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UKRAINIAN IDENTITY: CHANGES, TRENDS, REGIONAL ASPECTS

The Razumkov Centre has been studying the identity of Ukrainian citizens since 2005, when for the first time in history of an independent Ukraine distinctions between the society's different identity groups have created a foundation for a large-scale socio-political conflict known as the Orange Revolution.

These studies, conducted in the period of 2005-2009 in Ukraine and its separate regions, including Crimea, uncovered a number of special features of Ukrainian identity, the major ones being: contradictions in the process of forming a common, national civic identity and vagueness of its prospects; presence of an opposing trend – formation of regional sub-national identities on the basis of regional localisation of different linguistic, cultural, national and ethnic, denominational identities of citizens in various parts of Ukraine. The studies have also found interdependence and cross impact between different identity distinctions, in particular linguistic and cultural, and the civic identity.¹

Subsequently, starting from 2010, a whole number of events of different scale have taken place in the history of Ukraine due to internal and external factors. These events have, on the one hand, significantly influenced national identity formation in Ukraine and, on the other hand, have themselves become the consequence of the existing trends.

In particular, the Razumkov Centre has expressed warnings that since a common national identity of Ukrainian citizens has not been fully formed yet, there is a risk of sub-national identities of some communities integrating with other foreign national identities. Unfortunately, this came true, with such tragic consequences as annexation of Crimea by Russia, attempts by several Eastern and Southern regions to split away from Ukraine (known as the “Novorossiia project”) and the armed conflict in Donbas with thousands of casualties.

Results of opinion polls conducted in 2014-2015 demonstrate changes in different dimensions of Ukrainian citizens' identity. Along with this, due to the circumstances, these changes are of different, at times inconsistent nature, and consequently may bring different outcomes for further development of Ukrainian society and statehood. This creates a need for deeper comprehensive study of Ukrainian identity, changes that occurred during 2006-2015, current processes and trends.

The Razumkov Centre's Project “Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Changes, Challenges and National Unity Prospects” aims to solve these tasks. A national opinion poll was conducted as part of this project.² The presented informational and analytical materials contain main results of this poll in terms of different aspects of citizens' identity³ (“identities”) and their attitude to major topical problems in the society,⁴ and also describe aspects of identity of citizens from different regions and social groups.

Informational and analytical materials on the results of the 1st stage of Project “Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Changes, Challenges and National Unity Prospects” were prepared by: Yu. YAKYMENKO (Project Leader), A. BYCHENKO, V. ZAMIATIN, M. MISHCHENKO, A. STETSKIV (the Razumkov Centre), O. LYTVYNENKO (the National Institute for Strategic Studies).

¹ See: Building a common identity of Ukrainian citizens: prospects and challenges. Analytical report of the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2007, No.9, p.231.

² The study was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 11-23 December 2015 in all regions of Ukraine with the exception of Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. There were 10,071 respondents over 18 y.o. Theoretical sampling error – 1%.

³ At this stage of study, definitions “common national identity” and “common civic identity” are used synonymously. Definition “national identity” is mostly used to define identification of a citizen with the state in general, as opposed to local or regional identification (i.e. with a specific place of residence or region of the state).

⁴ This approach was used by the Razumkov Centre in the first comprehensive study of identity problems. See: Common identity of Ukrainian citizens: characteristics and formation problems. Analytical report of the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2006, No.7, p.2-38.

CIVIC IDENTITY

A study of the civic identity of respondents presumes consideration of such aspects as the attitude of respondents towards Ukrainian citizenship, perception of Ukraine as their motherland and country of residence, their level of patriotism and interpretation of its meaning, willingness to defend the country, attitude towards the independence of Ukraine, its national symbols and its achievements in various spheres.

First, respondents were asked to identify themselves with a certain geographical community – current or a previous one (the Soviet Union).

Equal shares (40% each) of respondents indicated that they “primarily” associate themselves with Ukraine and with the specific locality (city, village) they live in. 11.4% of respondents associate themselves with their region of residence.⁵

Insignificant numbers of respondents associated themselves with other territorial communities (2.1% with the Soviet Union, 1.5% with Europe, and 0.6% with Russia).

As their secondary place of association, a relative majority (33%) of citizens polled chose Ukraine, 26% chose their place of residence, and 22% indicated their region. 7.4% of respondents chose Europe as secondary, 2.3% chose the USSR, and 1.2% selected Russia.

Compared to 2006, the share of those who associate their identity primarily with Ukraine increased by 9%, while the share of people identifying themselves with their place of residence or region decreased (by 5% and 3%, respectively).⁶ They are slight changes in the number of people who identify themselves with the Soviet Union, Europe and Russia (in 2006 the numbers were 2.9%, 0.8% and 1.5%, respectively).

Among the residents of the West, Centre and East the shares of those who tend to associate themselves primarily with Ukraine are 49%, 44% and 43%, respectively;⁷ in the South the figure is 31%, and in Donbas it is 23%. Local identity prevails in the South of Ukraine and in Donbas (in these regions people associate themselves mainly with their cities and villages: 50% and 44% of respondents respectively). The majority of the people who primarily associate themselves with their region are from Donbas (23%).

A relative majority of citizens in all regions except the East associate themselves “secondarily” with Ukraine as a whole (from 30% in the West to 38% in the Centre). Local identity ranks second in the West and Centre of Ukraine (25% and 26%, respectively), while regional identity ranks second in the South



and Donbas (23% and 28% respectively). The third rank has regional differences as well: regional identity was reported by 23% of residents in the West and 19% in the Centre, whereas local identity prevailed among residents of the South (21%) and Donbas (20%).

Compared to 2006, there was no change in the share of respondents who chose pan-Ukrainian identity “in second place”. The share of those who identify themselves with their place of residence increased from 21% to 26%, and those who identify themselves with Europe rose from 4% to 7%. Meanwhile, the shares of respondents who chose their region, the USSR or Russia, decreased.

Attitude towards Ukrainian citizenship

The majority of respondents who are Ukrainian citizens⁸ are proud of their Ukrainian citizenship (68%),⁹ while 23% are not. **Compared to the results of the survey conducted in 2005, the number of those who are proud of their Ukrainian citizenship increased by 12%.¹⁰**

In all regions except Donbas, the share of those who were proud of their citizenship is greater than the share of those who are not, while in Donbas the shares are essentially equal. The highest number of people proud of their Ukrainian citizenship was recorded in the West and Centre, where they constitute a majority (83% and 76% respectively); in Donbas, they are in the minority (43%).

Attitude towards Ukraine as motherland

A vast majority (93%) of respondents see Ukraine as their motherland, while 3.5% do not. **Compared to 2006, these figures did not change significantly.¹¹**

The perception of Ukraine as motherland prevails in all regions, from 98% in the West to 83% in Donbas.

⁵ For detailed survey data in the form of tables and charts, including changes of figures over time, see herein.

⁶ The study was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre between 20 April and 12 May, 2006. 11,216 respondents were polled in all the regions of Ukraine. The margin of error is 1%.

⁷ Here and elsewhere the regional division is as follows: **West:** Volyn, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi Oblasts; **Centre:** the city of Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv Oblasts; **South:** Mykolayiv, Odesa, and Kherson Oblasts; **East:** Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv Oblasts; the **Donbas** – Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

⁸ The share of Ukrainian citizens among the respondents is 98%.

⁹ The total of the answers “very proud” and “rather proud”.

¹⁰ The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre from 20-27 December, 2005 in all regions of Ukraine. 2,009 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The margin of error does not exceed 2.3%.

¹¹ The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre between 20 April and May 12, 2006. 11,216 respondents were polled in all regions of Ukraine. The margin of error is 1%.



Meanwhile, given the opportunity to choose, 72% of citizens would choose Ukraine as their motherland while 13% would not. Compared to 2006, this figure has also changed slightly.

While in the Centre and West the overwhelming majority of residents would choose Ukraine as their motherland (79% and 78% respectively), in the South, East and Donbas this majority is not as large (73%, 65% and 57%). The following percentages would not choose Ukraine as their Motherland if given the choice: 19% of respondents in Donbas, 18% in the East, 11% in the Centre, 10% in the South, and 9% in the West.

One-quarter of respondents from Donbas remained undecided on this question.

Among the countries which the respondents would choose if they had a choice, the majority (61%) would choose Ukraine, 20% of respondents would like to live in the EU, and 4.5% in Russia.

67% of respondents in the West, 66% in the Centre, 60% in the East, 59% in the South, and 48% in Donbas would prefer to live in Ukraine. The second largest share of respondents in all regions except Donbas (from 25% in the West to 16% in the South) would like to live in the EU.

Russia appears less attractive as a place of residence: it was chosen by about 1% of respondents in the West and Centre, 4% in the South, 8% in the East, and 14% in Donbas.

Need to be proud of the country

A relative majority (48%) of respondents feel the need to be proud of their country in order to be happy in their own lives. For 41% of those polled, personal well-being is sufficient to feel happy. Compared to 2005, these figures have remained largely unchanged.

The majority of residents in the West and in the Centre (61% and 51% respectively) feel a need to be proud of their country in order to be happy in life; in the South, East and Donbas this share is much lower (38-40%), while the share of those for whom personal well-being is enough to be happy is much higher (from 41% in the South to 53% in the East).

Assessment of Ukraine's achievements by its citizens

An important factor for citizens to identify with their country is the existence of a basis for positively distinguishing it from other countries, providing people with a sense of pride in their affiliation with this country.

Ukrainian citizens' main sources of pride are their country's sport achievements (73%), the history of Ukraine (69%), the Ukrainian national character and the ability of Ukrainians to fight for their state and their rights (68%), achievements in art and literature (65%), and the Armed Forces of the country (57%).¹² Almost half (49%) of respondents are proud of achievements in science and technology.

Smaller shares of respondents are proud of various aspects of the societal structure: honest and fair treatment of various groups in society – 33%; political contribution by the country to the world and how democracy works – 22%; social welfare system – 13%; and economic achievements – 11%.

The regional distribution largely reflects the situation in the country as a whole, but there are some differences. Thus, in all regions except Donbas the share of respondents who are proud of achievements in science and technology is larger than those who are not. In the East, half of respondents are not proud of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Thus, the main reasons for Ukrainians to be proud of their country include the traits and achievements of Ukrainian people and society, the history of Ukraine, and state institutions such as the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is quite understandable under the current circumstances. Meanwhile, its social and political system, particularly social and economic achievements, are not a source of pride for citizens.

Level of patriotism

The vast majority (74%) of citizens consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, while 17% do not.¹³ Compared to 2005, the share of those who consider themselves patriots and those who do not have remained largely unchanged.

In all regions the share of those who consider themselves patriots constitute the majority (from 85% in the West to 56% in Donbas). In the West of Ukraine 52% of respondents unequivocally consider themselves patriots,¹⁴ while in the Centre the figure is 37%, in the East 31%, and in Donbas 17%.

The East of Ukraine and Donbas, unlike other regions, include a large number of those who do not consider themselves patriots of Ukraine (24% and 31% respectively).

Perception of patriotism

Among the most important traits a person should have to be a patriot of Ukraine (4.2-4.0 on a five-point scale, in descending order) respondents considered:

- a desire to raise children to love Ukraine;
- respect for Ukraine and its state symbols and holidays;
- concern for the stable well-being of one's family;
- respect for Ukrainian laws and institutions of state power;
- knowledge of Ukrainian culture and history;
- readiness to fight for the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens;

As slightly less important traits (3.9-3.5), citizens mentioned the following:

- working for the benefit of Ukraine;
- readiness to publicly defend the reputation of one's country in relations with citizens of other countries;
- readiness to defend Ukraine against outside enemies even at the expense of one's life;
- command of the Ukrainian language;
- readiness to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine even at the expense of one's life (i.e. not let regions secede from Ukraine);

¹² The total of answers "very proud" and "proud to some extent".

¹³ The total of answers "agree" and "somewhat agree" and "disagree" and "somewhat disagree".

¹⁴ Answer choice "yes".

- commitment to equal rights for all nationalities;
- observance of Ukrainian folk traditions in everyday life;
- advocating complete restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine (return of Crimea and Donbas);
- Ukrainian citizenship.

Less important (3.4-3.0 points) are such traits as:

- readiness to fight to give priority to the rights of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine;
- oppose granting special status to the territories of the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR;
- readiness to fight to give priority to the rights of ethnic Ukrainians abroad;
- use of only the Ukrainian language in private life, in public places and institutions of state power;
- refusal of some personal benefits today for the sake of Ukraine's future;
- being ethnically Ukrainian;
- having been born in Ukraine;
- support for Ukraine's accession to the EU;
- opposition to the resumption of cooperation with Russia.

The least important (less than 3 points) are the following traits:

- opposition to closer relations between Ukraine and Russia;
- support for Ukraine's accession to NATO;
- affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC);
- opposition to closer relations between Ukraine and the USA.

Compared to the 2005 survey, assessments of the significance of certain traits associated with ethnicity have improved. In addition, traits such as "respect for the state, state symbols and holidays", added in the latest poll, ranked among the most important traits of a patriot, while another trait, "command of the Ukrainian language", fell to the second-place group.

In every region citizens noted the high significance of such traits as raising children to love Ukraine (4.4-3.8 points); respect for the state, government institutions, state symbols, and laws (4.4-3.9 points); concern for the well-being of one's family (4.3-3.7 points); knowledge of Ukrainian culture and history (4.2-3.5 points); readiness to fight for the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens (4.2-3.9 points); respect for Ukrainian laws and institutions of state power (4.3-3.9 points); and working for the benefit of Ukraine (4.1-3.7 points).

Traits that have a clear ethnic/cultural component include: observance of Ukrainian folk traditions in everyday life, knowledge of Ukrainian culture and history, and command of the Ukrainian language. These traits were advocated by residents of all regions except Donbas (scores from 4.3 to 3.5 points).

Significant differences between some regions were seen in the assessments of items related to restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and its geopolitical choice.

The practical manifestation of patriotism is the readiness to defend the country in the event of war. While previously this question was hypothetical,¹⁵ in this survey, given the current state of actual war with Russia, it was asked directly: "Are you ready to defend your country?".

50% of those polled expressed their readiness to defend the country, 18% of these were ready to do so with weapons, and 32% through the volunteer movement. The share of those who were not ready to do so was 31%, while 19% did not provide an answer.

The readiness to defend the country with weapons has significant regional differences; this was reported by 24% in the West, by 20% in the Centre, by 17% in the South, by 13% in the East, and by 9% in Donbas.

41% of citizens in the West, 33% in the Centre, 31% in Donbas, 28% in the East and 23% in the South reported their readiness to participate in the volunteer movement.

The share of those who expressed unwillingness to defend the country is 18% of the residents in the West, 26% in the Centre, 32% in the South, 42% in Donbas and 45% in the East. The majority of respondents who did not provide an answer (29%) are in the South.

Willingness of citizens to suffer some deterioration of their living standards to increase the economic independence of Ukraine from other countries can be considered an indirect expression of **patriotism**.

In response to the question "Do you agree that Ukraine should increase its economic independence from other countries, even if this leads to a deterioration of the living standard of its citizens?", 33% of those polled agreed while 34% disagreed.¹⁶

As we move eastward, the share of people who would be ready to support increasing the economic independence of Ukraine despite a deterioration of living standards: 46% of people agree or tend to agree in the West, 37% in the Centre, 25% in the South, 24% in Donbas and 23% in the East.

In the West and Centre, the number of respondents who agree (completely agree or tend to) with the necessity to increase economic independence despite a deterioration of living standards is greater than the number of those who disagree. In other regions the percentage is reversed. The majority of those who disagreed are in the East (53%).

Support for Ukraine's independence

The will of the citizens in a referendum on the independence of Ukraine can be considered an indicator of their attitudes to the statehood of Ukraine and, to some extent, an assessment of its success as a state, as well as an attitude, in view of this assessment, to its desired future.

In response to the question "How would you vote in a hypothetical referendum on the independence of Ukraine?", 68% of respondents would support independence, while 9% would not.

¹⁵ In the 2005 study the question was worded as follows: "Of course, we all hope that there will be no war. But if there were, would you defend your country?". 53% of respondents answered "Yes" and 27% answered "No".

¹⁶ The total of answer options "agree" and "rather agree" and "disagree" and "rather disagree".



In July 2006 independence would have been supported by 59% of respondents, while 20% would not have supported it.

In the West independence would be supported by 87% of citizens, in the Centre by 77%, in the South by 57% and in the East by 56%. In Donbas independence would be supported by less than a half of respondents: 47%.

In all regions, the share of supporters of independence is greater (sometimes tenfold) than the share of its opponents. Meanwhile, 30% of those polled in the South, East and Donbas did not provide an answer or stated that they would not participate in the referendum.

Thus, the level of support for Ukraine's independence has significantly increased in the past 10 years. However, a considerable portion of residents in the East, South and Donbas have no clear position regarding whether or not they support independence.

Attitude towards national symbols and characteristics of the independent Ukrainian state

The vast majority of Ukrainian citizens are either proud or positive about the characteristics of the independent Ukrainian state.

91% of respondents are proud or positive about the national flag of Ukraine, 90% about the coat of arms, 84% about the anthem, and 82% about the national currency, the hryvnia.

92% of people polled are proud of the Ukrainian language or positive about it.

In all regions the share of people who are proud of all state symbols and attributes or positive about them greatly exceeds the number of those who feel negatively about them or would like to change them.

In the West and the Centre the greatest numbers of respondents are proud of all symbols and characteristics of the state (except the hryvnia), while in the East, South and Donbas people are mainly positive about them. This suggests a stronger emotional conception of the state symbols by residents of the West and Centre.

ASPECTS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY

To describe political identity, the following characteristics were selected: degree of interest in politics; attitude regarding the most desirable type of political system; assessment of the nature of political regime in Ukraine; and understanding of two key political values: freedom and equality.

Degree of interest in politics

Only 12% of respondents claim to be "very interested" in politics. The majority (67%) are interested in politics to some extent. 21% are not interested at all.

There is a high level of interest in politics in all regions of Ukraine. Thus, 82% of respondents in the Centre are very interested in politics or interested to some extent; this percentage in the Centre is 80%; in the South 78%; in the East 79%; and in Donbas 74%.

Attitude regarding the most suitable type of political system

51% of respondents consider democracy the most suitable type of political system for Ukraine. 18% of respondents believe that in certain circumstances an authoritarian regime may be preferable to a democratic one, and 13% of those polled are of the opinion that for persons like them it makes no difference whether or not there is a democratic regime in the country.

In December 2012¹⁷ democracy was considered the most suitable type of political system by 47% of respondents; 24% believed that in certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be preferable; 17% reported that the type of regime was irrelevant for them.

As we see, in light of the events of 2013-2014, the share of supporters of democracy has increased slightly.

Meanwhile, democracy is the most desirable type of political system for 56% of those polled in the West and Centre, 55% in the East, 40% in Donbas, and 36% in the South.

The number of citizens who believe that under certain circumstances an authoritarian regime may be preferable to a democratic one varies from 17 to 19% in all regions.

The largest percentage of those for whom the type of political system is irrelevant is in Donbas at 21%, while the lowest percentage of such respondents is in the West. The largest percentage of undecided respondents is in the South.

Assessment of the nature of political regime in Ukraine

Citizens were asked to use a 10-point scale to assess the nature of the political regime in Ukraine in terms of "dictatorship-democracy". The overall result was 5.24 points.

In December 2012 the average result was 4.97 points.

In general, citizens in all regions assess the current political regime in Ukraine as something in between dictatorship and full democracy.

Estimates of the level of democracy decrease as one moves from the West to Donbas (from 5.7 to 4.5 points).

Understanding of political values

Equality. Among the two proposed understandings of equality, greater support (54%) was expressed for the view that it primarily involves providing equal opportunities to express one's abilities and equality before the law; understanding the concept as equality of income, living standards and social status for all was met with lower support (36%).

The number of supporters of the "equality of opportunities to express one's abilities and equality before the law" in all regions is significantly larger than the number of those favouring "equality of income, living standards..." (in the West 55% vs. 36%; in the Centre 52% vs. 38%; in the South 45% vs. 41%; in the East 56% vs. 35%; and in Donbas 59% vs. 28%).

¹⁷ The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre in cooperation with The Ilo Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) on 21-24 December, 2012. 2,009 respondents aged 18 and over were polled in all regions of Ukraine. The margin of error is 2.3%.

Freedom vs. equality. A relative majority (48%) of citizens would prefer to live in a society where the government regulates everything, yet without excessive inequality; meanwhile, 35% of respondents prefer a society of individual freedom where people are responsible for themselves and take care of themselves.

In each region the number of those who support state regulation and limitation of inequality is greater (to varying degrees) than the number of those who believe in individual freedom and responsibility. The ratio of these groups of respondents is: 44% to 40% in the West; 49% to 34% in the Centre; 49% to 28% in the South; 53% to 33% in the East; and 45% and 35% in Donbas.

Hence, understanding of equality in terms of equal opportunities is more common in society. However, this understanding is combined with a desire for the state to limit excessive inequality, and a rejection of personal freedom in favour of state regulation for this purpose.

The perception of equality as equality of opportunities and support for individual freedom is relatively higher in the West of Ukraine.

Attitude towards the Euromaidan

The most significant event for the state and society in recent history was the Euromaidan.¹⁸ On the one hand, this event was caused largely by interregional identity differences among Ukrainian citizens, which were used by the former authorities for their own purposes; on the other hand, it was a catalyst for the emergence of social conflicts on the basis of existing differences, which resulted in tragic consequences. Therefore, the perception of Maidan and the embodiment of the opposing views, or Anti-Maidan, is a significant marker for potential conflict in the society.

Two years after the Maidan, 40% of respondents would have supported it; 7% would have supported Anti-Maidan; and 40% would support neither Euromaidan nor Anti-Maidan.

In all regions of Ukraine except Donbas the share of citizens who would support the Maidan is higher than those who would support Anti-Maidan. In the West, 71% of respondents opted for Maidan and 1% for Anti-Maidan; in the Centre the figures were 46% and 3% respectively; in the South they were 20% and 5%; in the East 25% and 15%; and in Donbas 17% and 14% (in the last case the difference is not statistically significant).

SOCIO-CULTURAL IDENTITY

The main characteristics of socio-cultural identity considered in this study include language identity in its various dimensions (native language, language of everyday communication in the family and social environment, command of the Ukrainian state language) and cultural identity, in particular self-identification with a certain cultural tradition, sense



of proximity/social distance with respect to representatives of other nationalities and residents of other regions of Ukraine and other countries.

Language identity

The majority (60%) of Ukrainian citizens call Ukrainian their native language; 15% say Russian; and 22% reported that Ukrainian and Russian are equally native for them; 2% of respondents report having another native language.

In 2006, 52% of respondents called Ukrainian their native language; 31% identified it as Russian; for 16% of those polled both were native languages; and 1% reported another language.

In the West and Centre of the country, Ukrainian dominates as the mother tongue (93% and 78%, respectively). In the South and East, similar shares of respondents identify Ukrainian and two languages as equally native (35% and 38%, 37% and 34%, respectively). In Donbas, a relative majority (40%) of respondents consider Russian their native language; 34% identify both Ukrainian and Russian; and 20% claim Ukrainian.

Thus, the share of citizens who consider their native language to be Ukrainian or both languages simultaneously has increased, while Russian has decreased.¹⁹

In private life (at home) 44% of respondents speak Ukrainian and 5% speak mostly Ukrainian. 13% of those polled speak Russian at home; 11% spoke mostly Russian. 25% of citizens sometimes use Ukrainian and sometimes Russian; 1.4% use another language to communicate at home.

In 2006, 39% of those polled used Ukrainian at home and 7% spoke mostly Ukrainian; 15% sometimes spoke Ukrainian and sometimes Russian; 28% spoke Russian and 10% mostly Russian.

Thus, there is an increase in use of the Ukrainian language and both languages at the same time at home, and a decrease in use of Russian.

92% of residents in the West, 63% in the Centre, 20% in the South, 27% in the East and 13% in Donbas speak Ukrainian or mainly Ukrainian at home.

¹⁸ Based on the wording in survey questionnaire, hereinafter the term Maidan is used.

¹⁹ In this context, we do not consider the reasons for these changes, as this question requires additional in-depth study.



3% of respondents in the West, 26% in the Centre, 37% in the South, 32 in the East and 34% in Donbas speak both languages.

Russian or mainly Russian is used at home by 2% of respondents in the West, 10% in the Centre, 38% in the South, 40% in the East, and 52% in Donbas.

The situation is similar with the use of language outside the home, i.e. at work, at school, etc.

40% of those polled speak Ukrainian outside the home, and 6% speak mostly Ukrainian. 12% of respondents speak Russian and 11% mainly Russian.

29% of respondents speak two languages, Ukrainian and Russian.

In 2005, in response to the question “*What language do you speak outside the home?*”, equal shares (37% each) answered that they used either Ukrainian or Russian in communication, while 21% used both languages.²⁰ **Thus, the frequency of use of the Ukrainian language and both languages has increased, while the use of Russian has decreased.**

Outside home, Ukrainian or mostly Ukrainian is spoken by 92% of respondents in the West, 57% in the Centre, 16% in the South, 24% in the East and 9% in Donbas.

Both languages are spoken by 5% of respondents in the West, 33% in the Centre, 41% in the South, 34% in the East, and 37% in Donbas.

Russian or mainly Russian is used for communication outside the home by 1% of those polled in the West, 9% in the Centre, 39% in the South, 42% in the East, and 54% in Donbas.

Thus, we can report an increase in the use of Ukrainian and both languages in the family, at work, and at school, and a corresponding decrease in use of Russian.

However, although less so than in previous years, the share of respondents who use Ukrainian language in all regions except the West is lower than the share of those who call Ukrainian their native language.

One of the factors that determines the use of the languages in everyday communication is their status in the immediate social environment.

According to 43% of respondents, it is more prestigious to speak Ukrainian in their social environment. 22% of respondents identified Russian as a prestigious language for communication, and 1.1% identified English. 29% of respondents say that, among their friends and colleagues, it does not matter what language is spoken.

The prestige of communicating in Ukrainian in the immediate environment was reported by 88% of respondents in the West, 51% in the Centre, 16% in the South, 21% in the East, and 11% in Donbas.

The Russian language is considered prestigious in the environment of 2% of respondents in the West, 12% in the Centre, 29% in the South, 34% in the East, and 50% in Donbas.

It does not matter, what language is spoken with friends and colleagues for 6.5% of respondents in the West, 32% in the Centre, 47% in the South, 38% in the East, and 30% in Donbas.

Hence, the Ukrainian language is considered prestigious by an overwhelming majority of the residents in the West and by a majority in the Centre; Russian is prestigious for majority of those polled in Donbas, while in the South and East of Ukraine this issue is irrelevant for the relative majority of people.

Command of the Ukrainian language

Most respondents (65%) are fluent in Ukrainian. 28% of those polled assess their command of the Ukrainian language as sufficient for everyday communication but insufficient for speaking on specialised topics. 4.4% of respondents have problems speaking and understanding the Ukrainian language. 0.4% of respondents do not understand the Ukrainian language at all.

In 2005, the percentage of respondents fluent in Ukrainian was 58%; the share of those who had sufficient command of it was 33%; Ukrainian was poorly understood by 7%; and 0.8% of those polled did not understand it at all.

Command of the Ukrainian language varies significantly depending on the region. 94% of respondents in the West, 72% in the Centre, 52% in the East, 49% in the South, and 39% in Donbas are fluent in Ukrainian. At the same time, in all regions of Ukraine the vast majority (99-81%) of citizens speak Ukrainian fluently or at a level sufficient for everyday communication.

As in 2006, the share of citizens that have a good command of the Ukrainian language is greater than the share of those who called Ukrainian their native language.

Command of foreign languages

Overall, 31% of respondents reported their command of Listed²¹ foreign languages as sufficient for everyday communication; 18% chose the answer “other languages”. Among the languages listed most respondents (20%) chose English, Polish (6%), German (5%) and French (1.3%). Less than 1% of respondents know the other suggested languages. 50% of respondents were undecided.

The majority of the citizens who speak foreign languages is in the West, where 47% of respondents reported their command of certain foreign languages; in the Centre the figure is 25%; in the South it is 29%; in the East it is 28%; and in Donbas the number is 25%.

The desired status for languages

The majority (56%) of respondents believe that Ukrainian should be the only state and official language in Ukraine, while Russian and the languages of other national minorities may be used in everyday communication.

²⁰ The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 20-27 December 2005 in all regions of Ukraine. 2,009 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The margin of error is 2.3%.

²¹ In response to the question “*Of what languages do you have a command sufficient for everyday communication?*”, respondents were to choose among 13 specific languages or select the option “other languages”.



According to one-quarter (24%) of respondents, Ukrainian should be the state language, while Russian should be an official language in some regions of Ukraine.

14% of respondents are in favour of two official languages, Ukrainian and Russian.

The option for Russian as the state language and Ukrainian as an official one in some regions, or Russian as the state and official language, were supported by 1.4% and 1.1% of respondents respectively.

In 2005, only 35% of citizens were in favour of Ukrainian as the sole state and official language, with other languages able to be used in everyday communication. 20% supported the idea of Ukrainian as the state language and Russian as the official language in some areas.

37% were in support of state bilingualism; 3% supported Russian as the state language and Ukrainian as a regional official language; and 0.8% were in favour of Russian as the sole state and official language.

In the West and Centre of Ukraine, the vast majority (81% and 75%, respectively) of citizens support the status of Ukrainian as the sole state and official language; the official status of the Russian language in certain regions is supported by 15% and 16% of citizens, respectively; state bilingualism is supported by 2% and 4% of citizens, respectively.

In the South, a relative majority (37%) supports state and official status of the Ukrainian language;

30% support granting the Russian language official status in certain regions; and 23% are in favour of state status for both languages.

In the East, equal shares of respondents (34% each) support state status for the Ukrainian language with the possibility of granting the Russian language official status in the regions. The number of supporters of state bilingualism is 25% in this area.

In Donbas, a relative majority support granting official status to the Russian language in the regions and preserving Ukrainian as the state language (37%). 35% favour state bilingualism and 21% support the idea of Ukrainian as the sole state and official language in Donbas.

The contrast in the current situation can be seen when we look at the regional distribution of responses in 2007.²²

The share of supporters of Ukrainian language as the sole state language was 77% in the West, 50% in the Centre, 25% in the South, and 13% in the East.

The share of those who supported state bilingualism was 5% in the West, 21% in the Centre, 46% in the South, and 50% in the East.

The idea of granting the Russian language official status in certain regions while preserving the state

status of the Ukrainian language was supported by 15% in the West, 25% in the Centre, 21% in the South, and 31% in the East.

The survey results show that there has been a major shift on the issue of the status of languages, resulting in increase of the status of the Ukrainian language and a reduction of that of Russian. The status of the Ukrainian language as the sole state language is beyond any doubt.

The idea of state bilingualism has now lost much of its popularity in all regions, especially in the South and East of Ukraine. Instead, support for the state status of the Ukrainian language and the possibility of granting Russian an official status in certain regions is higher than before in these regions.

Cultural identity and affiliation with cultural tradition

The majority (70%) of citizens associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition, 10% with the Soviet tradition, 7% with the European tradition and 3% with the Russian tradition.

In 2006, 56% of citizens identified themselves as representatives of the Ukrainian cultural tradition, 16% of the Soviet tradition, 7% of the pan-European tradition, and 11% of the Russian tradition.

A majority (absolute or relative) of the residents of each region of Ukraine associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition: 85% in the West; 81% in the Centre; 64% in both the South and the East; and 38% in Donbas. A clear gap is seen only between Donbas and the remaining regions.

In the West and Centre, the share of citizens who consider themselves representatives of the Russian cultural tradition is less than 1%, while in the South it is 4%, in the East 6%, and in Donbas 10%.

Affiliation with the Soviet cultural tradition was reported by 24% of Donbas residents, 14% of residents in the East, 12% in the South, 6% in the Centre, and 3% in the West.

The number of respondents who identify themselves with the pan-European cultural tradition is 8% in the West, 6% in the Centre, 8% in the South, 7% in the East and nearly 9% in Donbas.

Compared to 2006, the shares of those affiliated with the Ukrainian cultural tradition in all regions have grown, while the shares of those identifying with the Soviet and Russian traditions have decreased.

During the period from 2006-2015, there was a significant increase in the number of representatives of the Ukrainian cultural tradition and a reduction in the share of the Soviet and Russian traditions.

The survey indicated a high degree of correlation between language and cultural identity: among citizens

²² The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre between 31 May and 18 June 2007, with a representative sample of the adult population of Ukraine in terms of region of residence, type of settlement, age and sex. The survey was carried out in 403 populated areas (including 212 urban areas and 191 rural settlements). 10,956 respondents aged 18 and over were polled in the form of personal interviews. The margin of error does not exceed 1%.

Given the effect of the Russian aggression on population changes in the macro-regions of Ukraine designated in the surveys of the Razumkov Centre, the comparison of the regional distribution of responses with the survey from 2007 and other surveys conducted before March 2014 (unless otherwise indicated), are mainly illustrative in nature and reflect the situation as it was at the time of the survey.



who speak Ukrainian at home, 86% identify themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition. Association with the Ukrainian cultural tradition was claimed by 69% of citizens who speak both languages at home, and by a relative majority (41%) of those who speak Russian. Among bilingual and Russian-speaking citizens, somewhat larger shares identify themselves with the Soviet tradition (11% and 23% respectively), and among Russian-speaking citizens with the Russian tradition (11%).

The number of respondents who associate themselves with the pan-European cultural tradition is in the range of 6-8% in all language groups.

It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian cultural tradition was reported by more citizens than those who called Ukrainian their native language (70% vs. 60%) and speak Ukrainian or mostly Ukrainian at home (70% vs. 50%).

Hence, the conclusion drawn in 2006, in which Ukrainian cultural identity is inherent to a large share of bilingual and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, has proved to be true.

Views of the future of cultural traditions in Ukraine

Significant changes have occurred in the respondents' assessments of the future of various cultural traditions in Ukraine.

According to a relative majority (40%) of respondents, the cultural tradition that will prevail in Ukraine in the future is Ukrainian; according to 21%, pan-European culture will predominate; 17% of respondents believe that different cultural traditions will dominate in different regions.

The opinion that the Russian cultural tradition will be most prevalent was reported by 2.3% of respondents; 1.7% spoke out in favour of some other tradition. 17% of respondents remained undecided.

Assurance of the future dominant position of Ukrainian culture was expressed by 49% of the citizens in the West, 45% in the Centre, 33% in the South, 39% in the East, and 21% in Donbas. In all regions except Donbas this represents a relative majority of respondents.

The number of respondents who expect the prevalence of a pan-European cultural tradition is 28% in the West; 20% in the Centre and in the South; 22% in the East; and 13% in Donbas. In the West, Centre and East, this is the second largest share of respondents.

In Donbas, a relative majority (30%) of respondents supported the opinion that "in different regions, different cultural traditions will prevail". This opinion is the second most frequently reported in the South as well (22%). In other regions it was supported by 11-17% of respondents.

In 2006, 35% of respondents suggested the future prevalence of the Ukrainian cultural tradition; 22% foresaw different cultures in different regions; 16% believed in the pan-European tradition; 2% saw Russian culture prevailing; and 1.3% each saw the Soviet and some other cultural tradition prevailing. 22% of respondents remained undecided.

Thus, the share of respondents who expect the prevalence of the Ukrainian and pan-European

traditions in the future has increased, while the share of those who expect regional multiculturalism has declined.

Assessment of cultural affinity with residents of other countries

The affinity of Ukrainians living in Ukraine and Russians living in Ukraine in cultural terms was assessed at 3.8 points.²³

The distance between Ukrainian and Russian citizens seems to be more visible (3.5 points), and the distance between citizens of Ukraine and citizens of EU member states is greater still (2.5).

In terms of cultural affinity among different regions of Ukraine, respondents rated the highest affinity between the Centre and the East of the country (3.5), the West and the Centre (3.4), and Halychyna (Galicia) and the Centre (3.3).

The distance between the Ukrainians and residents of the temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and residents of the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea is given a rating of 3.

The greatest distance is between the inhabitants of the Western and Eastern Ukraine (2.7) and between the inhabitants of Halychyna (Galicia) and Donbas (2.4).

Thus, citizens believe that the differences between the cultures of some regions of Ukraine are more significant than with the cultures of other countries.

In 2005, citizens rated the affinity between Ukrainians in Ukraine and Russians in Ukraine as the highest, but the proximity was even higher at that point (4.2).

The affinity between the citizens of Ukraine and Russian citizens was ranked the second, but was also higher in the past (4.1). The distance between Ukrainian citizens and citizens of the EU was assessed at 2.3 points.

The level of affinity between residents of Halychyna (Galicia) and Donbas (2.8 points) was rated higher than in 2015.

Thus, the sense of the distinctiveness of Ukrainians from Russians and citizens of Russia has increased, while the sense of distance from citizens of the EU has decreased.

At the same time, the assessments of affinity between residents of Halychyna (Galicia) and Donbas has decreased.

In assessments by residents from different regions, there are similarities as well as differences.

In the West, the proximity between residents of Western Ukraine and Central Ukraine, Halychyna (Galicia) and Central Ukraine, and between Central Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine, was rated as the highest, while assessments were the lowest with regard to the closeness between the residents of Halychyna (Galicia) and Donbas, Ukraine and the temporarily occupied territories: the Crimea and areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

In the Centre, people consider Ukrainians in Ukraine and Russians in Ukraine to be the closest to each other. The lowest affinity is between the inhabitants of Halychyna (Galicia) and Donbas.

In the South, East and Donbas the highest affinity is considered to be between Ukrainians in Ukraine

²³ On a 5-point scale from 1 to 5, where "5" indicates the greatest similarity between the groups.

and Russians in Ukraine, as well as between citizens of Ukraine and Russian citizens; the lowest affinity was between residents of Halychyna (Galicia) and Donbas, and citizens of Ukraine and the EU.

The assessment of affinity with EU citizens decreases from the West to Donbas (from 2.7 to 2.2 points).

Obviously, stereotypes and myths of the past and the low level of communication have had a significant impact on the mutual perception of residents in different parts of Ukraine.

Identification with Europe

The majority (63%) of the citizens do not feel themselves to be Europeans.²⁴ 29% of those polled do.²⁵ 9% of respondents remained undecided.

Among those who do not feel themselves to be Europeans, 73% of those polled cite a reason as their low standard of living. Socio-cultural conditions rank second (46%).

Cultural and spiritual factors are cited by smaller shares of respondents: language barriers at 36%; “non-European” mentality at 33%; low level of culture and education at 29%; feeling oneself to represent another culture at 16%, and religious affiliation at 4.7%.

In 2006, 68% did not feel themselves to be Europeans, while 27% did. 6% were undecided.

Among those who do not feel themselves to be Europeans, the majority also cited socio-economic reasons: low living standard (73%) and socio-cultural conditions (39%).

After these follow: low level of culture and education (33%); “non-European” mentality (28%); language barriers (23%); feeling that one represents another culture (10%); and religious affiliation (2.4%).

Thus, the number of those who do not feel themselves to be Europeans has slightly decreased, while the share of “Europeans” has slightly increased. The hierarchy of reasons why the majority of respondents do not feel themselves to be Europeans has not changed significantly: problems of a socio-economic nature are the primary concern. At the same time, the importance of such factors as language barriers, feeling that one represents another culture, and “non-European” mentality has increased.

The recent changes may result from various factors, from greater personal awareness of Europe and an increase in the national consciousness of Ukrainians, to the effects of Russian propaganda myths about “civilisational distinctiveness of the unified Russian nation, with Ukrainians forming an integral part”.

The impact of material factors as the main obstacles is reported by residents of all regions of Ukraine, and in general the hierarchy of reasons is similar everywhere. Meanwhile, in Donbas the share of respondents who cite “feeling that one represents



another culture” as the main reason for their “non-Europeanness” is much higher than in other regions, at 31%, even twice as much as in the East and South.

This correlates with data on self-identification by citizens with a particular cultural tradition, according to which 34% of respondents in Donbas identified themselves as representatives of the Soviet and Russian cultural traditions.

Thus, the feeling of a certain cultural alienation from both Europe and the rest of Ukraine remains relevant for the majority of Donbas residents.

NATIONAL IDENTITY

With regard to the characteristics of national (ethnic) identity of citizens, in addition to direct question about their nationality, they were also asked about their view of the acceptability of various definitions of the Ukrainian nation, their attitude towards the Ukrainian cultural component of citizenship, and their perception of the concept of “Ukrainian nationalism”.

Ukrainians constitute the majority of respondents, both in Ukraine as a whole (86%) and in all its regions (from 96% in the West to 61% in Donbas). The second largest group is Russians (9%), the majority of whom live in Donbas (31%), the East (11%) and the South (9%).

Representatives of other nationalities make up 3% of the total number of respondents, and their greatest numbers reside in the South (7%) and in Donbas (5%).

Definition of the Ukrainian nation

The majority (56%) of respondents support the civic definition of the Ukrainian nation as a community of all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their ethnic origin, language of communication, and traditions.

19% of those polled supported the definition of Ukrainian nation as an ethnic one (i.e. having Ukrainian ancestors).

17% of respondents supported the “cultural” definition of nation, in which speaking the Ukrainian language, adherence to national traditions and raising children to follow these are of particular significance.

In 2006, the civic definition of the Ukrainian nation was supported by 43% of respondents, the ethnic definition by 34%, and the cultural definition by 15%.²⁶

²⁴ The total of answers “disagree” and “rather disagree”.

²⁵ The total of answers “agree” and “rather disagree”.

²⁶ The study was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre between 20 April and 12 May, 2006. 11,216 respondents were polled in all regions of Ukraine. The margin of error is 1%.



Civic definition of a nation is supported by 60% of citizens in the Centre, 59% in the South, 58% in Donbas, 52% in the East, and 50% in the West.

It is noteworthy that the ethnic definition of a nation is the second most supported in the East (24%), while in the West the cultural idea of a nation ranks second (28%).

Thus, over 10 years the understanding of the Ukrainian nation as a civic one has significantly strengthened and support of an approach based on ethnicity has decreased, while the level of support for a cultural understanding of the term has remained unchanged.

Attitude towards the Ukrainian cultural component of citizenship

Meanwhile, despite the prevalence of the civic idea of a nation, the majority (73%) support the assertion that every Ukrainian citizen, regardless of ethnicity, should be able to speak the Ukrainian language and know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture. 18% of respondents disagree with this statement.

The majority of respondents in all regions (from 86% in the West to 59% in Donbas) believe that such knowledge is obligatory for citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin. The largest numbers of those opposed are in Donbas (31%), in the East (26%) and in the South (20%).

Thus, the primarily civic understanding of a nation is combined with support for the necessity of the Ukrainian cultural component as a characteristic of every citizen. In addition, the cultural definition does not contradict the civic one, as it implies that citizenship is independent from ethnic affiliation.

Perception of Ukrainian nationalism

A relative majority (47%) of citizens consider Ukrainian nationalism to be an ideology that seeks transformation of Ukraine into a strong state that would be respected in the world and have a high standard of living.

Meanwhile, 25% of those polled disapprove of Ukrainian nationalism, viewing it as an ideology splitting society into ethnic Ukrainians and “non-Ukrainians” and limiting the rights of “non-Ukrainians”.

12% of those polled consider Ukrainian nationalism a historical phenomenon which is not of current relevance.

The situation has changed significantly compared to the previous survey. In 2005, 27% identified Ukrainian nationalism as an ideology seeking the transformation of Ukraine into a strong state, while 41% viewed it as an ideology splitting society. 15% believed that it was a historical phenomenon which is no longer relevant.

The definition of nationalism as an ideology seeking the transformation of Ukraine into a strong state respected in the world with a high standard of living was supported by the majority of residents in the West and Centre (67% and 50%, respectively) and by a relative majority in the West and Donbas (38% and 37%, respectively).

It is seen as a divisive ideology by relative majority of respondents in the South (34%). A considerable number of citizens share this opinion in Donbas (32%). In the East, equal shares of respondents see nationalism as an ideology of national development and ideology splitting society (38% each).

Compared to 2005, changes in perception of Ukrainian nationalism took place in all regions;²⁷ at that time, an overwhelming majority, or a relative majority, in all regions except the West considered it a divisive ideology. In the past 10 years, the shares of those who view nationalism as an ideology of state development has increased in all regions.

Thus, over these 10 years, the perception of Ukrainian nationalism has significantly changed; for the majority of citizens, Ukrainian nationalism has become a synonym for an ideology promoting building of the state.

However, some residents of Ukraine, especially in the South, East and Donbas, are still held captive by the ideological clichés and stereotypes imposed by Soviet and Russian propaganda.

Inter-ethnic tolerance

Slightly more than half (53%) of respondents do not care about the ethnicity of their neighbours. Among those who indicated a choice, a relative majority (29%) would choose to live near Ukrainians. Poles were ranked second (19%); 14% of those polled would prefer to live near Russians, 11% near Hungarians, 10% near Jews, 9% near Romanians, and 8% near Tatars.

In all regions except the West, the majority consists of citizens who do not care whom to live next to.

In the West and in the Centre, Ukrainians and Poles are more desirable neighbours; in the South and the East, Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles; and in Donbas, Russians and Ukrainians.

In response to the question “*What ethnic groups would you like to live next to?*”, 48% of citizens said that they do not care. This figure is the highest in the South (65%) and in Donbas (61%). In the Centre the number 47%, in the East 45%, and in the West 36%.

A relative majority of respondents would not like to live near Romani (32%). 13% would not like to live next to Russians, 12% to Jews, 10% to Tatars, 8% to Romanians, 5% to Hungarians, and 3% to Poles.

A relative majority (41%) of the residents in the West would not like to have Romani as neighbours. In other regions, as was previously mentioned, the answer “*does not matter*” was ranked first, while Romani as the most unwanted neighbours was ranked second. After the Romani, relatively large shares in various regions identified representatives of the following nationalities as undesirable neighbours: in the West and Centre – Russians and Jews (30% and 16%; 13% and 12%, respectively); in the South – Tatars, Romanians and Jews (10%, 8% and 7%); in the East – Tatars, Romanians and Jews (13%, 12%, 12%); in Donbas – Jews, Tatars and Romanians (9%, 8% and 7%).

²⁷ By regions, 2005 survey data is calculated without Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

In 2005, the number of those who did not care who they live next to was 32%. Among those whom respondents would like to live next to, Ukrainians were the most frequently mentioned (46%). Russians were ranked second (44%), followed by Poles (28%), Jews (21%), Hungarians (17%), Romanians (14%), Tatars (12%).

32% of respondents reported no antipathy to any neighbours in terms of their ethnicity. Half (51%) of respondents would not like to live near Romani. 18% of Ukrainians would not like to live near Tatars, 13% near Romanians, 10% near Jews, 6% near Hungarians, 5% near Poles, and 3.5% near Russians.

