



Peace and Conflict in Bolivia



Konrad
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Phill Gittins
Iván Omar Velásquez-Castellanos

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ABREVIATURAS Y ACRÓNIMOS

CAF	Corporación Andina de Fomento
CEPAL	Consejo Económico para América Latina
CPE	Constitución Política del Estado
ESM	Economía Social de Mercado
GDI	Índice Global de Paz
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
ISIS	Estado Islámico de Iraq
LTLT	Learning to Live Together
LIFP	Local infrastructures for Peace
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
OCDE	Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico
ONG	Organización No Gubernamental
ODS	Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible
ONU	Organización de Naciones Unidas
NGP	NewGen Peacebuilders
PAR	Participatory Action Research
PIB	Producto Interno Bruto
PYME	Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas
UE	Unión Europea
UN	United Nations
WW2	World War Two

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAF - ADC	Andean Development Corporation
CEPAL -ECLA	Economic Council for Latin America
CPE – PSC	Political State Constitution
ESM	Social Economy Market
GDI	Global Peace Index
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
OCDE	Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development
ONG - NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODS - SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
NNUU - UN	Organization of the United Nations
NGP	NewGen Peacebuilders
PAR	Participatory Action Research
PIB -GDP	Gross Domestic Product
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
UE - EU	European Union
NNUU - UN	United Nations
2GM - WW2	World War Two

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PRESENTATION

Freedom, justice and solidarity are the principles on which the work of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) is grounded. With our work at the international level we strive for people to live independently in freedom and with dignity. We contribute to an orientation of values so that Germany can fulfill its growing responsibility in the world.

The theme of “Peace” and the construction of dialogue for “Peace” is undoubtedly one of the important pillars of the cooperation and work of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) Bolivia Office. Latin America in general is characterized by a growing conflict in the different strata and institutions of society, empirical evidence highlights the fact that less conflictive societies have a tendency to grow more and better.

Friberg and Lederach (2012) agree that Peacebuilding is beyond state reforms that guarantee economic development, governance or access to justice; It is necessary to generate a culture based on truth and reconciliation by understanding the dispute and the culture of debate as civic weapons, not confrontation for the growth and development of the society.

Bolivia, since its return to democracy has registered a significant number of conflicts, according to several investigations, the social conflict has a defining equidistance with economic growth. In the absence of social conflict, a society is expected to have higher levels of economic growth. The presence of social conflicts such as blocking roads and disturbs, erodes the circuit of market economy. Social conflict affects business competitiveness, paralyzes the productive apparatus, increases expenses, reduces incomes, loses markets, reduces investments, increases the risk-country condition, increases unemployment and generates many other harmful effects which end up reducing economic growth.

The KAS Bolivia Office this year took the decision to elaborate a study related to Peace and to address three important issues: Peace, Conflict and Culture of Peace starting from Education, there is no such research in the national literature with these characteristics, therefore this fact highlights the importance of this publication

Finally, I would like to thank the researchers: Daniel Atahuichi, Phill Gittins Representative of NewGen Peacebuilders, Maria Soledad Quiroga coordinator of the Research Programme on Social Conflict and Democratic Communication of the UNIR Foundation and Marcelo Pacheco who are authors and contributed to this book, We would also like to thank Dr. Iván Omar Velásquez Castellanos, author and coordinator of this publication, which we hope will be of great assistance to researchers, universities and Bolivian institutions related to the theme.

November, 2016

Maximilian Hedrich
KAS Representative in Bolivia

Peace and Conflict — in Bolivia

Chapter 1

CHAPTER 1

THE PURPOSE OF THE BOOK

*It is not enough to win a war;
it is more important to organize the peace (Aristotle)*

1.1 Introduction

Peace is a matter of concern to all of us. Empirical evidence suggests that peace is correlated with growth and economic stability, while the more peaceful a country is, the better its economic performance and development. This book is about peace, conflictiveness and peace education. Its primary target audience are: those who study peace (researchers), those who make use of peace research in practical settings (practitioners), and those who commission peace research and practice (also referred to as funders, donors, or grant makers throughout). These are not mutually exclusive. For example, researchers (inside and outside of university) may engage in practice; practitioners may conduct research; and commissioners may undertake both research and practice.

Peace studies (which also goes by the name of peace and conflict studies) and peace education are fields of scholarship and practice with more than six decades of heritage. Both fields have their own theories, research tools, handbooks, journals, networks, and conferences across the world. More on peace studies, peace education and, by implication, peace will be found in the next chapter. For clarity, however, it is useful to provide some preliminary working definitions here for these key terms, which are discussed separately and together throughout the book.

Peace is viewed here as both a goal and a process, that consists of something more than the absence of war and violence. Specifically, the book makes a distinction between negative peace (absence of violence and absence of the fear of violence) and positive peace (the attitudes, institutions and structures that sustain a peaceful society) (GPI, 2016); a long-lasing theory introduced early in the history of peace studies by Johan Galtung (1964), who is widely considered a founder of the field (Webel & Galtung, 2007: xi; Webel & Johansen, 2012: 9).

Peace studies is viewed here as the theory and research needed to better understand how to move from negative to positive peace, by examining the causes of war and violence and what may be done to reduce or remove them. It is an academic endeavor that is carried out in formal educational institutions, leading to undergraduate and graduate degrees in the subject.

Peace education is viewed here as an educational process which teaches about the underlying causes of violence, dynamics of conflict, and appropriate conditions and strategies for achieving a more just and peaceful world¹. It takes place in formal, non-

¹ This definition is based on, yet builds on, Schirch (2004: 57); Harris (2010: 11); Harris & Howlett, 2011: 23). A more in-depth analysis of peace education is offered in Chapter 2.

formal, and informal settings², taking the form of formal qualifications, short-term courses leading to a certificate, or learning in communities, at home, or in any other setting, respectively.

As with many other fields of inquiry, the division between current scholarship and relative practice pose a continuing challenge to peace studies and peace education, one which limits their growth, impact, and overall effectiveness.

To address this challenge, and meet the needs of the target audiences noted above, the following chapters bring together work on the theory, research, and praxis of peace and peace education. When read, the book responds to the following questions and issues:

1. **Definitions and analysis of peace and peace education:** What is peace? What are some of the different ways in which peace has been defined? What is peace education? What is the current state of this field and some of its challenge for the future?
2. **Analysis of the relative peacefulness of countries and territories:** Why is it important to measure peace, and how? How peaceful are we as a race? Which countries are among the most and least peaceful? What are the drivers that help to create positive peace?
3. **Analysis of peace and peace education in Bolivia:** How is peace understood in Bolivia? How peaceful is Bolivia? What are the most important peace initiatives in Bolivia? Where is there room for improvement?
4. **Analysis of youth peace education praxis:** How can peace education teach students about, for, and, better yet, towards peace? How can peace education enable students to put theory and research into practice through peace action?

These questions, and others, constitute the books main contributions, and broadly follow the logic of the subsequent chapters. The rest of this chapter provides context for a discussion of those questions and related issues, presenting key arguments of the text and introducing topics that will be developed in subsequent chapters. It has the following structure: 1.2) background; 1.3) rationale of the book; 1.4) objectives of the book; 1.5) a note on the research process and methodology of the book; 1.6) why read this book; 1.7) the challenge; 1.8) structure of the book.

1.2 Background

To provide a clearer idea of the focus of the book, it is useful to, firstly, address three inter-related themes: the violence-to-peace transition; the shift in donor logic towards peace; and the emerging emphasis on youth peace education, which is to some degree a partial extension of the first and second themes. Here is a closer analysis.

² Formal settings include universities. Non-formal settings include community centers or training centers. Informal settings include work done in the streets.

1.2.1 The violence-to-peace transition

One of the most vexing challenges that human beings are facing is how to transition from violence to peace³. From one side, it is important to recognize that considerable progress has already been made. There is, for example, a growing trend in the literature highlighting the historical decline of violence, in general, and continuous improvements with regards to peace since the end of World War 2 (WW2, hereafter)⁴. Meanwhile, other scholars suggest that war is a relatively new phenomenon (Ferguson, 2003), with at least 47 relatively peaceful societies having been located by anthropologists thus far (Banta, 1993). From another, peace is becoming more unequal. Chapter 4, which turns to measuring peace, explains that the peace dividend is not being shared equally. Therefore, while it seems clear that there has been success in reducing interstate wars, it is also important to acknowledge that the contours of violence today are shifting.

Consider, for example, the move from the traditional battlefield and interstate (old) wars to ‘new wars’⁵, and that the deadliest conflicts today occur within states not between them. For another thing, how 90% of casualties in armed conflict are civilians, at least half of these are children⁶.

Hence, the challenges faced today appear to be considerably more complex, and at a much deeper societal and structural level in comparison to before. For example, although problems of ideology and ethnic tension are significant threats, the growing scale and significance of organized crime and corruption appear to be among the biggest threats to peace and stability⁷. Reflected in the rise of crime and corruption is the fact that there has been a sharp rise in the distribution and use of weapons in recent years. The fact that we are a world awash with weapons partially explains why some of the poorest countries in Latin America – Honduras and El Salvador – often top the charts in terms of homicide rates⁸. Thus, while the number of high intensity conflicts has declined since WW2⁹, the number of low-intensity conflicts has increased in recent years (Human Security Report, 2013). Meanwhile, political violence from ISIS is widespread in the Middle East and North Africa. And interpersonal and domestic violence across the world, in general, and in Latin America, more specifically, continue to persist.

Into these challenges, it is widely agreed that the building of a peaceful world is a complex and multi-dimensional process (Lederach, 2010: 136). Many layers of analysis must be considered including; political, social, economic, cultural, and environmental factors. It also requires involvement from a full range of actors; individuals, communities, institutions, organizations, as well as governmental, inter-governmental, and civil society actors (Lederach, 1997: 60-61; Schichr, 2003: 71-73).

³ This includes all the stages of transition from extreme violence and war to positive peace, remembering that all societies are experiencing some levels of violence and peace.

⁴ Chapter four will look at these arguments in more detail.

⁵ On the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ wars, see Mary Kaldor (2012). For a new look at the changing nature of war since the end of the cold war, see Keen (2007).

⁶ For more on these topics see (Clemens and Singer 2000). Also, see ‘Academics and scientists on preventing war’: <http://scientistsascitizens.org/2014/05/15/academics-and-scientists-on-preventing-war/>

⁷ For more on this topic, see the Human Security Report (2013) and Transparency International (2014).

⁸ The term “a wash with weapons” draws specifically from following article by the New York Times: ‘We Are a World Awash in Weapons and Grievances’. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/nytnow/top-10-comments.html?_r=0

⁹ The term “High intensity armed conflict” refers to those causing 1,000 or more battlefield deaths in a year (see, Lotta & Wallenstein, 2012).

1.2.2 A shift in donor logic towards peace

While donor agencies, government and private, can always make improvements in their practices, there also seems to be little doubt that international support by third-party governments or international organizations enhance the effectiveness of peacebuilding activities (Autesserre, 2014: 7), and that local efforts would be limited without it (Richmond, 2014a: 11).

International agencies like the United Nations (UN, hereafter), thus, have a key role to play in contributing to positive change by providing funding and resources to support research and practice aimed at addressing pressing issues. Peace, the most cross-cutting of all global concerns, has been a key issue, but not the only one, that has concerned such agencies in the past. Historically, however, most of the funds allocated by agencies have been used to support initiatives which revolve around the usual humanitarian goals. The last 15 years have witnessed a narrowing of this scope, largely in response to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's, hereafter).

Launched in 2002, the eight MDG's were: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and forge global partnerships and action among different countries. The target date for the MDG's was 2015, with a focus on reaching the most vulnerable.

Clearly, the MDG's did not mean that development was intended to stop in 2015. On the contrary, a critical review offered an opportunity to learn from its failures and consider ways in which to improve upon the areas not achieved. One of the most important conclusions from this review was that violence constituted the "main constraint to meeting the MDG's" (World Bank, 2011: 62). Overall, much progress was made, but no conflict-affected state achieved a single MDG. Just as violence restricted progress towards achieving the MDG's, it was also identified as one of the main obstacles standing in the way of achieving the targets of 'Education for All (EFA): a programme aimed at providing all children with access to education by 2015 (UNESCO, 2011). Clearly, cycles of violence and instability have a long-lasting and devastating impact on development, and constitute a pressing challenge to global peace and prosperity (GPI, 2016).

Therefore, unlike the previous MDG's, the newly adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's, hereafter), otherwise known as the Global Goals, now include peace as one of the main elements underpinning its agenda¹⁰ (see, Figure 1). Presenting themselves as a universal, integrated and transformative agenda, the SDG's give motivation to, and guide the work of, donor agencies worldwide. In general, they underline the interrelationship between sustainable development and peace, which is summed up

¹⁰ The 193 Member States of the United Nations reached consensus on the outcome document of a new sustainable development agenda entitled, "Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development". This agenda contains 17 goals and 169 targets, and implementing its symbolic five dimensions including people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership. The complete list of goals and targets are available at: <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/>
The outcome document is available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/>
Goal 16 aims to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels'.

aply by the United Nation's General Secretary's (2015) assertion that "There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development".

Figure 1: Sustainable Development Goals



To a degree, a renewed attention towards peace has already been noticed. It has driven the international community (including the UN, International Monetary Fund, and International Non-Governmental Organisations) to shift the ways in which they spend their time, money, and resources. This shift has indeed been driven in part by violence topping the global policy priorities in recent years (World Bank, 2011; UNESCO, 2011) and by peace being gradually recognised as a prerequisite for progress towards all the post-2015 development goals.

One leading example of this shift is the "local infrastructures for peace" (LIFP), which is supported by a growing number of advocates around the globe, including UN donors and other agencies. The newly adopted Resolutions by the UN on the Peacebuilding Architecture in the General Assembly and the Security Council (27 April, 2016) is another recent example of this shift. These are the most comprehensive resolutions on peacebuilding ever adopted by the UN.

The overarching goal of this resolution is to further the importance of peacebuilding as an integral part of the UN's work, and to foster more coherence in relation to cross-cutting themes of peace, security, development and human rights, at Headquarters and around the world. This far-reaching initiative builds upon the UN's earlier commitments to peace, which outlined how:

"...Between US\$500 million and US\$1 billion should be channelled to education through the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, with UNESCO and UNICEF playing a more central role in integrating education into wider peacebuilding strategies." (UNESCO, 2011: 22).

This shift in donor logic towards investing more in peace is not limited to the UN and its agencies, however. Another significant example is Rotary International, who was one of the founders of, and holds the highest consultative status possible with, the UN. With more than 1.2 million members, in more than 35,000 clubs across 200 countries and geographical areas, Rotary is the world's largest organization, and among the most impactful.

It has six main areas of focus, which, like the SDG's, revolve around the most critical and widespread humanitarian needs. The first area of focus is Peace and Conflict prevention/resolution, while the others centers on Disease prevention and treatment; Water and sanitation; Maternal and Child Health; Basic education and literacy; and Economic and community development. From its inception to the present day, peace has always been embedded in Rotary's ethos, and the groups' contributions to international peace hitherto has been considerable (Anastasiou, 2016: 137).

Rotary's grant structure funds peace and development initiatives through District or Global Grants. District Grants fund small-scale, short-term, local or international activities, aligned with the Rotary Foundation's mission. They are usually one-off grants awarded annually. Global Grants fund large, long-term and sustainable projects that must be in alignment with one of the six areas of focus.

They require international partnerships (between Rotary clubs or districts in different countries), which fund scholarships, vocational training teams, and humanitarian projects requiring a minimum of \$30,000 and up to \$400,000. Total Global Grants investment per area of focus for 2014-2015 was US\$197,715.616, with "disease prevention and treatment", and "water and sanitation" accounting for more than 60% of the global total¹¹.

These figures are not surprising, given Rotary's PolioPlus program, which was launched in 1985 as the first initiative to tackle global polio eradication through the mass vaccination of children. To date, Rotary has contributed more than \$1.5 billion - and inspired many organizations and governments to contribute more than \$12 billion - immunizing more than 2.5 billion children in 122 countries. Altogether this has helped to eradicate 99% of Polio in the World.

At the same time, more recent research shows that Rotary's financial investment is steadily changing. The increasing number of clubs and districts adopting peace as one of their main areas of focus has coincided with an increased attention and funding for 'Peace and Conflict prevention/resolution' initiatives. The same analysis also suggests that this trend is likely to continue, with more and more funded peace-related initiatives coming through over the subsequent years.

Perhaps one of the most important and innovative initiatives that Rotary are supporting with their time, money, and resources in recent years is NewGen Peacebuilders (NGP, hereafter), an international peace education programme for young people ages 14 to 24 that is endorsed by the Rotary Action Group for Peace¹². (The work of NGP is the focus of Chapter 8).

¹¹ Data from the Grants Department, situated at Rotary World Headquarters in the USA.

¹² NewGen Peacebuilders is an organization and program launched through the fiscal agency of non-profit Mothering Across Continents.

Yet while a shift in donor logic towards peace is certainly promising, it also poses several challenges. One such challenge is summed up lucidly by the World Bank's (2011: 2) World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development which observes that the "21st-century conflict and violence are a development problem that does not fit the 20th-century mold".

The same report adds that the "Global systems in the 20th century were designed to address interstate tensions and one-off episodes of civil war" (World Bank, 2011: 2). The crux of the matter, therefore, is this: the contemporary challenges of conflict and violence, noted above, require a different approach. Donor agencies, for example, must rethink their modes of operation to better engage with and adapt to the changing needs of today.

One of the ways in which donor agencies have been changing to meet these new challenges is by putting increased emphasis on grassroots initiatives that are bottom-up and community-driven. This emphasis has, in part, been informed by the increasing internationalization of internal conflicts, as well as a growing recognition of the ways in which international interventions have been perceived by local counterparts to be top-down and externally exposed (Auteserre, 2014: 149-153).

Unfortunately, however, most international development and peace work continue to be orientated towards an international NGO's/donor and local elite level collaboration (Smith and Verdeja, 2013: 10)¹³, despite the pressing need to better integrate the needs and expectations of civil society (Lederach, 1997: 39; Galtung 2000: 253-254; Fischer, 2001: 291).

Lately, therefore, critical scholars are stressing the need to get closer to, and engage more directly with, 'local' practices of peace on-the-ground, and the lived experiences and needs of people in everyday life (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; Auteserre, 2014: 20-29). This position stems in part from the assumption that there are "tasks for everybody" in the pursuit of peace (Galtung, 1980: 396). These developments draw attention to a view of "ordinary people" as an integral part of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 2013). They have also coincided with an emerging emphasis on the role of youth, and the importance of youth peace education.

1.2.3 An emerging emphasis on youth peace education

There is now a broad agreement that it is not possible to think about the future without thinking about the youth of today. There is an important justification for this, because almost half of the world's population (48%) are under the age of 24, and of these 18% - or more than one billion people - are defined as youth¹⁴. In numbers alone, it is clear this generation has a role to play in heightening the possibilities for a more just and peaceful world.

¹³ Elite-level actors refer to the highest levels of decision making. They operate at the national (macro-level) and have the ability to inform high level changes at the country level, for example government officials and policy makers (Lederachj, 1997).

¹⁴ United Nations (2007) as cited in World Bank, 2009. considers youth as the age between 15 and 24, which is the United Nations definition "United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 50/81 of 13 March 1996, "The World Programme of Action for Youth in the Year 2000 and Beyond" A/RES/50/81.

Another inspiration drive behind the book, therefore, arises in response to Mahatma Gandhi's mantra: "if we are to teach real peace in this world, and if we are to carry on a real war against war, we shall have to begin with the children"¹⁵. This premise is not new. There are already many 20th and 21st century politicians and academics who have for a long time advocated for youth to be included in peacebuilding processes, and decision-making related to peace and conflict (Montesorri, 1949; Freire, 1970; Galtung and Udayakumar, 2013; UNOY, 2015: 6).

On this, there is already research evidence demonstrating the benefits of including youth more in peace efforts. Youth, for instance, bring added vibrancy, creativity, and energy (see, AED, 2005: 4; Kester, 2010: 1; Hamilton, 2010: 4). They have "the potential to deeply influence both the young as well as the old, as they traverse communities sowing messages of peace" (Kamatsiko, 2005: 6). A final reason for prioritizing youth in peace efforts is that they tend to be more open to change, are resilient, future orientated, idealistic, innovative, energetic, courageous, have a desire for change, and bring with them knowledge about their peers' realities (McEvoy-Levy, 2001: 5; Sommers, 2006: 6-7; Del Felice & Wisler, 2007: 24-25; Danesh, 2008: 3). Given this context, the role that youth peacebuilding organizations play in contributing to a culture of peace is now recognized as important (Adams, et al 2010)¹⁶.

While there has been emphasis internationally that youth constitute one of the most powerful forces for peace, the challenge lies in how to update the "unexplored power and potential of youth as peace-builders" (see, Del Felice and Wisler, 2007). Unfortunately, a gap still exists between the rhetoric of youth as agents of peace and reality, although this is steadily changing. Much of the research and theory, as well as practice and policy derived from it, have been disproportionately formed, and informed, by academics (mostly white males), from the global North (Lederach, 1995: 68; Richmond, 2014a: 105)¹⁷.

So, while much has been written about youth in relation to peace, a disproportionate amount stresses the negative roles they fulfil - either as victims (usually young women) or perpetrators of violence (usually young men)¹⁸. As a partial consequence, "programmes targeting youth as agents of building peace remain underdeveloped aspects" of the peace studies and peace education field (Danesh, 2008: 1). This is problematic, leading to gaps in our understandings about the benefits, as well as challenges, faced in supporting the role of youth in peace.

¹⁵ Cited by Drew (1987, preface).

¹⁶ The United Nations declared the period 2001-2010 as the international decade for a culture of peace and non-violence for the children of the world.

¹⁷ For a related discussion about how peacebuilding needs to broaden its scope to learn more about the language and experiences of peace from the global South, see Mac Ginty (2013: 388).

¹⁸ For a useful analysis, which explores the complex and multi-faceted roles that youth play in peace, conflict and violence, see Del Felice and Wisler (2007), among others. Regarding the discussion of youth as victims, throughout the world, more than 600 million young people live in fragile and conflict affected contexts today (UNDP, 2014). Regarding the discussion of youth as perpetrators, several leading scholars, such as Samuel Huntington (1996:259-261) have made the case that societies are particularly vulnerable to war when people aged 15-24 (that is, youth) comprise at least 20% of the population (1996). This is often called the 'youth bulge theory'.

Security Council Resolution 2250 is available from:

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2250\(2015\)&referer=http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml&Lang=E](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2250(2015)&referer=http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml&Lang=E)

In recognition of this pressing need, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2250 in December 2015, which further underscores the importance of engaging young women and men in shaping lasting peace¹⁹. This ground-breaking resolution, on Youth, Peace and Security, calls for Member States to increase inclusive representation of young people in institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict and for countering violent extremism. Accordingly, it also calls for an increase in political, financial, technical, and logistical support the participation of youth in peace efforts and to take account of their needs.

One approach being used to support the participation of youth in peace efforts is peace education, which is widely considered as a necessary interface between peace research and peace action (Reardon, 2000). As discussed further in the literature review (Chapter 2), researchers, practitioners, and policy makers all around the world are turning to peace education because it offers promises and possibilities for a better tomorrow (Bajaj, 2016: 16). Former UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan (1999: 2), for example, sees peace education as “quite simply, peace-building by another name. It is the most effective form of defense spending there is”. By using recent developments in scholarship and practice as a spring board, the book also joins the debate about the utility of peace education as a conduit through which to help better prepare our future leaders as agents of peace.

Simultaneously, the book also recognizes that peace education is not without its challenges. While these are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, it is useful to list some of them here to further situate the relevance of the current work. First, most schools and universities are not teaching peace education. Youth, therefore, are often lacking the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed to work towards peace. Second, access to peace education is often expensive. Peace education, therefore, is often out of reach for most youth, especially those from the global South. Third, although most peace education programmes across the globe talk about the importance of students applying the knowledge they learn in the class to real-life problems outside, very few are doing it. Students, therefore, continue to find it difficult to recognize the theory vis-à-vis practice linkage, considered essential for furthering peace action.

This book is an attempt to respond to these challenges. Among other objectives, it offers a window into the important work of an international youth peace education programme called NGP (mentioned above).

This discussion is grounded in a much-needed example of youth peace education from Bolivia (Chapter 7 and 8), which demonstrates how NGP goes some way towards addressing the challenges noted, as well as continuing the discussion developed throughout the book regarding the importance of youth peace education.

Although the book uses an example from Bolivia, it does so with the awareness that many of the concerns addressed throughout the text - such as the possibilities and challenges of supporting the role of youth in peace efforts through their involvement in peace

¹⁹ Security Council Resolution 2250 is available from:
[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2250\(2015\)&referer=http://www.un.org/en/sc/docu-](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2250(2015)&referer=http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml&Lang=E)
[ments/resolutions/2015.shtml&Lang=E](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2250(2015)&referer=http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml&Lang=E).

education - are likely to resonate elsewhere. Underpinning discussions about peace in all settings is the same ever-present challenge also facing the field of international development: how to make such initiatives more sustainable. The book also assists in the process.

By elaborating on how local and international partners are already committing long-term support and funding to underwrite NGP programming in various countries, the book seeks to further engage potential donors in discussions around the ways in which they may support peace education efforts in their settings, as basis for helping to contribute the peacebuilding initiatives more broadly.

All in all, the hope is that this text will be widely read by many involved in peace. This includes those who study, practice, or commission peace work and, of course, local people who grapple with the violence-to-peace transition each day. Throughout, the book encourages readers to think critically about the arguments developed. In the spirit of critical approaches to peace and education itself, it hopes that readers will walk away with more questions than answers.

1.3 Rationale of the book

To further situate the focus of the book, a survey of the scholarly work on peace studies and peace education was necessary. The literature review revealed three key themes that helped to underscore the relevance of the present work; the evolution in our thinking about peace and peace education; the misunderstanding of peace as a utopian concept that cannot be measured; and the need for further examples to demonstrate the potential of youth to contribute to peace through their involvement in peace education. Each of these themes will now be addressed in turn.

First, peace and peace education are concepts that are commonly used, both in the practitioner and the academic world, but there is no agreement on their definitions. While a broadening of understandings about peace has occurred, over the last 50 years its meaning and use remains poorly defined (more on this in the next chapter). More importantly, concepts of peace have been dominated by ideas from the global North. Partly because of this, more attention has been paid to conflict and violence, and by implication less has been paid to peace. But, for there to be peace, it is important to learn about peace and, therefore, peace education. Peace education, like peace, however, has been notoriously difficult to conceptualize, and has therefore eluded a universally agreed upon definition.

Second, there is a pressing need to bring the benefits of measuring peace further into focus. Until recently, there has been a tendency to think of societal progress in terms of economic growth, reflected by Gross Domestic Product. However, more recently, there is an increasing recognition of the need to view social development - including measures of well-being, happiness, and for this work, peace - as benchmarks of progress. Although peace has historically been perceived as a utopian dream that is impossible to achieve, it is gradually being a tangible measure of progress.

Third, there is an absence of work that captures well-documented examples of peace in practice. While theoretical and empirical inquiry is certainly necessary, this is, arguably,

the easier part. The challenge, inevitably, lies in theoretically-informed practice and action. It is true that the importance of youth peace education has been emphasized globally. It is also true that peace education is not always practiced around the world. In Bolivia, for example, peace education is far being from mainstreamed in schools and universities. Of the peace education programmes that have been developed in Bolivia, very few have been focused at tertiary education.

1.4 Objectives of the book

This book thus has three-interlaced objectives, which broadly correspond to the questions articulated above and the structure of the book. The first objective is to give an overview of how peace and peace education is defined in the literature. Rather than purporting to offer the final word, this work further explores some of the multiple dimensions and variations of peace, along with what peace education is and should be (Chapter 2 and 3).

The second objective is to help the current push to move the discussion of peace beyond its usual utopian connotation, and to recognize it as an achievable and tangible measure of human well-being and progress. Reasons why it is important to measure peace and how are presented, along with key findings from peace research in relation to what we see around the globe in terms of countries or territories relative levels of peacefulness (Chapter 4, 5 and 6).

The third objective is to explore ways to create peace (Chapter 4, 7 and 8). The rare example of youth peace education in Bolivia reinforces a key argument developed in the book the power of youth to contribute to cultures of peace through their involvement in peace education (Chapter 8). What this case study also illustrates is a rare example of how” peace research, peace action, and peace education [became] integrated into a natural whole” (Galtung, 2008: 54), a core goal and challenge for peace education (and related programs) programmes around the world. It is in this context that the current work assumes its relevance and contributions.

1.5 A note about the research process and methodology of the book

The research process for the book firstly involved a critical review of the literature as it relates to the scholarship and practice of peace and peace education (Chapter 2). The methodological framework and empirically-based evidence used to assess the relative peacefulness of countries and territories is taken from the work of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP, hereafter – Chapter 3 and 4). IEP is a pioneering research organization that attempts to understand the benefits and drivers of peace. It does this most notably through the ground breaking Global Peace Index (GPI, hereafter), which is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. The GPI empirically investigates and then ranks 163 countries and territories according to their relative levels of peace, considering 23 aggregated indicators (Chapters 3 and 4).

The focus of Chapter 5 and 6 are limited to Bolivia. A systematic process was followed to gather academic and policy related literature about peace and peace initiatives in Bolivia. In general, the literature specifically relating to this was thin. The review was broadened, therefore, to include a specific and focused search of five specific themes such as peace, conflict, violence, and (peace) education in Bolivia.

Making use of some of the theory and research articulated in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the book then looks at practice. One of the greatest challenges in doing this, was the lack of available literature that combines theory, research, and practice, given the constant disconnect between those who study peace and those who practice it (Mac Ginty, 2013: 1; Miall et al., 2015: 3). Another purpose of this book, thus, becomes an attempt to highlight how it is possible to translate scholarly theory and research into practical application. Chapter 8 is helpful in this regard, because it offers a rare example of primary (participatory action) research from the authors' own experience of facilitating a youth peace education programme with students of university age in La Paz, Bolivia.

The book grows out of over 15 years' worth of experience of youth and community practice in various countries, and draws from recent Masters and Doctoral studies centered on peace and conflict studies, peace education, and participatory action research (PAR, hereafter).

The book's slant towards praxis — critical and collective inquiry, reflection and action (See, Freire, 1970a: 48) - reflects the authors understanding of the need for “public scholarship” (Fine, 2008: 232) that can “be of use” (Piercy, 1982). His epistemological, ontological and methodological commitments are in line with PAR. This research paradigm challenges conventional notions of inquiry, taking the view that social science can benefit greatly from doing research “with”, as opposed to “on” or “for” individuals and communities (Bryon-Miller et al, 2003: 24; Chevalier & Buckles: 2013: 29).

1.6 Why read the book?

There are several reasons to read this book. Researchers may find it helpful since it covers how peace and peace education have been conceptualized in the literature. They may also find the discussion about the importance of why and how to measure peace, along with empirically-based findings about the relative peacefulness of nations, of great use.

The discussion about the current state of peace education and some challenges for the future may also appeal to practitioners. It also raises critical questions relevant to research, theory, and practice, and offers signposts to more advanced discussions, which, it is hoped, are made clear in its presentation.

The book is also likely to be of interest to those involved in commissioning peace-related research and practice. For instance, donor agencies – government or private - can read it to become more aware about the impacts of violence and the benefits of peace. It can also help these officials to base their work on a clearer understanding of the inter-linkages between peace and development. Since one of the books aims is to widen and deepen the discussion around the emerging emphasis being put on youth peace education, it offers a powerful example of how similar funding organizations are steadily (re)prioritizing their focus on investing in such programs.

Though targeted at researchers, practitioners, and commissioners, the book may appeal to a broader audience. For instance, it may also be of use to schools and universities, since it identifies ways to begin to think about incorporating youth peace education as a tool for helping students to engage more effectively with the communities in which they are located – a core goal and challenge of most formal education around the world.

Overall, the book aspires to offer something for everyone. So, while many of the topics laid out in the work might be familiar to those who study, practice, and commission peace and peace education, there are few texts that have complied together in one place a cumulative discussion that moves from the theory and research to praxis. More specifically, there is no text which offers, a yet to be examined example of, peace education in Bolivia with university age students. While each of the chapters can indeed ‘stand-alone’, it is recommended that the text is read in its entirety. In effect, the whole is essentially greater than the sum of its parts.

1.7 The challenge

As this work, will show, building peace is a complex and multifaceted task. But, as readers of this book, you can contribute to peace in several, indirect and direct, ways. Indirectly, researchers can contribute to peace by studying the processes and conditions needed for building it. Practitioners can continue to disseminate the findings from peace research, through teaching and implementing more peace programs. Donors can continue to commission research about the study and practice of peace.

Yet since the foundations of peace essentially lie in the development of relationships (Lederach, 1997), all of us can contribute directly to peace through the relationships we develop in our everyday lives. With this in mind, exhaustive empirical evidence shows that “facilitative relationships characterized by empathy, acceptance, and honesty are the key to human growth and development” (Cornelius-White & Harbaugh, 2009: xxv).

These three traits originally came to be known as the famous ‘core conditions’, as defined by seminal psychologist and psychotherapist Carl Rogers (1902-1987). The core conditions provide the “necessary and sufficient conditions for effective change” (Rogers, 1957; 1989: 221). They are crucial in the relationship, because without these a person may not develop or grow as they otherwise could. The core conditions can be used to as a guide to help us respond more effectively to those that we work with in our professional lives and useful in our personal engagement with others.

Rogers (1980) later described the core condition as a ‘way of being’. In brief, this distinct way of being helps to shape the types of relationships typically sought - relationships built on empathy, acceptance, and honesty. Empathy “has been shown to be the gold standard for effective facilitation in any growth-focused relationship” (O’Hara, 2003: 77). It refers to a continuing process which attempts to learn what it feels like to be in the other persons’ skin and to perceive the world as they perceive it (Mearns and Thorne, 2013: 13). When we engage with, and attempt to learn from and understand others, we are taking steps towards peace.

Acceptance refers to a warm appreciation for and loving of another person, just because they are a human being (Rogers, 1994: 156; Rogers et al., 2013: 75). It does not include a lot of “if” or “should” statements but rather “takes the person in, just as they are” (Rogers et al., 2013: 131). This should not be misunderstood as a need to always “think well” of the others. Instead, it permits people to have their own unique feelings and thoughts, which may, indeed, be considered positive or negative (Rogers, 1967: 283-284). When we can acknowledge differences, and take steps towards accepting others, we are one step closer to peace.

Honesty refers to being real or genuine (as much as possible) without a front. “Deep honesty”, for seminal peace scholar John Paul Lederach (2003: 58), “comes hand in hand with safety and trust”, and can be approached through dialogue with our inner self, as well as others, asking exploratory questions such as ‘who am I?’ and ‘who are we?’. It takes honesty to speak up for ourselves and others. When we challenge sexist, fascist, or racist behaviors, we are contributing to the building blocks of peace. Clearly, none of this is easy. But all of us can do something to help to build peace. Go forth and take up the challenge.

1.8 Overview

The main ideas of the book are developed through a further 9 chapters. Each of these chapters has an introduction, which outlines the aims and main points to be covered, and a conclusion, that summarizes the main points discussed. Cumulatively, these chapters build on each other, sweeping from an analysis of theory to research through practice.

Chapter 2 and 3 provides necessary conceptual information, reviewing literature on peace and peace education. The first part of the chapter examines the following questions: What is peace? What are some of the different ways in which peace has been defined? Two key themes related to peace are also addressed: violence and conflict. Along with peace often comes the idea of peace education. The second part of the chapter, therefore, examines the following questions: What is peace education? What is the current state of this field and some of its challenge for the future?

Chapter 4 deals with ways to measure and create peace. It comprises three main parts. The first part consists of two sections: reviewing the reasons why it is important to measure peace, followed by a discussion of how peace is measured. In the second part on trends in peace, key findings from 10 years of peace research about the relative peacefulness of countries and territories are explored. The economic cost of violence and the comparable investment in peace is also presented. The third part is dedicated to a discussion of what creates peace. It also offers a more detailed examination of the relationship between peace and democracy, and a discussion of the transformative potential of positive peace.

Chapter 5 and 7 are about peace, conflictiveness and peace initiatives in Bolivia. It is divided into four parts. The first part offers some background information to the Bolivian context. The second part formulates an answer to ‘how peace is understood in Bolivia’. This part also covers conflict, violence, a culture of peace, and peace education. The third part deals with peace trends in Bolivia. It examines the country’s relative level of peacefulness by drawing from key findings from 10 years of peace research. The fourth part highlights some promising peace initiatives in Bolivia. This part also identifies areas needing further work, which, in turn, help to provide the backdrop for the analysis that follows in Chapter 8.

Chapter 8 moves the discussion towards practice, yet keeps a focus on Bolivia. It comprises two main parts. The first part introduces a youth peace education programme called NGP; outlining its structure and curriculum, as well as some examples of its impact thus far. A discussion of how NGP addresses some of the limitations of peace education programmes documented in Chapter 1 and 2 is also included. The second part covers

engaged peace education praxis. Based on rare and primary (participatory action) research undertaken by the author, it sheds light on the work of NGP at the university level in La Paz, to show how students were able to take what they had learned about peace theory and research in the class and apply it to practice in their community.

Chapter 9 concludes the book by summarizing the questions and related issues examined throughout. The first section presents a summary of the main ideas and lessons which emerge from each of the chapters, regarding the theoretical, empirical, and practice evidence provided throughout the book. The second section discusses the potential implications of this analysis. Based on the lessons learned and implications, the third section formulates some recommendations to researchers, practitioners, and donors thereafter. The final section offers some concluding remarks. It looks back and forward, posing some reflective questions which look more broadly at some of the central arguments which constitute the book.

It is appropriate to conclude this introductory chapter with an excerpt from a 1952 statement by Konrad Adenauer, the first post-war Chancellor of Germany (West Germany) and the person who led this country from the ruins of World War II to become a productive and prosperous nation:

“Peace and freedom,
these are the bases for an existence worthy of human beings.
Without peace and freedom there is no development of people.
There is no happiness, no peace for mankind.
Peace for the individual is not possible,
unless peace prevails in your community.
Peace for the individual is not possible,
without peace for the people.
But peace without freedom is not peace”

(Konrad Adenauer, 1952)

Peace and Conflict — in Bolivia

Chapter 2

CHAPTER 2

PEACE AND PEACE EDUCATION

*To reach peace, teach peace*²⁰

2.1 Introduction: aim of the chapter and outline

This chapter explores in more detail the definitions of peace and peace education that were introduced in the previous chapter. To achieve this purpose, the chapter primarily examines the following four questions: What is peace? What are some of the different ways in which peace has been defined? What is peace education? What is the current state of this field and some of its challenge for the future? The chapter addresses these questions regarding the literature on peace and peace education, from their origins through to the latest developments in theory, research, and practice. Responses to these questions help provide the conceptual background for more empirical and practical chapters which follow about measuring and creating peace in Chapters 3 and 4, and peace education in Chapters 7 and 8.

2.2 Peace

The analysis starts with the phenomenon that precedes any discussion of peace research and practice: peace. The story of peace dates back as long as humanity itself, and, indeed, as long as violence and war. While much of history has been relatively peaceful (Richmond, 2014a: 1), images of violence, destruction, and death dominate (Harris and Morrison, 2013: 3). Several authors, however, have discussed a broad range of peace interpretations in history and culture (see in particular, Cortright, 2008; Dietrich, 2008; Stearns, 2014, but also Barash, 2002; Fontan, 2012; Richmond et al. 2016).

This section on peace cannot analyze all the varying definitions that emerge from the literature. Rather, as will become clear in the following pages, it seeks to point out that defining peace is a difficult task, and that many different conceptual definitions exist (see, Harris and Morrison, 2013: 14). Prior to examining several the different ways in which peace has been conceptualized, the section begins by discussing negative and positive peace, because they provide the necessary conceptual framework for a discussion about measuring and creating peace in Chapters 3 and 4.

2.2.1 Negative and positive peace

As the analysis in this chapter proceeds it will be seen that a single agreed upon definition for peace remains absent (Anderson, 2004: 103). Nonetheless, a basic but highly useful conceptualization of peace has become widely accepted across the field of peace studies and related fields (although not without criticism, see, for example, Dietrich, 2008; and Fontan, 2012). Johan Galtung (e.g. 1967; 1969; 1990), who was mentioned in the introductory chapter and is widely referred to as one of the founders of peace studies, made a distinction between negative peace and positive peace.

²⁰ Navarro-Castro & Nario-Galace (2010).

Negative peace refers to the “absence of organized collective violence” (Galtung, 1967: 12). This includes the fear of violence and physical violence – i.e. “efforts to cause bodily harm to other human beings” (ibid: 13). Positive peace involves the “conditions that facilitate the presence of positive relations” (ibid: 14). Galtung (1964: 2) summarizes “positive peace [as] the integration of human society”. This expands the scope beyond security - the absence of direct violence, war, and fear of violence - to include democracy, development, justice and equal relationships at the individual, national, regional, and international levels (Boulding, 1964).

In a summarizing statement, Grewel (2003: 4-5), via Galtung, considers negative peace as pessimistic, curative, and not always approached by peaceful means, while positive peace is optimistic, preventive, and always approached by peaceful means. Another way to frame understandings of negative and positive peace is to think of the former as something that we do not want and the latter as something that we do want. It is useful to keep these definitions in mind while going through the analysis in the book.

Negative peace, for example, provides the theoretical base for measuring the relative peacefulness of countries and territories presented in the next two chapters. Positive peace helps to frame the discussion at the end of the next chapter about what drives peace. The peace education programme outlined in more detail in Chapter 8 also uses Galtung’s classification of negative and positive peace. Meanwhile, the below extends the discussion beyond negative and positive peace to examine some of the other ways in which peace has been defined across the literature.

2.2.2 Inner and outer peace

Another way of thinking about peace is that it comprises both inner and outer dimensions. At one level, for example, peace has an inner context, referring to peace with ourselves. Seminal peace scholar Webel (2007:10-11) points out the wider implications or requirements of inner peace:

States of inner peace, or psychological harmony and well-being, are characterized by low degrees of ‘inner conflict’ and malignant aggression [...]. But even the most psychologically healthy persons have difficulty maintaining their equilibrium in pathogenic environments. Their tranquility may be undermined and even uprooted by pathology-inducing familial, organizational, social and political systems, ranging from conflict-laden interactions with kith and kin, bosses and subordinates, to such stress- and potentially violence inducing structural factors as under- and unemployment, racism, sexism, injustice, need-deprivation, famine, natural catastrophes, poverty, exploitation, inequity and militarism. The intersubjective zone, which mediates and straddles the topographies of inner and outer peace, is accordingly the catalyst for environmental and interpersonal agents, energies and institutions that reinforce or subvert psychological equilibrium, or inner peace. Being-at-peace is possible but improbable in an environment that is impoverished. Being peaceful is an enormous challenge when others with whom one interacts are hostile, aggressive, very competitive, and violent. And living in peace is almost inconceivable in desperately poor and war-ridden cultures. Accordingly, the three zones of inner, outer and intersubjective peace are never static and always in interaction.

In this understanding, inner peace appears to be a necessary yet not sufficient requirement for comprehensive peace (Gittins, Forthcoming). Comprehensive peace requires encountering relationships outside our self. At another level, therefore, peace also has an outer context, referring to peace with others. Michael Allen Fox (2014) contributes to this discussion, by arguing that both inner and outer dimensions of peace are required and that they must derive from and mutually inform each other.

Fox (2014: 184-187) considers inner peace as subjective and outer peace as a more objective “viewpoint on peace”. The subjective viewpoint represents internal factors, such as an individual’s way of being, behaving, acting, and thinking. The objective viewpoint represents external factors that inhibit or foster peace. Nobel Peace Prize recipient Archbishop Desmond Tutu also discusses the relationship between inner and outer dimensions of peace.

He argues that “peace builds outward to become, among other things, a state of harmony with the universe as a whole (cited in Fox, 2014: 190). Hence, “Inner and outer are inseparable correlates” (ibid: 191). This line of argument resembles a well-known African phrase, or ideology, Ubuntu, which literally means “I am because we are” (Cortright, 2008: 13). It embodies “the belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity” (Dartey-Baah and Amponsah-Tawiah, 2011: 132).

Jeong (2000) builds on this to assert that harmony with the universe also requires living in harmony with nature. This entails recognition that “the earth, too, is the object of violence” (ibid: 8) and that an unsustainable way of living threatens our survival. This so-called ‘peace with nature’ (i.e. ecological and environmental sustainability and security) constitutes part of a more holistic understanding of peace, and considered the foundation for “positive peace” (Mische, 1989).

While it is generally agreed that a comprehensive understanding of peace combines inner and outer dimensions, which of these comes first is debated. Many join Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for instance, to assume that a focus on inner peace should come first before moving outwards (Hicks, 1988; Carson & Lange, 1997; Turay and English, 2008; Nario and Galace, 2008). Others suggest greater attention to outer peace first (Selby, 2000).

Yet both positions appear to inhibit the possibilities of taking an interconnected and mutually informing view of peace. The National Peace Academia, similarly, cautions against such ‘hierarchies’, and puts forward a peace system which attempts to address peace from the inner to the outer through five interdependent spheres: personal, social, institutional, political, ecological (see, Jenkins, 2013: 183). In the end, “learning conducted in isolation leads to a fractured understanding of the whole” (Jenkins, 2013: 12).

2.2.3 Peace in time and space

In addition to the above-mentioned definitions, another way of thinking about peace is to consider how understandings are grounded in the specific historical experience and political context of a country, society or region (Richmond, 2014a: 12). Peace, put more simply, is influenced by time and space (Gittins, forthcoming). Regarding time, peace in contemporary Bolivia may be substantially different from that of ten years ago, since it is influenced by the needs of Bolivia today.

