



## POLICY PAPER

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MAY 2017

# EU Global Strategy: Place, Role and Contribution of Ukraine

*Changes in geopolitical and security situation in Europe, provoked by Russia, urged the EU to develop new comprehensive framework for its foreign and security policy and approve in June 2016 the EU Global Strategy “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”. Annual assessments of achievements and development of further proposals should be made with active involvement of partner-states, namely Ukraine, into the process that would fill it with new practical content. Further cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in this context should be directed at strengthening the Ukrainian security sector and transforming Ukraine into the Eastern Partnership favorite and a successful example for the region.<sup>1</sup>*

The EU relations with neighbouring countries, including Ukraine, have been developed from the very start and up to recent time in various formats, outlined by policies and strategies of the EU. Launched in 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was based on the Commission Communication "Wider Europe – Neighborhood" of 2003<sup>2</sup>. The Policy established the framework of relations between the EU and 16 countries to the East and South from the borders of the European Union and was aimed at developing common interests and cooperation in the priority areas such as democratization, rule of law, and protection of human rights. In the same 2003, the European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World” was approved<sup>3</sup>. Later on, the ENP became a subject of transformation, and the Black Sea Synergy (2007), although unsuccessfully, the Mediterranean Union (2008) and the Eastern Partnership (2009) were launched. Although the ENP and abovementioned initiatives prescribed various aspects of cooperation, including security, but they could be described as one-sided and highly regional.

Geopolitical and security situation around the EU changed significantly after the Russian aggression against Ukraine. That urged the EU to develop a new comprehensive vision of its foreign and security policy and bring it to a higher global level, which was reflected in the EU Global Strategy

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<sup>1</sup> Prepared on the results of the international round-table "EU Global Strategy: place, role and contribution of Ukraine" (April 24, 2017, Kyiv) and the survey of Ukrainian experts in April 2017.

<sup>2</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/330/european-neighborhood-policy-enp\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/330/european-neighborhood-policy-enp_en)

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

«Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe» (EUGS), approved in June 2016. The Global Strategy is a subject to an annual evaluation of implementation results with the aim to determine perspectives of further implementation. But this vision will be incomplete if it does not take into account the opinions and estimates of the partner countries, including Ukraine, and their capabilities and contribution to the implementation of the EU Global Strategy.

First year preliminary results of the EU Global Strategy implementation, their impact on Ukraine and Ukraine's place and role in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU CFSP), as well as proposals for further development of relations between the EU and Ukraine in this sphere were discussed by experts from different regions of Ukraine during the international round table "EU Global Strategy: Place, Role and Contribution of Ukraine" (24 April 2017, Kiev)<sup>4</sup>. Earlier they also participated in the expert survey in April 2017<sup>5</sup> to the above issues.

### Evaluation and the preliminary results of the EU Global Strategy implementation

According to the President of the Centre for Global Studies "Strategy XXI" Mykhailo Gonchar, the EU Global Strategy should make the foreign and security policy of the European Union stronger and more effective, because the Strategy states: "To the east, the European security order has been violated".<sup>6</sup> That is why the EU Global Strategy provides a new vision from Brussels, which, according to the Scientific Director of the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Oleksandr Sushko, represents consolidated efforts of the pro-European forces to protect the common future of Europe.

Head of the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Ambassador Hugues Mingarelli called a combination of different foreign policy views from the 28 EU Member States into the common vision of the EU external priorities and practical bridging the gap between foreign and domestic policy and security as key features of the Global Strategy, which make it different from other documents of the EU. The document determines which values the EU should identify abroad, what type of interests it must protect, and which challenges appear outside, even away from the EU.

Although, according to Hugues Mingarelli, it is too early to talk about the results of the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, but first assessments can be done. According to the survey of Ukrainian experts<sup>7</sup>, while assessing the impact of the Strategy on the EU security and foreign policy, respondents divided themselves into three nearly equal groups (Fig. 1). 34,4 per cent responded that the Strategy became a way to stronger and more effective foreign and security policy of the EU, 37,5 per cent – answered negatively and 28,1 per cent had no answer to this question.