Thus, in general, tolerance regarding the perception of other ethnicities has increased. The highest level of antipathy remains towards the Romani. At the same time, the sympathies of Ukrainians towards Russians has decreased and antipathy has increased. Respondents from the West of Ukraine demonstrate more explicitly judgmental attitudes to citizens of other ethnicities.

GEOPOLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

Sociocultural identity largely determines the geocultural and geopolitical orientations of citizens. Consequently, the changes that have occurred in various aspects of socio-cultural identity over the past 10 years, particularly influenced by the events of the Maidan and Russian aggression against Ukraine, have affected the geopolitical orientations of citizens.

Priorities in Ukraine's foreign policy

Relations with EU member states are a high priority for half (51%) of respondents. Relations with Russia are prioritised by 11% of those polled, with other countries (unspecified) by 6%, with other (non-Russian) CIS countries also by 6% and with the USA by 3%.

In 2007, a relative majority (41%) of respondents gave preference to relations with Russia, 31% to the EU member states, 7% to CIS countries and 1% to relations with the USA.

There has clearly been a noticeable reorientation of citizens towards EU countries and a significant decline in support for Russia as a major partner.

The development of relations with the EU is a definite priority for citizens, supported by majority in the West and Centre (78% and 58%) and a clear plurality in the South and East (36% each).

For residents of Donbas, relations with Russia are of the same importance as relations with the EU (29% and 27%, respectively).

Relations with Russia are also prioritised by 20% residents in the East and 13% in the South.

It should be noted that on this issue fairly significant shares of respondents (24-28%) in all regions, except the West, remained undecided.

Support for Ukraine's accession to the EU

In a hypothetical referendum on Ukraine's accession to the EU, 56% of those polled would vote for it, and 18% against. 26% of respondents remained undecided or would not take part in the vote.

In December 2013,²⁸ 48% of respondents said they would vote for such accession, 36% against, 9% would not participate in the referendum, and 7% were undecided.

Thus, even in comparison to 2013, when the "Euromaidan" was in progress, the support in society for Ukraine's accession to the EU has significantly increased, while the share of opponents of European integration has declined.

Supporters of European integration prevail in the West (85%) and Centre (62%), and enjoy comparative advantages in the South (41%), East (40%) and Donbas (33%).

The majority of opponents are in the East (34%) and the majority of those who remained undecided are in the South (20%) and Donbas (19%).

Support for Ukraine's accession to NATO

If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO were held, relative majority (44%) would vote for accession, and 26% would vote against. 31% of respondents remained undecided or would not take part in the vote.

In 2007, 19% of respondents were willing to vote for accession to NATO, and 54% would have voted against. 27% would not have participated in a referendum or were undecided.

A referendum on NATO membership would have a chance to be successful mainly because of the votes of citizens from the West (70%) and Centre (49%).

NATO opponents dominate in the East (44% vs. 31%) and Donbas (37% vs. 21%), while the shares of opponents and supporters in the South do not differ significantly (34% vs. 30%).

With regard to the issue of support for Ukraine's accession to NATO, the years 2014-2015 represented a turning point: the idea of accession, for the first time since independence, has gained the support of a relative majority of citizens and a majority of those who would participate in a hypothetical referendum.

However, with respect to this issue, in contrast to the attitude towards accession to the EU, the prevalence of the positive attitude over the negative one has not yet been reached in all regions.

Attitude towards Russian citizens and authorities

Most people have a negative attitude towards the Russian authorities: the President (73%), the Government (69%) and the State Duma (69%).

As for the attitude towards Russian citizens, a relative majority of respondents have a neutral attitude (38%); the share of Ukrainians having positive attitude regarding the citizens of Russia is larger than the share of those with a negative attitude (30% and 23% respectively).

Compared to April 2014, the shares of respondents who have a negative attitude towards institutions of state power in Russia has increased. The number of citizens with a positive attitude towards Russians has fallen, while the share of those having a negative or neutral attitude has increased.

²⁸ The study was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre from 20 to 24 December 2013. 2,010 respondents aged 18 and over were polled in all regions of Ukraine. The margin of error is 2.3%.



In all regions of Ukraine except Donbas, the majority of respondents have a negative attitude towards all institutions of state power, and among these the most negative attitude is towards the President of Russia (from 93% in the West to 56% in the East).

Among the residents of Donbas, a relative majority (41%) also have negative attitude towards the President of Russia, and with respect to other public authorities roughly equal shares of respondents have neutral and negative attitudes.

The attitude towards Russian citizens of a relative majority of respondents in the West and Centre of Ukraine is neutral (42% and 41%, respectively), and a negative attitude ranks second (37% and 28%). In the South, East and Donbas, a relative majority of respondents have a positive attitude towards the citizens of Russia (47%, 46% and 50%, respectively); a neutral attitude ranks second (31%, 35% and 35%, respectively).

Attitude towards the unifying potential of the idea of European integration

A relative majority (41%) of the citizens do not share the opinion that European integration is an idea around which all Ukrainian regions could rally. 34% do support this statement. 24% of those polled did not provide an answer.

In December 2006, 47% of respondents rejected the idea that European integration holds any unifying potential, while 27% supported it. 27% did not provide an answer.

Scepticism about integration in the European Union as a unifying idea prevails in all regions except the West. In the Centre, the shares of “Euro-sceptics” and “Euro-Optimists” are almost equal (38% vs. 36%); while in the South, East and Donbas the number of “Euro-sceptics” prevails (54%, 57% and 43% respectively).

ATTITUDE TOWARDS REGIONAL DIFFERENCES, PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENTS OF HISTORICAL PAST

Assessment of regional differences

A majority (52%) of citizens believe that there are no contradictions, differences or disproportions between the western and eastern regions of Ukraine that could lead to their secession, the creation of their own states or their joining other states. 28% of respondents believe that there are such differences.

More than half of respondents in the West (57%), Centre (55%), and East (57%), as well as the relative majority of respondents in Donbas (45%) believe that no such differences exist.

In the South, the shares of those who answered “yes” and “no” are split almost evenly (34% and 35% respectively); almost a third of citizens did not provide an answer to this question.

In 2007,²⁹ the share of those who disagreed was 66%, while 19% of respondents answered in the affirmative.

The majority (57%) of respondents fully or partially disagree that the differences between western and eastern Ukrainians are significant enough that they

can be considered two different peoples. 26% agree with this statement.

An absolute or relative majority in all regions of Ukraine completely agree or tend to agree with this opinion: in the West the figure is 61%, in the Centre 62%, in the East 59%, in the South 43% and in Donbas 49%.

In the South and Donbas the number of respondents who could not answer this question was higher than in other regions (24% and 23% respectively).

In 2007, the share of those who disagreed, as in the previous question, was higher: 62%.

It is clear that the increase in the numbers of citizens who agree with the possibility of the separation of Ukraine’s regions, and with the idea that western and eastern Ukrainians are two different nations may have been influenced by current events that have shown the possibility of this scenario (Crimea and Donbas), and by Russian propaganda. The socio-cultural identities of citizens in different regions also contributed to this opinion.³⁰

Vision of prospects for regional development

The vast majority of respondents do not want their region/oblast to do the following: secede from Ukraine and establish its own independent state (89%); secede from Ukraine and join another state (88%); remain as an autonomous entity of Ukraine (with its own constitution, government and parliament) (81%). 8% of respondents would support the last option.

The majority (60%) of citizens would like their oblast to remain as a part of Ukraine in its current status but with expanded rights and powers of local governance (27% are opposed).

Equal shares of respondents (40% each) support or oppose the preservation of the current status of oblasts and powers of local governance.

In 2007 as well, the vast majority of respondents did not support the options for secession of their oblast/region from Ukraine and establishing its own independent state (88%), joining another state (85%), or the autonomy of oblasts/regions (74%). However, the number of supporters for autonomy was higher (14%).

At that point, the majority (54%) of citizens preferred that their oblast remain as a part of Ukraine in its current status but with expanded rights and powers of local governance. Shares of supporters and opponents of the existing powers of oblasts were, respectively, 45% and 40%.

The options for secession of the oblast from Ukraine followed by establishment of its own independent state or joining another state are rejected by an overwhelming or absolute majority of respondents in all regions (from 93% in the West to 74% in Donbas). The relatively largest share of supporters for this option is in Donbas, amounting to only 7%.

The idea of creating autonomy as a part of Ukraine is rejected in all regions (from 89% in the Centre to 76% in the South and East), and is opposed by 61% of residents in Donbas. The maximum number of adherents of this idea is also in Donbas, at 12%.

²⁹ The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre from 31 May to 18 June, 2007. The survey was carried out in 403 populated areas (including 212 urban areas and 191 rural settlements). 10,956 respondents aged 18 and over were polled in the form of personal interviews. The margin of error does not exceed 1%.

³⁰ See answers to questions about the closeness of regions on p.42 of this journal.

In all regions, the majority of respondents support the preservation of their oblast as a part of Ukraine in its current status, but with extended rights of local government, from 67% in the South to 52% in Donbas.

Maintaining the status quo of the oblasts with regard to status, rights, and the powers of local government is supported by half of respondents in the West (50%) and a relative majority in the Centre (44%); in the East and Donbas, a relative majority (47%) does not support this idea; in the South, the difference between supporters and opponents of this idea is not statistically significant.

In fact, there is a consensus between residents of different regions regarding the future status of their oblasts; the option of decentralisation policy, implemented in Ukraine, corresponds to it.

Opinion on the provisions of regulations regarding assessment of the historical past of Ukraine

Common historical memory, myths, values and traditions are important factors in the formation of a common national identity. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, for obvious reasons, the attitude towards the historical past, and assessments of certain historical events and personalities have long remained causes for interregional differences, fuelled and politicised by internal and external actors.³¹

The attitude of Ukrainian citizens to provisions of regulations regarding assessments of certain events in the historical past of Ukraine, including laws on “de-communisation” adopted in 2015, are examined below.³²

A vast majority of respondents supported:

- Recognizing the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people (74%);
- Condemnation of the national socialist (Nazi) (1933-1945) totalitarian regime in Ukraine and prohibition of the use and propagandizing of its symbols (58%);
- Condemnation of the communist (1917-1991) totalitarian regime in Ukraine and prohibition of the use and propagandizing of its symbols (52%).

A relative majority supported:

- Establishing criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting propaganda of the national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regime and for using its symbols (47%);
- Establishing a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation in Ukraine on May 8 (47%);
- Recognizing a number of historical organisations and groups as fighters for Ukrainian independence (in particular, UPR, OUN, UPA, etc.) (42%);



- Establishing criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting propaganda of the communist totalitarian regime and for using its symbols (38%).

Respondents’ assessments of support or lack of support are almost evenly divided in regard to such provisions as:

- Change of the holiday name from the Victory Day (May 9) to Day of Victory over Nazism in World War II (37% and 35%, respectively);
- Change of the name “The Great Patriotic War” to “World War II” in official documents, names of national holidays, historical monuments, etc. (35% vs. 35%).

Recognizing the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people is supported by the majority of respondents (absolute or relative) in all regions, from 91% in the West to 47% in Donbas.

Condemnation of the communist totalitarian regime and prohibition of the use and propagandizing of its symbols is supported by the majority of residents in the West and Centre (82% and 58% respectively). In the South and East, the difference between the numbers of respondents who support this provision and of those who do not is slight (34% and 30%; 36% and 38%). In Donbas, the number of opponents of this provision is slightly larger (38% vs. 30%).

Establishing criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting propaganda of the communist totalitarian regime and for using its symbols is supported by the majority of residents in the West and Centre (66% and 42%), while a relative majority in other regions do not support such a measure (50% in the East, 47% in Donbas and 30% in the South).

Condemnation of the national socialist (Nazi) regime is supported by a vast or relative majority of citizens in all regions (from 73% in the West to 49% in Donbas). However, considerable shares of respondents in the East and Donbas do not support this provision (23% and 24%, respectively).

³¹ For details, see: Yuriy YAKYMENKO, Oleksandr LYTVYENKO, Regional aspects of the ideological and political orientations of Ukrainian citizens in the context of the 2006 Election Campaign. Article by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2006, No. 1, pp. 2-18.

³² The Laws of Ukraine “On the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine”, “On the Condemnation of Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and the Prohibition of Propaganda of their Symbols”, “On Remembrance of the Victory over Nazism in World War II from 1939-1945”, “On Access to the Files of the Repressive Agencies of the Communist Totalitarian Regime of 1917-1991”, “On the Legal Status and Honouring the Memory of Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in the XX Century”.



Establishing criminal liability for propaganda of Nazi symbols is supported by a majority of respondents in all regions except Donbas, where this measure is opposed by 36% and supported by 32%. In the East, almost a third of respondents do not support this provision.

Recognition of organisations and formations, including the Ukrainian National Republic, Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS), troops of the Kholodny Yar Republic, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the People's Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction, **as fighters for Ukrainian independence** in the twentieth century was supported by a majority (absolute or relative) of respondents in the West and Centre (76% and 46%). In other regions, the share of those who do not support such recognition prevails: in the South, the ratio is 24% to 20%, in the East 40% to 27% and in Donbas 38% to 21%.

Replacement of the name “The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945” with “World War II (1939-1945)” in official documents, names of national holidays, historical monuments, etc. was supported by a majority of respondents in the West (59%) and by a relative majority in the Centre (38%). In other regions, opponents of such renaming predominate (from 54% in the East to 42% in the South).

Establishing a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation in Ukraine on May 8 to commemorate all victims of World War II in 1939-1945 was supported by the majority in the West (65%) and Centre (53%). This was supported by equal shares of respondents in the South and Donbas (37% each). Meanwhile, in Donbas the shares of supporters and opponents of this initiative are slightly different (37% and 35%, respectively), while in the East those opposed prevail (42% vs. 31%).

Changing of the holiday name from the Victory Day (9 May) to Day of Victory over Nazism in World War II (Victory Day) on 9 May was supported by a majority of respondents in the West (57%) and a relative majority in the Centre (42%). In other regions, half or nearly half of respondents (47-50%) did not support the change of the name of the holiday; the share of those who supported the renaming varies from 23% to 26%.

Thus, noticeable differences remain between residents of different regions of Ukraine on issues relating to changes in current approaches to assessment of historical events, especially such as assessment of the actions of the communist regime or recognition of certain authorities, formations and organisations as fighters for Ukraine's independence; establishing penalties for failure to comply with these approaches; and amending the established symbolism surrounding certain historical events (names, holidays).

A somewhat higher level of opposition to new assessments of historical events is seen primarily in Donbas and the East and South of Ukraine.

However, even in these regions, the share of opponents is half of respondents on a certain number of issues (particularly, in the East and Donbas, on issues of criminal liability for the violation of the prohibition on communist symbols and, in the East, renaming the Great Patriotic War to World War II and, accordingly, renaming Victory Day in the East).

Considerable shares of respondents in these regions also support the condemnation of communism (30-37%), while 20-30% support changes of names and holidays.

It is noteworthy that on most of the questions considerable shares of respondents (on average one-third) in all regions except the West chose the options “do not care” or “difficult to answer”.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CONFLICT IN THE EAST AND RELATIONS WITH OCCUPIED CRIMEA

Steps to be taken to resolve the conflict in the East of Ukraine

Almost one-third (31%) of respondents support prolonging the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of Ukrainian control over the areas occupied by separatists. 22% of those polled support granting special status to the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts³³ as parts of Ukraine, and 16% favour their secession from Ukraine.

Almost one-third of respondents (31%) remained undecided.

In March 2015,³⁴ the share of supporters for continuation of the anti-terrorist operation was 33%; granting special status was supported by 31% of respondents, and secession by 18%. 19% remained undecided. Thus, the share of supporters of special status has declined throughout the year, while the share of those who are undecided has increased.

Continuation of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) until complete restoration of Ukrainian control over the occupied areas is supported by relative majority in the West (45%) and Centre (36%); in Donbas a relative majority of respondents support granting the separate regions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts special status within Ukraine (39%), 19% support continuation of the anti-terrorist operation, and 11% support secession by these territories from Ukraine.

In the South, the amount by which supporters of continuing the anti-terrorist operation exceed the supporters of special status for separate regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts is not highly significant (27% and 22%, respectively).

In the East, a relative majority (32%) of those polled support the special status of separate regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts within Ukraine (continuation of ATO – 21%, secession of these territories from Ukraine – 17%).

Interestingly, the secession of separate regions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts is supported by almost equal shares of respondents in the West (19%), Centre and East (17%).

A significant share of respondents (from 27% in the West to 37% in the South) did not provide an answer.

³³ Hereinafter, the occupied territories of Ukraine will be referred to as separate regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (SRDLO).

³⁴ The survey was conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 6-12 March 2015 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea. 2,009 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The margin of error is 2.3%.



The motives for secession from Ukraine of the territories occupied by separatists

For a majority (60%) of respondents who support secession of these territories, the main motive is that they do not want the inhabitants of these areas to affect the policy of Ukraine and be financed from the Ukrainian budget. 29% believe that residents of these regions have the right to self-determination.

The motives of Donbas residents who support secession by the occupied territories contrast with opinion of the majority of residents in other regions. Specifically, 75% of respondents who support secession by these territories believe that residents of these regions have the right to self-determination (29% of respondents share this opinion in the West, 18% in the Centre, 36% in the South and 43% in the East).

Meanwhile, among those who support secession by these territories, 78% of residents in the West, 69% in the Centre, and 50% in the South do not want inhabitants of the occupied territories to influence Ukrainian policy, and thus they are in favour of secession. In the East, the shares of those who do not want residents of this region to influence Ukrainian policy, and that of those who believe that residents of this region have the right to self-determination, are almost equal (44% and 43%, respectively, among those who support secession of the occupied territories).

The overall assessment of the conflict in Ukraine

Almost half (49%) of respondents believe that the ongoing conflict in the East is a war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine; 20% see it as a conflict between Russia and the USA being waged in Ukraine for spheres of influence; 15% view it as a civil conflict between the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian citizens of Ukraine.

An overwhelming majority of those polled in the West (75%) and the majority in the Centre (60%) assess this conflict as a war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine.

A relative majority supports this assessment in the South and East (33% each). In Donbas, this assessment of the conflict was supported by 24%, while the assessment of it as a struggle between Russia and the USA for spheres of influence was agreed with by 32% (in the West this figure was 9%, in the Centre 15%, in the South 25% and in the East 30%).

In Donbas, the view that the conflict is of a civil nature is also relatively common (25%). In the West this assessment was expressed by 6% of respondents, in the Centre by 13%, in the South by 19% and in the East by 20%.

The majority of those who remained undecided are in the South (23%) and Donbas (20%).

Coexistence of Ukraine and the uncontrolled part of Donbas

With regard to the means of coexistence between Ukraine and the uncontrolled part of Donbas, there is no certainty among the respondents.

In December 2015, the largest number (40%) of respondents were undecided. 36% of respondents were in favour of ceasing any relations (including economic ties) with these areas, and 24% supported

granting special status to Donbas along with a possibility of influencing Ukraine's policies (including in the international sphere). In February 2016, respondents' opinions had significantly changed: 45% favoured ceasing all relations between Ukraine and the uncontrolled territories of Donbas.

In December 2015, supporters of ceasing all relations constituted the majority in the West (50%) and a relative majority in the Centre (45%). In the South, the shares of those who support terminating relations and those in favour of granting special status to separate regions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts were almost equal (25% and 24%). In the East and Donbas, the option of granting special status was supported more than the option of terminating all relations (37% and 24%; 38% and 16%, respectively).

Meanwhile, the question about the form of continued coexistence of Ukraine and separate regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts remained uncertain for the majority of citizens in all regions: from 51% in the South to 34% in the West.

Responsibility for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

A relative majority (48%) of respondents blame Russia alone for the conflict; one-third of respondents (33%) blame both Russia and Ukraine; 9% blame only Ukraine.

The majority of residents in the West (68%) and Centre (57%) hold Russia primarily responsible.

In the East, equal shares of respondents (36% each) assign responsibility to Russia alone and to both countries to the same extent.

In the South and Donbas relatively larger shares of respondents hold both countries equally responsible, while the second largest group blames Russia alone (41% and 33%; 43% and 24%).

Opinion on Ukraine's policy regarding separate regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts

With regard to the territories controlled by the DPR and LPR, half of the respondents chose the policy options that provide for isolation (complete or partial).

15% of those polled support "soft reintegration" of these areas (special status, local elections, contacts with their leaders, restoration of economic ties); 6% are in favour of recognizing them as independent states and establishing relations with them.

A quarter of the respondents declined to answer this question, and 5% would support other unnamed options.

Options involving complete or partial isolation without restoration of economic and trade relations are supported by the majority in the West (60%) and a relative majority in the Centre (47%). In the South, East and Donbas such options are supported by 27-31% of respondents.

11% in the Centre favour partial isolation to include maintaining economic and trade ties, this figure is 10% in the East, 8% in Donbas, 7% in the West and 5% in the South.

"Soft reintegration" is the second most popular option in Donbas (24%) and the East (22%). In the South this option is supported by 15% of those polled, in the Centre by 11%, and in the West by 7%.



Recognition of the independence of the DPR/LPR would be supported by 11% of respondents in the East, by 9% in the South and also by 9% in Donbas, by 3% in the Centre and by 1% – in the West.

The share of those who declined to answer ranges from 20% in the West to 38% in the South.

Attitude towards de-naturalisation of separatists

Half of respondents support the idea of de-naturalising those Ukrainian citizens who supported Russian aggression against Ukraine and secession movements. 32% of respondents are against it, and 18% are undecided.

68% of Western residents and 64% of respondents in the Centre are in favour of deprivation of citizenship. In the South, the votes are equally divided: 40% in favour and 40% opposed. In the East, the idea of de-naturalisation of Ukrainian citizens who supported Russian aggression is favoured by 32%, and opposed by 53%; in Donbas these figures are 24% and 59% respectively.

Attitude towards different categories of citizens in the occupied territories of Donbas depending on their actions following the outbreak of the conflict

Most people tend to follow the principle that it is not their fault in relation to people who have moved from the ATO zone **to other regions of Ukraine (70%), or who wanted to move to other regions of Ukraine but had no opportunity (66%), or have not moved from the ATO zone, but do not support the DPR and LPR (60%)**.

Respectively, 16%, 20%, and 23% of respondents believe it is necessary to “understand and forgive” them. An absolute minority (1.5-3%) “will not forget and will not forgive”.

The attitude towards those citizens **who moved from the ATO zone to Russia is more negative**. 46% of respondents believe that “they are not guilty”; 23% are ready “to understand and forgive,” however 14% “will not forget and will not forgive”.

Meanwhile, the attitude towards people who support the DPR and LPR or participated in their paramilitary forces is significantly more negative.

A relative majority (40% and 37%) of citizens support the “will not forget and will not forgive” approach regarding citizens who **have not moved from the ATO zone and support the DPR/LPR, as well as those who were urged to participate in DPR/LPR paramilitary forces and fought against Ukraine**.

25% and 27%, respectively, are ready to understand and forgive, while 13% and 12% claim that these citizens are not guilty.

The majority (66% and 72%) of respondents are not willing to “forget and forgive” concerning those who fought against Ukraine in paramilitary forces of the DPR/LPR on their own initiative, and those members of terrorist groups who participated in torturing of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians. Those who are ready to “forgive and forget” regarding these categories amount to 10% and 7%; 5% and 4%, respectively, believe that they are not guilty.

The largest share of undecided respondents (22% and 24%) are in regard to citizens who supported the DPR/LPR and were forced to participate in their armed units and fought against Ukraine.

The regional distribution of opinions is as follows.

Ukrainian citizens who moved to other regions of Ukraine from the ATO zone. The majority of citizens in all regions of Ukraine believe that people who left the ATO zone for other regions of the country are not guilty (66% in the West, 70% in the Centre, 76% in the South, 74% in the East and 68% in Donbas).

The number of those who believe that these people need to be understood and forgiven equals 21% in the West, 17% in the Centre, 11% in the South, 12% in the East and 17% in Donbas.

Ukrainian citizens who have moved to Russia from the ATO zone. Assessments are somewhat less straightforward in respect to those citizens who left the ATO zone for Russia. The majority of respondents in the South (54%), East (58%) and Donbas (57%) claim that they should not be blamed, while in the West and Centre this opinion is shared by 36% and 40%, respectively.

Readiness “to understand and forgive” is reported by 26% of residents in the West, 24% in the Centre, 23% in the South, 18% in the East and 25% in Donbas.

The “will not forget, will not forgive” approach is supported by 21% of respondents in the West, 17% in the Centre, 12% in the South, 6% in the East and 4% in Donbas.

Citizens who wanted to move to other regions of Ukraine from the ATO zone but have not moved as they had no opportunity. The majority of citizens in all regions are not likely to blame these people for anything. The shares of the answer “they are not guilty” are almost equal in the West (62%), Centre (65%) and in Donbas (64%), while the number of respondents who provided this answer in the South and East is somewhat higher (74% and 71% respectively).

Citizens who have not moved to other regions of Ukraine from the ATO zone but do not support the DPR/LPR. The majority of citizens in all regions adhere to the “they are not guilty” approach. This approach is shared by 56% of those polled in the West, 60% in the Centre and Donbas, 68% in the South and 62% in the East.

26% of respondents in the West, 24% in the Centre, 15% in the South, 20% in the East, and 23% in Donbas think it necessary to “understand and forgive”.

Citizens who have not left the ATO zone for other regions of Ukraine and support the DPR and LPR. Answers to this question reveal significant differences in opinions between residents of Donbas and to a lesser extent between the citizens of the South and East, and the West and Centre of Ukraine.

Thus, the majority of those polled in the West (55%) and Centre (57%) support an approach of “will not forget, will not forgive”.

A relative majority in the South (30%), East (32%), and Donbas (37%) believe that such people should be understood and forgiven. 16% of respondents in the South, 19% in the East and 24% in Donbas believe that they should not be blamed.

This question was rather hard to answer: the share of those who declined to answer ranged from 17% in the West to 32% in the South.

Citizens who were urged to participate in DPR and LPR paramilitary forces and fought against Ukraine. Half of the citizens in the Centre and a relative majority in the West (45%) and East (36%) espouse the “will not forget, will not forgive” approach. In the South and Donbas, larger shares (41% and 35%, respectively) support the “understand and forgive” approach.

The share of those who think that these citizens should not be blamed is the largest in the South, East and Donbas (17-20%).

This question was too difficult to answer for 21-28% of respondents throughout all regions.

Citizens who took part in paramilitary forces of the DPR and LPR on their own initiative and out of personal conviction and fought against Ukraine. Unwillingness to forgive those who fought against Ukraine on their own initiative was expressed by 83% of the residents in the West, 82% in the Centre, 48% in the South and 59% in the East.

Among the residents of Donbas, the total shares of respondents ready to forgive these people and consider them innocent is higher than that of those who are guided by the principle of “will not forget, will not forgive.”

Answering this question was difficult for respondents in Donbas (37% did not answer), the South (29%) and the East (22%).

Citizens who participated in paramilitary forces of the DPR and LPR and took part in the torture of Ukrainian military troops and civilians. The vast majority in the West (87%) and Centre (84%), the absolute majority in the South (65%) and East (64%), as well as a relative majority of citizens in Donbas (42%) are not ready to forgive this category of people.

Meanwhile, 15% of residents in Donbas, 8% in the East, 9% in the South, 4% in the Centre and 4% in the West are ready to “understand and forgive”.

The percentage range of those who could not answer, as in the previous question, was quite broad depending on the region: in Donbas 37% did not respond, in the East and South 21% each, in the Centre 9% and in the West 7%.

Thus, most residents of all regions do not demonstrate a negative attitude to the citizens of Ukraine who left the ATO zone for other regions of Ukraine or did not have such opportunity and those who stayed there for other reasons but did not support the DPR/LPR. The attitude towards citizens who moved to Russia is somewhat more negative, but the overall attitude towards them is not negative among the majority of citizens in all regions.

There are differences with regard to the attitude towards supporters of the DPR/LPR and members of their paramilitary forces.

In the West and Centre, the attitude of the majority towards these groups, and especially to those who

fought against Ukraine on their own initiative or were involved in torture, is uncompromising. This attitude is somewhat more positive only in regard to the “forced” members of paramilitary forces.

However, in the South, East and Donbas, the attitude of the majority is tolerant towards supporters of the DPR/LPR, as well as to the “forced” members of the military units.

Residents of these three regions differ from each other in terms of approaches in relation to the intentional members of the paramilitary forces of the DPR and LPR. In the South and East, the majority of respondents are not ready to forgive them. In Donbas, the majority either avoided answering this question or demonstrated a tolerant attitude.

Attitude to the people involved in torture is extremely negative among the majority of respondents in all regions. Donbas is an exception where the negative opinion is balanced by understanding or uncertainty.

Under these conditions, raising the question of a “general” amnesty for participants of the DPR/LPR without thorough investigation of conditions of their participation and the conduct of each participant may trigger an explosion of societal unrest in Ukraine.

Attitude towards the blockade of Crimea

Regarding the food and energy blockade of Crimea respondents’ opinions were divided almost in half. Respectively, 38% and 37% of respondents report positive or negative assessments regarding the food blockade, and 40% and 37% regarding the energy blockade.

The food blockade of Crimea is supported by the majority of respondents in the West and Centre (59% and 44%, respectively), and not supported in the South (40%), East (58%) and Donbas (48%).

The distribution of answers in respect to **the energy blockade** is almost the same. It is supported in the West (62%) and Centre (47%) and not supported in the South (40%), East (57%) and Donbas (49%).

Such distribution of answers shows that the use of radical methods against the occupied territories without an overall strategy of actions by the state, or actions outside the state, being proven to society, may be a source of internal tension.





CONCLUSIONS

The 2005-2016 time period has been marked by significant changes in various aspects of the identity of Ukrainian citizens.

Whereas the previous studies indicated predominance of local identity over pan-Ukrainian identity, now in most regions pan-national identity prevails over local and regional affiliations.

The majority of citizens perceive Ukraine as their motherland and would choose it as such given the opportunity. Most people are proud of their Ukrainian citizenship, and the share of such people has increased. The main reasons for pride in Ukraine include its history and achievements in sport, art, literature, science and technology.

A great source of pride is the national character of Ukrainians, and their ability to fight for their country and their rights. Ukrainians have become proud of their Armed Forces, which is quite understandable under the present circumstances. At the same time, above all, the sources of pride are the traits and achievements of the Ukrainian people and society, while the socio-political structure of the state, and especially its socio-economic achievements, do not yet represent a source of pride.

The vast majority of citizens consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, although there are regional differences in assessments of the level of patriotism. As to the perception of patriotism by citizens, features of a civic, cultural and ethnic nature coexist. However, with the civic understanding of patriotism continuing to be predominant, the importance of its ethnic/cultural component has increased.

Support of the state independence of Ukraine among citizens has also increased; the vast majority of residents of all regions are proud or positive about the symbols and attributes of the Ukrainian state. Over 90% of respondents reported a positive attitude to Ukrainian as the state language.

Most people are interested in politics. Democracy as the most desirable type of societal structure in Ukraine has the support of the majority of citizens, but the level at which it exists in practice is assessed as average.

Understanding of equality in terms of equal opportunities is the most common in society. However, this understanding is combined with the desire for the state to limit excessive inequality, along with rejection of personal freedom in favour of state regulation for this purpose.

In all regions, except Donbas, people are rather positive about the Maidan in 2013. However, a considerable part of society does not want to be on the side of any party to the conflict.

The Ukrainian language is native for the majority of citizens. In everyday communication, it is used

by almost 75% of citizens (including bilinguals). There was a growth in the percentages of citizens who consider Ukrainian language their native language and bilingual citizens. The share of Russian-speaking citizens and use of the Russian language have decreased.

In all regions of the state, most citizens speak Ukrainian fluently or sufficiently for everyday communication. Moreover, the share of such respondents has increased. More than a third of citizens speak foreign languages (not counting Russian) at a level sufficient for everyday communication.

The idea of the state bilingualism is now considerably less popular in all regions, especially in the South and East of Ukraine. Instead, support for the state status of the Ukrainian language and the possibility of granting the Russian language official status in certain regions is stronger than ever in these regions.

The majority of the citizens associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition; their share has significantly increased over the 2006-2015 period. There was also a significant reduction of the numbers of citizens who associate themselves with the Soviet and Russian traditions. Ukrainian cultural identity is inherent to a significant portion of bilingual and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine.

In the future, according to the majority of citizens, Ukrainian and pan-European cultural traditions will prevail in Ukraine. The number of those who expect regional multiculturalism has declined.

The highest level of affinity in terms of culture is between Ukrainians and Russians living in Ukraine. At the same time, a sense of distinctiveness of Ukrainians from Russians and Russian citizens has increased. Compared to the previous studies, citizens find residents of Halychyna (Galicia) and Donbas to be the most distant from each other.

Most Ukrainians do not consider themselves Europeans, primarily for financial reasons. Meanwhile, the share of citizens who consider themselves Europeans has increased to almost 30%.

A civic understanding of the Ukrainian nation, combined with support for the necessity of the Ukrainian cultural component (knowledge of the Ukrainian language, history and culture by every citizen of Ukraine) predominates in society.

The perception of nationalism as an ideology seeking the transformation of Ukraine into a strong state respected in the world with a high standard of living is now the most popular one among the citizens.

Over the last 10 years, the perception of Ukrainian nationalism has significantly changed; for the majority of citizens, it is seen now as the

force that dispensed with the ideological clichés and negative connotations imposed by the Soviet and Russian propaganda and became a synonym for an ideology of the construction of the state.

Tolerance by citizens in their perception of other ethnicities has increased. The highest level of antipathy remains to the Romani. At the same time, the sympathies of Ukrainians towards Russians has decreased and antipathy has increased.

There have been fundamental changes in the geopolitical orientations of citizens. The majority of them consider Ukraine's relations with the EU to be the foreign policy priority of the state. This point of view prevails in all regions of Ukraine except Donbas. Russia has lost much of its attractiveness as a major foreign policy partner.

The majority citizens support Ukraine's accession to the EU. Even in comparison to 2013, which marked the beginning of "Euromaidan", the support for Ukraine's accession to the EU in society has significantly increased, while the share of those opposed to European integration has declined.

With regard to the issue of support for Ukraine's accession to NATO, in the period from 2014-2015, there was a turning point: the idea of accession, for the first time since the independence of Ukraine, has gained the support of a relative majority of citizens and the majority of those who would participate in a hypothetical referendum. However, in some regions the share those opposed to accession exceeds that of its supporters.

In all regions of Ukraine except Donbas, the majority of respondents express a negative attitude towards all institutions of state power of Russia. As for the attitude to Russian citizens, it has also generally deteriorated, although a relative majority of respondents still have a neutral or positive attitude towards them.

Most citizens do not agree that the differences between the regions of Ukraine could lead to secession of these regions from the state, nor do they consider western and eastern Ukrainians as two different peoples.

The vast majority of people do not see their regions being outside Ukraine and do not support the idea of autonomy. In fact, there is a consensus between residents of different regions regarding the future status of their oblasts, which provides for expansion of the rights and powers of local governance.

As for the issues related to establishment of new approaches to interpretation of the historical past, especially to assessment of the actions of the communist regime or introduction of new names for historical events and holidays, there are noticeable distinctions between the opinions of residents of



different regions. There is a slightly higher rate of opposition to the new assessments primarily in Donbas and the East and South of Ukraine.

Among the citizens of Ukraine there is no certainty regarding future actions to resolve the conflict in the East; neither of the options were supported by the majority. There is also no certainty as to the means of coexistence of Ukraine and the uncontrolled part of Donbas. Currently, most respondents support policy options including full or partial isolation with regard to the territories controlled by the DPR and LPR. Significant regional differences can be observed in assessments regarding the principles for possible attitudes towards supporters of the DPR/LPR and members of their paramilitary groups.


In general, we can state that there have been significant changes in the identity of citizens of Ukraine over the last 10 years.

Many aspects can be seen as the foundations for the basic outlines of a common identity among citizens of the modern Ukrainian nation: the increased role of pan-Ukrainian identity as opposed to local and regional affiliation; a strengthening of positive attitude towards the country and self-respect of Ukrainians for themselves as a nation; a spread of the Ukrainian national and cultural component of identity, including in the East and South; perception of their own "uniqueness" by Ukrainians; a decrease in the distance between the opinions of residents of different regions on the fundamental issues of country's future; consensus-building around the European civilisational choice and liberation from the illusions of attractiveness of the Eurasian integration project of Russia.


However, this process could not be regarded as complete. The risk remains that conflicts will erupt in society and deepen on the basis of significant differences between the inhabitants of different regions associated with the choice of direction for further geopolitical development of the state, issues of restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the choice of models for coexistence with residents of the currently occupied regions, as well as attaining reconciliation and understanding.



Are you a citizen of Ukraine? % of respondents




How proud are you to be a citizen of Ukraine? % of respondents




With which of the following do you associate (identify) yourself the most, primarily?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)



With which of the following do you associate (identify) yourself the most, secondarily?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)







Do you perceive Ukraine as your motherland? % of respondents




Would you choose Ukraine as your motherland if you had a choice? % of respondents



If you could choose, where would you like to live?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)



To feel happy, do you personally need to be proud of your country, or is personal well-being enough?
% of respondents



Regions (2015)






How proud are you of Ukraine regarding the following achievements?
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Achievements in sport						
Very proud	24.5	29.1	27.7	29.3	22.6	10.5
Proud to a certain extent	48.4	53.7	47.8	42.6	51.3	43.2
Not very proud	10.8	6.8	10.5	6.1	11.1	19.7
Not proud at all	6.6	3.4	4.4	6.4	9.3	12.7
Difficult to answer	9.6	6.9	9.6	15.5	5.8	13.9
History of Ukraine						
Very proud	22.9	31.7	24.9	20.6	18.9	13.2
Proud to a certain extent	46.1	46.3	49.9	48.1	42.3	40.9
Not very proud	12.7	9.3	11.1	10.9	15.7	18.3
Not proud at all	7.4	3.8	4.1	6.3	13.5	12.8
Difficult to answer	10.9	9.0	10.0	14.1	9.6	14.7
The national character of Ukrainians, their ability to fight for their country and their rights						
Very proud	27.7	38.8	31.0	29.0	16.8	17.9
Proud to a certain extent	40.3	39.1	44.9	42.3	35.4	36.3
Not very proud	13.3	10.1	10.5	11.0	22.4	14.9
Not proud at all	8.7	4.7	6.0	5.6	16.5	13.0
Difficult to answer	9.9	7.2	7.7	12.2	8.8	17.9
Achievements in art, literature						
Very proud	18.3	21.2	20.4	17.5	16.3	13.0
Proud to a certain extent	47.1	50.8	49.0	43.6	48.6	38.7
Not very proud	13.7	11.0	12.9	7.4	15.6	20.9
Not proud at all	7.4	5.3	4.7	7.1	10.7	12.6
Difficult to answer	13.5	11.7	13.1	24.3	8.8	14.7
The Armed Forces of Ukraine						
Very proud	15.7	21.9	17.2	18.1	8.1	11.8
Proud to a certain extent	41.3	46.5	46.3	41.2	30.5	36.1
Not very proud	20.1	17.0	18.7	15.3	28.1	21.3
Not proud at all	11.8	7.7	7.0	11.3	22.3	15.9
Difficult to answer	11.1	7.0	10.8	14.0	11.1	14.9
Achievements in science and technology						
Very proud	9.9	12.0	10.8	10.3	9.2	5.8
Proud to a certain extent	38.8	45.6	38.7	38.5	37.2	31.9
Not very proud	21.2	20.3	21.5	12.8	21.1	27.6
Not proud at all	14.9	10.9	12.2	13.8	22.6	18.1
Difficult to answer	15.2	11.1	16.8	24.6	9.8	16.6
Honest and fair attitudes towards various groups in society						
Very proud	6.0	9.7	5.7	6.0	4.5	3.5
Proud to a certain extent	27.1	29.1	25.6	36.1	26.8	21.7
Not very proud	28.4	29.3	30.4	24.1	23.8	31.4
Not proud at all	22.7	17.5	22.7	14.7	30.1	26.6
Difficult to answer	15.8	14.3	15.5	19.1	14.8	16.9
How democracy works						
Very proud	1.8	2.7	1.6	1.6	2.1	1.1
Proud to a certain extent	20.1	21.1	22.9	18.4	15.0	19.6
Not very proud	36.5	41.8	37.2	34.4	29.6	37.3
Not proud at all	33.2	26.9	28.9	34.4	48.0	32.8
Difficult to answer	8.4	7.6	9.3	11.1	5.3	9.3
Ukraine's political influence in the world						
Very proud	2.5	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.0	2.6
Proud to a certain extent	19.0	20.7	20.0	19.2	12.0	22.5
Not very proud	34.3	40.6	34.1	33.7	29.6	32.5
Not proud at all	34.8	27.8	31.6	31.4	53.1	31.9
Difficult to answer	9.4	8.1	11.8	13.2	3.3	10.5
Social welfare system of Ukraine						
Very proud	1.5	2.0	1.5	0.8	1.7	0.8
Proud to a certain extent	11.5	13.2	11.2	12.8	9.3	11.8
Not very proud	31.2	33.4	34.2	26.2	26.9	30.3
Not proud at all	49.2	45.7	45.3	51.3	58.9	49.3
Difficult to answer	6.6	5.7	7.8	8.8	3.2	7.8
Economic achievements of Ukraine						
Very proud	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.9	0.6
Proud to a certain extent	9.8	10.6	9.9	10.3	6.7	12.0
Not very proud	33.1	36.8	36.3	29.5	26.0	32.2
Not proud at all	49.4	47.3	44.4	51.3	62.3	46.4
Difficult to answer	6.5	4.2	8.3	7.6	3.0	8.8


Do you consider yourself a patriot of Ukraine?
% of respondents



Regions (2015)

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Yes	51.8	42.9	36.8	30.8	17.1
Rather yes	32.8	38.3	31.1	37.5	38.6
Rather no	6.6	7.8	10.3	15.6	14.2
No	2.2	3.0	6.8	8.4	16.5
Difficult to answer	6.6	7.9	15.0	7.6	13.6


Are you prepared to defend your country?
% of respondents



Regions (2015)

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Yes, with arms	23.7	20.3	16.4	13.3	8.9
Yes, in the volunteer movement	41.2	33.2	22.7	28.3	30.5
No	17.8	26.0	31.7	44.5	41.9
Difficult to answer	17.3	20.5	29.2	13.9	18.7

Do you agree with the assertion that "It is important to strengthen Ukraine's economic independence from other countries even if this results in a decline of the living standards of its citizens"?
% of respondents



Regions (2015)

Region	Agree	Rather agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Rather disagree	Disagree	Difficult to answer
WEST	17.9	28.0	18.0	17.1	6.9	12.1
CENTRE	16.3	20.8	21.1	18.6	10.1	13.1
SOUTH	12.7	12.1	15.8	20.1	15.7	23.7
EAST	11.5	11.5	13.9	33.4	19.8	9.9
DONBAS	7.2	16.8	22.5	22.1	15.1	16.3



How important are the following features to call a person the Ukrainian patriot?*
average score


	UKRAINE		West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
	2005	2015					
Raising children to love Ukraine	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.2	3.8
Respect for the state, state symbols and holidays**	–	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.1	4.1	3.9
Respect for Ukrainian laws and government institutions	4.2	4.1	4.3	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.9
Concern for the stable well-being of one's family	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.2	3.7
Knowledge of Ukrainian culture and history	4.2	4.0	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.0	3.5
Readiness to fight for Ukrainian citizens' rights and freedoms	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.9
Readiness to defend Ukraine against outside enemies even at the expense of one's life	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.0	4.0	3.4	3.7
Readiness to publicly defend the reputation of one's country in relations with the citizens of other countries	4.0	3.9	4.2	4.0	4.1	3.6	3.7
Working for the benefit of Ukraine	4.4	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.7
Readiness to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine even at the expense of one's life (not let regions secede from Ukraine)	3.7	3.8	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.2	3.5
To observe Ukrainian folk traditions in everyday life	3.7	3.8	4.0	3.9	3.6	3.8	3.2
Advocating equal rights for all nationalities	4.2	3.8	3.7	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.6
Command of the Ukrainian language**	–	3.8	4.3	3.9	3.5	3.8	3.2
Ukrainian citizenship	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.1
Advocating the full restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the return of Crimea and temporarily occupied areas of Donbas***	–	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.1
Readiness to fight for the priority of rights of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine	3.2	3.4	3.8	3.4	3.4	3.3	2.9
Oppose granting special status to the territories of the self-proclaimed DPR/LPR***	–	3.4	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.0	2.8
Use of only the Ukrainian language in private life, in public places and institutions of state power	2.9	3.3	4.0	3.5	2.9	3.0	2.6
Being ethnically Ukrainian	3.1	3.3	3.7	3.4	3.1	3.4	2.7
Readiness to fight for the priority of rights of ethnic Ukrainians abroad	3.4	3.3	3.7	3.3	3.5	3.2	3.0
Refusal of some personal benefits today for the sake of Ukraine's future	3.4	3.3	3.8	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1
Being born in Ukraine	3.1	3.2	3.5	3.3	3.2	3.3	2.7
Support for Ukraine's accession to the EU**	–	3.1	3.8	3.4	3.0	2.7	2.3
Oppose renewal of cooperation with Russia**	–	3.0	3.6	3.2	3.0	2.6	2.3
Oppose closer relations between Ukraine and Russia	2.2	2.9	3.5	3.2	2.8	2.5	2.2
Support Ukraine's accession to NATO**	–	2.9	3.5	3.1	2.8	2.6	2.1
Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC)	2.7	2.7	3.2	2.8	2.6	2.3	2.2
Oppose closer relations between Ukraine and the USA	2.9	2.6	2.5	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.0

* On a 5-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "entirely unimportant" and "5" means "very important".


** In the 2005 questionnaire this option was not offered.

*** In 2005 there were no situations that would have brought about such an issue.

If a referendum on the independence of Ukraine were held today, how would you vote?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)






What is your attitude towards the following attributes of an independent Ukrainian state?
% of respondents


State language (Ukrainian)




State flag of Ukraine (blue and yellow)




State coat of arms of Ukraine




National anthem of Ukraine




Ukrainian hryvnia (currency unit)




With which of the following statements do you agree the most?
% of respondents



Regions (2015)





**Where on the scale “democratic regime – dictatorship” would you place modern Ukraine?
average score***




* On a 10-point scale from 1 to 10, where “1” means “entirely authoritarian regime” and “10” means “entirely democratic regime”.

