Security Challenges for the Transatlantic Area

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Introduction

Current discussions about the forthcoming 2010 NATO Strategic Concept will revolve around transatlantic security challenges as they concern the effective and efficient organisation of large means in pursuit of grand strategic ends. And, it is the need to re-discover grand strategy that is the main contention for a transatlantic relationship faced as it is with a) the need to maintain itself as a strategic cornerstone; and b) as great an array of challenges as at any time since at least 1945. But here's the rub (as Shakespeare would have it), for whilst the Euro-Atlantic community faces many challenges, very few of them constitute threats in the classical sense to the territorial integrity of any member of the Euro-Atlantic community. However, any one of these challenges/risks (or any number of them in combination) could rapidly become a threat, which highlights the profound dilemma faced by most North American and European leaders: what to plan for?

Or, rather, the challenge concerns where best to make the most reasoned security investments given the most reasonable assessment of likely need in what is a very fluid strategic environment. Fail and an opportunity cost will be paid in terms of the wrong tools in the wrong space endeavouring to cope with a set of threats for which they are ill-designed.

Thus, for the Euro-Atlantic community on the eve of NATO's new Strategic Concept and with the European Union's (EU) Lisbon Treaty having just become EU law, a fundamental question pertains: where best should the Euro-Atlantic community focus efforts that in a global context are necessarily limited? Even conceptually, the challenge is complex and fraught with difficulty and contention. Indeed, whilst all NATO strategic concepts prior to

1989 were focused squarely on the defence of Europe, and the 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts were concerned with the security of Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War and a Europe whole and free, for the first time, the role of the Atlantic Alliance has been considered in the Strategic Concept 2010. This will necessitate both ambition and modesty. Even the EU's Lisbon Treaty implicitly accepts the need for Europeans to look upward and outward. Therefore, after ten years of emphasis on inclusiveness by both NATO and the EU, the search for effectiveness is now urgent, and that will no doubt require a re-forging of a collective identity. In addition political courage to confront both the alliance and the world as it truly is, not as members would like it to be, is very important.

A Big Alliance of a Big West in a Big World?

Certainly, the Atlantic Alliance (the armed wing of the Euro-Atlantic community) is unique and remains the most important security grouping of states in the world. Moreover, the alliance is the natural forum for addressing defence and security issues by Europeans, North Americans and increasingly others, who share the same values and many of the same interests. However, given the changing centre of gravity of power in the world (and its increasingly diffuse nature), if the transatlantic security area is to become more secure, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic will need to have a better grip of the fundamentals of change both inside the West and particularly beyond. They will also need to recognise those challenges that could likely require the application of credible military power and those many challenges that will not. That is in essence the core message of this article.

To that end NATO remains pivotal because it is a big alliance for big events in a big world. The question underpinning current debates about how best to deal with dangerous complexity reinforces rather than diminishes the raison d'être of the Atlantic Alliance in a challenging world. This is not just to its public but also to a wider international community for which NATO has become a leitmotif of the commitment of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole to the secure governance of change and its global consequences. That is why for Europeans and North Americans, what happens in south Central Asia is so important. The days

of imperial influence are over and no one knows better than the West that this is the case. However, given the nature of the stated challenge terrorists pose to both Europeans and North Americans it is reasonable that they together seek to deal with that threat from whichever quarter it comes. Certainly, any Asian power would largely take the same view.

However, some twenty years on from the Cold War, strategic laziness and a lack of political courage have prevented the honing of old tools into new instruments. This is particularly important for NATO, but is also germane for the European Union. In a sense, NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Lisbon Treaty (through the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)) must be about strategic renewal if they are to be worth the paper they are written on.[1] Specifically, that means re-examining and justifying both NATO and CSDP, considering the saliency and relevancy of their missions and structures as well as re-affirming fundamental purpose to create credible strategic unity of purpose and effort, which has been so self-evidently missing. Central to that challenge will be a profound consideration of where NATO and the EU can be most effective given the environment, their respective competences, the shared tenets of overall security policy, and, most importantly, the role of militaries therein.

Such strategic renewal will require in turn a fundamental reconsideration of NATO's and EU's means and ends to establish where both should focus their future efforts, and what organisation would best support that effort. More importantly, as the rate of European relative decline accelerates (which is now marked in the wake of the financial crisis and the challenges to both the Euro zone and the pound sterling), and given the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, much will depend on the outcome of a re-defined set of security relations between the United States and Europe, and the extent an increasingly Asia-Pacific-focused America is prepared to continue to pay for much of Europe's defence.

