Interlinkage of terrorism and transnational organized crime in West Africa

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Executive Summary

The nexus between terrorist and transnational organized crime (TOC) networks in West Africa presents one of the most significant security challenges. Both networks undermine governance and the rule of law and cooperate on a multitude of levels in a complex web of mutual beneficial arrangements. Therefore, this nexus presents a mutually enforcing mechanism that supports and accelerates regional destabilization.

This paper argues that the risks emanating from this cooperation are not limited to terrorism financing alone as terrorist groups also use their cooperation with TOC networks to gain access to resources needed for their activities, such as arms and ammunition. Finally, such cooperation also allows terrorist groups to carve out spaces that allow them to control the local population while at the same time provide security for local licit and illicit economic activities. Therefore, this cooperation is in some cases also a tool through which terrorist groups can gain support and acceptance among the local population.

Therefore, tackling this nexus must involve both the regaining of territorial control from terrorist groups by the respective governments as well as the strengthening of governance structures. Both aims should also be attempted concurrently.

This paper presents a range of recommendations for German and European decision-makers that primarily aim to disrupt the entry as well as exit points of the flows of illicit goods of the region. Given the current challenges European and German projects face when cooperating with some of the governments in the region, an emphasis on increasing regional cooperation in West Africa seems advisable.

In particular, the paper suggests strengthening national and regional law enforcement and border control capabilities, especially within the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Increased cooperation with the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), increased support to strengthen the management and control mechanisms for national parks, and intensified exchange mechanisms, such as the West Africa Police Chief Committee (WAPCC) of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), could be contemplated. In addition, German and European decision-makers could encourage and support governments in the region in their efforts to intensify the use of existing regional mechanisms such as the ECOWAS sanctions mechanism, as well as increase the participation of regional states in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Program and INTERPOL's West African Police Information System (WAPIS) as possible priorities.
Introduction

In the last decade, many studies dealing with the link between TOC and terrorist groups have been published. The perception of what the United Nations often calls the “organized crime-terrorism nexus” has greatly evolved over the years. It has indeed long been assumed that terrorist groups were simply involved or benefiting from TOC to finance their activities. Research conducted in the wake of the West’s renewed interest in West African security (mainly after 2012), nonetheless, show that the reality on the ground is more complex and that TOC and terrorist groups have built a complex, moving, and multi-faceted relationship that results from a range of—often contradictory—factors, including ideological inclinations, local cultural and socio-economic conditions, operational needs, and opportunistic behavior. This brief offers a review of existing recent evidence-based research relevant to the issue of TOC-terrorist group synergies. Based on the various broad trends identified in authoritative research reports, the brief seeks to highlight the most recent trends and determinants in TOC-terrorist organizations collaborations in West Africa.

Which terrorist organizations are involved in TOC in West Africa?

- Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), meaning “the group for the support of Islam and Muslims,” is an umbrella organization of various groups aligned with al-Qaeda. Among others, it includes factions from Ansar al-Din, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Mourabitoun, and Katibat Macina. It is active in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

- Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) is the regional branch of ISIS, which began to emerge in 2015-2016. It has been active in Niger, Northern Mali, as well as in Burkina Faso and has a complex relationship with JNIM. Following the founding of ISGS, tensed relations between both Islamist groups have led to violent clashes, but in recent years these two groups tended to collaborate. More recently, clashes between JNIM and ISGS occurred that could indicate a growing competition over resources in their operational areas.1

- Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP), originally a spin-off the Nigerian organization Boko Haram, is mostly active in the Lake Chad Region. Similar to ISGS, it constitutes an official province of the Islamic State (IS), albeit the hierarchy between ISGS and ISWAP is somewhat unclear. ISWAP, as opposed to Boko Haram, is known for its willingness to replace the local state in its provision of basic public services and very systematically administers and levies taxes on territories it controls.

- Hezbollah, is a Shiite Lebanese political party and militant organization, mostly active in the Near/Middle East. It is present in West Africa through economically powerful Lebanese and other diasporas. Hezbollah, as a terrorist organization, is much less active in West Africa than in the Near East, but it still maintains funding and money laundering networks plugged into the gold, drug, and diamond trade in the southern edge of the Sahel, including in countries such as Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, or Sierra Leone.
It should be noted that these groups have distinct ways of interacting with TOC networks based on operational needs, methods, and ideological preferences. Involvement in the drug trade, for instance, significantly differs between JNIM and ISGS, with the former having no ideological obstacles to taking an active part in the drug trade provided that controlled substances are only sold to non-Muslim. ISGS, however, refuses to take a direct part in the drug trade but collects informal taxes (zakat) on drugs passing through the territories it controls. These ideological differences do not apply to all forms of criminal activities, with all terrorist groups having an opportunistic approach when it comes to the arms trade, for instance, with attitudes ranging from benefiting from existing flows to organizing new routes and schemes when opportunities arise.

