, and the EU and China can deepen their cooperation by making African issues more of a priority by working to increase their mutual understanding. After all, the AU has already set priorities for cooperation efforts and initiatives, and Africa has its Agenda 2063.

In terms of EU instruments, cooperation in crisis management is very young, dating from 2013. The high-level dialogue has been institutionalised and is expected to take place in 2017. It is based on three pillars: (i) political and military, which involves a review of the security environment; (ii) defence cooperation in the field of equipment and armament, under the auspice of the European Defence Agency;

and (iii) cooperation in the field of capacity building, including joint exercises and military drills. "If you benchmark China against other countries, this is the last dialogue you get and the first one you lose" said **Mr. Frédéric Maduraud**, Deputy Director, Crisis Management and Planning, European External Action Service (Brussels). The EU already has the high-level dialogue, crisis planning to discuss operational dialogue, and a high level seminar as an orientation course. **There has already been extensive cooperation in maritime affairs, but the approaches differ: China engages mainly in escorting and the EU fights against piracy**. While current efforts are focused on the conflict cycle itself, including peacemaking and reconstruction, Maduraud suggested that future efforts should be aimed towards crisis prevention via the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and developing exit strategies. This has become more complicated recently as EU Member States now want to repatriate their efforts to the Mediterranean.

Improving EU-China cooperation in the Department for Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) can be done through promoting field combat and exchanges,

exchange of information and sharing unclassified information. Moreover, there can be action in support of Malian armed forces. In Maduraud's point of view, there are three important stages: (i) confidence building; (ii) better information sharing; and (iii) better cooperation between the EU and China. He said, "We should not over-politicise and keep

a bottom-up approach. Africa is a place where we can have good cooperation". However, **trilateral cooperation is not within reach at the moment because both China and the EU want to keep their distinct approaches.**

## CONCLUSIONS

The EU and China are two distinctive partners in Africa. The EU's approach is defined by its commitment to democratic values, good governance and respect for human rights. China is renowned for its commitment to non-interference, which at times, could give China a competitive edge. Despite these differences, however, a number of complementarities were highlighted by the panels. In other words, 'opposites could attract' to enable effective future EU-China cooperation in Africa. While EU-China cooperation could be on the horizon in a number of areas – future cooperation, trade and investment, international migration, peacekeeping operations – trilateral EU-China-Africa cooperation did not appear to be feasible in the short run for a number of reasons, ranging from institutional development to ideological differences. The panels presented a number of critical points for this first debate on prospects for cooperation between the EU and China in Africa on the basis of which four key **recommendations** can be made:

**I. Future Cooperation:** Despite different structures for relations with Africa, panellists agreed that different approaches could be complementary. As such, the EU and China should leverage their respective competences in the areas where they have a competitive advantage in future cooperation.

**II. Trade and Investment:** The EU, China and Africa all have joint interests in Global Value Chains (GVCs), and future cooperation should focus particularly on services trade and regulatory barriers. Furthermore, any future joint cooperation on trade and investment must promote economic development in Africa, so as not to fall into the critique of neo-colonialism based on generating economic weakness.

**III. International Migration:** Future EU-China cooperation on the issue of migration from Africa should focus on the functional aspects of migration, which is two-fold: migration as a problem linked to 'brain drain' and migration that serves an economic end.

**IV. Peacekeeping Missions:** Security is increasingly seen as a global challenge, as a security issue in one country can affect several others. In this regard, future cooperation should be reinforced and there are a number of possible options for joint cooperation by and between the EU and China in Africa with a view to stronger coordination at the UN level.

## CURRICULUM VITAE

### Ms. Faten Aggad-Clerx



*Head of the Programme Africa's Change Dynamics, European Centre for Development Policy Mechanism (ECDPM), Maastricht*

Ms. Faten Aggad holds a Master's degree from the University of Pretoria in the field of International Relations. During her studies she especially focused

on governance and development in the African context. Throughout her career she worked as a researcher and trainer on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as well as North Interim program coordinator at the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg (SAIIA). She also worked as a national consultant for the African Forum where she worked on integration and development. Furthermore she has been a consultant for them in Pretoria and Maputo.

