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

Germany's "Islampolitik"
Old problems, new challenges, current debates

Andreas Jacobs

Key points

- For decades, Germany has struggled to produce a model that gives Islam in Germany equal status to the established religions of Christianity and Judaism vis-à-vis the state.
- Little progress has been made in the last decade. The current approaches still amount to little more than a patchwork of variegated policies which still lack a clear roadmap towards a coherent German "Islampolitik".
- Recent international and domestic challenges and developments such as the influx of Muslim refugees, the developments in Turkey, a number of terrorist attacks in Germany in 2016 and the rise of populist parties and movements brought back some dynamism to the present immovable state of affairs.
- Most notably, the legal situation of Islam and Muslim organizations is currently in a process of reassessment. Additionally, politicians, academics and commentators have brought up several proposals about the strengthening of loyalty of Muslims towards state and society in Germany.
- These debates demonstrate the need for a major restatement of Germany's "Islampolitik". The next federal government to be elected in September 2017 should seize the opportunity to define a new model that could reconcile the expectations of the state with the rights and aspirations of Germany's growing Muslim population.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction

According to Germany's specific understanding of "positive neutrality" (Heiner Bielefeldt) towards religious communities, secularism in Germany provides a mutually beneficial, cooperative relationship between the state and religion. In principle, this also pertains to Islam. For decades, Germany has struggled to produce a model that considers and reconciles the provisions of the constitution with the faith-related rights and claims of the country's Muslim community and the expectations of the non-Muslim majority.

Little progress has been made in the last decade. A coherent German "Islampolitik"[1] is still not in sight. Consequently, Muslim and non-Muslim observers protest the "second-class status" of Islam in Germany compared to other religious denominations.[2] But what appears to be the expression of politically motivated discrimination of the German state is in fact the result of a confusing mix of legal, political, organizational and practical provisions and problems.

New dynamism in a stalled debate

Recent international and domestic developments have added further strain to this rather gridlocked and often frustrating situation. But they have also emphasized the need for a coherent approach and added some new elements and arguments to the stalled discussion on Germany's "Islampolitik". The following paper describes these new challenges and analyzes their impact on the relationship between the state and Muslim communities in Germany.

2. Old problems

Germany's growing Muslim community

For several decades now the permanent presence of Muslims in Germany has been a given fact. With an estimated 4.4 and 4.7 million people (of whom between 1.5 and 2 million hold German citizenship), in 2015 the country was home to one of the largest Muslim populations in Europe.[3] With around 2.3 million people, Muslims of Turkish-origin make up the narrow majority, rendering Sunni-oriented Islam the main branch in Germany. However, there are also significant groups of Shi`is (originating from Iran, Lebanon or Iraq), as well as around half a million Alevis of Turkish origin and 30.000 Ahmadis with a Pakistani background, the oldest organized Muslim group in Germany. These figures demonstrate that while Islam in Germany has a significant Turkish imprint, it does not constitute homogeneity in religious or cultural terms.

The majority of Muslims in Germany has what is usually called a "migration background". Most Muslim immigrants who came to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s had initially planned to stay for a limited period of time. German legislators and administration tended to share these expectations. Accordingly, Muslim immigrants understood themselves as temporary guests in the country and were treated as such. The establishment of durable legal, political and social conditions for a continuous Muslim presence in Germany was not conceived of on either side. Islamic life was primarily a matter of self-organization by the different communities, the largest of which was supported by Turkish diplomatic staff and institutions. This Turkish "Consulate Islam" and the mistaken but widespread understanding of a merely temporary presence of the religion created a situation that allowed the German administration to forsake Muslims as being a part of the fabric of German society for many years.[4]

Germany's peculiar understanding of secularism: "positive neutrality"

Withal, the German legal system provides far-reaching freedoms for religious practice which are not restricted to Christianity and Judaism but enshrined for all religions, including Islam. Article 4 of the German constitution regulates religious affairs. This article is not limited to private religious conviction. It also grants public display of faiths protected by the state, which must insure this right is not unduly limited.[5] According to this understanding, the state must remain neutral and should not interfere in religious matters. Germany's legal secularism enshrines the equality of all religions and the freedom of the individual to either remain unaffiliated to any religion or to change her religious affiliation.[6]

