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Ambitious plans, difficult implementation

An interim review of the European migration and refugee policy

Christina Krause | Olaf Wientzek

Key Points

- The highest number of refugees worldwide was recorded in 2016 – a rapid decline is not to be expected. For that reason, migration and refugee protection will continue to preoccupy the EU.
- Since the beginning of the migration and refugee crisis, the EU has made considerable progress with short-term crisis management in particular. The creation of the European Border and Coast Guard, hotspots as well as the cooperation with third countries, can be considered as successes.
- The measures adopted over the past few years have bought the EU some time. It is imperative that this time is used now to determine long-term reforms beyond short-term crisis management.
- First and foremost, there is a need for agreement on how to reform the Common European Asylum System. The concerns of the various states must be taken into account. Yet, this does not alter the fact that a binding mechanism for the distribution of asylum seekers is essential.
- The upcoming EU financial framework must provide far more resources for migration policy – in particular also for the control of external borders.

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More people on the
move worldwide

Migratory pressure
remains high

The debate about the European migration and refugee policy shows no signs of coming to an end, neither at the EU level nor within the member states, although, the migration figures have dramatically decreased, the administrative chaos is resolved and humanitarian emergencies are overcome. Where does the EU stand now? What is the strategy of the EU three years after the migration and refugee crisis? What are the current and future challenges and is the EU prepared for them?

This paper explains the global context, depicts the specific challenges facing the European Union, analyses the existing system – with a focus on the most recent reforms – and illustrates shortcomings. Finally, the paper formulates short- and medium-term policy recommendations.

Global framework: Worldwide increase in migrants and refugees

The number of migrants across the globe has continued to increase since 2000, and hence the urgency for “safe, orderly and regular” international migration policies.¹ At the same time, the number of people in need of protection has also rapidly increased. The highest number of refugees and internally-displaced persons was recorded in 2016.² In fact, the number of those in need of protection almost doubled from 33.9 million to 65.6 million between 1997 and 2016 alone. While the majority are internally displaced persons – currently at around 40.3 million – the number of those, who leave their country, in search of protection, has also increased. Today, Turkey is the main host country with roughly three million refugees. On the basis of their population size and economic strength, Lebanon (with 1.5 million refugees among a population of 4.4 million) and Jordan (with 740,000 refugees among a population of 9.4 million), bear the greatest responsibility.

Given that migration and search for refuge now affect almost all countries around the world, in September 2016 the United Nations – at the first UN Summit for refugees and migrants – adopted the New York Declaration and launched two global processes, the global compacts, to establish new framework conditions.³ On the one hand refugee protection is to be granted faster, more effective and with greater solidarity. At the other hand an agreement about human rights standards for migrants is being negotiated.

European challenges – Figures and facts

The impact of war and conflict in the Near and Middle East was clearly felt in the European Union even before 2015. As of 2011 there was not only an increase in irregular border crossings, but also in applications for asylum. The main countries of origin were Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The rate of granting refugee status was high: In 2016, over 700,000 applications for asylum were approved throughout the EU.

Even though the crises in the EU’s neighbourhood are not overcome, the migratory pressure from the region remains high and human mobility unpredictable, European politicians have taken steps to successfully address irregular migration over the past few years. Due to these measures, the number of irregular border crossings started to decrease sharply in 2016. With some delay, this development is also evident in the number of asylum applications.

Irregular border crossings and asylum applications in the EU 2012 - 2017

Year	2012	2014	2015	2016	2017
Irregular border crossings	72,500	282,900	1.8 million	511,600	201,300
Asylum applications	335,290	626,960	1.3 million	1.2 million	685,000

Sources: Eurostat and Frontex

In 2017, the central Mediterranean route – via Libya to Italy – was the primary route for irregular migration into the EU. That’s why EU migration policy is increasingly focussing on Africa. Here, political instability, poverty and lack of prospects coincide with high population growth, which suggests that migration will continue to rise. By contrast, since April 2016, migration via Turkey – after closing the West Balkan route and the EU-Turkey Agreement – has significantly decreased.