[1] The Treaty of Lisbon states: "RECALLING that the common security and defense policy is an integral part of the common foreign and security policy; that it provides the Union with operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets; that the Union may use such assets in the tasks referred to in Article 28 B of the Treaty on European Union outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; that the performance of these tasks is to be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States in accordance with the principle of a single set of forces", http://eir-lex.europa.en/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ.C.306:SOM:EN:HTML

The Crafting of Strategy

Therefore, unity of purpose and effort between North Americans and Europeans is weaker than at any time in decades and yet the need for concerted action to be credible across a myriad of security tasks and across the globe is pressing. The question for all Euro-Atlantic partners is thus simple: can such unity be crafted by policy before challenge becomes threat, or will it be a function of the consequence of threat, i.e. disaster? Grand strategy is in effect the *what*, the *where*, the *why* and the *how* of concerted action at the structural systemic level and yet only the United States amongst the partners has the level of ambition to be effective at such a level or seems willing to bear the costs associated with operating at such a level. Along with that it is the only one to possess a conceptual understanding of strategic change.

However, all the fault does not lie on the notoriously dilatory Europeans because this stuff is difficult, as any Asian leader will attest. However, given that for the first time what is needed is a grand purpose which is not Euro-centric in the world, the scale becomes apparent of the political and policy-security mountain to be climbed. However, Europeans prefer not to bother, and a) live with a higher level of risk; and b) pretend to their publics that no such risk exists. Thus, what level of security needs to be afforded and what level of security can be afforded are two very different questions for both Americans and Europeans. Here Americans and Europeans share very different outlooks, with Europeans traditionally in any case being prepared to live with a far greater level of risk than Americans do simply because risk has always been a fact of European life. It is however a very delicate judgement but the absolutist security culture of Americans and the relativist culture of Europeans will always make the forging of a coherent transatlantic grand purpose difficult, to say the least.

Take a Look Around…

A survey of the strategic environment would appear to emphasise centrifugal rather than centripetal forces on the Euro-Atlantic community from both within and without the West. That said, certain foreign and security policy truths would shape the limited choices of the alliance over the ten-year life of the new strategic concept.

First, Europe, in particular, faces an acute political dilemma: being too big to hide from "events" and too weak to individually influence big events critical to its security. Second, much of the next five years or so will be spent on extricating NATO armed forces from south Central Asia which will emphasise a close working relationship between the US and its European allies but which will without doubt lead to tensions that could further undermine the cohesion of the alliance. Third, credible military power matters but is not in itself sufficient to shape strategic events for challenges such as energy security, the search for life fundamentals (food and water), climate change, and the consequences of mass migration and poverty.[2] There is little or no policy cohesion within the Euro-Atlantic Community on these issues (or even between Europeans although they are stumbling towards more coherence). Fourth, influencing the US will remain the single most important foreign and security policy objective; although within Europe there is still a profound difference of opinion over whether security nowadays is a function of closer co-operation with the Americans or keeping some distance from the Americans. The damage done to the transatlantic relationship by the controversial US-led invasion of Iraq is still apparent. Moreover, the Iraq War has profoundly undermined the strategic self-confidence and national cohesion of America's closest European ally, Britain.[3]

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[2] New challenges are emerging to the international order as a consequence of the combination of poverty, and the search for life fundamental, piracy being a case in point. Jonathon Stevenson writes: "…Somali piracy has increased, presenting a threat to international security. Over the last two years a growing number of Somali pirates (estimated to exceed 1000 and counting), enabled by the absence of rule of law in Somalia, have staged increasingly frequent and brazen attacks on commercial vessels transporting vital cargo such as oil, food and weapons in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden." See Stevenson J., "Jihad and Piracy in Somalia", *Survival*, Feb-March 2010 (London: IISS, 2010), p.30.

[3] Dobbins, Jones, Runkle and Mohandas write: "The decision to treat Iraq as a conquered country freed the United States from the constraints normally associated with UN-mandated multilateral peace operations. The UN Security Council recognized American authority over Iraq but did not endorse it, nor was the United States under any obligation to report back to the Security Council or seek public renewal of its mandate. But whilst the arrangement left the U.S. government legally unbound, the lack of a UN endorsement also left it bereft of substantial external support. Only the United Kingdom had contributed significant forces to the invasion, and even the British troop commitment was soon cut drastically." See Dobbins, J, Jones Seth G., Runkle Benjamin, Mohandas Siddharth, *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority* (Washington: RAND, 2009), p.12.

