

### **3. ANALYSIS**

To facilitate analysing the country reports, four key variables were formed that are of importance for developing trend statements:

- I. Institutionalisation of party systems and parties
- II. Structure of party systems
- III. Intra-party democracy
- IV. The parties' contribution to democratisation

Based on these variables, the results and trends emerging from the analysis will be summarised in the following chapter. Subsequently, theories will be formulated about the degree of the institutionalisation of the parties and their contribution to democratisation in transforming states and the participation of citizens in the political process. This will be followed by a statement about whether continent-specific patterns of development can be identified or other conclusions have to be drawn.

#### **I. Legal regulations and party systems – Institutionalisation of party systems and parties**

Looking at the *Asian* states of India (South Asia), Malaysia (Southeast Asia), Indonesia (Southeast Asia), and South Korea (East Asia), we find that none of these states, South Korea alone excepted, has a constitution which contains provisions for political parties or a catalogue of their functions. Beyond that, however, there are hardly any continent-specific characteristics relating to the constitutionalisation of party systems and parties that permit generalisation. In India, for example, political parties are mentioned for the first time in the 52. Constitutional Amendment (1985) which regulates the exclusion of Members from Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies. While there is no explicit law on political parties, there are regulations and procedures that govern the functions

of political parties in India. In Malaysia, on the other hand, there is neither a law on political parties, nor are there any specific regulations to define their functions and organisation. Nothing more is required to found a party than registering it with the 'Registrar of Societies'. In Indonesia, again, there is a dedicated party law to define party functions in greater detail. Under the law, parties are required to register with the authorities and collect data about their members. Their main functions are to run election campaigns and provide political education. In addition, they are obliged to respect the supremacy of the law, democracy, and human rights. Party funding in India and Malaysia differs from that in Indonesia inasmuch as parties in the latter country may derive their revenues not only from donations<sup>1</sup> but also from membership dues and government funds.<sup>2</sup> A source of revenue that is not provided for in law is the 'party tax' which the parties receive from members of parliament and other elected political decision-makers. However, no concrete figures are available under this heading.

### *The MENA region*

An analysis of the party systems in Turkey and Israel shows that, once again, the degree to which party systems are institutionalised in constitutional law differs completely. Although Israel has no written constitution, the principles of democracy have been laid down among the basic rights. A specific law on political parties has been in existence since 1992, while party funding was legally regulated in 1973. While the former act mainly addresses the criteria which the organisation of a party must meet to be admitted to elections, the party funding act provides strict rules for the financing of Israel's political parties. Unlike Israel, Turkey's constitution explicitly mentions political parties. In Art. 68 they are defined as „indispensable elements of democratic political life“ (cf. Gençkaya in this volume). The constitution of Turkey regulates the founding and activities of political parties, their surveillance and dissolution as well as their funding. In addition, parties must conform to certain principles. Thus, for example, the programme of a party may not conflict with the independence of the state, the principles of a secular and democratic republic must be recognised, and supporting any kind of dictatorship is prohibited. In addition, a dedicated party law exists which regulates, among other things, the establishment, organisation, activities, and functions of political parties.

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<sup>1</sup> Private donations are limited to 200 million Rupiahs (c. € 16,000) per year, while donations from business enterprises may not exceed a total of 800 million Rupiahs (c. € 65,000).

<sup>2</sup> In the elections of 2004, the parties received 1.000 Rupiahs (c. € 0,81) from the state for each vote cast in their favour.

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*Central and Southeast Europe*

More than in Asia and the MENA region, the degree of party-system and party constitutionalisation presents a consistent picture in the post-communist transforming states of Europe. Political parties are mentioned in the constitutions of all three countries examined in the 2007 Democracy Report. Party funding and the disclosure of party budgets are regulated either in constitutional or ordinary law. In all three countries, party budgets are financed by donations, membership dues, and governmental subsidies in amounts which generally depend on the electoral success of each party.

While the constitutions of each of the three countries (Poland, Serbia, Czech Republic) do emphasise the role of the parties in forming civic opinion, they do not specify a larger catalogue of functions. In the Czech Republic as well as in Poland and Serbia, the functions and duties of political parties are described in dedicated party laws. However, there are wide gaps between these east and Southeast European states as far as the precision of this function catalogue and the degree to which it reflects national political framework conditions are concerned. Whereas the party law of Poland (in force since 1997) explains the constitutional provisions on the foundation, organisation, functions, and dissolution of political parties in precise detail, that of The Czech Republic (in force since 1991) only marginally regulates their foundation and functions. While Serbia's party law (in force since 1999) regulates the foundation and functions of parties in greater detail than the constitution, experts criticise it for being superficial and containing outdated elements that do not reflect political framework conditions.

