

Chapter 10

Peacekeeping and regional integration in Africa

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Introduction

Peacekeeping in Africa dates from the late fifties when the United Nations deployed in the Suez Canal region in 1956 (Malan 1997:18-21). Then came the first African (i.e. Organisation of African Unity) mission in 1963. It was an observer mission during the conflict between Algeria and Morocco, followed by a similar mission in Chad in 1981 (Gumbi 1995:35). Ever since, the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity/African Union were the only roleplayers in the African 'peacekeeping' scenario.

At that stage (before 1993) there were no regional missions. This only became reality after the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 (driven by the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the OAU) that envisaged regional economic integration in Africa. All the while, pan-African security and defence structures were absent. These were only created in 1993 with the OAU's adoption of the 'Cairo Declaration' that provided for the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Before that, since 1988, the OAU would often rely on the sources and experience of the United Nations. Significantly it alluded to five regions for economic cooperation and integration in Africa (making this ruling compatible with Ch. VIII of the UN Charter on 'regional arrangements'), and the need to organise peace and security accordingly (Meyns 2002:142-143).

The African system not only accepts the authority of the United Nations system but defers to its mandates and has modelled its own institutions on the UN system. For example, both are hierarchical with the UN Security Council at the top of the UN system and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) at the top of the African system.

Both systems provide for similar types of functions modelled on the UN example as explained hereunder: peacemaking (Ch. VI); peacekeeping ('Ch. VI½'); peace-

enforcement (Ch. VII) and regional arrangements (Ch. VIII) of which the PSC and its regional/subregional institutions are examples. The African PSC defined itself in its own protocol as an example of the UN Charter's Ch. VIII (Regional Arrangements) institutions. The PSC Protocols of 2004 also mirror UN mandates. But the UN has of late tended to make its commitments in Africa conditional to the AU making ceasefires and peace agreements first. To be sure, this dates from 2000 when the Brahimi Report recommended that the UN would not enforce peace where there is no peace to keep. The onus was therefore on Africa to conclude peace agreements beforehand, such as the Arusha Agreement on Burundi, the Pretoria Agreement on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Nairobi Agreement on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan. Only then would the UN deploy peacekeepers.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes. This chapter makes no provision for unsolicited intervention, which must be impartial and can only be implemented with the consent of all parties concerned. UN missions were usually unarmed and only the General Assembly or the UN Security Council could deal with the issue of arming? (Malan 1997:16-22). The interpretation in those days was narrow: peacemaking peacefully. But under Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld (1961) the term '6½' emerged when more discretionary powers for the UN General Assembly were made. These were, however, never captured in the UN Charter, and implied three peacekeeping conditions: impartiality, consent, and the non-use of force. Before 1988, all UN peacekeeping took place under the conditions set out in Ch. VI. But after 1988, when conditions changed, the principles of consent and the non-use of force became eroded as the environment became more robust. Only impartiality was to remain.

Chapter VII provided for the use of force, i.e. enforcement. Only the Security Council can decide on such actions, implying that Permanent Members of the UN can veto such decisions (Art. 27 and 43). This made serious cases of conflict hostage to superpower politics, especially during the Cold War. But the same has since happened in the case of Sudan where China and Russia tend to veto intervention from the outside. Other crucial issues that were to emerge only later were post-conflict reconstruction and development, peace building, and the sharing of responsibilities in the case of hybrid (UN and AU) operations. It has now been

accepted that the AU should not only make peace agreements, but should deploy in advance of the UN (Cilliers 2008:7). As mentioned, this is in line with Brahimi thinking.

Meanwhile the UN has deployed in Namibia, Mozambique and Angola since 1989. These were all 'Ch. 6½' mandates, i.e. peacekeeping duties which involved more than peacemaking but also managing security in these conflict situations. This was in line with UN Resolutions as well as with UN mandates from the Security Council and the Secretary General. But it was not a case of enforcement yet.

African missions with military capacity, i.e. to enforce peace where robust intervention was required, were never deployed by the OAU (Berman 2004:28), for reasons mentioned hereunder. More robust operations (Ch. VII), as well as all classical peacekeeping missions (so-called 'Ch. 6½' mandates), were therefore always left to the United Nations: in Somalia and Rwanda in the early nineties; in Liberia and Sierra Leone since late nineties; and in the DR Congo, Sudan and Darfur (from 2005 onward).