Terrorist groups that aim to conquer and control territories and local populations in the region, such as JNIM, ISWAP, or ISGS, tend to leverage all economic opportunities in the area they administer. This is in sharp contrast to Hezbollah, which uses the region as one node in its global network and has a more discrete, embedded presence within the economically powerful Lebanese and Near East diaspora of West Africa. Hezbollah tends to focus on illicit activities on which it exerts a strong controls and manages financial circuits that often lead back to Lebanon, as opposed to other groups. Typical examples include the trade in extractives such as diamond (via well-established Lebanese trading networks in Sierra Leone and Liberia), but also, especially since around 2010, the trading in gold via established comptoirs in Conakry and Bamako.

Last, these groups have wide differences in how they interact with local civil societies but also largely informal and often illicit economies. While JNIM, initially born out of local rivalries and frustration over livelihoods, often tries to convince local economic actors that protection and good relations with the group is beneficial for them, ISGS often aims to exert pressure on local actors to ensure its exclusive control over the respective territory.

Why do terrorist organizations get involved in TOC in West Africa?

There are a number of ways in which terrorist organizations active in West Africa synergize with TOC networks in the region. The fact that terrorist organizations rely on the illicit economy to finance their activities does indeed constitute an important part of the picture, but research conducted with herders, pastoralists, the youth, and laymen in zones that see significant activity by militant groups unambiguously show interaction between TOC and terrorist groups go well beyond mere money-making schemes.

Financing

First, and most obviously, jihadi terrorist groups in West Africa are involved in numerous TOC networks because of their funding needs. Beyond ideological differences stated above, terrorist groups in the region engage in numerous types of illicit economies, including, but not limited to, the trafficking of counterfeited goods, fuel, drugs, weapons, cattle, extractives, wildlife trade, goods, and humans, along various and always changing routes depending on areas controlled. The size of each market is extremely difficult to ascertain, not only due to its illicit nature but also due to the constantly evolving situation and opportunistic behavior from these groups. Terrorist groups are heavily engaged in some illicit markets (i.e., drugs, weapons, extractives, cattle), mostly due to the size of these illicit economic sectors, easy access to the illicit operations, or value-add that the illicit goods present. Other illicit activities, such as
the illicit wildlife trade, do not provide stable income streams for terrorist groups,\textsuperscript{11} and therefore their involvement remains extremely limited.

Terrorist groups interact with TOC networks in a wide variety of ways, sometimes as partners and sometimes as competitors (see Governance section below). Terrorist organizations sometimes merely guarantee safe passage of goods and humans to pre-existing TOC networks, with a payment of an informal tax known as zakat (typically 2.5\% of the total value of the merchandise but sometimes up to 10\%),\textsuperscript{12} which can be paid also in kind or with livestock (especially in the case of cattle rustling).\textsuperscript{13} This informal tax is usually accepted by local populations and traffickers due to its religious roots but also due to corrupt practices from security forces (especially in Mali)\textsuperscript{14} that preexisted the arrival of terrorist groups, in which local economic actors (legal, informal, or illicit) had to pay security actors to continue their activities.

In other cases, terrorist groups use mafia-like tactics to financially benefit from organized criminal activities, such as demanding the payment of some sort of \textit{pizzo}\textsuperscript{15}, where economic actors pay for their security to their main source of threat. In Niger, for instance, jihadi terrorist groups have driven away government and private sector-linked security actors guarding gold mining sites in order to impose themselves as security providers of mining sites.\textsuperscript{16} Provision of all types of security services, for instance for the crossing of international borders or the smuggling of goods, is also among the services provided by terrorist groups. One example includes the trafficking of migrants from Mali to Algeria, where cross-border terrorist groups (JNIM, notably) operate and are able to organize safe passage.\textsuperscript{17}