In his recent book, Oliver Richmond (2014a: 20-21, 107-109, 121) surveys how thinking about peace has evolved over time. In particular, his genealogy shows how the evolution of peace can be broken down into several intellectual and practical traditions:

1. The victors' peace (medieval period) in which negative peace is imposed by a victory in war. This tradition remains relevant to contemporary policy thinking, influencing conflict management approaches.
2. The constitutional peace in which democracy and free trade are taken to be fundamental qualities on any peaceful states constitution (contributing positive peace). This tradition emerged in the early Enlightenment period as a response to the victors' peace, by focusing on democracy, human rights, development and free trade. This tradition has informed much of the peace thinking and practice, post-Enlightenment.
3. The institutional peace is in which international institutions such as the UN, international financial institutions (e.g. the Bretton Woods institution), state donors, act to maintain and order according to a mutually agreed framework of international law (contributing to a positive peace). This tradition has been widely applied since the end of the Cold War.
4. The civil peace tradition in which civil society organizations, NGO's, and domestic and transnational social movements seek to uncover and rectify historical injustices or processes that engender the risk of war (contributing to positive peace).
5. The hybrid peace emerged, in part, as a response to the failings of the traditions. In brief, it seeks to explore the extent to which it is possible to reconcile the "intertwined relationship between the global and the local, the formal and informal and the liberal and the illiberal" (Björkdahl and Höglund 2013: 293). (The hybrid peace will be discussed in more detail below, in a section by the same name.

In addition to time, interpretations of peace are also influenced by space. For example, peace in the north of Bolivia may well look different from the south, since understandings are contextually and culturally rooted (Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013b). Geographical differences in peace are widespread. Considerations of space mean that it is not possible to offer here a comprehensive review of the ways in which peace has evolved geographically, and thus readers are referred to major works on this topic (Dietrich, 2008, 2011; Richmond et al. 2016)²¹. More specific definitions of peace in Bolivia, however, will be covered in Chapter 5 and 6.

2.2.4 Peace in religion

Another factor which influences understandings of peace is religion. On the one hand, all the world's major organized religions have espoused their own versions of peace²². On the other hand, religion has often been blamed for the subject or object of much conflict

²¹ Wolfgang Dietrich has offered one of the most revealing and insightful explorations into the differing historical, geographical, and cultural interpretation of peace (see, Dietrich, 2008, 2011). In this work, Dietrich puts forward "Five Families of Peaces", clarifying how these emerged and some of the primary thinkers behind them. The five families of peace are "Energetic Peace," "Moral Peace," "Modern Peace," "Postmodern Peace," and "Transrational Peace".

For major reviews of this, see in particular the work of Appleby et al (2015) but also Harris & Morrison (2012: 39-47).

²² For major reviews of this, see in particular the work of Appleby et al (2015) but also Harris & Morrison (2012: 39-47).

and violence, from the Crusades in 1095 to the contemporary context of transnational fundamentalist movements. Religious studies expert John Ferguson (1978: 157) observes that, “of the great religions, Christianity and Buddhism have been the most clearly pacifist in their origins and essence”. In the same analysis, Ferguson (ibid: 157) also points to how religions “have been deeply involved with militarism from a fairly early stage in their history”.

In brief, the gap between rhetoric and reality in religion has led many to despair, among them religious scholar Raimon Panikkar (1999: 187) who concludes that “religions have contributed preciously little to the keeping of peace”. Mark Juergensmeyer (2000: xi), perhaps the most prominent contemporary scholar on the question of religion and violence, goes further to conclude that “religion seems to relate to violence virtually everywhere”. Ultimately, religion is no panacea. It has the ability to stimulate conflict and/or contribute to peace, making it ‘ambivalent’ (see, Appleby 2000).

2.2.5 Liberal peace

Having stressed that peace is influenced by time, space, and religion, it is necessary to acknowledge that the liberal peace remains the loudest and most influential, in terms of thinking, policy, and practice (Webel & Johansen, 2012: 43). Influenced by the school of international relations theory, and grounded in western concepts that emerged from the Enlightenment (Paris, 2004), much of liberal thought aims to produce consensual and secure international and domestic systems based on liberal norms and institutions (Richmond, 2004: 3).

The aim of liberal peace, from a Northern perspective, is to help address inequality and bring about the achievement of sustainable positive peace. It is based on universal values of justice and liberty rather than particularities (Mazower, 2009: 86). It focusses on the individual; encouraging the spread of freedom, economic development, marketization, free trade, private property, and human rights (Chandler, 2004: 77; Mac Ginty, 2011: 4; Webel & Johansen, 2012: 38; Firchow, 2016: 128).

It rests on the assumption that democratic governance constitutes the most effective ways to solve conflicts (Jarstad & Sisk, 2008: 7). The belief is that liberal institutions are best positioned to fulfil individual rights and uphold the social contract between the state and its citizens (Richmond, 2007: 467, 471). The essence of the liberal peace doctrine (which also goes by the name of a constitutional peace) can be traced back to the democratic peace theory, in general, and Kant’s (1792) foundational thesis on ‘Perpetual Peace’, in particular (Firchow, 2016: 128)²³.

2.2.6 Local and everyday peace

Still, the liberal peace discourse is not without its critics²⁴. One of its principal criticisms is that has been heavily influenced by the global North (see, Gittins, Forthcoming, but also see Richmond et al. 2016: 1) and often assumed to be the “only and best system” (Pugh, 2012: 411). When Northern-dominated approaches to peace are set as a universal utopia,

²³ For Kant’s (1795/1917) peace can be achieved through consensus, based on freedom, equality and common laws accepted by members of society.

²⁴ See Paris (2004); Chandler (2004); Pugh et al (2008); Richmond (2016); Richmond et al (2016).

they may not be aware of, reflective about, nor responsive to, the needs of those countries from the global South, many of which are currently experiencing the highest levels of conflict and violence (Uppsala, 2013; Global Peace Index, 2016).

Nonetheless, despite there being wide spread recognition that a “universal, single form of peace will inevitably be seen by some as hegemonic and oppressive” (Richmond, 2012: 36), an international (liberal dominated) blueprint for peace continues to inform most of the thinking, practice and policy of peace around the world. Under these conditions, the study and practice of peace appears to be symptomatic of what Foucault (1980) might have referred to as a “regime of truth”, since they serve to perpetuate a violence that crowds out alternatives.

Given this, it is understandable why examples already exist in the literature about how claims to universality have been found to be ineffective and met with resistance from the so-called local beneficiaries of peace (Richmond et al 2016: 3). Some of the same scholars drawing attention to this problem have also inspired a recent body of work that attempts to further think through matters of peace from the ground up, paying attention to indigenous, grass-roots, local, and everyday dimensions (see the work of Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2014, 2016; Autesserre, 2014).

Although each of these perspectives has their own nuances, the rationale behind each of them is that further dialogue is needed with “whole regions, peoples and world views” (Lederach, 2001) to better understand the different understandings and expectations for peace in each context (Richmond 2010: 32; 2014: 319). By and large, academics, practitioners, and donors alike are coming to understand that ‘local ownership’ and ‘local participation’ constitute the key to contextually effective peace programming. They all agree that grassroots level actors play a crucial role in building peace, and, therefore, programmes should be developed in recognition of, and respect for, the local and everyday understandings of peace already there (Gittins, forthcoming).

Challenges to the so-called “local turn” (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013) in peace have also emerged in the literature, however. Part of the rationale behind these challenges is that local cultures, norms, and practices have also been found to give rise to conflict and be destructive to peacebuilding efforts (Galtung, 1990; Autesserre, 2014: 65). Questions have thus been raised about the extent to which all local ideas and practices are valid or indeed conducive to positive peace. Academics and policy makers following an unquestioning “local Romanization” may indeed risk exacerbating the same ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy they purport to address (Gittins, forthcoming).

2.2.7 Hybrid peace

For these reasons, there has been an increasing interest from academics, governments, and donors alike for hybrid alternatives. Hybrid versions of peace call for a more sophisticated and emancipatory peace that departs from formal top-down understandings to demand “forms of thinking and practice that emerge as a result of interaction of different groups, practices, and worldviews” (Mac Ginty, 2011: 8)²⁵. In this way, peace is not a resemblance of an imported version from the global North or a romanticized

²⁵ Hybridity as a term that has its origins in critical analysis of colonialism, its form and its aftermath (Young 2001).

version of the local. Hybrid versions of peace not only allow for the inclusion of local autonomy and variations, but also recognize that capacity may well have to come from elsewhere to overcome long standing blockages to peace in each context (Richmond & Mitchell, 2012: 2; Richmond, 2016: 11).

The peace that emerges, therefore, will vary, depending on the encounter between the international and the local. Approaching peace through the lens of hybridity may admittedly pose several challenges. Attempting to connect international top-down and local bottom approaches involves a commitment to challenge both inside and outside biases (see, Anderson and Olsen, 2003: 37; Recyher, 2006: 7; Aueserre, 2014: 67). Tensions in doing so are thus inevitable, as the literature shows elsewhere (see, Richmond, 2016: 87-97). In any case, at least in theory, the idea of hybrid peace aspires to raise the possibilities of “a coexistence of difference, rather than assimilation and internationalization” (Richmond 2010, 687).

The question, thus, becomes: is it necessary to choose between the international and the local, or are there merits and strengths in both? Hybrid peace essentially proceeds on the premise that an encounter between the local-local, but also local-international ways of operating (Mac Ginty, 2011: 210; Richmond et al. 2016: 92) can offer generic principles, global dimensions, and lessons learned from what is developing in other contexts, while building in examples which are inclusive of the embedded local realities, norms, practices, politics, and cultures (Gittins, forthcoming, see also, Burns, 1996: 120).

But Richmond (2016: 154-173) is further deepening the argument, by making a distinction between a negative and positive hybrid version of peace. In general, most international-local collaborations tend to deal with those at the formal and local elite level (Smith and Verdeja, 2013: 10), characteristic of, and leading to, a ‘negative hybrid’ peace. Timothy Donias’s (2012: 147) analysis of interventional peacebuilding concludes that elite-level ownership by the state alone is not enough, and that a wider approach to societal ownership is preferable. From a ‘positive hybrid’ perspective, the international connects with the state, yet goes deeper to interact with civil society level actors as well. A positive hybrid peace essentially operates in both formal and informal spaces, encouraging a multi-level approach to peace (horizontal and vertical) where the international works with the local elite, mid, and grassroots level actors (Lederach, 1997: 39).

2.2.8 One peace or many peaces

The newer debates on local, every day, and hybrid versions of peace emerged in part as attempts to narrow the gap between international prescriptions of what peace is and the local realities (Richmond, 2016: 89). Accordingly, work has sought to (re)frame the debate about peace by further including the voices of ordinary people, those that are typically left most unheard (Richmond, 2005: 100; Mac Ginty, 2006: 33-57). These (albeit limited) attempts to move beyond the liberal peace, therefore, rest on the assumption that peace “should be broadly representative of all actors at multiple levels, public and private, gendered and age, and of multiple identifies” (Richmond, 2008b: 462). Working from the assumption that peace invokes different things to different people at different times and places, suggests that peace is likely to remain an ambiguous term; consistent with what philosopher Gallie (1956: 184) would term an “essentially contested concept”. What appears to be increasingly recognized, therefore, is that a more appropriate response might be to not only look for one peace but “many peaces” (see, Dietrich, 1997: 9-16).

Concluding this discussion on peace, it is possible to get a certain amount of agreement across the literature on several things. First, defining peace remains a difficult task and different conceptions emerge from the literature itself. Second, peace is a dynamic and organic process that is hard to build but easy to destroy (Johnson and Johnson, 2005: 277; Reardon and Snauwaert, 2014: 114). Third, a basic assumption behind most understandings of peace is that it goes hand in hand with justice, what Lederach and Appleby (2010: 23) term 'just peace'. Betty Reardon (1988: 26), often referred to as a mother of peace education, asserts that global "justice, in the sense of the full enjoyment of the entire range of human rights by all people, is what constitutes positive peace". Finally, we all want peace, but we typically want it on our own terms (Gittins, forthcoming). The question thus becomes whether a single all-inclusive definition is either possible or desirable. Given nuances of space, time, and human experience (see, Reardon, 1988: 40), peace is not what others give to you: it is "what you think it is (or want it to be)" (Bloomfield, 1986: 237).

In considering understandings of peace, it is also necessary to understand violence and conflict. Like peace, both violence and conflict have eluded universally agreed upon definitions (Danesh, 2015: 145). The following, however, addresses some of the ways in which these concepts have been conceived, understood, and spoken of in the literature, before moving to a more in-depth discussion of peace education.

2.3 Violence

Elise Boulding (2012: 423), who is internationally referred to as the mother of peace research, defines violence as "the intentional harming of others for one's own end". Another way of thinking about violence is to consider it as "avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life" that prevent people from fulfilling four basic human needs: survival, wellness, freedom, and identity (the opposites being death, illness, repression, and alienation, respectively) (Galtung, 1990: 292). These four basic human needs can be summed up as dignity (Galtung and Udayakumar, 2013: 103).

More specifically, Galtung (e.g. 1969; 1990) has pointed to three types of violence relevant to the understanding of peace: direct, structural and cultural violence. Direct violence refers to action, or threat of an action, that causes deliberate physical, emotional and psychological harm.

Examples include war, militarism, torture, rape and other forms of aggression. Structural violence, which can be considered an invisible social process, was to a good extent theorized in response to a critique of peace research as being too focused on 'direct violence'. It thus refers to deliberate policies and structures that cause human suffering, death and harm. Poverty and hunger are two prime examples.

Cultural violence refers to "any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form" (Galtung, 1990: 291). This includes cultural norms and practices that create discrimination, injustice and human suffering. This sort of violence emerges from a world views that execrate systems of racism, sexism, colonialism, and culturally coded exclusion (Brantmeier and Bajaj, 2013: 145). Since cultural violence makes the other two forms of violence "look, even feel, right - or at least not wrong" (Galtung, 1990: 291), it is possible to think of violence spiraling from cultural violence, passing to structural violence, and then direct violence (Grewal, 2003: 4).

Philosopher and Psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek (2008: 2) further defines violence as “violent perpetuation of normal state of things”, which can be subjective and objective. Subjective violence refers to physical acts of violence, such as shootings, riots, and wars. Objective violence is systemic, creating the conditions for the manifestation of subjective violence. It is inherent violence in the system that not only includes the threat of physical violence, but also “the subtler forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation’ (ibid, 2008: 7). Objective violence operates through cultures and societies. It is inherent in language. The adage ‘the pen is mightier than the sword’ indeed rings partially true, since language may well be more divisive and destructive than the sword.

Brock-Utne (1989), from a feminist perspective, emphasizes that violence operates at all levels, from the personal to the global, but also posits that that is ‘organized’, by states or groups, for example, or ‘unorganized’, between friends, families or within communities. Unorganized violence often fits within the realm of Galtung’s concept of cultural violence, since it often occurs “through practices that are culturally legitimized”, yet “also strongly tied to structural inequalities” (Baja and Hantzopolous, 2015: 3).

Understanding the root causes of violence in its various forms can help inform appropriate alternatives. Taken together, violence and peace are at opposite ends of a continuum (Schirch 2004: 82). The interrelationships between them both occur in four spaces: “personal relationships (the human space); the social space of societal constructions (broadly, culture, politics, economy); the global space of world systems (broadly, international politics), and ecological space (the relationship of people to the planet or to nature) (Woodhouse, 2014: 23). Galtung (1996: 193) refers to these as Nature, Human, Social and World spaces.

To date, the academic and policy literature has focused more on preventing violence than bringing about peace (Richmond, 2012: 39). Thus, while the drivers and consequences of violence are well-known, peace remains considerably understudied; to the extent that “violence is known: peace is a mystery” (Lederach, 2005: 39). At the same time, it is important to point out that “studying and working ... [for] ... peace entails some engagement with its conceptual opposite: conflict” (McCandless, 2007: 85), to which the attention now turns.

2.4 CONFLICT

Violence is often conflated with conflict, which can be understood as incompatible goals (Galtung and Udayakumar, 2013: 104). Like peace and violence, it is experienced at all levels of human activity, from the interpersonal to intrapersonal to the international. Typically, conflict has three components: attitudes (inside); behaviors (outside) and contradictions (inside and outside), which correspond to cultural, direct, and structural violence respectively (Galtung, 2015: 33 cited in Miall et al, 2015). Given that there is no such thing as a conflict-free society (Boulding, 2012: 422) the book works from the assumption that there is nothing wrong, or even undesirable, about the “omnipresence of conflict” (Brunk, 2012: 14).

Conflict is, so to speak, neither good nor bad, it just is (Dugan in Miall et al, 2015: 173). Thus, although “violence and conflict” are “inter-related” they “do not go together”

(Nicolaidis, 2008: 12). They are not, in other words, synonymous²⁶. It should not be assumed, therefore, that all conflicts adopt the use of violence. In some instances, conflict is considered “socially desirable if they result in personal and/or political progress” (Webel & Galtung, 2007: 8). The “important thing about human conflicts, then, is not so much the conflicts themselves as the means we choose to deal with them” (Brunk, 2012: 14).

2.5 Peace education

The analysis thus far has elaborated on the ways in which peace, violence, and conflict have been conceptualized in the literature. In reviewing this literature, the inter-relationship between these three concepts and education was frequently highlighted. Prior to examining some of the meanings and practices associated with peace education, therefore, a brief outline of how conflict, violence, and education interact is given as follows.

2.5.1 The two faces of education

Education is not a panacea. There is already ample empirical evidence highlighting its controversial ‘two faces’. The negative face “shows itself in the uneven distribution of education to create or preserve privilege, the use of education as a weapon of cultural repression, and the production or doctoring of textbooks to promote intolerance” (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: vii). There is also considerable research which demonstrates how education has been found to maintain and reinforce different forms of violence (see also the work of Seitz, 2004; Harber, 2004; Smith, 2005).

Lyn Davies (2004; 2005; 2006), one of the leading experts on conflict and education, discusses the ways in which school systems might reproduce social and gender inequalities, increase tension, and can be a catalyst for war. She makes the case that the school system itself contributes to sowing the seeds of war and conflict by promoting xenophobia and racism towards ethnic groups and religious minorities.

In line with this, she identifies three ways in which education contributes to the ‘roots of conflict’. First, how education contributes to the exclusion of (already) marginalised groups by (re)producing economic and class relations. Second, how ‘masculine’ gender relationships can reproduce existing violence. Finally, how education transmits or reinforces ‘essentialist’ identities, informed by ethnicity, religion, tribalism and nationalism (Davies, 2005: 359-361; cited in Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008: 15).

Critical peace education scholar Zvi Bekerman (2016: 63) posits that schools have, for the most part, been “used a chief colonizing device”, while Harris & Morrison (2003: 31) concluded that “traditional education reproduces violent cultures”. Formal education systems are typically alike all around the world, separated by discipline or faculty (Illich, 1973), relying on ‘productivity’, ‘performance’, ‘ranking’, ‘specializations’, ‘exams’, ‘sorting devices’, ‘scandalized testing’ and ‘centralized systems’ (Duckworth, 2011: 241). In line with this, Seitz (2004), drawing on Salmi (2000), identifies four different forms of violence in the context of education, ranging from direct, indirect, and repressive, through to alienating violence, summarised in the table below.

²⁶ For a discussion of the important differences between violence and conflict, see. Kalyvas (2006).

Table 1: Forms of Violence in the Context of Education

Forms of Violence in the Context of Education - Typology According to Salmi 2000	
1. Direct violence ("Deliberate injury to the integrity of human life")	e.g. effects of violent conflicts, weapons and violence in the school, corporal punishment, sexual abuse, suicide of students due to failure.
2. Indirect violence ("Indirect violation of the right to survival")	e.g. illiteracy, inequality of access to education, inequality of education opportunities, insufficient educational infrastructure (lack of hygiene etc.).
3. Repressive violence ("Deprivation of fundamental political rights")	e.g. absence of democracy and co-determination opportunities in schools.
4. Alienating violence ("deprivation of higher rights")	e.g. culturally biased curricula (dominance culture), suppression of: subjects/views/language of ethnic minorities. no teaching in mother tongue.

Source: (Seitz, 2004: 51, cited in (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008: 16))

By contrast, the "positive face goes beyond the provision of education for peace programs, reflecting the cumulative benefits of the provision of good quality education. These include the conflict-dampening impact of educational opportunity, the promotion of linguistic tolerance, the nurturing of ethnic tolerance, and the 'disarming' of history" (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: vii). Davies (2005: 364-368) also discusses the positive aspects of education, proposing three "possibilities for hope" for addressing what she calls 'war education'.

First, is schools' reliance to conflict, exemplified by countries like Lebanon, Uganda, Bosnia, Nepal and Liberia, for example, (see also Paulson & Rappleye, 2007: 344). Second, is the "impact of peace initiatives in education", such as peace education programmes which employ "exposure, encounter and experience". Third, refers to a "set of possibilities under the broad heading of global citizenship" – including the concept of "interruptive democracy", which uses dialogue to facilitate "positive conflict" within educational settings (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008: 17).

In summary, there is now diverse literature showing that education is something of a paradox, with the potential to contribute to or impede peace. From one perspective, education plays a major role in violence (Harber, 2004) and contributes to the factors that lie at the root of the conflict (Buckland, 2005: 86). At the same time, it bears noting that education cannot cause or end a war.

From another, it is now widely agreed that education plays a core role in helping to dismantle structures of violence and the promotion of building sustainable peace (Galtung, 1973: 317; Novelli and Smith 2011: 7). However, it is important to stress at this point that, in all cases, education cannot cause or end a war.

In general, however, there is wide spread agreement that to reach peace we must teach peace (Navarro-Castro & Nario-Galace, 2010). This perspective is summed up aptly by

the Global Campaign for Peace Education's slogan which states "no peace without peace education" (Larson and Gex, 2000). The rest of the chapter is, thus, dedicated to peace education. It covers the origins of the field and some of its core concepts for those new to the field, as well as some of the current trends and challenges for the future, useful to those seeking to deepen their understanding.

2.5.2 What is peace education?

Peace education is both an old and a relatively recent phenomenon. On one hand, teaching about war, violence, and by implication peaceful alternatives, has a long history that dates back hundreds of years. In fact, some of the oldest records about peace have their roots in many religious and wisdom traditions, through the teachings of Buddha, Ballá'u'lláh, Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Moses, and Loa Tse, among others (Harris, 2008; Brantmeier et al. 2010).

On the other hand, the academic study of peace (and therefore peace education) began largely in reaction to WW1 and 2, as a means for teaching peace rather than war (Bajaj, 2015: 154). Additionally, peace education, in part, also emerged as a response to the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) charter (1945), which states that "Since war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed".

In tandem with the developing understanding of peace and peace studies, the field of peace education has also evolved since its inception. The initial emphasis throughout the 1950s, for example, was on "direct (personal) violence", such as "assault, torture, terrorism, or war" (Hicks, 1988: 6). Along with the expanded definitions of violence, peace education also evolved throughout the 1960s and 1970s to include indirect or structural violence. Over the past four decades, interest in and research focused on peace education has grown exponentially²⁷, to the extent that it is in the process of developing its own 'educational paradigm' (Synott, 2005) and practiced globally.

This growth is evidenced by the field's growing network, support through the UN and UNESCO, the large number of specific research institutes, increased presence in academic institutions, funders, publishers, international programs, as well as the Global Campaign for Peace Education (GCPE) for The Hague Appeal for Peace, International Institute on Peace Education (IIPE), and Peace Education Commission (PEC) housed within the International Peace Research Association (IPRA).

In recent years, UNESCO (2011: ii) has called for a global joint effort to unlock "the full potential of education to act as a force for peace". In 2013 the Secretary-General of the UN Ban Ki-moon dedicated the International Day of Peace to peace education, asserting that "education is vital for fostering global citizenship and building peaceful societies" (Ki-moon, 2013, paragraph 2).

²⁷ For a useful discussions about the development of peace and conflict studies, see Harris and Howlett (2011: 26-50); Webel and Johansen (2012: 7). Also, Christopher Mitchells initiative 'Parents of the Field' housed within George Mason University provides an excellent mapping of the field and interviews some of the most influential thinkers and practitioners who have shaped it <http://scar.gmu.edu/parents-of-field/chris-mitchell>. With regards to peace education see, Harris (2002: 17-18); Kester (2010: 63-64); Harris and Morrison (2013: 39-68) who further discuss peace education's historical trajectory.

Today, “people all over the world are using educational tools to liberate themselves from human suffering caused by direct and structural violence. Where there are conflicts, there are peace educators” (Harris, 2013).

It is now possible to locate peace education under the broader umbrella of ‘peace knowledge’ (Reardon, 1988: 38-53) which also encompasses peace studies, peace research, and peace action (Fitzduff and Jean, 2011: 33; Kester, 2012: 1). Peace education is a diverse field of study and practice, but at a basic level it can be thought of as a form of organized learning (either formal or informal) that attempts to teach about “peace; what exists, why it doesn’t exist and ways to achieve it” (Harris and Morrison, 2013: 29).

Through educational policy, planning, pedagogy and practice, peace education provides the means through which to address the knowledge, attitudes, dispositions, skills, behaviors, and values needed to explore the causes of violence, dynamics of conflict, and conditions for comprehensive peace (Harris, 2003: 16; Schirch, 2005: 57; Bajaj, 2008: 1; Salomon and Cairns, 2010: 5). Peace education, then, constitutes an important component of peacebuilding, including links to conflict, international development, truth and reconciliation, teaching about extremism, terrorism, humanitarian responses, conflict transformation, and post conflict reconstruction (Gittins, Forthcoming). In brief, peace education can be broadly defined as the cornerstone of a culture of peace (Wessells, 1994: 43; Reardon, 2000: 414).

2.5.3 Core concepts

To work towards its objectives, seminal scholar Ian Harris (2004: 6) posits that peace education has the following five postulates: to explain the roots of violence; teach alternatives to violence; adjust to cover different forms of violence; recognize peace itself is a process that varies according to context; and that conflict is omnipresent. It is, thus, possible to summarize peace education’s broad theoretical framework as a holistic understanding of violence, peace, conflict, and power.

Although the former three were discussed above, it is useful to discuss them again here within the context of peace education. The first core concept peace education usually begins with an exploration of violence in all its forms. The rationale behind this is, it is important to develop an understanding of violence to present alternatives (Harris and Morrison, 2013: 135). Like peace and conflict, discussed next, peace education is interested in a multi-level approach to these issues - from the inter-personal to the international. Part of this focus on violence may include examining what Galtung terms direct, structural, and cultural violence. It may also include exploring the extent to which humans have a general disposition to violence (Kinder 2011) or if they are inherently peaceful.

The second core concept of peace education is to explore the richness of the concept of ‘peace’ (Galtung, 1981: 183; Johnson and Johnson, 2010: 223). Essentially, peace education encourages students to work towards ‘Peace by Peaceful Means’. Ideas of direct-structural-cultural violence are counteracted by “direct positive peace” (physical and verbal kindness, epitomizing in love), “structural positive peace” (dialog, integration, solidarity, and participation), and “cultural positive peace” (legitimation of peace, positive peace culture) (Galtung, 1969: 302; 1996: 32). Across the literature, most agree that a comprehensive and holistic concept of peace (and therefore peace education) is based on a relational view, encompassing education for negative and positive peace (Reardon, 1988: 11-37) and inner and outer peace (Groff, 2002). Building on this, Galtung’s (2002:8) “Transcend” method surmises peace as “the capacity to handle conflicts with creativity, non-violence and empathy”.

The third core concept of peace education is to explore the nature and dynamics of conflict. Lyn Davies (2005: 637) notes that “paradoxically, peace education comes from exposure to conflict, learning from people who disagree with you rather than those who agree”. Peace education can thus help students to consider the ways in which to reduce the use of violence in conflict. Understanding the differences between destructive or constructive conflict (Deutsch, 1973: 8) and negative or positive conflict (Davies, 2006: 13), helps students explore ways to manage, resolve, or transform them (Lederach, 1997). Taking a different approach, Danesh (2008: 147) argues that peace education has forgotten its original task: to “study the nature of peace and the dynamics of peace building”. He thus proposes a type of conflict-free conflict resolution (see, Danesh and Danesh, 2004; Danesh, 2006); a form of unity-based peace education premised on an integrated peace theory that displaces ‘conflict’ and conflict management as *raison d’être* in peace studies (Danesh, 2008: 147).

One of the newest trends in peace education is an argument for critical peace education, present in the work of Bajaj (2008), Brantmeier, (2010) and Duckworth (2012), among others. While most peace education programmes cover violence, peace, and conflict, critical peace education adds an additional focus on power. It also, drawing from post-structural and post-colonial critiques of the field being normative and decontextualized (Hantzopolous, 2016: 181), highlights the importance of researchers, local actors, and institutes collaborating to develop context-specific curriculum, pedagogy and relationships in educative spaces through activist research, education, and action towards social change processes (Bajaj, 2008: 137, 2014: 7).

As the study of, and approaches to, violence, peace, and conflict ultimately rest on questions of power (see, Brunk, 2012: 13-23), the author argues that the forth core concept of peace education should be to examine how power relations are reproduced and the status quo can be challenged (see, Gittins, forthcoming). This might also include an elaboration of the ways in which education systems are often a ‘part of the problem’.

More recently, work by Woodhouse (2014: 23) calls for the need to extend the scope further to consider cyber peace (as well as violence and conflict). The diagram below encapsulates the foregoing discussion on a holistic approach to peace education, indicating the types of violence examined and how they correspond with the ideas of peace and conflict, which all revolve around a discussion of power.

Holistic approach about violence peace and conflict					
	Direct violence	Estructural Violence	Socio-cultural/ Psicología Violence	Ecological Violence	Violence of war/ cibernetic
Peace	Negativ peace	Positiv peace (Economic/ political)	Positiv peace Ecological Cultural	Positiv peace peace with the nature	Cibernetic peace
Conflict	Behaviour	Contradictions	Attitudes	Attitudes and Behaviours	Behaviour: Cibernetic conflict.

(Based on Gittins, Forthcoming)

It bears that these four core concepts do not – or should not - belong in purely one discipline. Peace education and related fields, therefore, consider themselves as not discipline specific, but rather subject to, and benefiting from, cross-disciplinarily (Toh and Cawagas, 1990) or trans-disciplinarity (Galtung, 1996). Churchman (2005) enumerates 23 different disciplines that feed into these fields. In reality, peace studies is typically informed by political science, a process that Galtung (2009: 511-514) calls ‘uni-disciplinarity’.

Additionally, peace education must also consider the temporal dimensions (Haavelsrud, 2008); enabling students to analyze and deal with the past and the present, as well as the future. Being ‘futures’ orientated (Boulding, 1988; Reardon, 1988) offers students the chance to envision, imagine, and plan for “probable and possible futures”, considering “where do we want to get to?” and “how do we get there?” (Hick, 2008: 132, 128).

The holistic approach to peace education, set out above, is considered to incorporate some of the decisive factors needed to push us towards human development and the establishment of a culture of peace (Galtung, 1998: 16). Clearly, each peace education programme may not address these. The content should ideally be ‘cherry picked’ to be responsive to the realities faced in each context. Unfortunately, as the below will show, this is far from being the way things operate on-the-ground, as the below will now show.

2.5.4 Challenges for the future

There are many voices that confirm the importance of peace education, and wide agreement that it matters. As well as its value, it is important to be aware of some of the field’s challenges for the future. Four will be discussed here, each of which will be addressed to varying degrees in this book (Chapter 8 and 9).

1. Peace education and its evaluation

The lack of rigorous research on the effects of peace education needs addressing (Fountain, 1999: 31-37; Harris, 2003: 7; Salomon, 2004; Ashton 2007: 41). From the few evaluations, available, many tend to be quantitative (Nevo and Brem, 2002; 257; Duckworth et al, 2012: 81) and typically conducted by, and focused on, the views of teachers and administrators (see notable exceptions: Duckworth et al, 2012; Gittins, forthcoming). Because donors funding programmes require evidence of impact, the drive towards evaluation is strong.

2. Context-specific peace education

An ever-present challenge facing peace education, as with most of the peace and international developments fields, is how to develop programmes in ways that respond to the particular problems and needs in which they take place. Most research and policy literature highlight that peace programmes should vary from context to context, because conflicts have their distinct roots and people have different understandings of peace (Galtung, 1990; Harris, 2004: 6-7, Baja, 2015: 121). Typically, this requires critical reflection on “the relationship between how...[and what is taught]...and where” (TWB, 2011: 160).

Ardizzone (2001) highlights attempts made around the world to contextualize approaches, including popular education that aims to promote critical consciousness in Latin America (Diaz, 1993; Cabezudo, 1993), conflict resolution and democracy education in the Balkans (Corkalo, 2000; Murdzewa-Skarik, 2000), educational endeavours that promote

intercultural understanding in Northern Ireland (Duffy 2000), co-existence education efforts in the Middle East (Bar-Tal 2000), focus on values through youth programmes in Africa (Ekwueme 2001; Dovey 2000), and so forth (Gill, 2014).

This points us to another dynamic. Although the term peace education is widely used, it is important that peace educators examine with the local beneficiaries themselves “what peace education definition appeals best to my context” (TWB, 2011: 20). On this matter, it is worth noting that some governments do not permit the use the term ‘peace education’ because of its critical nature (Davies, 2005: 61).

Many different names are used instead, including human rights education, education for sustainability, international education, conflict resolution, disarmament education, interfaith education, gender-fair/non-sexist education, development education, non-violence education, civic education, life skills education; citizenship education, amongst others²⁸. While some see these as different, others see them as broad, interconnected and interrelated domains that fall under the umbrella of peace education.

Ultimately, it should be given a name that “has local resonance and motivational force” (Sinclair, 2005: xvi). Good examples of this include: Gandhian Studies in India (Bajaj, 2010), “A-Bomb education” in Japan, “development education” in South America, “education for mutual understanding” in Ireland, and “reunification education” in South Korea” (Harris, 2004: 7), disarmament and anti-nuclear education in other parts of Asia (Floresca-cawagas and Toh, 1993), and “education for peaceful coexistence” in Colombia (Chaux, 2009). Sinclair (2004; 2005) offers a response to this seemingly chaotic division by using UNESCO’s umbrella term ‘Learning to Live Together’ (LTLT)²⁹.

An extensive analysis of scholarly and programmatic literature (Gittins, forthcoming) revealed that peace education and peace building programmes in general, are routinely context-independent. They are generally decided a priori by outside experts and not adapted to the contexts in which they take place. More than that, they are not thoroughly and thoughtfully designed and planned carefully and collaboratively with the local host populations themselves. The authors own participatory action research (Gittins, forthcoming), through, offers the first compressive attempt to design, implement, and evaluate a contextualized peace education programme, with the so-called beneficiaries, from start to finish³⁰.

²⁸ For useful review of the literature and discussions on how each form of education relates to or differs from each other, see Fountain (1999: 7-14); Harris (1999: 308-309); Reardon (1990: 4); Bajaj (2008: 2); Salomon and Cairns (2010: 1-10); Harris (2004, 7-16); Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace (2008: 31-37); Harris and Morrison (2013: 70-80); Ardizzone (2001: 1); Bush & Saltarelli (2000: 23); Davies (2005: 61); Simpson (2004: 1).

²⁹ For a useful discussion of LTLT and an overview of ‘overlapping goals’ see Sinclair (2004: 21-38).

³⁰ The author worked with 34 Bolivian research collaborators who were drawn from different levels of programme implementation (from the governmental level to the participant group): 17 grass-roots-level (students participating in the programme), 13 mid-level (including Deans, Directors of university departments, academics/lecturers, NGO’s and programme makers), and 4 elite-level actors (including policy makers, government officials, and international donors), providing a broad coverage start to finish.

In general, however, context-specific programming is oft-cited, it is rarely practiced. By inference, peace education is routinely criticized for its reliance on ‘ready-made’, ‘decontextualized’ approaches (Weinstein et al, 2007: 44). Despite claims to avoid indoctrination, by being explicit with its aims (Mayor, 2005), peace educations inherent ‘liberal-western bias’ and impulse towards universalism and normalization (Schell-Faucon, 2001: 1; Ardizzone, 2001: 16; Page, 2008) have been found to undermine local identity, culture, history, indigenous traditions and knowledge (Choque, 2007: 70; Fitzduff and Jean, 2011: 19).

In framing this argument, Richmond (2004: 91), in the context of peacebuilding, warns against the dangers of self-appointed external experts who “educate others in their ways of peace, without necessarily renegotiating the peace frameworks that have arisen from the recipients”.

3. The theory-practice divide

Galtung (2008: 53-55) sees the ideal process of peace education and related fields as encompassing five stages. First, is an ‘analysis’ which helps to understand the complexities of the problems faced; second, to form a goal, where students come to together to formulate what it is they want for the future; third, is ‘critique’ where students formulate the data and values the goal is based on; fourth, involves making a plan of action; and the fifth is then to implement it.

The said stages follow the logic of Galtung (1996: 1) long standing admiration for the medical profession, combining diagnosis-prognosis-therapy³¹. Stage one to four, for example, moves from ‘diagnosing’ a situation to ‘predicting’ possible outcomes of the situation. This understanding of how to treat the situation provides the background for moving the situation in the direction of peace, a process what Galtung refers to ‘therapy’. Many join Galtung in recognizing that it is much preferable if students have the chance to act towards addressing problems in the real word.

Unfortunately, this is far from being the way peace education, and related fields, are operating around the globe. Although most such programmes talk about the importance of combining peace research and peace action, very few are doing it (Gittins, forthcoming). This gap between “know-ledge and know-how” (Reychler, 2010: 9), thus, remains an ever-present challenge, one inhibiting the fields development in terms of theory, research, and practice.

Further work is, thus, needed to help narrow the gap between what students study in the class and practice on the ground. By doing so, peace education can represent a field that not only fosters change in students, but also contributes to wider change ‘beyond the classroom walls’ (Adams, 2009), a process that many leading scholars refer to as the necessary ‘ripple effect’ (see Harris, 2004; Salomon, 2012).

4. Access to peace education

At present, there are more than 400 university programmes in peace education and peace studies worldwide (Anastasiou, 2016: 3). Institutions, however, are charging high fees. For example, the University of Kent in England, which houses the Conflict Research

³¹ Another word for diagnosis is analysis. Another word for prognosis is forecasting. Another word for therapy is remedy.

Society, charges £3,600 per year (3-year course) for tuition fees towards a Bachelor's Degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. In Bolivia, the Catholic University in La Paz charges 40,000 BS (US \$5,800) towards a Masters' Degree in Human Rights, Culture of Peace, and Democracy, for the 2016-2017 academic year³².

For a lot of people, this makes learning about peace impossible, although there are exceptions³³. Ultimately, peace education must be seen as a human right (Page, 2008), a public good (Prasad, 2008), and an investment into today and the building of a better tomorrow. And if this is the case, it should not be highly priced. Compounded by the lack of access in general, is the fact that peace education as a formal subject takes place primarily in the global North (Sommers, 2004: 170), despite most conflicts and violence taking place in the global South.

2.6. Conclusion

The conclusion now returns to the questions first presented in the beginning of this chapter. The first two questions looked at the concept of peace. Across the literature, spanning hundreds of years to the present time, it was shown that numerous definitions of peace emerged from the review itself. In general, it was shown that peace is "more than the absence of war, just as health is more than the absence of disease" (Johnson & Johnson, 2005: 275-276). The chapter, however, also illustrated that the scholarship around peace has, to date, been dominated by the theory of liberal peace.

This represents a significant challenge to the study and practice of peace, but there are alternatives emerging in the form of more nuanced, and perhaps more advanced, local, every day, and hybrid perspectives. Because there is no universal way of understanding peace, the author argued that more research with different cultures and contexts is required. However, peace is defined, it was also argued that it is likely to remain an 'essentially contested concept', thereby lending support to a further argument developed about the importance of searching for many 'peaces', not just one. After examining peace, two terms typically used interchangeable with this concept were explored: violence and conflict.

The second part of the chapter addressed questions three and four, which were about peace education. It swept from an analysis of the fields' origins and core concepts, through to a discussion of some current trends and challenges for the future. Chapter 5 goes some way to addressing these challenges. Before then, it is important to deal with measuring peace and ways to create it, and this is done in the very next chapter.

³² See: <http://lpz.ucb.edu.bo/Forms/ProgramasAcademicos/Postgrado/2016/Maestrias/MDerechosHumanosCulturaPaz-Democracia.pdf>

³³ An analysis of the literature pertaining to peace education and peace and conflict studies, revealed - aside from several prestigious scholarships, such as the Rotary Peace Fellowships - one notable exception at the university level which is subsidized (and therefore free for students to attend): The Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, Republic of Korea.

Peace and Conflict — in Bolivia

Chapter 3

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL BASES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF PEACE BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. Peace, definitions and conceptualizations

The concept of “peace” has counter-factual or sometimes contradictory meanings. According to Gawerc (2006), there is a relative coincidence of academic and governmental definitions regarding a defined peace such as the absence of war or physical violence. On one hand, this definition is convenient for the academy because it allows quantifying the number of war episodes or social violence in a given period of time and, on the other hand, is convenient for a government with programmes aimed directly at reducing the intensity of conflicts in its territory and submit those results to international organizations to access funds or as an electoral platform. However, this definition is problematic because academics or government officials are not the only actors in a conflict, and each protagonist can have a definition of what for its conglomerate of actors can mean “peace”, without mentioning the fact that in different stages of the conflict, the actors can redefine for themselves and for their surroundings that concept.

Galtung (2002), based on the discursive legacy of Martin Luther King, for example, proposed differentiating between “positive” and “negative” peace. The latter refers to the absence of direct violence (people being killed), while the former refers to the absence of structural violence (deaths of people as a result of poverty) and includes mitigation of factors of cultural violence (factors which prevent people from realizing or perceiving that an injustice is being committed or prevent them from rationalizing and sizing the harm caused to the victims and to themselves) and methods of introducing new members into society to integrate peaceful resolution mechanisms, among other elements. In this context, Burssino (2011: 14) states that “a negative peace order accompanied by a cessation of violence does not necessarily equate to pacification nor is it compatible with the notion of justice of the law, while Positive peace, by including reconciliation and psychosocial healing, presupposes that same notion of justice.”

Friberg and Lederach (2012) argue that since 1990, the year that the post-Cold War era was inaugurated until 2001, the year of the attacks on the Twin Towers, more than 80 peace agreements officially recognized by the UN were signed throughout the world (With the exception of the conflicts in South Africa, Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland), all of them with a Western vision of peace and, especially with the mechanisms to achieve it, the whole process was expected to culminate in the signing of a treaty. This way of achieving peace has tangible positive aspects, such as the obligation of the actors involved to comply with their part of the treatment, international recognition of the agreement, guarantors and rewards to fulfill it. In any case, it ignores the causes of the conflict and ignores the possibility that by not analyzing these causes adequately, violence reappears more intensely and has more actors involved with even more complex interests. That is why Kappler (2014) and Bell (2013) agree that the introduction of conflict analysis within peace studies has been a crucial step forward in understanding that different groups have different definitions of peace and that the experience of conflict, among other factors, readjusts or re-creates such definitions

There may even be the possibility that certain belligerent groups may understand peace as an endless series of episodes with relative violence that must take place at certain times of the year, without reaching levels of mass extinction or massive migrations (Serrano, 2004). : 55).

So, the point is this: Peace studies, by including conflict theories, have become an area of knowledge called “peacebuilding”, still in an embryonic level, but with great potential for growth at the theoretical, methodological and human to the extent that the world unfolds daily in a state of relative but questionable calm. Moreover, the introduction of elements of psycho-social and psycho-cultural analysis that sheds light on the bloodthirsty of a conflict and how the past in the form of images and memories influences, has given rise to different approaches to the Peace, each with its own definition, indicators and methods of building peace. Terms such as “conflict transformation” (which refers to the impossibility of ending a conflict in full, but also to the ability of mediators to reduce violence and promote relatively peaceful coexistence), “satellite wars” or “social deep conflicts” have recently appeared in the literature for peace studies (Zartman, 2006; Kaldor, 2011).

In them, the questioning of older paradigms seems to be the most widely used way of generating new knowledge - including, of course, the definition of the state as the “legitimate” monopoly of violence directed towards the citizen, a notion that has sustained studies on corruption, applicability of Human Rights, childhood, intellectual quotient, as a wealth factor of nations and economic freedom correlated with happiness indexes (Miall, 2013, Kauffman, 2013 and Aall, 1996).

Therefore, whatever is the definition of peace, it is important to distinguish between the mechanisms used to approach it or “build it”. For example, the term “Peacemaking”, other than referring to the whole process of negotiation between policymakers or people directly involved in decision-making, it also refers to the change in the perspective of elites about the current situation of those who do not have such power (access to education, work, experience of violence, etc.). One particularity of the peace settlement is that conflict is understood not as a means of transformation but as a pathological agent that must be eliminated. For Rothbart (2008), efforts to “make peace” are becoming less frequent because they precisely ignore the way of understanding the existence of the different people of the world or the influences of the past that affect their way of deciding in the here and in the now (as in the case of genocides in Rwanda in Africa or religious differences in Ireland).

Another term, “Peacekeeping”, is also of relatively recent introduction in the literature, and consists of the intervention of a third mediating / ordering force with a superior military power than the groups in conflict, to assist in the reduction of direct violence especially to the most vulnerable population, while efforts are made to reach treaties or temporary agreements (as was the case of Timor in the conflict with Indonesia). However, “Peacebuilding” is a concept with a lower level of operationalization than the previous two, but generally refers to the construction from “the bottom to up” peace structure that contains a wide range of activities focused on rescuing the social, economic and psychological wealth of people affected or not by conflict and ensuring not only a conjunctural level of response but a lasting and stable peace (Burton, 1999; 2003 and Kappler, 2015).

The reason why the words are kept in the original language (English) is because at the semantic level perception, the translation into other languages may not be compatible with the original intention of the term. For example, according to Ordóñez (2009), peacemaking can be perceived as an obligation, as a forced element to obey and whose explanations sound more to justifications of a dictatorship than to genuine attempts at peaceful coexistence (as was the case of civil conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire or Darfur in Sudan). Peacekeeping is a term that can be interpreted as subjection to an even greater power than was being combated (Timor or Kosovo) and generate mistrust and susceptibilities even when the goal is humanitarian aid. Rothbart, 2008). Although these three efforts could be understood as a continuum (Establishment of Peace in the first instance, Peacekeeping and then Peacebuilding), it is not appropriate to apply a linear-chronological perspective to them, given the systemic and dynamic characteristics of conflicts, one can appear without the need of others or may appear spontaneous efforts for each of them or even none of them could emerge at all.