In the three South American countries of Mexico, Ecuador, and Chile as well as in the African countries of South Africa, Ghana, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, parties are mentioned in the constitution, the sole exception being Kenya.

*Latin America*

When Art. 42 of the Mexican constitution was reformed in 1977, parties were rated as "entities of public interest" and assigned political opinion-forming, recruiting, and electoral functions in explicit terms. Beyond that, there is no specific party law, although the federal guidelines for federal institutions and electoral processes (COFIPE) contain a chapter that is dedicated to parties and mainly addresses their registration, their rights and obligations, and public party funding. In recent years, this code was reformed and amended on

several occasions.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, COFIPE limits the sums with which private persons may support a party. The Federal Judicial Branch (IFE) and the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Branch (TEPJE) decide about the amounts of governmental party funding.<sup>4</sup>

While parties are mentioned in Chile's current constitution, it does not define either their place in the political system or their internal organisation. The Chilean example deserves some attention because, in addition to the constitution, a dedicated party law exists in the country which, passed under Pinochet's military dictatorship (1987), regulates the internal organisation, the internal opinion-forming process, the foundation, and the funding of political parties. Although these guidelines came into being under Pinochet, they are still applied in Chile's political day-to-day life at present, nor have they been reformed so far to adapt them to the current political framework conditions of the country.

### *Africa*

Among the cases studied on the African continent, Kenya is the only country whose constitution mentions political parties only by implication. Unlike Kenya, reference is made to political parties in the constitutions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, and South Africa. With the exception of South Africa, the key functions of the parties are laid down in each constitution, namely participation, integration, and political education. South Africa again excepted, there are specific party laws to regulate the internal organisation and funding of the parties as well as their functions in greater detail. What should be emphasised is that the content and formulation of the constitutional articles as well as the laws relating to political parties were informed by the historic experience of single-party regimes, for in all three states the constitution *prescribes* a multi-party system.

A cross-sectional analysis of the degree to which parties and party systems are incorporated in the constitutions of the 16 countries examined clearly shows the inadequacy grouping the constitutionalisation of party systems and parties along continental lines. Thus, the constitutions of three out of four Asian states do not even mention political parties, but South Korea breaks with this pattern. It is true that in the east and Southeast European countries, parties are embedded in the constitution, and their functions are laid down in party laws. It is equally true, however, that large gaps exist

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<sup>3</sup> Introduction of a gender matrix for the nomination of candidates (2002), of stricter criteria for the registration of a party (2003), and of a ban on voting in presidential elections for Mexicans living abroad (2005).

<sup>4</sup> 30% of the budget is distributed equally among all parties, while 70% is allocated in relation to their success in the last elections.

between the central and eastern European states with regard to the precision of this function catalogue and the degree to which it reflects the political framework conditions of each country. Against the background of the degree of democratisation and the historical, political, and economic framework conditions prevailing in each country, political parties have found their way into the constitutions of Kenya, Ghana, Congo, and South Africa in various forms, and their functions are regulated in catalogues contained in dedicated party laws.

**Table 1**  
Legal regulation and party system

<b>Country</b>	<b>Region/ Continent</b>	<b>Party System, Government System</b>	<b>Incorporation of Party Systems and Parties in Constitutional Law</b>	<b>Party Legislation</b>
<b>Israel</b>	Middle East	Parliamentary system of government	No written constitution – no incorporation of parties in constitutional law	Party law exists Content: Party organisation
<b>Turkey</b>	Middle East	Multi-party system Parliamentary system of government	Parties mentioned in the constitution	Party legislation exists Content: Party functions Deficit: Inherited party law that does not reflect political framework conditions
<b>Poland</b>	Eastern Europe	Multi-party system Parliamentary system of government	Parties incorporated in the constitution as highly important for the formation of political opinion Constitution contains Article on party funding	Party legislation exists Content: Party functions