Major hindrances to more robust interventions by both the UN and the OAU/AU related to a number of factors: the cost of troop interventions, the paralysing impact of Security Council vetos (or abstentions) by permanent members of the Council, the upholding of the doctrine of non-intervention by African states which almost always rejected such actions on the basis of the principle of the non-violation of state sovereignty. To be sure, the AU can now intervene legally, but remains reluctant. More recently, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe consistently refused to take foreign advice on the normalisation of democracy in Zimbabwe on the basis that Zimbabwe is a sovereign state – not a colony of the United States of America, or Britain.

Apart from the non-intervention and sovereignty principles (see Ajulu 2002:2-3; Van Nieuwkerk 2004:41-62; Van der Westhuizen 2005:5-6; and De Coning 2005:83-116), another factor that weakened African compliance with rules of good governance is the lack of political will by African leaders to criticise fellow-African leadership. Why this is the case is unsure. The criticism of the Mugabe government at the AU Summit in 2008 was the first of its kind. This has yet to happen in the case of Sudan.

The beginning of a new era?

The end of the Cold War heralded the withdrawal of superpowers from African conflicts, as in the cases of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. This was also the beginning of new types of conflict in Africa (erupting from within, and not necessarily between African states) – the notable exceptions here were the wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and neighbouring states participating in the war in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo since 1998. In other words, the wars in places such as Angola, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire were internal civil wars fought between militaries of weak states and rebels, between warlords and private military companies, and between fighters on both sides that often included children and foreigners. How does one make peace in conflicts where the state is not always party to the conflicts, or where the state violates its own citizens, or where soldiers are not the only combatants? Whose responsibility is it to protect? What is the role of the International Criminal Court? What is the significance of the US African Command? Does it link with the African Standby Force? And finally, who are the peacemakers in Africa, and what is their agenda? Does it help or hinder African integration?

These questions spawned a whole series of new realities: humanitarian considerations could override objections based on non-intervention; the International Criminal Court in The Hague was willing to look at gross violations of human rights (e.g. war crimes and genocide); the American government decided to station an African Command on African soil (see discussion hereunder); the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) gained ground; and as far as Africa itself was concerned, the OAU was replaced by the African Union in 2002 with its own Peace and Security Council which mandated the creation of an African Standby Force (ASF), a Continental Early Warning System, and a Panel of the Wise. As mentioned before, the UN began to insist that peace agreements should be in place before UN involvement. As will be pointed out later, many of these agreements failed (for example, the Arusha Agreement of Rwanda in 1993). But quite a few succeeded (for example, the Lomé Agreement on Sierra Leone in 1999 and the Arusha Agreement on Burundi in 2000). Here follows an overview of the new realities:

Although the UN (in fact, really the US) intervention in Somalia in 1992/93 was a failure, it was the first time (Melvern 2001:102) that UN member states under the UN Security Council disregarded the sovereignty principle in Africa and launched a humanitarian mission, including an outside armed force (UN Resolutions 749 and 775) in a sovereign state. Intervention was therefore justified by its humanitarian goals (Samkange 2002:73). But despite Somalia, military intervention for whatever motive has– not been universally welcomed except for purposes of self-defence in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter (Samkange 2002:73 & 80).

After Rwanda (1994) and Kosovo (1998) the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (in 1999) challenged the international community to respond to these crises. The first to act was the Canadian government whose action led to the creation of the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in September 2000. The feeling was that intervention had to be considered more often, but only when properly authorised by the UN Security Council. The right to intervene had to be balanced by the responsibility to protect ('R2P'), implying the protection of citizens (Petruczynik 2006:26-27). Although these were UN – and Western – rather than AU initiatives, these trends were in line with new thinking in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, especially Article 4.

Another element of this latest era on security and humanitarian thinking was the establishment of the International Criminal Court in The Hague in 1998, based on decisions taken at the Rome Conference. It entered into force in 2002. A total of 139 states signed, and 92 ratified, including South Africa. Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sudan and the US are not parties to the Rome Statute (Du Plessis 2003:6). Despite this, the ICC decided to issue a summons for the arrest of the Sudanese president in July 2008. But South Africa (in the person of President Mbeki) is on record as having rejected this initiative. China and Russia opposed.

