



FROM DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION  
TO DEMOCRACY LEARNING



# FROM DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY LEARNING

TOWARDS A PARADIGMATIC TURN IN  
DEMOCRATIZATION STUDIES

EDITED BY

MOHAMED EL HACHIMI



*Publié par  
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.*

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*Editeur pour la Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung : Dr. Helmut Reifeld*

*Coordination : Abir Ibourk*

*Mise en pages : Babel com, Rabat, Maroc*

*Impression : Lawne, Rabat, Maroc*

*Dépôt légal : 2018MO2830*

*ISBN : 978-9920-36-046-3*

*Edition 2018*

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# Preface

*Laurence Whitehead*

In September 2017 the CERSS hosted the international conference in Rabat, entitled "From Democratic Transition to Democracy Learning". With the generous support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation some of the major presentations at that event are now published in revised form in this ten essay collection. There was naturally a particular interest in Morocco (covered directly in four out of these ten contributions) with transversal papers on state ideology, Islamic doctrine, youth and gender issues. But the scope of the conference discussion extended more widely across the post-2011 political panorama in the Arab world. Other country studies concern Iraq and Tunisia, together with more comparative essays in international relations topics (two), plus literature and democratic pedagogy. The unifying concern, as suggested by the title of the event, was the aftermath of the so-called "Arab spring" upheavals, and its implications for the hoped-for eventual progress in a broadly democratic direction despite the general absence of democratic regime "transitions". More broadly, the deeper question is what sort of socially inclusive and politically responsive outcomes may prove viable in the Arab world, given the lessons of recent experience indicating that standard "models" derived from elsewhere are either not transferable to this region, or at least in need of considerable adjustment before they can take root there. The rubric of "Democracy Learning" captures that concern, while also hinting that there may be some lessons from regional experience worthy of inclusion in more universal accounts of democratization.

These are multi-disciplinary and exploratory essays, and they refer to a variety of overlapping but not fully integrated themes, reflecting processes that are generally incomplete, and in many cases still even in flux. It is worth recalling that during his long life Konrad Adenauer himself also lived through extremely turbulent times, quite as disorienting as anything studied here.



So it would be wrong to conclude that such conflicting and uncertain interpretations are peculiar to any one large region of the world, or give grounds for long run pessimism about the scope for democratic advance in the Arab world. To the contrary, what these short essays underscore is the emergence in the region of a new generation of arab scholars, well aware of the flourishing international literature on this theme, but also fully alert to the challenges of adapting and applying its standard concepts and methods in the clearly *sui generis* context of their own lived experiences, and the specific trajectories of each nation's political and cultural evolution. In short, the Rabat conference, and the publication to which it now gives rise, provides a vivid demonstration of the rich and growing potential of its own subject matter – i.e. of arab "democracy learning".

# Introduction I

*Larbi Sadiki, Mohamed El Hachimi*

It goes without saying that North Africa as part of the Arab world has historically featured as a contributor to Euro-Med cultures and civilizations. Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Phoenicia all at one point in time or another mediated processes of infusion, inclusion and diffusion of 'learning'. The flow was not one-way. The 'travel' of ideas left lasting inscriptions on North Africa's cultural map. As North Africa enters its 'democratic' and 'revolutionary' moment, it is apposite to address the question of democratic knowledge and trans-democratic exchange. This question is noted by glaring omission in most accounts of Arab North Africa (ANA) since the eruption of the 2011 uprisings. This moment registers continuity as much as rupture. It is a moment opportune for a break, encouraging the unshackling of the region from postcolonial histories of tutelage from without. Yet, at the same time, it renews the practice of exchange, thus unmaking North Africa as a space of 'exile', 'exception' and 'otherness' and remaking it as a shared space of democratizing ferment, democratic exchange, and diffusion of democratic knowledge.

The air of superiority evidenced by many Orientalist writings on the Arab Middle East (AME) continues to prejudice the terms of how 'West' meets 'East' in relation to democratization. When 'West' meets 'East', contrast and difference reign supreme. The 'West' is privileged as the sole source of all knowledge of good government whilst the 'East' or 'Orient' is paired with 'West' only for the convenience of constructing mirror images. 'Orient' is invented to highlight and celebrate, by way of contrast, what the 'West' is and is not. In such mirror images, the 'non-West' is marginal to rationality, peripheral to theory and on the sidelines of knowledge-making. Many accounts of polity and society of the Arab Middle East generally expose the survival of this line of thinking.

Notwithstanding the persistence of the presuppositions of this transitology, there have been concerted efforts to break from its stranglehold. Scholarly journals and books have been published acknowledging the 'indigenous' capacity to drive change. Many of these focus on the sociological dimensions of popular mobilisation e.g. the globalising effects of social media in the Arab Spring. However, what is conspicuously lacking, in these otherwise astute accounts, is the synergy created between the 'West' and the 'East'. That is, the capacity of Arab publics to self-consciously draw on the resources, not just of social media, but also of the broader repertoire of democracy, freedom and human rights. Previous attempts to study the Arab Spring have identified the 'empirical' facets of its unfolding without duly recognising the 'theory' espoused by participants. Further, the critical application of a 'meta-theory' to political change away from autocracy to democracy in ANA is seemingly absent.

The 'East' – or the Arab world – is not just a 'workshop' or 'laboratory' where experimentation with the ideas and theories invented in, and by, the 'West' takes place. The democratic moment North African revolutions have heralded has necessitated cross-pollination: the ethos of pluralism, good government, and democratic identity defy being 'boxed' into a single location, paradigm of knowledge, ethnicity, region, religion or civilization. Today, this region pulsates with the ethics and values of democratizing futures. Democracy itself continues to be contested, making room for temporal, spatial and cultural difference and specificity as well as for shared spaces and commonality. Indeed, these newly emerging spaces spell 'in-between-ness', negating democratic mentoring from the 'West' to the rest, singular democratic knowing and 'civilizing'.

What is ruled out is the complete and utter unilateral exercise of power. Individuals and groups are either coerced or consented into subjection - authoritarian or democratic. Importantly, both of these processes involve a plurality of actors. Power is thus an incomplete act requiring opposing sites of reception. An arch of possibilities emerges within the stories told and retold that accompany agency. Moreover, re-narrations are not necessarily orally communicated. They can be expressed

in actions. From the graffiti paintings that litter walls on the streets of Cairo depicting fallen martyrs to protesters in Tunis or Rabat chanting in unison, meaning is embodied in words and deeds. Democracy's indeterminacy contains the thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics, dialogism and resistance. Meaning and power flow into one another without either wholly submerging the other. No longer is it tenable to suggest a binary of democracy versus despotism. Democracy exists in a fluid sense requiring constant 'renewals' without which institutions and elections contract further in an attempt to exclude their source of legitimacy - the voting citizenry. Even when such a scenario ensues, a liminal moment emerges that creates a shared platform, simultaneously physical and imaginative, of contestation. 'Domination' and 'resistance' ensue in the liminal or 'interstitial' space where seeming contradictions are maintained and subverted.

Additionally, Resistance techniques and revolutionary know-how have opened ample spaces of knowledge convergence and transfer. New social movements from Morocco to Egypt are grasping each other's lessons into how to rebuild bottom-up activism and deploy their followers for the travails of rolling back authoritarianism. Amongst states, elections, constitution-making, the quest for transitional justice, and coalition-building are all processes that continue to enrich the emergence of democratic identities and moralities. Western partners are less certain about their ways and today approach democracy promotion as partial stakeholders and not exclusively in full possession of democratic transitional know-how. Since 2011, with the transitional processes in full swing, and yet still unfurling and incomplete, new elites, political parties, forces, voices and discourses are learning the democratic rope. Their stories wait to be narrated. Of all the issues that relate to the democratic and revolutionary moment in North Africa, none takes precedence over democratic knowledge as the newest 'turn' calling for special attention.

This volume contains the major research papers presented by social scientists from Europe, United States, Japan and the Arab World at the conference held in Rabat on 29-30 September 2017. The articles examine the problematic of democratic

knowledge from different theoretical perspectives. In spite of the methodological specificities each one of these papers might have opted for, they all seek to highlight the learning of democracy through processes of infusion and infusion and exchange of knowledge between the Arab world and the West.

The authors follow several lines of investigation. Some contributors question the unequal exchanges between the Arab world and the West in the ongoing process of learning and democratization. In this period of in-between-ness, these authors (Sadiki, Whitehead, El Hachimi) seem to be concerned by the need to understand the modalities of deployment of the domination-resistance dialectic. The three authors attempt to determine the extent to which the new democratic knowledge generated by the events of the Arab uprising challenges the "democratic knowledge" produced by and in the Euro-American context. The other contributors try to explore the actions taken and approaches adopted by actors (from the Arab world and the West) to create new democratic knowledge adapted and specific to the current democratic moment. These contributions cover various democratic knowledge issues such as gendering democratic knowledge production (Rachid Touhtou), measuring civil society's democracy learning (Alexander Peter Martin, Mustapha El Mnasfi, Said Bennis), obstacles to democracy learning (Keiko Sakai), Islamists movements and democracy learning (Mohamed Fadil and Abdelhakim Aboullouz).

# Introduction II

*Mohamed El Hachimi, Larbi Sadiki*

Il va sans dire que le Monde arabe a historiquement contribué aux cultures et civilisations Euro-méditerranéennes. La Mésopotamie, l'Égypte ou la Phénicie ont toutes à un moment ou à un autre de l'histoire joué un rôle déterminant dans les processus de transfert, de diffusion, et d'échange du savoir avec d'autres civilisations. Ces processus n'étaient pas des flux à sens unique. C'était un voyage d'idées qui n'a pas manqué de marquer indélébilement la carte culturelle de l'Afrique du Nord et du Monde Arabe. Aujourd'hui au alors que l'Afrique du Nord vit son moment « démocratique » et « révolutionnaire », il semble judicieux d'aborder la question de la connaissance/savoir démocratique et des échanges trans-démocratiques. Cette question semble avoir passée sous silence dans l'analyse des événements de l'après 2011. L'étape que traverse l'Afrique du Nord, avec ses continuités et ses ruptures, offre une opportunité inédite pour émanciper la région des clichés orientalistes et de la tutelle de l'historiographie coloniale.

L'air de supériorité qui marque de nombreux écrits orientalistes sur le Moyen-Orient continue de peser sur la représentation que « l'Occident » se fait de « l'Orient » par rapport à la question de la démocratisation. Le rapport entre « Orient » et « Occident » est souvent perçu sous l'angle de leurs contrastes et différences. « L'Occident » est souvent privilégié comme la seule source de toute connaissance du bon gouvernement, tandis que « l'Orient » n'est associé à « l'Occident » que pour le besoin de s'en servir comme miroir. Dans cette optique, « l'Orient » apparaît comme s'il était inventé pour souligner et faire l'éloge, par contraste, de ce que « l'Occident » est ou n'est pas. Dans de telles « images miroir », le « Non-Occident » est généralement réduit à une simple périphérie de « l'Occident » en termes de rationalité, de théorie et de production de la connaissance.

Cette ligne de pensée peut être décelée dans de nombreux récits ayant pour objet les régimes politiques ou les sociétés de l'Afrique du Nord et du Monde arabe en général, dont notamment les travaux des *transitologues* et *consolidologues*. Nonobstant la persistance de certaines présuppositions de cette *transitologie*, des efforts concertés remarquables sont aujourd'hui consentis pour échapper à sa linéarité fatale et à son caractère téléologique anhistorique. A cet égard, plusieurs travaux scientifiques reconnaissent l'existence d'une certaine «capacité endogène» de conduire le changement. Par exemple, beaucoup d'écrits mettent l'accent sur les dimensions sociologiques de la mobilisation populaire e.g. les effets globalisateurs des réseaux sociaux dans le printemps arabe. Cependant, ce qui semble manifestement faire défaut à ces analyses, plutôt astucieuses, c'est la création d'une synergie entre l'Occident et l'Orient. On entend par là, le fait de reconnaître la capacité des peuples arabes à s'appuyer consciencieusement, non seulement sur les ressources des réseaux sociaux, mais aussi puiser dans le répertoire encore plus large de la démocratie, de la liberté et des droits de l'homme. A cet égard, certaines tentatives visant à étudier le «printemps arabe» ont identifié les facettes «empiriques» de son déroulement, sans pour autant dûment reconnaître le cadre conceptuel et théorique adopté par ses acteurs. Il faut souligner aussi l'absence, dans ces analyses, de toute sorte de «méta-théorie» des changements politiques que connaît la région.

L'«Orient» – ou le Monde arabe ne peut être réduit à un simple «atelier» ou «laboratoire» d'expérimentation des idées et des théories inventées par, et en «Occident». Le moment démocratique que les révolutions arabes semblent présager a nécessité une sorte de «pollinisation croisée». En effet, l'éthos du pluralisme, du bon gouvernement et l'identité démocratique semblent résister à toute tendance à les associer à une quelconque zone géographique, paradigme, origine ethnique, région, religion ou civilisation. Il est vrai que la démocratie continue d'être contestée, mais sans pour autant faire obstacle à l'émergence d'espaces d'expression de certaines des valeurs les plus fondamentales de l'idéal démocratique. C'est dire qu'aujourd'hui, le Monde arabe ne semble plus être intrinsèquement hostile à l'éthique et aux valeurs démocratiques.

Cette situation « d'intermédialité » aurait au moins le mérite de remettre en question les diktats de la *Democracy promotion* d'un occident auto-érigé en unique maître de la démocratie.

Il paraît, selon toute vraisemblance, que les techniques de résistance et le savoir-faire révolutionnaire ont ouvert de vastes espaces de convergence et de transfert de connaissances. En effet, les nouveaux mouvements sociaux, du Maroc à l'Égypte semblent tirer des leçons les uns des autres en vue de reconstruire des formes d'activisme par le bas qui seraient à même de faire face aux autoritarismes en place. Dans plusieurs pays arabes, les processus électoraux, les réformes constitutionnelles, la mise en place des mécanismes de justice transitionnelle et la construction de coalitions civiles, sont autant de processus qui favorisent l'émergence d'identités et d'éthiques démocratiques. De leur part, les acteurs des programmes de la *Democracy promotion* semblent plutôt hésitants et incertains. Ils ne sont plus en mesure de se comporter comme porteurs de projet de démocratisation et uniques détenteurs du savoir-faire démocratique. De toutes les questions que posent aujourd'hui la dynamique politique en cours dans le Monde arabe, rien ne semble primer sur celle relative à la connaissance démocratique comme nouveau tournant appelant une attention particulière.

Cet ouvrage contient l'essentiel des travaux de recherche présentés par spécialistes du Monde arabe lors du colloque qui s'est tenu à Rabat les 29-30 Septembre 2017. Les articles ici publiés examinent la problématique de la connaissance démocratique à partir d'angles d'attaque variables selon les exigences méthodologiques de leurs disciplines respectives. Toutefois ils ont tous en point commun de chercher à mettre en évidence l'apprentissage de la démocratie à travers des processus d'infusion et de diffusion et d'échange de connaissances entre le Monde arabe et l'Occident.

Pour ce faire, les auteurs empruntent plusieurs pistes d'investigation. Certains s'interrogent sur les échanges inégaux, entre le Monde arabe et l'Occident, dans le processus d'apprentissage et de démocratisation déjà en cours. En cette période de l'entre-deux, ou « d'intermédialité », ces auteurs



(Sadiki, Whitehead, El Hachimi) semblent être animés par le besoin de comprendre les modalités de déploiement de la dialectique domination-résistance. Les articles des trois auteurs convergent vers l'objectif de voir si et dans quelle mesure les nouvelles connaissances démocratiques générées par les événements du printemps arabe défient-ils le « savoir démocratique » produit par et dans le contexte Euro-américain. D'autres auteurs tentent d'explorer les démarches engagées par les acteurs (du Monde arabe et de l'occident) pour créer de nouvelles connaissances démocratiques adaptées et propres au moment démocratique actuel.

# Democratic Learning: Learning not Imposed by Obligatory Instruction, but Acquired through Dialogue and Reflection

*Laurence Whitehead*

The overall title of this conference is “from democratic transition to democratic learning”. Since I began my career in this field as one of the authors and editors of the four volume “transitions from authoritarian rule” project published by Johns Hopkins University Press thirty one years ago, I shall start this address my reflecting on the evolving relationship between the respective concepts of “transition” and “learning”. We foundational “transitologists” were trying to tackle a rather specific issue- prompted in particular by Spain’s surprisingly smooth and complete shift from the shamelessly repressive Franco dictatorship to its inclusively constitutional and democratic successor regime, we aimed to identify the dynamic pathways that might also be applicable in other comparable countries at that time. In practice we limited ourselves to the contemporary conservative authoritarian regimes of Latin America and southern Europe. Only later did “transitology” get extended to post-communist states, one party regimes in Africa, etc. Our initial focus was therefore on well established sovereign states with extensive histories of constitutional governance, including elections, fixed term presidencies, supreme courts and so forth. For that reason we did not need to place “learning” about basic aspects of democratic practice and normativity at the forefront of our analysis. We could take processes of state formation and civic education as background conditions (often weak and uneven, but in any case long-standing) rather than key variables to be independently explained. Transitologists were always aware that learning mattered in the course of democratization, and in particular they paid attention to the ways in which rewriting the “rules of the political game” would both promote and require the political re-education first of key actors and

then also of the citizenry as a whole. Later work on “learning to lose” underscored the importance of establishing trustworthy electoral processes through which political time horizons could be lengthened so that those who were defeated in one contest would practice patience and learn from mistakes in order to be more competitive in the following iteration. As transitions arose in a wider array of contexts we took the view that even in the absence of prior democratic experience pathways could be found – although they might be more protracted, erratic, and prone to reversals.

Three decades later we have much more comparative evidence to work with, as democratization studies have encompassed all regions of the world, in many more diverse – often unpromising – national contexts. One general lesson one could draw from all these experiences is that democratization processes are typically long-term, complex, multi-dimensional, and at least partially reversible political trajectories. Clearly, when examined from this broader comparative perspective, the role of democratic learning returns to the foreground. In its most inclusive sense this refers to a range of political socialization activities that can take place before the beginning of a democratic transition, as well as those arising from the regime change itself, together with further learning processes that will extend far beyond the start point of the new democratic institutional order.

So what precisely does “democratic learning” involve? It should be understood as a continuous, collective, discursive, and adaptive process. As indicated by the “learning to lose” example already cited, this includes some complex, even counter – intuitive, ideas – ways of acting in society that, to put it mildly, tend to run counter to some other strong and recurrent human impulses. It requires the ability to anticipate and weigh up not just immediate consequences of an action but also those several steps further on. That requires patience, and the disposition to work with lengthened time horizons. Moreover, democratic pay-offs are often socially dispersed rather than directly calculable personal benefits. To value these requires a sense of the collective interest, community, and empathy for non-kin. In fact, such learning depends on developing an understanding

of group history, a capacity for second-best reasoning, a sense of trust in public institutions, and a tolerance of difference. This involves not only the deployment of reason, but also the expression of suitably controlled emotions. All of these are complex forms of learned behavior. Good citizens also develop a capacity to persuasively express themselves in public debates, with accompanying sense of self-restraint and acceptance of the dignity of others. Obviously not all citizens in really existing democracies invariably satisfy these requirements. In addition, some – though not all – of these forms of complex learning are equally relevant to becoming a good communist, or a true believer in other non-democratic religious or secular doctrines. Although such forms of learning are therefore not necessarily democratic in themselves, they may qualify as democratic learning to the extent that they can facilitate democratization once the institutional incentives for it are in place.

In contrast to this perspective on democratic learning stands the more traditional idea that the definition of liberal democracy has long been settled, and the best examples are well-known, so all that is needed is to copy from their unquestionable experience. Current developments in Britain, the USA, and elsewhere indicate that to the contrary even the most secure democracies require periodic refreshment and re-learning (or arguably a lot more re-examination than that). More relevant here is the post-Iraq and post-Arab Spring evidence that national contexts really matter, and that supposed “lessons from elsewhere” are far less uniform and readily transferable than was imagined by past liberal internationalist orthodoxy. Such discordant evidence has lent support to theorists of “aversive” democracy, and students of comparative political thought, who explain why self-contained packages of supposedly universal democratic truth in fact rest on shaky conceptual foundations. So “learning” democracy is never simply a matter of assimilating some pre-digested certainties, but always requires reflexivity, constructivism, and the internalization of norms rooted in local understandings.

It is always the case that even the most cogent and socially embedded of democratic norms will have to coexist with other potentially rival beliefs and values – national pride, religious

conviction, class interest, racial and linguistic cleavages, and so forth. Thus the task of preserving strong public support for the processing of such issues by democratic means is never finished – new tests constantly arise, and a successful democracy must always be innovating. The passage from each generation to the next provides a powerful illustration of this point. No matter how deeply committed to democratic practices the current generation of citizens (perhaps reacting against Nazism or communism or some other anti-democratic trauma they have witnessed) their children and then their grandchildren will not automatically inherit the same convictions. Even in the most impressive of Scandinavian democracies active learning and re-socialization, with adaptations to the changing priorities of the rising generations, will be indispensable for the maintenance of institutional consensus. Otherwise – as illustrated by the return of white supremacy in parts of the US at present – democratic practices can easily be eroded, or even unlearned. If this is evident in some of the world's oldest and strongest democratic regimes, the need for sustained learning, renewal, and reactivation of democratic ideas is all the more urgent in less supportive settings.

When understood in this way democratic learning cannot be reduced to a simple exercise of reciting catchphrases from school lessons, or deferring to the orthodoxies proclaimed in public assemblies. It must involve reflexivity, deliberation, and practical engagement in lived experiences. Electoral contests and perhaps contact with political parties or activist organizations may be the most frequent and formative of these exposures, but sites of democratic learning are manifold – they include the family, the workplace, the local community, and even the religious assembly. Although the overarching focus and major location for most political life remains the nation-state democratic learning operates as much at the micro- and meso-levels of social life as in the macro-setting of national politics. For this reason, while legality and the normative endorsement of a democratic rule of law require firm support, good citizenship implies more active and participatory engagement than mere obedience to duly constituted authorities. Curiosity, imagination, inventiveness, and the promotion of inclusive solutions to collective problems are also important attributes to cultivate if democratic vitality is to be promoted.

Indeed learning *about* democracy should not be confused with democratic learning in the sense discussed here. After all, it is perfectly possible to study democratic principles and rules for the purpose of identifying their weaknesses, in order not to promote but to thwart them. The concern of this project is with democracy learning *for beneficial use* by participating public at large. This will naturally include some learning from theory, and from relevant examples of experience, but it also needs to be relevant and empowering for a diverse and perhaps partly unschooled population – not just for elites. The benefits of democratic engagement may need to be taught to large groups with no prior experience of such access. As the benefits of such lessons are internalized democracy can become more spontaneous, more broadly based, more locally owned, and therefore better defended against backlash. At the same time, democracy learning conceived in this way can never be a very harmonious affair- it must involve disagreements and clashes, false trails and reversals, and a constant tension between local spontaneity and experimentation on the one side, and overall cohesion and collective solidarity on the other.

To study all this more closely requires various procedures of disaggregation. Three headings can be briefly indicated here: diverse categories of learners; multiple types of lesson; and varied channels of transmission.

Old elites can be expected to learn to adapt to democracy in different ways from previously uninvolved majorities. Particular sectors will be affected according to their specific functions. For example, the judiciary, the security forces, and the legal profession will all face highly specialized new requirements. Journalists and media operatives accustomed to practicing their profession under censorship or control will have the opportunity to develop more open, competitive, and democratic alternative forms of communication. Teachers and professors will likewise face new challenges. Police must also learn new principles of action. Revolutionary dissidents must also adapt and learn new ways if they are to flourish under democratic conditions. Clearly when learners are so diverse the lessons they need can hardly be uniform, although they will need to be convergent.

Different types of lesson will be needed according to the type of student group in question. In very hierarchical institutions such as the police and the judiciary operating procedures may be redesigned from above without too much breach of continuity- but subsequent cycles of training and promotion may incorporate various forms of democratic learning. One recurrent method of resetting the agenda for such professions is to hold "Truth and Reconciliation" hearings, which can be highly educational in the right settings. Academics may well be encouraged to contribute to historical revisionism designed to enhance the legitimacy of the democratic regime. Political parties and their operatives will have strong incentives to reposition both their programmes and their narratives. Voluntary associations, by contrast, may want to learn how to exercise their autonomy, and to make their voices heard for the first time. This list of different lessons is obviously no more than illustrative.

The third area of disaggregation concerns the many channels of transmission through which these any new lessons may disseminated to these highly diverse target audiences. Democracy learning can take place through formal education, via the mass media, the courts, or in constitutional conventions, legislative assemblies, and party conferences. But it also needs to be studied in less formal settings. The family, the workplace, and the local community – even the mosque – are also critical sites of learning and adaptation. Elite salons can prove influential in some settings, or trade union branch meetings may matter more in others. Important lessons may also derived from the experiences of neighboring countries – for example as transmitted by satellite television. Mixed in with all this there will also be externally funded "democracy promotion" initiatives-and indeed activities like the one you are reading at this moment, funded by the Adenauer Foundation and supported by a network of Moroccan scholars and their foreign guests.

