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Corona Pandemic in Africa: More Poverty, Crises, and Conflicts?

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What does the spread of the novel Corona virus mean for the political and socio-economic development of countries across sub-Saharan Africa? What can German politics do in order to mitigate the negative impact on these countries and to increase these countries' resilience to future pandemics? Featuring exclusive insights from our country directors based in six African nations, this publication directly addresses these and other related questions.

Key Points:

- › Should the governments in those countries examined fail to get a grip on the current emergency and should this even lead to misappropriation of aid and funds, their credibility would be undermined, all while new actors such as religious authorities, diaspora groups and / or influential individuals and entrepreneurs will obtain more influence. These parties could become more relevant for German and European development cooperation in the future.
- › In view of the potential loss of confidence in the current governments in the countries herein examined, it seems opportune for opposition actors to demonstrate their presence during this crisis within the scope of their options, and to adjust to potential windows of opportunities arising from emerging shifts in power. It cannot be ruled out, for example, that a coalition of opposition parties could form the government in South Africa after the upcoming elections due to losses by the ruling ANC Party. Younger political actors, particularly in government parties, but also influential local authorities, to whom the will to change has been attributed, could benefit from any such power shifts. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, such an actor could be the former governor of the Katanga region, Moïse Katumbi.
- › In the foreseeable future, the situation is challenging for civil society actors and media representatives, whose freedom of action, which had been restricted in many places already before the pandemic erupted, was further reduced by those in power for fear of competing narratives. The situation is particularly serious in Tanzania, where President Magufuli, since taking office in 2015, with his increasing constraints on media and civil society, has created the optimal conditions to prevent any public criticism of the direction he has taken.
- › Hence, the Covid-19 pandemic should be used as a catalyst for German development cooperation, in order to, firstly, examine Germany's cooperation with existing and new partners across sub-Saharan Africa, and, secondly, to investigate the strategies and instruments of the German government's policy approach to date in Africa to identify potential adaptation needs. The Covid pandemic has further bolstered the need for international cooperation and multilateral formats.

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Preface

The extent to which the SARS-CoV-2 Corona virus has impacted sub-Saharan Africa cannot yet be predicted, yet there is little doubt that an unhindered spread of the virus threatens to drastically set back the region in its development. The consequences can be envisaged. In addition to the collapse of the already weak health and social systems, the negative effects on the economies could not only spark social unrest, but also contribute to aggravating existing conflicts throughout the region, as well as triggering new ones.

Whether this scenario unfolds depends on what mitigation measures have been taken and what political and socio-economic impacts emerge in each country under the current circumstances. The present publication was compiled against this backdrop. In addition to examining current developments, the texts at hand focus on medium and long-term effects. The analysis focuses on South Africa, the Democratic Republic Congo, hereafter referred to as DR Congo, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda, and Tanzania. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's country directors in these countries have contributed their assessments of the situation on the ground.

Whereas in South Africa reports say the virus was first officially detected in sub-Saharan Africa and, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), the country has the most Covid-19 cases in this region of the world, Kinshasa, capital of DR Congo with a population of 12 million inhabitants, is currently preparing itself for the Covid-19 pandemic, which could be far more drastic in scale than the Ebola crisis it recently experienced. Hence, Covid-19's future development in both countries will be decisive for the chances of success in containing the virus within the region. In contrast, Mali has already been in crisis mode for many years. The level of security introduced in many countries across sub-Saharan Africa over the course of the current Corona pandemic has already been in existence there for some time, given how the country has been confronting fundamental challenges on multiple fronts. In Côte d'Ivoire, the country that since 2017 has been a reform partner country within the framework of the G20's "Compact with Africa" initiative, the government swiftly responded, but criticism of the measures taken is now growing among the population, revealing a loss of confidence across society with the country's political elites. In Uganda, conversely, stringent restrictions were announced on 30 March 2020 and implemented on the very same evening. The country did not have time to prepare. The Tanzanian government, however, took a completely different tack; it did not introduce any curfews and reacted slowly, even though the virus had long since arrived there.

Although governments' responses clearly differ extensively and reveal a heterogeneous picture of measures, some developmental trends can be identified which apply to the entire region; these are outlined in the final analysis. For example, crises are regarded as the "great moment of the executive." Should governments fail to get a grip on the emergency, however, a situation may arise in which both aid and money may be misappropriated; the governments' credibility could be undermined and new actors could gain influence. Hence, this publication is equally devoted to the question of the changing role of non-state actors such as religious authorities, diaspora groups, influential entrepreneurs, the media and regional African organizations.

Furthermore, these developments cannot be viewed in isolation. Hence, it is paramount to avail of the Covid-19 pandemic as an opportunity in order to examine Germany's cooperation with existing and new partners throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and to review the

previous strategies and instruments in the German Federal Government's approach to Africa policy with regard to potential adjustment requirements. It is evident that the pandemic has demonstrated more clearly than any other recent challenge the urgent need for international cooperation and multilateral formats, and the question of how to improve approaches to international cooperation must be answered urgently. This is happening at a time when many countries and leading nations are increasingly focusing on their own national interests.

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We hope you enjoy reading it!

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Assessments from Selected African Countries

The challenges associated with the emergence of the Corona virus across sub-Saharan Africa have impacted our neighbouring continent Africa as a whole. At the same time, not only do regional and national framework conditions differ, but so do measures governments have taken to counteract the crisis. This publication presents insights by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's country directors based in South Africa, DR Congo, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda, and Tanzania, in which they share their assessments regarding the most significant developments in the countries where they are operating.

South Africa: A Twofold Crisis

Henning Suhr

As it was becoming apparent that the spread of Covid-19 would result in a global pandemic, President Cyril Ramaphosa responded relatively early and imposed an exceedingly stringent, nationwide curfew, commencing on 26 March 2020. Public life throughout the country was shut down and only the provision of basic care maintained. Right from the onset, the military in addition to the police was deployed to enforce and monitor the curfew.

The initially popular lockdown is increasingly causing incomprehension

According to Prof. van der Heerven, health expert at Witwatersrand University, there are approx. 2,140 intensive care beds in private clinics and 1,180 in public hospitals in South Africa. With a population of some 57 million, the health system rapidly reaches its limit, even if South Africa is better off compared with the rest of Africa. Knowing about the health system's inherent weakness, the government not only acted swiftly by imposing a curfew, but also instigated a testing system that has functioned relatively well. The resolute demeanour of President Ramaphosa and of his Minister of Health, Zvele Mkhize, impressed most South Africans; this not only caused their popularity ratings to skyrocket, but also ensured the necessary acceptance of the measures taken in order for them to be effective. Compared with international standards, the rise of the number of infected people was below average. Another positive feature is that Ramaphosa comprehensively informed beforehand opposition parties, trade unions, churches, and the private sector and was able to win them over.

Unlike in rich industrialized countries, South Africa cannot afford a lockdown over a protracted period of time. Officially, unemployment lies at 29 percent: more than half of the population lives in poverty or poverty-like conditions, and lacks any savings. Many companies do not have the financial cushion to be able to continue paying employees. For the majority, the curfew entails a loss of earnings that can cost them their very livelihood. Hence, the Corona crisis has exposed South Africa's severest problem: economic inequality throughout society.

While those financially better-off can adjust to the quarantine period, the poorer population groups living in townships and other densely populated areas are losers twice-over. They can neither afford not to work, nor do they benefit from improved protection against Corona infection, for they cannot maintain the necessary physical and social distance from neighbours due to their cramped living conditions.

Understandably, the curfew's success is contingent upon on the strained patience of residents in the poor neighbourhoods. How critical the situation has become can be evidenced from the fact that the police and army used excessive force to enforce the rules in more than a dozen cases, and that some township residents were killed during these operations. While, for many South Africans, images of violent law enforcement brought back memories of apartheid, the Minister of Police likened his role to that of a tough law and order man. Without first informing the Parliament in a timely manner, 70,000 additional soldiers were mobilized and reservists drafted. It remains to be seen, however, what the army's (potentially) enhanced domestic engagement actually means for South Africa's current overseas missions.

While President Ramaphosa initially announced measures to alleviate the crisis, the administrative system is only implementing them slowly. The government's longstanding mismanagement has taken its toll, for the public authorities are usually slow and inefficient in implementing policies. Corrupt behaviour can also be observed. This is exemplified by the scandals surrounding the distribution of food packages for the needy. The relevant authority calculated far too much per package, so it is likely that taxpayers' money was misappropriated. In other instances, food packages were sold or only given to supporters of the ruling party, the ANC. Even Ramaphosa himself was outraged by the abuse of his fellow party members. Civil society initiatives to distribute food to those in need have been partially prohibited.

Food Security: A Question of Funding – not of Production

As a net food exporter, South Africa need not fear a hunger crisis. According to Wandile Sihlobo, chief economist at the Chamber of Agriculture, South Africa's agriculture is so well-positioned that sufficient food can be produced even during the lockdown. As Sihlobo points out, however, a problem has arisen: the loss of income among large population groups has led to a decline in demand. The increasing hunger is thus due to households' financial difficulties and not a production problem in the agricultural sector and in the food industry.¹ Once again, it can be seen that the Corona crisis exposes a persistent inequality that is due both to structures dating back to the apartheid times, as well as to the failures of the ANC government over the past quarter of a century. In its 26 years of being a one-party government, the ANC has failed to reduce inequality. Measures such as the Black Economic Empowerment Program led to more inefficiency, but not less inequality. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption have characterized not only the state administration, but also the large state companies. Many South Africans have little or no prospect of advancement given that social housing construction, the state's monopoly supply of water and electricity, and the education system are inadequate.

