



Bayan بیان ביאן The Arabs in Israel הערבים בישראל

Editors: Itamar Radai and Arik Rudnitzky

Issue no. 12, December 2017

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From the Editors' Desk

The current issue of *Bayan* presents extensive findings from a public opinion poll conducted by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Israel, in the summer of 2017. A survey of these findings was presented at a conference organized by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation (KAP) on September 27, 2017, and we are happy to present them here in unabridged form.

Bayan is a quarterly review of Arab society in Israel, published by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.

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The Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation (KAP) was established in 2004 by the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Tel Aviv University as part of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. KAP is an expansion of the Program on Arab Politics in Israel established by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Tel Aviv University in 1995. The purpose of KAP is to deepen the knowledge and understanding of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel through conferences, public lectures and workshops, as well as research studies, publications and documentation.

Bayan is published in Hebrew and English.

We thank Ms. Chaya Benyamin for translating and editing the English edition.

The Editors

Itamar Radai and Arik Rudnitzky * / Citizenship, Identity and Political Participation: Measuring the Attitudes of the Arab Citizens in Israel

Introduction

The views of Arab citizens in the state of Israel have attracted broad interest from both researchers and the public in recent years. This is demonstrated by a series of public opinion surveys focusing on the Arab population in the country, some of which are conducted on a periodic basis.¹ National issues – the historical narrative, the Jewish-Arab divide, the definition of the state and the question of independent identity – generally occupy substantial space in these studies. The reasons for this can be attributed to the historical influence of the violent events that occurred in October 2000, which intensified the rift between Jews and Arabs in the country, and to the polarization of Jewish-Arab relations in the last decade that occurred whenever violence erupted between Israel and the Palestinians. The common conclusion of these studies is that the Jewish-Arab rift is a deep and ideological divide in all that is related to historical narrative, both in the perception of collective identity and the desired definition of the state's character.

Quite naturally, the civil aspect of the rift is often overshadowed by the national one. Yet the question remains: What are the issues that concern the daily lives of Arab citizens? What does the Arab citizen think about the current situation in the state, of Israeli citizenship and the issue of equality? Is there an expectation of political participation on the part of Arab citizens, or of the creation of an Israeli vision of coexistence within the state? To what extent do Arab citizens feel a sense of personal freedom and stability? To what extent do they feel they belong in Israel? These questions, and others like them, form the basis of the comprehensive survey conducted by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung last summer, and its findings are presented herein. Dr. Michael Borchard, who until recently served as director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Israel, initiated and led the project. The survey was conducted within the framework of activities of the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at Tel Aviv University.

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is a state-backed political fund based in Germany that has been active in Israel for thirty years. KAS deals with civic education at home, with the exchange of ideas outside of Germany, and with dialogue between societies, cultures, and religions. KAS also functions as a research institute at the national and international level. One of KAS's central areas of interest is the political participation of ethnic and religious minorities in multicultural societies. KAS believes that political participation is measured not only on election day, but in the daily lives of citizens, and the core question of the extent to which they feel a part of the state.

* **Dr. Itamar Radai** is the Academic Director of the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation. **Arik Rudnitzky** serves as KAP's Project Manager.

¹ See for example: Sammy Smooha, *Still Playing by the Rules: Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2013* (Israel Democracy Institute and Haifa University, 2015); Tamar Harman, et. al., *A Conditional Partnership: Jews and Arabs, Israel 2017* (Israel Democracy Institute, 2017).

The dynamics of the relationships between groups in divided societies is largely influenced by identity politics. In other words, the collective is personal and vice versa. The survey before us deals with the question of the collective identity of Arab citizens in Israel and its effects on their participation in politics. At the same time, the survey is also devoted to examining the positions of Arab citizens on questions that can be addressed to every citizen in Israel.

The survey data was collected by the "Keevoon" research institute under the management of Mitchell Barak, and was conducted in two stages. In the first phase, which was held in May 2017, three focus groups were formed under the guidance of Dr. Hisham Jubran in Umm al-Fahm (May 8), in Jaffa (May 11), and in Nazareth (May 26). The group in Umm al-Fahm included religious and traditional women between the ages of 25 and 40. The group in Jaffa included male and female students aged 18 to 30, and the group in Nazareth consisted of men and women aged 35 to 45. The second phase was conducted by telephone in August 2017 amongst a representative sample of the adult Arab population in Israel, which included 876 respondents, all Israeli citizens aged 18 and over.

The survey was conducted in the Arabic language by native Arabic speakers, and has a sampling error of 2.25%.


Findings

“The Israeli Experience” in the Eyes of the Arab Citizen

The survey sought to answer a fundamental question: how do Arab citizens of Israel feel about the state on a day-to-day basis? The respondents were presented with a number of questions and were asked to give general impressions of the current situation in the state, on Israeli citizenship, on their personal feelings and daily concerns, as well as their opinions on living conditions in Israel.

At the beginning of the survey, a general question was posed: "Do you think that things in Israel are going in the right direction, or not?" In response, half of the respondents said that they believed things in Israel were not going in the right direction, while 42% of the respondents thought that things were going in the right direction.


Figure 1: Are things in Israel going in the right or wrong direction?



The respondents' answers were examined according to the following demographic parameters: age, religion, and education. The segmentation of answers according to age revealed no correlation between age and one's stance on whether or not things in Israel are going in the right direction. For example, respondents between the ages of 23 and 29 and those aged 60 and over held relatively moderate stances on the current situation in the country. Conversely, 55% of respondents between the ages of 18 to 22 and 40 to 59 were convinced that things in Israel are not moving in the right direction. Substantial differences in respondents' stances were found when divided according to religion. More than half of Muslim respondents (54.8%) believe that things in Israel are going in the wrong direction, while most Druze respondents (64.4%) feel that things in Israel are going in the right direction. Amongst Christians, views are divided. Some believe that things are going in the right direction (45.9%), which others believe things are going in the wrong direction (48.6%).

When the responses were segmented according to education level, it was found that those with an elementary level of education tended to hold the most skeptical stance. The majority (67.2%) believed that things in Israel are going in the wrong direction. However, higher education level was shown to balance criticism. The rate of those who feel that Israel is going in the right direction (40.7% amongst those with a high school education and 43.4% amongst those with an undergraduate degree) is close to the rate of respondents who believe that things are not – 52.3% amongst those with a high school education and 50.0% amongst those with an undergraduate degree. This may be contrasted with the relatively optimistic view adopted by those holding a master's degree or higher: more than half (56.5%) believe that things in Israel are going in the right direction and only 39.1% going do not.