Fig.1. Answers to the question, whether the EU Global Strategy became a way to stronger and more effective foreign and security policy of the EU

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.kas.de/ukraine/ukr/publications/48694/>

<sup>5</sup> <http://geostrategy.org.ua/ua/analitika/item/1223-rezultati-ekspertnogo-opituvannya-globalna-strategiya-es-mistse-rol-i-vklad-ukrayini>

<sup>6</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_48665-1522-13-30.pdf?170424165403](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_48665-1522-13-30.pdf?170424165403)

An ambitious move of the EU to the global level is determined by the Global Strategy. Thus, according to the Head of the Board of the NGO “Promotion of Intercultural Cooperation” Hanna Shelest, one can observe a transformation of the EU from a regional organization into a global player. But this process has not yet become visible, because the European Union is in crisis, which is caused by both internal events and external factors, which became evident especially in recent time. Therefore, M.Gonchar was doubtful, whether the EU is capable to implement the Global Strategy at all, because it is more successful in the economic sphere, while a global player should have strong military and political levers. In the same context, the Head of the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) Kestutis Lancinskis said that the EU was created not as a military alliance, but as an economic union, and therefore, security in its rhetoric has mainly domestic and non-military dimension. Accordingly, most of the Ukrainian experts (59.4 per cent) consider that the EU does not act as a global security provider, able to counter current threats (Fig. 2).




Fig.2. Answers to the question, whether the EU plays a role of a global security provider, able to counteract modern threats

Such estimates of the preliminary results, according to M.Gonchar, are caused by a lack of practical actions to implement quite actual priorities, prescribed in the EU Global Strategy. The EU has already begun rethinking the importance of independent ability to counter threats, but it is going slowly. However, as the Coordinator for European Policy in the Political Dialogue and Analysis team at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Olaf Wientzek said, the Global Strategy provides a strategic autonomy of the EU and raises security and defense issues to a higher level of attention in the EU - at the level of the heads of state. For the first year of implementation of the Strategy some steps have been taken to strengthen the security and defense dimension of the EU.

Firstly, concretization and an increased defense and security vector of the EU became a subject of discussion at the political level within the Union. This was proved, as noted the Analyst of the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association Samuel Goda, by adoption of a number of relevant documents, combined into the so-called EU Security and Defense Winter Package 2016.<sup>8</sup> It included: new political goals and ambitions in the security and defense sphere - the Implementation Plan on Security and Defense<sup>9</sup>; new financial tools, described in the "European Defense Action Plan"<sup>10</sup>; and a set of concrete actions to implement the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. However, according to O.Sushko, in the medium term, it is still not clear who undertakes a key responsibility for the security and defense issues in the EU.

Secondly, the EU strengthened its defense governance structure. A step forward in the implementation of the EU Global Strategy was creation of the EU Military Planning Conduct and Capability Facility. Although, it is not a classic full-scale military headquarters but it is responsible for the EU military operations. Initially it takes under its control three operations of the EU: the civil-military training mission in Mali; the training mission in the Central African Republic; the training mission in Somalia. Military operations "Sophia" in the Mediterranean and "Atalanta" at sea off the Horn of Africa are still beyond its mandate, but can be included in the future.

<sup>8</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage\\_en/16693/EU%20Security%20and%20Defence%20package](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/16693/EU%20Security%20and%20Defence%20package)

<sup>9</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs\\_implementation\\_plan\\_st14392.en16\\_0.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/com\\_2016\\_950\\_f1\\_communication\\_from\\_commission\\_to\\_inst\\_en\\_v5\\_p1\\_869631.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/com_2016_950_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v5_p1_869631.pdf)

Thirdly, the creation of the EU Military Planning Conduct and Capability Facility provoked expert discussions about formation of a "European army". It is rather unlikely that the EU will make this step. According to O.Sushko, formation of an "European army" creates risks of a split in transatlantic unity, because not all EU countries support this idea, and drawing a divergence line between military and security responsibilities of the EU and NATO is extremely difficult. However, in the EU some elements are implemented in the form of the EU Battlegroups, and expert discussions on possible creation of a so-called "defensive alliance" are conducted. Today, the EU Battlegroups have still limited capacities and mainly peacekeeping functions.

Fourthly, since the EU does not intend to build its own army, cooperation between the EU and NATO has been intensified as it was prescribed by the Global Strategy. For the European Union the Alliance remains a military pillar in Europe in terms of countering military threats, as no single EU member state has sufficient military capabilities. Signed in June 2016 the EU-NATO Joint Declaration identified the areas of cooperation, which were itemized in December 2016 in a set of concrete proposals of the EU. However, according to the Program Director of the Slovak Security Policy Institute Monika Masarikova, the package of 40 proposals for the EU-NATO cooperation is rather a set of indicators than planned measures to promote cooperation.

