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EU Integration Models beyond Full Membership

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Contents

Contents 1

1. Summary 2

2. Limits to Enlargement 4

3. Alternative EU Integration Models under Discussion 6

3.1 European Economic Area+ (EEA+) 6

3.2 Extended Associated Membership (EAM) 7

3.3 Gradual Integration 8

3.4 Junior Membership 10

3.5 Privileged Partnership 11

3.6 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)..... 12

4. Flexible Integration Strategies for Future Enlargements 14

Table: Comparison of the EU Integration Models..... 16

The Authors..... 17

1. Summary

The European Union enjoys the glory of a 50 year-long success story. It has made significant contributions to prosperity, democracy and security in Europe. The EU's enlargement policy has been one of its most successful, serving as a powerful instrument of foreign policy contributing to the stabilization of political and economic development in the acceding countries. The far-reaching democratization processes in the new Central and Eastern European member states of the EU exemplify this. However, since the Southern and Eastern European enlargement of the EU in 2004, there has at least been talk of a political and institutional "overexpansion" of the EU, which will soon contain 27 member states and a fear that this could lead to Europe's inability to act effectively.

Intensive cooperation with the EU is not just of interest to the accession candidates. Rather, close political and economic relations with the neighbouring countries increasingly correspond to the EU's own interests. The idea is to introduce those democracies willing to integrate to the common market and to the political community in order to secure peace, freedom and prosperity, and to be able to act as a unified political power in international politics. The EU's interests extend far beyond its own ability to influence events, since Europe is directly affected by foreign crises and conflicts as well as by disruptions and blockades in trade and in the supply of raw materials. From a geopolitical perspective, Europe lies in a sensitive and turbulent neighbourhood. In order to better confront the current dangers, the EU's security strategy depends on an "effective multilateral system"¹, strengthened by the integration of neighbouring states.

As other states join the EU, it will become obvious that the EU's instrument of accession as an all-purpose solution for managing crises, promoting democracy and furthering economic integration has reached its limits. Further enlargement on the scale of multiple states does not seem to be an option, particularly as the ability of the EU to take on new countries while ensuring that its integration dynamic is maintained in the interest of both the Union and would-be member states has to be the main focus.

1 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

The EU's dilemma of being caught between the necessity of close cooperation with neighbouring countries and the limitations of its ability to enlarge makes alternatives to EU membership essential.

Other forms of integration between full EU membership and European Neighbourhood Policy are thus being considered as a complement to full membership. These intermediate stages would allow countries that either cannot or do not want to join the EU to cooperate with the EU in specific areas. Should accession negotiations fail with one state, these alternative forms of cooperation could be considered. The European Council has declared that if negotiations with a prospective candidate state should fail, "it must be ensured that the candidate state concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond."²

Given such a context, various integration models beyond full membership have been under discussion for some time. This study seeks to investigate the most important integration models (see overview table in the Appendix). The main objective is to find a solution acceptable both to the current EU and the aspiring member states. This will serve as a basis for determining which models are likely to be most sustainable in the future.

2 Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, December 16./17., 2004, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/st16/st16238-re01.en04.pdf>.

2. Limits to Enlargement

There are no automatic guarantees in the accession process for states wanting to join the European Union. According to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), “Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union.”³ A prerequisite for starting negotiations is the degree of development of the candidate country. Any European state interested in joining the EU must initiate the appropriate far-reaching reforms. The conditions for membership are laid down in the Copenhagen Criteria, which require the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; acceptance of the Community *acquis*: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”⁴ Adopting the “*acquis communautaire*” thus means accepting the total body of EU law created thus far.⁵

An additional criterion for accepting new members has until now received only limited attention. It is the ability of the EU to enlarge. Even if the candidate countries have fulfilled all of the criteria for accession, the EU itself must be in a position to accept new members. In this fourth Copenhagen Criterion, the EU has committed itself to accepting new members while “maintaining the dynamic of European integration.”⁶

With 25 member states currently in the EU, it is already apparent that the integration dynamic has stagnated. This is evident, for example, when considering the discussions on the future of the constitution. The last enlargement to take on 10 additional states led to even more diverse national standpoints within the EU, resulting in the decision-making processes becoming more difficult, slower and weaker. This in-

3 Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002M/htm/C_2002325EN.000501.html
Article 6 (1) of the EU contract says: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”

4 Retrieved from http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accesion_criteria_copenhagen_en.htm

5 European Council in Copenhagen, June 21 and 22, 1993, Conclusions of the Executive, Point 7.A (iii), http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921.pdf

6 One of the Copenhagen Criteria names the condition of “the ability of the Union to accept new members while maintaining the momentum of European integration.” European Council in Copenhagen, June 21 and 22, 1993, Conclusions of the Executive, Tz. 7/III, in: Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung (Bonn), (8.7.1993) 60.

ability to act can particularly be observed in the area of intergovernmental cooperation, where measures need to be approved by all.

