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Imprint

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
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PANORAMA

INSIGHTS INTO SOUTHEAST ASIAN
AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS



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PREFACE

It has been three years since the infamous incident of September 11, 2001, but yet, its after-effects never left the news headlines. Repercussions of global terrorism of late warn us not to let down our guard, and more than ever, the emphasis is on international and transregional cooperation to overcome this problem.

One response from the global community in an attempt to overcome this threat, among others, is the emerging trend of regionalisation. Regionalisation gives a new dimension in the fight against terrorism and also serves as a framework for a new mechanism that focuses on security and cooperation. Apart from combating terrorism, regionalisation is also a reaction against globalisation. In Asia's context, it is the preservation of the Asian identity, which encompasses the culture, philosophy and values unique to Asia, preventing this heritage from being swept away by the forces of globalisation.

In the operational level, regionalisation is a response to failed multilaterals talks, evident from the prolific mushrooming of regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) immediately after the failed World Trade Organisation talks in Cancun. Separate FTAs were forged or are being negotiated among Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries to strengthen ties among themselves, even as interregional bridges are formed between Southeast Asia and East Asia.

Cooperation between regions to combat the global terrorism threat is highlighted in Frank Umbach's paper that studies how the European Union (EU) has been increasingly emphasising on security cooperation with ASEAN. His study of the concept papers from 1994-2003 charts

this trend, and foresees that the ASEAN Regional Forum will be the key platform upon which future dialogues will take place.

The increased participation of ASEAN and East Asian countries like the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea in the regionalisation process is attributable to a convergent foreign policy, in this case, towards Europe, as observed by César de Prado Yepes. Increasingly, the idea of an East Asian Community (EAC) is gaining ground as Japan and China become more actively involved in forging bonds on various levels with their ASEAN neighbours.

Although the repercussions of the 9/11 crisis and terrorism still dominates the international media, Asia's own crisis of 1997 is still emanating waves of change in the region. As Eric Teo observes, offshoots of the Asian Crisis of 1997 has led to social and political upheavals, with civil society gaining a stronger voice in re-negotiating the *contrat social* (social contract) between the governed and the governing. But amidst this transformation, there are risks which threaten to surface due to the inherent trouble spots of Asian societies, such as history, religion and ethnicity.

The regionalisation of Asia, a phenomenon Manfred Mols describes as the "Asianisation" of Asia, is seen as an affirmation of the Asian identity in the midst of globalisation. This is probably Asia's answer to the emerging trends of regionalisation in other parts of the world, such as Europe, Latin America and North America.


In this issue, our Documents section includes a key concept paper from the EU on the European Security Strategy.

Proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and the Government in Brussels on 12 December 2003, the paper stresses that international cooperation strategy is the answer against global terrorism. Recognising that the threat is contributed by three components, namely terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as failed states and organised crime, the paper urges the strengthening of international order and the development of a more coherent foreign policy to counter the scourge of terrorism.

As further proof of the increasing interregional bonds between ASEAN and East Asia, we will look at the joint declaration between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China that both sides agree on a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity. Even among the East Asian countries, the regionalisation process is taking place. The declaration on the tripartite cooperation between the "Plus Three" members of the ASEAN+3 group,

namely the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, signals an increasing wish to form a cooperative group that can pursue common interests among themselves as well as with partners in other regional groupings.

In response to this omnipresent trend of regionalisation, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's Southeast Asia programme will promote networking and dialogue among think tanks not only from EU and ASEAN, but progressively accommodating the enlarged EU and the greater East Asia region. We can therefore look forward to more participation from members of the Eastern European countries as well as those that form part of the "Plus Three" component of ASEAN+3. It is our hope that the increasing trend of regionalisation will facilitate the formation of networks between regions and achieve better cooperation in the ever-changing global landscape.



Dr. Colin Dürkop
Singapore, June 2004



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EU-ASEAN Political and Security Dialogue at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Prospects for Interregional Cooperation on International Terrorism

Frank Umbach

“... our dialogue with ASEAN and its member countries should help identify areas where ASEAN and the EU can work together on global security questions, and on global challenges such as drugs and transnational crime. We should continue to give full support to conflict prevention efforts within the region..., and to civil society efforts to promote transparency, good governance and the rule of law. And in our political dialogue with ASEAN and its member countries we should give attention to human rights issues.”¹

An Overview of the Political and Security Dialogue until 2002

The basis of the structured relations between the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) started with a political dialogue at the level of Foreign Ministers in 1978 and a cooperation agreement signed in 1980. ASEAN is thus the EU's oldest regional dialogue partner. Economically, ASEAN with its ten member countries has meanwhile become EU's second-largest sales market and third-largest trading partner in Asia (after Japan and China), whilst the EU is the second-largest investor in ASEAN and its third-largest trading partner (accounting for 14% of ASEAN's trade) after the United States (16.5%) and

Japan (16%). In 2002, EU exports to ASEAN – with its combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 656 billion Euros, a total population of 532 million people and accounting for 27% of world GDP – were estimated at 61 billion Euros, while EU imports from ASEAN were valued at 42 billion Euros. The EU-ASEAN trade represented 5.1% of total world trade.² But the proportion of the total amount of EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) received by ASEAN has steadily declined from 3.3% in 1998 to 2.6% in 1999, 1.6% in 2000 and 1.8% in 2001, reflecting that other emerging markets (such as China) have become more attractive as destinations for EU investments. At the beginning of the 1990s, Southeast Asia acquired 61% of all EU-

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FDI flows to entire Asia. Ten years later, it is China that is accumulating 61% of all EU-FDI that go to Asia, whereas the ASEAN states receive only 10%.

More positive progress has been made on the political level. Both sides have strengthened and deepened their interregional cooperation, and particularly their security dialogue when the EU has become a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the “Track-One” (government dialogue) forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as the supporting “Track-Two” institution (involving Academic experts and government officials in “private capacity”) in 1993/94. In 1996, both sides established in addition the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process, supported by the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) as the “Track-Two” institution. Since the second half of the 1990s, the EU also supported the democratic government transition in Cambodia and East Timor, helped to finance the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) for de-nuclearising North Korea and has supported the refugee flows in and from Afghanistan.³

In reality, however, all these multilateral dialogue frameworks and even the ARF have only slowly developed a shared understanding of basic concepts and the needed habits as well as customs of close multilateral political and security consultation. Moreover, all security discussions in the ARF have focused hitherto primarily on threat perceptions and confidence-building measures rather than on concrete management of regional security conflicts and conflict resolution

mechanisms involving legal obligations and not just non-binding political declarations. Even more concrete initiatives in this direction within track-two processes and their constrained security agendas have not been transformed entirely into formal governmental ones due to key countries and their unwillingness or hesitance to do so. Furthermore, although those new forms of multilateral security cooperation have enhanced state-to-state relations, state building, and created “epistemic communities” (networks of experts) within the region as well as beyond with the United States (US) and Europe, they have not significantly contributed to the creation of wider civil societies, neither at the domestic nor regional level. With the waves of the Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and its impact on Asia, European politicians and the public have begun to recognise that despite the geographical and psychological distance of many local and regional conflicts from Europe, they have and will have direct or at least indirect impacts on Europe’s future economic and political stability. That is one of the reasons why Germany’s foreign and security policies have become increasingly globalised during the last decade. Thus regional security developments in Asia are now becoming much more important for the European foreign and security policy, as it is admitted, for instance, in the new sub-regional Southeast Asia concept paper of the German foreign ministry, published in May 2002: “Regional and security developments in Asia are now having a greater impact on European foreign and security policy.”⁴

A Comparison of the Major EU-Asia Concept Papers 1994-2003 – A Comment

If one looks back and compares the various regional and sub-regional concept papers of the EU and its member states since 1994, when the EU published its first comprehensive “Asia concept” paper, the European Commission has already admitted before September 11, 2001 that the growing interregional trade between Europe and Asia is becoming increasingly dependent on the future national and regional political-economic stability in East Asia. The new EU-Asia concept paper of September 2001, for instance, reflects a much better balance between the EU’s economic and political strategic interests in East Asia and Southeast Asia. The field of political and security dialogue is mentioned even at the first place ahead of our economic cooperation, though the real implemented policies very often differ from the concept paper due to the lack of political coherence of the different national European foreign and security policies vis-à-vis Asia as well as the political unwillingness of the EU member states to implement a real Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).⁵ Nonetheless, these concept papers determine the direction of the future development of the EU policies in Asia. The EU-Asia strategy paper of September 2001, for instance, has demanded:

“The EU should play a more active role in regional fora, support conflict prevention by sharing common experiences and enhance EU-Asia dialogue in the realm of justice and home affairs. This will include areas such as asylum,

immigration and arms trafficking amongst others.”⁶

Therefore, the paper has called for broadening and deepening of the EU’s engagement policies with the Asia-Pacific region that reflects its growing global security interests. The EU’s new “Comprehensive Strategy for Future Relations with Southeast Asia” of July 2003 has gone even further and has specified the European security interests in Southeast Asia in the light of the new security challenges arising since September 2001 in the following areas:

- supporting regional stability and the fight against international terrorism;
- continuing support actions in the area of conflict prevention and conflict settlement;
- deepening and intensifying cooperation on the multilateral and bilateral basis on new agendas such as human rights (moving even at the top of the agenda of “new priorities”), good governance, justice and home affairs issues and fighting against international terrorism as part of a “comprehensive security concept” that reflect a wider security understanding in the post-Cold War era.⁷

As Chris Patten, the EU’s External Relations Commissioner, has pointed out: “We are not only major trading partners, but partners in the fight against terrorism, organised crime, and drug trade”.⁸ In this light, the EU has declared its willingness to assist countries taking measures against international terrorism without prejudice to the respect by the countries concerned of basic human rights principles and

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peaceful political opposition. In this context, the EU's proclaimed strategic interest in cooperation in the field of energy security should also address, in the future, the field of supply security. Energy security and the projected growth in energy demand in Southeast Asia are also directly linked with maritime security and related security challenges such as piracy, terrorist attacks on ships and smuggling of migrants as well as illicit traffic in drugs and arms, especially in Southeast Asia such as the Straits of Malacca. Two-thirds of the global shipping trade (including Europe's) runs through these choke-points of the Sea Lane of Communications (SLOCs) in Southeast Asia. The number of terrorist and pirate attacks against ships in the open seas has risen sharply during the last decade. In 2000, this number increased by not less than 40% in comparison with the year before. The most well-known examples of piracy and terrorist attacks on international shipping during the last few years were the brutal attack of American destroyer *USS Cole* by Al-Qaeda terrorists in the port of Yemen-Aden in 2000 – killing 17 people and wounding 42, whilst the ship suffered severe damage – and the attack on the French oil tanker *Limburg* off Yemen in 2001.

This incident was soon followed by a number of similar attacks against ships from other countries, mostly in Southeast Asia. The shipping traffic and particularly the container trade is strategically important for the Asia-Pacific region in general and Southeast Asia in particular, given that five of the “top six” container ports in the world are now all in East Asia (with Hong Kong and Singapore by far the biggest “megaports” in the world).

Thus Northeast Asian countries such as People's Republic of China, Japan and South Korea are also heavily dependent on stable oil imports and secure SLOCs from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf to East Asia. Only the joint implementation of regional maritime security strategies and multilateral cooperation are able and effective for countering these increasing regional threats.⁹ Given the strategic importance of energy and the geo-strategic key position of the ASEAN countries in the supply (Indonesia is presently the largest Liquefied Natural Gas [LNG] exporter in the world) and/or transport, the EU has also proposed a strategic dialogue and further cooperation in the fields of co-generation and renewable energies in its newest Southeast Asia Strategy paper of 2003.¹⁰

Future Cooperation Fields

In June 2003, the EU has adopted three new major documents on the EU's CFSP:

- a) a first-ever global EU foreign and security concept paper, which will be adopted at the end of the year, also called “Solana paper” (officially named: “A Secure Europe in a Better World”)¹¹;
- b) a declaration on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), officially called: “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”.¹² This paper has also led to a joint EU-US statement to avert WMD on June 25, 2003¹³;
- c) a declaration on Iran which indicates a fundamental change in the EU's Iran policy in the light of Teheran's

nuclear weapons ambitions and the new importance of the EU's non-proliferation policies.¹⁴

On the Solana Strategy Paper of June 2003

This highly important document is serving as the basis for an officially declared "European Security Strategy" to be adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The new strategy is calling explicitly for extending the zone of security around Europe and to develop "strategic partnerships" not just with the US, Canada, and Japan, but also with China and India due to their important role "in their respective regions and beyond".

Even in a US view, this paper is seen as a remarkable document in many ways: it is "jargon-free, oriented to substance rather than process, and modestly self-confident rather than self-congratulatory". It characterises the transatlantic relationship as "irreplaceable" and calls for strengthened US-EU ties to cope with the new and even more dangerous security challenges outside of Europe. The paper outlines basically three new major security threats to the EU: (1) international terrorism; (2) proliferation of WMD; and (3) failed states and organised crime. In contrast to some of the new security declarations of the Bush Administration, however, the paper also calls for extending the zone of security around Europe by emphasising the instruments of multilateralism and respect for international law that includes also East Asia and Southeast Asia.

But even more important is the notion that the strategy paper calls for directly countering the new security threats. The

strategy paper interprets some of those threats as being so dangerous and dynamic that they require reaction before the crises arise (pre-emption/preventive action). But it emphasises on the context of diplomatic crisis prevention so that the need for military action will not arise (as we have seen in October 2003 when the French, German and British foreign ministers visited Teheran with some success in order to persuade Iran's government not to opt for a nuclear weapons capability). But the paper is also indicating that the door for pre-emptive military action has cautiously and partially been opened or is at least not totally excluded any longer, dependent on the characterisation of the concrete threat. Therewith, the EU's CFSP and its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are moving closer to some controversial US positions in this regard.¹⁵

On the Declaration on Non-Proliferation of WMD

Against the background of the Solana paper, the Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction for the first time declares, as a key policy objective of the EU's CFSP and ESDP, "to deter, halt, and where possible, reverse proliferation programmes of concern world-wide." In this context, the strategy paper no longer even excludes the political option of military action as a "last resort" to prevent dangerous developments of proliferation of WMD. But in contrast to the US position of a unilateral assessment and political decision, the EU restricts this possibility to the need of a legitimation by the UN Security Council. However, this option is no longer

excluded per se as it was in the past, but also in the future, where the primary European focus will still be based on preventive diplomacies.

On the Iran Declaration in June 2003

The statement at the *Thessaloniki* summit of the EU in mid-June 2003 is indicating a fundamental change of the EU's Iran policy. In the past, both the EU as well its member states such as Germany was prided to have a "critical dialogue" with Teheran in the hope of strengthening Iran's moderate and reform-oriented political forces. Now the EU is threatening Teheran by suspending economic and political ties. It does not even exclude economic and other sanctions if Iran weaponises its nuclear ambitions. This change of the EU policy towards Teheran needs to be explained not so much by Europe's strategic interest and intention to improve its relationship with Washington, but rather in the recognition that the EU and its member states have underestimated the new security threats such as the proliferation of WMD, international terrorism (particularly linked with WMD) in general and Iran's political will to develop and to deploy nuclear weapons in particular. It may also mirror the disappointment in the EU about the critical dialogue with Iran and even been misled by the disinformation of Teheran during the last years. In a new report on November 10, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) came to the conclusion that the Iranian documents turned over to the IAEA confirmed a clear pattern of years of experimentation in

producing small amounts of materials that could be fabricated into weapons, including plutonium.

Although the report did not officially confirm US's accusation that Iran is using its civilian nuclear programme as a cover for its nuclear weapons programme, the report has revealed how far and how long (almost 18 years) a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory subject to IAEA-inspections could be making nuclear weapons while pretending to comply with international inspections! Ultimately, the value of the agreement with the three EU foreign ministers to suspend (and not "permanently end") its uranium enrichment and giving the UN free access to all suspicious sites will depend not so much on the communiqué, but on the implementation of what has been agreed.¹⁶

Furthermore, it is not just Teheran but also other Arab states that seek to acquire WMD and long-ranging ballistic missiles that may threaten Europe much earlier than the United States. In a broader context, if both present crises, namely to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions, cannot be solved diplomatically and if both go ahead with the nuclear weapons development, it might mean nothing less than the end of the global multilateral arms control regimes which are already in a major crisis since India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles tests in 1998. It particularly concerns the future of the nuclear NPTs and the IAEA inspection regimes as an independent UN watchdog whose existence is especially important for non-nuclear weapon countries in Europe such as Germany. Moreover, if Iran will

develop and deploy nuclear weapons, other Arab and Persian Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia will follow soon as some recent statements from their side have already indicated. Hence an Iranian nuclear weapon option would not only be perceived in Israel as a deadly threat but also in other neighbouring Arab countries who distrust Teheran's political aims for historical and geo-strategic reasons.

Perspectives for Interregional Anti-Terrorist Cooperation between Europe and Southeast Asia

“Archipelagic Southeast Asia is a relatively comfortable operating theatre for the terrorists compared with the Middle East where the governments have been much harsher on them. This is particularly so in the case of Indonesia, in view of its democratic space, weak governance, and poor law enforcement.”¹⁷

“A franker recognition of these [terrorist] problems is undoubtedly growing at least at leadership level. But ASEAN's non-confrontational, consensus-based approach to addressing multi-lateral issues has never been conducive to tackling urgent problems head-on. Certainly, on the counterterrorist front none of these vulnerabilities is likely to see much improvement before the next major bomb goes off.”¹⁸

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. in September 2001, in Bali in October 2002 and the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2002 tragically demonstrated the new dimensions and the global nature of the threat of international terrorism. Those new dimensions are:

- an increasing dominance of religiously motivated terrorism,
- a geographic shift away from Europe and Latin America to Northern Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia,
- the increasing global nature of international terrorism,
- escalating warfare strategies, which might make use even of weapons of mass destruction,
- inseparability of internal and external security of states being potential targets,
- new networks with internationally organised crime and making use of weak and failed states as operational bases,
- increasing relevance of non-state actors,
- hybrid terrorist-criminal groups as the result of convergence of terrorist groups and organised crime.¹⁹

As the bombing in Bali and the Philippines in the autumn of 2002 have shown, Southeast Asia has become a new focal point in international terrorism that threatens the future of tourism and other important industries in the region during already difficult economic times. Southeast Asia has become both a main refuge of escape for Al-Qaeda members as well as a land base for the reconstruction of various loosely linked networks of regional Islamic terrorist groups, aiming to build a pan-Muslim state linking with Indonesia, Malaysia and the southern parts of the Philippines and Thailand.²⁰ Recent events have also highlighted a development that locally inspired terrorist groups in moderate Islamic countries in Southeast Asia (like in Indonesia) have established links with international terrorist groups (like Al-

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Qaeda). They pose a direct threat not just to these countries themselves but also to neighbouring states as well as to the world at large.