Arrivals via the Mediterranean

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
People	59,000	56,252	9,654	70,402	22,439

Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
People	59,421	216,054	1,015,078	362,753	171,332

Source: UNHCR

European migration and refugee policy – Structures, instruments, formats

In recent years, a great deal of work and energy has been invested in the new European migration agenda, and considerable progress achieved, which is worth highlighting. The EU’s response to the crisis are internal reforms, better protection of its external borders, increased cooperation with host and transit countries as well as a policy to combat the causes of displacement.⁴

However the starting point for this policy area was the establishment of the EU Single Market. The abolishment of internal borders and the construction of the common area of freedom, security and justice lead to the start of joint (external) border control measures as well as the cooperation in immigration and asylum policies. Over the past years competences were increasingly transferred from the member states to the EU. Hence, the trajectory of the Common European Asylum System is one of ever deeper cooperation.

The Common European Asylum System, CEAS: A question of solidarity and fairness

Since 1993, the Common European Asylum System, CEAS, has been negotiated in six legal documents – talks are currently underway, which will lead to a third generation of legal framework. This means that slowly but surely these policy areas are being harmonized throughout the EU.⁵

Six elements of the Common European Asylum System

The Eurodac and Dublin Regulations – which established the taking of fingerprints for comparable registration, as well as clarifies the responsibility of the member states for asylum procedures – were the first elements of the CEAS. In addition to this, four directives were passed on 1. temporary protection, 2. admission standards, 3. asylum procedures and 4. qualification for a protection status. Since asylum law varied significantly in the steadily growing EU, the first step was to lay down a coherent framework, fundamental instruments and minimum standards. The right to asylum and the protection against refoulement – in the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention – formed and form the normative core of the system.

A decisive obstacle in the implementation of CEAS was and still is the fact that the member states on the external borders bear most of the responsibility for asylum seekers, asylum procedures and the recognised refugees. This imbalance, which is inherent in the design of the Dublin Regulation, resulted in none or only sporadic registration on the external borders. Capacities (reception centres) and competences (asylum agencies), have been neglected. It was precisely this policy of looking away that led to the development, dynamisation and intensification of the crisis in 2015 and 2016. Even today, the Common European Asylum System continues to be characterised by a lack of solidarity and fairness: The unequal distribution of asylum seekers and the great disparities in the status determination procedures remain a big problem.

Continued disagreement about the distribution of asylum seekers

However, the EU institutions are working intensively towards rectifying these structural deficits. The main challenge remains the reform of the Dublin Regulation and agreeing on a distribution mechanism. The European Commission's proposal dated May 2016 provides for such a fixed distribution key for asylum seekers while simultaneously sanctioning those member states who abstain. The proposal foresees relocation from the country of first entry to other EU member states on a voluntary basis once 150% of the quota has been reached.⁶ The sanctions work like this: Countries that do not accept asylum seekers (although the key provides for it), are to pay a "solidarity contribution" amounting to 250,000 Euro for each person (that will not be accepted). This proposal is highly controversial; Central Eastern European countries deem it to be too excessive, whereas for other EU countries it is not far-reaching enough. In October 2017, the European Parliament advocated further steps: Member states that are reached first, are to be responsible for identification and registration as well as a security check, but not for all asylum procedures. Instead, following a preliminary consultation process, asylum seekers are to be distributed to the member states in accordance with a negotiated distribution key. In light of what are still highly divergent positions, a number of EU council presidencies have sought to find common ground, most recently the Estonian and later the Bulgarian EU Presidency. The Estonian provides for a mixture of voluntary admission and binding financial assistance. Moving from an obligatory to a more voluntary scheme however continues to be firmly opposed by the Southern EU member states.

Therefore, essential steps towards developing and standardising the CEAS still lie ahead. Yet the EUs achievements must not be underestimated. Where else in the world do states work so closely together when it comes to migration and asylum policies?