### Dr. Festus Kofi Aubyn



*Researcher at the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR) of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra*

Dr. Festus Aubyn holds an undergraduate degree in Political Science with History and a Master's degree in International

Affairs from the University of Ghana. He received his PhD in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Ibadan in Nigeria where he also gained the two topmost PhD Awards. He was additionally honoured with Omowore Lucas Prize for the Best PhD produced at University and a Post Graduate School Award for the Best PhD at University. Furthermore, Dr. Aubyn supports several courses such as the MA in Conflict, Peace and Security, the MA in Gender, the Police Middle Management Course as well as the Multidimensional Peace Operations Course and Humanitarian Assistance Course. Furthermore, he wrote a number of papers dealing with Africa and global peace and security issues.

### H.E. Ajay K. Bramdeo



*Ambassador of the AU to the EU, Brussels*

H.E. Ajay Bramdeo holds an under-graduate degree from the University of Durban-Westville. When still at university he was very active in student politics. He is amongst others founder of the Durban Branch of the Azanian

Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) in 1980. Throughout his career he worked as a recipient of the Fulbright Teacher Exchange Programme and taught at the Great Bridge Junior High School in Chesapeake in Virginia. In the mid 1990ies, he was then appointed Assistant Director in the Department of Foreign Affairs. He additionally served as First Secretary Political and Counsellor Political at the South African Embassy in Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia when being in his Diplomatic Training Course. Furthermore, he participated on the technical expert's level regarding the negotiations of the transformation of the OAU into the AU. Due to his vast experience he was then active in positions at the UNECA and the AU Commission, as well as Deputy Head of Mission. He was then appointed High Commissioner to the Republic of Mauritius and became observe of the Parliamentary Elections on Mauritius and on the Seychelles. Ambassador Bramdeo is the SADC Contact Point and takes overall policy development responsibility for SADC, AU, NEPAD and the Peace Missions.

### Dr. Fraser Cameron



*Director, EU-Asia Centre, Brussels*

Dr. Fraser Cameron is Director of the EU-Asia Centre in Brussels. He is a former European Commission advisor and well known policy analyst and commentator on EU and

international affairs. He is visiting professor at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, and Senior Advisor



to the European Policy Centre (EPC). Dr. Cameron was educated at the Universities of St Andrews (MA) and Cambridge (PhD). He was a Research Fellow at the University of Hamburg (1973-74) and a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Kent (1974-75). From 1975-89, he was a member of the British Diplomatic Service serving mainly in Germany, and covering economic, political and press affairs. He joined the European Commission in 1990, as an advisor in external relations, and was closely involved in enlargement, transatlantic relations, the Balkans, Asia and global governance. He was Political Counsellor in the EU delegation in Washington DC from 1999-2001. Dr. Cameron has lectured widely to business, academic and media audiences around the world. He has been a visiting professor at several universities and is the author of several books and articles on the EU and external relations. His recent books include *An Introduction to European Foreign Policy*, *The Future of Europe and US Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (published by Routledge).

#### Ms. Hanna Deringer

*Policy Analyst, European Centre for International Political Economy, Brussels*



Ms. Hanna Deringer holds a tri-national diploma in International Cultural and Business Studies from the University of Passau in Germany, the University of Limerick in Ireland and the University of Granada in

Spain. During her five-year study programme she was therefore able to gain a broad insight into the field of economics, business studies, Latin American civilization and Spanish language. She additionally holds a Master's degree in International Law and Economics (MILE) from the World Trade Institute (WTI). As an intern at the Commercial Office of Chilean Consulate and at the German Business Association for Latin America, she was additionally able to gain knowledge in the field of international trade. Ms. Deringer began her career working for GIZ in the division for Private Sector Development and Economic Policy, where she was especially involved in the field of regional economic integration and development economics.