Unlike most other European states, the religious neutrality of the state in the German understanding of secularism does not exclude structured cooperative relationships between state authorities and religious communities. While German law does not provide a system of legal recognition of religious communities, it offers them a special form of organization called "corporation by public law" *(Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts)*. This organizational form affords a number of far-reaching rights including the right to levy taxes and to employ people under community-specific labor-law. The status provides tax-reductions and the right to nominate members to public-service broadcasters.[7] To obtain this status, religious communities must meet a set of criteria: stable existence over a period of at least 30 years, clear structures of organization, transparent procedures of decision-making and a reliable body that determines doctrine and order.[8]

Muslim communities in Germany: why second class treatment?

Presently, Muslim organizations in Germany have fallen short of meeting these criteria – at least according to the majority of legal experts and politicians. However, from the 1970s onwards, Muslims in Germany have established several formal institutions and umbrella organizations. These organizations are: DITIB (The Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs), VIKZ (The Association of Islamic Cultural Centers), the two umbrella organizations IRD (The Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany) und ZMD (The Central Council of Muslims in Germany), plus AABF (The Alevi Community in Germany) and smaller Shi`ite and Bosnian-Muslim organizations. All of these organizations both cooperate with one another and compete for influence and privileges. Each organization has faced some criticism. DITIB for instance, which is funded and directed by Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), is criticized for its political nature. VIKZ represents an orthodox and secluded Sunni branch of Turkish Islam, while IRD is dominated by Milli Görüs, a Turkish group which is under scrutiny by German intelligence services for radical orientations. ZMD is smaller than the other organizations and mainly represents non-Turkish Muslims, while AABF is in the process of establishing Alevism as an independent religious group alongside Sunni and Shi`ite Islam in Germany and is therefore by no means representative for other Muslims.

The problem of representation: who speaks for German Muslims?

Only 20 percent of Germany's Muslims are officially represented by DITIB, VIKZ and the two Muslim umbrella organizations, while the vast majority remains unaffiliated with any group.[9] While the lack of representation is the main criticism usually raised against these organizations, the influence by foreign authorities, extremist and radical trends and tendencies, a lack of transparency and finally the assumption that some of these organizations are merely ethnic or political lobby groups rather than religious communities are also frequently brought against them.

With rising demands for the establishment of Muslim life in Germany, their unsatisfactory organizational structure has become a problem. This especially pertains to efforts to establish religious education for Muslim pupils at public schools, as required by Article 7 of the constitution. While German federal states have designed

a number of different models, almost all of them struggle to find partners that are universally accepted and able to devise school curricula that meet the pedagogical, legal and religious criteria.[10] The problem of acceptance prevails in other areas of cooperation between the state and the Muslim communities, most notably in the training of German speaking Imams, teachers and prison chaplains and in the establishment of chairs for Muslim theology at public universities.

Increasing urgency for a common point of contact

An increasing urgency for a common point of contact for state authorities led to the establishment of the German Islam Conference (DIK) by the Federal Ministry of Interior. Since its inaugural meeting in 2006, the DIK has been mired in disagreements on the composition of the Muslim delegation, by differences on the agenda, by a lack of trust and political will and – finally – by different expectations. As a result, the DIK has been criticized by three different groups of actors. State authorities and politicians blame Muslim organizations for a lack of willingness to cooperate and for a refusal to adapt to German legal norms and regulations. Muslim organizations, on the other hand, blame the organizers for pitting Muslims against each other, for actively denying the legal status of corporations by public law and for excluding the rise of Islamophobia from the agenda. Lastly, several Muslim individuals criticize the DIK for aggrandizing conservative Muslim organizations and for discriminating against liberal, secular and non-organized Muslims in the country.

Against the backdrop of this rather complicated legal and political situation, German "Islampolitik" in 2017 amounts to little more than a patchwork of variegated policies. It still lacks a clear roadmap towards a better integration of Islam into German politics and society. However, recent international and domestic challenges and developments may have the potential to bring back some dynamism to the present immovable state of affairs.