Fifthly, the EU countries must review their national defense spending. The process of implementation of the EU Global Strategy, as noted by S.Hoda, was influenced by the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU, because it forced Brussels to review many things, such as expenses for defense needs. Today only four EU member states spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Several countries have already announced an increase in defense spending, such as Slovakia. During the visit to the United States on May 8, 2017, Slovak Foreign Minister M.Lajčák assured his American counterpart that the increase in defense spending is already included in the plans to reform the Slovak army.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to defense issues, the EU Global Strategies also concerns other security aspects, for example, the fight against illegal migration, climate change and environmental policy, energy security. The last one, as M.Gonchar estimates, is closely linked to ambitious plans of the EU to implement the Southern Energy Corridor, which should become an alternative to the Russian energy supplies to Europe, and which is threatened by the provoked by Russia sharp change of the security situation in the Black Sea region and conflicts in the South Caucasus.

### **Ukraine in the EU Global Strategy**

The discussion at the round table "The EU Global Strategy: Place, Role and Contribution of Ukraine" and the expert survey showed a lack of information about the EU Global Strategy in Ukraine and its impact on cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. This, in particular, was underlined by the Head of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Office in Ukraine Gabriele Baumann who noted that the processes in the European Union affects the interests of Ukraine. In the Foreword to the Global Strategy the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini said: "Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure". The later, according to the Head of the International Programs of the Centre for Global Studies "Strategy XXI" Vitalii Martyniuk, is similar to Ukraine's problems, as both Ukraine and the EU want stability, peace and peaceful coexistence.

In a broader context of Eastern Europe, according to the conclusions of M.Gonchar, in the EU approaches, there is an evolution on evaluation of developments in the East, but understanding comes very sluggishly, and it slows down selection of adequate responses. This evolution is viewed in the EU Global Strategy too, which, as noted H.Mingarelli, makes a clear focus on the Eastern Neighborhood, as instability in the neighboring countries means uncertainty in the EU.

The Ukrainian experts evaluated the attention of the EU to the Eastern Europe and Black Sea regions insufficient. 75 per cent of respondents answered that the Strategy takes into consideration

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.mzv.sk/aktuality/detail/-/asset\\_publisher/Iw1ppvnScIPx/content/m-lajcak-rokoval-s-ministrom-zahranicnych-veci-usa-rexom-tillersonom?p\\_p\\_auth=mWZMofwo&\\_101\\_INSTANCE\\_Iw1ppvnScIPx\\_redirect=%2F](http://www.mzv.sk/aktuality/detail/-/asset_publisher/Iw1ppvnScIPx/content/m-lajcak-rokoval-s-ministrom-zahranicnych-veci-usa-rexom-tillersonom?p_p_auth=mWZMofwo&_101_INSTANCE_Iw1ppvnScIPx_redirect=%2F)

only few interests of these regions (Fig.3). The Black Sea region, according to H.Shelest, found itself out of the Global Strategy, it was mentioned only in the context of sovereignty and territorial integrity of some countries and not even considered as the single region.




Fig.3. Eastern Europe and Black Sea region in the EU Global Strategy

Meanwhile, concerning Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region, according to H.Mingarelli, the EU focuses on the following areas: strengthening institutions and proper governance; stability of all Eastern partners; enhancing economic development and market opportunities; development of closer intergovernmental relations; people-to-people contacts.

The EU pays great attention to the Eastern Partnership, according to O.Wientzek. However, the representative of the Directorate for the EU of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Andrii Nadzhos stated that the Ministry considered the EaP as a subsidiary initiative, because that format allowed implementing some useful for the European integration of Ukraine projects. The main format of the EU-Ukraine relations is the Association Agreement, which was signed before the approval of the Strategy. Respectively, the majority of Ukrainian experts (75 per cent) believe that, after the approval of the EU Global Strategy, relations between the EU and Ukraine have not changed and just confirmed the existing format (Fig.4).