Due to the evolving nature of actual control of these flows, in some West African territories, terrorist groups are seldomly able to control the whole supply chain for illicit goods and tend to specialize in specific tasks, which vary greatly depending on the goods that are trafficked across borders. Diamonds, for instance, are mostly mined in areas that are not controlled by terrorist groups (i.e., Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia), but sources indicate that illicit financial flows are laundered through gold comptoirs in Burkina Faso and Mali, where both terrorist groups and organized crime networks cooperate to mine, sell, and launder gold out of West Africa, often via the United Arab Emirates.\textsuperscript{18}

Finally, in some cases, terrorist groups are able to completely remove and replace illicit actors in territories they control. This can happen for operational reasons (such the slowing down of a smuggling route or a network that requires new ones to be created), or ideological and political ones (see Governance section below). In the Inner Delta River of Mali, for instance, extremist and terrorist groups have been able to create entirely new, unofficial markets where butchers and consumers can procure cattle that have been stolen by terrorist groups in various parts of the country.\textsuperscript{19}

Access to resources

Getting involved in organized crime also allows terrorist groups to access controlled resources that they need to continue their operations. This phenomenon is difficult to fully assess given the limited information available about the management of internal resources and supplies by extremist and terrorist groups in the region. This is nonetheless important to note for two main reasons. First, involvement in TOC by terrorist groups does not necessarily result in access to cash or hard currency nor necessarily proceeds that could be used for the financing requirements of these entities.
Second, complex money laundering schemes often involve barter trade, meaning that access to resources enabled by the involvement in TOC can constitute only one link in much larger and more complex supply chains, which are not fully under control of the respective terrorist group.

The arms trade is the most obvious example of how TOC can be mobilized by terrorist groups to access resources. Recent research suggests that weapons sold to terrorist groups in West Africa very frequently change hands and are being traded in an opportunistic fashion between various self-defense, armed, and extremist as well as terrorist groups, albeit ethnic links likely play a role in facilitating this weapons trade. According to reports and data of the UNODC, although terrorist groups have an active role in the arms trade, they do not seem to generate significant financial gains from it, but rather receive an indirect financial benefit from their use. In addition to the sourcing of weapons, terrorist groups distribute them, sometimes across international borders to their affiliates and partners and sometimes as in-kind donations to communities with which they are trying to develop a relationship or as part of the “protection” that terrorist groups offer.

Terrorist groups also use other TOC networks to access resources that are central to their operational needs. The extractive industry, and especially gold mining, is a case in point as mining pits constitute a key source of explosives and chemicals for terrorist groups. In several operations in 2020-2022, INTERPOL seized hundreds of kilograms of explosives in the custody of violent extremist and terrorist groups that were originally destined for the mining industry. Fuel, often originating from Nigeria, where it is heavily subsidized, is smuggled in large quantities to the North, through Niger to Burkina Faso and Mali, where it is sold to terrorist groups. Terrorist groups do not seem to take an active part in the trade, as the smuggling of fuel is driven by a large number of small-scale, profit-seeking actors and enabled by corrupt customs administrations and local governments, which turn a blind eye to this supply of cheap fuel crucial for local economic activities.

Governance
TOC is also used by terrorist groups to administer and govern territories, an important but often under-considered element of the strategy of terrorist groups, especially JNIM and ISWAP. In contexts where local economies are mostly informal and where informal and illicit economies are not easily distinguished by local populations given the state’s limited resources and high levels of corruption, the use of taxes by terrorist groups is not necessarily seen as oppressive by locals.

Katiba Macena, one of the component groups of JNIM, has for instance pursued a legitimation strategy that is based on replacing the mostly under-performing basic public services. In order to gain acceptance from local populations, Katiba Macena for instance sought to tackle the widespread issue of cattle rustling by providing arbitration and “justice” in daily conflicts. Katiba Macina has also imposed very strict rules on access to pasture and the management of natural resources, which have made cattle rustling marginal in the territories it controls. In exchange for these policing activities, Katiba Macena demands a zakat, often paid in-kind, from all herders. Despite the violence meted out by terrorist groups in what they term “expeditious justice”, this situation is not necessarily source of conflicts with the local population, as Katiba Macena has driven away corrupt officials who were accused of demanding groundless payments from locals herders.

The situation in the gold mining sector is similar. In Burkina Faso, protection provided by armed groups, including in some cases JNIM or other terrorist groups, around mining sites allows the development of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) by locals, which they view as a...
Looking forward: towards a closer interaction between TOC and terrorist organizations?