Steinberg (2008) assures that none of the approaches that will be shortly explained, has actually deconstructed the Hobbesian concept in which international relations between “countries against everybody” have their inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts remaining so intense and frequent in the twenty-first century as they were before the birth of Christ, but also recognizes that although deterrence and defense would be the best alternatives for maintaining peace among nations, an effective way to achieve lasting peace is qualitatively changing the quality of human-to-human relationships (Steinberg, 2008: 11).

3.2. Approaches to Peacebuilding

There are about 35 theories of peace, at least at the university level, and functionally investigated by study cases with the means to do so scientifically (Guterman, 2015: 12). (Not to mention Peace Neuroscience initiatives, promoted by the universities of Durham, Oxford and Newcastle, among others). For Gawerc (2006), these theories can be classified into four groups but with the sole objective of ordering knowledge for academic purposes, since according to the level of violence, duration of conflict, socio-cultural expectations or psycho-social characteristics, can be superimposed, annexed or annulled.

Basically, peace-building theories emerged formally from Boutros-Ghali's 1992 “Agenda for Peace” (Yaman, 2000: 9) advocating state-rebuilding activities and initiatives that reinforce the collective social environment. Respect for Human Rights, the Rule of Law and Democracy were the first pillars that supported peacebuilding approaches, whose four groups share certain similarities:

- A government of relatively small size and effective in its operation.
 - An environment conducive to business.
 - Acceptance of the rights of minorities.
 - Free flow of information.
 - High levels of education.
 - Low levels of corruption.
-

For Friberg and Lederach (2012) Peacebuilding is beyond state reforms that guarantee economic development, governance or access to justice; It is necessary to generate a culture based on truth and reconciliation by understanding the dispute and the culture of debate as civic weapons, not confrontation. It is, under these ideas, that the four approaches mentioned above are structured. It is possible that each approach has common points that stand out with the naked eye, but differ in method, epistemological origin and indicators. For now, and only in empirical terms, the four models have had relative success and this is partly because their theoretical construction is not finished. The figures reported by Smith (2015) regarding the outcome of armed conflicts in the world since 1990 could serve as a global indicator for the four models: more than 8 million people died in social conflicts (75% of them civilians), 90% of armed conflicts are intra-state or wars for independence, the central protagonists are the developing countries and the clear majority of these conflicts are unmanageable or impossible to control.

3.3 Quantitative Approach: Maximum Number of Democratic Nations

The basic assumption of this approach lies in the concept that democratic nations do not go to war with each other (Walker, 1997: 117), a concept that seems to be reinforced by Brennan (2013), in the sense that inter-state wars have dramatically reduced their numbers since the invasion of Iraq to Kuwait. The model of “exporting democracy” through official diplomatic relations between the western powers and the presence of institutions who provide loans based on the improvement of indicators that show the presence or growth of democracy in regions of conflict is the method by which this approach attempts to build peace. The more nations that defend democratic principles, the less they will have to invest in security or reconstruction (Coleman, 2007: 2) and in the long term, trade generated among this type of nation will be the main indicator of peace (Ingram, 2014: 6).

Some theorists have suggested that this model, instead of being a divisor, is integrative (Yaman, 2000), noting that especially due to economic exchange, Quebec’s independence intentions have been diminished in Canada, Texas or California in the United States, Scotland in the United Kingdom and recently, Catalonia in Spain. At the international level, all democratic nations would have a similar level of representation in policy and decision-making bodies (called the equivalence relationship), which assumes, among other elements, a certain similarity also in cultural systems and structures Governmental organizations. In this sense, democratic nations would experience relatively sustained economic growth, with an internal increase in private property and freedom of thought (Suhler, 2015: 31).

This is fundamentally a model based on the interdependence of nations and the concept of nation-state (Greenwell, 2006: 66) and advocates for private peace indicators (tourism, high labor exchange, inter-state marriages and exchange of information between inhabitants) and public (diplomatic relations, political and economic cooperation), trying to achieve a maximized integration of these relations and not only a symbolic friendship between nations. The line of interdependence of the most powerful nations with respect to the less favored nations, may change over time to avoid the establishment of protectorates or subordination relations that, once completed, generate poverty, and development cooperation could be the main interest of the powers with respect to the least favored countries.

One advantage of understanding peacebuilding from the maximum number of democratic nations is that it allows for high-level monitoring and promotion of human rights (Bartra, 2013) and from this perspective it is possible to generate indicators of compliance with measures, accountability and improvement in respect, compliance and promotion of human rights (especially in studies that try to relate the prevalence of corruption with them). It is further understood that an authority's ability to explain the management of the resources at its disposal and the tasks it has performed, both publicly and transparently (accountability), is dramatically increased not only by state officials but also by private service providers and it would be possible to have an easier identification of vulnerable groups of citizens, strengthen civil society and bring the real actors to the decision-making process (gender perspectives, for example, are based on this approach).

Nonetheless, Young (2013) warns that a danger of this model lies in ignoring that nations have preferences, interests and needs that would not allow all possible forms of economic exchange to occur in practice and that the central element at all form of existence, mental health of the population, will always be an annex to integration initiatives, even when talking about Human Rights. In this regard, Zorya (2010) points out that a deepening of the democratic levels in a country does not necessarily mean an improvement in the functioning of the judiciary in terms of impartiality and equality, especially for nations with emerging economies, because the justice process does not promote reconciliation and life in community. In addition, the Western idea of democracy may encounter fierce resistance at the local level, especially in places where traditional conflict resolution culture and norms have persisted despite the presence of colonial powers or prolonged and dynamic city life.

The Kantian model of "perpetual peace" argued that a combination of republican governments with transparent and accountable management for their citizens along with international laws to regulate state behavior and the generation of conditions of economic interdependence would generate a great interest in maintaining the peace. It is also possible that democracy can coexist with an internal armed conflict, as in the case of Colombia, Sudan or Guatemala, because established democracies provide non-violent mechanisms to sustain the political system, and in the face of such differences, discourages the use of violence as a means of overcoming them. For Lasswell (2008), at the heart of democratic regimes, the questions of who keeps what, when and how are decide without resorting to violence. Consequently, democracy provides a way to distribute scarce resources through mechanisms that theoretically represent the will of most people and therefore could be considered legitimate.

Finally, a major disadvantage of this peacebuilding model lies in the fact that most initiatives fall mainly on the political will of the rulers, who according to Lagerback (2008) have in mind the re-election or continuation in power by means that are not always the democratic ones that increase the quality of life of people.

In any case, it is the prevailing model for peacebuilding since the end of World War II and could be considered especially successful since its absence in some countries has marked the appearance of genocides, massive waves of forced migration, high levels of delinquency and disrespect for private property (Villalba, 2009: 12).

3.4. Approach of Homogeneity: Institutional Development and Individual Change.

This model is rooted in thinkers such as Broadbent (1961), Turman (1974), or Wilders (2011) who advocate a peace made up of a strong military force not only to defend the natural territory of a state but also to intervene in those that threaten global stability, as well as increasing cultural, religious and nurturing similarities between nations (Sparza, 2014). Basically, social groups with a Judeo-Christian religion, speak a language of Central European origin, follow patterns of upbringing depending on individual competence and, in short, generate an IQ in their population that allows them to understand the social purpose of their institutions and possess empathy as to their levels of security (the security of others as their own and vice versa), will be the ones who could build the best quality of peace.

This model understands that the values of peaceful coexistence (among which the democratic ones can be counted), cannot be imported or artificially taught, but culturally transmitted and educationally reinforced (Booth, 2015: 12), an element that, a priori, would tend to eliminate caste systems present, for example, in Nepal or India, and to expand the level of internal cohesion in cases of natural disasters, control of government behavior or demand for quality services to private providers

In addition, as Kaldor (2011: 67) indicates, “when there are contradictory versions of the history taught formally, there is a greater propensity to experience conflicts that defy the social or economic structure and that are prolonged” and this would not be the case under this approach, because the level of internal cohesion would be reflected in the assumption of a single version of the story. It is under this approach that terms such as “empowerment,” “sensitization,” “peaceful coexistence,” or “brotherhood of nations,” have emerged and become relevant in literature because it is proposed that institutions change as individuals Change in this way, according to Kappler (2014), there are common denominators in the daily life of homogeneous civilizations, such as cities designed to be friendly for children and older, mass access to entertainment, little tolerance about physical coercion, high trust in institutions that have strength or can exert violence against the population, minimal presence of graffiti in urban centers, high presence of women and children in the streets and an intention to assimilate the economic migrant.

This model tries to be “convergent” in the sense of affirming that the combination of institutionality and peace generates productivity, so that the international system of relations between nations is not politically polarized, and that at the same time there are internal dispute resolution mechanisms based in people’s own introspective and reflective capacity. Saunders (2013) mentions that the peace-building mechanism of this model lies in the structural speech that descends from levels of power, in the sense that recreating or perpetrating violence is going against the interests of all citizens, trying to humanize the other, while enriching social qualities such as solidarity. “Ordinary” people are the product of a long-term process of reinforcing their human capacities as responsibility, tending to promote peer cooperation and to rescue the symbolic value of human interaction (Seansaux, 2004: 31). In the long term, it is assumed that citizen initiatives will replace state official processes, leaving critical tasks to the state such as health, safety or welfare and retirement pensions.

In this model, it is understood that institutional development is inversely proportional to the resurgence or exacerbation of conflicts (Booth, 2015: 31) and that civil society is not trained to exercise political decision-making for an extended period of time. In this way, the political axis is not entirely located in the distribution of “war booty” in the form of government jobs, but in the creation of an environment that rewards individual prosperity outside of state positions. It is also understood that intra-population confidence levels and respect to their authorities are very high, which causes a significant decrease in perceived corruption.

However, individual change takes generations to develop and that an environment of peace does not necessarily diminish the attitudes of the human being with respect to their most basic instincts such as survival. In 2005, the presence of Hurricane Katrina resulted in looting of food and basic supplies in the US city of New Orleans, prompting it to be on the list of the 50 most violent cities in the world for intentional homicide (Varela, 2015). In Northern Ireland, institutional development does not have the same meaning compared to an emerging economy country. The book “Anatomy of Corruption in Mexico” (Casar, 2015), reports that for the average Mexican, institutionality refers to the capacity of a state institution to function at adequate minimum levels and basically do not interpose between the citizen and what wants to achieve, while Lindegaard (2013) states that a Northern Irishman hopes that all institutions will strive to ensure the agreed ceasefire and operate under an ever-present nationalist sentiment.

In this sense, continues Casar, institutionalism in Latin America has to do with how the colony used the institutions years before the independence insurrections (to extract the maximum possible wealth in the shortest possible time and to enrich the people who administered them in a private way) so there is a general feeling of acceptance that the institution alienates the individual, whatever the nature of it.

To support the “individual change” factor, this approach first resorted to the so-called “contact hypothesis” developed by psychologist Gordon Allport in 1954. He argued that through direct interpersonal and intergroup communications as well as shared experiences, racial or ethnic prejudices could be eliminated, especially in the United States. Through such interactions, negative stereotypes resulting from social, economic or religious barriers could be replaced by the discovery of common humanizing traits, egalitarian status, shared goals, and the ability to develop meaningful social relationships (Avendaño, 2004). It is from this model that the psychological definition of attitude emerges (a predisposition to react according to specific conditions of the environment) and the concept of Human Capital - or the set of all the acquired skills that allow to raise the quality of life of the members of a society (Figul, 2012: 14).

Later, Orjuela (1998) questioned this approach because it did not solve the victim/victimizer or majority vs. minority dichotomy, and found empirically that support from the grassroots is essential for the continuation of armed conflicts. That is why he introduced the concept that “identity means having representation” and in order to achieve real change in the protagonists of the conflict, it is necessary to have mutual acceptance, feelings of security, attachment to an origin, human dignity and a sense of achievement in the processes of labor insertion. (Orjuela, 1998: 67; Kauffman, 2001).

Finally, taking the Abu-Nimer argument (2008), the interaction “people with people” is not enough to build peace, because that interaction should generate integrative links that bring dialogue, debate and self-criticism as irreplaceable values to generate empathy for the suffering of the other, and at the same time to build trust for the other.

3.5. Withdrawal and reduction of resources for war or theory of the economy of war

Yaman (2000: 73) states that the balance of power on the world stage lies in the deterrent capacity of an attack rather than the ability to respond with one with the same intensity. In this sense, and in order to rationalize and guide bilateral negotiations between two belligerent nations, this approach seeks to legitimize the creation of supranational organizations which can help to solve conflicts without going to war, often dissuading or persuading, as the case may be, to certain regimes to comply with international laws from coalitions or alliances between countries

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union or the United Nations Security Council are an example of such organizations that have adjudicated for themselves a “normative power” (Brennan, 2013), which has to do with distribution of positive and negative sanctions for countries that have adhered to certain treaties or conventions. Criminal or civil courts where cases of refugees or persecuted politicians, crimes against humanity, trafficking in human beings or war crimes can be dealt by the legislator/enforcer who have this type of power that conceives the rule of Law as the better mechanism to regulate the international and intra-national behavior of the states.

This approach conceives the world as a place where there are asymmetric power forces (Gawerc, 2006), in which domestic laws must be in accordance with, or adjusted to international laws (Booth, 2015), and where principles of non-intervention and non-aggression between countries are respected, unless there is a resolution specifically issued by these bodies (Rasmussen, 2003). The attempt is simple: to negotiate ratifiable treaties based on formal diplomatic mechanisms so that states' behavior is mutually predictable (Ingram, 2014) - decreasing the probability of a state reacting to extremist responses - and attempting to have a shared platform of reference to facilitate communication and therefore to search for solutions to conflicts. Usually according to Zorya (2010), the establishment of these rules establishes the agenda on how to approach a conflict in such a way that there is a high level of agreement about how to proceed.

In psychological terms, this approach aims to eliminate the emotional component of the issues to be addressed, to lessen the importance of anxiety or anxiety associated with conflict (Kappler, 2014). It also attempts to depoliticize the conflict because the rules focus on the facts and not on the intentions or values associated with them (Kaldor, 2011). It is understood that trust is already built - in the case of bilateral relations - or that such trust can come from a regional or global supervisory body that serves as guarantor and that the options to be executed will always have a strong cooperative component, while at the same time they have a self-gratifying mechanism for all the involved people (Guterman, 2015)

Although it is true that there is an asymmetry of powers in the international scenario, this approach tries to make the perception about a conflictive situation symmetrical, which will be preferable to concentrate available resources to find a solution rather than to prepare for an aggression (Miall 2013: 16).

Much of the theoretical development of this position is based on the Theory of the Games from the works of Von Neumann and Morgenstern in the 50's of the last century. Essentially, Peace is defined as a cooperative game in which there are small gains which are in function of the coadjutant behavior between all the protagonists of the conflict, and that in the long term, such small profits will be fully cumulative. War, on the other hand, is a zero-sum game in which, although there may be an eventual winner in the initial stages of the conflict, in the long run, there will be none. This approach is particularly useful, as it put the psychosocial importance of the demobilization and reintegration of combatants, the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, the repatriation and return of refugees, food security, trauma therapy and reinstatement of projects and meanings of life (Smith, 2015).

However, this approach is more useful in studying the conflict than Peace itself: (Seansaux, 2004) identifies war, organized crime and forms of violent conflict that cause suffering in the civilian population as very lucrative ways of doing business in the “global south” (denomination in the literature to refer to all countries with emerging or developing economies, not to a particular geographical location), conflicts that are motivated by political interests (there are no longer any interests of nations-states, but the establishment of forms of power based on ethnic origin) ideologies but not of universal principles such as democracy, socialism, or fascism, but politics of communal or tribal identity). Mobilization have changed, financing mechanisms are no longer superpowers or colonial powers, but the diaspora of migrants, criminal mafias or mercenaries for hire. Weapons for fighting not only consist of traditional weaponry in the form of pistols or bullets, but in recruiting children, guerrilla warfare, rape, hunger and public massacres. In sum, a whole system of parallel economy has developed which includes drug trafficking and people to finance the conflict (Smith, 2015: 54).

Consequently, terms such as conflict mapping (or the graphic / structural organization of the behavior of belligerent actors), symmetric escalation (the ability for a conflict to become increasingly prolonged and uncontrollable), conflict spiral (the quality of a conflict to hide from academic eyes and reappear at the right time) or “Capacity Building” (relative to the rapid training of ordinary people to hold public office of critical importance during the development of the conflict and also in later stages), emerged from this school and are common in the introductory literature on conflict analysis (Kaldor, 2011; Young, 2013).

The most important contribution of this approach is a community action mechanism called “Truth-seeking and Reconciliation Committees”, which has been relatively successful in East Timor, Rwanda and South Africa, which basically consists on the establishment of popular tribunals using mechanisms of traditional or local courts, with the sole power to impose monetary sanctions (only up to a certain fixed amount that usually does not exceed 5000 dollars) or symbolic sanctions to ex-combatants to be re-accepted within society and in a specific community. These committees are a type of distributive justice (Kappler, 2015), and have dramatically reduced lynching and vigilantism in these regions, although they have not been entirely definitive in reintegrating ex-combatants (Bell, 2013: 78).

For Kaldor (2011), prolonged and uncontrollable conflicts in countries such as Sri Lanka, Palestine, Northern Ireland, Cyprus or Nigeria, represent a violent struggle over basic needs denied, as security, recognition, identity, acceptance or economic participation.

Marry (2015: 19) adds one more component: the state's inability to fight against corruption and Azar (2006) contributes to the idea that in many post-colonial societies, especially in Africa, the European concept of state simply does not apply to the local idiosyncrasy because it promotes cultural conditioning, which was artificially imposed under the principle of "divide and conquer" and makes multi-communal societies see the state as an enemy that does not emit any kind of response to their needs, and rather promotes the fragmentation of their social order.

Therefore, Peace, for this type of society, consists of a strong loyalty to the group identity and to all the processes of socialization that give rise to it. That is why there are still deeply paternalistic social structures (Somalia, Ethiopia, Rwanda or the Central African Republic) that hold almost all the power of decision in local decisions. Peace, then, comes from the rights reserved for the elders (tribal authorities) to influence the lives of younger people.

3.6. Civil society, grassroots movements and contagion effect

Pearlman (2010) acknowledges that after many workshops and peace-building dialogues between Israelis and Palestinians, working with elites would never work unless there is room for the participation of people directly affected by conflict (such acceptance was also carried out by students of the gang conflict in Central America at the end of 2014) as it considered that the "top-down" path did not generate results in terms of change in social attitudes. Lindegaard (2013: 44) states that "no one wanted to be like the elite" when he studied the conflict with the Maoist guerrillas in Nepal, and that agreements between faction leaders, however publicized, would not stand for ever.

This approach was first called "unofficial diplomacy" (Chigas, 2007: 11) and proved to be successful in promoting empathy and positive attitudes toward peace. Its first application came after the Rwandan genocide (Pearlman 2010: 13) bringing together Hutus and Tutsis to promote a "psychological cure for the traumatic effects of genocide as well as generating positive attitudes of acceptance from one group to the other." It is precisely "the other," when it is dehumanized and stereotyped, that generates rejection and threatens one's own existence.

This approach is the foundation for peacebuilding in civil society, understood as the sum of all the positive qualities of members of a society, which can contribute to efforts to rescue and reinforce human capital (Figul, 2012: 22). However, it also understands that grassroots movements or social organizations are more capable and better placed than elites to bring peace initiatives become effective (Guterman, 2015). The main philosophical idea is the belief that there is no civil society that has been done without reflecting on another (just as a child cannot be built alone, needs a mirror or a role model according to the psychologist Bandura) and that all societies of the "global south" seek this model in societies with a more advanced technical, economic, political or social power.

Bauman (2004), in his concept of "liquid modernity", refers to the fact that post-globalization societies will have a strong attachment to local traditions, while at the same time trying to insert themselves into a global economic and technological exchange which will inevitably generate cultural reciprocities that will shape societies in a way which have never been seen before.

By linking the concept of Bauman with the construction of Peace, it can be said that civil societies need a role model, a mirror or an example to be able to become like them, at the same time the grassroots movements could be considered the executors of such goal. For a sample, according to Suhler (2015: 18), there is no citizen movement in developing countries that has not been recorded before in some post-industrial economy, and that includes third wave feminism, religious ecumenism, environmentalism, recognition of the cultural rights of ethnic minorities or Human Rights in economic issues.

This means that a peacebuilding mechanism is to reflect or retake positive cultural elements from other civilizations or to accept attempts of a cultural influence by the world superpowers or regional powers. In this sense, the main expositor of this approach is Nye (1990) with its concept of “Softpower”, which refers to the ability of a developed country to attract the attention of one in the process of developing, to shape its preferences and persuade their cultural and political values. The main assumption of this model is that economic sanctions or military threats simply have a temporary effect on the belligerent way of acting of the protagonists of a conflict and increase the possibility of retaliatory actions on the part of those affected ones.

“Hard” or coercive power only generates resentment and a great “anti-all” movement. Nye explains that even influence from cash payments has lost the power to bend the will of certain actors because money has no symbolic power for the public opinion. For this reason, Nye continues, the soft power of a country lies in three resources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policies. These elements would attract other countries that would like to emulate those examples, aspiring to the same level of prosperity of the powers with a high soft power.

In this regard, Smith (2015: 61) states that “seduction is always more powerful than coercion” although it may take years to reach the expected results, there is a “contagion effect” when a country observes that another of its same economic level has imitated certain patterns or cultural codes and has had particularly favorable results. For Kappler (2014), the concept of soft power has changed the categories of power analysis initially proposed by Foucault because it includes a re-reading of a country’s internal and external narrative, while assuming diplomacy is like the strategic marketing industry. Interestingly, Nye (2011) explains that precisely because of Bauman’s concept of liquid modernity, power has ceased to be normative to become a descriptive subject because less and less countries or institutions decide to have a leader for the entire length of time of the vital cycle, and liberal values such as freedom of thought, individual opportunities and human rights, would form an “anti-violence” shield that would protect peace initiatives while reinforcing the mass media and popular culture (basically the Western interpretation of the World) as sources of soft power.

It is under this vision that many initiatives of grassroots movements are articulated and try to obtain legitimacy and social validity in a context where not only competes for the available funds, but for the acceptance of civil society. According to Kappler (2015), assuming that the aim of all world powers is to ensure their own survival in a wild and chaotic international context, soft power could be the best way to replicate their cultural values and practices in other citizens who do not belong to its territory, so that its way of life is resistant to the attacks or influences of other civilizations.

In this sense, then, it can be argued that peacebuilding mechanisms could be to some extent “spontaneous” in relation to “people with people” and that the line of conflict is more diffuse than ever in terms of actors, interests or objectives, precisely because of the attempts to construct power understood as an almost absolute novelty, unlike the attempts to obtain / remove power that characterized many previous conflicts (Young, 2013; Bartra, 2013).

Terms such as “resilience” (the ability to overcome obstacles and get ahead despite initially lacking the minimum conditions necessary to do so), “mediation” (the ability to intervene in a conflict to alleviate differences and promote the principles of an agreement) or “networking” (the capacity for functional relationship between peers or people with similar qualities) emerge from this approach and have become crucial for peacebuilding, since there is a growing body of literature that is increasingly approaching them with better conceptual and methodological tools.

Studies on resilience have allowed the design of programmes to reduce urban violence (Chigas, 2007); Research on conflict mediation has made it possible to reduce the intensity of conflicts, especially in the field of business and economic exchange (Saunders, 2013) and the principles of networking are used to connect various peace initiatives with one component, for now, almost exclusively academics (Gawerc, 2006).

4. Final remarks

It is a reality that the fields of analysis and resolution of conflict and peacebuilding have grown ostensibly especially in the last 15 years. However, the theoretical components that support them are still being developing, mainly because conflicts evolve faster than the tools available for analysis and because they still have problems in proposing measurable indicators and replicable strategies in contexts other than those that were created. Thus, there are still many questions that have yet to be answered, and which may not be fully addressed by the introduction of systemic thinking and neuroscience to peace studies.

While it is clear that these four sets of peacebuilding strategies share certain similarities and may even involve similar modes of execution for similar purposes, they are essentially disintegrating compared to each other, mainly because they differ in their operational definitions of peace, and there is still no clear effort to reconcile their philosophical foundations to an academically acceptable level (although it can be argued that at the official level of international organizations, the definition of Peace is that provided by Peacekeeping in the sense of military assurance of a geographical / social context where the basic needs of a population can be established). Lederach (2012) mentions that all people in the world are “strategic peace builders” because they are in a constant state of exploration for a peaceful and lasting existence. However, the term “strategic” by now refers to the creation of distributive systems of wealth and not to the generation of it.

Finally, the fact that tangible and structural violence in some parts of the world increases and there are serious difficulties in peace processes does not necessarily mean that the area known as Peacebuilding is neutralized or has no practical use; On the contrary, if the world tries to survive, it will always need tools that allow coexistence, increase social and human capital and, in short, optimism towards the future. Peacebuilding, therefore, is not the domain of experts in social behavior, but a driving force for the progress of nations.

Peace and Conflict — in Bolivia

Chapter 4

CHAPTER 4

MEASURING PEACE AND WAYS TO CREATE IT

We are now further away from world peace than at any time in the last ten years – and its creating a global peace inequality gap³⁴

4.1. Introduction: aim of the chapter and outline

This chapter takes the last chapter a bit further by dealing with ways to measure and create peace. It comprises three main parts. The first part consists of two sections: reviewing the reasons why it is important to measure peace, followed by a discussion of how peace is measured. In the second part on trends in peace, key findings from 10 years of peace research about the relative peacefulness of countries and territories are explored. The economic cost of violence and the comparable investment in peace is also presented. The third part is dedicated to a discussion of what creates peace. It also offers a more detailed examination of the relationship between peace and democracy, and a discussion of the transformative potential of positive peace.

4.2. Measuring peace

This part of the chapter deals with the following: why it is important to measure peace; and how peace is measured.

4.2.1. ¿Por qué medir la paz?

There are a variety of reasons why it is important to measure peace, five of which are described here. First, the drivers of peace are poorly understood, and should not be assumed to be the opposite of the drivers of violence. Consider, for example, healthy marriages as a good analogy. The factors that sustain a healthy marriage versus those that lead to a divorce are not the same. Second, peace is a multidimensional concept, informed by the cultural, political and economic context. Hence, composite measures and a multitude of factors are needed to better understand and measure a concept like peace, a complex phenomenon.

Third, it is now well recognized that violence impedes social development (refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2). A methodology for measuring peace offers Governments and intergovernmental organizations, like United Nations and OECD, a monitoring tool to consider ways in which to strengthen their economy and culture of peace. Fourth, it helps to identify gaps in data and areas needed for additional data collection. Fifth, there is a lack of key data available in relation to whether peace is improving or decreasing. Without data, it is difficult to know the extent to which policies and practices are helping or hindering progress towards peace.

³⁴ Global Peace Index Report (2016), Institute for Economics and Peace.

4.2.1. How to measure peace?

Having discussed why it is important to measure peace, this section sets out how peace can be measured. Achieving this means introducing the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP, hereafter) and their Global Peace Index (GPI, hereafter), because the analysis that follows in the rest of the chapter draws almost exclusively from their work.

The Institute for Economics and Peace

Established in 2009, the IEP is an independent, not-for-profit, think tank dedicated to building a greater understanding of the trends, patterns, and drivers of peace. The offices of the IEP are in Australia, the United States, Mexico, and Belgium. In 2014 and 2015 the IEP was rated as one of the world's most impactful think tanks, by the University of Pennsylvania's Global Go-To Think Tank Index.

Societal progress has been typically thought of in terms of economic growth, reflected by Gross Domestic Product. In recent times, however, it is becoming increasingly accepted that benchmarks for measuring progress should include well-being, and for the present purpose, peace. One of the IEP's main goals is to strip peace of its utopian connotations and to make peace a more tangible measure of progress.

Another goal of the IEP's work is to understand the benefits (economic and financial) of reductions in violence and improvements in peace, because they provide a means for further motivating government, business, and the public to action. Ultimately, the IEP wants to develop an evidence base to measure and understand the drivers of peace, and to show that peace not only has a moral value, but a financial value as well. The IEP produces research reports in four key areas:

1. Measuring peace and violence through the Global Peace Index, country-level indices, and the Global Terrorism Index
2. Understanding positive peace and the drivers of peacefulness
3. Calculating the economic cost of violence containment
4. Developing frameworks around risk

The Global Peace Index

The core research product of the IEP is the GPI; the world's leading measure of global peacefulness. The GPI calculates scores and ranks 163 countries and territories (covering over 99% of the world's population), according to their relative states of peace. Countries can be very peaceful, moderately peaceful or not very peaceful. Allowing for an assessment of peace on a continuum, shifts the focus away from the usual bad/good or rich/poor dichotomy to something that all nations can aspire to improve.

The GPI is a one-of-a-kind. Instead of studying disease to find out what makes people healthy, the GPI uses metrics to measure peace. Other well-known datasets either measure violence or conflict³⁵. In this context, the following phrase rings true: 'what we choose to measure ends up being what we define as being success'. Put another way, continuing to study the things we do not, i.e. violence, is unlikely to lead us to what we do want, i.e. peace.

³⁵ For major accounts of this work, see the 'Correlates of War Project' and the 'Uppsala Conflict Data Program', which include a focus on 'interstate and related wars' and 'systematic studies of conflict dynamics', respectively.

In order to develop an understanding of how the GPI measures peace, it is necessary to start with how peace is defined. The previous two chapters covered Galtung's concepts of negative and positive peace in some detail. Several questions emerge from this discussion, not least of which: how can negative peace be turned into positive peace? This question will be dealt with later in the end of the chapter. Meanwhile, the analysis is concentrated on the work of the GPI, which uses negative peace as its conceptual foundation.

The methodology behind the GPI is both conceptually sound and empirically rigorous. Conceptually sound because it is based on a definition of negative peace that is used widely across peace studies and other related fields. Negative peace (in the GPI's understandings of the term) refers to the "absence of violence" and "absence of fear of violence". Beyond thinking about the absence of interstate violence or wars, this definition also includes the absence of violence that affects the way people live their lives. It, thus, considers the security of states and interpersonal security.

Empirically rigorous because it is a composite index that uses 23 different indicators (listed below), which broadly fall into three main categories:

- 6 measures of ongoing domestic and international conflict including: intensity of organized internal conflicts, relations with neighbouring countries and number of deaths from conflict
- 10 measures of societal safety and security including: number of refugees and IDPs, impact of terrorism, homicide and incarceration rates
- 7 measures of militarization including: military expenditure, number of armed service personnel, ease of access to small weapons

23 Indicators; 3 domains or internal (blue) and external (black)

1. Level of perceived criminality in society
 2. Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people
 3. Number of homicides per 100,000 people
 4. Number of jailed population per 100,000 people
 5. Ease of access to small weapons and light weapons
 6. Level of organized conflict (internal)
 7. Likelihood of violent demonstrations
 8. Level of violent crime
 9. Political instability
 10. Political Terror Scale
 11. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons, as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people
 12. Impact of Terrorism
 13. Number and Duration of Internal Conflicts
 14. Number of deaths from organized conflict (internal)
 15. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP
 16. Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people
 17. Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions
 18. Nuclear and heavy weapons capability
 19. Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people
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
20. Number of displaced people as a percentage of the population
21. Relations with neighbouring countries
22. Number, duration and role in external conflicts
23. Estimated number of deaths from organized conflict (external)

These 23 indicators take into account both internal and external indicators: 13 Internal (60% weighting, 7 qualitative, 6 quantitative) and 10 External (40% weighting, 2 qualitative, 8 Quantitative). The reason why internal factors have a greater impact on the final score is because it is assumed that peace is felt first at home. This decision was informed by the expert panel that guide and oversee the work of the IEP.

To ensure reliability and quality, data is sourced from a range of international organizations, including the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and UNHCR, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, various UN entities, and peace institutes, such as the PRIO/Uppsala Conflict database. The Economist Intelligence Unit country analysts provide a score for the qualitative indicators. Their significant knowledge of a particular country or territory is used to estimate how it would score in certain areas. This allows for peer review.

Once all data for the year is brought together (March through March), countries and territories are scored on a one to five scale (one being the most peaceful and five the least). All these factors are brought together to ultimately present one single number. Note: rankings are relative, there is no country or territory that is completely at peace. Figure 1 provides a snapshot of what the 2016 GPI looks like, and how the world is faring according to the overall peace score. It reflects data from March 2015 to March 2016. Countries in yellow and green are more peaceful than those in orange and red.


Figure 1: Map of peacefulness from the 2016 Global Peace Index



An extensive discussion of the methodology behind the GPI is beyond the scope of this chapter (readers wanting to learn more about this, however, can visit IEP's communication platform at www.visionofhumanity.org, figure 2). The website allows readers to navigate the interactive maps, download the yearly GPI reports and resources, and review in more detail the methodology – including the research sources, definitions, scoring criteria, and expert panel - behind the GPI.

Figure 2: Website, www.visionforhumanity.org

www.visionofhumanity.org



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Explore our complete indexes and their data using our interactive maps.



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

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
The website also allows readers to explore maps of IEP's various indices in English, Spanish, and French. It lists countries according to their GPI rank, and by each year of the Index. It is possible to click on a country to see how it performs across the indicators. Figure 3 is an example from Peru, which summaries its overall score, along with how the country scores in terms of militarization, societal safety and security, and domestic and international conflict.

Figure 3: The GPI score for Peru



The website also allows engagement with how countries fare according to each of the 23 indicators, like the example in figure 4 which shows how each country fares according to their levels of incarceration. Here, it highlights how the US has the highest incarceration rate across the globe. The website also allows comparative analysis between countries and highlights relative scores to help enable a better understanding of how countries differ in the factors that create their scores.

Figure 4: Levels of incarceration across the globe



4.3. Trends in negative peace

The above covered why it is important to measure peace and how. This part of the chapter looks at some of the highlights from the 10th edition of the GPI, released in June 2016. The effects of violence on the economy and the amount of investment in peace will also be presented, along with an overall reflection on the impacts and limitations of the GPI.

4.3.1. Key trends in peace in the last ten years

This section deals with the question: What were the key trends in peace across the globe over the last ten years? It outlines the levels of peacefulness globally, before discussing some of the indicators driving these trends.

Looking at global trends, there has been a decade-long decline in world peace. This interrupts recent claims which indicate that not only war but also violence in general have been consistently declining over the past two millennia³⁶. One of the leading proponents of this argument is Harvard psychologist and linguist, Steven Pinker (although others have contributed). In the international bestseller, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: a history of violence and humanity* (2011), which comprises more than 1000 pages and an impressive amount of statistics and graphs, Pinker's (2011: xxi) bottom line conclusion is that "today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species' existence"³⁷.

³⁶ For more on this topic see Lacina and Gleditsch (2005); Goldstein (2011); Themnér and Wallensteen (2012, 2011).

³⁷ Pinker's (2011) book provides an impressive overview of the literature on conflict, and a controversial argument that violence and conflict have declined. Some of the findings in this book, however, have been challenged. See, for example, Fry (2013); Gray (2012); Fazal (2014), among others.


He cites four main reasons for the millennia-long decline in violence.

- Hobbes: logic of anarchy (less statelessness, fewer security dilemmas, democratic peace)
- Payne: Life more valuable (Higher living standards, better healthcare)
- Wright: Nonzero-sum games (Mutual beneficial relationships, peace dividend, economic interdependence, European Union)
- Singer – Expanding Empathy (enhanced communication, globalization and increased interaction)

He also attributes advance in technology, war being harder to sell, and the diminishing threat of nuclear weapons and deterrence as influencing factors that have also contributed to the historical decline in violence. In a summarizing statement, Pinker (2011: xxvix, 729) makes a compelling argument that “humans are not innately good (just as they are not innately evil), but they come equipped with motives that orient them away from violence and toward cooperation and altruism”.

It should be noted that there is evidence to support the claims made by Pinker. As shown in figure 5, the number of armed conflicts and subsequent death toll, for instance, continued to decrease after WW2 through the Cold War, and to the post-Cold War era³⁸. This suggests that we are getting better at avoiding wars, transforming violence, and that “peace is increasing” (Goldstein, 2011).


Figure 5: World-wide battle deaths since 1940



³⁸ Also, see Pettersson & Wallenstein (2015).

Yet it should also be noted that, in spite of the aforementioned advances, there is evidence to suggest that the world has become less peaceful over the last ten years. Figure 6 highlights how the average country score deteriorated in levels of peace by 2.44 per cent (2008 to 2016). While 77 countries improved, 85 countries deteriorated, highlighting the complexities of peace and its uneven distribution on a global scale. The decade long deterioration in peace has been primarily driven by the intensifying conflicts in the MENA region, which partly explains why it has become increasingly less peaceful over this period.

Figure 6: Peace in the last decade



Although some countries are enjoying unprecedented levels of peace and prosperity, findings from the GPI show that peace is becoming increasingly unequal. Peace is concentrating in certain countries. Countries toward the top of the GPI, such as those in the EU, for example, continue to experience high levels of peace, and tend to have a resilience that keeps them there. Conversely, countries at the bottom are becoming less peaceful, and remain stuck in spirals of violence and conflict (World Bank, 2011).


To give some idea of the peace dividend not being shared equally, there is now an estimated 2 billion people living in the 20 least peaceful countries in comparison to 500 million in the top 20 most peaceful. Even if larger nations, like China and India are excluded from the analysis, there would still be almost three times as many people living in the top 20 least peaceful countries compared to the 20 most peaceful.

One repercussion of this has been the increasing number of fragile states and vulnerable populations. Fragility is increasing: 54% of the world's population were living in urban areas in 2014. The UN predicts that by 2050, an additional 2.5 billion people will be living in cities, with Africa and Asia accounting for 90% of the increase. Of that increase, 1.9 billion will be in countries with low levels of peacefulness.

To date, there are now only 10 countries in the world free from conflict, and the World Bank (2011) estimates that one in four people on the planet (more than 1.5 billion), live in fragile and conflict affected states or in countries with very high levels of criminal violence. To top it all off, the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme(UCDP)³⁹ reported an unusual spike in armed conflict in 2014.

Globally, there continues to be a shift in conflict over the last ten years, moving from interstate conflicts (between states) towards more intra-state conflicts (within states), as figure 7 demonstrates. Today, civil wars are by far the dominant form of conflict in the world, accounting for more than 90% of contemporary armed conflicts (Bove, et al. 2016). Internal conflicts and instability within countries are having a greater impact on global levels of peace than external conflicts between countries.

Figure 7: Indicator changes



The three main indicators that appear to have driven this decade-long decline in peace are high levels of terrorism, and the rising number of battle deaths and refugees. Remember, the sources for each of these three are often interlinked and driven by a small number of countries, demonstrating the global repercussions of breakdowns in peace. The following examines these three indicators in more detail. Globally, terrorism is at an all-time high⁴⁰. Figure 8 shows the considerable increase in deaths from terrorism since 2000. 2014 saw the highest recorded level of terrorism, ever. When comparing the total number of

³⁹ UDCP is widely cited as the world's leading resource and data collection programme on conflict and organized violence.


⁴⁰ Note that the IEP calculates the impact of terrorism over a five-year period. So, the score reflects five-years of impact, with every year after the actual incident having less and less weight. For a fuller explanation, see page 96, under 5-year weighted average: <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>.

recorded deaths from terrorism, the total number increased by 80 per cent in this year when compared to the previous. This equates to the largest yearly increase in terrorism in the last 15 years. The number of deaths from terrorism rose from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014, reflecting a nine-fold increase since the beginning of the 21st century.


Despite the grim picture being drawn, it has to be pointed out that terrorism remains highly concentrated. In Europe, for example, terrorism is at lower level now than in the 1970's and 1980's. In the US, there were 26 deaths from Islamist terrorism between 2005 and 2015. To put this number into perspective, there were 301,797 gun deaths in the same period. Ultimately, most of the terrorist activity at present occurs in five countries: Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria.

More specifically, the majority of deaths from terrorism in 2014 occurred in three countries, Syria, Iraq and Nigeria, accounting for 78 per cent of all lives lost due to terrorism. Iraq and Nigeria, account for 53 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the same year. Note: although the majority of deaths have largely been in these five places, countries that have not been previously attacked are beginning to be more and more impacted in recent years. One of the regions beginning to experience more and more terrorist attacks is Africa.


Figure 8: Number of deaths from terrorism, from 2000 to 2014



A second indicator significantly impacting the overall trend is that the number of battle deaths is at a 25 year high, nearly 20% higher than 1989 (figure 9). 2014 saw over 112,000 deaths from conflicts involving states, mostly from civil wars. It is interesting to note that this number would have reduced to 28,000, if there had not been conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.


Figure 9: Number of battle deaths from conflict, from 1989 to 2014

A third indicator significantly impacting trends is that the number of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) has reached its highest level in sixty years. While there has been a steady increase since 1964 (figure 10), numbers increased by over 300% between 2004 and 2014 (figure 11). Over the past decade, numbers have continued to rise dramatically, doubling between 2007 and 2016. Today, there are an estimated 60 million refugees or IDPs (UNHCR, 2015), which represents nearly 1% of the world's population, with numbers expected to increase.


Figure 10: Number of refugees and displaced people, from 1964 to 2008

Five countries account for the majority of the refugees and IDPs: Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, hereafter). In fact, these countries account for 63% of the total number of refugees. Similarly, 77% of IDPs are from 5 countries: Syria, Somalia, Sudan, the DRC, and Colombia. This increase can be largely attributed to the conflict in Syria. While 0.1 per cent of the population were classified as refugees or IDPs in 2007, this figure rose to 63.18 per cent in 2015. Most these were IDPs, although an increasing number started to leave the country in 2015 and 2016, contributing substantially to the European migration crisis.

Figure 11: Number of displaced people, from 2005 to 2014



The good news is that the international community is responding to these trends by stepping up their international peacekeeping operations. Over the last 15 years, the number of peacekeepers has steadily increased. Since the start of the Afghanistan war, for instance, there has been a 150% increase in the number of troops deployed. This indicates a strong commitment from the international community to peace.


Figure 12: Peacekeeping deployment 2000-2014

4.3.2. Key trends in peace over the last year

This section deals with the question: What were the key trends in peace across the globe over a one-year period, 2015-2016? It outlines the levels of peacefulness globally, before turning to a broad analysis of countries and regions.

Globally, the findings not only show that levels of peace continue to deteriorate, but also that there continues to be a widening gap between the most and least peaceful countries. Although 81 countries became more peaceful, while 78 deteriorated, this trend is counteracted by the fact that there is increasing inequality in peacefulness. Since last year, therefore, the deteriorations were greater than the improvements. In terms of the three main GPI domains - ongoing domestic and international conflict, societal safety and security, militarization - the latter improved while the former two deteriorated (figure 13).


Figure 13: GPI overall score and domain change



The main factors driving this deterioration were the rising impact from terrorism, higher levels of displacement, and increased political terror (figure 14). These were the three indicators that worsened the most, followed by military expenditure and external conflicts fought. Conversely, the three indicators that improved the most were UN Peacekeeping funding, the number of police, and violent crime, followed by incarceration rates and violent demonstrations. It must be pointed out that this analysis reflects one year of the GPI at the global level, therefore some countries may not follow the global trend.

Figure 14: Five largest improvements and deteriorations**FIGURE 1.4** FIVE LARGEST INDICATOR IMPROVEMENTS AND DETERIORATIONS, 2015 - 2016

Of the indicators that changed the most from 2015 to 2016, terrorism and political instability had the largest deteriorations, with only UN peacekeeping funding showing a large improvement.



Source: IEP

Turning to the country-level findings, the overall average country score deteriorated by 0.53 per cent in this period. Syria remains the world's least peaceful country, followed by South Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Undergoing its fifth year of civil war, Syria has displaced millions of people, and left most of its population in poverty and in need of humanitarian assistance. The current estimates are that 470,000 have been killed and 60% of its population displaced. The impact of the civil war in Syria has been dramatic for neighbouring countries and the rest of the world. The largest country declines in peace over the year were Yemen and the Ukraine.

Conversely, Iceland was once again named the world's most peaceful nation, followed by Denmark, Austria, New Zealand, and Poland. One interesting fact that illustrates the difference between Iceland and the UK, for instance, is that the first citizen to be killed by police fire in modern day Iceland was in December 2013. Panama and Thailand showed the largest improvements in peace over the last year. Table 1 gives the complete ranking of the least and most peaceful countries in the world.