One particular issue that is still controversial is the American eagerness to obtain military bases in Africa, in the form of an African Command, called 'Africom'. Africom will become operational in late 2008. Its intended aims are to create stable environments in Africa, to train and equip African militaries, and to assist with humanitarian, border and maritime security issues. Bases are planned for Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Liberia, Senegal, Uganda, Cameroun, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea

and Djibouti. What is striking about this list is that all, with the exception of Uganda, Cameroun and Gabon, have Muslim majorities. Also, all of the rest, with the exception of Uganda, Senegal and Djibouti, have oil. But Djibouti is strategically situated at the southern tip of the Red Sea where the US already has an army base. The common denominators therefore seem to be military strategy, oil and Islam. But a common denominator could also be to discourage China's role in Africa (Neethling 2008:43), although this is denied by the US.

No wonder that African leaders are sceptical about being too close to Washington (Swart 2007:2), and that Libya and Algeria have already refused US presence. SADC governments have also decided that no member state would host US armed soldiers (Neethling 2008:43). Commentators believe that this is about protecting American interests, such as access to African oil and monitoring political sentiments in Muslim countries, especially those related to the US 'global war on terror' after the 9/11 attack on the US (2001). Africom is also a Department of Defence, and not a State Department initiative. Is this a new Cold War, with anti-terrorism, rather than anti-communism, as new US foreign military policy? Will it lead to a diminishing of US support for UN peacekeeping in Africa, except when the purpose also fits into American plans?

In Africa, the Organisation of African Unity was converted into the African Union in 2002, formulating a Protocol on an (African) Peace and Security Council (PSC) that was adopted on 25 May 2004. Article 13 of this Protocol provides for an African Standby Force (ASF) with one central and five regional brigades that would be mandated by Ch. VIII of the UN Charter, and could carry out Ch. VII-type mandates – something that had never been conducted by African missions before. Significantly, the US Africom debates do not (yet) allude to cooperation between Africom and the ASF. It therefore looks like a 'stand alone' initiative.

In 2006/2007 eight UN missions were deployed in Africa, which represents 70 per cent of UN peace operations worldwide. These eight states are the DRC, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, Southern Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Darfur in north-western Sudan. The African involvement in peacekeeping in Burundi and Darfur – and Somalia in 2008 – became test cases for Africa's new resolve to cater for its own peace and security. Burundi also became Africa's biggest test case for the

application of strategies for post-conflict reconstruction and development through the concepts of demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security reforms carried out by the government of national unity (similar strategies were applied in the DRC). But this was always under UN, not AU, supervision.

This is where the PSC and the ASF come in. The PSC initiative is the only new African initiative in operation today. And Africom stands alone. The ASF and Continental Early Warning System, however, are not functional yet. The ASF will consist of one brigade at the AU head office in Addis Ababa, plus five brigades or forces for each of Africa's regions: North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa.

South Africa enthusiastically endorses this concept (Shelton 2005). However, to call these entities 'forces' is perhaps misleading, as military components will be for each region and not in each region and therefore remain in their countries of origin (De Coning 2005:85) and only deployed when required. As is the case with the UN, the doctrine will be one of collective security – typical of Ch. V and VI of the UN Charter on the one hand, and three more military scenarios on the other, including Ch. VII-type of peace enforcements (Neethling 2005). The time line for implementation is 2005 to 2010, but at the time of writing in 2008, nothing had come of that yet, although much preparations had been made (Cilliers & Malan 2005; Cilliers 2008).

The long delays relate mainly to two arguments: the first is the lack of political will, of which the will to override the sovereignty of errant states in the name of intervention (see the Lomé Declaration and Article 4(b) of the African Union's Constitutive Act of 2002) may be the biggest challenge (Van der Westhuizen 2005:6), whereas the second argument is about insufficient funding and capacity to perform (Neethling 2005:4). This weakness is recognised by the AU Peace and Security Council, which provides for a Special AU Fund as well as 'hybrid AU and UN forces'. To this might be added 'other resources'. Examples could include logistics (the capacity for rapid deployment), the realisation of rapid deployment of troops, the timeous appointment of the panels of the wise and the implementation of early warning systems, plus the availability of enabling legal frameworks such as Memoranda of Understandings, Protocols, Treaties and Defence Pacts (Alusala 2004:120).