**With which of the following statements in each pair do you agree the most?
% of respondents**




**Nearly two years have passed since the events referred to as Maidan.
If the events of 2013-2014 took place now, would you support Maidan or Anti-Maidan?
% of respondents**




LANGUAGE IDENTITY


What is your native language?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)



What language do you mainly speak at home?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)







Which language do you use outside your home (at work, at school, etc.)?
% of respondents



What language is most prestigious to speak among your friends and colleagues at work or school?
% of respondents



In which language did you obtain secondary education?
% of respondents




How would you assess your command of the Ukrainian language?
% of respondents



Regions (2015)					
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Fluent	94.1	71.5	48.9	52.3	39.1
My command of the Ukrainian language is sufficient for everyday communication, but it is hard for me to speak on specialised topics	5.1	26.5	39.8	40.7	41.5
My Ukrainian is poor and I have problems using it to communicate	0.3	1.0	5.8	5.7	14.8
I do not understand Ukrainian at all	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.7	1.7
Difficult to answer	0.4	1.0	5.4	0.6	3.0

In what way should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine?
% of respondents



Regions (2015)					
	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Ukrainian should be the only state and official language; Russian can be used in everyday communication just as the languages of other national minorities	80.6	74.8	36.9	33.9	20.8
Ukrainian should be the state language; Russian can be an official language in some regions of Ukraine	14.5	15.9	30.4	34.4	37.3
Both should be state languages in Ukraine	2.0	3.6	23.1	24.8	34.7
Russian should be the state language; Ukrainian can be an official language in some regions of Ukraine	0.4	0.5	1.4	3.4	2.6
Russian should be the only state and official language; Ukrainian can be used in everyday communication	0.5	1.3	1.0	0.9	1.8
Difficult to answer	2.1	4.0	7.2	2.5	2.8




In which of the following languages do you have a command sufficient for everyday communication?
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
English	20.0	22.0	19.9	17.8	21.1	17.9
Polish	6.0	18.6	2.4	1.8	1.9	4.7
German	5.0	6.9	3.8	5.9	5.8	3.8
French	1.3	1.5	1.1	1.2	0.8	1.9
Romanian	0.9	2.1	0.1	3.5	0.2	0.0
Czech	0.7	2.9	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Bulgarian	0.7	0.3	0.5	3.0	0.5	0.3
Italian	0.6	1.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.8
Spanish	0.4	0.7	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.4
Hungarian	0.4	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1
Slovak	0.4	1.9	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Portuguese	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
Chinese	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2
Other language	18.3	28.4	19.8	7.0	14.8	13.4
Difficult to answer	49.7	30.1	52.8	57.9	52.2	60.5


2015

CULTURAL IDENTITY


What cultural tradition do you associate yourself with?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)



Which cultural tradition will prevail in Ukraine in the future (in 20-25 years)?
% of respondents



Regions (2015)




There are different opinions about the level of affinity of cultures, traditions and beliefs among different groups. How similar or different are the cultures, traditions and views of the following groups?*
average score

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Ukrainians in Ukraine and Russians in Ukraine	3.8	3.0	3.7	4.3	4.2	4.0
Citizens of Ukraine and citizens of Russia	3.5	2.7	3.1	4.1	4.2	3.9
Residents of the Centre of Ukraine and the East of Ukraine	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.5	3.8	3.6
Residents of the West of Ukraine and the Centre of Ukraine	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.6
Residents of Halychyna (Galicia) and residents of the Centre of Ukraine	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.2	3.3
Residents of Ukraine and residents of the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea	3.0	2.5	2.9	3.5	3.4	3.2
Residents of Ukraine and residents of the temporarily occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts	3.0	2.5	2.8	3.4	3.5	3.4
Residents of the West of Ukraine and the East of Ukraine	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.8
Citizens of Ukraine and citizens of the EU member states	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.2
Residents of Halychyna (Galicia) and residents of Donbas	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.4


* On a five-point scale from "1" to "5", where "1" means they are very different and "5" means very similar.



Do you feel being European?
% of respondents



Regions (2015)



What prevents you from feeling like a European?*


% of those who do not feel European, or hesitated or hesitated to answer that they feel European

	UKRAINE		Regions (2015)				
	2006	2015	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Low living standard	72.9	72.7	70.6	77.2	79.7	79.5	52.6
Socio-cultural living conditions	39.0	45.5	40.3	49.0	39.4	53.0	37.9
Language barriers	23.1	36.3	20.9	33.1	44.0	42.1	45.1
“Non-European” mentality	28.0	32.5	24.2	34.8	30.0	33.7	34.7
Low level of culture and education	33.3	28.8	23.7	34.8	26.4	31.1	19.4
Feeling that one represents another culture	10.4	16.1	9.0	12.0	16.7	16.2	30.5
Lack of information about the EU	8.0	9.9	5.5	10.5	10.9	11.9	10.0
Religious affiliation	2.4	4.7	1.6	3.0	4.8	8.7	6.5
Other	0.7	2.4	5.6	1.3	2.0	3.2	1.0
Difficult to answer	6.6	4.8	7.2	5.5	5.0	2.3	4.0


* Respondents were asked to indicate all applicable answers.

NATIONAL IDENTITY


What do you consider your ethnic nationality?
% of respondents




Which of these definitions of the Ukrainian nation do you find most applicable?
% of respondents



Is every citizen of Ukraine (regardless of ethnic origin) obliged to have a command of the national language sufficient for everyday communication and to know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture?
% of respondents




What is your understanding of the term Ukrainian nationalism?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
It is a world view whose main idea is to transform Ukraine into a strong state with high international prestige and a high standard of living	67.4	50.3	29.5	38.4	37.4
It is an ideology that splits the society into ethnic Ukrainians and "non-Ukrainians" and imposes limitations on the rights of "non-Ukrainians"	10.4	20.0	33.6	37.7	32.2
This phenomenon existed in Western Ukraine during the 1940s and 1950s and is no longer relevant	6.7	12.3	18.1	12.3	16.2
Other	2.5	1.7	0.9	2.3	1.8
Difficult to answer	13.1	15.7	17.9	9.3	12.4


What ethnic groups would you like to live next to?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)



What ethnic groups would you not like to live next to?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)






ATTITUDE TOWARDS "SENSITIVE" ISSUES

Do you believe that there are deep political contradictions, language and cultural differences and economic disproportions between the western and eastern regions of Ukraine that could lead to their separation, creation of their own states or their joining other states?
% of respondents




Some politicians and journalists claim that the differences in culture, language, historical heritage, and foreign policy orientations of the western and eastern Ukrainians are so significant, that they can be considered two different nations. Do you agree with this opinion?
% of respondents




Would you prefer that your region...?
% of respondents


Secede from Ukraine and establish its own independent country




Secede from Ukraine and join other country




Remain within Ukraine as an autonomous entity (with its own constitution, government and parliament)



Remain within Ukraine with the same status as it has now but with expanded rights and powers of local governance



Remain within Ukraine with the same status as it has now and with the same rights and powers of local governance






ASSESSMENTS OF HISTORICAL PAST

What is your attitude to these provisions of Ukrainian legislation regarding assessment of the historical past of Ukraine?
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Recognition the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932-1933 as genocide against the Ukrainian people						
Support	74.1	91.4	84.3	68.0	62.5	46.9
Do not support	9.9	2.8	4.7	11.0	14.5	24.6
Do not care	7.4	2.5	3.5	9.1	11.7	16.0
Difficult to answer	8.5	3.3	7.5	11.9	11.2	12.5
Condemnation the national socialist (Nazi) (1933-1945) totalitarian regime in Ukraine and prohibition against the use and promotion of its symbols						
Support	57.9	73.3	60.0	46.1	51.4	48.6
Do not support	15.7	7.0	12.9	17.5	22.5	23.9
Do not care	12.8	6.8	10.6	15.2	16.6	19.3
Difficult to answer	13.6	12.8	16.5	21.2	9.6	8.2
Establishing criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting the propaganda of the national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regime and the use of its symbols						
Support	47.3	66.4	48.3	36.6	42.8	32.4
Do not support	21.0	9.0	16.2	18.8	31.7	36.1
Do not care	14.8	10.5	13.6	20.4	15.2	19.0
Difficult to answer	17.0	14.1	22.0	24.3	10.3	12.5
Condemnation of the communist (1917-1991) totalitarian regime in Ukraine and prohibition against the use and promotion of its symbols						
Support	52.1	82.0	58.1	33.9	36.1	30.3
Do not support	22.7	5.5	15.8	30.0	37.5	38.1
Do not care	12.6	6.1	9.9	16.7	15.1	21.0
Difficult to answer	12.7	6.4	16.1	19.4	11.3	10.6
Establishing criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting the propaganda of the communist totalitarian regime and the use of its symbols						
Support	38.4	65.6	41.9	24.9	24.0	20.6
Do not support	29.5	10.5	21.7	30.3	49.8	46.9
Do not care	14.8	9.8	14.2	19.3	14.7	20.0
Difficult to answer	17.4	14.1	22.2	25.5	11.4	12.5
Establishing a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation in Ukraine on May 8 to commemorate all victims of World War II (1939-1945)						
Support	47.1	65.4	52.6	36.7	31.2	36.8
Do not support	25.3	10.8	18.8	31.7	42.1	34.5
Do not care	14.5	11.7	13.6	15.5	15.8	17.8
Difficult to answer	13.1	12.1	15.0	16.1	10.9	11.0
Change the holiday name from Victory Day (May 9) to the Day of Victory over Nazism						
Support	37.4	56.7	42.2	25.7	23.1	25.8
Do not support	34.6	15.7	28.4	47.4	50.0	46.6
Do not care	14.5	13.1	13.5	14.5	14.9	17.8
Difficult to answer	13.5	14.5	15.9	12.3	11.9	9.8
Changing the name "The Great Patriotic War" to "World War II in 1939-1945" in official documents, names of national holidays, historical monuments, etc.						
Support	35.0	59.3	38.4	19.9	21.3	21.9
Do not support	34.8	15.1	29.6	42.0	54.4	44.4
Do not care	15.6	12.0	15.0	19.5	12.7	22.5
Difficult to answer	14.6	13.6	17.1	18.7	11.6	11.1
Recognizing the following organisations and groups as fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century: Ukrainian National Republic, Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS), troops of Kholodny Yar Republic, Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the People's Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction						
Support	42.0	75.9	45.8	20.1	26.8	21.1
Do not support	22.0	6.2	14.2	24.4	39.6	37.5
Do not care	14.8	7.4	14.1	20.4	15.4	21.8
Difficult to answer	21.3	10.5	25.9	35.0	18.2	19.6


GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS

Which foreign policy areas should be the priority for Ukraine?
% of respondents







Which foreign policy areas should be the priority for Ukraine?
% of respondents




If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the EU were held, how would you vote?
% of respondents




Could European integration be a nation-wide idea to consolidate all the regions of Ukraine?
% of respondents








How would you vote if Ukraine held a referendum on joining NATO?
% of respondents




How would you vote if Ukraine held a referendum on joining NATO?
% of respondents



ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CONFLICT IN THE EAST OF UKRAINE

With which views and assessments regarding the situation in the East of Ukraine do you agree the most?
% of respondents

Steps to be taken to resolve the conflict in the East of Ukraine




Regions (December 2015)

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of control by Ukraine over the areas occupied by separatists	44.8	35.5	27.1	20.9	18.9
Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine	9.9	16.4	22.1	31.9	38.8
Cut off these areas from Ukraine	18.7	17.4	13.8	16.7	11.4
Difficult to answer	26.6	30.8	36.9	30.5	30.8

With which views and assessments regarding the situation in the East of Ukraine do you agree the most?
% of respondents (continued)

Why do you support secession from Ukraine by the areas occupied by separatists?
% of those who support secession from Ukraine by the areas occupied by separatists


2015



Regions

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
I do not want the inhabitants of these areas to influence Ukrainian politics and be financed by the Ukrainian budget	77.9	69.2	50.3	44.2	22.7
I believe the inhabitants of this region have the right to self-determination	12.9	17.6	36.2	42.9	75.1
Other	4.1	4.0	2.0	4.8	0.6
Difficult to answer	5.1	9.2	11.4	8.1	1.7


The overall assessment of the conflict in Ukraine



Regions (December 2015)

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
War of aggression by Russia against Ukraine	75.2	59.5	32.8	32.5	23.6
Civil conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian residents of Ukraine	6.4	12.5	19.3	19.6	24.6
Conflict between Russia and the USA for spheres of influence being waged in Ukraine	8.8	14.9	25.3	30.0	31.8
Difficult to answer	9.6	13.2	22.5	17.9	20.0

Co-existence of Ukraine and the uncontrolled part of Donbas




Regions (December 2015)

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Termination of all relations (including economic) between Ukraine and uncontrolled areas in Donbas	49.8	45.4	25.4	23.6	16.3
Granting a special status to Donbas with the possibility of its influence on Ukrainian policy (including international)	16.5	15.3	23.6	37.1	38.8
Difficult to answer	33.7	39.3	51.0	39.3	44.9

With which views and assessments regarding the situation in the East of Ukraine do you agree the most?
% of respondents (continued)

Who is responsible for the Ukrainian-Russian conflict?



2015


Regions

	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Russia, primarily	68.4	56.9	32.6	35.6	24.0
Both countries equally	21.9	30.9	41.0	36.3	42.5
Ukraine, primarily	4.2	4.7	10.0	16.7	12.9
Difficult to answer	5.4	7.4	16.4	11.4	20.6

Which Ukrainian policy option do you prefer concerning the areas controlled by the DPR and LPR?

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Complete isolation	24.5	37.0	30.3	17.5	15.9	10.3
Partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for the residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and to obtain cash payments)	16.9	22.9	16.4	9.7	14.6	17.8
Soft integration of these areas (restoration of personal and economic contacts, local elections, contacts with DPR and LPR leaders, adoption of a "special status" for these areas)	14.5	6.9	10.5	14.9	22.1	24.4
Partial isolation (maintaining economic and trade contacts)	8.8	7.4	10.6	4.7	9.5	8.4
Recognition of independence for the DPR and LPR and establishing relations with them as independent states	5.5	1.1	2.5	8.8	11.3	9.0
Other	5.0	4.6	5.6	6.7	5.2	3.0
Difficult to answer	24.8	20.1	24.2	37.7	21.4	27.1

There exists an opinion that it is necessary to de-naturalise those Ukrainian citizens who supported Russian aggression against Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, and secession movements in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, Do you endorse this opinion?
% of respondents




2015





What principles should be applied while establishing relations between Ukrainian residents and the following categories of citizens upon settlement of the conflict in the East of Ukraine?
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
People who left the ATO zone for other Ukrainian regions						
“Will not forget, will not forgive”	2.0	2.6	2.8	0.7	1.8	0.6
“Understand and forgive”	16.0	20.5	16.7	11.0	11.8	16.9
“They are not guilty”	70.2	65.5	70.4	75.9	73.9	67.8
Difficult to answer	11.8	11.5	10.1	12.5	12.6	14.7
People who left the ATO zone for Russia						
“Will not forget, will not forgive”	13.6	20.6	17.2	6.4	11.5	3.7
“Understand and forgive”	23.3	26.3	23.7	22.7	18.1	25.0
“They are not guilty”	46.4	36.0	39.5	53.9	58.0	56.5
Difficult to answer	16.7	17.0	19.6	17.0	12.4	14.8
People who wanted to leave the ATO zone for other Ukrainian regions but were unable to do so						
“Will not forget, will not forgive”	1.5	2.5	1.5	0.6	2.2	0.4
“Understand and forgive”	19.9	21.7	22.9	12.0	16.1	20.8
“They are not guilty”	66.3	62.3	64.8	74.3	71.1	63.8
Difficult to answer	12.3	13.6	10.9	13.1	10.7	14.9
People who did not leave the ATO zone and support the DPR/LPR						
“Will not forget, will not forgive”	3.1	5.0	3.0	0.8	4.6	0.4
“Understand and forgive”	22.5	25.5	23.7	15.0	20.4	23.3
“They are not guilty”	60.2	55.6	59.5	68.3	62.0	59.9
Difficult to answer	14.3	13.9	13.7	15.9	13.0	16.4
People who did not leave the ATO zone but do not support the DPR/LPR						
“Will not forget, will not forgive”	40.2	55.1	56.8	22.3	25.4	14.0
“Understand and forgive”	24.7	20.1	16.3	30.1	31.9	37.3
“They are not guilty”	12.8	7.9	6.2	16.2	18.9	24.2
Difficult to answer	22.2	17.0	20.7	31.5	23.8	24.6
People who were forced to take part in the paramilitary forces of the DPR/LPR and fought against Ukraine						
“Will not forget, will not forgive”	37.0	45.2	49.7	19.5	35.9	11.5
“Understand and forgive”	27.4	26.3	19.4	34.6	27.3	41.4
“They are not guilty”	12.1	7.8	6.6	18.8	16.6	19.6
Difficult to answer	23.5	20.6	24.3	27.1	20.1	27.5
People who took part in the paramilitary forces of the DPR/LPR on their own initiative and fought against Ukraine						
“Will not forget, will not forgive”	65.9	83.1	81.8	48.3	58.9	28.5
“Understand and forgive”	10.3	5.3	4.5	16.1	10.5	25.4
“They are not guilty”	5.2	2.3	2.6	7.1	9.0	9.3
Difficult to answer	18.6	9.3	11.1	28.5	21.6	36.8
People who participated in the paramilitary forces of the DPR/LPR and took part in torture of Ukrainian military troops and civilians						
“Will not forget, will not forgive”	72.1	86.8	84.1	64.7	63.9	41.7
“Understand and forgive”	6.9	3.6	4.4	8.4	7.9	14.7
“They are not guilty”	4.2	2.3	2.4	5.4	7.3	6.4
Difficult to answer	16.7	7.3	9.2	21.4	20.9	37.3

Did you or your relatives participate in the ATO or engage in military service due to mobilisation in 2013-2015?
% of respondents







To what extent do you believe information about events in Ukraine and the world which is obtained from the following sources?
% of respondents

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Friends, acquaintances, family						
Definitely believe	17.8	22.7	20.7	9.4	19.2	9.4
Likely to believe	51.4	54.3	56.7	54.7	47.8	38.0
Unlikely to believe	12.4	9.0	7.5	14.0	16.4	21.9
Definitely do not believe	5.1	3.8	2.9	4.1	8.2	8.6
Difficult to answer	13.2	10.2	12.2	17.8	8.4	22.2
Television news						
Definitely believe	3.5	5.0	3.8	2.4	3.3	1.9
Likely to believe	45.1	54.8	49.9	42.8	35.3	35.2
Unlikely to believe	29.2	22.5	27.9	33.6	33.3	32.9
Definitely do not believe	11.5	8.7	6.9	9.5	22.4	13.9
Difficult to answer	10.7	9.0	11.5	11.8	5.7	16.0
Political programmes on television						
Definitely believe	3.2	3.8	3.6	2.4	3.0	2.4
Likely to believe	37.9	44.8	41.0	38.3	31.4	29.1
Unlikely to believe	31.9	28.3	31.2	34.1	33.4	34.8
Definitely do not believe	13.1	11.6	9.7	10.7	21.0	14.9
Difficult to answer	13.9	11.4	14.6	14.5	11.2	18.9
News in newspapers and magazines						
Definitely believe	2.3	3.8	2.2	1.9	2.2	1.0
Likely to believe	35.1	45.1	37.4	34.6	29.0	24.4
Unlikely to believe	31.1	25.5	31.3	32.7	33.2	34.3
Definitely do not believe	13.1	9.4	8.7	10.7	23.6	18.2
Difficult to answer	18.2	16.3	20.4	20.1	11.9	22.2
News radio						
Definitely believe	2.6	3.4	3.0	1.5	2.3	2.0
Likely to believe	32.5	41.8	34.3	31.7	25.1	25.6
Unlikely to believe	28.0	22.0	27.9	30.4	30.7	31.6
Definitely do not believe	12.5	10.1	9.3	9.4	21.4	14.2
Difficult to answer	24.4	22.8	25.4	27.1	20.6	26.7
News or political websites						
Definitely believe	3.6	3.8	3.6	1.7	5.8	1.9
Likely to believe	28.8	34.6	30.4	23.6	29.5	20.7
Unlikely to believe	21.5	18.8	20.9	20.0	21.2	27.6
Definitely do not believe	10.2	9.7	7.1	9.7	15.2	12.0
Difficult to answer	35.9	33.1	38.0	45.1	28.3	37.9
Social networks (e.g. VKontakte, Facebook, Odnoklassniki, etc.)						
Definitely believe	2.9	2.4	3.3	1.2	4.9	1.3
Likely to believe	24.3	26.8	27.5	20.6	24.5	16.1
Unlikely to believe	22.0	21.4	19.4	19.7	22.1	29.7
Definitely do not believe	12.4	11.2	9.9	10.9	18.3	13.5
Difficult to answer	38.5	38.1	39.9	47.6	30.2	39.5
Other Internet sources						
Definitely believe	3.1	2.7	3.7	1.4	4.8	1.3
Likely to believe	22.8	26.4	23.3	19.3	23.6	18.5
Unlikely to believe	19.9	19.4	19.0	19.0	18.4	24.9
Definitely do not believe	11.0	9.6	9.1	9.1	17.1	11.4
Difficult to answer	43.2	41.9	45.0	51.2	36.1	43.9


To what extent do you believe these mass media outlets?
 % of respondents


	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Ukrainian						
Definitely believe	5.3	5.6	6.9	4.5	3.3	4.5
Likely to believe	47.6	60.1	51.6	41.8	38.7	36.9
Unlikely to believe	26.9	20.2	26.2	29.6	32.3	29.3
Definitely do not believe	9.3	6.0	5.5	7.8	18.3	12.4
Difficult to answer	10.8	8.1	9.8	16.3	7.3	16.9
Russian						
Definitely believe	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.6	2.7
Likely to believe	5.8	2.1	2.3	6.8	14.7	7.1
Unlikely to believe	27.7	18.1	26.1	31.8	30.0	38.4
Definitely do not believe	52.4	74.1	62.3	38.8	37.1	29.0
Difficult to answer	13.1	5.1	8.9	22.1	16.6	22.8
Western mass						
Definitely believe	3.0	5.0	2.2	3.6	2.3	2.8
Likely to believe	27.7	43.8	28.8	22.4	16.4	20.6
Unlikely to believe	25.7	20.1	26.3	23.2	29.5	29.2
Definitely do not believe	18.0	10.7	20.8	11.9	25.9	16.2
Difficult to answer	25.6	20.5	21.8	38.9	25.9	31.1
Mass media issued						
Definitely believe	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.3
Likely to believe	2.7	2.2	1.2	3.6	4.4	4.3
Unlikely to believe	19.3	12.2	19.5	24.9	18.1	25.7
Definitely do not believe	55.6	73.1	65.2	36.8	47.1	34.3
Difficult to answer	21.7	11.7	13.9	34.2	29.5	34.4
(Official) mass media of occupied Crimea						
Definitely believe	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.6	1.2	0.6
Likely to believe	3.8	3.0	1.9	4.3	7.9	3.5
Unlikely to believe	19.9	14.0	20.1	26.1	16.7	26.6
Definitely do not believe	52.4	68.9	62.2	32.3	45.4	30.7
Difficult to answer	23.3	13.3	15.4	36.7	28.8	38.6

2015


Social and demographic indicators
 % of respondents

	UKRAINE	West	Centre	South	East	Donbas
Gender						
Female	55.0	53.9	55.0	54.8	56.1	55.0
Male	45.0	46.1	45.0	45.2	43.9	45.0
Age						
18-24 years	11.7	12.8	11.7	12.7	11.3	9.9
25-29 years	10.6	10.9	10.4	10.3	10.5	10.8
30-39 years	18.0	18.6	17.7	18.1	18.3	17.7
40-49 years	16.5	17.0	16.5	16.9	16.2	15.7
50-59 years	17.4	17.0	17.2	17.5	17.3	18.4
60 years or more	25.8	23.7	26.5	24.4	26.3	27.5
Education						
Incomplete secondary education	3.1	2.7	2.7	4.0	3.7	3.3
General secondary education	23.2	22.4	22.3	28.2	21.1	25.1
Vocational secondary education	40.2	37.5	40.1	36.3	43.4	43.0
Post-secondary or incomplete post-secondary education	32.9	36.6	34.4	31.2	30.7	28.7
Did not answer	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.3	1.1	0.0

2015




If the Ukrainian society were hypothetically divided into three social classes, to which class would you attribute yourself? % of respondents



What religion do you belong to?
% of respondents




Regions (2015)



CERTAIN IDENTITY ASPECTS OF THE RESIDENTS OF VARIOUS UKRAINIAN REGIONS

The project survey provided an opportunity to explore identity features of Ukrainian citizens not only on the national but also on the regional level. This gives an opportunity to estimate common and distinctive identity features of the residents within a region and between neighbouring areas of different regions.



Cultural tradition and its future prospects

The vast majority (85%) of the residents in the West associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition. This figure is the highest in the Ivano-Frankivsk (93%) and Volyn (91%) regions and the lowest in the Chernivtsi Region (71%). The number is 87% in the Transcarpathian Region, 84% in the Lviv Region and 82% in the Rivne Region.

Need to be proud of the country

To feel happy, most people in all areas of the West need to be proud of the country. This figure ranges from 67% in the Lviv Region to 51% in the Ternopil Region.

Patriotism

The vast majority (85%) of local residents consider themselves Ukrainian patriots, and most of these (52%) do so unconditionally.¹ This number is 95% in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region (65% unconditionally), 87% (57%) in the Volyn Region, 82% (43%) in the Transcarpathian Region, 87% (51%) in the Lviv Region, 87% (61%) in the Rivne Region, 78 (44%) in the Ternopil Region, and 67% (38%) in the Chernivtsi Region.

Native language/language status

The vast majority (93%) of inhabitants consider Ukrainian their native language. This figure exceeds 90% in all Western regions except the Chernivtsi Region, where 74% of the population consider Ukrainian to be their native language. Meanwhile, 14% of residents in the Chernivtsi Region recognise “other languages” as native, i.e. any language other than Ukrainian and Russian. This is the highest ratio among all regions of Ukraine.

The absolute majority of the population (81%) agrees with the assertion that the Ukrainian language should be the only national and official language. Every fifth inhabitant in the Lviv Region supports the opinion that Ukrainian should be the state language while Russian may be an official language in certain Ukrainian regions. The same view is shared by 17% of residents in the Volyn Region and 16% in the Transcarpathian Region.

The vast majority (86%) of inhabitants of the territory also support the assertion that every Ukrainian citizen, regardless of ethnicity, should speak the state language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture.

Cultural tradition and its future prospects

The vast majority (85%) of the residents in the West associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition. This figure is the highest in the Ivano-Frankivsk (93%) and Volyn (91%) regions and the lowest in the Chernivtsi Region (71%). The number is 87% in the Transcarpathian Region, 84% in the Lviv Region and 82% in the Rivne Region. 83%, and 82% in the Ternopil Region.

At the same time, most followers of the pan-European tradition live in the Chernivtsi (10%) and the Lviv (10%) regions, and the lowest number is in the Volyn Region (1%). In turn, most followers of the Soviet tradition are in the Rivne Region and the Volyn Region (6% each).

Almost half (49%) of residents in the West believe that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will predominate in Ukraine in 20-25 years; 28% believe in the predominance of the pan-European tradition.

The predominance of the Ukrainian cultural tradition in the future is presumed by most residents in the Volyn (74%) and the Rivne (60%) regions. In other regions, this opinion is shared by 48% in the Lviv Region to 34% in the Transcarpathian Region.

Views of regional differences and interregional conflicts

Most residents (61%) of the West do not agree with the opinion that regional differences between western and eastern Ukrainians are so great that they may be considered two different nations. 26% people agree with this opinion.

A majority of residents in all Western regions disagree with this opinion except in the Ternopil Region, where 44% do not agree and 34% agree. The situation is as follows in other regions: in the Lviv Region 69% do not agree (21% agree), in the Rivne Region 66% (21%), in the Transcarpathian Region 65% (23%), in the Volyn Region 64% (25%), in the Chernivtsi Region 58% (19%), and in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region 51% (38%).

Assessment of regional development options

An absolute majority (92%) of the population in the West does not want to see their region secede from Ukraine and join another state. More than 80% of residents in all oblasts of the region are against this scenario.

The vast majority (88%) of residents in the West also does not want their region to remain as an autonomous entity of Ukraine (with its own constitution, government and parliament). The number of opponents of autonomy ranges from 98% in the Volyn Region and 94% in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region to 80% in the Chernivtsi Region and 79% in the Ternopil Region.

¹ Total of answer choices “yes” and “probably yes”. “Unconditionally” means selection of the answer “yes”.



Most residents (62%) of the West want their oblast to remain within Ukraine without changing its existing status but with more extensive rights and powers of local governance. More than a quarter of inhabitants (27%) are against this idea.

This opinion has the highest support in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region (72%) and the least support in the Ternopil Region (48%). This view is shared by 65% of residents in the Lviv Region, 64% in the Chernivtsi Region, 63% in the Transcarpathian Region, 58% in the Rivne Region and 58% in the Volyn Region.

Interpretation of the word “nation”

A relative majority of the population in the West supports the civic definition of the nation (all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their ethnicity, language, and national traditions). These respondents are most numerous in the Transcarpathian Region (62%) and least in the Lviv Region (44%).

However, more than one-third of residents in the Lviv Region (37%) and the Ivano-Frankivsk Region (36%) prefer the cultural definition (all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of ethnicity, who communicate in Ukrainian and adhere to Ukrainian traditions). 16% and 14% respondents in the Chernivtsi and the Transcarpathian regions share this view.

At the same time, a rather large share (19%) of respondents in the Rivne Region prefers the ethnic definition (all ethnic Ukrainians regardless of their place of residence and citizenship).

Foreign policy orientations

The vast majority (78%) of inhabitants in the West believes that relations with the EU countries should have the top priority in the Ukrainian foreign policy. A majority of inhabitants in all regions share this opinion. At the same time, although this idea is supported by the vast majority in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region (95%), the Transcarpathian Region (85%) and the Lviv Region (80%), only 54% of the population in the Chernivtsi Region share it. The level of support is 77% in the Ternopil Region, 74% in the Volyn Region and 69% in the Rivne Region.

Maidan/Anti-Maidan

The majority (71%) of the population would support Maidan, 17% would not support anybody, and only 1% of respondents would support Anti-Maidan.

Most of the population in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region (84%) and in the Lviv Region (81%) would support Maidan. The range of support is as follows: Ternopil Region -- 69%, Rivne Region – 64%, Transcarpathian Region – 63%, Volyn Region – 59% and Chernivtsi Region – 55%. From 28% of the population in the Volyn Region and 27% in the Transcarpathian Region down to 10% in the Lviv Region would not support any party.

Readiness to defend the country

Most (41%) Western Ukrainians are ready to defend their country by taking part in the volunteer movement. About one-quarter (24%) would do so with arms. 18% of respondents are not ready to defend their country.

Half (51%) of residents in the Transcarpathian Region are ready to take part in the volunteer movement; the number of such respondents in other regions constitutes a relative majority (45% in the Ternopil Region to 34% in the Chernivtsi Region).


More than a third (36%) of residents in the Rivne Region are ready to defend their country with arms,

Their share is 29% in the Volyn Region. This figure is the lowest in the Chernivtsi Region (18%) and the Transcarpathian Region (16%). In other regions, the support level is 24% in the Lviv Region, 24% in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region and 19% in the Ternopil Region.

Among the regions of the West, relatively high (28%) numbers of residents who are not prepared to defend their country are found in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region and in the Ternopil Region (21% each). The lowest numbers of such respondents are in the Rivne (14%) and the Lviv (12%) regions.

Responsibility for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Most residents (68%) in all regions consider Russia primarily the responsible party in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, the number varies considerably: from 90% in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region to 50% in the Chernivtsi Region.



Perception of Ukraine as the motherland

97% of the population in the Centre considers Ukraine their motherland: from 99% in the Khmelnytskyi and the Sumy regions to 94% in the Chernihiv Region.

Need to be proud of the country

To feel happy, most residents of the Zhytomyr and the Vinnytsia regions (69% and 52% respectively) need to be proud of the country, as does half of the population in the Khmelnytskyi Region (49%).

Personal well-being is enough to feel happy for the residents of the Poltava (62%), Sumy (52%) and Chernihiv (49%) regions.

Patriotism

The vast majority of the Centre considers themselves Ukrainian patriots (81%). Their share exceeds three-quarters in all regions. The highest share of these respondents is in the Vinnytsia Region (93%) and the lowest is in Kyiv City (75%).

Native language/language status

Ukrainian is native for the vast majority (78%) of inhabitants. However, the areas of the Centre are not uniform in this regard. They may be divided into three groups that consider the Ukrainian language as native:

1. More than 90% of residents: Vinnytsia (98%), Khmelnytskyi (95%) and Zhytomyr (91%) regions.
2. More than 70%: Cherkassy (83%), Poltava (79%), Sumy (78%), Kyiv (78%) and Kirovohrad (75%) regions.
3. More than 50%: Chernihiv Region (63%) and Kyiv City (58%).

In turn, about one-third of the residents of these regions (29% and 33% respectively) consider both Ukrainian and Russian as native.

Thus, the population of the Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi and Zhytomyr regions is closer to the residents of the West on this matter.

The vast majority of residents in the Vinnytsia (87%), Khmelnytskyi (83%), Kyiv (79%) and Zhytomyr (77%) regions believe that Ukrainian should be the only state and official language.



This opinion is shared by most inhabitants in the Cherkassy (74%), Sumy (71%), Chernihiv (71%), Kirovohrad (69%) and Poltava (64%) regions and in Kyiv City (72%).

A significant number of respondents in the Poltava (30%) and Chernihiv (19%) regions supports the option in which Ukrainian should be the state language and Russian may be official in certain regions.

The vast majority (78%) of the inhabitants in the Centre shares the opinion that every Ukrainian citizen, regardless of ethnicity, should speak the state language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture.

However, the support for this opinion varies from about 84-86% in the Poltava, Zhytomyr, Kyiv and Sumy regions to 70-73% in Kyiv City and the Khmelnytskyi and Vinnytsia regions.

Cultural tradition and its future prospects

The vast majority (81%) of residents in the Centre associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition.

Most people shared this view in the Khmelnytskyi Region (89%) and in the Vinnytsia Region (86%), while the lowest numbers were in the Sumy Region (73%) and in the Chernihiv Region (71%). The share of Ukrainian-culture respondents in the remaining regions is as follows: Poltava Region – 84%, Cherkassy Region – 83%, Zhytomyr Region – 82%, Kyiv City – 81%, Kirovohrad Region – 78%, and Kyiv Region – 77%.

The number of those who affiliate with the pan-European tradition is somewhat larger in the Kyiv (10%) and Sumy (9%) regions, and with the Soviet tradition in the Chernihiv (13%) and Sumy (11%) regions. The smallest number of followers of the Soviet cultural tradition is in the Vinnytsia Region (1%).

A relative majority (45%) of residents believes that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will predominate in Ukraine in 20-25 years; 20% of residents believe in the pan-European tradition. 14% of respondents believe that different cultural traditions will predominate in the future.

At the same time, the opinion that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will predominate in the future is supported by most residents in the Cherkassy (57%), Zhytomyr (55%), Sumy (54%), Vinnytsia (54%) and Poltava (53%) regions, and by a relative majority of people in the Khmelnytskyi (46%), Kyiv (45%), Kirovohrad (36%) and Chernihiv (31%) regions.

About one-third inhabitants of the Khmelnytskyi Region (31%) and more than a quarter of residents in the Kyiv Region and Kyiv City (28% each) believe that the pan-European cultural tradition will prevail. In other words, their proportion in Kyiv City is almost equal to the proportion of the respondents that believe in the prevalence of the Ukrainian cultural tradition (31%).

Views of regional differences and interregional conflicts

62% of residents in the Centre do not agree with the opinion that regional differences between Western and Eastern Ukrainians are so great that they may be considered two different nations. 23% people share this view.

Most people do not agree with this opinion in Kyiv City (75%; only 13% agree) and in the Khmelnytskyi Region (72%; 21% agree). The support is distributed similarly: the Kyiv Region – 67% (23% agree), Sumy Region – 65% (18%), Zhytomyr Region – 60% (21%), Chernihiv Region – 57% (32%), Poltava Region – 56% (27%), Kirovohrad Region – 55% (17%) and Cherkassy Region – 53% (27%).

In the Vinnytsia Region, the proportion of those that agree and disagree with this opinion is equal (41% each).

Assessment of regional development options

The absolute majority (93%) of the population in the Centre does not want to see their region secede from Ukraine and join another state.

The number of opponents of this idea is more than 90% in all areas except the Kirovohrad Region with 86%.

The vast majority (89%) of residents in the Centre also does not want their region to remain as an autonomous entity of Ukraine (with its own constitution, government and parliament).

The number of opponents of this option is more than 90% in the Khmelnytskyi (97%), Vinnytsia (91%) and Chernihiv (90%) regions. It is more than 80% in the following areas: the Kyiv (89%), Sumy (88%), Zhytomyr (88%), Cherkassy (87%), Poltava (86%), and Kirovohrad (84%) regions and in Kyiv City (88%).

Most residents (59%) of the Centre want to leave their area within Ukraine without changing its existing status but with more extensive rights and powers of local governance.

However, the support for this option varies among the regions. While this view is shared by 73% of the population in the Chernihiv Region, in the Vinnytsia Region opinions are divided almost evenly (45% endorse this idea, 46% do not). The support is distributed as follows in other regions: Kyiv Region – 68%, Sumy Region – 67%, Poltava Region – 65%, Kirovohrad Region – 59%, Cherkassy Region – 55%, Zhytomyr Region – 55%, Khmelnytskyi Region – 7%, Kyiv City – 60%.

Interpretation of the word “nation”

Most of the population in the region (60%) prefers the civic understanding of the nation. However, there are significant differences between regions. These respondents form the vast majority in the Zhytomyr Region and in the Vinnytsia Region (76% and 71% respectively) and a relative majority in the Poltava Region and in the Khmelnytskyi Region (47% and 46%).

At the same time, the ethnic definition of the nation is the most popular one in these regions as compared with others: 28% and 26% respondents support it while only 8% support it in the Kyiv Region.

The cultural definition of the nation has significant support in the Cherkassy Region (28%) and in the Khmelnytskyi Region (24%), while this idea has only 2% support in the Vinnytsia Region.

Foreign policy orientations

The majority of the population (58%) gives priority to relations with the EU in foreign affairs. This opinion is shared by 67% of Kyiv inhabitants and by 52% in the Cherkassy Region.

Russia is considered the priority partner by 6% respondents in the Poltava Region to 0.3% in the Vinnytsia Region.

17% inhabitants in the Khmelnytskyi Region and 11% in the Chernihiv Region believe that it is necessary to develop relations with other countries, while 11% in the Sumy Region prioritise relations with other CIS countries.

Maidan/Anti-Maidan

If the events that took place two years ago happened today, a relative majority (46%) of residents would support Maidan, more than a third (36%) would not support anybody, and only 3% would support Anti-Maidan.



Most people in Kyiv (64%) and the Khmelnytskyi Region (56%), half of respondents in the Kyiv Region (50%) and a relative majority in the Kirovohrad (46%), Sumy (44%) and Cherkassy (40%) regions would support Maidan.

In turn, a relative majority of the population in the Vinnytsia, Chernihiv (46% in each), Poltava (44%) and Zhytomyr (43%) regions would not support anyone. 7% of respondents in the Chernihiv Region and only 1% in the Vinnytsia Region would support Anti-Maidan.

Readiness to defend the country

One-third (33%) of population in the Centre is ready to defend their country by taking part in the volunteer movement, while 26% people are not ready to do so. Every fifth respondent (20%) is ready to defend the country with arms.

Half of respondents in the Khmelnytskyi Region (50%) and in the Cherkassy Region (49%) is ready to participate in the volunteer movement. The lowest number of potential volunteers is in the Zhytomyr Region (22%). They constitute approximately one-third in other regions.

More than one-third (35%) residents in the Kirovohrad Region are ready to defend their country with arms. This figure is the lowest in the Khmelnytskyi Region (17%) and in the Poltava Region (12%). In other regions, it varies from 24% in the Vinnytsia Region to 19% in the Zhytomyr Region.


A relative majority of people in the Poltava (38%), Zhytomyr (36%) and Sumy (34%) regions and in Kyiv City (33%) are not ready to defend their country. This figure is the lowest in the Kirovohrad (13%) and Cherkassy (11%) regions. 24% of population in the Kyiv Region, 23% in the Cherkassy Region, 19% in the Chernihiv Region, and 17% in the Khmelnytskyi Region are not ready to defend the country.

Responsibility for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

The majority of people in all areas of the Centre blame Russia for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, except the Zhytomyr, Chernihiv and Cherkassy regions, where such respondents form only a relative majority.

This figure is the highest in the Kyiv (69%) and Sumy (62%) regions, and the lowest in the Chernihiv (47%) and Cherkassy (41%) regions.

Relatively more people lay blame for the conflict on both countries equally (respectively, 42%, 39% and 37%) in the Zhytomyr, Cherkassy and Chernihiv regions.



Perception of Ukraine as the motherland

96% of people in the Mykolayiv Region down to 92% in the Odesa Region perceive Ukraine as the motherland.

Need to be proud of the country

Most people (56%) in the Kherson Region and relatively many people in the Mykolayiv Region (46%) must be proud of the country to feel happy. Personal well-being is enough to be happy for the relative majority of respondents in the Odesa Region.

Patriotism

68% inhabitants consider themselves Ukrainian patriots, while 17% do not. 81% inhabitants in the Mykolayiv Region, 68% in the Kherson Region and 61% in the Odesa Region consider themselves patriots (10%, 9% and 24% respectively do not).

Native language/language status

Russian and Ukrainian are both native for 38% of the population, Ukrainian is native for 35%, and Russian for 20%.

However, there are significant differences among the regions. 53% of inhabitants in the Mykolayiv Region define Ukrainian as native; 26% are bilingual. Russian is native for 21% of the inhabitants.

In the Kherson Region, the shares of those who recognise Ukrainian as their native language (42%) and bilinguals (41%) are almost equal. 14% consider Russian their native language.

The relative majority (43%) of people in the Odesa Region are bilingual. Almost the same number of residents consider Ukrainian (24%) and Russian (23%) to be their native language. A unique feature of this region is that 10% of inhabitants select "other languages" as native.

The relative majority of population (37%) in the South agrees that Ukrainian should be the only state and official language. 30% share the view that Ukrainian should be the state language, while Russian may be official in certain regions of Ukraine. 23% believe that both languages should be official in Ukraine.

The status of the Ukrainian language as the only state and official language is supported by a relative majority of inhabitants in the Mykolayiv Region (43%) and in the Kherson Region (42%). This figure is 32% in the Odesa Region.

A relative majority (37%) of the population in the Odesa Region believes that the Russian language may be official in certain Ukrainian regions. 25% people in the Mykolayiv Region and 20% in the Kherson Region share this opinion.

The idea of making both Russian and Ukrainian the state languages is supported by 28% inhabitants in the Mykolayiv Region, 22% in the Odesa Region and 21% in the Kherson Region.

Most residents (63%) of the area support the view that every Ukrainian citizen, regardless of ethnicity, should speak the state language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture. 20% of people do not share this opinion. There is no considerable difference between the regions.

Cultural tradition and its future prospects

A majority of the population (64%) in the South affiliates with the Ukrainian cultural tradition, while 12% affiliate with the Soviet tradition, and 8% with the pan-European tradition.

Southern regions are quite diverse on this matter. Thus, the highest number of affiliates with the Ukrainian cultural tradition (78%) is in the Mykolayiv Region, which makes it closer to the Central region. This figure is 66% in the Kherson Region and 56% in the Odesa Region. In turn, most of those who affiliate with the Soviet (15%) and Russian (5%) cultural traditions live in the Odesa Region. These values are 9% and 3% respectively in the Mykolayiv Region and 8% and 2% in the Kherson Region. 9% of inhabitants in the



Kherson and Odesa Regions, and 4% in the Mykolayiv Region support the pan-European tradition.

33% of inhabitants in the South assume that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will predominate in future; 22% believe that different cultural traditions will be predominant in different regions; and 20% believe that the pan-European tradition will take the lead.

The residents of the Kherson Region (40%), Mykolayiv Region (37%) and Odesa Region (28%) most often assume that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will prevail in the future. 25% of residents in the Odesa Region and 18% in both the Kherson Region and the Mykolayiv Region share the view that different cultural traditions will predominate in different regions. 22% of inhabitants in the Mykolayiv Region, 20% in the Odesa Region and 19% in the Kherson Region believe in the predominance of the pan-European cultural tradition.

Views of regional differences and interregional conflicts

A relative majority (43%) of inhabitants in the South does not agree with the opinion that regional differences between western and eastern Ukrainians are so great that they may be considered two different nations. This opinion is shared by 33% respondents. Thus, the difference between respondents who agree and those who disagree is less than in other Ukrainian areas.

At the same time, the opinion of the residents in the Kherson Region differs significantly from the view of people in other regions of the area and the country as a whole. This is the only region in Ukraine where most residents (56%) believe that the differences between Western and Eastern Ukrainians are so great that they can be considered two different nations. Only 20% respondents share the opposing opinion. Most people in the Mykolayiv Region do not agree with this view (54%; 28% do share it); this ratio is higher in the Odesa Region (49%, 25% support it).

Assessment of regional development options

The vast majority (85%) of the population in the South does not want to see their region secede from Ukraine and join another state.

However, this opinion is shared by the vast majority of respondents in the Mykolayiv Region (93%) and in the Odesa Region (89%), while only 64% respondents share this opinion in the Kherson Region. At the same time, one-third of respondents (34%) do not have a definite opinion on this issue.

76% people in the South do not want their region to remain as an autonomous entity of Ukraine (with its own constitution, government and parliament).

The number of opponents to the autonomy option represents a vast majority in the Mykolayiv Region (86%) and the Odesa Region (81%). More than half of respondents share this view (53%) in the Kherson Region.

The number of inhabitants in the Kherson Region that support autonomy (14%) is higher than in the Mykolayiv Region (5%) and the Odesa Region (8%).

Most residents (67%) of the South want their area to remain within Ukraine without changing its existing status but with more extensive rights and powers of local governance.

This alternative is supported most often in the Mykolayiv Region (72%) and least in the Kherson Region (58%). 70% people support this idea in the Odesa Region.

Interpretation of the word “nation”

59% inhabitants of the South support the civic definition of the nation concept. The distribution by regions is as follows: Odesa – 66%, Kherson – 55%, Mykolayiv – 46%.

In turn, the number of inhabitants in the Mykolayiv Region that prefers the cultural definition of the nation (25%) five times exceeds this amount in the Odesa and the Kherson regions (5% in each).

The ethnic definition is supported by 24% of respondents in the Kherson Region and 18% in the Odesa Region.

Foreign policy orientations

A relative majority (36%) of inhabitants in the South prefers closer relations with the EU, 13% desire closer relations with Russia, and the same amount prefer relations with other CIS countries.

The highest proportion of people that prioritise relations with the EU is in the Mykolayiv Region (46%), followed by the Odesa (34%) and the Kherson (32%) regions. 15% prefer relations with Russia in the Odesa Region, 12% in the Mykolayiv Region and 9% in the Kherson Region. At the same time, one-fifth of respondents (19%) in the Kherson Region prefer relations with other CIS countries.