Graph 1: Países menos y más pacíficos del mundo

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
1	Syria	3.806
2	South Sudan	3.593
3	Iraq	3.570
4	Afghanistan	3.538
5	Somalia	3.414
6	Yemen	3.399
7	Central African Republic	3.354
8	Ukraine	3.287
9	Sudan	3.269
10	Libya	3.200
11	Pakistan	3.145
12	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.112
13	Russia	3.079
14	North Korea	2.944
15	Nigeria	2.877
16	Palestine	2.832
17	Colombia	2.764
18	Lebanon	2.752
19	Turkey	2.710
20	Israel	2.656
21	Venezuela	2.651
22	Egypt	2.574
23	India	2.566
24	Mexico	2.557
25	Philippines	2.511
26	Burundi	2.500
27	Mali	2.489
28	Chad	2.464
29	Eritrea	2.460
30	Azerbaijan	2.450
31	Iran	2.411
32	Bahrain	2.398
33	Kenya	2.379
34	Cameroon	2.356

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
35	Saudi Arabia	2.338
36	Rwanda	2.323
37	Zimbabwe	2.322
38	South Africa	2.316
39	Thailand	2.312
40	Kyrgyz Republic	2.297
41	Mauritania	2.295
42	Tajikistan	2.293
43	Djibouti	2.292
44	China	2.288
45	Ethiopia	2.284
46	Cote d' Ivoire	2.279
47	Guatemala	2.270
48	Guinea-Bissau	2.264
49	Myanmar	2.256
50	Republic of the Congo	2.249
51	Niger	2.239
52	Honduras	2.237
53	El Salvador	2.237
54	Armenia	2.218
55	Uzbekistan	2.216
56	Algeria	2.213
57	Belarus	2.202
58	Turkmenistan	2.202
59	Brazil	2.176
60	Cambodia	2.161
61	United States of America	2.154
62	Guinea	2.148
63	Uganda	2.148
64	Dominican Republic	2.143
65	Papua New Guinea	2.143
66	Angola	2.140
67	Sri Lanka	2.133
68	Jordan	2.127

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
69	Guyana	2.105
70	Macedonia (FYR)	2.092
71	The Gambia	2.091
72	Jamaica	2.091
73	Morocco	2.086
74	Swaziland	2.074
75	Haiti	2.066
76	Burkina Faso	2.063
77	Cuba	2.057
78	Georgia	2.057
79	Peru	2.057
80	Trinidad and Tobago	2.056
81	Bangladesh	2.045
82	Greece	2.044
83	Bolivia	2.038
84	Paraguay	2.037
85	Gabon	2.033
86	Nepal	2.026
87	Kosovo	2.022
88	Ecuador	2.020
89	Kazakhstan	2.019
90	Oman	2.016
91	Benin	1.998
92	Liberia	1.998
93	Cyprus	1.994
94	Senegal	1.978
95	Nicaragua	1.975
96	Mozambique	1.963
97	Argentina	1.957
98	Togo	1.954
99	Moldova	1.953
100	Tunisia	1.949
101	Lesotho	1.941
102	Equatorial Guinea	1.940

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
103	United Arab Emirates	1.931
104	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.915
105	Vietnam	1.906
106	Tanzania	1.899
107	Montenegro	1.884
108	Timor-Leste	1.879
109	Namibia	1.873
110	Albania	1.867
111	South Korea	1.858
112	Laos	1.852
113	Kuwait	1.842
114	Mongolia	1.838
115	Panama	1.837
116	Serbia	1.834
117	United Kingdom	1.830
118	France	1.829
119	Malawi	1.817
120	Ghana	1.809
121	Sierra Leone	1.805
122	Indonesia	1.799
123	Taiwan	1.787
124	Zambia	1.783
125	Italy	1.774
126	Madagascar	1.763
127	Lithuania	1.735
128	Estonia	1.732
129	Uruguay	1.726
130	Qatar	1.716
131	Costa Rica	1.699
132	Latvia	1.680
133	Romania	1.649
134	Malaysia	1.648
135	Bulgaria	1.646
136	Botswana	1.639

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
137	Chile	1.635
138	Croatia	1.633
139	Spain	1.604
140	Slovakia	1.603
141	Mauritius	1.559
142	Poland	1.557
143	Netherlands	1.541
144	Singapore	1.535
145	Hungary	1.534
146	Belgium	1.528
147	Norway	1.500
148	Germany	1.486
149	Australia	1.465
150	Sweden	1.461
151	Bhutan	1.445
152	Ireland	1.433
153	Finland	1.429
154	Slovenia	1.408
155	Japan	1.395
156	Canada	1.388
157	Switzerland	1.370
158	Czech Republic	1.360
159	Portugal	1.356
160	New Zealand	1.287
161	Austria	1.278
162	Denmark	1.246
163	Iceland	1.192

As a region, the Middle East and Africa (MENA) is the least peaceful in the world, contributing extensively to the overall global deterioration in peace. To illustrate the concentration of violence and conflict in MENA, when considered separately, the rest of the world's average peace levels improved. Three of the five biggest country declines in peace were from this region: Yemen, Libya and Bahrain. These countries are all experiencing internationalized internal conflict, and at danger of failing into protracted conflicts.

The largest regional improvements took place in Central America and the Caribbean. In fact, all three regions in the Americas made improvements with regards to their overall

levels of peace. It is necessary to point out that these regions were coming from a lower base. They are still facing high homicide rates, levels of violence, and organized crime, which present major challenges to peace in these regions. Despite the average score in Europe deteriorating, it remains the most peaceful region. 7 of 10 of the most peaceful countries in the world are in Europe, and the homicide and violent crime indicators continue to improve in this region.

4.3.3 The economic cost of violence and investment in peace

Beyond the direct consequences to human life and the planet, violence also has an economic impact. Consider, for example, the average cost of civil war, which Paul Collier (2007), Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Oxford University, estimates at \$64 Billion. Elsewhere, the IEP provides a cumulative estimate each year of the global cost of containing, preventing, and dealing with violence, and the economic value of peace⁴¹.


The economic impact of violence containment to the world economy in 2015 was estimated to be \$13.6 trillion or 13 percent of Gross World Product (GWP), 842 billion of this can be attributed to armed conflict. To put this into context, it is 11 times the foreign direct investment and the equivalent of \$1,876 for each person in the world. To provide another frame of reference, violence costs \$5 per day for every person on the planet. If the total cost of violence was reduced by 10%, it would free up \$1.36 trillion. That is 10 times the official development assistance and 6 times the value of the bailouts for Greece.

Based on this reality, it is perfectly understandable to understand why the notion that war is good for the economy has been disproved, and that the economic benefits of peace are being recognized globally⁴². Yet peace currently receives the lowest amount of investment, accounting for only 2 per cent of the cost of conflict (figure 15). In 2015, 8.3 billion was spent on UN peacekeeping, whereas 6.8 billion was spent on efforts to build long term peace. Note the level of expenditure on peacekeeping and peace-building relative to other areas and also the size of small arms industry.

⁴¹ This costs is calculated using a method that values sixteen different dimensions of violence and conflict, allowing for relative comparisons to be made between 163 countries and territories as well as aggregating the amount to arrive at a global figure

⁴² The Economic cost of violence containment (2016: 8), Institute for Economics and Peace, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Economic-Cost-of-Violence-Containment.pdf>

Figure 15: Economic cost of violence and investment in peace, 2015



When comparing the economic losses from violence to the cost associated with peacebuilding and peacekeeping, there is a striking mismatch (figure 16). In terms of overall expenditure, the largest categories by far were military and internal security. This highlights a serious underinvestment. In this logic, it can be discerned that the world currently spends considerably more on violence prevention and negative peace, and a lot less on preparing and building positive peace.

Figure 16: Breakdown of the economic impact of violence, 2015



4.3.4 Impact of the GPI

At this point it is useful to reflect on the impact of the GPI to date. In brief, the GPI has helped to shift common perceptions of peace beyond its usual utopian connotation and brought a focus on peace as a critical dimension of progress. It has done this through public engagement, policy, research and training. With regards to public engagement, media reach exceeded 3 billion people in 2015. To date, the interactive maps on the website have received 5.5 million page views from people in 18,000 cities in 209 countries.

With regards to policy, Goal 16, Peaceful and Inclusive Societies, of the SDG's was informed by the definitions of negative and positive peace. The GPI has also contributed to healthy competition and political will for change in many countries by inspiring governments to further consider ways in which they could increase the peacefulness of their nations. Malaysia, for instance, uses the GPI as a Key Performance Indicator.

The increasing interest that governments are having in the inter-linkages between development and peace has also generated more country-specific studies. The Mexico Peace Index (MPI), United States Peace Index (USPI), the United Kingdom Peace Index (UKPI) all have national peace indices, produced by the IEP. The MPI looks at the most and least peaceful states, in addition to examining peace from the height of the drug war, the distribution of peace, state changes in peace, disappearances, official crime data, and justice reforms.

Insights from the GPI are also communicated through research and trainings. In terms of formal education, it has found its way into thousands of academic courses, including those taught by Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz. It is the basis for an annual graduate-level course on the Structures of Peace at New York University and at King's College in London. It is also used by NewGen Peacebuilders, an international youth peace education, discussed further in Chapter 5. To date, the GPI has been referenced in over 72,000 publications.

Another way in which the GPI communicates its work is through non-formal education. In addition to running regular conferences on the business and economics of peace to develop networks and research on peace, one of the IEP's most recent initiatives is the Global Peace Index Ambassador Programme(GPIA). Through the program, a collaboration between Rotary International and the IEP, former and current Rotary Peace Fellows spend two months receiving training on the methodology used by the IEP to create the GPI. One of the goals of this programme is to share the work with increasingly more people and engage audiences with peace in new ways.

4.3.5 Limitations of the GPI

As well as its impact, it is important to be aware of the limitations of the GPI. For instance, since the methodology used in the GPI draws from national averages, regional variations may remain hidden. This is considerably more problematic in large populations or land mass countries, like China and India, for example. Furthermore, the current stock of data, does not lend itself to understanding how peace is distributed between gender, ethnic, religious, or cultural groups.

(More on the shortcomings of the GPI, and a possible way forward to addressing these, will be found in the concluding chapter). Finally, the GPI focusses on negative peace, which offers little in the way of what is needed to create a peaceful society. While negative peace is necessary, it is not sufficient. The next section will take up this challenge by looking at the broader and more ambitious ideal of positive peace.

4.4. What create peace?

This section deals with the question: What creates peace? Answers to this question cannot be found in the study of violence alone (GPI, 2016: 53). Therefore, while the focus of the analysis thus far has been on measuring negative peace, which mainly focuses on what is not wanted, the IEP also developed the Positive Peace Index (PPI, hereafter) which uses the terminology of positive peace to measure what is wanted.

Positive peace, in IEP's understanding of the term, refers to "the attitudes, institutions and structures" most closely associated with creating and sustaining peaceful and resilient societies⁴³. It is by statistically analysing the attitudes, institutions, and structures associated with lower levels of violence or negative peace that we can better understand how to foster mutual cooperation and move more towards a systematic understanding of the drivers of positive peace.

4.4.1 Variables most closely related to higher levels of positive peace

Over an 8 year period, the IEP collected data and compared it to over 8,500 variables across macro-economy, social relations and attitudes, economic and social development, economic and social integration, the functioning and structure of government, and external relations. The overall aim of this comprehensive assessment was an attempt to better understand which variables have the strongest relationship with the lower levels of violence and higher levels of positive peace.


The result was an 8-part empirically linked framework of inter-related domains, or pillars (PPI Report, 2015: 10), that confirmed that the most important factors that reduce violence and create and sustain an optimum environment for humanity to flourish are:

- A Well-functioning government that includes government effectiveness, effective judicial systems and the extent to which citizens are allowed to have a voice in decision-making.
- Sound business environment, which refers to the economic framework for business set by government, the presence of supporting infrastructure such as internet access, business sophistication and overall market conditions.
- Equitable distribution of resources: more than a reflection of income, this pillar is about how vital goods and services such as land, water, education, health care and justice are distributed throughout a society.
- Acceptance of the rights of others, or the level of tolerance and acceptance afforded to individuals in a society.

⁴³ Download the latest Positive Peace Index report here:
<http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Positive-Peace-Report-2015.pdf>

- Good relations with neighbors – describing a country’s capacity to use diplomacy to manage disagreements and to positively manage relationships with other countries.
- Free flow of information, or how easily citizens can gain access to information and whether the media is free and independent.
- High levels of human capital, defined as a country’s stock of skills, knowledge and behaviors.
- Low levels of corruption, which is the extent to which corruption is prevented or individuals and organizations are held accountable when corruption occurs.

Figure 17: Factors of positive peace



4.4.2 Trends in positive peace

Because of space considerations, it is not possible to provide an exhaustive account of all the results emerging from the 2015 PPI report here⁴⁴. Instead, the below presents some brief results of the PPI, outlining the countries ranking and their subsequent positive peace score (see, Table 2), followed by a summary of the main highlights.

⁴⁴ Please visit the following to download the original report: <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Positive-Peace-Report-2015.pdf>

Table 2: 2015 Positive Peace Index rankings

iso3c	COUNTRY	2015 PPI Rank	2015 PPI OVERALL SCORE
DNK	Denmark	1	1.361
FIN	Finland	2	1.361
SWE	Sweden	3	1.396
NOR	Norway	4	1.408
IRL	Ireland	5	1.448
CHE	Switzerland	6	1.488
ISL	Iceland	7	1.5
NZL	New Zealand	8	1.533
NLD	Netherlands	9	1.535
AUT	Austria	10	1.589
DEU	Germany	11	1.608
CAN	Canada	12	1.614
AUS	Australia	13	1.616
GBR	United Kingdom	14	1.624
BEL	Belgium	15	1.666
FRA	France	16	1.769
JPN	Japan	17	1.824
SGP	Singapore	18	1.829
USA	United States	19	1.853
EST	Estonia	20	1.862
PRT	Portugal	21	1.889
SVN	Slovenia	22	1.921
CZE	Czech Republic	23	1.999
ESP	Spain	24	2.002
POL	Poland	25	2.032
CHL	Chile	26	2.074
LTU	Lithuania	27	2.079
ITA	Italy	28	2.095
URY	Uruguay	29	2.109
KOR	South Korea	30	2.131
CYP	Cyprus	31	2.169
SVK	Slovakia	32	2.171
HUN	Hungary	33	2.175
GRC	Greece	34	2.214

iso3c	COUNTRY	2015 PPI Rank	2015 PPI OVERALL SCORE
MUS	Mauritius	35	2.229
HRV	Croatia	36	2.268
ISR	Israel	37	2.283
LVA	Latvia	38	2.305
CRI	Costa Rica	39	2.317
ARE	United Arab Emirates	40	2.329
QAT	Qatar	41	2.375
TWN	Taiwan	42	2.431
BGR	Bulgaria	43	2.495
BWA	Botswana	44	2.552
MNE	Montenegro	45	2.558
KSV	Kosovo	46	2.564
JAM	Jamaica	47	2.608
MYS	Malaysia	48	2.647
ROU	Romania	49	2.678
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	50	2.682
KWT	Kuwait	51	2.698
OMN	Oman	52	2.701
PAN	Panama	53	2.722
MKD	Macedonia	54	2.734
NAM	Namibia	55	2.757
ZAF	South Africa	56	2.767
ARG	Argentina	57	2.768
BHR	Bahrain	58	2.77
SRB	Serbia	59	2.783
GEO	Georgia	60	2.807
TUN	Tunisia	61	2.82
ALB	Albania	62	2.837
BRA	Brazil	63	2.846
GHA	Ghana	64	2.856
MEX	Mexico	65	2.858
SLV	El Salvador	66	2.905
SAU	Saudi Arabia	67	2.919
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	68	2.955

iso3c	COUNTRY	2015 PPI Rank	2015 PPI OVERALL SCORE
MAR	Morocco	69	2.97
PER	Peru	70	2.98
THA	Thailand	71	2.987
DOM	Dominican Republic	72	3.012
JOR	Jordan	73	3.026
GUY	Guyana	74	3.033
TUR	Turkey	75	3.036
MNG	Mongolia	76	3.04
BLR	Belarus	77	3.048
COL	Colombia	78	3.056
ARM	Armenia	79	3.061
MDA	Moldova	80	3.081
KAZ	Kazakhstan	81	3.096
UKR	Ukraine	82	3.097
TLS	Timor-Leste	83	3.139
VNM	Viet Nam	84	3.151
CHN	China	85	3.154
BTN	Bhutan	86	3.158
CUB	Cuba	87	3.183
GAB	Gabon	88	3.201
GTM	Guatemala	89	3.212
ECU	Ecuador	90	3.213
RWA	Rwanda	91	3.222
LSO	Lesotho	92	3.228
RUS	Russia	93	3.235
PHL	Philippines	94	3.236
NIC	Nicaragua	95	3.237
LKA	Sri Lanka	95	3.237
PNG	Papua New Guinea	97	3.242
IDN	Indonesia	98	3.244
HND	Honduras	99	3.25
SWZ	Swaziland	100	3.255
AZE	Azerbaijan	101	3.268
SEN	Senegal	102	3.275

iso3c	COUNTRY	2015 PPI Rank	2015 PPI OVERALL SCORE
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	103	3.28
PRY	Paraguay	103	3.28
ZMB	Zambia	105	3.289
BEN	Benin	106	3.297
IND	India	107	3.31
DZA	Algeria	108	3.313
BOL	Bolivia	109	3.325
EGY	Egypt	110	3.332
GMB	Gambia	111	3.357
LBN	Lebanon	112	3.371
MWI	Malawi	113	3.413
TZA	Tanzania	114	3.414
VEN	Venezuela	115	3.418
MLI	Mali	116	3.424
BFA	Burkina Faso	117	3.433
NPL	Nepal	118	3.444
TJK	Tajikistan	119	3.462
LBY	Libya	120	3.463
UGA	Uganda	121	3.48
KHM	Cambodia	122	3.486
CIV	Cote d'Ivoire	123	3.487
SLE	Sierra Leone	124	3.491
MOZ	Mozambique	125	3.494
LBR	Liberia	126	3.499
DJI	Djibouti	127	3.504
TGO	Togo	128	3.517
KEN	Kenya	129	3.519
MMR	Myanmar	130	3.528
MDG	Madagascar	131	3.535
BGD	Bangladesh	132	3.564
UZB	Uzbekistan	133	3.571
TKM	Turkmenistan	134	3.578
LAO	Laos	135	3.592
HTI	Haiti	136	3.595

iso3c	COUNTRY	2015 PPI Rank	2015 PPI OVERALL SCORE
IRN	Iran	137	3.611
ETH	Ethiopia	138	3.616
COG	Congo	139	3.62
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	140	3.649
PRK	North Korea	141	3.686
BDI	Burundi	142	3.694
NER	Niger	143	3.718
SYR	Syria	144	3.757
CMR	Cameroon	145	3.761
MRT	Mauritania	146	3.767
SDN	Sudan	147	3.785
PAK	Pakistan	148	3.818
SSD	South Sudan	149	3.82
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	150	3.84
GIN	Guinea	151	3.851
AGO	Angola	152	3.852
NGA	Nigeria	153	3.865
IRQ	Iraq	154	3.916
ERI	Eritrea	155	3.925
COD	Democratic Republic of the Congo	156	3.93
YEM	Yemen	157	3.937
ZWE	Zimbabwe	158	3.946
TCD	Chad	159	3.961
AFG	Afghanistan	160	3.997
CAF	Central African Republic	161	4.154
SOM	Somalia	162	4.192


Here is a summary of the main highlights from the 2015 Positive Peace Index:

- Highlight 1: Since 2005, there have been steady improvements in the global average of positive peace (+1.65%).
- Highlight 2: Out of 162 countries ranked in the PPI in 2015, one-hundred and eighteen (73 per cent) showed improvement, while forty-four deteriorated (23 per cent).

- Highlight 3: Democracies and high-income countries have the strongest levels of positive peace, and dominate the top 30 countries in the Positive Peace index.
- Highlight 4: A high number of violent resistance movements took place in countries with low levels of positive peace (91 per cent).

In effect, positive peace is closely linked with developmental outcomes other than peace. Figure 18 shows that countries with higher levels of positive peace progressed further in their achievement of the MDG's (explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2). Development and peace are interlinked in complex ways, insomuch that development is informed by levels of violence, and lower levels of violence and higher levels of peace simultaneously contribute to higher levels of development.

Figure 18: Positive Peace and the Millennium Development Goals



4.4.3 Peace and well-functioning governments

At this point the analysis takes a closer look at the first pillar of the IEP's 8-part framework of positive peace - well-functioning government - because it is pivotal in its intersections with many of the other pillars discussed above. Put simply, positive or negative changes in this pillar are likely to affect other pillars.

The PPI includes three indicators of a well-functioning government, listed with their correlation coefficients in table 3. These indicators essentially reflect the three important aspects of governance: transparency, accountability and mechanisms for participation; effectiveness of the judiciary; and capacity for and quality of revenue collection (PPI, 2015: 42-43).

INDICATOR	DEFINITION	SOURCE	CORRELATION WITH INTERNAL PEACE
Democratic political culture	Measures whether the electoral process, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation and culture support secular democracy.	Economist Intelligence Unit	0.66
Judicial independence	Measures the extent to which the judiciary is independent from influences of members of government, citizen or firms.	Institutional Profiles Database	0.59
Revenue collection and service delivery	Measures the efficiency of the national tax system and the territorial coverage of public services and utilities.	Institutional Profiles Database	0.71

Findings from the PPI, by and large, suggest that well-functioning governments are a key indicator in predicting higher levels of positive peace. Several leading studies have come to similar conclusions on the ways in which effective governance and capacity have a positive influence on preventing armed conflict and violence, and the building of peace.

Evidence from James Fearon's (210) and Barbara Walter's (2010) work for the World Development Report, for example, points to how weak governance is closely associated with higher risks of armed violence. Relatedly, Rummel (1995) provides evidence on the linkages between genocide and the absence of democracy. Barbara Harff (1995), similarly, shows that inclusive democratic systems, which trade extensively with other countries, are less likely to employ genocide.

Some other studies show that good governance systems – which are accountable, resilient, and inclusive – are a key predictor in determining the prospects of peace (Thyne, 2006). Cortright, et al's (2013) recent paper, *Governance, Democracy, and Peace: How state capacity and regime type influence the prospects for war and peace*, is a leading example that supports this position. The authors identify two underlying elements through which state governance systems help to build peace.

The first is state capacity, which comprises security capacity and social capacity. Security capacity reflects the states' ability to control territory and resist armed incursion from other states and non-state actors. Social capacity reflects the ability to provide social services and public goods. Their research suggests that potentially violent groups and armed conflict are more likely when states lack the ability to execute their policy goals or to maintain security and public order.

The second is institutional quality. Building on the fact that not all governance systems are equally effective or capable of supporting peace, they find that governance systems - characterized by inclusiveness, representativeness, transparency, and accountability - are seen as more credible and legitimate, and are better at supporting peace. In addition, democratic systems which allow citizens to voice concerns, participate politically, and hold elected leaders accountable are more stable and better able to avoid armed conflict. By inference, governments that lack the institutional capacity to provide security and enforce state decisions in the territory it controls are less likely to maintain peace.

Additional support for the relationships between peace and democracy comes from Bauch's (2013) research - on Democracy, war efforts, and the systemic democratic peace - which examines the democratic peace theory, and its association with good governance systems. Findings show that 70% of conflicts between autocratic leaders resulted in war, where only 2.5% of the conflicts between democratic leaders resulted in war. Reasons for this difference pertain to how autocratic leaders can engage in war more freely, without worrying about their hold on power, whereas democratic systems are under more pressure to carefully consider the means used to address conflict for the fear of losing elections if their policies fail.

The main conclusion to be drawn from these studies is that, by and large, good governance, rule of law, and the spread of modern democracy are strongly associated with lower levels of armed conflict and violence and higher levels of peace. On the whole, though, much more work is needed to move states further towards the type of well-functioning governments described here.

To give an idea of the challenges faced, there are only 20 countries which can be considered full democracies, according to the Democracy Index (DI). Compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, this index measures the state of democracy in 167 countries: 166 of which are sovereign states and 165 are UN member states. It is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories that measure pluralism, civil liberties, and political culture. Table 4 gives a snap shot of the results from 2015 DI, outlining the number and percentage of countries and the percentage of the world population for each regime.


Cuadro 4: Resumen de los resultados del Índice de Democracia 2015

TYPE OF REGIME	SCORES	NUMBER OF	PORCENTAJE	PORCENTAJE DE LA POBLACIÓN MUNDIAL
Full democracies	8.01 to 10	20	12.0	8.9
Flawed democracies	6.01 to 8.0	59	35.3	39.5

TYPE OF REGIME	SCORES	NUMBER OF	PORCENTAJE	PORCENTAJE DE LA POBLACIÓN MUNDIAL
Hybrid regimes	4.01 to 6.0	36	22.2	17.5
Authoritarian regimes	0 to 4.0	52	30.5	34.1

Here is the same information presented in the form of a visual map.

Figure 19: The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy index map for 2015.
Greener colors represent more democratic countries.



Here, then, lies the challenge, how to move more countries that are characterized as flawed democracies, hybrid, or authoritarian regimes towards those emblematic of full democracies. There is an important justification for this, since the latter tend to be more stable, and, therefore, prone to less violence, armed conflict, and higher levels of peace.

The results of Jack Goldstone et al's (2010) flagship study came to a similar conclusion. Findings show that there are four significant variables to predict the likelihood of political instability and armed conflict: regime type, infant mortality, conflict in the region, and state-led discrimination. Jeffrey Dixon's (2009) research, which emerged out of a synthesis of quantitative studies on the correlates of civil war, concludes that the risk of armed conflict diminishes as democracies become more inclusive.

Into these challenges, it has been found that increased spending on education, health, and social security significantly decreases the risk of armed conflict and political stability (Taydas and Peksen, 2012). Education, health, and social security, along with the other factors described above, are all important factors influencing where a country ranks in the PPI.

4.4.4. Positive peace is transformation

In essence, the lesson to be learned from all this is that positive peace is transformational, because it correlates with many positive outcomes, including higher levels of GDP, well-being, human development, well-functioning democratic governments, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. This is why the PPI is such an important resource, since it provides an empirical-based approach that identifies and measures factors most associated with reducing violence and creating an optimum environment in which peace can flourish. It reframes the study of peace in a way that seeks to better understand what works rather than studying what does not.

In doing so, the PPI also shows that there is a relationship between positive peace and societal resilience. For instance, the countries exhibiting greater resilience to shocks - whether economic, geopolitical or natural disasters - and high levels of success in resolving conflicts non-violently, tend to have higher levels of positive peace. For these reasons, the PPI is more policy relevant, because understanding what makes societies peaceful and resilient is vital to informing policy. Without understanding the factors that drive overall social advancement and optimal human flourishing, moving away from violence and towards a sustained peaceful society will be more difficult.

4.2. Conclusion

This chapter was about measuring peace and ways to create it. The first part of the chapter examined: why it is important to measure peace and how peace. The second part presented key findings from the GPI over a ten-year and one-year period. Here, it was shown that we are “now further away from world peace than at any time in the last ten years – and it is creating a global peace inequality gap” (GPI, 2016). The GPI uses the theory of negative peace to measure levels of negative peace.

The third part of the chapter introduced the PPI, which uses positive peace to take a closer look at what creates and sustains positive peace. Results from the PPI report were presented. This part of the chapter also covered the inter-linkages peace and well-functioning governments, including the relationship between development and peace and peace and democracy, and the reasons why positive peace is transformative. Essentially, this chapter provided an analysis of measuring peace and what creates it, in broad strokes. A more country specific analysis of peace and peace initiatives in Bolivia is offered in the chapter that follows.

Peace and Conflict — in Bolivia

Chapter 5

CHAPTER 5

THE SOCIAL CONFLICT IN BOLIVIA FROM THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

1. Introduction

Succumbing in the social conflict seems to be a permanent itinerary of the Bolivian social plot. Faced with this conflictive reality, many researchers have devoted several studies on the problem of social conflict, from two major theories, such as: consensualist theory and conflictivist theory⁴⁵. First, the consensualist theory identifies that social conflicts per se are anomalous because they affect the conditions of social coexistence and with propensity to be explained spasmodically. Second, the conflictivist theory that is anchored in the phenomenon of the continue opposition to interests, inherent in any social dynamics. In this sense, the framework of social conflict rests on this subordinate place of struggle of conflicting interests ready to crack social order and peace.

Several empirical results about the origin of social conflict rest on the phenomenon of unsatisfied social demands that call on broad social groups to manifest themselves in the form of social protest and that must pass through the thorny stages and / or phases of the social conflict process: birth, development, maturation and crisis.

There is a phenomenon in the Bolivian social conflict that is its extreme correlation with politics. It is no coincidence that the leading social class is free from political ideology. Social protest is precisely coordinated and conducted by them.

Therefore, the phenomenon of social conflict as being linked to political interests, the party systems become diligent in the cooptation of them. The political slogans of erosion and the struggle to take control of the public administration are part of the common denominator of the leadership class representing the interest of the groups. In this state of affairs the primacy of conflict is anchored in the desire to find escape valves to the different social problems very close to surpassing the thin line of the civic to the political aspect.

It is important to recapitulate the historical social conflict in Bolivia. In fact, social conflict is part of colonial and republican conflict history. Many indigenous revolts that happened against the Spanish Crown until before the founding of the Republic of Bolivia in 1825 and then other social uprisings enthroned against the State, in the eagerness to extract the minimum possible rights. The recognition of the citizen status of being Bolivian was the greatest demand for which the different native cultures fought. There were few cultures that battled their rights, including: Aymara culture and Quechua. This consistent struggle would last until the national revolution of 1952 with the implementation of the three great flags of nationalist economic policies, such as: agrarian reform, nationalization of mines and educational reform. In this way, the Aymara, Quechua, Guarani and other

⁴⁵ Lorenzo C., Pedro-Luis. Main Theories on Social Conflict “. In history magazine Caceres 2001.

cultures that joined democracy were guaranteed the right to vote for the first time. The civic-political social conflict that was part of this network could not be absent.

At the level of social sectors, it was the mining sector that granted a ferocious affront to the private mining business sector and the State itself for the fight of their labor rights. In contrast, the repressive action of the Oligarchic-Feudal Mining State against the mining conflict was intense, so much that there were several mining massacres. Some of these massacres were the Uncia massacre of June 4, 1923, where seven workers died, the Catavi massacre of December 21, 1942 with seven dead, the Potosí massacre of January 28-29, 1947 with dozens of Dead, massacre of XX century of 28-29-30 of May of 1949 with a balance 144 dead recognized by the government, but might have being many more deaths.

The cumulative social conflict was incessant, even more so after the 1952 National Revolution. As in the Oligarchic-Feudal Mining State, the massacres towards the mining sector were intense. The massacre of the May 1965 camp resulted in seven deaths, the massacre of Siglo XX and Catavi on 19-21-22 September 1965 with 30 deaths, the San Juan mining massacre of June 23, 1967 with dozens of deaths The massacre of the Banzer coup of August 21, 1971, which killed four people, the massacre of Garcia Mesa's coup of July 17, 1980, with a tragic death toll of five, and the massacre of Caracoles, Viloco and Siglo XX of 3 August 1980 with 13 dead. It was the corollary of the conflict with the mining sector during the pre-democratic period.

Social conflict has historical aspects. In fact, even before the revolution of 1952 the exercise of citizenship was only for those who could read and write, coming from middle and upper class. While large indigenous social majorities were denied the exercise of their rights by the oligarchic-feudal state. Such social demands would take decades to wrest from the State some pro-inclusive social policies, while only the collective imagination was installed as a potential right. These social demands matured more vigorously with the awakening of national awareness that gendered the Chaco War. The transcendental ignominious forms of discrimination came out at the events of the National Revolution of 1952.

It was the years after the National Revolution of 52, that social conflicts also intensified along with the military blows that broke through the institutionality so fragilely built up until then. Many times, the social problem was accentuated around labor exploitation and the mineralogical resources.

In this context, this current work aims to address the structural problems of social conflict in the gelatinous process of the construction of Bolivian democratic institutions. The complex social grassroots: urban-rural, peasants, workers, miners, labor unions, neighbors, unions, unemployed and many others are part of that emancipatory mass that is likely to generate social conflicts of low or high intensity. In this respect, the present work draws the effort to recapitulate the Bolivian conflict in three precise moments of time. The first moment corresponds to the military dictatorial period between 1970 and 1982. The second moment corresponds to the neoliberal democratic period from 1982 to

2005. And a last moment to the period of the process of “socialist” change between the years 2006 and 2016.

2. Human development, social conflict and peace: a conceptual approach

The term human development is strongly related to the quality of life and fundamental freedoms of everyone. In fact, the United Nations Development Program defines human development in 1990 as a “process by which people are given opportunities. Among these, the most important are: a long and healthy life, education and access to the resources necessary to have a decent standard of living. Other opportunities include political freedom, the guarantee of human rights and respect for themselves” (UNDP 1990: 37). So, human development is a complex social paradigm that is part of the daily lives of citizens.

On the other hand, the issue of social conflict is a subject of research closely linked to the field of sociology, political economy and political science⁴⁶. In a broader sense, social conflict is defined as a “process of contentious interaction between social actors who share cognitive orientations, mobilized with varying degrees of organization and acting collectively in accordance with expectations of improvement, defending the pre-existing situation or proposing a social counter-project.”⁴⁷ Another definition indicates that social conflict is “the struggle for values and for status, power and scarce resources, while the opponents want to neutralize, damage or eliminate their rivals” and “transcend the individual and proceed from the very structure of society”⁴⁸.

In counterpart to human development and social conflict we have the term “peace” which means a situation of absence of direct violence⁴⁹. Then the dimension of peace is possible to portray within what could be called positive peace and negative peace linked to social justice, equality and dialogue. Therefore, the social conflict within the manifestation of peace becomes a constitutive process within every society. There cannot be the pure end of peace, but they coexist with conflicts, in which individuals perceive target interests and from it appear antagonistic interests or opposing interests.
structure of society”

In this complex situation, Bolivia coexists in the hope of achieving its human development in a peaceful situation, but which is customarily immersed in social conflict within a framework of “divergences in the goals and / or discrepancies in interests” of the interest groups.

3. Official Statistical Information: A Critical Criticism

The statistical availability of social conflict in Bolivia is still under construct. In essence, the quantitative information on social conflict is of the utmost importance for the serious and scientific treatment of the problem of social unrest. However, in Bolivia, the National Police is the institution in charge of the statistical compilation of the conflict phenomenon

⁴⁶ Foundation UNIR. “Profiles of social conflict in Bolivia (2009 - 2011). Multifactorial analysis and perspectives. P.17

⁴⁷ Cadarzo, Lorenzo.

⁴⁸ Giner, Jesus. *Conflicto Social (teoría del)*. p.1

⁴⁹ Mesa P., Manuela. “Paz y Seguridad”. p.1.

and through the official institutional channel of the National Institute of Statistics (INE) is public. But the calculation methodology is subject to the “professional secrecy” of the police institution. It is not known the standardized common methodology that guides the capture of statistical information. To this must be added if they have the professional police specialized in the statistical work and if they are continuously trained. Another factor that must be noted is that the National Police coexist with a limited budget, which limits its institutional development in terms of the acquisition of modern technological equipment and the implementation of an information network system for an efficient work.

The training of the professional human resources of the National Police in terms of statistical management is essential. It is necessary to have a police specialized in the statistic handling of the social conflict at national level, since this type of professional police specialized on statistical management also collects information on another structural and very sensitive problematic topic which is the citizen security.

The National Institute of Statistics (INE) is responsible for statistical publication through its Statistical Yearbook and through its website. A fact that is striking is the lack of opportunity in the presentation of statistical information with a lag of one or two years. This prevents social researchers on social conflicts, to design an effective and efficient investigations in the treatment of the problem. It is essential to have a type of information that is useful, timely, reliable, truthful and verifiable, so it becomes a strategic input to design efficient institutional policies and prevention of social conflict

The phenomenology of social conflict has different meanings as to the type of social demands, such as conflict over land, wages, citizen insecurity, etc. etc. which are not reflected in the statistics presented by the INE. Another interesting fact is the actors of social conflict that are not presented in the statistics provided by the INE. Bolivia, due to its geographic and historical characteristics, has a high demographic concentration in the central axis of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, and in this correlation, the social conflict is also concentrated in this axis. The city of La Paz, because it is the political center, concentrates the greatest degree of social conflict, for this reason will require a greater institutional effort to deal with the conflictive occurrence within the city of La Paz. A good statistical information allows an effective mapping of the conflict in terms of its dispersion, concentration and frequency.

The benefits of having statistical police information have an impact on good institutional management, organizational development and strengthen public trust with citizens. It is unthinkable to design effective conflict prevention policies without conflicting statistical information.

The precariousness of the statistical information of the conflict in Bolivia is a pending agenda. According to Gómez, “the lack of necessary information does not allow us to make adequate decisions, so we do not interpret the situation in a different way or we do not assign it the same degree of importance”⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Gómez Funes, Gloria. “Conflict within the organizations and mediation”. Málaga, febrero de 2013.

4. Social protest as a phenomenon of social groups

In primacy, the dispute over the administration and distribution of the benefits of natural resources has caused tension the relationship between State and society. Bolivia, as a country that is predominantly a producer of raw materials and has a highly informal economy (70% of the Economically Active Population), this accentuated the fact that the few who enjoy a formal job supported the conflicts to converge in extreme struggles to maintain their sources of employment, salary improvements and better working conditions.

The social mechanism for fighting is found in the union and the guilds as a mechanism of force to wrest from the state some possible benefits for their interests. Bolivia is a unionized and guild state. The union transcends the urban and rural environment.

In the peasant sector, several trade union bodies have been created, starting from the community. The sub central and central ones are part of this commendation called Syndicate. While the guilds are an intrinsic part of the cities where they take control of the informal economy.

These are characteristic features of Bolivian society, so much that it is not only part of a social group but of social groups. These forms of social groupings are extensive beyond the union and the guild. There are civic organizations like that organized social body always active in their different manifestations.


All of them, find in the phenomenology of social protest the means by which they try to make their rights prevail, which becomes the force of their social capital. But the fury of this conflict has a “keeper” who comes to be the leader of the union, the guild or another social grouping, which often is ideologized. This ideologization subtracts all civic-self-critical value and is therefore prone to be diverted from natural social demand. Hence, the social conflict in its stage of evolution will shift from an eminently civic demand to another with high political interest. It is enough to review the performance of the Bolivian Workers’ Confederation (COB) throughout its history, it will be noticed that the leadership has been highly politicized and related to some political ideology. Then the civic value of the COB entity does not exist. The same happens with leaders of guilds or other social groups that do not escape the politicization of the conflict. In this situation, the citizenship happens to be in the middle of the conflictive situation of two poles. There is an imperceptible gap between civic demand and political demand.

The high interdependence of the social bases with respect to their leaders linked to blackmail, coercion, fine, threat, end up subordinated to them. In the sense of democratic election by voting, does not fit in these organized bodies. On the other hand, it only fits the election by means of apparatus in the assembly, with reelections quasi indefinite.

Then from the unions, guilds or other social organizations resurges the high interest in politics. A political-social combination that leads to a large number of social manifestations, which are sometimes encouraged by the government itself⁵¹.

⁵¹ ZUAZO, Moira (2008). However, How was MAS born? The ruralization of politics in Bolivia. La Paz, Friedrich Ebert.

Graph N ° 1
Percentage of people participating in protests, by country, 2008



Source: Barometer of the Americas by LAPOP, 2008.

This high degree of unionization, guilds and the existence of other forms of social organization made the citizenry prone to social conflict attendance. This is portrayed by a LAPOP survey conducted in 2008, which shows that in Latin America, Bolivia has the highest percentage of participation in social protest with 29.3%. That is, three out of ten Bolivians are involved in social conflict.

5. The social conflict in the pre-democratic dictatorial period, 1970-1985

The interregnum of social unrest during the seventies and part of the eighties was intensified due to dictatorial militarism. A militarism that was a secular part of the canons of the cold war that belonged to the Cold War between the United States and the former USSR what is now Russia, an ideological confrontation of a catastrophic tie-break between capitalism versus socialism or the market economy versus the planned economy. The fall of the Berlin Wall of November 1989 ended with the Cold War and the triumph of coexistence with the market economy and democracy.

The dictatorial militarism broke the fragile institutionality and interrupted the circuit of the market system. It eroded the Bolivian labor market. The labor - management relations between the State and the miners broke down. In the same way peace was demolished and with it the democratic order. The dictatorial militarism of the government of Hugo Banzer⁵² started a cycle of states of siege by which it suspended the rights and freedoms of Bolivian citizens, exercising one of the most brutal violations of human rights⁵³. The government of Hugo Banzer between 1971 and 1978 coincided with a time of economic prosperity due to mineral prices for export. This added to the loans obtained by the Banzer government, again and again increasing the external debt until its collapse with the hyperinflation of 1985.

The social protest also coincided with the crisis of the statist model raised in 1952. A model of extractivist production of mineralogical resources. Conflict was concentrated in urban centers (74.3%)⁵⁴ and mining centers. In this period, the department of La Paz (29.3%), Santa Cruz (17.8%), Cochabamba (17.7%) and Oruro-Potosí (21%)⁵⁵

Another characteristic presented by Laserna, is the intense conflict generated by the "middle sectors" (55.9%), made up of students (25.9%), public employees (12.1%) and urban teachers (5.7%)⁵⁶. We will also have the workers with 17.2%, factories 5.4% and miners 5%⁵⁷.

Peasant participation in the conflict was 7.4%, as the majority population was among the Aymara, Quechua and Guarani cultures. The abandonment of the State to this majority group was evident given the absence of social inclusion policies and access to their basic rights such as access to basic services, education and health. However, the peasants did not stress social conflict.

One pole that flashed the social conflict was the question of the distribution of wealth from the exploitation of raw materials. Worker relations with the State were tightened around the labor market, with the issue of wages at 13.9%. The mining sector understood its influence and in its condition of proletarian social class was in charge of securing the political flag to access the administration of the public thing, nourished by the socialist ideology of the time.

In his study, Laserna invites to analyze the "institutional political" factor that was constituted as another accelerator of social conflict. The military dictatorship had destroyed all democratic institutions and respect for human rights. In fact, the population had fully understood the importance of the independence character that the institutions should possess. At the end of

⁵² The Banzer government was one of the most atrocious dictatorships in Latin America. He bashed the political parties, silence the freedom of the press, ignored the rights of the labor movement, violated the human rights of civilians. Only during the days of the Banzer coup in 1971, there were 98 deaths and more than 560 injured.

⁵³ Soledad, Maria; Leon, Cristian; Meneses, Oscar; Pacheco, Huáscar; RiosPablo. "Profiles of social conflict in Bolivia (2009 - 2011). Multifactorial analysis and perspectives. Unir Foundation. 2012.

⁵⁴ Laserna, Roberto; Villarroel, Miguel. "38 years of social conflicts in Bolivia". Editores CERES. p.28

⁵⁵ Ibidem. p.28.

⁵⁶ Ibidem. p.28.

⁵⁷ Ibidem. p.28.

the period of dictatorial militarism of Hugo Banzer the incessant struggle for the independence of the institutions was determinant, that caused the intensification of the social protest.

Another characteristic of the social conflict of the pre-democratic period of dictatorial militarism was the forms of protest that were implemented from simple demonstrations, marches, riots, strikes, blockades and indefinite general strikes. On the other hand, the State attacked with all the state military-police apparatus, without doubting the violation of fundamental rights.

In general, the main contender was the Central State with 56.1%, the local State with 13.1% and private enterprise with 8%. This high social conflict is widely related to the State because of its high centralism in the management of public resources that causes the demands to be channeled in the same direction.

One characteristic of the dictatorial militarism of the government of Hugo Banzer was its political base closely anchored to the institutional support of the Armed Forces. In fact, the armed forces acted as a sort of Praetorian force cohort. Not only military, also the police institution. That is the reason why citizen distrust the military institution because it had surpassed the line of external defense towards tasks of public order. The deinstitutionalization of the military and police sector was the regular policy of government dictatorships

Another key factor ignored by the militarist dictatorships was the good management of the economy. On the contrary, they privileged the expenses. If we review the budgetary percentage assigned to the defense sector, it is 4% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). From 1971 to 1978 during the administration of Hugo Banzer, the foreign debt grew from 600 million dollars to the astronomical figure of 4 billion dollars that ended up infuriating a political crisis and the emergence of social movements. A succession of military coups took place in the late seventies and early eighties. The Association of Relatives of Detainees, Disappeared and Martyrs for the National Liberation of Bolivia (ASOFAMD) counted from 1971 to 1978 a number of 246 deaths in Social Conflicts (see Table 1).

After the fall of the dictatorship of the Banzer government, between 1978 and 1982, once again, Bolivia entered a spiral of social upheavals, coups d'état and confinements. The degree of conflict is possible to measure with the nine presidents Bolivia had.

Chart N ° 1
LIST OF DEATHS IN SOCIAL CONFLICTS
(Dictatorial Militarism)

GOBIERNO	LIBRO "NUNCA MÁS" PARA BOLIVIA (INCLUYE MUERTOS EN MINAS, MUERTOS EN MASACRES Y DESAPARECIDOS)	ASOFAMD (INCLUYE DESAPARECIDOS Y FALLECIDOS)
Hugo Banzer Suarez (1971-1978)	392	146
Luis García Meza (1980-1981)	429	100
Totales	821	246

Source: ASOFAMD -Libro: "Nunca Más" ("Never Again") for Bolivia. Author: Federico Aguiló

Another study carried out by Aguilo has been able to quantify that 821 were the extensive list of deaths due to social conflicts between 1971-1981. This was the faithful expression of contempt for human life from dictators outside of democracy. Such terrible actions do not match the degree of civilization that makes the twentieth century, but they show the degree of barbarism and inhuman portray of the dictators

6. Continuity and crisis of the statist model: transition to democracy

In Bolivia, the transition to democracy crossed the path of an unscathed chronology of social unrest that followed the beginning of the end of dictatorships as a result of the crisis of the statist economic model. In 1985, such was the situation of crisis that the tin depreciated from \$ 5.96 to 2.46 dollars, price drop that generated the "relocation" of more than 30,000 miners. The situation of the economic weight of public enterprises and state mining became unsustainable. Under a market economy approach, President Vicente Paz Estenssoro, who was not well-placed in the government, had to execute economic market policies to overcome the hyperinflationary crisis that in 1984 reached 2,177% and in 1985 it rose to 8,170%. This hyperinflationary process managed to destroy the productive structure and impoverished thousands of Bolivians. The statist economy model demonstrated its failure to cope with the hyperinflationary crisis. It was the market and Supreme Decree 21060 that led to the normalization of the national economy in the face of the similar crisis triggered by the inefficiency of previous governments, between dictators and populists.

The easy path of empathic populist spending, saw broad social majorities align with such policies. In contrast, the problem of inflation turned into hyperinflation. Inflation as a disease that affects social stability, also affects governance⁵⁸. In fact, the presidential mandate


⁵⁸ Mercado F., Alejandro. "Social impacts of inflation". P.117.

of Hernán Siles Zuazo was shortened by the increase of the social conflicts and had to call to anticipated elections. The problem of inflation is one of the most unpopular, which causes greater impoverishment on already poor families. In this situation, the Bolivian economy was much more tightly sealed due to its lower economic development, exporter of raw materials, very little diversified production structure and low levels of productivity

A first appreciation of social unrest in Bolivia is its continued cyclicity. According to the National Institute for Statistics, INE, data between 1982 and 2005, there were registered 77,272 social conflicts under the form of demonstrations, marches, strikes, strikes, states of emergency, blockades, riots and enslavements. In this same period of time he observed 6 cycles of conflict. The highest peak was registered in 1983 with 7,114 conflicts during the government of Hernán Siles and is followed by the second cycle in 2005 with 5,794 social conflicts in the government of Carlos de Mesa. It should be noted that in the democratic period of market economy, analyzed from 1982 to 2005, three governments were removed from office: Hernán Siles in 1985, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 and Carlos de Mesa in 2005. It was the emancipation of social movements that convulsed society and affected the democratic system to pass to the political conflict. The Bolivian democratic system survives with the siege of political representation and the growing social demands highly politicized by the ruling class whose primary goal is their personal interests based on the needs of their social bases.