3. New Challenges

Refugees will diversify Islam in Germany

Since 2015 Germany has accepted more than 1.3 million refugees, the majority of whom are Muslims with Arab, African or Asian origin. Their makeup will have repercussions on the discussion about Germany's "Islampolitik" in two ways. First, it gives further significance to Islam in Germany. Second, it changes the national and ethnical origin of Germany's Muslim community. Until 2015, Islam in Germany was dominated by practices and traditions brought to the country by Turkish labor migrants in the 1960's and 1970's. The current immigration of Syrian, Iraqi and Afghani refugees is changing this situation and makes Islam in Germany ethnically and culturally more diverse.[11] At the same time, this immigration introduces political conflicts, social habits and cultural norms to Germany's Muslim communities, further complicating the formation of "Islampolitik".

The weakening of the Turkish imprint of German Islam

The gradual weakening of the Turkish imprint on German Islam is reinforced by an unprecedented political estrangement between the German and the Turkish governments. The thwarted military coup in July 2016 and the following crackdown on opposition groups and alleged supporters of the coup, Germany's criticism of Turkey`s human rights record and harsh rhetoric turned once close allies into an odd couple. In particular, two recent developments had repercussions on the political and social situation of Turkish-German Muslims.

Despite the fact that overseas election campaigning is banned under Turkish law, Turkish officials mobilized German-Turkish voters in March and April 2017 in order to vote in favor of a constitutional change that rendered far-reaching powers to the

Turkish president. Even though the Turkish government faced strong opposition by German authorities, the rally produced the intended results. Around 63 percent of voters in Germany approved the referendum in Germany, while within Turkey, only 51.4 percent voted in favor of Erdogan. This high level of support by German-Turks for a referendum granting immense powers to a (foreign) government who repeatedly accused their own (German) government of using Nazi methods triggered a debate about the loyalty of German-Turkish citizens towards the German state and illustrated the strong influence of Turkish authorities on German domestic affairs.

Repercussions of the Turkish-German political rift

This debate was fuelled further in early April when a network of German media reported that the head of the Diyanet, allegedly called on Turkish diplomatic missions around the globe to gather information on the followers of Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen. According to these reports, imams in Germany were commissioned to investigate Gülen supporters. At the same time a list of alleged "Gülenists" in Germany that was presented to Germany's intelligence service by the Turkish intelligence agency, became public. This list included the names of a number of high level German politicians. The use of Diyanet's German branch DITIB for espionage activities against German citizens caused a public outcry and was met with harsh criticism.[12]

Jihadist terrorist attacks in Germany

While the Turkish-German diplomatic rift may only be temporary, the threat of jihadist terrorism profoundly changed the direction of the debate on Islam. This threat reached a new level in 2016 when the country moved into the sights of jihadi terrorism. In February, a 15-year old Salafist-inspired girl attacked and seriously wounded a federal police officer at the Hannover train station. In April, three 16-year olds attacked a Sikh-temple in Essen with explosive devices, injuring three. In July, an Afghani refugee attacked several passengers on a local train in Würzburg (Bavaria) with a knife and hatchet, injuring five. Six days later, fifteen people were injured in a suicide bombing outside a bar in Ansbach (Bavaria) perpetrated by a 27-year-old Syrian who was in contact with IS and had been planning more attacks before his backpack bomb accidentally exploded. On 19 December 2016, a truck was driven into a Christmas market in Berlin, killing 12 people and injuring 56. The perpetrator, Anas Amri (a failed asylum seeker from Tunisia) was killed four days after the attack in a shootout with police in Milan. Amri had entered the country from Italy in 2015 and had contacts with local jihadi networks, radical mosques and IS-recruiters. More than previous attacks, this Berlin attack triggered a debate about the jihadist scene in Germany.