Future enlargements will further sharpen the challenges to the EU's ability to manoeuvre at the institutional and political level. Romania and Bulgaria have signed their accession treaties and are scheduled to become full members in 2007. Accession talks are being held with Croatia and Turkey. Other states in the Western Balkan region have prospects of acceding as well. Ukraine has already announced its interest in becoming an EU member state. For many EU citizens, enlargement is happening too quickly. The negative results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands on the European constitutional treaty highlighted the electorate's rejection of the enlargement policy of the EU.⁷ This "enlargement fatigue" thus comes on top of a crisis in trust, acceptance and legitimacy within the EU. The uncertainty over the future shape of the EU is leading to insecurity not just within the Union itself but also in potential accession candidates. Trust in the EU, its reliability and credibility are at stake – something that may only be countered by a consistent enlargement strategy and statements that can be relied upon.

The postponed or even aborted implementation of the constitution poses the unavoidable question of whether future accessions are possible without further development of the EU's institutional system. It is undisputed that reforms are desperately needed in order to maintain a sustainable EU. Only in this way can effective European action be ensured. The reforms contained in the constitution go in the right direction. They deal with the EU's institutional set-up, its decision-making and voting process as well as making significant improvements to the EU's ability to act, to democracy and to transparency in comparison to the current Treaty of Nice. The extension of the majority voting principle to the Council of Ministers is crucial for overcoming legislative blocks while the reforms also strengthen the focus on European policy at the governing level. However, whether the European constitutional treaty will enter into force in the foreseeable future is uncertain. But it is already clear that with or without a constitution, the limitations to the EU's capacity to enlarge will not go away.

⁷ Decisive for the "no" vote were, besides dissatisfaction with domestic politics, differing ideas on the nature of a future EU. The vote has been interpreted as a condemnation of EU enlargement and the pending approval of the possibility of Turkey joining the EU.

3. Alternative EU Integration Models under Discussion

Starting with the fact that the EU, due to its composition, does not have an unlimited capacity to accept members, other forms of integration other than full membership must serve to complement enlargement. The goal is to develop models that lie in between the European neighbourhood policy and full membership, that are well suited for states that either cannot or do not want to join the EU in the foreseeable future. With such an approach, the varying stages of development of different countries can be accommodated, and at the same time the EU's goal of caring for its neighbours' security and stability can be fulfilled.

3.1. European Economic Area+ (EEA+)

The Model EEA+ for accession candidates was prompted by the EU's relations with Norway.⁸ In a referendum held in 1994, Norway for a second time rejected becoming a full member of the EU. Despite Norway's excellent economic circumstances, which would have allowed it to fulfil all the convergence criteria for joining the European monetary union, the question of EU membership has never been a serious option for the country. Still, Norway signed the accord, creating a European economic area in the same year, thus allowing it to participate in the single European market. In order to do this, Norway had to adopt nearly all of the EU's regulations for the single market. Exceptions were made for the politically sensitive areas of agriculture and fishing, which remain regulated at the national level. The European Economic Area accord was extended in 2003, giving Norway better access for its seafood products in the broadened EU market.

The model EEA+ envisions the broadening of cooperation in trade and political economy. Numerous clauses of EU community law apply to the participating states in order to create a unified economic area. Individual countries adopt around 80 percent of the regulations for the EU's single market. Among other areas, the four basic freedoms of the European Community are included in the agreement, i.e. the rules concerning free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, as well as the main principles of EU competition law. The fields still needing to be integrated are negoti-

8 For more see Elmar Brok: „Eine neue Erweiterungsstrategie für die EU“, in: Die politische Meinung Nr. 433, Dezember 2005, http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/die_politische_meinung/7_dokument_dok_pdf_7682_1.pdf.

ated bilaterally by both partners. Areas excluded from the settlement are clearly defined, such as in the case of Norway's fisheries. These areas then continue to be controlled at the national level. EEA+ members may not make decisions on these integrated areas, however they must be consulted.