The erosion of the political party system caused by public mistrust of public mismanagement is another factor that affects the foundations of order and social peace.

Chart N° 2
BOLIVIA: SOCIAL CONFLICTOS, 1982-2005



Source: National Institute of Statistics, INE

Own elaboration

(e): estimated

Social conflict has a defining equidistance with economic growth. In the absence of social conflict, a society is expected to have higher levels of economic growth. The presence of


social conflicts such as blocking roads disturbs, erodes the circuit of the market economy. Social conflict affects business competitiveness, paralyzes the productive apparatus, increases expenses, reduces incomes, cause to lose markets, reduces investments, increases the country's risk, increases unemployment and generates many other harmful effects that ends up reducing economic growth.

The high amount of unions and guilds with different interest, cause tension and it is something unique that happens at Latin America level. It adds to the social conflict that emerges from belonging to different ethnical groups. Indigenous communities are also heirs to the demand for greater social inclusion. The Bolivian peasant sector of the highlands has one of its national unions, such as the Single Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) and the Eastern Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian East (CIDOB). Both organizations with original peasant roots understand that the State has a historical colonial debt accumulated from the colony and the Republic after its foundation in 1825.

Social conflict is an expression of rupture between State and Society. Such dissociation has a direct effect on economic growth. Between 1978 and 1985 Bolivia's economic growth was -1.1%. Conflict generates negative multiplier effects on economic performance and, along with it, undermine weak institutionalality. Social unrest creates an atmosphere of insecurity among citizens, while it also affects business activity.

The insecurity generated around conflicts, breaks with that basic condition of any market economy in which there must be free mobility of factors.

Graph N ° 3
Bolivia: Growth of Social Conflict Vs Economic Growth, 1982-200



Source: National Institute of Statistics, INE


Own elaboration

(e): estimated

7. Return to statism: social tensions, 2006-2016

The days of social conflict of October 2003 in the city of El Alto marked a social and political milestone apotheosis in the imaginary of the social collectivity. Large social groups took the streets, formed barricades, channeled ditches, set up their trenches, mobilized themselves in every possible way and called for the blockade and the indefinite general strike. The balance 67 deaths, more than 400 injured and a democratically elected President⁵⁹ was forced to give up his presidential invitation. The conflict did not end there, today the victims continue to claim justice, a justice that has not been reached yet. On the other hand, former president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada claims to be the victim of a plot orchestrated by Chavismo of Caracas and Castroism of Cuba (Socialism of the 21st century). However, it is the story that will be responsible for unveiling the details of the events of those fateful days for the sake of Bolivian democracy. But what is evident, is the massacre of these poor families. The Altoño people “put” the deceased ones, and another government emerged. Today the conditions of precariousness, poverty and inequality in the city of El Alto remain the same. Meanwhile, social conflict is still latent.

Graph N ° 4
BOLIVIA: SOCIAL CONFLICTS, 2006-2016
(In numbers)



Source: National Institute of Statistics, INE – National Police

Own elaboration

(e): estimated

Given the historical context of social conflict in Bolivia, it seems a regularity that social movements enter the continuous disregard for the laws and the rule of law. Thus, with the last Constituent Assembly and with the new Political Constitution of the State it was intended to unify the society with the State, it is still in a pending subject. This rupture

⁵⁹ See the newspapers La Prensa and La Razon.

is because social movements have the firm belief that the only scenario of debate is the blockade of the roads, blockade of the streets and the use of dynamite. In this sense, it is possible to affirm that today Bolivia attends a divorce associated with opposing and dichotomous interest in the process of social construction of democracy.

8. Bolivia and the Index of Global Peace⁶⁰

In Bolivia, democratic governance is subordinated to social conflict. They are the social organizations that do not stop at the social demand but they surpass to look for the political control. Here arises the phenomenon of the construction of peace, a sine qua non for the development of any society free of violence and risks, and necessary to reach a fluid system of market economy from a moral and natural right. Social organizations should not transgress the norms that are useful for an efficient social coexistence, being that the social conflict responds to a human action prone to deteriorate the free market.

According to data from the Institute for Economics and Peace, in its report for the year 2016 on Global Peace Index, notes that Bolivia ranks 81st in the world ranking of 163 countries.

Chart N ° 2
Bolivia: Global Peace Index

FECHA	ÍNDICE DE PAZ GLOBAL	RANKING PAZ GLOBAL
2016	2,038	81°
2015	2,025	90°
2014	1,969	70°
2013	2,062	86°
2012	2,056	85°
2011	2,005	73°
2010	2,038	82°
2009	2,041	82°
2008	1,957	75°

Source: Global Peace Index.

Own elaboration.

On the other hand, the violence exercised from the side of organized crime is not unknown to the Bolivian reality. The phenomenon of violence linked to citizen insecurity and drug trafficking is almost always present. Then, the question of peace is subject to violence. Social conflicts and violence lead to a situation of ungovernability that is further compounded by the serious institutional deficiencies that leave the citizen totally vulnerable.

⁶⁰ El Índice de Paz Global (Global Peace Index) mide el nivel de paz y la ausencia de violencia en un país.

The absence of the state in public security by the prevalence of criminal acts, and the public order affected by the presence of social conflict is part of the labyrinths of effective democratic governance. The State is the main guarantor for providing all the extensive security and peace conditions. Without peace, it is impossible to think of democracy.

The need to build deeper processes of democracy must guarantee more and more peace. For this situation, it is necessary to narrow the social gaps of poverty and inequality and to produce the greatest possible governance in a framework of democratic process.

9. By way of conclusions

Bolivia survives with a situation of latent social conflict between State and Society. Not only this, but often puts in danger their institutions and democracy. In this scenario of conflict, social movements deviate from compliance with the law and appeal to the scenario of blocking roads, blocking streets and general strikes, which constitute serious threats to free transit and citizen security.

The statistical information available on social conflicts is still in process. However, the National Police is the institution in charge of statistical compilation of the phenomenon of social conflict, but this is subject to the “professional secrecy” of the institution. Therefore, it is necessary to have a type of information that is useful, timely, reliable, truthful and verifiable, in such a way that it becomes a strategic input to design efficient institutional policies and prevention policies.

A first appreciation of social unrest in Bolivia is its continued cyclicity. According to the National Institute of Statistics, INE, data between 1982 and 2005, there were 77,272 social conflicts (demonstrations, marches, strikes, states of emergency, blockades, riots and enslavements). In the period 2006-2015, there were 46,897 social conflicts. In this last period, 58% were concentrated in demonstrations and marches, 23% in blockades and riots, 17% in strikes, and 2% the people who tried or take private or governmental land.

According to data from the Institute for Economics and Peace, in its report for the year 2016 on Global Peace Index, notes that Bolivia ranks 81st in the world ranking of 163 countries.

The need to build deeper processes of democracy must guarantee more peace. In order to achieve this situation, we must begin by shortening the social gaps of poverty and inequality and producing the greatest institutional development within a framework of democratic process.

Finally, the Bolivian State has the pending task to build an institutional framework to solve the issue of social contract in such a way as to guarantee a peaceful situation to guarantee the freedom of citizens.

Peace and Conflict — in Bolivia

Chapter 6

CHAPTER 6

SOCIAL CONFLICTIVITY IN BOLIVIA, A JOINT LOOK⁶¹

The practice of social conflict is deeply rooted in the national culture, having become a constitutive part of the daily life of the country. With an average of between one and more than four daily conflicts in the last ten years, it is necessary to ask about the role that conflict has in the Bolivian socio-political and economic dynamics. To address this question, it is necessary first to present an overview of social conflicts in recent years. An analysis of the conflict over the last eight years shows that, for the most part, the protests originate in the dissatisfaction of basic needs of the population and in demand of redistributive policies and improvement of the level of income or in the interest of preserving and consolidate certain prerogatives

This way, almost a third part (30%) of the conflicts between the years 2008⁶² and 2015 had an economic character and was linked to the level of income of the population, with salary issues, the cost of living, and with the adoption of measures of economic impact; Problems of administrative type of the institutions, especially the public ones, gave rise to 15% of the cases; (Potable water, electricity and household gas, development and improvement of infrastructure and equipment for education and health, opening and maintenance of roads, installation of public lighting and signaling, and improvement of transportation service) generated a similar percentage of conflicts (14%); And the legal situation or the adoption of legal measures caused 12% of these. The rest of the cases were produced by a variety of subjects had less significant percentages.

Percentage of social conflicts according to type (2008 - 2015)

TIPO DE CONFLICTO	RANKING PAZ GLOBAL
Economic measures and economic situation	19,1
Administrative management	15,1
Provision of Public Services	14,1
Legal situation and legal measures	12,0
Labor, salary	11,3
Questioning and / or recognition of authority	5,1
Political ideological	4,4
Management of urban space	3,1
Breach of Conventions	2,8
Land	2,4

⁶¹ Analysis prepared by Maria Soledad Quiroga who kindly accepted the request to make an evaluation of the last decade based on the data collected by the Unir Foundation. Maria Soledad Quiroga is a sociologist, coordinator of the Research Program on Social Conflict and Democratic Communication of the UNIR.

⁶² Se toma como año inicial 2008 debido a que el monitoreo de conflictos que realizaba la Fundación UNIR con anterioridad a ese año no contemplaba el total de los tipos de conflicto considerados en los años siguientes.

TIPO DE CONFLICTO	RANKING PAZ GLOBAL
Citizen security	2,1
Human Rights	1,8
Natural Resources	1,6
Environment	1,6
Values, beliefs, identity	0,8
Housing	0,7
Administrative policy limits	0,6
Others	1,4
TOTAL	100

Source: Elaboración propia.

In order to give meaning to the diversity of types of social conflict existing in the country, they can be ordered in three major fields⁶³: social reproduction which assembles those cases motivated by the need or the expectation of improving living conditions of the population, the institutional one referring to the conditions of institutionality of the country that allow the regulation of social relations, and the cultural political aspect which agglutinates the ideological issues and recognition of rights. It is evident that these fields, far from constituting compartments clearly separated from each other, present a series of intersections, which can cause conflictive situations belonging to more than one field.

Reviewing the social conflicts of the period shows that more than half (54%) is in the field of social reproduction, that is, they are motivated by demands for income, employment, basic services, etc. More than a third (36%) of the cases are in the institutional field, which means that there are problems regarding the norms that regulate social life and weaknesses in public institutions. Finally, a smaller proportion of conflicts (10%) are in the cultural political field. This distribution of the Bolivian social conflict in these three fields evidences its preponderantly claiming character; Only in a marginal way it has a transformative character, from what could infer that the Bolivian society today is rather conservative, a situation that may be a conjunctural phenomenon - although it would be a long situation, which lasts for more than ten years - or, perhaps, more permanent, this is relevant aspect which deserves a specific investigation.

The character of the Bolivian social conflict may lead to the conclusion that its origin is the situation of poverty which still affects a large part of the population; although this is partly true, it should be pointed out that, as will be seen below, there is no direct correspondence between the location of conflicts in the national territory and the areas with the highest incidence of poverty. Conflict is a complex social phenomenon

⁶³ The field of social reproduction includes topics related to the economic situation and the adoption of economic, labor and wage measures, the provision of public services, access to and use of land and natural resources, housing, urban space management and security Citizen; The institutional field includes issues related to the legality situation and the adoption of legal measures, with political administrative limits, administrative management, recognition or ignorance of authorities and non-compliance with agreements; The cultural political field groups ideological, political, values, beliefs and identity issues, human rights, gender issues and the environment

that requires certain minimum conditions to develop: a specific level of organization, capacity for social mobilization and ability to approach demands; In general, the most precarious areas do not have these requirements and, therefore, although they suffer serious problems, they cannot generate protests that oblige the responsible actors to solve them.

In the economic scope, the informality in which most the Bolivian population moves, has been an important source of conflicts for various concrete situations that affect the already precarious situation of thousands of people or, on the contrary, the commercial interests of powerful groups. The relocation of street trades, the struggles between traders and between them and neighbors, the updating of the maximum amount of income to belong to the Simplified Tax Regime, the legalization of undocumented cars and others, were the issues that triggered these conflicts.

As of 2010, the problem of the increased price for the family basket and the scarcity of some basic products was added to the growing public dissatisfaction with the lack of effective improvement of the conditions of employment and income, on which the population had high expectations. In this sense, an emblematic case is the conflict of Caranavi, in which two groups of settlers, both related to the political party MAS, faced with tragic balances for the construction of a citrus processing plant that had been compromised by this political organization during the election campaign. Another significant case, especially because its protagonists were members of an institution of the order, the policemen from all over the country demanded improvement of salary and other labor demands.

Among the social conflicts of an economic nature of the last decade, clearly notable for its extensiveness, intensity and virulence, was triggered by the enactment of the Supreme Decree No. 748, Christmas Day 2010, increasing the price of fuel up to 83%, which generated an immediate spiral of higher prices for different products and services. The violent protests that followed this action, demanded the revoke of this measure and the resignation of several ministers and even of the president and vice-president, generating a climate of social turmoil that could trigger a situation of ungovernability. In order to resolve conflicts, on December 31, the government had to cancel the provision; despite this, prices remained high and protests continued during the month of January 2011, reaching the record for that time of the year of 114 cases.

During 2011 the panorama of social conflict was very complex; the increase of the cost of living, the scarcity of some products, such as sugar and cement, the pressure of the drivers in the most important and also some intermediate cities, to authorize the increase of the rates of public transport, teachers, health workers, and other sectors affiliated to the COB Union, in demand for wage increase - all of which resulted from the abrogated measure - led to an unprecedented number of conflicts, which in April soared to 168 cases. In the following years, this type of protest was reiterated as the inflation index grew, although in a much more moderate way. In 2015 there were further protests by neighborhood councils and housewives in La Paz Sucre, Oruro and Potosí due to higher food prices, while different agricultural producers asked for authorization to raise prices

Conflicts over public transportation fares were constant, pressing the central government to transfer tariff competition to municipal governments. Both the arbitrary rise in prices and the poor quality of the service has generated continuous protests from users, with several clashes between neighborhood councils, neighborhood groups and drivers.

On the other hand, in a situation of macroeconomic stability, with high international prices for the different export products, conflicts between different sectors began to proliferate due to the control and exploitation of natural resources, especially mining. The productive decay of agriculture, the poverty of rural areas and the lack of alternative employment and income generation are factors that have made it difficult for local communities to see the development of mining activities as the best option for them, which in some cases, such as alluvial gold production, are relatively accessible because of their low technological and economic requirements. Between the years 2011 and 2013 there was a proliferation of mining cooperatives that achieved high percentages of profitability, allowing a certain enrichment of its partners.

This way, since 2009 the conflicts over natural resources began to increase; among these cases we have the mining cooperatives of Oruro and Cochabamba by the Japo mine, Mallku Khota in Potosí for the reversal in favor of the community of the mining concession of the company South American Silver and the Cooperative 26 de Febrero Against the Mining Workers' Union of Colquiri for the exploitation of the Rosario vein in Colquiri. All these cases acquired a very violent character and left balances of wounded and dead. In 2014 mining cooperatives were mobilized for the approval of the mining law; at the same time, other sectors, such as irrigators association (regantes), indigenous people and civic organizations, protested for they had been excluded from the treatment of this law, which in some of its provisions would affect their rights and interests.

In several of these conflicts, MAS (Movement to Socialism)-affiliated groups clashed with each other, demanding the government to solve the controversies, assigning the government the difficult situation of having to favor some of its adherents at the expense of others.

Other relevant cases for the control of natural resources were the old dispute between Coroma (Potosí) and Quillacas (Oruro) disputing the border area between both departments, where there are deposits of limestone and lands suitable for the production of quinoa, and also the problem between Chuquisaca and Tarija for the royalties of the gas field "Margarita", for Chuquisaca assures it is located in its territory and, therefore, they should get profits.

Linked to the problem of natural resources, there is also the conflict for the construction of the road Villa Tunari - San Ignacio de Moxos, crossing the Indigenous Territory Isiboro Secure National Park (TIPNIS), since the most interested in its development are the Coca grower's peasants from the Cochabamba tropical area, who for decades have been expanding into that area. This case is very important, as it became a political issue and gave a new emphasis to Bolivian social conflict.

As to its political significance, the problem revealed conflicting views about the country's development and the conservation of natural resources and the environment, with the dramatic result about extractives and development vision and practice, besides other considerations - were imposed and from then on applied, almost without restrictions, in the different domains of national life; likewise, the conflict showed that the indigenous rights promised by the "process of change" have no possibility of being a reality under the mentioned extractive actions, a finding that led to the rupture of the Unity Pact by the departure of the indigenous organizations, CIDOB and CONAMAQ⁶⁴.

As for its significance for social conflict, the case of TIPNIS was important because it produced the combination of a countless diversity of actors, neighborhood councils, civic committees, education unions, university students, youth organizations and others, who adhered to the demands, especially after the police repression suffered by the marchers; and because it revealed the reasoning with which the defendants act in these cases.

The maneuver of the sectors related to the Government overturned what was achieved by the indigenous people who walked for 65 days with a wide support of citizens, and forced them to make a new March in 2012, which did not reach its goal since the Government refused to even meet with indigenous leaders, accused and persecuted them, so they had to go back to their communities to try to resist a consultation on the construction of the road that did not respect the principles and procedures established for this mechanism.

Another conflict about indigenous rights is the Takovo Mora territory governed by the Guaraní people, which occurred in Santa Cruz in 2015, was affected by a similar dynamic than the previous case. This town demanded the realization of a process for a prior consultation for the operation of gas wells in its territory and rejected the supreme decrees which authorize the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in indigenous territories and protected areas; in response, the Guaraní indigenous group, was disqualified, accused of hindering development, delaying industrialization and seeking money in exchange for authorizing the exploitation of resources in its territory.

If the growth of the Bolivian economy generated conflicts, its slowdown has also produced social mobilizations in recent years. Starting in 2014, when it became clear that the country's economic boom was slowing, different sectors began to generate protests, such as agricultural producers - quinoa, sugarcane, dairy farmers, camelid, sheep, cattle and porcine, cooperative miners and others, requesting credits and other support for the development of their activities and to cope with the fall in international prices. The public sector, which had already manifested itself in the previous years due to labor issues, was also more intensely mobilized and a series of conflicts emerged, involving officers from health institutions, education, SEDEGES, employment and police in La Paz, Cochabamba, Tarija, Santa Cruz and Beni for the delay in the payment of salaries and other similar problems.

⁶⁴ CIDOB is the indigenous peoples' organization of the lowlands of Bolivia and CONAMAQ of the indigenous highland territory.

A type of conflict that seems to be rising is related to the economic conditions of the country - especially the lack of employment alternatives - and the chaotic growth of cities, and the deterioration of coexistence relations, it is the one that generates the citizen insecurity. There are numerous protests about the lack or insufficiency of police protection, the proliferation of night centers, as well as demand for justice, effective measures against domestic violence, infanticide and femicide which, according to official figures, have been increased.

In Bolivia, the management of urban space is a complex task that constantly generates problems due to the rapid growth of cities, insufficient urban planning, the pressure of its inhabitants for basic services, the struggles between social groups to control public spaces, and the technical, financial, and sometimes political constraints of municipal entities. Although the conflicts associated to this problem are not numerically significant (3.1%) it represents a constant headache for municipal governments.

Although the country's environmental problems are diverse and some are very serious, there is a great lack of knowledge and disinformation of the population in this respect, so that the problems are not perceived and in case they are noticed, they are not considered important. Contamination is probably the only thing that is noticed and that generates a degree of citizen concern, especially in the sectors directly affected. The extractivist logic, which, as already mentioned, has been imposed in the country, leads us to consider that environmental conservation is an issue that is external to our needs, more typical of developed countries and that constitutes a brake on development.

Under these conditions, social mobilization for environmental issues is extremely small, accounting for only 1.6% of total national conflict; Undoubtedly the conflict for TIPNIS was one of the high points in the defense of the environment and a bitter experience for many sectors that believed that citizen mobilization for a fair cause would achieve success.

On the other hand, in the political aspect, Bolivia has experienced countless tensions over the last ten years, having at times reached crisis situations that were about to jeopardize the governability of the country. However, the specific conflicts for this cause are not very abundant (4.4% of the total), although several cases reached a high intensity.

Between 2007 and 2008, when the period of extreme political confrontation was experienced, in which economic claims were mixed with demands for the return of resources of the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons to the states, which were cut by the Executive power- between the government and the leaders of the lowland departments agglutinated in the National Council for Democracy (CONALDE), the conflict was extremely intense and rapidly escalated in radicalism and violence, although their number was not very high (about 6% of the total). The tension between more or less equal sectors of power was resolved in favor of the government through two tragic events: the Rosza case in Santa Cruz and the confrontation between sectors from the government and the prefecture in Pando, making possible the elimination of the opposition in that area of the country, and consequently facilitating the construction of the hegemonic MAS (Movement to Socialism) project.

This way, since 2009 the political situation of the country was smoothed for the government and the second administration of Evo Morales was able to count on a strong popular support, with two thirds of the Multinational Legislative Assembly, with a new Constitution and with the certainty of approving the laws it deems necessary. However, social conflict, far from being reduced, continued to increase as a result of both political and economic factors. Once the lowland opposition was over, tensions and disagreements began to emerge within the social bloc that supported the MAS in connection with the municipal and departmental elections of 2010, the result of which was not as favorable to the ruling party as had been foreseen⁶⁵, and the approval of legal norms which were far from the constitutional spirit and in whose process of formulation was not allowed the social participation that was expected.

During the long management of MAS government, a very intense electoral activity has developed, which has given rise to many tensions and conflicts. Different sectors mobilized for a variety of issues: redefinition of single-member constituencies and diminished legislative representation in some regions, in demand for the revision of the electoral registration system, special seats for indigenous peoples and respect for parity and gender alternation, in rejection of nominations of MAS candidates and the irregular transfer of people from one municipality to another to be registered for voting, due to the lack of transparency of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Departmental Electoral Tribunal, TED, for the detection of irregularities and suspected fraud, among others

The problems of governance of public entities at the local level were continuous, resulting in a series of conflicts in demand, both of recognition and rejection of elected officers (5.1% of total cases).

Although some of these conflicts originated in other issues (poor performance, corruption and others), they also had a political character, so if added to the previous ones the percentage of ideological political cases of the period could rise to approximately 7%.

The multiplicity of issues which creates conflict in the country is related to the diversity of factors involved in these conflicts: economic, social, political and cultural, public and private, collective and individual. The different sectors of the country mobilize and organize public protests, including those that by their nature are limited of this type of manifestations, like the Armed Forces, that in 2010 mobilized demanding a fair salary and retirement for military personnel who are in the passive service, and in 2014 they carried out a conflict in demand of a law of decolonization that assures the equitable access to the higher education, wages and others to combat discrimination in the institution. Also, the Police raised several conflicts for salary improvements and in protest for accusations against them; due to the restrictions that these institutions must demonstrate, in the cases of conflicts, their wives played a fundamental role in preventing heavy sanctions against them. The central government itself generated some cases of conflict, mainly of a political nature. The participation of these public institutions in the conflict, as well as individual persons, shows how complex is the conflict in Bolivian culture and reveals

⁶⁵ Left and right opposition political organizations won seven capital cities, among them La Paz and Oruro, as well as Achacachi, Punata and Coro, all of the strongholds of the MAS, making a total of 37 municipalities

the inexistence or insufficiency and lack of confidence in other ways of mechanisms to express the demands and disagreements.

The sector that, because of its continuous participation in the conflicts of the country has become indisputably protagonist, is the communal neighborhood, that is to say the settlers of urban and rural areas of the country, sometimes represented by organizations, such as neighborhood meetings, and in other occasions temporarily assembled because of the conflict. This sector has generated approximately a quarter (22.3%) of the social conflicts developed in the last eight years. The main issues involved are the provision of basic services (education, health, water, basic sanitation, etc.), the economic situation they face, the questioning or demand for recognition of authorities, and access to and use of the land and natural resources. Although not always mobilized through formal organizations, it has demonstrated a truly remarkable level of organization and effectiveness in protest.

The educational sector, traditionally combative in Bolivia, also stands out as a fundamental player in conflicts (giving rise to 12.9% of cases), although its performance is limited to a certain period, the first months of the year, when the confederations of urban and rural teachers from schools are preparing their pleadings and pressing on the streets to be attended, and parents and students are participating in demonstrations complaining about the problems of units and schools and for the right to education.

Undoubtedly, the transportation sectors are important economic and social actors, because of the type of service they provide; That is why - and because of the aggressiveness and violence they often use in conflicts - their mobilizations are fearsome, although they constitute only 8% of the demanding sectors.

Other civil society organizations and groups, such as groups of people with disabilities, which have been mobilizing for the last nine years, have been involved in a number of cases which, while not very high (7.6%), is significant because they involve issues of human rights and identity, among others.

Likewise, the peasants who are the agricultural producers are important actors of the conflict, mainly for their role in the food supply. Although they are somewhat limited by their distant location from power centers, the conflicts they pose are often addressed to prevent them from not supplying their products to markets and disrupting free transit on the highways.

Given the predominantly informal nature of the Bolivian economy and the number of problems generated by commercial activities -competition among groups, tensions with neighbors, disputes with the Mayors for the regulations they introduce and with the central government for the rules that can affect them, etc.-, the guild is a continuously active sector in the country's social conflict.

It is necessary to point out that in the current analysis of social conflict, workers and miners have been considered separately, since most of the mobilized miners are member

of cooperatives, that is, they are part of a heterogeneous conglomerate in which are mixed the employees who receive a salary but at the same time are owners of the cooperatives, who present demands that are not of specific interest of the workers. This is one of the reasons why the labor sector appears with a very low percentage of participation in social conflict (2.6%), other reasons are probably the small size of the productive apparatus of the country and the alliance of the COB (Bolivian Central Union) with government. If they joined the percentage of workers in the mining sector (3.1%), they would represent 5.8% and would be in the seventh position among the plaintiffs.

Political parties and citizen groups are not important actors in contemporary social conflict in the country; The figures on their participation clearly show the modest role they play (an average of 1.3% between 2008 and 2015), even in critical political situations, such as that experienced in 2008, the percentage of their performance as a plaintiff did not surpass 2.8%, this could be explained by the existence of a sort of single party system, with a strong political organization in charge of the government, and some others relatively small and with little influence.

Several of the demanding sectors that tend to occupy important places in the arena of conflict, teachers, transporters, guilds and peasants, have a couple of important advantages, which could be due to this preeminence: their numerical weight, which means thousands and thousands of people willing to take pressure measures and represent a flow of votes that the defendants cannot disdain, and their organizational level that allows them to act forcefully in the protests.

The weight of the participation that the different social sectors have in the conflicts is correlated with the preponderantly demanding nature of the social protests in the country, as discussed in previous lines. This explains that neighbors, teachers, transporters, unions, peasants and other organized groups, together, represent more than 60% of the plaintiffs.

Percentage of plaintiffs sectors (2008 - 2015)

PLAINTIFFS SECTORS	PERCENTAGE
Vecinal comunal	22,3
Education	12,9
Transportation	7,9
Other organizations and groups of the civilian society	7,6
Peasants farming	6,1
Guild	6
Health	4,8
Civic	4,3
Miners	3,1
Private services and others	1,5
Worker	2,6

PLAINTIFFS SECTORS	PERCENTAGE
Indigenous	2,3
Individuals	1,9
Municipal Governments	1,8
Prison	1,6
Political Parties and Citizens Groups	1,3
Departmental governments	0,9
Retired people	0,9
Media	0,5
Central government	0,4
Police	0,2
Armed Forces	0,1
Others	6,6

Source: Own Elaboration.

These social protests have as main target the State, in its different levels and organizations. Between 2008 and 2015, the State accounted for three quarters (74.1%) of the country's total conflict, which is consistent with the nature of most of the social demands: improving the living conditions of the population and the effective operation of public institutions.

The central government was the most questioned, with 36.4% of cases, followed by municipal (22.5%) and departmental (10.2%). Although the first one maintained the highest percentages during the period, it was in 2008, the worst political confrontation with the opposition of lowlands, that reached the highest figure of demands (49.3%)

In general terms, the degree of interpellation to the different levels of government during the eight years analyzed remains more or less constant. This ratifies the deep rootedness of centralism in the country; beyond the processes of administrative political decentralization, the population still considers that the central government is the main entity in charge of solving the problems and, consequently, they expect it to solve the difficulties. This could explain why the conflicts raised against the municipal entities have not experienced a significant increase as a result of the transfer of some competences that previously were in the hands of the central government, as it is the case of the regulation of the transport tariffs. On the other hand, the fact that demands for departmental governments have not increased either - or has remained below the 14% reached in 2008, when the political polarization was more intense - is another indicator of the stagnation of the autonomic process. Apparently, in the country's political culture, the central government remains the center of reference for social demands.

The police and the judicial unit, governmental entities were severely challenged by the population for their ineffectiveness and the high levels of corruption they present, they are questioned in conflicts, although with a low percentage (3.2%). It should be noted that these protests have been increasing over time, a trend that will continue if a deep and effective reform of these institutions is not developed.

The private sector has not been significantly questioned in the social conflicts of these years, which is obviously due to the fact that the government concentrates most of the social protests, but it could also be due to its small size and its ability to manage timely protests from workers to prevent conflicts that could generate economic losses

**Demanded sectors percentage
(2008 – 2015)**

DEMANDED SECTORS	PORCENTAGE
Central government	36,4
Municipal government	22,5
Departmental government	10,2
Education	4,3
Private Services and others	2,2
Police	2,1
Transportation	1,8
Communal neighborhood	1,5
Judicial authority	1,1
Legislative Assembly	1,1
Individual Persons	0,8
Miners	0,7
Electoral entity	0,6
Guild	0,4
Health	0,4
Indigenous	0,3
Labor worker	0,3
Agrarian peasant	0,2
Political parties and citizen's associations	0,2
Hydrocarbons	0,2
Prisons	0,2
Civic	0,1
Other organizations and groups of the civilian society	0,1
Armed Forces	0,1

Source: Own elaboration.

The distribution of conflicts in the national scenario shows a clear concentration in capital cities, especially in the La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, which have experienced an accelerated urbanization process, generating a growing demand for public services that is not always possible to address due to economic constraints and institutional weaknesses of municipalities.

Over the last few years there has been a high level of conflict in these three departments, although in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz there were moments of a certain decrease in the protests; in Potosí and Oruro there was a medium high conflict; in Tarija moderate conflict; in Chuquisaca low average; in the lower lands of Beni and in Pando it was almost non-existent

The high rate of conflict in the three main cities of the country, now converted into metropolitan areas, which are the ones that present better indicators of satisfaction of basic needs, shows the lack of direct relation between social unrest and poverty.

Departmental distribution of conflict (2008 – 2015)

DEPARTAMENTOS	CONFLICTIVITY
La Paz	Alta
Cochabamba	Alta
Santa Cruz	Alta
Oruro	Media +
Potosí	Media +
Tarija	Media
Chuquisaca	Media -
Beni	Baja +
Pando	Baja

Source: Self made

Although the number of conflicts is not a fact that reveals much about the conflict and the society in which it occurs, there is no doubt it is significant for generally, a high conflict expresses the existence of social unrest and it is an indicator of failure or absence of institutional processes for channeling through other ways the demands of the population.

Starting in 2006⁶⁶, the social conflicts that had been very numerous in the previous years due to the crisis of State that lived the country, began to experience a tendency to reduce its level. This is explained by the expectations of the national citizenship about the new government and to the establishment of the Constituent Assembly which, it was hoped, could make possible to make a social agreement and offered a new horizon for the country. The clear electoral victory of the MAS (Movement to Socialism) in 2005 allowed us to hope that we would leave behind the political confrontation and the highly favorable international economic context - the rise in the price of export products and the cancellation of external debt - made us think that we were going to have political stability

⁶⁶ Although the present article deals with the period 2008-2015, the figures of social conflict in the previous two years (2006 and 2007) are also presented in order to present a complete picture of the sociopolitical changes that have taken place in the country since 2006.

and social peace. The social policies adopted by the government in its first stage, largely redistributive in favor of the most deprived sectors, helped to consolidate these hopes. And since the conservative opposition sectors, weakened by the crisis of the party system, were not able to offer more resistance during the first year of the new government, the factors that could generate conflicts were neutralized.

**Amount of social conflicts according per year
(2006 – 2015)⁶⁷**

YEARS	AMOUNT OF CONFLICTS
2006	369
2007	307
2008	205
2009	288
2010	838
2011	1.300
2012	1.270
2013	1.454
2014	1.642
2015	1.189

Source: Own elaboration

As you can see, the number of conflicts declined between 2006 and 2008, when it reached its lowest point, despite the fact that the political confrontation between the government and the conservative opposition entrenched in the prefectures and civic committees of the lowland departments became very intense in 2007 and especially in 2008, causing tragic results.

Paradoxically, from 2009, in a situation of effective control of power and of the whole national territory by the government, and once promulgated the new Political Constitution of the State, social conflict began to increase slowly, a little bit during that year and openly since 2010. The causes of this phenomenon can be summarized showing that the different social sectors that supported the government perceived that in a political scenario controlled by the government and in a favorable economic context, it was possible to demand effective improvement of their living conditions. As noted, the start of the process of cost-of-living increase was a factor that was gaining more and more weight and generating discomfort; and, over the months, there was a gap between some social organizations and the government, whereby the number of conflicts continued to climb from year to year to remain at high averages (between 100 and almost 140 conflicts per month).

⁶⁷ In 2008, the UNIR Foundation increased the number of media consulted for conflict monitoring from two to six, which resulted in the recording of a greater number of conflicts; As of 2010, the sources consulted were increased to eleven, which is estimated to allow information on the total number of cases (an increase of 9%); In 2015 had to reduce the consultation of sources, reason why the number of conflicts registered is probably 10% less than the cases actually produced.

Although social conflicts have increased steadily in recent years, they have become more complex and radicalized, it can be said that, for the most part, Bolivian conflict is moderate.

Between 2008 and 2015 more than 70% of the cases remained within moderate radical levels, either because it was in latency or emergence (40.8%) or manifestation (35.5%) through the announcement of measures of pressure or the adoption of measures of low intensity, like the marches.

Between 2008 and 2015 more than 70% of the cases remained within moderate radical levels, either because it was in latency or emergence phase (40.8%) or demonstrating (35.5%) through the announcement of measures of pressure or the adoption of measures of low intensity, like the marches.

In spite of the general moderation of the pressure measures carried out in the conflicts, in some cases extreme measures were put in place that endanger the physical integrity of the plaintiffs themselves, such as the extraction of blood, crucifixion, hanging in wheelchairs, the burial, locking themselves by building a wall around them, etc. There were also situations in which governmental security intervened with excessive use of force and regrettable results; This repressive overflow became evident in the cases of Rosza in Santa Cruz, Caranavi in La Paz, TIPNIS in Beni, coca producers in Yungas, and the disabled persons, among others.

Only 8.4% of conflicts reached the level of violent confrontation; although between 2008 and 2009 there were high-intensity conflicts which led to violence increase; in those years, the cases that escalated to the level of violent confrontation were more numerous (11,0% and 14,6% respectively).

The conflicts over the last eight years left more than 1,500 people injured and more than 40 dead, which should be a matter of concern.

Percentage of conflicts according to scaling level (2008 - 2015)⁶⁸

SCALING LEVELS ⁶⁸	YEARS								PERCENTAGE
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Latent	40,0	31,7	54,6	38,9	42,4	40,0	43,5	35,7	40,8
Manifest	40,0	28,8	27,5	34,1	36,0	37,0	36,8	44,2	35,5
Confrontation	9,0	24,8	8,5	22,7	19,5	13,0	11,2	11,9	15,0
Violent confrontation	11,0	14,6	9,4	4,1	1,7	10,0	8,4	8,0	8,4

Source: Own elaboration

⁶⁸ Latent Conflict, that is in the process of emerging;

Manifest one, that has already reached public visibility, but without direct confrontations.

Confrontation, present occasional outbreaks of low intensity violence.

Violent clash, escalation to a constant of low, medium or high intensity violence.

Crisis (5) affectation to society, to the degree of strongly damaging social peace

Despite the existence of some critical situations of conflict in the last ten years, such as the extreme political polarization of 2007 and 2008 and the “increase of fuel price” in December 2010, the conflicts did not affect in a severe way the governance of the country. Surely the solid control by the government and economic stability played an important role in this regard.

Conflict management involves complex, sometimes long-lasting, processes in which dialogue and negotiation are the foundation. However, the dynamics in which the conflicts develop and the different types of difficulties that arise are not always addressed in this way.

In Bolivia, the treatment of conflicts does not usually follow a management route with a constructive orientation. Since conflict is understood as an exercise of opposing pressures in which the strongest and most skilled manages to impose himself, his attention is often reduced to a calculation of costs and benefits apart from the key issues that should be considered.

Thus, there is a tendency to disregard conflicts until they have generated some kind of significant involvement, so that the plaintiffs choose to adopt radical earlier measures of pressure, in order to become visible and force the defendants to pay attention to them, but if they don't receive an answer the cases are prolonged in time and become more complex. When they are finally taken care of, the structural factors that are behind the conflicts are not analyzed with the necessary depth or, if they are, the existing alternatives are not exhausted to find a solution, as if the only thing that mattered were the circumstantial factors that triggered the conflict, for which the originator causes remain in force.

Usually there is neither a rigorous analysis of the interests and needs of the parties, their degree of power, the need to balance it and the ways to do so, or the convenience of appealing to a mediating party, but apart from these fundamental considerations, a simplistic treatment of relationships is chosen, in which the opponent is often denigrated, trying to be nullified, or through different means seeks to persuade the leaders of those movements in order to achieve compromises, breaking the unity of the demanding actors, generating distrust in the responsible ones, for the attention of conflicts and leaving sequels that are forming a substrate of dissatisfaction and resentment.

On occasions when the government has the role of arbitrator, by not focusing seriously on the issue - and on the demand - of the conflict and seeing only or, mainly, the benefit or prejudice that the case may bring, it becomes very difficult to decide based on the merits, without being able to decide among the actors involved, the conflict is being postponed until the escalation of the case forces it to consider it. Finally, it is for the benefit of the group who demonstrates a greater capacity for pressure (measures of more radical forces, with economic damage to the country or strong alteration of public peace) and / or that could cause political damage if it is not supported. The use of public force is sometimes a procedure to crush the conflict, thus reinforcing violence and nullifying the possibility of engaging in dialogue. And because the priority is to find a quick way to solve the problem in order to avoid the political and economic costs of the conflict, the

agreements are often signed without analyzing the fairness and viability of the demands, without being sure that they can be met, and sometimes even knowing that it will not be fulfilled. It is clear that this type of conflict attention is far from open dialogue and therefore do not find alternatives that transform the conflict situation into honest, viable and lasting agreements.

If the causes of conflicts continue to affect, if relations between the parties and sometimes with the mediating organizations, deteriorate or damage and if the agreements are not fulfilled, the conflict will be constantly reactivated and perpetuated. Regrettably, the existence of social conflicts is exploited to achieve certain small objectives, and at times, even their continuity is encouraged.

Three examples of recent conflicts, in addition to the above-mentioned TIPNIS, allow us to better illustrate this type of dynamics:

- a. Conflict between the agrarian centrals of the municipalities of Escoma, Puerto Acosta, Mocomoco and Humanata and the gold mining cooperatives of Suches in La Paz. The problem arose in the year 2000 due to the mining contamination that affected numerous peasant communities located in the middle and lower part of the Suches river basin. In 2009 the agrarian centrals decided to mobilize to demand to stop mining operations, blocked the road to Peru and the North of La Paz, arrived at the site of the mining operations and retained some heavy machinery of the cooperatives.

The plaintiffs submitted to the authorities a request that included the reversal of mining concessions, the establishment of a military presence in the area to establish sovereignty over Peru, to do a technical study on water quality and solid waste, compensation of damages by the pollution of the river, the construction of a public university and the development of highway projects. The prefecture, which led the negotiations, accepted the demands, signed an agreement and lifted pressure measures. Six years later, none of the agreed points had been met; Between 2010 and 2011 there were clashes between peasants and cooperatives without any progress being made; currently the unrest continues in the region and the conflict remains latent.

- b. Conflict between the indigenous communities of Mallku Khota, North of Potosí, and the government for the reversal of the mining concession that South American Silver company had since 2007 within its territory. Already in 2010 there was discomfort in the communities because the mining activity, in the exploration phase, it was causing pollution; in 2012 after the announcement that an open-cast mining would be made, the indigenous people denounced that the concession was illegal because the previous consultation had not been completed and demanded their reversion. The authorities affirmed that it did not proceed for exploration activities and for concessions prior to the promulgation of the Constitution and defended the permanence of the company. The conflict divided the community, some supported the continuity of the company and others challenged it; violent pressure was applied, company equipment was destroyed, there was a violent incursion of police into the community, clashes took place and hostages were taken. Under that situation, a negotiating team was organized, which was hampered by new confrontations with a balance of nine injured and the

arrest of an indigenous leader. Outraged the plaintiffs marched to La Paz demanding a meeting with President Morales, the climate of tension continued, there were new clashes with the police and the government accused the indigenous people to cover other interest pretending to care about the environment. Because of the government's refusal to dialogue, the community members returned to Mallku Khota and proceeded to take the site, two camps and five company officers; a new round table for dialogue was installed while the government sent police forces, there were other clashes with several injured and one dead. In the midst of the crisis and in order to stop it, the government decided to reverse the concession in favor of COMIBOL (Bolivian Mining Corporation).

- c. Conflict between people with disabilities and the central government for payment of a monthly bonus. Since 2008, disabled people have demonstrated in different parts of the country; between 2011 and 2012 the conflict was reactivated and new measures of pressure were exerted, some very radical ones like the extraction of blood, locking themselves building a wall around them, and crucifixion. In 2016 the disabled people demanded the approval of a law to establish a monthly bonus of Bs. 500 replacing the annual amount of Bs. 1.000⁶⁹; the government stated that this payment was not possible and instead that it would be considered integral issues for the benefit of the sector. During a dramatic and moving months, the disabled were organized and mobilized in the capital cities, called a national march towards the city of La Paz and requested a meeting with the president; at that city, they performed vigils, marches and other pressure measures, some spectacular, such as the hanging of a person in a wheelchair of a footbridge. The government closed the access to the Murillo Square, fencing it even with bars, and the police used tear gases against them; and after the accusations were made, the government accused them of having done it themselves, that means the disabled people used tear gas against themselves, and were also accused of assaulting policemen, of aggravated robbery, and even a paraplegic young man was accused of sexual assault on a disabled woman, and imprisoned some of the protestors. The situation of the disabled and the government's reaction was able to move several social organizations and citizen sectors that supported them (Confederation of Urban Teachers of Bolivia, Federation of Rural Women "Bartolina Sisa" of La Paz, guilds, Civic Committee and Association of Parents of Persons with Disabilities in El Alto, students of the Sociology and Social Work programs of the San Andres University, UMSA, among others) and provided food and others. The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities called for investigating police violence and making payment of the demanded bond. In the face of government inflexibility, the demand was not solved; while awaiting the resumption of a negotiating table, La Paz federation signed on its own an agreement with the Ministry of Labor that defined the creation of work allowances in private companies, technical training and a minimum wage of six months for work in public and private companies. This action generated the division of the disabled of La Paz, Mr. Flores the leader who signed the agreement was declared a traitor, the movement was mortally wounded; After years of mobilization, more than a month of marching and more than two months of vigil in La Paz, the disabled had to return to their places of origin without results and feeling humiliated.

⁶⁹ The population with permanent disability, according to the INE Household Survey of 2014 is 151,882 people, is one of the most deprived of the country, has no employment or income - six out of ten people have no job or are in Conditions of development - with health services or specialized education - 30% could not enter the education system - and suffers from discrimination. The annual bonus of Bs. 1,000 that you have is not enough to meet your minimum needs (CEDLA).

Although this pernicious logic of conflict and way of facing them seems to be the predominant one, there are cases - in a smaller situation when conflicts do not affect economic and political aspects of national significance, it has been possible to reach satisfactory results with the support of specialized entities. Bolivia already has institutions and individuals specialized in the field of social conflict and with some valuable experiences, which should serve as a foundation for defining a policy of conflict management at the public and private levels, to look for a way to solve the conflict, and to search for alternative solutions, so everybody can feel they are being represented.

The existence of social conflicts is not a problem and should not be sought for its eradication, for it is not feasible. What is worrying is that the persistence of socioeconomic, political and cultural gaps, lack of attention and resolution of problems and constructive management of conflicts, which maintains a high level of social conflict and violence, with the risk of becoming chronic and to intensify even more its manifestations.

This way, progressively, society becomes used to the accumulation of problems, to the proposal of irreducible demands - whether fair or not, sensible or crazy - to hard and inflexible reactions, to the emergence of spirals of violence from which all parties leave damaged. This naturalization of social unrest and violent conflict is extremely dangerous and hinders any possibility of building a culture of peace; the only way to counteract it, is through the exercise of critical reflection.

Only a permanent and rigorous critical reflection on the role and responsibility of each one, as social actors, will allow to channel the divergences through the dialogue and to construct common projects within the framework of the recognition of the differences; that way, perhaps, we will be able to reverse that unsatisfactory situation and to avoid the degradation takes possession of all the spaces in the national life.

Peace and Conflict — in Bolivia

Chapter 7

CHAPTER 7

PEACE AND PEACE INITIATIVES IN BOLIVIA

*Bolivia is a pacifist State, promoting a culture of peace and the right to peace
(Article 10, New Constitution policy of the State)*

7.1. Introduction: aim of the chapter and outline

This chapter is about peace and peace initiatives in Bolivia. It is divided into four parts. The first part offers an introduction to the Bolivian context, so that the reader has some background to the discussion that follows. The second part formulates an answer to 'how peace is understood in Bolivia'. This part also covers conflict, violence, a culture of peace, and peace education. The third part covers peace trends in Bolivia. It examines the country's relative level of peacefulness by drawing from key findings from 10 years of peace research. The fourth part highlights some promising peace initiatives in Bolivia. This part also identifies areas needing further work, which, in turn, help to provide the backdrop for the analysis that follows in the next chapter about a global youth peace education programme, called NewGen Peacebuilders (NGP, hereafter).