Investigations and interrogations across the region since September 2001 have provided a contradicting picture. On one hand, it offered a much better understanding of the general threat posed by international terrorist groups that were virtually unknown before. According to new analyses, for instance, the terrorist network is much broader and more deeply rooted than was previously assumed. Reportedly, 400-600 Southeast Asians had been trained by Al-Qaeda and its associated terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, however, despite many arrests in Southeast Asia, very little is known even for terrorist experts about the full extent of the loose networks existing in the region. Furthermore, the proliferation of man-portable air defence missile systems (such as the Russian-made *Strela-2M*) has raised particular concern in the region and beyond. The greatest terrorist risks exist in Indonesia and the Philippines, and to a lesser extent, in Thailand.

Effective strategies for counter-terrorism need not only include short-term measures such as security and public order measures but also long-term strategies which address the complex and manifold root causes of terrorism (poverty, low education, failing pluralism and freedom of opinion etc). The EU is seeing the fight against international terrorism in a broader context that also seeks to address issues like reducing poverty, improving health and education as well as illegal migration and to support programmes for the rule of law, practicing

good governance and democratic rule as part of its traditional development assistance to countries affected by terrorism.²¹ Special attention must also be paid on international cooperation against terrorist financing. Those financial activities that support terrorism include the use of individual network nodes; narcotic and weapon sales; kidnapping and ransom; charity use and abuse; corporate vehicle manipulation; financial benefactors, and the legitimate banking system. As the investigation of the attacks on September 11, 2001 has revealed:

“The 11 September cell funding flowed unimpeded to the terrorists, without the discovery of any assistance from corrupt officials, patterns of suspicious transactions, the flagging of large cash deposits, an increased scrutiny of account activity associated with high-risk countries or effective due diligence mechanisms for corresponding banking.”²²

Meanwhile, some important steps for an enhanced interregional cooperation between the EU and ASEAN have been taken. The 14th EU-ASEAN Meeting between the foreign ministers of the EU and ASEAN have adopted in January 2003 a “Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism”, while the ASEM-4 summit in September 2002 adopted a declaration and action plan on the fight against terrorism. Both sides are also working closely together in the framework of the ARF on counter-terrorism. The European Commission has provided financial assistance under its EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism to the Philippines in the fields of border management and money laundering, and has supported Indonesia to improve its judicial capacity building and its fight against the financing

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of terrorism. Malaysia might be offered financial support for establishing the “Counter Terrorism Centre” in its country.²³ Until summer 2003, the EU has been supporting counter-terrorist measures in Southeast Asia with a total of 21 million Euros. ASEAN also signed with the US a “Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Striking Terrorism” on August 1, 2002 to share intelligence, to prevent fund-raising, to prevent transnational cooperation and to draw up strict regulations for falsified documents of terrorists. In order to maintain a sustained global war against the international terrorism, the US, the EU and Asia must support regional and interregional counter-terrorism strategies instead of focusing on unilateral strategies and unstable coalitions of the willing.

In Asia itself, the arrest of Al-Qaeda terrorists or those linked with Jemaah Islamiah in Singapore and other ASEAN states have signalled that terrorism is a regional and not just a national security problem, affecting the entire region and even beyond. In this light, global security challenges such as international terrorism require regional and global strategies to cope with these new security threats. On a more basic level, extremism in Southeast Asia is centred primarily on debates within the Muslim communities of the region. Hence any strategy designed to counter terrorist threats must also address understandable concerns that those anti-terrorist strategies could upset social and political domestic stability and thus cause even more regional instability.²⁴ Inappropriate state anti-terrorist responses and an excessive use of military force against the civilian population, and general political as well as administrative ineptitude can

therefore, at the end, greatly support the terrorists’ aims and ultimately undermine the counter-terrorist strategies.

Although regional security cooperation has made important progress, it seems more than questionable whether the present regional cooperation for countering terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is adequate enough to prevent further terrible attacks such as those in Bali in 2002 for instance. This does not mean that we should overlook what has already been achieved. Initially, a troika of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia has been formed for discussing common policies in the face of extremist threats in those countries. Broader cooperation has increased, for instance, between Indonesia and Malaysia, and first-meetings of ASEAN’s military chiefs have been held. Counter-terrorism is also high on the agendas of the ARF²⁵, CSCAP and even Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to improve intelligence sharing, blocking terrorist funds and tightening borders. The latest APEC meeting in October, for instance, has produced an agreed declaration of the group’s 21 countries “to dismantle, fully and without delay, transnational terrorist groups” and to “confront other direct threats to the security of our region” as well as to “eliminate the severe and growing danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of deliveries”.²⁶ Those anti-terror measures also included controls on portable, shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile systems.²⁷

But ultimately these agreed regional anti-terrorist cooperations seem still insufficient in the context of effective regional responses as well as in regard to addressing the root causes of discontent

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which is not just limited to poverty as empirical studies of terrorism have already revealed since the mid-1990s.

What are the problems for a closer regional cooperation on international terrorism in Southeast Asia? Like always, new funding is needed to build new regional networks to address economic disparity, good governance and human rights while at the same time the region needs to build an intelligence network aimed at cutting off funds used by terrorist groups. However, this need still seems insufficiently implemented not just in Southeast Asia, but also in the EU which would have a significant positive global impact on fighting international terrorism.

ASEAN states also still face difficulties of arresting leaders in particular, and not just mid- and low level members of Jemaah Islamiah and Al-Qaeda. It illustrates the inexperience and problems by the major ASEAN states in dealing with these new forms of international terrorism. Those problems are compounded by the fact that there is no specific overall security institution in Asia that is comparable to institutions such as Interpol or Europol. Furthermore, these difficulties are complicated by the fact that some countries are heavily affected by terrorism such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines whereas others are thus far only a potential target for terrorists in the future. That explains the difficulty in promoting joint regional agendas for combating terrorism when not all the grouping's members are affected in the same way by these new security challenges. As past experiences also show, gathering intelligence on the neighbouring countries in which terrorist groups are located is

based on one's own intelligence assets in the neighbouring countries. The sharing information can thus compromise their own intelligence assets. Moreover, the overall lack of a real regional strategy leads to a situation in which each country looks after its own territory and operations, and passes on only selective intelligence information to its neighbours. In general, however, the ASEAN states have long overlooked the activities of Islamic groups like many European states too. The biggest problem in Southeast Asia is, however, the leadership vacuum in organising a joint anti-terrorism strategy amongst members being divided by to which extent they should coordinate their efforts and strategies closely with those of the United States and other non-subregional powers.²⁸

Symptomatic of the slow progress in finding regional solutions to address international terrorist threat is the creation of the Southeast Asia Anti-Terror Centre in Malaysia. Its idea has been promulgated in early 2002. The centre has become operational just in July 2003. Originally it was planned as a joint US-Malaysian initiative. But neither the military nor the police have been involved in the centre until today. It will focus just on studies of terrorist organisations and activities, giving instructions on border security and analysing strategies dealing with the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Thus the centre will only provide basic training in methods of identifying and tracking terrorist groups rather being a centre in which a joint regional strategy can be formulated and intelligence efforts between regional nations can be coordinated.

Meanwhile, Malaysia is funding the centre alone because of its fears of

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increasing anti-US sentiment among the majority of the Muslim Malay population. But a totally Malaysian sponsored and organised facility is clearly limiting its usefulness and regional importance. Up to now, there is still little active input, participation and contribution from other ASEAN states. Therefore the centre can not adequately assist the region for the time being in formulating a real joint and effective regional strategy against terrorism.

Another problem is that ASEAN governments depend considerably on its police forces and, to a less extent, its immigration control agencies in fighting terrorism. But they are both generally overworked, underpaid, under trained and, in some countries, prone to corruption. Hence ASEAN counter-terrorist forces not only have to monitor terrorists but also some of their own police and immigration officials – a fact that also may deter regional information sharing by other regional countries.

On the positive side, however, this new field of security cooperation for counter-terrorist strategies on the regional and interregional level between Southeast Asia and Europe opens a wide range of opportunities for the EU to assist and support in the funding as well as training of police forces and immigration officials, and thus promote interregional cooperation in anti-terrorist strategies in their own strategic interests.

Conclusions and Perspectives

The EU's external relations have become much more important as the result of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties,

the creation of a CFSP in 1993, which has been strengthened with an ESDP in 1999, and the increasing importance of Justice and Home Affairs for its relations with other countries outside of Europe, including Southeast Asia. Together with ASEAN's integration efforts for an ASEAN Economic and Security Community, the pre-conditions for a strengthened interregional anti-terrorist strategy between the EU and Southeast Asia have been improved.

ASEAN and the ARF will continue to be the major focus of EU's political and security dialogue with Southeast Asia. In the future, it will become even more important for the EU to play a proactive role in the ARF in order to address and to develop regional as well as interregional strategies dealing effectively with the new dimensions of the multi-dimensional threats caused by international terrorist groups. The progress in the interregional political and security dialogue between the EU and ASEAN depends, however, to a considerable extent, on the intra-regional integration processes on both sides, such as ASEAN's traditional non-intervention clause and, therewith, on Southeast Asia's regional understanding of sovereignty in the 21st century.

On the European side, after months of internal dividing lines and lack of real progress on the way to a real CFSP and ESDP, the EU will adopt its first ever global European Security Concept at the end of the year. It will focus on increasing interregional security cooperation in the field of international terrorism, proliferation of WMD as well as failed states and organised crime. Although some

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new forms of cooperation have already been implemented, much more needs to be done so that these new forms of cooperation will become more effective for both sides. The new discussions between the EU and ASEAN should also include debates on norms of the international law and its future development.

Let me conclude by pointing out a simple truth we have to face: *“If we are not controlling the new security challenges and conflicts, they will certainly control us”* – and that cannot be in the strategic interest of both parties.

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Endnotes

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16. As it looks now, Iran will not give access, for instance, to its declared military facilities. Furthermore, Iran has still the option for breaking out of the NPT and to produce a large arsenal of nuclear weapons in a matter of weeks when necessary and should it choose to do so.

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Is there a convergence of East Asian countries' foreign policies? The case towards Europe

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The Rise of Asean+3

The very diverse countries of Northeast Asia (Japan, the People's Republic of China and South Korea) and Southeast Asia (ASEAN-10) seem to be forging a common destiny under the synonymous terms of ASEAN+3 and East Asian Community (EAC). The growing Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) group, originating in 1967 in the wake of decolonisation and in the middle of the Cold War, started reaching with special impetus to the three countries of North-East Asia in the 1990s, being noticeably successful towards the end of the decade in a range of non-military issues.¹ In 1997 Malaysia convened a first ASEAN+3 Summit meeting that since 1999 has become yearly gatherings of foreign affairs and heads of state increasingly galvanising a growing number of ASEAN+3 general and sectoral meetings, often on the sides of the regular ASEAN ones, and sometimes complementing with special ASEAN+1 gatherings. These events are not only talking shops as they increasingly produce potentially far-reaching written

agreements. To help consolidate all this high-level political activity, ASEAN+3 governments have been debating how to create more permanent administrative institutions. In 2002, Malaysia proposed to set up an ASEAN+3 Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur, although in that year's summit there was only an agreement to set up a bureau for ASEAN+3 affairs within the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, and led by a deputy Secretary-General. In that same summit ASEAN countries also agreed to some landmark economic and security agreements and declarations pertaining mainly to Northeast Asian partners.²

The term East Asian Community (EAC) is currently gaining relative ground as ASEAN is no longer the key drive of East Asian regionalism. More important is the change in behaviour of the two largest powers in the region. Japan has always been in favour of increasing Asia-Pacific cooperation, although it now considers East Asia its major strategic goal. And China has recently taken a constructive position in various multilateral groups around its neighbourhood. Meanwhile, South Korea is trying to be a

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local hub to maintain regional prosperity and stability, both in Northeast Asia and in the broader EAC.

Analytical Approach to Study the EAC's Foreign Policy

If the EAC is indeed rising, one may well start studying its overall external projection, if any, as seen in the convergence of its member countries' foreign policies. In other words, I want to study if the EAC has begun to have a common foreign policy.

To tackle this new research area I propose to start from simple indicators before attempting to tackle more complex questions. The first questions that each academic researcher (like journalists) should ask are: *what?*, *when?*, *where?*, and *who?* Where did the event physically take place, when was it first visible? Who are the actors? The time dimension (*when?*) is simple to understand. Single momentous events are clearly recorded in calendar time by sources like newspapers and government agencies. The place dimension (*where?*) is also clear: the geographic parameters of places (that is, their latitude and longitude coordinates) do not change. The underlying parameters of time and space of any event are often forgotten when engaging in more complex discussions (*why?*, *so what?*). And relying on timelines of events and placing them in visual geographic maps would greatly help us clarify the interdisciplinary discussions and diminish the risk of engaging in ideological debates. Let me first briefly introduce the actors in the hypothetical EAC's foreign policy convergence before going into the geographical issue in more detail.

Actors

Some actors in East Asian foreign policy making are clearer to identify while others are easier to analyse. In the end (or the beginning) of our research we always find a few key people driving foreign policy. Presidents, Prime Ministers, and other government premiers have somehow acquired the legal authority to conduct their countries' foreign policy. Yet, it is not always easy to analyse the top leadership in many countries, and in East Asia the problem is compounded as they often change, are elusive, or their actions are little accounted for. Thus, one may try to study the groups of people in which powerful foreign policy leaders are visibly imbedded in, like the Ministries of Foreign Affairs under their jurisdiction. Foreign ministries in Southeast Asia are nowadays part of a regional intergovernmental organisation with ancillary executive functions. The ASEAN secretariat coordinates with the ASEAN country holding the alphabetically rotating presidency of the ASEAN member countries' foreign policies towards other world countries and regions. An ASEAN+3 secretariat, if achieved, would probably perform a similar function. Meanwhile, the ASEAN rotating chair coordinates with Northeast Asian countries bi-laterally and bi-regionally to prepare for ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, and EAC summits with other countries and regions.

But in a complex interrelated world where governmental leaders do not have the monopoly of international relations, one can also identify other actors that more or less directly affect foreign policy formation. The military and the media are usually too close to government executives

to consider them autonomous actors in foreign policy formation. Businesses alone or in associations (an ASEAN Business Forum was created in the last ASEAN Summit) tend to have some influence, but are usually too preoccupied with sectoral issues to have a broad influence. Meanwhile, social Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) are usually few and still not well coordinated regionally, although an ASEAN People's Assembly is rising to help a broader civil society to present more coherent inputs.

Yet, there are other regional actors I called Epistemic Policy Actors (EPAs) that have much influence in the regional construction of the EAC.³ I broadly defined EPAs as elite think-tanks, non-governmental institutions and networks that bring together a broad range of public and private interests to create foreign policy that directly influence the highest level. Key among them is the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), which was formed in December 1998 under the initiative of the South Korean government under President Kim Dae-Jung to become so far the closest to a preliminary constitutional effort to consolidate the ASEAN+3. A total 26 intellectuals (two by country) gathered several times before submitting in 2001 a landmark prospective report full of recommendations⁴. Then, again under Korean leadership, ASEAN+3 leaders agreed in November 2000 to convene an East Asia Study Group (EASG) of governmental officials to assess the EAVG recommendations on the implications of an East Asian Summit. The EASG, established in March 2001, submitted their own report in Cambodia in November 2002 arguing that an East

Asia Summit was both inevitable and necessary, and presented 26 recommendations generally ratifying the input of the EAVG⁵: 17 were short-term measures ready for implementation, often focusing in helping businesses, and nine medium to long-term measures, often addressing more social concerns that required further study. ASEAN+3 leaders meeting in Cambodia in November 2002 warmly endorsed the outcome of the EASG.

Overall, the EAVG and EASG reports suggest that the ASEAN+3 process has broadened its intellectual inputs from EPAs and businesses but it remains largely a top-down design. The masses, as seen from the very limited references to civil society, are still largely left out from the elite intergovernmental process, although the elites hope to eventually be able to reach to them and incorporate them into the process. One of the 17 concrete short-term measures advanced by the EAVG and taken up by the EASG was to establish an East Asian Forum (EAF). More precisely, the proposal was to "[e]stablish an EAF consisting of the region's governmental and non-governmental representatives from various sectors, with the aim of serving as an institutional mechanism for broad-based social exchanges and, ultimately, regional cooperation." The EAF would consist "of representatives from government, business, and academics", and "is modelled as a 'Track II' process that encourages dialogue and interaction, networking, and generation of practical proposals to strengthen regional cooperation." A first EAF is scheduled for mid-December 2003 in Seoul⁶, and if the above

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recommendation by the EAVG serves as its base, it will not be a radical change towards non-elite, more democratic regional construction in ASEAN+3, but perhaps will set up a precedent to begin a longer term process of consultation and accommodation of more actors.

Issues

The main observable issues that academics should ask relate to what the actors themselves claim to be doing. In East Asia, the foreign ministries and the regional gatherings claim to be dealing broadly with issues like economic (trade, investment) cooperation, security, political dialogue and social advancement. So let's start with those questions. Having these relatively basic indicators clear would allow academic researchers (and journalists) to ask the complex reasons that motivated the actions of the actors (*why?*) and, even more, start thinking systematically about the consequences and the possible reactions to address them in a broader context (*so what?*). For instance, Carlsnaes presents a summary of complex theoretical approaches in foreign policy debates basically in a North-Transatlantic academic context⁷ that remain useful as long as they logically build on basic indicators of reality. Otherwise, the (in)disciplines of Western social sciences suffer convulsions and a number of alternative paradigms compete to better analyse visible reality.

We might well be in such a time that the concept of multi-level governance seems to be a new paradigm in the study of international relations and foreign policy. There are already arguments

claiming that it is more useful than realism and neoliberalism approaches based on states as the key units of analyses. For although states are the main actors in the global system, they are not the only ones. Sub-state units are not nested within states, but they have some independence. This means that actors at various governance levels can interrelate in complex ways within and across levels. This has been argued in explaining the construction of the European Union,⁸ as well as its foreign policy formation.⁹ and it is now being argued at the broader world system level.¹⁰ Rüländ distinguished five vertical levels of international policy-making: global, inter- and trans-regional, regional, trans-border institutions at a sub-regional level, and bilateral state-to-state.¹¹ Yet, for our purposes it is enough to concentrate in states, world regions, and international governance actors. Particularly salient is the role of world regions, as nowadays they can be defined more broadly than trade, as political summits try to steer the increasing interrelations of actors in a greater variety of issues.¹² Moreover, world inter-regionalism is helping in the process.