<b>Czech Republic</b>	Eastern Europe	Multi-party system Parliamentary system of government	Parties incorporated in the constitution as highly important for the formation of political opinion	Party legislation exists Content: Party functions
<b>Serbia</b>	Southeast Europe	Multi-party system Semi-presidential system of government	Parties incorporated in the constitution as highly important for the formation of political opinion	Party legislation exists Content: Party foundation and functions Deficits: Imprecision; outdated elements that do not reflect political framework conditions
<b>Mexico</b>	Central America	Multi-party system Presidential system of government	Parties mentioned in the constitution	No party legislation; only federal guideline on party registration, functions, and funding
<b>Chile</b>	South America	Multi-party system Presidential system of government	Parties mentioned in the constitution	Party legislation exists Content: Organisation, decision-making processes, foundation, dissolution, funding
<b>Ecuador</b>	South America	Multi-party system Presidential system of government	Parties mentioned in the constitution Constitutional protection guaranteed	Party legislation exists Content: Party organisation and funding
<b>South Africa</b>	Southern Africa	Multi-party system Parliamentary system of government	Parties mentioned in the constitution	No party legislation

<b>Ghana</b>	West Africa	Two-party system (presidential-parliamentarian system of government)	Parties incorporated in the constitution as highly important for the formation of political opinion Constitution forbids single-party systems	Party legislation exists Content: Party functions
<b>Congo</b>	Central Africa	Multi-party system Presidential system of government	Parties mentioned in the constitution Constitution forbids single-party systems	Party legislation exists Content: Party functions and organisation
<b>Kenya</b>	East Africa	Multi-party system Presidential system of government Autocracy	Constitution stipulates that Kenya is a multi-party system; no other mention of parties in the constitution	No party legislation
<b>Indonesia</b>	Southeast Asia	Multi-party system Presidential system of government	Parties not mentioned in the constitution	Party legislation exists Content: Party functions
<b>India</b>	South Asia	Multi-party system Parliamentary system of government	Parties not mentioned in the constitution, only implicitly in an amendment on the exclusion of parliamentarians	No party legislation
<b>South Korea</b>	East Asia	Multi-party system Presidential system of government	Parties mentioned in the constitution, specifying functions, organisation, and internal decision-making	Party legislation exists Content: Party organisation and functions

<p><b>Malaysia</b></p>	<p>Southeast Asia</p>	<p>Multi-party system Parliamentary system of government / parliamentary monarchy</p>	<p>Parties not mentioned in the constitution</p>	<p>No party legislation</p>
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**II. Types of political parties**

An inquiry into the structural patterns of party systems once again reveals great diversity on the various continents.

*Asia*

While in India and Indonesia even established parties are institutionalised only to a small degree (generally, they merely maintain ad-hoc relations with societal groups and civil organisations to serve their temporary interests), Malaysia presents a radically different picture: There are formal party memberships as well as youth and women's organisations; the PAS (a religious opposition party) cultivates close links with Islamic institutions, and other opposition parties maintain close relations with worker and civic movements. The structure of the party system in Malaysia is mainly governed by ethnic considerations, revolving around the relations between Malays and non-Malays (Chinese). Unlike the parties in India, Malaysia's political parties may be credited with a high degree of ideological – and thus programmatic – stability. A party's clientele of voters is generally congruent with a specific social group. In India as well as in Indonesia and Malaysia, party systems are characterised by a plethora of parties and pluralist societal currents. With the exception of Malaysia, the institutionalisation of the parties and their roots in society are weak.

*The MENA region*

The salient characteristic of Turkey's party system is the gap that exists between the centre and the periphery. The centre is composed of nationalists, centralists, seculars, and the closed ranks of the governmental elite. The periphery, on the other hand, is culturally heterogeneous and complex. According to the judgement of an expert on the country (see Genckaya in this volume), there is no party in present-day Turkish politics and no coherent elite that occupies a middle position. This is the gap which the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) attempts to fill, having won 35 percent of the vote and an absolute majority in parliament in the early elections of 2002. During the 1980s, great changes happened not only in Turkey's party system but also in its electorate. Religion developed into a dominant factor in



politics. The rift in today's society runs mainly between secular and religious parties. Another structural fault line along which various parties have arranged themselves is the confrontation between the Turkish and the Kurdish identity.