Maidan/Anti-Maidan

Today, most people (54%) would not support Maidan or Anti-Maidan. Every fifth respondent (20%) would support Maidan and 5% people would support Anti-Maidan.

One third (33%) of inhabitants of the Mykolayiv Region would support Maidan, as well as 20% in the Kherson Region and 14% in the Odesa Region.

10% of people in the Kherson Region would support Anti-Maidan. Anti-Maidan followers represent 5% in the Mykolayiv Region and 4% in the Odesa Region.

Readiness to defend the country

Almost one-third (32%) of residents in the South are not ready to defend their country. 23% of inhabitants are ready to take part in the volunteer movement and 16% to defend the country with arms.

37% people in the Odesa Region are not ready to defend their country, along with 27% in the Kherson Region and 25% in the Mykolayiv Region.


27% of inhabitants in the Mykolayiv Region are ready to take part in the volunteer movement, along with 22% in the Odesa Region and 20% in the Kherson Region.

The greatest number of people (29%) ready to defend their country with arms is in the Mykolayiv Region, and the lowest (11%) is in the Odesa Region. Such respondents number 16% in the Kherson Region.

Responsibility for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

A relative majority of the population in the Odesa Region (48%) and the Mykolayiv Region (47%) believes that both countries are equally responsible for the conflict. A relative majority of respondents in the Kherson Region (29%) blames Russia for the conflict while 22% blame Ukraine.

34% of people in both the Odesa and Mykolayiv regions blame Russia for the conflict.



Perception of Ukraine as the motherland

92% residents in the Zaporizhia Region perceive Ukraine as their motherland. This figure is 91% in the Kharkiv Region and 85% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region.

Need to be proud of the country

Personal well-being is enough to feel happy for most residents in the Dnipropetrovsk Region (57%) and in the Kharkiv Region (55%). In the Zaporizhia Region, there are approximately equal amounts of those who must be proud of the country to feel happy (42%), and those for whom personal well-being is enough (43%).

Patriotism

Most people (68%) in the East considers themselves as Ukrainian patriots, 24% inhabitants do not share this opinion. 70% consider themselves patriots in the Kharkiv Region (21% do not), 69% (26%) in the Dnipropetrovsk Region and 65% (25%) in the Zaporizhia Region.

Native language/language status

37% inhabitants of the territory consider Ukrainian language as native, about one third (34%) are bilingual, and for 26% Russian is native.

The Eastern regions are quite diverse on this issue. Thus, half of residents in the Dnipropetrovsk Region identify Ukrainian as native, while this value decreases in the Zaporizhia Region (35%) and in the Kharkiv Region (only 24%). In turn, a relative majority (41%) of inhabitants in the Kharkiv Region considers Russian their native language. This figure is 23% in the Zaporizhia Region and only 15% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region.

The highest proportion (40%) of bilinguals is in the Zaporizhia Region, while they are fewer in the Kharkiv Region (34%) and the Dnipropetrovsk Region (32%).

The same numbers of residents believe that Ukrainian should be the only state and official language (34%) and that Ukrainian should be the state language while Russian may be an official language in some Ukrainian regions (34%). 25% of people support state status for both languages.

The same number of people in the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions (38% in each) are in favour of Ukrainian as the only state language. A smaller number (27%) of such citizens is found in the Kharkiv Region, where a relative majority (36%) supports the right of the Russian language to be official in certain regions. 36% of inhabitants in the Dnipropetrovsk Region and 29% in the Zaporizhia Region share this view.

State status for both languages is supported by 32% people in the Kharkiv Region, 30% in the Zaporizhia Region and 16% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region.

A majority (68%) of residents of the East share the opinion that every Ukrainian citizen, regardless of ethnicity, should speak the state language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture. 26% people share the opposing opinion.

This opinion is shared by the vast majority (77%) in the Zaporizhia Region, as well as 66% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region and 65% in the Kharkiv Region.

Cultural tradition and its future prospects

The majority (64%) of inhabitants of the East see themselves as affiliated with the Ukrainian cultural tradition, while 14% – of the Soviet tradition, 7% of the pan-European tradition and only 6% of the Soviet tradition.

Those who affiliate with the Ukrainian cultural tradition form the majority in all Eastern regions: Dnipropetrovsk Region – 68%, Zaporizhia Region – 64%, Kharkiv Region – 60%.

There are differences between the regions in representation of other traditions. Thus, the Kharkiv Region (20%) exceeds the Zaporizhia (12%) and the Dnipropetrovsk (10%) regions in the amount of those who affiliate with the Soviet tradition. It is closer to Donbas on this issue.

In turn, among all Ukrainian regions, the largest number of people that affiliate with the pan-European tradition is in the Dnipropetrovsk Region (11%), which significantly exceeds the share of such people in the Kharkiv Region (2%). 7% respondents position themselves as affiliated with the pan-European Tradition in the Zaporizhia Region.

8% of inhabitants in the Zaporizhia Region consider themselves affiliated with the Russian cultural tradition, along with 7% in the Kharkiv Region and 3% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region.

A relative majority (39%) of residents in the East believes that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will predominate in Ukraine in 20-25 years; 22% of residents the pan-European tradition will do so. 17% respondents believe that different cultural traditions will predominate in the future in different regions.

Only in the Dnipropetrovsk Region does a majority (53%) believe that the Ukrainian tradition will prevail in the future. In this regard, it is closer to the Centre and the West. 30% of inhabitants share this opinion in both the Kharkiv Region and the Zaporizhia Region.

More than a quarter of the population in the Zaporizhia Region (28%) and the Kharkiv Region (26%) believe that the pan-European tradition will predominate in Ukraine. In the Dnipropetrovsk Region, this view is shared by a far smaller number of residents (16%).

23% of inhabitants in the Kharkiv Region believe that different cultural traditions will prevail in different regions. There are considerably fewer respondents who share this view in the Zaporizhia and the Dnipropetrovsk regions (14% each). Only 4% people in the Kharkiv Region and 3% in both the Dnipropetrovsk Region and the Zaporizhia Region believe in the predominance of the Russian cultural tradition in the future.

Views of regional differences and interregional conflicts

Most inhabitants (59%) in the East do not agree with the opinion that regional differences between western and eastern Ukrainians are so great that they may be considered two different nations. This opinion is shared by 27%.

This view is not supported by most people in the Dnipropetrovsk Region (69%, 22% for) and in the Zaporizhia Region (55%), and by a relative majority in the Kharkiv Region (49%, 36% for).



Assessment of regional development options

The vast majority (86%) of the population in the East does not want to see their region secede from Ukraine and join another state.

This opinion is supported by a high of 93% of inhabitants in the Zaporizhia Region, and a low of 81% in the Kharkiv Region.

The vast majority (76%) of residents in the East does not want their region to remain as an autonomous entity of Ukraine (with its own constitution, government and parliament).

This idea is rejected by the vast majority of residents of the Zaporizhia Region (84%) and the Dnipropetrovsk Region (79%). 69% oppose this alternative in the Kharkiv Region.

The number of those who support autonomy is the greatest in the Kharkiv Region (23%), while the figure is 7% in both the Dnipropetrovsk Region and the Zaporozhia Region (11%).

59% of people in the East want their region to remain within Ukraine without changing the existing status but with more extensive rights and powers of local governance. 29% are against this alternative.

This opinion is supported by most people in all regions of the area: Kharkiv Region – 69%, Dnipropetrovsk Region – 55% and Zaporizhia Region – 53%.

Interpretation of the word “nation”

More than 52% residents of the region prefer the civic understanding of the nation. Their number varies from 59% in the Zaporizhia Region to 44% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region.

24% people endorse the ethnic definition, while 17% support the cultural definition of the nation.

The cultural definition is supported by 23% residents in the Dnipropetrovsk Region and 19% in the Zaporizhia Region. 9% in the Kharkiv Region support this definition.

The ethnic definition is supported most frequently in the Dnipropetrovsk (28%) and Kharkiv (26%) regions; its support in the Zaporizhia Region is 16%.

Foreign policy orientations

A relative majority (36%) of inhabitants in the East considers relations with the EU as a priority, while 20% prioritise relations with Russia.

There are significant differences between regions on this issue. About the half of residents (47%) in the Zaporizhia Region support prioritising cooperation with the EU, while this figure is only 36% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region and 29% in the Kharkiv Region.

32% of the population in the Kharkiv Region give preference to relations with Russia, which is second in Ukraine only to the Donetsk Region. 19% of respondents in the Zaporizhia Region and 9% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region support this view.

Maidan/Anti-Maidan

Half of residents (51%) in the East would not support Maidan or Anti-Maidan. One-quarter (25%) would support Maidan, while 15% would support Anti-Maidan.

Maidan would be supported by almost equal proportions of residents of the Dnipropetrovsk Region (27%) and the Zaporizhia Region (26%), along with every fifth respondent (21%) in the Kharkiv Region.

One-fifth (21%) in the Kharkiv Region would support Anti-Maidan; this is the highest ranking among

all Ukrainian regions. These figures are 14% in the Zaporizhia Region and 11% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region.

Readiness to defend the country

A relative majority (45%) of residents in the East are not ready to defend their country. 28% people are ready to take part in the volunteer movement, and 13% to defend the country with arms.

47% of residents in the Kharkiv Region and 40% in the Zaporizhia Region are not ready to defend the country.


27% of the population in the Dnipropetrovsk Region, 29% in the Kharkiv Region and 30% in the Zaporizhia Region would take part in the volunteer movement.

15% of residents of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia regions are ready to defend Ukraine with arms. This number is 10% in the Kharkiv Region.

Responsibility for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

44% of the population in the Zaporizhia Region, 40% in the Dnipropetrovsk Region and 24% in the Kharkiv Region believe that Russia is responsible for the conflict.

A relative majority (35%) of residents of the Kharkiv Region blame both countries, while 25% blame Ukraine. 38% of respondents consider both countries responsible for the conflict, 14% blame Ukraine. These figures are 35% and 9% respectively in the Zaporizhia Region.



Perception of Ukraine as the motherland

The vast majority (83%) of Donbas inhabitants perceives Ukraine as their motherland. This figure is 89% in the Luhansk Region and 80% in the Donetsk Region.

Need to be proud of the country

Personal well-being is enough to feel happy for the relative majority of residents in the Donetsk and the Luhansk Regions (48% each). 41% people in the Donetsk Region and 38% in the Luhansk Region feel the need to be proud of the country.

Patriotism

Most people consider themselves Ukrainian patriots in Donbas (56%). 31% people do not.

A majority of Luhansk inhabitants (68%) consider themselves Ukrainian patriots, while 20% do not.

The corresponding numbers in the Donetsk Region are 49% and 36%. At the same time, while 28% people in the Luhansk Region unconditionally consider themselves patriots, this number is only 12% in the Donetsk Region.

Native language/language status

Russian is native for the relative majority (40%) of Donbas inhabitants, 34% are bilingual, and Ukrainian is native for 20%.

While similar numbers of respondents (31% and 33% respectively) in the Luhansk Region consider both Ukrainian and Russian native, the number of people identifying Russian as native in the Donetsk Region is three times higher than those whose native



language is Ukrainian (45% and 14% respectively). Bilinguals represent 35% and 33% respectively. A significant portion of residents in the Donetsk Region speak other native languages (8%).

Only 16% inhabitants of the Donetsk Region and 29% in the Luhansk Region believe that Ukrainian should be the only state and official language. 42% of residents in the Donetsk Region and 29% in the Luhansk Region share the opinion that Russian may be official in some Ukrainian regions; 36% of respondents in the Donetsk Region and 32% in the Luhansk Region vote for both to be state languages.

Most residents of the Luhansk and the Donetsk regions (69% and 54% respectively) support the assertion that every Ukrainian citizen, regardless of ethnicity, should speak the state language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture. The opposing view is supported by 22% and 36% respondents respectively.

Cultural tradition and its future prospects

A relative majority (38%) of Donbas residents affiliate with the Ukrainian cultural tradition; almost one-quarter of inhabitants (24%) identify with the Soviet tradition, 10% with the Russian tradition and 9% to the pan-European tradition.

There is a significant difference between the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the number of those who follow the Ukrainian and Soviet cultural traditions. Thus half (50%) of residents in the Luhansk Region associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition. One-third of respondents (32%) affiliate with this tradition in the Donetsk Region. At the same time, more than one-quarter (28%) of residents of the Donetsk region associate themselves with the Soviet tradition; this is the highest such number in Ukraine. 17% responded in this way in the Luhansk Region.

There are similar shares of those who affiliate with the Russian and European cultural traditions in the Donetsk Region (10% and 9% respectively) and the Luhansk Region (9% and 7%).

About one-third (30%) of respondents in Donbas believe that different cultural traditions will predominate in the future (in 20-25 years). Every fifth respondent (21%) believes that the Ukrainian tradition will prevail, while 13% believe in predominance of the pan-European tradition, 7% of the Soviet tradition and 5% – the Russian cultural tradition.

More than one-third (36%) of respondents in the Donetsk Region believe that different cultural traditions will predominate in the future in different regions. This figure is 19% in the Luhansk Region.

In turn, almost every fourth (24%) resident of the Luhansk Region and almost one-fifth (19%) in the Donetsk Region believe that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will prevail.

The same proportions of residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (13% in each) believe that the pan-European tradition will predominate; 6% and 3% respectively believe in the predominance of the Russian tradition.

At the same time, a significant number of people (10%) in the Donetsk Region believes in the predominance of the Soviet cultural tradition in 20-25 years; this is considerably higher than in the Luhansk Region (2%).

Views of regional differences and interregional conflicts

49% inhabitants in Donbas do not agree with the opinion that regional differences between western and

eastern Ukrainians are so great that they may be considered two different nations; 29% support this opinion.

Most people do not agree with this opinion in the Luhansk Region (59%, 25% agree) and in the Donetsk Region (44%, 30% agree).

Assessment of regional development options

The vast majority (74%) of the population in Donbas does not want to see their region secede from Ukraine and join another state.

This share is 84% in the Luhansk Region and 69% in the Donetsk Region. The number of people wishing to join another country is insignificant, 8% and 5% respectively in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

61% of the residents of Donbas do not want to be part of Ukraine as an autonomous region (with its own constitution, government and Parliament).

This share is 75% in the Luhansk Region and 53% in the Donetsk Region. This option is supported by 8% and 15% of inhabitants respectively.

At the same time, most residents (52%) of Donbas want their region to remain within Ukraine without changing the existing status but with more extensive rights and powers of local governance. 25% are against this.

57% support such status in the Luhansk Region, and a relative majority (49%) supports it in the Donetsk Region.

Interpretation of the word “nation”

58% people endorse the civic definition of the nation in Donbas. The ethnic definition is supported by 21% of population in the Donetsk Region and 10% in the Luhansk Region, and the cultural definition by 7% and 18% respectively.

Foreign policy orientations

One-third (34%) of residents of the Donetsk Region prioritise relations with Russia, while one-quarter prefer relations with the EU (25%). Respondents that prefer relations with the EU prevail (32%) in the Luhansk Region. 18% of residents support relations with Russia.

Maidan/Anti-Maidan

Most people (54%) in the East would not support Maidan or Anti-Maidan. 17% would support Maidan, while 14% would support Anti-Maidan.

21% of the population would support Maidan and only 5% would support Anti-Maidan in the Luhansk Region. These figures are 14% and 18%, respectively, in the Donetsk Region.

Readiness to defend the country

Almost half the population (47%) in the Donetsk Region is not ready to defend their country. 33% in the Luhansk Region made the same choice.

33% of inhabitants are ready to take part in the volunteer movement in the Luhansk Region and 30% in the Donetsk Region.





11% of respondents are ready to defend their country with arms in the Luhansk Region, and only 7% in the Donetsk Region.

Responsibility for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

A relative majority of the population in the Luhansk (47%) and Donetsk (40%) regions believes that both countries are responsible for the conflict.









26% of people in the Luhansk Region and 23% in the Donetsk Region blame Russia, while 13% and 12% respectively blame Ukraine. ■

REGIONAL FEATURES

	West  Volyn Region, Transcarpathian Region, Ivano-Frankivsk Region, Lviv Region, Rivne Region, Ternopil Region, Chernivtsi Region	Centre  Kyiv City, Vinnytsia Region, Zhytomyr Region, Kyiv Region, Kirovohrad Region, Poltava Region, Sumy Region, Khmelnytskyi Region, Cherkassy Region, Chernihiv Region
Civic		
With what do you primarily identify yourself? (% of respondents) The three choices that rated the highest are presented here.	With Ukraine  49.0% with the city (village) where I live 32.0% with the region where I live 11% with the country	With Ukraine  44.2% with the city (village) where I live 41.2% with the region where I live 7.5% with the country
How proud are you to be a citizen of Ukraine? (% of respondents) The two choices that rated the highest are presented here.	Very proud (45.4%) rather proud (37.2%)	Rather proud (43.7%) very proud (32.6%)
Do you consider Ukraine to be your motherland? (% of respondents)	Yes (98.4%) no (0.7%)	Yes (97.3%) no (0.9%)
Would you choose Ukraine as your motherland if you had a choice? (% of respondents)	Yes (78.4%) no (9%)	Yes (78.8%) no (10.6%)
If you could choose, where would you like to live? (% of respondents)	In Ukraine (66.5%) in the EU (24.7%) in Russia (0.7%)	In Ukraine (65.7%) in the EU (22.2%) in Russia (1.1%)
To feel happy in life, do you need to be proud of your country, or is personal well-being enough? (% of respondents)	Need to be proud (60.5%) well-being is enough (30.6%)	Need to be proud (51.2%) well-being is enough (37.1%)
How proud are you of Ukraine in the following areas? (% of respondents) The three choices that rated the highest are presented here. *Total of answers "proud" and "proud to a certain extent". **Total of answers "not very proud" and "not proud at all".	I am proud of* Achievements in sport (82.8%), Ukrainian history (78.0%) the national character of Ukrainians, their ability to fight for their state and their rights (77.9%) I am not proud of** Economic achievements of Ukraine (84.1%) the social welfare system of Ukraine (79.1%) how democracy works (68.7%)	I am proud of* The national character of Ukrainians, their ability to fight for their country and their rights (75.9%) achievements in sport (75.5%) Ukrainian history (74.8%) I am not proud of** Economic achievements of Ukraine (80.7%) the social welfare system of Ukraine (79.5%) how democracy works (66.1%)
Are you prepared to defend your country? (% of respondents)	Yes, by taking part in the volunteer movement (41.2%) yes, with arms (23.7%) no (17.8%)	Yes, by taking part in the volunteer movement (33.2%) no (26.0%) yes, with arms (20.3%)
Do you consider yourself a patriot of Ukraine? (% of respondents) The two choices that rated the highest are presented here.	Yes (51.8%) probably yes (32.8%)	Yes (42.9%) probably yes (38.3%)

¹ The study was carried out by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre on 11-23 December 2015 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea and the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 10,071 respondents aged 18 and over were polled. The margin of error is 1%.





OF THE IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS ¹			
Mykolayiv Region, the Odessa Region, Kherson Region	South 	Dnipropetrovsk Region, Zaporizhia Region, Kharkiv Region	East 
		Donetsk Region, Luhansk Region	Donbas 
			UKRAINE 
identity			
With the city (village) where I live 	With Ukraine 	With the city (village) where I live 	With Ukraine 
Rather proud (44%) very proud (22.4%)	Rather proud (39.2%) not very proud (23.3%)	Rather proud (32.1%) not very proud (25.5%)	Rather proud (39.7%) very proud (28.7%)
Yes (93.6%) no (3%)	Yes (88.7%) no (6.4%)	Yes (83.3%) no (9.6%)	Yes (93.3%) no (3.5%)
Yes (72.6%) no (9.9%)	Yes (64.9%) no (18.7%)	Yes (57.1%) no (18.6%)	Yes (72.1%) no (12.8%)
In Ukraine (58.9%) in the EU (15.6%) in Russia (3.5%)	In Ukraine (59.7%) in the EU (17.2%) in Russia (7.5%)	In Ukraine (48.3%) in Russia (14%) in the EU (13.2%)	In Ukraine (61.3%) in the EU (19.7%) in Russia (4.5%)
Personal well-being is enough (40.8%) need to be proud (38.2%)	Personal well-being is enough (53.1%) need to be proud (38.3%)	Personal well-being is enough (48.1%) need to be proud (39.9%)	Need to be proud (47.6%) well-being is enough (40.8%)
I am proud of* Achievements in sport (71.9%) the national character of Ukrainians, their ability to fight for their country and their rights (71.3%) Ukrainian history (68.7%) I am not proud of** Economic achievements of Ukraine (80.8%) the social welfare system of Ukraine (77.5%) how democracy works (68.8%)	I am proud of* Achievements in sport (73.9%) art and literature achievements (64.9%) Ukrainian history (61.2%) I am not proud of** Economic achievements of Ukraine (88.3%) the social welfare system of Ukraine (85.8%) political influence of Ukraine in the world (82.7%)	I am proud of* The national character of Ukrainians, their ability to fight for their country and their rights (54.2%) Ukrainian history (54.1%) achievements in sport (53.7%) I am not proud of** Social welfare system of Ukraine (79.6%) economic achievements of Ukraine (78.6%) how democracy works (70.1%)	I am proud of* Achievements in sport (72.9%) Ukrainian history (69.0%) the national character of Ukrainians, their ability to fight for their country and their rights (68.0%) I am not proud of** Economic achievements of Ukraine (82.5%) the social welfare system of Ukraine (80.4%) how democracy works (69.7%)
No (31.7%) yes, by taking part in the volunteer movement (22.7%) yes, with arms (16.4%)	No (44.5%) yes, by taking part in the volunteer movement (28.3%) yes, with arms (13.3%)	No (41.9%) yes, by taking part in the volunteer movement (30.5%) yes, with arms (8.9%)	Yes, by taking part in the volunteer movement (32.4%) no (30.8%) yes, with arms (17.5%)
Yes (36.8%) probably yes (31.1%)	Probably yes (37.5%) yes (30.8%)	Probably yes (38.6%) yes (17.1%)	Yes (37.8%) probably yes (36.3%)

REGIONAL FEATURES					
	West		Centre		
<p>How important are the following features to consider a person a Ukrainian patriot?</p> <p>(average score on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” indicates that this feature is not important and “5” means very important)</p> <p>The answers that received the highest and lowest scores are presented here.</p>	<p>Highest</p> <p>Raising children to love Ukraine (4.4)</p> <p>respect for the state, state symbols and holidays (4.4)</p> <p>the readiness to defend Ukraine against outside enemies even at the expense of one’s life (4.3)</p> <p>respect for Ukrainian laws and government institutions (4.3)</p> <p>knowing the Ukrainian language (4.3)</p> <p>Lowest</p> <p>Opposing closer relations by Ukraine with Russia (3.5)</p> <p>Supporting accession by Ukraine to NATO (3.5)</p> <p>affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (3.2)</p> <p>opposing closer relations by Ukraine with the USA (2.5)</p>		<p>Highest</p> <p>Raising children to love Ukraine (4.2)</p> <p>concern for the stable well-being of one’s family (4.2)</p> <p>respect for the state, state symbols and holidays (4.2)</p> <p>Knowledge of Ukrainian culture and history (4.1)</p> <p>Lowest</p> <p>Supporting accession by Ukraine to NATO (3.1)</p> <p>Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (2.8)</p> <p>opposing closer relations by Ukraine with the USA (2.8)</p>		
	<p>Do you agree with the assertion that “It is important to strengthen Ukraine’s economic independence from other countries even if this results in a decline of the living standards of its citizens”? (% of respondents)</p> <p>*Total of answers “agree” and “tend to agree”. **Total of answers “disagree” and “tend to disagree”.</p>				
<p>If a referendum on the independence of Ukraine were held today, how would you vote? (% of respondents)</p>					
<p>What is your attitude towards the following attributes of an independent Ukrainian state? (% of respondents)</p> <p>*Total of answers “proud of this” and “positive attitude”. **Total of answers “negative attitude” and “negative attitude, and I would like to change this”.</p>					
State flag of Ukraine					
		Positive* (96.9%)	Negative** (1.3%)	Positive* (96.8%)	Negative** (1%)
State coat of arms of Ukraine					
		Positive* (97.3%)	Negative** (0.9%)	Positive* (96.4%)	Negative** (1.3%)
National anthem of Ukraine					
		Positive* (96.1%)	Negative** (2%)	Positive* (91.4%)	Negative** (6.1%)
Ukrainian hryvnia					
		Positive* (88.3%)	Negative** (6.9%)	Positive* (82.5%)	Negative** (11.7%)
State language					
		Positive* (97.4%)	Negative** (0.8%)	Positive* (97.0%)	Negative** (0.7%)
Political					
<p>To what extent are you interested in politics? (% of respondents)</p>					
		<p>Interested to a certain extent (70.9%)</p> <p>not interested at all (18.3%)</p> <p>very interested (10.8%)</p>		<p>Interested to a certain extent (71%)</p> <p>not interested at all (20.4%)</p> <p>very interested (8.6%)</p>	



OF THE IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS ¹								(continued)	
South		East		Donbas		UKRAINE			
Highest concern for the stable well-being of one's family (4.3) Raising children to love Ukraine (4.2) respect for the state, state symbols and holidays (4.1) being ready to publicly defend the reputation of one's country before the citizens of other countries (4.1) Lowest Oppose closer relations by Ukraine with Russia (2.8) support accession of Ukraine to NATO (2.8) oppose closer relations by Ukraine with the USA (2.6) Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (2.6)		Highest Raising children to love Ukraine (4.2) concern for the stable well-being of one's family (4.2) respect for the state, state symbols and holidays (4.1) Lowest Support accession of Ukraine to NATO (2.6) Oppose renewal of cooperation with Russia (2.6) Oppose closer relations by Ukraine with Russia (2.5) Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (2.3)		Highest Readiness to fight for observance of Ukrainian citizens' rights and freedoms (3.9) respect for Ukrainian laws and government institutions (3.9) respect for the state, state symbols and holidays (3.9) Lowest Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (2.2) oppose closer relations by Ukraine with Russia (2.2) support accession of Ukraine to NATO (2.1) oppose closer relations by Ukraine with the USA (2.0)		Highest Raising children to love Ukraine (4.2) respect for the state, state symbols and holidays (4.2) respect for Ukrainian laws and government institutions (4.1) concern for the stable well-being of one's family (4.1) Lowest Oppose closer relations by Ukraine with Russia (2.9) Support accession of Ukraine to NATO (2.9) Affiliation with a Ukrainian church (UAOC, UOC-KP, UGCC) (2.7) Oppose closer relations by Ukraine with the USA (2.6)			
Disagree** (35.8%) agree* (24.8%) Neither agree nor disagree (15.8%)		Disagree** (53.2%) agree* (23%) Neither agree nor disagree (13.9%)		Disagree** (37.2%) agree* (24%) Neither agree nor disagree (22.5%)		Disagree** (34.2%) agree* (32.9%) Neither agree nor disagree (18.7%)			
Would support (56.5%) would not support (8.2%)		Would support (56.1%) would not support (12.7%)		Would support (46.5%) would not support (19.9%)		Would support (68.3%) would not support (8.6%)			
(blue and yellow)									
Positive* (93.7%)	Negative** (2.5%)	Positive* (86.2%)	Negative** (7.9%)	Positive* (74.3%)	Negative** (10.9%)	Positive* (91.1%)	Negative** (3.9%)		
Positive* (93.1%)	Negative** (2.8%)	Positive* (82.0%)	Negative** (10.5%)	Positive* (73.7%)	Negative** (12.3%)	Positive* (90.0%)	Negative** (4.8%)		
Positive* (88.6%)	Negative** (6.8%)	Positive* (73.4%)	Negative** (20.6%)	Positive* (57.6%)	Negative** (25.3%)	Positive* (83.8%)	Negative** (11%)		
(currency unit)									
Positive* (82.8%)	Negative** (9.7%)	Positive* (81.8%)	Negative** (10.4%)	Positive* (73.4%)	Negative** (11.7%)	Positive* (82.1%)	Negative** (11%)		
(Ukrainian)									
Positive* (92.8%)	Negative** (2.9%)	Positive* (87.5%)	Negative** (6.1%)	Positive* (75.6%)	Negative** (11.7%)	Positive* (91.5%)	Negative** (3.7%)		
identity									
Interested to a certain extent (65.3%) not interested at all (22.5%) very interested (12.3%)		Interested to a certain extent (64%) not interested at all (20.9%) very interested (15.1%)		Interested to a certain extent (57.6%) not interested at all (26.1%) very interested (16.4%)		Interested to a certain extent (66.9%) not interested at all (21.2%) very interested (11.9%)			

REGIONAL FEATURES

	West	Centre
Type of the political regime desired for Ukraine (% of respondents)	Democracy is the most suitable type of political system for Ukraine (55.9%) under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be better than democracy (18.1%) for people like me, it does not matter whether or not the country has a democratic regime (10.5%)	Democracy is the most suitable type of political system for Ukraine (55.7%) under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be better than democracy (16.7%) for people like me, it does not matter whether or not the country has a democratic regime (11.2%)
The place of Ukraine on the democracy scale (on a 10-point scale, 1-10, where “1” means dictatorship and “10” means democracy)	 5.7 Dictatorship Democracy	 5.4 Dictatorship Democracy
Understanding of equality (% of respondents)	Equality means, first and foremost, equal opportunity to express one’s own abilities and equality of all persons before the law (54.9%) equality means, first and foremost, equality of income, living standard, and social conditions for all people (36.2%)	Equality means, first and foremost, equal opportunity to express one’s own abilities and equality of all persons before the law (52.2%) equality means, first and foremost, equality of income, living standard, and social conditions for all people (37.7%)
Freedom or equality? (% of respondents)	It is better to live in a society where the government regulates everything but where there is no excessive social inequality (43.9%) it is better to live in a society of individual freedom, where everyone is responsible and takes care of himself (39.6%)	It is better to live in a society where the government regulates everything but where there is no excessive social inequality (48.9%) it is better to live in a society of individual freedom, where everyone is responsible and takes care of himself (34%)
Nearly two years have passed since the events referred to as Maidan. If those events took place now, would you support Maidan or Anti-Maidan? (% of respondents)	I would support Maidan (70.7%) I would support neither (17.3%) I would support Anti-Maidan (1.4%)	I would support Maidan (46.3%) I would support neither (35.9%) I would support Anti-Maidan (3%)
Language		
What is your native language? (% of respondents)	Ukrainian (92.6%) Ukrainian and Russian (2.9%) Russian (2%)	Ukrainian (78.2%) Ukrainian and Russian (16.6%) Russian (4.2%)
What language do you mainly speak at home? (% of respondents) <small>*Total of answers “Ukrainian” and “mainly Ukrainian”. **Total of answers “Russian” and “mainly Russian”.</small>	Ukrainian* (92%) Ukrainian and Russian (3.3%) Russian** (2.2%)	Ukrainian* (62.9%) Ukrainian and Russian (26.2%) Russian** (10.2%)
What language do you speak outside your home, family (at work, school, etc.)? (% of respondents) <small>*Total of answers “Ukrainian” and “mainly Ukrainian”. **Total of answers “Russian” and “mainly Russian”.</small>	Ukrainian* (91.9%) Ukrainian and Russian (5.1%) Russian** (1.2%)	Ukrainian* (57.1%) Ukrainian and Russian (33.3%) Russian** (8.8%)
What language is more prestigious to speak among your friends and colleagues at work or school? (% of respondents)	Ukrainian (87.7%) Russian (1.7%) English (0.4%)	Ukrainian (51.1%) Russian (11.5%) English (0.7%)
How would you assess your command of the Ukrainian language? (% of respondents)	Fluent (94.1%) sufficient (5.1%) poor (0.3%)	Fluent (71.5%) sufficient (26.5%) poor (1%)



OF THE IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS ¹			(continued)
South	East	Donbas	UKRAINE
<p>Democracy is the most suitable type of political system for Ukraine (35.5%) under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be better than democracy (18.8%) for people like me, it does not matter whether or not the country has a democratic regime (17.5%)</p> <p>Dictatorship Democracy</p>	<p>Democracy is the most suitable type of political system for Ukraine (55.3%) under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be better than democracy (19.2%) for people like me, it does not matter whether or not the country has a democratic regime (11.2%)</p> <p>Dictatorship Democracy</p>	<p>Democracy is the most suitable type of political system for Ukraine (39.6%) for people like me, it does not matter whether or not the country has a democratic regime (20.6%) under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be better than democracy (18.1%)</p> <p>Dictatorship Democracy</p>	<p>Democracy is the most suitable type of political system for Ukraine (51.0%) under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime may be better than democracy (17.9%) for people like me, it does not matter whether or not the country has a democratic regime (13.2%)</p> <p>Dictatorship Democracy</p>
<p>Equality means, first and foremost, equal opportunity to express one's abilities and equality of all before the law (44.9%) equality means, first and foremost, equality of income, living standard, and social conditions for all people (41.3%)</p>	<p>Equality means, first and foremost, equal opportunity to express one's abilities and equality of all before the law (55.8%) equality means, first and foremost, equality of income, living standard, and social conditions for all people (35.0%)</p>	<p>Equality means, first and foremost, equal opportunity to express one's abilities and equality of all before the law (58.5%) equality means, first and foremost, equality of income, living standard, and social conditions for all people (28.1%)</p>	<p>Equality means, first and foremost, equal opportunity to express one's abilities and equality of all before the law (53.6%) equality means, first and foremost, equality of income, living standard, and social conditions for all people (35.8%)</p>
<p>It is better to live in a society where the government regulates everything but where there is no excessive social inequality (48.5%) it is better to live in a society of individual freedom, where everyone is responsible and takes care of himself (28.2%)</p>	<p>It is better to live in a society where the government regulates everything but where there is no excessive social inequality (53.1%) it is better to live in a society of individual freedom, where everyone is responsible and takes care of himself (32.9%)</p>	<p>It is better to live in a society where the government regulates everything but where there is no excessive social inequality (44.5%) it is better to live in a society of individual freedom, where everyone is responsible and takes care of himself (35.3%)</p>	<p>It is better to live in a society where the government regulates everything but where there is no excessive social inequality (47.9%) it is better to live in a society of individual freedom, where everyone is responsible and takes care of himself (34.6%)</p>
<p>I would support neither (54.2%) I would support Maidan (20.2%) I would support Anti-Maidan (5.4%)</p>	<p>I would support neither (51.4%) I would support Maidan (24.5%) I would support Anti-Maidan (15.3%)</p>	<p>I would support neither (53.9%) I would support Maidan (16.5%) I would support Anti-Maidan (13.5%)</p>	<p>I would support Maidan (39.9%) I would support neither (39.7%) I would support Anti-Maidan (6.8%)</p>
identity			
<p>Ukrainian and Russian (38.4%) Ukrainian (35.3%) Russian (20%)</p>	<p>Ukrainian (37.4%) Ukrainian and Russian (34.4%) Russian (25.9%)</p>	<p>Russian (40.4%) Ukrainian and Russian (34%) Ukrainian (19.9%)</p>	<p>Ukrainian (59.9%) Ukrainian and Russian (22.1%) Russian (15.1%)</p>
<p>Russian** (38%) Ukrainian and Russian (36.9%) Ukrainian* (20.2%)</p>	<p>Russian** (40.3%) Ukrainian and Russian (31.6%) Ukrainian* (26.6%)</p>	<p>Russian** (52.1%) Ukrainian and Russian (33.6%) Ukrainian* (12.5%)</p>	<p>Ukrainian* (49.8%) Ukrainian and Russian (24.7%) Russian** (23.7%)</p>
<p>Ukrainian and Russian (41.3%) Russian** (38.6%) Ukrainian* (15.9%)</p>	<p>Russian** (42.2%) Ukrainian and Russian (33.5%) Ukrainian* (23.6%)</p>	<p>Russian** (53.8%) Ukrainian and Russian (37.1%) Ukrainian* (8.8%)</p>	<p>Ukrainian* (46.1%) Ukrainian and Russian (28.9%) Russian** (23.7%)</p>
<p>Russian (28.5%) Ukrainian (16.2%) English (0.5%)</p>	<p>Russian (34.2%) Ukrainian (21.2%) English (1.2%)</p>	<p>Russian (49.7%) Ukrainian (11%) English (3.2%)</p>	<p>Ukrainian (43.2%) Russian (21.5%) English (1.1%)</p>
<p>Fluent (48.9%) sufficient (39.8%) poor (5.8%)</p>	<p>Fluent (52.3%) sufficient (40.7%) poor (5.7%)</p>	<p>Sufficient (41.5%) fluent (39.1%) poor (14.8%)</p>	<p>Fluent (65.1%) sufficient (28.4%) poor (4.4%)</p>



REGIONAL FEATURES		
	West	Centre
Which of these languages do you speak? (% of respondents) The three choices that rated the highest are presented here.	English (22.0%) Polish (18.6%) German (6.9%)	English (19.9%) German (3.8%) Polish (2.4%)
How should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine? (% of respondents) The answer that rated the highest is presented here.	Ukrainian should be the only state and official language (80.6%)	Ukrainian should be the only state and official language (74.8%)
Cultural		
What cultural tradition do you associate yourself with? (% of respondents) The three choices that rated the highest are presented here.	Ukrainian (84.9%) pan-European (7.5%) Soviet (2.9%)	Ukrainian (80.7%) pan-European (5.8%) Soviet (6.1%)
Which cultural tradition will prevail in Ukraine in the future (in 20-25 years)? (% of respondents) The three choices that rated the highest are presented here.	Ukrainian (48.5%) pan-European (27.8%) different traditions in different regions (10.9%)	Ukrainian (44.9%) pan-European (20.4%) different traditions in different regions (13.5%)
Do you feel being European? (% of respondents) * Total of answers "yes" and "probably yes". ** Total of answers "no" and "probably no".	Yes* – 46% No** – 44.6%	Yes* – 24.7% No** – 67.1%
What prevents you from feeling like a European? (% of the persons that do not feel European or hesitated answering this question) * Total of answers "yes" and "probably yes". ** Total of answers "no" and "probably no".	Low living standard (70.6%) socio-cultural living conditions (40.3%)	Low living standard (77.2%) socio-cultural living conditions (49%)
How similar or different are the cultures, traditions and views of the following groups? (average score) On a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means these groups are very different and "5" means very similar.	Ukrainian citizens and	
	 2.7	 3.1
	Ukrainians in Ukraine	
	 3.0	 3.7
	Ukrainian citizens	
	 2.7	 2.6
	Residents of Halychyna (Galicia)	
	 3.4	 3.2
	Residents of Halychyna (Galicia)	
	 2.5	 2.4
	Residents of Ukraine and residents of	
	 2.5	 2.9
Residents of Ukraine and residents of temporarily occupied		
 2.5	 2.8	
Residents of the West of Ukraine		
 3.5	 3.3	
Residents of the West of Ukraine		
 2.8	 2.6	
Residents of the Centre of Ukraine		
 3.4	 3.2	



OF THE IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS ¹				(continued)
South	East	Donbas	UKRAINE	
English (17.8%) German (5.9%) Polish (1.8%)	English (21.1%) German (5.8%) Polish (1.9%)	English (17.9%) German (3.8%) Polish (4.7%)	English (20%) Polish (6%) German (5%)	
Ukrainian should be the only state and official (36.9%)	Ukrainian should be the state language, Russian can be an official language in some regions of Ukraine (34.4%)	Ukrainian should be the state language, Russian can be an official language in some regions of Ukraine (37.3%)	Ukrainian should be the only state and official (55.9%)	
identity				
Ukrainian (64.2%) Soviet (11.5%) European (7.7%)	Ukrainian (63.9%) Soviet (14.3%) European (7.2%)	Ukrainian (38.4%) Soviet (23.9%) Russian (10.1%)	Ukrainian (70.0%) Soviet (10.3%) European (7.1%)	
Ukrainian (32.7%) different traditions in different regions (21.5%) pan-European (20.0%)	Ukrainian (39.2%) pan-European (22.1%) different traditions in different regions (17.0%)	Different traditions in different regions (29.9%) Ukrainian (20.8%) pan-European (13.2%)	Ukrainian (39.5%) pan-European (21.1%) different traditions in different regions (17%)	
Yes* – 30.2% No** – 61.1%	Yes* – 23.8% No** – 70.2%	Yes* – 21.6% No** – 67.8%	Yes* – 29% No** – 62.5%	
Low living standards (79.7%) language barriers (44%)	Low living standards (79.5%) socio-cultural living conditions (53%)	Low living standards (52.6%) language barriers (45.1%)	Low living standards (72.7%) socio-cultural living conditions (45.5%)	
citizens of Russia				
1 2 3 4 5 4.1	1 2 3 4 5 4.2	1 2 3 4 5 3.9	1 2 3 4 5 3.5	
and Russians in Ukraine				
4.3	4.2	4.0	3.8	
and citizens of the EU countries				
2.4	2.4	2.2	2.5	
and residents of the Centre of Ukraine				
3.0	3.2	3.3	3.3	
and residents of Donbas				
2.3	2.6	2.4	2.4	
the occupied territories of Crimea				
3.5	3.4	3.2	3.0	
areas of the Donetsk and the Luhansk regions				
3.4	3.5	3.4	3.0	
and residents of the Centre of Ukraine				
3.1	3.3	3.6	3.4	
and residents of the East of Ukraine				
2.5	2.7	2.8	2.7	
and residents of the East of Ukraine				
3.5	3.8	3.6	3.5	

REGIONAL FEATURES		
	West	Centre
National		
What do you consider your ethnic nationality? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Ukrainian (96.1%) Russian (1.1%)	Ukrainian (94.9%) Russian (2.6%)
Which of these definitions of the Ukrainian nation do you find most applicable? <i>(% of respondents)</i> The two choices that rated the highest are presented here.	The Ukrainian nation includes all citizens of Ukraine, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, language of communication, and the national traditions they observe and by which they raise their children (49.7%) Citizens of Ukraine (irrespective of ethnic affiliation) speaking the Ukrainian language, observing Ukrainian national traditions, and raising children to follow such traditions (27.9%)	The Ukrainian nation includes all citizens of Ukraine, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, language of communication, and the national traditions they observe and by which they raise their children (59.8%) Citizens of Ukraine (irrespective of ethnic affiliation) speaking the Ukrainian language, observing Ukrainian national traditions, and raising children to follow such traditions (15.6%)
How do you interpret the term “Ukrainian nationalism”? <i>(% of respondents)</i> The two choices that rated the highest are presented here.	It is a world view whose main idea is to transform Ukraine into a strong state with high international prestige and a high standard of living (67.4%) It is an ideology that segregates the society into ethnic Ukrainians and “non-Ukrainians” and seeks to limit the rights of “non-Ukrainians” (10.4%)	It is a world view whose main idea is to transform Ukraine into a strong state with high international prestige and a high standard of living (50.3%) It is an ideology that segregates the society into ethnic Ukrainians and “non-Ukrainians” and seeks to limit the rights of “non-Ukrainians” (20%)
Is any citizen of Ukraine (regardless of ethnic origin) obligated to know the national language to an extent sufficient for everyday communication and to know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Yes (86.4%) no (7.5%)	Yes (78.2%) no (14.2%)
What ethnicities would you prefer not to live next to? <i>(% of respondents)</i> The three choices that rated the highest are presented here.	Romani (41.3%) Russians (29.8%) Jews (16.3%)	Romani (32.3%) Russians (13.3%) Jews (11.9%)
What ethnicities would you prefer to live next to? <i>(% of respondents)</i> The three choices that rated the highest are presented here.	Ukrainians (43.8%) Poles (28.2%) Hungarians (13.2%)	Ukrainians (28.7%) Poles (18.3%) Hungarians (11%)
Geopolitical		
Which foreign policy areas should be the priority for Ukraine? <i>(% of respondents)</i> The choices that rated the highest are presented here.	With the EU countries (78.3%) with the USA (4.2%) with other countries (2.8%)	With the EU countries (58.3%) with other countries (6.2%) with the USA (3.3%) with CIS countries (3.3%)



OF THE IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS ¹			(continued)
South	East	Donbas	UKRAINE
identity			
Ukrainian (81.8%) Russian (8.9%)	Ukrainian (83.2%) Russian (10.9%)	Ukrainian (61.3%) Russian (30.7%)	Ukrainian (86.3%) Russian (8.9%)
The Ukrainian nation includes all citizens of Ukraine, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, language of communication, and the national traditions they observe and by which they raise their children (58.6%) They are citizens of Ukraine with ethnic Ukrainian origin (having Ukrainian ancestors) (13.9%)	The Ukrainian nation includes all citizens of Ukraine, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, language of communication, and the national traditions they observe and by which they raise their children (51.5%) They are citizens of Ukraine with ethnic Ukrainian origin (having Ukrainian ancestors) (17.4%)	The Ukrainian nation includes all citizens of Ukraine, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, language of communication, and the national traditions they observe and by which they raise their children (57.7%) Citizens of Ukraine (irrespective of ethnic affiliation) speaking the Ukrainian language, observing Ukrainian national traditions, and raising children to follow such traditions (10.6%)	The Ukrainian nation includes all citizens of Ukraine, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, language of communication, and the national traditions they observe and by which they raise their children (55.7%) Citizens of Ukraine (irrespective of ethnic affiliation) speaking the Ukrainian language, observing Ukrainian national traditions, and raising children to follow such traditions (17%)
It is a world view whose main idea is to transform Ukraine into a strong state with high international prestige and a high standard of living (29.5%) It is an ideology that segregates the society into ethnic Ukrainians and "non-Ukrainians" and seeks to limit the rights of "non-Ukrainians" (33.6%)	It is a world view whose main idea is to transform Ukraine into a strong state with high international prestige and a high standard of living (38.4%) It is an ideology that segregates the society into ethnic Ukrainians and "non-Ukrainians" and seeks to limit the rights of "non-Ukrainians" (37.7%)	It is a world view whose main idea is to transform Ukraine into a strong state with high international prestige and a high standard of living (37.4%) It is an ideology that segregates the society into ethnic Ukrainians and "non-Ukrainians" and seeks to limit the rights of "non-Ukrainians" (32.2%)	It is a world view whose main idea is to transform Ukraine into a strong state with high international prestige and a high standard of living (47.4%) It is an ideology that segregates the society into ethnic Ukrainians and "non-Ukrainians" and seeks to limit the rights of "non-Ukrainians" (24.6%)
Yes (63.2%) no (19.5%)	Yes (67.9%) no (25.6%)	Yes (58.7%) no (31.3%)	Yes (73.3%) no (18.2%)
Romani (25.8%) Tatars (9.5%) Romanians (8.2%)	Romani (36.9%) Tatars (13.3%) Romanians (11.8%)	Romani (18.8%) Jews (8.6%) Tatars (7.9%)	Romani (32.2%) Russians (12.9%) Jews (11.7%)
Ukrainians (18.6%) Russians (15.7%) Poles (14.9%)	Ukrainians (31.7%) Russians (24.2%) Poles (19.2%)	Russians (17.4%) Ukrainians (16%) Poles (7.4%)	Ukrainians (29.3%) Poles (18.5%) Russians (14.1%)
orientations			
With the EU countries (36.3%) with Russia (12.9%) with CIS countries (12.5%)	With the EU countries (35.8%) with Russia (19.7%) with other countries (8.8%)	With Russia (28.8%) with the EU countries (27.3%) with other countries (8.5%)	With the EU countries (51.1%) with Russia (10.8%) with other countries (6.4%)

REGIONAL FEATURES				
	West		Centre	
If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the EU were held, how would you vote? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	For (85.1%) against (3.5%)		For (62.2%) against (12.3%)	
How would you vote if Ukraine held a referendum on joining NATO? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	For (70%) against (7%)		For (49.1%) against (20.1%)	
What is your attitude towards...? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	President			
	Positive (1.1%)	Negative (93%)	Positive (1%)	Negative (88%)
	Citizens			
	Positive (11.2%)	Negative (36.9%)	Positive (18.4%)	Negative (28.3%)
Could European integration be a nation-wide idea to consolidate all the regions of Ukraine? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Yes (51%) No (24.7%)		No (38.4%) Yes (35.9%)	
View of prospects for development in Ukraine,				
Would you prefer that your region...? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Secede from Ukraine			
	Yes (1.2%)	No (93.3%)	Yes (1.7%)	No (92.8%)
	Secede from Ukraine			
	Yes (2.6%)	No (92.1%)	Yes (1.6%)	No (92.5%)
	Remain in Ukraine as an autonomous entity			
	Yes (4.5%)	No (87.5%)	Yes (3.5%)	No (88.8%)
	Remain in Ukraine with the same status that it has now			
	Yes (62.3%)	No (27.1%)	Yes (59.3%)	No (28.2%)
	Remain in Ukraine with the same status that it has now			
	Yes (49.7%)	No (34.7%)	Yes (44.4%)	No (37.4%)
Do you believe that there are deep political contradictions, language and cultural differences and economic disproportions between the western and eastern regions of Ukraine that could lead to their separation, creation of their own states or their joining other states? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	No (57%) Yes (26.1%)		No (55.3%) Yes (24.7%)	
Some politicians and journalists claim that the differences in culture, language, historical heritage, and foreign policy orientations of the western and eastern Ukrainians are so significant that they may be considered two different nations. Do you agree with this opinion? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Disagree** (60.8%) agree* (25.6%)		Disagree** (61.5%) agree* (23.1%)	
*Total of answers "agree" and "rather agree".				
**Total of answers "disagree" and "rather disagree".				