The study of "democracy learning" in the Maghreb is in its infancy. Many exciting challenges lie ahead.

# Locating “Democratic Knowledge”: Towards a ‘Democratic Knowledge’ Turn? Knowledge Production in the Age of the Arab Spring<sup>1</sup>

*Larbi Sadiki*

It is important to say at the start that as students of democratization we form a small part of the jigsaw of interrogating knowing and knowledge. Both are vital foci that guide our path to shedding light, comparatively when possible, on how rethinking democratization in the context of the Arab region, and of the cascading changes Maghrebis and Arabs will witness in years to come. What began in Tunisia in 2011 is an unstoppable ‘train’ – for us – of thought and of thinking into the biggest moral puzzle of our time, good rule and democratic citizenship. There were Euro-American pioneers in this field long before the Arab ‘subalterns’ can speak, to paraphrase Spivak. Our weight as lovers of wisdom – whatever that means today – is such that we can only act as a catalyst, in particular trying to engage local knowledge – without rejecting what our wider world has to offer in the realm of ideas, theory and experience, as Whitehead called it in his deconstructionist masterpiece of the democratic paradigm. Why Democratic Knowledge?

My paper posits an innovative epistemological framework- “democratic knowledge” – to studying Arab political change and democratization, particularly relevant since the Arab Spring’s eruption. For me this attempt at contributing something creative is an alternative to both: prevailing ‘political culture’ approaches whose essentialist reductionism has long plagued studies of Arab politics and democratization, teleological Western ‘transitology’ perspectives whose analytic barrenness has been empirically exposed by the current uprisings.”<sup>2</sup> How might the region’s thawrat (revolutions), the so-called ‘rupture’ building up for years, be more fruitfully approached by students of Middle



Eastern politics? This question is vital for our collective endeavor to locate and situate 'democratic knowledge'.

I argue that indigenous political change is invariably intertwined, if not rooted in, local knowledge. To explore this dynamism and engagement across space, time, and cultures, a paradigm shift away from the anachronistic 'old rules' of studying Arab political change is in order. Thus, my aim in JNAS and my article in the special issue was to seek to "develop a clear understanding of democratic knowledge" after providing a background of the "historical foundations of knowledge in both Western and Arab intellectual traditions," including Foucault and Bourdieu-inspired "critiques of knowledge practices." Part of that scholarly engagement, I began to explain "democratic knowledge headon, with specific reference to the Arab context, specifically in situations of initial democratic acquisition/transition/transformation."

This task involves a discussion of "decolonizing knowledge"<sup>3</sup> and a consideration of the "methodological implications of democratic knowledge, namely, appreciation of local knowledge production, which remains under-represented in narratives of Arab democracy and democratization."<sup>4</sup> Theoretical background on democratic knowledge "The departure point of my JNAS train of thought is that good government must be in the first instance rooted in a system of local knowledge. The term 'local' speaks to locality and specificity in the assimilation, application, and interpretation of ideas, values, morals, myths, symbols and the technologies they necessitate."<sup>5</sup> Thus democratic knowledge can be understood through an examination of the *makhzun* مخزون. That is, the system or repertoire of local knowledge, "which people adaptively and inter-generationally transmit and supplement as they manage change over time and space, is integral to the identity template of society as a whole" and which "engenders belonging." Intersecting with the *makhzun* is the "socio-cultural imaginary" or "filter" of the *mikhyal* to "rea[d] and ma[p] out the world and mak[e] sense of it in the quest for self-conception."<sup>6</sup>

Like those of other societies, the Arab *mikhyal* is "subject to revision due to encounters with competing imaginaries, including millennial processes of cross-cultural fertilization."<sup>7</sup> "Imagining democracy" in the Arab context will necessarily draw on the (dynamic) indigenous *makhzun* and *mikhyal*; encounters with the West in often messy (if not violent) processes of colonization, modernization, and globalization feature prominently here.<sup>8</sup> Importantly, "Democratic knowledge in both the Maghrebi and Arab contexts will find it difficult to transgress the symbiosis of God and man, and the individual and the group." Islam is part of the picture, as "any realistic conception of a democratic knowledge system may not be able to eschew religious sensibilities—not organized religion."<sup>9</sup> What is my definition of democratic knowledge? Firstly, Democratic knowledge refers to the intellectual and practical capacities, skills, ethics whose primary cognitive weight lends itself to democratic learning, and civic habituation and socialization via an open-ended, constructivist, interactive, cross-cultural but also reflexive process, across time and space, cumulatively and collaboratively. Secondly, Democratic knowledge is relative to the local context in which good government is formed, grounding it within the inherited repertoire of ideas, morals, including faith-based, and within institutions, significations, and experiences, but without excluding global adaptations."<sup>10</sup> Thirdly, Importantly, "the binary division between elites and peoples is avoided, making the process a collaborative one, a shared undertaking."<sup>11</sup> With collaborative being here the operative term. Lastly, to go back to Spivak, "subaltern" agency "through struggles, discourses, and the medium of speaking and writing back" is a notable pattern in this process of change,<sup>12</sup> as I have envisioned it, and continue to grapple with it.

Towards a "Paradigm Shift"? The need for a "paradigm shift", in the tradition of Thomas Kuhn), beckons because "democracy may be a universal good, but operationalizing it cannot escape the linguistic, cultural, historical and power-based facts specific to the host context"<sup>13</sup>: "Knowledge-making calls for contextualization and historicization. Democratic knowledge is no exception... 'especially when democracy is concerned': learning democracy does not avail outside history, language, politics, culture and local knowing. We are often reminded of the

contested nature of democracy; we should be equally reminded of the essentially contested nature of knowledge too. It implies power."<sup>14</sup>

This notion of continuous contestation and contestability – which scholars such as Whitehead have engaged with in their writing is integral to both democracy and democratization – moral projects that refuse uniformity and conformity. The dominant paradigm of Euro-American transitology (a la Huntington thirdwave, which I elaborated in my OUP book: *Rethinking Arab democratization*), then, has outlived its analytic usefulness: "Thus, the Arab Spring erupts at a historical juncture when the utility and explanatory power Western transitology is subject to revision and problematization",<sup>15</sup> as anticipated by Carothers and Whitehead. Particularly when it comes to Maghrebis and Arabs, moving past the transitology paradigm is paramount to a "decolonization" of knowledge, in the legacy of Foucault's understanding of knowledge as socially constructed, mediated through language and discourse, rendering thus knowledge-power as domination rather than simply emancipation.<sup>16</sup> Here we can get past narratives of Arab non-potential for democracy: "Like Foucault's prisoner, the Arab 'non-democrat' is a discursive formation, a peculiarity, a perversity, not devoid of the entanglements of knowledge and power, a subjectivity reconstituted their attendant discourses. Along the same lines of profiling the prisoner, the 'Oriental' is objectified in knowledge and discourse practices as mostly inhospitable to democracy or civil society", doubly ostracized due to liberal theory's obsession with secularity in ways that simply do little to explain non-Western and specifically Arab societies.

**Decolonizing Knowledge of Democracy & Democratization** How can we decolonize knowledge of democracy and democratization in ways relevant to the Arab world and the Arab Spring? In a word: look to the "local." "Third wave" studies' focus on teleological democratic processes and dichotomous categorizations of democracy and autocracy must be overcome. These academic emphases run parallel to Western (particularly American) policy interests as evident in a dizzying cycle of research funding, publications, expertise, and political/policy

staffing. Here challenges emerge: "a) to refigure the study and understanding of democratization along heterogeneous lines and b) go beyond their operationalization as pragmatic, practical and analytical categories closely tied to interest (i.e. security, hegemony, expansionism, opposition to Islamism, etc.) or ideology-driven agendas (liberalism, capitalism). Conceptually, democracy and democratization must be unshackled from their narrow use in some Euro-American scholarship as uniquely Western... Widening the horizon of how democracy and democratization are researched must include knowledge-making and practices in a way that encourage Muslim, Arab and Maghrebi studies to explore conceptual, theoretical, practical, and historical continuities, autonomous frameworks, and legacies."<sup>17</sup>

Locating Democratic Knowledge Thus the tough assignment of locating democratic knowledge must draw upon local knowledge will thus enrich and expand theories of democratization, making them more relevant and increasing their explanatory power. The potential for engaging with the "local" will additionally play a self-emancipatory and cross-culturally conciliatory role "instead of arousing ghettoizing and atavistic propensities" whether on a domestic, regional, or international scale.<sup>18</sup> The point here is thus: "Democracy and democratization cannot be articulated, much less practiced, through solely imported standards."<sup>19</sup> Empirically and theoretically, the bottom-up "unruliness" of Arab Spring mass protests, which has inserted itself into the Arab makhzun and mikhyal, is an exemplar starting point.<sup>20</sup> Such an examination would go beyond Arab critiques of Orientalist knowledgemaking that, while innovative in their deconstructive capacity, suffer from an elite bias and a preoccupation with past knowledge, the tradition or turath.

Necessary here is to add to the historical makhzun to "capture new learning, new challenges, and new realities that ought to supplement the inherited makhzun for the purpose of building a system of democratic knowledge made up of thought, practices, ethics, struggles, and adaptations, including from abroad" to spur the "paradigm shift" needed in a post-2011 era.<sup>21</sup> Here a "balancing act between knowledge deconstruction

and knowledge reconstruction is imperative.”<sup>22</sup> Implications of the argument/conclusion Consider democracy a moment of liminality, in Bhabha’s sense, I believe. It is a “shared platform of contestation and disputation (aimed at co-learning) and dialogism” not conflict, etc. “in the interstitial space where divergent and diverse narratives of democracy—involving power relations of ‘domination’ and subsequent ‘resistance’—meet and parley.”<sup>23</sup> What I am trying to do is to practice social sciences in a fashion that sensitize us to recognizing the power dynamics inherent in knowledge and knowledge-making, specifically with regards to democracy. The normative and academically responsible response or recourse is thus “privileging the locale’s voice” in a process of emancipation from hegemonic great power interests and funding manifest in dominant knowledge paradigms of democracy.<sup>24</sup>

Thus “Arabs and Maghrebis alike must disturb the existing universe of knowledge” to “rewrite history” (i.e. produce counter-narratives of the past) but also “inspire it” by enshrining the current “learning curve” in knowledge practice... as a step in the right direction... in our quest for democratic knowledge.

## NOTES

- 1 | *Sadiki, Larbi. 2015. "Towards a 'Democratic Knowledge' Turn? Knowledge Production in the Age of the Arab Spring." Journal of North African Studies 20(5): 702-721. [This article is his contribution to the SPECIAL ISSUE - made up of eight scholarly pieces in JNAS - dedicated to what Sadiki calls "democratic knowledge"].*
- 2 | *The work by leading democratization scholars such as Laurence Whitehead and Thomas Carothers help us on the way to refiguring new ways of doing democratization in the Arab region.*
- 3 | *Sadiki, "Democratic knowledge," p. 1.*
- 4 | *Ibid., p. 2.*
- 5 | *Ibid., p. 2-3.*
- 6 | *Ibid., p. 3.*
- 7 | *Sadiki, "Democratic knowledge," p. 3.*
- 8 | *Ibid., p. 4.*
- 9 | *Ibid., p. 5.*

- 10| Ibid., p. 5.
- 11| Ibid., p. 5.
- 12| Ibid., p. 6.
- 13| Sadiki, "Democratic knowledge," p. 6.
- 14| Ibid., p. 8.
- 15| Ibid., p. 8.
- 16| Ibid., p. 8-9.
- 17| Ibid., p. 13.
- 18| Sadiki, "Democratic knowledge," p. 13.
- 19| Ibid., p. 13.
- 20| Ibid., p. 14.
- 21| Ibid., p. 14-15.
- 22| Ibid., p. 15.
- 23| Sadiki, "Democratic knowledge," p. 15.
- 24| Ibid., p. 16.



# From Democracy Promotion to Trans-Democratic Exchange: A Critical Analysis of US and EU Democratization Programs

*Mohamed El Hachimi*

## **METHODOLOGICAL PITFALLS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION PROGRAMS**

It is well known among political science community that democracy promotion programs were designed on the basis of the transition paradigm. The implementation of US and EU democracy promotion programs is conducted by state institutions in the framework of bilateral or multilateral cooperation, but in close collaboration with research institutes and think tanks which provide practitioners with the analytical tools and conceptual framework that serve as landmarks for their work. As a consequence of this interconnectedness between democracy promotion policies and the transition paradigm, what we describe here as the methodological pitfalls of the latter are the same as the drawbacks that are rendering the former less appropriate in understanding the multidimensional and open-ended transformation processes in MENA region and Africa.

## **OVERESTIMATING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AS A FACTOR OF DEMOCRATIZATION**

Democracy promotion programs place too much emphasis on the supposedly leading role of civil society as a factor of democratization in the Arab countries. It has been argued that since civil society was used by citizens, in some parts of the world, to carve out independent space, to learn about democracy, to articulate a democratic alternative to the status quo, to spread this idea within society, and to mobilize millions of their fellow citizens against repressive regimes, it is very likely



to play a similar role in the Arab world as well.<sup>1</sup> This doesn't seem to have been the case in the countries of the MENA region because of, at least, two reasons. First, it has to be noted that such an assumption is based on a sort of analogy between the key role civil society organizations have played in the successful democratic transitions in the Eastern European countries and the role Arab civil society was tasked with. Yet, this seems to be a fallacious comparison as it did ignore the wide gap separating the conditions under which civil society actors were operating in these two different contexts.

From aid providers' perspective the very idea of using civil society as a key component of their democracy promotion toolkit has a wide appeal. This is due to the fact that the concept of civil society, as it was coined in the context of the formation of Western democracies, is inextricably linked to the role played by associations as "a sphere of citizen activity beyond direct control of government," and as such it is associated in aid providers mind with the idea of counter-weighting state power and "people power" movements to push out dictators."<sup>2</sup> In this way, civil society organizations would be able to influence policy and shape social attitudes. In doing so, they manage to form a sphere of "citizenship" that escapes the control of the state, against which they impose themselves as a real counterweight to power. Thus, bearing in mind that civil society organizations are primarily forces of democratic change, most MENA democratization programs have made civil society support a priority issue throughout the 1990s.

Indeed, by the end of the 1990, 90% of the financial assistance provided for by the European Union's strategy for the promotion of democracy and human rights was dedicated to supporting advocacy NGOs.<sup>3</sup> Likewise, civil society has often been considered one of the key tools of democratization in the American literature on Democracy Promotion.<sup>4</sup>

In fact, it is not the existence of service delivery associations as such that is problematic. Such associations also exist in established democracies such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and so on. But while service associations fulfill complementary roles to those of the state in these established

democracies, they tend to substitute for the state in undemocratic contexts. In other words, it is rather the context in which these associations operate and the relationship they have with the state that is problematic. Thus, in Morocco, the predominance of service delivery associations seems to contribute to the survival of Moroccan authoritarianism through the two main functions it performs: firstly, it allows using the associative movement to appease the effects of the economic and social crisis on the most disadvantaged strata of the society. In addition to this role of alleviation of the effects of the Structural Adjustment Policies, service delivery associations have been instrumentalized by the regime, in Morocco as in other countries of the MENA region, to face the rise of Islamists since the early 1980s. Indeed, to influence the ability of pro-Islamist charities to mobilize the masses, the regime seems to have systematically encouraged the proliferation of such associations. On the other hand, it remains practically hostile to initiatives aimed at creating associations active in fields other than services or advocacy. Thus, local authorities have always been reluctant as to democracy and human rights associations. For example, the local authorities of the city of Larache refused to grant the legal receipt to create an association because its initiators have overtly expressed their intention to claim the construction of a bridge over a river whose overflow had cost the life to a girl from their *Douar* (rural town). The same fate was reserved by the local authorities of Rabat for the Moroccan association for the defense of the right to freedom of information, Freedom Now, in May 2014.<sup>5</sup> The immediate consequence of this control of the associative movement by the state manifests itself clearly in the multiplication of service-providers associations whose survival largely depends on the State and/or foreign donors. Therefore, democratization has no priority in their agendas.

In this context it is possible to assert that what is commonly called, in the Moroccan political discourse, civil society, has been reduced to a simple "palliative", or even a subcontractor of the State. Most associations are confined to social actions without political demands or citizen mobilization. From this perspective, as Denoeux and Gateau have affirmed, we can only remain cautious about the possibility of one day seeing the Moroccan associative movement develop into a real civil society, capable of setting itself up as a counter-power.<sup>6</sup>

Second, it should be noted that the rise of democracy promotion programs coincided with the severe socio-economic crisis witnessed by many Arab countries during the 1980s, resulting in the proliferation of NGOs in most of them. However, this new associative dynamic did not pave the way for prodemocracy associations inasmuch as the state did not withdraw from the societal arena, although it did tolerate the presence of non-state actors, who are not independent and free from state control.

## **DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AS A SMART SECURITY TOOL**

What do donors gain by promoting democracy? And how democratizing authoritarian regimes in the world benefits democratic ones? These are not as naïve questions as they may sound. Indeed, given the national interest-based nature of international relations, and being aware of the motivations of the US and the EU democratization programs, such questions aim more at critically discussing these motivations than merely identifying them.

As a matter of fact, both US and EU democracy promotion programs have one underlying assumption in common: they seem to be built on the belief that bringing about democracy in the Arab world is the best way to eradicate the root causes of instability in the region. By the same token, this will help with tackling the security challenges this instability poses to the US and the EU.

Indeed, democracy promotion is one of the most recurrent expressions in US security strategy since mid 1980s. Promoting democracy has ever since been one of the three pillars of the US security agenda, along with military and economic related issues as the following paragraph shows:

We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And

democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and promote sustainable development.<sup>7</sup>

Before the American democracy promotion programs in MENA region started, this recipe was tried and tested in the context of the cold war. It was part and parcel of the containment strategy used by the US to prevent the spread of communism and soviet influence in Eastern Europe. In the American security strategy of 1988 it was clearly stated that the US "overall strategy toward the Soviet Union remains to contain Soviet expansionism, and to encourage political democracy and basic human rights within the Soviet Union and the countries under its hegemony."<sup>8</sup>

As far as the Arab world is concerned, the United States adopted a rather flexible and ambivalent stance. Being essentially concerned with its strategic interest in the region, successive US administrations have tried to strike a balance between the need to push reform forward without risking the stability of its dictator allies. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Bush Administration inaugurated a drastic change in the American stance towards the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and the way the United States conceives the causal link between terrorism and the absence of democracy. In November 2003 President G.W. Bush argued that "as long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export."<sup>9</sup> In the same vein, in his 2005 State of the Union address Bush made it clear that "the best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance and hope kindled in free societies"<sup>10</sup>. The emphasis on the putative link between terrorism and lack of democracy led US decision makers to the conclusion that continuing to see the region through the lens of their dictator allies doesn't necessarily promote stability, and that the latter is not an alternative to democracy. In 2005, the then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared in Cairo that "things have changed. We had a very rude awakening on September 11<sup>th</sup>, when I think we realized that our policies to try and promote what we thought was stability in the Middle East had actually allowed, underneath, a very malignant, meaning

cancerous, form of extremism to grow up underneath because people didn't have outlets for their political views."<sup>11</sup>

This is not to say that 9/11 terrorist attacks a starting point for the American democracy promotion programs. Nevertheless, it is certain that these events have dramatically and irreversibly reshaped the American strategy in the Arab world. They accelerated what can be characterized as a redefinition of US national interest. The latter seems to have been, henceforth, based on using the so-called "freedom agenda" as an antiterrorist strategy.

Despite all the pitfalls pointed out above, researchers and practitioners alike of democratization continue to draw from the Transition Paradigm. Such a systematic application of this paradigm has led to a linear understanding of the transition process that leads to liberal democracy. As a result, local history, contextual conditions, such as their institutional legacies and socio-cultural norms, are simply marginalized and underestimated.

## **TOWARDS AN ECLECTIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY**

The eclectic theory of democracy is far from being the only attempt to build an alternative democratic theory. Liberal democracy has already come under severe criticism both from within and outside the sphere of Western political thought, suggesting alternatives theories of democracy. From an Islamic perspective there is an abundant literature on how the Islamic idea of *Shura* could be a form of government that is as just and democratic as liberal democracy. In Africa there have been serious attempts to critically discuss the theoretical foundations of liberal democracy and the underlying assumptions of the Transition Paradigm, such as the Eclectic African Theory of Democracy.

The originality this theory of democracy lies in the fact that although it endeavors ultimately to use local traditions of governance as a substitute for liberal democracy, it doesn't reject the latter. Unlike the idea of *Shura* in Islam, which sees

liberal democracy through religious and ideological lenses, thus refusing any form of interaction or exchange with it, the eclectic African theory of democracy adopts a rather pragmatic stance. It seeks to strike a kind of balance between the dire need to set up a theory based on local traditions, culture and ethics, while remaining open to liberal democracy that informs some of its theoretical foundations.

As a departure point of the eclectic theory, its pioneers attempt to capitalize on the debate between the two schools of thought that seem to have, to a large extent, shaped the debate on democratization. These are the universalist school and the relativist one. In this regard, it is worth recalling that while universalism refers to the very notions of democracy and human rights as universal values that should apply to any human being regardless of any cultural or other contextual differences, cultural relativists argue that democracy and human rights are culturally-bound.

Two assumptions should be excluded from the outset; one is a universalist assumption while the other is a relativist one.

The argument according to which traditional values are anti-democratic is misleading. It denies any potential combination between local culture and democracy, and suggests that democratic change in non-western societies is possible only under the condition of a kind of *Tabula Rasa* of the whole traditional value system. This argument is obviously fallacious inasmuch as democratic values may exist in traditional culture as much as anti-democratic ones.<sup>12</sup>

The cultural relativist assumption that should be rejected is the one according to which because democratic institutions originated in the West, they are unlikely to take root in non-Western societies. Obviously while such an assumption seeks to address the problems of linearity and ethnocentrism, it seems to implicitly deny any kind of role of cultural exchange and flux of ideas in shaping the march of humanity. Indeed, it is a matter of fact that human cultures were molded by open-ended acculturation processes.

Put this way, the relativist assumption can, unsurprisingly, be ideologized by authoritarian regimes. It can be easily instrumentalized by the ideological apparatus of authoritarian rules and use it as an excuse for appalling actions. In some contexts this can amount to accepting despotism as culturally justified. Being aware of the negative implications this may have on his endeavor to build an alternative theory of democracy, Owalobi, one of the eminent specialists of indigenous democracy in Africa, "whatever could have facilitated the workability of such democratic ideas, principles and institutions in their original ontologies, would also as a matter of time, take its course in Africa."<sup>13</sup>

### **COMMUNALISM AS A KEY PILLAR OF INDIGENOUS DEMOCRACY**

This would entail revisiting the very concept of development in a way that collective wellbeing shall replace the Eurocentric equation of development with modernization, high GDP and other economic indices.<sup>14</sup> It is also intended that the reign of communalism will help to put people at the centre of development and will seek their collective well-being. As a result, it is very likely to enhance and promote shared material and non-material benefits, and reinforce mutual trust.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, it would encourage citizen participation in decision making and accountability of state officials to the general public.

Put this way, alternative democratic theory is very likely, from a theoretical perspective, to prevent the pitfalls of liberal democratic theory. However, it has to deal with the challenge of finding the best way to entrench the communalist spirit in social organization and state management.

### **AN ECLECTIC ECONOMIC CORRELATE**

Given that liberal democracy has capitalism as a correlate, this raises the question as to which economic correlate an alternative democratic theory could have. According to the eclectic school of thought, it is a matter of fact that an African democratic theory

need not have capitalism as its economic correlate but rather a mixed economy of both socialist and capitalist orientations<sup>16</sup>.

To make this shift from capitalist-oriented economy to an eclectic economy intelligible and legitimate, scholars refer to the conventional and basic definition of democracy of A. Lincoln. For him, "Democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people". This definition has clearly led to the popular view that democracy is a form of government. However, it gives absolutely no clue about the specific structure, be it political or economic, of a democratic society.

## **CONCLUSION**

The main thrust of this article was to show the various limitations of the transition paradigm that have seriously undermined its generalizable value. The assessment of the American democracy promotion policy which draws on the transition paradigm shows that the latter's concepts and assumptions can hardly cross the borders of Latin America and Eastern Europe. It can no longer be dealt with by a sort of theoretical Do It Yourself or conceptual innovation.

As this article shows, democracy promotions programs seem to have been selective and driven by the geostrategic interests of their initiators. In other words, the analysis of the democratization initiatives undertaken and implemented by the United States shows that the latter made democracy promotion instrumental to pursue its objectives on security and stability in the MENA region. This seems to have resulted not only in evaporating the promised democracy into a more cynical disillusion, but also in MENA populations becoming aware of the necessity to engage with self democratization processes. Indeed, as the eclectic theory of democracy discussed above shows, an alternative theory of democracy that draws from people's local history, their contextual conditions, such as their institutional legacies and socio-cultural norms, is possible.