During the continuing curfew restrictions, pressure on the government from the poor, opposition parties, and the private sector to loosen restrictions in order to revive economic life has increased.² Medical experts have also raised the alarm that the concentration of treatment for those infected with Corona virus has meant that mandatory health precautions such as measles vaccination in young children are being neglected and this would also result in fatalities.

The Corona Crisis Coincides with an Economic Crisis

Against the backdrop of growing doubts as to whether the rigid measures could do more harm than good, the government has announced the gradual opening up of the country – starting in May and estimated to last weeks, if not months – and another package of

measures meant to bolster the health sector, reducing hunger and social suffering, supporting companies and employees, and enabling the gradual lifting of restrictions. With the equivalent of EUR 25 billion, this monumental aid package corresponds to around ten percent of South Africa's GDP. In addition to redeployments from the current budget, reserves from the pension fund and unemployment insurance, they have also applied for international loans from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the BRICS Bank, and the African Development Bank (AfDB). As critical as the support for people in need may well be, the question still arises whether the package is not oversized by South African standards. Even before the Corona crisis, the South African economy was in recession. The state has been living beyond its means for years. This includes the billions in subsidies for the large state-owned companies. The domestic currency, the South African Rand, has been losing value for years and wages have been falling in real terms. In March, Moody's joined ranks with all the other major rating agencies by lowering South Africa's creditworthiness to junk status, thus making debt financing more expensive. Should the South African government not use the Corona crisis in order to undertake courageous economic reforms, the country will be threatened with a long-lasting recession.³

Development Deficits Undermine Anti-Corona-Measures

South Africa is a country with two distinct faces. On one hand, it has a diversified economy that is integrated into international trade. It can boast of hubs of technological progress and large sections of its population enjoy a very high standard of living. On the other hand, there is poor South Africa, which shows similar developmental deficits as other African nations. This becomes clear not only in terms of economic inequality, but also across other sectors such as education, transportation, and public health. Protective health measures, such as a lockdown, are only viable for a segment of its population and their medium-term impact is therefore questionable. The majority of South Africans cannot financially tide themselves over the curfew period, nor can they effectively protect themselves against the spread of the Corona virus. There is a realistic concern that a wave of infections is yet to come. Once the densely populated townships are hit hard, even the government's best intentions and efforts can no longer help.

German Development Cooperation Must Bolster Democracy in South Africa

The Corona crisis has confronted South Africa with its history of years of neglect and failed reforms in the economic sector and in combating corruption by successive ANC governments. The ANC remains the predominant political player in the country. The increasing social pressure, however, triggered by the novel Corona virus and the government's limited financial capabilities will in the medium- or long-term lead to the ruling party's decline in popularity and thus of its majority in the National Assembly. In the event that the ANC lacks just a few percentage points to hold onto its majority, it will then seek to form a coalition government with one of the many small parties. Given such a scenario, little would change. It is however also possible that a coalition made up of the opposition parties will take over government affairs in either four or nine years from now. Such an unusual coalition alliance could certainly not come about without the participation of the liberal Democratic Alliance (DA) and the radical left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

For the latter scenario to be successful, additional opposition parties from the democratic centre, who work constructively, would need to participate. Only if economic reason prevails within this coalition – and this entails containing the EFF – could it achieve better results than the existing ANC government.

German development cooperation would be well-advised to continue to support South Africa, primarily in democratic development, as intended through the developmental policy instrument of the German political foundations. It is not for nothing that all six German political foundations are present in South Africa. As a robust African economy, South Africa holds great appeal throughout the region. The neighbouring countries, whose populations total around 50 million, are dependent upon South Africa's economy. German companies are also well represented in South Africa. For the time being, the business outlook is gloomy, but South Africa remains a hub for doing business in and with Africa and hence highly relevant to developmental policy. As a member of G20, South Africa can also play a critical regional leadership role. Notwithstanding various disillusionments, Germany should closely support South Africa in terms of developmental policy.

DR Congo: A Country with Systemic Impact

Benno Müchler

Six and a half times the size of Germany, surrounded by nine neighbouring countries in Central Africa, DR Congo plays a key role in the region's stability. In 2019, Félix Antoine Tshisekedi replaced Joseph Kabila as president and was to launch the first anti-corruption reforms. A severe Covid-19 crisis could ruin developmental success and destabilize the entire region, as it did during the two Congo Wars during the 1990s.

Status of Covid-19-Cases

On 10 March 2020, the Health Minister announced the first Covid-19 case. Some two and a half months later, the official figure rose to 2,297, with 66 deaths (lethality: 2.8 percent).⁴ With 2,106 cases, the epicentre is Kinshasa, the nation's capital with a population of 12 million. Another six provinces in the country have been affected. In the absence of testing capacity, however, a high number of unreported cases can be assumed. According to the Prime Minister, there are currently only 500 emergency beds in the country.⁵

Government Measures

In the fight against the pandemic, President Tshisekedi initially suspended international flights from Europe and China, and later expanded this to include domestic flights in order to limit the spread within the country. An exemption was made to trade by air and sea. Tshisekedi declared a state of emergency and formed a crisis unit around the renowned doctor Jean-Jacques Muyembe, who had undertaken critical work in the fight against Ebola. Schools, universities, restaurants and discotheques were closed, religious services and funerals were prohibited.⁶ In Kinshasa, the maximum number of passengers allowed on local public transport was reduced. In mid-April, the governor issued a two-week curfew for the capital's economic centre, Gombe, which was particularly hard hit, and which in the meantime since been eased to such an extent that local people can once again go outdoors and go shopping. Recently, wearing a mask has become mandatory across Kinshasa. Failure to comply with this regulation will result in a penalty to the equivalent of USD 3. The average monthly income in DR Congo is USD 36.

Economic Cushioning of the Crisis

A crisis would mean that DR Congo, one of the poorest countries on Earth, would be hard hit. It was one of the 25 countries the IMF exempted in mid-April from debt repayments for a period of six months so that it could use these funds to combat the pandemic. Furthermore,

the IMF provided the country with funds of around USD 360 million in order to quickly fund relief efforts. The Congolese government has set a 12-month crisis budget of around USD 135 million.⁷ This corresponds to around 2.8 percent of gross domestic product.

Ramifications for the Region

Despite the preventative measures, the virus in Kinshasa has spread to other neighbourhoods in the city. Many people have not complied with the regulations, and large crowds are still gathering. The police lack the capacity to enforce the regulations in place. It is thus possible that the Covid-19 pandemic in DR Congo will lead to high fatality rates and increase poverty and hunger. Food prices have already risen.⁸ The global market prices for copper and cobalt, which were important export goods before the crisis, have continued to fall even further as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, although the price of copper has started to rise again since April. The Congolese government expects a recession of minus 2.2 percent in 2020.⁹ The closure of the borders, for example, between Rwanda and DR Congo, has temporarily deprived many small traders of their livelihoods.¹⁰ Farmers fear that they will find no buyers for their crops. Should the already fragile state sink further into chaos, the entire Central African region could be destabilized. More than 70 rebel groups are active within the country, especially in the Eastern Congo, and are partly financed through illegal mining. They could exploit the situation to increase their power. Other mines currently operated by global mining companies could become targets.

New Actors during Transformations

If political upheavals were to occur, new actors could emerge and replace the previous political rulers. The current president, Félix Antoine Tshisekedi, has only recently taken office and, despite his controversial election, enjoys trust amongst the population. Hence, he could find himself in a new government. Shortly before the crisis, in a hitherto unique step, he arrested several well-known entrepreneurs and high-ranking government officials on suspected corruption offenses – similar to measures taken by Angola's President Lourenço. This course of action even affected his own head of cabinet. The political signal that nobody is no longer untouchable should not be underestimated.¹¹ However, long-term members of the Kabila regime, such as Joseph Kabila himself, could probably be politically isolated. On account of years of mismanagement, many people consider the Kabila regime to be primarily responsible for the poor state of the country and are also likely to be considered responsible for the fact that President Tshisekedi has thus far not been able to implement major reforms. Despite the loss of the presidency, Kabila's coalition of parties retains power in both parliamentary chambers and in almost all 26 provincial governments.

However, there are also many younger and modern actors in Kabila's party alliance, as well as in the large parties with systemic impact, who, to date, have hardly partaken in governmental responsibility and can likely be believed to further wanting to develop their country. Martin Fayulu could also be among the potentially new political actors over the course of a shift in power; he has often been named as the actual winner of the 2018 presidential election and was an outsider with his small, liberally characterised Engagement for Citizenship and Development party (ECiDé); along with Moïse Katumbi, the entrepreneurially independent, very committed former governor of Katanga. The Catholic church and the Association of the Protestant churches would also be of great significance. It was primarily thanks to their efforts that the presidential election, which had been postponed several times, could eventually take place in November 2018. They are considered the highest moral authority. Hence, it should be seen as a major defeat when President Tshisekedi wanted to commission them during the current crisis to administer the social welfare fund that he set

up for society's weakest members, but the church leaders thankfully refused this office in order to protect themselves lest funds be misappropriated.¹² To this day corruption remains one of the country's major problems. Credible actors also include Nobel Peace Prize laureate Denis Mukwege, who has good contacts with Germany, doctor Jean-Jacques Muyembe, who heads the medical units in the Covid-19 crisis, and former Congolese basketball professional Dikembe Mutombo, who, inter alia, is the African ambassador for the U.S. National Basketball Association (NBA) and operates a hospital in Kinshasa.