Members of the EEA+ contribute significantly to the common programs that impact the single market. The extent of their contribution is determined by way of an annually adjusted proportionality factor. The method of calculation used for third states is fixed in the various association and cooperation treaties. Third states making a financial contribution to the different programs are entitled to participate in the arrangements like the member states. While not obliged to pay into the common EU budget, the EEA states must contribute to the economic and social cohesion of the European economic area as outlined in the agreement of May 1, 2004.

There are, however, doubts about the applicability of the EEA to all states.⁹ The EEA states Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein cannot be compared to states such as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The latter are far from being ready to adopt the *acquis communautaire* and also differ significantly from the other EEA member states as regards their political and economic situations.

As a whole, however, this model could serve as a functional integration model for potential candidates for accession. The individual political and economic conditions of each country could be treated on a one-by-one basis. Most areas would be made communal and the lion's share of the European body of rules and regulations would be adopted; other areas, to be determined at the national level, would be excluded from cooperation. The prospect of EU membership is at the outset not envisaged when joining the EEA+. There are, however, exceptions to the rule as in the case of Finland, Austria and Sweden, all former EEA members that joined the EU in 1995.

3.2. Extended Associated Membership (EAM)

Related to the EEA+ model, the Extended Associated Membership (EAM) model was introduced by Wolfgang Quaisser und Steve Wood of the Eastern European Insti-

9 Fraser Cameron: "EEA Plus? Possible institutional arrangements for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)",

tute.¹⁰ Going beyond the limits of the EEA, it envisions stronger integration into the political structures as well as greater financial commitment to the EU's programs.

In contrast to the EEA+ model, EAM would introduce special rules governing the free movement of workers. Workers from EAM countries would not be granted complete freedom of movement in the European market for a transition period of several years. There would, however, be the possibility of working in the EU member states with a work permit. This restriction is designed to prevent deterioration in the dire employment situation in many European member states. The customs union and the monetary union are excluded from the regulations. Since adopting the *acquis* would lead to extensive responsibilities and one-sided costs, each country would receive financial as well as structural assistance. Alternatively, already existing programs could be extended or new, special programs could be developed for these countries.

The EAM model has been criticized for not offering the countries in question enough incentive to progress along their paths towards democracy and consolidation. EAM allows the countries to be given observer status, including the right to be heard in the council on issues concerning EAM. The right of decision-making is, however, not included. This means that the countries cannot vote on joint integrated areas in the Council. But integration in the political structures of the EU could be carried out through the mechanisms envisioned by the EEA (common coordination committees) and through regular participation in the meetings of the EU institutions (Council, Parliament, Commission), without voting but with consultation rights.

3.3. Gradual Integration

The concept of gradual integration was originally used as a differentiated integration method between EU member states. Since then, the EU's deepening process, i.e. integrating political fields, has been carried out only by those states that agree to the deepening. In contrast to the original integration methods, which attempted to have all states pursue the same goals at the same speed, member states can now decide for themselves to what extent they want to take part in the integration process and

10 Wolfgang Quaisser: Alternative EU-Integrationsstrategien für die Türkei und andere Kandidatenländer. Privilegierte Partnerschaft oder „Erweiterte Assoziierte Mitgliedschaft“, Kurzanalysen und Informationen des Osteuropa-Instituts München, Nr. 12, März 2004; Steve Wood: Preconditions, Consequences and Integration Alternatives, Forschungsverbund Ost- und Südosteuropa (forost), Arbeitspapier Nr. 25, November 2004.

what goals they want to pursue. The advantage of gradual integration is that the speed of unification does not depend on the lowest common denominator of all member states.

Lately this term has also been applied in another context. Gradual integration was also suggested as a model for incorporating Turkey into the EU¹¹, but could also come into question for other countries. The special feature is the ability to incorporate a country into the EU structures in three steps that can be accomplished in manageable intervals. The steps are arranged according to the degree of integration, with the first step representing the lowest level of integration. It is important that the start of the next step is coordinated beforehand. This means that a step can only begin when the previously agreed requirements have been met in a timely and proper fashion. Therefore reaching the next step is not an automatic process. This should provide an incentive for each country to move along the path of reform and democratization. Annual monitoring by the EU Commission can control the implementation of the intended reforms.