However, the paradox for Europeans is that to achieve the *broad* foreign and security policy goals that Europeans do indeed share (stable environment, stable neighbourhood, stable energy, stable societies) and to help deal with the threat to European security posed by terrorism, American support will continue to be vital for the foreseeable future for European leaders long on challenges but short on forces and resources. Thus, the need for Europeans to leverage influence and create political options and security cost-effectiveness through solidarity with North Americans is both greater and less than it was a decade ago, because much of security which has driven the battle between power and weakness, particularly American power, has become the target, and in which weakness either means complete marginalisation or mutual dependency or both. In a sense, Europeans are conducting an experiment in security policy: replacing security instruments with political correctness in the hope that it will act as a security policy tool:

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Sustainable stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan will ultimately be achieved through political re-conciliation, enhanced governance, and macro-economic ideas, in all of which a credible EU would be well placed to assist the US-led military effort.[4]

Russia: An assertive Russia is highly unlikely to express its ambitions/concerns through direct military aggression. However, strategic reassurance through NATO will be critical to the stability of the continent by ensuring that Moscow understands that red lines do exist and must not be crossed. Equally, such strategic reassurance will be as relevant to the EU's Strategic Partnership with Moscow and the Union's Neighbourhood Policy as it is to NATO's Strategic Concept.

Energy security: Europe's regional-strategic role will also be vital for Europe's energy security not only in its relations with Russia but also the Mediterranean Basin and the wider Middle

[4] The current belief in Europe is that by and large the Wars of the Afghan Succession are unwinnable. However, evidence suggests otherwise. The authoritative Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People states: "Respondents were asked how they expect the security situation on their local area to be in a year's time. Overall, the majority of respondents (75%) are optimistic. Nearly half (46%) say they expect it will be much better and just under a third (29%) say that it will be somewhat better." See *Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People* (Washington: The Asia Foundation, 2009), p. 42.

East. However, energy strategy is as much about conservation as consumption and the need for a truly EU Common Energy Policy is pressing in which efficiency of use avoids over-dependence on one supplier. However, innovation helps to move Europe (and by extension partners) away from friction whichever greater consumption of ever-diminishing resources will unquestionably cause.[5]

Terrorism: The rise of international terrorism is linked to a host of local and cross-border conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia and the Horn of Africa. Confronting this rise will depend in the long term on societal solutions and the affording of legitimate and concerted action of NATO, the EU, and the wider international community (working in conjunction with partners many of whom are in Asia).

The Western Balkans: The Western Balkans is too easily forgotten in the lop-sided race of the Euro-Atlantic community to either confront or shrink from change in the world, seemingly in equal measure. The Western Balkans are an integral part of Europe and the next stage of political reconciliation and economic integration can only be afforded by NATO and EU membership to all states in the region.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The democratisation of mass destruction is an accelerating phenomenon in Asia and across what is a great belt of instability. Ever-smaller actors will likely gain access in the near future to the kind of destructive power hitherto only controlled by states. Both North Americans and Europeans support arms control legal instruments as fundamental components in balanced security policy. However, with such instruments (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions) in danger of leaking, the test for Americans and Europeans will be the extent they can agree on both architectural reinforcements to security (missile defence) and interventionist reinforcements such as counter-proliferation and, of course, a new role for nuclear deterrence. It is imperative to note that without such steps they can find themselves spawning a new

[5] Peter Truscott writes: "Resource nationalism will alter traditional global power structures, making it vital that the European Union strengthens its relations with both non-OPEC and OPEC countries and OPEC producers. In order to stem the global decline in oil and gas production, it is essential that the EU fosters durable diplomatic relationships with future energy producers." See Trustcott P., "European Energy Security: Facing a Future of Increasing Dependency?", Whitehall Paper 73 (London: RUSI, 2010), p.89.

arms race. President Obama was trying to square that circle when he called for a world free from nuclear weapons.[6] There are also at least two European allies who are not so sure, given proliferation of what is now old technology. Indeed, the essence of globalisation is that all technologies (civil and military) proliferate, particularly old technology.

Iran: The role of the EU in attempting to deal with Iran's illicit nuclear ambitions suggests a way forward if France and Germany are truly prepared to accept Britain as an equal in the future development of EU's foreign and security policy. Equally, given Iran's proximity to Europe (and the range of its new missiles), no European would seriously contemplate engaging Iran without the US. Of course, the true test of the relationship might come earlier than many in the Euro-Atlantic community hope, if Iran does succeed in weaponising its nuclear programme.