Germany's jihadist scene developed from the 1990's, largely unnoticed by the public. It took until the mid-2000's when the arrest of the members of the "Sauerland-group" – most of whom were German-born Muslims or German converts to Islam – made the larger public aware of the existence of the radical Salafist scene and the notion of "homegrown jihadist terrorists" in Germany. At the same time, authorities started to take action. Between 2008 and 2010 most of the protagonists of the German radical Salafist scene have been subject to criminal investigations. Authorities and experts alike consider particularly Ibrahim Abou Nagie's organizations "Die Wahre Religion" (named after the popular US-website "TheTrueReligion.org") or short DWR a recruitment pool for jihadists and Salafists. DWR acted as the main matchmaker for the elite of Germany's foreign fighters and jihadist terrorists. IS's German poster-boy, a Berlin-born former rapper Denis Cuspert, has been radicalized through this network.

The growth of Salafist and jihadist groups

Recent conflicts in the Arab world, in particular the Syrian civil war, added popularity to the local jihadist scene and increased its recruitment base. By the end of May 2017, Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany's domestic security agency at the state level, estimated the number of Salafists living in the country (including so called "quietist" and non-violent individuals) to be around 10.000. Among these, 670 individuals have been identified as "Threats" (Gefährder), i.e. radical Salafists who pose potential danger. Some of them belong to the group of around 300 returned foreign terrorist fighters.[13] The number of "Threats" quadrupled since 2011, partly because of the rise in numbers, partly because of better surveillance and partly because of a deeper understanding of the problem. Only half of the individuals listed as "Threats" currently reside in Germany, around 80 are behind bars. The rest have not yet committed any prosecutable crime but are believed to be willing and capable of committing a terrorist act at any time. More than 50 of those who are classified a "Gefährder" are rejected asylum-seekers who could be deported.[14]

The threat of populist parties and right-wing movements

But not only Salafist and jihadist groups have seen a substantial increase in followers. Populist parties, anti-Islam movements and far-right groups that stir up fears of "mass immigration" and "Islamization" have also gained increasing popularity. The "Alternative for Germany" party (AFD), originally founded as a conservative euro-skeptic party, now predominantly campaigns on a nationalist and anti-Muslim-immigrant agenda. It managed to win a number of seats in most German state parliaments and the European parliament. Despite the fact that the partly lost in appeal and popularity in recent months, most observers assume the AFD will enter the Bundestag after elections in September 2017. All established parties already pointed out that they will not form a coalition or even cooperate with AFD. However, AFD will most likely use its presence in the Bundestag to further push for an anti-Muslim immigration policy.

On the "grassroots"-level, AFD is supplemented and supported by several anti-Islam, nationalist and far-right movements, most notably the "Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident" (PEGIDA), the so called "Pro-Movements", the "Identitarian Movement", the "Reichsbürger" and the "Hooligans Against Salafism" (HOGESA). While PEGIDA and the "Pro-Movements" mostly address the frustrated middle-classes, Identitarians, "Reichsbürger" and HOGESA refer to elements of protest-, youth- and football-culture. The popularity of these groups corresponds with an increase of anti-Islam protests and politically motivated violence against Muslims in Germany.[15]

4. Current Debates

Against the backdrop of these developments the discussion about German "Islampolitik" has gained new momentum. Most notably, the legal situation of Islam and Muslim organizations is currently in a process of reassessment. Additionally, politicians, academics and commentators have brought up several proposals about the strengthening of loyalty of Muslims towards state and society in Germany. In total, these proposals and ideas can be subdivided in five different debates.

4.1 The deradicalization debate

Germany has no coordinated national deradicalization strategy

With the "arrival" of jihadist terrorism in Germany in 2016, deradicalization has come under the spotlight in public debates. Although Germany spends a lot of effort and money in related activities and established a network of local activities with different actors and stakeholders, criticisms of the various deradicalization programs remain manifold. Some observers complain about the lack of interest and cooperation on behalf of local mosque communities. Others blame some programs for collaborating with Islamists or accusing them of having "naïve" understandings of the root causes of radicalization. The main and most substantial criticism concerns the decentralized nature of the German political system. At least three state ministries, the 16 federal states, several civic education agencies and many others provide funding without really controlling who is spending how much, with whom and on which activities. According to Peter Neumann, one of the most prominent international experts on terrorism, this has led to a situation in which potential for cooperation is not used and money is squandered. Like the Netherlands, the UK, the Scandinavian countries or US, Neumann argues, Germany needs a coordinated national approach to deradicalization.[16]