## NOTES

- 1 | Howthorne Amy, "Is Civil Society the Answer?" in Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, Global Policy Books from Carnegie endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2005, p. 83.*
- 2 | Howthorne Amy, "Is Civil Society the Answer?", *op. cit.*, p. 83.
- 3 | Young Richard, "Democracy Promotion : The Case of the European Union Strategy", in Working document No. 167, p. 6, Center for European Policy Studies, October 2001.
- 4 | *Les deux autres outils sont les élections et les institutions. For more details see: Epstein Susan B., Serafino, Nina M., and Miko Francis T., "Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?" in CRS Report for Congress, p. 13, December 26, 2007.*
- 5 | *Further details can be found in : <http://www.demainonline.com/2014/05/14/la-wilaya-de-rabat-refuse-illegalement-de-delivrer-un-recepisse-de-constitution-dassociation/>*
- 6 | Denoëux Guilain et Gateau Laurent, «L'essor des associations au Maroc : à la recherche de la citoyenneté?», *Maghreb-Machreck, n° 150, 1995.*
- 7 | *Paragraph extracted from the US security strategy of 1994. Accessible at: <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1994/>*
- 8 | *Passage extracted from the United States National Security Strategy in 1988, accessible at: <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1988/>*
- 9 | *Cited by Shadi Hamid and Steven Brooke in "Promoting-democracy-stop-terror-revisited", 2010. <https://www.hoover.org/research/promoting-democracy-stop-terror-revisited>*
- 10 | *Ibid.*
- 11 | *Ibid.*
- 12 | Owolabi, Kolawole A., 2003. "Can the past salvage the future? Indigenous democracy and the quest for sustainable democratic governance in Africa". In Oguejiofor J.O. 2003, ed. "Philosophy, Democracy and Responsible Governance in Africa". Rome: LIT VERLAG Munster.
- 13 | *Ibid.*
- 14 | Fayemi Ademola Kazeem, "Towards an African Theory of Democracy", *Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK) Premier Issue, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2009, p. 120.*
- 15 | FayemiAdemolaKazeem, "Towards an African Theory of Democracy", *op. cit.*, p. 121.
- 16 | *Ibid.*

# Obstacles to Democratization in Post-war Iraq: Securitizing sectarian diversity

*Keiko Sakai*

Post-war Iraq is often considered to be a failed case of democratization, despite democratic institutions implanted by the occupation forces since 2003.

In order to explain the failure, primordialists tend to understand that religious, ethnic and sectarian diversity is the reason. They believe that there is no shared national identity stronger than traditional sub-national or trans-national social ties such as religious, sectarian, ethnic, and tribal identity, considering that a segmented and fragmented society is not capable of developing a common nation. Rise of sub- or supra-national identity is often witnessed in the political vacuum when the power of the central government shrinks or is demolished in multi-ethnic, multi-religious societies such as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Other scholars argue that the traditional social ties effectively function as routes for the people to implement their will, while state institutions are not reliable. In post-war total disorder, there would be no reliable order other than that offered by religious hierarchy, tribal solidarity, and ethnic kinship, which can provide the morality to maintain a certain degree of social order.

Some US policy-makers drew the blueprint for post-war political reconstruction in Iraq according to the Lebanese model of consociational democracy for multi-ethnic/sectarian societies:<sup>1</sup> to maintain a demographic proportion in any political and executive bodies such as cabinets, presidential councils, as well as headquarters in the ministries, according to their ethnic/sectarian affiliations.<sup>2</sup> People in Iraq, however, react negatively to ideas to divide Iraq into communal groups.<sup>3</sup>

Here the question arises; what is the reason for the failure to build up grass-roots democracy based on the common notion of nation and civil society in Iraq, despite the fact that the people believe in the presence of one nation and deny autonomy based on social divisions?

In order to answer the above question, I analyse how the post-war Iraqi political actors manipulated people's communal identities and their social networks. It is the process of securitization in the post-war Iraq that caused obstacles of nation-wide solidarity.

The securitization mechanism by the political actors labeling their rival groups as the enemy had hindered creation of wide space for national solidarity.<sup>4</sup> In this mechanism, ethnic/sectarian affiliation is the easiest factor available to differentiate the others from "us" and to mobilize them for collective actions. Religious rituals and behavior can also help to encourage group identity to fortify their solidarity, and religious teaching and guidance can be manipulated to legitimize the activities of the sectarian groups.

Securitization mechanism links the others to the "foreigner," and labels them as related to the "foreign agent." In the case of the 1991 Intifada in Iraq,<sup>5</sup> the regime described the protestors mainly in the South, where the most of the population were Shiites, as "riots" mobilized by "agents of foreign powers" (Iran and the US), although the uprising in principle occurred voluntarily from the grassroots. Here the securitization mechanism worked to securitize the domestic protest movement as a national security crisis that may induce foreign intervention, demonizing the protestors. Sectarian expression such as "no Shiite after tomorrow" had appeared in the military campaign against the opposition,<sup>6</sup> but securitization of sectarian identity was not a matter of religiosity or belief but a matter of nationhood and national identity, related to "non-national" factor.

This mechanism was evident during and after the civil war in 2006-2007. The ruling party has securitized a sectarian identity under the name of "protecting the Iraqi nation" from the foreign

“Wahhabi/Salafi” threat, meaning interference from Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the opposition securitized the sectarian identity against domestic Shiite military organisations and their relation with Iran.

It was after 2014 when the securitization mechanism was seen more obviously for the purpose of “national defense”. Military operations against IS unavoidably showed who was to be protected and was to be blamed. In defining who is fighting against whom, it would be crucial how the various political and social actors securitize the fight against IS in their own context, and how they try to frame the conflict not only in Iraq but also in this region. Media narratives of the major political actors in Iraq and the region on the Iraqi fight against the IS help us to grasp their securitization mechanism since 2014. The narrative of media of conflicting parties shows how the fight between IS and Iraqi forces are interpreted and under which kind of framework they position their “opposition”.

First framework that appears in the narratives is rivalry between two regional powers: Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Sunni-Shiite division is referred to as a basic component of the regional power struggle there, and both media focus on the intervention of regional power inside Iraqi territory.

The Iranian media, determinedly praises the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp in Iran and their commander Qasim Sulaymani, mentioning that “the involvement of Qasim Sulaymani in the operation [of the liberation of Tikrit, March 2015]... is yet another sign of Iran’s victory in the region...The victory and dominance of Iran in Iraq have shaken the supporters of Da’ish [IS]... which emerged with the help of Saudi Arabian arms under Bandar Bin-Sultan.”<sup>7</sup>

On the contrary, Arab and Turkish media depict Sulaymani’s presence in Iraq as “a real and direct insult to Iraqis.”<sup>8</sup> It was during the military operation in Tikrit in May 2016, when the Arab media heightened their condemnation against Iran; a Bahrain newspaper describes Iran as “the modern Mongols... and a cancerous entity that should be faced through an Arab

liberation project.”<sup>9</sup> Qatar’s *Raya* insists that “Arabs are living their worst times in the modern era while Iran is prospering and moving to achieve its strategic goal to devour the region and launch its expansionist Persian empire.”<sup>10</sup> Turkish government media agrees, reporting “Ottoman cities under Iranian control.”<sup>11</sup>

While Arab and Turkish media point out the “Iranian threat,” Iraqi military body (PMU: Popular Mobilisation Unit) warned that Turkey was a regional threat in the Iraqi operation in Mosul in October 2017, saying “if the PMU does not contribute, the city will be a new base for Turkish occupation forces.”<sup>12</sup>

Arab and Turkish media, intentionally and unintentionally, equate Iran with Shiite. A UAE newspaper states that the PMU supported by Iran “annihilates Sunnis under the pretext of fighting IS,” and “the Iraqi government insists on sowing the seeds of sectarianism in every state institution to get rid of any Sunnis.”<sup>13</sup> *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* on June 27, 2016 writes “the hordes of the Shiite PMU are engaging in the ugliest forms of sectarian cleansing.”

Beside the influence from the regional power struggle, the gap between Sunnis and Shiites escalated when “nationhood” became vital. Sectarian narratives are mobilized not to prioritize their sectarian identity over their national (Iraqi) identity, but to emphasize the contribution to the national cause by the social groups that happened to be a certain sects. They don’t compete for sectarian or ethnic superiority, but for nation-ness, claiming they are the ones who represent the Iraqi nation.

PMU is a good example; claiming that PMU is for national defense, it is often understood as a guardian for Shiite religious authority and holy cities. In May 2015 when the military operation to liberate Ramadi was launched, the operation was named “Labbayk, yāḥusayn,” which is a Shiite-specific expression. This naming was criticized mainly by Sunni-orientated media as PMU sectarian behavior under the name of nationalism.<sup>14</sup> Sunni-orientated Pan-Arab media, such as *al-Jazeera*, denounce the brutality and cruelty of the PMU, reporting a number of episodes of killing, raping, looting,

burning shops, and improper arrests by PMU especially in the military operation in Tikrit and Ramadi in 2015.<sup>15</sup> This kind of condemnation of inhumane behavior reflects a parallel image of the way in which PMU and the Iraqi government condemn IS of their inhumanity.

Here we can see how both of Sunnis and Shiites compete each other over who are more victimized and more oppressed. While the latter insists that IS targets Shiites, the former insists that they are the victims who were obliged to submit to the rule of IS.

In order to emphasize their victimhood, all the parties utilize various kinds of symbols. Historical events like revolutions, resistance or independence movements, and wars against foreign occupiers can be good materials for national symbols. There are two similar historical country-wide "revolutionary" acts in Iraq, although they are remembered and commemorated in completely different ways; the 1920 revolution and the 1991 Intifada.

Fight against IS has reactivated the memory of the 1991 Intifada which has been preserved as a memory of the victimized in the opposition movement against the previous regime. *Karbala news* issued an article saying that PMU is an extension of the 1991 Intifada, and this became a slogan in the celebration of the anniversary of the Intifada that year in Karbala.<sup>16</sup> This can be understood as an effort to interpret the Shiite-centric behavior of PMU as national/patriotic in the same way as in the 1991 Intifada. Fadila Party states that "the victory over IS was a new Sha'ban Intifada (1991 Intifada)."<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, we can find a narrative in the Arab media that considers Falluja as a symbol for Arab Sunnis, as *Akhbar al-Khalij* states that "the brutal assault on Fallujah, which is a stronghold for Sunnis in Iraq."<sup>18</sup> Moreover, some transform the meaning of the symbol from a sect-centric one to a matter of Arab nationalism. They revitalize the memory of anti-colonial nationalism against the British in the 1920 Revolution, in which Falluja was a part of the resistance against the colonial power. The victimhood of Sunni is represented by the victimhood caused

by the US in Falluja, which mingles the sectarian factor with nationhood, supported by an anti-colonial memory.

## CONCLUSION

The sectarian faultline in Iraq is caused not by the lack of the sense of nationhood, but by the lack of common understanding regarding who are the victims of whom. A securitizing mechanism often intervenes in the construction of a nationwide network of the "victimized" or "marginalized," which has resulted in building up the barriers of fear among communal groups. Thus competition for victimhood starts with disparate groups seeking the right to be rewarded, at the expense of cross-sectarian solidarities among the peripheralized.

## NOTES

- 1 | *Lijphart, Arend (1977). Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.*
- 2 | *US senator Joe Biden mentioned that Iraq should be divided into three states according to sectarian and ethnic difference. NBC News, May 1, 2005*[http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12572371/ns/world\\_news-mideast\\_n\\_africa/t/biden-proposes-partitioning-iraq-regions/#.WhEx8UpI82w](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12572371/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/biden-proposes-partitioning-iraq-regions/#.WhEx8UpI82w)
- 3 | *Haddad, Fanar (2013), "Sectarian Relations in Arab Iraq: Contextualising the Civil War of 2006–2007", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 115-138.*
- 4 | *See Toby Dodge and Eric Davis in explaining how the political institutions and elites contributed in the sectarianisation process. Dodge, Toby (2007). "State Collapse and the Rise of Identity Politics", in Bouillon, D. Malone and B. Rowswell eds., Iraq: Preventing a New Generation of Conflicts, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner; Davis, Eric (2010). "Introduction: the question of sectarian identities in Iraq", International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 229-242.*
- 5 | *Intifada is the nation-wide anti-Saddam opposition movement happened in 1991 a day after the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Kuwait. See Sakai, Keiko (2003), "The 1991 Intifadah in Iraq", Social Protests and Nation-Building in the Middle East and Central Asia (IDE Development Perspective Series No. 1, IDE, 2003)*
- 6 | *This slogan was seen in the side of Iraqi Army's tanks when they suppressed the Intifada. Sakai, op. cit.*

- 7| Hemayat, *March 4, 2015.*
- 8| Kuwaiti al-Siyasah, *May 31, 2016.*
- 9| Akhbar al-Khalij, *May 27, 2016.*
- 10| al-Raya, *March 12, 2015.*
- 11| Radikal, *March 14, 2015.*
- 12| Shafaq News, *October 8, 2016.*
- 13| al-Ittihad, *May 27, 2016.*
- 14| al-Jazeera, *May 27, 2015.*
- 15| al-'Arabiya, *June 12, 2016;* al-Sharq al-Awsat, *June 13 & August 18, 2016;* al-Jazeera, *June 16, 2016.*
- 16| Karbala News, *Mar 5 and 27, 2015.*
- 17| *Website of the Islamic Fadila Party, retrieved September 13, 2017*  
*<https://bit.ly/2Iy8IEO>*
- 18| Akhbar al-Khalij, *May 27, 2016.*





# What's "Left" Libtard?

## Intercultural competence and the Academic standardization

*Abdelilah Bouasria*

The concept of intercultural competence has gained popularity in the last five years due to the preponderant role of culture in politics and the alarmist views stereotyping the cultural other. The latter was developed by the sociolinguist Hymes in 1972 as an answer to Noam Chomsky's competence/performance model and later, it was developed by Canale and Swain (1980s) as "the underlying systems of knowledge and skill required for communication." (Beale, 2002:12) The role of the teacher has also changed with the advent of intercultural competence since the "post method condition" (Kumaravadivelu: 1994) emphasized an eclectic approach to teaching methods where the teacher is "an informed decision-maker" meanwhile more postmodernist theories stress the unavoidable weight of institutional discourse on a teacher's performance (Seedhouse, 1996).

### **INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORIES OF INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE**

One of the most important studies in the field of intercultural interaction is Ben Rampton's *Language and ethnicity among adolescents* (1996). The main theme of the book is the fact that culture never works without society. The author investigated small mixed (across gender and race lines) groups of adolescents in urban areas in the UK following them in different situations while occasionally having individual and group interviews with them and at times "eavesdropping" during their verbal interactions in sports events and group chats. He found many relations between ethnicity, manifested in accents and ways of dressing, and language. For instance, the members of the groups performed what Rampton called "crossing", a term referring to

ethnic code-switching where the boundaries of ethnicity were flexible and where the symbolic “closet” associated with ethnic identities was open for manipulation by members of peer groups.

Moreover, the function of ethnically marked communication styles differ according to circumstances in which they take place like being a strategy of contest, a subversion of hegemonic ethnic stereotypes, an expression of group solidarity or being a recognition of prestige. According to Rampton, “crossing varied in character according to the kind of event (...) in which it was embedded.” (1995:265) This analysis demonstrates that culture is not a reified entity which is deposited in every human being but rather a malleable construct to be born and torn. It can be made, changed, manipulated and dropped on the spot. Rampton would have seen our personal case study as an instance where the hegemonic ethnic stereotype of the no-touch American is subverted, or he would have seen touching in a non sexual way a form of solidarity between a teacher and the students.

The backdrop for this process is the multi-ethnic post-industrial urban setting, where immigration policies and social problems sit hand in hand with the political status of minority groups. Rampton challenges the *one person/one culture/one language* belief in his book showing the ways in which studies of intercultural communication are built on the access to knowledge about the social dynamics in which this communication develops: The main finding of Rampton is that new contexts generate new cultures and new ways of intercultural communication. For instance, if with management change, the culture of an educational institution shifts from a research environment to a factory mentality, teachers would become producing machines and their blossoming research potential would find itself curtailed by the most primitive administrative chores.

## **POLITENESS THEORIES**

Linguistic politeness in institutional talks has not been studied in depth (see Bogoch 1994; Spiers, 1998) even if one cannot miss this subfield while surveying that of intercultural competence.

Brown and Levinson's model of linguistic politeness would predict a preponderance of negative politeness strategies between customers and professionals due to the degree of social distance between the speakers. However, Aronsson and Rundstrom (1989) claim that sequences of natural institutional discourse show that roles and relationships are negotiable making politeness strategies unpredictable. In data from interactions between nurses and geriatric patients in a hospital, extensive use of positive politeness strategies is mixed with negative politeness strategies. Thus, politeness strategies reflect the ambiguity of institutional roles. Intercultural communication is indeed a collaborative process whose success relies on the joint responsibility of all participants (Grice, 1975; Clark, 1996) but such a view fails to realize that in certain circumstances part of the collaborative effort required in transactional dialogue (task-based) can be seen to involve the "management of face." Similar to Brown & Levinson's (1987) notion of face-threatening act (FTA), there is the concept of transaction-threatening act (TTA). FTA and TTA are managed in two ways: avoiding the production of unnecessary talk and refraining from shedding light on the non-competence of the interlocutor. In our case study, an analysis of the memos written by the administration reveals that the unnecessary talk is minimized through the elimination of emotions, like when the termination memo does not thank the teacher for his time spent at DLI. However, some memos engage in a non voluntary way in unnecessary talk like the final memo that revealed the testimony of two students saying that they have talked to Mr. Tagging about his "behavior", a plain non truth that never took the chance to be verified.

## **THE TABOO AND INTERCULTURAL INCOMPETENCE**

The word "Taboo" comes from the Polynesian Language and means: "forbidden" or "prohibited". It is a constraint with a social origin that falls on a being, an object or an action because of its sacred or impure nature that is attached to it. Taboos are different from controversial topics in a sense that they must be excluded from the conversation and especially in the classroom.

Taboos may be found in words, topics, social and cultural behaviors, slang, non-verbal communication, and personal space.

Since Culture is the foundation of Communication, the Foreign Language Teacher needs to be a Culture Teacher as well. In consequence, teaching a Foreign Language can be adventurous and even seen as subversive because of the violation a "private property" of thoughts and behaviors. Learners face a "clash between... the native culture and... the target culture, meanings that they were taken for granted and suddenly questioned, challenged, problematized." (Kramsch, 1993:238)

The North American people do not freely discuss prejudicial topics such as racial segregation, social class, disability, gender and sexual orientation that would be considered inappropriate in private or public places. Likewise, divergent political points of view that would lead to confrontational arguments would rather be avoided. Since America was founded by puritans Christian settlers, the topics of Sex and Religion are excluded from of the political correctness and banned from the discussion. Therefore, the American communication and interaction can be seen by European as "sterilized" because of the lack of touching and the hidden feelings behind a smile.

The French are eager to exchange opinions on racial, sexual, or political issues. However, since France education falls under the rule of secularism, state run schools are not allowed to promote any religion. As a result, any indication of religion or belief must be prohibited for fear of influencing other students. That explains why the wearing of headscarves, crucifixes, etc. in French schools is so controversial. As Latin people, the French externalize their feelings through emotional displays such as kisses and body language. They do not like to waste time to "smooth the rough edges off" and would speak their mind in a direct manner.

Arab taboos vary from society to society. The Middle East is completely different from North Africa especially in gender relations and issues of sexuality. Sexual matters are, in general, not discussed in family settings but in Morocco, the old sayings

of the old ladies are highly graphic, a bit like the biblical Song of Solomon, and traditional people seem to be comfortable in their sexuality unlike the born-again Muslim adherents espousing a more rigid Wahabi version. In the Arabic literature, works of Abu Nuwwas, Wallada bint al mustakfi and Umar Ibn Abi Rabi3a are key witnesses to the place that the erotic discourse occupies in the Arab and Islamic culture. As far as politics go, there is no cultural code against speaking about it except the totalitarian governments that imprison people for a poetic line that might allude to the ruler or his courtesans.

According to Eleanor Armour-Thomas and Sharon-Ann Gopaul-McNicol, "Culture defines not only what its members should think or learn but also what they should ignore or treat as irrelevant." (1998:56) It is one thing to be aware of taboos, controversial issues and sensitive subjects, but it is another to integrate them in a Foreign Language Classroom as a pedagogical tool for discussion and analysis, especially when the students come from a different background and are mature enough to react. Not only students are uncomfortable in front of embarrassing topics, but teachers feel the same way. As Kramersch (1993:85) writes, "Broadening the contextual options in this manner is no easy task. The reasons offered for not dealing explicitly with the social differences in students' opinions and discourse styles usually include ideological motives or the limited scope of one's legitimate expertise, or time constraints. However, these reasons are often excuses for inexperience or for conservative political attitudes." Foreign language teachers often take refuge behind a screen of justifications, claiming that they are language teachers, not culture teachers, or that they cannot fit cultural topics in their tight schedule.

Taboos as a topic in class must be presented very carefully and some extreme errors have to be avoided. The first faux-pas is dissecting the topic by isolating each elements and teaching them little by little in order to help along the student's comprehension and acceptance. The second mistake is a liberal approach of the subject, without any analysis or in-depth discussion, to "discuss about it" in order to launch a casual class communication.

One possible solution to this is to present taboos in context, with the help of the media for example. A controversial subject that is appropriate on TV or in a book may lead to different reactions when presented in the form of a comic. Henrichsen (1998) proposes the use of "cultoons" that are "visual cultural assimilators" to "promote understanding of cultural facts." Chances are that at first, students will be hesitant to approach a classroom experience with taboos. However, the method of "taboo processing" can help students and teachers to identify differences and common features within or between cultures and to overcome their fears and see the world in a "foreign way".

## **INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES**

In our world, difference has replaced inequality as the main focus of social science, where horizontal differentiation across societies (nationality, culture, gender, age) is preferred over vertical differentiation (power and status, hierarchies, inequality). The reason behind this upsurge of identity politics is a dogmatic interest in Market capitalism and liberal democracy. The paradigm through which we look at the world is made up of grossly misrepresented cultural relativism and blatant essentialism. In real societies, cultural differences are rarely treated as equivalents.

The greatest contribution of John Gumperz's work on intercultural communication (e.g. Gumperz 1982, Gumperz & Roberts 1991) is his analysis of the situational and emergent nature of cultural phenomena in speech. A first point he underscores is the fact that culture in the sense of a transcendent identity is not automatically there. According to the author, what can be observed in intercultural communication are the different communicative repertoires: people use speech genres to identify themselves or others. In Gumperz's work, such repertoires can be traced into traditions that are related to the use of other languages (French speech styles into Moroccan). Gumperz calls our attention to the critical role of context in intercultural communication. When the interlocutor is the dominant party in an interaction (Hispanics in California),

the communication process is different from that occurring with the interlocutor being the dominated party (a civilian in a military setting). When cultures meet, they usually do so under rather specific socioeconomic circumstances and clear power differences. Hence, studies of intercultural communication that focus on elite modes of interaction like business negotiations or diplomacy fail to see the big picture.

In his latest book (Hymes 1996) the linguistic ethnographer Dell Hymes tackles the issues of diversity and inequality. Every language name (Arabic, French...), his argument goes, obscures a vast array of varieties within these languages because we always use a variety of a language: a speech style or a type of interaction ("getting beyond language names to varieties", 1996: 67). Inequality of language varieties is a central aspect of sociolinguistic dynamics that needs to supersede calls for an acceptance of the potential equivalence of all forms of language. Hymes notes that rights to speak in certain ways are not evenly allocated in a real society since "one form of inequality of opportunity in our society has to do with rights to use narrative" (1996: 109) where "only the anecdotes of some would count" (1996: 114). In "serious" contexts (academia, armed forces...), narratives that express a lower degree of education are valued less highly than upper literate, and the agents of the former discourse are constructed as experts meanwhile the holders of the latter discourse are relegated to the status of laypersons.

Hymes mentions issues such as property rights, social status and prestige in relation to patterns of communication, where the choice of a particular way of interacting is likely to impose a power frame on the intercultural. The benefit of Hymes' work on inequality lies in the fact that it dilutes some of the *naïveté* that surrounds ideas of (and about) culture. He calls on issues like whose culture is being used in intercultural communication? Why do we say that in some forms of interaction intercultural differences are problematic? The interethnic encounters of contemporary urban areas are live cases of micro-intercultural competence.

Gumperz and Hymes provided us with an analytical framework for studying culture in communication. Their emphasis is on



two points: First, context as being one of the major factors in treating any phenomenon, and second, the importance of social differences and hierarchies in assessing the function of culturally marked ways of communication. Both authors offer interesting counterarguments to the simplistic views of cultural differences but differences are not always present, and when they occur they do not always manifest in the same shape in a way that understanding difference is conditioned by understanding inequality. Byram (1997: 108) is the missing link in this perspective through his introduction of the concept of "perspective shift" tracked through three ways: a decrease in negative judgment after an interaction, a tempering of one's emotional reactions to an uttering and a softening of absolute truths.