In the case of Israel, it is difficult to make any general statements about the types of political parties that exist, the lines of conflict around which the party system is structured, and the degree to which the parties contribute to the political participation of the citizens. Because of the diversity of Israel's society, its 13 parties are structured along various ideological, ethnic, and religious lines. Ideological and ethnic cleavages are reinforced by the Israeli-Arab conflict which overshadows all political actions. Seven out of ten parties have programmes whose ideological orientation is strong or very strong and/or whose programmatic stability is great or very great. One notable fact is that the programmes of the three religious parties are strongly tinted by ideology, whereas three of the four partners in the current coalition are passing through numerous far-reaching programme changes and lack a firm ideological background.

The religious line mainly consists of parties that target traditional ultra-orthodox Jews. In addition, some of these parties represent specific societal classes. As Israel's society is fragmented, and the parliamentary hurdle for parties is low at two percent of the vote, the party system is relatively unstable. Ten of today's 13 parties were formed after 1977. Being rather young, these parties only partially succeeded in establishing themselves in Israel's party system. One of these is the Kadima, the senior partner in today's coalition, which was founded only in the election year of 2006. This being so, it cannot be said that there is a connection between the age of a party and its electoral success. On the contrary, it is a fact that only one of the three established parties (those which were founded before 1977) is represented in the coalition as one of four junior partners.

### *Central and Southeast Europe*

There is no way in which parties in the states of eastern and Southeastern Europe can be generalised by assigning to them a specific party typology and/or overarching structural pattern. Still, there are parallels between The Czech Republic and Poland: The structural development of the party system in these two states was based on socio-economic characteristics. The Czech Republic shows a conditionally pluralist multi-party system, in which no single party can acquire permanent dominance. The positions of the two strongest parties are diametrically opposed.

After the overthrow of the communist regime in 1989, Poland's party system bore the marks of a weakly developed civil society and

underdeveloped institutions that represented the widely diverging interests of different social groups. Even now, plurality is one of the salient characteristics of Poland's party system. While a single party dominates in most cases, mainly because of the new electoral law, this dominance changes hands from one election to the next.

Poland's party landscape may be subdivided into four categories: Three parties are characterised as representing the rural population (Samobrona, RP, PSL), another is classified as liberal (PO), yet another as conservative (PiS), and two as workers' parties (SLD, SdLP). Four of the seven parties evaluated receive votes only from specific social groups, such as educated or less educated people, women or city dwellers. Two have no specific social group to vote for them, and one party has a balanced mix of voters.

### *Latin America*

Dominated by three parties, Mexico's party system is not structured along religious, ideological, or ethnic lines. Parties endeavour to appeal to voters from all classes as well as ethnic or income groups to set themselves off against the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Conversely, the structure of Chile's multi-party system is based on a traditional classification of voter and member clienteles. Whereas the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and the Renovación Nacional (RN) represent mainly the more prosperous segments of the population, socialists (PS) and communists (currently without parliamentary representation) represent the lower working class. The Party for Democracy (PPD), which belongs to the left end of the party spectrum, as well as the Radical and Social Democratic Party (PRSD) and the Party Christian Democracy (PDC) similarly target their specific voter and member clienteles in their programmes.

In Ecuador, there are three cleavages which particularly influence the structure of the party system. Next to a social line of conflict, the ethnic and cultural factor has been playing a – albeit subordinate – role in the party system since the early nineties; in the mid-1990s, a party representing the interests of the indigenous population established itself. However, the largest and most influential fault line runs along the borders of the three regions of Ecuador (coast, highlands, and Amazon). Normally, each of these regions votes for a specific set of parties, there being no party that is institutionalised beyond regional borders. Although the law allows the foundation of parties on the national plane, all parties really restrict their activities to 'their own' regions. In Ecuador, no party remains permanently dominant. Even so, there are four parties in the country's multi-party system with its extreme pluralism (25 legally registered parties, 18 lists of candidates for congress) that show a certain degree of stability. Those four parties (Social-Christian Party (PSC), Democratic Liberal Party (ID),

Roldocista Ecuatoriano (PRE), and Christian Democratic Union (CDU)) held a two-thirds majority from 1979 to 2002, dominating the system. Two other parties, the Popular Democrat Party (MDP) and the Pachakutik (PK), are less successful but were nevertheless represented in parliament for an extended period. In the elections of 2006, the parties named above sustained crucial losses, while two new parties won a majority: Institutional Renewal of National Action (PRIAN) and Patriotic Society (PSP).