The PSC/ASF mandate for African conflicts is quite wide: it restates the Cairo (1993) as well as UN Charter (1945) mandates without reservations. It goes even further by committing the AU to common defence structures and common defence policies (Aboagye 2004:185). It alludes to the overriding of the principle of non-interference when it justifies intervention in the case of 'grave circumstances'. According to Van der Westhuizen (2005:7) this builds on the Lomé Declaration of 2000 as well as on Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2002 that approves intervention in the cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The point is: sovereignty was made softer, but not abandoned in favour of R2P.

Sovereignty has once been described as the kind of right that creates a space within which the bearer is free to do what is morally wrong (Bhoke 2006:5). Non-intervention and sovereignty may, however, just have been replaced by the new principle of non-indifference. The candid criticisms expressed about the re-election of Robert Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe at the time of the African Union Summit in Egypt in July 2008, may serve as an example of this trend.

Africa's major contributing nations of peacekeeping troops on the continent since the AU came into being are Nigeria and South Africa (Molukanele et al. 2004). Nigeria's commitments date back to the adoption by both the OAU and the AU of Nigeria's proposal about the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa in 1999 (based on the Cairo Declaration of 1993), while South Africa's commitments date mainly, but not exclusively, from the Mbeki era and his role in putting the African Union and NEPAD together in 2002.

Apart from the issue of South Africa and Nigeria playing leading roles in continental and regional peacekeeping, the absence of stable African democracies contributing to peacekeeping is worrying. Although some of the SADC contributors to African missions included many of the poorer states such as Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, one of the more democratic and wealthier states, namely Mauritius, had not yet made any troop contributions to either the UN or the AU (Kent & Malan 2003; Kamidza, Mbugua & Pillay, 2005). Botswana only contributed to personnel for Somalia. Whether these facts relate to lack of resources, financial or otherwise, or the lack of political will, is uncertain, and calls for further investigation. But such an investigation should also attend to the question of whether the rest of

Africa is not regarding this whole initiative as a hegemonic project that only concerns the continental ambitions of some of the founding members of the AU such as Gaddafi (Libya), former president Obasanjo (Nigeria) or former president Mbeki (South Africa) (Kagwanja, 2006:39-58). With Obasanjo already retired and Mbeki having stepped down as president of South Africa, one wonders whether this initiative will have sufficient momentum after 2009. As it is, the Mbeki-driven NEPAD initiative already lost momentum even while he was still South African president. The Mbeki breakthroughs in the case of Zimbabwean mediation in September 2008 also never alluded to NEPAD, only to SADC.

South Africa is perhaps the only other AU member state with a specific public commitment to peacemaking in the form of the (RSA) White Paper on Defence (1996), the Defence Review (1998), and the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (1999). Neethling (2005:53) describes this as ‘... the most important foreign policy document of the last decade to pass Cabinet’. This White Paper, however, is not Africa-specific, as it covers the whole international spectrum and refers to participation in ‘a mission’, presumably anywhere in the world, irrespective of being UN or AU controlled. Does this reflect South Africa’s UN ambitions? Much more Africa-specific is the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003 where South Africa committed itself to assisting fellow-members in the case of external aggression. What is puzzling, however, is that the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) is linked to external aggression at a time when conventional threats are deemed to be about zero (Shelton 2005:10). Even where such a scenario becomes a reality, Article 6(3) of the MDP states that each state shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate. Therefore, as a kind of defence alliance, it is hardly an example of advanced regional military integration as participation remains voluntary.

What is also puzzling from a regional perspective is that the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security is not linked neither to the ASF or nor its regional SADC Brigade (Neethling 2005:5), nor is the ASF linked to SADC’s Interstate Politics and Defence Committee (De Coning 2005:87-88). From these points of view, the ASF/SADC Brigade is therefore neither cause nor consequence of regional integration (Fisher & Ngoma 2005:8). It stands alone, and creates the impression of being imposed.

One positive development, however, is that all SADC members have pledged support of the SADC Brigade of 6000 troops by 2010 (Rudman 2005) including Botswana. As this date is situated in a post-Mbeki dispensation, we shall be better able to speculate then about the future of the AU and of NEPAD after 2009.

Whether these initiatives will help or hinder integration will be assessed in the conclusion hereunder after the case studies have been dealt with.