Finally, intercultural competence cannot be acknowledged without mentioning a downside to it through one example from US academia. Generally, many tenured professors coming from the south succeeded in American Campuses because they had right-wing mentors and often times leftists learn from the "Global South" the precarious vulnerability of subalterns and start wanting to defend them but only from a superior position as if they were monkeys in a zoo. As the late comedian George Carlin said, political economy and education go hand in hand since big business owners "don't want a population of citizens capable of critical thinking. They don't want well-informed, well-educated people capable of critical thinking... They want Obedient Workers. People who are just smart enough to run the machines and do the paperwork but just dumb enough to passively accept all these increasingly shittier jobs with the lower pay, the longer hours, the reduced benefits, the end of overtime and the vanishing pension that disappears the minute you go to collect it."<sup>1</sup>

## NOTE

- 1 | <http://americanjudas.blogspot.com/2010/09/problem-with-education-today-george.html>  
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# Gendering Democratic Knowledge Production in Morocco: The Women of 20 February Movement

*Rachid Touhtou*

The 2011 Arab Spring movements across the Arab world dismantled the state-feminisms in these countries with their “first ladies” toppling neo-liberal authoritarian regimes.<sup>1</sup> The era of authoritarian regimes exploiting the gender agenda to reproduce their power is dead, and a new feminist spring is in the making where gender equals politics and change. From the 80’s Tunis Benali was marketed as a heaven for women; Egypt Moubarak’s first lady was a symbol of women’s emancipation and the kings of Morocco were considered women liberators; the three kings from independence in 1956 till 2011, Mohamed V, Hassan II and Mohamed VI, claimed the reform of the family law and coopted feminist leaders. The protests of the 20 February movement, however, gave birth to a new feminism going beyond an agenda of reform, and investing instead in the political to bring about change in the whole society and hence in gender values.

For Khadija Ryadi, a leader of the Marxist-Leninist party (the Democratic Voice), the ex-president of the Moroccan Human Rights Association (AMDH), the winner of the UN prize in the field of human rights in 2013 and the coordinator of the Maghreb human rights associations, 2011 was a parenthesis in the battle against authoritarianism and for democracy where women and men invested in the language of the streets to coerce the regimes for more democratic reforms and diminishing the executive powers of the monarchy.<sup>2</sup> For Ryadi, the feminist cause is a political cause; to her, **redistribution of power and wealth** are two conditions for gender equality.

In 2004, Moroccan Islamic feminist Nadia Yassine<sup>3</sup> voiced her opinion about the family code reform adopted by the king Mohamed VI, demeaning the reforms and arguing that her

Islamist organization had a much better version of the law. For Yassine, the reform announced by the king in 2003 came as a result of international and national pressure, and were merely cosmetic, not intended to change women's realities in Morocco. According to her women's rights are exploited by Moroccan kings to the advantage of their regimes, so as to appear democratic while avoiding real democratic reforms.

In 2009 the Saharawi activist, Aminatou Haidar<sup>4</sup> organized a sit-in asking for her ID and Passport which were confiscated from her while entering Morocco in Laayoune city Airport. She succeeded in pressurizing the Moroccan authorities to get her documents back as she was joined by international human rights activists in solidarity. From that moment, the Saharawi women movement for human rights emerged as a strong separatist movement in the city of Laayoune in the Southern provinces in Morocco where these women are active in the CODESA<sup>5</sup> NGO presided by Aminatou Haidar. The Sahraoui women human rights movement as a separatist movement questions the nationalist, guardians-of-tradition myths mainstream feminism rests on. Women against authoritarianism and against the nation break with the traditional view of feminism in the Arab world as linked to hegemonic authoritarian nationalisms.<sup>6</sup> In these contexts, the 20 February 2011 movement similarly criticized a merely legislative empowerment of women.

From independence to 2011, Morocco's neoliberal state-feminisms agendas only focused on women's legal empowerment, gender policies were a monopoly of the kings and were framed within the empowerment paradigm of making progress in social indicators of gender indexes. However, as Nancy Fraser (1989; 1996; 2008) rightly argues, we have to move beyond the empowerment paradigm to an emancipation framework where the social is an arena of political contestation. As she defines, the social is a shifting terrain where different actors forge new identities and where new social agents of change emerge in the political scene (Fraser 1989, p. 156-57). The social domain that is characteristic of the modern public sphere is a site of contestation and meaning production to counter hegemonic discourses.

From 2005 till now, Morocco's human development indicators are still low in all sectors.<sup>7</sup> The social in Morocco hence is a new terrain for the state but it is also a new terrain for wider political contestation. The 20 February movement in Morocco, its civic activism repertoires (secular, religious), discourses and strategies of mobilization and collective action in matters of political mobilization and reforms is an example in case.

## **THE GENDER VOICES WITHIN THE 20 FEBRUARY MOVEMENT**

Feminists' engagement with the state in Morocco historically embraces different means that incorporate opposition, co-operation and representation. The moment of 20 February was a moment of confrontation where women activists, mainly young females, across Morocco were at the forefront of the 20 February movement that swept Morocco during the 2011 Arab spring protests; right from the beginning, the 20 February movement through social media presented itself as a movement where gender equality is at stake. In its first YouTube video<sup>8</sup> there appeared five women from different regions in Morocco and from different age groups calling for Moroccans to protest on 20 February 2011 for democracy and against discrimination. Many women were active in blogging and social media and participated in an emerging dissidence<sup>9</sup> in the public sphere in Morocco. Gender dissident voices as cultural and political resisters' to hegemony and patriarchy, like Nadia Yassine and Aminatou Haidar, emerged as new activists producing posthegemonic<sup>10</sup> social movements. Salient during the 20 February movement was that feminist associations did not participate in the movements; hence giving room to new feminist actors and organizations to take the lead and forge new gender identities and new feminist demands; the organizations which provided leaders to the movement were mainly radical leftists and radical Islamists, such as activists from the Leninist Marxist party, Democratic Voice;<sup>11</sup> female activists from Justice and Charity organization (JCO);<sup>12</sup> and women from the Leftist Party, The Socialist Unified Party (PSU);<sup>13</sup> and activists from the AMDH and the Amazigh cultural movement (ACM). 20 February

movement women activists were all radicals, politically demanding radical change instead of merely ornamental reforms. The momentum of 20FM was the beginning of the divorce between generations among feminists and the birth of a fourth generation of feminism in Morocco.<sup>14</sup>

While the famous feminist leaders were absent from the movement protests, which unknown and young new female actors could formulate a new feminist consciousness. They seized the political opportunity offered by the Arab Spring to raise awareness of gender parity, social justice, and power/wealth redistribution. Born out of street activism, these young feminist leaders mobilized masses for democratization and social justice. Hence, in Morocco since the 20FM protests, we witness an emerging 'hybrid' feminist consciousness in which human rights, gender, and ethnic/linguistic activism function as a hybrid identity of transformatory power.

Despite the constitutional gain of injecting parity in the new constitution,<sup>15</sup> the emergence of a new feminist political generation in the new social 20 February movement, is a big leap towards the gendering of the Arab Spring in Morocco. Names like Sara Soujar, Khadija Erriadi, Ibtissam Lashguer, Saadia El Ouallous and others were partners of men in streets, producing a new feminist ideology and new meanings to women's activism. Leftists, Islamists and secular activists framed their gender activism on equality and democratization as the new battle of post Arab spring activism.

According to Latifa El Bouhsini,<sup>16</sup> the 20FM produced the birth of a 'fourth generation' of feminists in Morocco. To her, the first generation was to be found among the nationalists who fought against French colonialism; the second generation was linked to the 70's Marxists activists who fought against dictatorship; the third generation consisted of reformists during the 90's, who were focusing on institutionalization of gender equality. The fourth new feminist generation in the making, consists of secular and Islamic groups of women who produce new political and cultural values. For this new generation, born on 20 February, democracy is the solution for gender equality. But

several questions are still to be answered. (How) did activists produce gender equality ideals within the movement? What was the impact of the movement on women's rights in Morocco? And what are the ideological affiliations of the 20FM and how do they translate their demands into practical and strategic needs?

## **GENDER ACTIVISM BEYOND 'FEMINISM'**

The 20FM in Morocco can be compared to the 70's phase of students activism where the slogan was that every battle inside university campuses has its echo in society, be it that 20FM was a battle outside campus walls. The Student's union of the 70's confronted the regime by mobilizing students inside the university space, challenging authoritarianism from this legitimate space; the 20FM, because of the contagious effect of the Arab spring, invaded the streets and thus affected all other spaces including university campuses. Female leaders of 20FM were all students and were all politically active in leftist as well as in Islamic organizations. Both in the private and the public sphere they struggled for a new identity that emerged during activism, i.e. in a process of learning by doing. In a testimony book<sup>17</sup> published by Dounia Benqassem, a leader of the 20FM in 2014, all the women report that it was difficult for them to stay out late at night in meetings of the movement under difficult circumstances. Their parents were angry at them sometimes because of this and were afraid they would be imprisoned. As females it was hard to these activists to engage in the movement and discuss and strategize the change of the political game in Morocco.

These female activists believed in the change, but change comes with a price. Ghizlane Benomar for instance, a calm student studying Statistics and Economics, became a leader of the 20FM in Casablanca; in 2011, her last year to graduation, Ghizlane got engaged in the movement and left her studies for a broader cause. The contagious effect of the Arab Spring and the 20FM forged the identities of a new generation of politically engaged feminist activists who no longer believed in the institutions and the state's instrumentalisation of women's rights. Next to Ghizlane, women like Dounia Benqassem, Sara



Soujar, Ibtissame Lachgar, Soumia El Marbouh, Nabila Mounib, Latifa El Bouhsini, Fatima Ifriqi, Fatima Zahra Lqadiri, Zineb Belmkaddem, and Wafaa Charaf were the icons of the movement. These new female leaders were aware that the street protests in a way neutralized the gender struggle, as the cause was bigger than gender equality. For these female activists, adopting the language of social justice was the sole means to position their activism within the crowd, with the help of Islamic female activists within the movement. Marxists, Leftists, human rights activists, Islamic and Amazigh female activists, have to learn to coexist together. 70's and 80's feminists have to adapt to Facebook feminists and a new generation of women with new needs and a vision to politics and society.

For these activists, the 20 February movement was an experiential movement that filled the vacuum left by traditional actors and institutions eclipsed behind a powerful monarchy. It was an unfulfilled dream for change that ended changing the structures of authoritarianism and hence the structures of domination. The momentum of the 20 February movements (in fact it was a plurality of movements, leaderless and decentralized) was not enough to change the system. But the emergence of these social movements as new oppositional actor, re-appropriated the discourse on civil society in the public sphere from the perspective of legitimacy, representation and new oppositional, alternative strategies. The female activists of 20FM interpellate us to rethink gender justice as to be grounded in multi-dimensional sites of struggle and over competing definitions of social reality. As Fraser (1989) argued, justice is a matter that not only involves the public sphere, but that includes the gender dimension, that as such is the basic glue of the social domain. The social domain in Morocco is both a new field for state intervention and a site of contestation for social movements, bringing their own interpretations of what are peoples' 'needs'. The emergence of the new social actors consisting of a mixture of Islamists, secularists and feminists working together to change the face of the public sphere, involves a battle of 'needs interpretation'. In Morocco, the debate on gender inequalities is at the heart of this battle. 'Gender' was able to divide different actors in the political scene during the Plan of Action for integrating women in development (1999),

during the family code reform in 2004 and during the latest revision of the constitution in 2011. Gender justice is an arena where modernity and democracy are tested in Morocco.

Competing interpretations of gender, development and rights give rise to a modern public sphere where various actors (Secularists, Islamists, feminists and state organisations) use discursive strategies to impose meanings and counter rival discourses. At times when calls for justice, dignity and democracy in the MENA region are escalating in the emerging public spheres, gender equality and women's empowerment are at the heart of transformations in the rights of citizens to access modernity and democracy equally.

The 20FM and Arab Spring movements across the Arab world involved counter hegemonic discourses, calling for a new gender contract in the Arab Spring societies. From this perspective, gendered corporeality comes forward as a site of contestation during Arab spring activisms. Subaltern bodies investing in the public sphere, were creating their counter hegemonic narratives against authoritarianism and domination. Gendered bodies mobilized for change and against political and cultural patriarchies, invading the streets with no fear. In recent years, Mi Aicha (mother Aicha) wanted to commit suicide in Rabat against an unjust system that marginalized here. Another woman in the North of Morocco died in the Ceuta gate for smuggling goods.<sup>18</sup> Female activists called Flame of Women were protesting against violence against women in the train station of Marrakesh; and Latifa El Bouhsini, the feminist/leftist calls for a strategic alliance between non partisan leftists and the Islamist organization, El Adl Wa El-Ihsan. All these examples show that a new generation of feminism has been born during the 20FM.

Despite the absence of the established political parties and feminist organizations during the 20 February movement in Morocco, the momentum gave birth to new feminist activists outside the traditional circles of feminist organization, both secular and Islamic. Fedwa Misk<sup>19</sup> epitomizes this new generation; she is the editor of an online magazine, *Kandisha*, she says that: "my body is my own, the state does not own it".

Fedwa Misk mobilizes women struggles for democracy to link women's past activism with the 20 February movement. For her Fatna El Bouih, the only political dissident tortured in prisons of Hassan II to testify about her incarceration through her narrative, *Talk of Darkness*, is a symbol of resistance.

The new gender activism beyond the traditional feminist organizations not only deals with family issues but is mobilizing local and transnational values of democratization and solidarity. The 20 February 2011 movement is a movement asking for freedom, dignity and social justice, in other words for a genuine democratization and a parliamentary monarchy. The gendering of political reform is a move towards a radical agenda in conceptualizing gender equality in Morocco where being feminist does not mean defending women's right alone but pushing a democracy agenda where all genders would flourish.

## NOTES

- 1 | *In many Arab countries a hybrid assemblage is to be found of neoliberalism and authoritarian nationalism.*
- 2 | *See her interview on: <http://www.humanite.fr/khadija-ryadi-la-sequence-ouverte-par-les-soulevements-de-2011-est-loin-detre-finie-629617>*
- 3 | <http://aujourd'hui.ma/societe/les-volte-face-de-nadia-yassine-8707>.
- 4 | <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/17/western-sahara-hunger-strike>.
- 5 | *CODESA stands for the collective of Sahrawi human rights defenders, an NGO unrecognized by the Moroccan authorities.*
- 6 | *The debate among nationalist movements was women's rights should be solved after liberating the nation from colonialism; and the debate among 70's Marxists Leninist movements in the Arab world was that women would get their rights once democracy would be established.*
- 7 | *According the UN development program, Morocco is a low income country with a rank of 123 (medium Human Development) in the world.*
- 8 | *The link to the first YouTube video the movement used to call for the protest. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A\\_LF0JqnMzw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_LF0JqnMzw).*
- 9 | *Dissident voices are anti-conformist, pro-democracy activists in new social movements during and post Arab spring where cultural and political resistance strategies are used to counter hegemonic discourses.*

- 10| *The notion of 'posthegemony' is adopted from the 2010 book of Jon Beasley-Murray with the same title. I used it here to describe the new social movements during and in post Arab spring which are leaderless, decentered, digital and street movements with no formal institutionalized political organizations. The notion 'Posthegemonic movements' elucidates these metamorphoses within social movements during the Arab spring.*
- 11| *Annahj Addemocrti or La Voix Democratique is a Marxist- Leninist political party in opposition, boycotting elections.*
- 12| *Adl-Wa-Al Ihasane is the biggest opposition Islamist Association in Morocco.*
- 13| *PSU or the Unified Socialist Party is a leftist political party, which was active in 20FM and boycotted the 2011 legislative elections.*
- 14| *See the article by Latifa Bouhsini: <http://arabi.assafir.com/Article/25/8015>.*
- 15| *In the new constitution of 2011, gender parity has been given visibility in article 19 which was a sacred article in the last constitution before the reform as it was dedicated to the sacred status of the king; the replacement of this article with gender parity was highly viewed by political parties and feminist associations as an empowering move to women in Morocco. However, the translation of this article into reality has not been implemented yet. It was a form of user-friendly package for political consumption and make-belief concessions made by the monarchy.*
- 16| *A university professor, sociologist, feminist and leftist activists. Her article on the generations of feminist movements in Morocco appeared in Arabic in: <http://arabi.assafir.com/Article/8015>*
- 17| *Dounia Benqassem, 2014, Ne(e) Un 20 Février 2011: Temoinages des 20 Fevrieristes, Editions AfrcArts, Casablanca.*
- 18| *These examples of women trespassing the masculine norms of behaving in the public sphere, protesting against humiliation, injustices and inequalities in society and joined by feminists, mainly 20 February feminists, helping these marginalized and vulnerable women voice their indignation of neoliberal policies that produced more impoverished and dissident women in post-20FM era in Morocco, demonstrating that women empowerment policies have been cosmetic and producing more exploited women.*
- 19| *Her blog is: <http://qandisha.ma/author/fedwa-misk/>*

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# Methods of measuring democracy learning: an assessment of Tunisian civil society's political culture

*Alexander Peter Martin*

Political culture, the normative belief system and behaviour patterns pertaining to political action, is not static but an evolving phenomenon. Consequently, as democracy is not only a representative process but also a culture, the political culture of a polity that is undergoing a democracy learning process would also be changing. This paper addresses the question of how to measure that process by seeking to develop and establish a methodology for measuring democracy learning. This research seeks to understand political culture but does not employ macro-interpretivist methods of using exclusively historical or literature works to explain culture, as this would be either reductionist or Orientalist. It argues that in order to confirm the democratization literature assumption about civil society's positive impact on a state's democratisation process, civil society must exhibit civic political culture (CPC): a political culture that is conducive to supporting and promoting democratic ideals (Almond and Verba, 1963). Therefore, as neither democracy nor civic political culture are not inherent in civil society, civil society actors must engage in a democracy learning process.

Measuring civil society's political culture is necessary to assess the progress of democratisation and to determine the extent to which democratic learning is occurring. This in turn requires understanding both civil society actors' discourses and practices, as political culture manifests "dualistically" as both (Welch, 2013). Consequently, interview or survey methods in addition to ethnographic-observation methods are required to understand the extent to which CPC is developing and, by extension, to measure the rate and degree of democracy learning. This



paper uses evidence from research with Tunisian civil society organisations (CSOs) to support this claim.

## **DEMOCRATISATION THEORY & CAVEATS**

Democratisation theory stresses the importance of active civil society participation in ensuring democracy embeds and functions (Diamond 1999, Schedler 1998, Putnam 1993, Entellis 1996). Furthermore, although a contested paradigm (Carothers 2002) or considered only relevant to analysis of the Latin American and Eastern European transitions to democracy (Przeworski 1991, Lijphart and Waisman 1996, Diamond *et al.* 1997), Transitology argues that civil society plays a positive role, albeit in the latter consolidation stages, of democratic transition.

This paper does not refute the applicability of Transitology but presents two caveats. The first is structural and considers the importance of a supportive legal framework to facilitate democracy learning. For civil society to play a democratising role, it cannot be a limited and restricted, or a co-opted and loyal, civil society. Tunisia's CSO legal framework (Decree 88, 2011<sup>1</sup>) is "one of the most enabling civil society laws in the Middle East and North Africa region"<sup>2</sup> but is also imperfect, and Tunisian CSOs must remain vigilant of any state encroachment,<sup>3</sup> but it provides a framework for sufficient freedom and protection. Likewise, a civil society in a post or non-authoritarian state could be provided with legally protected civic space but fail to exhibit CPC. In authoritarian contexts, where the state fails to provide legal protection for dissenting CSOs and the space in which they operate, civil society's democratising impact may be limited. Ideally, CSOs would pressure the state into providing space and legislation for civil society to freely exist and organise, though in some cases this would be a dangerous strategy where any forms of regime criticism can lead to intimidation or arrest. However, within these restricted spaces they could manage to contribute to islands of democracy, where norms can develop on a small scale, rather than systematic change.

The second caveat is cultural and focuses on civil society's role in facilitating a democracy learning process. To maximise opportunities for engaging in democracy learning, CSOs must use their state's legal framework and space, however free or restricted, to exhibit CPC. This democracy learning process would feature engaging in interactions that may cause disagreement but would also encourage respect, empathy, and mutual understanding. The political culture of these interactions and activities can be measured through identifying the existence of six criteria; Freedom, Equality, Pluralism, Tolerance, Trust, and Transparency (Martin, 2016). These criteria were developed from my expansion of Almond and Verba's work and an extensive literature review of civil society, political culture, political civility, democratisation and political culture studies.

If associations are considered "schools for democracy" (de Tocqueville, 2000), observing the discourses and practices that occur within and between CSOs, and towards the government by CSOs, would help researchers determine the form of democratic learning that is developing. In other words, what's on the school's syllabus? Therefore, an appropriate research methodology for capturing both discourse and practice is required to determine whether the civil society exhibiting CPC and thus assisting its development.

### **THEORY OF POLITICAL CULTURE: A DUALISTIC PHENOMENON**

Democracy is not only measured in the procedures of political parties contesting elections or the vibrancy of civil society activism. Former Tunisian President Ben Ali could boast both, but elections were contested unequally and the thousands of registered CSOs that existed were either regime-loyal or co-opted. Rather, democracy is a culture, comprised of and manifesting in practices and discourses. Democracy learning is, therefore, changing or modifying these practices and discourses. To determine the rate and level of democratic learning that has occurred within a CSO, or any other group or institution, a study of democratic culture is required. This raises the question

of how to assess democratic culture? Welch's conceptualisation (2013) determines that political culture manifests dualistically, as discourse and practice. This is based on the notion that the attitudes people express in an attitude survey or questionnaire are not the same as what motivates their behaviour. In other words, a disparity exists between what is said and what is done.

## **A THEORETICAL RATIONALE TO A MIXED-METHODS RESEARCH APPROACH**

To examine the extent to which a civil society's political culture is democratic, a research approach that features appropriate methods, devised to capture both the practises and discourses of political culture, is essential. In practice, this means that a mixed methods approach is required. Interviews, focus groups, or surveys, to capture discourses, in addition to ethnographic-observation, to capture practices, social research methods are vital to understanding the extent to which CPC is developing within CSOs. These findings help to assess the rate and level of democratisation and democracy learning by asking if civil society is performing a democratising role.

This is not a critique of survey research; indeed, the opinion survey was the founding tool for Almond and Verba's political culture research and provides an effective bird's-eye perspective. Rather, the point is to highlight that survey data results fail to capture practice and, therefore, would produce an incomplete representation of political culture. Likewise, an ethnographic-observation study does not always capture discourses, but mostly practice. Moreover, ethnographic work tends to be time consuming as the researcher seeks to become "a part of their world" (Weinstein, 2006:364) and often the research depth that is required leads to production of single cases studies. Such findings might then well be indicative of other organisations in the country, demonstrating such islands of democracy, but would not be a representative or suitable basis upon which to extrapolate an assumption regarding national political culture or levels of democracy learning. Assuming that a 'national norm' (Hofstede 1980: 45), or a 'central tendency' (Hofstede,

1991: 253) can be determined from exclusive observation of subcultures or groups is reductionist. A mixed approach has the potential to produce a complete picture of political culture and more comprehensive results regarding democracy learning.


Although qualitative interviewing may also be challenging to conduct in an authoritarian context (Koch, 2013), there are cases where researchers have found creative ways to circumvent police-state surveillance, e.g. Hibou 2011. Unrestricted survey analysis, however, poses different difficulties and is potentially more dangerous to perform, not to mention the quality of such quantitative surveys where citizens feel threatened by their regime (Goode, 2010:1056). Therefore, context specific research with a view to capturing discourse is relevant for researcher and participant safety.

## **TUNISIAN CSOS RESULTS**

My findings from using a mixed-methods approach in a study of the extent to which Tunisian CSOs' political culture is democratic recognised that, for the most part, CPC is developing. However, not all six CPC criteria (Freedom, Equality, Pluralism, Tolerance, Trust, and Transparency) were developed to the same degree. Overall, Tolerance and Equality were high while Trust and Financial transparency registered lower results.

While interview data is discussed in Martin (2015), survey questionnaire data from 102 respondents representing 55 different organisations<sup>4</sup> was compounded into indexes by pooling the sections of the survey into groups of questions related to the criteria of CPC.<sup>5</sup> This demonstrated that trends of Tolerance and Equality were exhibited but disagreement over Pluralism was evident regarding politicised and religious CSOs and the inclusion of former RCD members. Agreement towards the implementation of democratic practices and independence from the state was expressed, respondents also preferred some limitations to Freedom in terms of state protection from religiously offensive views (Martin, 2016: 252).