Research has indeed shown that terrorist organizations tend to prefer low-end collaboration with TOC groups as opposed to symbiotic relationships. This means that the various partnerships between terrorist groups and TOC networks are moving, rapidly evolving, and based on a complex mixture of immediate needs, opportunities, and more long-term considerations. It is therefore likely that, for the near future at least, a clear division of labor and cooperation pattern is unlikely to emerge as opposed to micro-level or sector-specific collaboration. However, since terrorist groups are often involved in several TOC networks and illicit trades in various capacities and to different degrees, these terrorist groups also act as important links in complex supply chains that spread across illicit trades of various commodities.

Terrorist groups provide a wide range of services to TOC networks, including for instance transport, protection, mediation, administration, enforcement, procurement, or retail. Since some of these activities are conducted in order to generate profit, which in turn is used to procure other illicit goods or to conduct illicit activities, sometimes via barter trade (or in-kind zakat), the demarcation between organized crime flows is becoming increasingly fuzzy. The presence of terrorist groups as a link between these illicit flows and criminal ventures links them and therefore makes clear distinctions between these flows increasingly challenging.

This “multi-criminal behavior” is most obvious in what could be considered terrorism-TOC nexus hubs, specific locations where terrorist groups get involved in various types of illicit economies and collaborate with TOC networks. Cities and borders are already known to be hubs of criminal activities. Guinean and Malian gold comptoirs, for instance, or the very porous Nigeria-Niger border, are among the most well-known hubs of interaction between terrorist groups and illicit financial flows. In recent years, however, other types of hubs of the terrorism-TOC nexus have been identified.

Mining sites, for instance, combine several types of illicit activities and are used by terrorist groups for various purposes. Gold mining obviously constitutes a mean of funding for terrorist groups but also allow the laundering of funds obtained via others illicit activities. Mining pits also require security, which is regularly provided by militant, extremist, and terrorist groups. However, these mining sites are also a source of livelihoods for local populations. Therefore, these protection services provided by terrorist groups are also a tool for these groups to generate legitimacy and support from the local population. Furthermore, herders that have become victims of raids on cattle by bandit groups can be attracted by opportunities offered in the mining sector, especially in Burkina Faso and Mali. These flows of migrants, whether internally displaced persons or refugees, also feed into human trafficking flows that revolve around mining sites. For example, it has been reported that migrant smugglers “whitewash” flows of migrants as workers seeking economic opportunities at gold mining sites, especially in the Kidal region.
National parks and protected areas, which have long suffered from corruption and illicit activities, are also becoming hubs of the terrorism-TOC nexus. West African national parks have been dealing with funding shortages for years due to terrorist threats and the COVID-19 pandemic, making local rangers and authorities less efficient in their monitoring of activities within the park. Often located at or near international borders, these parks increasingly constitute hubs for both TOC networks and terrorist groups. Katiba Macina has established a presence at the Boucle du Baoulé National Park, near the Mauritanian border. ISWAP is deeply rooted within the deep forest of Sambisa, near the Cameroonian border while JNIM hides from aerial surveillance in the W National Park of Burkina Faso. These parks have various roles within the TOC-terrorism nexus. As part of a legitimation strategy, terrorist groups sometimes allow locals and organized crime groups access to legally protected resources within the park after having driven away state officials and rangers. While this theoretically allows for increased subsistence poaching and wildlife trafficking, protected areas are often used for the grazing of cattle stolen by terrorist groups or criminal organizations, against zakat (around 3€ per animal in the W National Park). The W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, which links several border national parks in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin, has long been known to be a JNIM stronghold where insurgents demand a fee from smugglers carrying fuel, smuggling humans, weapons, or drugs from coastal states to the North.

The location of these national parks and hubs of the TOC-terrorism nexus is a significant source of concern, as many of them are located on the southern rim of the Sahel and are directly connected to coastal states (see map below). These are indeed likely to be used as bases for southward expansion by terrorist groups, a risk that some observers consider underestimated by the international community.