#### Mr. Abdel Rahmane Diop



*Head of Office, Country Office of Burkina Faso, International Organization for Migration, Ouagadougou*

Mr. Abdel Rahmane Diop is the Head of Office at the Country Office of International Organization for Migration in Burkina Faso since 2014.

Former Research Professional for Chaire Stephen A. Jarislowsky in International Affairs Management in 2010 (Laval University) where he presented on China-Africa relationships: "Challenges of South-South relationships" presented at the federating workshop of the Research Centre for International Development and Economic and Social Movements, Mr. Diop was also Research Assistant in International Economics and Multinational Firms during his stay at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Quebec (Canada). As Head of Office, he is also holding border management, assistance to returning migrants on both humanitarian and reintegration aspects, migration mainstreaming in public policies projects and the Canadian Centre for Visa Application under his responsibilities.

#### Dr. Gu Jing



*Director of the Centre for Rising Powers and Global Development at the Institute of Development Studies, Brighton*

Dr. Gu Jing provides an interdisciplinary background in law, economics and international development and has extensive experience in the field of governance, business and development. As Centre Director, she also carries out academic research, training and consultancy on business, governance and development for the UNDP, UNCTAD, World Bank, African Development Bank, IPRC, MOFCOM, DFID, GTZ and NGOs such as the China-Africa Business Council. She has led many interdisciplinary research projects involving multi-country teams, including the ground breaking pioneering research on China's outward investment

in Africa which involved field research in 12 African countries and 9 Chinese provinces from 2007-2012. Her innovative research work has provided important new insights into the complex reality of state and business motivational and operational practices, challenging orthodox conventional wisdom. Dr. Gu Jing published widely on China and emerging powers, China's international development role and China-Africa relations.

#### Prof. He Wenping



*Director, Division of African Studies, Institute of West Asia and Africa Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing*

Prof. He Wenping is Professor and Research Program Director at the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies (IWAAS), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and specializes on Africa's relations with China and major world powers, and African democratic transition. She began her research and teaching career at CASS in 1989, and has served as a visiting scholar at Yale University, London University, the Nordic Africa Institute based in Sweden, German Development Institute and the BRICS Policy Centre of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). Prof. He is also the senior research fellow of the Charhar Institute, the Standing Member of the Chinese Asian & African Research Society, the Research Society for African Problems, and Asian-African Development & Exchange Society of China. She received B.A. and M.A. degrees in international politics and a Ph.D. in law from Peking University in China. Prof. He is a regular commentator of Chinese Central TV Station/Chinese Central Radiobroadcast and a regular lecturer on *Sino-African relations* and *Chinese Development Experiences* in various African human resources training classes. Prof. He also serves as associate researcher in the Centre for Chinese Studies of Stellenbosch University in South Africa and a Council Member of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on the Future of Africa from 2009 to 2011. Prof. He has additionally a number of publications on African Politics and China-Africa relations.

#### Dr. Claude Kabemba



*Executive Director, Southern Africa Resource Watch, Johannesburg*

Dr. Claude Kabemba holds a doctorate in International Relations from the University of Witwatersrand. During his career he worked for the Human Science Research Council as Chief Research Manager and at the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa in the Position of a Research Manager. Additionally, he worked for the Development Bank of Southern Africa and as a policy analyst for the Centre for Policy Studies. Due to his broad expertise in the field of Political economy of sub-Saharan Africa, as well as issues of democratization and governance and natural resources, he has been a consultant for several international organizations such as Oxfam and UNHCR. Dr. Kabemba published book chapters, journal articles, monographs, research and newspaper articles.

#### Dr. Li Wentao



*Deputy Director of African Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing*

Dr. Li Wentao is a member of Chinese Association of African Studies and Chinese Society of African Historical Studies. Dr. Li earned the M.A from the department of International Relations of Nanjing University and P.H.D of CICIR. Dr. Li has engaged in African Studies for almost 10 years. He has been to about 20 African countries for international conferences and exchanging. Dr. Li's country studies mainly focus on Nigeria, Zimbabwe and countries in the Horn of Africa, and the subject research refer to China's security engagement in African, Terrorism of Nigeria and West Africa, China-Africa-traditional donor's trilateral cooperation.