**Figure 2: Are things in Israel going in the right or wrong direction?
(by age group, religion and level of education)**



Citizenship and Daily Life

Respondents were also asked to answer more concrete questions regarding their personal feelings about Israeli citizenship and living conditions in the country. Most respondents (59.5%) expressed a positive opinion of Israeli citizenship, 39.4% of which said that they were very positive about their Israeli citizenship. Most (62.6%) believe that Israel is ultimately a positive place to live. On the other hand, a considerable portion of the respondents expressed a very negative view of Israeli citizenship (23.1%) and of living conditions in Israel (21.1%).


Table 1: Views on Israeli Citizenship and Living Conditions in Israel

| View | Israeli Citizenship | | Living Conditions in Israel | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|--|-----------------------------|--|
| Very positive | 39.4% | } Positive View 59.5% | 45.5% | } Positive View 62.6% |
| Quite positive | 20.1% | | 17.1% | |
| Quite negative | 12.5% | } Negative View 35.6% | 12.9% | } Negative View 34.0% |
| Very negative | 23.1% | | 21.1% | |
| Unsure / Refuse to reply | 4.9% | | 3.4% | |

Isolating responses by age revealed that the youngest respondents (aged 18 to 22) were the most critical about Israeli citizenship, with most of them (52.2%) espousing a negative view of it. On the other hand, members of other age groups hold a positive

opinion of Israeli citizenship. Particularly high satisfaction was found amongst respondents between the ages of 23 and 49: approximately two-thirds of them (64% or more) hold a positive view. Moreover, more than half of the respondents aged 50 or older (from 55% to 57%) hold a positive view of Israeli citizenship. That being the case, the stance of the youngest respondents is extraordinary. A possible explanation for this is that young citizens are taking their first steps in the world of Israeli citizenship. Although they are entitled to vote in parliamentary elections for the first time, they are generally unlikely to feel that citizenship is useful to them. Conversely, older respondents have already integrated into the Israeli experience – including the job market and higher education – and therefore sense greater value in Israeli citizenship.

Figure 3: Views on Israeli Citizenship
(by age group, religion and level of education)




The respondents portrayed the experience of living in Israel in a more positive light. The attitudes of young people aged 18 to 22 are balanced between those who see life in Israeli positively (47.1%) and those who see it negatively (48.6%). It should be noted that the percentage of young people in this age range who hold a very positive view of life in Israel (36.8%) is higher than the percentage of young people who hold a very negative stance on the subject (26.5%). In the rest of the age groups, a clear majority (60% to 70%) was found to have a positive attitude toward living conditions in Israel.

Analyzing the data by religion reveals that the Arab public is divided between Muslims and Christians on one side and Druze on the other. Amongst the Druze there is a positive consensus (96.2%) regarding Israeli citizenship and life in Israel. While most Muslims and Christians hold a positive view toward citizenship (56.0% and 54.1% respectively) and toward living conditions in the state (59.0% and 59.5%

respectively), however a considerable portion of both groups strongly criticize these issues. One-third or more of Muslims and Christians hold a negative opinion of Israeli citizenship (39.5% and 37.9% respectively) and toward living conditions in the state (38.1% and 32.4% respectively).

It appears that respondents with a high school education and above positively view Israeli citizenship and living conditions in Israel. Only one third of such respondents hold a critical view of citizenship and living conditions in the country. In general, there was a direct correlation between a respondent's level of education and having a relatively positive impression of Israeli citizenship. 36.9% of respondents with a high school education hold a very positive attitude towards Israeli citizenship, and this rate exceeds 45% among those with an undergraduate degree or higher. The opposite picture emerges among respondents with an elementary level of education: Half of them hold a negative attitude toward Israeli citizenship (55.2%) and its living conditions (50.0%).

**Figure 4: Views on Living Conditions in Israel
(by age group, religion and education level)**



Personal Feelings: Personal Freedom, Belonging to the State, Stability

Respondents were asked a number of questions relating to their personal feelings as citizens of the state. Each was asked to assess the level of his or her perceived personal freedom, personal affiliation to the State of Israel, and sense of stability. Respondents were asked to rate their feelings on a scale from 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest). The responses were then grouped into three clusters: “To a small extent” (1-4), “To a moderate extent” (5-7) and “To a great extent” (8-10). Alongside this, a weighted average of the responses was calculated on a scale of 1 to 10.

Almost half of respondents said they enjoy a great sense of personal freedom (46.2%), a sense of affiliation with the state of Israel (45.3%), and a sense of stability (46.3%).

On the other hand, about one third of participants responded that they enjoy only a small measure of personal freedom (29.9%), stability (32.8%), or a sense of belonging to the state of Israel (35.4%). The weighted average of the responses revealed that respondents gave in total a moderate score for each of the questions (between 6.0 and 6.3). However, it should be noted that only a small proportion (about one-fifth on average) gave a moderate score to every question. In other words, the respondents' responses are characterized by a great deal of variance. This finding demonstrates that the view of the Arab population regarding these matters ranges between two poles: between satisfaction and lack thereof.


Table 2: Personal Feelings

| Rating | Personal Freedom | Sense of Belonging to the State of Israel | Stability |
|----------------------------|--------------------|---|--------------------|
| To a small extent (1-4) | 29.9% | 35.4% | 32.8% |
| To a moderate extent (5-7) | 22.5% } 6.3 | 17.4% } 6.0 | 19.2% } 6.2 |
| To a great extent (8-10) | 46.2% | 45.3% | 46.3% |
| Don't know | 1.4% | 1.9% | 1.7% |

Segmenting the responses by age group shows that the youngest respondents (aged 18 to 22) and the oldest (aged 60 and over) perceive themselves to have less personal freedom, stability, and affinity to the state than do those in other age groups. Respondents aged 23 to 59 all gave significantly higher scores than those in the oldest and youngest groups.

A possible explanation for the attitudes held by the “marginal” groups of society is that both the young and old are more dependent upon their families and on their external environment than are respondents in other age groups. For this reason, they report that they feel less personal freedom and less stability. In terms of affinity with the State of Israel, it can be assumed that those aged 23 to 59, who are the prime participants in the workforce, are also at the peak of their integration into Israeli society. Therefore, they indicate a sense of greater belonging to the state than do young people, who have not yet entered the labor market, or the elderly, who have already retired.