OF THE IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS ¹								<i>(continued)</i>	
South		East		Donbas		UKRAINE			
For (41.3%) against (23.8%)		For (39.5%) against (33.7%)		For (33.4%) against (25.3%)		For (56%) against (17.7%)			
Against (33.6%) For (30.1%)		Against (43.9%) For (30.8%)		Against (37%) For (21.1%)		For (43.6%) against (25.9%)			
of Russia									
Positive (9.5%)	Negative (62.7%)	Positive (10%)	Negative (55.9%)	Positive (18.5%)	Negative (41.6%)	Positive (6.3%)	Negative (73.1%)		
of Russia									
Positive (47.1%)	Negative (13.4%)	Positive (45.5%)	Negative (14.2%)	Positive (49.5%)	Negative (10.5%)	Positive (29.9%)	Negative (23.1%)		
No (53.9%) Yes (19.1%)		No (57.6%) Yes (27.2%)		No (42.7%) Yes (26.8%)		No (41.4%) Yes (34.2%)			
attitude towards assessment of the historical past									
and create its own independent state?									
Yes (1.9%)	No (85.8%)	Yes (3.6%)	No (86.7%)	Yes (3.3%)	No (79.1%)	Yes (2.2%)	No (88.9%)		
and join another state?									
Yes (2.6%)	No (84.5%)	Yes (3.8%)	No (86.2%)	Yes (6.6%)	No (73.9%)	Yes (3.1%)	No (87.5%)		
(with its own constitution, government and parliament)?									
Yes (8.6%)	No (75.9%)	Yes (13.3%)	No (76.4%)	Yes (12.3%)	No (60.8%)	Yes (7.5%)	No (80.5%)		
but with expanded rights and powers of local governance?									
Yes (67.4%)	No (17%)	Yes (59.3%)	No (29.1%)	Yes (51.6%)	No (25.2%)	Yes (59.6%)	No (26.5%)		
and with the same rights and powers of local governance?									
Yes (36.6%)	No (40.1%)	Yes (34.1%)	No (47.3%)	Yes (25.8%)	No (46.7%)	Yes (39.8%)	No (40.4%)		
No (34.8%) Yes (34.4%)		No (57%) Yes (29.9%)		No (44.6%) Yes (28.9%)		No (52.1%) Yes (27.6%)			
Disagree** (43.3%) agree* (32.7%)		Disagree** (58.8%) agree* (26.8%)		Disagree** (49%) agree* (28.1%)		Disagree** (57%) agree* (26.2%)			

REGIONAL FEATURES				
	West		Centre	
What is your attitude to these provisions of Ukrainian legislation regarding assessment of the historical past of Ukraine? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Recognition of the Holodomor in 1932-1933			
	Support (91.4%)	Do not support (2.8%)	Support (84.3%)	Do not support (4.7%)
	Condemnation of the communist (1917-1991) totalitarian			
	Support (82%)	Do not support (5.5%)	Support (58.1%)	Do not support (15.8%)
	Condemnation of the national socialist (Nazi)			
	Support (73.3%)	Do not support (7%)	Support (60%)	Do not support (12.9%)
	Recognition of organisations and formations, including the Ukrainian			
	Support (75.9%)	Do not support (6.2%)	Support (45.8%)	Do not support (14.2%)
	Changing the name "The Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)"			
	Support (59.3%)	Do not support (15.1%)	Support (38.4%)	Do not support (29.6%)
	Change the holiday name from Victory Day (May 9)			
Support (56.7%)	Do not support (15.5%)	Support (42.2%)	Do not support (28.4%)	
Attitude towards the conflict in the East of Ukraine				
With which views and assessments regarding the situation in the East of Ukraine do you agree the most? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Further actions concerning			
	Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of control by Ukraine over the areas occupied by separatists (44.8%)		Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of control by Ukraine over the areas occupied by separatists (35.5%)	
	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (18.7%)		Cut off these areas from Ukraine (17.4%)	
	Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (9.9%)		Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (16.4%)	
	Why do you support secession of the regions			
	I do not want the inhabitants of these areas to influence Ukrainian policy and be financed by the Ukrainian budget (77.9%)		I do not want the inhabitants of these areas to influence Ukrainian policy and be financed by the Ukrainian budget (69.2%)	
I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (12.9%)		I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (17.6%)		



OF THE IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS ¹								(continued)
South		East		Donbas		UKRAINE		
in Ukraine as genocide against the Ukrainian people								
Support (68%)	Do not support (11%)	Support (62.5%)	Do not support (14.5%)	Support (46.9%)	Do not support (24.6%)	Support (74.1%)	Do not support (9.9%)	
regime in Ukraine, prohibition of the use and promotion of its symbols								
Support (33.9%)	Do not support (30%)	Support (36.1%)	Do not support (37.5%)	Support (30.3%)	Do not support (38.1%)	Support (52.1%)	Do not support (22.7%)	
(1933-1945) totalitarian regime in Ukraine, prohibition of the use and promotion of its symbols								
Support (46.1%)	Do not support (17.5%)	Support (51.4%)	Do not support (22.5%)	Support (48.6%)	Do not support (23.9%)	Support (57.9%)	Do not support (15.7%)	
National Republic, USS, OUN, UPA as fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century								
Support (20.1%)	Do not support (24.4%)	Support (26.8%)	Do not support (39.6%)	Support (21.1%)	Do not support (37.5%)	Support (42%)	Do not support (22%)	
to "World War II" in 1939-1945 in official documents, names of national holidays, historical monuments, etc.								
Support (19.9%)	Do not support (42%)	Support (21.3%)	Do not support (54.4%)	Support (21.9%)	Do not support (44.4%)	Support (35%)	Do not support (34.8%)	
to the Day of Victory over Nazism In World War II (Victory Day) on May 9								
Support (25.7%)	Do not support (47.4%)	Support (23.1%)	Do not support (50%)	Support (25.8%)	Do not support (46.6%)	Support (37.4%)	Do not support (34.6%)	
and relations with occupied Crimea								
settlement of the conflict in the East of Ukraine...								
Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of Ukrainian control over the areas occupied by separatists (27.1%)	Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (31.9%)	Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (38.8%)	Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of control by Ukraine over the areas occupied by separatists (31.2%)	Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (22%)	Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of Ukrainian control over the areas occupied by separatists (31.2%)	Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (22%)	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (16.2%)	
Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (22.1%)	Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of control by Ukraine over the areas occupied by separatists (20.9%)	Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of control by Ukraine over the areas occupied by separatists (18.9%)	Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (22%)	Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (22%)	Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of Ukrainian control over the areas occupied by separatists (31.2%)	Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine (22%)	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (16.2%)	
Cut off these areas from Ukraine (13.8%)	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (16.7%)	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (11.4%)	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (16.2%)	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (16.2%)	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (16.2%)	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (16.2%)	Cut off these areas from Ukraine (16.2%)	
occupied by separatists? (% of persons who support separation)								
I do not want the inhabitants of these areas to influence Ukrainian policy and be financed from the Ukrainian budget (50.3%)	I do not want the inhabitants of these areas to influence Ukrainian policy and be financed from the Ukrainian budget (44.2%)	I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (75.1%)	I do not want the inhabitants of these areas to influence Ukrainian policy and be financed from the Ukrainian budget (59.7%)	I do not want the inhabitants of these areas to influence Ukrainian policy and be financed from the Ukrainian budget (59.7%)	I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (29.4%)	I do not want the inhabitants of these areas to influence Ukrainian policy and be financed from the Ukrainian budget (59.7%)	I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (29.4%)	
I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (36.2%)	I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (42.9%)	I do not want the inhabitants of these areas to influence Ukrainian policy and be financed from the Ukrainian budget (22.7%)	I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (29.4%)	I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (29.4%)	I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (29.4%)	I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (29.4%)	I believe that the residents in this region have the right to self-determination (29.4%)	

REGIONAL FEATURES		
	West	Centre
With which views and assessments regarding the situation in the East of Ukraine do you agree the most? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	General assessment of the conflict	
	War of aggression by Russia against Ukraine (75.2%) conflict between Russia and the USA being waged in Ukraine for spheres of influence (8.8%) civil conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian residents of Ukraine (6.4)	War of aggression by Russia against Ukraine (59.5%) conflict between Russia and the USA being waged in Ukraine for spheres of influence (14.9%) civil conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian residents of Ukraine (12.5)
	Coexistence of Ukraine and	
	Termination of any relations (including economic) between Ukraine and the uncontrolled territories of Donbas (49.8%) granting special status to Donbas with the possibility of influencing Ukrainian policy (including international) (16.5%)	Termination of any relations (including economic) between Ukraine and the uncontrolled territories of Donbas (45.4%) granting special status to Donbas with the possibility of influencing Ukrainian policy (including international) (15.3%)
Who is responsible for the Ukrainian-Russian conflict? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Russia (68.4%) both countries (21.9%) Ukraine (4.2%)	Russia (56.9%) both countries (30.9%) Ukraine (4.7%)
Which Ukrainian policy option do you prefer concerning the areas controlled by the DPR and LPR? <i>(% of respondents)</i> The three choices that rated the highest are presented here.	Complete isolation (37%) Partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for the residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and to obtain cash payments) (22.9%) partial isolation (maintaining economic and trade contacts) (7.4%)	Complete isolation (30.3%) Partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for the residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and to obtain cash payments) (16.4%) partial isolation (maintaining economic and trade contacts) (10.6%)
There exists an opinion that it is necessary to de-naturalise those Ukrainian citizens who supported Russian aggression against Ukraine, annexation of Crimea and secession movements in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Do you endorse this opinion? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Yes (68.2%) No (15.6%)	Yes (64.3%) No (16.1%)
Did you or your relatives participate in the ATO or engage in military service due to mobilisation in 2013-2015? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	No (65%) Yes (32.4%)	No (63.1%) Yes (32.8%)



OF THE IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS ¹				(continued)
South	East	Donbas	UKRAINE	
In Ukraine				
War of aggression by Russia against Ukraine (32.8%) conflict between Russia and the USA being waged in Ukraine for spheres of influence (25.3%) civil conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian residents of Ukraine (19.3%)	War of aggression by Russia against Ukraine (32.5%) conflict between Russia and the USA being waged in Ukraine for spheres of influence (30%) civil conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian residents of Ukraine (19.6%)	Conflict between Russia and the USA being waged in Ukraine for spheres of influence (31.8%) civil conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian residents of Ukraine (24.6%) War of aggression by Russia against Ukraine (23.6%)	War of aggression by Russia against Ukraine (49.3%) conflict between Russia and the USA being waged in Ukraine for spheres of influence (20.2%) civil conflict between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian residents of Ukraine (15.2%)	
uncontrolled part of Donbas				
Termination any relationship (including economic) between Ukraine and the uncontrolled territories of Donbas (25.4%) granting special status to Donbas with the possibility of influencing Ukrainian policy (including international) (23.6%)	Granting special status to Donbas with the possibility of influencing Ukrainian policy (including international) (37.1%) Termination of any relations (including economic) between Ukraine and the uncontrolled territories of Donbas (23.6%)	Granting special status to Donbas with the possibility of influencing Ukrainian policy (including international) (38.8%) Termination of any relations (including economic) between Ukraine and the uncontrolled territories of Donbas (16.3%)	Termination any relationship (including economic) between Ukraine and the uncontrolled territories of Donbas (35.6%) granting special status to Donbas with the possibility of influencing Ukrainian policy (including international) (24.2%)	
Both countries (41%) Russia (32.6%) Ukraine (10%)	Both countries (36.3%) Russia (35.6%) Ukraine (16.7%)	Both countries (42.5%) Russia (24%) Ukraine (12.9%)	Russia (47.6%) both countries (32.9%) Ukraine (8.7%)	
Complete isolation (17.5%) smooth integration of these areas (restoration of personal and economic contacts, local elections, contact with DPR and LPR leaders, granting of "special status" for these areas) (14.9%) partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and obtain cash payments) (9.7%)	Smooth integration of these areas (restoration of personal and economic contacts, local elections, contact with DPR and LPR leaders, granting of "special status" for these areas) (22.1%) partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and obtain cash payments) (14.6%) Complete isolation (15.9%)	Smooth integration of these areas (restoration of personal and economic contacts, local elections, contact with DPR and LPR leaders, granting of "special status" for these areas) (24.4%) partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and obtain cash payments) (17.8%) Complete isolation (10.3%)	Complete isolation (24.5%) partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and obtain cash payments) (16.9%) smooth integration of these areas (restoration of personal and economic contacts, local elections, contact with DPR and LPR leaders, granting of "special status" for these areas) (14.5%)	
Yes (40%) No (39.7%)	No (52.8%) Yes (32.2%)	No (58.5%) Yes (23.6%)	Yes (50.1%) No (32%)	
No (86.4%) Yes (10.3%)	No (73.5%) Yes (23.9%)	No (77.5%) Yes (17%)	No (70.2%) Yes (26.2%)	

REGIONAL FEATURES				
	West		Centre	
What principles should be applied while establishing relations between Ukrainian residents and the following categories of citizens upon settlement of the conflict in the East of Ukraine? <i>(% of respondents)</i> The two choices that rated the highest are presented here.	People who left the ATO zone			
	“They are not guilty” (65.5%) “Understand and forgive” (20.5%)		“They are not guilty” (70.4%) “Understand and forgive” (16.7%)	
	People who left the ATO zone			
	“They are not guilty” (36%) “Understand and forgive” (26.3%)		“They are not guilty” (39.5%) “Understand and forgive” (23.7%)	
	People who wanted to leave the ATO zone			
	“They are not guilty” (62.3%) “Understand and forgive” (21.7%)		“They are not guilty” (64.8%) “Understand and forgive” (22.9%)	
	People who did not leave the ATO zone			
	“They are not guilty” (55.6%) “Understand and forgive” (25.5%)		“They are not guilty” (59.5%) “Understand and forgive” (23.7%)	
	People who did not leave the ATO zone			
	“Will not forget, will not forgive” (55.1%) “Understand and forgive” (20.1%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (56.8%) “Understand and forgive” (16.3%)	
People forced to take part				
“Will not forget, will not forgive” (45.2%) “Understand and forgive” (26.3%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (49.7%) “Understand and forgive” (19.4%)		
People who participated in paramilitary forces of the DPR and LPR				
“Will not forget, will not forgive” (83.1%) “Understand and forgive” (5.3%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (81.8%) “Understand and forgive” (4.5%)		
People who participated in paramilitary forces				
“Will not forget, will not forgive” (86.8%) “Understand and forgive” (3.6%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (84.1%) “Understand and forgive” (4.4%)		
What is your attitude towards the following actions? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Food blockade			
	Positive (59%)	Negative (21.2%)	Positive (43.8%)	Negative (29.2%)
Energy blockade				
Positive (62%)	Negative (19.3%)	Positive (47%)	Negative (26.7%)	
Socio-economic				
What is the overall financial situation of your family? <i>(% of respondents)</i> The three choices that rated the highest are presented here.	There is enough money only for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items (44.2%) there is generally enough money for everyday expenses, but purchasing durable goods is difficult (30.8%) we scarcely make ends meet; we are short of money even for food (18.2%)		There is enough money only for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items (45.2%) there is generally enough money for everyday expenses, but purchasing durable goods is difficult (29.2%) we scarcely make ends meet; we are short of money even for food (19.4%)	
	Middle (49.3%) Lower (42.5%) Upper (0.4%)		Middle (53.1%) Lower (35.8%) Upper (0.8%)	
If the Ukrainian society were hypothetically divided into three social classes, to which class would you attribute yourself? <i>(% of respondents)</i>	Middle (49.3%) Lower (42.5%) Upper (0.4%)		Middle (53.1%) Lower (35.8%) Upper (0.8%)	



OF THE IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS ¹								(continued)
South		East		Donbas		UKRAINE		
for other Ukrainian regions								
“They are not guilty” (75.9%) “Understand and forgive” (11%)		“They are not guilty” (73.9%) “Understand and forgive” (11.8%)		“They are not guilty” (67.8%) “Understand and forgive” (16.9%)		“They are not guilty” (70.2%) “Understand and forgive” (16%)		
for Russia								
“They are not guilty” (53.9%) “Understand and forgive” (22.7%)		“They are not guilty” (58%) “Understand and forgive” (18.1%)		“They are not guilty” (56.5%) “Understand and forgive” (25%)		“They are not guilty” (46.4%) “Understand and forgive” (23.3%)		
for other Ukrainian regions but were unable to do so								
“They are not guilty” (74.3%) “Understand and forgive” (12%)		“They are not guilty” (71.1%) “Understand and forgive” (16.1%)		“They are not guilty” (63.8%) “Understand and forgive” (20.8%)		“They are not guilty” (66.3%) “Understand and forgive” (19.9%)		
for other Ukrainian regions but do not support the DPR/LPR								
“They are not guilty” (68.3%) “Understand and forgive” (15%)		“They are not guilty” (62%) “Understand and forgive” (20.4%)		“They are not guilty” (59.9%) “Understand and forgive” (23.3%)		“They are not guilty” (60.2%) “Understand and forgive” (22.5%)		
for other Ukrainian regions and support DPR/LPR								
“Understand and forgive” (30.1%) “Will not forget, will not forgive” (22.3%)		“Understand and forgive” (31.9%) “Will not forget, will not forgive” (25.4%)		“Understand and forgive” (37.3%) “they are not guilty” (24.2%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (40.2%) “Understand and forgive” (24.7%)		
in paramilitary forces of the DPR and LPR and fought against Ukraine								
“Understand and forgive” (34.6%) “Will not forget, will not forgive” (19.5%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (35.9%) “Understand and forgive” (27.3%)		“Understand and forgive” (41.4%) “they are not guilty” (19.6%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (37%) “Understand and forgive” (27.4%)		
took part in paramilitary forces of the DPR and LPR on their own initiative and fought against Ukraine								
“Will not forget, will not forgive” (48.3%) “Understand and forgive” (16.1%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (58.9%) “Understand and forgive” (10.5%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (28.5%) “Understand and forgive” (25.4%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (65.9%) “Understand and forgive” (10.3%)		
of the DPR and LPR and took part in torture of Ukrainian military troops and civilians								
“Will not forget, will not forgive” (64.7%) “Understand and forgive” (8.4%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (63.9%) “Understand and forgive” (7.9%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (41.7%) “Understand and forgive” (14.7%)		“Will not forget, will not forgive” (72.1%) “Understand and forgive” (6.9%)		
of Crimea								
Positive (29.3%)	Negative (40%)	Positive (23.1%)	Negative (57.8%)	Positive (23.4%)	Negative (48.2%)	Positive (38.4%)	Negative (36.9%)	
of Crimea								
Positive (30.6%)	Negative (39.8%)	Positive (24.7%)	Negative (56.5%)	Positive (22%)	Negative (49.2%)	Positive (40.3%)	Negative (35.6%)	
identity								
There is enough money only for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items (36.1%) we scarcely make ends meet; we are short of money even for food (31.5%) there is generally enough money for everyday expenses, but purchasing durable goods is difficult (25.9%)		There is enough money only for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items (35.6%) there is generally enough money for everyday expenses, but purchasing durable goods is difficult (31.3%) we scarcely make ends meet; we are short of money even for food (28.4%)		There is enough money only for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items (37%) there is generally enough money for everyday expenses, but purchasing durable goods is difficult (32.9%) we scarcely make ends meet; we are short of money even for food (24.8%)		There is enough money only for food and purchase of inexpensive necessary items (40.8%) there is generally enough money for everyday expenses, but purchasing durable goods is difficult (30.1%) we scarcely make ends meet; we are short of money even for food (22.9%)		
Lower (46.6%) Middle (40.5%) Upper (0.5%)		Lower (49.2%) Middle (40.7%) Upper (1.1%)		Middle (51.8%) Lower (28.9%) Upper (0.5%)		Middle (48.3%) Lower (39.5%) Upper (0.7%)		

IDENTITY FEATURES OF DIFFERENT LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL GROUPS

Previous research by the Razumkov Centre has revealed cross impact and interdependence between several identity aspects – language, cultural, national, and civic.¹ In particular, such factors as Ukrainian nationality, Ukrainian language as a mother tongue, and belonging to the Ukrainian cultural tradition significantly influenced the respondents' level of patriotism, perceptions of Ukraine as a homeland, the desired status for languages, prospects for observing cultural traditions, understanding of the nation, support for territorial integrity of Ukraine and its particular geopolitical direction.

The survey held in 2015 enables to continue studying this interplay between different identity aspects. Given the situation in Ukraine, especially the Russian aggression, the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, identity features of different social groups in terms of their language and national identification become particularly relevant.

To achieve this, three groups were distinguished among the respondents depending on their language affiliation (Ukrainian-speaking, bilingual, and Russian-speaking respondents), and two groups based on their national self-identification (Ukrainians and Russians). Comparing these groups in each category enables to assess both similarities and existing differences.

I. IDENTITY FEATURES OF SEPARATE LANGUAGE GROUPS

Three groups were distinguished among the respondents depending on the language they speak at home (Ukrainian and mostly Ukrainian – 50% of respondents; sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian – 25%; Russian and mostly Russian – 24%).

CIVIC IDENTITY

In the first place, almost half of Ukrainian speaking citizens (47%) identify themselves with Ukraine. For Russian-speaking and bilingual respondents, affiliation to their town or village (43% and 42% respectively) comes first, and self-identification with Ukraine comes second (respectively, 30% and 38%).

15% of Russian speakers, 11% of bilinguals, and 10% of Ukrainian-speaking citizens identify themselves with their region; while 4% of Russian-speaking respondents, 3% of bilinguals, and 1% of Ukrainian-speaking citizens – with the Soviet Union.


As a second choice, in all language groups, the hierarchy of identities is as follows – nationwide, local, regional.

Notable are the differences in attitudes to holding a Ukrainian citizenship between different groups that speak Ukrainian, Russian, or both languages.

Indeed, 81% of Ukrainian-speaking, 64% of bilingual, and 47% of Russian-speaking citizens are very or somewhat proud of their Ukrainian citizenship.

39% of Russian-speakers are not or rather not proud of it (28% among the bilingual speakers, and 13% among Ukrainian).


The majority in all groups view Ukraine as their motherland, and would have chosen it anyway if they had been given a choice. However, among Russian speakers, 10% do not see it this way, and 24% would not have chosen Ukraine as their motherland, and 23% were undecided.



¹ See section "The Features of Identity of the Russian-Speaking Citizens of Ukraine" of the Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre "Building a Common Identity of the Citizens of Ukraine: Prospects and Risks". – National Security and Defence, 2007, No.9; p. 10-14.



Among the Ukrainian-speaking and bilingual citizens, the majority would choose to live in Ukraine or the European Union, and 1% and 3% respectively – in Russia. Among the Russian speakers, the majority would also like to live in Ukraine and the EU, but 13% would choose Russia.



To be proud of one's country is essential for more than half (56%) of Ukrainian-speaking respondents; while for half (51%) of Russian speakers personal well-being is enough to be happy. Among the bilinguals, the opinions are equally divided.

86% of the Ukrainian-speaking, 70% of the bilingual, and the 55% of Russian-speaking respondents consider themselves patriots of Ukraine. Respectively, 34% of the Russian speakers, 17% of bilingual and 8% of Ukrainian speakers do not.


Thus, in Ukrainian society, the issues of language and patriotism are interlinked.

In all the groups, the respondents agree that in order to consider oneself a patriot, a person, first of all, should cultivate love for Ukraine in his children, care for the welfare of his family, respect his country, its symbols, laws, government institutions, its history and culture, work for the good of one's country, readiness to fight for the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens, and to protect country's international image.

Readiness to defend the country from enemies, and to protect its territorial integrity, as qualities necessary for a patriot, are rated high among the Ukrainian-speaking citizens, and low among Russian speakers.

Using Ukrainian language in everyday life seems much less important for Russian speakers than for Ukrainian and bilingual respondents.

Giving up personal welfare for Ukraine's future also looks less important for the Russian-speaking and bilingual citizens. Very noticeable differences are observed in answers to the question on respondents' readiness to defend their country. In particular, 46% of Russian-speaking respondents were not ready to do so (either with arms or through the volunteer movement), only 9% of them would take up arms and 24% would take part in volunteer movement.



Among the Ukrainian speakers, 23% are willing to defend Ukraine with arms, and 37% to join volunteer activities. Among the bilingual speakers, this number is 15% and 31%, respectively.

To increase Ukraine's economic independence even if it leads to deterioration of living standards is not too popular among the groups. 40% of Ukrainian speakers, 32% of the bilingual speakers, and 20% of the Russian speakers are fully or somewhat willing to make such sacrifice.

Most Ukrainian-speaking respondents feel proud of Ukraine for the achievements in research and technology (56%), sports (80%), art and literature (71%), its Armed Forces (65%), history (75%), and the Ukrainian national character.

The bilingual speakers show less pride in these matters: 44% are proud of achievements in research and technology, 71% in sports, 65% in art and literature, 56% of the Armed Forces, 69% of history, and 65% of the Ukrainian national character.

Russian speakers are much less proud of the Armed Forces – 41%, and achievements in research and technology – 39%. 62% are proud of the achievement in sports, 57% in art and literature, 57% in history, and 54% of the Ukrainian national character.

All the groups do not tend to be proud of the way democracy works, Ukraine's political influence globally, achievements in the economy, the social security system in Ukraine, and fair and just treatment of different social groups. The Russian-speaking respondents are most critical of these issues.

The difference in opinions is observed in questions regarding Ukraine's independence, and its national symbols.

Indeed, among Ukrainian speakers, 81% would support the state independence at a referendum, 64% among the bilingual speakers, and 46% among the Russian speakers.

In all the groups, the majority are proud of or have a positive attitude towards Ukraine's national symbols and attributes – the Flag, the Coat of Arms, the Anthem, the national currency, and Ukrainian as an official language. However, if the majority of Ukrainian speakers are proud of them, the bilingual and Russian speakers share a positive attitude towards them.

ASPECTS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY

Most respondents in each group responded that they are interested in politics to some extent. The highest number of people who are not interested in politics at all is among the Russian speakers – 26%. Among the bilingual speakers, there are 22% of such answers, and 18% among the Ukrainian speakers.

Slightly larger number of Ukrainian speakers (56%) believe that democracy is the most preferred form of governance for Ukraine. Among the Russian-speaking citizens, 20% believe that, under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime can work better but this share is not larger than in other groups (17% each).

Among Russian speakers, there is the largest share (18%) of those for whom this does not matter.

All the respondents assessed the current political regime as something in between dictatorship and democracy but the Ukrainian speakers consider it slightly more democratic than representatives of other groups.

In all groups, the interpretation of equality is understood primarily as equality of opportunity and equality before the law. Also, in all the groups, about half of respondents believe that it is better to live in a society where the state regulates everything, and there is no excessive social inequality. A society of individual freedom and personal responsibility for one's own destiny is supported by roughly one third of each group.

The groups demonstrate clearly different opinions in relation to the support of the Maidan and the Anti-Maidan. Indeed, most of the Ukrainian speakers would support the Maidan (55%). In other groups, the majority would support neither of them.

SOCIO-CULTURAL IDENTITY


Language Identity

95% of Ukrainian, 40% of bilingual, and 9% of the Russian-speaking respondents consider Ukrainian their mother tongue.

Russian is a native language for 1% of Ukrainian-speaking population, 7% of bilingual, and 55% of Russian-speaking respondents. Both languages are considered equally native by 4% of Ukrainian, 51% of bilingual, and 32% of Russian speakers.

Outside home, 89% of Ukrainian-speaking respondents speak Ukrainian or mostly Ukrainian, and 87% of the Russian-speaking – Russian or mostly Russian.

Nearly two years have passed since the events referred to as Maidan. If the events of 2013-2014 took place now, would you support Maidan or Anti-Maidan?
% of respondents



Among bilingual citizens, 86% sometimes speak Russian, and sometimes Ukrainian.

Ukrainian speaking citizens consider speaking Ukrainian among friends and colleagues more prestigious (77% of the Ukrainian speakers think so), and 57% of Russian speakers note greater prestige of Russian. For 53% of bilingual, 33% of Russian-speaking, and 15% of Ukrainian-speaking citizens, it does not matter significantly which language is spoken.

It should be noted that 59% of the bilingual respondents, and only 29% of the Russian speakers stated fluency in Ukrainian. 52% of Russian speakers declare proficiency in Ukrainian sufficient for everyday communication, 15% admitted poor understanding of Ukrainian, and 2% do not understand it at all.

Ukrainian as the only official language is supported by 76% of Ukrainian-speaking, 47% of the bilingual, and 25% of the Russian-speaking citizens.

Among the Russian speakers, 34% want Russian to be granted an official status in some regions, and 33% – the status of an official language along with Ukrainian. The latter opinion is supported only by 4% of the Ukrainian-speaking citizens.

Among the Ukrainian-speaking citizens, compared to other groups, proficiency in foreign languages is somewhat higher.

In what way should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine?
% of respondents

	Ukrainian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Russian
Ukrainian should be the only state and official language; Russian can be used in everyday communication just as the languages of other national minorities	75.8	46.5	24.9
Ukrainian should be the state language; Russian can be an official language in some regions of Ukraine	16.2	30.7	33.6
Both should be state languages in Ukraine	4.1	15.8	32.7
Russian should be the state language; Ukrainian can be an official language in some regions of Ukraine	0.9	1.3	2.7
Russian should be the only state and official language; Ukrainian can be used in everyday communication	1.1	0.6	1.8
Difficult to answer	2.0	5.0	4.3




Cultural Identity

Among the Ukrainian-speaking respondents, 86% of citizens identify themselves with Ukrainian cultural tradition, 6% with the European, and 4% with the Soviet.

Among the bilingual and Russian-speaking citizens, significant shares (69% and 41% respectively) also associate themselves with Ukrainian tradition, 23% and 11% with the Soviet, and 8% with the pan-European culture.

It should be noted that only 11% of the Russian-speaking and 2% of the bilingual citizens identify themselves with the Russian cultural tradition.



Most Ukrainian speakers (52%) and the relative majority (34%) of the bilingual speakers believe that, in 20-25 years, the Ukrainian cultural tradition will prevail in Ukraine, and 22% and 23% respectively believe in the domination of the pan-European tradition.

Among the Russian speakers, there are more (29%) of those who think that, in different regions, different traditions will prevail than of those who would be convinced in the domination of the Ukrainian (20%) or pan-European (18%) cultural traditions. 6% of the Russian speakers believe in the dominance of both the Russian and Soviet cultural traditions in the future.

47% of the Ukrainian-speaking, 62% of the bilingual, and 57% of the Russian-speaking citizens do not care about who their neighbours are. The highest percentage of people in all the groups would not want to live next to Romani (28-35%). 21% of the Ukrainian speakers would not like to live next to Russians. The Russian speakers do not show such an attitude towards Ukrainians.

For the Ukrainian speakers, the most desirable neighbours are Ukrainians (34%) and Poles (22%). For bilinguals – Ukrainians (24%), Poles (15%) and Russians (14%). For Russians – Russians and Ukrainians (14% each), and Poles (14%).

For the Ukrainian speakers, the closest to each other are the residents of Western and Central Ukraine, Galicia and Central Ukraine, the residents of Central and Eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine. The Ukrainian-speaking citizens consider the distance between the residents of Ukraine and the residents of occupied areas of Crimea and Donbas greater than the bilingual and Russian-speaking respondents.

The Russian-speaking and bilingual respondents consider Ukrainians and Russians closer to each other than Ukrainians from different regions of the country.

The Ukrainian-speaking citizens more often feel European (34% of the responses “yes” and “probably yes”) than the bilingual (27%) and Russian (21%) speakers.

The reasons that do not allow them to feel European are similar in all the groups. However, for the Russian speakers, the “non-European mind” and language barriers are somewhat more important.

National Identity

97% of the Ukrainian-speaking, 89% of the bilingual, and 66% of the Russian-speaking citizens consider themselves Ukrainian by nationality. 27% of the Russian-speaking and 7% of the bilingual citizens consider themselves Russian.

55% of Ukrainian-speaking and 58% of the bilingual respondents perceive the Ukrainian nation primarily as civic.


22% of Ukrainian, 13% of bilingual, and 11% of the Russian speakers believe that the nation is composed of citizens who speak Ukrainian, observe national traditions, and raise their children accordingly. The understanding of the nation based on ethnicity is shared by about the same percentage among all the groups – 19-20%.

As to the definition of nationalism, opinions of the Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking respondents differ significantly.


For most Ukrainian speakers (60%), it is a worldview whose basic idea is to transform Ukraine into a strong respectable state. This definition is also supported by 42% of bilingual speakers and 30% of Russian speakers.

For the relative majority (38%) of Russian speakers, Ukrainian nationalism is an ideology that divides the society. 17% of the Russian speakers consider Ukrainian nationalism a historical phenomenon that is not relevant nowadays.

Among the bilingual citizens, nationalism is considered a splitting ideology by 26%.



Proficiency in Ukrainian and the basic knowledge of history and culture is considered a duty by 83% of Ukrainian-speaking, 70% of bilingual, and 57% of Russian-speaking respondents. 32% of Russian speakers (also 11% of the Ukrainian speakers and 20% of the bilingual speakers) do not think so.



GEOPOLITICAL PRIORITIES

Difference between groups exists in assessing foreign policy priorities. For 66% of Ukrainian-speaking, 42% of bilingual, and 32% of Russian-speaking respondents relations with the EU countries are top priority. Instead, 27% of Russian speakers consider relations with Russia as most important.

70% of Ukrainian-speaking, 48% of bilingual, and 36% of Russian-speaking citizens would support joining the EU at a referendum.

Only among the Ukrainian-speaking citizens, the majority of respondents believe that the EU integration may become a national idea uniting all regions of Ukraine (40% against 35%). In all other groups, the opponents of this idea prevail.

56% of Ukrainian speakers, 37% of bilingual speakers (and it is more than the opponents), and only 25% of Russian speakers (against – 41%) would vote for joining NATO.


When, in general, in all the groups, an absolute or simple majority demonstrates a negative attitude towards the President, the Government, and the State

Duma of Russia, among the Russian-speaking citizens, there is a significant share of both positive (approximately 15%) and neutral (approximately 30%) attitudes towards them although a negative attitude prevails (from 44% to 49%).


In their attitudes towards the citizens of Russia, the Russian speakers stand out among the other groups – among them, positive (46%) and neutral (38%) attitudes prevails while, for the Ukrainian speakers, neutral and negative attitudes are more typical. In this matter, the bilingual speakers are somewhat closer to the Russian speakers.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERREGIONAL DIFFERENCES, PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND ASSESSMENTS OF HISTORICAL PAST


Most of the respondents among the Ukrainian-speaking and bilingual citizens (56% and 54% respectively), and the relative majority among the Russian speakers do not think that there are any profound differences and contradictions between the western and eastern regions of Ukraine that can cause their separation. One third among the Russian speakers, and one quarter in all the other groups believe that such contradictions exist.



Also, a majority or a relative majority in all the groups do not agree that eastern and western Ukrainians are two different nations. However, among the bilingual and Russian speakers, the shares of those who agree are higher than in the Ukrainian-speaking group.



Some politicians and journalists claim that the differences in culture, language, historical heritage, and foreign policy orientations of the western and eastern Ukrainians are so significant, that they can be considered two different nations. Do you agree with this opinion?
% of respondents



In all the groups, the absolute majority of respondents do not want their oblasts to secede from Ukraine. Not many people would like their oblasts to withdraw from Ukraine and create independent states, or join another state – 4-7% of the Russian speakers, and even less in other groups. However, 15-16% of the Russian-speaking citizens do not know the answer to this question.

Among the Russian-speaking citizens, a share of those who would like their oblasts to remain part of Ukraine as an autonomy (with their own government and parliament) is significant – 14%. Among the bilingual speakers, there are 9% of such respondents, and 4% among the Ukrainian speakers.

In all the three groups, most citizens (from 62% of the Ukrainian speakers to 55% of the Russian speakers) support the oblasts to remain part of Ukraine with the expansion of the rights and powers of local government.

Only among the Ukrainian-speaking citizens, the relative majority (47%) agree to keep the current status of the oblasts and powers of the local government.

The language factor significantly affects public perception of Ukraine’s history assessments. **The general trend is a falling level of support for all provisions on which questions were asked, in the direction “Ukrainian-speaking – bilingual – Russian-speaking”.**

Given this trend, regarding some questions – in particular, the recognition of the Holodomor of the Ukrainian people a genocide, the condemnation of the national socialist regime, and the prohibition of using its symbols, establishing criminal liability for violating the law on the prohibition of the use of the symbols of the national socialist regime – in all three groups, the share of the respondents who support the corresponding legal provisions is higher than the share of its opponents.



What is your attitude to these provisions of Ukrainian legislation regarding assessment of the historical past of Ukraine? % of respondents			
	Ukrainian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Russian
Recognition the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932-1933 as genocide against the Ukrainian people			
Support	86.3	67.8	55.4
Do not support	3.9	13.0	19.6
Do not care	4.2	8.1	13.1
Difficult to answer	5.7	11.1	11.8
Condemnation the national socialist (Nazi) (1933-1945) totalitarian regime in Ukraine and prohibition against the use and promotion of its symbols			
Support	65.7	52.7	47.8
Do not support	10.8	17.8	23.9
Do not care	9.8	14.5	17.0
Difficult to answer	13.7	15.1	11.3
Establishing criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting the propaganda of the national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regime and the use of its symbols			
Support	55.7	39.5	38.6
Do not support	14.5	23.8	32.1
Do not care	12.5	17.8	16.4
Difficult to answer	17.3	18.9	12.8
Condemnation of the communist (1917-1991) totalitarian regime in Ukraine and prohibition against the use and promotion of its symbols			
Support	65.9	44.6	31.9
Do not support	13.0	27.6	38.5
Do not care	9.7	13.0	17.6
Difficult to answer	11.4	14.8	12.0
Establishing criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting the propaganda of the communist totalitarian regime and the use of its symbols			
Support	51.1	28.2	22.9
Do not support	18.9	33.5	48.5
Do not care	12.9	17.4	15.9
Difficult to answer	17.1	20.9	12.7
Establishing a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation in Ukraine on May 8 to commemorate all victims of World War II (1939-1945)			
Support	56.3	41.5	33.9
Do not support	16.4	29.9	40.0
Do not care	14.0	14.4	15.6
Difficult to answer	13.4	14.2	10.5
Change the holiday name from Victory Day (May 9) to the Day of Victory over Nazism			
Support	47.6	31.8	22.9
Do not support	24.2	39.6	50.6
Do not care	14.1	13.7	16.1
Difficult to answer	14.1	14.9	10.4
Changing the name "The Great Patriotic War" to "World War II in 1939-1945" in official documents, names of national holidays, historical monuments, etc.			
Support	46.6	27.1	19.7
Do not support	25.1	39.7	49.6
Do not care	14.0	16.8	18.0
Difficult to answer	14.4	16.4	12.7
Recognizing the following organisations and groups as fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century: Ukrainian National Republic, Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS), troops of Kholodny Yar Republic, Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the People's Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction			
Support	58.3	28.7	22.5
Do not support	12.3	28.1	36.7
Do not care	11.4	18.1	18.4
Difficult to answer	18.0	25.1	22.4



As to certain questions – in particular, on the recognition of such government agencies and groups as the Ukrainian National Republic, the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA) etc. as fighters for independence, establishing a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation in Ukraine on 8 May, the condemnation of the communist regime and prohibition of its symbols, and establishing criminal liability for violating the law on the prohibition of the use of the communist symbols, **the groups of Ukrainian-speaking and bilingual respondents support rather than oppose these changes. Among the Russian speakers, disapproval prevails.**

As to such questions as renaming the Great Patriotic War to World War II of 1939-1945 in official documents, and renaming the Victory Day, the relative majority of the Ukrainian speakers supporter it (47% and 48% respectively), and in the bilingual and Russian-speaking groups, **opponents of respective provisions prevail over it proponents.**

Meanwhile, the level of support for the most controversial questions of the Russian-speaking respondents is 20-23%.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE AND RELATIONS WITH OCCUPIED CRIMEA

Answers to the question on the overall assessment of the conflict in Ukraine demonstrate very noticeable differences in approaches between Ukrainian and Russian-speaking citizens.


Most Ukrainian-speaking respondents assess it as the war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine (65%) while the relative majority of Russian speakers think of the conflict as Russia and the U.S. fighting for areas of influence in Ukraine, and equal shares (25% each) – as the war of Russia against Ukraine, and a civil conflict in Ukraine.

Bilingual citizens are more likely to support the assessment of the conflict as a war of Russia against Ukraine (42%).

When 61% of Ukrainian-speaking citizens and 41% of bilingual citizens place responsibility for the conflict on Russia, 43% of the Russian-speaking citizens – on Ukraine and Russia equally. 16% of the Russian speakers tend to blame Ukraine primarily.



The opinions of the Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens clearly differ on many issues regarding further actions to resolve the conflict, future coexistence of Ukraine with the occupied area, and the attitude towards those who fought against Ukraine.



Indeed, among the Ukrainian-speaking respondents, 40% support the continuation of the CTO until fully regaining control over the occupied areas, and 17% among the Russian speakers.

On the other hand, 35% of the Russian speakers support giving the occupied areas a special status while among the Ukrainian speakers this number is 16%.

Equal shares (17%) of respondents support the secession of these areas from Ukraine but their motivation differs.

While among the Ukrainian-speaking supporters of secession, 75% do not want these areas to influence Ukraine's policy, and to be funded from the state budget, 55% of the Russian speakers believe that the residents of these areas have the right to self-determination.

The relative majority (46%) of Ukrainian-speaking citizens support the termination of any relations with the uncontrolled areas; among the Russian speakers, the most popular answers are "do not know", and support for giving the occupied areas a special status.

The Ukrainian-speaking citizens more often support complete isolation of the occupied areas – this decision is supported by 34% of respondents, and 13% among the Russian speakers (19% among the bilingual speakers).

The Russian speakers are more likely to support soft reintegration of the uncontrolled areas, including the restoration of trade, maintaining contacts with the leaders of illegal groups, adoption of a special status (22% against 10% of the Ukrainian speakers)



as well as the recognition of independence of the DPR/LPR (11% against 3% of the Ukrainian speakers).

Most Ukrainian-speaking citizens support the idea that those who supported Russian aggression, the annexation of Crimea, and the separatist movements should be deprived of Ukrainian citizenship (64% of the answers). Among Russian speakers, 56% are against (27% for) this proposal.

Among the bilinguals, the relative majority stand for depriving these people of citizenship (43% against 37%).

In the questions on defining the principles of relations between the residents of Ukraine and the occupied areas, approaches of the Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens differ significantly when it comes to those who supported illegal groups, fought against Ukraine, and committed torture against Ukrainian soldiers and civilians.

As to those who supported the DPR/LPR, the majority of the Ukrainian-speaking and the relative majority of bilingual respondents chose the answer “we will not forget, we will not forgive”; among the Russian speakers, this approach ranked third, after “understand and forgive”, and “they are not guilty”.

As to those who were forced to fight in the groups of the DPR/LPR, the relative majority of the Ukrainian speakers (46%) support the approach “we will not forget, we will not forgive”; among the bilingual speakers, the shares of those who are not willing to forget and forgive, and those who are willing to understand and to forgive are almost the same (33% and 30% respectively). Among the Russian speakers, the relative majority (34%) can “understand and forgive”.

81% of the Ukrainian-speaking and 61% of the bilingual respondents are not willing to “forget and forgive” the **citizens who willingly fought against Ukraine in the armed groups of the DPR/LPR**. Among the Russian speakers, this approach is shared by the relative majority (41%). Among them, there are also more of those who are willing to understand and forgive, or think that they are not to blame as well as those who could not answer.

As to the citizens who fought against Ukraine in the armed groups of the DPR/LPR, and committed torture against Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, the majority in all the groups support the principle “we will not forget, we will not forgive” (from 84% of the Ukrainian speakers to 53% of the Russian speakers). However, among the bilingual and Russian speakers, there are more respondents willing to support other approaches, and especially more of those who could not answer (19% and 28%, respectively).

Attitudes towards the blockade of Crimea

Nearly half of Ukrainian-speaking citizens support the food and energy blockade of Crimea. However, most of Russian speakers and the relative majority of bilingual speakers do not support such measures.