*Index average scores*



The ethnographic-observation research I conducted with one Tunis-based CSO established that a democracy learning process was occurring between the members. Engaging in respectful interactions showed Tolerance and Equality, while Pluralism within the CSO was developing, except for cases of members getting 'side-lined' only when their arguments or proposition did not gain enough support. Trust was evident as they worked with other CSOs and attempted to establish another branch in Gafsa,<sup>6</sup> but Trust was lacking in the leaders' reluctance to delegate tasks to other members. The organisational skills required to effectively run an organisation were gradually acquired through participation and practicing democracy was assisting the CSO in embedding the values of civility. Learning how to share roles and responsibilities helped make the CSO more equal and pluralistic, while co-operating and collaborating with other members, through inclusive rather than exclusive interactions, encouraged Tolerance and acceptance of contrasting views (Martin, 2016:253). In addition to working with the CSO for 10 months, interviews with members of the observed group revealed new information had been missed through mere observation, thus enabling a greater understanding of their perspectives. Interviews also addressed the critique Crapanzano makes of Geertz's interview-lacking ethnography (1973) which, he argued, only includes "a constructed narrative of the constructed native's constructed point of view" (1986: 74). The observation process combined with in-depth interviews thus helped address the key question and important difference of whether a group are undergoing democracy learning or only learning *about* democracy yet failing to implement it.

## CONCLUSION

If democracy learning is considered the cultural aspect of democracy, then a political culture research approach is vital to understanding the degree to which learning is occurring. Therefore, to understand democracy learning processes, using the right (research) tools for the job is vital. According to an Italian proverb, *Trail dire e il face c'è di mezzo il mare*, there is half a sea between saying and doing. If research on political culture is conducted that captures discourses and practices, then any possible discrepancy between what is said and what is done, by civil society actors, associations, or any other group seeking to engage in a democracy learning process, would be revealed. Furthermore, from an empirical data collection perspective, a survey is a far-reaching method but is a blunt instrument while observation is akin to using a microscope. The broad brushstrokes and fine details of the macro and the micro enquiry forms are complementary and produce more comprehensive results.

Democratisation literature and empirical evidence since 1991 remind us that it should not be assumed that civil society is, in every instance, supporting democratisation or democratic learning processes (Whitehead 1997, Abdel Rahman, 2002). It can do so, however, if it exhibits CPC. The Tunisian CSOs that I surveyed, interviewed, and observed demonstrated that members and associations are developing CPC, although not all criteria develop simultaneously, and therefore a degree of democratic learning is occurring.

## NOTES

- 1 | Decree No. 88 of the year 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of Associations, published 24 September 2011 – Translation by International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) Available at <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf> [Accessed 19/9/2014]
- 2 | International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)(2017) Civic Freedom Monitor: Tunisia. <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/Tunisia.html>
- 3 | Ahmed Nadhif (2017) 'Tunisia cracks down on NGOs', Al-Monitor. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/tunisia-ngos-crackdown-government-foreign-funds-declaration.html> [Accessed 29/9/2017]

- 4 | *I did not interview organisations with particularly Islamist goals, such as Quranic associations. Donker (2013) identifies two types of Islamist activism in post-revolutionary Tunisia based on their goals: activism aimed at societal change and that aimed at political influence. Interviewing either of these types of organisations proved problematic because they did not publicly advertise their Islamist agendas making it difficult to identify them. CSOs were reluctant to publicise any Islamist agendas and actively distanced themselves from the "Islamist" label. It is worth mentioning that Article 4 of Decree 88 published on 24th September 2011[1] states that "Associations are prohibited from the following: One: Adopting in their bylaws, data, programs or activities any incitement for violence, hatred, fanaticism or discrimination on religious, racial or regional grounds." Of particular importance is "discrimination" because CSOs that require members to be religious are not legally permitted to exist.*
- 5 | *A meaningful index for Freedom could not be created because a score of 5 in Q17-19 and 27 represent greater values of freedom than a score of 1, whereas in Q21, Q24, Q26, a score of 1 represents greater values of freedom.*
- 6 | *A city in a southern interior governorate in Tunisia.*

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# Reflections on the Idea of Democracy: the Case of the Arab Spring Novels

*Khalid El Aref*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Democracy as a form of political practice is more often than not approached within a field of study that investigates political entities and their political practices through an analytical appraisal of state apparatuses and institutions. That studies and research on democracy continue to pour forth is doubtless hard evidence that democracy as a modern form of political organization is far from being gained and secured even in the West, where both left-wing and right-wing intellectuals continue to raise concerns as to its very essence, as well as to its applicability. The sweeping rise of populism in the world is one such example. Therefore, the idea of democracy isn't yet a gained benefit; it continues to hover between a universal foundational myth and an unsecured utopia. If the rise of populism in the world is glossed over, the best example of the drifts and excesses of democracy is found, perhaps, in fiction. In Michel Houellebecq's *Soumission*,<sup>1</sup> for instance, a right-wing--apparently radical--politician becomes the president of France. His name is not important in itself, but it constitutes, among other things, a meaningful clue that sheds light on how the terrain of competition unto which the idea of democracy comes to take form through the interplay of underlying utopias and dystopias. Mohammed Ben Abbas is an Arab name; it carries with it all the social and cultural lore that would later motivate his desire to use his position as president of France to change the country's "political" identity beyond recovery by restoring polygamy and rendering work for women almost illegal. Although the plot rests on a binary construction of identity and political affiliation, which would, in the long run, homogenize public life in France, it nonetheless underscores the underlying

competition between two forms of utopia: one is inspired by Islam, the other is secular and inspired by history.

### **DYSTOPIAN SETTINGS: COMPETING FICTIONAL UTOPIAS**

A similar process can be found in a number of Arab Spring novels. My interpretation of these novels draws on concepts such as dystopia/utopia both as analytic categories, and as styles of thinking and behaving. For the novelistic representation of the fictionalized polities is replete with diverse forms of social, psychological, and physical violence, whose settings are complicated in terms of space and time. Some of the Arab Spring novels cast different, but not necessarily unrelated, looks at the historical era that the Arab world is slowly wading through. While *‘Utārid*<sup>2</sup> is set on the whole in the future, *At-Tābūr*<sup>3</sup> and *Thawrat al-Murīdīn*<sup>4</sup> (The disciples’ revolution) complicate the notion of space. The ground I would like to tread is midway between a social sciences approach and a literary one. To be sure, it’s one where the conditions of possibility, and even conditions of imaginability of these novels should be uncovered and tested against the way these novels have come to represent the “present”, or “reality” in the way they did; that is, in terms of dystopia (and sometimes utopia). These two categories are to be considered as imaginative categories, as “styles of imagination, as approaches to radical change.”<sup>5</sup> In addition, dystopia and utopia almost always go hand in hand, for any one utopia carries within itself the grains of its own dystopian story, dystopia being here understood as lived experience.<sup>6</sup> However, although utopia and dystopia seem to be opposite, at least at the level of language, dystopia is neither the obverse nor the negation of utopia. First, thinking about utopia leads one to imagine an idyllic non-place, where hopefully everything is perfect. In other words, it is seen as an imaginary site, one that is highly improbable. It is a conception of “existence which... can in principle never be realized.”<sup>7</sup> In being so, utopia is a sort of exuberance of hope and desire; sometimes it is a corrective to a hopeless political situation. A utopia is, however, characterized as such only when it transcends reality; once it is put into practice and integrated into people’s conduct, it succeeds in shattering, “either partially

or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time.”<sup>8</sup> In this sense, democracy, being imagined variously as a magic bullet, is very akin to a modern utopia in that it is sometimes presented, especially in the Arab world as a cure to all kinds of political ailments. This, however, shouldn’t be seen as a position against democracy, and by extension against democracy. Rather, the point I would like to stress is that democracy, following Chantal Mouffe for instance, is paradoxical because it is both a delicate mix of right-wing and leftist thinking traditions, between equality and liberty, between liberalism as a mode of thinking and the idea of human rights as the materialization of the idea of equality.<sup>9</sup> In addition, I strongly believe that Lefort’s insightful idea of the permanence of the theologico-political is more applicable to the Arab world than anywhere else in the world because the religious element, the permanent element, let us say, has strongly survived and has taken many forms and representations, so much so that piety has turned into a vogue. The rebirth of the religious is, therefore, an indication of the cracks in the edifice of the postcolonial state.<sup>10</sup> If the world views of the social base and those of the ruling classes tally completely, there would be no need for the improvisation of an ideology, or for the development of hegemony, understood as a body of ideas that lead people into approving of the rulers by consent. Thus, the coming of the Islamists to power in many Arab countries is to be seen as a marker of the coronation of Islamist ideology which has been belabored by diverse political, economic, and political crises. In the same vein, Islamist hegemony and ideology (including its Jihadist version) are but a response to a crisis, rather than elements of the solution. This is mainly because polity in the Arab imaginary has been a free-floating, if not an empty signifier, which was filled with Islamist ideology retrieved from the past.

The dystopian drive of the three novels I here take as examples emanates primarily from the inability to come to terms with two forms of competing utopias. On one hand, the utopia of an imagined collective selfhood whose motley and disparate features are retrieved from a primeval past of a lost glory; this selfhood seems to be grounded in an immutable identity that creates a false sense of continuity whose very effect bridges, imaginatively, early beginnings with current crises. On the other

hand, the dictates of the present driven by the advent of the postcolonial state and global modernization have occasioned another type of utopia in the Arab world, the Western secular version of utopia that has coalesced, politically, into democracy as the best form of governing. Between these two utopias lies the dystopian nature of these novels. Furthermore, the time- and space-lag between these two competing utopias weighs heavily down on the way fiction relocates the ensuing tension in terms of plot construction, character profile, and mood. *Otared*, a macabre and grim history, is, for instance, made up of three main narrative lines: the narrative of 2025, that of 2011, and another of AH 455. The narrative of 2011 is interrupted by that of AH 455. The latter, which tells the story of a certain Sakhr al-Khazraji, who was resurrected to report his life in the afterlife, seems to be a dangling episode; it is loosely connected to the other narrative only by the theme of being-here as a form of hell, itself an inversion of the order of things, for killing is represented as a form of delivery. However, the dangling episode takes its full meaning within a temporalized and spatialized vision in which both episodes—the 2011 and the 2025 one—constitute a logical continuity and effect of the former, more “latent” episode. Dystopia takes its full sense when Ahmed, the central character whose gratuitous killing of others, is elevated to the status of an “instrument of mercy.” (*Otared*, p. 294)

A similar time- and space lag is in operation in *Thawrat al-Murīdīn*. The novel is made up of twenty-one chapters, and two storylines which recount two seemingly unconnected stories. The story of Abdelmawlā al-Yammūrī, a novelist and script-writer who is spending his summer vacation in Benelmedena in Spain. He’s retreated there to write a novel/film script about the life of al-Mahdī Ibn Tūmart. The story of Abdelmawlā is narrated in the first person singular, whereas that of al-Mahdī is told in the third-person singular. These two storylines bring two utopias against each other: the utopia of al-Mahdī, the savior, which sustains the vision of some of the agents of political change in Egypt (Gomaa Bassiouni, for instance, who thinks that al-Mahdī is “contemporary to us” (p. 230)), and the utopia of revolutions and radical political change that would bring democracy. The meta-narrative confrontation of these two utopias yields a dystopia, for in practical terms radical political

change is approached both in geography and in history. There is a strong sense of continuity between the two categories. It is, however, a form of dystopia that is different from the one discussed above in *Otared*, although if we look at the conception of time underlying the narrative, we would certainly conclude that *Thawrat al-Murīdīn*, too, points to the permanence of the theologico-political throughout history. For the ultimate idea that the novel seems to put forward can be summed up in the following words: there are no revolutions in the Arab world, and what happened (mainly in Egypt, but also in Morocco) was a reinvigoration of the paradigmatic master trope of enjoining good and fighting evil. This poses the serious question of the civic process of democracy and democracy learning.

Thus, the narrative of *Thawrat al-Murīdīn* evolves out of a secret competition between two utopias, as I suggested above. Its narrative actualization takes the form of a competition between two books: one concerns the life of al-Mahdī as it has reached us through Al-Baydaq's account, while the other is being written by Abdelmawlā. In other words, *Thawrat al-Murīdīn* attempts to rewrite history in attempt to capture the truth that lies behind the esoteric and mythical rendering of al-Mahdī's life. This attempt to rewrite history, or at least to revisit it from a contemporary perspective takes the form of a series of binary oppositions: al-Mahdī's reading of *kitāb al-jafr* vs. Abdelmawlā's reading of his own novel about al-Mahdī; historical truth vs. fiction; the "historical" al-Mahdī vs. his contemporary emergence (in the form of an apparition); al-Mahdī's journey to the East vs. Abdelmawlā's journey to Cairo; Ibn Qusay's revolution in Muslim Spain (called the disciples' revolution, which gives the novel its title) vs. Egypt's events; the movie (about Ibn Qusay's revolution) vs. the novel (about al-Mahdī's life); the historical Muslim civil war, known also as the battle of the Camel or the Battle of Bassorah (in the year 656) on the one hand, and Mawqī'at al-Jamal in Mubarak's last days. All these binaries are brought to bear on North Africa and its politics. The tone of the novel is on the whole a negative one, for the Arab world is essentially incapable of attaining democracy, and the Arab Spring, in addition to being the result and the effect of an obsolete paradigm, is portrayed like a game whose strings are being pulled elsewhere as one of the characters puts it (p. 219).

Such a representation isn't generalized, however. The youth are singled out as being particularly courageous, although some of them seem to lose hope as to the future of Egypt after Mubarak stepped down. All these details, however, do not really capture the thrust of the novel which lies, for me, in its insistence on the diffuse, disjointed nature of truth—both historical and sociological. The former determines the latter and severely impedes its capability for change; if change is to take place, we need to shake up the historical truth that has created for us and in our stead our own identities. This amounts to nipping the idea of change in the bud, for it is the persisting theologico-political that stands out as the structuring factor in society; it is certainly not the individual. Paradoxically, it is through the prospective slow birth of the metaphor of the individual that the theologico-political might recede. Al-Mahdī, the savior, might as well be the individual yet to be born.

### **THE QUEUE: THE SOCIO-SEXUAL DYNAMICS OF SPATIALIZED DYSTOPIA**

*The Queue* by Basma Abdelaziz can readily be described as dystopian not only because of the somewhat eerie representation of reality, but also and most importantly because of its relocation of the sexual dynamics in space. Beyond the significance of the story and characterization, *The Queue* installs a dystopian mood that succeeds in the final turn in tipping the balance of potency for the benefit of the masses that make up the substance of the queue. Like *Otared* and *Thawrat al-Murīdīn*, *The Queue* is replete with signs that point in the direction of the permanence of the theologico-political both at the level of characters' beliefs and plot construction. The masses are caught in a deadly struggle for survival in an authoritarian regime whose master means is the Gate. Leaving apart the details concerning the behavior of individual characters, as well as the slightly gendered imbalance in terms of authority, agency, and resistance, power and the struggle for it are perused through two highly charged symbols: the queue and the gate. It is on the dynamics of this struggle that the whole plot of the novel rests. A quick consideration of these two elements reveals their protean nature, for, while they

challenge the socio-cultural dynamics of authoritarian regimes, they relocate them and assign them ambivalent positions. The somewhat explicit phallus-like rendering of the queue, awaiting entry into the gate, makes the latter acquire a yonic nature that remains highly ambivalent. Authoritarian regimes, Mbembe argued, maintain their powers via diverse means of subjection. One of these is what he calls "divine libido," in which libido is defined as "the emanation of bio-psychic energy located primarily in the area of sexuality." This energy should not, according to Mbembe, be seen as operating exclusively in pleasure, desire, and the area of sensuality, but also and most importantly in "suffering, unhappiness, and extreme pain."<sup>11</sup> The anxieties suffered by the crowds function at one and the same time as inhibitions and prospects of the pleasures to be realized by investing the gate. This is what Mbembe aptly calls the transfiguration of pain.<sup>12</sup> The interplay between these two spatialized dystopias, which transform pain into symbols with an almost sublime touch, betrays the deep nature of the socio-sexual codes operative in society, which naturalize and maintain the supremacy of the male-dominated economy of politics. The apparent castration of autocratic symbols, underwritten in the Gate, weakens the initial power of the autocrat, and simultaneously feminizes it.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The three novels briefly discussed above show clearly that fictional narratives are crucially grounded in human reality. I have attempted to unveil the implicit connection between fictional narratives and the political ambience that gave rise to them by relying on notions such as utopia and dystopia. The way these notions have been used in these novels testifies to the Promethean nature of modern subjectivity, which continues to resist structures of power and dominance by underwriting the apparatuses of dominance and rule no matter how strong they seem to be, paving the way for the spectacular emergence of the idea of democracy and the individual.



## NOTES

- 1 | *Michel Houellebecq*, *Soumission*, Paris: Flammarion, 2015.
- 2 | *Mohammad Rabbie*, 'Utārid. Beirut, Cairo and Tunis: Dar at-Tanweer, 2015), translated into English as *Otared* by Robin Moger, Cairo: Hoopoe, 2016.
- 3 | *Basma Abdelaziz*, *At-Ṭābūr*, Beirut, Cairo and Tunis: Dar at-Tanweer, 2013, translated into English as *The Queue* by Elisabeth Jaquette. New York and London: Melville, 2016.
- 4 | *Said Bensaid Al-Alaoui*, *Thawrat al-Muridīn*, Casablanca and Beirut: Al-Markaz at-Thaqāfī al-‘Arabī, 2015.
- 5 | *Michael D. Gordin et al. (eds.)*, *Utopia/Dystopia: Conditions of Historical Possibility*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 5.
- 6 | *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- 7 | *Karl Mannheim*, *Ideology and Utopia: an Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954, p. 176.
- 8 | *Ibid.*, p. 173.
- 9 | Cf. *Chantal Mouffe*, *The Democratic Paradox*, London and New York: Verso, 2000.
- 10 | *Claude Lefort*, *Democracy and Political Theory*, trans. David Macey, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988, p. 214-5.
- 11 | *Achille Mbembe*, *On the Postcolony*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, p. 212.
- 12 | *Ibid.*

# How can universities in Morocco develop democratic Citizenship and Human rights-based values more efficiently? The case of the Faculty of Law in Settat

*Abdeljabbar Arrach*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Living in a globalized World does not mean confronting only economic globalisation in terms of global production, global finance, global trade and cultural globalisation, but also taking into account political one that includes the contribution of the citizens to shaping public policies. Therefore, Citizenship education and human rights-based learning appears, as a strategy to face the challenges of the globalisations with its tripartite dimensions. Undoubtedly, the higher education has, generally speaking, an important role to play in the development of democratic citizenship and human rights-based values.

Based on a case study as a type of observational research, this paper presents a short overview on how the Faculty of Law, economic and social sciences at the Hassan 1<sup>st</sup> University in Settat prepare students and citizens for assuming and exercising their rights and responsibilities in the changing Moroccan society.

## **DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED VALUES IN MOROCCO: IMPORTANCE AND NECESSITY**

the citizenship learning and human rights-based values education has flourished in the period of the 90's, which Ralf Dahrendorf classified as "the decade of Citizenship", within the post-communist transitions. Linked to this, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and representatives of the 47 Council of Europe member

states adopted on 11 May 2010 the Charter on Education for democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education, in which the definitions of both "Education for democratic citizenship" and "Human rights education" is formulated respectively as follows :

"Education for democratic citizenship" means education, training, awareness-raising, information, practices and activities which aim, by equipping learners with knowledge, skills and understanding and developing their attitudes and behaviour, to empower them to exercise and defend their democratic rights and responsibilities in society, to value diversity and to play an active part in democratic life with a view to the promotion and protection of democracy and the rule of law.

"Human rights education" means education, training, awareness-raising, information, practices and activities which aim, by equipping learners with knowledge, skills and understanding and developing their attitudes and behaviour, to empower learners to contribute to the building and defence of a universal culture of human rights in society, with a view to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.<sup>1</sup>

This growing interest in citizenship education across the world embraces consequently the political Agenda in Morocco since the political Liberalization under the Consensual Government of alternance. With the popular upheavals in the Arab World and the new adopted 2011 Constitution, Morocco has been more concerned with how democratization can be realized and consolidated through democrats and active citizens, who should have a certain degree of skills and competencies which help to manage social life. Thus, Citizenship education became an important national task and accordingly one of the high priorities of the country. In 2003, the Ministry of Education launched a set of practices and activities and introduced new topics in the national curriculum from the fourth primary level to the ninth secondary one with the aim of making the pupils better equipped to participate actively in democratic life inside and outside their schools. Despite these efforts, the dysfunctions and the wide gap existing between the stated goals of national educational programs and their implementation, as identified

by the higher Council for Education, Training and Scientific Research in a report, elaborated by the National Authority of Assessment, entitled "The Implementation of the National Charter for Education and Training 2000-2013: Achievements, Gaps, Deficiencies and Challenges", persist at the level of the educational system cohesion, its internal and external effectiveness productivity and its capacity in promoting scientific research, the economy and areas of human, environmental, political and cultural development.<sup>2</sup>

In this sense, the strategic Vision of Reform 2015-2030 confirms the importance of rooting the values of Democracy, Citizenship and civic behaviour through Education that has to lead to the acquisition of abilities needed for the exercise of a responsible citizenship in a democratising state.<sup>3</sup>

Higher Education, which is considered as one of the keys to delivering the knowledge requirements for citizenship- and human rights-based development, makes use of both formal and non-formal Learning (organised Learning), as well as the informal Learning acquired in daily life and circumstances.<sup>4</sup>

In order to implement these goals, five interconnected and interdependent approaches were adopted, which are as follows:<sup>5</sup>

1. Adoption of Pedagogic universities reform since 2003-2004 through which the possibility was given to diversify the educational outputs and to elaborate accordingly new human rights fundamental and professional Bachelor, Master Degrees and PhD degree, especially in public and private Law departments belonging to the twelve public universities;
2. Elaboration of training programs and research units in human rights in the private and public Law Departments of the Faculties of Law, economic and social sciences;
3. Creation of human rights oriented UNESCO Chairs in the Moroccan universities such as Human rights; Peace culture; Women; Interreligious Dialog; Child, Family and Society; Environment and Development and Water;

4. Organization of scientific and cultural academic activities in human rights education;
5. Engagement of students in scientific and cultural activities.

**HOW FAR THE HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE FACULTY OF LAW, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN SETTAT DOES CONTRIBUTE TO DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED VALUES?**

to understand the contribution of the above mentioned faculty, the focus will be made only on the first approach adopted at the national level which consists both in introducing some human rights issues in the Curricula and elaborating professional Bachelor Degree (Agent de veille des Droits de l'Homme et de l'action humanitaire), fundamental Bachelor and master degrees, knowing that the faculty of Law, economic and social sciences in Settata has registered on its account a lot of scientific activities and pedagogic rectification, modernization and restructuration measures aiming at building pertaining knowledge, skills and values, in full compliance with the human rights culture.

Due to the fact that the university LMD-Reform has changed the pedagogical architecture and granted apparently more autonomy to the universities, it was possible to introduce units or topics that are directly linked to deepening the culture of democratic citizenship and human rights such as the general theory of Obligations, Trade Law, the general theory of engagements and contracts, Administrative justice and administrative litigation, administrative organization, the general theory of constitutional Law, Civil procedures, Mediation and Arbitrage, Corporate Law, Special penal Law, Public international Law, Human rights and fundamental Freedoms, Penal Law, and judiciary organization.<sup>6</sup> Concerning the evaluation of the higher education system, it must be pointed out that the implementation has revealed many shortcomings linked especially to "... a loose modular architecture, rising rates of exams, busy schedules, inadequate educational support and old curriculum content...".<sup>7</sup>

In order to avoid promoting rigid lectures and written examinations, and profiting from the possibility of introducing practical approaches into traditional legal education, the Faculty of Law, economic and social sciences in Settat created on March 2017 through the initiatives of Professors two legal clinics in public and private Law issues supervised respectively by Abdeljabbar Arrach and Mohammed Jamal Maatouk and emphasizing awareness raising and informing over litigation. As Hovhannisian put it, clinical legal education incorporates "... the teaching of practical skills and professional responsibility to Law students..." dealing "... with real cases under the supervision of an experienced Faculty member and the provision of legal services to vulnerable groups in society free of charge..." (Lusine Hovhannisian, Clinical Legal Education and the Bologna Process, Public Interest Law Initiative Papers, Number 2, December 2006, p. 11). But what is the nature of the linkage existing between this new introduced legal pedagogical system and its aims consisting in enforcing democratic citizenship and Human rights? To answer this question, it is worth tackling it from the point of the students who become involved in various kind of community, service learning and voluntary work and also from the point of view of the individuals or groups who benefit from the services of the legal clinics at the Faculty.

The established legal clinics in the Faculty of Law in Settat are twin-edged - for democratic citizenship and for human rights. As far as the students are concerned, it is broadly stated that the method of dissemination of legal knowledge and information uses holding formal class-room based lectures to the students in order to prepare them for acquiring the abilities of learning multidimensional skills that include problem definition, analysis, and solution generation, short- and long-term strategic planning, written and oral communication, negotiation, community organizing and legislative and policy advocacy. Furthermore, several series of lectures, seminars and debates on topics related to citizenship and human rights were organized, that will facilitate the mission of the students within a semester and under the supervision of the Professors staff in charge of elaborating a Citizen administrative rights Manuel.