Case studies: Burundi and Darfur

Burundi reflects the most complete case of African efforts to restore peace on the continent (Southall, 2006:110-111). The other important examples are the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2002-2003) on peace in the DR Congo and the conflict in Sudan, particularly Southern Sudan and Darfur. Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999), on the DRC, the UN established Mission of the UN in the Congo (MONUC), the UN mission in the DRC. In other words, there was never an African mission, or a SADC mission (the DRC is a member of SADC) in the DRC. That is why it cannot be compared to Burundi, as the latter had an African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) until the UN rehatting in 2004 (i.e. the same African troops now wore UN helmets) with the introduction of a hybrid force. The UN component was then also bigger than the AMIB part.

In the case of Burundi, the appropriate peace plan was the Arusha Peace Agreement signed on 28 August 2000. As no less than seven African heads of state played a role in this process, Curtis (2003:3) says it served as an example of African leadership and cooperation. It was under Nelson Mandela's presidency that South Africa became involved in the peacemaking initiatives in Burundi. But under Thabo Mbeki the pace picked up, possibly to demonstrate that Mbeki's NEPAD initiative had to be taken seriously. It was under Mbeki's presidency that South African troops were deployed (in 2001) almost two years before the African Union deployed more African troops in Burundi. These were deployed under the banner of AMIB since June 2003. The other AMIB troops – apart from South Africa – came mainly from Ethiopia and Mozambique. Then came the rehatting of 2004.

What makes this AU project in Burundi different is the strategy for post-conflict nation and state building captured in the Arusha Agreement of 2000.

The Arusha Peace Agreement (2000) consists of five protocols covering truth and reconciliation, new systems of governance, peace and security, reconstruction and development, and implementation. But the South African government realised there were shortcomings relating, among others, to issues such as an appropriate ceasefire and guidelines about power-sharing among the Hutu (85% of the population) and the Tutsi (14% of the population). This led to the adoption of the Pretoria Protocols in late 2003 (Alusala 2005:4-5). The ceasefire of late 2002 was significant as the United Nations stated this as a condition for its participation in the peace process (Curtis 2003:3-4). During this period, the Burundi peace process was seen as a South African (not SADC) initiative despite seven African heads of state participating in this process (Curtis 2003:3; Southall 2006:129-131). South African funding and costs to the taxpayer escalated as the ceasefire was soon violated by almost all parties to the conflict (Ajulu 2004:1-2). Hence the appeal for UN support, which was forthcoming in 2004, whereupon the abovementioned rehatting took place. At that stage the European Union saved AMIB financially with the amount of €25 million (Powell 2005:28).

On 21 May 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1545 – with a Ch. VII mandate – for the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) to take over from AMIB on 1 June 2004 (Alusala 2005:5 & 12). With more money, more troops were deployed, mainly from Kenya, assisting South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique. The troops were therefore still entirely African, but ‘rehatted’ as explained above, and with first EU, then UN funding.

In a post-Arusha and post-AMIB Burundi, the emphasis shifted to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), the multiparty elections of March 2005, and the realisation of Protocol 4 of Arusha, mainly the socio-economic development of Burundi (Jooma 2005:2), including the resettlement of many refugees in a country known for its land shortages. This is not the only problem, however.

Other issues are whether the power-sharing constitution that entrenches the Hutu majority over the Tutsi will endure, because it is impossible to ever win an election in future. The emergence of new divisions between an ‘Arusha group’ and an ‘anti-Arusha group’ (for and against the details of the pact) does not bode well. What is the prognosis?

Hope also depends on war wariness (Southall 2006:129-131) as well as the success of a whole range of institutions such as a DDR Commission, another Ceasefire Commission, a Demobilisation Programme and an Implementation Monitoring Committee (Boshoff 2006:138-141), and, above all, on the will of both the UN and Africans – especially Burundians – to make it work.

What happened in Burundi confirmed the pattern that was emerging: the UN would only get involved when there was peace to keep. But in this case, it was the South African led regional initiative that made it possible. One special problem in Burundi was that (as in Sudan and the DRC) some rebel groups refused to sign the ceasefire. And the problems continued in 2008.