Source: https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Coutonou-Discussion_eng.pdf
Conclusions and recommendations

The nexus between TOC networks and terrorist groups is multi-faceted, having various functions beyond the mere generation of assets for terrorist groups. The cooperation between terrorist groups and TOC networks not only further erode the already weak governance structures in the region and subverts the rule of law, but can also serve as a tool to legitimize the presence of terrorist groups among the local population as they supplant underperforming government services and provide security at local economic hubs such as mining sites. Furthermore, in addition to regional economic hubs, such as cities, border areas, mining sites, or areas secured by terrorist groups that allow for local economic activities, national parks have developed into important hubs where terrorist groups and TOC networks coalesce and cooperate based on mutually advantageous considerations. Since these national parks are regularly located near national borders, including borders with the coastal states of the region, these parks are at risk of becoming not only staging areas of transnational TOC activities but also key thoroughfares for the southward expansion of terrorist activities in the region.

Finally, an important challenge is that the regional cooperation between terrorist groups and TOC networks not only provides links between various illicit ventures, as terrorist groups are concurrently involved in several of these ventures, but this cooperation also presents a significant link in the transnational flows of illicit goods. This means that targeting this cooperation on a national level will only have a limited impact on the respective flows.

Given these elements, tackling and disrupting the TOC-terrorism nexus in the region will have to be a central element of any stabilization strategy to ensure that the effects of this mutually reinforcing mechanism on the continuing regional destabilization are limited. At the same time, tackling the TOC-terrorism nexus will be unsuccessful if not paralleled by the regaining of territory currently controlled by terrorist groups in the region. Therefore, both aims cannot be separated and should be attempted simultaneously.

Given the severity of the security challenges in the region, the focus of activities of European and German decision-makers should be on disrupting the entry and exit points of the illicit flows of the region. This would involve tackling the growing challenge issue of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (see map below No. 1). This could be done in cooperation with existing activities of the U.S. military. Furthermore, increasing security and controls within the territorial waters and increasing port security of the coastal states of the region (see map below No. 2) should also be priority targets. This should be accompanied by efforts to increase the effectiveness of border controls along the northern borders of the coastal states of the region (see map below No. 3) as well as efforts to increase the security along the southern borders of the countries in the North African region (see map below No. 4).
In order to implement these strategic priorities, European and German decision-makers could consider to following actions:

1.) **Strengthen national governance structures and increase regional cooperation between law enforcement and security authorities**

Regional involvement is currently hampered by political difficulties as several key governments in the region, such as the coup governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and more recently Chad have reduced their cooperation with European stakeholders. Simultaneously, European stakeholders have reduced their involvement in the region due to the lack of political legitimacy of some of the regional governments that gained power through military coups rather than elections. However, increased cooperation with other governments in the region, in particular the coastal states, remains a possibility and is gaining in importance as the region continues to destabilize.

This cooperation could focus on:

a) **Strengthening the capacities as well as the capabilities of local law enforcement and security authorities charged with fighting TOC.** In addition to increased in-country training projects, the transfer of best practices in the fight against TOC via virtual seminars and training course provided by German law enforcement and through the initiation of a special EUROPOL project could be contemplated.

b) Increased cooperation through the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body (FSRB), should be contemplated. This cooperation could focus not only on increasing financial transparency through the provision of beneficial ownership...
information and increased financial inclusion but also on developing stronger know your customer and due diligence standards for mobile banking, which is the primary access point of the population in the area to the financial system. Increasing the effectiveness of the defensive mechanisms within the regional financial system would not only increase the operational costs of money laundering operations but would also generate an increased number of investigative leads for law enforcement charged with disrupting TOC activities.

c) As national parks are at risk of developing into key TOC and terrorism hubs, German and European support to strengthen the governance, security, and control mechanisms for these parks could be contemplated.

d) Since the TOC-terrorism nexus regularly spans national borders, European and German decision-makers could encourage the states within the region, in particular the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea, to increase information sharing between their law enforcement and border control authorities to ensure that flows of illicit goods are detected before they reach areas currently controlled by terrorist groups. This could be achieved through increased support for regional mechanisms such as for example the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO).

2.) Increase cooperation with international and regional security structures to enhance their capacities

To supplement these national capacity building projects, German and European decision-makers could contemplate strengthening and encouraging a more effective use of existing regional and international mechanisms and instruments.