Regarding the individuals or groups who benefit from the services of the legal clinics, it is to mention that since the democratization process of state and society in Morocco an ongoing and dynamic project, generating awareness of rights and obligations as knowledge among the citizens is tremendously needed, so that members of the public should be educated about their rights and obligations and live, free from fear and want, and in obedience with the supremacy of Democracy and Law

## CONCLUSION

I have argued that the new established legal clinics at the Faculty of Law, economic and social sciences in Settat are not only a fortunate fusion of pedagogy and practice in citizenship and human rights related issues, but an appropriate approach as well, that could complete and enforce the adopted University Reform especially its strategic Vision 2015-2030 and contribute to the progressive teaching of democratic citizenship and human rights based values and dynamic training of the young generation of reflective, ethical and responsible skilled and committed citizens.

Through this emerging model of clinical education that we hope should have a positive impact of "contamination" in all the Moroccan faculties of Law, economic and social sciences, a very smooth revolution in the mindset of both state and society can occur.

## NOTES

- 1 | *David Kerr*, The Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE): and its Implementation, *December 2013*, p. 3.
- 2 | *Conseil supérieur de l'éducation, de la formation et de la recherche scientifique*, Pour une école de l'équité, de la qualité et de la promotion, vision stratégique de la réforme 2015-2030, *2015*, p. 7-8); (see also: *Muhammad Faour*, A Review of Citizenship Education in Arab nations, *The Carnegie Papers*, *May 2013*).
- 3 | *Conseil supérieur de l'éducation, de la formation et de la recherche scientifique*, Pour une école de l'équité, de la qualité et de la

promotion, vision stratégique de la réforme 2015-2030, 2015, p. 68-69).

- 4| *Th. J. La Belle, Formal, Non-formal and Informal Education: A holistic Perspective of Life long learning*, International Review of Education, 1982, vol. 28, No. 2, p. 162, in: Cesar Birzèa, Council for Cultural Cooperation (CDCC)/Project on «Education for Democratic Citizenship», Strasbourg, 2000.
- 5| *Interministerial Delegation for Human Rights, Follow up on Human Rights Education, World Program Implementation, Second Phase (2010-2014), Kingdom of Morocco's Report*, p. 4-10, in: [www.ohchr.org](http://www.ohchr.org)
- 6| *The portal of the Faculty of Law, economic and social sciences at the Hassan 1<sup>st</sup> University in Settat*, [www.fsjes-settat.ma](http://www.fsjes-settat.ma)
- 7| *Bouaziz M. l'Université: encore un ratage, Zamane, le Maroc d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, septembre 2014, in Khoulood El Masrar, *The current University Reforms in Morocco: The present situation of Labour Market and Culture*, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 5, No. 9, September 2015, p. 186.





# La démocratie? Oui... mais...

## L'épreuve islamiste vis-à-vis de la démocratie : le cas d'Ahmed Raissouni au Maroc

*Mohamed Fadil*

Un peu partout dans le monde islamique, les islamistes semblent jongler avec la démocratie entre rejet et adoption. Leurs tentatives de se réconcilier avec ce concept/méthode a produit un corpus bourré de contradictions. Dans ce texte, nous étudions un modèle édifiant de cette épreuve islamiste vis-à-vis de la démocratie. Théologien, universitaire et un des leaders historiques du Mouvement de l'Unité et de la Réforme (président du mouvement de 1996 à 2002), lequel incarne la matrice du Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD) au Maroc, Ahmed Raissouni est surtout un des concepteurs notables du cadre idéologique de l'intégration politique de cette fraction de l'islamisme marocain. Pour ce faire, nous prenons appui sur un corpus de recherche constitué de l'ensemble des écrits de Raissouni, plus particulièrement ses textes visant l'islamisation de la démocratie. Sur le plan théorique, nous nous référons à une littérature traitant du concept de la démocratie en particulier dans l'expérience moderne.

### **I. LA DÉMOCRATIE, PERSPECTIVES THÉORIQUES**

Qu'est-ce qui est permanent et stable au-delà de l'instabilité de l'histoire de la démocratie? En d'autres termes, de quelle démocratie parle-t-on? Une tendance générale lorsqu'il s'agit de répondre à cette question consiste à se concentrer sur de grands slogans que l'on présente comme les dogmes fondateurs de la démocratie. Le plus notable de ces slogans est celui du gouvernement/pouvoir du peuple/de la majorité. Or, si ce principe qui incarne le slogan le plus affiché de la démocratie

« ne souffre guère de discussion dans la théorie démocratique ni dans la conception affichée de ses dirigeants, il n'en soulève pas moins de redoutables problèmes lorsqu'il s'agit d'en expliciter les postulats sous-jacents ou les implications concrètes » (Holeindre et Richard, p. 62). En effet, cette volonté qui est censée représenter le peuple dans sa globalité est en réalité un simple pouvoir de la majorité. C'est là où réside un des reproches les plus insistants que l'on trouve dans le registre critique de la démocratie. Les tenants de ce registre craignent en fait que le pouvoir du peuple ne se dégrade en une simple tyrannie de la majorité.

Yves-Charles Zarka manifeste, dans un ouvrage que nous situons dans cette même tendance critique de la pratique démocratique basique, *Repenser la démocratie* (2010), ces mêmes inquiétudes tout en se concentrant sur les répercussions de la pratique de la démocratie comme pouvoir de la majorité sur les libertés individuelles. Ainsi s'interroge-t-il : « Est-ce que la démocratie qui a toujours été conçue depuis l'Antiquité comme le règne de l'égalité et la liberté, à quoi les Modernes ont ajouté la fraternité, n'est pas en train de succomber aux défauts, voire aux pathologies, qui lui sont constitutifs et qui ont été mis en évidence déjà par Platon et Aristote (p. 5) ? » Devant cette difficulté, Patrick Pharo (2010) distingue dans le concept de la démocratie trois sens : le politique, le fonctionnel et le moral (p. 38).

Le sens politique représente, explique Pharo, « un sens minimal de la démocratie comme gouvernement fondé sur des élections libres, une presse libre et des juridictions indépendantes (p. 40) ». Ce sens « correspond aux caractères particuliers de types de gouvernement qu'on désigne comme démocratiques (p. 38) », qui constituent ainsi le niveau le plus bas de la démocratie et renvoient particulièrement à l'adoption des élections pour choisir les gouverneurs. Le sens fonctionnel, quant à lui, « correspond à l'usage routinisé... des institutions démocratiques (p. 38) ». Il s'agit ainsi de « la mise en œuvre du système démocratique dans la vie courante de la société ce qui suppose, pour les dirigeants comme pour les sujets, un certain nombre de procédures stabilisées et connues par tous :

élections, campagnes, assemblées des différentes instances» (*ibid.*). Ce sens représente en fait le fonctionnement spontané du sens politique de la démocratie. Le sens fonctionnel n'est par conséquent valable que dans les systèmes politiques qui ont déjà atteint le sens politique.

Finalement, le sens moral de la démocratie est le plus difficile à atteindre. Il correspond, explique Pharo, à «certaines vertus politiques, par exemple l'amour de l'égalité, qui devraient être promues par un régime démocratique (p. 38)». Ainsi, constate-t-il, «lorsqu'on s'interroge sur le sens moral de la démocratie, on peut avoir l'impression que celui-ci a supplanté tous les autres, comme si la démocratie était devenue aujourd'hui, par son association aux libertés et aux droits de l'homme, un synonyme de l'éthique tout court (p. 46)». Bref, la démocratie est née à Athènes comme un régime politique, mais elle est devenue dans les temps et les sociétés modernes une valeur morale qui garantit les droits et les libertés de la personne. Les tentatives des islamistes de se convertir à la démocratie intègrent-elles les différents enjeux contemporains qui entourent ce concept? Essayons de répondre à cette question à travers le modèle d'Ahmed Raissouni, un des notables négociateurs avec le concept de la démocratie dans le paysage islamiste marocain.

## **II. RAISSOUNI: ISLAMISER LA DÉMOCRATIE...**

Ex-membre de la *Jama'atad-da'wa wa tabligh* (groupe de la prédication et de la transmission) dont le discours est purement religieux et apolitique, il fonda en 1978 sa propre association religieuse et culturelle : l'Association islamique à Ksar el-Kebir. Après la dispersion du Mouvement de la jeunesse islamique (la Chabiba), Raissouni, bien que de tendance apolitique, accueillit au sein de son association une partie des activistes de ce groupe qui avaient choisi de renoncer à l'islamisme politique pour se tourner vers l'action prédicative et culturelle. Il fallut attendre le début des années quatre-vingt-dix pour que le cheminement de ce théologien prenne un tournant majeur. Ainsi, entre 1994 et 1996, son association fusionna avec d'autres groupes issus de la Chabiba dans un cadre uni portant le nom de Mouvement de

l'unicité et de la réforme, dont Raissouni devint le président. Ce mouvement représenta la matrice et le cadre religieux du Parti de la justice et du développement (PJD).

En outre, la particularité biographique de Raissouni par rapport aux autres leaders de son groupe ne réside pas seulement dans son parcours d'activiste/militant. Son statut d'ouléma (docteur de loi) conféré par sa formation théologique (doctorat en études islamiques) le distingue des autres leaders islamistes marocains qui exercent les professions, dans leur ensemble, d'enseignant, de médecin ou d'ingénieur. Cette particularité disciplinaire lui permit de contribuer sérieusement à la reconstruction d'un cadre idéologique pour la nouvelle tendance islamiste qui a traversé les héritiers de la Chabiba depuis la fin des années quatre-vingt. En 1992, Raissouni présenta sa thèse de doctorat qui redonna vie à la pensée de l'imam andalou Abu Ishaq Al-Chatibi (XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle) autour de la théorie des finalités de la charia (*Nadariyyate maqassid ach-charia*). Le travail théologique de Raissouni sur la théorie des finalités de la charia au début des années quatre-vingt-dix répondait à un besoin théorique interne au sein de cette fraction de l'islamisme marocain qui s'apprêtait à intégrer la vie politique moderne. Ce n'est pas un hasard si cette théorie trouva une traduction rapide dans la littérature de son groupe (le PJD/MUR). Ainsi, on lit dans un document interne de MUR que « le livre d'Ahmed Raissouni intitulé *La Théorie des intentions* a eu un grand impact dans l'élaboration de cette mutation méthodologique » (MUR [2006], p. 44-45). Voyons en quoi consistent les conceptions de cet ouléma-islamiste à propos de la démocratie.

Les écrits d'Ahmed Raissouni illustrent très bien la position d'une bonne partie de l'islamisme marocain vis-à-vis de la démocratie. Dans son ouvrage intitulé *Au début il y avait la communauté* (2010), il résume les jalons du différend entre les tenants et les opposants de la légitimité religieuse/islamique de la démocratie. Ce différend découle, selon l'analyse de Raissouni, des origines philosophiques et des contextes d'évolution non islamiques de la démocratie et par-delà des retombées de l'application de ce concept dans une société musulmane, en particulier au niveau et éthique et moral.

Face au premier problème, Raissouni propose de dissocier la démocratie de son environnement d'émergence et d'évolution. Ainsi, et contrairement à d'autres théoriciens islamistes qui insistent sur l'origine philosophique de la démocratie, au point de présenter celle-ci comme une religion indépendante (le cas d'Abdessalam Yassine par exemple<sup>1</sup>), Raissouni ne trouve dans la démocratie ni religion ni obligation d'appartenir ou de renoncer à une religion quelconque. L'adoption de la démocratie dans l'optique de Raissouni n'implique pas l'adoption de ses origines philosophiques ou de ses mutations culturelles. Ainsi explique-t-il :

« Le fait que la démocratie soit née dans un milieu païen et se soit développée dans un milieu non religieux signifie qu'elle n'a pas de religion, car si l'on admet que les résidus de ce milieu correspondent à cette démocratie, cela veut dire que les Occidentaux devraient adopter le paganisme grec avec ses dieux multiples. Cela démontre que les principales idées de la démocratie peuvent être adoptées à l'abri de ses résidus et attributs païens ou irréguliers (*ibid.*, p. 39-40). »

Suivant cette logique, Raissouni formule un cadre théologique dont le but est de démontrer les bienfaits du principe de la majorité et d'infirmer par conséquent toute incompatibilité entre ce principe et les finalités de l'islam. Bien entendu, cette formulation se nourrit de la théorie des finalités de la charia interprétée par Raissouni lui-même, à savoir *al-maqasid* (les intentions), *al-masalih* (les intérêts), *al-mafasid* (les dommages) et *al-maslaha al-'amma* (l'intérêt général). Il expose ainsi les *masalih* issues du principe du pouvoir de la majorité comme suit : « L'intérêt de la majorité exige de faire obstacle aux rois et présidents despotiques, car le despotisme mène inéluctablement à la tyrannie et à la corruption, et nous avons à cet égard plusieurs exemples dans l'histoire musulmane et non musulmane (*ibid.* p. 90). » Qu'en est-il du risque de l'attribution du pouvoir de la majorité à une formation politique autre que les islamistes et dont les conceptions politiques ne sont pas forcément situées sous l'égide de la référence islamique ?

La réponse de Raissouni à cette question se fonde sur la démocratie elle-même, mais exclusivement dans son sens politique. Ainsi, selon lui, une démocratie honnête et

transparente demeure la seule garantie de la formation d'une majorité politique en harmonie avec les normes et les valeurs de toute société. En effet, explique-t-il, « lorsqu'on choisit ce qui nous gouverne, nous le choisissons pour qu'il nous gouverne selon une référence sur laquelle nous nous entendons et à laquelle nous croyons » (Raissouni (2000), p. 31). Dans le cas des sociétés musulmanes, l'islam, ses représentants et ses défenseurs sont majoritaires. De fait, c'est la démocratie elle-même qui peut garantir que ces sociétés soient gouvernées par des régimes islamiques. Selon cette logique, les islamistes n'ont pas à avoir peur de l'investissement dans le cheminement démocratique (*ibid.*).

« La majorité – du moins dans le monde islamique – va toujours soutenir l'islam et tout gouvernement islamique stable annoncé, expliqué et prôné par les oulémas. Celui qui a des doutes doit nous prouver le contraire. Les expériences ont confirmé que là où on donne la liberté de choix dans le monde islamique, ce choix se renouvelle et s'enracine en faveur de l'islam [...], la réalité témoigne qu'à chaque fois (*sic*) que l'on demande l'opinion des gens, la majorité de ceux-ci sera avec l'islam en globalité et en détail [...] (Raissouni (2004), p. 42-43). »

En bref, Raissouni considère que l'enracinement de la culture islamique, la popularité et la bonne organisation des mouvements islamistes pourraient constituer un rempart efficace contre toute infiltration de l'espace politique par des élites politiques qui ne s'identifient pas à l'islam. Cette conception constitue en fait une idée enracinée dans le mode de penser de la plupart des mouvements islamistes dans leur logique ambivalente vis-à-vis de la démocratie. Fort conscients de leur force organisationnelle et de leur capacité à communiquer avec la masse populaire de la société globalement imprégnée par la culture religieuse, ceux-ci se montrent largement convaincus de leur capacité à réaliser des victoires faciles, à condition que les élections soient honnêtes et transparentes. Et si la démocratie amenait au pouvoir dans une société musulmane des acteurs qui ne s'identifiaient pas à l'islam ?

Dans son ouvrage intitulé *le Mouvement islamiste marocain, montée ou déclin?* (2004), Raïssouni présente une réponse ferme à cette question. La signification du fait qu'une véritable démocratie amène au pouvoir d'une société musulmane des acteurs qui rejettent l'islam consiste en ce que « ceux qui ont choisi d'être gouvernés par un autre référent que l'islam ne sont pas des musulmans, et l'islam n'est pas venu pour gouverner les non-musulmans. [...] L'islam est venu pour gouverner les gens qui l'ont accepté (p. 53). » Cette réponse ferme se trouve davantage détaillée dans son livre précité, *Au début il y avait la communauté* (Raïssouni (2000)) où il explique que « le bienfait de la démocratie dans ce cas sera de nous mettre au courant de la vérité des faits, pour que nous ne restions pas désinformés et pour que nous sachions à quel point la religiosité s'est détériorée (p. 43-44) ». Une telle situation resituera, selon la logique de Raïssouni, les islamistes dans leur mission favorite de base, soit la réhabilitation religieuse de la société. Ainsi explique-il :

« Si nous supposons qu'une société islamique choisit une législation autre que la charia ou choisit des faits de l'islam et en refuse d'autres, l'action, alors, ne sera pas d'obliger les gens et de les forcer à appliquer l'islam qu'ils ont rejeté. La solution est de convaincre les gens et de les faire retourner à leur bonne guidance et compréhension et à la correction de leur savoir et de leur connaissance de l'islam (p. 44). »

Mais là, il faut répondre à une objection capitale du camp des opposants à la légitimité religieuse, voire islamique, de la démocratie. Selon les représentants de ce camp, il y a une contradiction entre la logique de la démocratie qui attribue la souveraineté et le pouvoir au peuple et la logique islamiste générale considérant l'islam comme religion et État et attribuant la souveraineté à Allah. Pour faire face à cette contradiction, Raïssouni rappelle systématiquement une idée chère aux islamistes qui courent l'aventure de négocier avec la modernité, celle limitant la négociation et la communication des acteurs de ce groupe avec les normes de la vie politique moderne sur les frontières des enseignements de l'islam (la référence islamique). La fameuse concession se présente ainsi comme une réponse à toutes les questions, y compris celle concernant la souveraineté et le pouvoir entre Dieu et le peuple. La réponse est toute



simple : oui au pouvoir de la majorité, mais à condition qu'il ne dépasse pas la référence islamique et donc la souveraineté de Dieu. Ainsi explique-t-il dans *le Pouvoir de la majorité en Islam* (2001) :

« La majorité est souhaitée à condition qu'elle n'outrepasse pas le cadre de la foi et des bonnes actions, car la majorité associée au bien ne fait que diffuser ce dernier, de même pour le mal ; et la minorité dans le bien est une réduction de ce dernier, ce qui s'applique au mal aussi. Ainsi, la majorité dans le bien est meilleure que la minorité, et la minorité dans le mal est meilleure que la majorité (p. 38). »

On serait ainsi loin d'une conversion complète et catégorique à la démocratie. L'argumentaire d'Ahmed Raissouni se concentre exclusivement sur l'islamisation du principe de la majorité auquel il a consacré un ouvrage intitulé *le Jugement de la majorité en Islam* [2004]. Le non-dit dans les conceptions de Raissouni consiste en ce que la conversion islamiste à la démocratie ne doit pas dépasser son aspect technique. Or, ce concept a beaucoup évolué à travers l'espace et le temps. Plus encore, ce principe n'est valable dans la logique de Raissouni que sous l'égide de la référence islamique.

## CONCLUSION

Si nous lisons les conceptions de Raissouni à l'aune de ce cadre théorique, il nous sera facile de conclure que si la démocratie que prône ce théologien islamiste marocain pourrait couvrir les deux premiers sens de ce concept (le politique et le fonctionnel), il n'arrivera point à atteindre le troisième sens (le moral). Notre analyse rejoint les conclusions du chercheur suisse Patrick Haenni qui conclut que l'attitude contradictoire des islamistes vis-à-vis de la démocratie entre rejet et adoption est animé par une crainte double qui provient de « la confusion des deux niveaux évoqués » (la démocratie et le libéralisme). Les islamistes, explique Haenni, « ne sont pas pour la défense d'un projet d'extension des libertés. Ce sont des démocrates « illibéraux ». Ils respectent le verdict des urnes, mais pas la dissidence – ou même la dérision – religieuse, théologique

ou culturelle...» (2001). Bien qu'il ne se montre pas en rejet catégorique de l'idée de démocratie, à l'instar d'autres théoriciens islamistes (Yassine), Raissouni partage avec ceux-ci la même inquiétude lorsqu'il s'agit des implications de l'adoption de ce principe au niveau éthique et moral.

Cette conscience est d'une certaine rationalité sur le plan argumentatif. En effet, le registre universel des droits de la personne qui a fini par représenter le sens moral de la démocratie est en opposition avec le credo capital de l'islamisme, y compris dans sa version qualifiée de modérée, considérant l'islam comme à la fois *dine wa dawla* (religion et État) et *dine wa donia* (religion et vie terrestre). Ce credo postulant l'impossibilité de concevoir un système politique ou éthique en rupture avec les enseignements de l'islam implique le refus du sens moral de la démocratie. C'est en répondant à cette contradiction que des idéologues islamistes comme Raissouni mènent une stratégie visant l'islamisation de la démocratie. Cette stratégie consiste à dissocier ce principe/concept de ses origines philosophiques et de ses contextes d'évolution (l'expérience occidentale). Bref, il s'agit d'une stratégie visant la dissociation de la démocratie de son sens moral, ce qui garantit la cristallisation de ce principe autour de ses sens les plus basiques : le politique et le fonctionnel.

## NOTE

1 | Dans son ouvrage *Islamiser la modernité (1998)*, Yassine utilise maintes fois l'expression « la religion de la démocratie ».

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# La transition marocaine et l'usage royal de la rhétorique démocratique

*Hassan Zouaoui*

La complexité de la transition politique marocaine provient d'une tension structurelle entre continuité et changement. C'est pourquoi la compréhension de la transition marocaine ne peut se faire sans un retour réflexif sur l'usage royal de la rhétorique démocratique.

Le fait de s'intéresser au rôle politico-constitutionnel du roi et aux discours royaux nous permet en effet d'accéder à un niveau d'explication plus élaboré. Il nous conduit à chercher de qui émane l'initiative de changement et par qui la démocratisation est entreprise. Parce que l'innovation qui se dégage soit de la réforme constitutionnelle de 2011, soit de l'ensemble des mesures de réforme politique prises par le roi Mohammed VI se trouve puissamment contrôlée et même contrainte par le poids de l'institution royale et notamment de son référent religieux, *Imamat Al Mouminine*, qui ne peut jamais être totalement abandonné au risque d'engendrer justement une rupture. Cette continuité est assurément à considérer avec attention, car elle se trouve renforcée par le comportement coopératif des partis politiques qu'illustre le vote favorable de ces derniers à cette réforme constitutionnelle de 2011 aussi bien que par la capacité de l'institution royale de savoir tirer des avantages politiques de la démocratisation en tant que processus d'apprentissage de la démocratie.

Ainsi, de démocratisation il sera beaucoup question dans ce travail. L'essentiel ne consiste pas uniquement à montrer si elle « fonctionne » bien ou si elle « tourne » mal. Il s'agit également de comprendre ce que démocratisation veut dire dans un pays arabo-islamique. Pour être plus précis, il s'agit surtout de se demander ce que le monarque Mohamed VI veut dire et veut faire quand il parle de démocratie et quand il dit qu'il construit une démocratie.

## A. LE RECOURS ROYAL À LA RHÉTORIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE

Dans un entretien accordé à la presse étrangère et publié par *Le Figaro* du 4 septembre 2001, le roi Mohammed VI a bien défini le cadre institutionnel de son action politique : « Les Marocains veulent une monarchie forte, démocratique et exécutive. Notre monarchie est constitutionnelle, avec un texte fondamental datant de 1962 qui avait été élaboré en étroite concertation avec les formations politiques de l'époque. Mais chez nous, le Roi ne se contente pas de régner. (...) Depuis treize siècles que dure la monarchie marocaine, nous avons évolué dans ce cadre et les Marocains le veulent ainsi<sup>1</sup>. » Ce sont quasiment les mêmes propos du Roi Hassan II qui avaient justifié que le roi du Maroc doive régner et gouverner à la fois parce que « sans une monarchie populaire, le Maroc n'existerait plus. (...) Plus que jamais le peuple marocain a besoin d'une monarchie populaire, islamique et gouvernante. C'est pourquoi au Maroc le Roi gouverne. Le peuple ne comprendrait pas qu'il ne gouvernât point<sup>2</sup>. »

Tout comme le discours de Hassan II, celui de Mohammed VI insiste sur la croyance en une fonctionnalité de l'institution monarchique, c'est-à-dire en l'existence de son utilité politique, de sa raison d'être et de son rôle légitime. On ne s'étonne donc pas dans ces conditions de constater que le fond reste le même, le rôle du roi « Amir Al Mouminine et représentant suprême de la Nation » étant immuable. L'ordre institutionnel a réellement atteint à l'objectivité en ce qu'il est vécu comme doté d'une force propre qui permet au nouveau roi d'endosser le rôle de Commandeur des croyants dès le premier jour de sa *baï'a* (acte d'allégeance) dont le texte ne fait aucune référence à la constitution. Cet argument indique que la transition dynastique, telle qu'elle fut réalisée, était en principe imprégnée par l'impératif de la stabilisation qui se traduit avant tout par le maintien des règles de la constitution implicite<sup>3</sup>. Celles-ci sont censées garantir la prééminence royale dans les interactions politico-institutionnelles.