The duration of the respective steps would be determined through mutual negotiation and agreement. The next step could already begin at the midway point of the previous one. It would also be possible to remain at the level of one of the completed steps for many years. The integration step achieved might for various reasons be sufficient for one of the partners, so that any further integration or deepening would not be desired. The prospect of full membership would remain open, even if it would only be possible after the completion of the final integration step.

Gradual integration differs from the previously mentioned models because the states are not only integrated economically, but also to a degree politically. To ensure that political integration can be credibly implemented, each country receives a voting right limited to its integrated areas, but no right of veto in the Council. The weight of the vote would be decided according to the EU regulation concerned. With a veto vote there would be the danger that decisions could be blocked. Yet, the right to vote could secure majorities. Limited co-decision rights would be appealing to the countries because they would actively be involved in the political work and decision-making process.

11 Cemal Karakas: „Für eine Abgestufte Integration. Zur Debatte um den EU-Beitritt der Türkei“, HSFK-Standpunkte 4/2005, <http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/Standpunkte-4-2005> (druckfrei).pdf.

How would gradual integration actually look in practice? Both parties would decide on the areas to be integrated in the three steps. In theory, this would lead to the topics which are mutually beneficial for both partners. The topics may be decided differently for each country.

The benefit of gradual integration is the creation of incentives for a policy of democratization due to a dynamic and conditioning process. The prospect of full membership also makes this model attractive for the countries involved. Thus, it could represent a long-lasting and clearly defined integration alternative.

3.4. Junior Membership

This model was suggested by Franz-Lothar Altmann of the German think tank SWP for the countries of the Western Balkan region (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, Montenegro, and Serbia, including Kosovo).¹² Altmann named the model “junior membership”. The name is supposed to emphasize the close proximity of a given “junior member” to the EU. At the same time, it implies that actual full membership for these countries still lies in the distant future. By leading the Balkan countries gradually to the EU, it is hoped that the junior membership scheme will provide for long-term stability in that region. A junior membership could also be an option for other states that wish to join the EU in the future, but have not started accession negotiations yet.

Qualitatively, junior membership would be similar to gradual integration. It grants the countries privileges in the form of improved access to the common market and more intensive cooperation with Brussels and the EU member states.

The basic assumption underlying this model is that the prospect of accession is the key to stability in the region. Therefore, membership is not *a priori* impossible, but rather should serve as an incentive for the continuation of economic and political reform processes. In order to reduce the “waiting time” until possible membership, integration is accomplished in stages, as with the gradual integration model. The incentives are in the form of financial assistance as well as investment-encouraging programs drawn from the EU budget. In this way, the frustration of a lengthy path towards membership can be limited, and incremental incentives can lead to the gradual democratization and modernization of the country.

3.5. Privileged Partnership

In Germany, the concept of privileged partnership was introduced into the debate by the CDU/CSU parties in February 2004 as an alternative to full EU membership for Turkey.¹³ The CDU/CSU parties believe that the EU's goal of stabilizing Turkey politically and economically can be accomplished without full membership by offering a privileged partnership instead.¹⁴

Privileged partnership is a strategy for continually bringing Turkey closer to EU standards, while excluding the possibility of full membership. This strategy entails political and economic cooperation – excluding participation in the EU institutions - between the EU and the countries concerned. Relations are focused and in some areas deepened through strengthened cooperation in certain areas such as participation in the single market and the “four freedoms”¹⁵, and closer cooperation on justice and home affairs. The “problem areas” raised in the debates would be omitted: free movement of workers, freedom of services, direct payments for agriculture and participation in the economic and monetary union.

The privileged partnership envisions, among other things, the possibility for the participating countries to take part in the various council meeting and actively participate in consultations. The right to vote, and thus to influence the decision, would not be allowed. As in Turkey's case, the special geostrategic significance of the country would be acknowledged, and cooperation in the area of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) further developed. The main issues for the EU concerning security policy lie in stabilizing the regional neighbourhood in the eastern Mediterranean area and the bordering regions in the Middle East. In this context it is argued that an Islamic and democratic Turkey integrated into Europe would serve as a “bridge to the Near and Middle East”¹⁶. This would have a positive effect on European security and the entire Islamic world by serving as a counterweight to Islamic fundamentalism.

12 Franz-Lothar Altmann: „EU und Westlicher Balkan. Von Dayton nach Brüssel: ein allzu langer Weg“, SWP-Studie S 1, Januar 2005, www.swp-berlin.org.