The Interregional Construction of the EAC

In my previous research I argued that trans- and inter-regionalism were key in constructing an EAC. Malaysia formally requested in 1990 to create an East Asia Economic Group outside the newly created Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC),¹³ but it was turned down by the US and some other countries fearing US reaction, so the whole idea was scaled

down to an East Asian Economic Caucus within APEC that formally never went very far. But closer independent collaboration between North- and South-east Asia started to come about with the help of the European Union (EU) mainly through the inter-regional Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process that began in 1996 (more below). Thus, when the financial crisis sparked by Soros' decision to pull out Quantum Funds investments from industrial Asia hit many countries in 1997, leaders of ASEAN+3 countries started to meet on the sides of more regular ASEAN summits. Given the relative success of ASEM, the government of Singapore proposed in September 1998 to the government of Chile a multi-issue interregional process with Latin American countries that, in 1999 in Singapore, led to the first official (not ministerial) meeting of the Forum for East Asia - Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) or, in Spanish, the *Foro (de Cooperación) América Latina y Asia-Pacífico* (www.FOCALAE.net). It included EAC countries, Australia, New Zealand and the Latin American countries part of the Rio Group.

The loose bi-regional model was also tried with other parts of the world where regionalism is much less consolidated, thus

implicitly giving more weight to the East Asian side. In June 2002 the Thai government launched the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (www.ACDdialogue.com) that brought together ministers from 17 countries in East, Southeast, South Asia, and even some Arab states members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to discuss the diffusion of tensions and possibilities of economic and cultural cooperation. Meanwhile, Japan increased its efforts to promote "Asian modes of development and governance" in Africa. The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (www.TICAD.net) process, started in 1993 by the Japanese government, brings in the collaboration of several actors, including the United Nations Development Fund, the Global Coalition for Africa, the World Bank, and the UN/DE SA/OSCAL Office of the Coordinator for Africa and the Least Developed Countries. TICAD-I led to the First Asia Africa Forum organised in 1994, which subsequently led to the Bandung Framework for Asia Africa Cooperation. TICAD II was held in 1998 and TICAD-III in September-October 2003, where the Asian mode of development was more assertively advertised.

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East Asia's Main Interregional Processes

Name and Acronym	Year established	Countries involved	Issues tackled
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)	1989	North America, much of Latin America, Oceania, Russia	Trade liberalisation Economic cooperation Venturing in security aspects
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)	1996	ASEAN-7, North East Asia, EU	Politics Economics Culture/Social/Intellectual
Forum for East Asia Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC/FOCALAE)	1999-2001	East Asia, Oceania, Latin America	Politics Economics Culture/Social/Intellectual
Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)	2002	SAARC, GCC, reaching to Central Asia	Mainly economic development, Some social/intellectual input
Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)	1993	Japan, East Asia, African Union (NEPAD's scheme)	Export of Japan/Asia's Economic governance (mode of development)

Moreover, there are other alliances worth watching for the potential of having EAC on board. For instance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a multi-issue process that involves China, Russia and some Central Asia Republics, originated in 1996 but really took off in 2001. In 2003 they even agreed on setting up a Secretariat in Beijing as of early 2004. As Japan and other countries in the EAC have been improving their relations with Russia, they may want to be more involved in the SCO.

The majority of these dialogue and cooperation processes are with the European Union. Thus, if they have helped establish an EAC identity then EAC

countries are possibly developing a more convergent and assertive foreign policy towards Europe.

EAC's Convergent Foreign Policy towards Europe

There is a recent history of improved bilateral relations during the 1990s between EAC countries and Europe. Soon after the US started to actively engage itself in Asia through APEC, East Asia and the EU started fostering mutually closer bilateral and interregional relations in a broader range of issues.¹⁴ The tune was already set by improving Japan-EU relations, which led in 1991 to *Den Hague* Declaration full

of good intentions in many fields, some of which became substantiated during the 1990s in bilateral and multilateral venues.¹⁵ Meanwhile, China-EU relations entered into a temporary decline in 1989, and ASEAN-EU relations concentrated on some economic cooperation and development issues. Yet, the European Commission pushed for a broad-based process of increasing dialogue and cooperation towards Asia with its "New Asia Strategy" of 1994.¹⁶

The goal was to accord a higher priority to relations in economic, political and social terms as a key to its perceived world economic role and to complement and enhance the existing variety of Europe-Asia relations.¹⁷ The economic rationale for the Strategy was the fact that the EU was not allowed to participate even as an observer in the APEC process, more relevant once it became clear in 1993 that the US was going to be more active in it to accelerate the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, partially stalled by the French-led EU's position not to liberalise the agricultural sector. Yet, the whole process paved the way in the EU for the ASEM, a unique inter-regional dialogue and cooperation process first discussed in the 1994 World Economic Forum's East Asia Economic Summit between the premiers of France and Singapore, and formally proposed in 1995 by the Singaporean Premier Goh Chok Tong during his visit to France, where he found warm support for the idea.¹⁸

The ASEM process has been very instrumental in the creation of an ASEAN+3 identity. Simply, the ASEAN+3

is basically the Asian side of the ASEM process.¹⁹

Let us now analyse the key actors and issues in which the EAC countries have been engaged. Then I will start exploring in more detail how the particular EAC countries' foreign policies seem to be converging towards Europe.

Actors and Issues in the ASEM process

It has been in the various ASEM preparatory meetings that key ASEAN+3 government representatives first got used to multi-level meetings on their own.²⁰ There are meetings at the levels of country, sub-regions (Southeast on the one hand and Northeast Asia on the other), and region (Southeast and Northeast Asia together) before meeting with European counterparts. As much of the foreign policy of the EU is still intergovernmental, and will be so in East Asia for the foreseeable future, ASEM was designed as an intergovernmental, flexible dialogue and action on broad political, economic and social issues involving the 15 member states of the EU (coordinated by the European Commission) on one side, and ten Asian countries (coordinated by two rotating countries, one from Southeast Asia, the other from Northeast Asia) on the other. Heads of state meet biennially since its first summit (ASEM-1) in Bangkok in March 1996, and an increasing number of ministers and senior officials meet in between, usually annually, to substantiate the broad range of economic, political and cultural proposals agreed in the summits, and to elaborate on new ideas to be

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presented for future gatherings.

ASEM-2 in London, in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, concentrated on addressing economic and financial problems, but kept addressing issues in all pillars. ASEM-3 in Seoul was again broad-based, and even started to pay attention to security issues, especially in the Korean peninsula. And, in the wake of the US's reaction to September 11, the ASEM-4 in Copenhagen enhanced leaders' attention to a broader range of security issues,

especially the delicate situation in the Korean peninsula. And the ASEM-5 expected for October 2004 in Hanoi will address the issue of enlargement. The EU accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe would most likely be allowed to join ASEM. Similarly, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma/Myanmar (if the domestic situation improves), might also join. If that is the case, and no other country joined, then the ASEM-Asia side would be the same as the EAC.

The following table summarises the key issues discussed in the four ASEM summits so far.

ASEM	Year	Place	Highlights
1	1996	Bangkok	Setting of three pillars: political, economic, social/cultural/intellectual
2	1998	London	Trust Fund to help address financial crises
3	2000	Seoul	Raise of political collaboration (Korean peninsula)
4	2002	Copenhagen	General advancement and stocktaking
5	2004	Hanoi	Enlargement; bi-regional and interregional rationalising

Moreover, a growing number of EPAs have been accommodated in the advancement of policy ideas to keep the whole process going forward in all pillars.²¹ An Asia-Europe Vision Group has given an overarching vision to the process. An Asia-Europe Business Forum feeds into the economic pillar, and the more substantial Asia-Europe Foundation does likewise into the social, cultural and intellectual pillars.

We can now move to the level of individual countries to study foreign policies towards Europe to see if the ASEM process seems to be promoting a slight

convergence of East Asian countries.²² Among the simplest indicators one can find of such a phenomenon include the existence of high-level meetings and the creation of comprehensive strategies that tend to rely on the regional and inter-regional mechanisms available. Let's start with Southeast Asia before proceeding with Northeast Asia.

ASEAN's Foreign Policy towards Europe

After six years of informal contacts, formal ASEAN-EU relations date back to

1978, when foreign ministers started to meet biennially.²³ Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s they were based on the idea that the EU should provide cooperation aid to the ASEAN side. In 1995, while the ASEM process was being prepared, it was agreed that EU-ASEAN senior officials would meet in between ministerial meetings. But in 1997 the process became stalled due to the poor human rights record of Burma/Myanmar, then accepted as a new ASEAN member.

Yet, after some diplomatic manoeuvres, ministerial meetings were resumed in 2000 (the 13th meeting) with the idea of “block-to-block” formation composed of equal countries dealing with a broader range of issues, just like in ASEM. The 14th Ministerial meeting that took place in January 2003 presented a declaration for “[a] progressive EU-ASEAN dialogue” that “agreed on the need to further deepen the EU-ASEAN dialogue as a fundamental building block for the strategic partnership between Europe and Asia. To this end, Ministers stressed their determination to further enhance their co-operation at bilateral, sub-regional, regional and multilateral levels”.

A driving force in ASEAN is Singapore, whose foreign policy towards Europe is embedded in a multi-level strategy to turn the island into a vibrant political hub. Yet, I hope the foreign policies of individual countries will be further researched upon soon.

Japan

Japan has been gradually strengthening its regional foreign policy in favour of leading an ASEAN+3 grouping, but at the

same time being careful not to antagonise the US or its allies in the region.²⁴ “All the major initiatives for the institutionalization of Asia-Pacific cooperation from the mid-1960s onwards came mainly from Japanese academics, who acted in close association with the Japanese government, and in collaboration with counterparts in Australia”.²⁵ Japan argued in favour for an informal East Asia Economic Caucus within APEC, not outside it, as Malaysia had originally envisioned. But more recently, Japan has teamed with Singapore to explore a bilateral Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership that helped pave the way for Japan’s first ever bilateral free trade agreement (signed with ASEAN in November 2002) and is nowadays actively debating promoting an East Asia Free Trade Agreement (FTA).²⁶ What is more, Japan always wanted to promote a regional security concept broader than trade. It was instrumental in formalising the proposal for an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that originally came from the ASEAN-ISIS (Institute of Strategic and International Crisis) and, as a test for putting ideas into practice, became engaged in the peaceful transition in Cambodia. After the 1997 financial crisis created economic and political havoc through the region, Japan proposed an Asian Monetary Fund outside the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although largely unsuccessful at the time, Japan pledged a large amount of financial aid to the more affected countries in the region and brokered a regional financial insurance scheme, the Chiang Mai Initiative, in principle with similar conditionality criteria to those of the IMF. More recent activity includes the promotion of an Asian bond market, which

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should facilitate international financial investment less risky than that based on equity and derivatives.

Japan's ministerial bureaucracy had traditionally lead the process of foreign policy formation to facilitate their subsequent implementation,²⁷ although the basic reform of central government ministries and agencies that took off in 2001 slightly increased the power of the Prime Minister's Cabinet, whose research section has started to promote more efficient policy-oriented consultative research groups bringing officials and external experts together.²⁸

Although Japan does not seem to have yet a grand strategy towards Europe, the "Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy", written by the Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister and published on 28 November 2002, include two complementary goals that strongly suggests a convergence of foreign policies with other East Asian countries as it regards Europe²⁹:

1. "The highest priority for the Japanese economy is East Asia..."³⁰
2. "The EU is moving steadily towards becoming one of the world's largest quasi-states. The development of the EU should be regarded highly in the context of world history for the implications it has for the balance in the international community. In the new world order, Japanese foreign policy will require strong partners case by case. In the EU that can reasonably be expected to be a partner in several of these cases. Japan should study how best to cooperate with the EU and its strategy for the EU over the long term".

Japan's relations with Europe have particularly improved early in the new century as "A New Decade of Japan-Europe Cooperation" officially opens on 8 December 2001 based on a Joint Action Plan with four main areas.³¹ And the 12th Japan-EU Summit in Athens on 1-2 May 2003 emphasised that the Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation should continue to be implemented actively. Regarding ASEM Interregional dimension:

"Both sides share the aspiration of bringing the two regions together through the ASEM dialogue process, and reaffirm their willingness to deepen their partnership in political, economic, cultural and other aspects. This should result in a more active inter-regional involvement over the coming years, conducive to a successful international system."

P.R. China's Foreign Policy towards Europe

Nowadays, the prospects of EAC's countries having a convergent foreign policy depend less on Japan's global projection, and more on China's ongoing domestic development and accommodation to the regional and global system. China's overall foreign policy towards its neighbours has discreetly moved from an antagonistic handling of recurrent and dialectical low-intensity conflicts to an increasing accommodation and even collaboration with most of them.³² China particularly engaged in the region through the 1990s after showing signs of repentance from the 1989 Tian An Men student crackdown. It began more regular and

seemingly friendly bilateral high-level meetings with Japan, sanctioned by a first-ever visit by the emperor in 1992. Relations with South Korea also grew in intensity after the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations that same year. Meanwhile, China's broadening range of cooperation projects with Southeast Asian countries reflected its becoming a full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 1996, the joining of the ASEAN+3 summits that started in 1997 and, more recently, the signing of path-breaking economic and security declarations with ASEAN in November 2002.

Despite some recent changes, much formal power still resides with members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (or the Politburo Standing Committee, PBSC) and a few other top-level managers of the Communist Party's institutions. In November 2002, the 16th Communist Party Congress Central Committee approved the 4th generation of leaders focused on controlled development and openness³³. The PBSC was enlarged from seven to nine members roughly divided into two factions, one led by the new Premier Hu Jintao, a diligent protégé of the late Deng Xiaoping, and the other led by Zheng Qinghong, an energetic protégé of Jiang Zemin, the previous Premier and still a powerful figure in the background in command of the armed forces.

There is a clear indication that the ASEM process has helped China's Communist Party to reformulate a foreign policy towards Europe.³⁴ It was actually on the margins of the ASEM-2 Summit in London in April 1998 that China and the EU held their first ever Summit. The 4th

Summit in 2001 agreed on creating a full partnership that would advance consultation and cooperation in political, economic, trade, scientific, cultural and educational fields. The 5th Summit took place in September 2002 on the margins of the ASEM-4 Summit. And to better prepare for the 6th Summit that took place on 30 October 2003 in Beijing, the PRC presented on 13 October 2003 its first ever EU Policy Paper with which China expects to strengthen its cooperation with the EU in all fields.³⁵ Point 6 of the Political Aspect is to strengthen international cooperation, and includes a desire to:

"[a]dvance the process of Asia-Europe cooperation. China and the EU should work together to make ASEM a role model for inter-continental cooperation on the basis of equality, a channel for exchange between the oriental and occidental civilizations and a driving force behind the establishment of a new international political and economic order."

South Korea's Foreign Policy Towards Europe

(South) Korea, who feels itself constantly pressured by two giants and a divided peninsula, has also upgraded its international relations and foreign policy towards Europe.

Korea and the EU held their first ministerial meeting in 1983, which concentrated on trade issues. Since the mid-1990s both sides also have had separate annual ministerial meetings on political issues, traditionally taking place on the margins of the ARF. ASEM-3 took place in Seoul in the year 2000, an event that

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marked a qualitative change in relations towards Europe. In April 2001, the Framework Agreement on Trade and Cooperation entered into force. It had attached a Political Declaration foreseeing Presidential Summit meetings, annual Ministerial meetings and expert meetings to enhance the political dialogue.³⁶

Among Korea's key diplomatic tasks for 2003 was the promotion of cooperation with the international community that includes the plan to "actively participate in fora for regional cooperation such as APEC, ASEAN+3 and ASEM..."³⁷

Preliminary Conclusions and Future Work

This paper has argued that ASEAN+3 or East Asian Community groups of countries have started a path of convergence towards a common foreign policy. The paper started with an overview of the institutional creation of EAC. It

then presented some basic ideas of foreign policy analysis, including a roadmap of question asking from basic to more complex. Afterwards, it presented the interregional processes in which EAC are involved, mainly with North America, Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

The paper then focused on EAC relations with Europe, the most advanced form of interregional, intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation. Formally equal partners engage in a broad range of political, economic, cultural, social, intellectual issues, and have given leeway to non-governmental actors. A first analysis of each country's relations and foreign policy towards Europe shows a general tendency to maintain the momentum towards greater rapprochement within a bi-regional structure. That is specially so for the case of ASEAN and China, and somewhat less explicit in the cases of Japan and South Korea. The following table summarises the findings:

Preliminary Summary Table of EAC's countries towards Europe

COUNTRIES	Overall strategy	Political Summits	Economic	Social...
ASEAN	Since 2003 explicit	Only Ministerials	Yes	Yes
Japan	2002 gave strong hints	Since 1991	Yes	Yes
China	Oct 2003 policy paper	Since 1998	Yes	Yes
South Korea	2003 gave some hints	Within ASEM	Yes	Yes
Overall convergence?	To be seen in the future EAC and ASEM events.			

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As this is the first time, as far as I know, that the convergence of East Asian foreign policies issue has been approached by academics, much more research is warranted. Individual countries' foreign policies should be more thoroughly researched to add greater weight to the hypothesis of convergence of EAC countries' foreign policies not only towards Europe, but also to other world regions (Latin America, South Asia, Africa, etc), and other key countries (the litmus test would be the US and its more or less ad-hoc alliances).³⁸ There are indeed even more research possibilities, as foreign policies towards international organisations

(UN System, Bretton Woods organisations, etc) have yet to be studied. And finally, the above suggested geographically-based research should be complemented with a thorough analysis of single issues.

All the above discussion does not mean at all that the EAC should be considered a homogenous international actor that has the willingness or capacity to change the world system or anything of that sort. Yet, for a number of relatively lower level complex questions one may find increasingly useful to note that the EAC countries are increasingly working together and presenting common position for some aspects of global politics.

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Endnotes

1. The ASEAN Secretariat has created a small webpage on the issue (www.aseansec.org/4918.htm) that complements information elsewhere in their website. More information is available from various countries' websites, including Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/asean/conference/asean3/index.html). For an overview from the Special Assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN, see Chalermphanupap, Termsak (2002) "Towards an East Asia Community: The Journey Has Begun", *Presentation at the Fifth China-ASEAN Research Institutes Roundtable on Regionalism and Community Building in East Asia*, University of Hong Kong's Centre of Asian Studies, 17-19 October 2002, www.hku.hk/cas/cap/programmes/card5/Papers/Termsak/termsak_chalermphanupaps_paper.htm.