**Mr. Frédéric Maduraud**

*Deputy Director, Crisis Management and Planning, European External Action Service, Brussels*

**Dr. Birgitte Nygaard Markussen**

*Managing Director Africa, European External Action Service, Brussels*

Dr. Birgitte Markussen holds a Ph.D in Ethnography and Social Anthropology from the University of Aarhus in Denmark. She was Director for Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and in this position responsible for the strategic direction to Danish foreign policy relations with countries in Africa, and with the region as a whole, from August 2012 to June 2016. Between September 2010 and August 2012, she was the Danish Ambassador to Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and the Central African Republic, responsible for the strategic direction and implementation of Danish foreign policy, development cooperation, trade, and consular affairs. Between September 2008 and September 2010, she was the Deputy Director for Environment, Energy and Climate Change at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, responsible for the day-to-day management of the Department for Environment, Energy and Climate Change, supported Ministers and conducted high-level policy consultations that out-reached to embassies and international organisations. A major task was the preparation of the COP15 (United Nations Climate Change Conference) held in December 2009.

**Mr. Paul Melly**

*Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House, London*

Mr. Paul Melly has represented Chatham House in the Sahel Task force organised by EUISS in 2014. He has also worked on EU mediation in the Great Lakes region and Sudan, in order to contribute on the thoughts on how China could collaborate with Europe concerning the diplomatic side of crisis mediation. His expertise ranges from French and EU Africa policy to Development policy, as well as IMF/World Bank Africa strategy and project and trade financing. Former to his work at Chatham House he worked as a Freelance contributor to Africa Confidential, the Africa Report, the Globe and Mail, Oxford Analytica, Writenet Africa reports and MEED. Mr. Melly then worked as a country report author on various African states. In 1993 he started working as a contributing editor for the Gulf States Newsletter, before he then started as assistant editor for the Africa Analysis in 2000.

**Ms. Andrea Ostheimer de Sosa**

*Head of Department for sub-Saharan Africa of KAS, Berlin and Co-Chair of the Working Group Africa-EU Relations at the European Network of Political Foundations*

Andrea Ostheimer de Sosa is the former director of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue at the KAS in Brussels where she facilitated events and consultation in the field of EU development politics and initiatives for the support of democratization processes. Formerly she served for several years the KAS in the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as the KAS in South Africa. She additionally joined the Institute for Security Studies in Maputo in Mozambique which additionally enriched her expertise in development politics. She was also research scholar at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

**Ms. Kristin de Peyron**

*Head of Division Pan-African Affairs, European External Action Service, Brussels*

Ms. Kristin de Peyron is the Head of the Pan-African Affairs division in the European External Action Service (EEAS), dealing with EU-Africa as well as EU-ACP relations. She was previously Head of Division for Multilateral Relations (UN and the Council of Europe) and Chair of the Council of the European Union's Working Party on the United Nations, and co-chair of the joint work of this and two other Council Working Parties to develop EU positions on the post-2015/Agenda-2030 framework. She has over the past 20 years also worked in the European Commission, including External Relations, Enlargement and Enterprise policy DGs, and was a member of the Secretariat of the European Convention presided over by Pres. Giscard d'Estaing. Prior to joining the EU institutions, she was a Swedish diplomat, working notably on disarmament issues and the accession of Sweden to the EU.