Which Ukrainian policy option do you prefer concerning the areas controlled by the DPR and LPR?
% of respondents

	Ukrainian	Sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian	Russian
Complete isolation	33.5	18.5	12.6
Partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for the residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and to obtain cash payments)	18.4	16.4	15.1
Soft integration of these areas (restoration of personal and economic contacts, local elections, contacts with DPR and LPR leaders, adoption of a “special status” for these areas)	9.9	16.7	22.3
Partial isolation (maintaining economic and trade contacts)	8.2	10.4	8.4
Recognition of independence for the DPR and LPR and establishing relations with them as independent states	2.5	6.3	11.4
Other	5.2	4.9	3.9
Difficult to answer	22.4	26.8	26.3



CONCLUSIONS

Based on the study, it can be assumed that the language factor significantly affects various aspects of citizens' identity.

Indeed, the factor of the use of the Ukrainian language is combined with a higher level of national identity, patriotism, support for its independence, willingness to defend their country, the need to be proud of its achievements and assessment of such achievements, and a value attitude towards the national symbols. The Ukrainian-speaking respondents mostly are supporters of democracy; most of them share the goals and values of the Maidan.

Among the Russian-speaking citizens, only one third demonstrates fluency in Ukrainian when among the bilingual respondents, it is 59%. Most of the Ukrainian speakers and the relative majority of bilingual speakers support the current status of Ukrainian as the only official language.

If, among the Ukrainian-speaking and bilingual citizens, the Ukrainian national identity prevails, two thirds of the Russian-speaking respondents share the Ukrainian national identity, different to the language they speak. This also roughly correlates with the share of the Russian speakers who demonstrate Ukrainian or pan-European cultural identities.

In different groups, the majority share a civic understanding of the nation but for the Ukrainian-speaking citizens a Ukrainian cultural component is more significant, and a noticeable share of Russian speakers reject it.

The fact that respondents use Ukrainian more often relates to an approach of understanding nationalism as a contemporary worldview of development of a strong Ukrainian; state when using Russian – interpretation of nationalism in the spirit of Soviet and Russian stereotypes.

The Ukrainian cultural tradition is dominant among the Ukrainian-speaking and bilingual citizens. Almost half of the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine consider themselves bearers of the Ukrainian and pan-European cultural traditions, almost a quarter – of the Soviet, and only one in ten – of the Russian. Russian-speaking citizens are more likely to see regional multiculturalism in Ukraine in the future.

The Ukrainian-speaking citizens tend to feel more European than representatives of other groups. For all the groups, the main obstacle for this is the financial factor but for the Russian speakers these are cultural differences too.

The feature of using Russian is combined with obvious weakening of support of the Western vector of foreign policy and strengthening of the pro-Russian priorities.

Even in the conditions of war, almost half of the Russian-speaking citizens demonstrate positive

or neutral attitude towards public institutions of the aggressor state when most Ukrainian-speaking citizens have a negative attitude towards them. Clearly, differences in assessments may cause tension in relations between different groups of Ukrainian society.

The Russian-speaking citizens are more likely to distance Western Ukraine from other regions than the Ukrainian speakers, and support the options of autonomy of the regions more. However, in all the groups, the absolute majority does not support the options of secession of their regions, or their autonomy.

The language factor is connected with internal resistance of some citizens to changing the historical events, names, symbols, and dates established in their minds. Apparently, this is partly due to the fact that a certain share of these groups has Russian and Soviet cultural identities (up to 34% among the Russian speakers). Respectively, the processes of formation of their own Ukrainian historic narrative and decommunisation among them are more difficult. However, it should be noted that the majority in these groups (absolute or relative) belongs to the Ukrainian cultural tradition.

The differences in assessments of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine between two language groups relate to the following issues – defining who is responsible for the conflict, the assessment of solutions to the conflict, the way of co-existence with the occupied areas, the attitude towards citizens who supported the DPR/LPR and members of the armed groups of the latter.

The Ukrainian-speaking citizens place more responsibility for the conflict on Russia, more often support the use of force in the conflict resolution and isolation of the occupied areas, and are less prone to understanding and forgiveness of the supporters of the DPR/LPR and members of their armed groups.

The bilingual and especially Russian-speaking citizens more often place responsibility on both countries or Ukraine only, assess the conflict from the points of view common in Russia, support giving a special status to the occupied areas, and are more tolerant towards supporters of the DPR/LPR and members of their armed groups.

However, the above differences do not exclude chances of reaching understanding on these matters, especially given a basic consensus among all groups on the most fundamental questions of the existence of the Ukrainian statehood (the perception of Ukraine as motherland, patriotism, and support for the territorial integrity of the country). The above features are important to consider when making political decisions in certain areas, and especially in the development and implementation of an integrated, coherent policy of building a common national identity of Ukrainian citizens.

II. IDENTITY FEATURES OF DIFFERENT NATIONAL GROUPS (UKRAINIANS vs. RUSSIANS)

Two groups were distinguished among the respondents, depending on their answers to the questions on their national identity. Ukrainians comprise the relative majority among the respondents – in total (86%) and in all its regions (from 96% in Western Ukraine to 61% in Donbas). The second largest group among the respondents are Russians (9%) – the highest number of them is in Donbas (31%), Eastern Ukraine (11%), and Southern Ukraine (9%).

CIVIC IDENTITY


Two national groups have clear differences in almost all the aspects of civic identity.

Among Ukrainians, the relative majority associate themselves primarily with Ukraine (43%), then with the place of residence (39%), and only then, with the region of residence (10%). Among Russians, local identity (42%) prevails; 22% identify themselves with Ukraine, and 20% with the region.

96% of Ukrainians and 74% of Russians perceive Ukraine as their motherland. Ukrainians would choose to live in Ukraine much more often than Russians if they had this choice – 76% vs. 48%. 10% of Ukrainians and 30% of Russians would not choose Ukraine.



Among Ukrainians, the majority (65%) would like to live in Ukraine. 20% of Ukrainians would like to live in the EU, and only 2% in Russia. Among Russians, the situation is different – the relative majority (39%) would like to live in Ukraine, 27% in Russia, and 12% in the EU.



Half of the Ukrainians feel the need to be proud of their country, and 40% consider personal well-being is enough. Among Russians, this ratio is reversed: 35% and 53%, respectively.

Among Ukrainians, over 70% are proud that they are the citizens of Ukraine. Among Russians, there are only 31% of them while the majority (52%) are not very proud of the Ukrainian citizenship, or are not proud at all.

Among Ukrainians, 77% of respondents consider themselves patriots; among Russians this number is 47%. The shares of “non-patriots” in these groups are 14% and 40%, respectively.

The approaches of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians differ in both defining the hierarchy of qualities of a patriot and assessing them (on a scale of 1 to 5).


For Ukrainians, the most important qualities of a patriot are respect for his country, its symbols and holidays; cultivation of love for Ukraine in his children; knowledge of the history and culture of Ukraine; care for the welfare of his family; and respect for Ukraine’s laws and state institutions.

For Russians, care for the welfare of his family, fighting for observance of rights and freedoms, and equality of rights of all nationalities are more important.

Furthermore, for Ukrainians, the hierarchy of “the qualities of a patriot” involves willingness to defend their homeland and its territorial integrity, and fight for the observance of rights and freedoms of the citizens. Russians tend to assess these qualities as somewhat less important.

Among Ukrainians, willingness to defend homeland is much higher – 19% are willing to do it with arms, and 34% by participating in the volunteer movement.

The share of those not willing is 28%. The majority of Russians (54%) are not willing to defend their own country and 28% are willing to.



Among Ukrainians, almost equal shares of those who agree and disagree with the statement that it is important for Ukraine to strengthen economic independence from other countries even despite deterioration of living standards (35% and 33%, respectively). Among Russians, over a half (54%) disagree, and 17% agree with this statement.

Considering possible grounds for being proud of their country, both Ukrainians and Russians are rather not proud of the way democracy works, Ukraine’s global political influence, achievements in the economy,



the social security system in Ukraine, and fair and just treatment of different social groups (although Russians are more critical).

In such areas as achievements in sports, arts, literature, history of Ukraine, the Ukrainian national character, and the ability to fight for their country and their rights, the share of those who are proud of these achievements prevails over the share of those who are not proud of them both among Ukrainians and Russians. However, while, among Ukrainians, the share of those, who are proud of achievements in these fields exceeds 68%, among Russians, it is within 46-51%.

Among Ukrainians, the majority are proud of national achievements in science and technology (52%), and the Armed Forces (59%). Among Russians, 53% are not proud of the achievements in science and technology. Roughly the same shares of respondents are not proud as well as proud of the Armed Forces (45% and 41%, respectively).

Among Ukrainians, 72% of respondents would vote for independence of Ukraine if such a referendum was held this day, and 6% would not. A relative majority of Russian speakers would also support independence (37%) but 28% would not, and 19% would not participate in the referendum.


Both among Ukrainians and Russians, most respondents have a positive attitude to the attributes of the independent Ukrainian State (the Flag, the Coat of Arms, the Anthem, the Hryvnia, and Ukrainian Language). However, among Russians, this attitude is more reserved (significantly smaller shares of respondents indicate that they are proud of these attributes).

Thus, Ukrainians much more often than Russians perceive Ukraine as their preferred homeland, which they are proud of and are willing to defend.

ASPECTS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY

Most respondents in each group responded that they are interested in politics “to some extent”. However, Ukrainians are somewhat more interested in politics than Russians.

For most Ukrainians (53%), democracy is the most preferred form of government for Ukraine. Among Russians, 33% think so. For a quarter of Russians, authoritarian regime, under certain circumstances, can be better than democratic (among Ukrainians, 17% think so), and for 26% of Russians, political system does not matter (12% among Ukrainians).




Ukrainians rated the level of democracy in Ukraine 5.3 (on a scale of 1 to 10), and Russians – 4.4 points.

Most Ukrainians (54%) and the relative majority of Russians (48%) understand equality primarily as equal opportunities. 35% of Ukrainians and 41% of Russians understand it as an actual income equality.

60% of Russians and 47% of Ukrainians would like to live in society where everything is regulated by the state but there is no excessive social inequality. However, 35% of Ukrainians and 25% of Russians support a society of individual freedom.

The attitude of both groups towards the Maidan, if it was happening now, differs significantly. Among Ukrainians, the relative majority (44%) would support the Maidan, and 5% would support the Anti-Maidan. Among Russians, 13% would support the Maidan, and 22% the Anti-Maidan. 37% of Ukrainians and 57% of Russians would support neither of them.



SOCIO-CULTURAL IDENTITY

Language Identity

Ukrainian is a mother tongue for 68% of Ukrainians and 6% of Russians, and Russian – for 10% of Ukrainians and 65% of Russians. 22% of Ukrainians and 27% of Russians consider both mother tongues to the same extent.

56% of Ukrainians speak solely or mostly Ukrainian at home, and 71% of Russians only or mostly Russian. 25% of Ukrainians and 20% of Russians answered that at home they sometimes used Ukrainian, and sometimes Russian.

Thus, at home Ukrainians use Russian more often than Russians use Ukrainian (the respective shares are 43% and 29%).

Out of home (at work, school, etc.), 52% of Ukrainians and 6% of Russians speak Ukrainian (solely or mostly); 30% of Ukrainians and 23% of Russians sometimes speak Ukrainian, and sometimes Russian; and 18% of Ukrainians and 71% of Russians speak only or mostly Russian.

In general, Ukrainians more often use Russian in everyday communication, compared to Russians using Ukrainian (the ratio is 48% vs. 29%).

Which language do you use outside your home (at work, at school, etc.)?
 % of respondents


Among Ukrainians, 48% consider speaking Ukrainian more prestigious, and 18% think the same about Russian.

Among Russians, 58% consider speaking Russian language as more prestigious, and 8% Ukrainian. 20% of Ukrainians and 25% of Russians think that, in terms of prestige, it does not matter which language to speak.

71% of Ukrainians are fluent in Ukrainian. 26% consider their level sufficient for everyday communication; 2% of ethnic Ukrainians poorly understand Ukrainian; 0.1% do not understand it at all.

Among Russians, 25% are fluent in Ukrainian, 44% are sufficiently proficient, 25% poorly understand it; 3% do not understand it at all.

Among the Ukrainian respondents, 70% got secondary education in Ukrainian, and 28% in Russian. Among Russians, 89% got education in Russian, and 10% in Ukrainian.

Slightly more Ukrainians speak foreign languages than Russians. In particular, 21% of Ukrainians and 14% of Russians speak English, and 5% of both speak German, and 6% of Ukrainians and 3% of Russians speak Polish.


Significant differences exist between Ukrainians and Russians in the matter of a preferred language status in Ukraine. Among Ukrainians, 61% support the scenario where Ukrainian is the only official language, and other language, including Russian, can be used in everyday life. The scenario with the official status of Ukrainian and the possibility to give the official status to Russian in some regions comes second. The scenario of official bilingualism of Ukrainian and Russian languages is supported by 10% of Ukrainians.

Among Russians, support for official bilingualism ranks first (44%); official Ukrainian, and official Russian in some regions ranks second (31%); and official Ukrainian and using Russian in everyday life ranks third (16%). 7% of Russians support the scenario of the only official language in Ukraine – Russian (2% do among Ukrainians).

Cultural Identity


Most Ukrainians identify themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition (77%). 8% of respondents identify themselves with the Soviet tradition, 7% with the pan-European, and 1% with the Russian.

Among Russians, the situation is more varied – the relative majority identify themselves with the Soviet cultural tradition (33%), roughly the same shares with the Russian (22%) and Ukrainian (21%), and 8% identify themselves with the pan-European cultural tradition.

In what way should the Ukrainian and Russian languages coexist in Ukraine?
 % of respondents




I.e., much more Russians identify themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition than Ukrainians with the Russian. Much more Russians than Ukrainians identify themselves with the Soviet cultural tradition.



As to the vision of the cultural traditions in Ukraine, among Ukrainians the relative majority (43%) believe that the Ukrainian cultural tradition will prevail, 22% – pan-European, and 15% think that, in different regions, different traditions will prevail. The predominance of the Soviet tradition is predicted by 2% of respondents, and of the Russian – by 1%.

Among Russians, the relative majority (32%) think that, in different regions different traditions will prevail, almost equal shares (15% and 14%) – Ukrainian and pan-European, 11% – Russian, and 9% – Soviet.

For the relative majority of Ukrainians (47%) and most Russians (53%), it does not matter which nationalities they live next to. Among Ukrainians, 33% would not like to live next to Romani, 15% next to Russians, and 12% next to Jews.

Among Russians, 37% would not like to live next to Romani, 13% next to Tatars, and 11% next to Romanians and Jews.

It should be noted that, among Russians, less than 1% would not like to live next to Ukrainians, i.e. social distancing of Ukrainians from Russians living in Ukraine is considerably higher than of Russians from Ukrainians.

When asked “What ethnic groups would you like to live next to?”, the majority (52% of Ukrainians and 62% of Russians) responded “I do not care”. In each group, the relative majority would like to live next to the representatives of their own ethnicity (31% among Ukrainians, 27% among Russians).

In terms of preferences of Ukrainians, Poles (20%) come second, then Russians (13%), and Hungarians (11%). Among Russians, Ukrainians (21%) rank second, then Jews, Poles, and Hungarians (9-10%).

There are differences in assessments by these groups of the degree of closeness of cultures, traditions, and beliefs of citizens of different countries and regions of Ukraine.

Ukrainians rate the closeness between the citizens of Ukraine and the EU countries, between the residents of Galicia and Central Ukraine, between the residents of Galicia and Donbas, and between the residents of Western and Central Ukraine higher than Russians.

Russians rate the closeness between the citizens of Ukraine and the citizens of Russia, between Ukrainians in Ukraine and Russians in Ukraine, between the residents of Ukraine and the residents of temporary occupied areas of Donbas, and between the residents of Central and Eastern Ukraine much higher than Ukrainians.

Ukrainians and Russians rate the closeness of the residents of Ukraine and temporary occupied areas of Crimea, and the residents of Western and Eastern Ukraine roughly the same.

Both among Ukrainians and Russians, the majority do not consider themselves Europeans although among Russians, this share is higher (61% and 75%). Respectively, among Ukrainians, there are more of those who consider themselves Europeans (30% vs. 17% among Russians).

Both Ukrainians and Russians who do not consider themselves Europeans list primarily a low level of welfare (respectively, 74% and 64%) and socio-cultural living conditions (46% i 44%) among the reasons.

However, among Russians, there are more of those who, among the reasons, list “the sense of being a representative of another culture” (28% against 14% of Ukrainians), language barriers (44% against 35%) as well as religious affiliation (10% against 4%).

Thus, Russians feel their “difference” from the Europeans more.

Among Ukrainians, low level of culture and education (30% against 23%) is mentioned more often.

Similar shares of Ukrainians and Russians, among the reasons, mention a “non-European” mind (33% and 31%) and lack of information about the EU (10% each).


National Identity

Both among Ukrainians and Russians, most respondents support the civic concept of the Ukrainian nation (56% and 54%, respectively). Similar shares of respondents support the ethnic concept of the nation (19% and 21%).

However, among Ukrainians, there are almost twice as many respondents as among Russians who support the “civic and cultural” definition of the Ukrainian nation (18% and 10%, respectively).


The understanding of the concept of the “Ukrainian nationalism” among Ukrainians and Russians considerably differs.

Among Ukrainians, half (51%) consider it a world view whose basic idea is to transform Ukraine into a strong state, 23% consider nationalism a “splitting” ideology, and 12% – a historical phenomenon that is not relevant nowadays. Among Russians, the relative majority (42%) consider nationalism a “splitting” ideology, the second largest share (28%) – an idea of building a strong Ukrainian state, and 20% – a historical phenomenon.

What is your understanding of the term Ukrainian nationalism?
 % of respondents



Among Ukrainians, the majority (77%) consider a duty of every citizen of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic origin, sufficient proficiency in the official language, and basic knowledge of Ukrainian history and culture; 15% of Ukrainians do not consider this knowledge a duty.

Among Russians, the relative majority (48%) also support the need for every citizen to know Ukrainian, and the basics of history and culture. However, 43% do not consider this necessary.

Is every citizen of Ukraine (regardless of ethnic origin) obliged to have a command of the national language sufficient for everyday communication and to know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture?
 % of respondents

Geopolitical Priorities

Among Ukrainians, 55% consider relations with the EU a foreign policy priority, 7.4% – relations with Russia, and 5.3% – with other CIS countries.

Among Russians, 40% consider relations with Russia a priority, 22% – with the EU countries, 9.1% – with other CIS countries.

Which foreign policy areas should be the priority for Ukraine?
 % of respondents


69% of Ukrainians and 36% of Russians would vote for Ukraine joining the EU, and 15% of Ukrainians and 40% of Russians would vote against.


47% of Ukrainians and 17% of Russians would vote for joining NATO. 23% of Ukrainians and 47% of Russians are against joining.

Russians have a much more positive attitude towards Russia's government agencies – the President, the Government, and the State Duma (22-23% demonstrate positive attitudes); although the share of those with a negative attitude (31-38%) exceeds the share of those with a positive attitude. Among Ukrainians, 74-78% demonstrate negative attitudes, and 4% – positive.

Most Russians (59%) have a positive attitude towards the citizens of Russia, and 6% – negative. Among Ukrainians, these shares are roughly the same (26% and 25% respectively).

The relative majority of Ukrainians (40%) and most Russians (56%) do not think that integration into the EU can become a national idea that will unite all the regions of Ukraine. 39% of Ukrainians and 19% of Russians believe in the unifying potential of European integration.






Attitude towards interregional differences, prospects for regional development, and assessments of historical past

Ukrainians and Russians assess the differences between western and eastern regions of Ukraine differently.

More than half (54%) of the Ukrainian respondents believe that these differences and contradictions are not so deep for these regions to split, creating their own states or joining other states. 27% of Ukrainians hold a different opinion.


Among Russians, the relative majority (41%) see a possibility for such a split, and 33% deny it.



Also, opinions on whether western and eastern Ukrainians can be considered two different nations somewhat differ.

Among Ukrainians, 58% disagree with this statement, and 25% agree. Among Russians, 42% disagree, and 36% agree.

Some politicians and journalists claim that the differences in culture, language, historical heritage, and foreign policy orientations of the western and eastern Ukrainians are so significant, that they can be considered two different nations. Do you agree with this opinion? % of respondents





Both among Ukrainians and Russians, the majority are against the scenarios of withdrawal of their oblasts from Ukraine, creating their own state or joining another state as well as creating autonomy within Ukraine. However, the share of supporters of these options among Russians is higher than among Ukrainians. In particular, the share of supporters of the autonomy among Ukrainians is 6%, when 18% among Russians.

Most Ukrainians and half of Russians (respectively, 61% and 50%) would like their oblasts to remain within Ukraine in the current status but with more rights and powers of local government.

43% of Ukrainians support (39% are against it) and 24% of Russians (49% against) maintaining status quo.

Thus, among Russians, the popularity of the idea of empowerment of local government, their regions, and decentralisation is much higher, which correlates with their greater tendency towards regional identity.

The national factor significantly affects the respondents' perception of Ukraine's history assessments which differ from those that existed in the Soviet times.

Indeed, Russians much less often than Ukrainians support such provisions of the Ukrainian legislation as the recognition of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 as genocide; the condemnation of the communist regime, and prohibition of the use and propaganda of its symbols; establishing criminal liability for violating this prohibition; the recognition of the UNR, the OUN, and other armed groups and government agencies of Ukraine as fighters for independence; renaming the Great Patriotic War to World War II of 1939-1945 in official documents, and renaming the Victory Day.

Even in the matters such as prohibition of the propaganda of the national socialist regime and its symbols as well as establishing criminal liability for violating this prohibition, the share of Russians who support these initiatives is smaller than the share of Ukrainians.

Attitudes Towards the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Relations with Occupied Crimea

The national identity of citizens significantly affects their assessments of the conflict in Ukraine, especially the role of Russia in it.


Most Ukrainians (53%) consider the conflict in Eastern Ukraine a war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine; among Russians, only 17% think so. Almost the same shares of Russians consider the conflict a fight for areas of influence between Russia and the USA (34%) and a civil conflict in Ukraine (33%).

The overall assessment of the conflict in Ukraine, % of respondents



Most Ukrainians place responsibility for the conflict on Russia (51%), and the relative majority of Russians – on both parties (42%). Among Russians, 20% blame Russia, and 19% – Ukraine.

Who is responsible for the Ukrainian-Russian conflict? % of respondents



Among Ukrainians, the relative majority (34%) of the respondents support the continuation of the ATO until fully regaining control over the occupied areas, and among Russians – giving these areas a special status within Ukraine (41%). Only 12% of the respondents support the continuation of the ATO. 16% of Ukrainians and 19% of Russians support the separation of these areas from Ukraine.

Steps to be taken to resolve the conflict in the East of Ukraine % of respondents

	Ukrainian (%)	Russian (%)
Continue the anti-terrorist operation until complete restoration of control by Ukraine over the areas occupied by separatists	33.8	12.1
Grant special status to these areas within Ukraine	19.8	41.0
Cut off these areas from Ukraine	16.1	18.9
Difficult to answer	30.3	27.9




What is your attitude to these provisions of Ukrainian legislation regarding assessment of the historical past of Ukraine? % of respondents		
	Ukrainian	Russian
Recognition the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932-1933 as genocide against the Ukrainian people		
Support	77.3	49.0
Do not support	7.9	28.8
Do not care	6.7	11.2
Difficult to answer	8.1	11.0
Condemnation the national socialist (Nazi) (1933-1945) totalitarian regime in Ukraine and prohibition against the use and promotion of its symbols		
Support	58.6	52.1
Do not support	14.8	25.4
Do not care	12.4	14.7
Difficult to answer	14.2	7.9
Establishing criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting the propaganda of the national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regime and the use of its symbols		
Support	49.1	33.0
Do not support	18.8	42.3
Do not care	14.7	14.5
Difficult to answer	17.3	10.2
Condemnation of the communist (1917-1991) totalitarian regime in Ukraine and prohibition against the use and promotion of its symbols		
Support	55.5	25.6
Do not support	19.8	50.2
Do not care	12.2	13.8
Difficult to answer	12.4	10.5
Establishing criminal liability for violation of the law prohibiting the propaganda of the communist totalitarian regime and the use of its symbols		
Support	41.7	12.3
Do not support	26.0	62.8
Do not care	14.8	13.8
Difficult to answer	17.6	11.0
Establishing a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation in Ukraine on May 8 to commemorate all victims of World War II (1939-1945)		
Support	49.0	33.8
Do not support	22.9	46.8
Do not care	14.7	11.3
Difficult to answer	13.4	8.0
Change the holiday name from Victory Day (May 9) to the Day of Victory over Nazism		
Support	39.6	21.9
Do not support	31.6	60.2
Do not care	14.7	10.7
Difficult to answer	14.1	7.2
Changing the name "The Great Patriotic War" to "World War II in 1939-1945" in official documents, names of national holidays, historical monuments, etc.		
Support	37.4	16.6
Do not support	31.7	61.2
Do not care	15.9	13.1
Difficult to answer	15.0	9.0
Recognizing the following organisations and groups as fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century: Ukrainian National Republic, Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS), troops of Kholodny Yar Republic, Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the People's Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction		
Support	45.5	15.7
Do not support	19.8	41.3
Do not care	14.2	19.0
Difficult to answer	20.5	24.0

However, the motives for support among Ukrainians and Russians differ significantly. Most Ukrainians (65%) want separation because they do not want these areas to influence Ukraine's policy, and to be funded from the Ukrainian budget; when 75% of Russians support separation because they think that residents of these areas have the right to self-determination.

As to the scenarios of coexistence of Ukraine and the uncontrolled part of Donbas, the relative majority (40%) of Ukrainians are undecided, 38% support halting any relations, 22% – giving a special status, including the ability to influence Ukraine's foreign policy.


Among Russians, the relative majority support giving a special status (44%), and 19% stand for the severance of any relations. 37% are undecided.



As to Ukraine's policy on the areas controlled by the DPR/LPR, Ukrainians more often than Russians choose the options of complete or partial isolation (52% against 36%), and Russians – slow reintegration (22% against 14%) or recognition of the DPR/LPR as independent states (15% against 5%).

Opinions on the idea of deprivation of Ukrainian citizenship of those citizens who supported Russian aggression against Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and separatist movements in the East are opposite.

Most Ukrainians (54%) support to deprive these citizens of Ukrainian citizenship; most Russians (67%) are against it, 17% are for it.



Among Ukrainians, 29% participated in the ATO themselves, or their relatives and friends did. Among Russians, the share is 14%.

Which Ukrainian policy option do you prefer concerning the areas controlled by the DPR and LPR?
% of respondents

	Ukrainian	Russian
Complete isolation	26.6	9.6
Partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for the residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and to obtain cash payments)	17.0	18.0
Soft integration of these areas (restoration of personal and economic contacts, local elections, contacts with DPR and LPR leaders, adoption of a "special status" for these areas)	13.7	21.9
Partial isolation (maintaining economic and trade contacts)	8.7	8.3
Recognition of independence for the DPR and LPR and establishing relations with them as independent states	4.5	15.1
Other	4.8	5.1
Difficult to answer	24.8	21.9



The attitude towards the principles of future relations between the residents of Ukraine and various categories of citizens from temporarily occupied areas has some differences.

Both Ukrainians and Russians demonstrate roughly the same attitude to the citizens who left the ATO area for other regions of Ukraine, who wanted to leave but were not able to, and who stayed in the ATO area but did not support the DPR or LPR.

Russians have a somewhat better attitude towards the citizens who left for Russia.

Ukrainians have a much worse attitude towards the citizens who supported the DPR and LPR, who were forced to participate in the armed groups of the DPR and LPR, especially those who participated in these groups because of their own beliefs and fought against Ukraine, as well as committed torture against Ukrainian soldiers and civilians within these groups.

When, regarding the two latter categories 71% and 76% of Ukrainians support the principle “we will not forget, we will not forgive”; among Russians, it is 27% and 44%, respectively. 37% and 36%, respectively, chose the answer “difficult to answer” in these cases.

Attitudes Towards the Blockade of Crimea

Among Russians, the majority (58% and 57%, respectively) do not support the food and energy blockade of Crimea, and 16% and 17% do.

Among Ukrainians, these measures are supported by the majority (41% and 43%, respectively), and 35% and 33%, respectively, do not.

CONCLUSIONS

Ethnic origin (Ukrainians/Russians) significantly affects various identity aspects of Ukrainian citizens, their attitudes towards the past, defining prospects for development of society, and geopolitical priorities.

Ukrainians much more often than Russians are proud of their Ukrainian citizenship as well as identify themselves primarily with Ukraine. For Russians, identification with their towns or villages (local self-identification) of the region residence (regional self-identification) is more typical.

Both Ukrainians and Russians perceive Ukraine as their motherland but a significant number of Russians, would choose another country to live in, if they had a choice.


In general, Russians, as compared to Ukrainians, have less appreciation for Ukraine, its statehood, its accomplishments, national symbols and attributes. In particular, among Ukrainians, the need to be proud of their country, assessment of its achievement in different areas, willingness to defend it, and the level of support for independence is higher.

The respondents of Russian nationality more often perceive the Ukrainian citizenship as a given and have a more pragmatic attitude towards Ukraine – in particular, they are less willing to give up personal well-being for their country.

The political identity of Russians has higher tolerance to authoritarianism, and indifference to the form of government, and greater tendency towards state regulation of social relations.

Socio-cultural identities of the two groups show significant differences.

Indeed, there is a clear asymmetry in terms of language usage. Ukrainians use Russian at home and in public communication more often than Russians use Ukrainian. Among Ukrainians, proficiency in Russian is higher than among Russians. For most Russians, speaking Ukrainian at the level above everyday communication causes difficulties. This fact may cause the desire of most Russians to increase the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, and compensate the need for Ukrainian language skills with increasing the use of Russian.





Much larger share of Ukrainians identify themselves with Ukrainian cultural tradition than Russians – with Russian. The Soviet identity is the most frequent among Russians, whose bearers, together with bearers of the Russian tradition, make up more than a half of this group. Apparently, this fact affects various aspects of identity, including geopolitical priorities.

However, almost one third of Russians identify themselves with Ukrainian and European cultural traditions, which correlates with their answers on the vision of prospects for cultural traditions in Ukraine. In general, the relative majority of Russians tend to see Ukraine as a multicultural country. Russians are the most sceptical about the prospects for the Soviet and Russian traditions in Ukraine (at least at the national level).

In general, both for most Ukrainians and Russians, “civic” concept of a nation is typical. Meanwhile, Ukrainians more inclined to a positive perception of the ethnocultural elements of the nation-building while a significant share of Russians are not willing to perceive them as compulsory. A significant share of the citizens of Russian origin does not tend to recognise the priority position of Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian cultural tradition in Ukraine. The relative majority of Russians still understand “Ukrainian nationalism” in the spirit of the Soviet propaganda, and may perceive it as a threat.

Russians are much more beware of the differences between Western and Eastern Ukraine than Ukrainians as well as between the residents of Ukraine who live there. However, most citizens in both groups oppose the scenarios of withdrawal of their oblasts from Ukraine and federalisation although three times as many Russians as Ukrainians stand for the creation of regional autonomies with their own legislation, government, and parliament.

The scenario of providing more powers to local governments in regions is acceptable for the majority in both groups.

In their foreign policy priorities, the relative majority of Russians tend to focus on Russia, and stand against Ukraine possible joining the EU and (mostly) NATO. Russians are much more tolerant of the state leadership of Russia (although the relative majority of Russian express a negative attitude towards the President of Russia).

Less Russians support the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide, and do not support the condemnation of the communist regime, establishing criminal liability for violating the law on the prohibition of its propaganda, and the recognition of some organisations and personalities as fighters for independence.

Most Russians negatively view renaming the Great Patriotic War to World War II of 1939-1945, and, respectively, renaming the holiday of 9 May.

The attitude of Ukrainians and Russians towards the Maidan and the current events in Eastern Ukraine are completely opposite. Most Russians avoid direct accusations against Russia for starting the war in Eastern Ukraine, and assess it either as a civil war, or as Russia and the US fighting for areas of influence.

A significant share of Russians support giving a special status to the occupied areas in Eastern Ukraine. Regarding further coexistence with the occupied territories, Russians tend to support complete isolation less than Ukrainians, and more often support their “soft reintegration”.

Unlike Ukrainians, most Russians stand against deprivation of the Ukrainian citizenship of those citizens who supported Russian aggression. Ukrainians and Russians also demonstrate different approaches to those who fought against Ukraine because of their own beliefs. When most Ukrainians assume the opinion “we will not forget, we will not forgive”, Russians are more tolerant towards them.

Russians have a more negative attitude towards such measures as the food and energy blockade of Crimea.

Thus, Ukrainians and Russians have certain, sometimes rather significant differences in various aspects of their identities.

It should be noted that, for Russians, belonging to another cultural tradition is combined with unwillingness to understand cultural traditions of the Ukrainian nation as a state-building process, which prevents the consolidation of the Ukrainian society. The use of such position for political purposes by some parties has already led to tragic consequences in Ukraine.

However, the differences between Ukrainians and Russians in their views on political development, the historic memory policy, and key areas of further political and geopolitical development of Ukraine are not an impassable obstacle for the process of building a common national identity of the Ukrainian citizens. It can be indicated by such factors as the perception by most Russians of the Ukrainian statehood, respect for its symbols and attributes, self-awareness as the citizens of Ukraine, and unwillingness of their oblasts to withdraw from Ukraine.

It should also be considered that, for the citizens of Ukraine who are Russians by birth, the perception of the new Ukrainian reality turned out to be more difficult than for Ukrainians (both due to their abrupt nature and the speed of social change and the new role of Russia – not a friend or a partner but an aggressor state).

Therefore, the processes of understanding and acceptance of new social values, history assessments, and new development goals of the country by representatives of the Russian community in Ukraine may be of a complex and long-term nature. ■

FEATURES OF THE IDENTITY OF CITIZENS AFFILIATED WITH THE ARMED RESISTANCE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

A substantial aspect of research on the identity of Ukrainian citizens is the identification of factors affecting the processes of its formation and resulting in the change of particular aspects, as well as factors affecting the interaction and interdependence of various identity aspects.

Without a doubt, the armed conflict with Russia has had the greatest impact on civic identity, being one of the most significant events on such a scale in recent years. The need to resist Russian aggression has formed a new community of people within Ukrainian society. It ties together the citizens who have participated in the “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) (volunteers, mobilised and regular servicemen), as well as their families and loved ones.

This study attempts to determine the identity features of these categories of citizens by comparing their answers with the answers provided by the citizens who are in no way affiliated with the ATO.

26% of citizens responded affirmatively to the following question in the questionnaire: “Did you, your family members or your relatives participate in the ATO or were you, your family members or your relatives called to military service from 2013 to 2015 during mobilisation?”¹ The absolute number of these respondents in the sample was 2,709 persons. Most of these citizens were in the Central and Western regions (35% and 34%, respectively), 24% of them in Eastern regions, and somewhat fewer in other regions (17% in Donbas, 10% in Southern regions).

CIVIC IDENTITY

A common national identity is predominantly characteristic of the citizens affiliated with the ATO. Among them, nearly half of respondents are likely to associate themselves primarily with Ukraine (49%), while the remainder of respondents are most likely to associate themselves with their native city or village (41%).

75% of persons affiliated with the ATO and the armed forces are proud or likely to be proud to be the citizens of Ukraine. 66% of persons who did not participate in the above feel this way.

Meanwhile, while 19% of the respondents who participated in the ATO directly or indirectly are not fully proud of their Ukrainian citizenship or are not likely to be proud of it, 24% of persons not affiliated with the ATO responded this way.


97% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 92% of persons not affiliated with it consider Ukraine their motherland. If given the choice, Ukraine would be considered a motherland by 77% and 71% respondents respectively.

Most respondents in both categories would prefer to live in Ukraine (64% of direct and indirect ATO participants and 61% of persons not affiliated with the ATO). The second most popular answer was the EU (24% of participants and 17.5% of non-participants). In general, Russia is regarded an unpopular potential place of residence.

The difference in opinions becomes rather significant with regard to sense of pride in the country.

Thus, 56% of persons affiliated with the ATO answered that they need a sense of pride in their country for their personal happiness. 45% of persons not affiliated with the ATO responded this way.

While 81%² of respondents among the category of persons affiliated with the ATO consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, 72% of persons not affiliated with the ATO made this claim. 18% of persons not affiliated with the ATO and 12% of persons affiliated with it do not consider themselves patriots (fully or likely).



¹ Hereinafter, the terms “citizens affiliated with the ATO,” “direct or indirect participants of the ATO,” “participants in the ATO and their families and loved ones” are used interchangeably to refer to such respondents.


² The sum of answer options “yes” and “rather yes.”



27% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 14% of persons not affiliated with it expressed readiness to defend their own country with arms and 36% and 32% of respondents respectively expressed readiness to participate in volunteer activities. 34% of persons not affiliated with the ATO and 23% of persons affiliated with it described themselves as unwilling to be involved in the above activities.

A plurality of respondents among the ATO participants and their families and loved ones fully agreed or were likely to agree with the need to enhance the economic independence of Ukraine, even though it may result in a decline in its citizens' standards of living (43% vs. 30%).

Citizens affiliated with the ATO feel pride in Ukraine and its achievements in various fields to a greater extent. For example, 55% of respondents among this group and 46% of persons not affiliated with the ATO are proud of scientific and technological achievements; 79% and 71%, respectively, are proud of achievements in sports; 73% and 63%, respectively, are proud of achievements in arts and literature; 67% and 54%, respectively, are proud of the Armed Forces; 75% and 67%, respectively, are proud of the history of Ukraine; and 77% and 65%, respectively, are proud of the Ukrainian national character.



The difference in support for the independence and national attributes is also noticeable. Indeed, 80% of respondents among the ATO participants and their families and loved ones would support Ukraine's independence in the event of a referendum, while 65% of persons not affiliated with the ATO would do the same.

96% and 89% of respondents, respectively, are proud of the flag of Ukraine and regard it positively; 96% and 88%, respectively, provided the same answer regarding the National Emblem of Ukraine; 92% and 81%, respectively, answered in this way regarding the Anthem of Ukraine; 87% and 81% of respondents, respectively, provided this answer regarding the Ukrainian hryvnia; and 96% and 90%, respectively, provided the same answer regarding the Ukrainian language.

Therefore, civic identity is expressed to a great extent in the respondents affiliated with the ATO; they have a greater need to be proud of their country and feel that their pride is justified; and their patriotism is of a mostly active nature.

ASPECTS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY

The majority of respondents in both groups are interested in politics.


60% of respondents affiliated with the ATO consider democracy the most desirable type of political system in Ukraine. 48% of respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO expressed this opinion. More respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO consider democracy to be unimportant (15% vs. 9%).

Both groups assess present-day Ukraine as a regime located between dictatorship and democracy, while the assessment of the degree of democracy in Ukraine is somewhat higher among persons affiliated with the ATO.

The majority of respondents in both groups define equality as equal opportunities and equality before the law (57% of respondents affiliated with the ATO and 52% of respondents not affiliated with the ATO); virtually the same number of respondents in the two groups expressed the desire for income equality (35% and 36%).

The respondents affiliated with the ATO voted in virtually equal numbers regarding their wish to live in a society implementing the concept of individual freedom and personal responsibility (41%) and regarding their wish to rely on the state, which should prevent excessive social inequality (44%). Nearly half of respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO are in favour of implementation of governmental regulation.

There are noticeable differences between these groups regarding their support of the Maidan. Thus, 58% of the ATO participants expressed support for Maidan, and 34% of respondents among persons not affiliated with it expressed the same. Conversely, 28% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 44% of persons not affiliated with it would support neither the Maidan nor the Anti-Maidan. A relatively small number of respondents in both groups expressed support for the Anti-Maidan (4% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 8% of persons not affiliated with it).





Respondents who are affiliated with the ATO have a stronger democratic political orientation and more of them are committed to the ideas and goals of the Maidan.

SOCIO-CULTURAL IDENTITY

Language identity. Ukrainian is the native language for 73% of the ATO participants and their families and loved ones. Russian is the native language of 6% of respondents, and both languages are regarded as native languages for 19%. 55% of respondents among those not affiliated with the ATO consider Ukrainian as a native language, 19% of them consider Russian their native language, and 23% of them consider both of these languages native.

60% of the ATO participants and 46% of persons not affiliated with the ATO speak Ukrainian or mostly Ukrainian at home, while 14% and 27%, respectively, speak Russian, and 25% speak both languages.

55% of the ATO participants and 43% of persons who did not participate in the ATO speak Ukrainian or mostly Ukrainian outside their homes, while Russian is spoken by 16% and 27% of them, and both languages are spoken by 29% and 28%, respectively.

53% of the ATO participants and 40% of persons not affiliated with it believe that it is prestigious to speak Ukrainian among friends and colleagues. Respectively, 18% and 23% of respondents think the same about Russian. 23% and 31% of respondents believe it does not matter what language they speak.

71% of respondents among persons affiliated with the ATO obtained their secondary education in Ukrainian, and 26% of them obtained it in Russian. Respectively, 59% and 38% of respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO were educated in the above languages.

76% of the ATO participants and 61% of non-participants assess their knowledge of Ukrainian as fluent.

The respondents' opinions in the two groups differ regarding the status of Ukrainian and Russian languages. 69% of respondents among the ATO participants and their families and loved ones support the idea of designating Ukrainian the only official language, while 51% of respondents among those not affiliated with the ATO believe this. 17% of persons not affiliated with the ATO and 5% of persons affiliated with it support the idea of considering both Russian and Ukrainian as official state languages.

It is particularly remarkable that 26% of the ATO participants and 17% of persons not affiliated with it possess sufficient ability to communicate in English.

Therefore, the prevalence of Ukrainian, the ability to speak it and the desire to institutionalise it as a state language are more widespread among the ATO participants. The greater number of representatives of Ukraine's Centre and West among the ATO participants and the greater number of persons who obtained education in Ukrainian may be among the possible reasons for this phenomenon.

Cultural identity. The majority of respondents in both categories associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition (79% of the ATO participants and 67% of non-participants). However, the second most popular answers are association with the common European tradition among persons affiliated with the ATO (9%), and association with the Soviet tradition among persons not affiliated with the ATO (12%).

When thinking about the next 20-25 years, the majority of respondents in both categories hope for gradual prevalence of Ukrainian (46% of ATO participants and 38% of non-participants) and European (26% and 20%, respectively) cultural traditions. Citizens do not believe in the predominance of the Russian culture throughout Ukraine in the future, but some respondents believe in predominance of different cultural traditions in different regions (13% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 18% of persons not affiliated with it).

There are certain differences in assessments regarding the proximity of cultures, traditions and beliefs of different groups. While persons affiliated with the ATO assess the identity of the Ukrainians and the Russians in Ukraine and the identity of citizens living in the Western and Central regions of Ukraine as very close, persons not affiliated with the ATO assess the identity of the Ukrainians and the Russians in Ukraine and citizens of Ukraine and Russia as very close, according to their highest assessments.

More respondents among persons affiliated with the ATO consider themselves (or rather consider themselves) European (40% vs. 26% of respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO).

Therefore, it can be stated that self-identification as a part of the Ukrainian cultural tradition and belief that one is European are present to a greater extent among the ATO participants.

NATIONAL IDENTITY


The most common interpretation of the Ukrainian nation as primarily civic is spread among both analysed groups of citizens (52% and 58%), though more respondents among the ATO participants and their families and loved ones define the nation as being composed of citizens of Ukraine who speak Ukrainian, adhere to the national traditions and bring up their children in Ukrainian (22% compared to 15% of respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO).

In both categories of citizens, the majority consider nationalism as a world view whose main idea is to turn Ukraine into a strong state of high standing and providing high standards of living. Over half of respondents among the ATO participants (57%) and 44% of respondents among other groups believe so.


However, more respondents among non-participants consider nationalism as an ideology that polarises the society: 28% of them compared to 17% of respondents among the ATO participants.

The great majority of respondents in both groups (82% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 71%

What is your understanding of the term Ukrainian nationalism?
% of respondents



Is every citizen of Ukraine (regardless of ethnic origin) obliged to have a command of the national language sufficient for everyday communication and to know the basics of Ukrainian history and culture?
% of respondents



of non-participants) agree that every citizen of Ukraine is obliged to be able to speak the state language and know the basics of the history and culture of Ukraine.

A significant number of respondents in both categories feel indifferent regarding their neighbours' nationality (49% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 55% of persons not affiliated with it). However, 19% of the ATO participants and 11% of non-participants would not like to have Russians as their neighbours; this figure is second among unpopular nationalities, however (34% and 32% of respondents, respectively, would not like to have the Romani people as their neighbours). Ukrainians appeared to be the most desirable neighbours for respondents in both categories (34% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 28% of persons not affiliated with it).


Respondents affiliated with the ATO consider Ukrainian nationalism as an ideology that is able to turn Ukraine into a strong state and they attach greater importance to citizenship as a Ukrainian cultural component.

GEOPOLITICAL ORIENTATION

The majority of respondents in both groups are committed to prioritizing Ukraine's relations with the EU: 63% of the ATO participants and 46% of persons not affiliated with it. At the same time, 14% of persons not affiliated with the ATO considered relations with Russia to be a priority (while only 3% of respondents among persons affiliated with the ATO do).


72% of persons affiliated with the ATO and half of respondents not affiliated with it would vote for joining the EU in a referendum. 21% of persons not affiliated with the ATO and 9% of persons affiliated with it would vote against this.

If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the EU were held, how would you vote?
% of respondents



Nearly half of respondents among the ATO participants believe that European integration may become a national unifying idea, and almost half of respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO do not believe this is possible.

59% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 39% of persons not affiliated with it would vote for joining NATO in a referendum. 13% and 31% of respondents respectively would vote against joining NATO.



Respondents in both groups expressed a largely negative attitude towards the state administration of Russia (this attitude is expressed to a greater extent among persons affiliated with the ATO); more respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO expressed a neutral attitude towards the President, the Government, and the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

A neutral or positive attitude towards the citizens of Russia prevails in both groups, though a third of the ATO members and 19% of non-participants expressed a negative attitude towards them.

Therefore, pro-Western geopolitical orientation and strongly expressed anti-Russian views are more widespread among respondents participating in the ATO.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS REGIONAL DIFFERENCES, PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND ASSESSMENT OF HISTORICAL PAST

The majority of respondents in both groups do not believe that there are contradictions, differences and disparity between the Western and Eastern regions of Ukraine that might result in their separation and formation of new countries or joining other states.


Similarly, the majority of respondents in both categories do not see great differences between Western and Eastern Ukrainians such that they could be considered separate peoples.

A majority of citizens in both groups do not want their region to form an independent state or join another state, or have it granted any privileged autonomous status.

59% of respondents among the persons affiliated with the ATO and 61% of non-participants support the idea of extending the rights and powers of local authorities. Meanwhile, 46% of respondents among the persons affiliated with the ATO and 38% of persons not affiliated with it support the idea of maintaining the status quo.

Therefore, there are no essential differences between the different groups regarding the issue of development of relations between the state and the regions.

Some essential differences among the groups emerge regarding assessment of the provisions of legislation related to the attitude towards the historical past. The majority of respondents in both groups support the recognition of the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people. However, more respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO do not support this view (12% vs. 4%); more of the latter group also expressed uncertainty on this issue (10% vs. 5%).