In all South American states, the institutionalisation and the standing of the political parties are equally weak. In Mexico, for instance, there is no formal party membership, while in Ecuador the membership rolls that are required to register for an election are not updated after the event. These and other party-internal figures are not disclosed to the Mexican or Ecuadorian public. Consequently, the parties' public transparency in Ecuador has reached an all-time low, further weakening the already infinitesimal trust of the population. Although two parties maintain a youth organisation and three a women's organisation, there is no way for these organisations to influence the formulation of the party's programmes or politics, so that there is little chance of the parties advancing civic participation in this way.

### *Africa*

The great extent to which the structures and cleavages of party systems and the role played by the parties in the political process depend on the specific historical and political experiences of a country (South Africa), its socio-economic development (Ghana), and the degree of its democratisation (Congo) emerges particularly clearly from the diversity of the cases on the African continent. In South Africa, both the conflict lines around which the party system is arranged and the parties' standing in society may be traced back to the experience of the Apartheid regime, while in Ghana the dominant cleavage is that between the prosperous and the impoverished segment of the population. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the party system mostly owes its structural characteristics to the low degree of democratisation<sup>5</sup> and the continuous civil wars.

### **III. Internal organization and decision-making**

With regard to 'internal democracy, internal policy-making, and internal decision-making' three major groups of parties may be formed:

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<sup>5</sup> The Status Index of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index places the Democratic Republic of Congo among those states confronted by 'serious obstacles to a market-based democracy'.

1. The organisation and structure as well as the internal policy- and decision-making processes of the parties in the first group come close to the German and West-European understanding of a democratic party. Most of the parties studied consider participating in the policy-making process an important duty. Their decision-making processes comply at least formally with the bottom-up principle from grassroots to top level, and their functional structure is such that their elected bodies are accountable to the general assembly.

To begin with, the east European states of The Czech Republic and Poland may be assigned to this first group. Neither The Czech Republic nor Poland exclude specific population segments from participating in political parties. In Poland, the statutes of the parties as well as the legal regulations of the republic prescribe that access should be free to all groups of the population. Judges, public prosecutors, the president of the National Bank, soldiers, and policemen are barred from joining a party only for reasons of political neutrality. In both countries, candidates are nominated on the bottom-up principle. The results of regional preliminaries are accepted at party headquarters, and regional party organisations are consulted about any changes. Decisions about national programme issues are made by party conventions. In The Czech Republic, all parties have formal and informal departments to specify and handle individual programme items. As work on party programmes is decentralised, relevant decisions may be made on the spot. All in all, the parties' regional organisations are independent of their headquarters as far as the nomination of candidates and the formulation of programmes is concerned. While the latter also holds true in Poland, objections lodged by regional party leaderships are frequently ignored, and the ultimate decision is made at headquarters. In the Czech Republic, members of the House of Representatives and the Senate are free to exercise their mandate both at the regional and the national level. Mandates are personal, and party allegiance is of no importance in formal terms.

Party organisation in Poland is strongly regional, from provinces down to districts and communities. Consequently, there is a local, a regional, and a national level of organisation. Parliamentarians may exercise their mandate freely. Representing the entire nation, they are not bound by instructions. However, party discipline rules in parliament inasmuch as members have to submit to the party line, although there is no formal punishment for 'rogues'.

The internal activities of three out of seven parties evaluated in Poland concentrate largely or very largely on advertising and campaigning (PO, Samoobrona, LPR). Two others present a balanced picture (PiS, SLD), while another two concentrate on party internals (PSL, SdPL). There are no restrictions on using the media to address the electorate. Access to the public and private media as well as to the internet is unrestricted. All parties investigated in Poland use most of their funds to recruit members and invest in their organisation. In addition, two of the seven parties studied spend significant sums on campaigning (PiS, PO).

2. In the second group, the picture presented by the 'internal democracy, internal policy-making, and internal decision-making' variable is more diffuse. On the one hand, no segment of the population is excluded from political participation in and through a party, and efforts are made to implement the bottom-up principle in decision-making. On the other hand, the process of making decisions and policies from the bottom to the top is often undermined and/or applied inconsistently. In addition, the selection of candidates is often influenced more by charismatic leaders than by internal decision-making processes. Members are free from party discipline, at least *de iure*. At the same time, many of the parties' internal processes are not transparent for the general public.

This is the group to which we may assign the political parties of Chile, South Africa, South Korea, and Mexico. While Chile's parties, *de iure*, do not exclude any segments of the population from political participation, there are no internal organisations, women's quotas, or extensive networks between the parties and society. According to the judgement of the expert on the country, Chile's presidential democracy leaves little freedom of action for its political parties, which are highly centralised analogously with its political system (Huneus in this volume).