This could include:

a) Encouraging a more effective use of the existing ECOWAS sanctions mechanism. Building on recommendation 6 of the FATF, this would include implementing a regional sanctions list that could target individuals and entities involved both in terrorism as well as in TOC activities. Such a regional list would enable governments to ensure that illicit assets stored within the regional financial system could be frozen and therefore inhibiting their use as well as preventing their transfer out of the region.

b) Several countries in the region are already participating in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Programme. Given the proven effectiveness of this program in increasing the capabilities of port and airport authorities in their fight against illicit goods, German and European decision-makers could encourage those countries in the region that do not yet take part in this program to join.

c) INTERPOL and, in particular, its National Central Bureaus (NCBs) housed within the respective governments play a key role in the fight against TOC globally. Not only do the NCBs have access to all INTERPOL databases but they also allow for the exchange of detailed operational information between law enforcement agencies around the globe. Furthermore, INTERPOL’s Integrated Border Management Task Force provides a range of relevant training modules that increase the effectiveness of border control mechanisms. German and European decision-makers could encourage those governments in the region that have not yet done so to request specific training for their law enforcement and border control authorities. This could be requested via existing regional cooperation mechanisms, such as the INTERPOL WAPIS Programme, which is already funded by the European Union.
ENDNOTES


2 Interview with Mady Ibrahim Kanté, 5th of April 2023.

3 *Idem.*

4 Interview with Marcena Hunter, 5th of April 2023.

5 *Idem.*

6 *Idem.*

7 Interview with Mady Ibrahim Kanté, 5th of April 2023.

8 OHCHR, "Views of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism to the secretary-general's pending report pursuant to unscr 2482 (2019) addressing the issue of linkage between terrorism and organized criminal groups (OCG)". https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-terrorism


14 Interview with Malian expert, April 2023.

15 Pizzo (Italian) is a term communally used to denote payment of protection money to a maifa organization.


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16 Marcena Hunter, „Beyond Blood“, op.cit.


18 Interview with Marcena Hunter, 5th of April 2023.

19 Flore Berger, “locked horns”, op.cit.


23 Idem.

24 Interview with Malian expert, April 2023.

25 Marcena Hunter, „Beyond Blood”, op.cit.

26 UNODC, “Fuel Trafficking in the Sahel Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment — Sahel”,

27 Flore Berger, “locked horns”, op.cit.

28 Flore Berger, “locked horns”, op.cit.

29 Marcena Hunter, „Beyond Blood”, op.cit; Interview with Marcena Hunter, 5th of April 2023.


32 Interview with Marcena Hunter, 5th of April 2023. Interview with Mouhamadou Kane, 6th of April 2023.

33 Marcena Hunter, “Beyond Blood”.


35 Idem.

36 Idem.

37 Interview with Sahel security specialist, 10th of April 2023.


42 https://www.giaba.org/


46 Its most recent use against the coup government in Mali involved freezing of assets of the government in the region, demonstrating its ability to function as an effective mechanism. See for example: Festus Kofi Aubyn, “ECOWAS Sanctions Against Mali Necessary, but May Be Counter-Productive”, International Institute for Peace, 2 February 2023, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/02/ecowas-sanctions-against-mali-necessary-but-may-be-counter-productive/


48 According to UNODC information, these are Benin, Ghana, Senegal and Togo, see: https://www.unodc.org/missions/wggf/documents/00_2020/7_September/CCP_Digital_Brief_FINGOV_September_2020.pdf


50 INTERPOL, „National Central Bureaux (NCBs)“, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Member-countries/National-Central-Bureaux-NCBs#:~:text=NCBs%20are%20at%20the%20heart.intelligence%20to%20assist%20another%20country.


51 INTERPOL, „WAPIS Programme“, https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Capacity-building/WAPIS-Programme
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About the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)
The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (KAS) is a German political foundation that started its international cooperation programs in 1962. The Foundation carries out assignments in the field of governance, parliamentary support and cooperation, rule of law, human rights protection and gender, civil society development, media promotion, decentralization and local democracy promotion in more than 110 countries on four continents. In this regard, KAS functions as a political think tank. KAS places a strong emphasis on dialogue and free exchange of views and ideas, the cornerstone of an open, democratic society.

About the Counter Extremism Project (CEP)
The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) is a nonprofit and non-partisan international policy organization formed to combat the growing threat from extremist ideologies. CEP builds a more moderate and secure society by educating the public, policymakers, the private sector, and civil society actors about the threat of extremism. CEP also formulates programs to sever the financial, recruitment, and material support networks of extremist groups and their leaders. For more information about our activities, please visit counterextremism.com.