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2. ASEAN and China ratified the non-binding "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea", and a framework accord on economic cooperation toward the conclusion of an FTA within 10 years (similar to other agreements that ASEAN signed with Japan and South Korea). Moreover, China also presented ASEAN countries in the Mekong River area with a general development plan, including capital assistance, for the river basin. For reference, see all the preferential trading arrangements in and around the region in Avila, John Lawrence (2003) "EU enlargement and the rise of Asian FTAs: Implications for Asia-Europe relations", *Asia-Europe Journal*, Vol 1, No. 2: 213-222 (p. 218).
3. See *ibid.*
4. East Asia Vision Group (2001) *Towards an East Asian Community; Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress*. Report submitted on 31 October 2001 to ASEAN Plus Three Leaders, available in full at www.aseansec.org/4918.htm.
5. East Asia Study Group (2002) *Towards an East Asian Community*. Report submitted on 2002 to ASEAN Plus Three Leaders meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 4 November 2002, available in full at www.aseansec.org/4918.htm.
6. See www.EastAsiaForum.org.
7. Carlsnaes, Walter (2002) "Foreign Policy", in Carlsnaes et al, eds., *Handbook of International Relations*. Sage publications.
8. Hooghe and Marks use three levels: European institutions, states, sub-state regions. See Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2001) *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*. Rowman and Littlefield.
9. Krahmman used three levels (core states, European institutions and international organisations) and tested the theory in three cases. See Elke Krahmman (2003) *Multilevel networks in European foreign policy*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
10. In my previous work I presented a multi-level framework for high-technology governance in which I argued that the interplay of public governments and multinational actors at various levels differentiated by high-technology sectors render different patterns of technological change. See *Technology investment expectations and multi-level protection patterns; standardization of info-communications sectors in the Triad*, doctoral monograph, European University Institute, Florence, 2002. Moreover, my current research institution (www.cris.unu.edu) is dealing with those issues more systematically. It is based on the Bruges Initiative to Open the Social Sciences (BRIOSS) hoping to traverse academic disciplines to better help pressing global problems. See "Reshaping Integration Studies in Social Sciences", in Collegium; News of the College of Europe, N. 20, IV-VI.2000, www.coleurop.be/publications.htm.
11. Rüländ, Jürgen (2002) "Inter- and Transregionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research Agenda". *National Europe Centre Paper No. 34; Paper prepared for the Workshop "Asia-Pacific Studies in Australia and Europe: A Research Agenda for the Future"*, Australian National University, July 5-6, 2002. www.iias.nl/asem/publications/Rueland_InterAndTransregionalism.pdf.
12. The work of my institution in Bruges is particularly concerned with this raising phenomenon in world politics. See more in www.cris.unu.edu.

13. After many years of discussions and low-key gatherings, APEC was first formally proposed and hosted by Australia in 1989, but under the intellectual encouragement of the Japanese government, as elaborated below. In APEC an increasing number of economic partners from the Asia and the Pacific discuss on a number of economic development issues, served by a secretariat in Singapore (www.apecsec.org.sg). For a comprehensive analysis, see Ravenhill, John (2001) *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism*. Cambridge University Press.
14. See Maull, Hanns et al., eds., (1998) *Europe and the Asia Pacific*. London and New York: Routledge.
15. See Gilson, Julie (2000) *Japan and the European Union; a Partnership for the Twenty-First Century?* MacMillan Press.
16. Communication from the Commission to the Council COM(94)314 final "Towards a New Asia Strategy" 1994. Brussels, 13.07.1994.
17. It was updated in 2001 with a new Communication expecting to strengthen the EU's presence in Asia by focusing on six dimensions: political and security; trade and investment; poverty reduction; promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law; building partnerships and alliances on global issues; and promotion of mutual awareness and knowledge. See COM(01)469 final "Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships" 2001. Brussels, 4.9.2001. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/w36/3.htm.
18. For a rich source of materials, see the online ASEM Research Platform of the Leiden University's International Institute of Asian Studies, www.ias.nl/asem. For particularly comprehensive examinations, see Lay-Hwee, Yeo (2003), *The Development and Different Dimensions of ASEM*. Routledge.
19. The seven members of ASEAN at the time, plus China, Korea and Japan; or basically, ASEAN+3 minus Burma/Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, the least relevant (or most problematic) countries (as in the case of Burma/Myanmar is, which its human rights record has for long precluded the EU to agree on holding meetings with a full ASEAN at the highest possible level).
20. There is no bibliography describing these intra-Asian dynamics yet, although the point is reiterated in the writings of the Commission's official in charge of following the ASEM process during the past few years: see Reiterer, Michael (2002) *Asia-Europe; Do They Meet?; Reflections on the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)*. Singapore: Asia-Europe Foundation.
21. That is visually seen in the following table prepared by the European Commission (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/asem_process/structure.pdf).
22. In May 2004, Hanoi, in collaboration with the Asia-Europe Foundation and the National Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities, I will be convening a conference titled "ASEM Achievements and Prospects: Understanding Foreign Policy Dynamics between Asia & Europe" to analyse the case studies of the ASEM countries' foreign policies towards the other regions.
23. Information available through the ASEAN Secretariat's website, www.aseansec.org/4970.htm.

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24. For an overall overview until very recent times, see Stockwin, J. A. A. (2003) *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Japan*. London and New York: Routledge Curzon. For an overview of one of the most senior Japanese intellectuals in the issue, see Inoguchi, Takashi, ed., (2002) *Japan's Asian Policy; Revival and Response*. New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. For a broader synthetic textbook, see Glenn Hook et al. (2001), *Japan's International Relations; Politics, Economics and Security*. Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/ Routledge Series.
25. Japanese economist Kiyoshi Kojima proposed in 1965 to create a Pacific [Advanced Countries] Free Trade Area (PAFTA), which proved unsuccessful but led to a long series (first meeting in 1968) of Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conferences of self-selected economists from academia and government promoting economic liberalisation. Meanwhile, Japan proposed to enlarge the Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Conference, and hosted in 1967 the first conference of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (www.PBEC.org), an association of prominent business representatives from the same five industrialised economies originally envisioned by Kojima, and serviced by a small secretariat in Honolulu. The lack of governmental interest in PAFTA led Kojima to reformulate the proposal into the more functional (less institutionalised) Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OFTAD), aided by the writings of Peter Drysdale and John Crawford, two Australian students of Kojima. OPFTAD was also unsuccessful but it generated momentum to create in 1980 another Australian-Japanese initiative, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (www.PECC.net), a still active tripartite gathering of prominent government representatives, academics and business people. Ravenhill, *ibid*, p. 50 and subsequent.
26. For an inside story of the beginnings in the transformation of Japan's position, aided by the intellectual contributions from non-government officials, see Munakata, Naoko (2001) "Evolution of Japan's Policy Toward Economic Integration", *Working paper of the Brookings Institution*, December, www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/2001_munakata.htm.
27. Tanaka, a member of the EAVG, describes the relevant actors in Japan that manage the alliance with the US (and, by extension, much of its foreign policy), their policy preferences and resources. The Prime Minister is chosen by the leaders of the dominant factions in the ruling LDP party who also oversee the creation of his Cabinet. The Prime Minister's Cabinet, collectively answerable to the Diet, signs what has been agreed by their vice ministers, who in turn sign what has already been worked out in the relevant ministries. See Tanaka, Akihiko (2000) "The Domestic Context of the Alliances: The Politics of Tokyo", *Working Paper of the Asia/Pacific Research Center*. Stanford University. January, <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/11376/Tanaka.pdf>.
28. Its best example so far has been "The task force for Japan's foreign policy", which was composed mainly of Japan, US and Asian experts and, more recently, some knowledgeable about Europe. This is a way for the Prime Minister's cabinet to try

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- to decrease the great influence of the ad-hoc consultative committees through which government ministries create and implement policy.
29. The Executive Summary (unofficial translation) is available in the Prime Minister's portal at www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2002/1128tf_e.html.
 30. MOFA's website on its relations with Asia provides links to many regional initiatives: www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/.
 31. Japan's overview of its relations with Europe is available in www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/.
 32. For an overview of the dialectical transformations in China's aspirations for the region from Mao's time until soon after the Tian An Men crisis, see Hinton, Harold (1994) "China as an Asian Power", in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds. *Chinese Foreign Policy; Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Clarendon. Kim, Samuel (1998) *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millenium*. Westview Press. For more recent developments, Pollack, Jonathan and Richard Yang, eds., (2000) *In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development*. RAND. See also official websites that give basic information, including the news agency Xinhua, www.xinhuanet.com/english and www.xinhua.org in Chinese.
 33. For what is supposed to be the most reliable 'insider' description of the selection process and expected characters of the new generation of PBSC members and assistants, see Nathan, Andrew and Bruce Gilley, eds. (2003) *China's New Rulers; the secret files*. London: Granta. For overviews of the expected results, see Brodsgarrd, Kjeld Erik (2002) "The 16th Party Congress in China: A Note on Personnel Changes", *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 16, pp. 138-149. Fewsmith, Joseph (2003) "The Sixteenth National Party Congress: The Succession that Didn't Happen", *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 173, March, pp. 1-16. For basic official information, see the website www.16congress.org.cn of the China Internet Information Center.
 34. See, inter alia, the website of the EU's delegation in China at www.delchn.ccc.eu.int/en/whatsnew/summit.htm.
 35. It wants to engage in all kinds of political issues, and it expects to do likewise in economic issues to the point that Europe becomes the largest trading partner of China. It also hopes to advance in education, S&T, Culture, Health and other aspects. Afterwards, the paper raises social, judicial and administrative matters. And it ends with expectations of collaboration in military matters. See the document available through the website of the PRC's Foreign Ministry Directorate General for Western Europe, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq/3265/.
 36. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/south_korea/intro/polit_rel.htm.
 37. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website, www.mofat.go.kr/en/for/e_for_aim.mof.
 38. See how East Asian' countries form the core of an increasing number of regional and inter-regional processes in this table prepared by the European Commission (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/asem_process/regional_chart.pdf).

Re-Negotiating the “Contrat Social”: Institution-Building, Reforms, Democracy, Development and Stability in Southeast Asia

Eric Teo Chu Cheow

The Asian crisis of 1997-98 has had many important political, economic, financial and social consequences on Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Its effects are still being felt today. The six original members of ASEAN suddenly faced a ‘total’ crisis of financial, economic, and then social and political proportions. The economic and social fabrics of their societies were torn as bad loans, shaky financial systems, corporate bankruptcies, rising unemployment and plunging currencies suddenly engulfed them. Indonesia and Thailand were ‘forced’ into new political upheavals and reforms. Similarly, crucial political and social reforms are affecting the Philippines and Malaysia. Even traditionally stable Singapore and Brunei face social reforms and a rethink of their futures. The crisis also aggravated ethnic and religious tensions and the uneven distribution of wealth within countries and within ethnic-cum-religious communities, like Indonesia and the Philippines, and to a lesser extent, Malaysia and Thailand.

Meanwhile, the transition economies of the newer members of ASEAN (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam,

or CLMV) were less exposed to the Asian crisis as the original members. Still “transitioning” to free markets and open societies, they were not yet open to capital flows and international finance in 1997. Nevertheless, they also suffered, as the expected benefits of ASEAN membership were undercut by the existing members’ preoccupation with economic hardship and political chaos. Furthermore, these less-developed members were in the grips of their own painful economic and social transformation; a process that is far from complete today. Reforms are still ongoing and it remains to be seen whether these countries will eventually succeed in adjusting to the new globalised world.

The Asian Crisis: A “Total Crisis”, with Important Social and Political Implications

The Asian crisis was indeed a “total crisis” for the affected countries. Beginning as a financial crisis, it soon became an economic one. It then evolved into a social crisis, which spilled over into the political realm as well.

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The crisis began when currency exchange regimes came under speculative attack, beginning with the Thai baht in June 1997. On 2 July 1997, Thailand was forced to float the baht after its defense depleted the country's foreign reserves. As a result, massive speculative attacks were also launched against other regional currencies that were pegged to the dollar, such as the Malaysian ringgit and the Philippine peso. By mid-August 1997, Indonesia was forced to float its rupiah to save its dwindling foreign reserves. As a result, all the attacked Asian currencies plunged; from December 1996 to December 1997, the baht fell (in comparison to the US dollar) from 25.6 to 48.2, the ringgit from 2.53 to 3.89, the peso from 26.3 to 39.9, the Singapore dollar from 1.40 to 1.69 and the Indonesian rupiah from 2,363 to 5,495. However, departing from orthodoxy, Malaysia in 1998 imposed capital controls and pegged the ringgit to the US dollar at RM 3.8, so as to prevent the further erosion of Malaysia's financial assets.

The Asian Crisis then became a full-blown economic crisis in all the affected countries. With the withdrawal or flight of capital from the affected countries, industries (and not only the big conglomerates, but also small and medium-sized enterprises [SMEs]) and the wider economy began to ground to a halt, as interest rates had doubled or tripled over a few weeks, and corporate and consumer confidence plunged. The Asian governments most affected then appealed for monetary aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), related agencies and other governments. Thailand was pledged US\$17.5 billion, South Korea

US\$55 billion and Indonesia US\$43 billion in bail-outs. In return the IMF forced the affected governments to impose austerity measures, reduce government deficits and seek to increase efficiency in the economy (in both the real and financial sectors), while loosening liquidity with the arrival of bail-out packages. These measures were accompanied by efforts to restore health to the financial sector, via adjustments in fiscal, monetary and exchange rates policies, as well as structural reforms in the real sector, such as tariff reductions, domestic deregulation, the elimination of subsidies and some fiscal policies. The forced closure of ailing banks created a panicked withdrawal of savings from even healthy banks. Economies then went into a tail-spin, as industries and factories ground to a halt and hard-hit consumers tightened their belts. On the other hand, Malaysia decided against IMF aid, whereas the Philippines was already under IMF assistance at the time the crisis began.

The Asian monetary crisis then became a social one also as it unleashed a reform process that caused unemployment to increase dramatically. Indeed, “democracy” and “reforms” became buzzwords in the affected countries by 1998. In fact, the nexus of the Asian political economy shifted from the previous duopoly of big government-big business to a new triangular nexus of government-private sector-civil society (note that the new tripolar nexus has “government” minus the “big”, and “private sector” replaces “big business”). Conservative Asian societies were changing fast, as civil society strengthened in Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea. In this way,

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the Asian crisis gave civil society a forceful push in the right direction, as democracy and reform took root in Asia. As unemployment and the lack of social safety nets threatened social harmony, civil society groups became increasingly assertive after years of centralised decisions by powerful governments. Civil society, comprising lobby groups (including labour unions, student groups and rights groups), Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), and environmental lobbies, then began taking governments to task openly on an array of issues. It appeared that there was a real need to redefine the ‘*contrat social a la Jean-Jacques Rousseau*’ between the governed and the governing in these societies. The social order had nevertheless begun to change.

Finally, it became a crisis of governance. Democratic aspirations grew as strong as the calls for drastic economic and social reform. Decentralisation gained favour as grassroots democracy took root. Governmental accountability came under the spotlight and governments are now checked not only by a mushrooming of political parties and the development of a bolder opposition, but also by the rising demands of civil society and people’s groups. Asian democracies became more complex political entities with multiple power centres. The crisis therefore contributed to a reform of the political foundations of the affected countries. The successive Indonesian governments of Presidents Suharto, B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid fell. Today, under Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia has yet to find true political stability. In Thailand, Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh fell from power after the collapse of the

baht and was replaced by the more sombre Chuan Leekpai. He was in turn replaced by Thaksin Shinawatra, who swept into power in January 2001 after campaigning against Chuan’s slow economic reforms. In these countries, incumbents were swept from power as a more genuine democracy was installed but political and economic stability remain elusive. For many countries, political and social institutions need to be built or re-built. Even relatively stable Malaysia went through a political whirlwind during the controversial Anwar Ibrahim saga in 1998, which resulted in a resurgence of the Islamic opposition party Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) at the 1999 general elections.

It is undeniable that the Asian Crisis had contributed greatly to the impetus for change and transition in Southeast Asia. These changes and transitions could generally, and in most cases should, be considered irreversible as the region develops.

Social and Political Changes in Southeast Asia: Basis for Re-Negotiating the *Contrat Social*

The Southeast Asian countries affected by the Asian crisis have notably seen dramatic changes in the social/civil society arena and politics, just as economically, they boosted the importance of domestic consumption (as versus exports) in their economies, shifted the emphasis back to a better balance between the public and private sectors, focused on social redistribution and safety nets, and emphasised the development of Small and

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Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in their macro-economic policies.

As the nexus of the Asian political economies shifted from a duopoly to a tripolar structure, governments in Asia have been forced to give the private sector (via SMEs) a greater role in setting the direction of the economy. This should also ensure the “decoupling” of big business from the authorities, and its accompanying cronyism, collusion and nepotism, as highlighted by the experience under President Suharto in Indonesia. Furthermore, with the rise of democracy and people’s participation in the economic strategies and direction of the country, labour has increased its bargaining power in the corporate world, thus becoming one of its most important stakeholders. A *Business Week* article had highlighted the fact that one of the major shifts in capitalism in the next ten to twenty years could be a shift from “market and managerial capitalism” to a more “managed capitalism”, where other stakeholders, other than the management, play a greater role. Asia will be no exception in this novel business trend.

In the social and civic arena, Asian governments are seeing important shifts in four areas, which should have implications on the re-negotiation of the *contrat social*.

First, the rise of civil society in Asia now appears irreversible. From Indonesia to the Philippines, Thailand to Malaysia, peoples’ movements have emerged to claim a voice and role in society. In some cases, as in Indonesia and Thailand, the Asian Crisis helped unleash the power of civil society groups, whereas in others, increasing wealth and economic development have

contributed to its rise as a powerful social force, as in Singapore or Malaysia. It has amounted to the people’s willingness to express themselves more after years of control and government-led economic expansion and growth. In many cases, Asian civil societies are still “tame” by Western standards; but those in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand can get boisterous and rowdy at times. Unlike many of their Western counterparts, most Asian civil society groups and NGOs are very issue- or interest-based (such as opposing specific infrastructure projects for environmental reasons or lobbying against human rights abuses or even trade union claims) and have not transformed themselves into formidable politico-social forces. However, labour movements have become formidable forces in Indonesia, just as NGOs are now more listened to in Philippines and Thailand.