Figure 5: Measure of Personal Feelings According to Age Group (Scale of 1-10)



Significant differences were recorded in the breakdown of responses by religion. The Muslim public, which constitutes the vast majority of the country's Arab population, enjoys a markedly small degree of feelings of personal freedom, stability and sense of belonging to the state in comparison to Christians. The difference is even more pronounced in relation to the Druze. One third of Muslims report minimal feelings of personal freedom (33.4%) and feel little stability (36.8%). An interesting finding emerges from the responses regarding the sense of belonging to the state amongst Muslims: the proportion of those reporting a low sense of belonging (40.2%) is similar to the proportion reporting a high sense of belonging (40.9%). It seems, therefore, that opinions among the Muslim citizens are divided on this issue. As for the Druze, their high positive feelings in the three areas examined stand out significantly compared to the perceptions of Muslims and Christians.

There is also a direct correlation between education level and positive personal feelings. The higher the respondent's level of education, the higher his or her sense of personal freedom, stability, and sense of belonging to the State of Israel. The fact that more than half of the respondents with an elementary level of education report a low sense of personal freedom (53.4%) and low personal stability (55.2%) is particularly noteworthy. Two-thirds of those with an elementary level of education (65.5%) attest to a weak sense of affiliation to the State of Israel, and only 15.5% of them claim a strong sense of belonging to the state. These attitudes are a mirror image of the positions held by holders of graduate and postgraduate degrees: 65.2% of this group attest to a strong sense of belonging to the state, and only 17.4% report a weak sense of belonging.

Figure 6: Measure of Personal Feelings by Religion (Scale of 1-10)





Figure 7: Measure of Personal Feelings by Education Level (Scale of 1-10)



What Concerns You and Your Family the Most?

The respondents were asked to focus on the issues that concern them most in their daily lives. They were presented with ten subjects in random order and were asked to choose the subjects that are of most concern to them and their families. The respondents' answers appear in Table 7, in order of descending importance.

Table 3: What Concerns You and Your Family the Most?

| Subject | Percentage |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Personal security / Crime / Violence | 22.9% |
| Racism | 20.9% |
| Economy and jobs | 16.4% |
| Palestinian issues | 9.9% |
| Equality | 9.8% |
| Peace process | 5.7% |
| Healthcare | 4.5% |
| Education | 3.8% |
| Municipal issues | 1.6% |
| Welfare | 0.7% |
| Don't know / Refuse to respond | 3.8% |

The findings clearly show that Arab citizens are interested first and foremost in issues related to their daily lives, and less preoccupied in external issues such as the peace process or matters related to the Palestinian territories. The concerns of the majority of the Arab citizens (60.2% in total) are focused on three issues: the spreading violence in Arab communities in recent years (approximately 1,200 murders in Arab communities since 2000, and 60 in 2017 alone), racism against the Arab citizens, and economic and employment issues.

Isolating the responses according to age shows that three subjects identified above concern the Arab citizens across all age groups, with the exception of the youngest respondents (aged 18 to 22) and the oldest respondents (aged 60 and older). Those aged 23 to 29, who are in the process of integrating in the Israeli work force, are most bothered by issues related to the economy and employment. On the other hand, the central concern of those aged 30 to 59, who are typically more established, is the safety of their families. As such, personal safety concerns this age group more than other age groups. Alongside this, a quarter of the youngest age group ranks racism as the most troubling problem. Their ranking reflects the culture shock they experience in their first direct encounter with Jewish majority society.

Evaluating the responses by religion shows that violence and crime are of great concern to Christian Arabs (28.4%) and to the Druze (30.4%), and are significantly higher than that of the Muslim population (21.7%). It is possible to attribute feelings of insecurity amongst the Christians and the Druze to through prevailing tensions in Arab communities in the Galilee (such as Abu Sinan, Shfar'am and Mughar), where

different religions live together. Muslims also rank racism as the most troubling problem (22.0%), along with fears for personal security. Interestingly, the percentage of Druze (19.0%) who regard racism as the most troubling problem is significantly higher than that of Christians (14.9%). This finding attests to a certain dichotomy among Druze citizens between the feeling that the state is an inseparable part of their identity (as we shall see below) and a sense of rejection and manifestations of racism on the part of the Jewish majority. In other words, a significant portion of the Druze still feel that Israeli-Jewish society rejects them, even though many of them serve in the security forces and are much more integrated into the Israeli-Zionist experience than the general Arab population.

The Question of Equality

The survey sought to examine how Arab citizens perceive the state of equality in Israel. The question posed to the respondents was: "Regarding your status as an Arab citizen in Israel, do you feel that the attitude towards you is usually equal or unequal?" The answers show that Arab citizens are divided on this question. Although half of the respondents (51.1%) believe that the Arab citizens are treated equally, it cannot be ignored that nearly one-third of these citizens (30.2%) is convinced that the attitude towards them is not equal at all.

Table 4: Do You, as a Citizen of the State, Receive Equal or Unequal Treatment?


| Response | Percentage | | |
|--------------------------------|------------|---|----------------------|
| Very equal | 20.1% | } | Total Equal |
| Quite equal | 31.0% | | |
| Quite unequal | 16.8% | } | Total Unequal |
| Very unequal | 30.2% | | |
| Don't know / Refuse to respond | 1.9% | | |

Evaluation by age shows that young people aged 18 to 22 hold the most skeptical view on the matter of equality. 53.0% believe that the attitude towards them is not equal, and 36.8% believe that the attitude toward them is very unequal. Other age groups hold a more moderate view and believe that the attitude towards them is equal overall. However, between a quarter and a third of those surveyed in all age groups believe that the attitude towards them is very unequal.

Separating responses by religion reveals that Muslim citizenry is the least satisfied with the state of equality in the country. While Muslims' opinions differ, the numbers tell a clear story: half of Muslims feel that they do not enjoy equality in Israel, and one-third believe that the attitude toward them is not equal at all. The Christians adopt a more positive position. Most Christians (60.8%) believe that they enjoy a fairly large degree of equality, while a third (33.8%) believe that the attitude towards them is not equal. An especially high level of satisfaction was found among the Druze respondents: the vast majority (77.2%) indicated that the overall attitude towards them is equal.