There is a considerable difference in opinions regarding condemnation of the totalitarian communist regime and prohibition of its propaganda, violation of legislation related to these issues, and recognizing a number of former authorities and armed groups to be the fighters for independence of Ukraine (the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS), the units of the Kholodny Yar Republic, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), etc.).

Indeed, 69% of respondents among those in some way affiliated with the ATO and 46% of respondents not affiliated with it support the condemnation of the communist regime. 12% and 27% of respondents respectively do not support this position.

52% of ATO participants support the imposition of criminal liability for propaganda of the communist regime and 19% of them do not support this. Opinions divided equally among persons not affiliated with the ATO: a third of those polled support the imposition of criminal liability for propaganda of the communist regime and another third do not support it.

58% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 37% of persons not affiliated with it support the recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (USS), the units of the Kholodny Yar Republic, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as fighters for independence of Ukraine. 11% and 26% of respondents respectively do not support this.

There are even greater differences of opinion between these two groups regarding the change of the official paradigm concerning the Second World War. In this regard, half of the ATO participants and 30% of persons not affiliated with it support changing the name "Great Patriotic War" to "World War II" in official documents, while 23% and 40% of respondents, respectively, do not support this.


While the establishment of the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation in Ukraine on May 8 is largely supported in both categories of citizens (62% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 42% of non-participants), the change of the name "Victory Day" to "Day of Victory over Nazism in World War II" is supported by 54% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 32% of persons not affiliated with it. 23% and 39% of respondents, respectively, do not support this change.

The survey data show the level of support for de-communisation and re-evaluation of the past of Ukraine, as well as breaking with Soviet and Russian interpretations of history is higher among respondents affiliated with the ATO and their families and loved ones.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CONFLICT IN THE EAST AND RELATIONS WITH OCCUPIED CRIMEA

There is a distinct difference in attitudes expressed in the two social groups when asked to assess the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 65% of the ATO participants and 44% of persons not affiliated with the ATO assessed the conflict as Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

While 17% of respondents in the group not affiliated with the ATO consider this to be a civil conflict and 22% of them consider it to be a turf war between Russia and the USA for spheres of influence, 11% and 15% of respondents among persons affiliated with the ATO take these positions, respectively.





The majority of respondents among those affiliated with the ATO (60%) believe that Russia bears responsibility for the conflict, while the percentage among non-participants is 43% regarding this issue. 26% and 36% of respondents, respectively, consider that both countries bear equal responsibility for the conflict, while 6% and 10% of respondents, respectively, consider Ukraine responsible for the conflict.

43% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 27% of persons not affiliated with it support the idea that the ATO should be continued until Ukraine fully regains control over its occupied territories. 15% of the ATO participants and 25% of persons not affiliated with it supported the idea of granting these territories a privileged status within Ukraine.

18% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 16% of persons not affiliated with it are committed to the idea of separating these territories; among these, 67% of persons affiliated with the ATO and 57% of persons not affiliated with it justify it by the fact that they would not want the residents of these territories to influence Ukraine's politics and receive funds from Ukraine's budget. In this regard, 20% of ATO participants and a third of persons not affiliated with the ATO believe that the residents of these territories have the right to self-determination.

Nearly half of respondents among those affiliated with the ATO are committed to the termination of any relations between Ukraine and the territories not controlled by it. 31% of respondents among those not affiliated with the ATO think the same and 43% of respondents stated that they did not know the answer.

66% of the ATO participants and 45% of non-participants support the idea of full or partial isolation of the occupied territories.

9% of persons affiliated with the ATO are committed to the idea of soft reintegration of these territories (compared to 17% of persons affiliated with the ATO). 18% of those affiliated with the ATO and 27% of persons not affiliated with it were not sure about their attitude.

71% of respondents among persons affiliated with the ATO believe that those who supported the aggression against Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea should be deprived of Ukrainian citizenship. 43% of respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO believe this, while 38% of respondents do not support this idea (compared to 18% of respondents affiliated with the ATO).

In both groups, the majority of respondents (67% of the ATO participants and 72% of respondents among persons not affiliated with it) consider citizens who left the ATO zone for other regions of Ukraine to be innocent. The same attitude is expressed towards the citizens who would like to leave but had no opportunity to do so.

The attitude towards persons who have left the ATO zone for Russia is somewhat different. They are considered innocent by 38% of persons affiliated with the ATO and by half of residents not affiliated with it; at the same time, 28% of persons affiliated with the ATO are ready to "understand and forgive" them. However, 20% of respondents take a "never forget, never forgive" attitude. 22% and 12% of respondents among persons not affiliated with the ATO take these positions, respectively.

In general, the attitude towards the citizens who remained in the ATO zone and do not support the occupation regime is positive in both groups.

Attitudes differ regarding persons who support the occupation. 57% of respondents among the ATO participants hold a "never forget, never forgive" opinion, 34% of respondents among ATO non-participants think the same, while 27% of these respondents would like to "understand and forgive" them.

More than half of persons affiliated with the ATO hold a "never forget, never forgive" opinion regarding persons who were forced to fight against Ukraine. 32% of respondents among non-participants share this view, while another 30% of respondents would like to understand and forgive them. 25% of respondents were not sure about their attitude.

81% of respondents among the ATO participants hold a "never forget, never forgive" opinion regarding persons who fought against Ukraine due to their own beliefs. 61% of persons not affiliated with the ATO think the same, and 21% of these respondents were not sure about their opinions.

A more defiant attitude in both groups was expressed regarding persons who fought against Ukraine and participated in torturing Ukrainian servicemen and civilians: 85% of the ATO participants and 68% of persons not affiliated with it (another 19% of these provided no answer).


While the majority of persons affiliated with the ATO are committed to the idea of a food and energy blockade of Crimea (54% and 56% of respondents, respectively), a plurality of persons not affiliated with the ATO expressed negative attitude towards the blockades (41% and 40%).

Thus, there are differences in the assessment of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine between the ATO participants and non-participants, and these differences sometimes seem to be substantial.

Citizens affiliated with the ATO more explicitly consider the conflict to be Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine; they support a heavy-handed military option for conflict management or share the idea of isolation of the occupied territories to eliminate the possibility of their influence on Ukrainian politics. Respondents among those affiliated with

Which Ukrainian policy option do you prefer concerning the areas controlled by the DPR and LPR?
% of respondents

	Those affiliated with the ATO	Those not affiliated with the ATO
Complete isolation	34.7	21.2
Partial isolation (the only exception being the possibility for the residents of these areas to enter Ukraine and to obtain cash payments)	21.7	15.3
Partial isolation (maintaining economic and trade contacts)	9.5	8.4
Soft integration of these areas (restoration of personal and economic contacts, local elections, contacts with DPR and LPR leaders, adoption of a "special status" for these areas)	8.5	16.8
Recognition of independence for the DPR and LPR and establishing relations with them as independent states	3.9	6.2
Other	3.7	5.4
Difficult to answer	17.9	26.7



the ATO express a far more negative attitude towards persons who supported the DPR and LPR and fought in their armed units; the vast majority of them are not ready to “forgive and forget” and are committed to depriving them of their Ukrainian citizenship.

CONCLUSIONS

The survey showed the existence of certain differences, some of them quite considerable, between the identity of citizens in some way affiliated with the ATO, and persons who are not personally tied to such operations.

In particular, respondents affiliated with the ATO expressed a stronger civic identity, they have a greater respect for their country, and their patriotism is of a more active nature.

Respondents affiliated with the ATO have a more democratic political orientation and the majority of them are committed to the ideas and goals of the Maidan.

The Ukrainian language is spoken more often, self-association with the Ukrainian cultural tradition, and identification as Europeans are more widespread among direct or indirect ATO participants. They generally consider Ukrainian nationalism as an ideology able to turn Ukraine into a strong state and attach more importance to citizenship as a Ukrainian cultural component.

The level of support for de-communisation and re-evaluation of the past of Ukraine, as well as breaking with Soviet and Russian interpretations of the past, is higher among persons affiliated with the ATO. Pro-Western geopolitical orientation and strongly expressed anti-Russian views are more widespread among respondents participating in the ATO.

Citizens affiliated with the ATO more explicitly consider the conflict to be Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; they support a heavy-handed military option for conflict management or adhere to the idea of isolation of the occupied territories to prevent their influence on Ukrainian politics.

The ATO participants express a more negative attitude towards persons who supported the DPR and LPR and fought in their armed forces; the vast majority of them would not “forgive and forget” and believe they should be deprived of their Ukrainian citizenship.

Considering that the conflict is far from over, the number of citizens who are directly or indirectly affiliated with it may grow. The expansion of patriotic, pro-Ukrainian and pro-European orientation expressed by most members of this group will play a prominent role in social and political processes in Ukraine in the future.

At the same time, the attributes of the views of citizens affiliated with the ATO regarding various aspects of the conflict in the East and relations with the occupied Crimea should be taken into consideration by the government authorities during development and implementation of measures related to restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Issues concerning the attitude towards supporters of the DPR and LPR, participants in armed units (amnesty), and the future status of these territories appear to be particularly sensitive. ■

THE STATE OF INTEGRATION OF TEMPORARILY INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS


Nearly 1.8 million Ukrainian citizens have been forced to leave their places of residence and move to safer regions of Ukraine as a result of Russian aggression and the occupation of Crimea and some districts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions.¹

Despite the military situation and the complicated socio-economic conditions, the processes of migration and resettlement of such a great number of people in Ukraine have been carried out without considerable disturbances.


However, the ability of internally displaced persons to integrate into new communities remains relevant, considering the existing social and cultural differences between residents of different regions of Ukraine, their different political orientations, and, most importantly, the social and political context of this migration.²

A number of questions concerning the adaptation process of migrants into new communities were asked for this purpose in a research study conducted by the Razumkov Centre. The sample size of the survey made it possible to distinguish certain groups among the respondents; internally displaced persons themselves comprised one of these groups (158 persons) and those having internally displaced persons among their relatives with whom they maintain regular relations formed the other group (496 persons).

Are you personally an internally displaced person who has moved from the territories located in the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) zone, the DPR/LPR – controlled regions or Crimea? % of respondents



Are there any internally displaced persons who have moved from the territories located in the ATO zone, the DPR/LPR – controlled regions or Crimea among your relatives with whom you maintain regular relations? % of respondents




Integration into a new community

The majority (62%) of internally displaced persons confirmed that they became members of a new community after moving to a new place of residence (22% of respondents stated that they “merged” into a new community, and 40% of them said that they were likely to be merged into it). 20% of interviewed internally displaced persons were unable to do this, while 19% of respondents were not sure about their opinions.

According to assessments by the relatives of internally displaced persons, 60% of them have integrated into new communities, 26% of them were unable to do this, and 14% of them were not sure about their opinions.

Can you say that you have joined a new community and become a member of it after moving to a new place? % of internally displaced persons



¹ 1,785,740 persons, or 1,445,660 from Donbas and Crimea, were registered as of June 6, 2016 according to data provided by the social policy departments of the Regional and Kyiv City State Administrations. 868,051 families applied for financial assistance; 808,567 of these were granted such assistance. 1,416,106 thousand UAH have been transferred to recipients since the beginning of 2016. – the official website of the Social Policy Ministry of Ukraine, http://www.mlsp.gov.ua/labour/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=189926&cat_id=107177.

² In particular, the events of the Maidan, separatist movements in some territories of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the development of armed conflict in Donbas.




Discrimination at a new place of residence

The majority (59%) of internally displaced persons did not encounter instances of discrimination and harassment related to the circumstances of their movement to a new place of residence, while a quarter (26%) of them have experienced this.

In the assessment of relatives, 66% of internally displaced persons did not encounter discrimination and harassment and 20% did.

Did you encounter any cases of discrimination related to the circumstances of your movement to another place of residence?
% of internally displaced persons




The difference in views

The majority (56%) of internally displaced persons did not feel any difference in attitudes, beliefs, customs and traditions between them and the majority of residents living in the region that is their current place of residence. 29% internally displaced persons have experienced such a difference.

The relatives of internally displaced persons assess the situation similarly; the ratio is 54% and 27%, respectively.

Do you feel any difference between your attitudes, beliefs, customs, and traditions and those of most residents of the region where you live at present?
% of internally displaced persons




Readiness to change views

There is no consensus among the internally displaced persons regarding the issue of readiness to change some of their attitudes, beliefs, customs and traditions if they contradict or substantially differ from those that are common among residents of the region where they currently live.

31% of internally displaced persons are prepared to do so, 38% of them are not, and 31% of them were not sure about their opinions. Assessments are as follows among the relatives of internally displaced persons: 36% say yes, 24% say no, and 40% of them were not sure about their opinions.

Are you ready to change your attitudes, beliefs, customs, and traditions if they contradict or substantially differ from those common among most residents of the region where you live at present?
% of internally displaced persons



Thus the survey data showed the following:


- the majority of internally displaced persons (according to their own assessments or those of their relatives) have integrated into the new communities. At the same time, a considerable number of them have failed to do this;
- the majority of internally displaced persons were adequately assimilated in their new places of residence, but one in four of them has come up against instances of discrimination and harassment related to the circumstances of migration;
- the majority of internally displaced persons found no considerable differences between their own customs and traditions and those in their new places of residence. However, nearly a third of them have encountered such cases;
- the majority of internally displaced persons are not ready to change their customs and traditions in order to adapt to the new environment if these considerably differ from the same prevailing in the new environment.

Unfortunately, the small number of respondents did not make it possible to analyse the answers by region, though it may be assumed that the distribution of answers depends on the differences in the identity attributes of the residents of different regions of Ukraine that have taken in internally displaced persons, and the attributes of the internally displaced persons.

According to the survey data, over 80% of internally displaced persons included in the sample are residents of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, which have their own specific regional identity.³ The majority of internally displaced persons have settled in the Eastern regions of Ukraine,⁴ which apparently resulted in their relatively easy adaptation to local conditions.

However, it may be assumed that the integration of internally displaced persons into communities located in other regions, namely the Central and Western regions, might become more problematic due to the following factors: greater differences in identity attributes and customs and traditions; differences in the interpretation of events and processes that resulted in migration between the internally displaced persons and the residents of local communities; and unwillingness of internally displaced persons to adapt to local conditions if this involves some changes in their own customs and traditions.

Before your relocation you lived in...,
% of internally displaced persons



³ See the following for particulars: V. Kipen, Y. Pasko "Donetsk Regional Identity: some dimensions of analysis." – National Security & Defence, 2006, No.1, p. 56-60.

⁴ For a map of resettlement of internally displaced persons in Ukraine, see <http://unhcr.org.ua/en/20110826065856/newsarchive/1244internal-displacementmap>.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE IDENTITY OF CITIZENS OF UKRAINE: MAJOR CHANGES AND TRENDS¹



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“**B**uilding a Common Identity of Ukrainian Citizens in the New Environment: Special Aspects, Prospects and Challenges”, a project carried out by the Razumkov Centre, has its own history. It addresses the problem of identity, in its essence, 10 years after the first studies on the subject were conducted, considering the new conditions resulting from the events of 2013-2014. We have also followed the dynamics during the period from 2006 to 2012, when many events in our political history and social life also influenced processes related to the formation of identity, and thus the importance of such events should not be underestimated.

Today, we would like to present the first large-scale public opinion survey regarding identity. This study, with a sample size of over 10,000 respondents, enabled us, *first*, to study small districts rather than only macro-regions, and, *second*, to distinguish groups of respondents based on required socio-cultural and national characteristics, etc., and to analyse the specific features of their identity in the new conditions.

We have identified a particular relationship between socio-cultural and civil aspects of identity during the first study with regard to the identity of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. In this study, we repeated this approach by carrying out a fundamental analysis of groups of respondents distinguished by their language and ethnic characteristics.

When carrying out the study, special attention was paid to two groups of persons that have emerged in our society due to Russian aggression. A large number of citizens surveyed, i.e. 26% of respondents, were mobilised ATO participants, or had such persons among their family members and loved ones. We called this group “Citizens affiliated with the resistance in response to the armed aggression from Russia”, and studied the special identity features of its representatives, as compared with citizens who were not affiliated with such activities.

The other group consisted of internally displaced persons. We were interested in the extent of their integration into the communities they joined after moving to new places of residence, issues with their adaptation, and their readiness to adopt new values, customs and traditions.

The research materials are diverse in their topics and provide much food for thought and further fundamental

analysis. At this point, we are presenting data regarding the state of various aspects of identity, differences between the regions, and temporal dynamics. We have formulated the question in largely the same manner as before in order to make it possible to compare the survey results with previously obtained data.

I would like to briefly outline the main characteristics of the current state of certain aspects of the identity of the citizens and the changes that have taken place since previous surveys.

The study allows us to draw a conclusion that the changes have affected various aspects of identity.

Let us begin with the civil and political aspects. First of all, national identity has become a priority for residents of most regions, whereas local or regional identity prevailed based on the data of previous surveys. Today, local identity, i.e. self-association primarily with a place of residence, is more characteristic of citizens of the South and Donbas, while residents of other regions (West, Centre and East) primarily consider themselves citizens of Ukraine.

As before, the vast majority of the citizens consider Ukraine their motherland and would consider it so if given the choice. These figures have not changed. The majority of citizens are proud of their Ukrainian citizenship, and this number has grown considerably. Previously, the history and achievements in sports, art, literature, science, and technology were named among the sources of pride in the country; today, the Ukrainian national character, defined as the ability to fight for one’s country and rights, and the Armed Forces have been added to this list. This is quite understandable considering the current circumstances. However, it should be mentioned that citizens’

¹ The first stage of the Project entitled “Building a Common Identity of Ukrainian Citizens in the New Environment: Special Aspects, Prospects and Challenges” was presented during the Expert Discussion “Building a Common Ukrainian Identity: Prospects and Challenges”, Kyiv, June 7, 2016.

Expert Discussion, 7 June 2016



sources of pride consist primarily of the qualities and achievements of the Ukrainian people and society, while the achievements of the state and its social and political system were named as the sources of pride to a lesser extent, as well as social and economic benefits.

The vast majority of citizens (74%) consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, although, of course, there are certain regional differences. A combination of certain specific characteristics of a civil and socio-cultural nature may be observed in the citizens' ways of defining patriotism. We can say that the importance of the social, ethnic and cultural components of patriotism has increased, while the civic understanding of patriotism has remained the same. Knowledge of the history and culture of Ukraine and the Ukrainian language has become an issue of much more importance.

Support for Ukraine's independence has increased among the citizens. 68% of respondents would "vote for" in the event of a referendum, while the previous poll recorded only 59% in this regard. Over 90% of Ukrainians are proud of or have a positive attitude towards the symbols or attributes of the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian language.

The number of citizens who are interested in politics has increased. 51% of citizens polled consider democracy to be the most desirable type of socio-political system for Ukraine. The current state of democracy in Ukraine is assessed as moderate by the citizens, at just over 5 points on a 10-point scale.

Understanding equality to mean equal opportunities is common throughout the society. Nevertheless, this understanding is combined with a desire for the state to limit excessive inequality with a certain denial of personal freedom for this purpose. 40% of respondents have a positive attitude towards the Maidan of 2013 and are ready to support it at the moment. However, 40% of respondents would not like to support any party to the conflict, meaning they would not support either the Maidan or the Anti-Maidan.

Language identity. 60% of citizens consider Ukrainian their mother tongue. Another 22% of respondents consider both languages to be native. 75% of respondents, including 25% of persons who speak both languages, use Ukrainian for communication in everyday life. The number of citizens who consider Ukrainian their native language and the number of bilingual citizens have increased from previous surveys. The number of Russian-speaking citizens has decreased. The percentage of citizens who speak Ukrainian fluently is 65%, and 28% of respondents speak Ukrainian to the extent necessary for everyday communication.

The idea of bilingualism on the state level has lost its popularity in all regions of Ukraine in the current conditions. The percentage of persons who are

committed to the current status of Ukrainian as the only official state language is 56%, while the 2005 survey showed 35%. We can see considerable changes in this regard.

Cultural identity. **The majority of citizens associate themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition, and their number has significantly increased during this period, currently reaching 70%.** The percentage of citizens who associate themselves with the Soviet (10% of respondents and 16% in 2006) and Russian cultural traditions has decreased. There were changes in the assessments of which cultural tradition will be widespread in Ukraine in the future. The majority of citizens think that the Ukrainian and European cultural traditions will prevail in Ukraine. The percentage of persons who expected that different cultural traditions will prevail in different regions has decreased. The tendency to expect the Ukrainian cultural tradition to prevail in the future is discernible.

There are certain changes in assumptions about the difference between different national groups and citizens from different regions. Citizens believe that they are culturally closer to the Ukrainians and Russians living in Ukraine. However, the number of people who believe that there are considerable differences between the Ukrainians, on the one hand, and Russians and Russian citizens, on the other, has increased. Citizens believe that there are considerable differences between residents of Galicia and Donbas. Thus, the awareness of differences persists, and the tendency is increasing to a certain extent.

The majority of Ukrainians do not consider themselves Europeans yet, although the percentage of those who do has increased to 30%. Clearly, this is primarily due to socio-economic issues and is related to socio-cultural differences such as the level of education, and, to a lesser extent, considering oneself a citizen associated with another culture, etc.

National identity. The vast majority of citizens identified themselves as Ukrainians, i.e. 86%; 9% identified as Russians and 3% as representatives of other groups. The civic understanding of nationalities has become more common among the citizens and the percentage of persons who support ethnic identification has decreased as compared to previous surveys. However, the majority of respondents supported mandatory knowledge of the official Ukrainian language by every citizen, as well as the fundamentals of the history and culture of Ukraine. Therefore, we may note a combination of a civic approach regarding interpretation of nationalities along with the Ukrainian cultural component. This issue appears to be quite important.

The following question was raised in 2005: How do citizens understand "Ukrainian nationalism"? Three possible answers were suggested: the first defined nationalism as a world view whose main idea is to turn Ukraine into a strong state, the second defined it as an ideology that polarised the society, and the third defined it as an ideology that existed in Western Ukraine at a particular time and is no longer present. In 2015, the survey was carried out again and it was revealed that the understanding of Ukrainian nationalism has been largely cleansed of negative connotations during the intervening 10 years. **47% of citizens now consider nationalism to be the ideology of state development.** This opinion was expressed by a plurality of respondents.

There have been fundamental changes in geopolitical orientation. The figures are roughly the same in different surveys carried out by our Centre and by other



sociological centres. Orientation towards the EU has become characteristic of the majority of Ukrainian citizens. Furthermore, **a change regarding the issue of joining NATO** was identified: a plurality of respondents are committed to the idea of Ukraine joining NATO and a minority do not support this.

In all regions of Ukraine except Donbas, the majority of respondents have a negative attitude towards all Russian government authorities. A plurality of Ukrainians expressed a neutral attitude towards the citizens of Russia, 30% of them expressed a positive attitude and 23% of them expressed a negative attitude in this regard. It stands to reason that the attitude has worsened overall.

There is a consensus among the residents of Ukraine regarding the future status of the regions. The ideas of separatism and federalism are not supported by the majority of citizens. A majority (absolute or relative) of respondents in all regions support the idea of accretion of powers to local authorities while preserving the existing status of the regions. This is consistent with the policy of decentralisation, which is being implemented through constitutional processes at present.

Attitude towards certain disputed issues. There is no certainty about the next steps regarding settlement of the conflict in the East. None of the proposed answers was supported by a majority of respondents. Nevertheless, one of the proposed answers that included full or partial isolation of the territories occupied by the DPR and LPR was chosen most often. There are noticeable differences in the attitudes towards different categories of persons affiliated with the conflict. This applies particularly to participants in armed units of the DPR and LPR.

The issue of citizens' attitude towards assessment of the historical past appears to be important as well, especially in light of adoption of the "de-communisation laws" and other legislation related to historical memory. The majority of respondents (52% to 74%) supported recognition of the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people and the condemnation of the totalitarian communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, as well as prohibition of use and propagandizing of their symbols.

A plurality of citizens supported the imposition of criminal liability for violation of legislation prohibiting the use and propagandizing of symbols of the Nazi regime, establishing a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation on 8 May, recognizing a number of former authorities and armed units to be the fighters for independence of Ukraine (the Ukrainian People's Republic, OUN, UPA, etc.), and the imposition of criminal liability for violation of legislation prohibiting the use and propagandizing of symbols of the communist regime. 38-47% of respondents expressed support for these measures.

Opinions of respondents regarding changing of the name "Victory Day" to "Victory Day over Nazism in World War II" divided roughly in half, with 37% supporting it and 35% opposed. The same applied to the change of the name "Great Patriotic War" to "World War II" in official documents, names of public holidays and historical sites. There are considerable differences in the opinions expressed by residents of different regions.

In summation of all trends regarding identity, we may note an increase in the role of common national identity as compared to local and regional identities, an increase in respect for the state and towards oneself as a representative of the Ukrainian people, an increase in the Ukrainian national component of identity, inclu-

ding in the East and the South, development of a consensus opinion on European cultural affiliation, and certain devoid of illusions regarding the Eurasian integration process. These attitudes documented in the course of carrying out the survey prove that the process of forming a common identity is in progress.

The following information briefly describes the identity features of citizens based on their language, as well as citizens affiliated with the ATO.

The language factor significantly affects various aspects of the identity of Ukrainian citizens. As seen in the diagrams, the factor of the Ukrainian language correlates with common national identity, active patriotism, and readiness to defend the country. Two-thirds of Russian-speaking citizens are characterised by a distinctive language and ethnic identity due to the fact that they are the Ukrainians in terms of their nationality. Similarly, there is an intersection between linguistic and cultural identities. These phenomena must be analysed in detail in order to avoid premature conclusions. For the time being, we may confine ourselves to certain observations. Thus, we consciously focus our attention on obvious differences, specific features in certain groups.

The same is true regarding persons affiliated in the armed resistance in response to Russian aggression. The aspect that must be considered, first and foremost, is their attitude towards the conflict, the methods for settling it, and the persons affiliated with it on the part of the DPR and LPR. These issues are important considering the necessity of establishing peace and national unity in the future. The specific features of the identity of persons affiliated with the ATO should be taken into particular consideration due to the activities of this group, which may be manifested in social and political spheres.

Finally, we present information regarding the issue of internally displaced persons. It may be acknowledged that the majority of internally displaced persons have integrated into new communities (62% of the respondents). A smaller percentage of them, 20%, do not feel they have integrated. Nevertheless, they did not find any considerable differences between their own customs and traditions and those attributed to residents of their new places of residence, and were adequately accepted by them. Less than a third of internally displaced persons observed such differences, while a quarter have faced the problems related to their migration. The majority of migrants mentioned that they were not ready to change their customs and traditions in order to adapt to a new environment, even if their own customs and traditions differed considerably.

This is a general view of the issues analysed. The ultimate goal of our research is to prepare reasoned proposals regarding methods for further development of a common national identity among the citizens of Ukraine and ways of advancing the formation of a modern Ukrainian nation, while acknowledging the existence of a number of approaches in this regard.

There are various concepts that sometimes compete against each other. It is necessary to achieve a balance between common civic, socio-cultural, and ethnic approaches to the formation of a common national identity. It is necessary to develop a viable concept that cannot be destroyed by other "worlds," be they Russian or others, and can be internally integrated, strong, and able to withstand current and future challenges. ■

BUILDING A COMMON UKRAINIAN IDENTITY: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

On 7 June 2016 the Razumkov Centre held an Expert Discussion “Building a Common Ukrainian Identity: Prospects and Challenges”, organised together with Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine and Matra European Partnership Programme of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Netherlands.

Discussion participants talked about the most topical aspects of building a common national identity, including the influence of events of 2013-2015, key trends of the current stage of national identity formation, modern risks and challenges.

Below, we present opinions of participants in the order they were presented during the discussion. Texts have been prepared using discussion transcripts and are presented in somewhat shortened form. Some presentations include references made by editors.

SOCIETY ITSELF URGES THE POLITICAL ELITE TO MAKE SERIOUS POLITICAL CHANGES AND TO DEFEND THE CULTURAL NEEDS OF THE MAJORITY OF POPULATION



Mykola KNIAZHYTSKYI,
*Chairman of the
Verkhovna Rada Committee
on Culture and Spirituality*

We can see how much the number of supporters of Ukrainian identity has changed after the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. These changes are stunning. The government machine has done everything in its power for them not to happen. We still have ideological imprints. This is why we often identify the idea of “Ukrainianness” as ultra-right. We had the “Svoboda” (“Freedom”) party, which claimed its monopoly in representing “Ukrainianness”. However, there is also another extreme – when we identify liberalism as anti-Ukrainian. Because when someone offers to change the official language from the Ukrainian to another one or to restrict its usage, it is called liberalism.

A normal political nation will form only when the Ukrainianness, the language and culture will be the priority and will include people with different views – right, left, social democrats, Christian democrats.

This is something that we have to build, something that is difficult to accomplish, given the informational

influence of Russia. Maybe, you have observed the heated discussions in the Parliament concerning the introduction of the 35% quota for Ukrainian songs, and how media lobby has done everything possible using covert, presumptuous methods for this not to happen, for Ukrainian songs not to be on air.

Why is this necessary? Ukrainian identity in the currently occupied territories was at its lowest level, Ukrainian language was the least used one. Now the line of occupation of Crimea and East runs along the border of these territories.

It is interesting to compare this research to the one conducted for Television Industry Committee.¹ Broadcasting of private TV and radio companies is done on the basis of this research, programmes are selected according to it. Overall figures for Ukraine are not very different. “Main language spoken in the household” and “what language do you speak at home” are essentially the same question. Combining answers “Ukrainian” and “mostly Ukrainian” gives us 49.8%, almost 50%, in the other research – 48%.

However, Ukrainian preferences regarding TV and radio shows are only measured in cities with population over 50 thousand, including Donetsk and Luhansk. Which provide quite a different picture. The data is as follows: “main language spoken in the household is Ukrainian – 26.4%”, while the overall number for Ukraine is 50%; “Russian – 52.2%”, so over a half of people use Russian; 20.9% – “Ukrainian and Russian equally”. So all programmes on all TV channels are targeting the preferences of the Russian-speaking population only. If you change this – you get less advertising, and hence, less money. Sociologists play no role here – viewers make all decisions, as well as the Television Industry Committee controlled by major Ukrainian oligarchs. Essentially, this is pure Russification. Apart from it, our linguistic and cultural identification would have been rather different.

¹ Television Industry Committee – a professional association of leading TV channels and media agencies representing television industry of Ukraine, <http://itk.ua>.


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After the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity, significant changes took place, and now more people identify themselves as Ukrainian. Society itself urges the political elite to make serious political changes and to defend cultural needs of the majority of the population.

These are the important issues that our Committee has to work on. They are equally as important as, for instance, the signing or not signing of the “Kivalov-Kolesnichenko” Law² or the development of a new language law, taking into account the Charter for Minority Languages.³ While, previously, all of this was necessary to form Ukrainianness, now these problems must be solved in order to fulfil society’s needs and ensure national security. ■



THE STUDY IS VERY IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF FINDING THE LINE BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND NORMALISATION



Yuri RUBAN,
Head of the
Main Department
for Humanitarian Policy,
Presidential Administration
of Ukraine

I think the study makes an important statement of instrumentalising the concept of identity. Why is this important? We feel that the language used in regulations, which we mostly inherited from the Soviet Union, the language, in which our laws on cultural and language policy are written (back in 1989 – early 1990s), has no capacity to adequately describe the current situation. It is clear that we need new approaches, even new language, or discourse, for these documents.

There have been different attempts. The language used to describe everything in regulations turned out to be irrelevant. Classical example – the well-known “Kivalov-Kolesnichenko” Law. At the time of its adoption it was believed to bring about the Apocalypse, the death of Ukrainian language. The Law has been adopted and, in my opinion, it has not really influenced further developments. In the spring of 2014 it was announced that the Law would be abolished – the Rada voted. In Donetsk and Luhansk, Russian media screamed that this would bring about the Apocalypse for the Russian language. Which did not happen either. Very often regulations that are adopted try to describe

the norm using language that is irrelevant for the real world with millions of people.

Let us remember our discussions on the existence of Ukrainian political nation in 2012-2013. There, we also had a number of apocalyptic forecasts, statements about “two Ukraines”, etc. Through a horrible and blood-drenched lesson we learned by experience that all the borders we were drawing on the map of Ukraine previously, turned out to be inadequate. It turned out that the political border, drawn as a result of Russian aggression and the annexation of Crimea, is very different from the one we were drawing before. Apocalyptic predictions about the lack of unity in the society did not come true. Again, **by experience we learned about enormous unity of our society in confronting the Russian aggression.** There were times when the key role in this process was played by civil society structures, because the state was sometimes a little more helpless than we would like it to be.

This study talks about strengthening the national identity, which can be interpreted more as a political category. This is my personal point of view, as I am convinced that the concept of nation is political. I have a dream that someone would explain to me what “ethnicity” is in the 20th century.

Now about trends that are typical for the modern stage of building national identity. All the concepts of liberal political theory are interpretive. Sometimes I have a feeling that we attempt to standardise this notion. Sometimes, within our political discourse there are attempts to create the concept of a “normal Ukrainian person”. Which type of Ukrainian person is a “proper” one? The classical example is an attempt to describe a “normal Ukrainian”, and gradually, using state policy instruments, bring up to this norm everyone else who does not fit this description. In most people this causes rejection, as for each of us our individuality has tremendous value.

This is why some actions in the frame of, for example, decommunisation, are not received well. Not because anyone is mourning communism, but because

² This is the unofficial, but rather popular name (after the last names of its authors – people’s deputies from the Party of Regions S. Kivalov and V. Kolesnichenko) of the notorious Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of State Language Policy” of 2012. According to the Law, the official state language is Ukrainian, but a wider use of regional languages is allowed, provided that the size of minorities exceeds 10% of population of that particular region. Such language is used in the respective area of Ukraine’s territory in the work of local state administration bodies and local self-government authorities, is used and studied in state and municipal educational establishments.

The Law was adopted in violation of the Constitution of Ukraine, rules of procedure and consideration procedure, and aims primarily to support development of the Russian language.

Adoption of the Law led to mass protests mainly in Western and Central regions. At the end of February 2014, after the Revolution of Dignity, in its special session Verkhovna Rada cancelled this Law, but the President still has not signed it, so the Law is still in effect.


³ The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, signed on 5 November 1992, ratified by Ukraine on 15 March 2003, entered into force for Ukraine on 1 January 2006.

people feel that the world they live in is being declared “improper”. This can be felt in simple conversations with people.

This is why this study is very important from the point of view of finding the line between interpretation and standardization. It is important for the state policy, for developing state documents of different levels.

On what basis could a national identity form, given the current conditions and challenges? The key is our country’s success. People like success, they feel success as a complex concept. If the country gets back on its feet, demonstrates success in economy, social policy, etc. – it will be the best way to develop and strengthen national identity. ■

MAIN CONCLUSION – UKRAINIAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE IS BUILT ON THE CIVIL SOCIETY BASIS AS PART OF REPUBLICANISM



Taras VOZNIAK,
Editor-in-Chief,
independent cultural
journal “Ji”

Personality, preservation of own dignity, selfness are very important, but we must not forget the fact that a person, regardless of features, is not absolutely independent. In any society, the personality is being formed. In our times, it is shaped less by family and more by media, the environment that we live in.

Our discussion includes many sociologists, who accept figures for the real state of affairs, divine and unwavering. And we all have to build our plans based on this book of infinite wisdom. Meaning that the voice of the people is the voice of God. But this is not always the case. When the Italian statehood was established, Count of Cavour said: “Italy is made, we still have to make Italians”.⁴ This idea is slightly contrary to what the previous colleague said.

It is important for research to show the dynamics, not just a one-time expert cross section. The foundation for awareness of our people, building the future Ukraine, planning our political or social structure, is a civic republican approach. But what is a change in sentiment?

The diachrony, when 40% supported the idea of building the country on the civic basis, was essentially republicanism. Now – about 60%. It is just the change of sentiment, as sociologists would put it. This is also due to learning. Due to the circumstances, two years of war, two revolutions (or as some people call them, Maidans) the society has had certain experience, has

learnt a certain lesson. The plans for building a future society are now to be developed on a different ground. The structures from the 1930s were easy to sell, – they were simple, familiar.

So I would treat the results of this study as a certain intention to design the future. **Main conclusion – Ukrainian political structure is built on the civil society basis as part of republicanism.** No one here spoke of republicanism, only about the civil foundation. While the republic is the common cause for everyone in Ukraine. And not just with an ethnic or religious foundation.

There is also an important foreign policy conclusion. We are talking about Ukraine and our experience. But we are not in an isolated space. Next to us are Poland, Hungary and other countries, which are saying: “We are building things, and you for some reason – can’t”. Today’s Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic are quite different from Ukraine: their societies were monoethnic, monotheistic or monolingual. Since Ukraine is different in this sense, **we have to choose a different foundation to use.** We have unique experience. In the context of EU integration, this experience can be even more unique than that of Poland.

Does our state-building contain threats? Of course, it does, and they are becoming more and more apparent since the last Maidan.

First of all, we must admit that ethnocentric Ukrainian nationalism has de facto failed in Ukraine as represented by the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” and others, which became apparent after the results of elections to the Verkhovna Rada and local councils. This does not mean that attempts to “sell” ethnocentric nationalism to the Ukrainian society will cease to exist. No one has ruined these plans. So let us not substitute Ukrainian republicanism with ignoring Ukrainianness in Ukraine as it is. There is a great danger here – the return of ethnic nationalist “demons”. Of course, it will take other forms, possibly not such primitive ones as in the case of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”.

So we cannot defile the Ukrainianness of Ukraine. And talking about that law⁵ and other things like that – this is playing with fire. Because a reaction will follow. They can play these games in their business offices in Kyiv, with their worldviews. But this can

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⁴ Phrase, the translation of which is given by T. Vozniak “...pur troppo s’è fatta l’Italia, ma non si fanno gl’Italiani” – “...unfortunately, Italy is made, but we still have to make Italians”, is more often attributed to the Piedmontese Marquess Massimo d’Azeglio, supporter of a union between Italian states. See: Massimo d’Azeglio, https://it.wikiquote.org/wiki/Massimo_d%27Azeglio.

⁵ The author probably means the possibility of later revocation of the so-called “Kivalov-Kolesnichenko” Law.

bring back the relevance of Ukrainian ethnocentric nationalism and its sparring partner – Russian ethnocentric nationalism, Russian imperialism as it is. I think V. Putin dreams that the situation we have overcome in 2014 comes back.

We cannot but see some confusion in definitions, when “republican patriotism”, due to journalists’ illiteracy in certain areas, is replaced by the vague term “nationalism”. It was mentioned that nationalism has been “refined”, and became warm and fuzzy. So, the attitude to it changed. This is also a dangerous game that will be used later. We are observing a type of schizophrenia in society, which, on the one hand, seems to believe our future is to be built on republicanism or civic patriotism, and on the other – brings back nationalism as a concept into a more acceptable discourse. At this point, just as a definition, not as practice. But let us not entertain any illusions as to this. This is a signal, which can be dangerous.

We are talking not just about a fixed state of being, but about shaping the future of Ukrainian society. These “diseases”, schizophrenias that I talked about, must be treated. And we need to actively shape our society. Whose job should it be? The leading segment – is the group of people with a purpose, who lead the society. Do we have such a segment? This is a question for all of us.

Currently, we are in the process of constructing a new Ukrainian identity. I am convinced that leaving this process unattended or simply documenting it in research – is a childish approach. ■

WE MUST DEVELOP A POLICY OF UKRAINIAN IDENTITY, NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS



Iryna KRIESINA,
Associate Member,
National Academy
of Legal Sciences of Ukraine

I would like to continue with the idea that we have to build our identity. Consciously, purposefully, consistently and persistently.

Sociological study data is very interesting and useful for the society, and it directs us to specific actions – in research, real politics, legislative support for the changes that are now taking place in the society.

The academic community should, first of all, implement these studies, use them in various ways and promote them through research, scientific discourse, current topics. We need to change the focus, *first*, in our approach to values that are being demonstrated today. In particular, national values, national idea as the idea of a political, civil nation

with a national perspective. *Second*, in our approach to Ukrainian nation as a political, civil, polyethnic community.

I am very pleased that we, the Ukrainian political scientists, for decades have been promoting the idea that Ukrainian nation – is a political nation, not an ethnic one. And finally, the developments in the society are confirming that Ukrainian political nation is sound as a concept. It is important that these studies become the foundation of real politics, political decision-making at all government levels.

We should develop a policy of Ukrainian identity, national consciousness. We see that the conflict we are currently going through and the aggression are not caused by socio-economic factors. They are caused by the lack of attention of society and political elite to ethno-national problems that have been brewing in the society for decades. We have talked about them, insisted on the necessity of developing an adequate proactive national policy of the Ukrainian state. Which was virtually non-existent. For decades the concept of national policy remained a laughable subject for discussion.

Today, the task is to develop a modern model of ethno-national policy for the re-integration of Donbas and Crimea, to advance the Ukrainian society towards establishing tolerance and Ukrainian national values.

Today, we would like for our legislators and representatives of specialised committees to give us a vision of today’s state policy and strategy regarding the re-integration of the occupied territories and consolidation of the Ukrainian society. In reality, we do not see a strategy – either regarding the resolution of the armed conflict, or regarding the establishment of a Ukrainian civil society. So far, all of this remains the behind-the-scenes talks.

Talking about this strategy, we need to establish that we have to change our Basic Law in such a way that it is based on these values – European and Ukrainian national ones. Talking about the development of a paradigm and the model of the new Constitution (this is exactly what we should be talking about, and not about small patchlike changes, which do not make any alterations to the main rules society lives by), we need to talk about developing key characteristics of the concepts the basic law is to be based on.

National and European values, combined and interrelated, are to determine the future development of Ukraine, which has to be mapped out in the new Constitution of the Republic of Ukraine. I would like us to be called not just “the land of Ukraine”, but the Ukrainian People’s Republic. So that we finally revive our historical tradition – Ukraine has always been a republic, a Cossack republic, Ukrainian People’s Republic, back in the early 20th century. **Today, we have to restore the Constitution that is based on the rule of the people and national patriotism.**

We need to change the Law “On the National Minorities in Ukraine”, need to develop a national policy concept and give it the status of law. We need to make a law on national and cultural autonomy in order to prevent all kinds of separatist trends, which

can be observed today in attempts to impose the idea of national autonomy in the society. This is a dangerous idea and we know who produces it. Behind it is a certain interest of a certain community, as well as separatist ideas.

Today, we have to talk about creating the best conditions for ensuring and fulfilling national and cultural needs of all ethnic communities living in Ukraine, and the nation as a whole.

In the present studies, we see that the Ukrainian nation is viewed as a civil community, which is combined with supporting the need for the Ukrainian cultural component. The tight connection between the civil-political and national-cultural aspects has to be reflected in the law. So, that there would be no attempts to establish national autonomies. Even for those people, who were affected by the 1944 expulsion.

We need to talk about changing the Law “On the Principles of State Language Policy”. There is no need to resort to ethnic nationalism, but it is also impossible to further tolerate the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law in the Ukrainian society. It is humiliating – in the state of war, after thousands have died for our national independence – to live by this law. This is the indisputable priority for our legislation today.

Through extensive discussions and coverage in the media, Internet, academic circles we have to come to the basic ideas and principles that should be the foundation of the new Constitution of Ukraine. What we see today are the patchlike changes dictated from above that humiliate our Ukrainian nation, which has a different vision of the rules and laws it has to follow in order to give birth to the new Ukraine – strong, independent, flourishing. ■

A NATION CANNOT BE NON-POLITICAL. IT EITHER EXISTS OR NOT



Serhiy ZDIORUK,
*Lead Research Fellow,
Humanitarian
Security Department,
National Institute
for Strategic Studies*

I would like to talk about a few points regarding Ukrainian civic identity and focus attention not so much on the implementation processes, but more on the challenges and threats that are painful for us, hurt the body and soul of our nation and state.

Here’s the question: if in the 21st century there is no identity, where do the challenges and threats come from? Naturally, there is something to think about here. Humanity’s development is dynamic. We know that on Earth there are specific areals that gave birth to ethnic groups. No two natural areas gave birth to one ethnic group. And one ethnic group does

not have several states. According to different estimates, there are 4-6 thousand ethnic groups on earth, and about 200 states. This is a problem for centuries.

Today, we have an immense problem – war with Russia. Russia’s leaders are ready to recognise anyone and anything but the equality with people and states of post-imperial Russian identity. They will never admit themselves to be equal with Estonians, Ukrainians, there have to be equal and more equal ones. This phenomenon has existed in the community for centuries, and it carries a threat – currently to the Ukrainian nation.

The problem of Orthodox fundamentalism. The misfortune, great threat and challenge for us, Ukrainians, and for the Ukrainian state is that as a result of a hundred years, and now decades of our leader’ policy, we had to anchor our identity not to international Orthodox faith, as we should have, but to Russia’s fundamentalism bordering on Orthodox ritualism.

Another layer is culture. **There is a need for the reconstruction of our cultural industries.** Post-soviet narrow-mindedness and commonness are coming in bulk from Russia and bringing a tremendous threat. Why is the momentum so strong?


There is also the notion of political culture. We have to appeal to our best expert communities, which should be using the well-established or new notions that are identical in the European, American as well as Ukrainian schools.

Let us look at the study. We say “ordinary people”, but people are not wrong, they see that a nationalist is something different from a chauvinist, fascist, Nazi. Talking about the notion of nationalism, we can keep away from dozens of definitions and simply say that it is a nation’s advance towards its rights – that’s it. And depending on specific historical conditions this advance can be either democratic or force-based.

I am surprised when people say “political nation or non-political”. Let us be honest with ourselves, a nation cannot be non-political. It either exists or not. If there were no nation, it would not be able to restore statehood. I have offered my graduate students a simple and clear definition of a nation: a nation is a community, group of people, who have gained a state, or at least are fighting to gain it. Then everything falls into place. A lot of communities have disappeared. But it was not us who pushed them. It was their own choice. The choice that Russian people are making today.

Identity permanently accompanies socio-political activity and individual lives of people. It is an illusion that we can back down on it. Same as the illusion of building communism. Our way is based entirely on fundamental democratic principles. This is why today’s mother of all questions is: will Ukrainian state politics be run on the basis, in particular, of such sociological studies, in the best interest of the entire nation, specifically from the point of view of protecting national interests? Therefore, as a practical step, I think we will also change the electoral system, including parties, which will become mainly ideological as entities within the electoral process, and this will bring immensely significant results for the real democracy and real identity of the Ukrainian nation. ■

ACADEMIC INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY IS BEING CONSCIOUSLY DISTANCED FROM THE PROCESS OF BUILDING NATIONAL IDENTITY IN UKRAINE



Vasyl TKACHENKO,
Lead Research Fellow,
Institute of World History,
NAS of Ukraine

Identity is a two-way process that triggers binary opposition. *First* is the identity of rejection expressed in the statement “We are not them”. *Second* – identity of self-assertion: what we achieve, who we were and who we are, who we want to be. What does acquiring identity mean today? **We need to understand the world we live in – the progress of globalisation, the main political trend – and find our place within this trend.**

We are being told that today science’s return on investment is zero. However, science starts to show ROI with the minimum investment of 1% GDP. Our GDP is neglected and sickly, unlike in the West. When 0.2% GDP is invested in science – this is conscious distancing of academic intellectual community from the process of building national identity in Ukraine.