7.2. The Bolivian context

The case of Bolivia is a good fit for the discussion about peace, in general, and especially in youth peace education. Bolivia remains one of the most unequal and poor countries of the Latin American continent (World Bank, 2009). From colonial times to the present day, it has suffered from a long history of conflict. In recent years, it has registered the highest level of social conflict and domestic violence within the Latin America family (UNIR, 2013).

Encouragingly for Bolivia, however, addressing conflict and violence, and the pursuit of peace across the country, appear to be at the forefront of the new government agenda. Naturally, this new push towards peace is reflected in the recent government reforms. The new Constitutional Policy of the State, for example, states that "Bolivia is a pacifist state, promoting a culture of peace and the right to peace" (CPE, Art, 10). By inference, there are several aspects related to peace that Bolivia is endorsing. For example, the Bolivian State appears to be supporting the language of human rights, in general, and recognizes the importance of gender justice and gender equality, in particular⁷⁰.

Although some progress has been made in recent years with regards to the discourse for peace, there exists a gap between rhetoric and reality. Accumulating research evidence shows that there is a notable absence of a culture of peace in Bolivia, despite it being a pressing need (UNIR, 2010: 5, 132). One of the ways in which Bolivia has been attempting to respond to this challenge is through education, which is increasingly being situated as one of the main ways to peace and development in the country.

⁷⁰ A number of constitutional articles for instance refer to gender equity, including 8, 11, 14, 15, 26, 48, 58, 78 and 79 (relating directly to education), 104, 147, 172.22 (gender equity in parliament), 210, 270, 278 and 402. Similarly, the ASEP education reform includes Articles 3.13, 4.2, 4.6, 5.7 and 10.5, which all directly refer to the importance of gender equity.

Article 77, of the Pluri-national Constitution, for example, states “education is the highest function of the state”. Meanwhile, President Evo Morales maintains that education, in general, and teachers, in particular, are the “solution of liberation and decolonization” within the region (Ministry of Education of Bolivia 2010d).

In line with this, the new ‘decolonizing’ education reform - which forms part of the broader political changes towards ‘vivir bien’ (live well) and is called Avelino Sinani Elizardo Perez (ASEP) - aims to help push Bolivia more towards development. In brief, education is considered an important tool for dealing with conflict across Bolivia and an essential component for achieving Morales’ ‘politics of change’ (Lopes Cardozo, 2011).

However, in practice, education is often contested (see in particular the work of Lopes Cardozo 2011; but also, Regalsky & Laurie, 2007 and Rocabado, 2009). Teacher-led education, with an emphasis on rote learning and memorization techniques, is still very much the norm in the education system (Dranger, 2007; Speiser, 2000: 236; Regalsky and Laurie, 2007: 236). Students apparently lack the type of a problem-posing approach deemed necessary for helping to nurture the critical and active citizens that the governments’ new discursive education for transformation agenda purports to address. Hence, why schools are neither completely resistant nor fully cooperative to adopt policy reforms from the Bolivian state (Talavera Simoni, 2011: 19).

Nonetheless, much has been said recently about peace and education in Bolivia, and the importance of both are recognized in various governmental and policy documentation. Article 3.12, for example, illuminates the relationship between peace, education, and culture of peace, stressing the need to “promote peaceful coexistence and the eradication of all forms of violence in education, for the development of a society based on a culture of peace, with respect for individual and collective rights for all”.

In this context, it is necessary to ask why peace education and related programmes are not widely mainstreamed in schools and universities. While the discourse hints towards the overlapping and inter-connectedness between education and peace, one thing this push does not appear to have done is to filter down to inform widespread policy and practice on-the-ground. By and large, there is a lack of, and need for, peace education in the country. For this reason, young people in Bolivia lack opportunities to learn about the causes of violence and strategies for peace. The dearth of peace education programmes in Bolivia might be explained by the fact that the country lack trained peace educators, resources, and tools that can be used in their context to teach about peace (Gittins, 2012; Forthcoming).

This may partly explain why local organizations and people are calling on the need for training in peace education, and the incorporation of principles underpinning a culture of peace into the curriculum, a priority (UNIR, 2010, 2013, 2014). Clearly, there are still more things to do. This is the background for the discussion that follows in the rest of the chapter about understandings of peace, peace trends, and peace initiatives in Bolivia. It also provides an interesting backdrop for a case study presented in the next chapter about youth peace education in Bolivia.

7.3. Understandings of peace in Bolivia

This section covers ‘how peace is understood in Bolivia’. It is common to frame a discussion about peace by covering understandings of violence and conflict. This section, therefore, draws on recent research which provides useful insights into how Bolivians represent, feel, and live violence, peace, a culture of peace, and peace education⁷¹. It also covers conflict, and its direct and indirect spill-over costs.

Violence represents the principal cause of death in women, exceeding cancer and motor vehicle accidents. A woman is sexually assaulted every 15 seconds. In Bolivia, a woman is killed every three days, and is a victim of some sort of violence every 7 (UNIR, 2010: 73). This, as much as anything, explains why Bolivia is situated as having among the highest levels of violence against women in Latin America.

Regarding violence against children and youth, 23% of children suffer some sort of sexual aggression worldwide. In Bolivia, the number is higher, some 40%. 1 in every 3 children suffers from some form of sexual aggression, 75% of these occur in the home (UNIR, 2010: 74). As well as violence in the home, studies elsewhere show that violence appears to be inculcated in the Bolivian education system:

- 7 out of 10 boys and girls are victims of physical and psychological in their homes or schools
- 50% of students in schools have been victims, perpetrators, or spectators of violence
- 59% of students of frequently verbally assaulted, between 5 and 10 times each year
- 1 out of 10 students is a victim of threats or coercion at least 2 times per week, in both rural and urban areas
- 3 out of 10 students are victims of exclusion and marginalization
- 4 out of 10 students are victims of beatings at least 2 times a week
- 3 out of 10 students state that sometimes their teacher shouted at the or beat them
- 30% of all students are hit by their parents, and 1 in 10 by their brothers or sisters
- 6 out of 10 teachers say that the parents authorize punishment to teach their sons or daughters a lesson⁷²

As discussed in Chapter 2, violence in education is not unique to Bolivia: in fact, a synthetic review of empirical evidence shows that violence in “formal, mass education – schooling” - is “common, systematic and widespread internationally” (Harber, 2004: 1).

⁷¹ Research by UNIR (2013) was comprehensive in scope, providing useful insights into how Bolivians represent, feel, and live violence, peace, and a culture of peace. This research worked with 1709 people (conducting 216 interviews and 543 focus groups) across 36 municipalities or communities in 9 departments: high lands (La Paz, Oruro, Potosí); medium lands (Cochabamba, Tarija y Chuquisaca); and low lands (Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando)

⁷² Report Defensoría 2009 and National Bulletin of the Ombudsman's Office, No 7, May 2011, La Paz Bolivia, cited in Educational Proposal (2014: 25)

In effect, then, violence appears to be pervasive in Bolivia, permeating cultural identities, economics, and politics. This partly explains why it is typically thought of as natural; a social construct that is learnt from generation to generation and inherent in Bolivian society (UNIR, 2013: 71). The same study by UNIR (2013: 321-322) also found that the main factors driving violence in Bolivia are poverty, political and cultural power, discrimination, gender violence, and violence within the family, insecurity, and taking justice into their own hands.

Besides violence, on-going cycles of conflict have long been a concern to Bolivia⁷³. In a summarizing analysis, Lopes Cordozo (2011: 73-76) distils five main reasons for conflict in the country: “1) high levels of poverty and inequality of opportunities; 2) discrimination and exclusion; 3) a regional struggle linked to the use of separatist discourses and identity politics; 4) a severe mistrust in the functioning of state (institutions) and between groups in society; and 5) reoccurring clashes between the state and social movements, that sometimes turn popular pressure methods into violent encounters”.

Studies elsewhere identify a variety of other common factors driving conflict in Bolivia. These include the gap between rich and poor, ethnic and cultural tensions (LATINbarometro, 2007: 67, 70)⁷⁴, racism (Loyaza Bueno, 2010, 2014), social reproduction, institutional, and cultural tensions (UNDP, UNIR, 2013), the exclusion of people (UNIR, 2012), and disputes over resources (e.g. water and gas) (Dangl 2007: 8).

The direct and indirect spill-over costs of such conflicts have a considerable impact on the economy, not only for the sectors that are struggling, but for the country as a whole. Using data on different incidents of conflict in Bolivia (demonstrations, strikes, road blockades, protests), between 1970 and 2005, Evia et al's (2008) research shows that the cost alone of the participants in such incidents was on the order of 1 percent of the GDP. They estimate the average cost of conflict in Bolivia over this 35 year period at just under US \$60 million per year. They also show how the economic cost of conflict spiked in the 1980s and the 2002-05 period. More recently, the IEP considers the direct and indirect costs of violence in Bolivia at 4 percent of the GDP. In numbers, an estimated \$2,290 (\$ millions PPP) went to the total cost of violence, whereas \$225 (\$ millions PPP) went specifically to violence containment (cost per capita).

In line with Lederach (2003: 4), who thinks of conflict as a possible “motor of change”, it is important to note that the task is to not necessarily end conflict, but to handle it more constructively (Brunk, 2012: 20). The problem in Bolivia, however, is that the State lacks the necessary capacities to deal with conflicts in an effective manner (UNDP, UNIR, 2013: 6). Since the modes of communication are, too often, bad, conflict tends to transcend into violence rather than something positive. There is, therefore, an urgent need to educate the population to recognize how to dialogue and negotiate in order to deal with conflicts more constructively and peacefully (UNIR, 2010: 132).

Before looking at the question of this type of education, however, it is helpful to consider peace. Findings from the study by UNIR (2013) show that, across the 9 departments,

⁷³ Research shows that the history of Bolivia reflects cycles of conflict, ranging from intense to calm (UNIR, 2013)

⁷⁴ The Latinobarometro (2007) shows that 80% of people in Bolivia express that conflict is due to the chasm between rich and poor, while 71% equate it to ethnic and cultural tensions between groups

there was a common understanding that peace is an essential part of coexistence. Bolivians, by and large, tend to think of peace as being collectively in harmony. More specifically, the indigenous community tend to think of peace as being happy in the environment, a place where they are not bothered by others.

Although there are no major differences in understandings of peace, there were slightly different perspectives regarding the chances of peace. Those in the highlands (*tierras altas*, i.e. La Paz, Oruro, Potosí), for example, tended to think that peace is not possible, whereas those in the middle (*tierras medias*, i.e. Cochabamba, Tarija, Chuquisaca) and low lands (*tierras bajas*, i.e. Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando) tended to think that peace is more possible. Findings also draw attention to the pressing need to speak about peace in its own right, and not necessarily through violence and conflict.

This same research also covered understandings of a culture of a peace and peace education. Regarding the former, findings suggest that Bolivians tend to think of a culture of peace as a utopian dream and not part of their reality (UNIR, 2013: 317). For these reasons, it is widely agreed that further work is needed to move Bolivia from a culture of violence to a culture of peace. Part of this work includes the urgent need for peace education, which can help Bolivians develop their capacities to live together, respect diversity, transform conflicts, and move towards a culture of living together with justice (UNIR, 2010: 24).

In short, peace education is considered an indispensable instrument to help construct a culture of peace and for humanity to progress (UNIR, 2013: 11). At the same time, there exists a gap between the rhetoric of peace education and the reality, as section 4.5 will show.

Recent research (Luna, 2016) conducted by a NGP alumni and co-facilitator of the programme in Bolivia comes to a similar conclusion about the important need for peace education⁷⁵. This study attempted to examine the relationship between knowledge about peace education and conflict (*conflictividad*). The analysis was based on qualitative research conducted between January and December 2015. The data collection process included six focus groups with young people between the age of 18 and 28 from La Paz. To test the analysis, the sample was controlled: one group had previous experience of peace education and the other did not⁷⁶.

Although both control groups expressed some level of knowledge about how to deal with conflicts in theory, considerable differences were found when presented with scenarios about how to deal with conflict in practice. For instance, those that had experience with peace education demonstrated a level of competency in active listening, looked for ways in which all positions and interests were taken into account, and eventually reached appropriate ways of dealing with the conflict constructively through

⁷⁵ Luna, B (2016) Education for peace in the city of La Paz. Unpublished bachelor's thesis, Catholic University of São Paulo, Faculty of Science and Politics

⁷⁶ In an attempt to bring about a more diverse and varied representation of youth of this age, participants varied in background. Some were full-time students (Bolivian Catholic University, UPB, UMSA), and some were full-time employees (working at banks, ONG's, etc.). Those that had gone through some kind of peace education experience previously were drawn from the latest cohort of NewGen Peacebuilders in La Paz (September 2015 to December 2015)

negotiation. Conversely, those that had no experience with peace education tended to act aggressively and did not actively listen to others in the groups. They demonstrated disinterested behaviours and attitudes - including playing with their cell phones and other objects - and did not deal with the conflict constructively.

Differences with regards to understandings of violence were also found between the two groups. Those who had gone through peace education training previously had more complex understandings of violence. They were able to identify, for example, a number of different ways in which violence has been theorized, and importantly use this knowledge to help them better understand the problems in context. In contrast, those who had not gone through peace education had less of an understanding about different kinds of violence. Many thought that poverty was an inherent part of their everyday reality, for instance, and something that people just had to learn to live with. This group also demonstrated a disinterest and lack of understandings with regards to this (and other) types of violence.

The findings of this research are telling in a number of ways. They suggest that exposure to peace education training does help young people deal with conflict more constructively. Consequentially, they add credence to claims made in the literature that peace education not only helps people deal more constructively with conflict, but also that the lack of exposure to peace education is a determining factor which informs the ways people think about violence and, in turn, develop appropriate strategies to work for peace. Two final caveats must be pointed out, however. First, all participants thought that their potential role in contributing to peace in Bolivia is undervalued. Second, many thought violence is an inherent part of their life which, in the current situation, they can do very little to change.

Support for findings from the studies described above comes from a study conducted by the author in 2010. His research examined one major question: 'how young people learn about peace and conflict in England and Bolivia⁷⁷. By doing so, the study contains rare examples of how young people between the ages of 18 and 30 in La Paz think about peace and conflict, and how they learn about such concepts. The results show that young people of this age learn considerably more about violence than they do about peace.

The sources of such learning come from both informal and formal learning environments. School, home, media, and walking through the streets were the most commonly cited sources of informal learning about violence. More specifically, the findings show that young people learn a considerable amount about violence in school; either through bullying or through the ways in which the teachers treat students in the class. The findings also draw attention to how young people in Bolivia are not learning about peace and ways to deal with conflicts constructively in schools and universities. Given this gap, and informed by Bolivia's history of conflict, there was wide-spread agreement that peace education is a pressing need in contemporary Bolivia.

⁷⁷ Gittins, P. (2012) A study of young people in Bolivia and the United Kingdom, investigating how they learn about peace and conflict. Unpublished master's thesis, Glyndŵr University, Wales, School of Education and Community

Altogether, there are commonalities between the studies described above. They all identify that the ebb and flow of violence in Bolivia is problematic and needs addressing. They also identify that there is a lack of educational opportunities for Bolivians to learn about the threats of peace, dynamics of conflict, and strategies for peace. Against this backdrop, Section 4.5 discusses some promising peace initiatives which are attempting to respond to this need. Before we do this, however, the attention turns to key trends in peace in Bolivia.


7.4. Trends in peace in Bolivia

The first section deals with the question: What were the key trends in negative peace in Bolivia since 2008? It presents the overall levels of negative peace over a nine-year period, along with the three indicators that increased and decreased the most during this time. It then turns to a more specific analysis for the years 2008, 2012, and 2016. In each of these years, an overall ranking and score is presented, together with some of the indicators that appear to have driven the overall scores for each year analyzed. All this is done by drawing on the findings from the GPI (refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.3).

7.4.1. Trends in negative peace from 2008 to 2016

In comparing the first GPI year – 2008, and the last, 2016 – findings suggest that overall Bolivia got slightly better over the nine years of data. In general, levels of peace appear to have increased by 0.017%.

Chart 1: Negative peace in Bolivia since 2008



The indicators that improved the most over this same period were: contributions to UN peacekeeping funding, political instability, and terrorist activity.

Chart 2: Indicator changes





Chart 3: Indicator changes



These findings raise a number of questions. For example, what drove the improvement in political instability? Also, the fact that Bolivia started paying its UN peacekeeping dues more recently might be boring for the reader. But maybe that has something to do with a new policy or international agreement that resulted in Bolivia funding for police and prisons (I don't know??) Also, what was the terrorism Bolivia was experiencing around 2010, and what alleviated it? In discussing these questions, it is important pay attention to the methodology, because the impact score is the impact over 5 years, not just one event.

Conversely, what is driving the rise in homicide rates? Again, it is important to note that data is lagged, because it takes a couple years for UNODC to put it out. It may, however, be possible to get more up-to-date data from the government? Also, regarding police and incarceration? Does the rise follow in response to the rising homicides, or did the increases in police come first? Note, it takes time to actually get new officers up and running – was there some policy change a few years ago? Also, who is being affected by the rise in homicides - men, women, people from one ethnic group or another? Are there criminal groups present that are fighting with one another? From a legal perspective, homicide and terrorism are distinct, but from a conceptual/peace studies perspective they might overlap. Are these trends related to one another?


While the above raises more questions than it does answers, it also provides a point of references for the discussion of social conflict in Bolivia, in Chapter 8, as well as highlighted the need for more work to be done in this area.

7.4.2. Key trends in negative peace in 2008

This section deals with the question: What were the key trends in negative peace in Bolivia in 2008? The findings show that Bolivia ranked 87, sandwiched between Kosovo, Dominican Republic, and Libya above and Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana, below, respectively.


The three best indicators for this year were: deaths from internal conflicts, internal conflicts fought, and weapons exports.

Chart 4: The three best indicators



The three worst indicators were: access to small arms, violent demonstrations, and contributions to UN peacekeeping funding.

Chart 5: The three worst indicators




7.4.3. Key trends in negative peace in 2012

This section deals with the question: What were the key trends in peace in Bolivia in 2012? The findings show that Bolivia ranked 97, sandwiched between Ukraine, Ecuador, Republic of the Congo and Niger, Mali, and Angola.


The three best indicators for this year were: deaths from internal conflicts, internal conflicts fought, and weapons exports.

Chart 6: The three best indicators



The three worst indicators were: the number of homicide rates, access to small arms, and the number of violent demonstrations..

Chart 7: The three worst indicators



7.4.4. Key trends in negative peace 2016

This section deals with the question: What were the key trends in peace in Bolivia in 2016? The findings show that Bolivia ranked 81, sandwiched between Ukraine, Ecuador, Republic of the Congo and Niger, Mali, and Angola.

The three best indicators for this year were: deaths from internal conflicts, internal conflicts fought, and weapons exports.

Chart 8: The three best indicators





Chart 9: The three worst indicators

In brief, the findings emphasize a number of key themes. At first hand, data suggests that overall progress with regards to negative peace has being made since 2008. Still, evidence also shows that there continues to worryingly trends in relation to high homicide rates, large number of violent demonstrations, and the access to small armed. On all these points, then, there is plenty of room for improvement.

Regarding violent demonstrations, it should be noted that considerable improvements have been made with regards to this indicator on a global scale, over the nine-year period. Yet Bolivia shows a worrying trend with regards to violent demonstrations over the same period. Before turning to a review of selected peace-related initiatives in Bolivia, which are attempting to respond to the problems of conflict and violence across the country, the below covers positive peace trends in Bolivia.

7.4.5. Key trends in positive peace from 2005 to 2015

Having covered key trends in negative peace, the analysis turns to key trends in positive peace in Bolivia since 2005. It does this by drawing from the findings from the PPI (refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.4). The first part of this section deals with the question: What were the key trends in positive peace in Bolivia from 2005 to 2015? It then presents an analysis of the overall rankings and scores over this period, followed by some of the main indicators that increased and decreased the most during this time.

The results, by and large, suggest that Bolivia has got better in relation to levels of positive peace, from 2005 to 2015 (first and last year measured). To illustrate, it moved up 7 places in the ranking (figure 10) and recorded a 0.043% increase in levels of positive peace (figure 11). At the same time, turning to the global average, between the same periods, the average positive peace score went from 2.98 to 2.93, recording a 0.05 increase (Chapter 4, Section 4.4).

Thus, despite making progress, improvements in Bolivia were slightly less than the global average. So, the rank falling when the score got better, meant that other countries improved more so than Bolivia this year. As in, the scores of other countries improved above and beyond Bolivia's improvement such that they now score better, and thus

outrank Bolivia. Note, like the GPI, the PPI uses inverted scores; a smaller score represents an improvement.

Chart 10: Change in overall rankings




Figure 11: Changes in overall scores




Table 1 shows that the stand-out improvement over the period of 2005 to 2015 is the acceptance of the rights of others, which improved by 0.206. The other indicators with the most improvement are well-functioning government and equitable distribution of resources, which improved 0.191% and by 0.169%, respectively. The indicators which decreased the most over this period are sound business environment, high levels of human capital, and free flow of information.

Table 1: Comparative summary, comparing changes in indicators, 2005 a 2015⁷⁸

INDICADOR	2015	2005	CAMBIO
PPI Puntuación Total	3.325	3.368	-0.043
Gobierno con buen funcionamiento	3.676	3.867	-0.191
Entorno empresarial sólido	4.042	3.901	0.141
Niveles Bajos de Corrupción	3.750	3.861	-0.111
Altos niveles de capital humano	3.318	3.223	0.095
Flujo libre de información	2.758	2.610	0.148
Aceptación de los derechos de los demás	2.902	3.108	-0.206
Buenas relaciones con los vecinos	3.394	3.414	-0.020
Distribución Equitativa de Recursos	2.336	2.505	-0.169

Table 2 compares 2015 to 2008, and shows that acceptance of the rights of others, well-functioning government, and low levels of corruption improved, while sound business environment and high levels of human capital deteriorated.

Table 2: Comparative summary, comparing changes in indicators, 2006 to 2015

INDICADOR	2015	2008	CHANGE
INDICADOR	2015	2008	CHANGE
PPI Puntuación Total	3.325	3.396	-0.071
Gobierno con buen funcionamiento	3.676	3.863	-0.187
Entorno empresarial sólido	4.042	3.950	0.092
Niveles Bajos de Corrupción	3.750	3.803	-0.053
Altos niveles de capital humano	3.318	3.257	0.061
Flujo libre de información	2.758	2.812	-0.054
Aceptación de los derechos de los demás	2.902	3.247	-0.345
Buenas relaciones con los vecinos	3.394	3.414	-0.020
Distribución Equitativa de Recursos	2.336	2.381	-0.045

Against this backdrop, there are already some peace-related initiatives in Bolivia. Here is a closer analysis.

⁷⁸ The highlighted green represents indicators that became more peaceful, while red represents those that became less peaceful. In other words, green signifies improvement and red deteriorations.

7.5. A review of selected peace-related initiatives in Bolivia

As documented above, peace education is relatively new and underdeveloped in Bolivia. There are several peace-related initiatives underway across the country to be noted, however.

La Paz por La Paz. This is a new and broad campaign that seeks to contribute to a collective consensus for, and the pursuit of, a culture of peace in La Paz. The main objective of its work is to assist in the promotion of peace as a right, and the practice thereof in every-day life. Another objective of its work is to contribute to the broader goal of La Paz becoming one of the cities around the world known as United Nations Peace Messenger City.

9 pledges guide the work of La Paz por La Paz, each of which broadly relate to peace. These pledges have been communicated through a variety of workshops, seminars, forums in schools and universities, and in cultural, artistic, social and sports events, thus far. To date, over 300,000 have signed the pledge, with the overall objective being 1 million.

Given its lofty goals, La Paz for La Paz has developed strategic partnerships with organizations that can assist them in their work. One of the most important and successful partnerships has been with NGP. NGP, discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, contributes to the work of La Paz for La Paz by being a source and resource for them with regards to the theory and practice of peace, in general, and peace education.

Rotary. Conflict resolution/prevention is one of the areas of focus informing the work of Rotary worldwide (refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2). Historically, part of this focus has involved devoting attention to the role of youth in peace. Globally, clubs and districts have been spending their time, money, and resources to make youth peace education programming possible, through NGP.

In Bolivia, Rotarians have historically worked on issues that revolve around health, water and sanitation, basic education, and construction projects. They have not had a strategic focus on supporting peace initiatives. At the same time, there is ground for some encouragement. In recent times, there has been increased recognition by Bolivian Rotarians to (re)orientate their work more towards peace, given the country's history of conflict and lack of peace opportunities available to youth.

The challenge Rotarians are presented with is that a focus on peace is relatively new to them. This recognition paved the way for a new collaboration between Rotarians and NGP in Bolivia. Since, 2013, NGP have helped support Rotary clubs and district to plan and implement meaningful and strategic activities and projects, with a especial focus on supporting the role of youth in peacebuilding efforts (Chapter 8).

The United Nations. Another organization partnering with NGP to support peace in Bolivia is the United Nations (UN), most notably through the Model United Nations (MUN). MUN is an educational activity in which high school and university age students learn about the UN and practice diplomacy and international relations through simulations.

The goal of the MUN is to advance understandings of international issues and prepare participants to “be better global citizens through quality educational experiences that emphasize collaboration and cooperative resolution of conflict”.

Discussions with the UN National Information Officer revealed how participants going through the MUN Model could benefit from organized peace education and peacebuilding training. NGP, therefore, provides MUN participants with the frameworks, insights and practical skills of 21st century peacebuilding with the potential to deepen and enhance dialogue and debate through a “peace lens”. Each MUN/NGP experience is adapted to the context and the participant group. Case studies and activities discussed throughout the workshops are developed in view of the themes students’ debate in the MUN Model experience.

The first NGP and MUN Model experience was held in August 2016 at Unifranz University in El Alto. 31 students participated. Their average age was 21 (range: 17-34). Evaluations show that participants gained new knowledge (about peace or ways to solve problems specifically) and connect with others in a meaningful way. They also show that: 1) all 31 would recommend NGP workshops to a friend or classmate; 2) all but 1 would be interested in future opportunities to participate in NGP programmes; 3) much of the content and activities were new to participants; and 4) that the experience helped participants to recognize violence in its various forms, think through ways to deal with conflict more constructively, and recognize a variety of strategies for peace.

Common responses to the question, “what is the key idea, concept, or tool that you will ‘take away’ from the workshop as you prepare for the MUN model/other projects”, included ‘learning about the different types of violence’, ‘understanding different ways of thinking about peace’, ‘analyzing the symptoms and root causes of conflict’, ‘understanding human rights’, ‘measuring peace’, and ‘how to practice active listening’.

Outcomes and lessons learned from this pilot are being used to advance conversations about pursuing a national focus across Bolivia. On-going conversations with Rotarians – in Bolivia and Rotary International headquarters in the USA – confirm that this new and innovative collaboration between NGP, the UN, Rotary, and universities in Bolivia would be a great candidate for a Global Grant (refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2).

The broader objective of this collaboration is to be global in scope, where NGP can continue to support Model UN work in other countries. Discussions are already underway with UN in Colombia.



Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS). KAS concentrates its efforts on peace within the realm of consolidating democracy, the unification of Europe, the strengthening of transatlantic relations, and development cooperation. It defines itself as a political foundation, think-tank, and consulting agency, which uses scientifically researched concepts and current analyses to offer a basis for possible political action. It is world-wide in scope, with 76 offices in more than 120 countries.

KAS has worked in Bolivia for more than 45 years. In line with the foundation's overall mission, its work in Bolivia has been broadly focused on the promotion of freedom, liberty, peace and justice through a range of civic education programmes. Some of this work has focused on the following areas: strategies for development and the fight against poverty, the promotion of principles and values in civil society, the formation of young leaders, supporting freedom of expression, state reforms, political participation of indigenous people, and political education. To some extent this work has arisen in response to the fact that much of Bolivia lacks a basic knowledge of democratic principles and processes.

Globally, KAS is assisted in their work by a "circle of friends", both inside of the country as well as abroad. In Bolivia, these include a range of universities, foundations, associations, and general institutions who also work in the broad areas of peace and development. One of KAS latest partnerships is with NGP. Conversations are underway regarding working together to make more youth peace education experiences available next year, together with the broader possibility of a large conference in observance of the International Day of Peace (21st September).

Foundation UNIR Bolivia. Perhaps one of the most well-known national and local efforts for peace in Bolivia thus far is Foundation UNIR Bolivia. Created in 2005, UNIR's broader objective is to contribute to the construction of a country that is united, intercultural, and equitable, guided by values that make it possible to live peacefully in Bolivia. Its vision is subsequently broad, encompassing several activities. Within this is an integral focus on strengthening a culture of peace and the transformation of conflicts. To this end, UNIR concentrates its work in four areas: peace education; constructive management of conflicts; investigation and analysis of conflict; and democratic communication.

In line with the broader literature, UNIR considers peace education a political action that involves teaching about responsibility, compassion, and the constructive management of conflicts. Their approach rests on the assumption that peace education should aim to foster growth in four pillars or types of learning: learning to know, learning to do, learning to be and learning to live together⁷⁹. The author contends that a fifth pillar can be added: learning to inform personal and societal transformation (refer to Chapter 5).

To date, over 50 schools across the country have been impacted by the work of UNIR and its partners⁸⁰. This work took many different forms and was referred to by many different names, including peace education, culture of peace, conflict resolution, conflict

⁷⁹ UNIR's conceptualisation of peace education is more directly based on the work of Jacques Delors (1996), as well as being informed by Fisas (2010).

In El Alto, La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and Tarija.

⁸⁰ In El Alto, La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and Tarija.

transformation, education without violence, and education for values. Based on the experiences of this work, it became clear that peace education in Bolivia has the potential to be transformative, in the sense that it is an invaluable tool through to which to contribute to social transformation in Bolivia. However, despite UNIR's immense efforts to mainstream peace education, there is still a lack of, and need for, this type of education in schools and universities. At best, peace education is offered on an ad-hoc basis.

Universities. The initiatives discussed above take place in predominantly non-formal settings that do not lead to formal qualifications. There are a few recent initiatives, however, that take place in formal educational settings that lead to formal qualifications in peace and conflict related issues. Besides the Masters' Degree at the Bolivian Catholic University in La Paz in Human Rights, Democracy, and Culture of Peace that was mentioned in chapter two, the University of Mayor de San Andres has started to run a short course in May 2016 on Conflict Resolution and Social Peace. The author teaches on both programmes.

In sum, the common characteristic of these diverse initiatives discussed above is that they are all working directly or indirectly to contribute to peace in Bolivia, through public awareness campaigns or teaching about peace in the classroom and the community. On the whole, though, peace-related initiatives are rather recent in Bolivia, and there appears to be areas that could benefit from further attention.

First, there is a need to make peace education more broadly available, since there is a lack of opportunities for Bolivians to learn about how to transform conflicts and promote peace. This is particularly true for those of university age. Second, there is a need for an approach that combines peace research, peace education, and peace action, since the few peace education programmes offered in Bolivia are typically confined to the 'classroom walls'. The next chapter elaborates on how the work of NGP responds to these gaps and contributes to the growing body of work for peace in Bolivia through education and action.

7.6. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on peace and peace initiatives in Bolivia. It framed this discussion by giving a brief overview of the Bolivian context. In doing so, it outlined why Bolivia makes an ideal candidate for peace education, in general, and youth peace education, in particular. Against that backdrop, the chapter moved on to discuss how peace is understood in Bolivia. This part of the chapter also covered conflict, violence, a culture of peace, and peace education.

Following this, peace trends in Bolivia were explored, by drawing from key findings from 10 years of peace research. The final part of the chapter reviewed some promising examples of peace-related initiatives in Bolivia. This analysis drew attention to some areas needing further development and provided the backdrop for a discussion in the next chapter, about a global youth peace education programme which offers a way forward to addressing some of the gaps in practice already discussed in the previous chapters.

Peace and Conflict — in Bolivia

Chapter 8

CHAPTER 8

PROMOTING PEACE THROUGH EDUCATION AND ACTION: THE CASE OF NEWGEN PEACEBUILDERS

*Practical knowing, knowing-in-action,
is of a quite different nature to knowing-about-action⁸¹*

8.1. Introduction: aim of the chapter and outline

Building from previous chapters, this chapter moves the discussion towards practice, yet keeps a focus on Bolivia. The overall purpose of the chapter is two-fold. First, it introduces an innovative programme for educating and empowering a new generation of young peace leaders, called NewGen PeacebuildersSM, a proprietary global youth peace education programme (NGP, hereafter). Second, it elaborates on the work of NGP in Bolivia, a country that has a long history of conflict and a lack of opportunities for youth to engage in peace education programmes. Ultimately, this chapter provides evidence in support of the arguments developed in the book for the potential of youth to contribute to peace, while at the same time reflecting on some of the challenges this can entail.

8.2. NewGen Peacebuilders

Prior to examining the case study which constitutes the core of the chapter, this section sets the scene by introducing NGP. A comprehensive overview of this programme is beyond the scope of this chapter⁸². Instead, NGP is described in this chapter through the following subtitles: rationale, programme overview, mission, structure and curriculum, in the workshops and classroom, team action peace projects, multiple country expansion and applications, measuring the effects, and impact.

This is done regarding the original programme documentation, as well as an analysis of how NGP appears to fit into the discussion about the existing scholarship and practice of peace education. Drawing from and engaging with the key ideas and seminal thinkers from the field helps to explain the rationale for the content and methods adopted, and further underscore the rigor and credentials of the NGP programme. Throughout the analysis, references are made to how NGP addresses some of the limitations of peace education programmes, already explained in Chapters 1, 2 and 4.

8.2.1. Programme rationale

We are living in a world with an increasingly large youth population and interest in the role of youth as agents of change. Nearly half of the world's population today is under

⁸¹ Reason (2006: 195)

⁸² Please visit NewGen Peacebuilders website for more information, <http://www.motheringacrosscontinents.org/NewGen-Peace/>

25 (the largest youth generation in history). Nearly 2 billion people are between 10 and 24⁸³. Now, more than ever, non-profit and for-profit leaders are pointing to the potential of youth as tomorrow's global citizen leaders. Yet peace, the most cross-cutting of all global topics, is essentially absent from formal and informal educational frameworks. And young people are rarely invited to gain experience by participating in local, national and international peace initiatives.

NGP was launched officially in 2013 with the goal of emphasizing the role, value and impact of young people ages 14 to 24 in achieving a peaceful world. The programme places emphasis on practice: it equips secondary school and university students ages 14 to 24 with analytical skills to understand the drivers of violence and conflict and provides them with opportunities to engage in tangible efforts to create peace through team action peace projects. NGP is a flagship effort established through the United States-headquartered international 501c3 non-profit Mothering Across Continents. NGP has been recognized and endorsed by the Rotary Action Group for Peace and actively supported by local clubs and Districts of Rotary International (Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2).

8.2.2. Programme overview

In a "Knowledge-Connection-Action-Skills" format, NGP combines: scholarly work on conflict resolution, peace project case studies, peacebuilder profiles, high-energy exercises, and peace project management training and mentoring. A particularly unique aspect of the programme is the focus on "education for peacebuilding" versus simply "education about peace." To become certified NGP, participants must demonstrate knowledge of the content but also complete team action peace projects that demonstrate empathy/compassion and address one or more of Johan Galtung's four elements of social violence (refer to previous chapters).

8.2.3. Programme mission

The mission of NGP is to "make learning to be a peacebuilder a rite of passage (for everyone)". The overarching emphasis is on:

a) Learning to be a peacebuilder:

first, recognizes the importance of not only educating about peace but educating "for peace, or better yet toward peace" (Jenkins, 2007: 28). For instance, using university peace studies as one reference point, there are 4 basic steps that are generally considered core to peace studies: 1) examine the formation of attitudes towards peace, conflict, and justice; 2) envision a peaceful and just world because society cannot move in a direction until there is a goal; 3) define peace as a process involving all peace at the personal, familial, interpersonal, societal and global levels; 4) discuss how to be peacemakers at home, at work, and in the community (Harris & Morrison, 2013: 198).

Peace work approached in this way is consistent with the theory of education about peace (Reardon, 2000: 97, 418), since it is predominantly knowledge-based. Knowledge about peace is important. But even more essential to the concern of peace and conflict

⁸³ See, The Global Youth Wellbeing Index, <http://www.youthindex.org/about/>

work broadly is that of understanding and changing the world (Webel & Johanssen, 2011: 2). More action is also needed, not just more study. This emphasis on action is far from being the way peace education and related programmes are conducted around the globe, as this book has already made clear.

The NGP programme responds to this need. It is differentiated from other programmes by providing construct and training in project management and supporting this training through a guided, mentoring experience supported by programme alumni and or local professionals with training and experience in project design and implementation. This aids participants in taking knowledge and skills beyond the “beyond the classroom walls”⁸⁴ and applying it to the real-world. This distinguishes the NGP programme as a tangible bridge to peace, narrowing the historical and persistent gap between theory and practice in the peace and conflict community, and in the modern day schools and universities (Smith, et al. 2010: 7; Firchow and Anastasiou, 2015: 4-5).

b) Broadly-distributed understanding and culture of peace: second, the NGP programme is designed to ensure that more youth have access to peace education, regardless of, and without discrimination toward, economic circumstances and background. NGP collaborates with funding partners to provide youth peace education as a “human resource and social investment” versus a cost and ‘expenditure’. This is consistent with the core purpose and challenge of education more broadly (see, Naylor 1998; UN, 2000). Making possible the inclusive participation of youth in peace education works against the common perception of youth as perpetrators or victims of violence and in support of their potential as agents for peace.

8.2.4 Programme structure and curriculum

Based on the mission, the NGP programme is both educational and experiential. It is designed to help participants understand frameworks related to peace, develop project planning and management skills, and explore peacebuilding as a personal responsibility. It is flexible in terms of recognizing and conveying “peace universals” that are generally understood to be consistent across cultures, while adapting for local context and circumstances. This approach to peace helps foster an environment where the international and local can learn with from each other, a process Richmond and others refer to as hybridity in the broader context of peacebuilding (Chapter 2, Section 2.2.7).

The core, foundational NGP programme, structure is designed in an Immersion Workshop format, divided into five parts or themes, with typically, two options for delivery (figure 1). It can be introduced within informal or formal education contexts: either as an extra-curricular activity and specific subject, or as a whole school approach integrated within a curriculum (integrative approach). It can also be introduced through non-formal or informal educational routes that may not be in a school setting per se (additive approach)⁸⁵.

⁸⁴ The idea of “classroom without walls” draws more directly from the work of Carl Rogers (1980: 294), in the context of education more broadly, and more recently from Cheryl Duckworth’s (2011: 96), in the context of critical peace education

⁸⁵ See, Carson and Lange (in Simpson 2004: 3; Bretherton, et al, 2005: 2)

Figure 1: Immersion Workshop Format

Option 1:

Five days of workshops distributed over 10-12 weeks and completion of a team action peace project during this timeframe. This is the "2-2-1" model.

**Option 2:**

Four consecutive days of workshops followed by completion of a team action peace project, and one day of reflection and presentation at the end (10-12 weeks). This is the "4-1" model.



Workshop content is supplemented with other experiences including conversations with policy-makers, non-profit professionals, and researchers addressing conflict and building peace. Pedagogically, the methods employed by NGP vary, and can include practically all known techniques under peace: varied format of lectures, workshops, role plays, seminars, peer-to-peer learning, and one-to-one consultations, mentoring, and coaching. An online learning platform and website supports participant access to readings, resources and reflections.

8.2.5. In the workshop and classroom

The educational work in the classroom is based on 5-days of facilitated instruction and workshops. Each day/part comprises a number of units. Part I, *Foundations and Frameworks*, comprises three units. In Unit A, *Perceptions and Beliefs*, individual surveys and self-assessments help NGP develop a better understanding of participant starting points before the programme. Over time, NGP pre-workshop surveys have revealed that most youth in most countries and contexts do not otherwise have opportunities to become educated about and practice principles of peacebuilding. Creative exercises through NGP help participants share and reflect on pre-conceived ideas about peace and conflict and evaluate the impact of cultural influences from the media and other sources on perceptions of peace.

Unit B, Origins, History of Peace Education, helps participants understand the evolving nature of peace education by examining social norms, values based in religion, culturally-distinct folktales, and the work of modern peace scholars. Unit C, *Understanding Conflict, Peace and Violence*, introduces participants to key frameworks used in peace theory. These include Galtung's (e.g. 1960, 1990) Triangle of Violence, Negative and Positive Peace, and the Global Peace Index which is used to explore relative levels of national peacefulness (refer to Chapter 4 and 7). Using these tools and frameworks as a backdrop, participants debate: "Has the world become more peaceful or violent?"

Part II, *Processes and Practices of Peace*, starts with Unit A, Analyzing Conflict, where participants work in small groups, choose a "conflict hotspot" and use a Conflict Analysis Tool to identify pathways to peace. Unit B, *Exploring "Is Peace Possible?"*, enables participants to examine connections between human rights and peace. Various calls for global peace are reviewed. Sources include speeches from Bertha von Suttner, Gandhi, John F. Kennedy, Nelson Mandela, Oscar Arias, and peacebuilding role models

that may be contextually specific. For instance, in Argentina, physicist, writer, painter and activist Ernesto Sabato is profiled. Unit C, *conceptualizing a Peace Project*, helps participants envision projects by introducing them to the Five Spheres of Peace Framework (personal, social, political, institutional, environmental). Through case studies, participants differentiate “good neighbor” and humanitarian service projects from “true” peace projects identified by the presence of specific features and characteristics.

Part III, *Being a Peacebuilder*, starts with Unit A, *Inspiring Role Models*, where participants learn about and discuss young people empowered as peace advocates and project leaders. Examples include Craig Kielburger and Malala Yousafzai. Unit B, *Values for Peacebuilding*, explores the histories of noted peace advocates and activists and generates a list of core values for being a peacebuilder. Unit C, *Developing Compassionate Presence*, introduces participants to the distinctions of pity, sympathy, empathy and compassion, and explores peace scholar John Paul Lederach’s expression of compassionate presence as an interest and ability to alleviate suffering by coming alongside and empowering those who are suffering to creatively develop new opportunities for themselves. The programme also introduces meditation and other forms of mental and emotional self-awareness to reduce stress and cultivate compassion and empathy. Using scenarios, participants practice skills that help resolve conflict in daily interactions.

Part IV, *Effective Peace Project Management*, starts with Unit A, *Coordinating a Peace Project Team*. Since any peace project is likely to encounter friction – stemming from team dynamics and trying to introduce change - role plays introduce skills and practices that make for high-performing teams. Unit B, *Designing a Peace Project*, is where one large or several smaller teams select an issue/opportunity. Participants are then introduced to the Theory of Change and supported to systematically outline short-term project activities and a possible longer-term goal.

Unit C: Planning a Peace Project, is where participants use a NGP “10-Step Planning Tool” to assist them in creating a detailed plan for team action peace projects. The planning tool includes critical questions and considerations for goal setting, establishing milestones, planning resources, budget, roles and responsibilities, and evaluation measures.

Part V, *Demonstrating, Celebrating Peace*, starts with Unit A, *Assessing Project Results*, where teams complete an impact report and design a final presentation of action peace projects. Unit B, *Reflecting as a Peacebuilder*, is where participants share personal statements of peacebuilding intentions going forward. Unit C, *Public Celebrations*, is where results of team peace projects are assessed, and personal growth and learning from the programme is presented to family, friends and community stakeholders.

8.2.6. Team action peace projects

The work of NGP is strongly influenced by the work of Paulo Freire, one of the most influential educators of the 20th century. Freire, (1970: 65), who maintained that critical engagement for social change “cannot be purely intellectual but must involve action; nor can it be limited to mere activism, but also include serious reflection; only then will it be praxis”. One of the key aspects that differentiate NGP from other peace programmes is that there is always an action component that enables participants to have experiential involvement in practical and real-life problems.

This is achieved through team action peace projects, which are designed to place emphasis on the blending of reflection and action to make praxis. In this way, peace education has the potential to become more broadly effective, beyond those that consist of classroom learning only, contributing to “personal, social, and political change and transformation” (Jenkins, 2013). Keeping in mind the definitions of negative and positive peace discussed in the previous chapters, NGP teams design, implement, and evaluate action projects focused on positive peacebuilding. An assumption that informs NGP is that most young people who participate in the programme are not perpetrators of violence themselves, but instead they are young leaders who can contribute to general conditions of social well-being as engaged community members and citizens. Here are a few examples of completed projects (2013-16):

Countering Urban Food Deserts – USA

A food desert is an urban area where it is difficult to buy affordable or quality fresh food is one indicator of social exclusion. Concerned that 70,000 individuals in a nearby city live in a food desert, an NGP peace project team partnered with a local non-profit to grow seedlings in an under-utilized greenhouse. They made the seedlings available to low-income families as part of a “Grow Your Own” project and recruited more students to serve at a non-profit urban produce market.



Promoting a Peace Culture – Bolivia

In the city of La Paz, the seat of Bolivia’s government, an NGP project team designed and delivered a campaign inviting young people to demonstrate tolerance across cultures. They led workshops in local schools and organized a conference titled “Constructing a Culture of Peace Through Youth and Education: Projects and Possibilities.” It was promoted on television and featured Bolivia’s Vice President for Human Rights.



Linking Education and Peace - South Sudan

South Sudan is the newest country in the world, having become independent in July 2011 following nearly 50 years of civil war between northern and southern Sudan. Two of the consequences are: 1) a lack of infrastructure and systems that result in some of the highest rates of poverty, illiteracy and early mortality in the world; and 2) mistrust and misalignment between tribes and political groups that sparked an ongoing internal war in December 2013. A



team of NGP decided to focus their project on the virtuous link between education and peace. They concentrated on the needs of one county in Unity State, a site of extended fighting, and planned an awareness campaign and walk-a-thon to support schools in the county. Their Walk for Wisdom attracted 2,500 registrants ages 12 to 18 from five schools and raised \$10,000 to be used toward a primary school reader called “What Will You Do for Our New Nation?,” a first-ever book of folktales gathered from different tribes, and solar lights by which to read.