The European Border and Coast Guard

Rapid creation of the European Border and Coast Guard

One of the measures on which the EU reached a relatively quick consensus was the expansion of the EU border agency Frontex into a European Border and Coast Guard. The new European Border and Coast Guard signifies a clear improvement in respect to finance, personnel and competencies. Currently there are more than 1,400 border officials in operation within the scope of the European Border and Coast Guard. Additionally a reserve of 1,500 border guards for emergency situations was set up. One of the new tasks includes the assistance of the EU member states with return operations. That is a novum! E.g. in 2017, the European Border and Coast Guard assisted with over 12,000 returns. Closer cooperation with the non-EU countries in the Western Balkans was also agreed. Furthermore, the border guard gained additional competences, in particular for combating and preventing cross-border crime. It can now process data from those persons suspected of being involved in criminal activities such as smuggling of migrants, terrorism or human trafficking.

Commitments regarding staff and equipment for the European Border and Coast Guard have yet to be fulfilled.

There are shortfalls nonetheless: The coordination of return measures with member states still leaves space for improvement. Furthermore some member states still fail to honour their commitments especially as regards the pool of staff for the new emergency force. Bulgaria would need more assistance, that is, a far higher number of border guards. Even more serious are the gaps in equipment, which is why at the start of 2018, the European Commission once again urgently requested that member states keep their promises.

A strengthened EU external border protection requires much higher funds

The expectations of the Border and Coast Guard should not grow beyond measure: 1,500 European border guards cannot replace the national border guards, but are at best a selective addition to their work. Most of the work is still carried out by the member states and a total number of over 100,000 national border guards.⁷ In the long term, the Border and Coast Guard should have significantly more personnel (the Commission suggests up to 10.000 in 2027) and should have an own standing pool of border guards at its disposal.⁸

Complementary instruments for controlling border crossings: Eurodac, ETIAS, entry and exit system

Various additional reforms aimed at improving the control of borders are nearing completion; an important proposal has already been accepted. This includes:

- The reform of the so-called Eurodac Regulation, which records asylum seekers' digital fingerprints and biometric data. Law enforcement authorities are to gain better access to the database here. However, the European Parliament and the member states continue to disagree about how long data should be stored. An agreement is however to be expected relatively soon.
- The creation of a European Travel Information and Authorisation System, ETIAS, which records data about all non-EU citizens who can travel to Europe without a visa is about to be decided. This will help to prevent irregular migration and provide more accurate data.
- The entry and exit system adopted on 20 November 2017 makes it possible to register the movement of non-EU citizens and in doing so, to ensure better monitoring of short stays in the EU. This system will help to improve the efficiency of border controls and to uncover fraudulent documents. At the same time it will be

easier to identify those who exceed their stay. However, the new system is not expected to be ready for operation until 2020.⁹

Sea rescue and the fight against smugglers and human traffickers

Rescued over
280,000 migrants
in distress at sea
since 2015

The efforts of the EU – not least by means of CSDP missions and the European Border and Coast Guard – have helped to rescue over 280,000 migrants in distress at sea since 2016. As a result of the closer cooperation with Niger (CSDP mission in Niger and Mali) and the closer cooperation with the Sahel countries, it was also possible to rescue 1,100 migrants from the Sahara. What’s more, since its launch in June 2015, the mission to combat people smuggling has arrested 100 smugglers and seized financial assets in 500 cases.

Sea rescue is, however, afflicted by dilemmas like no other area. This is because human traffickers and smugglers exploit rescue missions as pull factors to provoke people to cross the sea on unsafe routes and unseaworthy boats. Therefore, the EU in cooperation with Italy has been searching for alternatives over the past few months. Awareness campaigns in countries such as Niger, which deter people from embarking on the dangerous journey to Libya as well as work carried out by the international organisations, IOM and UNHCR, have a positive impact on this. To date, though, the training and provision of equipment to the Libyan coast guard has developed along a negative trajectory because the guard – owing to arbitrary practices – so far has aggravated the risk to human life during the journey. Difficult as it is, there is no alternative to cooperating with the Libyan coast guard in the medium-term. But the first priority of the EU must be to help stabilise the country.