Fig.4. Evaluation of impact of the EU Global Strategy on relations between the EU and Ukraine

Few references of Ukraine in the EU Global Strategy, in comparison to countries in the Middle East region or the Sahel, according to V.Martyniuk, indicates that the EU does not consider Ukraine as a threat but as a partner in maintaining a secure environment in Eastern Europe. For example, A.Nadzhos noted that, despite more than three years of war, Ukraine did not become a source of illegal migration and refugees, like Syria did. For three years of the war, only about 500 Ukrainians have asked for asylum in neighbouring Poland, although there are about 1.8 mln internally displaced persons in Ukraine.

Security of both Ukraine and the EU, as noted M.Masarikova, are closely interrelated. Level of Ukraine's integration into the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy is mostly positively estimated by Ukrainian experts: 46,9 per cent of them estimate it as suitable and sufficient; 18,8 per cent – integration corresponds with actual possibilities of the EU and Ukraine. The best contribution to the European security is that the Ukrainian army deters Russian aggression in the East.

The European Union recognizes that today Russia is the main strategic challenge for the Black Sea region, because it annexed Crimea and has strengthened its military presence in the region. Namely the Global Strategy says: "Russia's violation of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged the European security order at its core." That is why, H.Mingarelli stressed that the sanctions against Russia should be prolonged, and that would be a demonstration of continuity of realization of the EU values in the foreign dimension.

Defense cooperation between the EU and Ukraine is frequently focused on countering Russian aggression, but, according to H.Shelest, if aggression of the RF remains the only base for this cooperation, it would not become long-term and comprehensive. This dimension of the EU-Ukraine cooperation is marked as successful by just 12,5 per cent of the interviewed Ukrainian experts, and, according to the Head of the Democratic Processes Support Program of UCIPR Yulia Tyshchenko, the conflict management, prescribed by the EU Global Strategy, does not concern Ukraine at all. Instead, the Ukrainian experts listed the following most successful spheres of security cooperation between the EU and Ukraine: energy security (53,1 per cent); reform of security sector (40,6 per cent); countering illegal migration (31,3 per cent); strategic cooperation (28,2 per cent).

Participants of the above-mentioned round table also underlined importance of the EU's involvement in reforming the security sector of Ukraine, noting readiness of the European Union to invest into civil security of Ukraine and other Eastern partners as a part of the implementation process of the EU Global Strategy. For example, K.Lanciskas noted that the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine became a practical demonstration how the EU Global Strategy is implemented in Ukraine. The EUAM is an advisory mission to assist reforms in the civil security sector and works all around Ukraine, focusing on the directions of delineation of competence of security sector agencies, partnership between the police and the community, criminal investigation, reforming human-resource management and public order. More than 2.5 mln Euro have been invested into EUAM backed activities in Ukraine.

A majority of Ukrainian experts (75 per cent) consider that the EU Global Strategy gives Ukraine only a field for cooperation but not possibilities for future membership. Thus, the EU and Ukraine can become real partners in the dimension of the foreign and security policy.

### **Prospects of the EU-Ukraine cooperation in the foreign and security policy**

The Global Strategy for the EU Foreign and Security Policy contains an important area - to "work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings." By this criterion, Ukraine is an important partner of the EU in the East. Ukraine is referred not in the section "An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises", but namely in the section "European Security", in the context of countering Russian aggression, thus confirming its pivotal importance to the EU security and defining prospects of such dimension of cooperation.

Consequently, an actual partnership approach to further development of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in the foreign and security policy shows that it should be a two-way street. This cooperation can be divided into three clusters: the EU-Ukraine cooperation in international and regional dimensions for common security; the EU assistance in strengthening stability and security of Ukraine; Ukraine's contribution to security in Europe.

Obviously, the *international and regional dimensions* of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine will further rely on the comprehensive support to Ukraine by the European Union in matters relating to sovereignty, territorial integrity, protection of national interests, security of the state and human security. From its part, Ukraine should support the EU policies, respect the European values and become their provider on the regional level, especially within the Black Sea region and the Eastern Partnership format.

The EU-Ukraine cooperation can develop both in large scale and within individual initiatives. The EU Global Strategy, according to H.Shelest, provides opportunities to develop proactive cooperation, for example, between the Visegrad Group and Ukraine or the entire Black Sea region



in a wide range of issues relating to security, combating crime, terrorism, and exchange of information. A good example of such cooperation is the planned participation of Ukraine in the Visegrad Battlegroup in 2019.