The Congolese Federation of Entrepreneurs (FEC) is also of great consequence. It includes executives from numerous private companies, most of whom trained in Europe, particularly in Belgium, where the largest Congolese diaspora is located. Through cooperation in the academic sphere with the University of Würzburg and the Frankfurt School of Finance, there is now also a small network of Congolese graduates who have trained in Germany.

Potential Openings for German Development Cooperation

Before the Covid-19 pandemic, the next round of intergovernmental negotiations with the DR Congo had been scheduled for June 2020. Taking the crisis into consideration, German developmental cooperation could in future identify two areas as strategic and thus shift their focus. In the wake of the crisis, for example, Germany could set up hospitals and clinics and execute this strategy as part of a pan-regional approach across Africa. The new strategy by the Federal Ministry for Development and Economic Cooperation (BMZ) offers approaches for such a shift.¹³ For instance, the "BMZ 2030" concept provides for the so-called global as well as nexus and peace partnerships for working on cross-border issues. The BMZ could avail of synergy effects that arise during the development of health systems in the individual countries and thereby underline its position as an actor in global health. The German Development Minister Müller has already proposed that the WHO be expanded into a global pandemic centre.¹⁴

A second strategic area is education. For President Tshisekedi, the topic is of paramount importance. After the crisis, however, he will lack funds for important reforms he has initiated, such as free primary education. Here Germany could come in and support the President. The development of the country's dilapidated universities, which the German development agency GIZ has already undertaken in other African countries, could create prospects for the sizable young population and significantly enhance Germany's visibility as a partner of DR Congo.

At the same time, the expansion of scholarship offers should be mentioned, the importance of which Minister Müller has emphasized on multiple occasions. Even though there has been a Goethe-Institute in Kinshasa since 2016, it neither offers German language courses nor language tests. Hence, many qualified Congolese cannot overcome the hurdle that faces them prior to studying in Germany. In conjunction with the German political foundations, who enjoy good networks among the universities, and also award scholarships, the BMZ and the Federal Foreign Office, upon whose support the Goethe-Institute depends, could develop this sector.

Germany is viewed as a role model and as one of those countries that have thus far mastered the crisis best. The demand for information from and about Germany, in both English and French, was considerable even before the crisis and has continued to grow. In the wake of the crisis, health and nutrition along with education and the economy are likely to top the

political agenda, and the need for advice and expertise will significantly increase in order to shape national politics and to participate in international negotiations.

The Impact of Covid-19 in Mali

Thomas Schiller

Corona Pandemic in Mali: Prevailing Situation

The Corona virus reached the Sahel region and thus Mali in early March 2020. According to the Ministry of Health, the number of cases in Mali confirmed through testing at the end of May (on 25 May) stood at 1,059. These included members of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA). Sixty-seven people died of Covid-19; 604 have been classified as cured. It is assumed that there are a high number of unreported cases, not least because testing capacities in Mali are very limited.¹⁵

The Malian government responded to the virus outbreak with a raft of preventative measures. Gatherings of more than 50 people, seminars, and conferences were prohibited. Compliance with hygiene rules (avoiding physical contact, washing hands, etc.) has been actively promoted and practiced almost everywhere, including at entrances to banks, shops, and restaurants. Recently, the wearing of a face mask in public spaces has become mandatory. Moreover, medical centres were set up in Bamako in order to isolate positive cases. Until recently, entry into Mali was only possible if followed with an immediate 14-day isolation. There were and are, however, almost no more commercial flights into or from Bamako, with the exception of air forces transporting some troop suppliers from EUTM and MINUSMA – including the Bundeswehr – that still fly into Bamako relatively regularly.

Unlike many other countries, Mali has never closed shops, food-markets, or restaurants. Mosques were also not closed; joint prayers are taking place as they were before the virus erupted. The situation differs in Niger, where joint prayers in mosques were prohibited. This restriction was to provoke numerous – and also violent – demonstrations against the ban. To date, the highly limited measures taken by the Malian government have prevented the triggering of major unrest nationwide on account of anti-Corona measures such as those that erupted in Niger. The mass riots that erupted in Kayes over recent days cannot be attributed to anti-Corona measures, but rather are an expression of protest following the killing of a young man by a police officer.

The Malian government is acutely aware that an all-out lockdown would be neither enforceable nor practical, for a large majority of the population depends on everyday work in order to survive. On 19 April, President Keita stated as an aside during his vote in the parliamentary elections that it was impossible to “blockade” Malians in their homes and thereby condemn them to starvation.

The country’s various religious leaders have reacted differently to the virus outbreak: whereas the Catholic Church has not celebrated mass in its churches since the end of March, the mosques remained open during the month of fast, Ramadan. The influential Imam, Mamadou Dicko, pointed out that it is up to the state authorities to make a decision whether to close houses of prayer. To date, this has not happened. For many observers this represents a sign of weakness on the part of the state vis à vis influential representatives of

the Islamic community. Recently, riots have erupted in several cities across the country: young Malians in particular were not only protesting about the results of the parliamentary elections, but also about the nightly curfew. This curfew was eventually lifted on 9 May. No national political figure or organization have supported these protests, however.

International organizations in Mali have significantly reduced their workload. Many MINUSMA employees in Bamako now work from home, and measures to minimize social contact have also been implemented in the camps in northern Mali. The EUTM called a halt to training activities with the Malian armed forces, the civil EU mission EUCAP even recalled almost all employees from Bamako at the end of March. Moreover, the developmental cooperation organizations can only work to a very limited extent, for many international employees have departed the country.

Short-term Ramifications

Even before the outbreak of the Corona pandemic, the situation in Mali and across the Sahel region was critical overall. In recent years, the security situation throughout the region has deteriorated dramatically. International institutions such as the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) had already highlighted the foreseeable problematic food situation at the end of 2019. The deficit infrastructure – not alone of the health system – was and remains a major problem for all countries in the region.

According to multiple observers, the global Corona pandemic will have significant short-term effects on further developments across the Sahel region and thus also throughout Mali. Amongst other things, measures to combat the impending food crisis are currently highly difficult to implement. This could not only have short-term consequences in the field of humanitarian aid, but also will endanger the sustainability of numerous projects that have been operating for some time. It should be noted in this context, however, that even before the Corona pandemic, the unstable security situation had rendered numerous development projects and humanitarian aid in many parts of the country significantly more difficult or virtually impossible.

Furthermore, the measures taken to combat the Corona virus now also impact international organizations' internal processes and their ability to act. In the short term, there are also difficulties for stabilization efforts in the security sector.

For instance, the Bundeswehr's contingent rotation within the scope of MINUSMA has been rendered more difficult due to quarantine regulations that are now in place. German soldiers must observe quarantine periods both prior to and after entering Mali; the same applies to French military forces affiliated to the anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane.

Plagued by the crisis, the Malian population has thus far been relatively prudent with regard to the Corona pandemic. Even the two rounds of parliamentary elections in Mali on 29 March and 19 April 2020 went ahead notwithstanding the Corona crisis and without major incident.

The pandemic's medium- and long-term political and economic consequences and the ensuing global economic downturn for Mali are not yet foreseeable. It can be assumed, however, that the already alarming lack of prospects for the vast majority of the population

will continue to worsen should Mali also be impacted by the shock of a global economic crisis, for example, by a reduction in development cooperation as a result of cost-cutting measures in households across donor countries over the coming years.

Long-term Consequences

The direct impact of the Corona crisis on further long-term international and German engagement in Mali and across the Sahel region are likely to be minor in scale. The Sahel region was already dealing with an alarming situation ever before the crisis erupted and was thus a focus for international and German security and development engagement. The stabilization efforts throughout the region against the backdrop of the triple crisis in the security and nutrition sectors, as well as the lack of prospects for a young population were and remain a tremendous challenge irrespective of the Corona virus. Without effective and efficient core functions of the state – basic public health care being just one element thereof – these three challenges (unstable security situation, food crisis, and lack of economic prospects) will not be met. The current global focus on containing the Corona pandemic should not divert attention from the reality that the Sahel states are confronted with these fundamental challenges. For this reason, the international community should continue to focus on strengthening these vulnerable states as a prerequisite for stable development across the Sahel region.

Calm before the Storm in Côte d'Ivoire?

Florian Karner

Current Overview of the Situation

The current situation in Côte d'Ivoire is relatively transparent and calm. The first positive test result for Covid-19 was announced on 11 March 2020. Consequently, as of 16 March, public institutions such as schools and universities, as well as restaurants and bars, were closed. Churches and mosques also had to close their doors to worshippers. In a televised speech on 23 March, President Ouattara declared, in a calm but determined tone, a national emergency, including a night-time curfew, and explicitly demanded discipline from the population with regard to compliance with hygiene and social distancing rules. For the time being, the state of emergency lasted until 15 May; the night curfew and the closure of public and private institutions were lifted for the country's interior in a further speech by the President on 7 May; this now also applies to the greater Abidjan area. National borders have also been sealed tightly since 23 March and, for now, will remain closed until the end of May.