Main country of transit
Libya: Instability
and the business of
people smuggling

Migration via Libya is closely connected with the political vacuum. Yet, it is not the Libyans but rather the migrants – who have for decades been attracted as guest workers by the oil rich country – that are now leaving. At present, some 600,000 migrants are said to be living in Libya. It is believed that around 5,000 people are currently being unlawfully detained in 29 camps under inhuman conditions. Since 2017, the International Organisation for Migration, IOM, has taken steps to safely repatriate migrants in general but also help those who are detained in camps. In 2017 IOM assisted the voluntary return and reintegration of some 19,300 people from Libya. In the current year, up to 30,000 people are to be supported. But not everyone will be able to return. By February 2018 UNHCR registered over 46,700 refugees and asylum seekers in Libya – including 22,000 Syrians. The UN Refugee Agency pursues two approaches: 1. Protection through humanitarian visas (via direct evacuation schemes from Libya – this is how 161 people directly reached Italy in December 2017, for instance), and 2. Protection through resettlement to safe third countries.

Hotspots

Registration quota
in Greece and Italy
close to 100 per cent
due to hotspots

In 2015, with the arrival of up to 15,000 migrants in Greece and Italy each day, the EU created hotspots – at the points of entry – as preliminary reception and registration centres. At these hotspots, national institutions cooperate closely with the EU authorities Frontex, EASO (European Asylum Support Office), Europol (European Police Office) and Eurojust (EU agency for judicial cooperation). This close and intensive cooperation of various national institutions and EU actors in one location was an innovation in itself, and led to an increase in efficiency. The registration quotas in Greece and Italy are now close to 100 per cent.

At the hotspots at first, the identification and registration of the migrants is carried out. The second step enables migrants to apply for asylum. If an application is approved, the refugee is either integrated in the host country or relocated (for integration) to another EU country. If an application is rejected, a legal appeal is possible before voluntary repatriation or deportation become necessary. That is the theory. However in practice, standards are often not complied with when it comes to conditions of admission, legal assistance or the duration of the proceedings, for instance.¹⁰

Despite the strong commitment of the EU and many of its member states,¹¹ the hotspots need to be improved as a matter of urgency. A distinction must be made between the situations in Greece and Italy: It is true that both countries continue to need financial and personnel support – in addition to solidarity when the relocation of asylum seekers and refugees is concerned – but in the case of Greece, the main issue is the practical and lawful implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement as well as overcoming the humanitarian plight at the hotspots. Since Greece is unable to master the situation alone, the EU continues to be called upon to help.

Although many aspects of the hotspot system are not ideal as of yet, this model should continue to be enhanced and fine-tuned. It is precisely this cooperation that could provide the necessary impetus for developing the European Asylum System.

Cooperation with third countries

The last few years not only bore witness to important developments of the European migration and asylum policy, an EU foreign policy on migration also emerged during this time. This is dedicated to 1. The immediate neighbour states (especially Turkey) 2. The neighbouring region, Middle East and Maghreb (countries such as Jordan or Libya), 3. Important transit countries (such as Niger) and finally, 4. Countries of origin (for example Senegal and Ghana).

Since 2015, the EU and its member states have provided substantial funds and applied political leverage for the purpose of controlling migration. Here are three examples:

The EU-Turkey Agreement

Scarcely any agreement has been subject to as much criticism as the EU-Turkey Agreement dated 18 March 2016. Only a few saw it as an opportunity to reinvigorate EU-Turkey relations. In reality, both sides have benefited from cooperation in the refugee policy – but some things need to be improved.

In 2015, almost 900,000 people reached the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean route and thus through Turkey. Many of them then travelled onwards to Germany, including a large number of asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Up to 15,000 people per day crossed the Aegean Sea during October 2015. However, since the EU-Turkey Agreement entered into force on 20 March the number of irregular migrants has significantly decreased: While over 210,000 people arrived in Greece in October 2015, the number dropped to 31,000 in 2016 and to approx. 14,000 in October 2017.¹² With the help of the EU-Turkey Agreement, it was therefore possible to virtually bring the flourishing “business” of human trafficking in the Aegean to a standstill.