In the transformation of Ukraine into a leader of the Eastern Partnership the key role, according to A.Nadzhos, can play security issues that correspond to the way of further implementation of the Global Strategy. So to the next 5th EU Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2017 Ukraine plans to come up with concrete proposals, among them A.Nadzhos outlines the follows:

- In the security dimension - establishing of an intergovernmental platform on security issues of the EU and the Eastern partners and a Cyber - defense centre of the EaP to be located in Ukraine;
- In the energy security sphere - further integration of Ukraine into the EU energy market;
- In the sphere of domestic security and justice - provision of uninterrupted functioning of the visa-free regime with the EU;
- In the sphere of infrastructure and transport - deepening relationships and integration of transport and energy infrastructure with a focus on the project of the corridor Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region (3Sea100Roads);
- In the trade and economic sphere - further integration of Ukraine into the EU market within the DCFTA and development of economic cooperation with all EaP countries.

Although Ukraine lags behind, for example, Moldova and Georgia on such parameters as the ratification of the EU Association Agreement and visa-free regime, it is the undisputed leader in contribution to the security of Europe and security cooperation with the EU. Among the countries of the Eastern Partnership a progress of Ukraine in the European integration will allow the EU to talk about a success of the Eastern Partnership, the European Neighborhood Policy and the EU Global Strategy in the East. Therefore, the EU should give priority to European reforms in Ukraine and provide it with appropriate assistance to speed up its integration into the EU on all issues identified by the Global Strategy.

The priority focus in the context of *the EU assistance*, to which Brussels must pay attention, should be involvement of Ukraine to processes of preparation of the EU policies in different spheres with its right of an advisory voice, which, by the way, is provided by the Association Agreement. Such a move by the EU would enhance responsibility of the Ukrainian authorities for the European future of the state and assist Ukraine's integration into the EU political decision-making system.

Ukraine itself, as noted by O.Sushko, requires extensive intellectual debate and understanding of opportunities of the EU Global Strategy to have a common horizon of a broad vision of the joint EU-Ukraine future and identify specific mechanisms for effective interaction. As Ukraine has already achieved many of the goals of the Eastern Partnership - the Association Agreement is signed and to be ratified soon, the DCFTA and a visa-free regime are almost acting, and processes of sectoral integration are going, the EU and Ukraine should determine the next horizon that would go beyond the currently existing documents. This will facilitate determination of the joint future and give an answer for the painful question "What is the next?", in the conditions of reluctance of Brussels to put a possibility of the EU membership for Ukraine on the agenda. It should be noted that only 28 per cent of Ukrainian experts marked that prospects of Ukraine's EU membership were real.

Mechanisms like the Global Strategy and the Eastern Partnership allow Ukraine to use the instruments and resources of the EU for reform within the state to make it more stable and secure that will result in a significant contribution to the European security.

Ukrainian experts consider energy security (17,5 per cent) and information security (16,2 per cent) as the very priority directions of foreign and security cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. Second group of priorities includes: military interaction and participation in the EU operations (12,5 per cent); countering illegal migration (10 per cent); cyber security (8,7 per cent); countering hybrid aggression (7,5 per cent). The third important group includes: security sector reforms (5 per cent); military and technical cooperation (5 per cent); countering terrorism (5 per cent). The less important

directions for development of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine are: ecological security; countering organized crime; science and education; fight against corruption; social security; cooperation in other regions; sustainable development.

In this context, it is important to continue functioning and even expand activities of the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine with the final goal to cover all areas of the state and society security. At the next stage, the EUAM activities would be appropriate to be extended to all sectors of the civilian security component, going beyond creation of the Police, anti-corruption activities and cyber-security, but not stopping them. The EUAM could open up new spheres of assistance to Ukraine, especially on critical infrastructure protection, information security, human security in the conflict area (humanitarian demining, training rescue teams, protection of human rights in the occupied territories), countering illegal immigration and terrorism, civilian control over the security sector. Although active cooperation between NATO and Ukraine are developing in some areas, but only the EU can make an effective non-military contribution. The EUAM would further be expanded on the military component of the national security, initially focusing on training of units, which would be able to perform tasks in the EU Battlegroups and military operations.

The aim of the EU assistance in strengthening Ukraine's security has to be not only stability and security in its neighbor country, but also Ukraine's ability to contribute to the European security.