**Dr. Anna Stahl**

*Research Fellow, EU-China Research, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe, Bruges / Research Fellow, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington*

Dr. Anna Katharina Stahl holds a Master's degree in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies from the College of Europe in Bruges and a French-German double degree in political science and public law from the Institute d'Etudes Politiques de Lille and the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster. Prior to her work at the EU-China Research Centre she worked at the Institute of European Studies (IES) as a researcher in the field of EU Foreign and Security Policy where she finished with a doctorate on EU-China-Africa trilateral relations. She additionally worked as visiting researcher at the Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS) of Stellenbosch University in South Africa, as well as at the Council of Europe,

GIZ, UNDP, European Parliament and in the NGO sector. Additional to her Research Fellow position at the College of Europe, she is a Research Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) at the Johns Hopkins University.

**Dr. Thierry Tardy**

*Senior Analyst, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris*

Prior to his work at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Dr. Tardy worked as a Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). He did several researches on military and civil crisis management with focus on the United Nations and the European Union and published several papers. Dr. Tardy attended the National Session of the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies (IHEDN) in Paris and was member of the editorial leading staff of International Peacekeeping. He was additionally lecturer at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Genf and at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques at the War College in Paris. Even now he continues his lectures on European Security and Defense College.

**Ms. Yentyl Williams**

*EU-ACP Trade Researcher at the University of Gent and Founder of the ACP Young Professionals Network, Gent*

Yentyl Williams is a political economist who specializes in EU trade relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. She has several years of experience in both the public sector, working for the European Commission and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), and the private sector, working for an international consultancy. In 2015, Ms. Williams was appointed as an Expert to the EESC for the Green Paper on "The Future of the EU's relations with the ACP group and the successor to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement".



She has published extensively on topics such as the EU-ACP economic partnership agreements and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

#### Ms. Sabina Woelkner



*Head of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue, KAS, Brussels*

Sabina Woelkner is the Head of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue of KAS in Brussels, since April 2014. The aim is to shape and consolidate the dialogue between, the European Union, NATO and KAS Partners worldwide with focus on development, democratisation, human rights and security. Prior to this, Ms. Woelkner worked as Director of KAS office in Sarajevo from 2009-2014. In Bosnia and Herzegovina KAS supports the democratic development of political parties, bringing the country closer to the European Union (EU), reconciliation and understanding among ethnic groups and religious communities. Before Ms. Woelkner left for Sarajevo, she was supervising KAS projects in Western Europe/United States. She joined the foundation in 2006.

#### Dr. Zeng Aiping



*Assistant Research Fellow at the China-Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and Deputy Executive Director of China-Asian African Cooperation, Beijing*

Dr. Zeng Aiping is an Assistant Research Fellow of China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and the Deputy Executive Director of China-Asian African Cooperation Centre (CAACC). His current areas of research include the general political and economic situation in Africa, case studies of Sudan, South Sudan and South Africa, peace and conflict studies in Africa, China-African relations, and political Islam. In January 2010, Dr. Zeng obtained his doctorate in international politics with the dissertation of A Study on Moroccan Alaouite Monarchy (1956-2007) from the School of

International Studies at Peking University, China. As a member of Chinese government's delegation, he observed the independence referendum of South Sudan in Khartoum and Juba in January 2011. He served as third secretary in the department of politics in the Chinese embassy in the Islamic Republic of Iran from March 2011 to July 2013. He has authored many articles and research reports on African studies and Sino-African Relations, such as China-Africa Governance.

#### Prof. Zhou Yuyuan

*Senior Fellow, Centre for West Asian and African Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Shanghai*



Prof. Zhou Yuyuan is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for West Asian and African Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. He got the PhD degree for International Relations from the School of International Relations at Jinan University and finished a two-year

post-doctorate study at the School of International Relations, Peking University. He has visited and carried out field study in several countries including South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zambia, Indonesia and Cambodia. His research now is focusing on African security, China-African peace and security cooperation, the sustainability of FOCAC, security regionalism and comparative studies between ASEAN and African Regional Cooperation. He has published articles on African development and security, China-African relations, and Interregional cooperation in Africa.