Candidates are nominated partly by national party leaders and partly through preliminaries. When questioned about an internal power centre, three of the five parties evaluated reported equilibrium between the dominance of a single leader and an institutionalised decision-making process. In the Renovación Nacional (RN) party, a single leader tends to be dominant, whereas the Christian Democracy Party (PDC) tends more to arrive at its decisions by the bottom-up principle. Chile's parliamentarians are free in the exercise of their mandate. Members leaving their party retain their mandate and remain in parliament as independents.

Participation in the political parties of South Africa is not formally subject to restrictions applying to specific groups of the population. Furthermore, parties maintain youth and women's organisations. As in Chile, the decision-making process in South Africa's parties is guided by the bottom-up principle. Yet although all parties have regional structures that reach to the lowest level, many key decisions are made on the national plane by the 'National Working Committee'.

The second configuration of 'internal democracy' also applies to the parties of South Korea. Although it is true that both major parties depend to a relatively great extent on charismatic leaders who define the party's internal activities together with its executive, they may rely on their ability to influence party politics extensively because of their broad backing and deep roots on the regional plane. Excluding no one from political participation, South Korea's parties uphold women's quotas. While members of the national assembly are legally free to exercise their mandate, they normally cast their votes along party lines. There have been some cases in the past where parliamentarians were expelled by their party after having voted against its directives.

Mexico is the last case that can be clearly assigned to this group. Serbia and Israel are the only countries whose responses to the variable 'internal democracy, internal policy-making, and internal work' are so differentiated as to make allocation difficult. In Mexico, parties are institutionalised and organised at both the national and the local level, their campaign platforms are debated by their 'community organs' (general assembly, national congress, national convention), and the decisions of the top party echelons must be approved by these bodies. On the other hand, programme decisions are made by each party's National Electoral Committee (CEN). While no social group is excluded from participating in political parties in Mexico, there are mainly two items that impair their internal democracy as well as their policy- and decision-making processes: First, internal candidate elections are not disclosed to the general public; they are held behind closed doors. In most cases, the candidates selected conform to the preferences of the party chairman. Second, although the law allows parliamentarians complete freedom in exercising their mandate, party discipline is really strict in Mexico, for three reasons: First, important public offices are awarded only to candidates nominated by a party; second, to stand for public office again, candidates must follow the party whip although they cannot be directly re-elected to any political office; third, the national

electoral committees that manage a party's budget may impose fines on candidates.

Mexico highlights the salient fact which characterises this group with regard to the status of internal democracy: In law, many of the regulations that support exemplary internal policy- and decision-making are present, but a wide gap yawns between the ideal and reality.

The picture presented by an analysis of the degree of intra-party democracy in Serbia and Israel is rather diffuse. In general, no social group is excluded from participation in political parties in Serbia,<sup>6</sup> and there is a general trend for decisions to be made on the bottom-up rather than the top-down principle. Parliamentarians too enjoy complete freedom in principle, although their freedom as well as that of the political parties has grown to such an extent in the last five or six years that, in the opinion of the expert on these countries, it is no longer conformable with a democratic party landscape. Thus, the G17 Plus and the PSS were permitted to take part in elections even before they had been approved as political parties. Parties may send representatives into parliament without a mandate. This is made possible by the general practice of representatives having their names inserted on the list of a major party as 'guests' and then transferring their mandate to their own party. However, it is impossible to make a general statement about whether or not a party whip exists in Serbia, and party work presents a similarly diffuse picture.

In Israel's pluralist party system, no party has internal rules that exclude certain groups of the population from participation. However, as parties are established along ethnic, religious, or ideological lines, citizens' participation is greatly limited in all political parties. There are no catch-all parties such as those in Germany. To the extent that stable party programmes exist, which is the case only with half of the parties represented in the Knesset, these were adopted by party committees. In the religious parties, programmes are formulated by religious leaders. Seven out of ten parties have charismatic leaders. Candidates are mostly appointed by party leaders and occasionally elected in preliminaries. Parliamentarians are free in the exercise of their mandate, although rabbinical decisions are binding for members of religious parties. No more than six of ten Israeli parties concentrate on advertising in their party

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<sup>6</sup> An exception was instituted in October 2000 when representatives of the old Milošević regime were banned from party membership.

work, while the other four, including the three religious parties, focus on internal activities.