The agreement is largely based – besides the aims for rapprochement with the EU – on five components: 1. Determining a deadline after which migrants without a need for protection are repatriated to Turkey, 2. A 1:1 mechanism whereby a rejected

Situation at the hotspots is in urgent need of improvement

Both sides have benefited from cooperation in the refugee policy

person from Syria (without need for protection), justifies the claim for a second person (with protection need) to be regularly accepted in the EU, 3. An effective coastal and border control by Turkey, 4. Establishing a humanitarian admission programme by the EU for Syrian refugees from Turkey and 5. Supporting Turkey financially with managing the social support for Syrian refugees by means of specific aid projects (with up to two times three billion Euro made available by the EU).

It does, however, appear necessary to amend the EU-Turkey Agreement in order to make it credible and durable. This includes creating channels for coordinating of the agreement (it would be sensible to entrust "ombudspersons" with this task), negotiating about the expenditure and use of the second tranche at an early stage, determining and complying with the resettlement quota for refugees from Turkey as well as Turkey continuing to work on developing its asylum law.

It is necessary to amend the EU-Turkey Agreement

EU-Jordan Compact

In 2016 the „Supporting Syria and the Region“-conference heralded the start of a paradigm shift in European development cooperation. This not only entailed mobilising new and significantly large amounts of financial resources, but also placing the focus of development policy on strengthening first host countries over the long-term. Hence, there was a shift away from short-term humanitarian aid in favour of sustainable development. This new approach was granted legal recognition with the EU-Jordan Compact. The Compact aims to create long-term perspectives and employment opportunities for refugees in Jordan but also for those native to the country. In addition to the pledged 747 million Euro (for the years 2016/2017), the core aspect is a trade agreement with the EU, which complements the existing Association Agreement. In principle, it is an economy- and employment-boosting measure: It facilitates the export of Jordanian products to the EU, this aims to boost the turnover of Jordanian companies and, as a result, generate more local employment. The Jordanian government is flanking the Compact with far-reaching tax concessions for companies that are established in the qualified industrial zones – in the immediate vicinity of refugee camps.

Although the Compact is to be welcomed, it does, however, exhibit conceptual weaknesses that need to be rectified so that it can have full effect. Opening up the markets and creating an employment-enhancing infrastructure are vital for improving living standards in Jordan. On the EU side, for example, restrictions on the 18 industrial zones and on the 52 product groups should be removed. In turn, Jordan would have to stop favouring nationals and generally permit refugees to take up work.¹³

EU-Jordan Compact with strengths and weaknesses

Migration partnerships

The concept of the migration partnership is new and still in the development stage; it was presented by the Commission in June 2016 and is largely focused on countries of origin of migrants in Africa. Mali, Nigeria and Senegal were identified as partnership countries in West Africa. The goal is to improve the management of migration. The EU sets the following priorities: To protect human life, to combat smuggler networks and human trafficking, to improve perspectives in the home country, to simplify the return of people without a right to remain in the EU and to create legal routes into the EU for those in need of protection or skilled workers needed in Europe.

These new partnerships aim at promoting positive developments in the countries of origin and transit, reducing migration pressures in Europe and opening up opportu-

nities for migrants. This is to be achieved by joining new forces and refocusing EU policy. Therefore, the introduction of the concept went hand in hand with the promise of making questions on migration a fundamental premise of the EU, and of deploying all EU and member states' instruments in order to better manage migration. Funds for the migration partnerships are also provided by the EU Africa Trust Fund. The Trust Fund receives more than 2.4 billion euros from the EU budget and European Development Fund, which are combined with contributions from EU member states and other donors.

Migration partnerships: A step in the right direction

It will only be possible to gauge the impact of the partnerships later down the line. Besides the actual cooperation, it will be interesting to observe the extent in which policies of EU member states can be harmonised or at least effectively coordinated.