Meanwhile, only special flights operated on humanitarian grounds are approved by the Ivorian government, and many foreign nationals living in the country have already departed. This is primarily on account of medical precaution or fear of potential social unrest. At the same time, a minimum of public life remains unchanged: markets as well as supermarkets and shopping centres remain open, albeit for shorter time-periods and those entering are subject to the requirement of wearing a mask. Houses and apartments can be left easily during the day. Since the beginning of May, Abidjan has appeared much livelier than before, even traffic congestion has returned. After weeks of restrictions, a sense of fatigue toward the restrictive Corona measures seems to be gaining traction. This trend has been reinforced due to the easing of measures in neighbouring countries such as Ghana and Burkina Faso.

Tackling the Virus

In Côte d'Ivoire, currently, 2,376 people have tested positive; 1,219 of whom recovered and 30 have died.¹⁶ To date, only 18 of its 33 provinces have been affected with individual cases. So far, the government has managed to limit the spread of the virus beyond Abidjan by prohibiting people from leaving Greater Abidjan. The rest of the country has thus been cut off from the economic centre. Those with symptoms are tested; they tend to belong to the middle class and have been sensitized accordingly. The tests performed total 23,444.¹⁷

The government is relying upon extensive awareness-raising measures on posters, on television and radio, on social media and via text-messaging. The mandatory use of protective masks is gradually increasing. A curfew or social distancing measures, such as practiced in various European countries, would be virtually impossible. A large number of people living here are permanently outdoors, whether for working, eating, or even for sleeping purposes.

Côte d'Ivoire's health system, as in most of its African counterparts, would not be able to cope with an onslaught of patients requiring intensive medical care. According to the WHO, there are currently 80 intensive care beds, 20 of which are equipped with ventilators. The government plans to expand this capacity, particularly in Abidjan. Still, the healthcare system will not be able to be modernized quickly in response to the virus. For this reason alone, the idea of flattening the curve scarcely makes sense in the local context. Whether faced with a linear or an exponential increase in cases, the Ivorian health care capacities would very quickly no longer be sufficient to treat the sick appropriately.

Hour of the Executive

The Covid-19 pandemic also constitutes the hour of the executive in Côte d'Ivoire. The presidential decree (*ordonnance*) is the method of choice. The government reacted swiftly and comprehensively to the first cases of infection, knowing well that the only solution to restrictive measures is to steer a middle course. On one hand, an outright curfew would be impossible and would lead to considerable unrest amongst the population. On the other, the government has benefited from its experience with the Ebola containment measures it imposed between 2014 and 2016. The government has also succeeded in gathering alternative political actors such as religious representatives and many entrepreneurs in order to jointly draw up measures.

The Parliament, which normally resumes work on 1 April each year following a session-free period between January and March, remains on forced vacation on account of Corona, without a new date for the 2020 session. A transitional arrangement has been envisaged that – differentiated by majority ratio – 40 parliamentarians carry out a kind of parliamentary emergency operation. This arrangement is challenging for those parliamentarians who, in institutional terms, have a poor standing. Parliamentarians usually do not have a coterie of academic staff at their disposal, as is customary for anybody coming from Europe; there is often a lack of technical equipment for those volunteers. It's not that easy to pull virtual meetings out of the hat in such circumstances. This is particularly challenging during the run-up to the elections.

This is not only the case in Parliament. The work of civil society has equally been severely restricted. There may well be digital natives, but they are few and far between. This is compounded by a lack of equipment, fast internet connection, and PC know-how. Home

office looks quite different in the densely populated districts of Abidjan than in most European cities, and many working people do not consider working at home a desirable state of affairs.

The original timetable for the presidential election has thus far been adhered to. The time-frames and deadlines, especially for updating the register of voters, which must be completed three months prior to the election, have been adjusted in order to meet the election date of 31 October 2020. Nothing else was to be expected at this juncture. To date, the government has had no interest in postponing the election. Should they do so today, barely six months before the election date, the opposition and also parts of civil society would then accuse them of organizational inability. The incumbent government also secretly hopes for a win in the first round. And their chances for success are not too bad, for the opposition has been finding it challenging, especially in the current situation, to rally and to raise its political profile.

Many Outstanding Questions

On a local level, there are many outstanding questions. Too little data has been compiled on how the virus will unfold amidst local demographic and climatic conditions. Three quarters of Côte d'Ivoire's population is under the age of 35. The hypothesis that for the majority of this young population Covid-19 will be asymptomatic or only result in mild symptoms, and that overall far fewer cases or fatalities will be reported is not that far off.

The low number of tests would suggest a high number of unreported cases among the broader population. Those who go to the doctor with symptoms such as mild fever or signs of a common cold, after all, are usually treated with conventional influenza medication under normal circumstances. Even in the current situation, every symptomatic patient is not subjected to a Covid-19 test, although the President has promised to conduct testing free of charge. This reflex is not only due to limited testing capacities. In the minds of many Ivorians, Covid-19 ranks among a long line of everyday tropical diseases. Diarrheal diseases, tropical fever, or the still ubiquitous malaria from which thousands of Ivorians continue to die every year, especially children. Côte d'Ivoire is one of the six African countries that account for the half of all malaria cases worldwide. At first glance, Covid-19 does not appear to be a priority problem, because, unlike in Europe, the virus encounters a much less well-organized and sterile environment here.

Instead, the government agencies' focus on combatting Covid-19 could lead to the neglect of the fight against other equally dangerous and omnipresent diseases such as malaria. One is almost inclined to claim that malaria would merely be a marginal medical phenomenon if political actors took a similarly seriously-minded approach to the one they have adopted against Covid-19.

Loss of Trust in the Political Class

Government warnings about the dangers of Covid-19 do not appear to have hit home with the Ivorian population. Notwithstanding extensive awareness-raising measures, doubts still abound not only about the very existence of the disease in the country, but also and primarily about the need for state-imposed restrictions.

The remark, "we haven't come across either a sick person or a cured person; we don't believe in this disease" is commonly heard from ordinary people, especially outside of Abidjan. High-profile appearances by the Minister for Defence Hamed Bakayoko, who

enjoys popularity among the public, and Patrick Achi, Secretary-General to the President's Office, who both announced their positive test results and earnestly beseeched the population to take preventive hygienic measures into account, have been of no use. The shattered trust between the general public and the political class is also blatantly obvious during the Covid-19 crisis.

It is assumed that business advantages from locally produced masks only benefit a few; and many doubt that international aid will ultimately reach needy sections of the population and cash-strapped institutions. The fact that politics no longer gets through to a significant segment of society was recently reflected in the destruction of a planned testing centre by local residents.

Socio-economic Impact

Even if it is too early to take full stock of developments, the economic implications of the Corona crisis are assured. According to the Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly, GDP growth will halve to at least 3.6 percent or, according to the worst-case scenario, amount to only 0.8 percent, depending on how long the crisis will persist. The government is seeking to counteract such an outcome with a whole raft of measures. As part of the *Plan de Soutien Économique, Social et Humanitaire (PSESH)*, tax deferrals for companies, support funds for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and larger companies, the strong informal sector, as well as a relief fund for particularly vulnerable sections of the population are worth particular mention. The economically central cocoa sector is to be supported by export grants and local processing promoted. The influential business association for industry and services has characterised the government proposals as not being effective sometimes and complicated to implement. The needs criteria remain partially unclear for those affected.

Ultimately, the country's stability could depend on how well the majority of the informally employed population comes through the crisis. The country's enforced isolation from the outside world and the de facto separation of Abidjan from the rest of the country have led to price increases for meat and vegetables, for example. Day laborers are no longer able to generate their daily minimum income. Meanwhile price caps have been introduced for various everyday products. Abidjan port is the economic ray of hope in the crisis, and it continues to mostly function smoothly. To date, there have only been restrictions on the delivery of various construction materials, especially clinker bricks, which could have a negative impact on the construction industry in the foreseeable future.

Implications for German Development Cooperation

Since 2017, the Côte d'Ivoire has been one of the six African countries that have become Germany's official reform partners. This partnership's current priorities, however, for renewable energies and energy efficiency are likely to be a low priority for the Ivorian side. Hence, expanding cooperation would be advisable and could include matters relating to security, employment, and demography, for the focus set within the framework of a reform partnership offers the opportunity to act with the selected partner on another level of strategic cooperation.

Côte d'Ivoire has asked Germany to contribute toward crisis management across the country. Without hesitation they asked for EUR 15.5 million; other international cooperation partners will have had a similar experience. A positive response from Germany would probably further expand and consolidate the cooperation between both countries, which

has grown stronger in recent years. At the same time, the focus on the sole support of multilateral mechanisms and institutions through German development cooperation would not be sufficient, because the recipient countries might find it difficult to see when and how they could benefit directly from it. Hence, it will hardly be feasible to do without bilateral aid.

Under no circumstances should (even more) general budget support be provided, not even via the African Development Bank, in which Germany, as the third largest non-regional member, holds 4.1 percent of the capital. Even some Ivorian entrepreneurs strongly advise against such a step. Only a small portion of this money would arrive where it is needed. An alternative to such an arrangement would be concrete, direct material assistance.

Germany's Covid-19 engagement should also continue to operate within the EU framework in order not only to increase the impact of European development cooperation, but also to improve Germany's external image and to have it stand out overall from other donor nations. Côte d'Ivoire is not yet a priority country for Chinese commitments, but here, too, Chinese actors are constantly working on the Chinese narrative regarding the outbreak and the fight against the virus – whether in the economically dependent Ivorian press or through cash and in-kind contributions to various Ivorian institutions. On 30 April, a medical team of experts from China was visibly welcomed at Abidjan airport – fully aware it was at the behest of the Ivorian government.