With total respect to our media and TV, I know that our main channels belong to oligarchs. So we have entrusted the entire process of building national identity in Ukraine to the oligarchs, who use all their channels to broadcast information that forms the image of a ludicrous Ukrainian. Someone like V. Zelenskyi⁶ makes a joke and the people accept this image, this identity.

All my works on identity were written in close cooperation with the Razumkov Centre. We find common language, common interests. Meanwhile, in our science sector – there is no synergy, it is left unattended. If we do not concentrate our forces, gather them around political pedagogy, we will keep losing. ■

Expert Discussion, 7 June 2016



IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP AN INTEGRATION POLICY FOR THE ENTIRE UKRAINIAN SOCIETY



Viktor KOTYHORENKO,
Lead Research Fellow,
National Minorities Department,
I. F. Kuras Institute
of Political and
Ethno-National Studies,
NAS of Ukraine

One of the trends formulated as the subject of the discussion, demonstrated by this study, and stressed by all recent studies, is the question – how the events of Maidan, Donbas, etc. influenced the development of identity. Institute of Sociology has been asking the same question as the one raised by the Razumkov Centre colleagues since 1992: “What do you consider yourself in the first place?” Meaning, the scale of identities. After the majority of Ukraine voted for state independence, the rates of attitude to state independence dropped, civic identification did not exceed 55%, and before Maidan it was only 44%.

Although research showed a slight increase during the Tuzla conflict. Followed by another drop, then Maidan, second Maidan, Donbas events... What does this say? **Ukrainians as a nation consolidate in the time of threats – to state independence, citizens’ rights, human rights.** On the one hand, this is a reassuring factor, on the other, – a rather sad one, because we do not observe such increases in connection with success and resolution of important issues.

The research shows one more interesting thing. It answers the question of what directions the policy of building the Ukrainian nation should take and what evaluation criteria for the development of the Ukrainian nation can be.

Let us look at what a nation is. It does not make sense to talk about an ethnic nation. If in Ukraine there is an ethnic nation, maybe there is also another one. In this case, how many nations does Ukraine have? When we talked about the priority of ethnic self-identification, according to Institute of Sociology research, the numbers were in the range of 1.8% to 3.2%. The Razumkov Centre asked the same question in a slightly different way (which is very good, as sociology is a science that gives precise answers to not very precisely formulated questions), but the trend shows that ethnic affiliation is not a priority. Although along with this, ethno-cultural civic values are consolidating for the society in all parts of Ukraine – this is a unique situation.

Nation as a political community is not an entirely correct point of view. Some people support nationalist parties, others vote for the Opposition Bloc, someone else may have voted for communists and, possibly, still supports them. **A nation is a national-civic**

⁶ Volodymyr Zelenskyi – art director of “Kvartal 95” Studio – a popular high-ranking entertainment show.

phenomenon with an ethnic component. Every society, every state must provide individuals with an opportunity for cultural self-identification. But we understand, and research proves it that ethnic Ukrainianness is the centre which attracts all other ethno-cultural groups in our society. More specifically – individuals. Because we do not have a lot of groups. Out of 130 nationalities, with the exception of some living in certain regions, the majority is Russified.

Building national civic identity means treating state independence as the priority. Second – is the indicator of patriotism. Third – the value of civic identity within the set of priorities. And emotional attitude to citizenship. There is a question: “How proud are you to be a citizen of Ukraine?” There is a field of work for politics, politicians. How this is implemented is exactly what depends on our ruling elite, our government.


Do you remember 2004, when Ukraine was divided into different sorts of people? **If our ruling class keeps on trading on regional, ethno-cultural, economic and other differences, conflicts will keep brewing.** There will be separatism in Donbas, as well as in Crimea. There was a lot written about it, but nobody paid any attention, no one was interested. In Donbas the main factor is not ethnic. Do you remember what Russian-language media did after 2004? “Russian-speaking Donbas feeds Ukrainian-speaking West and Centre”.

I.e. linguistic and ethnic factors are subordinate to the economic one in these speculations. Political powers trade on this to create an electoral base for themselves, strengthen it, gain power leverages as the source of economic resources. Research demonstrates this very clearly. Maidan of 2013, events in Donbas have consolidated our nation, and now the indicators are going down again as compared to 2014. This shows the quality of our government and effectiveness of their policies. I am not saying that politicians have to come to power who will put their private interests after the interests of the people, but they, at least, must look for a sensible balance between the two. Then, the national-civic identity in our country will grow.

This study provides answers to many questions, but it also raises even more questions. I was very glad to hear that there will be more of in-depth focus group studies. Question – why in Donbas there is a greater proportion of those, who oppose the ban of national-socialist regime propaganda? I have a hypothesis: because in the situation of fear, danger, any radical prohibitions are rejected by people. But there is another question for the political elite: I am very concerned that the majority of people support separation of Donbas. Who said that Donbas residents are anti-Ukrainian? They are becoming anti-Ukrainian. Scientists wrote to the government in August 2014: retirees need to receive their pensions. Luhansk political analyst Kononov conducted focus group studies that showed that these people believe that Ukraine abandoned them. I do not remember in which study, but there was data that up to 2% of people in Donbas were ready to support Russia. And Ukraine abandoned Donbas, the government abandoned Donbas. I understand that for a period of time there was no proper government. But the government is still abandoning people today. So what do we want to regain – territory or people? This is why

we need a different rhetoric. One thing is terrorists, and another – ordinary people. My personal communication with ATO veterans, who spent half a year as prisoners of war proves the same: they say “we need to feel sorry for those people, we have abandoned them”. ■

BIETHNIC INDIVIDUALS ARE AN “ARMY RESERVE” FOR EACH OF THE ETHNO-NATIONAL COMPONENTS



Roman LENCHOVSKYI,
Senior Research Fellow,
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of Sociology

I would like to dwell on the issue of building national identity. According to KIIS data, there are very apparent trends. Global trends in Ukrainian society, macro-processes are powered by micro-trends, processes of personal choices citizens make – especially in the domain of national-ethnic identification, self-determination, which is directly and indirectly related to the national civil objective reality.

I am talking about a popular everyday phenomenon, to which neither the political elite, nor state statistics services, when presenting the national-ethnic composition of the population, pay any attention.

A typical “survey” question: “What is your nationality?” How are the children from mixed marriages supposed to answer it? According to the old Soviet administrative-bureaucratic tradition of established “passport” nationality? According to what was documented in the mother’s or father’s passport?

By the way, some nations have the tradition of determining their “national identity” through the paternal line, others – through the maternal line ... The biggest “freedom” granted to USSR citizens was the “freedom of choice” between parents’ “passports” – at least some “relief” for the numerous discriminated “Soviet nationalities”... Although, in the most “serious” forms you still had to indicate who is who in your family...

How far away did we move from those practices in the independent Ukraine? There is no more “fifth line” with its strict rules of definitive one-component wording in our passports... But what about the civic consciousness of Ukrainians? What do we think about Ukrainian citizens’ and our own national origin and ethno-national self-identification?

For instance, such phenomenon as mixed marriages. They are rather popular, especially in the urban environment, big cities, in order to ignore their influence on personal ethno-national self-identification. Besides, mixed marriages may be not the only, but possibly the most important factor of forming biethnicity or polyethnicity as the phenomena of a multidimensional ethno-national structure – in personal and general society planes.

Thus, we have to realise that next to those who define themselves with certainty as Ukrainian, Russian (“rosiiany”, “ruskie”, also Ukrainian version proposed by V. Khmelko – “ruski”), Belarusian, Jewish, Polish, etc., there are also our fellow-countrymen, who are ready – under certain conditions, in particular those, presented in KIIS studies, – to indicate their multiple ethnicity (“background”). It may be composed of two or more ethnic components integrated on the personal level with different results, different level of realisation, “intensity”.

The most common version in Ukraine is Ukrainian-Russian biethnicity. Among those, who consider themselves Ukrainian and/or Russian there is a significant proportion of those, who combine these ethnic components in their self-identification.

According to KIIS, in February 2016, within the Ukrainian-Russian ethnic-national range, 83% defined themselves as “only Ukrainian”; about 14% considered themselves “both Ukrainian and Russian” (“more Ukrainian” – 7%; “equally” – 5%; “more Russian” – 2%); 3% – “only Russian”. Another very important regional cross-section is a separate topic: the study was not conducted on the temporarily occupied territories – in Crimea and separate parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Obviously, in order to uncover the ultimate meanings of this distribution, we have to simultaneously link it with other characteristics (variables), but today I would like to attract attention to the diachrony, the unique value of the main trends – in 20 years!

For reference, let us take KIIS data before the 2014 occupation of a part of Ukraine’s territory.⁷ The percentage of monoethnic Ukrainians in the Ukrainian-Russian ethno-national range was generally increasing (1994 – 59%; 2006 – 67.4%; 2013 – 66.8%); percentage of biethnic individuals in general – was going down (1994 – 28%; 2006 – 20.8%; 2013 – 22.1%); percentage of monoethnic Russians was decreasing especially noticeably (1994 – 12%; 2006 – 8.8%; 2013 – 7.9%). The “plateaus” or “fluctuations” in the period of “late” V. Yushchenko and “early” V. Yanukovych – are a different topic.

What do these trends tell us about? In the very least – about the rather latent and very interesting details of the complex development of Ukrainian national identity. About multivariance, multiplicity, fluidity of those ethno-national structural elements that we mostly treat as completely and invariably unambiguously defined. This is not so much assimilation, as acculturation.

Also, these trends are an undeniable manifestation of the consequences, absolutely negative for the general well-being and self-identification of Russians (“ruski” – as opposed to citizens of the Russian Federation) and Ukrainian-Russian biethnic individuals in Ukraine, caused by Russia’s aggression.

When in the middle of 1990s I was discussing the biethnicity phenomenon with a famous dissident and researcher of nationalism V. Lisovyi, he warned me: “Now is not the time...”. In the sense that every, so to speak, “bayonet” is vitally necessary... And the biethnic individuals are “taking away” a very significant part from our national community! But at that time

it was hard to foresee the full meaning of it: the ambivalent biethnic individuals are so to speak an “army reserve”! For each of the ethno-national components. The only thing left to do, is to convince: it is better with us! Not “either – or” (exclusion principle), but “both – and” (integration).

Personal and social identity, our “I” that is individual and one with “We”, our civic consciousness – are all a delicate territory. “Sometimes more Ukrainian, and sometimes more Polish” – thus defined his personal fluctuating identity one of our contemporaries, a well-known advocate of the Ukrainian cause! ■

A MORE MODERN, EUROPEAN POLITICAL IDENTITY IS BEING BUILT TODAY



Yuliia TYSHCHENKO,
Director, Programme
for Support of Democratic
Processes, Ukrainian Centre
for Independent
Political Research

Today, we have talked a lot about political or civic nation issues. I would like to talk about some aspects of attitude to Russians and Russian-speaking people in Ukraine. At UCIPR we conduct different studies, including on identity policies. Because even laying the road from Kharkiv to Lviv is also an important part of identity policy. It is like “sewing the country together”. Which is very important, especially considering the experience of building, shaping a common national identity in other countries. We need to look at their practices as well.

Talking about specifically Ukrainian values, we do not always clearly see how they differ from overall democratic or republican ones, what they have that is unique. Our respondents often identify themselves as “ruski” (Russian), because “rosiiany” (Russian) – are those who are now fighting in Donbas. They [ruski] consider themselves part of Ukrainian civic nation, with the only difference being their language practices. The values of republicanism are common interests in building a democratic country that would differ from what they see or realise in Russia, a country that would protect their rights and where people would mean something.

Quite interesting are the trends in evaluating this group in regard to Soviet heritage. And we are not just talking about decommunisation. Those who reject these Soviet values as illiberal, non-republican, identify themselves as part of Ukrainian society, nation, even in the presence of linguistic differences.

Social practices after Maidan, Donbas events, annexation of Crimea are also changing. Here is what the Russian (“ruski”), Russian-speaking respondents say during focus groups: Ukrainian language is being used more, although Russian remains the first language;


⁷ All studies are representative for the country, in May 1994 – 1,000 respondents, in 2006 and 2013 aggregated data is provided from 10-12 KIIS studies in each of these years, the total number of respondents for each of these years – about 10 thousand.

religious preferences are changing; they participate in boycotting goods of Russian origin; indicate the need to know the Ukrainian language. Along with this, even though this may sound surprising, despite the grave challenges we face, the level of understanding and tolerance to different language and ethnic groups is increasing. Many Russian-speaking Ukrainians are now participating in the ATO. This changes attitudes in the society.

When we speak about developing identity policies, building the Ukrainian civic political nation, we should be talking not only and not so much about constructing it. This is a political project in the context of republicanism as a common cause. **Ukraine can establish itself, preserve itself and provide ethnic groups that speak different languages with certain development guarantees based on the European model.** What is happening today is even deeper than simply the formation of Ukrainian identity. A more modern, European political identity is being born today. The society has not quite realised that yet.

In my opinion, after the two-year annexation of Crimea, it is cynical to talk about the threat of separatism coming from Crimean Tatars, transformations in the context of Crimean autonomy. Such assessments will only aggravate the existing problems. First, we need to implement the de-occupation policy in Crimea and Donbas. Discussions in society on these topics, including in the area of identity, are the very manifestation of shaping the de-occupation policy that we need today. ■

THE STATE SHOULD MANAGE SOCIETY'S AFFAIRS THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS



Ivan VARZAR,
*Professor
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Politology and Law Institute
of the National Pedagogical
Drahomanov University*

In the meeting in February 1995 in Lviv, heads of state administrations – from district to oblast levels – voiced my suggestion about instrumentalism of realisation of our country's development and achieving self-definition. **The proposal suggested that the political state should manage society's affairs not directly, but through public policy aspects.**

As the first step to implement our plans I offered to bring more clarity in our definitions. We are mixing up terms "state – country – society". It is unclear,

who is responsible for what, who does what. There is confusion in the issues of distribution of political powers and responsibilities, the number of authorities, distinguishing between ruling the country and managing the country's problems. The same goes for economy and trade, balance between the needs of society and interests of individuals and groups, differences between ethno-historical and political nation.

It was also proposed to identify the main areas of public policy. I have counted more than a hundred of such areas. Under V. Pustovoitenko's Government were developed eight concepts of managing these areas. Now, there are 11. I think that resolution of this issue would propel us to the trajectory of natural development. ■

UKRAINIAN IDENTITY POLICY MUST BE BUILT BASED ON THE INCLUSIVE MODEL



Maksym ROZUMNYI,
*Director,
Centre for Russian Federation
Research, National Institute
for Strategic Studies*

Beginning from the first conferences and seminars since our independence in the early 1990s, we are walking in circles around the same discussions. Our scientific, public, political musings create an ozone screen, which prevents the "sun of truth" from reaching our earth. While sociological studies bring us back to earth and demonstrate the inadequacy of our expectations in the context of processes happening in real life. This is why such studies are very valuable, as they are eye-opening and pushing us to construct new interpretation schemes. Their value is, among other things, instrumental.

I will dwell on four points, each of them applies to a certain hypothesis that was created during our reflective attempts to comprehend reality. In my opinion, the results we received prove these hypotheses.

The first hypothesis concerns the nature of the conflict taking place in Ukraine. The fact that the armed conflict, the war in Ukraine have been triggered from outside is apparent. The fact that the ideological conflict, the conflict of identity has been brewing in Ukraine for more than a year, I think, is also apparent. The solution to this conflict comes from its nature. My conclusion from this problem is the following: understanding the conflict in Ukraine as a corporate one, and attempts to resolve it with consociational democracy methods, the Bosnian precedent,⁸ are unsuitable for us. They are not inherent to our identity, not local.

⁸ This refers to the structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 14 December 1995. In particular, according to this document, developed on the basis of theory of consociation reconciliation methods in divided societies, the country was divided into two (de facto, three) federation entities – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska (as well as Brcko Area). Presidency was established composed of representatives of the three main nations (Bosniac or Muslims, Serbs and Croats), who take turns holding the position of the President by rotation.

How this works is presented in the article "Torments of peace at all costs: Bosnia's experience" – http://texty.org.ua/pg/news/textynewseditor/read/61220/Muky_peremyrja_budjakoju_cinoju_dosvid_Bosniji.

This is a typical civil confrontation, through which went all civil, political nations during their formation – French, English, German, American. Society is polarised. There are different conflicting points of view, sometimes leading to critical confrontation. But trying to localise these identities, bringing them to separate areas – and thus ensuring peace – is a faulty approach. It is very important to make our European partners realise this, as their vision (at least in some of them) is clouded by the illusion of this consociational democracy and the Bosnian precedent. People must be warned against it. In Ukraine, one identity will win that is currently just taking shape.

How is it developing, how do we influence it? The next two points answer these questions.

What are the mistakes we make regarding our identity policy? **The first mistake, which is also confirmed by sociology, – is that we are trying to build identity in retrospect.** Looking for sources of our identity in history and traditions is the wrong path that will lead to artificial fragmentation. Identity has to be built on the basis of future prospects – ideas of common future, developing compromises regarding the rules for living. This is a productive way.


The second point is connected with the first one. **Our identity is exclusive.** Meaning that we build our identity policy based on the separation principle: things that are not Ukrainian. But this is also a wrong path. Imagine that Ukrainians in the 15-16th century tried to separate themselves from the Tatars with whom they had serious conflicts at that time. Tried to erase from their language such words as “hata” (house), “tyn” (fence), “kavun” (watermelon), etc. Or abandoned the work of Jesuit collegiums of 17-18th century. Ukrainian identity policy must be built based on the inclusive model, i.e. including all working elements in the identity model.

The next point concerns **our attitude to our territorial integrity and sovereignty.** When the war broke out in Ukraine, I tried to talk about this, but the ideas were dismissed. But now, after we received the data from the surveys, in the frame of this discourse on the occupied territories, I am ready to confirm my hypothesis, proposal regarding the fact that Ukraine’s territorial integrity should be built on the basis of idea that being part of Ukraine has to be earned. Being a part of Ukraine is an honour. If we formulate our position in this way, our conversation with the partners will be much more efficient and morally firm. ■

Expert Discussion, 7 June 2016



WE NEED TO TURN OUR MIND TO LOOKING FOR THE SOURCES THAT SHAPE, TRANSFORM AND MODERNISE IDENTITY IN MODERN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT



Leonid SHKLIAR,
Doctor of Political Science,
Professor

Points that I will make require legislative and administrative decisions. On what grounds can common identity be built? We have heard valid ideas regarding **“a successful country” and “constructing identity” – these are important concepts for shaping identity policy and discourse in modern environment.**

From the point of view of methodology it is important to understand the following: is identity a random natural process that happens independently or is it a manageable process that requires making administrative decisions and corresponding government actions? Everyone remembers the saying attributed to O. Bismarck that German nation was created by the German teacher. We live in different conditions – not those of the 19th century Germany, but in Ukrainian reality of the early 21st century. The role of the teacher should not be underestimated, but reducing identity building only to humanitarian aspects and information policy is not right.

At times, our events resemble gathering recollections about the past. Discussions only on separate topics – language, values, etc. Of course, all of this is important. But it does not take us to the new orbit of analysing the problems and challenges our country is currently facing.

I suggest taking a slightly different angle to look at the problem of identity. We need to turn our mind to looking for the sources that shape, transform and modernise identity in modern global environment.

What is a “successful country”? It is a country that is safe and comfortable for living. If you live in a country, where the GDP per capita is 10-15 times less than in a successful country, I want to ask: what choice will a young talented creative person make (as a component of nation’s resources, nation’s well-being)? What identity will this free person prefer? The question is rhetorical.

What should Ukraine do in the conditions that it found itself in? Ukraine has huge resources for economic recovery, for recovery of man as the main capital of any economy. Currently, there is an ongoing debate in the Verkhovna Rada on what to do with land – to lift on not to lift the moratorium. The investment potential of our land that has not been privatised yet, the land under the moratorium, according to different estimates, is \$300-400 billion.

Recently, famous economist O. Savchenko said that in order to relaunch the country, to give impetus to Ukraine for development, \$100 billion is enough.⁹ According to the Foundation for Modernisation of Ukraine, as a push and means for modernisation, Ukraine needs \$300 billion.¹⁰ Where can we get this money? Only in Ukraine. What do we need to do to achieve this? We need to issue land shares. In case of simply lifting the moratorium and selling the land, – money, assets and capital will flow through private channels. Something will go to the budget, but not in the amount that is necessary.

We need to issue land shares, give each adult Ukrainian shares equivalent to 1 ha of land, and then lift the moratorium and activate the market, after which the money will go to private accounts. But the state has to sign an agreement with citizens that they do not withdraw the money for 5-10 years in order for the state to receive resources for development and modernisation. This is the foundation we can use to relaunch the country and gain a qualitatively new impetus for building our identity. The country will become successful and people will be proud of it. ■

THERE ARE CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN MEMORY POLITICS OF UKRAINE AND WESTERN HISTORY



Andreas UMLAND,
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Institute for Euro-Atlantic
Cooperation

As a foreigner, I would not want to talk about identity politics. I can only share an important observation. I have been watching the recent years' developments, on the one hand, in the memory politics, the history policy of Ukraine, and on the other hand, – in Western historical studies, concerning World War Two. There is an obvious contradiction. I am reading books, articles, following the press. On the one hand, each month in Ukraine new books come out about OUN, Bandera, Shukhevych etc., which celebrate them. Streets are being renamed.

On the other hand, each month Western media publish materials about the same personalia and organisations with a completely opposite interpretation. These articles appear in prestigious high-ranking scientific journals that have an influence on the academic and intellectual environment. Academic publishing houses

also publish books. There are also a lot of incompetent materials. Each country has amateur hobby groups writing about history without being members of a university or publishing articles in peer-reviewed journals.

The problem is that the abovementioned articles issued in the West will have influence on European countries' policies. Because these are peer-reviewed journals. And this can result in a big scandal. *Foreign Policy* journal already had an article in which a scandal was taking shape. The journalist was not an expert in the history of Ukraine, yet he was writing about the memory politics in Ukraine, citing different historians. All of this will come to no good. ■

WE HAVE TO START WITH DECENTRALISATION OF HUMANITARIAN POLICY



Yevhen PEREHUDA,
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Science Department,
Kyiv National University
of Construction
and Architecture

The study presents today's situation in Ukraine. I was happy to see the results that show the process of formation of a civil nation. But this does not mean that political elites follow the trends characteristic for the majority of society, other social groups.

Regarding concepts of “civil – political nation”: there are different models, for example, the French one, which does not exclude assimilation. The study had questions with a theoretical possibility of several answers. For example, admitting the fact of Russia's aggression against Ukraine does not exclude the idea that Ukraine is turning into a battlefield between the West and Russia. The same goes for the problem of the concept of nation. In Ukraine, the supporter of the French model, which includes assimilation, famous historian H. Kasianov, talks about a political nation with an ethnic core.

Regrettably, I believe that this concept cannot work in Ukraine. In particular, in the part of language relations. The study only analyses relations between the Ukrainian-speaking, Russian-speaking and bilingual groups. Representatives of other languages groups within the Ukrainian society are ignored. I understand why: only 4% of people in Ukraine are neither Ukrainian nor Russian, and a third language is considered native, according to 2001 data, only by 2.4%.

⁹ O. Savchenko: “... only the parliamentary-government system can create and implement a Marshall Plan together with the EU and the USA. The Marshall Plan for Ukraine in its current situation needs to include strong financial support not only from international financial institutions, but above all from the governments of the US, other G7 countries and the EU. My assessment of such aid is approximately \$100 billion, which Ukraine could absorb in the period of 5 years...”. For more information, see: The Marshall Plan for the new parliamentary coalition. – <http://savchenko-o.com/index.php/uk/2009-12-21-15-56-47/2011-05-03-14-22-24/174-2016-03-10-15-51-39>.

¹⁰ Apparently, this refers to the created by D. Firtash Agency for Ukraine's Modernisation, in the framework of which a plan of economic modernisation Ukraine was developed. See: The Firtash Plan. Part 1. – <http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/petrenko/56544910eb70a>.

But the thing is that these minorities live in compact communities. In some parts of Ukraine they are the third, second or even the first ethnic group. For instance, Bolhrad district, where there are more Bulgarians than Ukrainians, Russians or Moldovans. These are the points of potential conflicts, potential influence of other states. They cannot be ignored.

Regarding the principles of developing the language policy that will influence language identity. There is the two-step concept of media influence on people's mind. If we contrast the influence of media to the influence of family, what are we doing? Do we want to form our national model of Pavlik Morozov in different ethnic groups? I believe that we have to **single out two influence areas. On the one hand, we need to talk about using the language in certain social areas (administration, Armed Forces, etc.), on the other – communication.**


I think in 1999, when the Constitutional Court made its judgment regarding the status of the Ukrainian language, it was documented that the Ukrainian language is the language of communication in administrative management.¹¹ Communication is not limited to document flow and the use of language at the time of performing certain functions. The first sphere of language use is regulated by the status of state language. Communication of individuals in Ukraine must be regulated by the European principle of free choice of communication language. Razumkov Centre's studies show that coexistence of these principles in Ukraine is possible. There are significantly more people who recognise Ukrainian as their native language, than those who just use it.

I think that we need to divide these spheres of language policy regulation – thus **we will be able to influence people's choice of their language of communication outside of state-regulated areas through success of the state.**

Today, we hear a lot about decentralisation in different sectors. I am a supporter of these concepts too. But I believe that **talking about progress of financial decentralisation in the situation of war, economic crisis – means lying to people.** We have to start with decentralisation of humanitarian policy. Such opinions are also expressed by the scientific community. Meanwhile, economic and political success will ensure that decentralisation does not lead to catastrophic consequences for the existence of state. The word "unity" does not come from the word "one", they have different etymology. ■

¹¹ Apparently, Ye. Perehuda is quoting p.1 of Concluding Provisions, namely: "Provision in part 1 of article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine, according to which "the state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language", must be interpreted in such a way that the Ukrainian language as the state language is a mandatory means of communication throughout Ukraine at the time of exercise of powers by state authorities and local self-government bodies (the language of acts, work, recordkeeping, documents, etc.), as well as in other spheres of public life as determined by the law (p.5 of Art.10 of the Constitution of Ukraine)". Judgment of the CCU in the case of constitutional appeals by 51 people's deputies of Ukraine regarding the official interpretation of provisions in Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine on the use of state language by government authorities, local self-government bodies and its use in the academic environment at educational institutions of Ukraine (the case on the use of the Ukrainian language) No.10 of 14 December 1999. – Website of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, <http://ccu.gov.ua:8080/uk/doccatalog/list?currDir=9343>.

WE HAVE TO SEE FUTURE CHALLENGES



Maria KARMAZINA,
Head of the Social and
Political History Department,
I. F. Kuras Institute of Political
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NAS of Ukraine

As a scientist I always question issues and data and think whether we might possibly be oversimplifying the situation. Whether we are trying to turn something complicated into simple, explain it and make peace with it? Each number is tricky. You look at it and think: where did it come from? How was it calculated? For me, a more interesting wording of questions would be not "What are you?", "What language do you speak?", "What is your civic baseline?", but questions like "What do you want?" Meaning, "What should we expect from you as a citizen? What are your values?"

Having understood who we are dealing with, we can figure out **what our identity policy should be – building something with an element of violence, creating a Ukrainian according to some standards, or a policy that meets tomorrow's challenges.** In this regard, I am suspicious not only about numbers, but also about the categories used in the survey.

On the one hand, it is a valuable product, because we have the cross-section of society from 2005 to 2015, we can follow the dynamics, see the trends. On the other hand, I understand that conducting a survey in 2015, during the crisis, must be rather problematic. Because identities can appear in the state of crisis, their birth and growth can be attributed to social and socio-cultural uncertainty.

Even without taking the crisis into consideration, the majority of respondents tend to give "correct" answers – they give answers that the interviewer living in this country would like to hear. This is why I am stressing the question of adequacy of these numbers, especially taking into account manipulations and propaganda of the crisis period. Do these numbers provide an adequate understanding of our society?


We often look to the past, in order to get answers what we should be like to match our past. I am more interested in what we should be like tomorrow? What can the future Ukrainian be like? Reading the data on civil identity, I do not see the question of whether the respondents have dual citizenship. A positive answer would negate all the rest of them.

Talking about political identity, I do not see questions about party identity. This is an important cross-section, angle of view on political identity. In the past two years, there appeared parties with a national accent. We had two Hungarian parties, in 2015-2016 there appeared a Polish party, a Romani party, Georgian, as well as Odesa, Kherson party, "We are Kyivans",

“Vinnytsia Initiative”. This also suggests a certain identity. I understand that if we wish to identify trends, we have to ask the same questions, but we need to add new questions from time to time, because reality is very changeable. Could we be missing some important aspects?

Talking about common national identity, for me as a citizen it is not the language that you speak and the church you go to that are important, rather – I am interested in your values – are they compatible for living in one country? To take them into account, we have to see future challenges. ■

CREATING ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES SHOULD BE THE DOMINATING APPROACH



Volodymyr PANIOTTO,
Director General,
Kyiv International Institute
of Sociology

The proposed study shows a typical situation for all sociologists, when **we do not know what causes changes – territorial changes** (the study was not conducted in Crimea and other occupied territories) **or changes in people’s heads**. I think the Razumkov Centre will have a chance to conduct the necessary additional analysis and find out, what really changed in people’s heads.

For a long time, expert community has been stressing the need to develop Ukrainian political nation, but these ideas have not reached those who make decisions. Here is an abstract from the book by V. Khmelko writing about the third year of Ukraine’s independence, 22 years ago:

“Interest of over a half of citizens of Ukraine in preserving the possibility to use Russian language, which has been their regular language for most of their life, – is a factor that has to be taken into account by all politicians, who are truly willing to preserve the integrity of the Ukrainian state, prevent its polarisation and exploitation of its linguistic and ethnic inhomogeneity by its enemies.

Russian politicians guided by imperial ideas are already promoting the idea of protection and, as a matter of fact, unification of all Russian-speaking people. They also address the Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in Ukraine as theirs. I think that in order to strengthen Ukraine’s independent statehood, we must rethink the national idea. Reinvent it is a political idea. Abandon its linguistic-ethnic emphasis and concentrate on building an integrated political nation in Ukraine, all representatives of which will be able to consider themselves Ukrainian, regardless of their ethno-national or linguistic-ethnic background”.

Such warnings regarding the danger of ignoring linguistic and ethnic inhomogeneity of Ukraine were unfortunately shut out. The problem is also that we mostly

try to use heavy-handed tactics in our Ukrainisation attempts – prohibitions, restrictions, shutdowns, disregarding public opinion and the reaction of the Russian-speaking population. While the dominating approach should be creating additional opportunities.

In my opinion, the perfect example of this approach is the creation of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, a high quality university, in order to enter which one must know Ukrainian language. This does a lot for the development of the Ukrainian language, stimulating parents who want their children to have good education to have their children go to Ukrainian kindergartens, schools. They do so voluntarily, – this is encouragement, not compulsion.

Same story with decommunisation, which should have been done back in 1991, when there was greater social demand for it. Now it is being done as a mere formality, without consideration of public opinion. We need to develop in people the correct attitude to such criminals, as for example, Lenin, so that they would demand decommunisation. Meanwhile, we are trying to do it by force. A lot of people have no idea about the public figures, whom we are trying to fight in this way, they are annoyed by the renaming of streets and demolishing of monuments, **instead of decommunisation we have an opposite effect – the decline of confidence in today’s government.**

Last remark. Today in Ukraine there are two terms for “Russian” – “ruski” and “rosiiany”, and we have to distinguish between them and use “ruski” more often, as for many people being called “rosiiany” may be offensive. ■

WE NEED TO FIGURE OUT WHAT WE WANT – A UNITED UKRAINE WITH A SINGLE POLITICAL NATION OR A PERMANENT ENCLAVE SIMILAR TO THE GAZA STRIP WITH UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES



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NAS of Ukraine

I have recently read article “Entrance and exit” in the French journal *Le Monde*. It discussed French citizens. One – coming from South Africa, who wanted to get French citizenship will all the benefits that come with it. Another – Corsican “separatist”, who does not want to be a French citizen, does not want the benefits that come with this citizenship, and considers himself only Corsican.

Why am I talking about this article? Today, we talked about building common national values, common identity, political nation. We also talked about this yesterday and will keep talking tomorrow. In all our conversations we tactfully and **subconsciously leave**

out our two regions – Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. We talk about building common national values sort of including and at the same time not including these oblasts. This is a complicated mental situation.

Talking about formation of common national values, the national idea, in my opinion, we must first answer the more global and key question: what do we want, we as a society – as Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Gagauzes. What do we want our state to look like tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, in 20-30 years? The answer that is on the surface: yes, we want to be in Europe – does not stand up to criticism, as our European aspirations are not a goal, but an instrument. An instrument for what? For (a) living in safety, (b) living plentifully, being healthy, (c) living without war, etc. This is what any normal human being anywhere in the world wants.

We subconsciously distance ourselves from the regions in the South and the East. I am not sure that here we can apply the scheme presented in the “Entrance and exit” article I mentioned, but we objectively lack information about people’s attitudes in these regions. What we sometimes hear is: “Donbas feeds the entire Ukraine”, “Listen to Donbas”, “They are not listening to us, they have abandoned us” and the last statement – “Let the Kyiv junta pay our pensions”. Great. But what are the real sentiments in these regions? How can we theoretically integrate these territories and people into the new-old Ukrainian society?

I do not have an answer to this question. The only thing I can predict is that if Minsk Agreements are fully executed, even in the *soft* form, I am not sure whether we will have to talk about any common national values at all. It is high time we finally made a decision both on the expert and state level to figure out what we want – a united Ukraine with a single political nation or a permanent enclave similar to the Gaza Strip with unpredictable consequences. ■

FOUNDATION – IS THE UKRAINIAN CULTURAL COMPONENT, WHICH HAS TO BE PART OF CITIZENS’ IDENTITY IN MODERN UKRAINE



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This study is very important for our Institute, because for the first time we received a comprehensive cross-section of results of implementing state policy in the area of national memory.

I would like to talk about two points. First – about identity. For me as a historian, **the policy of identity**



formation does not begin today. Before talking about it, we need to analyse the quarter of a century of implementing the policy that we have had in our country – as inconsistent and disorganised as it may have been. We need to learn from our previous experience. Because right now we are facing the same question L. Kuchma faced in the early 1990s: “Tell me, what kind of Ukraine should we build?”

Indeed, there is an upsurge of patriotism in the situations of external threat, but it is still based on the Ukrainian identity, Ukrainianness. So when we speak about creating a modern identity, we need to take into account that our identity as citizens of this community still has to be based on the foundation that determines the uniqueness of Ukrainian state. If there is no foundation, what are we building? A better Ukrainian or some general European identity? Foundation – is the Ukrainian cultural component, which has to be part of citizens’ identity in modern Ukraine.

The place of history and historical memory in the process of building identity. It was said here that it is not the past, but only the future that unites nations. One can agree with this statement. But the past can ruin any identity. In Ukraine, which for a long period of time was a stateless community, there are a lot of different myths and fantasies regarding its past. They limit our possibilities for further development. So the key task in the process of building the identity and national memory policy must be to move beyond myths and fantasies about our past.

Survey results provide interesting food for thought. We see that over 50% of society support condemnation of the communist regime. But the questions, around which certain myths are being cultivated with different methods, have less support. In Donbas, there are more opponents to banning the national socialist regime. There was an explanation about fear, but it can be more simple than that: if a more common term “fascist” was used, the numbers would have been similar to the numbers throughout Ukraine.

I think that **today certain groups within the society are enchained by myths that have been created. So our task today is to move beyond these myths. Without an honest dialogue about the past, consolidation and building the future are impossible.** ■

THERE ARE SERIOUS THREATS TO CONSOLIDATION OF THE UKRAINIAN SOCIETY



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It is quite clear that in the current stage of its history Ukraine is more than ever in need of efforts that would consolidate the society. Also, still relevant are the imposed artificial models of negative identity, conflict actualisation of differences in identity, identity manipulation, using identity conflicts by political figures.

The change of ideological guidelines, discrediting old ideology values, lack of integrating ideas – have caused the splitting of identification and identity crisis. The factors that aggravated this crisis are: ideological confrontation; preserving post-Soviet identity; emerging regional subidentities with different dominant values and integration directions. The Russia-Ukraine war has brought to light the issues of building a common identity of Ukrainian citizens, the issues of general national consolidation of society.

Regional polarisation has led to a “diffused” identity state in the majority of society, produced disintegration challenges, competition of conflicting interests and values. Ukrainians do not make up one civil community – such that would have a common historical mythology, common values and symbols, and unidirectional political aspirations.

Ideological sphere remains a major psychologically traumatising factor for a certain segment of the population. Euromaidan 2014 has demonstrated the solidity of demarcation lines in the value and symbol-based planes of our society. Ukrainian society is missing such unifying factors as ideology, common values, articulated state interests, – therefore their consolidating part is not realised.

Even though the notion of “civil society” is present in our political rhetoric, its meaning remains rather vague, as well as the perception of a “political nation”. It seems that power institutes purposefully avoid this topic, and prefer the vague concept of “nation” that contains both national-civic and ethnic connotations. **The lack of civil identity is very poorly compensated by local varieties of cultural identities.** Various ethnic, religious and linguistic identities often act as factors that destabilise the foundations of civic identity.

Recurrent political crises have brought to life the axis of conflicts inherently present in the Ukrainian society due to disparities in worldviews and everyday practices of different segments of our complex society.

The ongoing hard opposition in the government is often perceived by people as a “controlled chaos” caused by the “conflict of ambition”. In reality, this is not only and so much the fighting “at the top” for power and property, as a manifestation of aggravation of all development crises, including the identity crisis.

Today, Ukrainian society is undergoing the “integration crisis”, in the presence of which, ineffective government and its populist policy have caused serious destabilisation of society. However, regardless of the depth of this over-arching crisis, it is imminently based on the disparities of identification criteria and value systems: cultural norms and traditions, ideological preferences of people with different cultural and civilisational identities.

The powerful events of the last three years have formed a public demand for an absolutely new package of value priorities. **The main one is the principle of social justice, transparency and accountability of government to the Ukrainian people.** This means that the government’s efforts should be aimed at building civic identity based on the collective “us”. But the ever growing gap between the elite and the majority of population has caused disagreements and social alienation.

Today, Ukrainian society is not simply split – it is atomised. This kind of “running back to the Soviets” is a compensatory mechanism in the new socio-political environment. Many markers necessary for the formation of civic identity are left unreclaimed or even partially discredited. This goes for such concepts as politicians’ honesty and morality, the rule of law and fairness of courts. This state of society brings forward the danger of social upheaval, which can lead to losing the foundation of statehood.

Society’s disappointment in government’s actions and truly astonishing non-transparency in political decision-making after loud assurances of honesty and openness have greatly aggravated the alienation in the society. The dangerously high level of frustration and a high level of exasperation create the effect of “negative mobilisation” in society, which has expressed itself through public protests (against the increased tariffs, raider attacks on businesses, bad roads, delayed salary payments and so on).

It is clear that today we are witnessing the breaking down of the value system established at the times of independence. As a result – the phenomenon of “the divided social consciousness”, which reinforces the dramatism of the current situation. Attempts of political players to exploit the events across the demarcation line, the existing occupation of a part of the country to improve their own image and discredit their opponents, bring the “confrontation germs” into the society.

We have to admit that the context of insecurity of civil identification policy is created by the following factors: differentiation of linguistic practices and attitudes (not questions!) to the status of the Russian language; evaluation of historical (also in the times of independence, etc.) heritage; special aspects of Ukraine’s limitrophe territorial position (on the border between civilizations).

Building a common identity of citizens in Ukraine is also complicated by the fact that Ukraine is a segmental society, where political and ideological differences generally coincide with socio-cultural division lines (language, religion, historical memory, foreign policy orientation), and result in distinctly binary mental models.

Obviously, without building an integral system of values, articulating a consolidation strategy, Ukraine is doomed to suffer from orientation duality, confrontation in political thinking and behaviour, “the crisis of ideals.” This does not mean imposing a single ideology on everyone and creating an atmosphere of ostensible consensus. This means looking for a fundamentally new development paradigm based on mastering best international practices, products of domestic public thought.

An important factor in building a common civic identity is achieving socio-cultural consolidation of the population. We cannot ignore the fact that the undeveloped civic consciousness and weak socio-cultural identity, as well as fragmented political culture, tendency to look for an “enemy” – are some of the major challenges of Ukraine’s present. **We watch socio-political projects of reformers have reverse effect in the situation of critically low level of social culture in the society where “war of all against all” is perceived as the norm.** This makes it possible to manipulate public consciousness, build identity practices along the lines of contrast/rejection, different/alien.

The absence of factors for the formation of a common identity significantly increased the threat of separatism, as well as the role of regional identities. Given sufficient capacity to preserve separatist sentiments in Donbas (the East), we should implement an effective communication strategy of a dialogue with the population, which should take into account: features of regional identity; historical conditions of the development of this territory; mental and psychological characteristics of local population.

Especially dangerous, as we found out, was the underestimation of the regional consciousness’ condition, the feelings of the “man on the brink”. We are dealing with a pronounced socio-cultural conflict. The crisis in the East is also the worldview crisis. In the situation of destruction of the single spiritual space, different segments

of society create for themselves opposite visions of the model of the state and their place in this state.

Today, we desperately need transcultural practices, we must focus on the cultural transcendence, stress the dynamics of mutual influence and divisions. In my opinion, the best approach is the strategy of gradual decentralisation and abandoning the already irrelevant “centre-periphery” relations. ■

TALKING ABOUT EUROPEAN VALUES AND EUROPEAN CHOICE, WE SHOULD ALWAYS SPECIFY, WHICH VALUES WE HAVE IN MIND



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The topic of national identity is possibly the most relevant and complicated one in the age of globalisation and “post-national constellations” (J. Habermas). These processes transform the integrative space of Ukrainian society, changing the semantics of pronoun “WE” in the meaning of “common values” and “common interests”.

The issue of self-identification in Ukrainian society is especially relevant with the recent dramatic and tragic events in the background. The most important factor for a nation’s identification is the ability of its people to undertake joint responsibility for their own actions in historical continuity.

The concept of identity, along with other concepts, such as consolidation, solidarity, social integration, is an important social theory concept. Integration in society includes such categories as social and system integration: the first one is based on common values, the second – on finding a compromise and systemic functional mechanisms.

The foundation of socio-cultural integration, solidarity and consolidation of society are values and norms, and its heart – the ethos of the lifeworld, or the “substantial morality of national spirit”, that is what forms a nation’s identity. **The collision of these types of social integration due to changes and transformations of society in the process of modernisation creates threats to cohesion, solidarity and consolidation of Ukrainian society, in particular, in the value-norm and system-institution spheres.**

We are talking not just about the coexistence of different value-norm formations. The basic norms and values of society in general are being questioned.

Expert Discussion, 7 June 2016



Expert Discussion, 7 June 2016



This state of uncertainty in values, with coexistence of different value systems, creates diffusion of the system of values and norms as a state of anomie, which strips national identity of its foundation.

According to the Institute of Sociology, to the question “Which of the following do you lack?”, for decades, about 40% of respondents have been answering: “norms and values that would unite the state and society”.¹² The same goes for solidarity, justice, and freedom. However, these are the very core values that form the foundation for social integration of society, and, therefore, its consolidation. I have to note that, unfortunately, the index of anomie-based demoralisation of Ukrainian society has remained almost unchanged in 20 years and is on the level of 13 points on the 18-point scale¹³; also, this index has been growing recently even more due to the hybrid war, which is by definition an anomie-related phenomenon.

When we talk about overcoming the state of anomie, meaning, providing the value-norm basis for consolidation of society, we mostly refer to the so-called European values. However, we have to take into consideration that Europe also has the so-called conservative, traditional values supported by conventional civilian ethos.

This conservative position, at least in the post-war period and today, is opposed by values based on universalism model, along with cosmopolitanism and Christianity, substantiated by Kant.

This is why talking about European values and European choice, we should always specify, which values we have in mind.

Fundamental European values, based on the idea of enlightenment as an important component of modernisation, became the values of “freedom,” “equality” and “brotherhood”. In the modern democratic society these values have undergone certain transformations and became the so-called **basic values**, namely: “freedom”, “justice”, “solidarity” and “responsibility.”

These basic values form the foundation of EU’s system of values and norms, having taken shape during the development of this system. In particular, Art. 2 of the draft Constitution of 2005 formulated their nature: “The Union is founded on the values of respect

for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to Member States in a society in which pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination prevail”.¹⁴

In the new text of the Constitution of 2007, Art. 2 was amended by “the rights of persons belonging to minorities”¹⁵ and “equality between women and men”.¹⁶ As we see, this is about moral, legal, social and political values that make up the foundation of social and system integrations in the European society.

These are the values that the Euromaidan stood up for, defending freedom, justice and solidarity.

Maidan with its universalist ethos and democratic potential became an important new factor of consolidation of the Ukrainian society. Having started as a process to protect European choice, and hence, European values, it turned into the Revolution of Dignity, which accelerated modernisation processes in Ukraine.

However, this process was also extremely controversial, as Maidan was opposed by Anti-Maidan with its conventional, civilian (even criminal) ethos, which became yet another challenge to cohesion within Ukrainian society. However, **on the overall, Maidan became a factor of further consolidation and self-identification for the Ukrainian society.**

Euromaidan became a step forward and an accelerator of Ukraine’s integration into the EU, and European values – the regulatory principles of implementing universalist values.

Even though the majority of citizens (41%) do not see European integration as a unifying factor for Ukraine, and European identification is still rather low among our citizens, still, according to Razumkov Centre, compared to 2006, this number has grown.¹⁷

Study results of the Razumkov Centre and other sociological organisations show that, *first of all*, European universalist values are becoming a factor in Ukrainians’ self-identification. *Secondly*, there is a significant progress in consolidation of Ukrainian society.

Further consolidation requires cooperation of system integration (public institutions) and social integration (civil society) using the principles of dialogue, openness, mutual trust and responsibility. ■

¹² Ukrainian society. 20 years of independence. Sociological monitoring, vol. 2, tables and graphs. – Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, 2011, p.279.

¹³ Ukrainian society in 1992-2012. State and dynamics of changes. Sociological monitoring. Edited by Vorona, Shulha. – Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine, 2012, p.553.

¹⁴ Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Art. 1-2.

¹⁵ The Treaty of Lisbon (2007).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ For more information, see: Information and analytical materials “Ukrainian Identity: Changes, Trends, Regional Aspects” in this journal.