C'est dans cet esprit que s'annonce le projet démocratique prôné par le roi Mohammed VI. Il s'agit en effet d'un processus

démocratique qui permet au roi de conserver le contrôle du jeu politique et des changements qui peuvent l'atteindre. Le discours royal du 30 juillet 2007 a bien expliqué que ce projet démocratique n'a nullement pour enjeu « l'identité de l'Etat marocain ou les fondamentaux de son régime, en l'occurrence l'islam modéré et ouvert, la monarchie constitutionnelle, l'unité nationale, l'intégrité territoriale et la démocratie sociale. Ce sont là des constantes qui font l'objet d'une unanimité nationale imprescriptible<sup>4</sup>. » Pour le monarque Mohammed VI, le changement et l'apprentissage des règles démocratiques doivent être inscrits dans une tradition institutionnelle fondée sur un contrat religieux dont il est le garant constitutionnel et le protecteur qui doit « servir le citoyen, là où il vit dans notre pays, sans distinction entre le nord et le sud, l'est et l'ouest, ni entre citadins et ruraux<sup>5</sup> ». Ainsi, il s'avère nécessaire de placer l'usage royal de la démocratie dans le cadre de la problématique de l'articulation entre le changement politique et la continuité institutionnelle, surtout que la démocratisation en tant que processus d'apprentissage a été perçue comme un mécanisme permettant à l'institution royale de s'ancrer dans la longue durée et continue de peser.

En fait, le recours royal à la rhétorique démocratique a principalement été vu sous l'angle des savoir-faire et des pratiques qui permettent à la monarchie de donner d'elle-même une image attrayante. Se faire valoir vis-à-vis du peuple et faire valoir la qualité de ses actions, tel paraissait être son objectif principal. La réinvention royale de la question démocratique ainsi que sa conversion en ressource politique contribuent assurément à la refondation du pouvoir monarchique. Celui-ci est confirmé avec l'arrivée au pouvoir en juillet 1999 du roi Mohammed VI qui adopte une politique réformatrice destinée à mettre en œuvre une nouvelle conception du rôle de l'institution monarchique dans la vie politique du pays.

## **B. L'EXCEPTION MAROCAINE EST-ELLE DÉMOCRATIQUE ?**

L'interprétation de la trajectoire marocaine de réforme politico-institutionnelle repose essentiellement sur l'idée que les évolutions politico-institutionnelles demeurent surdéterminées

par la primauté de l'héritage institutionnel qui continue à avoir un impact considérable sur la transformation du régime politique marocain. Il en résulte que l'argument de la spécificité agit ici de façon à déterminer l'obéissance de l'ordre politique interne à la cadence démocratique.

Ces constats soutiennent le fait qu'il existe d'abord un contexte historique marocain à la fois politique et religieux qui modèle le changement en lui conférant un sens singulier et local tiré de l'incontournable principe de la légitimité du calife en terre d'Islam. Ensuite, il y a aussi la fonction de l'habileté du souverain, c'est-à-dire de l'institué qui contribue à la création et la re-création institutionnelle dans le cadre d'un passé institutionnel dont les effets se font notamment sentir chaque fois que le monarque procède à des réformes politiques. Ces considérations nous ont incité à nous lancer dans la discussion du paradigme de changement politico-institutionnel. Parce que dans cette approche la principale difficulté émane de la nature polysémique de l'idée même du changement au Maroc. Celui-ci n'est pas d'une appréhension immédiate et aisée<sup>6</sup>.

Ce qui distingue les voies empruntées par le régime politique marocain pour atteindre la démocratie est que le mariage arrangé entre continuité et changement soulève une contradiction majeure qui met « face-à-face » autoritarisme et démocratie. Il suffit de voir les contours de la concurrence électorale aussi bien que ceux du travail gouvernemental pour conclure que la démocratisation bute sur un dispositif institutionnel solide qui s'est progressivement forgé à partir de la première expérience constitutionnelle de 1962. La politique réformatrice renforce la conviction selon laquelle le régime monarchique n'est pas en situation de passage et d'incertitude mais plutôt en situation de consolidation favorisée par la réussite de ce dernier à gérer la réforme selon une logique consensuelle brouillant les frontières entre changement et continuité. L'ambiance consensuelle et l'« enchantement » qui ont accompagné les réformes constitutionnelles de 2011 ont produit ensemble des effets dans la manière même de classer le régime politique marocain. Autrement dit, cette

politique réformatrice plaide en faveur d'un régime hybride où autoritarisme et démocratie se juxtaposent.

A partir de là, on vise à comprendre pourquoi et comment la démocratisation sous surveillance de la monarchie s'est soldée par un processus lent et graduel qui tient au rythme prolongé de la transition marocaine et s'opère en position de force pour la monarchie. La conversion « calculée » à la démocratie a en effet permis à la monarchie marocaine de s'affranchir relativement du fameux *king's dilemma* énoncé par Samuel Huntington<sup>7</sup>, dans la mesure où le pouvoir royal a su garder un équilibre entre deux options : d'une part, l'engagement dans une politique de modernisation et de « démocratisation » sans être cantonné dans le rôle symbolique d'une monarchie constitutionnelle à l'occidentale où le roi règne mais ne gouverne pas et, d'autre part, le maintien d'une politique de traditionalisation, qui ne risquerait pas d'entraîner le pays dans l'immobilisme mais qui placerait la monarchie à l'abri et lui conserverait un statut dominant dans le système en réduisant les autres forces politiques dans des rôles secondaires. Or, cet équilibre révèle des particularités qui poussent au paroxysme la « démocratie spécifiste », c'est-à-dire une démocratie « à la marocaine » représentée par un rapport instrumental avec l'argument démocratique.

Le ressort de la transition marocaine se trouve dans le fonctionnement même de la démocratie marocaine. Il présente la particularité d'avoir son origine dans ce que Jean Leca appelle dans ce cas « la combinaison d'un ensemble d'anticipations rationnelles d'acteurs guidés par leur *self interest*, avec des structures matérielles et des mythes fondateurs (ou « des préjugés bien fondés »)<sup>8</sup> ». Dans cette perspective analytique, notre raisonnement propose, à l'instar des analyses de Crozier et Friedberg<sup>9</sup>, un trait d'équivalence entre imprévisibilité et supériorité : le pouvoir de la monarchie dépend dans ces conditions du contrôle qu'il lui est possible d'exercer sur une zone d'incertitude affectant sa stratégie d'ouverture politico-institutionnelle.



Désormais, l'incertitude liée à la démocratie peut être remplacée par la certitude propre au processus de démocratisation marocain dont l'impératif de l'existence repose sur la coexistence entre monarchie exécutive et démocratie. Au regard de la spécificité marocaine, les orientations théoriques de la transition démocratique sont condamnées à devenir plus modestes vis-à-vis de la complexité du changement politique et constitutionnel qui défie toute généralisation facile.

## CONCLUSION

Force est de constater que la procédure de la démocratisation, telle qu'elle est appliquée au Maroc, n'offre pas la garantie d'un développement linéaire. Elle se trouve influencée par la consistance particulière des normes qui commandent le déroulement du processus démocratique. La rigidité de ces normes conduit à un certain mode d'imposition du sens, de sorte que l'innovation ne s'impose que si elle ne comporte pas d'incertitudes ou des possibilités d'infléchissement susceptibles d'agresser l'ordre politico-institutionnel établi. Cette procédure a pour fonction de renforcer les chances de consolidation de cet ordre. Elle repose sur un fond de représentations qui surestime l'emprise concrète de la monarchie.

Le processus de démocratisation au Maroc a été mesuré au moyen d'une continuité institutionnelle qui tient compte de la qualité de l'existence d'une tradition islamique du pouvoir. Il favorise la permanence de la monarchie agissante dont les chances de consolidation sont plus élevées grâce à sa capacité de prévoir les effets pervers de son engagement « démocratique ».

## NOTES

1 | *Le Figaro* du 4/09/2001.

2 | *Hassan II, Le Défi*, Paris, Editions Albin Michel, 1976, p. 154.

3 | *Rkia El Mossadeq*, « *Les labyrinthes de la transition démocratique* », in *Dispositifs de démocratisation et dispositifs autoritaires en Afrique du*

Nord, sous la direction de Jean-Noël Ferrié et Jean-Claude Santucci, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2006, p. 37-58.

- 4| Le Matin du Sahara du 31 juillet 2007.
- 5| «*Discours royal*», in Le Matin du Sahara du 29 juillet 2017.
- 6| *Hassan Zouaoui*, Changement institutionnel et transition politique : la démocratisation au Maroc, *thèse de doctorat en science politique*, Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne, octobre 2009, p. 386.
- 7| *Pour Samuel P. Huntington, le dilemme fondamental auquel fait face la monarchie traditionnelle est d'être prisonnière d'une contradiction fondamentale entre un attachement à la tradition et une timide ouverture. Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, «The King's Dilemma: succes vs. Survival», in Political order in changing societies, 1968, Yale University Press, p. 177-191.*
- 8| *Jean Leca, «La démocratisation dans le monde arabe : incertitude, vulnérabilité et légitimité», in Démocraties sans démocrates : politiques d'ouverture dans le monde arabe et islamique, sous la direction de Ghassan Salamé, Paris, Fayard, 1994, p. 35-84.*
- 9| *Erhard Friedberg et Michel Crozier, L'Acteur et le système, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1977.*



# L'apprentissage de la démocratie chez la tendance salafiste au Maroc

*Abdelhakim Aboullouz*

L'étude du comportement politique des islamistes marocains a constitué l'objet principal de nombreuses études scientifiques. Dans le même cadre, il est nécessaire d'avancer que le paradigme de l'apprentissage de la démocratie serait indispensable pour expliquer les transformations au sein de ce courant politico-religieux.

En effet, avant de présenter les principales idées qui seront traitées dans cet article, il est nécessaire de souligner que jusqu'à l'émergence du Mouvement du 20 Février, la tendance salafiste n'était ni organisée, ni structurée. Son objectif n'était pas de renverser le régime en place, ni de s'occuper des affaires publiques, mais de consolider la mission principale pour laquelle elle a été créée : celle de l'appel à Dieu (*Da'awa*, prédication). Mais cette mission principale ne fait pas l'unanimité au sein de cette tendance. Ceci dit, le mouvement salafiste a connu des transformations au Maroc, notamment avec l'émergence de ce qui a été appelé par les médias *Salafia Al Jihadia*<sup>1</sup>.

En fait, le salafisme désigne une tendance qui refuse – par principe – toute interprétation, voire exégèse, du texte religieux, s'opposant à l'évolution qu'avaient déjà connue les principaux niveaux de la religion : le niveau de la croyance et celui du culte. Ils revendiquent un retour aux *Salaf*, c'est-à-dire les premières générations qui ont accompagné le prophète Mohammed.

L'un des objectifs du salafisme est la recodification de la religion au niveau de la croyance afin d'orienter métaphysiquement et éthiquement les croyances telles qu'elles existent réellement. Cependant, l'objectif final sera le même, c'est-à-dire la recodification des pratiques religieuses en unifiant leurs modèles,

leurs mots, leurs symboles, afin de préserver l'activité religieuse originale de toute innovation<sup>2</sup>.

Sociologiquement, le salafisme semble avoir une dimension sectaire<sup>3</sup>. Ce sont des communautés ou groupes d'inspiration religieuse, c'est-à-dire un type de religiosité qui essaye de garantir son indépendance vis-à-vis des relations sociales dominantes. C'est une religiosité radicale adoptée par quelques mouvements sociaux afin d'exprimer un certain refus des institutions sociales et politiques, considérées comme hérésie<sup>4</sup>. Elle est adoptée pour préserver le maximum de distance vis-à-vis des comportements et traditions religieuses officielles de la société en s'inspirant d'autres doctrines religieuses ou d'une autre interprétation ambiguë vis-à-vis de la religion officielle, celle de l'Etat<sup>5</sup>.

L'enjeu principal des mouvements salafistes est la mobilisation massive par une machine de production idéologique intense. Cela veut dire que le discours salafiste est propre à accomplir les tâches précédentes. Ce discours critique les modes traditionnels de la religiosité, en privilégiant pour ses propres adeptes une idéologie puriste, une culture différente et plus capable d'interpréter, de raisonner et d'expliquer l'existence sociale des disciples, sans que cette culture ne sorte des formules conservatrices du champ religieux. Cette idéologie s'entrecroise avec des dimensions importantes de la culture religieuse traditionnelle. Cependant, elle s'éloigne absolument de la politique et ne s'intéresse pas à la justice sociale, ce qui la distingue des autres mouvements de l'islam politique<sup>6</sup>.

## **UNE NOUVELLE ATTITUDE**

Depuis les attentats terroristes du 16 mai 2003 à Casablanca, les modes traditionnels de la religiosité sont devenus de plus en plus inefficaces, ce qui oblige la tendance salafiste de s'adapter à la nouvelle réalité sociale marocaine. Ainsi, une nouvelle stratégie s'affirme et repose sur le conformisme politique selon le même slogan du mouvement salafiste : l'apolitisme (من السياسة ترك (السياسة)).

## **DEUX TENDANCES**

Nous distinguons à cet égard deux grandes périodes : une période, qui ne fait pas l'objet de notre étude, celle du salafisme réformiste issu du Mouvement national marocain dont Allal El Fassi, est l'un des fondateurs. La deuxième période, qui a commencé avec les années 70, constitue l'objet de notre investigation scientifique. Parce que cette période a été influencée par le wahabisme, dont les premiers fondateurs ont suivi leurs études à la Faculté théologique de Médine (Arabie saoudite), comme El Maghraoui et El Hossin Ait Said<sup>7</sup>.

## **LA TOURNANTE DE 20 FÉVRIER**

La tendance salafiste marocaine a connu des transformations depuis l'émergence du Mouvement du 20 Février. Certains de ses membres ont participé aux manifestations organisées par ce mouvement. Les militants salafistes ont réclamé la justice ainsi que la libération des prisonniers qui avaient été arrêtés suite aux attentats de 2003 à Casablanca. Cela explique que le Printemps arabe a joué un rôle important dans les transformations de cette tendance. Ce nouveau contexte a même contribué à l'émergence des mouvements sociaux salafistes. Cela montre que cette tendance n'est plus isolée de la société marocaine et commence à s'intéresser à ce qui se passe autour d'elle<sup>8</sup>, d'une part, et à apprendre à mieux utiliser les mécanismes et les outils offerts par la constitution et la législation en vigueur et sous le contrôle des autorités, d'autre part.

## **UNE NOUVELLE GÉNÉRATION**

Il est nécessaire de souligner que les salafistes marocains ne négligent pas l'intérêt que représente l'engagement politique, mais ce dernier ne constitue pas pour eux une priorité. Cette position est justifiée par l'adoption de l'idée selon laquelle il faut donner la priorité à « la purification et à l'éducation ». Je cite dans ce cadre les propos d'un salafiste qui confirme ce choix : « On commence par la doctrine, puis par l'adoration, ensuite le

comportement et l'éducation, mais un jour on va s'intéresser à la politique, car celle-ci est définie comme une gestion des affaires de la nation, la Oumma.»

Nous avons remarqué, dans le cadre de nos études empiriques, que les dirigeants des écoles coraniques ne s'étaient jamais inscrits sur les listes électorales<sup>9</sup>.

Par ailleurs, il est interdit à tout membre d'une école coranique de parler politique. Pour les pouvoirs publics, l'enjeu était d'éviter tout rapprochement entre les salafistes et la mouvance islamique, notamment le parti politique *Alaadala wa attanmiya* (PJD) et le mouvement *Al Adl Wa Al Ihsan*.

Cependant, en 2008, les pouvoirs publics ont décidé de fermer soixante-cinq écoles coraniques, ce qui a donné lieu à une sorte de politisation de la tendance salafiste. Parmi les manifestations de cette politisation, on trouve un changement dans certains comportements des membres de la Salafia. Par exemple, certains salafistes ont rejoint des associations locales, d'autres ont créé une coordination nationale des écoles coraniques, sous la présidence de Hamad Elkabaj, l'un des disciples de Cheikh El Meghraoui. Cette coordination s'est mobilisée sur le terrain et les réseaux sociaux dans le seul but d'exiger la réouverture des écoles coraniques<sup>10</sup>.

En revanche, suite à l'émergence et à la mobilisation du Mouvement du 20 Février, les disciples et les dirigeants des écoles coraniques ont multiplié leurs revendications concernant la réouverture de leurs écoles. Ces revendications ont été portées par la nouvelle génération de la Salafia, ce qui explique les transformations que connaît cette dernière dans un contexte marqué par le Printemps arabe. Par ailleurs, le discours adopté par ces jeunes se focalise sur des concepts du répertoire du libéralisme tels que la liberté d'expression et d'association, les droits humains et la démocratie. Cette nouvelle situation explique pourquoi les salafistes marocains sont devenus de plus en plus visibles et pourquoi ils ont suscité l'intérêt des médias et des acteurs politiques<sup>11</sup>.

Cependant, entre 2008 et 2016, il a été observé que les salafistes ont opté pour l'exercice de la démocratie à travers leur discours et leur comportement. Mais durant cette période, plusieurs événements ont eu lieu et ont favorisé chez eux l'apprentissage de la démocratie.

Le premier événement est lié à l'émergence d'une nouvelle génération des salafistes. Celle-ci a profité de la répression qui a eu lieu contre leur tendance en maîtrisant les techniques ainsi que les outils de la mobilisation collective. Elle est même devenue consciente de ce qui se passe autour d'elle en matière de politique.

Le deuxième événement est lié à l'incapacité du parti islamiste, le PJD, à réouvrir les écoles coraniques. Il n'a pas pu répondre aux demandes des salafistes, bien qu'il ait été à la tête du gouvernement.

Le troisième événement est celui du refus de la candidature d'un leader salafiste, Hmad El Kabaj, qui a voulu se représenter au nom du PJD aux élections législatives du 7 octobre 2017. Sa candidature a été rejetée par le gouverneur de la ville de Marrakech.

## **CONCLUSION**

En guise de conclusion, il est nécessaire de souligner que les analyses centrées autour de l'hypothèse selon laquelle les salafistes restent à l'écart de tout engagement civil et politique sont rejetées, car depuis le déclenchement du Printemps arabe, les salafistes marocains sont de plus en plus présents sur le terrain social. L'émergence des mouvements de contestation dans le monde arabe a encouragé les salafistes à s'organiser et à ne plus rester à l'écart de la société. Ce nouveau contexte a donné lieu à l'émergence de jeunes salafistes qui refusent l'isolement de leur tendance et militent dans des associations locales de développement et d'éducation. De surcroît, cette nouvelle génération a pu comprendre et découvrir certains concepts liés aux libertés publiques et aux droits humains. Cela



confirme que cette tendance est sur la voie de l'apprentissage de la démocratie.

Pour les autres acteurs politiques, il est temps d'admettre que le salafisme est un fait reconnu sociologiquement. Son travail de prédication qui a démarré en 1971 lui a donné le statut d'expression religieuse orthodoxe et puritaine<sup>12</sup>. Il est un acteur parmi d'autres, qui est en quête de cohabiter avec les expressions politico-religieuses.

La nouvelle politique en matière de religion<sup>13</sup> devra intégrer le salafisme dans un champ religieux en pleine compétition. Le salafisme va se trouver devant la nécessité de s'exprimer d'une autre façon. C'est un processus d'apprentissage de la démocratie, voire une opportunité pour réussir la transition d'une secte à un mouvement social.

## NOTES

- 1 | *Le sujet est l'objet d'une thèse intitulée « Sociologie du salafisme au Maroc », publiée par le centre Dirassat Alwahda Alaarabiya, 2<sup>e</sup> édition 2013 ; voir autres études de l'auteur sur le site : [www.academia.org](http://www.academia.org)*
- 2 | *Aboullouz A., « Les rites chez les mouvements salafistes contemporains au Maroc, in Al Mawaqif, revue des études et des recherches sur la société et l'histoire, numéro spécial, avril 2008.*
- 3 | *Bryan W., Les Sectes religieuses, Hachette, Paris, 1970.*
- 4 | *Deconchy J.P., L'Orthodoxie religieuse, Paris, Mouton, 1980.*
- 5 | *Aboullouz A., « Le salafisme au Maroc entre la radicalité religieuse et le conformisme politique », in Le Maroc au présent, sous dir., CJB, 2017.*
- 6 | *Aboullouz A., L'Islam politique et la crise de la modernité, édition Rouya, Le Caire, 2012.*
- 7 | *Aboullouz A., « New salafist dogmas strict beliefs and cultural limits », in Arab Insight, Bringing middle eastern perspectives to Washington, vol. 2, No. 6, Winter 2009.*
- 8 | *Aboullouz A., « Salafism in Morocco between radicalism and conformism », in Radicalism in North Africa, Politics and Process, Edited by George Joffe, Published 29<sup>th</sup> July 2011 by Routledge, New Work.*
- 9 | *Aboullouz A., Etude du comportement électoral de certaines sensibilités religieuses, le cas des salafistes.*

- 10| Aboullouz A., «*La répartition géographique des salafistes au Maroc, étude monographique*», in revue *Naqd d'études et de critique sociale*, n° 24, automne-hiver 2007).
- 11| Aboullouz A., «*Le glissement du salafisme vers le phénomène associatif à Marrakech : étude sur le comportement électoral de quelque sensibilité religieuse au Maroc*», in *La Démocratie*, revue publiée par le Centre Alahram pour les études stratégiques, 2013.
- 12| *Pour cette politique établie par le roi (discours du 31 avril 2004)*, voir Aboullouz A., «*La rigidité de la doctrine salafiste contemporaine*», in Idafate, la revue arabe de la sociologie, n° 2 et 3, été-automne, 2008.
- 13| Aboullouz A., «*Le rapport sur la politique religieuse au Maroc en 2005*», *Insaniyat, revue algérienne d'anthropologie et de science sociale*, n° 31, janvier-mars 2006.

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# Pratiques démocratiques au Maroc, entre expertise citoyenne et délégation de pouvoir

*Mustapha El Mnasfi*

Cet article porte sur une catégorie de pratiques démocratiques adoptées au Maroc, qui est liée aux mécanismes de participation mis en place par les pouvoirs publics dans le but d'«associer» la population dans l'élaboration des politiques publiques.

À travers le cas des conseils locaux des jeunes, qui est un dispositif participatif visant l'implication des jeunes dans la vie politique locale, et le cas des dispositifs participatifs d'une politique publique sociale (l'INDH), qui est une politique visant à lutter contre la pauvreté dans les zones urbaines et rurales, la question centrale à laquelle vise à répondre cette contribution est la suivante : comment ces pratiques démocratiques constituent-elles une école de la démocratie pour les acteurs mobilisés autour des mécanismes participatifs ?

Les éléments de réponse à cette question se feront à travers la mobilisation des données empiriques d'une enquête en cours de réalisation sur les conseils locaux des jeunes et celles d'une enquête de terrain déjà réalisée sur les dispositifs participatifs de l'INDH.

La première partie de cet article se propose de démontrer comment ces pratiques démocratiques ont donné lieu à l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs à l'échelle locale. La seconde partie vise à démontrer comment ces pratiques ont permis à ces nouveaux acteurs de se doter de compétences civiques, voire démocratiques.

## **I. PRATIQUES DÉMOCRATIQUES ET ÉMERGENCE DE NOUVEAUX ACTEURS**

Dans l'objectif de répondre à la question centrale de cet article, il est nécessaire de présenter dans un premier temps le contexte dans lequel ont émergé les dispositifs participatifs de l'INDH et ceux des conseils locaux des jeunes.

En effet, il est nécessaire de souligner que les dispositifs participatifs de l'INDH ont été lancés dans un contexte marqué par l'arrivée d'un nouveau monarque.

Ces dispositifs sont arrivés après des années marquées par une atmosphère de défiance qui régnait entre les pouvoirs publics et les « citoyens » à l'époque de l'ancien monarque. Les pouvoirs publics ont alors voulu opérer une rupture avec cette époque en adoptant un nouveau concept de la gouvernance.

Par ailleurs, le contexte international a joué un rôle dans la mise en place des dispositifs participatifs dans le cadre des politiques sociales. Les pouvoirs publics n'ont inscrit ce concept sur leur agenda politique qu'après que des critiques aient été émises par les organisations internationales, comme le Fonds monétaire international et la Banque mondiale. Ces critiques mettaient en évidence la marginalisation des « citoyens »-cibles dans la production des projets et des politiques concernant l'amélioration de leur qualité de vie. Il est observé que ces dispositifs participatifs ont redonné aux « citoyens » confiance en l'institution publique, notamment l'institution monarchique.

Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne les conseils locaux des jeunes, il est observé que ce dispositif participatif adressé aux jeunes a été diffusé et élargi dans un contexte marqué par les soulèvements dans le monde arabe et l'émergence et la mobilisation du mouvement de contestation du 20 février.

Dans ce même contexte, une première rencontre appelée « la journée nationale de consultation avec les jeunes » a été organisée au mois de septembre 2012. Les objectifs de cette

consultation, selon les organisateurs, sont la mise en place, d'une part, d'une stratégie en faveur des jeunes et, d'autre part, du cadre stratégique du conseil consultatif des jeunes et de l'action associative.

Avant cela, plus précisément au mois de février 2010, le Programme de gouvernance locale (PGL) a été lancé par l'Agence américaine pour le développement international en partenariat avec la Direction générale des collectivités locales du ministère de l'Intérieur. Ce programme a soutenu la création, dans quelques villes<sup>1</sup>, de conseils locaux des jeunes. Ces derniers sont considérés comme un instrument participatif visant à créer des instances de dialogue entre les jeunes et leurs communes. Ils sont composés de jeunes délégués par les associations qui œuvrent dans le domaine de la jeunesse. Ces conseils sont donc un moyen d'élargissement de la « participation » des jeunes au gouvernement local.