13 Matthias Wissmann: „Eine Privilegierte Partnerschaft als Alternative zu einer EU-Vollmitgliedschaft der Türkei.“ Aktualisierte Fassung des Positionspapiers vom 22.1.2004, www.cducsu.de/section_2/subsection_3/id_8.

14 Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg: „Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und der EU – eine Privilegierte Partnerschaft“, hrsg. von der Hans-Seidel-Stiftung, 2004, www.hss.de/downloads/aa33_internet.pdf

15 The “four freedoms” refer to the European common market rules for the free movement of goods, labour, services, and capital.

16 Claus Leggewie (Hrsg.): Die Türkei in Europa, Frankfurt a. M. 2004, S. 17.

The privileged partnership model has suffered from the negative connotations arising from the debate over Turkey's possible membership of the EU. It is generally thought to have been used solely as a means to prevent Turkey from joining the EU, and thus has become a political dead duck. The Turkish government and the majority of the population have rejected privileged partnership as "second-class membership".¹⁷

Moreover, from Turkey's perspective this model hardly offers anything beyond what Ankara itself is already asking for. Privileged partnership would grant Turkey the right to consultation, but not the right to vote within the Council. But Ankara already has the right to be consulted. Turkey has been participating in Council meetings ever since the customs union of 1996. Policies directly linked to the customs union have already been adopted by Turkey: free movement of goods between the EU and Turkey, the implementation of the EU external customs tariff and the common trade policy.¹⁸ In addition, Turkey participates in EU development projects. As a non-member of the EU, Turkey has no right to influence decisions in Brussels, even where economic or trade policy issues are concerned. It is therefore in Turkey's national interest to become a part of the European decision-making mechanisms and to exert real influence.

The fact that the privileged partnership model excludes the possibility of EU membership from the beginning is interpreted in Turkey as a policy of exclusion. Turkey, associated with the European Community since 1964 and a candidate for EU accession since the December 1999 Helsinki summit, views the offer of privileged partnership as a breach with the previous arrangements.

3.6. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

As a complement to the Eastern and Southern European enlargement round in 2004, the European Union began to intensify its relations with neighbouring states that have no immediate prospect of joining the EU. That enlargement brought the question of future relations with the old and new neighbours back to centre stage. The goal of the ENP is to give the countries outside of the enlarged community the pros-

¹⁷ Wolfgang Quaisser: „Eine Erweiterung der EU wird sie nach innen und außen schwächen“, in: Handelsblatt vom 16.06.2004.

¹⁸ The complete freedom of labour has not yet been implemented and there are still restrictions on the agriculture sector.

pect of participation in European integration and to expand stability and prosperity beyond the borders of the EU itself.¹⁹ Furthermore, the ENP is designed to contribute to stability in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, one of the central goals of the EU security strategy of 2002.

For the purpose of close political, economic and cultural cooperation, common action plans should enable countries to participate in a variety of jointly organized EU activities and programs, and to profit from a variety of financial instruments. The action plans of the EU and the respective country will be individually developed, and take into consideration the needs and capacities of the country as well as the interests of the EU. Under consideration are country-specific, multi-year programs, which would include goals and corresponding measures for a broad range of political fields. The action plans are based on country reports in which the situation of the partner countries are evaluated and which should eventually lead to new, comprehensive neighbourhood resolutions. The implementation of agreed measures should be subject to regular controls and reported on by the Commission in progress reports. The distribution of EU-aid is adapted to the level of implementation of the political and economic reforms in the partner countries. The principle of conditioning and motivation by giving incentives is a basic element of the ENP.

The core of the Neighbourhood Policy is economic integration within the EU single market. By removing trade barriers, granting preferences and improving access to the common market, trade should be stimulated and the economic situation of the partners strengthened. This goal should also be achieved through the adoption of legal EU norms and standards, that is, by the convergence of legislation. In other political fields, like CFSP, or environmental or energy policy, cooperation should be strengthened. The ENP countries should also profit from participation in various EU programs (general and vocational education, research and innovation), as well as a better interconnectedness with the EU, for example in the areas of energy, transportation, environment and information society.

In the area of justice and home affairs, the goal should be to establish closer cooperation in securing borders to manage migration, the fight against terrorism, and preventing human, drug, and weapons trafficking. The issues of organized crime, money laundering, and finance and white-collar crime should also be tackled. As a

¹⁹ All pertinent documents can be found on the Neighbourhood Web site of the EU Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/index_en.htm

final outcome, political dialogue on current issues should be formalized and could provide information on how to combat terrorism effectively, prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or how to settle regional conflicts.