Keeping Children in School with Science – Tanzania

NGP from a “science magnet” secondary school learned about a conflict in Tanzania that emerged from the country’s well-intentioned desire to expand “purpose-driven” science. In Tanzania, primary school attendance is high (over 90% for boys and girls). However, national high school enrolment is about 11%. In a country with high poverty rates and issues of healthcare, agricultural productivity, etc., the government has stressed that all high schools must focus on math, science and “project-based learning” to address real issues. The government mandated that high schools build and equip science labs or face closure. Many rural



schools do not have financial means to comply. Students at some of these schools face suspension or expulsion. A NGP team chose a specific rural high school in Tanzania and organized an awareness campaign and 5K Color Fun Run as a way to raise funds for the school’s science lab. The focus on science has further inspired a group of teachers to develop and deliver volunteer science workshops at schools in Tanzania and neighboring Rwanda.

Reconsidering Hunger through a Peace Lens – USA

According to the World Food Programme, half the world’s people who suffer from hunger live in developing countries. Yet, hunger, driven by political, economic and environmental factors can be found in communities around the world. In response, mission-driven organizations manage large-scale hunger drives, often inviting schools to participate. A team of NGP questioned the efficacy of the annual district-wide hunger drive, a competition awarding prizes based on the weight of food collected. They wondered if the types of food being collected did more harm to health than



good, and aspired to increase hunger drive participation from students across diverse nationalities and socio-economic levels. After interviews with teachers, students, food council leaders and food banks, they reimaged and changed the name of the annual hunger drive to #RiceforLife, reflecting their learning that rice is one of the healthiest and most global of diet staples around the world. The next drive begins in October 2015.

Closing the Education Gap – China

To discourage internal mass migration, policies in China prevent rural students from moving to and studying at urban schools. Inequity of resources between these schools results in social tension. An NGP project team, including students studying Chinese, created a plan to become certified English, as a Second Language trainers, conduct pilot tutorial workshops at select schools, and equip computer labs.



8.2.7. Multi-country expansion and applications

Since its official launch in October 2013, training cohorts have been facilitated or are in the pipeline for delivery by early 2018 in Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Kenya, South Sudan, and Thailand. As NGP continues to develop, it plans to: expand programming to other parts of the world; develop capacity building trainings in context so that local actors can become co-facilitators; and write about the work in ways that are accessible for researchers, scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers.

8.2.8. Measuring the effects

Evaluating the quality of programming — its outputs, outcomes and, most importantly, impacts — is a pressing and vexing challenge for peace education, in particular, and peace and development programming, in general (refer to Chapter 2, section 2.3.4). Understanding (and measuring) the extent to which programmes make a difference is important not only for donors, who require evidence to justify funding, but also for practitioners and facilitators, who design and implement peace programmes.

How, then, is it possible to understand theoretically and operationally the extent to which programmes makes a difference? There is no united answer to this question in the literature. The NGP programme employs and deploys a five-level measurement framework to measure the quality and impact of their work. This framework builds most directly from the seminal work of Donald Kirkpatrick (1959), who developed a “Four-Level Model” for assessing the effectiveness of learning and training⁸⁶. The table below illustrates what NGP evaluates at a glance, along with some suggested examples.

ELEMENT	EVALUATION TYPE (WHAT IS MEASURED)	EVALUATION DESCRIPTION AND EXAMPLES
1	Satisfaction	This level measures the extent to which participants were satisfied by the learning experience, including which of the learning activities they most and least enjoyed, and why
2	Knowledge acquisition	This level measures the increase in knowledge over the duration of the programme, including changes in comprehension and recalling key peace definitions, concepts, and frameworks, before and after the programme

⁸⁶ Kirkpatrick’s Four-Level Model” (which became Five Levels), which was introduced in 1959 and has become a corporate standard for assessing training effectiveness and ROI

ELEMENT	EVALUATION TYPE (WHAT IS MEASURED)	EVALUATION DESCRIPTION AND EXAMPLES
3	Transfer of learning	This level measures the extent to which knowledge acquired during the programme was applied to practice in the “real-world”, including how definitions, concepts and frameworks were used to better inform team action peace projects
4	Results	This level measures the impact participants have on their environment, through team action peace projects, including the number of people made aware of an issue as well as numbers of direct and indirect beneficiaries
5	Social impact	This level assesses broader social impact of team action peace projects, including personal reflections on evidence of systematic changes in relationships, structures, and culturally-based attitudes, and behaviours

The NGP programme uses this five-part evaluation process to measure results and impact, as well as to serve as a means and mechanism for continuous learning and improvement to strengthen programme rigor. This occurs through a range and combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators. Because it is important to have some understanding of where participants have come from, in order to better understand where they have finished, a base line survey is used to assess participant growth before (pre-test) and after the programme (post-test).

The range of actors and narratives that affect social impact (less violence, more peace) are wide and varied. Peace education is a relatively new and emerging field of scholarship, and the same can be said for intentional peacebuilding as practiced by individuals and community-based groups. NGP developers are, thus, conservative with claims about the efficacy of this programme, first initiated in 2013.

Ambitions of creating “instant peace” through any one peace project alone are probably unrealistic, although grassroots projects can lead to systematic change (Lederach, 1997; Ricigliano, 2012). So, the fifth evaluation element (See Table above) involves reflection-driven assessment and public demonstration and celebration of project results. The question becomes: “If this project were expanded, to what extent would it contribute meaningfully toward the problems and challenges of the community(ies)?”

NGP is not alone in being realistic about what it can and cannot measure. Peace education evaluation expert Ian Harris (2003: 24) advocates that peace education practitioners should avoid extravagant claims that peace education and related outcomes can immediately stop violence⁸⁷. He suggests that peace education should not be judged on how much peace it brings to the world, but rather on the development of participants’ thought patterns, attitudes, behaviours, values, and knowledge, which may in turn help foster immediate outcomes and long-term societal impact.

⁸⁷ Another evaluation expert, Carolyn Ashton (2004) further underscores the point that peace education should not be judged on if it resolves the larger problem.

8.2.9 Impact

Since the launch and the first participant cohort of the NGP programme in 2013, participants from high schools and universities have developed and implemented action peace projects locally, nationally, and internationally. Results from ‘Internal evaluations’ show that an average cohort of up to 50 participants may: 1) create and deliver projects that raise awareness of an issue with multiple thousands of people and engage multiple hundreds to take action in conjunction with a project; 2) experience a heightened and enduring sense of personal efficacy and empowerment that extends long after the cohort is completed; 3) voluntarily decide to continue and expand projects for several months or years; 4) receive societal recognition, awards, and scholarships for service leadership; and 5) become vocal advocates for peace.

In terms of ‘external evaluation’, positive indicators in the first few years of the NGP programme include: 1) in Bolivia, NGP has been invited to adapt programming in collaboration with the country’s UN organization to use NGP as a foundational training for Model UN conferences (Chapter 4, Section 4.5); 2) in the US, NGP and co-founder Patricia Shafer are recognized as official partners of Youth Service America, the world’s largest youth service non-profit; 3) NGP was selected by Social Venture Partners as part of the leading social innovators Class of 2016 (Charlotte, NC, USA), as well as a regional finalist in the 2016 Discovery Forum Social Entrepreneurship competition (North Carolina); and 4) Phill Gittins, co-director of Global Curriculum Development for NGP, was recognized by the Institute for Economics and Peace as one of 10 innovators advancing the Future of Peace (June 2016).

8.3 NewGen Peacebuilders in Action: The case of Bolivia

The case study from Bolivia that follows is a product of the NGP programme. In taking a closer look at an example of NGP’s work in action it provides a view of how to combine “peace research, peace action, and peace education into a natural whole”, a process which closely aligns with Galtung’s (2008: 54) vision for “good peace studies”. The analysis is not written as a distant observer, as the author of this work was directly involved in the delivery of the NGP programme in Bolivia.

It is written from a practitioner-researcher perspective, elaborating on a personal experience of facilitating a youth peace education programme from start to finish in the capital city of La Paz. Examples of such praxis-orientated research and practice are rare in the scholarship on peace education and peace studies. Ultimately, the purpose of sharing this case is both to articulate the utility and efficacy of NGP as an innovative programme for educating and empowering a new generation of young peace leaders, as well as to map out the practice of doing so. It is written from a practitioner-researcher perspective, elaborating on a personal experience of facilitating a youth peace education programme from start to finish in the capital city of La Paz. Examples of such praxis-orientated research and practice are rare in the scholarship on peace education and peace studies. Ultimately, the purpose of sharing this case is both to articulate the utility and efficacy of NGP as an innovative programme for educating and empowering a new generation of young peace leaders, as well as to map out the practice of doing so.


To orientate the reader and further situate the analysis that follows, it is useful to begin with a discussion of the rationale behind why Bolivia was selected as the first country

in Latin America in which to introduce NGP. This is followed by an exploration of the methodology used to examine the process and outcomes. Next, the analysis focuses on a discussion of the process participants went through during their NGP experience – the learning in the classroom as well as the team action peace projects.

Among other things, this analysis allows us to see how participants were able to take what they learned about peace theory and research in the classroom and apply it to practice in real-life settings. After a review of what this entailed, a number of challenges, and efforts made to address them, are examined. These challenges emerged from implementing peace education in settings fairly new to peacebuilding work and almost entirely new to the notion of educating and equipping young people as peace catalysts. The final section reflects on key outcomes and lessons learned.

8.3.1 ¿Why Bolivia?

There are a number of converging practical, academic, and personal reasons which justify the need for NGP in Bolivia (see Figure 1 below).



From a practical perspective, Bolivia makes an exceptional candidate for youth peace education for a number of reasons. The first is the following irony: while youth are considered demographically dominant in Bolivia, most see themselves and are treated as the “outcast majority”⁸⁸. In some countries, young people ages 24 and under represent nearly 40% of the population. In Bolivia, it is estimated that more than 53% of the population are under the age of 25⁸⁹ (global average: 30%).

This generation, as cited in Chapter 6, are typically unrepresented in processes for peace and there is the relative absence of peace education in schools and universities in Bolivia. By not engaging youth in peace education, Bolivia may be missing a chance to contribute more fully towards the government’s model of development known as “Vivir Bien” (To Live/Living Well), as well as its national pledge of developing a culture of peace.

The ground work for NGP introduction in Bolivia was laid in early 2013 when the author facilitated a 12-week peace education and action experience for university age students in La Paz from Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA), Bolivian Catholic University “San Pablo” (UCB), and Universidad del Valle (UniValle). The community engagement and appreciation for the experience was advanced enough at the end of this work that a 1-day peace conference took place (refer to 5.2.9). It centered on youth presenting the outcomes from their team action peace projects.

⁸⁸ This paragraph builds on Sommers (2015).

⁸⁹ The Index Mundi.

Several makers of policy and shapers of public opinion attended the conference. Among them were the Rector from UMSA and Vice-Rector from the university UCB; the Vice-President for the Permanente Assembly for Human Rights; representatives from the UN, Save the Children, UNIR, and the Ministry of Education; as well as children, youth and parents. Attendees acknowledged the importance of supporting the role of youth in peace and called the need for training in peace education a priority. Consequently, the author and co-founder of NGP concluded that NGP offers a “good fit” for Bolivia and vice a versa.

From an academic perspective, post-colonial countries, because of their shared history of social conflict, have much to offer research and practice in conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Williams, 2016: 144). However, there is a lack of scholarship about Bolivia and peacebuilding, in general, and youth involved in peace action, in particular. This analysis, therefore, adds to the growing body of work on the practice of peace education by providing an example missing from the literature to date. This analysis also contributes to Latin American Studies and research on Bolivia more broadly by highlighting an aspect of Bolivian society that is previously unexamined.

From a personal perspective, the author has lived and worked in Bolivia for a considerable time. In a year of travel in 2008 he was fortunate to visit many countries⁹⁰.

He was specifically drawn to Bolivia, because of its colorful, vibrant, and multi-cultural environment, and also because of the issues it appeared to be facing then (and now) with regards to conflict, violence, and peace. All of this acted as a catalyst in his decision to focus his research and practice in Bolivia, in particular, and Latin America, in general.

From then onward, the author has lived in Bolivia for extended periods. Over the years, he has volunteered in a youth offending prison, taught in several universities, and delivered workshops for various INGO/NGO's. His dual interest in peace work and Bolivia led to Masters and PhD studies which centered on the topics of peace, peace education, and youth in Bolivia. This accumulative practice and research experience over the years has further underscored the fact that the role of youth in transforming conflicts and promoting peace in Bolivia must be further recognized and appropriately supported. In sum, it is in this context that the work of NGP in Bolivia assumes its practical, scholarly, and personal relevance.

8.3.2 Methodology

The following analysis is based on rare and primary (participatory action) research conducted by the author in La Paz, Bolivia, between September 2015 and December 2016, with guidance and collaboration from NGP co-founder Patricia Shafer and team members at the US headquarters of NGP. It sheds light on the work of NGP in Bolivia during this time. Specifically, it describes the process of what was considered a first NGP pilot in Bolivia, as well as the outcomes from its work with two cohorts: one cohort of high school age students (14-18) and one cohort of university age students (18-24)⁹¹. The data collection process included pre- and post-surveys, questionnaires, and extensive participant observation.


⁹⁰ Having visited more than 20 countries this year - through Central, South America, South East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan - I feel fortunate to have visited so many of these places, yet at the same time fortunate to not have lived there, having witnessed some of the devastating legacies left by past and present conflicts.

⁹¹ High school age participants were drawn from Leonardo da Vinci, San Ignacio, Colegio Internacional Del Sur, ACS American Cooperative School, Colegio Amor De Dios, Colegio La Salle, and Loretto. University age participants were drawn from: Universidad Catolica Boliviana (UCB), Universidad Mayor de San Andres (UMSA), and Primera Escuela Hotelera y Turismo.

8.3.3 In the workshops and classroom

This section provides a brief summary of the process participants went through in the workshops and classroom. It follows the logic of the NGP programme of 5-days of classroom instruction, described above. One key insight from this work is that it offered a comprehensive approach to the development of the whole-person, attending to the three domains of educational activities or learning: cognitive: knowledge (thinking); affective: emotional intelligence and attitudes (being); and psychomotor: manual and psychical skills (doing)⁹². NGP can, thus, be seen as an approach that provides participants with a chance to not only develop as thinkers, but as listeners, communicators, and doers as well⁹³.

This approach is sharply different to what most peace education (and related) programmes are currently offering. Most programmes, for example, pay more attention to rationality (cognitions) and less to behavioral and emotional aspects (Nevo and Brem, 2002: 274)⁹⁴, despite actions and emotions being important aspects in conflict situations (Stewart, 1998: 10-11). Very few programmes, combine cognitive, affective, and experiential learning, despite evidence and awareness that education that only focuses on ideas alone may not attend to the formation (and transformation) of the whole-person⁹⁵. Still, it must be stressed that NGP approach to the all-round development of the person is not easy, and may confront challenges, as detailed later (Section 8.3.5).



⁹² See, Bloom, et al. (1956) for an original and more in-depth discussion about the cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains of educational activities and learning.

⁹³ This sentence is paraphrased from the work of Duckworth (2011: 242).

⁹⁴ Baruch Nevo and Iris Brem's (2002) meta-analysis, the most extensive evaluation of peace education programmes to date, examined seventy-nine articles, chapters, reports, and symposia (dated from 1980 to 2000) which dealt with the broadly defined topic of peace education. Their analysis showed that fifty-one were found to be partially or highly effective in teaching peace and conflict skills. Their analysis also showed that most peace education programmes tend to focus more on cognitive development and less on the development of emotional and behavioural aspects.

⁹⁵ This paragraph draws from and paraphrases the work of critical educator, Gert Biest (2012: 135).

Part I, Foundations and Frameworks:

Participants reviewed numerous theories related to peace and violence, the debates that exist within the peace studies field, and some implications with regards to the changing nature of contemporary problems and opportunities. Emphasis was placed on “putting theory to work” (Fircchow and Anastasiou, 2015): using claims made in peace theory as lens through which to think through realities on-the-ground, local context, and participants understanding thereof.



Part II, Processes and Practices of Peace:

Participants explored the nature, dynamics, and utility of conflict, were familiarized with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and completed an activity which helped them to further examine what human rights looks like in their context. One of the main points of departure from this day was a conflict analysis, used as a framework of analysis through which to explore a conflict in more detail.

The basic point was to help participants work through three important parts of a conflict: the causes (roots), the core problem (trunk), and the effects (branches). As well as exploring the drivers of conflict, participants also identified drivers of peace. In many ways, days 1 and 2, of the core 5-days of workshops, can be thought of as ‘getting to know the subject matter’ given that these two days covered knowledge acquisition related to concepts/frameworks of violence, peace, conflict, power and human rights. In this sense, the focus was on predominately on cognitive learning, i.e. the head.



Between Part II and III, participants attended three 1.5 hour sessions at night. Each was structured around Galtung’s three forms of violence (direct, structural and cultural, refer to Chapter 2), yet tailored to the Bolivian context, and delivered by local experts from UNESCO and the Permanente Assembly for Human Rights.

Part III, Being an Effective Peacebuilder:

While Part I and II were predominantly knowledge-based, this day involved experiential and affective elements, encouraging what the Honorable Dalai Lama (2011: 187) might

refer to as “education of the heart”. The capacity to be effective peacebuilder resides, to a good extent, in one’s ability to experience inner peace. Exploring the principles of reflective practice, therefore, helped participants address their own developmental process and introduced them to a range of strategies to become more self-aware.

Since “true” peacebuilding, as described by Lederach (1997: 20), is a social dynamic construct that must involve transforming relationships, participants explored ways in which they could extend their capacities to ‘be’ in harmonious’ and ‘right relationships’ with others (Schirch, 2004; Harris and Morrison, 2012). Using insights from Carl Rogers’ (1980) ground-breaking ‘person-centered way of being’, they learnt about the philosophy and practiced the skills of active listening (refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.7). This helped participants to further recognize the ways in which clear communication and patient present listening can help hold a space - based on empathy, trust, and acceptance - for others to be themselves, and ultimately grow⁹⁶.

Overall, participants emerged from this day with an initial set of skills (reflective practice, active listening, and compassionate presence)⁹⁷, which could be used to further inform their team action peace projects, as well as being useful in their personal engagement with others. In many ways, this day can be thought of as ‘getting to know oneself and others’, since it gave participants a chance to develop a better understanding of themselves and ways of being in relationship with others.



Part IV, Effective Peace Project Management:

Participants were divided into three teams (discussed in the next section), and shared responsibility for designing a team action peace project. To help prepare for this, participants were familiarized with the stages of team formation (Tuckman, 1965) and spent time exploring how to work effectively as a group. Participants were also introduced a ‘theory of change’, and led through a discussion about the guiding principles of ‘Do No Harm’ and a ‘person-centered approach’ to peace.

Building on this, subsequent activities were devoted to the design of the team action peace project. Participants learnt that “good intentions are not enough” (Schirch, 2004: 82), and that positive change takes place through strategic planning. The NGP “10-Step Planning Process”, therefore, provided a coherent approach and strategic model to work from that brought a necessary focus to the work. More specifically, it helped participants think through the “degree to which particular activities and their outputs ...[may]...

⁹⁶ The author is fully trained in the humanistic approach to psychology and psychotherapy and has run training courses in various countries for hundreds of students and professionals on active listening.

⁹⁷ This day draws most directly from educational and psychological theory of human and professional. For example, although the idea of reflective practice is a methodology for the field of peace and conflict work, it was popularized many years ago, by David Schon (1983), who used it mainly in the context of education, social work, and youth and community work. Active listening draws from the seminal work of Carl Rogers (refer to introduction chapter). John Paul Lederach’s recent ideas of ‘compassionate presence’ to a great extent have their roots in the work of Rogers particular and humanistic psychology in general.

contribute to larger or higher-order objectives and goals”, and how their “indicators for activities, outputs, results, or objectives ...[were]... “SMART”: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (Rouche, 1999 as quoted by Neufeidt, 2007: 3).

Participants were assisted in this process by mentors trained in the NGP programme. These mentors worked with participants throughout the day, as well as the rest of the programme. They assisted in the formulation of project goals, ensured projects were well-grounded in the problems and needs of the context, and coached the alignment of team action peace projects from design through to implementation and evaluation.

This approach helped participants recognize the utility of ‘theory-in-use’ (Argyris and Schön 1974: 6-7); that is, how to incorporate key ideas of theorists and tools, learnt in the classroom, to better inform their project ideas. Towards the end of this day, participants presented and intensely discussed their ideas for their projects, and were provided with constructive feedback and practical hands-on advice from their peers, co-facilitators, and mentors regarding possible areas for refinement.



Part V, Demonstrating, Celebrating Peace

This day was co-organized by NGP’s local partners. The morning was spent reflecting on some learning’s as a result of attending the programme. This included participants’ developments as peacebuilders, in general, and growth in knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values, in particular. The afternoon provided an opportunity for participants to “experience themselves as someone with something to say” with regards to the practice of peace (Duckworth, 2011: 252), since they had a chance present their team action peace projects to invited members of the community.

In many ways, this day can be thought of as ‘getting to know how to use and appropriately communicate the subject’, since it gave participants the opportunity to ‘publicly present their work towards peace’ to a wider audience (Duckworth, et al, 2012: 63) and members of the public a chance to learn more about the impact of their projects. The final part of the day was ‘future-orientated’ (refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4). Participants took their “stand for peace”, articulating how they plan to continue to use the new found knowledge, skills, and attitudes to work for peace in their personal or professional lives.



8.3.4 Real-world applications

Although participants attend the NGP experience as individuals, they design, implement, and evaluate projects together as a team or teams formed from within each workshop cohort. To link academic learning with the real-life application of peace, participants completed three team action peace projects, each of which took place between Part IV and V of the programme⁹⁸. Considerations of space mean it is not possible to elaborate on all of these in great detail. The following, instead, briefly presents two examples of completed projects in La Paz, before examining in closer detail a completed project in El Alto, a challenged community outside La Paz.

Home Sweet Home – High school age students

Concerned by the high rate of violence against women in Bolivia as well as very high levels of inter-familial violence (Pan American Health Organization, PAHO, 2013), participants raised awareness about the different cases of violence within the family, in general, and the issue of “machismo”, in particular. Through a conflict analysis, they established that one of the key drivers of this type of violence is lack of trust within families. To this end, participants attempted to address this problem through a project they named: “Harmonious Reconstruction of Interfamilial Bonds”. This project achieved its two main objectives. The first objective was to produce a video that centered on violence in the family and the problem of machismo. The second objective was to plan and complete an activity for the main plaza of La Paz, where interactions with families and youth fostered awareness, communication, and reflection regarding the issue of violence in the family. This work was conducted in collaboration with La Paz por La Paz, a local and government-supported organization, discussed in the previous chapter. Quantitative results from pre- and post- surveys show that more than 40 people were affected directly through this work. Qualitative results, obtained through dialogue and written feedback to questions, also show that participants learned something about the topic as a whole, with many expressing that they now want to do something noteworthy to raise awareness and advocate against the problem of violence in the home in Bolivia.



⁹⁸ Team action peace projects took place between the 18th October and the 19th December 2015.

Unplugged – University age students

Most of the electricity produced in Bolivia comes from thermoelectric and hydroelectric plants. In the next few decades, it is conceivable that the capital city of La Paz will face a significant water shortage and crisis. This could force Bolivia to rely heavily on thermoelectric plants, further polluting the environment. To raise awareness of the importance of energy efficiency, participants designed and implemented a workshop for managers and employees at Hotel Presidente, a leading hotel in La Paz. The workshop had three objectives: 1) Raise awareness of links between negative ecological impacts and cultural conflict; 2) Educate management and staff that a root cause of ecological conflict is luminal pollution and propose steps they could take to model reductions in energy use; and 3) To confirm that the hotel changed all the light bulbs to more energy efficient LED bulbs.



As documented in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.3), democratic processes are intimately connected to higher levels of peace. In this specific context, the team action peace project in El Alto, outside La Paz, Bolivia, offers a relevant real-world example of NGP'S work related to the building of democracy through young people.

Democratízate – University age students

Bolivia has been and continues to be one of Latin America's most conflictive countries (UNDP/UNIR, 2013). Evidence of this includes the country's experience with recent dictators, government overthrows, and a fairly new democratic system often viewed at risk of escalating into overt conflict. A conflict analysis highlighted the lack of active youth participation in the Bolivian political system as one barrier to the development of a culture of peace. Political parties and social movement organizations in Bolivia

have underestimated and even ignored young people as valid and viable participants in community-level change.

The lack of youth participation in decision-making is particularly noticeable in El Alto, a district just outside La Paz that often experiences the highest level of conflict and violence in Bolivia. If, as many leading scholars argue (Ropes, 2002: 67; Conley Tyler and Bretherton, 2006: 129; Galtung and Udayakumar; 2013), the ‘engines of growth for tomorrow’, are likely to be found in the university students of today, then the significant absence of young people in decision-making in El Alto needs to be addressed.

A NGP participant group of 12 university students - in the study disciplines of psychology, political science, and social communication - aimed to bring the thematic of “democracy” to the attention of some 40 youth in El Alto. To achieve this end, the group of university students worked with a well-known NGO in El Alto called Gregoria Apaza. The NGO selected 40 youth involved with the organization to participate in a project of peacebuilding in action.

Initial discussions with Gregoria Apaza, and the young leaders selected to participate, corroborated a secondary source desk-literature review and a primary community needs analysis done in El Alto. The literature review and analysis confirmed that young people felt disregarded and not invited by the community to be involved in decision-making. It was also apparent that these young people had not had opportunities to learn about how to engage in political processes and democracy in El Alto.

Accordingly, the group conducted three half-day workshops and one half-day closing event with the following goals:

- **Create Awareness** about social and political realities within Bolivian so that El Alto youth (and elders) could learn about and recognize the importance of youth political participation.
- **Enable Learning** by providing access for youth in El Alto to a range of personal and professional tools and skills related to democratic involvement, active citizenship, critical thinking, and methods for achieving positive change.
- **Knowledge of how to ‘Replicate the Experience’** through additional workshops with youth peers.

The rationale of this approach was to encourage youth to see themselves as ‘social and political’ agents’ (McEvoy-Levy, 2001) capable of becoming more politically engaged in in decisions that affect their lives. An assumption is that as youth learn to constructively use their voices they will increasingly be heard by community members, local authorities, and political parties. In turn, they will potentially influence and become a part of political decision-making in the short- and medium-term. Additionally, increased positive political participation of youth can help support community cohesion and decrease chances of future conflicts because Bolivia’s young citizens will be more capable of making informed decisions and engaging in decision-making derived from a spirit of democratic participation and negotiation.

Impact:

Consistent with the original goals, 40 students from El Alto were trained in democracy, active citizenship, and critical thinking, and 28 agreed to introduce workshop activities in schools and social circles. Also, representatives of Gregoria Apaza agreed to consult with youth when making decisions that are sure to affect the community, as well as open up a physical space and continuing dialogue for youth to explore how to address community needs.



Although each team action peace project took a slightly different form, they all had a number of things in common. Three are described here: 1) They were youth-led; 2) They were context-specific with projects decided upon following a conflict analysis and community needs assessment; and 3) They were linked to peacebuilding vs. simply “service” as each had to consider and express how root causes of conflict were being decreased and or overall social well-being was being promoted.

8.3.5. Challenges

While well-received by students and the community in Bolivia, new and innovative youth-led peace programmes like NGP inevitably confront challenges. The challenges confronted by NGP in Bolivia can be grouped into two categories.

The first group of challenges relates to internal challenges; that is, those faced in the classroom. Since the NGP experience is designed in a way to inspire and better prepare participants to become agents for peace, effective delivery requires a broad understanding of education. For example, NGP does not treat participants as empty vessels that need to be filled with knowledge⁹⁹. Participants are encouraged to think critically, to see

⁹⁹ The idea of empty vessels draws more directly from the work of Carl Rogers (1977) and Paolo Freire (1970).

themselves as powerful knowers capable of understanding the world and, and take personal action to contribute to peace. The challenge in Bolivia was for participants to adapt to this way of learning.

Earlier, in Chapter 7, it was shown how studies from Bolivia pointed to the problem of education being concentrated predominantly on rote learning. In the NGP work, it was observed that many participants were not accustomed to making decisions. They were instead used to being told what to do and how to think. This is not unique to Bolivia; in fact, a robust body of research on education suggests that, globally, children and youth are rarely given the opportunity to be decision makers (Harber, 2010).

Another challenge, which relates to the foregoing, is that participants were not used to working through and sharing feelings. While the majority of peace related programmes around the world place a heavy interest on cognitive development, what is often not addressed are social and emotional skills, even though conflict in its broadest level is about a breakdown in relationships.

Although many participants were not used to social and emotional components of learning, this challenge was successfully addressed and navigated. Over the course of the programme, participants gradually developed in this area. While Part III was intended to emphasize a focus on feelings, participants were helped to engage in the affective domain of learning throughout the programme by being encouraged to explore 'how they felt', as well as 'what they thought'.

A third challenge in the classroom had to do with preparing participants for their team action peace projects. NGP encourages participants to begin to see themselves as capable of not only learning about peace, but taking steps towards peace through projects. While this focus on praxis has multiple benefits, it inevitably throws up challenges to those who are not used to combining education and action.

Many participants noted that they had never systematically used learning in the classroom to execute a project in the community. This, again, is not unique to Bolivia. Despite the development of project management skills being considered crucial transferable skills that are overwhelmingly important to most employers, these skills are rarely offered by peace programmes (Zelizer and Johnson, 2005: 7, 11; Carstarphen, et al. 2010: 7).

The described challenges in the classroom were addressed with patience and persistence. Over time, because of the philosophy informing the NGP approach to education and with the help of facilitators and assigned mentors, participants gradually became more comfortable with making informed decisions. They also appeared to become further aware of how "significant learning" (Rogers, 1977) is based on experience and action, as well as intellectual learning about a topic.

The second group of challenges relate to external challenges; that is, those outside of the classroom. They revolved around implementing peace programmes in a setting that is only recently beginning to recognize the utility of youth peace education. It is widely recognized that any peace initiatives will fail if they are not embraced by local populations (Donais, 2009a: 3). Given the nature of peace work, programmes may not always be

completely owned by the local - due to the inputs of international organizations like the UN, World Bank, and IMF, for example. But there is relative acceptance that local legitimacy, agency, ownership, and investment are crucial to the success of peace and development programming (Richmond, 2016: 99).

Consistent with the broader literature on peace education (Lopes Cardozo, 2008), the NGP programme acknowledges the need for buy-in from local partners in order to grow and be sustainable. From its inception to the present day, the success of NGP has been achieved through what is delivered in the classroom, combined with coordination and collaborative partnerships outside the classroom. These local partnerships helped to fund small-scale projects in the short-term. They are also helping to foster longer-term sustainable NGP programming, the scaling up of youth peace education opportunities across various countries, and ultimately the inclusion of youth in matters related to peace on a much broader scale.

Thus, at the outset of a new project, NGP typically collaborates with a variety of local partners – Rotarians, NGO's, INGO's, Foundations – who are involved in the development of the work at each stage. Prior to running each cohort, NGP engages in dialogue with and provides overview training to these partners about the purpose and practice of peace education. At the same time, local partners contribute financially; providing scholarships for participants to attend and covering food and refreshment costs during the workshops.

Local partners also suggest context-specific case studies, act as mentors for participant peace projects, deliver guest speeches, and co-organize final public demonstrations and celebrations. Attendees of this final day celebration include, but are not limited, to the media; representatives from local service organizations such as Rotary, NGO's, INGO's and Foundations; and parents. It is in this context that NGP has been able to avoid the usual criticisms levelled at peace programmes that are far too considered by the so-called recipients "as something done to them" not with them (Mac Ginty, 2013: 3).

Of note, while NGP in Bolivia eventually benefited from widespread local support, getting to this level of interaction required considerable work. Through an initial assessment of the resources for and obstacles to peace programming, it became clear, over the course of many discussions, that there was a lack of understanding about how to support peace work, in general, and youth peace education, in particular. This is not unique to Bolivia. NGP plans for this. It has a strategy and training process that helps local partners to better understand the role of youth in peace and the philosophy and process of NGP. This has become an important capacity-building tool to help advance NGP acceptance and use.

In sum, each of the internal and external challenges mentioned appear to spring, in part, from the reality that implementing innovative peace education programmes, like NGP, in new settings require attention to what goes on inside and outside the classroom. Inside the classroom, the effective application of peace education pedagogy is essential. Outside the classroom, programme legitimacy and credibility with partners must be achieved. This may be particularly necessary in contexts that lack resources, expertise, and systematic approaches to peace education broadly, as this analysis from Bolivia makes clear.

8.3.6 Outcomes and lessons learned

This chapter offers a small glimpse into the work of NGP. In total, case summaries across countries and communities (refer to Section, 5.2.9) highlight key outcomes and lessons learned that might be helpful to those studying, practicing, and commissioning peace work. In Bolivia, the key outcomes and lessons learned from NGP's work were also many. Using NGP's five-level evaluation process (refer to Section 5.2.8) as a framework for the following discussion, these included:

- How participants were overwhelmingly satisfied with their NGP experience. Many described their opinions of the programme as 'excellent', 'challenging but rewarding', and 'transformative'. In responding to which topics participants enjoyed the most, "active listening", "Galtung's peace and violence triangle"; "10-step planning tool", and the "qualities of an effective peacebuilder" were among the most common answers.
- How NGP succeeded in introducing participants to range of new topics, theories, and concepts (knowledge acquisition). These included, but are not limited to, 'negative and positive peace', direct-structural-cultural violence', 'peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding', 'global peace Index', 'theory of change', and 'active listening'. Having witnessed the topics that participants are introduced to throughout the duration of the programme, mentors – several whom teach post-graduate level course at universities in La Paz – repeatedly mentioned how the content and pedagogical process was sophisticated and advanced, yet delivered in a way that made it accessible to participants to relate it to their daily lives.
- How participants were able to transfer their learning. Critical peace education specifically aspires to raise critical consciousness¹⁰⁰. While most participants explained that many of topics were new to them, they repeatedly commented how this new content helped them to raise their awareness about the problems and needs around them. As illustrated above, participants transferred their learning in the classroom to better inform practice in the "real-world" through their team action peace projects. Another way in which they described how they transferred their learning was through a deeper understanding of the changing nature of the problems faced at the micro-level in their daily lives. Several explained how having the frameworks they learnt in mind helped them to recognize the challenges to and opportunities for peace, violence, and conflict in their "neighborhoods", "schools", and "communities".
- The range of positive results, particularly in relation to participants and the community. Participants shared how the NGP experience impacted them in serious and substantial ways. While several spoke about 'increases in knowledge', others mentioned 'changes in personality'. At times, participants evoked the word 'transformative', to capture a sense of what the experience meant to them. Also, it is important to note the achievements at the broader community level. 330 people were affected directly, and estimated 1,230 indirectly, because of the three team action peace projects.
- The potential for a longer-term social impact. While it is not possible to measure the broader impacts of this work in Bolivia at this time, peace writ large so to speak, the point that many participants engaged in peace projects for the first time, together with the increasing capacity of local partners to recognize the utility of peace education

¹⁰⁰ Critical consciousness, conscientization, or conscientização (Portuguese), is a popular education and social concept developed by Brazilian pedagogue and educational theorist Paulo Freire, grounded in post-Marxist critical theory.

as powerful strategy for supporting the role of youth in peace, suggests some ground work for changes in relationships, structures, and potentially the culture have been laid. NGP is interested in longevity, thinking strategically about where to work and why. It never wants its work in each context to be a sparkler event (here one day and gone the next). Based on this reality, a broader outcome of this work in Bolivia, therefore, is its potential for follow through. Advanced discussions are underway with various local partners – Rotarians, universities, Foundations – about plans for longer-term sustainability and expansion. This includes moving forward in other districts, as well as ‘train-the-trainer’ workshops. These local partners recognize that to do all this continuing investment of time, money, and resources is needed.

The key lessons learned from this work are (among others):

- La educación para la paz de los jóvenes es más eficaz cuando adopta una comprensión más amplia de la educación; Cuando asiste al desarrollo de la persona entera. Idealmente, la educación para la paz debe ofrecer un enfoque de la educación que aborda los dominios cognitivo, afectivo y psicomotor del aprendizaje.
 - Las formas más eficaces de educación para la paz van más allá del aprendizaje en el aula. Idealmente, ofrecen a los participantes, oportunidades no sólo para aprender sobre la teoría en el aula, sino también para aplicar esto a la vida real, como en el programa NGP. De esta manera, la educación para la paz no sólo permanece en el ámbito del pensamiento, sino que se extiende a la acción de la vida real para el cambio social. Esto, una vez más, requiere que los participantes piensen más ampliamente sobre la educación que incluye componentes de aprendizaje y acción. Pero también requiere que los educadores sobre la paz tengan experiencia y sean competentes para facilitar la práctica (teoría, reflexión y acción).
 - Los programas de educación de la paz para los jóvenes deberían ofrecer a los participantes la oportunidad de reflexionar sobre las lecciones aprendidas, celebrar los logros y presentar su trabajo a un público más amplio.
 - Se debe seguir enfatizando la evaluación y satisfacción por el trabajo, el proceso y los resultados del programa. Es importante ser realista con lo que se puede o no se puede esperar del trabajo.
 - Los programas de educación para la paz de los jóvenes deberían ser programas comunitarios: requieren la participación de los socios locales en cada localidad. Los socios locales deben tener la oportunidad de compartir sus observaciones sobre el propósito y la práctica del programa en su contexto. Es improbable que los programas importados desde el exterior por sí solos tengan éxito a largo plazo.
 - La educación para la paz de los jóvenes también requiere que estos socios locales asignen tiempo, fondos y recursos para aumentar la concienciación y hacer que el aprendizaje sobre la paz sea más posible para los jóvenes en su contexto. El rol de los donantes es crucial cuando se trata de iniciativas a corto plazo, pero sobre todo de sostenibilidad a largo plazo.
 - Trabajar en contextos nuevos para la programación de la paz, requiere paciencia y flexibilidad. Si la paz es una tarea para todos, es necesario reconocer que los que
-

apoyan la programación para la paz -investigadores, practicantes o donantes- también pueden beneficiarse de capacitaciones que les ayuden a comprender mejor la utilidad de la educación para la paz de los jóvenes y cómo apoyarla apropiadamente en sus respectivos contextos.

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter sought to illustrate the utility of the educational and experiential approach to peace education adopted by NGP. The case study from Bolivia was used to provide insight into what youth need and can do to contribute to peace, particularly in a unique environment defined by historical conflict that continues today. Examples of participant team action peace projects hopefully illustrated ways in which peace education can be something more than learning about peace theory in the classroom. References to participant feedback were presented in order to underline the point that more significant learning takes place when education encompasses ideas, feelings, and actions.

Perhaps the most important contribution of youth peace education work and the NGP approach specifically is that these challenge the prevailing “monolithic image” (McEvoy-Levy, 2006a) of youth as mere victims and or perpetrators of violence and either threats or non-contributors to peace. In many ways, this chapter adds credence to claims made in the literature about the “power and potential of youth as peace-builders” (Del Felice and Wisler, 2007) by highlighting ways in which “children and young people’s participation in peacebuilding contributes to positive changes in the lives of children, families, schools and communities” (Save the Children, 2012: 6). While, hopefully, making the point throughout that supporting the role of youth in peace is essential, the chapter also reflected on some of the challenges that emerged from facilitating such a process.

Although the key outcomes described in this chapter were made possible through collaboration with local partners, there is still much more work that needs to be done with regards to offering peace education to youth on a larger scale throughout Bolivia. Sustainable long-term efforts that have the potential for higher level impact beyond the classroom, rest on local policy-makers, organisations, and donors continuing to provide political, financial, technical and logistical support relevant to supporting peace programming for youth, in line with the Guiding Principles and Security Council Resolution 2250 (refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3). Therefore, the chapter also provides evidence for, and stimulates further thoughts around, how local partners can and already are spending time, money, and resources to support NGP programming, thereby engaging youth as partners in transforming conflict and build peace.

Against this background, it is appropriate to leave the last words of this chapter to a participant who completed the NGP programme in Bolivia and a representative from one of the programme’s local partners and supporters:

This was the only programme I know of regarding peace education. And it is great that it is focused on youth (Sam, student at UCB)

What we need to do is to promote peace education, especially among youth. We need to get more involved. We need to educate young people, especially in ways that help them become more effective peacebuilders” (Gerrado, Rotary International and representative of PUM Netherlands Senior Experts)

Peace and Conflict — in Bolivia

Chapter 9

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS AND LOOKING FORWARD

*Peace is not merely a distant goal that we seek,
but a means by which we arrive at that goal (Martin Luther King, Jr)*

9.1 Introduction: aim of the chapter and outline

This book has been about peace and peace education. In particular, it addressed a range of questions and related issues, described in the introduction chapter. These questions and related issues were not only theoretical, but also empirical and practical. This is why the preceding chapters provided different lenses through which to examine the theory, research (Chapters 1 through 7) and praxis of peace and peace education (Chapter 8).

Although aimed at a wide audience, page 1 noted that the book has been specifically designed to help researchers, practitioners, and donors in their work for peace. The research community are likely to benefit from reading this book because it has provided clarity to the meanings of peace and peace education, offered several insights for measuring peace, and illustrated how peace research, peace education, and peace action can be combined. For the practitioner community, it might be useful because it covered how youth can become more involved in peacebuilding activities, together with giving a sense of the wide range of activities in the classroom that help prepare them for such work.

It might also be a valuable resource for the donor community, helping to sharpen awareness about the inter-linkages between development and peace, and providing examples of the ways in which donor agencies can provide resources to help improve the peacebuilding capacities of those that they seek to serve. On one level, the book contributes to the growing literature centered on peace and peace education. On a broader level, it is a response to the persistent disconnect between scholarship, on the one hand, and relative practice, on the other. In the end, it is hoped that the evidence amassed throughout the book might prompt readers to consider new ways of thinking and acting in relations to issues pertaining to peace.

This final chapter summarizes questions and related issues examined across the book. It proceeds as follows. The first section presents a summary of the main ideas and lessons learned from each of the chapters. This is done regarding the theoretical, empirical, and practice evidence examined throughout the book. The second section discusses the potential implications of this analysis. Based on the lessons learned and implications, the third section formulates some recommendations to researchers, practitioners, and donors thereafter. The final section offers some concluding remarks, looking back and forward. Specifically, it poses four reflective questions which highlight, more broadly, some of the central arguments which constitute the book and the types of approaches needed if the study and practice of peace is to continue advancing in the future.

9.2 Summary of chapters and lessons learned

Here is a summary of the preceding chapters and lessons to be learnt from the book as a whole.

Chapter 1 provided some necessary background for the analysis that followed in the remaining chapters. It highlighted the changing global context for conflict and peace. Notably, how the dynamics of violent conflict have changed since WW2, and become increasingly more complex since the beginning of this century. In doing so, it also showed how there is a mounting body of evidence indicating that violent conflicts continue to be one of the vexing challenges standing in the way progress.

At the same time, the discussion in this chapter also drew attention to some encouraging signs with regards to peace. For example, how the achievement of peaceful societies has been made a global development priority in contemporary times, clearly demonstrated by the recently adopted SDG's. As a result, there is an increasing shift in donor logic, with more and more funding agencies coming to recognize the necessity to invest in peace programmes, in general, and youth peace education programmes, in particular (Section 1.2.2; 1.2.3).

Chapter 2 and 3 explored the evolution in thinking about peace and peace education. It was more conceptual than the rest of the chapters. One of the main points of departure from the analysis of peace was that it is widely considered a normative pursuit. Most of us, it is reasonably safe to say, "prefer peace to war and creative conflicts to uncreative ones" (Regan, 2013: 346).

Peace is an essential component of a sustainable society (Amster, 2014). While there is a massive literature on peace and varied definitions, there is broad agreement that it involves not only stopping violence but also dealing with the social and economic factors that underpin conflict¹⁰¹. In effect, then, a comprehensive peace encompasses negative peace and positive, the former is in a sense reactive while the latter is forward looking (Section 2.2.1).

At the same time, it was shown that definitions of peace are constructed, and should not be taken as a given. Understandings are inevitably informed by different historical times, geographies, and cultures which have different political and religious systems. It follows from the foregoing that peace is likely to mean different things to different people, in different locations at different times (Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3; 2.2.8). This appears to be indubitable. Chapter 2, therefore, outlined several different ways in which peace has been conceptualized (Section 2.2.1 – 2.2.8).

Another thing that can be gleaned from the analysis in this chapter, however, was that the practice of peace, and the policies and theories informing it, have been predominately developed by a select few people and drawn based on a limited range of research participants (Section 2.2.6). A consequence of this is that "donors and external interveners in conflicts rely predominantly on the advice of external consultants", despite the assumption that the "architecture of peace could significantly improve by eliciting local intelligence" (Reychler, 2006: 12).

¹⁰¹ This paragraph builds notably on Mac Ginty (2013: 387).

This is even more remarkable, since expert knowledge from outside is typically considered subjective, often hegemonic, and not well suited to meeting claims made at the local level (Richmond, 2016: 184). Another closely related consequence of academic knowledge from the global North being given the most authority and weight is that liberal versions of peace are (too often) seen as the “only and best system” (Pugh, 2012: 411).

When the liberal peace leads, local and traditional approaches to peace are often undermined (Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5). This is because the liberal peace tends to privilege a certain type of peace, and ways in which to promote and build it. For these reasons, it is argued that if liberal forms of peace continue in this way then there will inevitably be a “hegemonic collusion over the discourses of, and creation of, peace” (Richmond, 2007: 251).

As seen in this chapter, however, academic and policy literature have been regularly calling for the need to “look beyond liberalism” (Richmond, 2010: 666) and create more space for alternatives versions of peace to emerge (Section 2.2.6, 2.2.7). In the discourse, this has pushed towards more every day (Autesserre, 2014), indigenous (Mac Ginty, 2008), local and hybridized concepts of peace (Mac Ginty, 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). In practice, much more remains to be done in practice, however.