Le lancement et l'adoption de ce dispositif montrent qu'il existe une sorte de circulation de modèles de dispositif participatif. Dans le cas, par exemple, des conseils locaux des jeunes, les organisations gouvernementales et non gouvernementales ont joué un rôle important dans la circulation de ce dispositif. Lors des enquêtes de terrain que j'ai menées sur ces conseils, j'ai observé que l'Agence française de développement et l'association française « Solidarité laïque » ont joué, à travers le financement et l'accompagnement des acteurs locaux, un rôle de grande ampleur dans le transfert de ce dispositif de la France vers le Maroc.

« L'association Solidarité laïque finance les formations, les voyages, les visites d'échanges entre les différents conseils locaux à travers les associations qui pilotent ces derniers. Solidarité laïque est financée par le gouvernement français, le ministère des Affaires étrangères et l'Agence française de développement<sup>2</sup>. »

Cependant, les recherches menées sur ces deux pratiques démocratiques montrent que ces dernières ont donné lieu à l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs de l'action publique locale :

les femmes et les jeunes. Cela explique que ces dispositifs constituent un nouvel espace d'investissement citoyen.

« On était sept femmes au début dans notre coopérative, et lorsqu'on a eu un financement de l'INDH nous sommes devenues dix-sept femmes ; l'INDH nous a permis de renforcer notre coopérative et de participer ; la porte de notre coopérative est toujours ouverte. Plusieurs femmes bénéficient de notre partenariat avec l'INDH, maintenant on forme des femmes dans tout ce qui concerne l'artisanat, ensuite elles partent pour créer leur propre coopérative ou au moins elles travaillent chez elles, ou elles ouvrent leur propre boutique, comme ça elles aident leurs maris et leurs enfants, elles sentent qu'elles sont en train de contribuer. Donc notre participation est efficace, s'il n'y avait pas eu l'INDH on n'aurait pas réalisé tout ça<sup>3</sup>. »

Le profil de ces nouveaux acteurs est hétérogène. Ces citoyens ont entre 18 et 35 ans, leur niveau d'études est varié, allant du niveau baccalauréat jusqu'à l'équivalent du master. Il y a par ailleurs des citoyens mobilisés autour de ces dispositifs, qui sont au chômage et à la recherche d'un premier emploi, tandis que d'autres adhèrent à des partis politiques, notamment de gauche.

La participation féminine montre également que la société marocaine est en cours de transformation. Cela veut dire qu'il existe une coupure au niveau de la distribution traditionnelle des rôles entre hommes et femmes.

Les enquêtes de terrain menées pour observer ces pratiques démocratiques montrent que les dispositifs participatifs pourraient être utilisés comme un instrument visant à transformer la relation entre les représentants des pouvoirs publics et les acteurs civils<sup>4</sup>. Par ailleurs, il est possible que ces pratiques démocratiques aient des enjeux politiques.

En effet, les dispositifs participatifs ne font qu'éloigner la contestation des quartiers populaires, ou bien ils sembleraient avoir « aidé » les pouvoirs publics à canaliser la colère des citoyens, notamment des jeunes.

La question qui se pose maintenant est la suivante : comment ces pratiques, que l'on pourrait qualifier de démocratiques, ont-elles permis à ces nouveaux acteurs de se doter de compétences civiques et démocratiques ?

## **II. PRATIQUES DÉMOCRATIQUES ET ACQUISITION DE COMPÉTENCES DÉMOCRATIQUES**

Suite à leur mobilisation autour des conseils locaux des jeunes et des dispositifs participatifs de l'INDH, les acteurs civils mobilisés autour de ces derniers sont passés du bénévolat au « professionnalisme ». Cela s'explique par les postes de salariés permanents qu'ils ont créés au sein de leur structure associative, comme le poste de directeur d'association, de chef et d'animateur de projet.

Par ailleurs, la vision du travail associatif a changé chez ces acteurs ; ils sont passés d'associatifs qui sensibilisent leurs homologues citoyens à des acteurs qui mènent des projets visant à régler les problèmes sociaux. Par exemple, les associations partenaires de l'INDH avaient mené, avant le lancement de celle-ci, des actions ayant la forme d'activités occasionnelles, mais suite à leur « participation » à cette initiative, elles sont devenues des structures porteuses et animatrices de projets.

Il est observé que ces acteurs possèdent des compétences « démocratiques » confirmées par la conscience de leur rôle d'intermédiaire entre les citoyens et les institutions publiques, ainsi que par les assemblées générales, les réunions et les élections internes qu'ils organisent au sein de leurs structures civiles. Par ailleurs, ces acteurs possèdent une connaissance de l'environnement autour duquel ils se mobilisent.

« Je pense que la casquette civile est mille fois mieux que la casquette politique, car je fais pas mal de choses, je peux diriger, devenir un leader, signer avec des partenariats, cela me donne la possibilité de travailler comme je veux, mais en tant qu'acteur appartenant à la catégorie des jeunes cela ne marche pas, car il faut que j'obtienne ma légitimité au sein du cercle de décision, la casquette civile ne me donne



pas de pouvoir, je ne peux pas m'imposer. Je suis capable de faire beaucoup de choses si j'ai une casquette politique. Le changement est dû à la capacité personnelle, je vais chercher le financement ailleurs, à l'étranger ; je pense que l'acteur civil peut être un acteur public et donc présider une commune. Par contre, l'élu local ne peut pas être un acteur associatif<sup>5</sup>. »

Cependant, bien que ces acteurs civils acquièrent des compétences démocratiques, ils mènent, dans le cadre de ces pratiques démocratiques, des actions et des missions qui devraient être accomplies par les agents publics de l'Etat. Les enquêtes de terrain montrent que ces acteurs agissent comme des agents publics. Cette situation peut expliquer que l'on assiste à une institutionnalisation des acteurs de la société civile. Il existe en effet une tentative d'utilisation des ressources civiques pour produire de l'action publique dans les quartiers. Il y a donc une délégation du service public aux acteurs civils. Dans ce cadre, Martine Barthélémy souligne que l'expression de la société civile peut devenir un facteur de contrôle social<sup>6</sup>. Les acteurs de la société civile jouent un rôle de médiation entre les représentants de l'autorité et les populations-cibles. Cette situation interroge l'autonomie de la société civile vis-à-vis des pouvoirs publics et explique comment l'État s'appuie sur les acteurs civils dans ses actions publiques<sup>7</sup>.

## NOTES

- 1 | *Notamment dans les villes de Salé, d'El Jadida et de Fès.*
- 2 | *Entretien réalisé avec le coordinateur de la Coordination nationale des conseils locaux des jeunes.*
- 3 | *Entretien réalisé avec la présidente d'une coopérative de l'économie sociale.*
- 4 | *Bherer Laurence, «Les relations ambiguës entre participation et politiques publiques», Participations, 2011/1, n° 1, p. 107.*
- 5 | *Entretien réalisé avec le coordinateur de la Coordination nationale des conseils locaux des jeunes.*
- 6 | *Barthelemy Martine, Associations : un nouvel âge de la participation ?, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2000, p. 56-57.*
- 7 | *Ibid., p. 129.*

# Enjeux et défis de la participation au Maroc : de la participation citoyenne à la revendication citoyenne

*Saïd Bennis*

Au Maroc, la participation citoyenne comme prédisposition constitutionnelle pour l'implication des citoyens dans les affaires publiques est intimement liée à l'adhésion de la population et des jeunes au projet sociétal tracé dans les différents articles de la Constitution de 2011. L'hypothèse avancée est que la démocratie participative passe essentiellement par la contribution des jeunes aux instances politiques et de gouvernance. Toutefois, il s'agit parallèlement de territorialiser les référents de la participation en rapport avec le paradigme de la citoyenneté intégrant le développement humain durable et concerté, la bonne gouvernance, la responsabilité, la solidarité, le volontariat, le bénévolat, la « netoyenneté » (ang. *netizenship*)...

La question de recherche induite par cette hypothèse peut être énoncée comme suit : compte tenu des mécanismes institutionnels favorisant l'intégration des jeunes dans le processus de prise de décision collective, comment aménager l'articulation entre la représentation politique et la participation des citoyens ? Pour répondre à cette question, il sera procédé d'abord à une analyse du positionnement des acteurs de la participation citoyenne, ensuite il sera question de la description de la nature des espaces de dialogue comme cadre d'apprentissage, puis seront abordés les défis de l'apprentissage de la participation citoyenne, et enfin seront prospectées les perspectives de la participation citoyenne.

## **LE POSITIONNEMENT DES ACTEURS DE LA PARTICIPATION CITOYENNE**

Le positionnement des citoyens par rapport à l'acte de participation au Maroc est confronté au phénomène de désengagement des jeunes ; le défi étant de re-politiser cette

tranche de la population. Si la Constitution ne mentionne pas nommément les jeunes dans la trajectoire de la participation citoyenne, les faits réels et objectifs indiquent que le processus de la participation citoyenne ne peut avoir lieu de manière adéquate et viable que par l'adhésion des jeunes à la vie politique. Les quelques indicateurs qui permettent d'estimer l'importance d'une telle tranche d'âge pour l'avenir de la participation citoyenne consistent dans la nature et les projections relatives à la pyramide démographique<sup>1</sup> mais aussi au processus de la socialisation politique par l'école.

Il semble dorénavant pertinent de dépasser la logique de l'éducation citoyenne vers la logique de socialisation citoyenne, car l'éducation suppose un exercice pédagogique neutre et neutralisant, alors que la socialisation est une forme de contextualisation dépendant d'une immersion, d'une dynamique, d'une philosophie, d'interactions et de spécificités locales induisant un habitus<sup>2</sup> citoyen régulant et contrôlant l'adhésion de l'individu à la société. Il est question avant tout d'une dialectique multipolaire, en témoignent les événements d'Al Hoceima ainsi que la marche de Rabat du 11 juin 2017 mêlant appropriation, capitalisation mais aussi capacitation (*empowerment*) ouvrant une sphère publique aux différents modes du dialogue citoyen.

## **LES ESPACES DE DIALOGUE : CADRE DE LA PARTICIPATION CITOYENNE**

Pour appréhender les espaces de dialogue qui conditionnent la participation citoyenne au Maroc, il semble essentiel de comprendre comment les différents acteurs impliqués dans la formulation et la mise en œuvre des politiques publiques confrontent leurs intérêts spécifiques. Il serait adéquat, en outre, de resituer la logique des jeux d'acteurs dans un processus plus vaste par lequel ils contribueront à la construction de cadres cognitifs et normatifs constituant un niveau pertinent pour assimiler l'impact de la participation citoyenne.

Les instances qui gèrent ces espaces de dialogue ne sont pas des outils axiologiquement neutres et indifféremment disponibles.

Ils sont, au contraire, porteurs de valeurs, nourris d'une interprétation de l'action politique et de conceptions précises du mode de régulation envisagé. Ce qui, dans l'expérience du Dialogue sur la société civile<sup>3</sup> – ayant eu lieu en 2013 –, a débouché sur deux espaces parallèles, à savoir un espace étatique représenté par le dialogue parrainé par le ministère chargé des Relations avec le parlement et la société civile et un espace civil animé par l'Appel de Rabat<sup>4</sup>. Les deux espaces constituent des marges de concertation de nature et de facture différentes mais demeurent deux expériences impliquant et induisant un processus basé sur la délibération et la négociation de l'avenir de la participation citoyenne.

Par ailleurs, si le socle de la participation est de créer une sphère de dialogue ouvert, concerté et partagé, ce dernier peut constituer une passerelle entre démocratie représentative et démocratie participative puisqu'il s'appuie sur l'interaction entre structures et pôles organisés. C'est pourquoi, dans le cas du Mouvement du 20 Février, la possibilité et l'alternative du dialogue et de la négociation étaient sans issue car le mouvement n'avait pas de porte-parole ni de comité fédérateur. A cet égard, la dynamique du « hacktivism<sup>5</sup> » a généré une participation citoyenne non pas à base d'une médiation ou d'une idéologie bien déterminées mais plutôt à partir d'une « imagéologie » à base de réseaux et de forums sociaux. Cette nouvelle logique a permis de créer de nouveaux espaces de dialogue parallèles, de concertation et d'appel à la revendication citoyenne en affichant un positionnement clair pour le principe de la citoyenneté à dominante virtuelle retraçant une diversité d'alliances nationales et internationales, territoriales et régionales, rurales et urbaines, de gauche et d'obédience religieuses, culturelles et politiques... comme en témoignent les différentes mobilisations et dynamiques d'appui et de soutien aux revendications d'Al Hoceïma.

## **LES DÉFIS DE L'APPRENTISSAGE DE LA PARTICIPATION CITOYENNE**

Il paraît judicieux de replacer le débat à un autre niveau à savoir que la culture de la participation citoyenne et politique est nouvelle au Maroc et nécessite d'adopter une méthodologie

qualitative pour mieux appréhender la nature qualitative de la participation des jeunes. Une telle approche permettra d'appréhender le passage d'une « citoyenneté » *de jure* à une « netoyenneté » *de facto* à travers laquelle la participation à la chose publique se *vit* par le truchement de la revendication citoyenne sur le net et les réseaux sociaux. La transition de la citoyenneté vers la « netoyenneté » est d'abord une transition d'un mode réel (refoulé, fermé et hostile) vers un mode virtuel (éclaté, généreux et accueillant). La participation citoyenne occasionnelle et sporadique se transforme en une action pédagogique de veille, de vigilance, de censure et en une présence virtuelle, revendicative, continue et permanente.

Partant, la citoyenneté au Maroc se construit virtuellement, elle est refoulée dans la réalité et transparaît sur le virtuel à travers des expressions de patriotisme comme celle du groupe « Forces de défense marocaines » ou à travers des mobilisations comme celle de l'Appel du 13 avril pour l'application de l'article 19 *via* le podcast « Coalition civile pour l'application de l'article 19 ». Il est notoire d'observer que cette nouvelle forme de participation citoyenne est *déterritorialisée, atopus* et *polyphonique* : les interactants marocains reflètent et appartiennent à des territoires différents et variés (localités marocaines, européennes, américaines, asiatiques, australiennes, africaines...). Elle s'appuie sur une interaction et une expression à base d'un multilinguisme qui reconnaît la diversité linguistique et culturelle des participants, l'arabe, l'amazigh, le français, l'espagnol et l'anglais.

Par ailleurs, cette nouvelle forme de participation citoyenne a induit un autre débat, celui de la citoyenneté plurielle. Ce concept de « citoyenneté plurielle » réfère à une situation juridique dans laquelle des individus sont citoyens de plus d'un Etat ou corps organisé en même temps. Ainsi, ces citoyens sont détenteurs de plus de droits et de devoirs à l'égard de leur pays d'accueil et non plus seulement à l'égard de leur seul pays d'origine. Il serait pertinent d'élaborer des enquêtes qualitatives auprès des « Marocains du monde » pour appréhender leur prédisposition à participer à la vie citoyenne de leur pays d'origine compte tenu de leur vécu « étranger » en termes de citoyenneté.

## PERSPECTIVES ET ADVENIR DE LA PARTICIPATION CITOYENNE

Pour entrevoir les perspectives et l'advenir de la participation citoyenne au Maroc, le questionnement sur le développement demeure une question de base, d'autant plus que la nature et la qualité de la participation dépendent du design et du modèle de développement voulu, à savoir un développement *hard* et matériel visant à atteindre et satisfaire les valeurs et les besoins matériels : santé, emploi, éducation... et/ou un développement *soft* et post-moderne aspirant à incarner les valeurs post-matérialistes<sup>6</sup> : parité/liberté de conscience/droits linguistiques et culturels, droits individuels, et donner plus de place au patrimoine immatériel dans les programmes et les processus de développement... L'orientation et la politique publiques dans le champ du développement façonnent la sphère publique et les modes de revendication citoyenne envisagés (plaidoyer matérialiste vs plaidoyer post-matérialiste).

En outre, la création d'un environnement favorable à la société civile contribuera à distinguer la participation civile organisée et les revendications citoyennes personnalisées et collectives non organisées. Ces dernières, spontanées et non organisées, ont conduit à l'émergence de nouveaux paradigmes conceptuels cadrant et régulant la participation citoyenne tels que ceux de : *Ihogra*<sup>7</sup> (injustice sociale, mépris, snobisme de l'Etat et des autorités), droit linguistique et culturel, équité sociale, marginalisation territoriale, revendication socio-économique, partage des ressources naturelles, fracture sociale ([*3ayyacha*]/ [*aHrar*])... Ce qui suppose un changement de degré et de nature de la participation quand cette dernière est citoyenne ou civile. Toutefois, il demeure important de poser de manière claire et concertée les termes de cette revendication citoyenne, notamment en adoptant une grille de bonne conduite<sup>8</sup>.

Il est également pertinent d'évoquer, dans le cas du Maroc, qu'une bonne participation citoyenne dépend du droit d'accès de la population à l'information<sup>9</sup> et aux outils pour y accéder, comme le stipule la Constitution de 2011 dans son article 27 : « Les citoyennes et les citoyens ont le droit d'accéder à l'information

détenue par l'administration publique, les institutions élues et les organismes investis d'une mission de service public.» Cette condition est intimement liée à la nature de la relation entre population, société civile et Etat. La participation implique aussi des interlocuteurs, au sens que l'interlocuteur est un représentant fort et légitime, un porte-voix. C'est pour cette raison que dans le cas du Mouvement du 20 Février, il n'y avait pas de dialogue direct entre l'Etat et le Mouvement puisqu'il y avait une pluralité d'interlocuteurs.

De ce fait, la pédagogie du dialogue suppose aussi la prise en compte de l'émergence d'espaces parallèles *via* les réseaux sociaux moyennant une « imagéologie virtuelle » au sein de laquelle se sont construits les positionnements des différents interlocuteurs envers le principe de citoyenneté. Maintenant, si on veut débattre de la pratique de la mobilisation comme relai et vecteur de la participation citoyenne, il est essentiel de faire le constat selon lequel la mobilisation citoyenne se situe foncièrement sur une base virtuelle. Ce qui induit qu'on est en phase de « transition participative » : de la participation réelle (participation classique) on dérive vers la participation virtuelle (néo-participation). Ces modalités peuvent comprendre un spectre d'apprentissage qui s'étend de la co-construction en passant par l'entérinement des décisions politiques, le partenariat, la co-production des politiques publiques, la coopération, jusqu'à la conflictualité, la confrontation, la protestation, et la contestation ; en témoignent les événements en cours à Al Hoceima. De ce point de vue, la démocratie participative peut être conçue comme une manière de requalifier l'espace public marocain pour élargir le dialogue multipolaire.

## NOTES

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- 2 | Pierre Bourdieu (2000), Esquisses d'une théorie de la pratique, p. 272.
- 3 | <http://hiwarmadani2013.ma/fr/>
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- 5| *Dagiral É. (2008), Pirates, hackers, hacktivistes : déplacements et dilution de la frontière électronique, Critique, 733-734, (6), p. 481.*
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- 7| *Bennis S. (2014), «Société civile et nouveaux paradigmes conceptuels : le concept de 'hogra'» [https://www.academia.edu/7424599/Societe\\_civile\\_et\\_nouveaux\\_paradigmes\\_conceptuels\\_au\\_Maroc](https://www.academia.edu/7424599/Societe_civile_et_nouveaux_paradigmes_conceptuels_au_Maroc)*
- 8| *Jeanne Planche, Philippe Lavigne Delville (2005), «L'Union européenne et les sociétés civiles du Sud : du discours politique aux actions de coopération», Autrepart 2005/3, n° 35, p. 144.*
- 9| *Perrine Canavaggio et Alexandra Balafrej (2011), Vers un droit d'accès à l'information publique au Maroc : étude comparative avec les normes et les meilleures pratiques dans le monde, p. 134.*



## List of authors

**Abdelhakim Aboullouz**, professeur-assistant à l'Université Ibn Zohr, Agadir, Maroc, est l'auteur de la thèse de sociologie *Les Mouvements salafistes au Maroc, 1971-2004*, éditée en 2008. Ses travaux focalisent sur les mouvements religieux et les mutations politico-religieuses dans la région MENA.

**Abdeljabbar Arrach** is a Professor in the Department of Public Law/Faculty of Law, Economics and Social Sciences at the University Hassan 1<sup>st</sup> of Settat in Morocco. He received all his degrees in cultural, legal, administrative and political Studies from German universities and currently serves as a director of Laboratory for Research on Comparative Democratic Transition (LRTDC), House of Humanities and Social Sciences, and Human Rights Law Clinic.

**Said Bennis** is Professor of Social Sciences, Faculty member (Mohammed V University in Rabat). His research focuses on Social Movements, Research Methodology, Diversity and Pluralism, Social Media, Minorities, Social Cohesion, MENA region.

**Abdelilah Bouasria** taught Middle East politics at American University in Washington DC and George Mason, Virginia. He is the author of *Sufism and Politics in Morocco: Activism and Dissent* (Routledge: 2015) as well as *Master and Disciple* (Author house: 2007) and *Mamlakat al Qaht* (Nadacom: 2006) and several other articles and book chapters. He received his PhD in political science from American University in Washington DC and his Masters in international relations from Sussex University in the UK.

**Khalid El Aref** is an assistant professor at the faculty of humanities in Rabat. His fields of interest include Cultural Studies, Postcolonial Theory, Translation and Translation Studies, and the Arabic novel, among other things. His publications

include articles in both English and Arabic, mainly in subjects related to culture and politics in the Arab world. He has also published partial translations from English and French into Arabic.

**Mohamed El Hachimi** is a senior research fellow in the CERSS and a lecturer in Political Science at Chouaib Doukkali University (El Jadida, Morocco). He studied Political Science (Phd) at Mohamed V University, Rabat, and International Politics and Human Rights (MA) at City University, London. He has also published several articles (in English, French, and Arabic) on democratization, security and justice sectors reform, civil society, new forms of activism in the Maghreb.

**Mustapha El Mnasfi** est enseignant-chercheur à l'Université Moulay Ismail, Meknès, Maroc, et chercheur associé au Centre Jacques-Berque (USR3136-CNRS, Maroc). Ses domaines de recherche portent sur l'associatif et le politique au Maroc ainsi que sur la participation civique de la jeunesse marocaine.

**Mohamed Fadil** est professeur-chercheur en sociologie à l'Université Sidi Mohamed ben Abdellah, Fès. Chercheur associé à la chaire sur la gestion de la diversité culturelle et religieuse à l'Institut des études religieuses de l'Université de Montréal, Canada. PhD en sciences des religions et sociologie de l'Université de Montréal, Canada, et de l'École pratique des hautes études sociales, Paris-Sorbonne.

**Alexander Peter Martin** completed his doctorate at Durham University on the democratizing role civil society organizations (CSOs) have played in Tunisia and the importance of civil political culture in the transition process. He has taught International Relations and MENA Politics at Durham University, University of Exeter, and the University of Tunis. His latest research addresses civil society advocacy for increased transparency policies in the Tunisian extractives sector.

**Larbi Sadiki** is an academic at Qatar University where he teaches international affairs. He is author of *Rethinking Arab Democratization* published by Oxford in 2009 and 2011 and is

editor of the Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring which was reissued in 2015.

**Keiko Sakai** works as a Dean of Center for Relational Studies on Global Crises, Chiba University. She served in the Embassy of Japan in Iraq in the late 80s, and worked as the overseas researcher at the American University in Cairo in the 90s. She published various academic works on contemporary Iraq and the Middle East, including award-winning *Iraq and the US* (2002).

**Rachid Touhtou** is an associate professor of communication at the National School of Statistics and Applied Economics of Rabat in Morocco and head of the Department of Communication, Languages and Social Sciences in the same school. His main research interests are in the field of dissidence and social movements. His fieldwork and publications now are on the relationship between social capital and political capital in post Arab spring.

**Laurence Whitehead** is a Senior Research Fellow in Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford University. He is editor of an Oxford University Press series, 'Studies in Democratization' and President of the Conseil Scientifique of the Institut des Ameriques in Paris, and belongs to the steering committee of the Red Eurolatinoamericana de Gobernabilidad para el Desarrollo.

**Hassan Zouaoui** est professeur-chercheur en sciences politiques à l'Université Ibn Zohr, Agadir, spécialiste en sociologie politique et auteur de plusieurs articles et études sur la démocratisation dans le monde arabe.



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These are multi-disciplinary and exploratory essays, and they refer to a variety of overlapping but not fully integrated themes, reflecting processes that are generally incomplete, and in many cases still even in flux... What these short essays underscore is the emergence in the region of a new generation of arab scholars, well aware of the flourishing international literature on Democratization, but also fully alert to the challenges of adapting and applying its standard concepts and methods in the clearly sui generis context of their own lived experiences, and the specific trajectories of each nation's political and cultural evolution. In short, the Rabat conference, and the publication to which it now gives rise, provides a vivid demonstration of the rich and growing potential of its own subject matter – i.e. of arab "democracy learning".

**Laurence Whitehead**

