## EPP Party Barometer July/August 2018

The Situation of the European People's Party in the EU and an Outlook on the EP Elections

(as of 28 August 2018)

Created by

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
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



### Summary and latest developments


- The maps show the electoral results for parties belonging to the European People's Party (and in one case the Socialists).
- The maps indicate the political affiliation of Heads of State and Government of EU member countries. They also indicate which party family is leading in the national polls.
- Parties belonging to the EPP family are (in national polls) the strongest political family in **13** countries (-1 compared to the last party barometer). The Socialist family is leading in **6** (+2), the Eurosceptic Conservatives in **4** (+1), the Liberal family in **3** (-1) countries. In France, an independent movement (Macron / LREM) is leading in the polls, in Italy the far-right is the strongest political group.
- In many countries, the advantage of the leading political family in the opinion polls is very slim (**Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Slovakia, Finland, United Kingdom**). In a few countries, the leading <u>political party</u> in the opinion polls does not belong to the leading <u>political family</u>: In **Sweden**, for example, the Social Democrats are leading in the opinion polls, but together, both EPP parties Moderaterna and the Christian Democrats are stronger
- Parties of the EPP familiy enjoy a relatively strong support in the opinion polls (above 30%) in Germany, Hungary, Austria,
   Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania and Cyprus
- The relatively strong position of the EPP family can be partly explained by a) the relative weakness of the Socialist family in many countries, b) the high level of party fragmentation in several countries
- In the European Council, 8 Heads of State and Government belong to the EPP family, 7 (8)\* to the Liberals, 5 to the Socialists/Social Democrats, 2 to the Eurosceptic Conservatives, one to the European Left. 5 (4)\* are formally independent (\*in Slovenia, the Independent Marjan Sarec has been elected Prime Minister on 17 August as a successor to the Liberal Miro Cerar, the government is expected to be endorsed in the first half of September).











### Outlook on the EP elections in 2019


#### Introductory remarks:


- Preferences expressed in national opinion polls are not necessarily identical with voting preferences in EP elections
- A low turnout (or a different mobilisation rate among competing parties) may have a strong impact
- The prominence of the "Spitzenkandidat"/national top candidates may influence voter preferences

#### With caution, the following statements can be made:

- Despite (significant) losses in bigger member states, the EPP would likely remain the strongest political family (176-196 seats) in the EP (25.0%-27.8% of seats)
- In relative terms, the share of the EPP group (currently 29.2% of the seats) would only moderately be reduced, as the EPP Group will suffer less from the departure of the British MEPs than other political groups
- Parties of the far-right (ENF and others) and the far-left (GUE/NGL) might together receive up to 20% of the seats
- A coalition of EPP and S&D would not have a majority on its own but would need a third partner
- 66-68% of MEPs would continue to belong to moderate political groups (EPP, S&D, Liberals, Macron-led movement ("Europe en Marche"), Greens)
- Due to several unknown variables (Will Macron form a group on his own or will he join the Liberals? Will
  the various far-right parties manage to form one political group?) three different scenarios will be
  developed








## Possible seat distribution in the coming EP – Scenario 1 – Status Quo

Presumption: Emmanuel Macron does not succeed to create a Europarty on his own, membership in other Europarties remains stable; with the departure of UKIP, the EFDD-Group falls apart
 Sub-scenario A: Macron remains indepedent
 Sub-scenario B: Macron joins the ALDE Group




- With caution, the following statements can be made:
  - Both big political groups would be indispensable to form a majority
  - A future majority would probably have to rely on the EPP, the S&D and ALDE. Other three-partyconstellations (EPP+Social Democrats+Greens or Macron) would arithmetically be possible but are politically unlikely



## Possible seat distribution in the coming EP – Scenario 2 – Europe en Marche

• **Presumption:** a new Europarty created by Macron ("Europe en Marche") successfully assembles liberal and left-liberal pro-European forces; some of the unaffiliated forces join other Europarties

Scenario 2.1.: Macron creates a group on his own Scenario 2.2.: Macron and ALDE join forces




- With caution, the following statements can be made:
  - Macron's "Europe en Marche" (EEM) could in the best case grow bigger than the Liberals
  - A joint political group of Macron and ALDE could become the second-biggest political group in the European Parliament



## Possible seat distribution in the coming EP – Scenario 3 – United Radicals

• **Presumption:** far-right and far-left parties manage to reunite in one political group each (ENF, GUE/NGL). Due to the difficult relations among several of the bigger far-right parties, this scenario is not realistic in its pure form. However, it helps to demonstrate the potential of the extremes in the next EP.