The situation in Sudan shows many similarities but also greater differences. Here the conflict also goes back to shortly after independence in 1956. But in the nineties, after oil was discovered, conflict flared up again. The process of mediating was initially African before the UN stepped in, especially in the case of Darfur. The major differences are that the conflict in Burundi engulfed the whole territory whereas in Sudan, the oldest manifestation is regional: the South-North fault line. This might have been about identities: Africans in the South and Muslim Arabs in the North clashing, manifesting in either demands for secessionism in the South, or at least, demands for greater autonomy for the southern region. But it is also a resource war, as oil was discovered in the South, and then piped to the North, from where most is exported to the People's Republic of China. This is by far the greatest source of revenue for the central government in Khartoum, the seat of Arab and Muslim power in that country. This North/South conflict in Sudan became a full-scale war between two conventional armies, the Sudan Defence Force and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) representing the non-Muslim, non-Arab South. As in Burundi, the AU took the peace initiatives and tried to make peace. In December 2004, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was agreed, and signed in January 2005 in Nairobi between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Ajulu et al. 2006:1-2). This brought South/North hostilities to a temporary end – but it flared up again in 2007 because not all parties signed the original agreement, despite the Juba Declaration of 2006 that tried to involve the remaining outside parties as well. Then there was also disagreement about the

reintegration of armies after the conclusion of the ceasefire (Young 2007:9; Schafer 2007:14). Meanwhile conflict spread to Darfur as well.

The UN had established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to assist in the implementation of CPA in 2005. Special features of the CPA are that Southern Sudan could draft a constitution for the region; that there would be a Government of National Unity between Khartoum and the South, and that the South could hold a referendum on self-determination in 2011. One unintended consequence of this agreement was that it served as a catalyst for the eruption of conflicts in Darfur as Darfurians suddenly felt that the South had gained more self-governing benefits than they had.

Conflict in Darfur erupted in 2003. This is not about secession or oil or religion since all the inhabitants in Darfur are black and mostly Muslim as well. But there is an Arab minority. The conflict is claimed to be based on old ethnic tensions fuelled by conflicting interests between nomads and farmers, between black Africans and ethnic Arabs, between Darfurians and the government in Khartoum, and, once the tensions escalated into armed conflict, it became a war between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Janjaweed (local Arab militia fronting for the Sudanese government). The military wing of the (Southern) Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the SPL Army, then joined forces with the Darfurian rebels, mainly with the JEM, and attacked the government in 2003. The CPA – between the North and South – also fuelled tensions in Darfur as implied above. This was because Darfurians felt marginalised and excluded from political benefits that might accrue to Southerners from that process. In Darfur, as the conflicts escalated, many refugees moved into Chad (Rankhumise 2006:10), creating spillovers into the region just as conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi also caused refugees to spill over into the eastern DRC impacting negatively on stability in that country.

After the conflict erupted in 2003, Chad and other states in the region met in Ndjamen (Chad) to negotiate a ceasefire agreement in April 2004. Unlike the UNMIS, set up to support the Ceasefire Agreement in 2004, the African Union was again first to move into Darfur. The AU wanted to demonstrate that Africans could solve African problems. It decided in July 2004 to set up the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to support the Ndjamen Ceasefire of three months earlier. For the new

African Union, and PSC, Darfur was therefore a test case. As the conflict deteriorated and the ceasefire seemed not to work, the South African president remained unwilling to acknowledge these problems, and delayed any requests for UN assistance. For Motsi (2006:1), 'not only did the AU fail dismally in carrying out its mandate, it exacerbated the conflict', and only agreed in January 2006 to endorse the role of the UN. But the Government of Sudan then objected to the UN, and refused to allow non-Africans in the peacekeeping forces. At that time, troop contributions were from seven African states, mainly from Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa. This was new, as none of these countries made any troop contributions to UNMIS in Southern Sudan. However, as three of the five leading nations of the NEPAD initiative (South Africa, Senegal and Nigeria) took the lead in Darfur, the AU/NEPAD imprint was clear to observe. But the African capacities remained weak and the UN agreed to increase its presence in another hybrid force dwarfing the African presence from 2008 onwards.

The problem with Darfur is that it is part of 'sovereign' Sudan with its complex relations with superpowers such as China and Russia as well as with the Arab League, the United Nations, the African Union, and with Chad, where French and American oil interests are invested. Chad is also a major receiver of Darfurian refugees.

As in the case of Burundi, the AU was eager to make a success of an entirely African initiative. But the mandate was not robust enough (Appiah-Mensah 2006:11). If the Arusha Agreement of 2000 was too ambitious for the limited AMIB capacities on the ground in Burundi, the same could be said about Ndjamen and the situation on the ground in Darfur. Here, the need for a Rapid Reaction Force was even greater. But unlike in Burundi where a new government had to be created, the situation in Sudan is that an existing government – the government of Sudan – is party to the conflict. This makes the problems in Darfur more complicated, as the government of Sudan invoked the principle of sovereignty and therefore non-intervention in its affairs. Ironically, this principle was not invoked in the case of the CPA (2004) nor in the case of Ndjamen (also 2004), but only in the case of Darfur – a case that attracted the attention of Britain and the United States in condemning Sudanese genocide in Darfur.