Uganda's "War" on Corona Virus: Will Collateral Damage Become the Real Problem?

Mathias Kamp

Uganda has been tried and tested when it comes to fighting infectious diseases. The Ugandan health system is anything but well equipped – on the contrary: conditions in hospitals and health centres are often terrifyingly miserable. Yet, when tackling Ebola infections, the country was able to win the trust of the international community by being able to quickly and efficiently control outbreaks of the virus – most recently in summer 2019. Furthermore, they had similar outcomes with outbreaks of the Marburg virus and the Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever; they successfully combated yellow fever and measles, and not least Uganda has a reputation as a model country in its fight against AIDS.

Hence, it is hardly surprising that Uganda distinguished itself when it came to tackling the Covid-19 pandemic in its initial phases and that the rise in the number of cases was relatively low.

Early Response to the Pandemic

Even before the first confirmed case of infection, Uganda's government had already imposed strict measures, including the closing of all schools, banning public gatherings, mandatory quarantine for travellers, and stopping flights from countries with high infection rates. Over the course of a further tightening of measures, a general entry ban was imposed, the use of public transport was prohibited, and finally even the use of private cars was banned. Across the country, public life came to a virtual standstill.

Reaction to the strict measures were and remain mixed. On one hand, the news and images from other parts of the world had provoked great concerns and fears in Uganda as well.

Accordingly, the majority of Ugandans welcomed the strict procedure. In particular the Ugandan Minister of Health, a trained medical doctor, was able to inspire confidence by dint of her professional demeanour and structured crisis management – even though President Museveni had swiftly made the matter a “top priority.” For several weeks now, the President has been addressing the population in regular, mostly via evening televised speeches, explaining the measures and referring to the rules of conduct that have been imposed. Overall, the acceptance of these restrictions appears to be high. At the same time, however, there has been great concern about the direct and indirect effects of this lockdown.

Drastic Measures Threaten Economic Livelihoods

In Uganda, as elsewhere throughout the African continent, the question arises whether aligning those measures against the Corona virus as practiced in western industrialized countries is practical and sensible considering the local circumstances. On one hand, the warnings are stark: the uncontrolled spread of the virus could result in hundreds of thousands or even millions of deaths across Africa given the prevailing inadequate health care. On the other hand, social distancing rules, work bans, and strict hygiene measures, for example, in densely populated and impoverished slum areas, are scarcely implementable. And it should not be forgotten that in the prevailing context of poverty and instability, the strict measures to combat the virus will also have considerable negative consequences that will threaten not only economic livelihoods but also human lives

The immediate economic challenges are enormous, notably in Kampala, the Ugandan capital. Many people have lost their jobs or are no longer paid their salaries. The informal sector accounts for a large part of the economy. For many Ugandans, this means a daily struggle for survival. Most of them have no savings or any form of social security. Their incomes are falling, while food prices are rising as a result of the crisis. Ultimately, this means that within a few days, many of them will no longer be able to make ends meet and will suffer from hunger. Furthermore, there is the comparatively drastic measure to ban not only public but also private means of transport. This restriction in the transportation of people brings further problems, because in the event of a medical emergency, getting to the nearest hospital often becomes a major problem.

The government’s response has been that in such emergencies, local authorities could issue quick exemptions. Yet, the authorities seem overwhelmed with the task, especially given that they suffer from corruption and inefficiency in any case. Reports of avoidable deaths, for example, due to complications during childbirth in the absence of medical care have correspondingly accumulated across (social) media outlets.¹⁸

Emergency Help for the Poorest – but no Masterplan for the Economy

The restrictions’ immediate consequences can already be felt. At the same time, there are fears that the long-term consequences could be far more devastating. As a comparatively poor developing country, Uganda has barely any capacity to cushion the economic shocks caused by the Corona crisis. Shutting down the domestic economy will only exacerbate this situation. That means: more unemployment, more poverty, more hunger.

While imposing such draconian measures, the Ugandan government also promised to implement state aid programs for the poorest sections of the population. Among other things, a major campaign to ensure supplies of the most basic food was launched, from which around 1.5 million people in Kampala alone should benefit. It does not seem to be distributed everywhere, however; complaints from needy Ugandans who are still waiting for

help are on the increase.¹⁹ And no sooner had the program been launched than the first major corruption scandal erupted. Four senior officials in the prime minister's office were arrested on charges of fraud. They are accused of using taxpayers' money to purchase foodstuffs at inflated prices.²⁰

The government's efforts have generally been well-received, yet experts sense the lack of a clear strategy for tackling the economic challenges. To date, little has been heard from government circles. It is a matter of urgent necessity to relieve households and businesses, for instance, through tax exemptions or emergency financial aid. As a result of the general lockdown measures, many economic activities are no longer viable, especially small-scale production and the marketing of agricultural products. In multiple cases, this could be thoroughly avoided by more targeted restrictions. The fact is that almost every sector of the economy is suffering acutely from the crisis and will also face major problems in the long term. This is not alone on account of the lockdown measures, but primarily due to external factors such as the slump in demand across the tourism industry, which is highly critical for Uganda, and the almost stagnant trade with China.²¹

Political Ramifications of the Crisis

Observers fear that the economic consequences could also be accompanied by political turmoil and an increased potential for conflict. To date, major protests have failed to materialize in Uganda, and for the moment the crisis seems to have strengthened identification with the state and government. It has become fundamentally clear that over the course of the crisis, the balance of power has been shifting to the benefit of the government. This development is not good news for democracy. This tendency toward authoritarian dominance by the executive, which has been observed for some considerable time, can be further intensified over the course of combating the Corona virus. President Museveni has declared "war" on the virus and as a veteran guerrilla fighter and military strategist, he appears to be fully in his element. He has commanded his government troops in true commander-style, at times in front of rolling cameras during his lengthy televised evening speeches. Critical voices are finding it difficult to be heard, the opposition is by and large condemned to passivity, while the media view their role as primarily to disseminate government communications.

At the same time, Parliament has been utterly side-lined. The decision by parliamentarians to provide themselves with substantial financial injections derived from tax resources in order to help them fight the virus is perceived by the general public as an attempt to enrich themselves through the prevailing crisis. Their behaviour only further shakes confidence in the already weak legislative institution. Furthermore, it is open to question how the crisis will impact the national elections scheduled for early 2021. The original schedule for the primary races and the electoral campaigns probably can no longer be adhered to.²²

Tensions across the Region

The crisis is putting the relationships within the East African Community (EAC) to a critical test. A regional approach to tackling the crisis is barely noticeable. While Uganda succeeded in keeping the number of cases low, the neighbouring countries Kenya and Tanzania are struggling to contain a much faster spread of the virus. In Uganda, there is mounting frustration with their neighbours, for the most recently reported cases of infection were almost exclusively truck drivers from Kenya and Tanzania. Uganda's decision to repatriate Tanzanian and Kenyan citizens who had tested positive, contrary to WHO recommendations, caused further tension between the countries. The crisis threatens to jeopardize the free

movement of goods within the East African community and could significantly set back the integration process.

Role of Non-State Actors

Meanwhile, the non-governmental actors in Uganda are themselves either engaged and struggling with the impact of the crisis, or they are following the government's policy. Churches and businesses have contributed by making donations to government aid programs. Private aid initiatives are officially prohibited. During a televised address, President Museveni declared that the private distribution of aid would lead to people gathering, which would ultimately facilitate the spread of the virus. Anyone distributing aid in such a manner will be punished for "attempted murder" – a threat, notably, directed at opposition politicians who had announced their own relief efforts. Many charities and non-governmental organizations are abandoning their regular programmes in response to the Corona pandemic and are trying to mitigate its worst effects on the population. Yet, at the same time they fear for their own survival. Future funding of their programmes seems more than uncertain given the global crisis and in some cases individual donors and donor organizations have already stopped making payments.

Challenges for Development Cooperation

Similarly, the Corona pandemic poses challenges for German and European development cooperation. It can be thus assumed that dependence on development aid will increase in the wake of the crisis. On one hand, this relates to the enormous costs involved in tackling challenges to the health system and the acute care for the needy population, and on the other, it also pertains to the setbacks in the economic development process and poverty reduction caused by the crisis and the measures taken to combat it. Here, it is paramount not to lose sight of the holistic approach. Obviously, acute support is required in response to this current crisis, such as the EU is already providing with a EUR 30 million grant for the Ugandan budget. And while Germany is not primarily active in the health sector, it still does so via various aid agencies, such as *Malteser* or *Welthungerhilfe*, involved in promoting health and social care.

In the long term, however, the current priority programs such as rural development, adaptation to climate change, and the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, must not be marginalized by an activism fuelled by the Corona crisis. Wherever aid is extended, the Ugandan government's handling of the funds must be critically evaluated. Mismanagement and corruption have occurred too often in the past. Hence, it is also a matter of calling for more transparency and democratic standards, and moreover to conduct a critical dialogue about the priorities in the Ugandan state budget.