Israel-Palestine: The greatest test, however, for the transatlantic relationship is the search of an enduring solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. This is particularly important because so many of the other challenges (Iran, terrorism, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and energy supplies) are directly or indirectly linked to it. Unfortunately, there is a large cleft in the attitude of Americans who tend to support Israel more or less unequivocally, and Europeans, who by and large feel sympathies for the Palestinians not least because of relatively large numbers of citizens of Arab extraction and Muslim faith. The best that could probably be hoped for is probably a "good cop, bad cop" role for both Americans and Europeans, with them respectively putting pressure on one side whilst the other supports the other. This would be entirely justifiable

[6] In a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Obama stated: "I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, 'Yes, we can.' Now, let me describe to you the trajectory we need to be on. First, the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies – including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal." See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, April 5, 2009, Remarks By President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, www.state.gov.org.

given how much aid Americans and Europeans pour into a conflict that sits squarely on Europe's doorstep.

The Military Dilemma

Thus, ten years into the 21st century, North Americans and Europeans face an abundance of choices, which by its very nature makes this moment a truly strategic moment. The good news is that they can still make such choices. The bad news is that if they dally a few years hence others might make those choices for them. Central to the Treaty of Washington and the Lisbon Treaty is the upholding of the values and systems central to the United Nations Charter. In effect, the military power of the Atlantic Alliance was conceived of as the ultimate military guarantor of stability, not just in the Euro-Atlantic community but beyond, with the "soft" power of the European Union designed to ensure that never again would war ever scar Europe's historic homeland. Both NATO and the EU are designed a) to create and assure a stable platform; and b) ensure that if need be security can be projected from it. Events have transpired such that for the first time in its history both the Atlantic Alliance and the Union are now called upon to play such a stabilisation role at a time when inner policy and even societal cohesion is weak.

Given this expanding context of the core purpose of both NATO and the EU and the shrinking political resolve, much of the debate in the transatlantic security community concerns how best to strike the balance between what needs to be done and what is possible. The broader security role of both the Atlantic Alliance and the Union, which the world is forcing upon reluctant Europeans and uncertain Americans within the framework of a transatlantic relationship, is in urgent need of modernisation, if it is to be fit for any purpose in the twenty-first century.

Specifically, the centre of gravity of that challenge is how best to adapt both NATO and EU militaries (they are by and large drawn from the same countries) to meet the challenges of a new and rapidly evolving strategic security environment. For the main transatlantic institution, NATO, this causes a real dilemma because to focus the main alliance effort on any one area could well lead to the opportunity cost discussed earlier. For example, the Red Army conceived of Article 5 as de facto automatic armed assistance in

the event of an attack across the North German Plain. Today, the September 12, 2001, decision to invoke Article 5 in the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington has established a precedent whereby an Article 5 attack is conceived of as any attack by a state or non-state actor that generates a big enough catastrophe for the North Atlantic Council to agree to the mobilisation of a large military (and increasingly non-military) response organised by NATO.

Thus, the meaning in the twenty-first century of collective defence in general and Article 5 in particular whilst central to Strategic Concept 2010 and relevant to the Lisbon Treaty raises a whole raft of strategic-legal questions with which Asians also grapple.[7] What constitutes an *armed* attack—terrorism, cyber-warfare, strategic criminality? What will constitute the main defence architecture—high readiness forces, missile defence and/or deterrence? What balance will need to be struck between protection (critical infrastructure, civil defence) and projection (deployable manoeuvre forces)? What roles should NATO and the EU respectively seek, and should those roles be closely co-ordinated or for the sake of strategic politesse should a distance be kept between them to emphasise the different and differing political identities of force?

Put simply, the context and the complexity of security has changed to such an extent that both the treaty underpinning the Atlantic Alliance, and the task-list implied by the elaborated Petersberg Tasks of the EU require a response that could well be global, and a level of policy and strategy cohesion which have been noticeable by their absence since the end of the Cold War.[8] Indeed, unity of purpose and cohesion is thus not only vital for members of

[7] The Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union stated in February 2008 that "…a mutual assistance article (article 28A.7)…reads like a mutual defense clause in that it states 'if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power...'. This reminds us of questions raised during the European Convention on whether the EU should have its own mutual defense clause *a la* NATO and on the fate of the modified 1954 Brussels Treaty and the remaining cell at the Western European Union.", http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200805/20080513ATT28796/20080513ATT28796EN.pdf

[8] The Treaty of Lisbon states: "The current tasks of the European security and policy, known as Petersberg, are specified by the Treaty on European Union (article 17). They encompass: humanitarian missions and the evacuation of nationals, peacekeeping missions and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking operations.", http://www.euromonde2015.eu/IMG/pdf/annexe6_en.pdf

both the alliance and Union but also for potential partners in other parts of the world, particularly Asia.