Second, the rising civil society has also come to realise that it has a greater role to play in the new “tripolar nexus”, together with the authorities and the corporate sector. This civil society will in time wield a greater and more far-reaching role, not only as voters and consumers of social goods (for the authorities and the political establishment), but also as consumers and individual shareholders (in the corporate world and private sector). It is this “dual role” between the public authorities and corporate world that the emerging civil society and citizenry is learning to play in Asia; this is in turn forcing the government and private sector to “reconnect” themselves to the people. When well organised, civil society groups could thus wield enormous power and influence in the “tripolar nexus” of the Asian political

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economy, especially when domestic consumption is now clearly emphasised in Asia by both governments and the corporate world.

Third, as education rises and is emphasised more forcefully in the development of societies, the role of intellectuals will inexorably increase, as compared to the role of businessmen, in the future direction of the country. Asia has in the past granted substantial authority to business conglomerates and top businessmen, but it can now be envisaged that intellectuals, the *intelligentsia* and academia in general will rise in importance as Asia looks for ideas and creative thoughts to develop further. This trend may also gain impetus as the society questions the “quality” of economic development (especially the social and societal aspects) as well as the moral questions concerning “unbridled capitalism” that have been raised in the wake of the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandals in America. This could in turn help steer Asian governments towards a shift in mindset that would give more priority and accord more value to intellectual exchanges and debates. The intellectual space in Asia should therefore open up in the coming years, as Asian societies themselves open up.

Fourth, the Asian crisis brought about a period of introspection in the region. There is firstly a feeling of Asian vulnerability, and hence a debate on “returning to Asian roots” has begun. This has then sparked a regional debate on Asia’s future identity and culture, as a region and as a civilisation. As Asians search for “inner strength” from their past, old civilisations and long histories, many are looking for answers in “things Asian” and the Asian

art de vivre, as opposed to the Western fads that had influenced Asia for more than a century. Asian societies have, in a way, turned inwards to look closely at themselves, probably also as a negative reaction to globalisation and cultural uniformity. However, this “return to Asian roots” is also accompanied by a certain “loosening up” of Asian societies, as they grow “in less conformity” and embrace some individualism and creativity as well. The trend of “Asian-ness” (minus strict conformity) should be healthy, if it is not tainted by undue Asian arrogance or pride, as epitomised by the previously raging debate on “Asian values”, which was fortunately eclipsed by the Asian Crisis.

In the political field, four new trends have also emerged in Asia, with also implications for the re-negotiation of the *contrat social* as well.

The first of these trends is the cry for democracy and reforms that has resonated across Asia since the Crisis. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia faced serious challenges during and after the Anwar Ibrahim saga from the latter’s supporters and other disenchanted Malays. Elsewhere in the region, calls for more democracy could be perceived on their websites. It is clear that Southeast Asia has embarked on a new phase of democratic aspirations after years of intellectual and social “containment” of its people; today the people of the region are beginning to challenge years of thinking and policies characterised by an authoritarian “government knows best” mindset.

Second, increased popular and local-level assertiveness have also resulted in moves towards decentralisation and devolvement of power to local levels.

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Indonesia enacted decentralisation laws in January 2001, although preparations for the move were lacklustre and left much to be desired. Unfortunately, this has resulted in a rather messy transfer of power downwards and in conflicts of interest between the different levels of authority and competence. A similar experience is taking place in Thailand, with “chief executive officer governors” nominated in the provinces. Malaysia, meanwhile, experienced a power struggle between federal and state authorities, especially when the latter were controlled by opposition Islamic PAS conservatives in Kelantan and Trengganu (the latter till March 2004). In some cases, there have also been genuine concerns that decentralisation and devolvement of power had led to increased corruption like in the case of Indonesia, where multiple power centres exist and “compete” for power and money. The *contrat social* re-negotiation would now also involve both the central and decentralised levels with civil society.

Third, it is nonetheless clear that public accountability has become more important in Asia, especially with the increasing power of the media, or the “fifth estate”. Political and corporate scandals have erupted across the region, as the media exposes them, with disastrous consequences for politicians, high-level bureaucrats and corporate chiefs. The media has acted hand-in-hand with civil-society groups and NGOs to expose errant individuals and organisations, although not all media and journalists are impartial, neutral or non-politicised. The new-found powers of journalists in the Philippines and Indonesia have at times helped destabilise societies, especially when they touch on

religious or ethnic issues. However, there is no doubt that public accountability has increased from Indonesia to Thailand, thanks to the free (but at times, “not too responsible”) media, which has spawned in these countries. Journalists and the media would now be an integral part of the *contrat social* re-negotiation process too.

Lastly, Southeast Asian countries and societies are re-defining the concept of power and politics. The days of the Javanese kings and Thai absolute monarchs are fast fading away, as new democratic aspirations (from the “common people”) increase and test the traditional concepts of power in Asia. This would require a new mindset in both the people and those elected to lead. The desire for short-term financial gains could decline in importance, as Asian leaders look towards political visions and the ideal of public service to hold public office, though this shift would be slow and hazardous. A new concept of power and politics is inevitable in the region, as politicians sever their close links to corrupt business and big vested interests. They would also understand progressively that leaders cannot cling to power indefinitely, especially as the concept of hereditary power in Asia recedes. Power shifts and political successions should then become “normalised” and political transitions “smoothened” in Asia; thanks to the rise of civil society, Asian power would become more diffused and the re-negotiation of *contrat social* more broad-based.

With the above four social and four political trends, the social agenda for Southeast Asia would now be even more substantially focused on the re-negotiation of this *contrat social* between the governed

and the governing in Southeast Asia. It is as though the Asian Crisis has unleashed a huge social debate in Southeast Asia, something akin to the monumental political and social transformations in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 19th century post-French Revolution Europe.

The Geo-Political Risks of Democracy, Institution-Building and Reforms in Southeast Asia: Further “Complication” by History, Religion & Ethnicity

A factor which has become characteristic of this “new” emerging “*contrat social*” Southeast Asia is undoubtedly the link between its weak institutions and systems and the budding democracy, which are both a legacy of the Asian Crisis, or a result of the socio-economic transition in the CLMV countries. The on-going negotiation of the region’s *contrat social* is an indication of how Southeast Asia is still in the throes of a major socio-political transformation, which in turn carries huge inherent geo-political risks for the whole region. To recap, three aspects could be summarised, as follows:

- **the nexus of the political economy in Southeast Asia has truly begun to shift, within the context of *democrasi*, in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis (in the case of the original ASEAN-6) and as the CLMV countries “open up” their economies and societies. This “new” tripolar nexus of “government-private sector-civil society” was further**

strengthened by the calls for *democrasi* and people’s power, from Indonesia to the Philippines, through Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Cambodia. The cries of *democrasi*, which had resonated in the region, has indeed provided a powerful force for change in Southeast Asia, as the people’s voice begins to timidly dictate politics in the region.

Moreover, thanks to the forces of *democrasi* and people’s power, decentralisation and the devolvement of power downwards are now taking root effectively after years of authoritarian or military rule, like in Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines. Decentralisation should undoubtedly strengthen, but it could also inevitably “complicate” the democratic process and democratic institution-building in Southeast Asia. The advent of *democrasi* in Southeast Asian politics thus brings inherent geo-political risks, even in the Philippines, which prides itself as the “democratic model” of Southeast Asia. Although the first “people’s power” dates back to 1986 against ex-dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the recent military mutiny against the Magapacal-Arroyo Administration on 27 July 2003 shows how fragile democracy and democratic institution-building still are in this country, especially given the increasingly fractious nature of Filipino society. In Cambodia, the political stalemate which has resulted from the last legislative elections in July 2003, also highlights the fragility of democracy in this country, which is undoubtedly already in full transition towards a more open economy, society

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and political system. The geo-political risks from *democrasi* are therefore still very high in Southeast Asia today.

- *Reformasi* was the other key-word that had resonated loudly in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis. Old institutions, like in Indonesia or Thailand, were brutally uprooted and decimated in the name of “people’s power”. Thailand lives under a new Constitution, which was introduced in 1999-2000, and Indonesia is currently living a new mode of democratic institution-building, with the first-ever presidential election through universal suffrage (the first in the last 30 years) in July and September 2004. But the fact that new institutions have to be re-built in chaotic and uncertain times of change also portends serious potential geo-political risks and fall-outs, especially when authorities and the governed are seriously at loggerheads in re-negotiating a new *contrat social* and establishing new institutions or systems to “consummate” these changes. But Southeast Asia would still have to live under **the spectre of weak institutions and political systems** (within the democratic framework) for years to come; the consolidation process inevitably brings with it high geo-political risks to the region. Indonesia is the best example of this risk, but a country like Vietnam (the second largest country in ASEAN and Southeast Asia) also risks major institutional failures if its “opening up” process is not progressively aligned to the people’s growing politico-social aspirations or if economic growth

falters. In the Philippines, the democratic process and democratic institutions will be further tested during the coming presidential and congressional elections in May 2004, whereas in Thailand, many liberals and academics are concerned with PM Thaksin Shinawatra’s power consolidation “to the detriment of democracy”, despite the democratic and liberal 1999 Constitution. Moreover, it remains to be seen how the present democratic process would “mesh in” with the serious threats of secession and insurgencies in Aceh and Papua in Indonesia, Mindanao and Moro territory in Southern Philippines or even the Southern Muslim provinces in Thailand.

- Linked to the above is the issue of **an explosion of democratic aspiration, electoral rendezvous in 2004-2005 and the impending political changes and transitions in the region**, which could ensue in at least five ASEAN countries. Major elections take or have taken place in Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines this year and in Thailand in February 2005, whereas Singapore would most probably witness a political transition towards the end of this year. Coupled with weak institutions (ranging from the judiciary, the bureaucracy to law-enforcement agents like the police), elections bring crucial risks too to Southeast Asia, especially in the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines. At this point in time, Presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Indonesia and Philippines respectively,

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incumbents in the upcoming elections, are not “guaranteed” of re-election this year and their possible successors could provoke new and surprising upheavals to the present ASEAN consensus and concord amongst its leaders. Moreover, there are also risks that they could be succeeded by either a military personality or another untried (but popular) film star respectively, which could in turn provoke negative external reaction to ASEAN as a whole. Malaysia’s Abdullah Badawi has passed his political test but Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra is relatively confident of his re-election bid, although the unprecedented violence in the majority Muslim South Thailand may affect Thaksin’s February 2005 re-election bid, should he fail to contain the violence effectively. Uncertainties in these electoral processes could thus further “aggravate” the geo-political risks for Southeast Asia.

But these aspects of feeble institution-building, uncertainty *reformasi* and weak democracy bring to mind another aspect of geo-political risks; indigenous cultural and social factors in a Southeast Asia portend greater risks ahead. In fact, institution-building, reforms and the progress of democracy in the region are indeed “complicated” by history, religion and ethnicity in Southeast Asia, as follows:

- **History** still plays a major role in the complicated and intricate relations between Southeast Asian states, like between Thailand and Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, and Malaysia and

Philippines. There are clearly existing complicated issues of sovereignty and nostalgia linked to Southeast Asia’s intricate history. For example, the flare-up in Thai-Cambodian relations in May-June 2003 resulted from a historical misunderstanding and lingering enmity over the Angkor Wat, which in turn provoked the savage plunder and looting of the Thai Embassy and Thai businesses in Phnom Penh. Myanmar’s past history and present-day relations with its Thai neighbour have never been easy or smooth, given the deep-seated animosity between Burmese and Thais, from the sack of Ayutthaya by the Burmese in the late 18th century to periodic eruptions of tension over their respective re-interpretations of their “common” history in literature, journalism and films.

Also linked to history, sovereignty issues still exist between Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca/Batu Puteh (a light house on a islet claimed by both countries) or between Malaysia and Philippines over the latter’s claims over Sabah, which has never been resolved, but “kept under wraps”, thanks to the traditional “ASEAN spirit of cooperation and solidarity”. (The sovereignty dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over Ligitan and Sipadan was finally resolved in Malaysia’s favour by the International Court of Justice last year, but to the great dismay of Indonesians.) Lastly, although ideology is no longer a divisive issue within ASEAN and Southeast Asia (like in the 1960s and 1970s), the Philippines is still fighting the New Democratic Front

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(NDF), which represents the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA); significantly, China has recently sent out “feelers” to both the NDF and the Philippine government authorities indicating its willingness to host future peace talks beyond the last round held in Oslo, Norway.

- **Religion** is the second most important cultural factor, which still divides communities across Southeast Asia. At this moment, radical Islam and Muslim activities seem to be hitting the headlines in the region, from the Muslim insurgencies in Southern Philippines (Abu Sayef and Moro-Islamic Liberation Front [MILF]) against Catholic Manila to the killing of Buddhist monks, unprecedented violence and the burning of public schools in Southern Thailand. There are two dimensions to this problem. Firstly, there is the rise of political Islam in Indonesia, Malaysia and even Brunei, which could bring to the fore a certain radical brand of Islam across Southeast Asia; in fact, there are almost 240 million Muslims in Southeast Asia, about a quarter of the total Muslim population in the world or more than 40% of Southeast Asia’s total population. The radicalisation of Islam in Southeast Asia and the concurrent rise of political Islam, especially in Indonesia, portend potential and serious conflicts in the region. Everything must be done to support and strengthen the majority (but a silent majority) of Muslim moderates in Southeast Asia against radical and

fundamental teachings and ideas. The rapid spread of Koranic schools, like the *madrasahs* in Malaysia, *pesentrens* in Indonesia and *pendoks* in Thailand, could constitute hotbeds of religious and social strife across Southeast Asia as well as the radical nucleus for a terrorist organisation, such as Jemaah Islamiah (JI), to establish its Muslim “caliphate”, stretching from Indonesia to Southern Philippines through Malaysia, Singapore, South Thailand and Brunei.

Secondly, other than intra-Muslim struggles, there is always a huge potential for inter-religious conflicts in Southeast Asia, like what took place recently in South Thailand, when Buddhist monks were massacred in cold blood in early January 2004, purportedly in retaliation for the insensitive search (with dogs) of Muslim mosques for concealed weapons by the Thai military in late December 2003; the continuous violence in South Thailand is preoccupying. The Christmas Eve 2001 bombings of churches in Jakarta and Medan, as well as the bloody religious conflicts in Ambon, Maluku, Papua (former Irian Jaya) and Poso, Sulawesi, all remind us of the potency of religious strife and conflicts in Indonesia. The religious conflicts in South Thailand, Southern Philippines and across Indonesia are clearly examples of tension and geo-political risks Southeast Asia.

- **Ethnicity** is another factor, which could engender serious geo-political risks in Southeast Asia. The attacks against Indonesian Chinese in Jakarta,

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Surabaya and other major Indonesian cities in May 1998 had a serious racial element, just like the May 1969 “race riots” and racial killings in Malaysia and Singapore between the Malay and Chinese communities. In Indonesia, which constitutes a mosaic of peoples, ethnic-related violence had erupted sporadically across the archipelago, as in Maluku (between Ambonese and Madurese), Kalimantan (where Christian Dayaks have fought with Muslim Madurese) and in Papua/ex-Irian Jaya (where indigenous Christian Papuans are seeking independence from Muslim Jakarta), or even in the past, in East Timor. In the Philippines, the kidnapping and ransoming of Filipino-Chinese illustrates the further linkage between ethnicity and the socio-economic gap between them and indigenous Filipinos. Linked to Indochinese history and past cultural animosities, Thais and Burmese, Thais and Cambodians, Cambodians and Vietnamese, Laotians and Thais have never really “pacified their past”; in fact, present-day Indochinese politics are still wrought with potential misunderstandings and conflicts from the past. For example, Cambodian elections have always been marked by some form of violence against “settlers” from its two powerful neighbours, either against the Vietnamese in 1999 or the Thais in 2003; in fact, these two countries largely embody the intricate political power-play in complex Indochina today.

Even in Malaysia and Singapore, racial “balance” is especially taken seriously by the authorities; Malaysia had in fact

experienced in 2001 an unexpected flare-up between Malays and Indians in the Klang Valley, as more than a dozen people were randomly killed on both sides. Malaysia has in fact just begun the first phase of its National Service programme for 85,000 of its multi-racial youth, which has, as one of its most urgent tasks, the promotion of racial harmony and integration amongst Malays, Chinese and Indians. There were also racial “tensions” in Singapore, following the two waves of arrests (of some thirty Muslim Malays) and their detention under the Internal Security Act (or ISA) for “JI conspiracies” in 2002 and 2003. Even in Myanmar, the present political rapprochement process is complicated by the existence and internal struggles of and amongst its diverse ethnic groups and tribes, from the Shans, Karens and Kachins to the more assimilated Chinese and Indian Burmese communities in Yangon, Mandalay and other major Myanmar cities.

Development and Stability in Southeast Asia

Just as the recent 10th National People’s Congress Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (NPC-CPPCC) parliamentary session in Beijing had focused on sustainable economic growth in China, and the current political turmoil in Seoul (following the legislative impeachment process of President Roh Moon Hyun) highlighted the importance of political stability in South Korea, Southeast Asia is constantly faced with the dilemma of

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development and stability, as it re-negotiates its *contrat social*, build institutions and advance democracy. In fact, political stability and sustainable economic growth are inexorably linked and mutually-reinforcing in societal development, especially in Asia and Southeast Asia today.

In Southeast Asia, political stability is in the fore, thanks to the series of elections in Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand in 2004-2005, and as Cambodia seeks to stabilise its fragile political system in the aftermath of elections in July 2003. Economic growth and development, as well as stability, have been major issues in electoral campaigns in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, as Southeast Asian economies seek to recover from the economic dip of 2001-2002.

During the Malaysian general election on 21 March, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi proposed in his electoral platform a version of progressive Islam or *Hadhari Islam*, which balances religion and development. Economic growth and development were thus at the heart of the electoral campaign of Abdullah's *Barisan Nasional* (BN) coalition. The BN won an astounding victory against the opposition conservative party PAS, which adopted an Islamic “votes for heaven” electoral platform. Stability, economic redistribution and social justice were also significant facets of the Abdullah vision and the BN's manifesto, which finally won the day decisively in Malaysia's legislative polls.

In the Indonesian legislative election, it is likely that GOLKAR, the party of ex-Indonesian strongman Suharto would make impressive gains at the polls and

become the premier party in Indonesia, whereas Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the party of President Megawati, may suffer a huge electoral loss. Two reasons could explain this shift. There is firstly a growing nostalgia for the “Suharto times”, as the advent of democracy in Indonesia had not provided more economic benefits to the majority of Indonesians, but instead, increased corruption, social injustice and inequity. This has invariably shifted votes from PDI-P to GOLKAR, which still represents the “good times” of the Suharto era. Secondly, the present Megawati regime is deemed to have failed to “deliver” on stability, order and economic development, as economic hardship and high unemployment unfortunately characterise the present free-wheeling democracy in Indonesia.