Tanzania's President Aggravates the Corona Pandemic in a Country Adrift

Daniel El-Noshokaty

Government Measures against the Corona Virus

The first case of infection with the Corona virus was officially confirmed in Tanzania on 16 March 2020. On the same day, the country's prime minister announced that every educational institution in the nation would close for one month as of that day. On 22 March, however, President Magufuli announced that all houses of worship in the country would

remain open, for the virus was the “devil” and that it could be “cured through the power of God.”²³ On 30 March, the Minister of Health had to announce the first death due to a Covid-19 infection. On 11 April, the closure of all educational institutions was extended indefinitely. With the exception of cargo aircraft, all international air traffic in and out of Tanzania was also suspended indefinitely as of 11 April. On 16 April, President Magufuli once again addressed Tanzanians and beseeched them to pray for three days in order to defeat the virus. Additional restrictions were only imposed on 22 April and exclusively for the Dar es Salaam metropolis. Restaurants and bars were closed and the mandatory wearing of masks introduced. Markets, shops, and especially churches and mosques were, however, to remain open under pressure from the President. He ruled out any further tightening of preventative measures, for Dar es Salaam generates 80 percent of the state’s revenue; this would speak against a lockdown.²⁴ Instead, people should continue to work and pray. Even the official infection numbers continue to rise. As of 10 May, 509 people had tested positive, with 21 fatalities. The government has not published fresh data since then. Given, however, that only the government is allowed to carry out tests and publish results, there are considerable doubts as to the accuracy of the official figures, both within the country and by the WHO.²⁵ That conclusion is borne out by the fact that according to the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention in total only 652 tests had been carried out until 7 May.²⁶

The Pandemic’s Impact on the Population

More than 80 percent of Tanzania’s population works in the informal sector. They have no health insurance, no unemployment insurance, and their access to the health system is limited to the few state hospitals and health stations that they can afford. Many people with a Covid-19 infection are afraid to report to the public authorities lest they end up in a state quarantine facility. Furthermore, many fear stigmatization. Even those who regularly pay taxes cannot rely on the scarcely available social security system. The health system is in a deplorable condition and, particularly in rural areas, practically non-existent.

According to the WHO, there is less than one hospital bed for every 1,000 people in Tanzania.²⁷ According to the World Bank, per capita expenditure in the health care system in Tanzania in 2017 amounted to only USD 33.92. In neighbouring Kenya it was USD 76.61 per capita, while in Germany the figure for 2017 was USD 5,033.45.²⁸ Hence, Tanzania is unprepared for a pandemic and the health system is not in the position to provide care for the hundreds or even thousands of sick people.

Many people in Tanzania are aware of this and do not trust the official figures, nor do they believe that prayer alone can cure. The dearth of reliable information has meant that curious conspiracy theories and healing methods have been circulating on social media. A significant segment of the urban population lives in such a confined space that effective isolation is not feasible. Furthermore, many of the nation’s more than 55 million inhabitants are poor; they literally live from one day to the next and are thus dependent upon earning a daily wage. Tanzania ranks 159 out of 189 countries surveyed in the United Nations Human Development Index.²⁹ Almost 13 million people live below the poverty line. In large cities in particular, many people have to generate a daily income in order to feed themselves and their families. Tighter curfew restrictions would thus only increase the distress and at the same time lead to food supply stoppages. Given the poor infrastructure, logistics, and hardly any storage capacity in the country, the urban centres are supplied with products that come from their immediate surroundings. If retailers, however, are no longer allowed to drive to the markets, this would result in considerable problems with food supply. Hence, a total

curfew would cause many people to take to the streets out of sheer necessity and to turn against the government. Perhaps, this explains exactly why the president is calling for prayer rather than announcing actual restrictions. Unrest would have negatively impact on stability across the country; this situation has not changed fundamentally since the outbreak of the pandemic in Tanzania, for the autocratic governor has restricted discussion and antagonized critics since the beginning of his term in office.

The Economic and Financial Impact

The expected impact on the country's economic development and financial opportunities is severe. Tanzania relies heavily on revenues from tourism. In 2019, this covered nearly 20 percent of the state budget. These funds are expected to cease to exist for almost the entire year 2020. Not only will the state lack this income, but many employees will also be directly impacted by layoffs. The same applies to the export of agricultural products. For example, cultivating flowers for the European market constitutes a vital economic sector in the northeast of the country. This sector has come to a complete standstill. The same applies to the few other agricultural products that Tanzania exports almost exclusively in an unprocessed or raw state.

The country directly experiences the lower demand for these products across their export markets and cannot react to the situation flexibly, for there is neither a processing industry nor other sales markets, and local consumption cannot compensate for this loss.

Furthermore, given that President Magufuli has financed his "industrialization" policy with fresh debts over recent years, the financial impact of the pandemic will lead to the already high debt burden being further increased.

Currently, it stands at 40 percent of the annual national budget, whose capacity stands slightly less than EUR 15 billion. Tanzania already pays EUR 280 million a month in debt repayments.³⁰ This burden will be exacerbated by the expected loss of revenue, which is why the President has already asked the World Bank to waive his country's debt.³¹ Should the crisis, food shortage, as well as the negative economic and financial consequences of the pandemic become extreme, President Magufuli could well become the victim of his own system; it could sacrifice him for the survival of the longest governing party in Africa. Currently, however, there are no signs of such a situation arising.

Other Actors Have Been Commandeered

Before the outbreak of the Corona crisis, the voices of other actors were rarely to be heard in Tanzania. The president's repressive policies towards all opponents over the past four years have meant that the oppressed opposition parties, the controlled media, or even the population cannot be expected to criticize him too harshly. Public space is controlled and has been increasingly restricted. Only the various associations from the private sector have drawn up a joint paper in which they mooted a special economic programme from government, tax relief for particularly affected sectors, and incentives for investments. It cannot be assumed, however, that the government will respond to this. In the current budget negotiations in parliament, it introduced a draft budget that does not in any way respond to the currently changing general conditions. Instead, it continues to envisage increasing tax revenues and a burgeoning tourism sector, as well as for growing income from exports. Hence, it can be assumed that the government will continue to downplay the effects of the Corona pandemic and bring its draft budget through the parliament it dominates.

The role played by representatives of the religious communities has been deplorable. Instead of closing the churches and mosques, or restricting the number of believers at religious services, they have been commandeered by the president in this regard. All major religious communities in Tanzania have heeded the President's call and continue to hold services. Even rational-minded actors on social media are barely heard at present, for they are subject to the country's extremely restrictive media laws and their content has no chance against the ubiquitous conspiracy theories circulating.

Implications for German Development Cooperation

The impact of the Corona pandemic is affecting German development cooperation in Tanzania. Nearly all projects have been temporarily stopped. Hence, it would now be appropriate to carry out a critical evaluation of the previous programs and measures. German development cooperation in the health sector has been operating in Tanzania for decades, but these programs are not aimed at establishing comprehensive, crisis-proof primary care for patients. The pandemic clearly reveals the manifest shortcomings in the Tanzanian health system and thus offers an opportunity for a realignment in this field. At the same time, in terms of the competitiveness of systems, competition with China for Africa also continues to intensify, as exemplified by development cooperation in Tanzania. While the People's Republic of China has handed over protective clothing, masks and other medical equipment as donations to Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa, contributions from Germany and the European Union are not yet visible.

At the same time, the Tanzanian government continues to cover up the gravity of the pandemic throughout the country, and presents it as a short-term phenomenon. President Magufuli's public statements have merely reinforced this impression. He thus announced that the virus could be stopped through prayer, the power of God, or by inhaling hot steam.³² Against such a backdrop, the question arises whether effective development cooperation can take place under these conditions. The pandemic's expected economic consequences offer German development cooperation the opportunity to enter into new partnerships and programmes with reliable private sector actors. Actors from the private sector and civil society, who can competently implement the relevant programmes, also exist in Tanzania. They could diminish dependence by the state on development cooperation.

The Covid-19 Pandemic as an Intensifier of Existing Challenges – Conclusion and Outlook

Veronika Ertl and Martina Kaiser

More than Health – Political, Economic, and Social Impact of Covid-19

The case studies at hand – DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda – represent a heterogeneous spectrum of political and socio-economic framework conditions and responses to the Corona pandemic across sub-Saharan Africa. The potential impact on political stability, as well as on economic and social development vary from country to country. At the same time, common trends are detectable.

Deficient Health Infrastructure Impedes Fight against the Pandemic

First and foremost, it should be noted that the health infrastructure in the countries analysed ranges from deficient to non-existent across the respective countries. Even without a health emergency such as the prevailing Covid-19 pandemic, health systems are already overstretched and are barely capable of offering basic health care to the general public. Not only is there a lack of hospitals, medical personnel, laboratory and research capacities, but also of rudimentary features such as hygiene precautions and personal protective equipment (PPE). In DR Congo, for example, with its approximately 80 million inhabitants, only some 500 intensive care beds are available; Côte d'Ivoire has only 80 intensive care beds for a population of around 26 million. Furthermore, the severely limited testing capacities in all the countries examined represent a major challenge in determining the actual number of people infected with the virus. By comparison, South Africa still seems to be best equipped in this regard. This is hardly surprising, given that South Africa is the second largest economy on the African continent and, as an emerging country, is evidently better positioned to fight a pandemic than a vulnerable country such as Mali. Still, the fact of the matter is that a country such as South Africa is also reaching its limits in containing the pandemic. Especially in the structurally weak rural regions, Covid-19 infections often cannot even be identified as such. According to reports, an unhindered spread, including nightly collective burials of those deceased, whose cause of death is unknown or not disclosed, is on the increase in Tanzania. Due to the increasing number of infections, there is also the risk that fewer financial and human resources will be available for the treatment of prevalent diseases, such as malaria in western Africa. Bottlenecks are also conceivable for preventive health measures such as vaccinations, which are urgently needed in DR Congo, for example, due to a measles epidemic that broke out last year. In a worst-case scenario, the consequence would be a rapid spread of other infectious diseases, the treatment of which would further stress the inadequate health systems.