According to conclusions of the participants of the round table, the primary *contribution of Ukraine to the security of Europe* is strengthening its own defense and deterrence of the Russian aggression on its eastern borders. However, considering factors of geographical location of Ukraine, its understanding of the situation in Eastern Europe, acquired experience in confronting Russian aggression, and developed mechanisms to counter hybrid threats, in the future, Ukraine should be included into formats of the EU Foreign and Security Policy and take part in the EU missions and operations as, for example, Switzerland and Norway are doing this now.

According to S.Goda, in the case of a "EU defensive alliance", Ukraine has a potential prospect to join it. Of course, the priority in its functioning will be given to the EU member states, but the Union cannot do this without partners, especially Ukraine. Taking into account that one of the considered components of the "EU defense alliance" concept is development of joint defense industry, Ukraine could become a contributor to it, and moreover, according to M.Gonchar, such interest of the EU already exists, that was confirmed at the "Industrial Defense and Energy Summit. Europe meets Ukraine 2017" (IDES17). The worth of Ukraine's potential contribution is based on practical developments during more than three years of war against the Russian forces and the backed by Russia separatist groups in the east of Ukraine, as well as the Ukrainian existing defense industrial base in various sectors - from air-building and ship-building to the latest technical innovations for reconnaissance, command and fire control.

Ukraine can share with the EU the best practices of early detection of preparation and conducting of Russia's information and propaganda actions and identification of effective countermeasures. In a broader sense of strategic communications, Ukraine could provide experience of maintaining the unity of the country and neutralizing attempts of the foreign aggressor to turn the state into a boiler of mass protests, social riots, local power clashes, internal confrontations, and especially problems of about 1.8 mln IDPs. This phenomenon is partly based on the created in Ukraine system of social and humanitarian provision of internally displaced persons and citizens in the conflict zone that mostly relied and still relies on non-governmental structures and civil society organizations.

**Therefore, in the context of further implementation of the EU Global Strategy and the role and contribution of Ukraine into it, the following recommendations can be formulated:**

1. The EU should identify specific structures responsible for implementation of the EU Global Strategy like the EU Military Planning Conduct and Capability facility, and the last one should be gradually turned into a full-fledged EU military headquarters, which interacts with NATO.



2. In evaluating results of the first and following years of implementation of the EU Global Strategy and perspectives for further realization of its priorities, views, evaluations, capabilities and contributions of partner countries, including Ukraine, have to be taken into account.
3. Capabilities of the EU Battlegroups should be strengthened while gradually turning them into real rapid response units and involving military units from the partner states to their activities.
4. Challenges and threats from the East to the European security should be clearly identified and documented, and a mechanism to neutralize and counteract them should be developed with active involvement of Ukraine and other partner countries.
5. More attention should be paid to the Black Sea region with a key focus on reducing its militarization, keeping balance of forces, implementing the EU plans to build energy and transport infrastructure, protecting human rights and rights of national minorities, particularly in the occupied Crimea.
6. Ukraine has to consistently support the EU policies, where it is in the national interests, respect the European values and become a leader of the European integration in the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea regions that will be a sign of the success of the EU Global Strategy in the East.
7. Attention should be focused on growing support of Ukraine in confronting Russia's aggression and providing it with financial and technical support to address problems of temporary displaced persons and residents of the conflict zone to prevent flows of refugees from Ukraine.
8. In the field of energy integration parties should adhere to the Association Agreement, taking into account primacy of the interests of Ukraine as an associate partner of the EU in comparison with third countries, which do not have such a status.
9. Together with Ukraine the EU should clearly define goals of further relations, which can be: in the short term period - full implementation of the Association Agreement; in the medium term period - partnership relations on the model of Switzerland and Norway; in the long time period - the possibility of membership in the EU if it still remains on the geopolitical map.
10. In the context of preparations for the 5th Summit of the Eastern Partnership it is desirable to consider new initiatives: creation of an intergovernmental platform on security issues and a Cyber-security center of the EaP; integration of transport and energy infrastructure with a focus on the project of a transport corridor linking Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas; spread of free trade area for the entire region of the Eastern Partnership; and involve experts and NGOs from partner countries to discuss these and new initiatives.
11. The mandate of the EU Advisory Mission Ukraine should be extended and include issues of critical infrastructure protection, information security, human security in conditions of the conflict, countering illegal migration and terrorism, civil society control over the security sector.
12. In order to develop the EU-Ukraine military cooperation it is desired to initiate participation of Ukrainian specialists and units, especially with combat experience, in the EU missions and operations, and integration of the Ukrainian defense industry into the EU common defense industry.

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