Unlike in Sudan, French and American interests dominate the oil business in Chad, which is also the only state in this region that has diplomatic relations with Taiwan – this of course irritating mainland China, Sudan's main oil client in Africa. Concerned about renewed instability in this new region of conflict, the United States and Nigeria decided to mediate another peace agreement, similar in scope to the Arusha and Nairobi Agreements, but this time in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2006. This was the first deal between the government of Sudan, the Southern Liberation Movement and Darfur's JEM. It was another African made ceasefire, but was violated once again and by all main actors in Sudanese politics.

The AMIS mandate in Darfur expired on 30 September 2006. By the end of September, it was extended to the end of 2006 with 4000 more troops from the same countries (Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal and Rwanda), with funding from mainly Arab states and with the blessing (Ch. VIII) of the UN. China and Russia abstained in the Security Council in 2006. Earlier, in 2005, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1593, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the UN found that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed violated international human rights and humanitarian law (Williamson 2006:21). However, the United States then abstained during this vote because it objected to the view that the ICC should be able to exercise jurisdiction over states (such as the US) not party to the Rome Statute on the ICC (Williamson 2006:21). The government of Sudan also does not recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC. But this did not prevent the ICC from issuing a summons for the arrest of the Sudanese president in July 2008.

It is therefore clear that the case studies of Burundi and Darfur illustrate that the AU has the capacity to initiate peace processes (peacemaking, ceasefires, etc.), but lacks the funding and capacity to enforce peace. It is also powerless when confronted with international, and especially superpower, interests. Thus, Burundi and Darfur illustrate that AU peace remains an African coalition-of-the-willing and is mainly driven by South Africa and Nigeria. What would happen if they withdrew?

Conclusion

Peacekeeping is not incompatible with regional integration. It is a form of multilateral political and security cooperation globally, continentally and regionally. It also

presupposes common understandings on peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcements. Ch. VIII of the UN Charter of 1945 is particularly appropriate, as it encourages regional arrangements, such as the AU's African Standby Force and regional brigades. The US proposals about an African Command do not fit into this kind of thinking. Africom neither sees itself as a peacemaker in Africa, nor does it propose any links with the African PSC or its African Standby Force.

In contrast, the emergence of continental and regional organisations in Africa, especially in West and Southern Africa, is therefore fully compatible with this kind of regional integration, although not linked to regional bodies. Article 13 of the Protocol on the African Union's Peace and Security Council complements this framework. But it is a case of collective security rather than a military alliance.

Collective security also calls for cooperation on human security issues such as water, refugees and the environment. Unfortunately, this remains the domain of the UN, non-governmental organisations and civil society, and even Western governments as the R2P and ICC initiatives illustrated. The softer issues of human security are just not the terrains of regional integration.

Then there is very little evidence of cooperation on peace enforcements – except in the cases of hybrid forces and under certain protocols of the Arusha Peace Agreement in the case of Burundi. But Burundi is not part of SADC, and it is no longer under AMIB, as the United Nations has already taken over from the African Union. Here it was about provisions made for Ch. VII-type of enforcement functions, never conducted by African missions before. The African Union has therefore yet to complete an African mission that goes beyond the mandate of peacemaking. The AU is also not yet able to conduct more robust missions on its own. The same applies to SADC. The integration agenda on almost all issues – from human security to more military and political matters – thus remains unfinished business.

While the African Union is vastly different in principles and policies from the old Organisation of African Unity, the problems remain basically the same. The same old problems of weak capacity, insufficient funding, lack of political will, the impact of superpower politics, and once more in Africa, the sovereignty principle – that was again to override any form of interference in the domestic affairs of states where

human rights violations took place – have not gone away. However, the debate about R2P is welcome. But big powers such as China, France and the US may still have their own agendas, not always supportive of African goals. The evidence about the role of the ICC and Africom come to mind. SADC structures also remain marginal even where conflicts occur within SADC. It therefore remains to be seen whether the causes of weak integration in the past have been overcome by the desire to unite and cooperate for a better future. The intentions of the peacemakers matter more than ever before.

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