Lack of Social Protection Aggravates the Situation for the Poorest

How severe the social consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic in each country will be primarily depends on the effectiveness of social security systems in place in order to mitigate the human impact of government-imposed containment measures. Formal protection against poverty and unemployment is either absent or poorly developed in all the countries analysed.

Instead of state supports, family structures offer a safety net, which, in the current crisis situation, can reach its limits even more rapidly given that family members in developing countries are increasingly affected and dependent on support. Furthermore, there have been declines in urgently needed overseas remittances, from those industrialized countries in which a large part of the diaspora have settled. As epicentres of the pandemic, these countries are likewise impacted by negative economic growth and unemployment. According to estimates by the World Bank, remittances across sub-Saharan Africa are expected to plummet by around 23 percent this year on account of the crisis. This threatens to endanger the livelihood of many families.³³

Even before the Covid-19 pandemic broke out, most people in the countries analyzed were living in precarious conditions, working in the informal sector, or relying on a daily income to feed their families.³⁴ The current situation has further worsened living conditions for poorer population groups. This presents an enormous problem, particularly in countries such as Tanzania and DR Congo, which are among the world's least developed countries (LDCs), and in which almost 50 percent of people and more live in extreme poverty.³⁵ In the absence of

social security systems, the aid programs now launched by some states cannot compensate for this. Their implementation by state institutions, such as those observed in Uganda and South Africa, is often characterized by corruption and inefficiency. Furthermore, existing social inequalities could worsen, for example, in South Africa, where the poorest population groups can be considered as “double losers.” They are the most affected by the negative impact of containment measures and at the same time benefit least from their protective effects. Given that very few people have financial reserves, they and their families quickly run into financial difficulties. Against this backdrop, strict curfew restrictions, such as those in place in South Africa or Uganda, are not feasible over a longer period of time and not even enforceable in many other African countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.

Twofold Crisis: Hunger in the Wake of the Pandemic

Given the severe impact of the pandemic on social conditions, the ensuing rise in unemployment and decline in purchasing power, as well as local and international supply shortages, existing food insecurity and poverty are expected to worsen. Net food importers – with the exception of South Africa and Côte d’Ivoire among the countries evaluated³⁶ – are notably at risk in their food supply on account of border closures and the interruption of international supply chains. Within these countries, this particularly impacts urban populations, for they cannot provide for themselves through subsistence farming, and the available foodstuffs, as is the case in DR Congo, for example, are becoming significantly more expensive. Moreover, price increases also pose a risk to food supplies for the poorer population in Côte d’Ivoire, a net food exporter. In particular, the crisis has severely hit countries in East Africa, such as Uganda and Tanzania, whose food security has been endangered for months on account of a massive locust plague. In this context, the World Food Programme Executive Director, David Beasley, has warned of a famine of “biblical proportions”.³⁷ The task of containing the food crisis, worsened by the unstable security situation across the Sahel region even prior to the Corona pandemic, has now been further hampered by the restrained capacity of international organizations to act, for some overseas staff have left the region.

The social destitution associated with food insecurity, as well as frustration with containment measures and inadequate government aid programmes, have the potential to spark social unrest in some countries.

Challenging Times for African Economies

On the economic front, challenging times also lie ahead for those countries. The Covid-19 pandemic has strongly impacted African economies that are largely dependent upon raw materials and agricultural exports, as well as tourism: international travel restrictions have led to the collapse of the tourism industry and to the loss of many jobs across this sector. Tanzania and Uganda, for which tourism constitutes a key economic sector, have been particularly hard hit. In the wake of the global economic downturn, the sales markets and world market prices for export goods that are central to resource-rich countries, in the way cobalt is important to DR Congo, have also been shrinking. For oil-producing nations such as Angola, Cameroon, and Nigeria, similarly deteriorating export markets for crude oil represent a serious economic challenge. The drastically falling demand for agricultural products, such as flowers from Kenya and Tanzania, as well as cocoa from the world’s largest producers, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, is piling on pressure on the economies of the countries concerned. Given the lack of economic diversification and industrial basis in many African countries, they cannot compensate for such a decline in core economic sectors by any other means.

Regional trade on the African continent is also impeded on account of border closures and increased entry controls. This poses existential challenges for companies, workers, and farmers. Hence, some countries, such as DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and South Africa, have set up support funds and promised tax relief. In the medium term, however, this situation will result in massive downturns in economic growth in those countries examined. For example, the Congolese government expects economic growth in 2020 to decline by 2.2 percent. For the entire sub-Saharan Africa region, the World Bank forecasts a negative growth of somewhere between - 2.1 percent and - 5.1 percent for 2020.³⁸ This is particularly alarming given the ongoing population growth throughout sub-Saharan Africa, which requires correspondingly high economic growth rates in order to be able to meet the populations' needs. At the same time, the need for finance increases in order to cushion the economic and health impact of the pandemic. Given that most of those countries examined cannot cope with the consequences of the crisis on their own due to their weak economic situation, additional debts and an increased dependence on international support can be expected. Consequently, financially robust external actors, such as China, could exploit this predicament in order to expand their spheres of influence across the African continent. Chinese actors are already proactively approaching African countries -- whether with donations of PPE, which is an effective bait for local media outlets or via the dissemination of a novel Corona narrative in which Beijing has stylized itself as Africa's "helper in its hour of need", all while systematically suppressing any critical assessment of its own handling of the Corona pandemic.

Hour of the Executive

At the same time, it can be observed that political and civil society actors have been increasingly marginalized; they are less and less able to fulfil their watch-dog and control functions. As part of those measures introduced to contain the pandemic, inter alia, the end of the Ivorian parliament's annual recess has been postponed from the end of March for an indefinite period.

This further marginalizes the already weak parliament. Furthermore, the ban on gatherings, as in Mali, complicates the work of political parties and the political opposition. Addressing the electorate, especially in remote regions, has also been made more difficult in the current situation. Meanwhile, In Uganda, private pandemic relief efforts have been prohibited.

All this goes to underline a growing tendency toward an authoritarian accumulation of power in some countries. With such developments, setbacks in the spheres of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law can be expected. The Ivorian president confidently governs the crisis "by decree," while the Ugandan president likes to see himself in the role of the assertive general in his self-declared war against the Corona virus. In the wake of this power accumulation, political discourse has been dominated by governments, all while alternative voices are systematically suppressed, as is clearly evident in Tanzania, amongst others. Furthermore, far-reaching empowerments for the police and military in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and elsewhere, have resulted in cases of excessive use of force and thus have posed a threat to the protection of fundamental human rights. It cannot be ruled out that the elections scheduled for 2020 and 2021 to take place in Tanzania, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire will not take place as planned. While parliamentary elections in Mali were held in April 2020 despite challenging circumstances, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia has already postponed the parliamentary elections scheduled for August 2020 for an indefinite period. In Gambia, Kenya, and South Africa, various local level by-elections have been postponed.³⁹ For the moment, the general public has largely accepted such decisions. It

remains to be seen, however, whether this acceptance will continue, and will depend upon the severity of the impact of the crisis on societies. In those countries with underdeveloped democratic structures, however, there is a risk that the longer the elections are postponed, political participation by the electorate will be permanently prevented and current power configurations will solidify without any democratic legitimation. Furthermore, existing social tensions in such countries could be further fuelled by armed, non-governmental actors such as terrorist or rebel groups. In the countries herein analysed, this risk is notably evident in Mali and DR Congo, where violent outbreaks of conflict cannot be ruled out and an increased international engagement could result therefrom.

Fresh Challenges, New Actors

Temporary Increase of Confidence in Governments

The pandemic has been causing a temporary increase in support for those currently holding the reins of power in some of the countries examined: in Uganda, for instance, the president has benefited from a strengthened identification with the state and government, while in South Africa, President Ramaphosa's approval ratings have increased significantly since the pandemic began. In spite of far-reaching restrictions, their crisis management has received the approval of the population and the governments – temporarily in any case – are benefitting from their profile as effective crisis managers. With the expected rising death toll, however, the tide could turn against governments on account of economic downturns and related side-effects such as increased poverty and food insecurity.

Furthermore, the more dramatic the impact of the crisis, the more likely that social antagonisms in societies characterized by inequality will stand out even more, and the ruling elites will be held responsible for the poor starting position of their respective countries on account of historical mismanagement. Such a development can already be witnessed in South Africa and could cost the ANC, the current governing party, their majority in parliament, while in DR Congo responsibility could be blamed on the previous regime of Joseph Kabila. Elsewhere, however, with consolidated authoritarian structures and growing state repression, any public outcry could be suppressed, at least temporarily.