An interesting finding was obtained from an analysis of responses by education level. A majority of respondents with an elementary education (62.1%) believe that they do not receive equal treatment in the country. This position is consistent with the positions of the members of this group in the other areas presented above. However, it turns out that even among holders of graduate and post-graduate degrees, the current feeling is that they do not receive equal treatment (56.5%). The position of those with the highest level of education is the opposite of those with some post-secondary education and those with an undergraduate degree – most of whom believe that they are treated equally (58.4% of those with some post-secondary education and 55.8% of undergraduate degree holders). A possible explanation for this is that graduate and postgraduate degree holders judge with a more critical eye the essence of equality that the Arab citizens of the state receive. It is reasonable to assume that their position is also influenced by personal experience; these citizens have made good progress personally, but at some point, their careers encounter a "glass ceiling" that prevents them from fulfilling their professional and personal aspirations.

Figure 8: Do You, as a Citizen of the State, Receive Equal or Unequal Treatment? (by age group, religion and level of education)



Will There Ever Be an Arab Prime Minister or President in Israel?

The survey sought to examine the extent to which Arab citizens believe in the implementation of the principle of equality. The law states that every Israeli citizen is entitled to be elected to the role of president or prime minister. In the political history of the Arab public in Israel, we are reminded of Azmi Bishara's candidacy for prime minister during the May 1999 elections for the 15th Knesset [parliament] and premiership (at that time, direct elections for the premiership were held alongside the Knesset elections). Bishara submitted his candidacy two months before the elections but withdrew it only a few days before Election Day. Bishara later testified that his candidacy for the post of prime minister of Israel was merely a protest; he did not

believe he had any chance to be elected, nor did he intend to be. Recently, MK Ahmad Tibi (who was first elected to parliament jointly with Bishara's party in 1999) spoke again about the issue in an interview with CNN, in which he stated that if there would be one state shared by Israelis and Palestinians, he would be prime minister. Later, Tibi gave an interview to Haaretz newspaper in which he clarified that he did not support the one-state solution, and that despite his personal ambitions, the statement about his candidacy was hypothetical and he did not really believe that he would be prime minister someday. Nevertheless, his words still challenged the common discourse.²

The respondents were asked to express their opinion on when (if ever) an Arab citizen would be elected to the position of president or prime minister. The responses show that half of the respondents (51.4%) are convinced that this is an imaginary scenario that will never materialize. This response was received across all sample segments, including respondents who relate positively to Israel and those who feel that the treatment toward them is equal. Interestingly, more than half of the respondents who said they participated in the previous elections (52.7%), and of those who said that they are very likely to participate in the next elections (51.7%) do not at all believe that an Arab citizen will be elected president or prime minister in the future.

Conversely, almost one-third of the respondents (29.2%) believe that such a scenario is bound to happen in the future. A sizable portion of them (19.6% of all respondents) believe that this will happen within 20 years at most, or that they will see it happen in their lifetime.

Table 5: When will an Arab citizen be elected president or prime minister?

| Response | Percentage |
|---------------------------|--------------|
| Within 10 years | 6.5% |
| Within 20 years | 5.3% |
| During my lifetime | 7.8% |
| In my children's lifetime | 9.6% |
| | 29.2% |
| Never | 51.4% |
| Don't know | 15.2% |
| Refuse to respond | 4.2% |

Is there real hope that one day an Arab prime minister will be elected in Israel? The responses of the participants in the focus groups provide an unequivocal answer to this question. Their first response to the question was: "Is this a serious question?" When they were asked to reflect on the question in any case and to give their opinion, the participants expressed strong opinions that the scenario was unrealistic. One of the participants explained his position thus: "It will never happen, and even if we approach it, they [majority in the Knesset] will change the laws just as they did with raising the threshold for the Knesset." Other participants said: "In Israel, Arabs are second-class citizens. This is the nature of the state"; "The Israeli [Jewish] public will

² "Ahmad Tibi is Ready to be Prime Minister of One State," *Haaretz*, 2 March 2017.


not accept this"; and "An Arab cannot lead a country that hates Arabs." One of the participants even stated categorically: "I object to an Arab being prime minister of Israel."

It seems that Arab citizenry agree that an Arab citizen will not be elected prime minister because such a scenario is unrealistic and because the Arab citizens themselves are not interested in it. This finding is clear from the participants' response to the question of whether they would feel pride or embarrassment if a relative were appointed to one of the following positions: a Knesset member, a government minister, president, or prime minister. A clear majority of the respondents indicated that they would feel proud if their relative was elected to the Knesset (72.5%), or chosen as a minister (73.3%), or even elected president (73.6%). Only a small minority of respondents said that they would be embarrassed if their relative were elected to one of the positions (Knesset member: 15.5%; minister: 16.1%; president: 16.5%). These findings demonstrate that the Arab public believes that their participation in high-level politics can indeed be welcomed. On the other hand, half of the respondents (49.5%) said they would be embarrassed if their relative was elected prime minister and only 41.6% said they would be proud of it. Interestingly, when responses were separated by religion there were no significant differences between the views of Muslims, Christians and Druze. It appears that in fact the Druze (57.0%) would have been more embarrassed than Muslims (48.7%) or Christians (52.7%) if a relative were elected prime minister.

Political Participation: Should an Arab Party Join the Government?

The participants were presented with a number of options regarding the political participation of Arab parties in Israel and their possible participation in any future government. According to the findings, only 36.7% oppose an Arab party joining the government or supporting it from outside the coalition (as the Arab parties supported the Rabin-Peres government in 1992-1996 without joining the coalition and the government). On the other hand, **42.5% support an Arab party joining the government under the "right circumstances" or supporting it from the outside given the same conditions.** A decided majority among this group, 32.7% of total respondents, support joining the government if the conditions are ripe. Another 9.8% of respondents said that an Arab party "should not join the government, but can support it from the outside in the right circumstances." 20.8% were unsure or refused to respond.

Figure 9: Should an Arab Party Join the Government?



This high proportion of supporters, not only for support outside a coalition, but also for joining a coalition and even to sitting in the government (on the condition that the Arab public can agree to its basic principles and policies) attests to the Arab public's growing desire to fully integrate and participate in Israeli political life. This was also evident in the increase in voter turnout in the last elections and in the expectation of greater participation in politics that emerged in the general reactions of the Arab public after the establishment of the Joint List of Arab parties and its participation in the last elections.

A breakdown of responses by religion reveals that 35.8% of Muslims oppose an Arab party joining the government, 34.1% of Muslims support joining under the right conditions, and 9.5% favor giving support from outside the coalition under same conditions. The responses among Christians are very similar to the general average of the respondents' answers (as shown above). On the other hand, among the Druze, the percentage of those who oppose an Arab party joining the government is relatively high, at 46.8%. Only 25.3% of Druze respondents support an Arab party joining the government under the right circumstances, and only 7.6% favor giving outside support to the government under the same circumstances. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the vast majority of Druze voters tend to vote for Zionist parties in the parliament elections and not to the Arab parties, hence their relative opposition to an Arab party joining the government.