Like in other European countries, prisons have become one of the main fields of deradicalization activities in Germany. In this context, there is a new debate about how much of a role Muslim clergy can play with regard to preventing radicalization in prisons. Here, progress remains slow.[17] Nation-wide there are only two imams working full-time in prisons. In order to increase their number, most federal states have allocated additional funds for Muslim prison chaplains. However, few qualified imams have been identified for these positions.[18] Meanwhile, most imams working in prisons serve as volunteers. Some of them have been criticized for not speaking proper German, for being affiliated to Islamist groups or for not agreeing on required security clearance procedures.[19] Politicians and authorities have pushed to change this situation. In November 2016, Muslim Chaplaincy was a topic at the German Islamkonferenz. German politicians now call on organized Muslim communities to develop a specific portfolio for Muslim Chaplains. Despite these new approaches it remains to be seen how a nationwide political framework for Muslim Chaplaincy in German prisons will transpire.

4.2 The facial veil-ban debate

No political consensus for banning the facial veil

While the debate about deradicalization and prison chaplaincy is merely about the implementation of "Islampolitik", the debate on banning facial covering in public is about its principles. In response to the attacks in summer 2016, several CDU politicians, including prominent vice-head of the party, Julia Klöckner, demanded a nationwide ban of all forms of full-face covering. In her argumentation Klöckner referred to France and Belgium which already prohibited full face-covering in public spaces in 2011. In response, Chancellor Merkel and Minister of the Interior, Lothar de Maizière, made clear that a total ban might be desirable, but would be legally not possible.

Instead, they argued, facial coverings should be banned in certain contexts such as court sessions, during police checks and while driving a car.[20] Merkel reiterated this position at the CDU-party convention in November 2016 but slightly changed the tone by stating that the facial veil ban should be banned "wherever it is legally possible". This left room for different and in some cases contradicting interpretations. Domestic observers saw this as an attempt to reconcile different positions within the party by keeping the principle line that a nation-wide ban would be impossible. In contrast, most international commentators interpreted her statement as a call for such a ban.[21]

Further veil-discussions are to be expected

There is still no legal or political consensus about the necessity, desirability and possibility of banning the facial covering in Germany. Consequently, political reactions to this debate have been incoherent to date. In February 2017, the German state of Bavaria announced plans to ban facial covering in government offices, schools and universities and while driving a car. Two month later, the German lower house of parliament approved on a draft law that would prohibit civil servants, soldiers and judges from wearing a full face veil at work. As this ban covers only rather unlikely cases, further discussions are to be expected.

4.3 The "Leitkultur" debate

New prominence for an old term

Along with the discussion about a facial veil-ban, an on old term regained popularity. In May 2017, Minister de Maizière used a guest column in the tabloid *BILD am Sonntag* to pose the question "who are we and who do we want to be?" He referred to "Leitkultur" (core values) as a vital "yardstick for the coexistence" of Germans and immigrants. "Leitkultur" is not new per se; it was introduced to the German debate on immigration in 2000 by Friedrich Merz, then head of the CDU-party group at the Bundestag. Merz demanded that immigrants adapt to the German common culture: secular, democratic, rule-of-law abiding. The ensuing criticism was fierce, and although the CDU did include the term in their official immigration position, the party more or less dropped its use.

A consensus about the rules of society?

This time, the controversy is less heated as old frontline positions have shifted. Raed Saleh, the chairman of the SPD faction in Berlin's House of Representatives, has also called for "a new German Leitkultur".[22] He believes this should describe "a consensus about the society we wish to be" rather than merely maintaining the status quo, and says that it should be based on the country's constitution.

Critics of the "Leitkultur" concept believe that German "core values" are impossible to define given that such values are inherently flexible and constantly changing. They also believe that the concept would serve the purpose of limiting immigration by rejecting those who do not succeed in assimilating. The SPD, Greens and Left party have also argued that the idea of a "Leitkultur" breeds intolerance and supports the arguments of the AfD, Pegida and other anti-Islam movements. From their point of view, existing laws already sufficiently define acceptable behavior.