Hence, the economy inevitably still “predominates” politics and political stability in many parts of Southeast Asia today.

But taking the example of China, which may ironically be fast emerging as a “politico-economic model” for Southeast Asia, the latest NPC-CPPCC parliamentary session in China in early March in Beijing testified to the importance of seeking “quality economic growth”, and not just a continuous rise in a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Furthermore, social problems could emanate from robust economic growth and cannot be “wished away” with good GDP growth alone. The NPC-CPPCC had rightly focused on the need to adopt stringent measures in tackling the negative effects of high (and perhaps, run-away) economic growth as well as an

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over-heating economy. Growth sustenance in the longer term must therefore hinge on social stability, otherwise vertiginous GDP growth could also lead to social instability.

Secondly, one of the most important pillars in sustaining economic growth is the re-distribution of wealth, rural uplift and the utmost importance of creating a budding middle class, which would in turn “anchor” sustainable socio-economic development and growth. The development of the private sector is key, and China is showing the way, especially to its Southeast Asian neighbours on its southern flank, that nurturing and “growing” this private sector could stabilise society by “broadening” its middle class. China’s “Go West” and “Northeast rejuvenation” policies, as well as enshrining the protection of private property in its Constitution are definitely on the right path towards creating a more sustainable socio-economic development in the country.

Southeast Asian countries could learn from the Chinese experience in “rural uplifting” its 900 million peasants from poverty and developing the private sector-cum-middle class, especially for Indonesia and the Philippines. Social and political stability can only be achieved if and when these societies “anchor” their future in a budding and developing middle class and spread wealth more evenly. The cries of democracy alone cannot guarantee social and political stability; stability should instead be built on social redistribution and the fight against corruption and power politics as well. Malaysia’s PM Abdullah led a valiant fight against corruption at the recent elections, just as Thai Premier

Thaksin Shinawatra seeks to develop domestic consumption and demand in the Thai economy, so as to consolidate its budding middle class. East Asia’s economic sustainability is therefore not fully assured as yet, despite the seeming “economic boom” of 2003 and the “advances” of democracy, especially in Indonesia and Philippines.

As for political stability in Southeast Asia, there are clear cases of crisis and turmoil in Phnom Penh, as well as the large electoral uncertainties in Indonesia and Philippines. In fact, democracy has brought with it inherent uncertainties and challenges as a new form of geo-political risk. Filipinos are constantly reminded of the “Edsa Revolution”, when thousands marched down the Edsa Avenue to protest against ex-strongman Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and then again in 2002 against President Joseph Estrada. Threats of future people’s power on the Edsa cannot be discounted. Cambodia’s precarious political situation continues, despite multiple mediation by King Norodom Sihanouk to break the political impasse, which originated from an unprecedented constitutional clause (in its post-civil war constitution), requiring a ruling party to have a two-third majority in the National Assembly. The cries and exigencies of democracy do not necessarily presage political and social stability in both these cases.

But beyond these examples, Philippines and Indonesia offer cases of potential political crises in the making, if the elections turn out to be inconclusive or controversial. The current stand-offs in Taiwan for an overall vote re-count and the demands of the opposition in Malaysia

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for a similar re-count in Trengganu, one of the northern states, augur badly a new electoral trend in Asia. The insistence on re-counts by the losing side invariably increases the risks of post-electoral instability, especially in the cases of Indonesia and Philippines, which have the added inherent weakness of political and social institutions. As the democratic fibre in these two countries remain weak and fragile, potential unrest and disorder could erupt, although democracy is also believed to be an irreversible trend in both Manila and Jakarta. For this reason, it is hoped that the new Indonesian and Philippine leaders would win big and decisively to avert this spectre!

It is also hoped that the Indonesian and Philippine elections would give rise to stable governments, and not unstable coalitions, with constant infighting within the legislature, as well as between the executive and legislative branches of government. As their courts are not perceived to be impartial, non-corrupt and efficient, there is every fear that inconclusive or controversial electoral results could destabilise Manila and Jakarta. Political stability is hence an important asset, which Indonesia and the Philippines cannot afford to forsake in the expediency of democracy or democratic struggles. Any instability resulting from elections could affect the entire region and ASEAN as a whole, which is already in dire need of improving its image of international credibility and effectiveness, both as an organisation and as a region.

Sustainable socio-economic redistribution, development and growth are thus crucial for Asia's social and political

stability. As East Asian electorates headed to the polls in Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand this year and next, economic and unemployment issues have dominated political debates. In this context, stability could best be assured by sustainable socio-economic growth and development, as well as the consolidation of a private-sector-attuned middle class in these countries. With a sustainable development, democracy, institution-building and the re-negotiation of *contrat social* in Southeast Asia complete this picture of stability for the region.

Conclusion

The Asian Crisis brought to Southeast Asia monumental transformation and changes, which are today considered irreversible. Amongst these changes are profound social and political changes, which have amounted to a re-negotiation of the *contrat social* between the region's governing and governed in the region. But in re-negotiating this *contrat social*, Southeast Asians seek to re-build institutions, introduce *reformasi* and foster democracy, sometimes, adversely complicated by the region's complex plethora of history, religion and ethnicity. Thanks to the convergence of all these above factors, the region's geo-political risks have increased tremendously, as Southeast Asia witnesses one of its most fundamental social transformations and transition to more open and “globalised” societies. Moreover, amidst this transformation, it is still the intrinsic link between development (sustainable socio-economic development) and stability that predominates, as this stability, which

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emanates from sound economic development and social re-distribution, is undoubtedly key to institution-building, *reformasi*, democracy and above all, the

on-going but crucial re-negotiation of the *contrat social* between the governing and the governed in Southeast Asia.



Is there an Asianisation of Asia? The New Millennium in Asia and the Identity Debate

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Most current books¹ dealing with the political or cultural situation of contemporary Asia try to avoid the word or concept “Asianisation”. Instead, topics under discussion include Asian regionalism, Asia’s participation and non-participation in the process of globalisation, the Asian position in certain international economic and financial questions, the so-called Asian value debate, common positions vis-à-vis Europe in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) theatre and in view of the United States of America (USA), by-and-by even an Asian perspective with regard to Latin America.² But then normally a big full stop appears. An Asianisation of Asia would mean no more and no less than the affirmation of an Asian identity within the world of an emerging planetary globalisation. Few people and few elites would dare to affirm that such an identity already exists. Asia’s appearance is not a closed profile, but a picture of diversities in history and civilisations, in ethnical compositions and religions, in political regimes and levels of development, in freedom and authoritarianism, in divergent

levels of world market integration. Is it therefore not premature or even naïve to look for something which seems to lack common concerns and common consideration amongst Asians themselves? It has been stated again and again the Asia is the historic “cradle of civilisation”. Is a cradle a guarantee of a functioning family in our time?

The question marks in such deliberations cannot be overlooked. It is definitely not my intention to propose something whose virtual qualities are easier to discern than to rely on absolute and non-contradictory real indicators. On the other hand I do not always think that the German philosopher’s Hegel dictum should be valid in every occasion, namely that the owl starts its flight with the beginning twilight. Interpretations “thereafter” make sense, but interpretations of trends or movements with the help of proven indications, which nurture the suspicion that something develops, are not completely alien to political science and the social and historical sciences in general. We dispose of certain experiences in relatively comparable cases (European-

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isation of Europe, Americanisation of North America, Latin Americanisation of Latin America etc.).

It is my intention therefore to apply some analytical criteria to the subject matter, that means to discuss some appearances of a possible or potential Asianisation of Asia within a general caution of avoiding firm predictions. I pretend to observe that things are moving. To have a go at a certain direction is not without imagination. Let me mention the following seven points.

First: To deal with the subject matter from a political science perspective is overdue given the overall rearrangement of the international political and economic fields. There is one assessment of the international situation which deals with the appraisal of an international tripartite arrangement or even equilibrium between East Asia, integrated Europe and the US.³ This constructivist idea found a widespread consideration in all three parts of the triad, in fact both in practical political considerations and in academic designs. Was not Mahathir's old East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) idea a forerunner of this profile, put into practice in the dialectic or nearly parallel entanglement of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process and the "ASEAN+3" (Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) process? We face right now a discussion put forward on the ASEAN Free Trade Area project by Lim Chai Mee and Michael Yeoh, in which these recent developments of an intra-Asian regionalism are considered as a "defensive strategy to counter the emerging regional economic blocs"⁴,

namely the other two parts of the triad. Is this not an attribute (I do not use the word manifestation) of an economic and additionally a political Asianisation strategy?

Second: The traditional ASEAN success story depended on, and is up to a large extent, surviving and flourishing in a larger international and greater regional context in a profile that puts ASEAN in a position as a contributor to a political power equilibrium via a sophisticated dialogue system.⁵ Caesar Parreñas of the Philippines had written some two-and-a-half decades ago a marvellous doctoral dissertation on the subject matter under the title "*ASEAN im Kräftefeld der Großmächte*" ("ASEAN in the Field of Force of the Big Powers").⁶ Big powers meant at that time the Asian-Pacific presence of the USA, the Soviet Union, Japan, the People's Republic of China and to a lesser extent Communist Vietnam and also Europe. There is a lot of a convincing talk that nowadays both East Asian as well as trans-pacific arrangements like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) apply in their performances, to a large degree, norms and procedures of the "ASEAN way". The international situation has changed worldwide and in East Asia. The powerful competitors in Asia-Pacific today are the US, Japan, and China – with an undeniable tension between China and Japan for leadership or primacy in Asia in the next decades – this perhaps again with a poisoning role of ASEAN.⁷

Quite a few people are particularly concerned about what they would name the "China Threat". But that China seems to base its overall security strategy last but

not least on a regional security environment that has to do with confidence building measures (and forms of regional cooperation) preached and provided by the ASEAN group, which speaks again for an Asianisation process – here of security or geostrategic matters. The ASEAN group was wise enough to attract China’s cooperation per dialogue and matching in many fields, maintaining and spreading in such a way it accumulated experience as an equilibrium broker. This means no more and no less than taking up Asian problems in terms of the current and developing power situation in East Asia. Add to this the growth triangles between different countries or the ongoing deliberations of an Asian currency system and to trans-Asian traffic systems,⁸ add to this the ongoing deliberations to cope with globalisation in Asia⁹, you will get the same impression that things are moving to deepen common concerns and the search for common solutions,¹⁰ criteria with a particular weight as indicators for regional identities and parallel analytical considerations for a sort of an intra-Asian growing together.¹¹

It should not be denied, however, that this is still a small and tender plant. Will it become a strong tree one day? Common concerns are possibly not or not yet the major feelings of the East Asian populations at large, perhaps partly due to the fact that East Asia is not extremely strong in independent print and television media with a clear regional perspective.¹² And we may not forget that perhaps “in Asia the age of nationalism is now” – as stressed by Hisahiko Okazaki.¹³ Common Asian concerns are to be traced back to the responsibility of prospective political elites

and farsighted administrators. (Such a diagnostic is perhaps clearer in Asia than in continental Europe where larger parts of the populations identify themselves more or less clearly with Europe, but not necessarily with its current organisational structures!).

Third: Would it be far fetched to assure that Asia shows the emergence of a trans- or Pan Asian epistemic community which provides a stimulating pro-Asian discourse? Topics like stability, governance, security (both in traditional and in comprehensive terms) or simply the big concept of *pax* (*pax nipponica*, *pax sinica*, *pax asiatica*) are convincingly discussed in nearly all East Asian countries in research institutions, think tanks, and leading universities and their periodicals in a way that there is a tight connection between what is called “track one” and “track two” – this particularly in matters of international relations and security.

Such common concerns are admittedly restricted to limited publics that are, nevertheless, not without influence and policy suggesting or at least stimulating capabilities. To repeat it in other words: I don’t think that there is a general and widely spread pro-Asia mood in Asia, comparable to, for example, attitudinal counterparts in the formative years of European integration. But nobody can deny the fact that you today find in East Asia epistemic communities (to use Ernst Haas’ appropriate term) which generate a so-called sustainable concern on East Asian matters.

Fourth: Here we come nearly logically to what is internationally considered as the

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Asian value debate. I do not feel trained enough to go into depth and details. If I understood and understand it well, it contains the principal messages: a) "We in Asia should try to define our own identity vis-à-vis a larger world we did not invent ourselves", and b) in terms of a question: "Why should we not be able to shape or co-shape the values and norms prevailing in our planet?"

Having spent five years researching in a United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) research team directed by the outstanding Brazilian Helio Jaguaribe de Mattos researching on global history,¹⁴ it was not surprising that after analysing 16 main world civilisations, one of the results was: The modern world is heavily dominated by Western values and behavioural standards. It can easily be traced back to the Mediterranean-European Antiquity, to the impacts of imperialism following centuries later, and to the adjacent spread of capitalism and the concomitant bourgeois world. The emerging planetary civilisation of our time is therefore also in large parts primarily a late Western civilisation. When the Asian value debate emerged in its contemporary form in the 90's of last century (with forerunners of course more than 100 years ago), it was based on one hand on the self-consciousness of political elites who regarded themselves not only as the administrators of the Asian economic miracle of that time, but also as the architects of a coming Asian or Asian-Pacific century. An assessment of Asian ethical superiority was a collateral proposition. Prominent speakers or preachers and writers were Lee Kuan Yew,

Mahathir, Ishihara, Nakasone and many others. The value debate is going on, though its lines of argumentation changed.

One of the most noteworthy contributions in my opinion is Anwar Ibrahim's book, *The Asian Renaissance*.¹⁵ Anwar writes: "Asia's economic progress...has enabled Asia to rediscover its soul and to reconstruct its civilisations. Inevitably this process will necessitate civilisational dialogue between the East and the West."¹⁶ This reflection on the philosophical and/or religious roots of the Asian civilisations (comparable indeed to the role of the Renaissance in Europe's modern development) has become typical for many strands in the current value debate, be it directed by Islamic, Buddhist or Confucianist¹⁷ roots. That this provides a basis for an inter-cultural, planet-wide dialogue is repeated very clearly by Kishore Mahbubani. In his provocative book, *Can Asians think?*¹⁸, his message is: "I remain absolutely convinced that the future lies in the fusion of civilizations."¹⁹ The fusion will need time and patience. Mahbubani again: "When this discussion begins, they will look back at the Asian values debate of the 1990s as only the initial round of a discourse that will last for several centuries."²⁰

My point is not that the value debate provides a comfortable and common bond pooling Asians in their norms and attitudes together, because the national or ethnic and cultural based style of the value discussions is too obvious.²¹ Yet a common denominator is evident as well. A widely spread concern to define something like an identity which is not derived exclusively from western culture and civilisation and which portrays converging standards which

one would discover in a comparative way in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore or Korea. The Asian value debate is possibly not the locomotive on an Asianisation of Asia, but it is at the same time not just an optional wagon in the train of an emerging Asian regionalism.

Fifth: Any Asian regionalism, or any regionalism in the world for that matter, would not make sense without one basic prerequisite: available sets of structures and role in order to learn, train and simply live this regionalism. The idea of an Asian commonness would remain just an imagination if there are no concrete structures and roles accorded to active participants or people prone to be activated, and who accept trans-Asian responsibilities. Asia nowadays disposes of a relative dense pattern of Asian and transpacific organisations like ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), APEC, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), ASEAN+3, the Asian part of ASEM, tomorrow perhaps also ASEAN+1, Council for Security Cooperation for the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) – to mention just the tip of an iceberg. A no less dense family of business networks and trans-Asian Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) should be added, the already mentioned growth triangles and their organisations, interstate development schemes and others like the other already mentioned group: the epistemic family or families. Formal and informal arrangements coincide or work in a parallel way. There is no reason to idealise this situation and derive from it overdone conclusions, for we all know in practically any of these structures

situations of shortcomings, stagnation and low efficiency. Yet the structures and roles do exist and develop dynamics of their own in directions of an intra-Asian cooperation and even *de facto* integration, unheard of a generation ago.²²

Sixth: Another bunch of factors classified as “pro-Asianisation” is what we call in international integration theories “external federators.”²³ External federators are actors or situations which provoke regionalist reactions and/or pursuits of cultural or situational identities via assistance, pressures, threats, or simply by their mere existence. The Soviet Union and the USA contributed in a substantial way to the formation of an integrated Europe, and Washington was a principal external federator in nearly all efforts of Latin American integration. The contemporary globalisation process provokes reactions in Asia in favour of regionalism, so does Europe’s new common currency. Asian regionalism may be elusive, and the diversity of existing external stimuli is not more than a set of inspiring and sometimes influencing dynamic factors towards common efforts. Perhaps it is meaningful to distinguish between external and semi-external federators, the latter being forces which work partly from outside and partly from within. The US’s role in establishing APEC and other transpacific fora is typical for such a semi-external force. China, former Vietnam, Japan and Europe with its group-to-group philosophy had for years been decisive for the growing stabilisation and growth of ASEAN. ASEM, though a Southeast Asian initiative articulated by Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, brought Europe again

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into the role of an external federator, this with wide repercussions, namely on the ASEAN+3 process.

After studying for more than 30 years on regional processes and regional identity questions in the Americas, in Europe and finally here in East Asia, it can be concluded that without the existence of effective external federators, regional identity and cooperation schemes would never come into existence and flourish. On this topic, Mark Beerson puts in an interesting essay, the title of which is “ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism.”²⁴

Seventh:

- a) Any discussion of an Asianisation in Asia is not the business of a “once and for all” leading academic discipline, but in the best sense a business of project groups in which political scientists, sociologists, economists, philosophers, geographers, historians, ethnologist and probably also religious thinkers meet and deal with the subject matter.
- b) Only profound historical and cultural reflections delineate possible spaces for realistic assessments and the prediction of improvements, actions, limitations, and deadlocks.
- c) Comparisons and – even more important – the exchange of comparative experiences between Asia, Europe, and Latin America would be fruitful, the latter being a reminder that Latin America disposes of the oldest

experiences in cooperation and integration and its peaks and deep valleys.

Personally, I am inclined to speak of a slow, but continuous Asianisation of Asia (in comparison to former decades when Asianisation had no meaning at all). At the same time, it is very difficult to separate, in regard to our subject, strictly empirical, analytic and normative levels. These intersections and overlaps, surely an infraction of the current standards of modern science, cannot be avoided if one tries to escape the outstanding temptation of current and international academic work: to degenerate into what my Bolivian friend Felipe Mansilla has called “book science”. In comparison to this book science, I confess to be closer to Aristotle’s idea of a “Practical Philosophy”, particularly when regarding such important things as regionalisation here in Asia, in Europe, or in my old field Latin America.