3. In the third group, the 'internal democracy, internal policy-making, and internal decision-making' variable is configured in a way that runs contrary to the West European idea of a democratic party: In some cases, only certain groups of the population are eligible for party membership, and there are hardly any women's quotas. The whip rules, and candidates are nominated and internal decisions made in a top-down process conducted behind closed doors. What is more, most parties do not act as multipliers, and their political communication fails. This being so, the parties' internal activities mostly focus on campaigning pure and simple, while any internal work is abandoned completely. Under this heading, we find the states of Turkey, Malaysia, Ecuador, Indonesia, India, Kenya, and Congo.

Next to democratic deficits, parties in Kenya, Congo, and Ghana exhibit defects in their internal policy-making, their decision-making, and their organisation. As far as advancing the democratisation process through political participation in parties is concerned, this constitutes a vicious circle composed of infrastructural defects, difficulties in accessing information caused by technical as well as educational deficits (such as the high illiteracy rate in Congo, for example), the lack of a democratic tradition and, finally, inadequate funds to close these gaps.

#### **IV. Parties and democracy – The parties' contribution to democratization**

The cross-section of the 16 cases analysed reveals the inadequacy of grouping the institutionalisation of party systems and parties, the development patterns in party democratisation, and deficits in democratic party development along continental lines. Again and again, we find exceptions from the rule among the states investigated on a continent or in a region. Models to explain the contribution of political parties towards democratisation and greater civic participation in the political process cannot be confined to continents but must be developed on the basis of other clusters, and the same holds true for trends and action recommendations to enhance the sustainability of development cooperation in a target country. Thus, for example, great differences exist in the local, societal, economic, historical, and political contexts applying in India (South Asia), Malaysia (Southeast Asia), Indonesia (Southeast Asia), and South Korea (East Asia), so that it appears necessary to form more differentiated clusters. From the results of this study, the following conclusion may be drawn: Almost



without exception, the contributions made by political parties in the last five years towards the process of democratisation in the developing and transforming countries investigated may be charted on the basis of local degrees of democratic transformation rather than continents.

Tools are available to assign a specific phase of transformation to each of the states analysed. Using a tripartite scale, Freedom House (2006 a,b) grades democratisation processes as 'free', 'partly free', and 'not free'. The Status Index of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) differentiates more closely. For the purposes of this study, it is a suitable tool for aggregating the 16 states analysed not only by continent but also by degree of democracy and/or democratic transformation. This permits answering the question about the contribution of the political parties to the process of democratisation in a country against the background of its transformation phase. As suggested by the 2006 Status Index of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the cases analysed may be grouped together as follows, based on their respective degree of transformation (Bertelsmann Foundation 2006):<sup>7</sup>

- The Czech Republic, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Chile, and the Republic of Korea may be numbered among those democracies that have completed or are undergoing a process of consolidation. Parties there are institutionalised correspondingly.
- According to the BTI, 'good prospects for consolidation of a market-based democracy' prevail in the Republic of South Africa, Mexico, and India.
- Deficits in market-based democracy appear in Ghana, the Republic of Serbia, Turkey, Indonesia, Kenya, Ecuador, and Malaysia. Similarly, the parties there show corresponding deficits in the indicators on which this study is based.
- On the BTI Status Index, the Democratic Republic of Congo appears under the heading 'serious obstacles to a market-based democracy'.

As the BTI's analyses of democratisation tendencies largely agree with those of this study, the only exceptions being India and Israel, it may be said that, in the last five years, the political parties of the Czech Republic and Poland have reached a comparatively high level of development with regard to the institutionalisation of parties and party systems as well as with regard to their contribution to the process of democratisation. What is more, there is a trend towards enhancing this

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<sup>7</sup> Israel is not listed in the 2006 Status Index.

positive development. For Mexico, Chile, South Korea (where party-mediated democratic participation tends to increase), and South Africa, an analysis of the last five years shows that matters tend to stagnate. In Ghana, Turkey, Serbia (where attempts to enhance the institutionalisation of political parties can be distinguished), Kenya, Ecuador, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the parties' contribution towards the process of democratisation tends to decline. The findings of this study regarding the contribution of the Congolese parties agrees with the rating of the BTI, which diagnoses 'serious obstacles to a market-based democracy'. Consequently, this study comes to the conclusion that especially there are grave obstacles impeding further democratisation by political participation in and through parties.

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