Another dilemma concerns competence. NATO's Strategic Concept needs to be both ambitious and modest in equal measure for it must not only establish the implications of the new strategic context for alliance action, but also recognise that NATO cannot do everything and that its primary responsibility (and necessity) is to guarantee military security and defence and organise an effective military response to security penetrations with catastrophic consequences. The Atlantic Alliance must therefore return to its military roots if it is to focus on effective response, but that in itself is a very political step requiring as it will a new form of campaign planning that will necessarily involve a far greater range of partners than hitherto, both civil and military. Politically, NATO will remain vital as a forum for consideration of strategic security but given the very non-military nature of the challenges outlined above, and given the need for the political identity of force to be as flexible as possible, its relationship with other institutions, most notably the EU, but also the UN and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) will doubtless grow, as will the relationship with regional groupings such as ASEAN. However, the real contention between Americans, Canadians, Europeans, and others concerns the actual meaning of force as a tool of last resort, because without a consensus on that seminal issue, it is hard thereafter to plan together for the type of forces that would be needed.

Equally, even in the absence of such a consensus, the fact is that the only member of the alliance capable of sustained global missions is and will be the US, and because of that fact alone, the Americans will continue to exert massive influence over European security and defence. Therefore, the choice for Europeans is whether they seek to sustain America's role as the stabilising balancer in Asia and elsewhere, or should they focus on NATO, and the EU, in and around Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa, to relieve pressure on the US (which is in itself no mean challenge), or can they simply retreat into fortress Europe. That truly grand strategic debate has in fact only just started. Indeed, given that fact, even if NATO is a big military-security organisation able to reach worldwide, the idea of a global NATO is and will remain patently absurd.

That is because the implications of such a role are huge for the state sovereignty and national coffers of both Canadians and

Europeans. First, the US investment in military technology has rendered simple task sharing between allies almost impossible. Second, the alliance would become increasingly a mechanism for the organisation of Europeans and other partners in pursuit of overall global stability, implying a strategic culture that only Britain and France possess. Third, the smaller member nations would need to specialise and integrate their defence efforts to such an extent that either they would lose control over their armed forces or such a force would never be used. Thus, given the purpose of NATO is to create a contract for the efficient organisation of large means towards large ends, such constraints will need to be addressed and urgently.

The Vital Role of Partners

Therefore, implicit in the grand debate over transatlantic grand purpose is a further debate about the vital and growing role of partners, both civilian and military, both in the Euro-Atlantic community and beyond, particularly in Asia. There are many new actors and institutions emerging within the broad architecture of world security and given the sheer scale of complexity faced by all actors today (and by extension the security and military task-list so generated), the big question for the transatlantic relationship is where best should its efforts and energies be focused and with whom?

It is self-evident that the United States has global responsibilities with a security policy and armed forces to reflect such a leadership role, even if that role is being increasingly stretched thin by commitment. For Washington, the European allies are one set of partners vital to American security leadership, which is increasingly focused on Asia and the Pacific Rim, something which seems not yet to have sunk in with many Europeans long used to complaining about Americans and yet relying on them in equal measure. This is particularly the case as the centre of gravity of world security shifts from Europe to Asia. Herein lies a dilemma centred on the expectations that Americans have of allies and those that Canadians and Europeans have of Americans. Intellectually, Europeans might agree on the need for a partnership with the US in global security even as they retreat into parochial regionalism but the willingness to put such a role into practice after the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan is for most of them next to zero. Thus, a key

question Europeans face concerns the price Europeans are prepared to pay in terms of support for US policy and strategy to keep Americans engaged in European security.

Here the basis for a consensus might be emerging. For example, Canada's "5Ds" (Development, Democracy, Disarmament, Diplomacy, and Defence) is central to Ottawa's security policy and emphasises a civil-military effort that is strikingly similar to the emerging European strategic culture as expressed through the modified Petersberg Tasks in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. Moreover, whilst of the Europeans only Britain and France maintain what can be termed as a classical strategic culture with an emphasis on projectable robust military power (even as they develop new structures and doctrines for civil-military effect under the rubric of the Comprehensive Approach), Germany and several of the remaining Western European members see the utility of force primarily for policing and peacekeeping. Therefore, however counter-intuitive it may appear given the ineptitude with which Europeans have sought to develop an EU European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP now CSDP), the need for an effective NATO-EU relationship will be pivotal over the next decade to the transatlantic relationship. Such "subsidiarity" will pre-suppose a far greater level of political flexibility than hitherto, which will be essential when engaging complexity, because the political identity of engagement will be pivotal to the mission success. There will be times when flying an UN, EU, or OSCE flag on an operation will give more chance of success than flying a US, British, French, or NATO flag.