Is there an Asianisation of Asia? On one hand, it is absolutely traceable that “in practice regional identity is far from a full-fledged concept to most East Asian countries.”²⁵ On the other hand it has been said that “regional identity is gradually emerging at an unprecedented pace on both the economic and security fronts”,²⁶ based on a political philosophy that prime minister Mahathir Mohamad has repeatedly called “prosper thy neighbour”.²⁷

Endnotes

1. To talk or write about Asia means in the context of this paper nearly exclusively East Asia, comprising both North- and Southeast Asia. Those familiar with the subject know that I follow here an international trend in debates about Asia in the social sciences.
2. Cf. Peter H. Smith/ Kotaro Horisaka/ Shoji Nishijima (eds.): *East Asia and Latin America. The Unlikely Alliance*, Lanham et al.: Rowman 2003.
3. Roloff, Ralf 2001: *Europa, Amerika und Asien zwischen Globalisierung und Regionalisierung. Das internationale Konzert und die ökonomische Dimension internationaler Politik*, Paderborn u.a.: Schöningh.
4. Lim Chai Chee and Dr Michael Yeoh: ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA): Charting a New Era of Regional Cooperation, in: Michael Yeoh et al.: *Globalization and its Impact on Asia. Sharing Knowledge, Ideas and Information*, Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk, 19-30, here 22.
5. Jörn Dosch and Manfred Mols: Thirty Years of ASEAN: achievements and challenges, in: *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2 1998, 167-182
6. Caesar Parreñas: *ASEAN im Kräftefeld der Großmächte. Großmachtspolitik und regionale Zusammenarbeit in Südostasien seit 1975*, Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang 1989.
7. Jian Yang: Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for South East Asia, in: *Contemporary South East Asia*, Vol. 25, No. 2 2003, 306-327.
8. Cf. Anthony Millner: Asia-Pacific Perceptions of the Financial Crisis: Lessons and Affirmations, in: *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 25, No. 2, August 2003, 284-305.
9. = maintaining stability, good governance, the role of the state, Asian values etc. Cf. Samuel S. Kim (ed.): *East Asia and Globalization*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2000.
10. Peter Birlle et al.: *Globalisierung und Regionalismus. Herausforderungen für Staat und Demokratie in Asien und in Lateinamerika* (Festschrift für Manfred Mols), Opladen: Leske und Budrich 2002.
11. Manfred Mols: Latin America and East Asia between bilateralism and inter-regionalism, in Jörg Faust and Manfred Mols (eds.): *The Relations between Latin America and East Asia* (forthcoming in 2004).
12. This of course with the exception of the “Far Eastern Economic Review” and “Asiaweek”.
13. Quoted in Jian Yang, Sino-Japanese Relations..., 321.
14. The project was called “A Critical Study of History“. See Helio Jaguaribe: Un estudio crítico de la historia, México: *Fondo de Cultura Económica* 2001, 2 vols.
15. Singapore/ Kuala Lumpur: Times Books International 1996.
16. Ibidem 13.

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17. See Gilbert Rozman (eds.): *The East Asian Region. Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation*: Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991.
18. Singapore/ Kuala Lumpur: Times Books International, first ed. 1998.
19. Ibidem 15.a
20. Ibidem 14.
21. Michael Yeoh et al. (eds.): *Globalization and its Impact on Asia*, Selangor Darul Ehsan: asli/ Pelanduk 2003.
22. See Fu-Kuo Liu: East Asian regionalism, in: Fu-Kuo Liu and Philippe Régnier (eds.): *Regionalism in East Asia. Paradigm shifting?*, London: Routledge, 3-29.
23. Manfred Mols: *Integration und Kooperation in zwei Kontinenten. Das Streben nach Einheit in Lateinamerika und in Südostasien*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1996.
24. Mark Beerson: ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism, in: *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. Vol. 25 No. 2 2003, 251-268.
25. Fu-Kuo-Liu: Conclusion: The renewal of regionalism and an East Asian new order, in: Fu-Kuo Liu/ Régnier: *Regionalism in East Asia*. Op. cit., 220-230, here 222.
26. Ibidem 228.
27. Cf. Hashim Makaruddin (ed.): *Regional Cooperation and the Digital Economy*. Selected Speeches by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Vol.2, Prime Minister's Office 2000.



Political Parties and the Internet. Net gain?

R.K. Gibson, Paul Nixon, Stephen Ward (Editors)
London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

Reviewed by James Gomez

Editors of this book argue that *Political Parties and the Internet. Net gain?* aims to provide an assessment of how political parties are adapting to the rise of new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and what the consequences of that adaptation will be. The editors argue, based on selected contemporary case studies, that on the whole, political parties are beginning to adopt new ICTs more extensively and new practices are emerging gradually.

The editors recognise that the research thus far focuses on North America or North Europe, and hence claim that this volume goes beyond that by including chapters on Korea, Romania and the Mediterranean regions. They recognise that the initial phase of party website development (1994-1998) was symbolically creating a presence online. Since then they note that Internet strategies are being integrated into the mainstream of party communication and campaign activity. Hence, in terms of time frame, the book includes new empirical research

from the period 1998-2001. The volume thus provides a benchmark to gauge work in this area as well as to forecast the development of political party online strategies.

One of their findings is that once a party in a country moves to build an online presence, others quickly follow suit fearing to be left behind. Going online is also an expression of modernity. Parties want to project an image that they are modern in outlook and in touch with technological change. So although the real practice of politics may not be democratic, a modern expression of democracy associated with the Internet is sought.

The collected result of the book shows that the primary purpose of party websites has been the provision of standard information about party organisation and policy and, in some cases, personality. Much of this information is often available offline elsewhere, hence it is argued that parties are not providing much that is new but more of the same in a different format for those who want. However this is only true to a point. What is different and is

especially important to parties operating in a controlled environment is that the outreach is cheaper and perhaps more efficient, perhaps in some ways reaching even more people and having an overseas pull.

Evidence also points to the fact that the interactivity attributed to the Internet is not translated to communication with voters and sometimes even party members. Interactivity where it does occur is controlled by the parties rather than the voters. Additionally even though the Internet provides opportunities through information management system and database to target political campaign, most still opt for catch-all principle. The Internet has also been recognised as a means to encourage more individual candidates or personality-based promotion.

On the question of campaign style, there is some evidence that parties beginning to use the Internet do look towards the American experience. But not all parties do so, there is some evidence that parties look at global sister partners such as the Greens, Labours, Far right etc., to some extent the political and institutional rules also have a bearing on how parties use the Internet. Some emerging evidence is also cited of new online marketing strategies as a personalised marketing channel.

Overall party presence on the Internet seem to represent largely an additional element to a party's repertoire of action along with more traditional communication forms rather than a transformation of the fundamental relationship between political parties and the public.

The editors show that there is broad agreement among the contributors that the

Internet can provide fringe parties with a presence. Opposition parties in particular can enjoy more exposure because of the Internet. However, the vast majority of the electorate still receives its political information via traditional broadcast methods usually in the control of dominant parties via government or business interests.

Even when citizens use the Internet for political information, they do so through mainstream and dominant news sites which often carry the news of the dominant incumbent. Fringe and emergent parties often lack the resources to build good and effective sites, update them regularly or have access to journalists and academics to amplify their position. Hence they often continue to operate under the shadow and agenda of the dominant parties.

Nevertheless, it allows fringe parties in certain situations to circumvent legislative contractions and take advantage of the international nature of Internet information exchange and enable them to publish their material to as wide an audience as possible. Further, a professional website can make small parties appear larger than they actually are and bolster their legitimacy. However, the verdict is out on whether the ability of fringe parties to have a presence is equal to their ability to score the same level of success electorally.

The editors confirmed that almost all the contributors note that there has been no substantial increase in the discursive activity between the party elites and the memberships using the Internet. Although many party websites have behind them sophisticated internal communication channels, new ICTs have been used less for internal participatory purposes and more for campaigning and administration. Parties

are generally wary of opening up communication channels with either members or the public because quality of open online debate is poor and moderation is a drain on resources. Further electronic channels for party discussion are for information exchanges rather than substantive policy debating arenas, and only taken as additional consultative channels. The option to use electronic channels of communication is guided by party rules and constitutions created before the Internet, organisational framework and culture. Changes are needed in this area if it is to affect the use of the Internet for communication.

At the level of participation, it is suggested that new ICTs are more likely to enhance some the pre-existing trends in internal party democracy such as individualisation of participation and even more centralised control of campaigning.

For anyone looking into the study of new media and political parties, *Political Parties and the Internet. Net gain?*, is probably the only comprehensive book presently available on the topic. Hence from this point of view, this book makes for important reading for those interested in looking further into this area. But for researchers wanting to know more about political parties in the Asian region, they will find a couple of things missing in this book.

Firstly, this book focuses largely on case studies from liberal democracies and emerging democracies, hence it makes for a strong case to have more case studies from the Asian region. After all, the legal environment that enables political party usage of the Internet is different and largely restrictive in several countries in the region.

Incidentally, the book contains one case study from South Korea, which, together with Japan, are the two countries often featured as case studies in the study of Internet and political parties in Asia.

Secondly, there is very little mention about the political culture and how that affects the use of the Internet by political parties. Although party constitution, structure and ethos are important in determining the use of the Internet, the surrounding political culture is also equally important especially in the context of Asia and one party regimes in the region such as Japan, Vietnam, China and Singapore since political culture determines how political parties and their personnel actually use the Internet for party work and campaign activities.

Presently, as this is a new area of research, the editors point out that verdict on the impact of new media on political parties is rather mixed. On the one hand, some believe new media spells the end of traditional representative structures such as parties, as the Internet can provide a platform for more single-issue networks and campaigns. On the other hand, some feel that new media can stimulate public participation through its interactive technology and ensure better information management and dissemination. Yet others are sceptical of the Internet's impact.

Hence, more work is needed in this area to better understand the impact of the Internet on political parties.

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A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy

Document proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels on 12 December, 2003

Introduction

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.

The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able

to tackle today's complex problems on its own.

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo). The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

I. The Security Environment: Global Challenges and Key Threats

Global Challenges

The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than 2 Euros a day while 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.

Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world's largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

Key Threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political

crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.

Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical

infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

State Failure: Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. Around 90% of the

heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy. Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

II. Strategic Objectives

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

Addressing the Threats

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

- It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences.
- It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The

Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.

- The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe. Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate worldwide: their activities in central or south-east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are

dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

Building Security in our Neighbourhood

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes,

dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution – which Europe has long supported – is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union,

the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.

An International Order Based On Effective Multilateralism

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the Council of Europe have a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market) and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world.

It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world's largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals.

Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

III. Policy Implications for Europe

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and

effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.

More Capable. A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the

strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.

More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

Working with partners. There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest

partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.

We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an

important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

Conclusion

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

Source: European Union Institute of Security Studies website at <http://www.iss.eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>



Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea

Bali, Indonesia, 7 October, 2003

WE, the heads of Government/ State of the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea met during the ASEAN+3 Summit held in Bali, Indonesia on October 7th, 2003. We reviewed and acknowledged the positive progress in the development of our bilateral relationships and trilateral cooperation. For the further promotion and strengthening of our tripartite cooperation in the new century, we hereby issue a joint declaration as follows:

- I -

With geographical proximity, economic complementarity, growing economic cooperation and increasing people-to-people exchanges, the three countries have become important economic and trade partners to one another, and have continuously strengthened their coordination and cooperation in regional and international affairs.

The cooperation among the three countries demonstrates the gratifying momentum for the development of their relations. Their leaders have held regular

informal meetings since 1999. Their departments of various areas have established mechanisms for meetings at the ministerial, senior official and working levels. The three countries have developed fruitful and effective cooperation in priority areas such as economy and trade, information, environmental protection, human resources development and culture.

The three countries have actively supported and participated in various forms of regional cooperation such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). As a major driving force for cooperation under the 10+3 framework, the three countries have taken an active part in implementing the projects recommended by the East Asia Study Group (EASG) Final Report, furthered Mekong sub-regional cooperation, and made positive contributions to the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI).

In this context, we, the Leaders of the three countries recognized that a solid foundation has been laid for the promotion of the tripartite cooperation among China, Japan and Korea. We were convinced that advancing and deepening the tripartite

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cooperation will not only serve to further promote the stable development of bilateral relations between China-Japan, China-Korea and Japan-Korea but also contribute to the realization of peace, stability and prosperity throughout East Asia.

- II -

The advent of globalization and informationalization era has brought with it huge opportunities for development as well as many new challenges to all countries in the world. As important countries in Asia and the whole world, China, Japan and Korea share responsibilities to maintain regional peace and stability and promote common development for all countries. The tripartite cooperation is aimed at boosting development, strengthening East Asian cooperation and safeguarding peace and prosperity at the regional and global levels.

To this end, we, the Leaders of the three countries shared the following fundamental views:

1. The tripartite cooperation will be pursued in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other universally recognized norms governing international relations.
2. On the basis of mutual trust and respect, equality and mutual benefit and with a view to securing a win-win result for all, the three countries will seek ways to strengthen their across-the-board and future-oriented cooperation in a variety of areas, including economic relations and trade, investment, finance, transport, tourism, politics, security,

culture, information and communication technology (ICT), science and technology and environmental protection.

3. With the governments of the three countries being the main players in the tripartite cooperation, they will encourage business and academic communities and various non-governmental organizations to play their parts.
4. The tripartite cooperation is an essential part of East Asian cooperation. The three countries will, through regional cooperation in diversified forms such as ASEAN+3, continue to strengthen coordination and support the process of ASEAN integration. The three countries will promote economic cooperation and peace dialogue in Northeast Asia for the stability and prosperity in the region.
5. The tripartite cooperation will be carried out in a transparent, open, non-exclusive and non-discriminatory manner. The three countries will maintain their respective mechanisms for cooperation with other countries so as to benefit from one another's experience in the interests of their mutual development.

- III -

To promote substantial progress in cooperation among our countries, we, the Leaders of China, Japan and Korea stressed the need to expand and deepen the tripartite cooperation in the following areas in a steadfast manner, starting with easier projects and gradually expanding the scope and depth of cooperation.

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1. Cooperation in trade and investment.

The three countries will develop economic cooperation and trade marked by mutual trust and complementarity in order to maximize the growth potentiality of all countries in the region and eventually to achieve common prosperity. The three countries will also endeavor, in consistence with related WTO rules, to strengthen coordination with a view to creating an attractive environment for trade and investment.

The three countries will make joint efforts to push forward the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations with a view to improving market access and strengthening the rules in a well-balanced manner, such as strengthening discipline on anti-dumping. The three countries will endeavor to prevent abusive and arbitrary application of WTO rules.

The three countries will strengthen dialogue and cooperation on trade facilitation among their customs and transport authorities and continue exchange and cooperation between their quality supervision, inspection and quarantine authorities through the existing channels. They also emphasize the importance of food safety and animal and plant health in trade, in conformity with relevant WTO agreements.

The three countries will strengthen cooperation and protection of intellectual property rights including through the promotion of public awareness, personnel exchanges, experience sharing and law enforcement.

Appreciating the progress of the joint study on the economic impact of a free trade agreement (FTA) conducted by

their respective research institutes, the three countries will explore, in a timely manner, the direction of a closer future economic partnership among the three countries.

To facilitate trade and investment as well as to promote exchange of people in Northeast Asia, the three countries will promote existing dialogue and cooperation with a view to developing international civil air transport among the aeronautical authorities of the three countries.

The three countries recognize the importance of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) for the enhancement of each domestic economy and welcome the various efforts that have been made for the promotion of IFDI. They confirm their intention to take further steps to promote IFDI including addressing specific issues raised by their investors in a fair and transparent manner. In this light, they will launch an informal joint study on the possible modality of trilateral investment arrangements.

The three countries will make full use of the existing bilateral and trilateral consultations while strengthening exchange of information and prior consultations so as to minimize the possibility of any trade dispute.

2. Cooperation among information and communication technology (ICT) industries.

The three countries will enhance, as a priority, exchange and cooperation in broadband communications, mobile communications and e-business. They will continue to advance high-tech communication R&D and promote

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exchanges in such areas as new generation communications network and the third generation mobile communications. They will also expand the application of ICT in all sectors of society while ensuring its security. Meanwhile the three countries will seek to play a positive role in building a broadband network throughout Asia, accelerate the development of internet industry and facilitate the flow of information within Asia.

3. Cooperation in environmental protection. The three countries will, under various frameworks such as the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM), intensify cooperation in addressing common environment concerns, such as dust and sandstorms and their monitoring and early warning, acid deposition monitoring, air, water and marine pollution, and climate change. They will also expand exchange and cooperation in green industries and technology and facilitate dialogue and cooperation on water resources management, forest conservation, reforestation and conservation of biodiversity. In order to promote sustainable development, the three countries will strengthen consultations and cooperation on major regional and global environmental issues.
4. Cooperation in disaster prevention and management. The three countries will promote cooperation and dialogue in this field with a view to preventing or mitigating the damage from disasters such as storms, typhoons, floods and earthquakes.
5. Cooperation in energy. The three countries will expand their mutually

beneficial cooperation in the field of energy and work together to strengthen regional and global energy security.

6. Financial cooperation. To promote financial stability in the region, the three countries will continue to strengthen dialogue on economic policies and implement the Chiang Mai Initiative. They will deepen regional financial cooperation in the future, including the exploration of the possibility of establishing a regional financing and stability mechanism and developing the regional bond market. The three countries will strengthen their cooperation and coordination in international financial institutions with a view to attaining well-balanced economic development in the region and the Millennium Development Goals.
7. Cooperation in science and technology. The three countries will promote and facilitate scientific and technological cooperation at various levels, including in such areas as succeeding in ITER Project, to strengthen capacities to deal with issues of common concern and advance new technologies with a view to opening up new industry sectors.
8. Cooperation in tourism. The three countries will further boost the tourism industry, encouraging expansion of tourism among the three countries through appropriate measures, and strengthen exchange and cooperation among tourism authorities and industries in such areas as development of tourism infrastructure and circular tours going around the three countries for residents outside of the three countries, for example, residents of Europe or North America.

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9. Cooperation in fishery resource conservation. The three countries will cooperate, bilaterally or trilaterally, to promote the sustainable use and conservation of fishery resources through effective fishery management.

- IV -

10. For the purpose of enhancing mutual understanding and trust and expanding diverse channels for exchanges for better trilateral cooperation in the future, the three countries will strengthen cooperation in a variety of areas, such as people-to-people contacts, culture, education and human resources development, news media, public health and sports.