- With caution, the following statements can be made:
  - If ALDE+Macron do not join forces, a united far-right group could become the third-biggest force in the EP
  - Together, the far-left GUE/NGL and the far-right ENF would have 137 seats and thus one fifth of the seats




# Government participation of the EPP family









### **Notes**

- \* The figures for France refer to the LR results achieved in the second round of the parliamentary elections; the shares of votes obtained by independent rights (1.68%) or by the UDI (ALDE) are not included.
- \*\* There have been no polls in France on the legislative elections since the last national parliamentary elections, only on European elections
- \*\*\* In **Belgium**, polls are conducted at the regional level. In order to obtain an adequate result at the national level, these results were weighted according to the number of voters (compulsory voting). Despite compulsory voting and the relatively similar voter turnout in the various regions, there may be small discrepancies. In Belgium, the partner parties CD&V, CSP and CDH only compete on a regional basis, and the results in the individual regions are weighted accordingly. The CSP only takes part in European elections. In national elections, it is part of the CDH because the Belgian House of Representatives is composed by region (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels) and not by language community. In **Luxembourg**, the polls are conducted regionally, the results being weighted according to the number of voters (compulsory voting) to calculate the national strength. Despite compulsory voting and the relatively similar voter turnout in the various regions, small deviations may occur.
- \*\*\*\* In Portugal, a PSD and CDS-PP electoral alliance was formed in the last national elections, so both values of the PSD are not comparable with the result of the parliamentary elections.

#### Further notes:

In several countries (e. g. Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania), the undecided and non-voters are included in the total (100%) in the polls. The poll values have been extrapolated accordingly. Example: Party A has 13% in the polls. 30% of respondents will not vote. 20% of respondents are undecided. Accordingly, support for Party A is reported to be 26%.

In **Croatia**, the EPP party HSS was a member of the Social Democratic People's Coalition in the elections and did not receive a separate result. Correspondingly, the data are not quite comparable; the calculation of the difference has not been made. The election result noted for the Social Democrats therefore refers to the entire electoral alliance, which also did not include PES parties (such as the HSS).

In Germany, the CDU and CSU are not listed as two separate parties due to the faction community and the always aggregated polling figures.

Some of the parties in the ACRE family are right-wing populist or have strong right-wing populist positions. Since this is a now (or for the time being) an established party family, parties belonging to it are listed as part of the ACRE family and not as "right-wing populist". This category, on the other hand, includes the parties belonging to the ENF or EFDD group in the EP, as well as other independent right-wing populist or right-wing extremist forces.

- The list usually refers to the heads of government. Heads of state (in the case of a different party affiliation than the government) are only shown (separately) if they are represented in the European Council (case of Johannis in Romania). In the case of France, no EPP participation in the government is shown, since the official EPP party LR is not officially part of the government.
- While the EPP has no member party in the UK, since February 2018, two Tory MEPs have switched from the ECR Group to the EPP Group

Sources for polls: Ipsos (Belgium), Trend (Bulgaria), voxmeter (Denmark), Forsa (Germany), Kantar (Estonia), TNS (Finland), IfoP (France), Metron (Greece), YouGov (UK),BA (Ireland), Ipsos (Italy), Ipsos (Croatia), SDKS (Latvia), Vilmorus (Lithuania), Sondesfro (Luxembourg), Malta Today (Malta), Ipsos (Netherlands), RA (Austria), Ibris for Rzeczpospolita (Poland), aximage (Portugal), CURS(Romania), Inizio (Sweden), Focus (Slovakia), Mediana (Slovenia), NC Report (Spain), Median(Czech Rep), Szazadveg (Hungary), Symmetron (Cyprus)

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