Equally, the allies are keen not to dwell to a great extent on old-fashioned adversarial concepts of security. Be it the G20 or the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), there are new players on the international stage with whom both NATO and the Union must work and contend with, and to that end various forms of strategic partnership are being sought. Many such groupings might be more effective both regionally and/or functionally than either NATO or the EU. Certainly, both NATO and the Union will need new power partners, such as China, Russia, India, Brazil and Japan. The Strategic Concept will need to further open the political door to such partnerships, particularly at the civil-military level. It is evident from operations in Afghanistan that relations with host and regional governments as well as those with civilians in international and non-governmental organisations are important factors in success.

There are always going to be states in and around Europe that seek either membership or close partnership with the Euro-Atlantic community. This causes a dilemma for both North Americans and Europeans for there are a plethora of so-called Frozen Conflicts (e.g. Moldova, Trans-Dniestria, Georgia, South Ossetia et al.) which remain on the borders of the Euro-Atlantic area. Russia remains as ever a dilemma.[9] The 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia at the very least suggested the limits of NATO expansion, if not that of the EU. It is also not at all clear if Ukraine will be either ready for membership or will be offered it given both the pivotal place Kiev occupies in European security and the very delicate balance internally. Therefore, what partnership will mean for states on the periphery that are critical to stability and security but unlikely to be offered membership on grounds of their own unsuitability will remain an important and open question. Turkey's difficult path to EU accession being a case in point.

Security Challenges for the Transatlantic Area

Ultimately, for all its many travails the transatlantic relationship will persist as "a", if not "the" strategic cornerstone of world security because in the end the Europeans are not going to contract out of global security, and the Americans will not contract out of Europe. To that end, five clear roles are suggested by the emerging strategic environment and driven by the need for cost-effective effectiveness. The first role will see the modernisation of Article 5 and main defence based on a new system of layered defence, which will need to include some form of missile defence, a commitment to effective cyber-defence (and attack) with a role for the alliance in consequence management. The second role will confirm the maintenance of intervention capabilities to strengthen counter-proliferation. The third role will emphasise stabilisation and recon-

[9] President Obama has reached out to Moscow by ending the Third Site plan for missile defence and offering a new strategic arms reduction treaty. In Prague he stated: "To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. President Medvedev and I began this process in London, and will seek a new agreement by the end of this year that is legally binding and sufficiently bold. And this will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor." See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, April 5, 2009, Remarks By President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, www.state.gov.org.

struction operations as part of hybrid warfare. The fourth role will see a re-statement of the commitment of both North Americans and Europeans to nuclear deterrence, even as efforts are made to reduce stockpiles. The fifth role must and will see reaching out to help partner states in areas such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Democratic Control over Armed Forces (DCAF).

Grand strategy is the organisation of large means in pursuit of large ends. That is the stuff of the transatlantic relationship and the essence of its role given transatlantic security challenges. Therefore, the transatlantic relationship will come to reflect twenty-first-century fundamentals. First, the world today is too complex for North Americans and Europeans credibly to manage global security alone, even though a strong transatlantic relationship will be essential for world security. Second, for the transatlantic relationship to play its wider military security role, the military stability of Europe (both members and partners) will remain central to the mission of both NATO and the EU. Third, NATO is a military security organisation and both its purpose and role is essentially limited to the generation and organisation of military effect relevant both in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

Such a commitment will take honesty with publics and the political courage of true leadership reinforced by a commitment to communicate the necessity and utility of such a vision, which will be critical to publics, partners, and adversaries alike. Realism and resolve has always been the twin pillars of the transatlantic relationship even if it does represent also the shared values of the democracies that it comprises. The world will be a safer place if all-important unity of purpose can be thus re-established even within the diversity that is the twenty-first-century transatlantic relationship. The transatlantic relationship is by no means perfect and the transatlantic security area by no means free of challenge but the security relationship between North Americans and Europeans remains and will remain "a" if not "the" most important such grouping in the world.

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