## PROGRAMME

Thursday, 01 December 2016

<b>08:30</b>	Registration
<b>09:00</b>	Welcome remarks by organisers <b>Dr. Fraser Cameron</b> , Director, EU-Asia Centre, Brussels <b>Ms. Sabina Woelkner</b> , Head of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Brussels
<b>09:10</b>	Short statements on EU, African and Chinese priorities by <b>Dr. Birgitte Markussen</b> , Managing Director Africa, European External Action Service, Brussels <b>H.E. Ajay K. Bramdeo</b> , Ambassador of the AU to the EU, Brussels <b>Prof. He Wenping</b> , Director, Division of African Studies, Institute of West Asia and Africa Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing
<b>09:30</b>	<b>Panel I – Cooperation Formats</b>  The panel reflects how do China and the EU conduct their relations with Africa in different structures such as FOCAC, JAES, ECOWAS or SADC.  <i>Moderator</i> <b>Ms. Faten Aggad</b> , Head of Programme Africa's Change Dynamics, European Centre for Development Policy Mechanism (ECDPM), Maastricht  <i>Short Interventions from</i> <b>Ms. Kristin de Peyron</b> , Head of Division Pan-African Affairs, European External Action Service, Brussels <b>Dr. Zeng Aiping</b> , Assistant Research Fellow at China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and deputy executive director of China-Asian African Cooperation Centre, Beijing <b>Dr. Anna Stahl</b> , Research Fellow, EU-China Research Centre, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe, Bruges <b>Dr. Claude Kabemba</b> , Executive Director, Southern Africa Resource Watch, Johannesburg
<b>10:15</b>	Discussion
<b>10:45</b>	Coffee break
<b>11:15</b>	<b>Panel II – Trade and Investment</b>  The panel reflects the implications of CAP in the context of sustainable development and discusses the role of the Agenda 2063 as well as the idea of an EU-Africa Free Trade Agreement.  <i>Moderator</i> <b>Dr. Gu, Jing</b> , Director, Centre for Rising Powers and Global Development, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton  <i>Short Interventions from</i> <b>Prof. He Wenping</b> , Director, Division of African Studies, Institute of West Asia and Africa Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing <b>Ms. Hanna Deringer</b> , Policy Analyst, European Centre for International Political Economy, Brussels <b>Ms. Yentyl Williams</b> , EU-ACP Trade Researcher, University of Gent and Founder of the ACP Young Professionals Network, Gent

- 12:15** Discussion
- 12:45** Lunch
- 14:15** **Panel III – International Migration**  
 The panel reflects the implications of demographic trends in Africa for migration flows and discusses the challenges in promoting sustainable development and employment in this regard.
- Moderator*  
**Dr. Fraser Cameron**, Director, EU-Asia Centre, Brussels
- Short Interventions from*  
**Mr. Abdel Rahmane Diop**, Head of Office, Country Office of Burkina Faso, International Organization for Migration, Ouagadougou  
**Prof. Zhou Yuyuan**, Senior Fellow, Centre for West Asian and African Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), Shanghai  
**Dr. Li Wentao**, Deputy Director of African Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing
- 15:15** Discussion
- 15:45** Coffee break
- 16:15** **Panel IV – Peacekeeping Missions**  
 The panel focuses on peacebuilding capabilities and missions of the African Union as well as on the growing Chinese involvement in peacekeeping and conflict prevention on the African continent.
- Moderator*  
**Ms. Andrea Ostheimer de Sosa**, Head of Department for sub-Saharan Africa of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin and Co-Chair of the Working Group Africa-EU Relations at the European Network of Political Foundations, Brussels
- Short Interventions from*  
**Dr. Thierry Tardy**, Senior Analyst, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris  
**Mr. Paul Melly**, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House, London  
**Prof. He Wenping**, Director, Division of African Studies, Institute of West Asia and Africa Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing  
**Mr. Frédéric Madurand**, Deputy Director, Crisis Management and Planning, European External Action Service, Brussels  
**Dr. Festus Aubyn**, Research Fellow, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra
- 17:15** Discussion
- 17:45** Summary and closing remarks
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