Windows of Opportunity for the Opposition

In view of the potential loss of confidence in the current governments in those countries examined, it seems opportune for opposition actors to demonstrate their presence during the crisis within the scope of their possibilities and to prepare for potential windows of opportunity due to emerging shifts in power. It cannot be ruled out that a coalition comprised of opposition parties could form the next government following upcoming elections in South Africa due to losses by the ANC, the ruling party. Younger political actors in government parties in particular, but also influential local authorities, who are credited with the will to make changes, could benefit from any such power shifts. For instance, in DR Congo, such an actor could be Moïse Katumbi, former governor of the Katanga region.

Media and Civil Society under Pressure

For the foreseeable future, the situation will remain difficult for civil society actors and media representatives, whose freedom of action, which was restricted in many places even before the pandemic, was further reduced by those in power for fear that they would engage in competing narratives. The situation is particularly difficult in Tanzania, where President Magufuli, ever since taking office in 2015, through his campaign of increasing

media and civil society constraints, has created the optimal conditions to prevent any public criticism his leadership. Similarly, other governments are implementing various measures to prevent critical media coverage of the spread of the virus and countermeasures in their countries. In South Africa, for instance, journalists face up to six months in prison for spreading fake news following the enactment of a new law. In Côte d'Ivoire, two journalists have been fined for critical reporting of Corona cases in prison facilities. In many other countries, too, journalists are having to witness their work being hampered by increasing state intimidation.⁴⁰ In Uganda, the consequence of such intimidation has been that most media have settled into the role as the government's mouthpiece. Moreover, it is problematic that the media in many places fail to cope with the large amount of fake news and conspiracy theories circulating on social media. This is exemplified once again in Tanzania. In the longer term, it will be of critical importance whether restrictions on the scope of action of these actors will be lifted and whether they can have their voices heard again among their respective populations.

The Crisis as a Breeding Ground for Armed Non-state Actors

Conversely, for armed non-governmental actors across the African continent, the current situation presents a welcome opportunity to weaken the governments of their respective countries through targeted attacks, thereby enabling them to expand their spheres of influence. For some time now, violence by terrorist groups has been on the rise in parts of Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Mali, and could further destabilize these countries. Some 70 rebel groups are also active in DR Congo, especially in the east of the country; they, too, could benefit from any weakening of the government. Furthermore, armed groups could take advantage of the fact that international activities to promote stability and security, such as those carried out by MINUSMA, the UN stabilization mission in Mali, have been constrained due the current crisis. Any further destabilization of African countries also fuels the risk of renewed refugee movements toward Europe. In the longer term, any further decrease of already scarce economic prospects, especially for young people, and rising poverty also mean that there is an elevated recruitment potential for terrorist or criminal organizations.

Religious Authorities as Potential Opinion Leaders

Religious authorities, which often enjoy outstanding legitimacy at both local and national levels, differ significantly in their behaviour with regard to governments. The churches in Tanzania have followed the President's instructions: he has called on his people to pray in their fight against the virus. Conversely, heads of religious communities, including in Kenya and Nigeria, initially refused to implement state bans on gatherings. In contrast, in South Africa and Côte d'Ivoire, the governments were able to rally religious communities behind them in order to implement preventive measures. In Kenya, the Catholic Bishops' Conference has called on the government to be transparent about how aid is distributed during the Corona crisis. Religious dignitaries, as morally credible leaders, enjoy a high level of trust amongst the population also – or even particularly – in crisis situations, and it is conceivable that individual religious figures will play a crucial role over the course of potential shifts in power. It is also conceivable that some of these personalities will use their role as opinion leaders in order to support established but also new political actors or groups. For political stability and social peace, it is crucial whether religious authorities will play an integrative role or can be won over to support sectarian narratives that could further deepen existing religious and ethnic lines of conflict.

Influential “Doers” in the Economy

Influential economic actors could also boost their influence in African countries on account of the crisis. Coupled with the support of powerful business associations and overseas connections also to the diaspora population, these actors could position themselves as “doer types” and as counter-models to those regimes plagued by corruption and inefficiency. For instance, some prominent members of the Congolese Federation of Entrepreneurs (FEC); Congo’s influential employers’ organisation, would have the necessary backing for this. At the same time, it can be assumed that large parts of the population attribute the necessary experience and assertiveness to these actors in order to carry out economic reconstruction in the wake of the crisis.

Regional Cooperation Can Be Further Enhanced

The crisis provides an opportunity – not yet seized due to internal discrepancies and fragmentation – for regional organizations in Africa, such as regional economic communities like EAC, ECOWAS, and SADC, and above all the African Union (AU). For instance, the structure of the Africa Task Force for Novel Coronavirus (AFCOR) instigated at the level of the AU could be maintained and expanded as an instrument following the coordination of short-term containment measures in order to also coordinate a long-term approach regarding the necessary reconstruction. At a juncture in which cross-border coordination is more important than ever, these organizations could play a critical role as mediators to prevent setbacks in the integration processes that have started on the continent. Negative influences on relationships, such as those between Kenya and Uganda, are already showing just to what extent they can jeopardise cross-border trade relations. Similarly, with regard to the arduous negotiations and implementation of the already agreed African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the AU’s coordinating role and that of the various regional economic communities remain decisive and should be supported constructively by international partners.

The Corona Crisis as Catalyst for German–African Cooperation?

The present analysis of the impact across the countries examined highlights that far-reaching regressions in development are to be feared. At the same time, it is clear that international support is necessary in order to meet these challenges. This not only refers to the immediate development of health systems and the absorption of the crisis’ social effects such as increasing poverty and food shortages, but also economic development, stabilization efforts, and the promotion of democratic structures. Hence, the current crisis offers the opportunity to take a critical stock of both the existing priorities and partner structures for German cooperation with African countries. The following starting points are drawn from the previous analysis:

Renewed Accents and Priorities for Cooperation

While health has long been a central component of German-African cooperation and Germany’s commitment to global health at a multilateral level is increasing, the pandemic has exacerbated the complex set of problems to be tackled. Against this backdrop, it is critical to consider existing programs from the standpoint of resilience in the future. Other areas of cooperation should also gain in importance as a result of the crisis. This applies, inter alia, to the expansion of social security systems, the eradication of hunger, the safeguarding and creation of employment, and the promotion of basic and vocational training. An adjustment of key issues according to changing framework conditions in the

wake of the pandemic could make a significant contribution to sharpening the thematic focus and stringency of the cooperation.

At the same time, the core concerns of cooperation must not be pushed into the background over the course of this adjustment.

Programs to strengthen fragile states, to support democratic structures, political participation, the rule of law, and freedom of expression continue to be essential in order to create the necessary framework for sustainable development throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Here, Germany should continue to send an important signal for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The political foundations together with their local partner networks, can provide support in this process.

Partnerships Assessment

The current crisis represents a turning point, opening up possibilities to reassess cooperation with existing partners and to orient it coherently along the Federal Government's Africa policy guidelines. The will of partner governments to make democratic reforms and instigate the rule of law should continue to be a key factor in any decisions regarding the continuation and level of cooperation. In addition to the state partners, it is paramount to further expand cooperation with non-state actors such as civil society, the media, religious authorities, universities, and the private sector, in order to strengthen, inter alia, their role as non-state control bodies. These can also assist in counteracting the vanishing of aid funds through government mismanagement and corruption. The current BMZ 2030 reform process also focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of German development cooperation – a requirement that seems more relevant than ever in times of increased need for support for the local population and economy in donor countries.

Expanding Multilateral Cooperation

More so than any other recent challenge, the Corona pandemic has clearly highlighted the need for international cooperation and multilateral formats. At the same time, it confronts these forums with immense challenges when it comes to balancing national interests at a time when even robust economies are struggling to cope with the impact of the crisis. The need for support for developing countries which cannot manage the crisis through their own efforts far exceeds the possibilities of bilateral state cooperation. Cooperation at the UN and the EU level, as well as within the framework of the G20 and other formats is therefore important. Germany can send an important signal for multilateralism on account of its clout in these contexts and should actively participate in further developing these formats in order to strengthen them and to better prepare them for new tasks in the future. Against this backdrop, German cooperation with African countries should also clearly situate itself within a European framework. A strong and united presence of European actors could establish a necessary counterweight to the prevailing Chinese narrative through which the country portrays itself – often successfully – as an equal, while at the same time a more generous and reliable partner for African countries.

It should be noted that in addition to increased rigour in the thematic focus and in selecting partners for bilateral German-African cooperation, the relevance of multilateral cooperation can scarcely be underestimated given the magnitude of the challenges resulting from the pandemic. These considerations should be appropriately reflected in German foreign and developmental policy.

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Dr. Stefanie Brinkel has been a policy advisor in the Sub-Saharan Africa Department of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung since October 2018. She is responsible for Central Africa and Nigeria and oversees the Climate and Energy programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa. She previously worked as a project manager at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's office in Tanzania for almost three and a half years. She studied business administration at the Universities of Halle-Wittenberg and La Réunion and received her doctorate as a KAS scholarship holder for her research on greenhouse gas management. Before she joined the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Dr. Brinkel, inter alia, worked as a guest lecturer at the University of Economics in Bratislava.

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Veronika Ertl is a policy advisor for development policy in the 2030 Agenda Department at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. In this role, she monitors questions concerning German and European development policy and sustainable development in terms of the 2030 Agenda. Prior to her current position, she worked as a research assistant in the KAS regional program "Political Dialogue South Mediterranean" based in Tunis, and in the GIZ program "Cooperation with Arab Donors" in Amman. She studied political science and international public management at the Free University of Berlin, the University of California Los Angeles, and Sciences Po Paris.

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