The three countries will continue to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges to increase contacts among youth and young leaders. They will also vigorously develop cultural exchange and cooperation to enhance cooperation in such areas as the preservation and development of tangible and intangible cultural heritage, cultural diversity and dialogue among civilizations.

The three countries will continue to support the tripartite cooperation in the field of education. They will enhance cooperation to expand student exchanges among their institutions of higher education, promote mutual institutions' recognition of academic records, degrees and credits, and encourage language teaching and cultural exchange among the three countries.

The three countries will encourage communication and cooperation among

their media organizations through joint seminars or in other forms with close communication among the three governments.

The three countries will expand exchange and cooperation among local governments by arranging sister cities among the three countries or by other means.

For the enhancement of mutual understanding and friendship among their peoples, the three countries will encourage diversified forms of exchange and cooperation among the sports communities of the three countries such as organizing football and table tennis matches.

- V -

11. The three countries will strengthen cooperation in international affairs and continue to support the core role of the United Nations in maintaining world peace and stability. They will promote dialogue and consultations on UN related issues, including the strengthening and reforms of the UN.
12. The three countries will make concerted efforts to press ahead with Asian regional cooperation in various forms. They will step up the process of implementing the measures put forward in the Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, promote the 10+3 cooperation in the direction of East Asia cooperation, and support ASEAN's key role in this process. They will further enhance cooperation within such mechanisms as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).

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13. The three countries will strengthen security dialogue and facilitate exchange and cooperation among the defense or military personnel of the three countries.

The three countries will strengthen exchange of views and cooperation in disarmament, as well as prevent and curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, based on international regimes, through political, diplomatic and administrative measures including effective export controls, while recognizing the importance of complying with the related international norms.

The three countries reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue facing the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while addressing all the concerns of the parties and working together to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula.

14. The three countries will reinforce their cooperation in preventing infectious diseases including Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and combating crimes and terrorism, sea piracy, people smuggling, trafficking in illegal drugs and related crimes, money laundering, international economic crimes, cyber-crimes and other transnational crimes through effective cooperation among their respective authorities.

to have a wide range of channels for an effective tripartite cooperation. Accordingly, we decided to hold our summit meetings continuously. We will support the effective operation of on-going meetings at the ministerial level in foreign affairs, economy and trade, finance, environmental protection, information and telecommunications, and patents, and endeavor to hold similar meetings in other areas. We also decided to set up a three-party committee to study, plan, coordinate and monitor the cooperation activities currently under way or envisaged by this Joint Declaration. The committee will submit progress reports to the annual summit meeting.

WEN Jiabao
Premier of the State Council
People's Republic of China

KOIZUMI Junichiro
Prime Minister
Japan

ROH Moo-hyun
President
Republic of Korea

Signed at Bali, Indonesia this 7th day
of October 2003 in tripartite in the English
language.

- VI -

WE, the Leaders of China, Japan and
Korea shared the view that it was essential

*Source: The official website of the Association
of Southeast Asia Nations at
<http://www.aseansec.org/15285.htm>*

Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the ASEAN and the People's Republic of China on strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, on 8 October, 2003

- 1 -

We, the Heads of State/Government of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the People's Republic of China have reviewed the development of bilateral relationship in recent years. We agree that since the issuance of the Joint Statement of the Meeting of the Heads of State/Government of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the President of the People's Republic of China in 1997, the relationship between ASEAN and China has seen rapid, comprehensive and in-depth growth and ASEAN and China have become important partners of cooperation.

a. Politically, our two sides respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and their independent choice of development path. Guided by the spirit of the Joint Statement of the Meeting of the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the President of the People's Republic of China in 1997, China has signed separately with the ten ASEAN countries political

documents aimed at development of bilateral relations in the 21st century. In October 2003, China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which demonstrated that the political trust between the two sides notably enhanced.

- b. Economically, the two sides have strengthened contacts and exchanges for mutually complementary and beneficial cooperation. Cooperation in the five priority areas: agriculture, information and telecommunications, human resources development, two-way investment and the Mekong River Basin development, has made steady progress. In 2002, the two sides signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China, launched the process towards an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and moved bilateral economic cooperation towards greater scope and depth.
- c. In security, ASEAN and China have worked to actively implement the concept of enhancing mutual trust

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through dialogue, resolving disputes peacefully through negotiations and realizing regional security through cooperation. With a view to securing peace and stability in South China Sea, the two sides signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and agreed to work on the basis of consensus towards the eventual attainment of this objective. The two sides have issued the Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, under which active cooperation on transnational issues has been conducted, opening new areas of security cooperation.

- d. In regional and international affairs, ASEAN and China have engaged in productive cooperation. The two sides have joined hands in promoting the sound development of the ASEAN Plus Three cooperation, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) and other regional and trans-regional cooperation mechanisms. The two sides have good communication and cooperation on issues of mutual interest and concern and have rendered each other support and cooperation in the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and other international organizations with mutual understanding.

- 2 -

We are pleased with the depth and scope of the mutually beneficial cooperation between the two sides. We agree that ASEAN-China relations have seen important and positive developments, extensive and substantive cooperation in all areas of mutual interest. We highlight the strategic importance of ASEAN-China relations to peace, development and cooperation in our region and recognize the positive contribution of such relations to world peace and development.

- 3 -

In today's world that is undergoing complex and profound changes, the enhanced cooperation between ASEAN and China, as two important partners in the Asia-Pacific region, will serve the immediate and long-term interests of both sides and is conducive to peace and prosperity in the region. To this end, we agree that ASEAN and China establish "a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity".

- 4 -

We declare that the purpose of the establishment of a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity is to foster friendly relations, mutually beneficial cooperation and good neighbourliness between ASEAN and China by deepening and expanding ASEAN-China cooperative relations in a comprehensive

**Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the ASEAN
and the People's Republic of China on strategic Partnership
for Peace and Prosperity**

manner in the 21st century, thereby contributing further to the region's long-term peace, development and cooperation. This strategic partnership is non-aligned, non-military, and non-exclusive, and does not prevent the participants from developing their all-directional ties of friendship and cooperation with others.

- 5 -

We reiterate that ASEAN-China cooperation will continue to take the UN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized norms governing international relations as its guidance, and the Joint Statement of the Meeting of the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the People's Republic of China in 1997 and other cooperation documents the two sides have signed in various fields as its basis.

- 6 -

We agree that ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity is a comprehensive and forward-looking cooperation focusing on politics, economy, social affairs, security and international and regional affairs. To this end, we agree to:

1. Political Cooperation

- a. Strengthen high-level exchanges and contacts, consolidate and deepen understanding and friendship among the peoples of ASEAN and China and give fuller and more effective play to

the role of dialogue and consultation mechanism at different levels.

- b. Proceed from the new starting point of China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia to further enhance mutual trust and lay a solid foundation for bilateral relations.
- c. Continue consultation on China's intention to accede to the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

2. Economic Cooperation

- a. Give full play to the respective strength of their markets and maintain the rapidly growing momentum of their economic relations and trade in order to achieve the goal of US\$100 billion of two-way annual trade by 2005.
- b. Speed up talks on ASEAN-China FTA, which has become a key pillar in ASEAN-China economic cooperation, so as to ensure its smooth establishment by 2010, and hereby assist ASEAN's new members (CLMV) to effectively participate in and benefit from the ASEAN-China FTA.
- c. Deepen cooperation in key areas, such as agriculture, information and telecommunications, human resources development, two-way investment and the Mekong River Basin development, and earnestly implement long and medium-term cooperation programmes.
- d. Support each other's endeavour for economic growth and development. China undertakes to strongly support ASEAN's drive in narrowing down the development gap and to assist the new

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members in the exercise. To this end, China shall increase its input in the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and support cooperation at sub-regional level, including the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), West-East Corridor (WEC), and the Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam Growth Triangle. ASEAN is prepared to participate in China's western region development.

3. Social Cooperation

- a. Implement the consensus of the Special ASEAN-China Leaders' Meeting on SARS, which was held in April 2003, such as strengthening cooperation in the public health sector. A 10+1 special fund for health cooperation will be set up and the 10+1 Health Ministers meeting mechanism will be launched.
- b. Further activate exchanges in science and technology, environment, education, and culture as well as personnel exchange, and improve cooperation mechanisms in these areas. Efforts will also be made to enhance tourism cooperation and deepen understanding and friendship between the peoples of their countries.
- c. Attach importance to and strengthen youth exchanges and cooperation and establish a 10+1 Youth Ministers meeting mechanism to broaden the base for everlasting friendship.

4. Security Cooperation

- a. Expedite the implementation of the Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues

and actively expand and deepen cooperation in such areas.

- b. Hold, when appropriate, ASEAN-China security-related dialogue to enhance mutual understanding and promote peace and security in the region.
- c. Implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, discuss and plan the way, areas and projects of follow-up actions.

5. Regional and International Cooperation

- a. Cooperate on major regional and international issues for the maintenance of regional peace and stability, while maintaining the authority and central role of the UN.
- b. Maintain close coordination and cooperation under the framework of ARF and promote its healthy development. China supports ASEAN's role as the primary driving force of the ARF and its commitment to move the overlapping stages of ARF at a pace comfortable to all.
- c. Make the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism as the main channel to move forward cooperation and regional economic integration in East Asia and Asia as a whole so as to promote sustainable development and common prosperity there.
- d. Further promote ACD, APEC, ASEM, FEALAC and other regional and trans-regional cooperation schemes.
- e. Work for free and fair trade worldwide as well as a well-balanced development of economic globalization. China strongly supports an early WTO membership for Lao PDR and Viet Nam.

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- f. Respect the diversity in the Asia Pacific, particularly the differences in development path, security concern, values, culture and traditions of the countries in the region. Work jointly to create an environment of tolerance and openness for cooperation and development in the region.
- g. Have a periodic review of the present Joint Declaration when necessary,

taking into due consideration the dynamic development in the region and in the world.

Done on the Eighth Day of October in the Year Two Thousand and Three in Bali, Indonesia.

For Brunei Darussalam
HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH
Sultan of Brunei Darussalam

For the People's Republic of China
WEN JIABAO
Premier of the State Council

For the Kingdom of Cambodia
SAMDECH HUN SEN
Prime Minister

For the Republic of Indonesia
MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI
President

For the Lao People's Democratic Republic
BOUNNHANG VORACHITH
Prime Minister

For Malaysia
DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD
Prime Minister

For the Union of Myanmar
GENERAL KHIN NYUNT
Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President

**Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the ASEAN
and the People's Republic of China on strategic Partnership
for Peace and Prosperity**

For the Republic of Singapore
GOH CHOK TONG
Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand
DR. THAKSIN SHINAWATRA
Prime Minister

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
PHAN VAN KHAI
Prime Minister

*Source: The official website of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations at
<http://www.aseansec.org/15266.htm>*



Web Links on Europe and Asia

Timely and up-to-date information is a necessity for policy-makers and researchers. In an increasingly information-dependent world, the Internet is an unsurpassed medium for rapid dissemination of news. The following is a compilation of websites that offer invaluable insights and timely information on Southeast Asian issues and Asia-Europe relations.

ASEAN Secretariat

<http://www.asean.or.id>

The homepage of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat, this site provides information on the latest ASEAN meetings as well as archived documents.

Asia Daily

<http://www.asiadaily.com>

Part of the World News Network, Asia Daily offers news pertaining to Asia as well as links to the various Asian news sites.

Asia-Inc

<http://www.asia-inc.com>

Asia-Inc is a monthly regional business magazine targeted mainly at Asian executives, with emphasis on business news in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia. The website offers articles featured in its

publication, which give insights into the Asian business community.

Asia News Network

<http://www.asianewsnet.net>

Established with support from Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the Asia News Network (ANN) website offers news updates and commentaries from 13 major dailies in Southeast Asia who are members of ANN.

Asia Source

<http://www.asiasource.org>

A project of the US-based Asia Society, Asia Source provides information on various aspects of Asia, such as arts and culture, business and economics, policy and government and social issues. It also offers access to information by experts and also links to pages that focus on Asian lifestyle, education and statistics.

Asia-Europe Foundation

<http://www.asef.org>

The Asia-Europe Foundation was established by the members of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) on 15 February 1997 with the objective of promoting better mutual understanding between the peoples of Asia and Europe through greater intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges between the two regions. The

Web Links on Europe and Asia

website provides a listing of the activities and events of the Foundation as well as speeches delivered at ASEF events, media articles, press releases and book reviews with special interest in Asia and Europe.

The Asia Society

<http://www.asiasociety.org>

The Asia Society is an American non-profit, non-partisan educational organisation dedicated to fostering understanding of Asia and communication between Americans and the peoples of the Asia and the Pacific. The website features details of the events organised by the Society, the speeches delivered and a selection of the Society's publications.

BBC News Asia Pacific

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific>

Part of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Internet network, this site is updated daily with top stories from the Asia-Pacific region.

CNN Interactive – World Regions - Asia Pacific

<http://edition.cnn.com/ASIA>

Part of the Cable News Network (CNN) online news portal, this site is updated daily with the top stories from the region. It also has links to other media such as TIME magazine and The New

York Times belonging to parent company AOL Time Warner.

The East-West Center

<http://www.eastwestcenter.org>

The East-West Center is an education and research organisation that helps promote the establishment of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific community. It is a source of information and analysis about the Asia-Pacific Region, including the United States. Some 2,000 scholars, government and business leaders, educators, journalists and other professionals from throughout the region work with Center staff annually to address issues of contemporary significance.

European Institute for Asian Studies

<http://www.eias.org>

The European Institute for Asian Studies is Brussels' research and policy think tank analysing political, economic and security relations between the European Union and Asia. The Institute is particularly concerned with developing the European Committee's relations with the countries of South and Southeast Asia that have grouped themselves into regional associations, such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the ASEAN. The EIAS web site contains information about the Institute, details of their seminars and research programmes as well as a list of related websites.

The European Union Online

<http://www.europa.eu.int>

The server of the European Union provides access to the homepages of the EU institutions with news, press releases and on-line documentation of EU meetings in several European languages.

Far Eastern Economic Review

<http://www.feer.com>

The online version of the weekly magazine on Asia's economic and business news. It contains some of the stories and features carried in the magazine. FEER also offers a free e-mail news service which is a digest of the major features carried on their website.

German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

<http://www.dgap.org/english/summary.htm>

The main goals of the German Society for Foreign Affairs (DGAP) are: to stimulate interest in international questions, to promote worldwide scholarly cooperation, and hence to increase understanding between nations. The DGAP was founded in 1955 as an independent, non-partisan, non-profit association. Its aims, organisation, and mode of financing are similar to those of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and the Royal Institute of

International Affairs (Chatham House) in London.

Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)

<http://www.iseas.edu.sg>

Established in 1968, ISEAS is a regional research centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The ISEAS website provides details of its research programmes as well as a full catalogue of publications.

Nouriel Roubini's Global Macroeconomic and Financial Policy Site

<http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro>

The homepage of Nouriel Roubini, Associate Professor of Economics and International Business in the Stern School of Business, New York University, and Presidential Economic Advisor. It contains detailed reading materials on the Asian Economic Crisis, policy papers and links to other useful resources on the subject of economics.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

<http://www.oecd.org>

The OECD has an exclusive membership of 30 developed economies

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that share a commitment to democratic government and the market economy. Since its establishment three decades ago, OECD has moved beyond a focus on its own members to embrace the entire global economy, with active

relationships with some 70 other countries, NGOs and civil societies. Its website contains an on-line bookshop that contains the policy studies undertaken by the OECD as well as details of the workshops.



FRANK UMBACH studies how the concept papers from the European Union (EU) have been increasingly emphasising on security cooperation with Asia. In particular, he compares the major EU-Asia concept papers from 1994 to 2003 that are concerned with the issue of security cooperation between the two regions, as well as future cooperation fields. His paper also gives some insights into interregional anti-terrorist cooperation between Europe and Southeast Asia.

CÉSAR DE PRADO YEPES explores if the rise of the ASEAN+3 regionalisation process is attributable to a convergent foreign policy. The paper introduces the main interregional processes of East Asia with other parts of the world and focuses on the case of ASEAN+3 countries' foreign policy evolution towards Europe. Preliminary research results indicate that indeed the region's countries have started a path of convergence towards Europe.

ERIC TEO CHU CHEOW examines how the social and political upheavals caused by the 1997 Asian Crisis in Southeast Asia have led to a change in social order. He observes how the shifts in the social and civic arena and the political field that will impact on the re-negotiation of the *contrat social*. He also points on various risks and complications like history, religion and ethnicity that may pose problems for the re-negotiation process. He stresses that the stability that emanates from sound economic distribution and social re-distribution is key to the ongoing re-negotiation of the *contrat social*.

MANFRED MOLS discusses the phenomenon of the Asianisation of Asia which serves as an affirmation of an Asian identity in the midst of globalisation. He gives several perspectives in examining the process of Asianisation, including in the field of political science, the formation of an epistemic community, the Asian value debate, as well as the effect of external federators that are "pro-Asianisation".



PANORAMA

◆ MAIN TOPICS

How SARS has changed Singapore in a Third Wave of Transformation
Eric Teo Chu Cheow

The Fight against Terrorism in Southeast Asia after the American War in Iraq
Noel M. Morada

Corruption and Development Aid
Yeo Lay Hwee

Current Foreign Aid Policy of Korea and its Problems
Kwon, Wul

◆ BOOK REVIEW

Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape
Reviewed by Sharon Siddique

◆ DOCUMENTS

Information Paper on the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement

◆ WEB LINKS

Informative websites on Europe and Southeast Asia



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◆ MAIN TOPICS

Proceedings of the 5th EU-ASEAN Think Tank Dialogue
Prepared by Yeo Lay Hwee, Chang Li Liu and Plamen Tachev

Marking the Passage to Southeast Asian Economic Community in the Vastness of Globalisation
Djisman S. Semandjuntak

Political and Security Cooperation within ASEAN: Increased Opportunity for EU's Participation
Carolina G. Hernandez

The European Convention and Enlargement: Opportunities for ASEAN
Jürgen Rüland

EU-ASEAN Relations: A Frustrated Partnership
Dick Gupwell

◆ DOCUMENTS

A New Partnership with Southeast Asia – Communication from the European Commission

Executive Summary of the ASEAN Roundtable 2003: Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community – Summary of report by Denis Hew, ISEAS.

Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)

Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan Partnership in the New Millennium

◆ WEB LINKS

Informative websites on Europe and Southeast Asia