Chapter 2 also covered peace education, which is widely recognized as an essential component of basic education (Fountain, 1999: 38) and an important tool for the achievement of a culture of peace. This analysis will be useful for many interested in peace education, because it takes the reader on a journey through contemporary debates in the field, including what peace education is, its core concepts, and current trends. It also offers new insights into some of the most pressing and enduring challenges that the field needs to address if it is to advance in the future.

These challenges, which are laid out in Section 2.3.4, include peace education and its evaluation; context-specific programming; the theory-practice divide; and access to peace education. Some of these challenges were elaborating on in greater detail (Chapter 4) and responded to in the case study example in Chapter 5. To provide some background to the discussion on peace education, the chapter discussed what Bush and Saltarelli call the ‘two faces of education’ – the capacity of education to be part of the problem and solution (Section 2.3.1). But the book is not just about exploring the thinking about peace and peace education. It is equally interested in empirical and action-orientated research and practice.

Chapter 4, therefore, extended the analysis by covering measuring peace and ways to create it. The first part of chapter showed why it is important to measure peace and how. In doing so, it outlined how peace is gradually being stripped of its utopian connotation. Since it is now possible to collect data to animate levels of peace, it is not only considered as tangible measure of progress, but also taken more seriously by researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers. This preamble was followed an examination of the relative peacefulness of countries and territories.

Here, it was learnt that there appears to be a long-term trend in human society toward reductions in violence (Section 4.3.1). More specifically, it showed that considerable progress with regards to peace has been made since the end of WW2. Take for example, the number of armed conflicts and subsequent death toll decreasing - from World Wars,

the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era. In addition, moral progress has been made over the last 60 years, through developments in civil rights, together with women's and gay rights (Section, 4.3.1; also, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1).

At the same time, it was learnt that, despite some arguments in the literature claiming that we are now living in the most peaceful century in human history, the worlds' leading empirical study of national peacefulness indicates that the world has become 2.4% less peaceful over the last decade (Section 3.3.1). As documented, this determination in peace appears to be mainly driven by terrorism (which is at an all-time high); battle field deaths (which is at a 25 year high); and the refugee crisis (which is the highest level for 60 years). These high numbers, however, are driven by just a few countries.

It was also shown that, in addition to there being only 10 countries free of conflict worldwide, the peace dividend is not being shared equally (Section 3.3.1). Although some countries appear to have reached historically high levels of peace (mainly in Europe), the gap between more peaceful and less peaceful countries is increasing. While higher levels of peace are highly concentrated, countries at the bottom of the GPI are becoming less peaceful, and remain stuck in spirals of violence and conflict. Regarding country rankings, Iceland is currently considered the pinnacle of peacefulness (most peaceful), while Syria the opposite (least peaceful) (Section 3.3.2).

Chapter 4 also explored the economic costs of violence, and showed how the world spends a considerable amount on violence and comparatively little on peace (Section 3.3.1). The first part of this chapter drew mainly from findings from The GPI, which essentially measured levels of negative peace (Section 4.2.2; also, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1). However, beyond negative peace it was additionally argued that it is necessary to understand the conditions which build resilience and enable peace to prosper.

The second part of this chapter helped address this phenomenon. It made the case that positive peace is a higher ideal than negative peace. Notably, it was learnt that there appear to be eight main variables most closely related to higher levels of positive peace (Section 4.6.1). The results of the PPI, including the countries ranking and their subsequent positive peace score, were also presented, together with a summary of the main highlights (Section 4.4.2).

The analysis also found that there is a substantial body of literature and evidence that, by and large, supports the view that good governance and rule of law are being inextricably connected with peace (Section, 3.4.1). In order to elucidate this argument further, the chapter further reflected on how the findings from the PPI fit with the conclusions of many other studies that highlight the different ways that democracy and higher levels of peace are becoming increasingly interlinked (Section 3.4.3).

Chapter 5 and 6 was about social conflict, peace and peace initiatives in Bolivia. It starts from a discussion about why Bolivia is a good fit for the discussion about peace, in general, and youth peace education, in particular (Section 6.2). This discussion highlighted how existing research has shown that Bolivia is an unequal, diverse, and conflictive society with a long history of violence. The discussion also covers some of the main reasons for, and the economic impact of, such problems. For these reasons, attention to peace and education has achieved notable breakthroughs in the discourse in recent years, as this sections also showed.

This chapter also reflected on how Bolivians understand, feel, and live peace, violence, conflict, and a culture of peace (Section 6.3). Among these reflections were the fact that ‘peace’ is considered an essential part of coexistence; ‘violence’ is pervasive and considered natural; ‘conflict’ is poorly dealt with and has a tendency to escalate into violence; and a ‘culture of peace’ is desperately needed yet considered not part of Bolivia’s daily reality. Altogether, it was evident that: the ebb and flow of violence in Bolivia is problematic and needs addressing, and that there remains a lack of educational opportunities for Bolivians to learn about the threats of peace, dynamics of conflict, and strategies for peace.

This led onto the question of how peaceful is Bolivia. To formulate an answer to this question, the analysis drew on findings from the GPI. In the main, evidence suggests that Bolivia has got slightly more peaceful over the last nine years of data. However, one other thing is also clear, and that is that there are numerous worrying trends across the data. Among them, high homicide rates, easy access to small arms, and the considerably high number of violent demonstrations (Section 6.4). This analysis lays the ground for future research, in terms of a more country specific examination. (More detailed information about this will be given later, in Chapter 9 Section 9.3).

Given these worrying trends, together with the discourse of peace and education being popular in contemporary times, one would naturally expect to find several programmes which revolve around the teaching of peace. Not quite. Although the discussion showed that there are some promising examples of peace initiatives underway in Bolivia, much more work is needed (Section 6.5). From one side, it is true that the discourse gives the semblance of a push towards peace and education. Yet from another, it is perplexing that the practice of peace education in schools and universities clearly lags behind. This is the background for the work discussed in the penultimate chapter.

Chapter 8 introduced the NewGen Peacebuilders model of peace education. The driving concept behind this programme is that, in contrast to most peace education initiatives worldwide, its approach is based on learning that is not only academic but also emotional and practical. It does not merely imply the usual education about peace, but an advanced movement towards education for peacebuilding which emphasizes learning about peace as well as taking action towards it (Section 8.2.2). In practice, this is a complex process, because it requires the combination of peace research, peace education, and peace action (Section 8.2.2; 8.2.3; 8.2.5).

Another key aspect of NGP is that it is designed in a way to bring forward the role that youth can play in peace. This process is firmly rooted in the belief that youth should not merely be seen as victims or perpetrators of violence, but as potential agents of peace. Accordingly, the example of NGP practice in Bolivia helped to contribute to wider discussions in peace studies and peace education fields by throwing light on the possibilities and challenges of supporting young people’s role in peacebuilding (Section 8.3).

Notably, this chapter discussed the process that ensued and the outcomes and lessons learned that resulted from this work (Section 8.3.3; 8.3.6). In doing so, it contained examples of team action peace projects. Among other things, these projects demonstrated the importance of praxis; that is, how students could take what they had learnt in the classroom and apply it to real life-circumstances in their communities – a significant but too little examined phenomenon in peace studies and related fields (Section 8.3.4).

Even when this is done, it should be noted that an approach, which combines learning about peace with peace action, can be challenging. The work in Bolivia was no exception. Chapter 8 also, therefore, described some of the internal (inside the classroom) and external (outside the classroom) facing challenges involved in facilitating this type of action-orientated approach, and attempts made to overcome them (Section 8.3.5). In many ways, NGP was spawned by an awareness of gaps in peace education (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4), and a need to work in ways that are quite different from the typical educational process adopted in many schools and universities around the world. Much of the same can be said about the justifications for introducing NGP to Bolivia (Chapter 6, Section 6.1; 6.5).

9.3 Implications

Altogether, the implications emergent from this work are many. Three are discussed here in the context of the overall objectives and related issues raised throughout the book as a whole.

The first implication pertains to the study of peace and peace education. Peace is coincident with being human, *per se*. As academic fields of inquiry, however, the study of peace and education about or for it are relatively new. On one hand, it is true that the number of peace-related programmes worldwide is now impressive. Notably, they remain among the most rapidly growing disciplines within the social sciences. On the other, it is also true that they are still evolving, and therefore a caveat is necessary. Despite over 50 years of scholarship, “we know remarkably little about peace” (Regan, 2013: 350).

One of the main reasons for this is because the focus of peace programmes have been more on studying war, violence, and armed conflict, and less on peace¹⁰². Another reason why less is known about peace is because the corpus of knowledge has been disproportionately guided by a relatively small number of experts. Greater attention has indeed been given to theories and studies developed in the global North (predominately by white men) and less from the global South, although this is gradually changing (Chapter 1 and 2). This has implications. One of the most significant is that there is still much that can be learnt from other parts of the world regarding peace. This, in turn, suggests the need for further research¹⁰³.

The second implication pertains to peace trends and the ways in which to measure peace. Regarding peace trends, the obvious conclusion from this work is that many of the major dilemmas of our time pertain to issues of peace and violent conflict. The empirical findings in Chapter 4 imply that the world has got increasingly less peaceful since 2008. In particular, they yielded important insights into how the peace dividend is not being shared equally. To this end, the violence-to-peace challenge we are confronted with is enormous (Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1). As such, governments need to take up the challenge of investing more in peace. Yet addressing the violence-to-peace transition requires a societal level effort. Therefore, it makes good sense for governments, civil society organizations¹⁰⁴, and ordinary people to collaborate in working for peace together. (More on this topic will be explained later, in Chapter 9, Section 9.4).

¹⁰² For more on this topic, see Regan (2013: 345).

¹⁰³ For a related discussion about how peacebuilding needs to broaden its scope to learn more about the language and experiences of peace from the global South, see (Mac Ginty: 2013: 388).

¹⁰⁴ Civil society refers to “aggregate of non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest interests and will of citizens.”

Regarding measuring peace, it is possible to deduce that there are, broadly speaking, at least two ways to approach this task, namely: 1) top-down; and 2) bottom-up. A standard and widely used example of a top-down approach is the GPI. The GPI is unique, because it brings a new empirical lens to the study of peace, while most other datasets seek to measure conflict and violence¹⁰⁵. It is now widely accepted as the world's leading study on global levels of peacefulness, and used by researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers worldwide (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4). What makes the GPI particularly credible in academic settings and replicable is that it uses 23 indicators to collect data and measure levels of peace in exactly the same way (see, Chapter 4 and 6),

However, the GPI has limitations. The first is that the methodology behind it has a prescriptive orientation, since its indicators are decided a priori by outside experts, with little or no consultation with local people. A downside of this is that it runs the risk of deductive logic, since locals are subordinated to external claims and declarative knowledge about what peace is how to measure it.

The second is that it works on national level, aggregated, data, to come up with generalizations across the country. Conflicts, however, are often concentrated in certain areas and not always spread across the entire country, however. A downside of a national level analysis, therefore, is that it inevitably strips away the anomalies in each context, and overlooks differences within and between communities.

In effect, then, approaches that look at measuring peace in a top-down fashion tend to be based on external legitimacy, and give less accountability to the local and space for bottom-up responses to emerge. For this reason, existing ways of measuring peace are incomplete¹⁰⁶, and, thus, (often) met with resistance because of the irrelevance to the needs of local people on-the-ground¹⁰⁷.

In contrast, a bottom-up approach to measuring peace attempts to elicit local-level information from the ground up. This means thinking about peace in contextual terms; examining notions of peace and preferred indicators for measuring it from the vantage point of, and with, locals themselves. A difference between top-down prescriptions and bottom-up responses is that the former prefers micro level data, which allow for broader generalizations, while the latter prefers more micro level data, which allow for context-specific understandings¹⁰⁸.

Accessing bottom-up - local and everyday - understandings of peace and how to measure it is perhaps easier said than done, however. It poses particular challenges to the research community who, typically, prefer working with large data sets, because they want top-down understandable and replicable data. A danger of this is it takes the 'social' out of the 'social sciences' – a type of science without humans (Gittins, Forthcoming). There is, thus, the argument that science must assume a broader understanding of inquiry; one

¹⁰⁵ Two leading examples are: the Upsalla Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which engages in the “systematic studies of the origins of conflict, conflict dynamics, and conflict resolution”, and the Correlates of War (CoW) project, which studies “interstate and related wars - 1,000 or more “battlefield” related deaths – from 1816 (Singer and Small, 1972: 381-382)

¹⁰⁶ Many authors follow Mac Ginty (2013: 1), cautioning that “many of the approaches to measuring peace favoured by international organizations, INGOs and donor governments are deficient”

¹⁰⁷ See Mack (2014: 109) who found that some fragile state governments “have resisted common indicators claiming they primarily reflect the interests of donors”. Also, Autesserre, 2014 (201-203) analysis of international peacebuilding interventions which show how a disproportionate focus on the expertise of outsiders lead to local resistance and non-cooperation in international peacebuilding efforts

¹⁰⁸ The term ‘context-specific’ refers to an attempt to ground understandings of peace and ways to measure it in the realities of the particular setting in view of space (context) and time (historical moment) (Gittins, Forthcoming)

that allows space for different models of science, and moves away from the notion that we are in a laboratory.

Another difficulty in accessing bottom-up understandings of peace relates to the ways in which social scientists are traditionally trained. The preference for quantitative analysis in the social sciences means that social scientists tend to engage more in trainings on statistical analysis and less on how to enter into relationships, to listen and better understand¹⁰⁹. There is indeed a difference between extracting data and careful empathic listening to hear and understand people on-the-ground that inhabit peace each day. For the above reasons, local and everyday understandings are somewhat overlooked, in the both the theoretical and pragmatic literature.

Just as the research community has difficulties, recent debates in the academic literature show how connecting with and understanding the host populations they seek to serve is a frequent challenge for donor agencies, engaged in internationally-supported peace and development interventions (Richmond, 2014: 138). The reasons for this can be attributed to several inter-related factors, including: the ways in which those working in the donor community are trained; the ways in which donor agencies are typically organized to be headquarter-centric; and resource and time constraints which make it increasingly difficult to access and respond to the needs on the realities on-the-ground (Gittins, Forthcoming).

In one respect, many of the criticisms levelled at top-down approaches are warranted. In another, country level analyses are important. This is not to say, therefore, that top-down approaches should be replaced with bottom-up approaches. It is a recognition that more sophisticated views of peace, and context-specific indicators to measure it, are also needed – what Mac Ginty (2013) might refer to as “everyday peace indicators”. Locally defined indicators, which are largely unexamined yet incredibly important, can supplement the more orthodox externally-defined indicators commonly used. Essentially, this book calls for the research and donor community to pay due attention to the ways of studying peace and how it is being measured in any given setting.

This, in a sense, is the challenge. It means using appropriate methodological tools and processes that allow for engaged inquiry and the gathering of data at the national, as well as local and everyday levels. Besides the use of appropriate methodologies, inducing bottom-up understandings may also require a different quality of relationships than the research and donor community are typically accustomed to – relationships marked by active listening, dialogue, and collaboration. In short, it means a much more reflexive and facilitative approach to learning that is done with the locals themselves (Gittins, Forthcoming).

The third implication pertains to what creates peace. Findings compiled from a range of sources in Chapter 4 indicate that systems of government matter in terms of peace. Certain kinds of states are indeed important; they help deliver services, rebalance power, and build the conditions for people to live without violence. Notably, this chapter also showed how democratic governments tend to produce higher levels of peace. One


¹⁰⁹ Phenomenology and ethnography are two methods appropriate for developing a richer understanding of lived experience.

implications of this is that there needs to be a stable base for democratic states to emerge. At the same time, peacebuilding should not be limited to something “done out there” (Mac Ginty, 2013: 389) by those at the elite (government) levels.

Mid-level actors — including, but not limited to, civil society organizations and international financial institutions — also play a vital role in peacebuilding, in particular, and international interventions, in general¹¹⁰. They can help states move more towards democratic practices and processes. They can also support the capacities of institutes to deal more effectively with conflicts and provide opportunities for local people to help them deal with grass-roots issues. The importance of peacebuilding being undertaken simultaneously at a variety of levels in society is further developed by seminal peace and conflict scholar John Paul Lederach (1997). Notably, he attributes the greatest significance to actors at the mid-level, because they have the ability to influence those at the top and grassroots levels¹¹¹.

TYPES OF ACTORS

HOW TO ACHIEVE CHANGE



Based on John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 39.

¹¹⁰ Belloni (2001: 163) notes, in the context of Bosnia, but also more broadly, “civil society has become an integral component of international intervention”

¹¹¹ Lederach (1997: 39) uses a pyramid to illustrate how a variety of actors can and must be involved in working for sustainable peace, from the grassroots (bottom part of pyramid) to the middle range or regional experts (middle part of pyramid) to leaders and heads of state (top of pyramid). He places particular emphasis on civil society organizations, since they can play crucial roles in the further integration of society – from the elite through to grassroots level.

But governments and civil society are not the only, and often not even the main, actors in peacebuilding. Only recently have the scholarly and policy community been paying attention to the under-researched, yet incredibly important, role that ordinary people play in peace¹¹². Notwithstanding the power of states and the power of institutions to shape and orientate work for peace, these insights help to underscore the need for a holistic approach. In sum, much more space must be made for a wider set of actors to participate in peacebuilding efforts, since the achievement of a culture of peace essentially rests on the collective commitment of all citizens of the world.

Building on the work of others, another contribution of this book is its emphasis put on youth, because they are (too often) overlooked in the discussion of peace. The argument put forward, evidenced by an example of youth peace education in Bolivia (Chapter 7), encourages thoughtful reflection on, and a timely reminder of, how the inclusive participation of youth in peacebuilding efforts is crucial, yet too often lacking. Including youth in creating peace is a choice. It is intentional.

Instead of viewing youth as merely victims or perpetrators, it is important to further engage them as partners in transforming conflicts and building peace (Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5). For this, youth need to participate in educational opportunities that help them develop the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed to work for a culture of peace. This, again, draws attention to the need to address the issue of access to peace education, already explained in this work (Chapter 1, 2, 7, 8).

9.4 Recommendations

Considering the aforementioned, here are some recommendations about how to improve the study and practice of peace and peace education. These recommendations were derived from the key issues discussed in the book, as well as being informed by the authors own experiences of studying and practicing peace and peace education within a variety of settings. The hope is that they help to influence the practice of, and provide support to, the main target audiences of this book: researchers, practitioners, and donors.

Recommendations for researchers

Here are some recommendations for researchers interested in the study of peace as a topic:

- Further studies are needed to better understand the nuances of how peace is understood in each context. Knowing this can lead to better understandings of the similarities and variances in different settings. This context-specific understanding can, in turn, help those developing projects and programmes to reflect the actual language and uniqueness that make it more accessible to the local beneficiaries who not only live with the problems experienced in their context, but also must make use of the types of knowledge being presented.
- Another area of research that warrants further attention pertains to the ways in which peace is measured. The IEP has also expressed an interest in adding more complexity to their frameworks. In line with this their signature research product, the GPI has now developed more country specific analyses (Chapter 3,

¹¹² See also Mac Ginty (2013). In particular, the conclusion (Chapter: 387) for more on this topic.

Section 3.3.4). It is additionally necessary to work closer with the local contexts themselves, to elicit bottom-up indicators from each setting. This would not only help to address the issue of prejudging what type of peace is best for others, but also highlight local agency in helping to provide further insight into their own understandings of peace and ways to measure it.

One way of approaching this task is through participatory action research, which offers an approach to inquiry that is done with the community, not about or for them (Chapter 5). In the context of peace work, participatory action research has been found to help increase the legitimacy of local knowledge, build practice from experience, and capture the dynamics of how change works (Lederach and Thapa, 2012: 15 17).

- More studies of peace education, highlighting ways to build bridges between theory and practice (such as the example outlined in Chapter 5), are also called for. Results of these studies can contribute to and build on a growing body of literature on peace studies and peace education, which have until now focused more on the role of youth as victims or perpetrators of violence and less on their contribution to peacebuilding efforts on-the-ground.
- Further research can investigate what those involved in teaching about peace need in order to do their job more effectively. Since the process and outcomes of peace education revolves around the work that the peace educator and students do together, an understanding of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed by the peace educator to do their job more effectively, therefore, requires attention.
- Research is still needed to examine the extent to which states and civil society organizations have the necessary capacities to support peace work in their context. This includes their capacity to deal with conflict more constructively, without transcending into violence. It is by examining such capacities that we can better understand the possibilities and challenges for peace in each setting, and, in turn, what further support maybe needed to appropriately support peace efforts in each context.

Recommendations for practitioners

Here are some recommendations for practitioners interested in the practice of peace as a practice:

- Practitioners should be practitioner-researchers. As peace studies (and related fields) continue to expand they will need to continue to address how theory and practice can become further integrated. In general, those involved in peace work fall into camps: peace researchers or peace practitioners. Most often, researchers have a tendency to focus on the theory and study of peace as a topic, while practitioners think in terms of putting such ideas into practice on-the-ground. This dynamic often perpetuate an unhelpful division of labour between the two.

Ideally, practitioners should “work the hyphen” (Fine, 1999) between theory-research and practice, recognizing that “thought and action (or theory and practice),

are dialectically related” (Kemmis and Carr, 1986: 34). To make the nexus between academia and real-world application, practitioners must think deeper about what they are doing. They must recognize the theory behind their practice, and how both theory and practice should ideally inform and be informed by each other. This requires practitioners to be interested in something more than “getting the job done on-the-ground” (Gittins, Forthcoming). They must come to see themselves as practitioners-researchers¹¹³, recognizing that their work ideally needs to be research-based and, in the case of peace education, classroom-tested.

- Practitioners should be content and process experts. As a content expert, practitioners need to have a thorough grounding in the ideas, principles, and processes which guide peace studies (and related fields) – what is taught. This is important because it offers the people they work with a chance to learn theories and concepts deemed important to the context as well as to the field. In effect, content experts must offer those that they work with both a chance to learn from the context in which they live, as well as extending their knowledge beyond their context.

Knowledge held by the practitioner, however, does not equate to effective learning (Gittins, Forthcoming). It is generally accepted that knowing is just the beginning, not the end goal, of (peace) education and related programmes (Galtung and Udayakumar, 2013: 10, 131). It is also generally accepted that the means is just as important as the ends in peace work (Gittins, Forthcoming). In pursuing this line of argument, Haavelsrud (2008: 63) asserts that “the educational interaction should be in harmony with the idea of peace”. For example, teaching about peace in ways that close down dialogue, critical thinking, and collaborative decision-making run contrary to the philosophy and process underpinning peace education.

This leads to the discussion of what is meant by process experts. The author argues that those interested in the practice of peace as a practice need to become competent in at least two areas to become process experts. The first is that they must be competent at facilitating an environment for others to learn – how it is taught. Ideally, this includes the ability to cater for the development of the whole-person and to support those that they work with through the process of completing peace-related projects from start to finish (such as the example outlined in Chapter 5).

The second is that they must be knowledgeable of the context in which they work – where it is taught. Literature indicates that practitioners working in the field of peace and conflict work are (often) deployed in contexts that they have very little contextual knowledge about, and even less experience of living and working in¹¹⁴. In sum, practitioners will be better placed to support those that they work with if they become both content and process experts, therefore competencies in what is taught, how, and where are all essential. Relatedly, it is also widely recognized that all three must be considered in conjunction, since an emphasis on one without consideration of the others would be problematic (Haavelsrud, 2008).

¹¹³ This idea builds from the work of Kemmis and Carr (1986) who make the powerful case for “Teachers-as-researchers”.

¹¹⁴ For more on this topic, see Gittins (Forthcoming). Also, Sending (2009: 8) who found that international peacebuilding actors “assume a position of authority in knowing what needs to be done in countries they often know little about”.

Several implications follow from the two recommendations just discussed. One is that they require an obvious shift in the types of teacher-student relationships typically preferred in most school and university settings. In effect, they require a type of partnership between the peace educator and the students. A second subtle, but perhaps just as important, implication of these recommendations is that they also require a broadening of professional training.

From its inception to the present day, peace studies (and related fields) have been well situated to developing content experts. But there is not much space in these programmes to deal with how to nurture the development of process experts. That is, how to learn ways to cultivate relationships, create favorable environments for others to learn, and to gain project management skills needed to better support prospective students to put theory and research to work in practical ways through peace action in the community¹¹⁵.

Recommendations for donors

The quality of peace work relates directly to the quality of research and practice. In general, donors are in the best place to incentivize and support this work. Recommendations for donors fall under two headings; the first set is specific to peace research and the second set is specific to peace practice.

Donors can contribute to the quality of peace research by budgeting for the following:

- Research into local and everyday understandings of peace.
- Research into the different ways in which peace can be measured in any given setting. Chapter 3 covered peace trends in general, while Chapter 4 focused on Bolivia. Both chapters chose to limit themselves to an analysis which drew mainly from the findings of the GPI, which uses pre-determined indicators. A deeper analysis which elicits local and everyday perspectives, from local populations themselves, is an important area for future exploration. This analysis will help to provide clarity the ways in which local populations prefer to measure peace and what indicators are important for them.
- Research into understanding the dynamics and drivers of what creates peace.

Donors can contribute to the quality of peace practice by budgeting for the following:

- Peace education programming. There is a pressing need to respond to the access to peace education gap discussed in this book (Chapters 1, 2, 4 and 5). Donors can help to make possible the inclusion of more youth in peacebuilding efforts by financing peace education programmes that include action elements, like the example of NGP in Chapter 5.
- Capacity-building trainings. Linked to the need for further investment in peace education is a larger point about improving the local capacities for peace. Improving access to and the quality of peace education in each context, ideally rests

¹¹⁵ See, Chapter 5, as well as Zelizer and Johnson (2005) and Carstarphen, et al (2010) for a discussion of how programmes are not teaching students of peace the necessary project management skills needed.

on the involvement of locals themselves, who must be adequately equipped to play roles in supporting peace, as appropriate. Based on the experience of implementing peace education in Bolivia (Chapter 5), this book offers a timely reminder of the importance of education and training being made available for those involved in supporting youth peace education programmes. Donors, therefore, can enhance the abilities of individuals, organizations, and systems to support peace programmes more efficiently and effectively by financing education and trainings. Such education and training fulfil a critical strategic function in capacity building by helping to improve the capacities of local counterparts, so that they can appropriately support peace-related initiatives in their respective settings.

The above recommendations offer a view into the future, a prognosis, pointing to several important directions for future reflection and action. Given that the economic costs of violence are significant, the argument for spending more on the research and practice of peace is more powerful. Looking back, and evidenced by the previous chapters, it appears that further investment in peace would not only address violence but also deal with economics.

9.5. Concluding remarks: looking back, looking forward

This chapter provided the conclusion of the book. A summary of the preceding chapters and lessons learned as a whole provide a springboard for others who seek to study, practice, and/or invest in peace and peace education. Implications derived from the lessons learned learnt and overall findings were presented thereafter, followed by some recommendations for areas needing further exploration.

Despite recommendations for future work, it is argued that the book has made some important contributions to the scholarly, practitioner, and donor communities, as described above and at various points in the book. Ultimately, the book concludes by looking back and looking forward. It poses four overarching reflective questions that provide a lens through to which consider some of the more far-reaching themes which emerged from this work. These questions, again, are especially relevant to those interested in peace and peace education.

1. How might peace programmes bridge the gap between theory-research and practice?

At various points in this book, references have been made to a common critique: how most peace work is (too often) bifurcated between those that study it and those that practice it (Chapters 1, 2, 8). Bridging the gap between theory-research and practice is a major challenge facing everyone interested in peace. This challenge is not specific to peace studies and related fields, however. Sadly, it applies widely to the social sciences, and is particularly salient within the modern day academe.

There can indeed be a great deal of debate about the need for more theory and research. Yet when there is still debate, there is not likely to be action. Now, a good case can now be made that there is there sufficient knowledge of theory and practical methods to change the ways in which to engage with peace. Thus, it is true that theory and research

is needed to guide practitioners in the “what” of peacebuilding. But it is also true that none of this will be of any use if it is not applied. The book, therefore, makes the argument that the problem is not knowledge. The ‘crux of the matter’ is this: “We are not putting to work what we know... We do not have a knowledge gap, we have monumental use-of-knowledge gap” (Perkins, 2008: 3).

This is not a suggestion to undermine the contributions that blue sky thinking and pure research have made to the nurturing of critical reflection and the production of knowledge. It is a suggestion that problems arise when theory and research remain in the esoteric realm of the academe. The book was also developed with this in mind. It builds from the assumption that, if a guiding aim of peace studies (and related programmes) is (or should be) to “produce more enduring and positive peace, not only more peace studies” (Galtung and Webel, 2007: 399), then more engaged scholarship, committed to linking theory and research to practice in the real world, is called for.

The hope is that the work in Chapter 5 has gone some way to shining meaningful light on how peace research, peace education, and peace action can be combined. Based on the findings from the case study discussed in this chapter, and in accordance with contemporary arguments in the literature on peace studies and related fields¹¹⁶, the book argues that, since “there is no substitute for practice” (McNiff, 2014: 125), both fields can benefit from further use of forms of enquiry in which scholarship and activism become more readily integrated (Gittins, Forthcoming).

Although the work in Chapter 5 is especially relevant to Bolivia, innovative ways in which to bridge the gap between theory-research and practice are increasingly applicable to a wider audience and can, therefore, inspire action in other contexts. Another noticeable contribution of the work in this chapter, which lacks sufficient academic attention, is that it offers a telling illustration of the important role that youth play in peacebuilding. This leads to the second reflective question.

2. How might youth become more involved in peacebuilding efforts?

More than half a century ago, Gandhi taught us that “if we are to teach real peace in this world, and if we are to carry on a real war against war, we shall have to begin with the children” (Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3). Policy and academic interest in the potential of youth as peacebuilders increased thereafter. Now, few disagree that the key to lasting peace is to be found in the leaders of tomorrow (McEvoy-Levy, 2001). In other words, the youth of today

At the same time, “young people are citizens now, rather than citizens in preparation” (Smyth, 2012: 8, quoted in Smith Ellison, 2014: 40). Their perspectives towards peace, therefore, should not be overlooked in current processes and their rights to participate in peacebuilding activities should be fully supported (McEvoy-Levy, 2001). We, thus, find

¹¹⁶ For similar arguments, see Cooper and Finley (2016: 212) who make the case that community-based research combined with action merits further attention within peace studies. Morrow and Cooper (2016: 212) who hope to see PAR used more often in peace work. Also, Baja and Hantzopolous (2015: 238) who argue how peace education could benefit from further use of participatory action research in general, and youth engagement in their own programmes, in particular.

ourselves in an interesting position at the current time. For, on one hand, we are currently witnessing the largest number of youth in human history (Chapters 1 and Five).

At present, there are 1.2 billion youth (aged 15- 24) (18 per cent of the world's population), with this number expecting to rise to 72 million by 2025. It is not only Bolivia that has a very high youth populations relative to its total populations, many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa have more than 40 per cent of their population below the age of 24. Thus, now, more than ever, it becomes necessary to build spaces for more (disenfranchised and marginalized) youth throughout the world to become agents of peace.

On the other, if we fast forward from Gandhi's maxim above to the present day, we find that youth are, generally speaking, somewhat overlooked as agents for peace. One of the reasons for this is that youth work for peace is relegated to a peripheral activity. Most educational systems are not teaching young people the knowledge, attitudes, and skills needed to work for peace. In fact, schools and universities (too often) serve as instruments for the promotion of conflict and violence (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1)

One tool being used to interrogate how education can be 'part of the problem', but can also 'solution', is peace education. As well as helping students to explore "why things are the way they are" and "how they came to be", peace education also encourages students to think through "what can be done to change them" (Teachers Without Borders). However, as this book has shown, there is still a lack of peace education programmes available to youth around the world. This is unfortunate. The hope is to see larger scale commitment to addressing the issue of access to peace education.

Besides making peace education more accessible, it is equally urgent that teaching about and for peace need to go beyond the usual goal of creating "peaceful young people" to empowering "youth as peacebuilders". Peace education is nearly always enacted in the classroom. This leads to students having difficulties connecting their learning's inside the classroom walls to real-problems and real-world solutions on-the-ground. Learning about theories and concepts are indeed important, but more action is also needed.

In effect, young people need to engage in a study, made systematic by the analysis of relationships, of important issues, both contemporary and historical, as well as attempting to apply analysis to practice¹¹⁷.

However, to quote conflict and youth expert Marc Sommer (2001: 179), "transforming uplifting ideas to concrete action is difficult, as is measuring the impact". Chapter 8 sheds light on how participating in NGP proved to be relevant and helpful for youth in their development as peacebuilders. Accordingly, the book argues that it has made visible what has been thus far obscured in much of the literature on peace education and peace and conflict studies, notably how classroom learning and the inclusion of youth in peacebuilding activities on-the-ground can become integrated as a whole. Essentially, it

¹¹⁷ This paragraph builds on Curle (1985: 21).

calls attention to the positive effects of youth as agents of peace, and serves as a reminder that youth should not just been seen as victims or preparatory of violence.

There are still more things to do, however. Special programmes like NGP should not be special; they should be a part of every school and university curriculum¹¹⁸. Here, therefore, lies the challenge: How can special programmes, like NGP, be made more freely available to youth on a broader scale? Certainly, by themselves they cannot. This leads to the third reflective question, which concerns the role of international and local actors in supporting the type of peace work discussed in the previous two reflective questions.

3. How might international and local actors work together more effectively on peacebuilding efforts?

Any attempt to transform peace work in the directions outlined in the two questions above would undoubtedly be challenging. The general argument stated is that profound change of the kind this book has been talking about will depend on international and local actors working together more often on peacebuilding efforts. There is an important justification for this argument, as “when they work together insiders and outsiders bring different and distinct qualities to peace partnerships” (Anderson and Olson, 2003: 37)¹¹⁹.

The comparative advantage that international actors bring is that they can offer context-independent knowledge’ of general theories, concepts, and practices from outside (Gittins, Forthcoming). They are also familiar with funding procedures, have the necessary access to donors, and can mobilize substantial amounts of money required to help fund large-scale projects in the host population. The comparative advantage that local actors bring is that they have lived through the through the conflict, have context-specific knowledge, and can access areas that international actors often cannot¹²⁰.

The above illustrates that local and international actors differ in resources, capacities, and legitimacy structures, but both have much to contribute to, and learn from, each other. Thus, while it appears to be a truism that peace cannot be imposed by outside - and that the resources, ownership, and legitimacy of peace activities must come from within the society - it is also pertinent to recognize that international actors can critically assist host populations in several ways with their peacebuilding efforts¹²¹.

But despite there being a commonly-held view that local and international forces need to be joined in order to build the conditions for a lasting peace, this has been - up until now, at least – more theorized than it has been practiced (or at least empirically researched). In fact, the available existing literature, which focuses directly on the interaction between local and international peacebuilding actors, is nearly always policy related research pieces (Anderson and Olson, 2003: 35-45; Hellmüller, 2014: 7).

¹¹⁸ This paragraph builds notably on Duckworth, et al. (2012: 97) who, from the perspective of critical peace education, who make the argument that programmes which incorporate experimental learning activities for peace should not be special; they should be a part of every school’s curriculum.

¹¹⁹ For a related discussion about the differing worldviews of international and local actors, see Autesserre (2014: 174-183)

¹²⁰ This section draws directly from Hellmüller (2014: 7-9).

¹²¹ Francis (2011: 518) makes a similar argument. claiming that international actors should play supportive, but the author argues not necessarily superior, roles in peacebuilding work on-the-ground.

This has important consequences. To begin with, it leads international actors to rely on their own thematic knowledge, and routinely view local actors as lacking the capacities to build peace (Autesserre, 2014: 197). This, in turn, leads host populations to typically consider the practice of peacebuilding as an activity conducted by international actors (Barnett et al., 2007: 36; Donais, 2012: 31), despite concepts such as local, every day, and hybridity making their way into the discourse. A related problem to this is that locals are typically portrayed as the 'objects' of peacebuilding and seldom as the 'subjects' and actors in their own right (Mac Ginty, 2011c: 31).

Given this, it comes as no surprise that host populations often complain about the international community being "arrogant", 'condescending' and 'paternalistic' (Anderson and Olsen, 2003: 39; Anderson, et al. 2012: 17, 18; Autesserre, 2014: 97). It is also understandable why "the relationship between outsiders and insiders in peacebuilding contexts is typically marked more by conflict than by collaboration" (Donais, 2012: 34, 74). On the whole, it is, thus, fair to say that despite there being considerable literature highlighting the benefits of international-local efforts to build peace, this has yet to be fully realized in practice.

Yet the practice of international-local actors working together, both of which appear to be needed for sustainable peace, is by no means a panacea. As biases and preferences are inevitable, frictions between external interventions and locally-led initiatives are likely to occur¹²². Such collaborative work, clearly, takes extra time and effort on the part of the all actors, who need to reflect upon what they can bring to the table, and which ideas and practices take precedence.

To be sure, reaching this point is not an easy task. There is no one overarching model to follow in order to establish a more inclusive, and ultimately, effective international-local effort for peace. While much work continues to be done on this, the book argues that, to address some of the challenges discussed in various parts of the book, both international and local actors need to think more deeply about the ways in which they engage with each other. The key word is process. To progress more fully in work for peace, greater attention needs to be paid to the process (means) by which international and local actors work together.

Process here is taken to mean a negotiated space where international and local actors interact through praxis to address a common goal – to help host populations reach a lasting peace (Gittins, Forthcoming). As well as shaping and orientating the outcomes on-the-ground, a focus on the process itself can also help foster a sense of community and strengthen relationships. It can also facilitate learning in symbiotic relationships, where local and international actors are constitutive to one another, and shift as they learn from and with each other's ways of working¹²³. There may be a balance somewhere to be arrived at in this process. Sometimes local ideas may lead, sometimes international, and sometimes they come together.

¹²² Richmond (2016: 162) makes a similar claim, arguing that while international and local collaboration is necessary, it is a tight line to walk between local traditions and western notions.

¹²³ A project called "Time to Listen: Hearing people on the receiving end of international aid" underscores this point lucidly by concluding that the best way to "develop contextually appropriate strategies for pursuing positive change" is through an "international assistance system that integrates resources and experiences from outsiders with the assets and capacities of insiders to" (2012: 137). Recent ethnography research, undertaken by Auserere (2014: 67), into the study of international peace and aid work around the world, note a similar push from local counterparts towards a type of international-local partnership.

The most pressing case for this focus on process is provided by the state of the peacebuilding field. As already noted, examples exist throughout the literature illustrating how many of the persistent dysfunctions of peacebuilding revolve around the ways in which the international community interact (or do not interact) with host populations. Much of the same can also be said about international aid practice. In any case, given what was said earlier about such interactions, it is important to face the reality that the impetus for such learning and change may need to come from both ends.

The international community must base their work in host populations on locally driven priorities and processes. This requires a greater understanding, and mobilization of, local principles, knowledge (plural), and practices, considered critical to reaching a sustainable peace. This may also require extending the scope of inquiry, beyond a reliance on working with governments alone. International actors would do well recognize that they are more likely to critically assist host populations with peacebuilding activities if they also connect with the world outside the state, including civil society and people on-the-ground.

The host community must recognize that they may be able to enrich and enhance their own resources and capacities for peace if they open themselves up to collaborating further with international actors. This requires seeing sustaining peace as a core task of the host community, linked interchangeably to development. Key to this point is recognition that peace will not be sustainable in the long run without resources and funding for peacebuilding activities coming from within society itself. At the same time, they would also do well to acknowledge the comparative advantages that outsiders potentially bring.

Unfortunately, this relational process is in no way typical, as various parts of this book have already explained. The main difficulty faced in addressing this, however, is not that a change in mind-set is needed. The benefits of international and local collaborations are at the forefront of most academic and policy thinking. Rather, the main difficulty faced is that a fundamental change in practice is needed. Against this, Chapter 5 offers a promising example of how international and local actors are partnering to deliver youth peace education in many countries.

To support the further integration of international and local actors, NGP base their work on the assumption that host populations must play a key role in every stage of the process. Host populations, for example, contribute to funding student scholarships, which help initiate the programme in the beginning, act as mentors and guest speakers during the implementation phase, and take responsibility for the celebration day at the end.

This relational practice helps to address a variety of problems commonly associated with international peacebuilding operations: breaking down the barriers between international actors and their local counterparts (Autesserre (2014); and bridging the gap between international prescriptions and local needs (Richmond (2016: 89). Although different from the norm, the work of NGP is all but one example. There is still a long way to go.

It is, therefore, one of the conclusions of the book that international and local actors need to work together more often on peacebuilding efforts. Do they both have the will power and determination? That is the questions all involved in the peacebuilding community must answer. At the same time, it is necessary to look beyond international and local collaborations for peace. This leads to a final reflective question regarding the salience of ordinary people in peacebuilding efforts.

4. How might ordinary people be involved in peacebuilding efforts?

The end of Chapter 1 challenged readers to promote peace on a daily basis, so it seems to appropriate to come full circle and return to this here. A focus on the larger social and political issues discussed throughout the book matter for peacebuilding. At the same time, it is important to confront the reality that peace is not something that can be mass-produced via political leaders, civil society organizations, or international financial institutions alone. Even though these actors may set the official terms for peace programmes, it is those on-the-ground who ultimately determine the types of practices that are meaningful to them and what they want to do with them¹²⁴.

With this as the guiding rubric, a final point to make is that the quest for peace also hinges on the practices of so-called 'ordinary people'. This, again, is similar to Galtung's view that there are "tasks for everybody" in the pursuit of peace, as well as drawing attention to new ideas of local, hybrid, and everyday forms of peace, already discussed in various parts of the book. Although this has been significantly more important to the study and practice of peace than is generally understood, the book has attempted to add to an understanding of the spaces available for ordinary people to use their everyday politics and agency to engage with conflict and advance peace and change.

To advance change, peacebuilding, in its broadest sense, encompasses two inter-related dimensions: work with others and work with oneself¹²⁵. Therefore, while individual change is necessary, there is now a burgeoning sense that personal or inner change and social or outer change are intrinsically intertwined. So, one can begin understanding why there is a commonly-held view that broader social change cannot occur without us changing along with it. To paraphrase Gandhi, each of us must embody the change we seek in the world. In the end, we are all defined by our actions, so it is up to us all to decide them carefully.

In this spirit, the introductory chapter noted how peace is essentially about relationships (Section 1.7, also Chapter 8, Section 8.3.3). The general argument put forward is that the same principles apply to most relationships – inclusion-exclusion; collaboration-competition; trust-mistrust; presence-distance; monolog-dialogue (Gittins, Forthcoming). Each of us, therefore, must hold ourselves to account, reflecting upon the extent to which our actions contribute to or impede peaceful or unpeaceful relationships. In brief, each

¹²⁴ This paragraph draws directly from and builds on the work of Paula Pickering (2007: 3), who highlights how "[E]ven though local political elites set the official terms of citizenship, it is ordinary people in the postwar period who interpret official constraints and decide what to do about them".

¹²⁵ The author has already, however, acknowledged recent arguments made for 'peace with nature' (Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2).

of us can become agents for peace, by focusing on the types of relationships we develop in our daily lives. Clearly, this is not easy.

Here it is, thus, helpful to remember the advice in Chapter 1 (Section 1.7), which provided readers with some practical ideas about how they themselves can advance the development of peaceful relationships. Specifically, it highlighted how the ‘core conditions’ of empathy, acceptance, and honesty have been found to be provide the conditions most closely related to growth in human relationships. The challenge, therefore, is for each of us to develop ways of being with ourselves and others that permit constructive change, and thereby higher levels of peace. This can start with each of us right now. So, let us not wait any longer; go forth and take up the challenge.

ANEXXES

Chart No 1
Bolivia: Social Conflicts, 1982-2015

CONFLICTS	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Demonstrations and protests	1.107	1.235	967	1.083	1.097	1.123	1.053	1.238	206	434	2.991	1.011	1.015	958	1.325	1.114	1.055	960
Strikes	3.354	3.469	2.457	1.813	1.845	987	768	424	410	328	677	665	621	631	1.400	538	316	82
Strikes and estate of emergency	600	900	460	190	210	345	312	623	863	357	445	880	507	729	1.216	513	487	238
Road blockades	377	437	204	117	321	167	195	342	164	133	128	503	225	173	239	274	204	135
Strikes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blockades and riots	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asesallamiento (tracking position against law)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	5.438	6.041	4.088	3.203	3.473	2.622	2.328	2.627	1.643	1.252	4.241	3.059	2.368	2.491	4.180	2.439	2.062	1.415


Source: INE, Naciona Institute of Statistics
Own elaboration

....continuation

CONFLICTS	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014P	2015P
Demonstrations and protests	1.450	1.293	1.256	2.371	2.254	2.476	1.300	4.325	3.469	1.795	1.912	2.766	2.831	3.872	2.429	2.585
Strikes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Strikes and estate of emergency	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Road blockades	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Strikes	359	501	450	944	1.086	1.792	1.017	1.206	1.162	383	506	472	1.102	842	513	836
Blockades and riots	384	562	455	581	567	1.526	935	1.426	1.035	1.148	597	1.081	472	1.478	1.223	1.452
Asesallamiento (tracking position against law)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	117	95	159	118	93	145
TOTAL	2.193	2.356	2.161	3.896	3.907	5.794	3.252	6.957	5.666	3.326	3.132	4.414	4.564	6.310	4.258	5.018

Source: INE, Naciona Institute of Statistics
Own elaboration


Chart No 1
Bolivia: Social Conflicts, 1982-201



Source: INE, National Institute of Statistics

Own elaboration


Chart No 2
Bolivia: number of social conflicts per day, 1982-2015



Source: INE, National Institute of Statistics

Own elaboration

Chart No 3
Bolivia: Growing of Social Conflict Vs Econocmic Growing, 1982-2005




Source: INE, National Institute of Statistics – National Police

Own elaboration

€: estimate

Chart N° 4
Social Conflicts in Bolivia, 1982-2014(p)
(According to the Government)



Source: INE, National Institute of Statistics

(p): Preliminar

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