A large number of politically and economically pivotal areas apply to all participating countries equally. Among these areas is political dialogue on core values, such as democracy, the rule of law, good governance and human rights, as well as the corresponding reforms, like the creation of an independent judiciary and competent government agencies. Security, with its internal and external aspects, including border control, migration, crisis management, fighting terrorism and organized crime, and ensuring the non-proliferation of WMDs, also belongs to this area. The point is not to prepare for possible EU accession. The ENP excludes the question of EU membership and thus forms an alternative option of participating in European integration for countries that in the short or long term have no prospect of joining the EU.

The ENP is not, however, without contradictions. Recent experience with the ENP has shown that there are differing interests among the EU and the neighbour states in essential questions of cooperation. While the EU is primarily interested in issues concerning security policy, the neighbour states hope for access to the European single market as well as for economic and financial aid. The fundamental problem of the ENP lies in its unique structure: the tension stems from the discrepancy between trying to have a single policy for all bordering states despite their great differences, and wanting to acknowledge the special circumstances of each individual country. The partner countries certainly differ from one another greatly. A “one size fits all” approach would thus appear to be insufficient to capture this diversity. This is especially clear with the Eastern European countries who do not accept the ENP since their stated goal is to join the EU.

4. Flexible Integration Strategies for Future Enlargements

The EU models for cooperation introduced above represent the possible alternatives to full membership. They constitute the space between EU accession and the ENP, and consequently signify partial membership.

The EEA+ model is basically limited to economic cooperation. However, some models (EAM, privileged partnership, ENO) envision additional forms of political participation, for example within EU programs⁴⁷ and Council meetings. Common to all

of these forms of integration is that full membership, and thus the possibility to participate in all political fields and influence decisions in the Council, is not an option.

The political elite at the national or EU level should no longer use the concept of “privileged partnership”, since Turkey, for whom the term was originally devised, has firmly rejected it.

The junior membership model is identical to the gradual integration model as regards content. The junior membership model was, however, originally only designed for the western Balkan region. Due to stronger institutional involvement and step-by-step political integration, gradual integration appears especially appealing for the EU accession candidates.

In comparison to the other models, gradual integration gives strong incentives for continuing the democratization and modernization processes. Since the countries would like to exert more political co-decision, a limited possibility for them to participate in the Council makes sense. Gradual integration of the countries allows for conditioning, and is linked to the implementation of reforms. The EU and the countries in question decide together on the level of integration. In addition, gradual integration preserves the prospect of full membership. This prospect will act as a “reform catalyst” bringing about democratization and modernization of these countries and may, though it does not have to, lead to full EU membership.

5. Table: Comparison of the EU Integration Models

Level of Integration	Prospect of Full Membership?	Participation in the EU Funds for Structurally Weak Regions and Agriculture?	Participation in the European Monetary System and Adoption of the Euro?	Participation in the Single Market	Possibility of Expanding Integration to Other Areas	Right to Vote in the Council
European Economic Area+	Possible	Intended to a limited extent	Intended to a limited extent	Intended to a limited extent, no freedom of movement for labour	Primarily intended for trade policy fields	No voting right but the right to be consulted concerning the Enlarged European Economic Area
Extended Associated Membership	Not intended	Intended to a limited extent	Intended to a limited extent	Intended to a limited extent, no freedom of movement for labour	Primarily intended for trade policy fields	No voting right but the right to be consulted concerning the Enlarged European Economic Area
Gradual Integration	Intended	Intended to a limited extent	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended for integrated areas (voting right by sector) But no veto right
Junior Membership	Intended	Intended to a limited extent	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended for integrated areas (voting right by sector) But no veto right
Privileged Partnership	Not intended	Not intended; Participation in tenders for environmental, cultural and educational programs intended	Not intended	Intended to a limited extent, Position paper of the CDU/CSU: Expansion of the Customs Union to a Free Trade Zone	Intended to a limited extent	No voting right but the right to be consulted concerning foreign and security policy
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)	Not intended	Not intended, Participation in EU programs in the education and research areas	Not intended	Not intended	Intended to a limited extent	No right to vote in the Council

Source: Cemal Karakas: „Für eine abgestufte Integration. Zur Debatte um den EU-Beitritt der Türkei“, in: HSFK-Standpunkte Nr. 4/2005, S. 14

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