Isolating the findings by age shows that among young people aged 18 to 22, there is considerable support for joining the government (37.5%) in comparison to the 35.2% of young people who oppose it and the 7.4% who favor supporting the government from outside a coalition. Amongst adults aged 50-59, 37.7% opposed joining the government, 25.4% supported joining, and a relatively high percentage (12.3%) supported giving the government outside support. It seems that the historical experience of 1992-1996, which is remembered by this age group, has informed their

inclinations, while the desire of young people for change and the need to integrate into Israeli society is clearly evident in the youngest respondents' answers to this question. There were no significant differences in the breakdown of responses by education, except that the lowest rate of favor for outside support (5.1%) was among those with only an elementary level of education, who tend to support joining the government to a greater extent (29.3%). The proportion of supporters for outside support gradually increases to 15.1% among those with an undergraduate degree, compared to 25.5% of those who support joining the government. This position may be the result of a more developed political consciousness among the educated, since external support for a coalition without joining the government, under appropriate circumstances is of course the stated position of several party heads within the Joint List.

Attitude Toward State Institutions

The respondents were asked about their views on a series of state institutions: the Knesset, local authorities, the Supreme Court, the state Shari'a courts, the government, the prime minister, the president, the army and the police. Surprisingly, there were no large gaps in the relations of those surveyed to the various institutions, and similar patterns were often presented in the responses. However, relatively small differences were found to indicate the general attitude of the Arab public toward state institutions. For example, 22.4% expressed a very positive attitude towards the Knesset, 22.5% responded fairly positively, 23.7% responded negatively, and 24.5% expressed very negative attitudes towards parliament. **A total of 44.9% of respondents expressed a positive attitude towards the Israeli parliament, while 48.3% expressed a negative attitude.** In terms of the local authorities where they live, 45.9% expressed a positive attitude, and 49% expressed a negative attitude. This finding is unsurprising given the difficult problems facing local governments. The Israeli Supreme Court, which often appears to defend minority rights, has a more positive image: 25.1% expressed a very positive attitude towards it, 22.5% expressed a positive attitude, 20% expressed a rather negative opinion of the Supreme Court, and 23.6% take a very negative view of it. Overall, **47.6% expressed a positive attitude towards the Supreme Court and 43.6% voiced a negative attitude.** On the other hand, only 43.3% expressed a positive attitude toward the government, while 50.3% showed a negative attitude towards it.

The most surprising results were found in relation to the police: 30.5% of respondents said their attitude toward police was very positive, 18.3% called the relationship quite positive, 19.1% expressed a rather negative attitude toward police, and 26.8% reported a very negative attitude. **In all, a total of 48.7% respondents expressed a positive attitude towards the police, and only 45.9% reported a negative attitude.** These findings are inconsistent with what is known about the repeated clashes between the police and the Arab public, for example in Umm al-Hiran in January 2017, but can be explained by the large percentage of respondents who worry for their personal safety and about crime, concerns for which the police are the proper address. Another surprising finding is the attitude toward the IDF: **47.5% expressed a positive attitude toward the army, compared with only 45.4% of respondents who declared a negative attitude.** The most positive feelings were demonstrated towards the president of the state, an institution identified in recent years with incumbent President Reuven Rivlin and his overall attitude toward the Arab minority: **49.7% of those surveyed declared a positive attitude toward the president** (of them, 30.1% expressed a very positive attitude toward the presidential institution),

while only 42.5 percent expressed a negative attitude. Only 44.3% of respondents expressed a positive attitude toward the Shari'a courts, the equivalent the Jewish public's rabbinical courts, as compared with 43% who expressed a negative attitude.

Table 6: Attitudes Toward State Institutions

| Institution | Positive View | | | Negative View | | | Difference |
|------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| | Very positive | Quite positive | Total | Quite negative | Very negative | Total | |
| Parliament (Knesset) | 22.4% | 22.5% | 44.9% | 23.7% | 24.5% | 48.2% | - 3.3% |
| Local municipal authorities | 19.5% | 26.4% | 45.9% | 22.3% | 26.7% | 49.0% | - 3.1% |
| Supreme Court | 25.1% | 22.5% | 47.6% | 20.0% | 23.6% | 43.6% | 4.0% |
| Government | 21.6% | 21.7% | 43.3% | 22.3% | 28.1% | 50.4% | - 7.1% |
| President of Israel | 30.1% | 19.5% | 49.6% | 17.5% | 25.0% | 42.5% | 7.1% |
| Shari'a Court | 24.2% | 20.1% | 44.3% | 19.5% | 23.5% | 43.0% | 1.3% |
| Israeli Police | 30.5% | 18.3% | 48.8% | 19.1% | 26.8% | 45.9% | 2.9% |
| IDF (Israeli army) | 31.5% | 16.0% | 47.5% | 19.3% | 26.1% | 45.4% | 2.1% |

Isolating the results by demographic segments explains some of the relatively surprising results. Amongst Druze respondents, there was great support for state institutions (first and foremost security institutions), but it should be remembered that many of the Druze serve in these institutions. No less than 91.1% of the Druze expressed a positive attitude towards the IDF, 70.9% of whom expressed a very positive attitude towards it. Only 8.9% of the Druze expressed a negative attitude toward the army. On the other hand, amongst the Muslim population, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the Arab public in Israel, 50% took a negative view of the army, while 42.1% voiced a positive opinion of it – a percentage higher than expected. The Christians are in the middle: 54.1% of them expressed a positive attitude towards the army, and only 41.9% had a negative attitude toward it. The same picture emerges with regard to the police: 87.3% of the Druze population has a positive attitude toward police, compared with only 43.5% of the Muslim respondents. 50.6% of Muslims held a negative attitude toward the police. 56.8% of Christian stated a positive attitude toward the police and 40.5% expressed negative views toward them. A breakdown of answers by age shows that those aged 18 to 22 tend to be negative toward the police, as 55.9% of them stated, compared to just 34.6% who expressed a positive attitude. Conversely, in the age group between 23 and 29 we find the opposite: 51.7% of respondents in this age group indicated a positive attitude toward police as compared with 42% who view them negatively. These results remain nearly unchanged until we examine respondents aged 50 to 59: 56.6% of them expressed a positive attitude and 41.8% expressed a negative view. The picture of attitudes held toward the IDF is similar among the various age groups.