Channels for legal migration

Legal channels into the EU are repeatedly called for in order to design an effective migration policy and to meet the demand for labour within the Union. In fact, there is already an array of legal channels into the EU from third countries. Although these channels are determined by the individual member states for the most part (such as the admission of Ukrainians in Hungary, the entry of Argentinians into Spain or the migration of Vietnamese to Germany), the EU has, however, created a regulatory framework in the area of labour migration which is currently in the reform stage. There are now five EU directives: The directives on highly-qualified persons (Blue Card), on seasonal workers, on intra-corporate transferees, on students as well as researchers and the Procedures Directive.¹⁴

Expanding the channels of legal migration

The current reform discussion mainly emphasises the „Blue Card“ for the recruitment of highly-qualified third country nationals.¹⁵ Since its introduction, it has only proven to be an effective instrument to a limited extent: Over the past few years, only 31% of the highly-qualified migrants to OECD countries decided in favour of the EU. It is therefore hardly surprising that, in June 2016, the Commission submitted a proposal which is intended to replace the current directive. The aim is to increase the attractiveness of the Blue Card. On the one hand, the new regulation aims to facilitate mobility within the EU, while extending the rights of employees and their families on the other. Furthermore, the admission procedure will be simplified. Notwithstanding negotiations between the Council and the Parliament continue to be difficult: Among other things, there is disagreement as to whether practical work experience and competencies can be recognised as a qualification. It is hoped that an agreement can be reached on this proposal by June 2018.

The European Commission has also proposed more far-reaching plans that extend beyond the Blue Card. The idea is to develop (on a voluntary basis) pilot projects for controlled and limited labour migration from those countries who have proven to be cooperative with the EU (for example as regards readmission or the prevention of illegal migration). This initiative could be interesting for some member states, such as Germany, which has 116 shortage occupations and where an increasing number of training places remain vacant. But for this to succeed, migration needs to be targeted and specifically tailored towards the actual needs.

Interim review and conclusions

On the whole, the EU has made considerable progress with the short-term crisis management in particular: Yet, several areas are still in need of improvement when it comes to the long-term viability of the Common European Asylum System. An agreement has yet to be found on a number of aspects. Hence, at the moment, the EU is not sufficiently prepared for a new migration crisis to the extent witnessed in 2015 – which cannot be ruled out in light of the global increase in migration and protection needs. The policy makers involved seem to be aware of this, however. Thus, the European institutions and the member states have set themselves a very ambitious goal: An agreement on a comprehensive reform of the European Asylum System is to be reached before the end of 2018 (ideally by the European Council June Summit). Of the 23 European Commission initiatives proposed since 2015, 13 still need to be adopted by the Council and the Parliament: A number of them (especially the proposals on reforming the CEAS such as the Dublin Regulation and the Procedures and Qualification Regulations in particular)¹⁶, are of utmost importance for the sustainability of the European migration and asylum system in the face of a future crisis.

Progress with short-term crisis management but room for improvement with long-term reforms

Even though some observers have been relatively optimistic about the prospects for a comprehensive agreement, there is still a level of scepticism: Several dossiers are fundamentally controversial. Whether a breakthrough can be achieved on all fronts over the next months remains to be seen. A final summary on the legislative period which is soon to be over will therefore only be possible in late 2018. Albeit, it is already possible to draw the following conclusions from the previous experience:

No simple solutions for a complex problem

- The crisis has illustrated the multidimensional nature of the problem: Merely focusing on internal (distribution of refugees) or on external (external border protection) measures, does not do justice to the complexity of these challenges.
- It represents a core problem of EU policy: The EU and its member states have proven themselves as crisis managers, yet it is difficult to reach a consensus on the long-term reform of asylum and migration policy.
- Patience is necessary here: Even the few measures which have been implemented very quickly, for example the creation of a European Border and Coast Guard, will need time to be fully effective: Either because member states find the implementation difficult, or because these measures will primarily have a long-term impact.
- Notwithstanding internal disputes within the EU, it has thus far shown solidarity in negotiations with the United Nations on the current negotiations of the Global Compacts on migration and refugees. It is precisely due to the withdrawal of the US, that the EU – and above all Germany – is needed to promote this new multi-lateral approach.