4.4 The foreign interference debate

The "Leitkultur" debate inherently reflects a reassessment of foreign interference on the organization of Muslims in Germany. For decades, most politicians and authorities had welcomed such interference and considered it to be mutually beneficial. Turkey and other countries were allowed to care for the religious needs of their expatriates abroad, while German authorities did not have to deal with the sensitive issue of Islam. This perception dramatically changed over the past years.

Foreign interference under fire

In the fall of 2015, Saudi Arabia's king Salman offered to build 200 mosques in Germany to cater for the religious needs of Muslim refugees. German politicians and the media, both accusing Saudi Arabia of financing radical mosques and schools in Germany, immediately rebuffed the offer.[23] The ensuing public debate and the fierce criticism of Saudi Arabia's involvement in funding radicals worldwide finally led to the decision to close the controversial King Fahd Academy in Bonn mid-2016.[24]

In the spring of 2017, the foreign interference debate spilled over onto a discussion about Turkey's influence on Muslims in Germany. This influence was particularly criticized by Alexander Radwan, a member of the Bundestag for the CSU, Bavaria's sister party of Merkel's CDU. For several years, Radwan has demanded a law that bans foreign funding of German mosques and calls for better means and ways of domestic funding of Muslim institutions in Germany. Usually, Austria's approach serves as a model in this regard. In February 2015 Austria passed a reform to the 1912 law that made Islam an official religion. According to this reform continuous foreign funding for mosques and imams will be banned in Austria.[25] Although most observers share the criticism of foreign influence on Germany's Muslim the Austrian ban raised a controversial discussion. Critics argue that this ban discriminates against Muslims as churches are allowed to accept foreign funding and can send money to Christian communities abroad.

4.5 The Islam-law debate

Can Austria be a model?

The Austrian example was also behind the discussion of a possible German "Islam-law". The idea about a specific law that regulates the affairs of Muslims in Germany immediately came up after Austria issued the bill. In March 2015, Secretary General of the CDU Peter Tauber publicly announced that the application of the Austrian law to the German legal situation should be explored. The law was again put up for discussion by Jens Spahn, member of CDU's ruling council and Parliamentary State Secretary at Germany ministry of finance. In March 2017, Spahn demanded the introduction of an official registry for mosques and a law to regulate Muslim communities. According to Spahn, this law should not only settle the issue of representation for the Muslim communities vis-à-vis the state, but also the use of German language at mosques and the introduction of transparent funding and financing mirroring the established system of "Church taxes" collected by the state.[26]

The necessity of regulating rights and duties of German Muslims

Spahn's proposal immediately encountered pushback. Most of the commentators and politicians commenting on the issue argued that unlike Austria, an Islam-law is neither needed nor possible under the German constitution. The proposal was even rejected by CDU-heavyweights such as Thomas de Maiziére and Volker Kauder, the influential head of the party group in the Bundestag. While acknowledging the necessity of regulating rights and duties of Muslim communities in Germany in principle, both politicians argued, that a specific law that regulates the affairs of one specific religion contradicts the constitutional order in Germany. Spahn's approach was disregarded as an attempt to raise his visibility within the party against the backdrop of the upcoming elections.[27]

5. Conclusions

New difficulties and new chances

German "Islampolitik" continues to struggle to find political answers to the yet unresolved issue of legally recognizing Islam. The international and domestic developments described in this text will undoubtedly have repercussions on this struggle. It makes the already complicated situation even more difficult – and it forces politicians, experts, academics and the representatives of Muslim organizations in Germany to rethink previous positions and approaches.

The time has come for a fresh start

This process of re-thinking has already begun. New debates emanating from these developments might be controversial, sometimes ill-conceived and often mired in politicking and practical deficits. Irrespective of their shortcomings, emergent debates enrich the discussion and demonstrate the need for a major restatement of Germany's "Islampolitik". Once the frenzy of the election campaign has passed, this restatement should be put on the political agenda. Provided with a new mandate, the next federal government to be elected in September 2017 will have enough political leverage to unlock the current situation. It should seize the opportunity to define a new model that could reconcile the expectations of the state with the rights and aspirations of Germany's growing Muslim population.