As for the Shari'a courts, it is somewhat surprising that the attitude of the Muslim respondents is more negative: 46.5% of Muslim respondents expressed a negative

attitude toward the courts, while only 40.8% expressed a positive attitude. On the other hand, with respect to the Christians (who do not require the services of these courts), the view is more positive: 48.6% declared a positive position, compared with 40.5% who expressed a negative view. Amongst the Druze, who also have their own religious court system, 70.9% view the Shari'a courts favorably, and only 17.7% view them negatively, a result which is undoubtedly owing to a general identification with the establishment and with government institutions. A breakdown by age shows a lower level of confidence amongst young people: only 32.4% of those between the ages of 18 and 22 reported a positive attitude towards the Shari'a courts, as compared to 54.3% amongst those aged 60 and over.

Religious affiliation also has a great influence on feelings toward the institution of the presidency. Only 45% of Muslims regard the office of the president of the state favorably, and 46.7% regard it negatively, while 59.5% of Christians favor it and 33.8% view it negatively. In this area as well, a very large majority of the Druze (82.3%) view the institution favorably and only 15.2% declare a negative attitude towards it. By age, a high negative regard was found again among those aged 18 to 22 (52.9%), compared with only 34.6% who expressed a positive attitude. This figure again rose starkly in the next age group, 23 to 29, with 47.7% stating a positive attitude toward the presidency, and only 42.6% expressing a negative attitude. The rate of those who declare a positive attitude toward the presidency then rises modestly until the age of 50 to 59, 60.7% of whom declared a positive attitude toward the president and only 36.9% of whom expressed a negative attitude.

The general negative attitude towards the government is reflected in the breakdown of the results according to religion. Amongst Muslims, 54% expressed a negative attitude towards the government, and only 39.2% declared a positive attitude. Among Christians, who tend to support other institutions, there is a near balance of positive (48.6%) and negative (47.3%) attitudes. Amongst Druze, trust in the government is also relatively low compared to the other institutions of the state, which enjoy the most confidence: only 70.9% of Druze surveyed declared a positive attitude toward the government, a relatively low percentage, and 26.6% expressed a negative attitude - a relatively high percentage. A breakdown by age groups again found the youngest survey (aged 18 to 22) to be more negative (58.1%). Negativity was moderate amongst 23 to 29-year-olds, however, unlike other institutions, there was no gradual increase in the positive ratio. Among those aged 60 and over, positive and negative perceptions were represented equally: 47.1% each.

Muslim respondents also expressed relatively little trust in the Supreme Court, only 43.3%, as compared to 79.7% amongst the Druze and 54.1% amongst Christians. By age, there was once again relatively little confidence among those aged 18 to 22. This rate rises with the age group of 23 to 29-year-olds and climbs moderately across age groups.

Only 41.8% of Muslim respondents expressed a positive attitude toward local authorities, and 52.7% expressed a negative attitude. Amongst Christians, 60.8% expressed a positive attitude and 35.1% held a negative attitude toward local government. Among the Druze, only 64.6% reported a positive view, a relatively low percentage, while 34.2% expressed a negative attitude - a relatively high percentage, which is certainly due to the immorality and corruption widespread in many local authorities, at least according to public perception.

With regard to the Knesset, only 39.2% of Muslim respondents expressed a positive attitude, while 53% expressed a negative attitude. 54.1% of Christian respondents declared a positive attitude towards the Knesset and 43.2% expressed a negative

attitude. Amongst the Druze, great support for state institutions was expressed also in this matter: 82.3% of Druze respondents expressed a positive attitude toward the Knesset, compared with only 16.5% who voiced a negative attitude. As in other areas, only 31.6% of respondents aged 18 to 22 expressed a positive attitude towards the Knesset, while 62.5% expressed a negative attitude, however the rate increased to 37.5% among those aged 23 to 29, while 50% of respondents in this age range expressed a negative attitude towards the Knesset. From here, the rate of those declaring positive attitudes towards the Knesset rose to 63.9% among those aged 50 to 59, and only 33.6% of this group declared a negative attitude toward it.

Attitudes Toward the Economic Policy of the Government

The respondents were asked if they had heard about the budget for the five-year plan for the years 2016-2020 totaling NIS 15 billion earmarked for the Arab public, which was approved by the government in December 2015. Only 36.4% of respondents had heard about it, while 45.2% were not aware of it or did not know exactly what it was. 10.3% answered that it was a lie, or that it was not correct, or that they did not believe it. By religion, no significant differences were found between Muslims and Christians who had heard about the budget and knew what was involved. Among the Druze respondents, a slightly higher rate of knowledge was found (46.8%), apparently due to the tendency to support and sympathize with the establishment in general.

Table 7: How Knowledgeable are you on the Government's 15 billion Shekel plan (December 2015)?

| Response | Percentage | | |
|--|------------|---|--|
| Very knowledgeable | 22.6% | } | Total Knowledgeable 36.4% |
| Quite knowledgeable | 13.8% | | |
| Quite unknowledgeable | 11.3% | } | Total Unknowledgeable 45.2% |
| Very unknowledgeable | 33.9% | | |
| It's a lie / not true / I don't believe it | 10.3% | | |
| Don't know / Refuse to respond | 8.1% | | |

Another question posed about economic equality dealt with taxation: Are Arab citizens receiving a fair or unfair portion of the budget from the taxes that they pay? The findings of the survey show that, according to the prevailing opinion among Arab citizens, 50.7% of the respondents believe that they do not receive the portion that they deserve of the state budget. Only 43.6% believe they receive their fair portion of the budget out of the taxes that they have paid.

When segmented by religion, only 41.5% of Muslim respondents believe they are getting fair budget allocations, against 53.3% who believe that the allocation is unfair. 48.6% of Christian respondents believe they are receiving fair allocations, while 44.6% do not believe so. A relatively high percentage of Druze respondents, 36.7%, do not believe that they receive a fair budget allocation that reflects the taxes that they pay, while a relatively low rate (58.2%) believe that their treatment on this issue is fair. Given the general tendency of the Druze respondents to respond positively, it

appears that these rates stem from agitation and resentment due to economic inequality between the minority and the majority in the country.