Recommendations for action

- More funds, up to 2-3% of the future EU financial framework, are required for border protection.
- The Common European Asylum System needs to become more stable, more united, fairer and more efficient. The expansion of the EASO into an asylum agency and the development of the hotspot approach into a mobile asylum mission, could help achieve this.

- At least a minimal compromise on the Common European Asylum System is necessary, since this would be an important signal of the EU's ability to act, particularly with respect to the European elections in 2019. In this case, those initiatives should be promoted that are less controversial and politically charged.
- The EU could also show solidarity by financially supporting EU regions that are especially committed to accepting refugees.
- Amendments to the models for co-operation with third countries (for example EU-Turkey Agreement and the EU-Jordan Compact) should be made.
- The EU should participate more strongly in the global resettlement programmes for especially vulnerable refugees from first host countries. 20 EU member states have promised 50,000 resettlement places by 2019 – however, 1.2 million places are needed worldwide.
- Migration partnerships should be tested as they can provide incentives for third countries which are willing to cooperate. The rapid implementation of other incentives, such as the EU External Investment Plan, in the countries of origin should also be aimed at. In addition, targeted legal labour migration from these countries should be taken into consideration as these could be beneficial for the EU's economy.
- The fulfilment of the member states' financial commitments in a wide range of funds (such as EU Africa Trust Fund) is necessary.
- More personnel resources for a more efficient and a better coordinated migration policy in the EU capitals should be provided.

- 1] Cf.: *United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General: "Making Migration Work for All"*, 12.12.2017
- 2] Cf.: UNHCR: „*Forced Displacement Worldwide at its Highest in Decades*“, 19.06.2017 <http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/stories/2017/6/5941561f4/forced-displacement-worldwide-its-highest-decades.html> [29.01.2018]
- 3] see. *General Assembly: "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 2016 - New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants"*, 3.10.2016 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1 [29.01.2018]
- 4] Cf. Pastore, Ferruccio: "Beyond the European Migration and Asylum Crisis – why, what now, what next?", *Aspen European Strategy Group*, December 2016
- 5] Cf.: Parusel, Bernd and Schneider, Jan: "Reforming the Common European Asylum System: Responsibility-sharing and the harmonization of asylum outcomes", *Delmi Report 2017:9*, p. 30
- 6] see. <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-270-EN-F1-1.PDF> [26.02.2018]
- 7] Cf.: EC: „*Securing Europe’s External Borders: A European Border and Coast Guard*“, September 2017
- 8] Cf. *Europäische Kommission: „Ein neuer, moderner mehrjähriger Finanzrahmen für eine Europäische Union, die ihre Prioritäten nach 2020 effizient erfüllt“*, COM (2018) COM final, 14 February 2018, Brussels.
- 9] Cf. *Council of the European Union: „Entry/Exit System“*, final approval by the Council, 20 November 2017.
- 10] see. ECRE: "The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece", 12.2016, <https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-5.12.2016..pdf> [26.02.2018]
- 11] Cf.: „*Hotspot State of Play*“, December 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_hotspots_en.pdf [04.02.2018]
- 12] see. UNHCR: „*Sea Arrivals Monthly*“, <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean> [26.02.2018]
- 13] see. Schubert, Manuel und Haase, Imke: „*So funktioniert Fluchtursachenbekämpfung – der EU-Jordan-Compact im Praxistest*“, *Auslandsinformationen*, January 2018
- 14] Cf.: Thym, Daniel: "Einwanderungsgesetzgebung: Chancen und Illusionen" in *ZAR*, 8/17, p. 302
- 15] *Germany uses the Blue Card more than any other member state. During March 2017, some 35,000 people were residing in Germany with the card. See. BAMF: „Wanderungsmonitor: Erwerbsmigration nach Deutschland – Bericht für das Jahr 2016“*, Nürnberg, June 2017, p. 27
- 16] *In 2016, the Commission decided to turn the valid guidelines of the CEAS into regulations so as to make them legally binding. Cf.: Krause, Christina and Wientzek, Olaf; „Analysen und Argumente: Lehren aus dem Stresstest. Was die EU aus der Flüchtlingskrise gelernt hat – und noch lernen muss“*, September 2016

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