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2| *Alexander Görlach, Why Islam Gets Second Class Status in Germany, New York Times, December 15, 2016.*
3| *For recent numbers see Anja Stichs, Wie viele Muslime leben in Deutschland? Eine Hochrechnung über die Anzahl der Muslime in Deutschland zum Stand 31. Dezember 2015, Working Paper 71 des Forschungszentrums des Bundesamtes, Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, December 2016.*
4| *Mathias Rohe, Islamic Norms in Germany and Europe, in: Ala Al-Hamarneh/Jörn Thielmann (eds.), Islam and Muslims in Germany, Leiden/Boston 2008, p. 50.*
5| *Ibd., p. 52.*
6| *Heiner Bielefeldt, Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat, Bielefeld 2003, p. 15.*
7| *Gerhard Robbers, Religion and Law in Germany, Austin et. al. 2010, p. 135–155.*
8| *Hermann Weber, Muslimische Gemeinschaften der Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts unter dem Grundgesetz, in: Janbernd Oebbeke (ed.), Muslimische Gemeinschaften im deutschen Recht, Frankfurt a.M. 2003, p. 85–108.*
9| *For an assessment of this argument see Dirk Halm, The Current Discourse on Islam in Germany, in: Migration & Integration (2013) 14, p. 469.*
10| *For an (older) discussion of this issue see Wolfgang Bock (ed.), Islamischer Religionsunterricht – Rechtsfragen, Länderberichte, Hintergründe, Tübingen 2006.*
11| *For recent numbers see Stichs (2016), p. 25–29.*
12| *German authorities investigate high Turkish religious official, Deutsche Welle Report, April 1, 2017.*
13| *Speech by Hans-Georg Maaßen at the 14th symposium of the BfV in Berlin, May 29, 2017. Cit. after: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/symposium/symposium-2017.*
14| *Ibd.*
15| *Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Frank Tempel, Sevim Dağdelen, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Islamfeindlichkeit und antimuslimische Straftaten im vierten Quartal 2016, Drucksache 18/10984.*
16| *Peter R. Neumann, Die neuen Dschihadisten. IS, Europa und die nächste Welle des Terrorismus, Berlin 2015, p. 201–206.*
17| *For a recent comparative study on a substate level see Lisa Harms-Dalibon, Surveillance and prayer – comparing Muslim prison chaplaincy in Germany's federal states, Comparative Migration Studies (2017) 5:8.*
18| *Interview mit Mathias Rohe. Islamwissenschaftler über Grenzen muslimischer Seelsorge, BR24, November 23, 2016, cit. after http://www.br.de/nachrichten/rohe-seelsorge-gefaengnis-100.html (June 20, 2017).*

19| *Sicherheitsüberprüfung in NRW. Zweifel an Gesetzestreue der Ditib-Imame, Rheinische Post, April 4, 2017.*
20| *Streit um Vollverschleierung. Merkel gegen vollständiges Burkaverbot, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 14, 2016.*
21| *Angela Merkel calls for full-face veil ban in Germany, CNN, December 2016, cit. after: http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/06/europe/angela-merkel-full-veil-ban-germany/index.html (June 20, 2017).*
22| *Wir brauchen eine neue deutsche Leitkultur, Der Tagesspiegel, October 19, 2015.*
23| *„Der Nährboden des Terrors", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 28, 2015.*
24| *„Controversial Saudi school in Bonn to close", Deutsche Welle, August 29, 2016, Cit. after: http://www.dw.com/en/controversial-saudi-school-in-bonn-to-close/a-19511109 (June 20, 2017).*
25| *"Austria passes controversial reforms to 1912 Islam law", BBC, February 25, 2017, Cit. after: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31629543 (June 20, 2017)*
26| *http://www.dw.com/en/german-politician-wants-islam-law-and-mosque-registry/a-38200982 (June 20, 2017).*
27| *"Debatte über Islam-Gesetz zeigt Richtungsstreit in CDU", Reuters, April 5, 2017, Cit. after: http://de.reuters.com/article/deutschland-islam-union-idDEKBN1770IE (June 20, 2017).*

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