Similar responses arose in the focus groups on these issues. Some see the five-year budget as a drastic change, while others have not yet heard of it. As for taxation and the distribution of the budgetary pie, the general view is that the Arabs do not receive their fair share. One respondent even claimed that “we pay 34 billion shekels in taxes and all of it goes to the army.” Others spoke of inequality, saying that the issue would be resolved only by affirmative action. It appears that on this issue there are no major gaps between the collective position and the personal position within the Arab public.

Defining Personal Identity

The respondents were presented definitions of their identities in a random manner and were asked to pick **one** identity that describes them best.

The respondents’ answers can be divided into four categories: (A) an Arab or Palestinian identity that includes a component of Israeli civil identity; (B) pure Arab or Palestinian identity, without an Israeli civil identity component; (C) Israeli identity without a national identity component (Arab or Palestinian); (D) religious identity (which includes or does not include an Israeli civil identity component).

Table 8: Definitions of Self-Identity and its Components


| Category | Identity definition | Percentage | |
|--|---|------------|----------------|
| National identity with Israeli civil component | Palestinian in Israel / Palestinian citizen of Israel | 8.9% | } 49.7% |
| | Arab in Israel / Arab citizen of Israel | 40.8% | |
| Pure national identity | Arab | 8.7% | } 24.1% |
| | Palestinian | 15.4% | |
| Civil identity | Israeli | | 11.4% |
| Religious identity | | | 9.5% |
| Other / Don't know | | | 5.3% |

The respondents’ answers reveal that the national consciousness in the collective identity of Arab citizenry is very solid. About three-fourths of those surveyed chose a national identity definition: half of respondents associated their national identity with the Israeli experience, while a quarter of them chose a pure national identity, Palestinian or Arab, without any necessary connection to the Israeli civilian identity component. Approximately one tenth of respondents said that their identity is “Israeli,” and another tenth declared that religious identity suited them best.

The breakdown of responses by age reveals that rate at which the youngest and oldest age groups (those between the ages of 18 to 22 and those aged 60 and over) define themselves by a pure national identity is significantly higher than the other age groups

- 35.3% of respondents aged 18 to 22 and 34.3% of respondents aged 60 and over chose to define their identity as Arab or Palestinian (the survey's overall average was 24.1%). A possible explanation for this is that contact with the Jewish majority for these groups is comparatively smaller than with other age groups. To this a unique characteristic must be added to each of the two groups: little time has passed since young people aged 18-22 completed their high school studies, and they are now for the first time leaving their natural environment and venturing out into the wider Israeli job and education markets. The first direct encounter with the Jewish majority society is usually accompanied by "culture shock" that is expressed by an emphasis on national identity. The oldest respondents were born during the establishment of the state and grew up in a traumatic reality in which they and their families experienced the *Nakba*.³ In contrast, respondents aged 23 to 59, who are integrated into the workforce, are in constant contact with Jewish society and with Israeli culture. This fact appears to be reflected in the definition of their self-identity, as they allocate a larger space to the Israeli civilian identity component.

Figure 10: Definitions of Self-Identity and its Components (by age group)




A breakdown of responses by religion indicates significant differences between Muslims and Christians on the one hand, and Druze on the other. Interestingly, the percentage of Druze who identify as "Arab Israeli" or "Arab citizen of Israel" (65.8%) is higher than that of Christians (47.3%) and even more than Muslims (37.5%). Without a doubt, this finding indicates the centrality Arab consciousness within the Druze identity, but the importance of Israeli identity in the eyes of the Druze is reflected in the fact that 21.5% of them declared that the definition "Israeli" best characterizes their identity. The rate of Druze who self-identify as Israeli is

³ The term *Nakba* ("Catastrophe" in Arabic) refers to the loss of Palestine and the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem in the wake of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.


significantly higher than that of Muslims (10.3%) or Christians (9.5%). Moreover, in comparison to the sizable percentage among Muslims (27.4%) and Christians (21.7%) who chose pure national identity, Arab or Palestinian, not a single Druze respondent did so. In other words, the state - Israel - is so dominant among the Druze that in their view the definition of self as “Arab” or “Palestinian” does not stand on its own.

Figure 11: Definitions of Self-Identity and its Components (by religion)



A breakdown of the answers by level of education leads to several conclusions. First, self-identification by nationality is dominant across all levels of education. There are those who emphasize pure national identity, “Arab” or “Palestinian” (38.2% among those with an elementary level of education, 30.4% among those with a graduate or postgraduate degree), and there are those who combine this identity with an Israeli civil component (56.3% among those with some post-secondary education, 45.7% among undergraduate degree holders). Second, a direct correlation was found between education level and Israeli identity. In other words, as education level rises, so too does the likelihood that the Israeli component will become incorporated as a secondary element of the respondents’ identity. The percentage of respondents who define themselves as “Israeli” amongst those with an undergraduate degree (16.0%) and those with a graduate and postgraduate degree (21.7%) is significantly higher than among those with only elementary level education (5.2%), secondary education (10.8%) and some post-secondary education (9.0%). At the same time, it was found that the percentage of those with an elementary level of education tend to emphasize religious identity (20.7%) at a much higher rate than those with higher levels of education (the survey average was 9.5%). This finding is further evidence of the weakness of Israeli civil identity amongst those with low levels of education.

Figure 12: Definitions of Self-Identity and its Components (by level of education)



How did participants in the focus groups relate to the definition of self-identity? The participants, most of whom were Muslims, expressed an opinion on four components of the collective identity of the Arab public in Israel: (A) the national component - Palestinian or Arab; (B) the religious-Muslim identity component; (C) the civic component - life in Israel; (D) The historical component that is expressed in the collective term “the Arabs of 1948.”

Amongst the participants there was consensus that Palestinian identity occupies a central place in their consciousness. The definition “Palestinian” has national and emotional importance, as it embodies the heritage of Arab citizens and their culture. This was expressed explicitly in the words of the participants: “We are Palestinian Arabs and we say this with pride;” “We are *Palestinian* citizens of Israel. The emphasis is on the word ‘Palestinians’;” “I am first and foremost a Palestinian and nothing more.” The designation “Arab citizens of Israel” was acceptable to them on the basis of the understanding that it is impossible to live without citizenship, and as long as Israeli citizenship does not harm the national consciousness. Conversely, the participants spoke out against the designation “Arab-Israeli” and made statements such as “I am an Arab, I belong to a larger culture than the State of Israel;” “We are not the Arabs *of* Israel, I am an Arab who does not belong to the State of Israel. My roots and my Arabness existed before them.” “[Arab-Israeli] is an inappropriate expression because our ancestors were here before ‘48.”

The responses of the participants in the focus groups regarding Israel's Independence Day reflect the collective attitude toward this day. Some of the participants spoke of sadness and even a sense of envy. Others said that Israel's Independence Day symbolizes the *Nakba*, the destruction of home and of exile. Some said that Palestinian society was torn apart on this day, and consequently, their relatives live in Jordan or Lebanon. Others mentioned the old refugee who holds the key to his home and dreams of returning. Once again, there is a pronounced gap between the collective

national identity and civic identity, which is personal and is therefore reflected to a greater extent in survey responses and to a lesser extent in the focus groups.

Attitudes Toward the High Follow-up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel

The respondents were also asked about their position on the High Follow-up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel, which is not an officially recognized state institution. The Follow-up Committee includes Arab Knesset members, members of Arab political parties, heads of local and municipal authorities organized on their own council, and representatives of extra-parliamentary organizations. In 2015, former Knesset member and veteran politician Mohammad Barakeh was elected to head the Committee, a choice intended to strengthen its standing and increase its activities. The results of the survey indicate that these goals were not achieved. **Only 35.4% of respondents expressed a positive attitude towards the High Follow-up Committee, and only 16.3% declared a very positive view of it. 52.3% expressed a negative view and 31.7% expressed a very negative view.**

A breakdown of the results shows that 32.9% of Muslim respondents expressed a positive attitude towards the Follow-up Committee, as compared to 40.5% of Christians and 50.6% of Druze. The position of the Druze respondents is slightly surprising. The leaders of the Druze local authorities are not included in the Follow-up Committee (and have their own council that is independent of the Arab council of local authorities), and Druze leaders have criticized the Follow-Up Committee's conduct and what they view to be its rather feeble condemnation of the murder of two Druze policemen during the July 2017 terrorist attack on the Temple Mount, just shortly before the survey was administered. In response, Mohammad Barakeh and Mazen Ghanaim (the mayor of Sakhnin who also heads the council of Arab mayors) paid visits to the bereaved families of the policemen, which may have had a positive effect on the Follow-up Committee's image in the eyes of Druze respondents. The results may also be explained by the Druze tendency to declare a positive attitude towards institutional bodies, even if in this case the body is not state-sponsored. No significant differences were found when segmenting results by age.

Summary

The findings of the survey show that the concrete issues facing the daily life of Israel's Arab citizenry are on its main agenda, while they are less preoccupied with external issues such as the peace process or issues related to the Palestinian territories. The concerns of the majority of the Arab citizens (60.2% in total) are focused on three areas: the problem of spreading violence in Arab communities, manifestations of racism on the part of Jewish citizens towards Arab citizens, and difficulties in the areas of the economy and employment.

This agenda has changed considerably over the last two decades. In the 1990s, the Arab citizens placed the progress of Israel's peace process with the Palestinians together with the advancement of civic equality within the country (this spirit is captured in the decade's popular slogan: "Peace and Equality"). Today, the agenda of the Arab citizens has become limited to a statement of "equality and security (personal, occupational) now, peace later."

These findings are consistent with the findings of the Konrad Adenauer Poll of Public Opinion that was conducted in early 2015, on the eve of the elections for the 20th Knesset. The poll's participants expressed their views on the role of the Joint List on the day after the elections. In response to the question "What should be on the agenda of the Arab citizens after the elections?" the respondents ranked first the internal problems of Arab society and second, the government's policy toward the Arab population. Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians ranked third, followed by religious and cultural ties with the Arab and Muslim world, and finally by Jewish-Arab relations in the state.⁴ The new findings from the current survey show a strengthening tendency toward integration into politics and the desire for full political participation, stemming from the strengthening of Israeli civic identity, but without relinquishing the Arab-Palestinian national and cultural identity.

Most Arab citizens (60%) relate positively to Israeli citizenship and to current living conditions in Israel. In contrast, a considerable portion - at rates ranging from one-quarter to one-third of the respondents (by varying demographic categories) - holds very critical views on these matters. Basic demographic variables such as age, religious affiliation, and level of education have a decisive influence on the personal position of Arab citizens. Young people and those with a low level of education tend to adopt a suspicious and critical attitude toward the situation in the country, toward state institutions and toward government policy. On the other hand, the survey found a direct correlation between age and level of education and the adoption of positive stances and feelings. It is made apparent that the integration into the education and labor markets of the working-age groups (between 23 to 59 years of age, as defined in the survey) has additional effects. For example, the higher the level of education of a respondent, the more he or she tended to report feelings of personal freedom, stability, and even a sense of belonging to the State of Israel. It should be noted, however, that in certain areas, especially on the issue of equality, those with higher education are more critical of the situation in the country. There is no doubt that in addition to their assessment of the standard of living in Israel and the advantages of Israeli citizenship, they tend to judge from a deeper perspective the essence of equality towards the Arab citizens of Israel.

⁴ Itamar Radai and Arik Rudnitsky (editors), **Survey of Political Positions Amongst the Arab Population in Israel Approaching the 20th Knesset Elections** (Tel Aviv University: Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation, 15 March 2015).

Arab citizens attribute importance to their participation in Israeli politics, even if it is divided on whether an Arab party should join the government (in the right circumstances), or if to support to the government from outside a coalition, or to refuse to support it under any conditions. The fact that having a family member elected to an official position – as a Knesset member or a minister – would be a source of pride among an overwhelming majority of Arab citizens reinforces this conclusion. Nevertheless, it appears that the Arabs explicitly differentiate roles in the parliamentary field. The role of the prime minister is not appealing to Arab citizens and achieving it does not seem realistic in their eyes, apparently because of the full identification of this role with the Zionist character of the state. This finding is supported by the words of the participants in the focus groups: Israeli citizenship is welcomed as long as it does not interfere with their sense of national belonging to the Arab or Palestinian nations.

The positions of the participants in the focus groups reflect the strength of Palestinian-Arab identity among Arab citizens and the fact that they do not see a contradiction between Palestinian-Arab national identity and Israeli civic identity. The designation “Israeli-Arab” aroused great opposition in the focus groups, as did Israel's Independence Day. A comparison of views expressed in the focus groups with the general results of the survey points to differences between collective positions and memory and individual feelings and attitudes. The collective position presented in the focus group discussions finds expression in the public sphere and emphasizes the Palestinian national identity. Conversely, the responses of the survey participants reveal individual attitudes that assign a broader (albeit secondary, identity) dimension to the component of Israeli civic identity.